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DEFENCE
STUDIES
Special Edition

Behind
Declarations
Civil-Military
Relations in
Central Europe
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....

BU DAPEST 1996

PANEL

5.: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS WITHIN THE

FRAMEWORK OF WESTERN INTEGRATION

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Rudolf JO

12

Civil-Military Relations Within the Framework of Western

Integration: The Hungarian Experience

Last year, an American expert of the subject discussed here, Jeffrey
Simon, published a study on Central European civil-military relation and
NATO extension. In his paper, he enumerated four conditions as being essential for an effective demoeratic control over the military:
- Clear legal-constitutional division of authority between the president
and governrnent (prime minister and defence minister) in their relations
with the armed forces;
- Significant role of Parliament in legislating on defence matters, in
giving budget approval and controlling spendings;
- Government control of the general staffs, and of the military commanders through civilian defence ministries;
- Restoration of military prestige and effective accountability of the
armed forces.
The author ofthe study concluded by saying: "If NATO comes to define
these four conditions as necessary for exercising "effective" demoeratic
control of the military, most Central European states would not meet these
standards. "
1 would like to join Jeff Simon's critical appraisal to a large extent.
However, let me underline three remarks.
First, in the last 1-2 years, an important legal clarification process took
place in the region, especially in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic.
Due to the progress in legislation on defence matters, the legal-constitutional
ambiguity constitutes today a much smaller problem than in the early 1990s.
The focus of the public debates has switched from legal matters to the institutional-organisational ones; from the Law to its implementation to the politicai procedures and attitudes, to the elements of political culture.
Second, when formulating legitimate criticism concerning the Visegjad
group, we should also compare the progress of there countries to the evokitionof other ex-Warsaw Pact countries in this regard. An objective comparison gives an unambiguous advantage to the Visegrad four in many fields,
civil-military relations included.

12 The author is professor atthe G. C. Marshall Center in Germany, Between 1990-1994 he served
as Secretary ofDefence in Hungary.

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Paradoxically, these are the same countries where there has been most controversial public debate around this issue in the last five years. On the one
hand, this reflects a relatively developed capacity to articulate political
problems. On the other, it proves what another expert of the subject, Chris
Donnelly, suggested in a conference: the first step in establishing civilian
control is the realisation that there are problems with civilian control.
Third, even among well-established democracies there is a real dilemma
of how to define effective civilian control, which will serve eventually as
criteria for admission of new members into Western security institutions
The four demoeratic conditions enumerated above are based on the shared
experience of countries belonging to the Euro-Atlantic community. They
constitute an important aspect of Western political culture, which has
evolved over a hundred of years. Beside this common experience, NATO is
composed of a fairly diversified group of countries; each member-state has
its own history, cultural traditions, and singular set of institutions. Based on
this uniqueness, there is not one single solution to the problem of demoeratic
control of the military: the legaI and poIiticaI arrangementsvary
widely. In
such circumstance. it is a real problem to determine what the standards are
and consequently what should be standardised.
No doubt this is a problem, but at the same time. it is also an advantage, as the individual NATO countries can provide a wide variety of experience to their Central and Eastern European partners. Separate Western
models cannot and should not be copied by the new democracies, because
they do not fit in with their historicai and societal realities. which are different. However, everyday practice demonstrates that the wide range of experiences can be usefully studied and taken into consideration when developing
new civil-military relations in Central and Eastern Europe.
Each Western country can make its specific expertise to the states of this
area. for instance:
- Britain's model of how to build astrong civilian-administrative
component in the MOD;
- Frances's legal and political experience of cohabitation, in the sharing
of tasks and authority between the main constitutional actors (the president
and the prime minister [MOD]) in security and defence policy;
- Germany's special institutions that promote the individual rights of the
soldiers, like the
Wehrbeauftragter
(the Parliamentary speaker for soldiers' rights) and
the concept of Innere Fhrung (leadership and civic education in the armed
forces);

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- the experience of Spain and Portugal in the in-depth transformation of

the relationship between MOD and High Command during their transition
to democracy;
- US expertise in military planning, programming and budgeting, including the relationship of the executive and legislative branches in these
important areas;
- the experience of small and medium size countries, like Belgium,
Netherlands, Denmark, but also (former) neutral nations like Austria, Finland of how to harmonise professional efficiency with demoeratic values
when building their national defence. The case of neutral countries which
join ED [end eventually WED] might be also instructive from the point of
view of the harmonisation of security and defence policies with the requirements of integration.
Many of these issues have been included in the bilateral co-operation of
defence ministries of the forrner East and West. They have been also incorporated in the individual Partnership Programs, and the Planning and Review Process co-ordinated by NATO. Several academic institutions, research
centres, foundations are running programs about the subject of civilian control and civil-military relations. In all these programs, one should also welcome the shift in focus from the question 'Democratic control: Why?' to the
question of 'Democratic control: How?'.
This reflects, Jassume, an increased familiarity with and an understanding of fundamental demoeratic concepts and principles on an international
(regional) level. This assumption however has still to be verified. In my
view, the impact of various academic and research programs on the real
political processes (attitudes, conduct, professional abilities); their societal
spill-over effect in Central Europe would also merit a separate review and
scientific investigation in the future.
To conclude, let me raise one more point. The contribution of the previously mentioned academic programs to the strengthening of defence and
strategic communities in the Central European countries. The presence of a
strong non-governmental component within the defence communities is an
important requirement of the development of demoeratic control. The Central European politics desperately needs independent academics, media experts, skilled advisers to political parties capable of participating in public
debate on defence and security polity, presenting alternative ~iews and programmes. Western institutions should focus more on these groups and the
nascent NGOs (foundations, academic workshops,) which are engaged in
security and defence programmes. This is also a way to consolidate demoeratic pluralism in that area.

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