You are on page 1of 938

UNCLASSIFIED // FOUO

BY ORDER OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

1 July 2006
AIR FORCE TACTICS,
TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

COMBAT
FUNDAMENTALS
GUARDIAN ANGEL and
Special Tactics Forces (U)

UNCLASSIFIED // FOUO

3-3.8

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY


OF THE AIR FORCE

AIR FORCE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES,


AND PROCEDURES 3-3.8
1 July 2006
Tactical Doctrine
COMBAT FUNDAMENTALS
GUARDIAN ANGEL and
Special Tactics Forces

NOTICE: AFTTP 3-1 and 3-3 volumes are available on-line via SIPRNET at the following web
site: http://www.nellis.af.smil.mil/units/JASTC/default.htm.
OPR:

AFSOC/DOXT (1Lt Luke Bates)


14 WPS (Capt Ed Espinoza)
Supersedes NA

Certified by: HQ AFSOC/CC


(Lt Gen Michael W. Wooley)
Pages: 936
Distribution: X
(Controlled by USAFWC/DOTW)

PURPOSE: The Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-3 series publications
are the primary aircraft fundamental reference document for the USAF This series provides
considerations to be used in planning and execution for effective mission accomplishment. These
recognized best practices are presented as the foundation of employment and standardization for
all USAF weapons systems.
APPLICATION: This publication applies to all regular, Air Force Reserve, and Air National
Guard personnel. In accordance with AFI 33-360 V1 TTP and TTP(I) publications are not
directive. The tactics, techniques, and procedures in this document are still authoritative;
deviations require sound judgment and careful consideration. In cases where this publication and
AFIs conflict, the applicable AFI will take precedence. The following joint publication
definitions apply:
TacticsThe employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other.
(JP 1-02)
TechniquesNon-prescriptive ways or methods used to perform missions, functions, or
tasks. (JP 1-02)
ProceduresStandard, detailed steps that prescribe how to perform specific tasks.
(JP 1-02)
SCOPE: This manual addresses basic weapon system tasks. AFTTP 3-3 provides information
and guidelines on basic procedures and techniques used for standardization. It presents a solid
foundation on which effective tactics can be executed.
SERIES: The series of AFTTP 3-3 volumes includes the following:
Volume 3

Combat Aircraft FundamentalsA/OA-10

Volume 4

Combat Aircraft FundamentalsF-15A/B/C/D

ii

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


Volume 5

Combat Aircraft FundamentalsF-16C/D

Volume 8

Combat FundamentalsGUARDIAN ANGEL


and Special Tactics Forces

Volume 15

Combat Aircraft FundamentalsAWACS

Volume 17

Combat Aircraft FundamentalsF-15E

Volume 18

Combat Aircraft FundamentalsF-117

Volume 19

Combat Aircraft FundamentalsB-52

Volume 20

Combat Aircraft FundamentalsB-1

Volume 22A

Combat Aircraft FundamentalsKC-10

Volume 22B

Combat Aircraft FundamentalsKC-135

Volume 24

Combat Aircraft FundamentalsHH-60G

Volume 25A

Combat Aircraft FundamentalsC-130

Volume 25B

Combat Aircraft FundamentalsC-130J

Volume 30

Combat Aircraft FundamentalsJSTARS

Volume 31

Combat Aircraft FundamentalsAC-130

Volume 33

Combat Aircraft FundamentalsHC/MC-130

Volume 34

Combat Aircraft FundamentalsMH-53

Volume 35A

Combat Aircraft FundamentalsC-17

Volume 35B

Combat Aircraft FundamentalsC-5

AUTHORS: The following people assisted in writing and preparing this volume:
Maj Scott Shepard

HQ AFSOC/DOXJ

Capt Mike Branston

720 OSS

Capt Brian Gebo

347 OSS/OSKW

Capt Travis Woodworth

AFSOC/DOXF

1Lt Luke Bates

34 WPS (Vol OPR)

1Lt Greg Lowdermilk

308 RQS

CMSgt Tom Phillips

HQ AFSOC/DOXJ

SMSgt Don Allie

131 RQS

SMSgt Mike Barnes

HQ ACC/A3TOP

SMSgt Brain Douglas

HQ AFSOC/DOTW

SMSgt Leif Eiriksson

131 RQS

SMSgt Gecko Herlihy

48 RQS

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

iii

SMSgt Steve Lupenski

123 STS

SMSgt Lee Shaffer

HQ AFSOC/DOV

MSgt Bryan Kasmenn

563 OSS/SERE

MSgt Jerry Nowlin

16 OSS/OSTS

MSgt Jeff Murphy

38 RQS

MSgt John Romspert

212 RQS

TSgt Brady Armistead

720 OSS

TSgt Travis Butikofer

563 OSS/SERE

TSgt Jim Goyet

103 RQS

TSgt Jeff Green

103 RQS

TSgt Alexander Guerrero

58 RQS

TSgt Scotty Howell

720 OSS

TSgt Mike Merritt

CENTAF A3 DOOR

TSgt Don Nickel

720 OSS

TSgt Mike McBee

58 RQS

TSgt Mike Malloy

131 RQS

Tsgt Paul Orse

720 OSS

TSgt Rob Sanders

38 RQS

TSgt Todd Swartz

23 STS

SSgt Dirk Baier

58 RQS

LEAD PRODUCTION TEAM. The following individuals prepared, edited, and published this
volume:
Capt Lisa Kruger

USAFWC/DOTW

Volume Manager

Mr Dale Mitcham

USAFWC/DOTW

Technical Editor

Mr Dave Foote

USAFWC/DOTW

Layout Editor

Mr Mike Davis

USAFWC/DOTW

MM/VI Specialist

DISTRIBUTION: The AFTTP 3-3 series is distributed worldwide to the USAF and the combat
forces of the other US services. These volumes are for official use only (FOUO) and are not
releasable to non-US government agencies or contractors, in any form, without
USAFWC/DOTW approval as coordinated through AFSOC/A-3.

iv

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


Military units may contact USAFWC/DOTW directly to request initial distribution or to
update their requirements. Contact:
USAFWC/DOTW
5490 Pease Drive, Bldg 1114
Nellis AFB NV 89191-6203
DSN: 682-3421
fax: 682-9725
Non-military units (e.g., contractors) may request AFTTP 3-3 volumes from the approving
authority. Contact:
AFSOC/A-3
100 Bartley Street/ Suite 153 West
Hurlburt Field FL
fax: 579-5555
A paper copy of AFTTP 3-3 series publications may be obtained in two ways. Units may
either provide their local base DAPS with a CD-ROM and arrange for printing, or units
may purchase a paper copy of AFTTP 3-3 volumes by contacting:
Defense Automated Printing Service
Attn: Tony Bowker
4349 Duffer Drive, Bldg 625
Nellis AFB, NV 89191
DSN: 682-2871
fax: 682-9256
Cost of the volumes will vary depending on number of pages (size of volume) and method
of shipment requested (FEDEX or regular registered mail). Payment may be made via
IMPAC card, MIPR, or DD Form 282. Responsibility for payment rests with the unit
ordering the paper copy.

MICHAEL W. WOOLEY
Lt General, USAF
Commander, Air Force Special Operations Command

AFTTP 3-1.8, 1 July 2006

iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Paragraph

Page

CHAPTER 1INTRODUCTION
1.1

Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1-1

1.1.1

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1-1

1.1.2

Specifics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1-1

1.2

Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1-2

1.3

Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1-2

1.4

Responsibilities and Discipline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1-2

1.4.1

Commanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1-2

1.4.2

Weapons and Tactics Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1-2

1.4.3

Operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1-2

Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1-2

1.5.1

Distribution X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1-3

1.5.2

Reproduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1-3

Change Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1-3

1.5

1.6

CHAPTER 2MISSION PREPARATION


2.1

General

......................................................

2-1

2.2

Operational Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-1

2.2.1

Predeployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-1

2.2.2

Deployment and Stand-Up Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-13

2.2.3

Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-15

2.2.4

Stand-Down and Redeployment Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-72

2.2.5

Postdeployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-73

Specific PR/RO Planning Guides and Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-74

2.3.1

Mission Commander Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-74

2.3.2

Personnel Recovery Coordination Center Planning . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-74

2.3.3

Battlestaff and Liaison Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-74

Considerations for Immediate Surface Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-87

2.4.1

2-88

2.3

2.4

Opportunity for Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

AFTTP 3-1.8, 1 July 2006

2.5

2.6

2.4.2

Control/Coordination Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-88

2.4.3

Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-88

2.4.4

Recovery Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-89

2.4.5

Assets and Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-89

2.4.6

Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-89

2.4.7

Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-89

2.4.8

Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-89

2.4.9

Extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-89

2.4.10

Mission Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-89

Pararescue Team Leader Specific Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-89

2.5.1

Team Leader Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-90

2.5.2

Receive and Study the Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-90

2.5.3

Plan Use of Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-92

2.5.4

Study Terrain and Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-92

2.5.5

Make Tentative Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-94

2.5.6

Select and Organize the Recovery Team, Weapons, and Equipment

2-95

2.5.7

Issue a Warning Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-96

2.5.8

Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-97

2.5.9

Make Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-98

2.5.10

Complete Detailed Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-98

2.5.11

Issue the Operations Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-105

2.5.12

Briefback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-105

2.5.13

Briefback the Command Releasing Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-105

2.5.14

Supervise (At All Times), Inspect, Rehearse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-105

2.5.15

Include Provisions for Test Firing all Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-105

SERE Specialist Specific Mission Planning Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-105


2.6.1

Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-106

2.6.2

Qualification and Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-106

2.6.3

Concept of Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-106

2.6.4

PR Operational Support Duties at Home Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-106

2.6.5

PR Duties while Deployed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-106

2.6.6

SERE Program Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-106

AFTTP 3-1.8, 1 July 2006

vi

2.6.7

Sere Specialist Assigned to a Unit Other Than the JPRC/PRCC


(i.e., flying unit, joint ground unit, coalition unit, rescue squadron,
or SOF/OGA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-108

2.6.8

Evasion Plan of Action Guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-109

2.6.9

Evasion Plan of Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-110

2.6.10

Isolated Personnel Report (DD Form 1833) Guidance . . . . . . . . . . 2-110

2.6.11

SERE Specific Mission Planning/Execution Tools Terminology . 2-121

CHAPTER 3GENERAL AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS


3.1

Airmanship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-1

3.2

General

......................................................

3-1

3.2.1

Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-1

3.2.2

Crew Coordination/Duties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-1

3.2.3

Aircraft Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-1

3.2.4

Interphone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-1

3.2.5

Common Crew Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-3

3.2.6

Voice Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-3

3.2.7

Disabling of Aircraft Systems and Destruction of Classified . . . . .

3-6

Alternate Loading Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-6

3.3.1

Alternate Loading Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-6

3.3.2

Restraining Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-6

3.4

Aircraft Marshalling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-6

3.5

Aircraft Egress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-6

3.6

Pararescue/CRO Duties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-7

3.6.1

En Route Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-8

3.6.2

Objective Area Threat Assessment and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-8

Vertical Lift Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-8

3.7.1

Pre-Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-8

3.7.2

Pararescue Minimum Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-8

3.7.3

Time Warnings and Alternate Insertion Extraction Preparation . . .

3-9

3.7.4

Vertical Lift Transload Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-9

3.7.5

Combat Search and Rescue Terminal Area Operations . . . . . . . . .

3-9

3.3

3.7

vii

AFTTP 3-1.8, 1 July 2006


3.7.6

Individual/Team Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-9

Fixed-Wing (FW) Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-15

3.8.1

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-15

3.9

Fixed-Wing Airborne Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-16

3.10

Aerial Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-16

3.10.1

Special Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-16

Airland Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-16

3.11.1

Engine Running On-Load/Off-Load . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-16

3.11.2

Combat Loading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-17

3.11.3

Recovery and Transload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-18

3.11.4

Patient Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-18

3.11.5

Forward Arming and Refueling Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-19

Aircraft and Airfield Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-19

3.12.1

Security Element Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-19

3.12.2

Basic Plan for all Fixed-Wing Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3-21

3.8

3.11

3.12

CHAPTER 4INSERTION/EXTRACTION OPERATIONS


4.1

General

......................................................

4-1

4.2

Alternate Loading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-1

4.2.1

Restraining Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-1

4.2.2

Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-1

4.3

Contingencies and Emergency Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-1

4.4

Alternate Insertions and Extractions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-2

4.4.1

Time Calls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-2

4.4.2

Rope Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-2

4.5

AIE Master . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-2

4.6

General Setup and Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-2

4.7

Rope Ladder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-3

4.7.1

Setup and Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-4

4.7.2

Installation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-4

4.7.3

Etrier Assist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-4

AFTTP 3-1.8, 1 July 2006

viii

4.7.4

Caving Ladder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-4

4.7.5

Advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-4

4.7.6

Disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-4

Rappel

......................................................

4-4

4.8.1

Setup and Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-4

4.8.2

Installation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-4

4.8.3

Rope Diameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-5

4.8.4

Deployment Bag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-5

4.8.5

Personal Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-5

4.8.6

Deployment Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-5

4.8.7

Hook Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-6

4.8.8

Rope Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-6

4.8.9

Rope Retrieval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-6

4.8.10

Contingencies and Emergency Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-6

4.8.11

Advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-6

4.8.12

Disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-6

Short Haul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-6

4.9.1

Setup and Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-6

4.9.2

Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-6

4.9.3

Contingencies and Emergency Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-7

4.9.4

Advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-7

4.9.5

Disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-7

Fast Rope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-7

4.10.1

Setup and Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-9

4.10.2

Installation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-9

4.10.3

Time Warnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-9

4.10.4

Unsafe Drift or Premature Lift Off . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-10

4.10.5

Fastroping With Combat Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-10

4.10.6

Night Deployments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-11

4.10.7

NVG Overwater Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-11

4.10.8

Advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-11

4.10.9

Disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-11

4.8

4.9

4.10

ix

AFTTP 3-1.8, 1 July 2006


4.10.10
4.11

4.12

4.13
4.14
4.15

Extractions Using Fast Rope Insertion Extraction System . . . . . .

4-11

Hoist Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-12

4.11.1

Primary Rescue Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-12

4.11.2

Climbing Harness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-12

4.11.3

Forest Penetrator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-12

4.11.4

Rescue Seat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-14

4.11.5

Stokes Litter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-15

4.11.6

Tag Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-15

4.11.7

Rescue Basket . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-17

4.11.8

Rescue Net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-17

4.11.9

Rescue Strop (Horse Collar) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-17

4.11.10

Quick Strop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-19

4.11.11

Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-19

4.11.12

Water Hoist Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-28

4.11.13

Free-Fall Swimmer Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-29

4.11.14

Predeployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-29

4.11.15

Aircraft Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-30

4.11.16

Deployment Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-30

4.11.17

Safety Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-31

Special Patrol Insertion/Extraction System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-31

4.12.1

Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-31

4.12.2

Setup and Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-31

4.12.3

Installation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-32

4.12.4

Land Operating Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-34

Rapid Equipment Delivery System and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-34

4.13.1

REDS Container/Contents Inspection/Storage Requirements . . . .

4-34

Tethered Duck Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-39

4.14.1

Set Up and Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-39

Helicopter Freefall Equipment Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-43

4.15.1

Preparing Raft for Drop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-43

4.15.2

Delivery Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-43

4.15.3

Safety Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-43

AFTTP 3-1.8, 1 July 2006


4.16

4.17

4.18

Kangaroo Duck Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-43

4.16.1

Equipment Installation and Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-44

4.16.2

CRRC Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-44

Soft Duck Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-46

4.17.1

Construction of the Soft Duck and Platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-46

4.17.2

Loading the Soft Duck in the Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-47

4.17.3

Deployment Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-48

4.17.4

De-Rigging the Soft Duck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-48

Vehicle On/Off Loading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-48

4.18.1

Preparation/Infiltration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-48

4.18.2

Preparation/Exfiltration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4-49

CHAPTER 5PARACHUTE OPERATIONS


5.1

5.2

General

......................................................

5-1

5.1.1

Regulatory Guidance Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-1

5.1.2

Recovery Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-1

5.1.3

Operational Risk Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-1

5.1.4

Insertion Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-2

5.1.5

Exit Altitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-2

5.1.6

Drop Zone Elevation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-2

5.1.7

Surface Winds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-2

5.1.8

Drop Zone Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-3

5.1.9

Parachute Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-3

5.1.10

Coordination for Airdrop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-4

5.1.11

Ram Air Static Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-16

5.1.12

Free-Fall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-16

5.1.13

The ML-4 kit or Pararescue Flotation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-34

Land Parachute Deployment Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-46

5.2.1

Prepare to Land.

......................................

5-46

5.2.2

Landing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-46

5.2.3

Equipment Release Procedures

5-46

...........................

xi

AFTTP 3-1.8, 1 July 2006


5.2.4

Delivery Containers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-46

Rescue Jumpmaster Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-54

5.3.1

Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-55

5.3.2

General Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-55

Airdrop Release Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-57

5.4.1

Computed Air Release Point

.............................

5-57

5.4.2

High Altitude Release Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-58

5.4.3

Ground Marking Release System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-58

5.4.4

Verbally Initiated Release System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-58

5.4.5

Wind Streamer Vector Count . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-58

5.4.6

Other Airdrop Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-58

Jumpmaster Directed Drops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-59

5.5.1

Sight Alignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-59

5.5.2

Head Alignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-59

5.5.3

Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-59

5.5.4

Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-59

5.5.5

Jumpmaster Release . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-59

5.5.6

Fixed (Normal) Target Pattern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-59

5.5.7

Moving Target Pattern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-60

5.6

General Jumpmaster Information/Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-62

5.7

Chief, Standardization Certifier/Evaluator (Stan/Eval) Responsibilities .

5-62

5.8

Static Line Aircraft Deployment Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-62

5.8.1

HH-60 Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-63

5.8.2

C-130 Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-64

5.8.3

HC-130 Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-65

Free-Fall Deployment Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-67

5.9.1

C-130 Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-67

5.9.2

H-1 Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-67

5.9.3

H-60 Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-67

5.9.4

Other Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-68

5.9.5

Visual Meteorological Conditions Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-68

5.9.6

Deployment to a Vessel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-68

5.3

5.4

5.5

5.9

AFTTP 3-1.8, 1 July 2006


5.9.7
5.10

5.11

xii

Spotting and Aerial DeliveryCrosswind Procedures . . . . . . . . .

5-69

High Altitude/High Opening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-71

5.10.1

DZ Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-71

5.10.2

Weather . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-71

5.10.3

Altitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-71

Container Ramp Loads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-72

5.11.1

Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-72

5.11.2

Loading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-72

5.11.3

Deploying/Exit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-72

5.11.4

Watercraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-72

CHAPTER 6AERIAL DEPLOYMENT EQUIPMENT


6.1

Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-1

6.2

Types of Airdrops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-1

6.2.1

Low-Velocity Airdrop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-1

6.2.2

High-Velocity Drop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-1

6.2.3

High-Speed/Low-Level Aerial Delivery System . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-1

6.2.4

Free-Fall Airdrops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-1

6.2.5

Cushioning Materials for Aerial Delivery Loads . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-1

Methods of Airdrops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-2

6.3.1

Door Loads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-2

6.3.2

Wing Loads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-2

6.3.3

Gravity-Release Loads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-2

6.3.4

Extraction Loads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-2

6.3.5

External Transport Loads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-2

Cargo Parachutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-2

6.4.1

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-2

6.4.2

Routine Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-2

6.4.3

Parachute Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-3

6.4.4

Poncho Expedient Parachute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-3

6.4.5

Packaging and Deploying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-4

6.3

6.4

xiii

AFTTP 3-1.8, 1 July 2006


6.5

Aerial Delivery Containers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-4

6.6

Aerial Delivery Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-4

6.6.1

A-7A Cargo Sling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-5

6.6.2

A-21 Cargo Bag Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-5

6.6.3

A-22 Cargo Bag Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-5

6.7

Aerial Delivery Operational Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-5

6.8

Aerial Delivery Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-8

6.8.1

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-8

6.8.2

Airdrop Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-9

6.9

Water Equipment Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-9

6.10

Night Equipment Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-9

6.11

Tree Let Down Sling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-9

6.11.1

Rope Length . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-9

6.11.2

Knot Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-9

6.11.3

Remaining Rope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-9

6.11.4

Running Ends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-9

6.12

Crew Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-9

6.13

Surface-Directed Equipment Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-10

6.13.1

Comm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-10

6.13.2

Reference Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-10

6.13.3

Release Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-10

6.13.4

Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-10

6.13.5

Ground Marked Release System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-10

6.13.6

Verbal Initiated Release System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-10

Fuel

......................................................

6-10

6.14.1

One-Gallon Cans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-11

6.14.2

Small Cans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-11

6.14.3

Shipping Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-11

6.14.4

Labelling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-11

6.14.5

Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-11

6.14

AFTTP 3-1.8, 1 July 2006

xiv

CHAPTER 7COMBAT MARKSMANSHIP AND MUNITIONS


7.1

Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7-1

7.2

General

......................................................

7-1

7.3

Safety

......................................................

7-1

7.4

Mindset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7-1

7.5

Moving, Shooting, and Communicating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7-2

7.6

Moving Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7-2

7.7

Terminal Ballistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7-2

7.7.1

Slews and Cavities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7-2

7.7.2

M-16 Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7-3

7.7.3

Better Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7-3

7.7.4

Special Ball . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7-3

7.7.5

Handguns versus Rifles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7-3

Training Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7-5

7.8.1

Marksmanship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7-5

7.8.2

Rifleman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7-5

7.8.3

Advanced Carbine Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7-5

7.8.4

Designated Marksman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7-5

7.8.5

Marksmanship Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7-5

7.8.6

Arms Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7-5

7.8.7

DM Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7-6

7.8.8

Target Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7-6

7.8.9

Long-Range Anti-Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7-6

7.8.10

Range Safety Officer Duties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7-6

7.8.11

Night Shooting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7-9

7.8.12

Sighting in IR Lasers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7-10

7.8.13

Advanced Carbine Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7-10

7.8

CHAPTER 8ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS


8.1

Desert Combat Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-1

8.1.1

8-1

Environmental Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xv

AFTTP 3-1.8, 1 July 2006

8.2

8.3
8.4

8.5

8.6

8.7

8.8

8.1.2

Climate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-1

8.1.3

Life Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-1

8.1.4

Environmental Effects on Equipment and Personnel . . . . . . . . . . .

8-2

8.1.5

Tactical Vehicle in the Desert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-2

8.1.6

Vehicle Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-3

8.1.7

Driving Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-4

8.1.8

Driving Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-4

8.1.9

Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-5

Maritime Combat Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-6

8.2.1

Environmental Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-6

8.2.2

Environmental Effects on Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-19

Jungle Combat Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-21

8.3.1

Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-21

Urban Combat Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-35

8.4.1

Environmental Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-36

8.4.2

Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-36

8.4.3

Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-44

Mountain Combat Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-45

8.5.1

Mountain Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-45

8.5.2

Alpine Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-45

8.5.3

Environmental Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-45

8.5.4

Environmental Effects on Equipment and Personnel . . . . . . . . . . .

8-46

8.5.5

Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-47

Cold Weather Combat Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-48

8.6.1

Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-48

8.6.2

Terrain and Weather . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-48

8.6.3

Environmental Effects on Equipment and Personnel . . . . . . . . . . .

8-51

CBRNE Combat Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-61

8.7.1

NBC Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-61

8.7.2

Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-61

Environmental Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-61

8.8.1

8-61

Urban Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

AFTTP 3-1.8, 1 July 2006

xvi

8.8.2

Desert Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-62

8.8.3

Low Terrain, Temperate Zone Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-62

8.8.4

Mountain Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-62

8.8.5

Jungle Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-63

8.8.6

Cold Weather Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-63

8.8.7

Special Precautions Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-64

8.8.8

Maritime Environments and Riverine Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-65

8.8.9

Atmospheric Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-65

8.8.10

Deployment Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-66

8.8.11

Potential Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8-66

CHAPTER 9MARITIME OPERATIONS


9.1

Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9-1

9.2

Surface Search, Rescue, and Recovery Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9-1

9.2.1

Water Hoist Rescue Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9-1

9.2.2

In-Water Survivor Approaches, Carries, and Releases . . . . . . . . . .

9-5

9.2.3

In-Water Rescue Breathing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9-16

9.2.4

In-Water Cervical and Spinal Stabilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9-18

9.2.5

Uncooperative Survivor in Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9-19

9.2.6

Wet Rock Rescue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9-20

9.2.7

Surf Rescue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9-21

Small Boat Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9-23

9.3.1

Load Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9-23

9.3.2

Equipment Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9-26

9.3.3

Outboard Motor Familiarization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9-28

9.3.4

Boat-Based Search Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9-34

9.3.5

Boat Rescue Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9-42

9.3.6

CRRC Recovery by Large Vessels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9-47

Underwater Search, Rescue, and Recovery Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9-51

9.4.1

Equipment Considerations and Techniques for Adverse Conditions

9-51

9.4.2

Diving Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9-75

9.3

9.4

xvii

AFTTP 3-1.8, 1 July 2006


9.4.3

Communication and Line Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9-78

9.4.4

Search Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9-80

9.4.5

Rescue Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-103

9.4.6

Recovery Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-107

9.4.7

Overhead Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-122

9.4.8

Contaminated Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-122

CHAPTER 10TECHNICAL RESCUE/RECOVERY OPERATIONS


10.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10-1

10.2

Physics Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10-1

10.2.1

Intended Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10-1

10.2.2

Historical Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10-1

10.2.3

Technical Merit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10-1

Safety

......................................................

10-1

10.3.1

Rescuer Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10-1

10.3.2

Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10-1

10.3.3

Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10-1

10.3.4

Technical Rope Rescue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10-1

10.3.5

Rescue Necessities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10-2

10.3.6

Safety Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10-2

10.3.7

New Descriptive Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10-6

10.3.8

Deprecated Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10-6

10.3.9

Rope in Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10-6

10.3.10

Fall Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10-6

10.3.11

Rope Stretch and Rope Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10-6

Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10-7

10.4.1

Operational Risk Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10-7

Control

......................................................

10-8

10.5.1

Individual Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10-8

10.3

10.4
10.5
10.6

Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11
10.6.1

Lowering Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11

AFTTP 3-1.8, 1 July 2006

10.7

10.8

xviii

10.6.2

Raising Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11

10.6.3

Communications Checklists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11

The Science of Rope Rescue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11


10.7.7

The Physics Behind the Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-14

10.7.8

Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-16

10.7.9

Dynamic Force Calculations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-16

10.7.10

Pulley Systems and Mechanical Advantage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-17

10.7.11

Summary of Simple Pulley Systems Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-23

10.7.12

Compound Pulley Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-24

10.7.13

Summary of Compound Pulley System Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-24

10.7.14

Complex Pulley Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-24

10.7.15

Vector Angles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-26

10.7.16

The Tension-Method for Pulley Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-27

10.7.17

Litter Raises and Lowers on Slopes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-33

10.7.18

Ropes for Rescue Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-39

10.7.19

Accessory Cord . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-41

10.7.20

Care and Maintenance of Accessory Cords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-41

10.7.21

Types of Webbing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-41

10.7.22

Pulleys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-42

10.7.23

Carabiners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-42

10.7.24

Descenders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-43

10.7.25

Belaying Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-46

10.7.26

Rigging Plates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-47

10.7.27

Knots and Hitches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-48

10.7.28

Basic and End-of-Rope Knot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-50

10.7.29

Anchor Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-67

10.7.30

Components of a Rescue System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-81

10.7.31

Equipment Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-118

Snow, Ice, and Glacier Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-121


10.8.1

Crevasse Travel and Rescue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-121

10.8.2

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-121

10.8.3

Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-121

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10.9

10.8.4

Glacier Terms: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-121

10.8.5

Avalanche Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-129

10.8.6

Runout Angle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-129

10.8.7

Settling, Settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-129

10.8.8

Slope Cut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-129

10.8.9

Sympathetic Trigger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-129

10.8.10

Terrain Trap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-129

10.8.11

Trigger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-129

10.8.12

Weak Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-130

10.8.13

Whoompf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-130

10.8.14

Wind Loading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-130

10.8.15

Windward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-131

10.8.16

Gearing Up For Travel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-134

10.8.17

Rope Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-136

10.8.18

Tying into the System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-137

10.8.19

Tying in the Sled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-138

10.8.20

Tying in the Back-Pack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-139

10.8.21

Tying in Snow-Shoes and Skis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-140

10.8.22

Traveling Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-140

10.8.23

Rope Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-140

10.8.24

Route Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-140

10.8.25

Crossing Crevasses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-142

Confined Space and Collapsed Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-155


10.9.1

Introduction to Confined Space and Structural Collapse . . . . . . . . 10-155

10.9.2

General Tactical Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-156

10.9.3

Confined Space Rescue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-156

10.9.4

Structural Collapse Rescue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-167

10.9.5

Final Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-190

10.10 Extrication Techniques and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-190


10.10.1

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-190

10.10.2

General Tactical Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-190

10.10.3

Extrication Techniques and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-191

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10.10.4

xx

Extrication Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-198

10.11 Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and Explosives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-198


10.11.1

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-198

10.11.2

Unknown and Reactionary Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-199

10.11.3

Known Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-199

10.11.4

Tactical Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-199

10.11.5

Specific NBC and Explosive Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-200

10.11.6

Decontamination Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-201

10.11.7

NBC Casualty Processing and Handling Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . 10-222

10.11.8

Casualty Decontamination Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-223

10.11.9

Patient Decontamination at a Medical Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-223

10.12 Swift Water Rescue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-231


10.13 Tree Recovery Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-231
10.13.1

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-231

10.13.2

Tree Climbing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-231

10.13.3

Using Tree Climbing Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-231

10.13.4

Recovery of Personnel Suspended in Trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-232

10.14 Land Party Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-234


CHAPTER 11INDIVIDUAL COMBAT SKILLS AND EQUIPMENT
11.1

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11-1

11.2

Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11-1

11.3

Tactical Clothing and Individual Combat Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11-1

11.4

Tactical Clothing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11-1

11.5

Individual Combat Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11-1

11.5.1

Durability and Functionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11-1

11.5.2

Fighting Load . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11-1

11.5.3

Load Bearing Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11-1

11.5.4

Rucksack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11-2

11.5.5

Sleep Gear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11-3

11.5.6

Food and Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11-3

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11.6

11.7

11.8

11.9

11.5.7

Communications Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11-3

11.5.8

Night Vision Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11-4

11.5.9

Influencing Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11-5

11.5.10

Individual Combat Equipment Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11-5

11.5.11

Essential Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11-6

Cover and Concealment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11-6

11.6.1

Artificial and Natural Cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11-6

11.6.2

Natural Concealment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11-6

11.6.3

Individual Concealment Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11-6

Environmental Camouflage, Cover and Concealment Considerations . . .

11-7

11.7.1

Desert Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11-7

11.7.2

Urban Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11-7

11.7.3

Mountain Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11-8

11.7.4

Cold Weather Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11-8

11.7.5

Jungle Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11-9

Fundamentals of Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11-9

11.8.1

General Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-10

11.8.2

The Rush . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-10

Crawling Maneuvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-11


11.9.1

High Crawl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-11

11.9.2

Low Crawl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-11

11.10 Stealth Walking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-12


11.10.1

Body Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-12

11.10.2

Toe First Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-12

11.10.3

Heel First Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-12

11.11 Combat Tracking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-12


11.11.1

Qualities of a Tracker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-13

11.11.2

Tracking Terminology: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-13

11.11.3

Tracking Team Composition and Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-13

11.11.4

Concepts of Tracking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-14

11.11.5

Analyzing Footprints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-15

11.11.6

Weathering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-16

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11.12 Tactical River and Stream Crossing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-18


11.12.1

Fording . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-18

11.12.2

Swimming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-18

11.12.3

Rope Bridges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-18

11.12.4

Inflatable Raft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-18

11.12.5

Improvised Rafts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-18

11.12.6

Vegetation Raft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-19

11.12.7

Boats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-19

11.13 Navigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-19


11.13.1

Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-19

11.13.2

Maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-19

11.13.3

Watches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-19

11.13.4

Lensatic Compass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-19

11.13.5

Silva Compass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-20

11.13.6

Wrist Compass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-20

11.13.7

Altimeter Used as a Compass Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-20

11.13.8

Pace Count . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-21

11.13.9

Six-Point Navigation Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-21

11.13.10 Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-21


11.13.11 Global Positions System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-21
11.13.12 Waypoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-21
11.13.13 GPS Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-22
11.13.14 Transmitting Coordinates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-22
11.14 Navigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-22
11.14.1

Desert Environment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-22

11.14.2

Jungle Environment Navigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-22

11.14.3

Cold Weather Environment Navigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-23

11.14.4

Urban Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-24

11.14.5

Mountain Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-25

11.15 Combatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-26


11.15.1

Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-26

11.15.2

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-26

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CHAPTER 12REINTEGRATION OPERATIONS


12.1

General

......................................................

12-1

12.1.1

Reintegration Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12-1

12.1.2

Planning Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12-1

12.1.3

General Debriefing Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12-6

12.1.4

Combat Rescue Officer/SERE Specialist Responsibilities . . . . . . .

12-7

12.1.5

Reintegration Phases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-10

12.1.6

After-Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-13

ATTACHMENT 1GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING


INFORMATION
A1.1

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A1-1

A1.2

Abbreviations and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A1-2

A1.3

Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A1-19

ATTACHMENT 2REINTEGRATION CHECKLISTS AND DEBRIEFING GUIDE


A2.1

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ATTACHMENT 3DEBRIEFING GUIDE FOR PR OPERATIONS

A2-1

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

xxiv
LIST OF FIGURES
Page

Figure 2.1
Figure 2.2
Figure 2.3
Figure 2.4
Figure 3.1
Figure 4.1
Figure 4.2
Figure 4.3
Figure 4.4
Figure 4.5
Figure 4.6
Figure 4.7
Figure 4.8
Figure 4.9
Figure 4.10
Figure 4.11
Figure 4.12
Figure 4.13
Figure 4.14
Figure 4.15
Figure 4.16
Figure 4.17
Figure 4.18
Figure 4.19
Figure 5.1
Figure 5.2
Figure 5.3
Figure 5.4
Figure 5.5
Figure 5.6
Figure 5.7
Figure 5.8
Figure 5.9
Figure 5.10
Figure 5.11
Figure 5.12
Figure 5.13
Figure 5.14
Figure 5.15
Figure 5.16
Figure 5.17
Figure 5.18

Space Environmental Global Situational Awareness . . . . . . . . . . . . . .


Ionospheric Impacts UHF SATCOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ionospheric Impacts High Frequency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Global Positioning System Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
FARP Refueling Site Layouts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fast Rope Eyesplice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fast Rope Metal Sleeve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Double Rescue Hook Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Forest Penetrator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rescue Seat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stokes Litter with Floatation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rescue Basket . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rescue Strop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Quick Strop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Daisy Chain to Hoist Cable Attachment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rope Strap with Jumar Ascender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Prusik Strap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Foot Placement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
SPIE Rope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Commercial SPIE Harness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cargo Suspension Sling with Type IV Connector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Harness System for Double-Door K-Duck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Optional CRRC Floor Extension for Double-Door K-Duck . . . . . . . .
Soft Duck Platform Configured for H-46 with Internal Roller Rails . .
Descent Versus Weight and Altitude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Negative Pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Static Line Belly Band . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reserve Pin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
M-4 Jump Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Weapons Bag Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Free-Fall M-4/EBR Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Weapons Bag Free Fall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Leg Strap Tension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Free Fall Leg Straps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lowering Line Attachments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Free Fall Lowering Line Attachment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Eagle Jump Bag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Multiple Container Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Static Line Oxygen Donning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Free-Fall Tied Oxygen and Oxygen Hose Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
UDT Vest, the Para-Swimmer Vest, LSP Pararescue Flotation . . . . . .
ML-4 Kit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-41
2-42
2-43
2-44
3-20
4-8
4-9
4-13
4-14
4-15
4-16
4-18
4-18
4-19
4-23
4-24
4-25
4-28
4-32
4-33
4-33
4-45
4-45
4-47
5-14
5-18
5-20
5-21
5-22
5-23
5-24
5-25
5-27
5-28
5-28
5-29
5-30
5-31
5-32
5-33
5-33
5-34

xxv
Figure 5.19
Figure 5.20
Figure 5.21
Figure 5.22
Figure 5.23
Figure 5.24
Figure 5.25
Figure 5.26
Figure 5.27
Figure 5.28
Figure 5.29
Figure 5.30
Figure 5.31
Figure 5.32
Figure 5.33
Figure 7.1
Figure 7.2
Figure 7.3
Figure 7.4
Figure 7.5
Figure 7.6
Figure 7.7
Figure 7.8
Figure 7.9
Figure 7.10
Figure 7.11
Figure 7.12
Figure 7.13
Figure 7.14
Figure 7.15
Figure 7.16
Figure 7.17
Figure 7.18
Figure 7.19
Figure 7.20
Figure 7.21
Figure 7.22
Figure 7.23
Figure 8.1
Figure 8.2
Figure 8.3
Figure 8.4
Figure 8.5
Figure 8.6
Figure 8.7

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


ML-4 Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Configuration Left . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Configuration Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Free-Fall Configuration Left . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Free-Fall Configuration Rear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Static SPUDS Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Static SPUDS Rear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Free-Fall SPUDS Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Free Fall SPUDS Front . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fin Taping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tree Suit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
SOV 3 Lighting Rear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
MC4/T10 Lighting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Parachute Manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Relative Wind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Diagram Combat Triad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Picture of Wound Ballistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
M855 Terminal Performance at Muzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Excellent Terminal Performance at the Muzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Picture Marine Corps DM Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Picture Curb Prone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Picture SBU Prone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Picture Kneeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Picture Double Kneeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Picture Shooting Around Obstacles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Picture Rapid Kneeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Picture 180-Degree Pivot Step 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Picture Indoor Ready . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Picture Locking the Bolt to the Rear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Picture Operating the Charging Handle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Picture Ready Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Picture Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Box Drill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cooper Olympic Shooting Drill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
FBI 360-Degree Movement Drill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
100-Yard EBR Target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Picture .50-Caliber Rifle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ATV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wave Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Types of Breaking Waves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure High and Low Tides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Neap and Spring Tides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tropical Rain Forest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Deciduous Forests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Secondary Jungles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5-35
5-35
5-36
5-37
5-37
5-38
5-38
5-39
5-40
5-41
5-41
5-42
5-42
5-44
5-50
7-2
7-3
7-4
7-4
7-9
7-12
7-13
7-13
7-14
7-14
7-15
7-15
7-16
7-16
7-17
7-17
7-18
7-18
7-19
7-21
7-23
7-26
7-28
8-7
8-9
8-13
8-14
8-22
8-22
8-23

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

xxvi

Figure 8.8
Figure 8.9
Figure 8.10
Figure 8.11
Figure 8.12
Figure 8.13
Figure 8.14
Figure 8.15
Figure 8.16
Figure 8.17
Figure 8.18
Figure 8.19
Figure 8.20
Figure 9.1
Figure 9.2
Figure 9.3
Figure 9.4
Figure 9.5
Figure 9.6
Figure 9.7
Figure 9.8
Figure 9.9
Figure 9.10
Figure 9.11
Figure 9.12
Figure 9.13
Figure 9.14
Figure 9.15
Figure 9.16
Figure 9.17
Figure 9.18
Figure 9.19
Figure 9.20
Figure 9.21
Figure 9.22
Figure 9.23
Figure 9.24
Figure 9.25
Figure 9.26
Figure 9.27
Figure 9.28
Figure 9.29
Figure 9.30
Figure 9.31
Figure 9.32

8-24
8-25
8-25
8-26
8-27
8-27
8-28
8-31
8-37
8-38
8-38
8-40
8-40
9-3
9-6
9-7
9-8
9-10
9-11
9-12
9-14
9-15
9-16
9-27
9-29
9-35
9-36
9-37
9-38
9-39
9-40
9-44
9-48
9-49
9-49
9-52
9-54
9-57
9-58
9-59
9-60
9-61
9-69
9-72
9-73

Mangrove Swamps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Palm Swamps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Savanna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bamboo Forest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rice Paddies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Plantations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Small Farms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Leech Straps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Typical Urban Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
City Core . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Core Periphery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Outlying Industrial Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Urban Battlespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tri-SAR Harness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rescue Stroke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Underwater Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Front Surface Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cross-Chest Carry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Equipment and Collar Tow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Front Head Hold Release . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Front Head Hold Escape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rear Head Hold Release . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rear Head Hold Escape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Navigation Board with Knot Meter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson 30-Horsepower Military Two-Stroke OBM . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Search Planning Work Slate (1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Search Planning Work Slate (2 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Search Object Drift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Expanding Square Search Pattern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sector Search Pattern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Creeping Line Search Pattern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
PIW Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hoisting from CRRC Underway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CRRC Bow Line Attachment Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CRRC CRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Protective Helmet with Divator FFM and Underwater Communications
EXO BRMS FFM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
EGS Bottle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dive Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Contingency Cylinder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hardwired Underwater Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wireless Underwater Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Diving Harness with Cutting Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Line Markings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Contingency Strap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xxvii
Figure 9.33
Figure 9.34
Figure 9.35
Figure 9.36
Figure 9.37
Figure 9.38
Figure 9.39
Figure 9.40
Figure 9.41
Figure 9.42
Figure 9.43
Figure 9.44
Figure 9.45
Figure 9.46
Figure 9.47
Figure 9.48
Figure 9.49
Figure 9.50
Figure 9.51
Figure 9.52
Figure 9.53
Figure 9.54
Figure 9.55
Figure 9.56
Figure 10.1
Figure 10.2
Figure 10.3
Figure 10.4
Figure 10.5
Figure 10.6
Figure 10.7
Figure 10.8
Figure 10.9
Figure 10.10
Figure 10.11
Figure 10.12
Figure 10.13
Figure 10.14
Figure 10.15
Figure 10.16
Figure 10.17
Figure 10.18
Figure 10.19
Figure 10.20
Figure 10.21

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


Farallon MK-VIII DPV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Farallon MK-VIIIS DPV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Current Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Body Sinking in Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Arc Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Walking Shoreline Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hurricane Anchoring System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Running Line Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Direct Overhead Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jack-Stand Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jack-Stand Search Kit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Circle Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Large Area Search #1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Large Area Search #2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Static-Line Platform Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Diver Configured for Helicopter Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Body Recovery System with Lift Bag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mesh Body Bag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Open Bottom Lift Bags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Enclosed Flotation Lift Bags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Boulder Lift Bag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Roundslings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Staged Lift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Contaminated Water Dive Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Typical System Load Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gibbs Ascender on 11mm Rope After Sustaining 2kN Load . . . . . . . .
Spectra Daisy Chains After Sustaining an 80 kg Load Falling 1 Meter
Simple 1:1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Simple 2:1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Simple 2:1 With a Change in Direction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pulley System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ratchet Prusik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Simple Pulley System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Simple Pulley System Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Compound Pulley Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vector Angle and Resultant Loads I (1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vector Angle and Resultant Loads II (2 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tension Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Simple 3:1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Compound 9:1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Complex 3:1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Theoretical Mechanical Advantage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Points of Friction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Force Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Force Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9-74
9-74
9-82
9-83
9-88
9-88
9-90
9-92
9-92
9-94
9-95
9-96
9-98
9-98
9-101
9-107
9-110
9-111
9-113
9-114
9-115
9-116
9-118
9-124
10-4
10-15
10-18
10-19
10-19
10-20
10-21
10-22
10-22
10-23
10-25
10-26
10-27
10-29
10-29
10-30
10-30
10-32
10-32
10-34
10-35

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

xxviii

Figure 10.22
Figure 10.23
Figure 10.24
Figure 10.25
Figure 10.26
Figure 10.27
Figure 10.28
Figure 10.29
Figure 10.30
Figure 10.31
Figure 10.32
Figure 10.33
Figure 10.34
Figure 10.35
Figure 10.36
Figure 10.37
Figure 10.38
Figure 10.39
Figure 10.40
Figure 10.41
Figure 10.42
Figure 10.43
Figure 10.44
Figure 10.45
Figure 10.46
Figure 10.47
Figure 10.48
Figure 10.49
Figure 10.50
Figure 10.51
Figure 10.52
Figure 10.53
Figure 10.54
Figure 10.55
Figure 10.56
Figure 10.57
Figure 10.58
Figure 10.59
Figure 10.60
Figure 10.61
Figure 10.62
Figure 10.63
Figure 10.64
Figure 10.65
Figure 10.66

10-38
10-39
10-40
10-42
10-43
10-44
10-45
10-45
10-46
10-47
10-49
10-50
10-52
10-53
10-54
10-55
10-56
10-57
10-58
10-59
10-60
10-61
10-62
10-63
10-64
10-65
10-66
10-67
10-69
10-70
10-71
10-72
10-73
10-73
10-74
10-75
10-75
10-76
10-77
10-79
10-80
10-80
10-81
10-82
10-83

Leg Tensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ropes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Accessory Cord . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Types of Webbing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pulleys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carabiners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Descenders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Test Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
540 Belay Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rigging Plates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Knot Cartoon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Definition Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Double Fishermans Knot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure Eight Knot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Water Knot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bowline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Round Turn Two Half Hitches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure Eight Retraced . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Butterfly Knot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Directional Figure Eight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bowline-On-a-Bite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Two-Loop Figure Eight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure Eight On a Bight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Middle-of-the-Rope-Prisik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
End of Rope Prusik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bowline-on-a-Coil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Frost Knot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Munter Hitch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wrap Three Pull Two . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Two-Point Distributive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
High Strength Tie Off . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Focal Point Utilizing Snow Anchors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Focal Point Utilizing Three Rock Anchors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Standard Anchor Focal Point for a Mainline Lowering Package . . . . .
Pretensioned Back-Tie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pretensioned Front-Tie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Edge Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Improvised Soft Edge Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
System Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Purcell Prusik System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Knot Bypass Lower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Knot Bypass Raise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Components of a Rescue System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tying of Brake Rack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Edge Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xxix
Figure 10.67
Figure 10.68
Figure 10.69
Figure 10.70
Figure 10.71
Figure 10.72
Figure 10.73
Figure 10.74
Figure 10.75
Figure 10.76
Figure 10.77
Figure 10.78
Figure 10.79
Figure 10.80
Figure 10.81
Figure 10.82
Figure 10.83
Figure 10.84
Figure 10.85
Figure 10.86
Figure 10.87
Figure 10.88
Figure 10.89
Figure 10.90
Figure 10.91
Figure 10.92
Figure 10.93
Figure 10.94
Figure 10.95
Figure 10.96
Figure 10.97
Figure 10.98
Figure 10.99
Figure 10.100
Figure 10.101
Figure 10.102
Figure 10.103
Figure 10.104
Figure 10.105
Figure 10.106
Figure 10.107
Figure 10.108
Figure 10.109

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


Edge Attendant Tie-In . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cliff Rescue Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Effective Rope Management by Edge Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Prusik Minding Pulley in Belay Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Prusik Minding Pulley and Hand Placement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Belay Package Lower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Belay Package Raise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Radium Release Hitch Tying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Completed Load Releasing Hitch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Litter Evacs Litter Evacuation Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Litter Rigging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Interlocking Long-Tail Bowlines and Bowlines with Carabiners
for Harness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Checking Interlocking Long-Tail Bowlines and Attachment Points . .
Attendants Sit/Chest Harness Configuration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mainline Package, Lower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brake Rack SetUp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jigger Set-Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Prusik Sling Holding the Load on a Jigger Pulley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Harness Configuration for Vertical Litter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vertical Litter, Single Attendant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Attendant Prepares to Transition Edge with Vertical Litter . . . . . . . . .
Patient is Secured to Litter Prior to Attendant Moving Into Position . .
Lowering Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lowering Sequence Part II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Horizontal Litter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Haul Team Prepares to Raise the Load While Control Communicates
with the Attendant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pickoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Aztek Set-Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Buddy Rappel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Drooping Highline Utilizing a Kootenay Carriage System . . . . . . . . .
Track Line Rigging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
English Reeve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Norwegian Reeve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Accessory KitIndividual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tubular Nylon Color Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Glacier Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Glacier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Abalation Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Accumulation Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bergschrund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cornice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Couloir . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crevasse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10-83
10-84
10-85
10-87
10-88
10-89
10-89
10-90
10-91
10-91
10-93
10-94
10-95
10-96
10-97
10-97
10-98
10-98
10-100
10-101
10-102
10-103
10-104
10-105
10-105
10-106
10-107
10-109
10-111
10-112
10-113
10-115
10-116
10-119
10-119
10-123
10-124
10-124
10-125
10-125
10-126
10-126
10-127

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


Figure 10.110
Figure 10.111
Figure 10.112
Figure 10.113
Figure 10.114
Figure 10.115
Figure 10.116
Figure 10.117
Figure 10.118
Figure 10.119
Figure 10.120
Figure 10.121
Figure 10.122
Figure 10.123
Figure 10.124
Figure 10.125
Figure 10.126
Figure 10.127
Figure 10.128
Figure 10.129
Figure 10.130
Figure 10.131
Figure 10.132
Figure 10.133
Figure 10.134
Figure 10.135
Figure 10.136
Figure 10.137
Figure 10.138
Figure 10.139
Figure 10.140
Figure 10.141
Figure 10.142
Figure 10.143
Figure 10.144
Figure 10.145
Figure 10.146
Figure 10.147
Figure 10.148
Figure 10.149
Figure 10.150
Figure 10.151
Figure 10.152
Figure 10.153
Figure 10.154

Moraines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hanging Glacier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Snow Covered Crevasse Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Collapsed Snowbridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Avalanche Sequence Part (1 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Avalanche Sequence Part (2 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Avalanche Sequence Part (3 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sit Harness Fit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Traveling with a Sled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Back Pack Set-Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crossing the Crevasse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Step 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Step 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Step 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Step 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Step 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Step 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Step 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Step 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Step 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Step 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vertical Confined Space Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vertical Confined Space Post-Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hand-Held Gas Monitor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Anchor Tripod . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Circular Masonry Saw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gas Powered Saws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crash-Axe Extended . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Miscellaneous Entry Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Remote Microphone-Communications System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Flex-Scope Camera System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Flex-Scope LCD Camera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
T-Shore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vertical Shore Diagonal Brace Joints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Window Frame Brace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mechanical Jack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Trench for Jack 4 x 4 Placement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jack Supporting Cross Beam Members . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Move Concrete Slab On Poles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Move Concrete Slab Over Object (1 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Move Concrete Slab Over Object (2 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Move Concrete Slab Over Object (3 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Concrete Entry 1 (1 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Concrete Entry 1 (2 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Concrete Entry 1 (3 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xxx
10-127
10-128
10-128
10-129
10-131
10-132
10-133
10-134
10-139
10-141
10-143
10-145
10-146
10-147
10-148
10-149
10-150
10-151
10-152
10-153
10-154
10-157
10-157
10-158
10-161
10-164
10-164
10-165
10-166
10-169
10-169
10-170
10-171
10-172
10-173
10-175
10-176
10-177
10-178
10-179
10-180
10-181
10-182
10-183
10-184

xxxi
Figure 10.155
Figure 10.156
Figure 10.157
Figure 10.158
Figure 10.159
Figure 10.160
Figure 10.161
Figure 10.162
Figure 10.163
Figure 10.164
Figure 10.165
Figure 10.166
Figure 10.167
Figure 10.168
Figure 10.169
Figure 10.170
Figure 10.171
Figure 10.172
Figure 10.173
Figure 10.174
Figure 10.175

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


Concrete Entry 2 (1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Concrete Entry 2 (2 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clamp Meters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clamp Meter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Collapsed Structure Kit in Two Bags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Collapsed Structure Kit Bag 1 Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wheeled Equipment Sled with Pull Harness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Contents of Wheeled Equipment Sled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
24-Volt Straight Blade Saw with Bag and Spare Batteries . . . . . . . . .
Hand-Pump Jaws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Powered Jaws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lift Pads with Foot Pump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Small ALICE Rigged with 24 Volt Saw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Small ALICE Rigged with Jaws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Planning Decontamination Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Unsupported One-Lane Washdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thorough DecontaminationEquipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thorough DecontaminationTroop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Expedient Personnel Decontamination System (EPDS) . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cut Out Diagram (1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cut Out Diagram (2 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10-184
10-185
10-186
10-186
10-187
10-188
10-189
10-189
10-192
10-193
10-194
10-194
10-196
10-196
10-202
10-205
10-208
10-208
10-212
10-218
10-219

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

xxxii
LIST OF TABLES
Page

Table 2.1
Table 2.2
Table 2.3
Table 2.4
Table 2.5
Table 2.6
Table 2.7
Table 2.8
Table 2.9
Table 2.10
Table 2.11
Table 2.12
Table 2.13
Table 2.14
Table 2.15
Table 2.16
Table 2.17
Table 2.18
Table 2.19
Table 2.20
Table 2.21
Table 2.22
Table 2.23
Table 2.24
Table 2.25
Table 2.26
Table 2.27
Table 2.28
Table 2.29
Table 2.30
Table 2.31
Table 2.32
Table 2.33
Table 2.34
Table 2.35
Table 2.36
Table 2.37
Table 2.38
Table 2.39
Table 2.40
Table 2.41
Table 2.42

Deployed Support Requirements Checklist (1 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .


Deployed Support Requirements Checklist (2 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Deployed Support Requirements Checklist (3 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Deployed Support Requirements Checklist (4 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Area of Operations Essential Elements of Information (1 of 3) . . . . . . . . .
Area of Operations Essential Elements of Information (2 of 3) . . . . . . . . .
Area of Operations Essential Elements of Information (3 of 3) . . . . . . . . .
Mission Planning Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Request for Information Request Worksheet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Warning Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Warning Order Briefing Format (1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Warning Order Briefing Format (2 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Course of Action Briefing Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Phase Diagram (1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Phase Diagram (2 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Terrain Essential Elements of Information (1 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Terrain Essential Elements of Information (2 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Terrain Essential Elements of Information (3 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Terrain Essential Elements of Information (4 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Weather Essential Elements of Information (1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Weather Essential Elements of Information (2 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Solar/Lunar Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Space Environmental Situation One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Space Environmental Situation Two . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Enemy Force Essential Elements of Information (1 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Enemy Force Essential Elements of Information (2 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Enemy Force Essential Elements of Information (3 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Enemy Force Essential Elements of Information (4 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Friendly Force Information Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Evasion and Recovery Essential Elements of Information (1 of 2) . . . . . .
Evasion and Recovery Essential Elements of Information (2 of 2) . . . . . .
Operational Risk Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Concept of Operations/Briefback Format (1 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Concept of Operations/Briefback Format (2 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Concept of Operations/Briefback Format (3 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Concept of Operations/Briefback Format (4 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Team Leader Brief Format (1 of 6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Team Leader Brief Format (2 of 6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Team Leader Brief Format (3 of 6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Team Leader Brief Format (4 of 6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Team Leader Brief Format (5 of 6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Team Leader Brief Format (6 of 6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-3
2-4
2-5
2-6
2-10
2-11
2-12
2-17
2-21
2-23
2-24
2-25
2-27
2-30
2-31
2-32
2-33
2-34
2-35
2-36
2-37
2-38
2-39
2-40
2-45
2-46
2-47
2-48
2-50
2-53
2-54
2-56
2-58
2-59
2-60
2-61
2-62
2-63
2-64
2-65
2-66
2-67

xxxiii
Table 2.43
Table 2.44
Table 2.45
Table 2.46
Table 2.47
Table 2.48
Table 2.49
Table 2.50
Table 2.51
Table 2.52
Table 2.53
Table 2.54
Table 2.55
Table 2.56
Table 2.57
Table 2.58
Table 2.59
Table 2.60
Table 2.61
Table 2.62
Table 2.63
Table 2.64
Table 2.65
Table 2.66
Table 2.67
Table 2.68
Table 2.69
Table 2.70
Table 2.71
Table 2.72
Table 2.73
Table 3.1
Table 3.2
Table 3.3
Table 3.4
Table 3.5
Table 3.6
Table 3.7
Table 3.8
Table 3.9
Table 3.10
Table 4.1
Table 4.2
Table 4.3

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


Intelligence Debriefing Checklist (1 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Intelligence Debriefing Checklist (2 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Intelligence Debriefing Checklist (3 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Combat Search and Rescue Planning Guide (1 of 9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Combat Search and Rescue Planning Guide (2 of 9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Combat Search and Rescue Planning Guide (3 of 9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Combat Search and Rescue Planning Guide (4 of 9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Combat Search and Rescue Planning Guide (5 of 9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Combat Search and Rescue Planning Guide (6 of 9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Combat Search and Rescue Planning Guide (7 of 9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Combat Search and Rescue Planning Guide (8 of 9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Combat Search and Rescue Planning Guide (9 of 9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
JPRC/PRCC Planning Guide (1 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
JPRC/PRCC Planning Guide (2 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
JPRC/PRCC Planning Guide (3 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Personnel Recovery Reference Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Team Leader Checklist (Example) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
TL Time Schedule (Reverse Planning) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
PJTL Time Schedule (Chronological Planning) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Types of Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Instructions for Filling Out EPAs (1 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Instructions for Filling Out EPAs (2 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Instructions for Filling Out EPAs (3 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sample Aircrew Evasion Plan of Action (1 of 5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sample Aircrew Evasion Plan of Action (2 of 5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sample Aircrew Evasion Plan of Action (3 of 5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sample Aircrew Evasion Plan of Action (4 of 5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sample Ground Team Evasion Plan of Action (1 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sample Ground Team Evasion Plan of Action (2 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sample Ground Evasion Plan of Action (3 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sample Ground Evasion Plan of Action (4 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mission Crew Member Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Common Terminology (1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Common Terminology (2 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Aircraft Egress, Familiarization, and Destruction Briefing Guide . . . . . . .
Pararescue Individual Equipment Requirements (1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pararescue Individual Equipment Requirements (2 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pararescue Team Equipment Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Team Equipment RequirementsLogistics Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Individual Equipment RequirementsWeapons, Munitions, and
Pyrotechnics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Individual Equipment RequirementsVertical Lift Configuration . . . . . .
Chemlight Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Standard and Recommended Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Standard Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-69
2-70
2-71
2-75
2-76
2-77
2-78
2-79
2-80
2-81
2-82
2-83
2-84
2-85
2-86
2-87
2-90
2-93
2-94
2-101
2-111
2-112
2-113
2-114
2-115
2-116
2-117
2-118
2-119
2-120
2-121
3-2
3-4
3-5
3-7
3-10
3-11
3-12
3-13
3-14
3-15
4-3
4-29
4-31

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


Table 4.4
Table 4.5
Table 5.1
Table 5.2
Table 5.3
Table 5.4
Table 5.5
Table 5.6
Table 5.7
Table 5.8
Table 5.9
Table 5.10
Table 5.11
Table 5.12
Table 5.13
Table 5.14
Table 5.15
Table 5.16
Table 5.17
Table 5.18
Table 5.19
Table 5.20
Table 5.21
Table 5.22
Table 5.23
Table 5.24
Table 5.25
Table 6.1
Table 6.2
Table 6.3
Table 6.4
Table 6.5
Table 6.6
Table 7.1
Table 7.2
Table 7.3
Table 7.4
Table 7.5
Table 7.6
Table 8.1
Table 8.2
Table 9.1
Table 9.2
Table 9.3

Heavy REDS Kit Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .


Light REDS Kit Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Exit Altitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Drop Zone Elevation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Surface Wind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Drop Zone Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Briefing Items . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Briefing Items for Target Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Briefings for Operations Above 10,000 Feet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Coordination Duties for Airdrop Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Parachute Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sea Level Fall Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C-130 Personnel Airdrop Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C-141/C-5/C-17 Airdrop Speeds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Opening Delays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Guide to Safely Jump Containers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rear Load Guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DZ Wind Determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Determine Direction and Rate of Travel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wind Cone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tree Entry Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Suggested Water Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Post Water Entry Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Free-Fall Drift Determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Free-Fall Water Entry Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Free-Fall Tree Let Down . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Prebreathing Requirements and Exposure Limits for High-Altitude
Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cargo Parachute Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Aerial Delivery Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Operational Mission Altitudes (1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Operational Mission Altitudes (2 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Operational Airspeeds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Equipment Surface Wind Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Designated Marksman Qualification Course . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Designated Marksman Sustainment Course . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Advanced Carbine Course of Fire (1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Advanced Carbine Course of Fire (2 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
EBR Course of Fire.(1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
EBR Course of Fire (2 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Beaufort Wind Scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Example of Basic Language Translation Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
OBM and CRRC Repair Kit Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Track Spacing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Diver-To-Tender Voice Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xxxiv
4-38
4-39
5-2
5-2
5-3
5-3
5-7
5-10
5-11
5-12
5-13
5-14
5-15
5-16
5-17
5-26
5-30
5-43
5-45
5-46
5-47
5-48
5-49
5-51
5-52
5-53
5-54
6-3
6-4
6-6
6-7
6-8
6-8
7-7
7-8
7-11
7-12
7-24
7-25
8-19
8-42
9-28
9-41
9-78

xxxv
Table 9.4
Table 9.5
Table 9.6
Table 9.7
Table 9.8
Table 10.1
Table 10.2
Table 10.3
Table 10.4
Table 10.5
Table 10.6
Table 10.7
Table 10.8
Table 10.9
Table 10.10
Table 10.11
Table 10.12
Table 10.13
Table 10.14
Table 10.15
Table 10.16
Table 10.17
Table 10.18
Table 10.19
Table 10.20
Table 10.21
Table 12.1
Table 12.2
Table 12.3
Table 12.4
Table 12.5
Table 12.6
Table 12.7
Table A2.1
Table A2.2
Table A2.3
Table A2.4
Table A2.5
Table A2.6
Table A2.7
Table A2.8
Table A2.9
Table A2.10
Table A2.11
Table A2.12

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


Tender-To-Diver Line Pull Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Diver-To-Tender Line Pull Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tether Length Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Staged Lift Equipment Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Basic Underwater Salvage Physics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Units of Measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conversion Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Operational Risk Management Planning Worksheet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Command and Communication for Lowering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Command and Communication for Raising Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Team Leader Briefing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
SI System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Resultant Force (kN) for a Given Slope Angle and Mass . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Summary of Leg Tension Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hardware Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rope Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rope Strength Decrease Due to Knot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Angle Calculations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Types of Belays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
kN Calculations for Number of Haulers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Harness Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Snow and Ice Environment Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Avalance Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Heavy REDS Kit Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Light REDS Kit Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reintegration Kit (1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reintegration Kit (2 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Phase 1 Reintegration Team Contacts (1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Phase 1 Reintegration Team Contacts (2 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reintegration Team Task Organization and Responsibilities (1 of 2) . . . .
Reintegration Team Task Organization and REsponsibilities (2 of 2) . . . .
Nondisclosure Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
JPRC/PRCC Reintegration Checklist (1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
JPRC/PRCC Reintegration Checklist (2 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reintegration Team Chief Checklist (1 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reintegration Team Chief Checklist (2 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reintegration Team Chief Checklist (3 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reintegration Team Chief Checklist (4 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Debriefing Checklist for Reintegration Team Chiefs (1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . .
Debriefing Checklist For Reintegration Team Chiefs (2 of 2) . . . . . . . . . .
DD Form 2810Promise of Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
JPRC CRO C2 Checklist (1 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
JPRC CRO C2 Checklist (2 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
JPRC CRO C2 Checklist (3 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9-79
9-79
9-84
9-117
9-117
10-5
10-5
10-10
10-12
10-13
10-14
10-16
10-36
10-37
10-47
10-48
10-51
10-68
10-85
10-92
10-120
10-122
10-130
10-163
10-197
10-198
12-2
12-3
12-4
12-5
12-8
12-9
12-11
A2-1
A2-2
A2-3
A2-4
A2-5
A2-6
A2-7
A2-8
A2-9
A2-10
A2-11
A2-12

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

xxxvi

Table A2.13
Table A2.14
Table A2.15
Table A2.16
Table A2.17
Table A2.18
Table A3.1
Table A3.2
Table A3.3
Table A3.4
Table A3.5
Table A3.6
Table A3.7
Table A3.8
Table A3.9
Table A3.10
Table A3.11
Table A3.12
Table A3.13
Table A3.14
Table A3.15
Table A3.16
Table A3.17
Table A3.18
Table A3.19
Table A3.20
Table A3.21
Table A3.22
Table A3.23
Table A3.24
Table A3.25
Table A3.26
Table A3.27
Table A3.28
Table A3.29
Table A3.30
Table A3.31
Table A3.32
Table A3.33
Table A3.34
Table A3.35
Table A3.36
Table A3.37
Table A3.38
Table A3.39

A2-13
A2-14
A2-15
A2-16
A2-17
A2-18
A3-2
A3-3
A3-4
A3-5
A3-6
A3-7
A3-8
A3-9
A3-10
A3-11
A3-12
A3-13
A3-14
A3-15
A3-16
A3-17
A3-18
A3-19
A3-20
A3-21
A3-22
A3-23
A3-24
A3-25
A3-26
A3-27
A3-28
A3-29
A3-30
A3-31
A3-32
A3-33
A3-34
A3-35
A3-36
A3-37
A3-38
A3-39
A3-40

JPRC INTEL Checklist (1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .


JPRC INTEL Checklist (2 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
JPRC Legal Counsel Checklist (1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
JPRC Legal Counsel Checklist (2 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
JPRC PAO Checklist (1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
JPRC PAO Checklist (2 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (1 of 62) . . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (2 of 62) . . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (3 of 62) . . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (4 of 62) . . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (5 of 62) . . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (6 of 62) . . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (7 of 62) . . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (8 of 62) . . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (9 of 62) . . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (10 of 62) . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (11 of 62) . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (12of 62) . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (13 of 62) . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (14 of 62) . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (15 of 62) . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (16 of 62) . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (17 of 62) . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (18 of 62) . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (19 of 62) . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (20 of 62) . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (21 of 62) . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (22 of 62) . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (23 of 62) . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (24 of 62) . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (25 of 62) . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (26 of 62) . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (27 of 62) . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (28 of 62) . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (29 of 62) . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (30 of 62) . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (31 of 62) . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (32 of 62) . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (33 of 62) . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (34 of 62) . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (35 of 62) . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (36 of 62) . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (37 of 62) . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (38 of 62) . . . . . . . . . .
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (39 of 62) . . . . . . . . . .

xxxvii
Table A3.40
Table A3.41
Table A3.42
Table A3.43
Table A3.44
Table A3.45
Table A3.46
Table A3.47
Table A3.48
Table A3.49
Table A3.50
Table A3.51
Table A3.52
Table A3.53
Table A3.54
Table A3.55
Table A3.56
Table A3.57
Table A3.58
Table A3.59
Table A3.60
Table A3.61
Table A3.62

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (40 of 62)
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (41 of 62)
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (42 of 62)
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (43 of 62)
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (44 of 62)
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (45 of 62)
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (46 of 62)
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (47 of 62)
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (48 of 62)
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (49 of 62)
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (50 of 62)
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (51 of 62)
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (52 of 62)
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (53 of 62)
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (54 of 62)
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (55 of 62)
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (56 of 62)
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (57 of 62)
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (58 of 62)
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (59 of 62)
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (60 of 62)
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (61 of 62)
Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (62 of 62)

..........
..........
..........
..........
..........
..........
..........
..........
..........
..........
..........
..........
..........
..........
..........
..........
..........
..........
.........
..........
..........
..........
..........

A3-41
A3-42
A3-43
A3-44
A3-45
A3-46
A3-47
A3-48
A3-49
A3-50
A3-51
A3-52
A3-53
A3-54
A3-55
A3-56
A3-57
A3-58
A3-59
A3-60
A3-61
A3-62
A3-63

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

1-1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview. The mission of GUARDIAN ANGEL is the recovery of personnel and sensitive
material. GUARDIAN ANGEL is a human/equipment weapon system that provides airborne and
ground based capability to prosecute each of the five tasks assigned to personnel recovery
operations. The Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3270.01A, dated July 2004,
defines personnel recovery (PR) as the sum of all military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to effect
recovery and return of US military, DoD civilians, and DoD contractor personnel who are isolated
or missing while participating a United States government-sanctioned military activity, or
missions in an uncertain, or hostile environment. AFDD 2-1.6, Personnel Recovery Operations
(PRO), describes the specific tasks performed by Air Force units to recover isolated personnel (IP)
throughout the entire spectrum of conflict. Emerging threats in an asymmetrical battlespace have
identified the requirement to execute five specific tasks of PR: (1) report, (2) locate, (3) support,
(4) recover, and (5) reintegrate. The lead command for USAF PRO, Air Force Special Operations
Command (AFSOC), has expanded the PR mission area to include recovery operations (RO) as
the return of sensitive material.
1.1.1 General. This document is designed to provide the fundamental tactics, techniques and
procedures which form the foundation for combat employment of the GUARDIAN ANGEL
weapon system. GUARDIAN ANGEL is composed of personnel from three specific Air
Force specialties with the core skills and equipment required to provide the warfighting
commander with a full spectrum capability to accomplish PR/RO. The combat rescue officer
(CRO), pararescue (PJ) personnel, and survival, evasion, resistance, escape (SERE) specialists
represents three distinct elements of a weapon system capability. The TTP addressed in this
volume are a baseline for these operators to utilize and improve upon when employed to
conduct personnel recovery and recovery operations.
1.1.1.1 Combat Rescue Officer. These officers lead and command GUARDIAN
ANGEL as direct combatant ground force commanders during tactical mission scenarios
as required during surface operations, high value target recovery, and bilateral operations
with other weapon systems and tactical forces. CROs provide subject matter expertise to
the command and battle staff; performing duties as mission planners and advocates for
pararescue and SERE operations.
1.1.1.2 Pararescue. PJs are the only DoD specialty specifically trained, equipped,
organized, and employed to conduct conventional or unconventional PR operations
(AFPD 16-12, Pararescue) They are the USAF force of choice for assisted evasion and
recovery of isolated personnel.
1.1.1.3 SERE Specialist. SERE Specialists are the only DOD specialty specifically
trained, equipped, organized, and employed to conduct SERE operations for the duration
of their career (AFPD 16-13, Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape). They are the
USAF force of choice to train and support isolated personnel.
1.1.2 Specifics. This volume does not address classified tactics, techniques, or procedures.
Additionally, there are many specific missions not covered in this volume which

1-2

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


GUARDIAN ANGEL may be tasked to perform. These missions have historically included
civil search and rescue (SAR), combat aviation advisors, support to humanitarian relief
operations (HUMRO), noncombatant evacuation orders (NEO), National Aeronautical and
Space Administration (NASA), and the President of the United States (POTUS). For a
thorough discussion of all capabilities, limitations and classified tactics, refer to AFTTP 3-1.8,
Tactical EmploymentGUARDIAN ANGEL and Special Tactics Forces.

1.2 Purpose. This volume is a primary reference document for GUARDIAN ANGEL assets in
the combat air force (CAF) and special operations forces (SOF). It addresses basic flight
requirements and ground operation considerations for planning purposes. When used with other
directives, publications, and formal/continuation training, it provides a solid foundation upon
which effective TTP can be developed to meet the demands of current USAF aerospace roles and
missions. This volume is not directive in nature and provides no authority or sanction to depart
from established procedure or directives. No manual can substitute for common sense and sound
judgement based on actual factors encountered in a given situation. During combat operations, the
mission commander/pararescue team leader will decide the specific tactics and modifications to
be employed.
1.3 Contents. This volume uses the non-standard format identified in AFTTP 3-1.1, General
Planning and Employment Considerations.
1.4 Responsibilities and Discipline. Commanders are responsible for the dissemination of the
information in this manual. Weapons and tactics personnel must have a clear understanding of the
principles and considerations for combat fundamentals of this weapon system. Operators should
be intimately familiar with the tactics, techniques, and procedures addressed in this manual.
Rescue and special operations exist in a dynamic environment, it is impossible to dictate specific
tactics for each and every scenario. Demonstrated proficiency allows basic TTP to be modified
when adjusting for terrain, weather, target, and enemy actions in specific tactical situations.
1.4.1 Commanders. Wing, group, and squadron commanders should continually evaluate
unit/training programs to ensure proficiency levels support combat readiness requirements.
Tactics deficiencies should be identified and reported through the appropriate chain of
command.
1.4.2 Weapons and Tactics Personnel. Unit personnel identified as weapon system experts
should actively manage training of this manual to assigned operators. Questions by
inexperienced as well as seasoned operators should be answered by the expert, rather than left
open to interpretation. Weapons and tactics personnel should be available and fully prepared
to explain the specific application of individual TTP applied in any situation.
1.4.3 Operators. Every operator in the GUARDIAN ANGEL weapon system should
clearly understand the mission and how roles may change during the execution of PR/RO
missions. During combat operations, the mission commander or pararescue team leader
decide the specific tactics and modifications that will be employed.
1.5 Security. This manual is sensitive but unclassified with Distribution X restrictions. It is not
releasable to foreign nationals (including NATO countries) without written authorization under
the provisions of the National Disclosure Policy, DoD Directive 5230.11, Disclosure of Classified

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

1-3

Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations, and AFI 31-401,
Managing the Information Security Program.
1.5.1 Distribution X. Distribution is authorized to DoD and only US DoD contractors to
protect technical or operational data or information from automatic dissemination under the
international exchange program or by other means. This protection covers publications
required solely for official use or strictly for administrative or operational purposes. This
statement may be applied to manuals, pamphlets technical orders, technical reports, and other
publications containing valuable technical or operational data. Date of determination 05
August 2005. Requests for this document shall be referred to USAFWC/DOTW in
coordination with the lead command, AFSOC/DOTW. Distribution restrictions are IAW AFI
61-204, Disseminating Scientific and Technical Information.
1.5.2 Reproduction. Portions of this document may be reproduced to meet command
requirements. Agencies not on the distribution list will not reproduce any portion of this
document without written permission of the office of originUSAFWC/DOTW in
coordination with the lead command, AFSOC/DOTW. Copies of training materials should be
sent to MAJCOM training directorates.
1.6 Change Procedures. Operational experience, training evaluation, and equipment
modernization will dictate changes to this text. The previous TTP should not be disregarded
simply because these TTP have existed for several years. Safety inputs will be incorporated as
soon as possible. Other inputs will be included during the 24-month review cycle. New ideas are
encouraged and should be submitted through respective MAJCOM tactics channels for
coordination/action by the lead command. Tactics improvement proposal (TIP) submissions
should use IMT 4326, IAW AFI 11-260, Tactics Development Program, and AFSOCI 11-207,
AFSOC Tactics Program.

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CHAPTER 2
MISSION PREPARATION

2.1 General. This chapter outlines the operational cycle. It provides GUARDIAN ANGEL
unit-level personnel with a step-by-step guide for the mission preparation from predeployment
through postdeployment and provides information for component level, Air and Space Operations
Center (AOC), or other weapons system planners seeking information regarding planning
considerations for GUARDIAN ANGEL.
2.2 Operational Cycle. The operational cycle construct begins with the predeployment period
and concludes with postdeployment actions. Each phase of this cycle contains actions that are
taken to ensure effective tactical mission planning and employment. These phases are as follows:
Predeployment.
Deployment and stand-up.
Employment.
Stand-down and redeployment.
Postdeployment.
2.2.1 Predeployment. The predeployment phase begins with initial notification and
includes a number of predeployment actions by unit sections and individuals. This phase ends
when the main body departs for the area of operations (AO). Although units are structured to
internally support tactical operations, they do require resources and support for sustained
operations. Required support includes intelligence resources, communications infrastructure,
and base operating support (BOS) functions. Effective planning in the predeployment phase
will set the conditions for the successful tactical employment of forces.
2.2.1.1 Initial Notification. Initial notification is provided through the chain of command
in the form of a planning order (PLANORD), operations order (OPORD), other official
tasking, or notification through official channels of likely/potential tasking. The tasking
may or may not be linked to a theater operations plan (OPLAN) or concept plan
(CONPLAN).
2.2.1.1.1 Initial Briefing. A briefing should be conducted as soon as possible after
initial notification. Carefully weigh operational security (OPSEC) and
communications security (COMSEC) considerations when determining the
appropriate unit personnel for the initial briefing. At a minimum the unit commander,
director of operations, superintendent of operations, team officer-in-charge
(OIC)/noncommissioned officer-in-charge (NCOIC), SERE specialist, intelligence
chief, logistics chief, and necessary section chiefs should be included. This forum
should act as the vehicle to establish an initial common understanding of the mission
task and the projected operating environment. Ultimately, the commander uses the
briefing to disseminate preliminary information, receive initial input from key staff
members, and establish direction and guidance for subsequent actions in the

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predeployment and deployment phases. Following the initial brief, section chiefs
begin preliminary planning for deployment.
2.2.1.1.2 Operational Analysis. Unit leadership should analyze the deployment
tasking and/or all information pertaining to the tasking or potential tasking. Give
special consideration to geographic location, projected duration of the deployment,
potential mission sets, and BOS provisions and requirements. Established OPLANs
identify the unit type codes (UTC), geographic area, and main operating base (MOB),
or forward operating location (FOL) that the unit will initially deploy. Contingency
tasking promulgated by OPLANs and/or OPORDs should also specify required UTCs.
The type and quantity of required organic logistical support is determined by UTC
tasking and proper special operations readiness and training standards (SORTS)
reporting. Unit commanders should implement appropriate OPSEC/COMSEC
measures and consider requirements for an operational deception (OPDEC) plan and
implement as necessary.
2.2.1.2 Predeployment Actions. Following operational analysis, each unit section has a
number of responsibilities during the predeployment phase to ensure that the unit arrives in
the AO prepared for mission employment.
2.2.1.2.1 Operations. Operations sections along with input from team OIC/NCOIC
and section chiefs will determine specific names, numbers, and qualifications of
deploying personnel. They will also assign tasks to support the preparation for the
deployment. Analyze individual UTCs and tailor appropriately to meet required
taskings. NOTE: GUARDIAN ANGEL should consider packing out the full
compliment of UTCs across a broad spectrum of PR/RO capability to meet all
expected and unexpected theater commander taskings. Plan for sustained operations.
Personnel augmentation and equipment backfill are frequently required to support
sustained efforts. Identify these shortfalls. Be prepared to tailor UTCs to support
multiple operating locations. Additional operations tasks include but are not limited to
the following.
2.2.1.2.1.1 Identify Command Relationships. Closely scrutinize the OPLAN or
OPORD task organization, chain of command, and operational control
(OPCON)/tactical control (TACON) relationships. Determine the specifics of
these relationships to include who has responsibilities for command, control, and
support requirements. Request clarification as required.
2.2.1.2.1.2 Identify Liaison Requirements. Determine the number and
placement of liaison officers. Ensure that liaison officers are placed at the critical
supported components, agencies, and their subordinate elements as required to
most effectively facilitate mission success. Manning constraints will likely force
tough decisions regarding placement of liaison officers.
2.2.1.2.1.3 Identify Support Requirements. Identify all support requirements
for deployment and deployed operations then submit a statement of requirements
(SOR). Required support functions/facilities include, but are not limited, to
security, workspace, storage (e.g., munitions, HAZMAT, and POL), billeting,
messing, medical, intelligence, weather, communications (e.g., computer and

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secure comm), supply, vehicles/transportation, contracting, and training areas (e.g.,


weapons ranges). Include all of the following items in the SOR. (See Table 2.1
through Table 2.4, Deployed Support Requirements Checklist.)
Table 2.1 Deployed Support Requirements Checklist (1 of 4).
General Instructions.
- Base/Post chain of command up to unified/specified command level.
- Local mailing address.
Vehicle Operations Support.
- Vehicle availability.
- Driver availability.
- Driver requirements for government vehicles.
- Shuttle bus service.
- Flight line transportation.
- On base support.
- Commercial car and truck rental.
- Commercial truck transport service.
Supply.
- Supply operations.
- Storage facilities.
- Material handling equipment (MHE).
- Host nation support (HNS).
- Limiting factors.
- Fuels support.
Billeting Facilities.
- Tent availability.
- Can hangar be converted into billeting area?
- Can warehouse be converted into billeting area?
- Can gymnasium be converted into billeting area?
- Cots availability.
- Portable latrines availability.
- Laundry facilities.
- Showers facilities.
- Who provides above services (military/local civilian)?

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Table 2.2 Deployed Support Requirements Checklist (2 of 4).


General Support Information.
- Messing facilities.
- Electrical/power sources.
- Office space facilities.
- Briefing/planning areas.
- Is a self-service center availability? How are accounts handled?
- What is the location and what are the procedures to draw?
- Parachute/airdrop rigger facilities.
- Finance.
Medical.
- Hospital/dispensary.
- Inoculations required.
- Ambulance.
- Air evacuation capability
- Isolation ward (or area slotted for creation of isolated).
- Medical specialists available in hospital.
- What types of medicine are in short supply/not generally available?
- Units of blood normally on hand.
- Availability and power requirements of mobile drug/blood refrigeration.
Storage Units.
- Size.
- Climate control.
Communications.
- Description/drawing.
- Recommended radio beacon.
- Telephone.
- Coax.
- Additional considerations.
- JOC area.
- Additional information.
- Neat to have items.

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Table 2.3 Deployed Support Requirements Checklist (3 of 4).
Contracting.
- US military base information.
- Non-US military base information.
- Quarters.
- Food service.
- Transportation.
- Water.
- Laundry service.
- Potential contract services.
- Limiting factors.
Command Post.
- Building availability to support 50- to 60-person CP.
- Office space.
- Planning/briefing areas.
- Communications availability.
- Operations center availability.
- Audio/visual aids.
- Availability of isolated building.
- Physical security.
- Availability of military guards.
- Classified storage capability.
- COMSEC material availability (e.g., AKAs).
- Secure phones available (number/type).
Training.
- Ground maneuver areas.
- Ground firing/demo ranges.
- Zones.
- Air-to-ground firing ranges.

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Table 2.4 Deployed Support Requirements Checklist (4 of 4).


Intelligence/Security.
- SSO facilities.
- Classified storage capability
- Security forces availability.
- Base/Post perimeter security.
- Local press access/procedures.
- Availability of debugging equipment.
- Secure working space availability.
- GENSER/SSO communications availability.
- Secure telephone availability.
- Availability of local intel support apparatus
- Availability of destruction facilities (how and where)?
- Local OPSEC considerations (HUMIT, SIGINT, or PHOTINT).
- Type local vehicles used.
- Photo labs of photo reproduction capability/availability.
- Training aids supply office capability/availability.
- Availability of field safes and additional/high security locks.
Weather.
- Coverage/forecasting available.
- Hours of operation/observation.
- Pilot to metro radio frequency (if available).
- Other communications available.
- Weather radar available.
- Other equipment available (wing or ceiling).
- Computer flight planning availability.
2.2.1.2.1.3.1 En Route Security. Deploying elements may require en route
security for weapons, ammunition, classified, and narcotics, if they will be
making stops and changing aircraft.
2.2.1.2.1.3.2 Workspace and Staging Areas. Units will require space to set
up an operations center, planning area, support area, and team staging area.
Buildings and/or hangars are preferred but units should be prepared to use
tents.

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2.2.1.2.1.3.3 Storage. If storage areas are available, units will require secure
storage for weapons, ammunition, medical supplies, and classified material.
They will need parking space for tactical vehicles and boats, as well as storage
space for additional equipment. They will also require climate controlled
storage space for parachutes and medical supplies.
2.2.1.2.1.3.4 Billeting. If hard billets or tents are not provided, units will
require space to set up tents and living areas.
2.2.1.2.1.3.5 Intelligence. Specific intelligence support requirements vary
with respective unit capabilities. Individual organizations should refer to unit
designed operational capability (DOC) statements, established UTCs, SOPs,
and commanders guidance for unique requirements. At minimum, planning
personnel, ADVON, and/or lodgement teams will consider the following:
Adequate space for adequate intelligence personnel, equipment, and
informational displays.
Proximity to key operations centers/functions and plans personnel.
Dedicated organic provisional secure and nonsecure communications
platforms capable of voice and data transfer such as international maritime
satellite (INMARSAT) terminals.
Dedicated organic UNCLASSIFIED and SECRET/COLLATERAL
automated information systems (AIS).
Convenient and uninterrupted access to TOP SECRET/SCI, and
applicable special category (SPECAT)/special access program (SAP) AIS
and information channels.
Ability to monitor applicable radio communications suites and field data
transfer mediums such as high performance waveform (HPW) terminals.
Access to near-real-time data (NRTD) feeds/displays and combined
operational picture (COP) displays.
Adequate climate controls to operate and maintain automated systems.
Sufficient external/internal power and wiring configuration to maintain
uninterrupted operations.
Organic secure telephone unit (STU-III) connectivity.
Ready integration with a multi-discipline analytical capability.
Adequate facilities to implement appropriate security measures required
in multi-national operating environments.
Ready access to satellite television for open source media coverage.
Secured internet protocol router network (SIPRNET)/mIRC chat
connectivity

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2.2.1.2.1.3.6 Weather. Unit planners will need access to weather data and
products regarding the AO. Identify specific requirements based on anticipated
mission sets.
2.2.1.2.1.3.7 Communications. Identify communications requirements as
soon as possible, submit requests through appropriate channels, and track
requests. Consider frequencies, call signs, satellite channels, landlines, secure
phones, cell phones, computers, software, secure/unsecure internet lines,
e-mail/website addresses, chat room addresses, data transmission addresses,
HPW addresses, and demand assignment multiple access (DAMA) addresses.
Ensure unit placement on appropriate distribution lists (e.g., chat rooms, data
nets, or voice nets). Request special instruction (SPINS) if available. Request
navaid frequencies/channels.
2.2.1.2.1.3.8 Vehicles/Transportation. Unit personnel will require vehicles
for transportation around the operating location. Units will also need vehicles
to move operator equipment to and from training areas, and flight-line.
Consider four-wheel drive requirements.
2.2.1.2.1.3.9 Training Areas and Weapons Ranges. Unit operators will
need a small arms range to zero/test fire weapons as well as training areas to
complete proficiency, special, and area familiarization training.
2.2.1.2.1.4 Prepare the Advanced Echelon Party. Form and deploy an
advanced echelon (ADVON) team as soon as feasible in the predeployment
process. Team composition will vary but a representative from operations,
intelligence, logistics, communications, SERE, each operator Air Force Speciality
Code (AFSC), and a OIC is recommended. The ADVON team assumes
responsibility for initial preparations at forward operating and staging bases and
represents the unit commander during interaction with other agencies. ADVON
teams will obtain ground truth regarding the command relationships that were
establish prior to departure, liaison requirements, support requirements (SOR), and
any other applicable issues identified in the predeployment planning process. The
ADVON team will also begin preliminary mission planning with
supporting/supported force elements in preparation for main body arrival and
mission taskings. The ADVON element will establish communications with the
main body force immediately following arrival at the forward location and pass an
initial situation report (SITREP) relaying ADVON mission status. Both the
ADVON element and main body force will implement aggressive, daily
cross-communication measures to coordinate subsequent deployment requirements
and actions until forces re-consolidate at the forward operating locations.
Recommend ADVON carry a SATPHONE for communication in austere locations
2.2.1.2.2 Recovery Team. Team leadership will work closely with operations to
determine team composition for deployment. Manning requirements should be
weighed against the numbers of available, current and qualified personnel. Consider
physical/mental status, training currency, time on station, retainability, and potential
for augmentation when determining team composition. Immediately identify

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shortfalls and requirements for waivers and/or augmentation and forward this
information to operations for coordination and action. Formulate a packing list of
individual and team equipment and distribute to team members. Team members will
begin preparation of individual gear and team equipment. Team leaders will
coordinate directly with intelligence personnel immediately following initial
notification to address estimated battlefield impact on friendly force operations; threat
force considerations; and survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE)
requirements.
2.2.1.2.3 Support. Unit support sections, particularly logistics, will work closely
with operations to prepare necessary equipment for deployment. Operations and team
sections will specify the required equipment and support. Support sections identify
internal unit shortfalls and forward the information to operations. Consider anticipated
deployment location, environmental conditions, and duration of deployment.
2.2.1.2.3.1 Intelligence. Upon notification of potential or impending deployment,
unit intelligence operations will begin the intelligence preparation of the
battlespace (IPB) process. The IPB process gives consideration to staging bases,
insertion and exfiltration routes, and forward operating locations within the
targeted area of interest (AI) and area of operations (AO). Intelligence sections
will execute the IPB process in close coordination with the unit commander and
director of operations (DO) to ensure appropriate focus and scope and to facilitate
the timely dissemination of pertinent intelligence information. The IPB process is
continuous in nature and spans all phases of operations. Refer to FM 34-130,
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, for detailed information on the IPB
process. Familiarity with a given area must take all factors into consideration to
include aspects in the social, economic, and political fields. (See Table 2.5 through
Table 2.7, Area of Operations Essential Elements of Information.) Each must be
weighed as military consideration. (For a detailed listing of factors to consider, see
AFTTP 3-1.8, Chapter 6, Intelligence Support to GUARDIAN ANGEL Forces.)
2.2.1.2.3.2 Admin/Commanders Support Staff. Unit section chiefs and
commanders support staffs should identify pending or required administrative
actions on deploying personnel. Project for suspense for the duration of the
deployment.

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Table 2.5 Area of Operations Essential Elements of Information (1 of 3).


Cultural Features and Considerations.
Population Centers.
- Major population centers in the region.
- Local population centers within 20 NM of the target.
- Individual buildings/dwellings that may influence the mission.
Language.
- Predominant language.
- Other dialects in use.
Social Traits and Conditions.
- Taboos.
- Customs.
- Holidays.
- Major social divisions (e.g., familial and tribal).
- Health and medical standards.
-- Common diseases.
-- Standards of public health.
-- Type of medical facilities.
-- Attitude towards western medicine.
-- Sewage disposal.
-- Ordinary diet (e.g., how prepared and seasonal changes).
Ethnic Composition of the Target Region.
- Majority groups in the target region.
- Minority groups.
-- Location or concentration.
-- Opposition to majority or political regime.
-- Basic for discontent and motivation for change.
-- External or foreign ties of significance.
- Means of identification of ethnic groups (e.g, clothing, dialect, race, habits, and physical
characteristics).

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Table 2.6 Area of Operations Essential Elements of Information (2 of 3).
Religious Information.
- Dominant sects in the operating area.
- Minority sects in the operating area.
- Basic tenets of the dominant group and influence on the population.
- Religious taboos.
Leadership of Religious Groups.
- Type of.
- Identify of leaders.
- Location of headquarters.
- Personal security (e.g., guards).
- What religious groups support dissident groups.
Type and Stability of the Government.
- Type of government.
-- Identity of leaders which may reasonably be expected to influence the mission.
-- Location of controlling body and individuals.
-- Political parties of factions.
-- Controls and restrictions imposed by the government (e.g., documentation, travel
restrictions, censorships, rationing, and curfew).
- Stability of the government.
-- Internal dissidence and allegiances.
-- Susceptibility to subversion.
-- Vulnerable or sympathetic groups.
Population Control Measures.
- ID cards.
- Work papers.
- Passports.
- Food/fuel ration cards.
- Checkpoints/location.
- Informant system.
- Curfew or martial law restrictions.
- Police units.

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Table 2.7 Area of Operations Essential Elements of Information (3 of 3).


Economics.
- Monetary system (e.g., currency denominations in circulation).
- Barter or trade system.
-- Primary barter or trade items.
-- Mechanism for barter or trade.
- Primary means of support for the target area.
- Industrial/agricultural emphasis in target area.
- Extent and effect of black market operations.
-- Materials in demand and available.
-- Controlling factions.
Local Dissidents and Guerillas.
- Dissidents.
-- General active or passive potential.
-- Nature of the dissident movement.
-- Attitudes toward the ruling regime, US, other dissident factions, and political ideologies.
-- Level of external support.
- Guerillas.
-- Disposition, strength, and composition.
-- Organization, armament, and equipment.
-- Status of training (morale).
-- Cooperation and coordination with other groups.
-- Attitude towards the enemy, US, and the civilian population.
-- Caliber of leadership.
-- Reliability of the guerilla force.
-- Health of the guerillas.
-- Possibility of contacts (e.g., location and method).
-- Access to enemy supplies.
2.2.1.2.3.3 Unit Deployment Monitor. Unit deployment monitor (UDM) and
designated assistants should plan and organize the systematic pack-out,
transportation, and marshaling of personnel and equipment for deployment.
Organize a unit mobility line to determine shortfalls. Identify individuals who

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require specific training prior to deployment and schedule accordingly. Provide


inputs through appropriate channels for UTC load plans. Ensure completion of
declarations for hazardous materials (HAZMAT) and coordinate for joint air
inspection (JAI) times and locations.
2.2.2 Deployment and Stand-Up Planning. This phase of the mission planning process
begins when the main body departs from homestation and ends when the unit is prepared to
receive and execute mission taskings.
2.2.2.1 Main Body Departure. Ensure accurate tracking of deployment line numbers,
load plans, and show times. Plan for transportation for personnel and equipment to the
departure location. Conduct a final check of required personal deployment items. Main
body senior leadership should carry a SATPHONE for connectivity with home station and
ADVON party
2.2.2.2 Main Body Arrival and Reception. ADVON representatives should coordinate
with the arriving main body to assist in the download and beddown of equipment and
personnel. Provide transportation for the download of aircraft and movement of personnel
and equipment. The senior ADVON representative will informally brief the senior
representative with the main body on special interest or critical information.
2.2.2.3 Security Measures. Physical security of equipment, munitions, classified
material, controlled medications, and high-value items must be maintained until they can
be secured in the designated facilities. All deployed personnel will be immediately briefed
on any threat situations ranging from the pilferage of equipment to anticipated hostile
actions, including OPSEC and COMSEC requirements. In situations where a low profile
should be maintained, all personnel will be apprised of uniform requirements, the removal
of identifying patches or distinctive apparel, and travel restrictions within and around the
units operations area. Consider modified grooming standards.
2.2.2.4 Establish Section Facilities. After completion of personnel/equipment
movement and initial assessment of the situation, the section facilities will be established
and arranged for daily operations. Deployed personnel will be assigned to functional areas.
2.2.2.5 Establish Communications. Establish communications with rear, higher, and
lateral organizations as required. Build and/or update lists of critical phone numbers,
e-mail addresses, websites, and chat rooms.
2.2.2.6 Receive ADVON Briefing. The ADVON representatives will present an updated
brief on all of their coordination. They will include information concerning available base
support agencies, applicable base regulations and civil law, currency exchange, base
transportation, base facilities, base uniform requirements, air raid warning signals,
locations of shelters and bunkers, emergency recall and reporting procedures, off-limits
areas, restricted and controlled areas, base command structure and key personnel, the
name/rank/phone number of significant points of contact (POC), and phone numbers of
base services.
2.2.2.7 Receive Theater Indoctrination Intelligence Briefing. Intelligence operations
personnel will conduct a theater indoctrination intelligence briefing within 72 hours of
main body arrival at the forward operating location. The brief serves to update main body

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personnel on significant activities or events that have occurred in the forward AO/AI since
their departure from garrison facilities and associated intelligence support. Although the
specific content may vary from theater to theater or unit to unit, the brief will address the
minimum requirements of the following:
Local force protection considerations.
Hostile elements to include military, paramilitary, law enforcement, SOF, insurgent
activities, terrorist cells, active and passive threat force sympathizers and supporters,
and sponsored surrogate entities or enemy in extremist forces.
Foreign intelligence and security services (FISS) threat to include all associated
capabilities and host-nation intelligence collection activities.
Criminal activity.
Environmental factors posing a threat to personal health and welfare (e.g., polluted
surface waters, poisonous plants/animals, and potential weather phenomenon).
Enemy situation.
Current enemy disposition within the AO and AI.
Recent enemy activity within the AO and AI to include any noted trends or patterns
in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).
Projected enemy activity and/or COAs.
Noted battlespace affects.
Observed impact of terrain on enemy and friendly operations.
Observed impact of weather on enemy and friendly operations.
Observed impact of other characteristics (e.g., transportation infrastructure,
population density, and regional politics) on enemy and friendly operations.
SERE considerations.
Individual isolated personnel report (ISOPREP) review.
Theater and/or task force directed contact, authentication, and recovery procedures.
Theater and/or task force directed evasion corridors and specified evasion and
recovery (E&R) areas.
Theater and/or task force collection, reporting, and debriefing directives.
Initial familiarization with established CCIR.
Reporting criteria such as triggers, formats, and channels.
Debriefing time lines, baseline informational requirements, and established formats.
Theater and/or task force intelligence support capabilities and request procedures.
Available intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) collection assets and
associated basic capabilities of each platform (e.g., night-capable, platform

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communications capabilities, and sample platform products).


Specialized or unique production activities (e.g., ISR downlink stations or geospatial
information and services [GI&S] production facilities).
Request for information (RFI) procedures and formats; GI&S production methods;
preplanned and ad hoc ISR support request procedures.
2.2.2.8 Establish Contact With Supporting/Supported Forces. Contact the
supporting/supported forces and make arrangements for integration of personnel. Ensure
support agreements are solidified.
2.2.2.9 Inspect Individual/Team Equipment. Accomplish an individual/team
equipment inventory and inspection as soon as possible after arrival. Shortfalls should be
noted immediately.
2.2.2.10 Establish Accountability Procedures and Events Logs. Each section should
immediately establish procedures for accountability of personnel and equipment.
Additionally, sections chiefs should begin maintaining a log of significant events for
tracking and historical purposes.
2.2.2.11 Build Schedule and Establish Battle Rhythm. Each section should establish
a daily schedule of meetings and events and should begin projecting weekly and monthly
schedules. Ensure schedules are synchronized with higher units to support requirements
for information, products, and representation at meetings. Determine the requirements for
situation report (SITREP) inputs to higher and establish a format, process, and suspense.
2.2.2.12 Conduct Initial Training, Rehearsal, and Test Fire. Operators should conduct
immediate action drills, weapons zero/test fire, environmental familiarization, range
familiarization, nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC), special mission rehearsals and
any other required training as soon as possible after arrival. Completing this training will
allow more time to plan for mission taskings. Operations center personnel and support
sections should also conduct rehearsals, NBC training, and begin preparations of any
products, processes, or equipment required for deployed operations and tactical
employment.
2.2.3 Employment. This phases begins when the unit is prepared to receive and execute
mission taskings and ends with notification to stand down and redeploy.
2.2.3.1 Mission Planning Criteria. The following five operational mission criteria
provided from Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, can assist
commanders, planners, and operators when assessing potential PR/RO missions:
Is the mission appropriate for the tasked forces? Does it support the Joint Forces
Commanders campaign plan?
Is it operationally feasible?
Are required resources available to execute?
Does the expected outcome justify the risk?
2.2.3.2 Mission Planning Process.

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2.2.3.2.1 The mission planning process (MPP) establishes a standardized, baseline
methodology to guide planning for the tactical employment of GUARDIAN ANGEL
forces taking into consideration the factors of mission, enemy, terrain, time, troops
available, and civilians (METT-TC). Derived from joint and inter-service publications
as well as vast operational and tactical experience, the MPP consists of five phases:
Mission analysis and course of action (COA) development.
Concept of operations (CONOPS) development and detailed planning.
Final preparation.
Execution.
Postmission actions.
2.2.3.2.2 The process contains sequential, concurrent, and continuous events, and the
sequence will vary from mission to mission. This guidance outlines recommended
mission planning steps for planners and team leaders functioning in a mission planning
authority (MPA) capacity. GUARDIAN ANGEL forces often serve as attachments to
joint and combined forces. Although not primarily responsible for MPP products such
as COA, CONOPS, and commanders briefings in multi-lateral settings, GUARDIAN
ANGEL personnel should still actively engage in the mission planning and/or military
decision-making processes. Additionally, for alert missions such as CSAR, most of the
employment planning process will be accomplished prior to assuming alert status so
that teams only require specific information and intelligence updates regarding the
objective area prior to execution. Regardless of the mission type adherence to the
logical progression of this sequence will assist planners and team leaders in managing
and tracking their efforts for any mission. (NOTE: For some missions, the team
leader will be the primary planner throughout the planning and execution process. For
other missions, a planner (usually senior NCO, flight commander, or operations
officer) will accomplish the planning process through COA approval prior to handing
off the mission to the tactical team leader for CONOPS development, detailed
planning, and mission execution. Mission Planning Criteria. (See Table 2.8, Mission
Planning Checklist.)
2.2.3.2.3 Mission Analysis and COA Development. This phase starts with the task
unit being alerted by the mission tasking authority (MTA) of a mission or potential
mission. It includes recall of the force, receipt and analysis of the mission tasking,
warning order briefing, and COA development. The phase concludes with COA
selection and approval.
2.2.3.2.3.1 Alert. The first event in the mission planning process is
alert/notification that the unit will receive a mission tasking. Upon alert, the
mission planner should begin the mental process of assessing and evaluating
readiness, as well as identifying available logistical and operational resources (i.e.,
in-theater insertion/extraction assets). Preliminary review of the teams health,
equipment status, and overall capabilities will assist in the decision making process
during mission analysis and COA development.

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Table 2.8 Mission Planning Checklist.


Alert, recall, initial situation brief.
Receive tasking.
Conduct mission analysis.
Extract: situation; mission; commanders intent, specified, implied, and mission essential tasks;
task organization; force list; ROE; assumption/limitations; EEIs.
Submit request for information (RFI).
Develop/brief warning order.
Assign planning cells (e.g., intelligence, weather route planning/navigation, infil/exfil asset
coordination, admin/logistic, command and signal, coordinating instructions, fire support, PR,
ISR, E&R, and vehicles/boats).
Develop/brief/select course of action (COA).
Coordinate with supporting/supported forces (continuous).
Establish joint planning time line.
Identify admin/logistics support requirements.
Submit mission support requests (MSR): fire support, or infil/exfil.
Develop/submit concepts of operations (CONOPS).
Receive CONOPS approval.
Conduct reconnaissance.
Conduct detailed planning.
Develop/brief briefback.
Receive approval by task unit commander.
Review/amend warning order/conduct supporting briefs.
Develop/brief team leader brief.
Conduct rehearsals, equipment prep, inspections.
Receive execution order.
Execute mission.
Debrief/downstage.
Prepare/submit lessons learned/after action report.
Prepare for follow-on tasking.
2.2.3.2.3.2 Recall. Recall the team and all required unit support sections as soon
as possible. Once the recall is complete a situation brief should be given based

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upon all available information and intelligence. Mobilize all hands toward mission
accomplishment.
2.2.3.2.3.3 Mission Tasking. The MTA generally assigns missions to
subordinate tactical elements through the use of a tasking order (TASKORD) or
fragmentary order (FRAGORD). The mission tasking is delegated down the chain
of command. Many times the mission tasking will only state what the operational
commander wants to have done and will leave wide discretion as to how it is to be
accomplished. The format for the mission tasking may vary from theater to theater
but should address the standard five paragraph order format:
Situation.
Mission.
Execution (to include coordinating Instructions).
Administration and logistics.
Command and signal.
2.2.3.2.3.4 Tasking Analysis. As soon as the unit is tasked, mission planners
should analyze the TASKORD to extract who, what, where, when, why, and
begin development of how.
2.2.3.2.3.4.1 Situation. The situation paragraph should be contained in the
mission tasking and should be an overview of the general situation, to include
enemy forces, friendly forces, attachment, and detachments. Planners and
intelligence personnel should develop the situation paragraph to provide more
detail as it pertains to the specific mission tasking.
2.2.3.2.3.4.2 Mission. The tasking should provide a clear concise statement
of the task and purpose. If the following questions are not answered in the
mission statement, the mission planner must request clarification: who is
conducting the operation, what is to be accomplished, where is it to be
accomplished, when is it to be accomplished, why is it to be accomplished.
Restate the mission in a manner that supports the mission statement as well as
providing focus for the task element executing the mission.
2.2.3.2.3.4.3 Execution (To Include Coordinating Instructions). Review
the mission tasking execution paragraph to determine what the MTA wants the
mission to accomplish. It should provide the intent and desired effects. Extract
the subordinate tasks, which lists tasks by components, with each component
receiving its own paragraph. This section should designate the mission
planning authority (MPA) and supporting agencies and establishes suspense for
CONOPS submission. Finally, review the mission tasking for the coordinating
instructions. This section lists tasks common to two or more components. It
m a y e s t a b l i s h t h e e a r l i e s t a n t i c ip a t e d l a u n c h t i m e o f t h e t e a m
(insertion/infiltration) and states any other instructions for joint or conventional
coordination, including commanders critical information requirements

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(CCIR), rules of engagement (ROE), and other planning limitations when


applicable. Points of contact may be provided.
2.2.3.2.3.4.4 Administration and Logistics. Review the mission tasking
administration/logistics paragraph. The tasking will likely refer to specific
annexes of the operational order (OPORD). This section should state the
applicable administrative and logistics support arrangements. Identify any
additional admin/logistics requirements and begin to formulate support
requests as necessary.
2.2.3.2.3.4.5 Command and Signal. Review the tasking command and
signal paragraph to extract any changes to the OPORD annexes, headquarters
locations, code words, code names, and liaison. If there is no change, no
change should be indicated. Review the current air tasking order (ATO),
airspace control order (ACO), and special instructions (SPINS) for mission
specific information.
2.2.3.2.3.4.6 Commanders Intent. Extract the commanders intent from the
mission tasking. The commanders intent is a short, clear, and concise
statement of the purpose of the missiona statement of what the commander
wants to accomplish during the operation. It should focus subordinate
commanders on the purpose of the operation and the desired endstate, and
describe how that endstate relates to future operations. The commanders
intent helps decision makers when they are unable to communicate directly
with the commander. The commanders intent should include a purpose,
method, and endstate. It may also include a risk and success statement,
depending on the commander.
2.2.3.2.3.4.7 Specified, Implied, and Mission Essential Tasks. Extract
specified, implied, and mission essential tasks from the mission tasking.
Specified tasks are stated in the mission tasking and outline mission objectives
and other supporting tasks. Implied tasks are executed by the operational
elements to accomplish specified tasks. (Implied tasks are nonexistent until
developed by the mission planners.) Mission essential tasks are specified or
implied tasks that are essential to mission success.
2.2.3.2.3.4.8 Task Organization. The mission analysis continues by
determining command and control relationships. Determine what units are
exercising operational control (OPCON) and tactical control (TACON) of the
team. Also, identify supported/supporting force roles.
2.2.3.2.3.4.9 Force List. The tasking should also be accompanied by a force
list of assets/units available to support the mission (do not let the force list limit
initial planning during mission analysis and courses of action development).
Initiate contact with appropriate units and begin preliminary coordination.
2.2.3.2.3.4.10 Rules of Engagement. Extract the ROE from the tasking.
ROE should be requested if not specified. Coordinate to have the ROE briefed
to the team by a judge advocate general (JAG) representative if possible. This

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will eliminate any misinterpretations and allow individuals to ask specific
questions.
2.2.3.2.3.4.11 Assumptions and Limitations. The mission tasking will
likely lack much of the specific information necessary for mission planning
purposes. Planners/team leaders are therefore required to make educated
assumptions about specific details in order to plan effectively. As the planning
process progresses, these assumptions will either be validated, determined to be
incorrect, or left unknown, but all assumptions will be briefed to higher to
ensure that there are no misunderstandings about the basis for decision making.
Similarly planners/team leaders will identify potential limitations to successful
mission execution. As the planning process progresses, these limitations will
either be resolved, considered within acceptable risk limits, or will become
no-go criteria.
2.2.3.2.3.4.12 Essential Elements of Information. All mission planning and
prosecuting team members should conduct a full review of available
intelligence regarding the objective area/target to determine impact on friendly
operations and formulate initial informational requirements. Intelligence
information may include but is not limited to target intelligence packages
(TIP), traditional and nontraditional geospatial information and services
(GI&S) products, threat force order of battle studies, and IPB analytical
products. Mission planners should extract all EEIs from the TASKORD and
develop additional EEIs as required. (For a detailed listing of EEIs, see
AFTTP 3-1.8, Chapter 6, Intelligence Support to GUARDIAN ANGEL.
From the list of EEIs, planners should identify commanders critical
information requirements (CCIR). CCIRs are defined as information required
by the commander that directly affects decisions and dictates the successful
execution of operational or tactical operations. CCIR normally result in the
generation of three informational subsets:
Priority intelligence requirements (PIR), those informational
requirements regarding the enemy and the environment designated by the
commander as the priority in MPP and MDMP efforts.
Friendly force information requirements (FFIR), information the
commander and staff need about the forces available for the operation.
Essential elements of friendly information (EEFI), the critical aspects of
a friendly operation that, if known by the enemy, would subsequently
compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation, and therefore
must be protected from enemy detection.
2.2.3.2.3.4.13 Initial Information Gaps. Following the review of available
intelligence and operations data, mission planning personnel should establish
EEFIs and identify initial information gaps. Once identified, planners must
categorize informational requirements as either FFIRs (operations) or PIRs
(intelligence) and prioritize each category based on established mission time
lines and operational impact. Once accomplished, planners should submit

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each informational requirement as a request for information (RFI) through


appropriate intelligence and operations channels. The timely identification,
prioritization, and submission of information requirements are key to a
successful RFI process and the greater MPP/MDMP effort. RFIs are not
unique to the mission analysis and COA development phase, rather planners
must continue to develop the informational construct through judicious use of
the RFI process throughout subsequent phases of the MPP/MDMP. (See Table
2.9, Request for Information Request Worksheet.)
Table 2.9 Request for Information Request Worksheet.
The following is a basic RFI worksheet. The operator should strive to fill in as much possible, as
this will help the intel analyst and collection management team better understand the needs.
1. Request Date:______________________________________________________________
2. Desired Date:______________________________________________________________
3. Last Time Intelligence is of Value:______________________________________________
4. Message Reference DTG:_____________________________________________________
5. FRAGORD Number:_________________________________________________________
6. Target Name:_______________________________________________________________
7. Information Requested:
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
8. Imagery RequestOldest Acceptable Date of Imagery (DOI):________________________
Target Center Point:____________________________________________________________
Radius of Coverage:____________________________________________________________
Upper Left Coords:_____________________________________________________________
Upper Right Coords:____________________________________________________________
Lower Left Coords:_____________________________________________________________
Lower Right Coords:____________________________________________________________
Map, Sheet Name:______________________________________________________________
Series:_______________________________________________________________________
Edition: ______________________________________________________________________
Products Requested (type and number):_____________________________________________
Required Annotation:___________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
Requestor and contact information for follow-up questions:_____________________________

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2.2.3.2.3.5 Planning Foundation. At the conclusion of mission, analysis planners
should have extracted and developed the following information, which will serve
as the basis for the remainder of the mission planning process and will remain
consistent throughout associated briefings. The development of these items allows
planners to focus on building the concept of operations and detailed execution plan
for the mission.
Situation (i.e., environmental data, enemy situation, and friendly situation).
Mission statement.
Commanders intent.
Specified/implied/mission essential tasks.
Task organization.
Force list.
ROE.
Assumptions/limitations.
Essential elements of information.
2.2.3.2.3.6 Warning Order. The warning order is a mandatory event but its
position in the planning sequence may vary. The warning order should be issued as
soon as adequate details exist or as soon as possible upon completion of mission
analysis. The warning order is a brief given by the team leader to inform team
members of an impending mission. It is often the first time that team members are
exposed to the full mission scenario. Its purpose is to direct the team toward gear
preparation, rehearsals, and planning, by issuing specific direction on what is
expected of them. The team leader assigns team members to planning cells to
facilitate the mission planning process. Gear preparation assignments should be
completed before planning cells are activated. The warning order will be
continuously amended/updated throughout the mission planning process. (See
Table 2.10, Warning Order, and Table 2.11 and Table 2.12, Warning Order
Briefing Format.)

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Table 2.10 Warning Order.


A. Situation:
1. Enemy: _________________________________________________________________________________________
2. Friendly:_________________________________________________________________________________________
B. Mission: (fill in as required)__________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. General Instructions:
1.
Name

2. Chain
3. General
4. Spec Org
5.
of Command Organization
(teams)
Duties

6. Arms,
Ammo, And
Equipment

7. Gear
Common
To All

8. Time Schedule

A.
B.
C.
When What Where

D.
Who

D. Specific Instructions and Risk Assessment: (fill in as required)


______________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________

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Table 2.11 Warning Order Briefing Format (1 of 2).


Security: Ensure security is set
Time Hack
Conduct Muster
Give Classification/Code Name of Operation
Introduction: Introduce briefers and briefing tools
Overview: Provide an overview of briefing topics
Situation: Environmental data, enemy forces, and friendly
Mission Statement
Commanders Intent
Specified/Implied/Mission Essential Tasks
Task Organization
Force List
Rule of Engagement
Assumptions/Limitations
Essential Elements of Information
General Instructions:
- Position in team
- Name and task organization
- Chain of command
- Primary/secondary weapon and munitions
- Uniform/equipment common to all
-- First line of equipment (on the body)
-- Second line of equipment (web gear)
-- Third line of equipment (day or ruck sack)
- Special weapons, ammunition, and equipment (thermal imager, crypto, signaling devices,
medical equipment)
Special Instructions: Special instructions state specific assignments for mission preparation.
- Planning cell assignments as applicable
-- Intelligence
-- Weather
-- Route planning/navigation
-- Insert/extract asset coordination

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Table 2.12 Warning Order Briefing Format (2 of 2).


-- Admin/logistics
-- Command and signal
-- Coordinating instructions
-- Fire support
-- ISR
-- E&R
-- Vehicles/boats
Planning Time Line/Schedule of Events
Status of Support Requests
Shortfall: Operations, intelligence, equipment, and logistics
Required Rehearsals/Special Training
Address OPSEC/OPDEC Plans (if required)
Team Leader Comments
Next Muster/Brief will at________
2.2.3.2.3.7 Planning Cells. Planning cells provide team leaders with a method of
distributing the planning workload while maximizing use of the operational
experience within the team. Delegating planning assignments to operators tasked
to execute the mission achieves three objectives. First, the total time of planning a
mission is significantly reduced when all team members assist in the planning
cycle. Second, each member of the team can focus on tasks critical to mission
success providing a tactical evaluation and developing that portion of the plan
responsible for executing. Third, each member involved in the mission planning
process gain valuable experience. Personnel are assigned responsibility along
functional departmental lines and are responsible for preparing certain details of
the plan, or conducting liaison with supporting units (i.e., insert/extract assets;
supporting arms; contingency assets). Individuals consistently assigned the same
responsibilities become very proficient at producing tactically sound plans in a
timely manner. These areas of responsibility include but are not limited to
intelligence; weather; route planning/navigation; insert/extract asset coordination;
admin/logistics; command and signal; coordinating instructions; fire support;
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); evasion and recovery (ER);
and vehicles/boats.
2.2.3.2.4 Course of Action Development. Conduct wargaming sessions with key
leadership and planning personnel. Study all available information using the acronym
METT-TC for guidance: mission, enemy, terrain, time, troops available, and civilians
on the battlefield. Use the mnemonic obstacles to movement, cover and concealment,
observation and fields of fire, key terrain, and avenues of approach (OCOKA) to
evaluate terrain factors. Review the area of operations (AO) and potential routes. Start

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


at the objective and work back through the insertion. Return to the objective and work
through the extraction. A rule of thumb is to develop three viable options for each of
the five phases (insertion through extraction). Consider the following items when
developing COA: suitability, feasibility, acceptability, completeness, assumptions,
limitations, and survivability.
2.2.3.2.4.1 COA Comparison and Selection. Once COA are identified, they
should be compared against one another. Remember that a comparison should be
broken down with each phase of a mission from insertion to extraction. Weigh the
advantages and disadvantages of each to arrive at one recommended or preferred
course of action. The COA is prioritized (1 through 3) based on the comparative
analysis and, then briefed to the task unit commander for approval or disapproval.
Consider the following factors when comparing and selecting COA:
Number of isolated personnel or type of equipment to be recovered.
Number and experience of operators required.
Number/type of insertion/extraction assets and limitations of each.
Mission simplicity.
Access to supporting/supported forces.
Availability of bump plan.
Effects of weather and terrain.
Enemy capabilities.
Potential for enemy/civilian contact.
Enemy/civilian reaction time.
Probably enemy COA.
Availability of fire support.
Availability of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR).
Time required.
Operational risk management.
2.2.3.2.4.2 COA Brief. There are times when commanders request a briefing on
the COA so they can be involved in the mission planning process. (See Table 2.13,
Course of Action Briefing Format.)

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Table 2.13 Course of Action Briefing Format.


Pre-Brief Checklist: Ensure that the briefing location is prepared. Ensure maps/charts/imagery
is available. Provide a printout of the brief and any other associated products to the senior
leaders present.
Security: Ensure security is set.
- Time hack.
- Conduct muster.
- Give classification/code name of operation.
Introduction: Introduce briefers and briefing tools.
Overview: Provide an overview of briefing topics.
Situation: Environmental data, enemy forces, and friendly forces.
- Mission statement.
- Commanders intent.
- Specified/implied/mission essential tasks.
- Task organization.
- Force list.
- Rule of engagement.
- Assumption/limitations.
- Essential elements of information.
Brief the Courses of Action: Use the situation map to show the relationship of the COA to the
enemy threats. Analyze each COA by phase.
Present the Preferred Course of Action Based on:
- Simplicitypositive command and control of elements.
- Ease of execution: reliability of assets, minimal external support required.
- Probability of success: High/medium/low: Based on what? Is there anything that
specifically increasing the success factor?
- Minimum forces required: assets, team personnel, and support.
Shortfalls: Discuss any support requests, equipment requirements, and intelligence shortfalls.
Identify intelligence EEIs and operations EEIs that have not been answered.
Address OPSEC/OPDEC Plans (if required).
Team Leaders Comments.
2.2.3.2.5 Concept of Operation Development and Detailed Planning. Once a
COA is selected/approved, the concept of operations (CONOPS) development and
detailed planning process begins. Tasking authorities will sometimes require a general
CONOPS briefing for approval early in the planning process, and then a detailed
briefback prior to mission execution. In this case, the CONOPS is stated in broad
terms and provided to the operational commander via the chain of command to

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


evaluate the approach and approve the concept. This format should answer the who,
what, when, where, why, and how of each phase. Other tasking authorities will require
a single detailed CONOPS briefing for approval prior to execution, and other tasking
authorities might insist on reviewing the entire team leader briefing. Determine these
requirements upon initial tasking and plan accordingly. Tailor this briefing as required
to meet tasking authority guidance for CONOPS and/or briefback briefings. In any
case, the detailed planning process is the most time consuming and thorough portion of
employment planning. It results in the necessary information required for the
briefback and team leader brief and ultimately ensures mission success. Accomplish
the following actions during detailed planning.
2.2.3.2.5.1 Coordinate with Supporting/Supported Forces. Initiate contact and
begin coordination with supporting/supported force assets as soon as possible in
the mission planning process. Identify their capabilities/limitations and determine
what steps to take to ensure that mission support requests (MSR) contain all
necessary information to expedite the approval process.
2.2.3.2.5.2 Mission Support Requests. Identify mission support requirements
and submit the appropriate requests. Ensure the process is understood and have the
correct formats. Track electronic and/or paper MSRs and follow-up with phone
calls or face-to-face coordination. Provide as much information as soon as possible
and notify supporting forces of changes as soon as they are identified.
2.2.3.2.5.3 Establish Joint Planning Time Lines and Location. Develop a time
line for coordination meetings that require representatives from some or all
participating units. Prepare a location for these meetings ensuring that chairs,
tables, computers, and maps are available. Post the time line electronically and
identify where the master hard copy time line will be posted. When the time line
changes, post the change immediately and identify all players.
2.2.3.2.5.4 Identify Admin/Logistics Support Requirements. Identify
requirements and submit requests for admin/logistics support as soon as possible.
Track these requests and determine shortfalls. Some common requirements are:
Special equipment.
Weapons and ordnance.
Briefing equipment and materials.
Computer access.
Vehicle transportation.
Food/water and resupply items.
Hazardous materials declarations.
Joint air inspections.
Parachutes.
Tactical vehicle requirements/rigging.

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2.2.3.2.5.5 Conduct Reconnaissance. A reconnaissance can be conducted in a


number of ways. Something as simple as a map reconnaissance may be
appropriate. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) may also be available and are able
to pass back real-time imagery of enemy lines of communication (LOC) or enemy
positions. The traditional method of reconnaissance is to insert a small team to
monitor and report on the objective. The amount of time available to plan will
sometimes dictate whether to conduct a reconnaissance and which method would
be most appropriate.
2.2.3.2.5.6 Plan the Execution Phase. A preferred method of detailed mission
planning is phase diagramming; a process that chronologically breaks the mission
down into phases and further analyzes specific events and considerations within
each phase. This process assists in developing a tactical plan focused on mission
accomplishment. It also provides an inherent modularity that allows the planner to
discard and replace segments of the mission without completely replanning the
operation. This phase diagram can serve as the basis for briefing the execution
portions of the briefback and team leader brief. (See Table 2.14 and Table 2.15,
Phase Diagram.) To apply the phase diagram analyze each phase of the mission
considering the following items:
2.2.3.2.5.6.1 Command and Control. Identify the location of leaders
exercising command and control during every phase or event of the operation.
As the mission progresses, the command and control may shift.
2.2.3.2.5.6.2 Method of Insertion. Analyze the methods of insertion,
infiltration, exfiltration, and extraction and identify any required coordination,
training, and special equipment.
2.2.3.2.5.6.3 Primary and Secondary Routes. Determine primary and
secondary routes for insertion, infiltration, exfiltration, and extraction.
Analyze using METT-TC. Analyze the effects of the terrain, vegetation,
weather, and sea conditions on the team during each phase and event (i.e.,
exposure limits of personnel on boats and in water).
Table 2.16 through Table 2.19, Terrain Essential Elements of
Information.
Table 2.20 and Table 2.21, Weather Essential Elements of Information.
Table 2.22, Solar/Lunar Events.
Table 2.23, Space Environmental Situation One.
Table 2.24, Space Environmental Situation Two.
Figure 2.1, Space Environmental Global Situational Awareness.
Figure 2.2, Ionosperic Impacts UHF SATCOM.
Figure 2.3, Ionospheric Impacts HF.
Figure 2.4, Global Positioning System Error.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 2.14 Phase Diagram (1 of 2).


Phase

Steps
Command/control
Method of insertion
Primary/secondary routes
Threats and actions in response to threats

Insertion

Mission essential tasks


Time line: begin time, end time, and drop-dead time
Supporting forces
Communications
Go/no-go criteria
Contingencies (What ifs)
Command/control
Method of infiltration
Primary/secondary routes
Threats and actions in response to threats

Infiltration

Mission essential tasks


Time line: begin time, end time, and drop-dead time
Supporting forces
Communications
Go/no-go criteria
Contingencies
Command/control
Identify type of mission and define tasks required to accomplish the
mission statement

Actions at the OBJ

Brief team tasks in chronological sequence


Identify critical tasks and assigned personnel
Threats and actions in response to threats
Mission essential tasks
Time line: begin time, end time, and drop-dead time

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Table 2.15 Phase Diagram (2 of 2).


Phase

Steps
Supporting forces

Actions at the OBJ

Communications
Go/no-go criteria
Contingencies
Command/control
Method of exfiltration
Primary/secondary routes
Threats and actions in response to threats

Exfiltration

Mission essential tasks


Time line: begin time, end time, and drop-dead time
Supporting forces
Communications
Go/no-go criteria
Contingencies
Command/control
Method of extraction
Primary/secondary routes
Threats and actions in response to threats

Extraction

Mission essential tasks


Time line: begin time, end time, and drop-dead time
Supporting forces
Communications
Go/no-go criteria
Contingencies

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Table 2.16 Terrain Essential Elements of Information (1 of 4).


Type of Terrain.
- Type of feature (i.e., cliff, mountain, and river).
-- Location from the target.
-- Direction and distance.
-- Magnetic anomalies.
- Relief.
- Vegetation.
-- Type.
-- Average density.
- Cover and concealment capability (seasonal variations).
- Cover in AO (i.e., brush and type density).
- Concealment in AO (i.e., brush and type density).
- Beach/bay/harbor information.
-- Man-made obstacles.
-- Natural obstacles (sand bars/coral/rocks).
--- Location.
--- Type.
-- Hazards to navigation.
-- Dangerous marine life.
-- Type of injury possible.
-- Bottom gradient.
-- Beach current (knots).
-- Direction of current flow: bearing (mag).
-- Kelp.
-- Salinity.
-- Bottom composition (e.g., sand/rock).
-- Beach traffic ability.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


Table 2.17 Terrain Essential Elements of Information (2 of 4).
Riverine.
- Man-made obstacles.
- Natural obstacles (e.g., sand bars/rocks).
-- Location.
-- Type.
- Hazards to navigation.
- Dangerous marine life.
- Type of injury possible/first aid.
- Bottom gradient
- Depth.
- Width.
- Water visibility (feet).
- Currents speed (knots).
- River bank height.
- Shore vegetation.
-- Type.
-- Density.
-- Height.
- Bottom composition (e.g., mud/rock).
- Water temperature (degrees Fahrenheit).
- Width.
- Water visibility (feet).
- Currents speed (knots).
- River bank height.
- Shore vegetation.
-- Type.
-- Density.
-- Height.
-- Bottom composition (e.g., mud/rock).
-- Water temperature (degrees Fahrenheit).

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 2.18 Terrain Essential Elements of Information (3 of 4).


Natural and man-made data/identify danger areas on patrol routes.
- Natural.
-- Animal traits.
-- Rivers.
-- Streams.
-- Drinking water availability in AO.
-- Details.
-- Mangroves.
-- Savannas.
-- Mud.
-- Swamps.
- Man-made.
-- Population centers.
-- Roads.
-- Canals.
-- Man-made trails.
- Wildlife indigenous to the area.
-- Type.
-- Habitat.
-- Quantity.
-- Possible impact on the mission.
Lines of communication (LOC).
- Typerailway, canal, sea lane, and road.
- Location with respect to the operating area.
- Access from the major LOC to the operating area.
- LOC construction materialasphalt, crushed rock, and dirt.
- Trafficability.
- Capacity (especially military equipment).
- Obstacles or hazardous areastreams, choke points, fjords, and landslide areas.
- Road sections suitable for aircraft landings.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


Table 2.19 Terrain Essential Elements of Information (4 of 4).
- Communications.
-- Radio.
-- Television.
-- Newspaper.
-- Messenger.
Recommended landing zone, drop zone, beach landing site, and river crossing point.
- Type.
-- Location.
-- Dimensions.
-- Conditions.
-- Vegetationdensity and height.
-- Soil and surface composition.
-- Vertical obstructionsheight and location.
- Fixed defenses along route to target.
-- Type of installation.
-- Location.
-- Operational characteristics.
- Indigenous support available for ingress/egress.
- Other facilities which have an effect on ingress/egress.

2-35

2-36

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 2.20 Weather Essential Elements of Information (1 of 2).


Weather data.
- Visibility in miles.
- Wind direction and speed (knots).
-- Nature (i.e., steady or gusting).
-- Wind chill factor (degrees Fahrenheit).
- Air temperature.
-- Daily high (degrees Fahrenheit).
-- Daily low (degrees Fahrenheit).
- Precipitation type.
-- Relative humidity (percent).
- Cloud cover.
-- Ceiling height.
-- Cloud layers and type.
- Altimeter.
- Extended forecast (i.e., 24, 28, and 72 hours).
Light and illumination data.
- Sun light and illumination data.
-- Date.
-- BMNT (hours).
-- Sunrise (hours).
-- Sunset (hours).
-- EENT (hours).
- Moon light and illumination data.
-- Date.
-- Moon rise (hours).
-- Moon set (hours).
-- Phase.
-- Percent illumination.
- Visibility.
-- Day (miles).
-- Night (miles).

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


Table 2.21 Weather Essential Elements of Information (2 of 2).
- Celestial data.
-- Times of optimum use (hours).
-- Direction: Venus/Polaris.
Space weather information.
- HF communications impact forecast.
- UHF communications impact forecast.
- GPS error forecast.
Hydrographic data.
- Tides.
-- Date/time.
-- Low.
-- High.
- Sea state.
-- Date/time.
- Sea temperature (degrees fahrenheit).
-- Date/time.
- Exposure limits (hours/minutes).
- Bioluminescence data.
- Current at sea.
-- Direction of flow: bearing (maps).
-- Speed (knots).
- Surf.
-- Date.
-- Height.
-- Period.
- Ice flows.
-- Coordinates.

2-37

2-38

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 2.22 Solar/Lunar Events.


Station Location: Fort Bragg
Location: 35 degrees 08' 00''N 078 degrees 56' 00''W
Lunar
Percent
Illumination
0000 2359

Date

BMNT
(LOC)

SR
(LOC)

SS
(LOC)

EENT
(LOC)

MR
(LOC)

MS
(LOC)

1 June 2003

0458

0603

2025

2130

0656

2207

2 June 2003

0457

0602

2025

2131

0745

2300

3 June 2003

0457

0602

2026

2131

0840

2348

15

4 June 2003

0456

0602

2026

2132

0940

**

15

23

5 June 2003

0456

0602

2027

2133

1044

0030

23

32

6 June 2003

0456

0601

2027

2133

1149

0107

32

43

7 June 2003

0455

0601

2028

2134

1255

0140

43

54

8 June 2003

0455

0601

2029

2135

1401

0211

54

65

9 June 2003

0455

0601

2029

2135

1509

0240

65

75

10 June 2003

0455

0601

2029

2136

1619

0310

75

85

11 June 2003

0455

0601

2030

2136

1731

0343

85

92

12 June 2003

0454

0601

2030

2137

1846

0419

92

98

13 June 2003

0454

0601

2031

2137

2002

0502

98

100

14 June 2003

0454

0601

2031

2138

2113

0553

100

99

15 June 2003

0454

0601

2032

2138

2217

0653

99

96

16 June 2003

0454

0601

2032

2139

2310

0759

96

90

17 June 2003

0454

0601

2032

2139

2354

0907

90

83

18 June 2003

0455

0601

2032

2139

**

1014

83

74

19 June 2003

0455

0601

2033

2139

0030

1119

74

64

20 June 2003

0455

0601

2033

2140

0100

1220

64

55

21 June 2003

0455

0602

2033

2140

0127

1318

55

45

22 June 2003

0455

0602

2033

2140

0152

1415

45

35

23 June 2003

0455

0602

2034

2140

0217

1511

35

27

24 June 2003

0456

0602

2034

2140

0242

1607

27

19

25 June 2003

0456

0603

2034

2141

0309

1704

19

12

26 June 2003

0456

0603

2034

2141

0338

1803

12

27 June 2003

0457

0603

2034

2141

0413

1902

28 June 2003

0457

0604

2034

2141

0453

2000

29 June 2003

0458

0604

2034

2141

0540

2055

30 June 2003

0458

0605

2034

2140

0634

2145

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

2-39

Table 2.23 Space Environmental Situation One.


Space Weather Events

Observed Summary

Forecast Summary

Solar Activity

Observed GREEN.

Forecast GREEN
23 through 26 June Flare
Probabilities: M:25 percent X:
05 percent.

Charged Particle Environment

Observed GREEN.

Forecast GREEN
23 through 26 June.

Geomagnetic

Observed YELLOW
23 June for minor
geomagnetic storming.

Forecast GREEN
23 through 26 June.

HF Comm

Observed YELLOW
23 June for minor
geomagnetic storming.

Forecast GREEN
23 through 26 June.

UHF SATCOM

Observed YELLOW 23
Forecast YELLOW
June for localized moderate 23 through 26 June for
scintillation.
localized moderate
scintillation.

Satellite Operations/Health

Observed YELLOW
23 June for minor
geomagnetic storming.

Forecast GREEN
23 through 26 June.

Space Object Tracking/Satellite Observed GREEN.


Drag

Forecast GREEN
23 through 26 June.

Altitude Flight

Observed GREEN.

Forecast GREEN
23 through 26 June.

Radar Interference/False
Returns

Observed GREEN.

Forecast GREEN
23 through 26 June.

2-40

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 2.24 Space Environmental Situation Two.


Potential Environmental Impact

Results to DoD Operations

HF Comm (when YELLOW or RED)

Temporary degraded or total loss of HF radio


communications.

UHF SATCOM (when YELLOW or RED)

Temporary degraded or total loss of UHF radio


communications.

Satellite Operations/Health (when YELLOW Increased likelihood of spacecraft anomalies;


or RED)
degradation of spacecraft components due to
radiation interference to communications
satellite circuits.
Space Object Tracking/Satellite Drag (when Increased likelihood for space object tracking
YELLOW or RED)
loss, increased drag on low-Earth orbiting
spacecraft.
High Altitude Flight (when YELLOW or
RED)

Increase in harmful radiation dosage to


personnel in high-altitude operations.

Radar Interference/False Returns (when


YELLOW or RED)

Increased interference or false returns to


sunward and/or poleward looking radars.

OVERALL NOTE:
* This table provides a generalized situation awareness of past and future space environment
impacts to warfighters and weapon systems. The severity of the impacts due to the space
environment may be more or less than indicated by the color-coded assessment in a particular
area. The impact variability is dependent on a variety of factors including but not limited to
system location, geometry, and operating frequency. Contact the AFWA Space Weather
Forecaster at DSN 272-8087 or 272-4317 (commercial 402-323-8087 or 402-232-4317) to
arrange mission-specific support or to report conditions experienced by your system that may be
related to space weather disturbances.
2.2.3.2.5.6.4 Actions at the Objective. Analyze actions at the objective in
chronological sequence identifying critical tasks and the personnel responsible
for accomplishing these tasks.
2.2.3.2.5.6.5 Threats and Actions in Response to Threats (Actions Upon
Enemy Contact). Review the insert through extract phases to include E&R
and compare the teams routes to the enemy disposition reflected within order
of battle displays. Coordinate with intelligence operations to receive all
pertinent information regarding recent, current, and projected enemy activity
surrounding infiltration/exfiltration routes, insertion/extraction points,
objective areas, and E&R areas. (See Table 2.25 through Table 2.28, Enemy
Force Essential Elements of Information, for enemy considerations.)
Determine vulnerable periods and potential enemy assets that could contact the
team; modify the routes as necessary. Determine the teams actions on enemy
and civilian contact for the areas with the highest potential of compromise.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

2-41

Figure 2.1 Space Environmental Global Situational Awareness.

Space Environment Situation


Valid: 23/1800Z Jun 03
09

10

17Observed Space Environment EVENTS


11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

20

21

22

Today
O F

3-Day
Forecast
24 25 26

Solar

See Discussion
and Events Slide
for Details

Charged Particle
Geomagnetic
Quiet

Active

Very Active

Probable Space Environment IMPACTS


09

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

3-Day
Forecast

Today
20

21

22

24

25

26

HF Comm

See Discussion and


Impacts Slide for Details
Check regional products
for specific details in your
AOR

UHF SATCOM
Satellite Ops
Space Obj Track
High Alt Flight
Radar Interference
Low

09

10

Moderate

11

Image Valid: 23/1648Z

Severe

Reported Space Environment IMPACTS


12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

20

21

22

Today
O

HF Comm

See Impacts
Slide for Details

UHF SATCOM
Satellite Ops
Space Obj Track
High Alt Flight
Radar Interference
None

Moderate

Severe

No Report

Prepared by AFWA/XOGX DSN 272-8087 COMM (402) 232-8087

UNCLASSIFIED

Tarras/Davis
Issued 23/1800Z

2-42

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 2.2 Ionospheric Impacts UHF SATCOM.

Ionoshperic Impact UHF SATCOM


Forecast Valid: 23/1800Z - 24/0000Z June 03

Additional Comments:

Marginal UHF operations


Severely degraded UHF operations
AFWA/XOGX DSN 272-8087 COM (402) 232-8087

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

2-43

Figure 2.3 Ionospheric Impacts High Frequency.

Forecast Valid: 23/1800Z - 24/0000Z June 03

Additional Comments:

Ionoshperic Impact HF

Marginal UHF operations


Severely degraded UHF operations
AFWA/XOGX DSN 272-8087 COM (402) 232-8087

UNCLASSIFIED

2-44

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 2.4 Global Positioning System Error.

GPS Error
Forecast Valid: 23/1800Z June 03

Marginal
UHF operations
Errors between
15-50 meters
Severely degraded UHF operations

Additional Comments:

Additional Comments:

Errors greater than 50 meters


Forecast: Tarras/Davis

UNCLASSIFIED

Issued Time: 23/1800Z

AFWA/XOGX
(402)
232-8087
AFWA/XOGXDSN
DSN272-8087
272-8087COM
COM
(402)
232-

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

2-45

Table 2.25 Enemy Force Essential Elements of Information (1 of 4).


AO Threat Summary. Air, ground, naval, paramilitary, or indigenous forces which may influence the target, infiltration/exfiltration, or SERE operations.
Air Threats.
- Mobile/fixed rockets and missiles.
-- Surface-to-air/surface-to-surface.
- Shoulder fired rockets.
-- Surface-to-air/surface-to-surface.
- Attack, bomber, and reconnaissance air assets.
-- Ground threats.
- Howitzers/artillery.
- Small arms.
- Chemical weapons.
- Mines.
- Ground forces.
-- Infantry.
-- Mechanized.
Electronic Threat.
- Electronic countermeasure (ECM).
- Jamming capability.
- Chaff.
- Directional findings capabilities.
- Sensors.
Sea/Riverine Threats.
- Surface-to-air/surface-to-surface missiles.
- NGFS.
- Small arms.
- Mines.
- Surface combatants and boats.
- Civilian craft.

2-46

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 2.26 Enemy Force Essential Elements of Information (2 of 4).


Type of Force.
- Mission.
- Location.
- Access routes to the operating area.
- Location of routes or direction from which enemy forces can be expected to enter the
operating area.
- Type of access (i.e., road, rail, waterway, and air route).
- Transit time associated with each method of transportation.
-- Personnel strength.
-- Weapons/armament.
-- Communications with target.
- Type of equipment (i.e., radios, telephones, or visual).
- Frequency of communications (how often does the enemy communicate with the target).
- Location of critical elements.
- Alternate means of communications.
- Fuel or power supplies.
-- Type.
-- Location.
-- Method of fuel storage (i.e., tank or bladder).
-- Backup power source.
Leadership (Foreign Advisors and Support).
- Degree of training, morale, and combat effectiveness (readiness).
- Uniforms and unit designationsordinary and special insignia.
- Operations.
-- Recent and current activities.
-- Expected alert activities.
Area Surrounding the Objective Target.
- Avenues of approach/escape.
- Entrances and exits to target.
- Natural and man-made obstacles near target.
- Sensor threat.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


Table 2.27 Enemy Force Essential Elements of Information (3 of 4).
Physical Layout and Functional Organization of Target.
- Number of structures.
- Location of each structure.
- Construction of key components.
- Dimensions.
- Materials.
- Entry or access points.
- On target power sources.
-- Number.
-- Type.
-- Location.
- Conduits.
-- Location.
-- Type.
- Fuel supply.
-- Location.
-- Type.
- Fueling schedule.
- Alternate or backup power sources.
Communications Capabilities on Target.
- Type of communications used.
- On-site security.
-- Typefence, ditch, sensors, external lighting, domestic animals, night vision
equipment, mine fields, concertina wire, barbed wire, early warning systems, booby
traps, and claymores.
-- Location.
-- Description.
- Dimensions.
- Power source and location.
- Illumination on target.
-- Entry procedures (i.e., key, cipher, and personal recognition).
-- Enemy on objective target.

2-47

2-48

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 2.28 Enemy Force Essential Elements of Information (4 of 4).


- Type unit occupying target.
- Size/strength of target forces.
- Mission of targeted enemy unit.
- Markings on equipment and uniforms that assist in identifying enemy personnel.
- Target enemies estimated action, upon enemy contact (e.g., patrol is compromised).
- Target enemy patrol routes, and modes.
- Times watch sections are rotated/daily routine.
- Training level/moral.
- Transportation and degree of mobility.
- Chain of command and communication.
- Weapons.
- Emplacements/fortifications
Enemy Reaction Force Locations.
- Reaction time.
- Type and number of personnel, vehicles, vessels, or aircraft.
- Type ordnance/weapons.
- Enemy reaction force SOPs.
Target Vulnerabilities.
- Critical damage pointsprimary and secondary.
-- Location.
-- Dimensions.
-- Construction material.
-- Stress points.
-- Means of neutralization/destruction.
--- Stand-off weapon.
--- Heavy weapon.
--- Small arms.
--- Demolitions.
- Time or situation in which damage to one system will affect the entire system.
2.2.3.2.5.6.6 Mission Essential Tasks. Identify mission essential tasks
during each phase and determine how these tasks will be accomplished.
2.2.3.2.5.6.7 Time Line. Ensure adherence to the time windows specified in
the mission tasking. These times drive mission planning, and assist in defining

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

2-49

phase time windows and drop-dead times. Conduct backward planning from
the specified time window to ensure adequate time is giving to each phase of
the mission. The requirements for the actions at the objective can drive
constraints of other phases. This may require planning actions at the objective
first and working outward in both directions. Calculate the earliest and latest
times for beginning each phase. Calculate the earliest and latest times for
completing each phase. Calculate the drop-dead times (no-go criteria) for each
phase. Examine the earliest and latest beginning and completion times to
determine whether the mission can be completed in the allotted time. If the
time windows in the tasking make the probability of mission success
unacceptably low, this should be addressed with the operational commander,
along with a viable alternative.
2.2.3.2.5.6.8 Supporting Forces. Identify required supporting assets and
their intended employment during each phase. It is imperative that the team
leader is aware of the actions and disposition of all supporting forces
throughout the operation. Ensure all the assets listed in the force list have been
used according to their capabilities. Identify any excess or deficient assets.
Modify the support request, if required. Also identify the location and mission
of friendly forces of additional friendly forces. (See Table 2.29, Friendly Force
Information Requirements, for friendly force considerations.)
2.2.3.2.5.6.9 Communications. Identify communications requirements for
all phases of the operation.
2.2.3.2.5.6.10 Go/No-Go Criteria. Using the phase diagram to determine
mission-stopping criteria. Consider drop-dead times, weather minimums,
minimum forces, supporting forces, or enemy/civilian contact. These issues
must be addressed with the operational commander who bears responsibility
for communicating the level of acceptable risk to the team leader.
2.2.3.2.5.6.11 Contingencies (What Ifs). For each phase extract the three
most likely problems and determine a solution to correct or circumvent the
problem. Only three potential problems per phase should be briefed during the
briefback and team leader brief. However, the team leaders must still plan for
other potential problems and be prepared in the event one is encountered in the
field. Keep it simple. Do not dilute briefs with long lists of contingencies and
lose focus on the mission.

2-50

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 2.29 Friendly Force Information Requirements.


Friendly Operations in AO/Adjacent AOs. Friendly forces that may encountered the area of
operations and joint special operations areas.
Type Friendly Units (e.g., joint or combined infantry, artillery, aviation, and naval units).
- Location.
- Mission.
- Size/activity.
- Action on enemy contact.
- Friendly units/patrols/activity/routine.
- Markings on uniforms/equipment that assist in identifying friendly units.
- Armament (defensive/offensive.)
-- Vehicles.
-- Vessels.
-- Aircraft.
-- Personnel.
-- Ground.
- Friendly supporting arms in AO.
-- CAS.
-- NGFS.
-- Artillery.
-- Riverine assault craft.
- Electronic warfare.
-- ECM jamming capabilities.
- Passage through friendly lines.
-- Location.
-- Markings.
-- Procedures (e.g., daily SPINS, password).
- Guide availability in AO.
2.2.3.2.5.7 Admin/Logistics. Consider rations, transportation to the point of
departure, weapons, ammunition, special equipment, hazardous declarations, and
joint air inspections. Consider initial load out and resupply requirements. For
missions requiring resupply, ensure the event is timed to the team needs and the
tactical considerations for the resupply asset/team. Resupply items include but are
not limited to fuel, ordnance, water, and rations. Coordination must be conducted,
a plan must be developed and requests submitted in order to receive initial supply

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

2-51

and field resupply. Re-supply bundles must be packed and ready for upload. A
location and time window for resupply must be specified along with
communications and marking procedures.
2.2.3.2.5.8 Command and Signal. Verify the current joint communications
electronic operating instructions (JCEOI), ATO, ACO, SPINS, frequencies and call
signs, crypto and change dates, computer settings, and addresses. Build a
communications bubble diagram that includes airborne
command/control/communications integration. Develop a no-comm plan by phase
and identify required communications reports and execution checklist calls.
Research supporting/supported asset comm capabilities. Within the team
determine challenge and reply, number combo, running password, duress word,
near/far recognition signals, hand/arm signals, and pyrotechnics. Coordinate for
communications checks with all players prior to execution.
2.2.3.2.5.8.1 Execution Checklist. Using an execution checklist minimizes
transmission time in a restrictive communications environment. From the list
of phase events, extract execution checklist requirements that enhance
command and control through communication. These execution checklist
items should identify critical decision points, notify when mission essential
events are complete. The purpose is to make sure these events are identified
and chronologically placed into the execution checklist format. Deviation
checklist items are by exception calls established to notify when there are
deviations to the plan that adversely affect successful mission execution or
require a contingency response (time delay, or maintenance abort). Efforts
should be made to minimize the number of mandatory calls on the list. When
making an execution checklist call, pass (your call sign) IS (code word) AT
(time). Do not pass the time if the event is a hard time and occurs within 2
minutes of that hard time. If the event is a soft time, the time will be in
parentheses and you should always pass the time. Refer to an event by line
number prior to its completion. After its completion, refer to an event by the
code word. Never use the code word prior to an event occurring. This prevents
confusion as to whether an event has taken place or not. Forward execution
checklist inputs to the MPA for inclusion in the overall execution checklist for
the mission.
2.2.3.2.5.9 Annexes. The planning cells assigned during the warning order are
essential to detailed planning and should correspond to sections and annexes in the
team leader brief. Designated personnel should accomplish detailed planning for
their assigned sections and annexes.
2.2.3.2.5.10 Coordinating Instructions. Plan team movement formations and
actions at rally points, halts and danger areas. Plan procedures for actions on
enemy contact (e.g., chance or near/far ambush) as well as departure/re-entry of
friendly lines. Within the team determine POW/captured equipment procedures.
Keep in mind the five Ss: silence, search, separate, speed, and safeguard.
Develop WIA/KIA/MIA procedures as well as procedures for the protection and
accountability of special equipment and sensitive items.

2-52

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


2.2.3.2.5.10.1 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. Coordinate
with intelligence operations for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) support. Determine platform capabilities, communications frequencies
and procedures, basing locations, and established request procedures.
Coordinate preplanned and ad hoc ISR coverage requests through intelligence
operations. Coordinate with ISR crews to effectively integrate coverage into
mission objectives and to determine capabilities, coverage times, locations,
contact procedures, and markings.
2.2.3.2.5.10.2 Evasion and Recovery. Evasion and recovery (E&R) is a
contingency plan that can commence during any phase of the mission and ends
when the evading element is recovered and returns to the operating location.
E&R planning for each phase of the operation is critical and should include
airborne ingress and egress emergencies, personnel separation on infiltration
and exfiltration, and while conducting actions at the objective. This plan should
be as simple as possible for easy retention under the worst of circumstances,
and should be clearly understood by all hands. SERE data should be provided
in the OPLAN or the OPORD. If not, it should be requested from higher
authority as part of the initial request for information. E&R information can be
extracted from the SPINS. Submit the evasion plan of action (EPA) up the
chain of command for coordination and deconfliction. See Table 2.30 and
Table 2.31, Evasion and Recovery Essential Elements of Information, for E&R
considerations. Coordinate with SERE personnel for ISOPREP review, PR Kit
issue, SERE refresher training, and EPA development.
2.2.3.2.5.10.3 Vehicles/Boats. Plan the employment procedures for any
tactical vehicles or boats. Determine any special rigging/de-rigging
requirements and assign personnel to specific duty positions.
2.2.3.2.5.11 Additional Planning Considerations. In addition to the phase
diagram and annexes, consider the following areas during the detailed planning
process.
2.2.3.2.5.11.1 Weapons and Critical Equipment. Review the execution
phases identifying weapons and/or critical equipment that is required to
complete the phase or event (i.e., alternate insertion/extraction equipment,
specialized optics, night vision goggles, special weapons, rapid employment
deployment system [REDS] kit, and M249 SAW). Check the warning order
boards to ensure that the equipment has been listed.
2.2.3.2.5.11.2 Critical Skills and Training. Identify individual skills that
require refresher training to increase the probability of success (i.e., fast roping,
call for fire (CFF), close air support (CAS), night photography, and data
transmission). If time is a critical factor, skills training and rehearsals should
be prioritized IAW their relationship to the list of things that are likely to go
wrong.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


Table 2.30 Evasion and Recovery Essential Elements of Information (1 of 2).
Friendly Forces Capable of Supporting SERE Operations.
- Identity.
- Location.
- Personnel strength.
- Weapons.
- Type.
- Number.
- Condition.
- Stock of ammunitions on hand.
Transportation.
- Type of vehicles.
- Number of vehicles.
- Condition of vehicles.
Communications.
- Methods.
- Procedures.
- Equipmentquantity, condition, and capabilities.
Border Data.
- Location.
- Personnel strength.
- Allegiance.
- Weapons.
- Transportation.
- Reaction time.
- Use of sensors, dogs, or other unique equipment.
- Specialized training received.
Location of Nearest Selected Area for Evasion (SAFE) or DAR Sites.
- Water sources during season of operationslocation and potability.
Transportation Availabletype and location.
- Nearest fuel supplytype and quantity.
Advantageous Terraintype and location.

2-53

2-54

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 2.31 Evasion and Recovery Essential Elements of Information (2 of 2).


Population Information.
- Locations of concentration.
- Number of inhabitants.
- Weapons available.
- Allegiance.
- Communications available.
Food Sources.
- Vegetation.
-- Type.
-- Location.
-- Special preparation information.
-- Potential hazards.
- Animals.
-- Type.
-- Location and habitat.
-- Methods of capture.
-- Preparation information.
-- Potential hazards/treatment.
Shelter.
- Type.
- Location.
Medical Assistance.
- Type.
- Location.
- Available service.
Public signs in the target area.
- Flags, banners, or pennantssignificance.
- Danger signs: minefield, high voltage, toxic fumes.
-- SAFE house locations and SPIDER routes.
-- SARDOT coordinates.
2.2.3.2.5.11.3 Rehearsals. Based upon the phase diagram, identify rehearsals
that will improve the elements capability. List element and team size rehearsals
that will assist in successfully completing events during the operation (e.g.,

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actions on the objective, parachute operations, or immediate action drills). Add


these rehearsals to the warning order time schedule board.
2.2.3.2.5.11.4 OPDEC Plan. The purpose of the OPDEC plan is to mask the
intent and capability of forces conducting operations. The mission may be a
diversion, or use deception to increase the probability of success of the mission
(i.e., uniforms, boat underway lighting schemes, electronic jamming/electronic
warfare [EW], or false insertions). Imagination is the only limitation. This is
not a required item for all missions. GUARDIAN ANGEL forces should
coordinate all OPDEC planning with intelligence operations to identify enemy
strengths and weaknesses to facilitate exploitation of such factors for deception
purposes.
2.2.3.2.5.11.5 OPSEC Plan. Review the OPSEC plan. The scope of
operational security plans may vary but must include all participants, and their
roles. Special operations are inherently sensitive in order to achieve relative
superiority on the battlefield and ensure success in high-risk, high-pay off
mission scenariossafeguarding information is imperative.
2.2.3.2.5.11.6 Operational Risk Management. Operational risk management
(ORM) is a method of identifying and mitigating various risk factors during a
mission in an attempt to decrease the overall mission risk level. The OPORD
or MTA should provide guidance on the criteria for specific risk levels and the
acceptable level of risk for the mission. Team leaders should make an honest
assessment of overall risk based on this guidance. Table 2.32, Operational
Risk Management, provides and ORM worksheet to assist with this process.
2.2.3.2.5.11.7 Rules of Engagement. ROE are usually provided in the
OPORD. ROE must be interpreted; consult judge advocate general (JAG)
officer for ROE amplification. All members of the team must understand the
ROE and how they will influence their actions. Conduct an evaluation of the
effects of ROE on each phase of the mission. If the rules of engagement are not
clear or present a significant operational limitation, especially in cases where
they unnecessarily endanger friendly personnel, this limitation must be
specified and presented to the tasking authority for clarification or amendment
at the earliest possible time. ROE can present unique go/no-go criteria.
Specially check to see if there is a separate ROE for fire support assets. The
following considerations should be addressed and clarified, if they could
possibly occur during the operation. ROE could present unique go/no-go
criteria in these situations. Evaluate these examples in each phase.

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Table 2.32 Operational Risk Management.


Planning Worksheet
Planner:
Mission:
Mission Steps

Date:
Potential
Hazards

Risks Level

Circle Overall
Rating

Controls

Residual Risk
Level

APPROVED
Date:________
BY:______________
Low (L)
Medium (M)
High (H)
Extremely High (EH)

PAGE_______________OF______________
2.2.3.2.5.11.8 Briefback. The detailed planning process culminates with the
backbrief given to the tasking authority commander for inputs and approval. It
also provides the team leader with a platform to bring up issues about the
mission and discuss limiting factors. This brief should demonstrate that the
plan is complete, well conceived, and will accomplish stated mission
objectives. Capabilities and vulnerabilities of the enemy have been evaluated.
The effects of weather and terrain have been considered. Mission essential
elements have been identified and incorporated into the plan. The members of
the patrol are familiar with the plan and understand their role in the operation.
The operational commanders staff understands the plan and support
requirements (deconfliction and coordination). A briefback is given near the
end of the planning cycle, after the entire plan has been developed. It should be
given before the operations order so that any changes mandated by the
operational commander can be incorporated into the OPORD. If the OPORD
is briefed first, the team must then be re-briefed on any changes directed in the
briefback. This sequence could add an unnecessary element of confusion.

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Briefbacks may be required depending on who the operational commander is,


where the operational commander is located relative to the team members, the
priority of the operation, and how much time is available prior to mission
execution. The length and amount of detail of the briefback is largely a
function of the audience receiving it and the time-sensitive nature of the PR/RO
mission. The brief generally lasts approximately 1 hour. If the operation is
extremely complex, requiring a large number of assets, integrating with foreign
units, engaging multiple targets, or operating from several different assets, it is
possible to have a brief lasting 2 hours. The patrol leader must be prepared to
address specific concerns such as fuel consumption, transit times, ranges of
weapons, communications capabilities or limitations, and other information
derived from the detailed planning process. Rehearsal of the briefback is
recommended if time allows. It will give the briefer added confidence and
allow the briefer to correct problems with the presentation and content. (See
Table 2.33 through Table 2.36, Concept of Operations/Briefback Format.)
2.2.3.2.5.11.9 Rock Drill. The rock drill incorporates all assets in a
walkthrough of the mission by phase and addresses one or two contingencies
per phase. The rock drill usually incorporates a mock-up or sand table of the
AO and objective area large enough for all primary players to view and address
their actions. The MPA or mission commander should lead the rock drill.
2.2.3.2.5.11.10 Warning Order Review/Supporting Briefs. At the
conclusion of the briefback, issue a final warning order covering changes or
updates and make final preparations for the team leader brief and other
briefings (i.e., jump brief, dive brief, team leader brief, or pilots brief). There
may be sufficient time to review the warning order and give support briefings
prior to the briefback. However, any changes the operational commander
directs will need to be re-briefed to subordinate commanders and the team.
2.2.3.2.6 Final Preparation. After the briefback and rock drill, the team leader
should focus energy on ensuring internal team preparation.
2.2.3.2.6.1 Team Leader Briefing. The team leader briefing is used to pass the
detailed plan to operators tasked with execution. The team leader and key
members of the team are responsible for delivering the brief. The audience
consists of the team and supporting elements (when available). From tasking, the
team has systematically prepared for the team leader brief. This method with team
members and supporting forces assisting in planning provides continuous focus on
developing a tactically sound plan. Team leaders generally brief the introduction,
mission, concept, and execution (all tactical phases). Intelligence, weather, and
team members that have been assigned to planning cells generally brief their
portions. A standardized briefing format is used to ensure that all categories are
briefed and relevant information is included and that the brief is logical, clear, and
concise. It must be easy to follow for note taking and for patrol members to quickly
grasp all the details. The members of the team thoroughly understand the entire
plan and their specific individual, team, and element tasks. (See Table 2.37
through Table 2.42, Team Leader Brief Format.)

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Table 2.33 Concept of Operations/Briefback Format (1 of 4).


Pre-Brief Checklist: Ensure that the briefing location is prepared. Ensure maps, charts, air
photos, and other aids are available and placed in sequence with the brief. Provide a printout of
the brief and any other associated products to the senior leaders present.
Security: Ensure security is set.
- Time Hack.
- Conduct Muster.
- Give classification/code name of operation.
Introduction: Introduce briefers and briefing tools.
Overview: Provide an overview of briefing topics.
Situation: Environmental data, enemy forces, and friendly forces.
- Mission statement.
- Commanders intent.
- Specified/implied/mission essential tasks.
- Task organization.
- Force list.
- Rule of engagement (ROE).
- Assumption/limitations.
- Essential elements of information.
Concept of Operations: Using the situation map to show the relationship of the teams routes to
the enemy threats, brief the concept of operations.
Execution: Brief using the phase diagram.
- Insertion.
-- Command/control.
-- Method of insertion.
-- Primary/secondary routes.
-- Threats and actions in response to threats.
-- Mission essential tasks.
-- Time line: begin time, end time, and drop-dead time.
-- Supporting forces.
-- Communications.
-- Go/no-go criteria.
-- Contingencies (What ifs).

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Table 2.34 Concept of Operations/Briefback Format (2 of 4).


- Infiltration.
-- Command/control.
-- Method of infiltration.
-- Primary/secondary routes.
-- Threats and actions in response to threats.
-- Mission essential tasks.
-- Time line: begin time, end time, and drop-dead time.
-- Supporting forces.
-- Communications.
-- Go/no-go criteria.
-- Contingencies.
- Actions at the objective.
-- Command/control.
-- Identify type of mission and define tasks required to accomplish the mission statement.
-- Brief team tasks in chronological sequence.
-- Identify critical tasks and assigned personnel.
-- Threats and actions in response to threats.
-- Mission essential tasks.
-- Time line: begin time, end time, and drop-dead time.
-- Supporting forces.
-- Communications.
-- Go/no-go criteria.
-- Contingencies.
- Exfiltration.
-- Command/control.
-- Method of exfiltration.
-- Primary/secondary routes.
-- Threats and actions in response to threats.
-- Mission essential tasks.
-- Time line: begin time, end time, and drop-dead time.
-- Supporting forces.
-- Communications.
-- Go/no-go criteria and contingencies.

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Table 2.35 Concept of Operations/Briefback Format (3 of 4).


Extraction.
- Command/control.
- Method of exfiltration.
- Primary/secondary routes.
- Threats and actions in response to threats.
- Mission essential tasks.
- Time line: begin time, end time, and drop-dead time.
- Supporting forces.
- Communications.
- Go/no-go criteria.
- Contingencies.
Admin/Logistics: Address resupply if applicable.
- Items required.
- Location.
- Time window resupply is required: start time, stop time.
- Asset/delivery method.
- Signals/comms/authentication required.
Command Signal.
- Identify communications capabilities, call signs, and frequencies.
- Identify communications windows and required reports.
- Identify execution checklist calls.
- Identify backup and no-comm procedures.
Annexes.
- Coordinating Instructions.
- POW/captured equipment procedures.
- WIA/KIA/MIA procedures.
- Special equipment/sensitive items.

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Table 2.36 Concept of Operations/Briefback Format (4 of 4).


Fire Support Plan.
- Identify potential danger area during the operation for which fire support could be required.
- Location.
- Potential time windows for fire support: start time, stop time.
- Asset/delivery method.
- Signals/comms/authentication required.
CSAR.
- Identify potential danger areas during the operation for which CSAR support could be
required.
- Location.
- Potential time windows for CSAR: start time, stop time.
- Asset/recovery method.
- Signals/comms/authentication required.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) asset plan.
- Location.
- Time: start time, stop time.
- Asset.
- Signals/comms/authentication required.
Evasion and Recover/(E&R).
- Explain E&R concept from insert through extraction IAW SERE briefs.
Vehicles/Boats.
- Planned employment.
Go/No-Go Criteria.
Address OPSEC/OPDEC Plans if required.
Team Leaders Comments.

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Table 2.37 Team Leader Brief Format (1 of 6).


Pre-Brief Checklist: Ensure that the briefing location is prepared. Ensure that a model or sand
table of the objective, maps, charts, air photos, and other aids are available and placed in
sequence with the brief. Assemble key leaders and go over the changes or questions that came
up in the briefback.
Security: Ensure security is set (windows covered and doors locked).
- Time Hack.
- Conduct Muster.
- Give classification/code name of operation.
Introduction: Introduce briefers and briefing tools.
Overview: Provide an overview of briefing topics.
Situation: Include environmental data, enemy forces, and friendly forces.
- Mission statement.
- Commanders intent.
- Specified/implied/mission essential tasks.
- Task organization.
- Force list.
Rules of engagement (ROE): Brief the ROE and how it may affect the operation. Define
collateral damage in the context of this mission and the concepts of reasonable, proportional, and
excessive force.
- Assumption/limitations.
- Essential elements of information.
- Execution.
Concept of Operations: Use the situation map and charts with route overlays and summarize
the five phases of the mission.
- Scheme of maneuver: Brief each phase of the operation using maps, charts, imagery,
photos, and the phase diagram table.
- Phase diagram (Address items as they apply within each phase).
- Insertion.
-- Command/control.
-- Method of insertion.
-- Primary/secondary routes.
-- Threats and actions in response to threats.
-- Mission essential tasks.
-- Time line: begin time, end time, and drop-dead time.
-- Supporting forces.
-- Communications.
-- Go/no-go criteria.
-- Contingencies (What ifs).

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Table 2.38 Team Leader Brief Format (2 of 6).


Infiltration.
- Command/control.
- Method of infiltration.
- Primary/secondary routes.
- Threats and actions in response to threats.
- Mission essential tasks.
- Time line: begin time, end time, and drop-dead time.
- Supporting forces.
- Communications.
- Go/no-go criteria and contingencies.
Actions at the Objective.
- Command/control.
- Identify type of mission and define tasks required to accomplish the mission statement.
- Brief team tasks in chronological sequence.
- Identify critical tasks and assigned personnel.
- Threats and actions in response to threats.
- Mission essential tasks.
- Time line: begin time, end time, and drop-dead time.
- Supporting forces.
- Communications.
- Go/no-go criteria and contingencies.
Exfiltration.
- Command/control.
- Method of exfiltration.
- Primary/secondary routes.
- Threats and actions in response to threats.
- Mission essential tasks.
- Time line: begin time, end time, and drop-dead time.
- Supporting forces.
- Communications.
- Go/no-go criteria and contingencies.

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Table 2.39 Team Leader Brief Format (3 of 6).


Extraction.
- Command/control.
- Threats and actions in response to threats.
- Mission essential tasks.
- Time line: begin time, end time, and drop-dead time.
- Supporting forces.
- Communications.
- Go/no-go criteria and contingencies.
Admin and Logistics.
- Rations.
- Transportation.
- Primary/secondary weapon and munitions.
- Uniform/equipment common to all.
- Special weapons, ammunition, and equipment.
- Hazard declaration (Dash-2).
- Joint air inspection (JAI).
- Resupply.
-- Supporting asset coordination.
-- Items required.
-- Resupply bundles packed and ready for upload.
-- Location.
-- Time window resupply is required: start time, stop time.
-- Asset/delivery method.
-- Signals/comms/authentication required.
-- Individual/team assignments during resupply.
--- Security team.
--- Recovery team.
Command and Signal.
- Command and control by phase.
- Current JCEOI/component/SPINS frequencies and call signs.
- Current crypto and change dates.
- OTAR.
- Data requirements. Computer settings and addresses.
- Communication bubble diagram.

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Table 2.40 Team Leader Brief Format (4 of 6).
- Airborne command/control/communications integration.
- Comm/no-comm plan by phase (see phase diagram).
- Required communications reports.
- Execution checklist calls.
- Supporting/supported asset comm capabilities.
- AO characteristics.
-- Terrain (line of sight, satellite take-off angle).
-- Weather/atmospheric conditions.
-- Electromagnetic environmental effects (E3).
-- Enemy threat: electronic warfare (EW)/directional finding (DF).
- SPINS info.
-- Signaling/marking.
-- Code words.
- Challenge and reply.
- Number combo.
- Running password.
- Duress word.
- Near/far recognition signals.
- Hand and arm signals.
- Pyrotechnics.
Annexes (brief by assigned personnel).
Coordinating Instructions.
- Movement formations/techniques.
- Routes.
- Actions at rally points, halts, or danger areas.
- Action on contact (chance, near/far ambush, aerial, and sniper).
- Departure/re-entry of friendly lines.
- POW/captured equipment procedures.
-- Silence, search, separate, speed, and safeguard.
- WIA/KIA/MIA procedures.
- Special equipment/sensitive items.
- NBC considerations.

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Table 2.41 Team Leader Brief Format (5 of 6).


Fire Support Plan (as required).
- ATO/ACO considerations.
Call Sign/Frequency.
- IP/CPs.
- Control instructions.
- Time windows for fire support: start time, stop time.
- Signals/comms/authentication required.
- Beacon, laser, and marking procedures.
- Friendly locations.
CSAR.
- Location of and planned/tasked mission of CSAR forces.
- Supporting forces.
- Theater JPRC/RCC procedures.
- Call sign, frequencies, contact procedures, and signals/markings.
- Primary, secondary, and tertiary assets.
- Survival radios/personnel locator systems.
- Quantity and type of specialized rescue/recovery equipment.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)/Asset Plan.
- Location.
- Time: start time, stop time.
- Asset.
- Signals/comms/authentication required.
Evasion and Recover (E&R).
- Explain E&R concept from insert through extract IAW SERE brief.

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Table 2.42 Team Leader Brief Format (6 of 6).


Vehicles/Boats.
- Planned employment.
- Rigging/de-rigging.
- Vehicle/boat duty positions.
Team Briefbacks (Recommended briefback items).
- Rank, name, and operating initials.
- Duty position.
- Infil chalk, infil bump load.
- Exfil chalk, exfil bump load.
- Jump/exit position.
- Specific duties at the objective.
- Backup duties.
- Critical equipment.
- Contingencies.
- Actions on E&E.
Address OPSEC/OPDEC Plans (if required).
Team Leaders Comments.
- Take and ask questions.
- Review Time line.
- Sanitize room, and brief team on next scheduled event.
- Next muster/brief will be at ____________
2.2.3.2.6.2 Communications Checks. Make every attempt to coordinate and
conduct communications checks with all players prior to mission execution.
Check all frequencies and crypto. Ensure close frequencies do not bleed into one
another. If unable to accomplish comm checks with all players, assemble as many
as possible. At a minimum, the team must accomplish thorough internal comm
checks, both inter-team and with the delivery/recovery vehicle, and allow enough
time to fix potential problems.
2.2.3.2.6.3 Rehearsals and Inspections. Conduct rehearsals and inspections
throughout the mission planning process. Rehearsals should culminate in a full
dress rehearsal of actions at the objective and other phases as prioritized. After
determining the rehearsals required (prioritized) and the time available for
conducting rehearsals, rehearse everything possible. The best brief will not make
up for a rehearsal once on the mission. Conduct rehearsals prior to briefing the
team leader brief operations order. This method ensures the concept can be

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executed prior to briefing. Rehearse, brief, and conclude with a final rehearsal and
inspection prior to departing for the operation. Each phase of the mission should
be rehearsed beginning with actions at the objective. This assists in providing
critical times required to complete events and in reviewing established time lines.
Replicate physical objects (size, color, or texture) and environment (day/night,
terrain, weather, and water temperature). Use engineer tape for outlines if suitable
rehearsal facilities are not available. Sketches, maps, photos, chalk talks, sand
tables or other models, and verbal rehearsals are also beneficial. At a minimum,
rehearsals should include the following:
Actions at the objective.
Insertions and extractions.
Communications and execution checklist calls.
Small-unit tactics, immediate action drills (IAD), and the handling of
wounded personnel and prisoners.
Rendezvous/link-up procedures if (applicable).
2.2.3.2.7 Execution. Conduct the mission.
2.2.3.2.7.1 Fragmentary Order. The team might be tasked in the field for a
follow-on mission prior to returning from the initial mission. Time, threat
situation, and resources available will determine the level of detail of the planning
process. Plan and brief only the items that have changed from the original mission.
At a minimum, plan and brief actions on the objective and rehearse if possible.
2.2.3.2.8 Postmission Actions.
2.2.3.2.8.1 Intelligence Debrief. The postmission debrief process provides a
mechanism for capturing combat information of possible intelligence value to
ongoing and future operations. A high priority is placed on the intelligence debrief
as every mission is responsible for the collection of raw data to satisfy standing
CCIRs. This collection and reporting effort requires discipline and designation of
key individuals to gather specific types of data. The shared responsibility
distributes the collection load across all team members to mitigate information
chokepoints and ensure focused observation, recording, and reporting of combat
information. (See Table 2.43 through Table 2.45, Intelligence Debriefing
Checklist.)
2.2.3.2.8.2 Mission Debrief. If possible all players should conduct a debrief
following the mission to analyze mission execution. The debrief should be lead by
the mission commander and should be conducted by phase.
2.2.3.2.8.3 Team Debrief. The team should conduct an internal debrief to
analyze the mission by phase in order to highlight after action items and determine
areas for improvement.
2.2.3.2.8.4 Post-Operation Report. Prepare the post-operation report in the
format provided if required by the tasking authority.

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Table 2.43 Intelligence Debriefing Checklist (1 of 3).


1. Pupose. The purpose of this checklist is to guide those who have to debrief a recovery team
after conducting PR/RO missions.
a. It suggests a number of questions but it must not stop debriefers from asking other
questions they may think relevant.
b. Hints on Debriefing:
(1) Make the person being debriefed comfortable.
(2) Do not make them write the answers. You must do the work while they relax.
(3) Debrief as soon as possible while the knowledge is still fresh in their minds.
Record and file all information.
(4) Avoid asking questions which suggest the answer (i.e., do not lead the teams with
your questions).
(5) Operators will answer these questions better if they know what is needed before
they go out.
2. Debriefing Checklist:
a. Topography:
(1) Was the intelligence material accurate? If not, what inaccuracies were
discovered?
(2) Was the map accurate? If not, what were the inaccuracies?
(3) If imagery was used, how well were the actual conditions portrayed.
(4) What was the state of tracks followed?
(5) Did the tracks show signs of recent use?
(6) Were any other tracks or game trails seen? Where?
(7) Where rivers were crossed or followed, give location of:
(a) Bridges (include type).
(b) Fjords.
(c) Were they in recent use?
(8) If any indigenous personnel were contacted out of their known locations, state:
(a) Name of men?
(b) Name of tribe and headman?
(c) Number of individuals?
(d) Were they friendly.
(e) Whether previous Government contact or not?
(f) Have they moved recently? If so, why?
(g) Did they give any information?

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Table 2.44 Intelligence Debriefing Checklist (2 of 3).


b. Contacts:
(1) Where contacted? (Time, date, place, and grid ref)
(2) How many? Of what race? Sex?
(3) Any known persons? Can you describe any of them?
(4) How were they dressed?
(5) Were they carrying packs?
(6) How were they armed? (Weapons seen and estimated from volume of fire.)
(7) What were they doing? If moving, in what direction?
(8) Any equipment or documents recovered? To whom have they been given?
(9) Any casualties? To own troops, indigenous, or enemy?
(10) Have their casualties been identified? If not, what has happened to the bodies?
(11) Any injured or captured? What have you done with them?
c. Camps:
(1) Where and when was the camp discovered?
(2) How was it sited (e.g., valley, hillside, and hilltop)?
(3) How many huts or buildings?
(4) What type were they?
(5) Estimate their accommodation.
(6) How long ago were they built?
(7) When were they last used? By how many?
(8) Were any defenses constructed? Describe layout, including sentry posts, warning
signals, booby traps, and dugouts.
(9) How many approach or escape routes? Give their directions.
(10) Any food dumps in the camp?
(11) Any weapons, ammunition, or armorer tools?
(12) Any signs of a printing press?
(13) Any signs of radio set being used?
(14) Any documents? If so, where were they found?
(15) What was done to the camp?

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Table 2.45 Intelligence Debriefing Checklist (3 of 3).


d. Cultivation Areas:
(1) Give time, date and grid reference of place of discovery.
(2) What was its size and shape?
(3) Any steps taken to camouflage crops?
(4) What kings of crops?
(5) How old were they?
(6) When were they last tended?
(7) Any signs of habitation in the area?
(8) Any tracks?
(9) What was done to the cultivation?
(10) In the case of small crops, can you estimate the food produced in excess of the
inhabitants own requirements?
e. Supply Dumps/Caches:
(1) Location, time and date?
(2) What was in it?
(3) What was the condition of the store?
(4) How was it concealed?
(5) When was it last visited?
(6) Estimate the age of the cache.
(7) Has it been added to since it was first laid down?
(8) What was done with the stores?
f. Enemy Radio Transmissions or Interference:
(1) Own operating frequency in kilocycles.
(2) Interfering stations frequency in kilocycles or meters.
(3) Type of transmission (i.e., Morse code or voice). If the latter, details of language spoken.
(4) Whether a permanent transmission, or interference, or weather spasmodic.
(a) If spasmodic, dates and times at which interference experienced.
(b) If permanent, date and time of start of interference.
(5) Strength of signal (i.e., strong, moderate, and weak).
(6) Whether message is in cipher, code, or clear.
(7) Enclose copies of any intercepts recorded, with times of recordings.
(8) Any other information that may be of use in identification.

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2.2.3.2.8.5 Lessons Learned/After Action Report. Prepare a lessons
learned/after action report as soon as possible following the mission. Solicit inputs
from all team members. Use the issue, discussion, and recommendation format.
Submit this report to the unit operations officer for review, filing, and
dissemination to higher headquarters and/or subordinate units.
2.2.3.2.8.6 Prepare for Follow-On Tasking. Recommend a 12- to 24-hour stand
down period at a minimum for the team to rest and refit before a follow-on tasking.
Preparation for follow-on operations must be considered. Maintenance of
departmental gear, the first/second/third line of personal equipment, and other
personnel requirements (hygiene/food/sleep), as well as resupply of
fuel/ammunition is a high priority when a sustained level of operations is required.

2.2.4 Stand-Down and Redeployment Planning. The redeployment phase begins with
initial notification and ends when the main body departs the AO.
2.2.4.1 Initial Notification. Initial notification is provided through the chain of
command and can come in the form of a redeployment order, other official tasking, or
notification through official channels.
2.2.4.2 Analysis. Unit leadership will analyze the redeployment tasking and determine
whether the redeployment will be phased or complete. Applicable unit personnel and
equipment might be required to remain in the AO to support continuing operations.
2.2.4.3 Stand-Down and Redeployment Actions. Following analysis each unit section
has a number of responsibilities during the stand-down and redeployment phase to ensure
that the unit departs the AO.
2.2.4.3.1 Build Departure Schedule. Each section should establish a schedule of
events required to prepare for redeployment. Ensure schedules are synchronized with
higher units to support requirements for information, products, and representation at
meetings.
2.2.4.3.2 Final SITREPs/AARs. Determine the requirements for final SITREPS
and/or AARs owed to higher units. Establish a format, process, and suspense for these
products.
2.2.4.3.3 Formulate Load Plan and Pack-Out. Designated personnel should
formulate appropriate UTCs based on redeploying personnel and equipment. Provide
inputs through appropriate channels for UTC load plans. Plan and organize the
systematic pack-out, transportation, and marshaling of personnel and equipment for
deployment. Ensure completion of declarations for hazardous materials (HAZDECS)
and coordinate for joint air inspection (JAI) times and locations.
2.2.4.3.4 Withdrawal of Forces. Establish a plan for the withdrawal of unit
personnel from supported forces. Build the plan so that it creates minimal impact to
supported force operations.
2.2.4.3.5 Inspect Individual/Section Equipment. Each section should conduct an
inventory and inspection of individual and section equipment as soon as possible after
notification of redeployment. Shortfalls should be noted immediately.

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2.2.4.3.6 Turn Over Host Base Facilities. Arrange for the inspection and turnover
of all facilities and equipment provided by the BOS or other agencies. Consider
workspace and staging areas, storage areas, billeting rooms/areas, and vehicles.
2.2.4.3.7 Discontinue Communications. Notify all associated agencies prior to
discontinuing communications. Implement provisional secure and/or nonsecure
communications platforms, (e.g., INMARSAT) as required to adequately support
ongoing operations and facilitate the redeployment process.
2.2.4.3.8 Intelligence Debrief. Intelligence operations will de-brief the deployed
element on all applicable intelligence considerations and classified material
disposition/destruction requirements for the redeployment phase. Re-affirm any
security classification directives for the deployment. Include any and all information
regarding special instructions on releasable or non-sensitive information. Collect any
intelligence-issued classified or sensitive materials from deployed personnel,
appropriately annotate hand receipts or other tracking documents and secure for
redeployment or destruction.
2.2.4.3.9 Decompression Brief. Schedule psychology/chaplain/mental health/
family support briefings as required.
2.2.4.3.10 Security Measures. Physical security of equipment, munitions, classified
material, controlled medications, and high value items must be maintained until they
can be secured in the homestation facilities.
2.2.4.3.11 Main Body Departure. Ensure accurate tracking of deployment line
numbers, load plans, and show times. Plan for transportation for personnel and
equipment to the departure location. Conduct a final check of required personal
deployment items.
2.2.4.3.12 Main Body Arrival and Reception. Unit representatives should
coordinate with the arriving main body to assist in the download and transportation of
equipment and personnel.
2.2.5 Postdeployment.
2.2.5.1 Accountability. Ensure accountability of all personnel and equipment.
Download, clean, repair, and store equipment as necessary.
2.2.5.2 Replacement Requirements. Identify replacement requirements and submit
necessary requests.
2.2.5.3 Complete and Catalogue Lessons Learned/AARs. Ensure completion of all
AARs. Establish a filing system for hard and soft copies so that reports can be easily
accessed for future reference. Compile unit AARs and submit to higher as required.
Identify OPRs for AAR action items, set suspense, and track progress.
2.2.5.4 Build Training Plan. Examine currency and proficiency of unit personnel. Build
a training plan base on expired currencies, identified deficiencies during mission
execution, and expectations for future operations.

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2.3 Specific PR/RO Planning Guides and Considerations. Combat rescue officers are
personally responsible to ensure the planning and preparation needed to accomplish the five tasks
of PR are accomplished IAW the commanders intent, IAW Joint Publication 3-50.2, Doctrine of
Joint Combat Search and Rescue. There are several different positions in which the CRO will be
assigned in order to accomplish the overall PR mission. The first is tactical command of direct
combatant forces during recovery operations. Second, the CRO will direct, plan and execute
strategic and operational level control of PR operations when assigned to operations center at the
combined, joint, component, and task force levels (JSRC/JPRC, PRCC/RCC, COAC, JAOC,
AOC, JOC, and STOC). The CRO may also be attached to battlestaff and liaison elements as a
subject matter expert for PR operations. The CRO must analyze the commanders intent to
determine what the scope of the PR tasking is prior to mission planning. In general, the CRO will
need to develop all the same guidance prior to planning for both the tactical and operational levels
of war. However, it is not advised that the CRO conduct both tactical and operational level PR
mission execution simultaneously
2.3.1 Mission Commander Planning. Combat rescue officers can act as the mission
commander for pararescue forces or perform as a member of the pararescue recovery team to
facilitate the mission success. The CRO does not supplant normal pararescue team
composition. The role of the CRO is to execute recovery command and control in the
air/ground mission capacity. (See Table 2.46 through Table 2.54, Combat Search and Rescue
Planning.)
2.3.2 Personnel Recovery Coordination Center Planning. C o m b a t r e s c u e o f f i c e r s
assigned to the JPRC/PRCC can provide overall direction or be assigned to the strategic and
operational elements. Mission planning considerations for these positions are provided in
AFTTP 3-1.1, General Planning and Employment Considerations. Table 2.55 through Table
2.57, JPRC/PRCC Planning Guide describes JPRC/PRCC planning guidelines.
2.3.3 Battlestaff and Liaison Planning. Combat rescue officers (CRO) assigned to
battlestaff and liaison elements as subject matter experts (SME) will not have specific mission
planning factors. Rather, this CRO must be well versed in the full spectrum of PR operations.
This knowledge should not be specific to the TTP of the air- and ground-recovery task. The
CRO will provide both commander and staff with SME for the entire PR mission. A working
knowledge of the joint and service specific operational support programs is necessary to
ensure isolated personnel are reported, located, supported, and recovered during a PR event.
The PR operation is not complete until the fifth and final task, reintegration is complete. The
CRO in a battlestaff or liaison position will have the responsibility to ensure the reintegration
program is applied to all isolated DoD personnel. Table 2.58, Personnel Recovery Reference
Material, provides an overview of the specific publications that provide instruction and
guidance in the joint arena of theater level PR missions.

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Table 2.46 Combat Search and Rescue Planning Guide (1 of 9).


CSAR is a specific task performed by designated forces to effect the recovery of personnel or
equipment during wartime or contingency operations. Because there are no typical CSAR
operations, the successful conduct of CSAR operations requires meticulous planning and
preparation. This planning and preparation applies to every echelon of the CSAR mechanism.
Section 1CSAR Planners Guide (CSAR).
(Enter classification letter for each sentence).
1. Concept of Operations: Briefly describe the concept of operations. Include assets and
designated coverages.
2. CSAR Assets: List the primary, secondary, and additional assets.
a. List the unit location responsibility, equipment, crew qualification, and contact
procedures.
3. CSAR Coverage:
a. Identify who has primary and secondary coverage and how they fit into the tactical
mission; also, identify on board capabilities of each CSAR asset.
b. Identify the CSAR asset bump plan.
c. Explain procedures for CSAR incident response outside the capabilities of the tactical
assets. Include contact procedures for theater JPRC/RCC (to include phone numbers).
4. Implementation of the CSAR Plan: (Canned statement) Any aircraft or person observing a
mishap will immediately notify command and control personnel. Notification should be over
secure nets. If this is not possible, use unsecure net and as a last resort use emergency signaling
devices.
a. The notification format will include the following:
(1) Type mishap (downed aircraft [call sign] and isolated/injured personnel).
(2) Number/status of persons/aircraft involved.
(3) Location of the incident and level of enemy threat.
5. Signal: (Canned Statement) All aircraft will monitor 243.0 (guard) at all times.
a. Initial notification: This should be done on a secure net if possible (list tactical
frequencies).
(1) Primary tactical satellite (TACSAT).
(2) UHF frequency (secure or unsecure).
(3) SAR Alpha/Bravo frequency.
(4) VHF frequency (secure or unsecure).
(5) FM frequency (secure or unsecure).

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Table 2.47 Combat Search and Rescue Planning Guide (2 of 9).


b. (Canned statement) After initial notification and authentication of an incident, the CSAR
coordinator will direct all assets involved to change to the designated CSAR frequency. (List
CSAR frequencies below.)
(1) TACSAT channels.
(2) UHF/VHF frequencies.
(3) FM frequencies.
c. Personnel location systems: (List systems being used.)
6. Command and Control:
a. Chain of Command:
(1) Combatant commander.
(2) ACC.
(3) CSAR coordinator.
(4) On-scene commander.
b. (Canned statement) The initial decision on how to respond to an incident will normally
rest with the ground forces commander in consultation with the combatant commander.
Designation of an appropriate on-scene commander will normally be situational dependent
and may include any of the following:
(1) Aircraft commander of the first aircraft on scene.
(2) Ranking ground force representative on scene.
(3) Mission commander of the CSAR task force.
(4) Aircraft commander of the CSAR recovery aircraft.
(5) Ranking USAF pararescueman on scene.
7. CSAR Coordinator: Designated by the ACC and responsible to the ACC for the
management of all assigned CSAR assets. Coordinates actions such as site security, casualty
evacuation, and downed aircraft destruction with the on-scene commander.
a. Location: Identify CSAR coordinator location.
b. Call sign: State the CSAR coordinators call sign. CSAR coordinator should have a
separate call sign which should be briefed as a break for control phrase which will clear the
net and allow critical CSAR information to be passed.
8. Ground Force Element: Identify size and composition of ground force elements, which
relate to CSAR mission execution (i.e., SAR/security team, rangers, or pararescue team).
9. Aircraft Equipment Requirements:
a. Type of CSAR asset:
(1) List all CSAR unique equipment on-board aircraft (i.e., PLS FLIR, hoist penetrator,
tethered duck, and fast rope).

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Table 2.48 Combat Search and Rescue Planning Guide (3 of 9).


10. Casualty Evacuation: Write the detailed procedures for evacuation of casualties to include
final destination.
11. Evacuation Facilities: List the primary and secondary facilities with latitude/longitude,
UTM, HLZ, information, contact procedures, and frequencies.
12. Special Instructions:
a. Signaling requirements (i.e., all personnel will use non-permissive signaling for
recovery).
b. CSAR team requirements (i.e., CSAR team will be prepared for land and water CSAR).
c. Other special coordinating instructions.
Section 2Operations Order Development Guide (CSAR).
(Enter classification on the top and bottom of each page.)
(Enter classification letter for each sentence.)
1. Situation.
a. Enemy forces. See main OPORDrestate only those points, which require special
emphasis in CSAR planning.
b. Friendly forces.
(1) CSAR forces of next higher unit.
(2) Location and planned/tasked missions of CSAR forces.
(a) Adjacent units.
(b) Handover units.
(c) Theater JPRC. Explain procedures for CSAR incident response outside the
capabilities of the tactical assets; include contact procedures for theater JPRC (to
include phone numbers).
1 Call sign, contact procedures, and required reporting.
2 Number and type of each theater CSAR asset.
a List the capabilities of each asset.
b Type and quantity of CSAR equipment per asset.
(3) Theater SPINS.
(a) Theater medical.
(b) Definitive care facilities (capabilities and location).
(c) MEDEVAC.
c. CSAR attachments and detachments; include effective times and reasons.
2. Mission. Clear, concise statement of mission of CSAR forces. It tells you who, what (task),
when, where, and why (purpose).

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Table 2.49 Combat Search and Rescue Planning Guide (4 of 9).


3. Execution:
a. Commanders intent is not required. Commanders intent should always be to provide
sufficient CSAR capabilities to recover all forces under his command, and to destroy anything
left behind with the intent to deny the enemy access to technology and SA intelligence.
b. Concept of Operation: Each unit/element should receive their tasks with purposes and
understand their relationships within the concept.
4. CSAR Assets. List the primary, secondary, and additional assets.
5. CSAR Coverage. Identify who has primary and secondary coverage and how they fit into the
tactical mission. Also, identify on board capabilities of each CSAR asset.
a. Scheme of maneuver. Within the concept, use the 5 Ws (who, what, when, where, and
why) to describe CSAR coverage and forces supporting the following objectives.
(1) Recovery sites:
(a) Number of sites.
(b) Geographical separation of sites.
(c) Method, mode, of conveyance to sites.
(2) Reconnaissance and surveillance sites. (Include only those points which are different
from recovery sites [a].):
(a) Number of sites.
(b) Geographical separation of sites.
(c) Method, mode, of conveyance to sites.
(d) Follow-on missions.
(3) Detailed instructions for each site/mission:
(a) Number of personnel and aircrew members per chalk to each site. Use manifests as
attachments to this annex whenever possible and include the following into that single
attachment.
(b) Bump plans (include assault and CSAR bumps).
(c) Maximum ACL for each assault aircraft type.
(d) Survival radios/personnel locator systems.
(1) Frequencies available and level of dissemination of radios/beacons/transmitters
how are they distributed by unit (i.e., squad level, platoon level, or individual).
(4) Number and type of dedicated CSAR assets.
(a) List the capabilities of each asset.
(b) Types and quantity of CSAR equipment per asset.
(c) Number of pararescuemen available.
(d) Routes of movement (see air plan/flimsy as required).

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Table 2.50 Combat Search and Rescue Planning Guide (5 of 9).


6. Limitation of the CSAR Plan. (Canned statement) Any aircraft or person observing a
mishap will immediately notify command and control personnel. Notification should be over
secure nets. If this is not possible use unsecured net and as a last resort use emergency signaling
devices.
a. The notification format will include the following:
(1) Type mishap (downed aircraft [call sign] isolated/injured personnel).
(2) Number/status of persons/aircraft involved.
(3) Location of the incident and level of enemy threat.
b. (Canned statement) All aircraft will monitor 243.0 (guard) at all times.
c. Initial notification. This should be done on a secure net if possible (see example of tactical
frequencies).
(1) Primary TACSAT.
(2) UHF frequency (secure or unsecured).
(3) SAR Alpha/Bravo frequencies.
(4) VHF frequency (secure or unsecured).
(5) FM frequency (secure or unsecured).
d. (Canned statement) After initial notification and authentication of an incident, the CSAR
coordinator may direct all assets involved to change to the designated CSAR frequency to
deconflict radio communications with the main operation (see example list of CSAR
frequencies below).
(1) TACSAT channels.
(2) UHF frequencies.
(3) VHF frequencies.
(4) FM frequencies.
e. On-scene commander responsibilities. (Canned statement) The initial decision on how to
respond to an incident will normally rest with the on scene commander in consultation with
the theater commander. Designation of an appropriate on-scene commander will normally be
situational dependent.
f. Isolated personnel procedures. List any actions for isolated personnel as they interface with
and integrate into the E&R annex. Limit detail to information required by CSAR forces to
facilitate recovery.
g. Actions on objective. Limit restatements and detail in this section to information required
by CSAR forces to facilitate recovery.
h. Interface with fire support plan. (List only those points unique to fire support for CSAR.)
i. Interface with MEDEVAC plan. (List only those points unique to medical support for
CSAR forces.)

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Table 2.51 Combat Search and Rescue Planning Guide (6 of 9).


j. Evaluation (medical) facilities:
(1) Facility name:
(a) Facility capabilities: (Level I, II, and III):
(b) City/state:
(c) Location:
(d) Communication:
(e) Hours of operation:
(f) Approach/departure heading:
(g) Elevation:
(h) HLZ description:
(i) Prior landing notification:
(j) Information request:
1. ETA.
2. Number and type casualties.
3. Special needs.
k. MEDEVAC assets.
7. Coordinating Instructions.
a. Priority intelligence requirements. Limit restatements and detail in this section to
information required by CSAR forces to facilitate recovery.
(1) Permissive or non-permissive environment.
(2) Possible actions of civilian populace.
b. Annexes. (Reference but do not include the following in this annex).
(1) Evasion and recovery (E&R).
(2) CEOI. Call sign matrix with ground and air layers from flimsy or air plan.
(3) Medical.
(4) Fire Support.
8. Service Support. (List only that information not identified in the above areas that are unique
to CSAR.)
a. Quantity and type of equipment on dedicated CSAR assets.
b. Quantity and type of specialized rescue and recovery equipment on pararescue team.
c. Type and availability of personnel locator systems.
d. Method of handling dead and wounded (plan to include priorities, evacuation, and
transload).

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Table 2.52 Combat Search and Rescue Planning Guide (7 of 9).


9. Chain of Command and Signal:
a. Location of leaders during movement and at objective (e.g., identify airborne and ground
based command and control nodes).
(1) Location of primary and alternate CSAR coordinators.
(2) Define handover procedures for primary CSAR coordinator duties.
b. Signal.
(1) CSAR frequencies/call sign for initial notification.
(2) CSAR frequencies for conduct of CSAR after initial notification.
(3) Contact methods for JPRC.
(a) Frequencies and point of contact names/telephone numbers.
(4) Pyrotechnic and other surface to air or surface-to-surface signaling (from incident
site evader).
(5) Fire Support frequencies and call signs.
(6) Challenge and response/running password/number combination.
(7) Codes and formats.
Section 3On-Scene Commanders Checklist (CSAR).
SARDOT/Datum (lat/long)___________________________.
AMC or first aircraft on scene, notifies any C2 node, become OSC.
1. Call emergency.
2. Identify by call sign.
3. Incident location.
4. Fuel state.
5. Time remaining on station.
6. Current weather on-scene.
7. Attempt comm per SPINS.
8. PLS if equipped.
9. Key terrain features.
10. Establish comm plan for survivor contact, check-in, and authentication:
a. Survivor check-in:
(Note: After initial contact, survivor does not initiate comms)
b. Authentication:
(Note: Use challenge/reply or ISOPREP data but never ask survivors to do anything to
further reveal his/her position)

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Table 2.53 Combat Search and Rescue Planning Guide (8 of 9).


(Note: Use any one item of authentication data only once)
c. Determine condition of survivors and planned updates.
d. Threats and updates.
11. Fire support coordination
Section 4Planners Immediate Response Guide (CSAR).
1. Purpose. (NOTES: Use METT-TC, add enemy, mission statement, commanders intent,
commanders definition of success).
2. CSAR Considerations.
a. Type of CSAR.
(1) Permissive versus non-permissive.
(2) Water CSAR versus land CSAR (or combination).
(3) Immediate versus planned.
b. Objective sites.
(1) Number of personnel plus number of aircrew per chalk.
(2) Number of individual objective sites.
(3) Geographical separation of objective sites.
(4) Method/mode/conveyance of travel to objective sites.
(5) Infiltration and exfiltration routes to and from objective sites.
c. Reconnaissance and surveillance inserts.
(1) Number of individual R and S sites.
(2) Geographical separation of R and S sites.
(3) Method/mode/conveyance of travel to R and S sites.
(4) Infiltration and exfiltration routes to and from R and S sites.
d. Number and type of dedicated CSAR assets.
(1) List capabilities per asset.
(2) Type and quantity of CSAR equipment per asset.
e. Number and type of assets with CSAR capabilities.
(1) List capabilities per asset.
(2) Type and quantity of CSAR equipment per asset.
(3) Assets available (outside JTF).
(a) OPCON to JSOTF or JPRC.

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Table 2.54 Combat Search and Rescue Planning Guide (9 of 9).
f. Number of pararescue assets available.
(1) List capabilities.
(2) Type and quantity of CSAR equipment.
g. Type and availability of personnel locator systems.
(1) Dissemination of beacons/transmitters.
(2) Frequencies available.
h. Signal.
(1) CSAR frequencies for initial notification.
(2) CSAR frequencies for conduct of CSAR after initial notification.
(3) Surface to air signaling (from incident site/evader).
(4) Contact methods for JPRC.
(a) Frequencies.
(b) Point of contact and telephone numbers.
i. Implementation of the CSAR Plan.
(1) Who/what/when/where/how.
(2) To whom (CSAR coordinator or agency).
(3) What response can the notifying person expect from the CSAR coordinator or
agency.
(4) Deconfliction with FSO.
J. Interface with MEDEVAC plan.
(1) Medical evacuation facilities.
(2) MEDEVAC transportation assets.
3. Responsibilities.
a. JTF commander.
b. Air component commander.
c. RQS commander.
d. STS commander.
e. CSAR coordinator.
f. Designated CSAR assets.
g. Other CSAR Assets (on call).
h. Individuals requiring CSAR assistance.
i. JPRC.

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Table 2.55 JPRC/PRCC Planning Guide (1 of 3).


- CSAR Plan.
-- If a plan has not been constructed, bring the template from this regulation as a guide to
developing a plan to fit the operation.
-- Ensure that diplomatic agreements/procedures exist for CSAR/SAR with host/friendly
nations in the JTFs AOR.
--- Where is the host/friendly nation JPRC or equivalent?
--- What are the contact procedures?
--- Who must give approval for their use? (In most cases, individual countries are in
charge of any rescue effort going on within their country. Go through the embassy to
set up procedures to use friendly/neutral countries.)
- Coordinate with JTF staff on the following items:
-- J-1 (Administration) or service equivalent.
--- Ask J-1 if they would like to be added as an addressee to all messages to keep them
informed of rescue efforts in planning or underway.
-- J-2 (Intelligence) or service equivalent.
--- Ensure that evasion and recovery (E&R) plans at the JTF level match those at your
level and ensure that recovery procedures match those in the CSAR plans.
---- Contact the POC for SAFE/DAR area selection in the AOR and coordinate a
review of the information. Make sure that the channels are set up to pass this
information to the subordinate assault units.
-- J-3 (Operations) or service equivalent.
--- Review/write CSAR SPINS.
--- Coordinate with adjoining AORs on standardizing command and signal (pay
particular attention to ground to air signals for authentication).
--- Find out the CTAPS process and be ready to use it to get mission information and
as a backup communication link.
--- Coordinate with civil affairs and PSYOP to plan ways to get locals to turn isolated
personnel in to friendly forces.
--- Transmit a message requesting information on other PRCCs.
---- Include JPRC phone number, fax, radio frequencies, and coordinate the
establishment of daily reporting times for other component PRCC to exchange
updates in the event of concurrent CSAR efforts or multiple incidents of isolated
personnel (either through the JPRC or obtain DIRLAUTH approval).
---- Request each PRCC advise the JPRC with their communications setup.
---- Request each PRCC transmit a reply to the request for information (RFI) to
determine how effectively the hard copy message system works. This will allow
the JPRC to backup the messages in case they are lost.

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Table 2.56 JPRC/PRCC Planning Guide (2 of 3).


--- Talk to the JAG about the Law of Armed Conflict, how it applies to CSAR
efforts, and how to report any violations (e.g., someone shoots at a survivor in a raft).
Also, ask about your responsibility for picking up enemy and civilians in the AOR.
--- Try to get a clear definition of, and distinction between MEDEVAC and CSAR.
Determine who is responsible for what and how to get into the MEDEVAC system if
necessary.
--- Make sure you know who can suspend the search for isolated personnel. (This will
come from higher headquarters.)
--- Make sure the chain of command to the CSAR coordinator is clearly defined so
that there is no question who is in charge of the CSAR effort. This should be written
into the CSAR plan.
---- Determine who has launch/border crossing authority for CSAR assets.
--- Ensure that communication architecture between the operations center (JOC or
TOC) and the JPRC is effective and redundant. Plan to run a test CPX to determine
the effectiveness.
--- Ensure that all members of the PRCC are fully versed in the CSAR plan, E&R,
plan, and medical/MEDEVAC plan. Ensure that all operational units are familiar with
these documents.
--- Develop a plan for operational units to provide the JPRC/PRCC with ISOPREPs
and other authentication data to aid in recovery operations.
-- J-4 (Logistics) or service equivalent
--- Coordinate with the logistics readiness center (LRC) to determine the requirements
for forward operating locations (FOL) for CSAR forces
-- J-6 (Communications) or service equivalent
--- Does the JPRC/PRCC need radios? Check on their capabilities and make sure to
have a backup means of communicating with the JPRC and each component PRCC.
--- Take computers with appropriate software for messages. Prior to deployment,
copy essential message templates to ensure expediency when preparing paperwork.
--- Request a separate call sign for the CSAR coordinator (which acts a Buzz-word
to stop all radio traffic on the net to allow the initial CSAR calls to get through).
--- Check all call signs. Ensure that everyone uses one set of call signs as published
in the comm plan.
--- Check the JCEOI. If designated, identify the CSAR net architecture and publish
unique extracts to support CSAR operations.

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Table 2.57 JPRC/PRCC Planning Guide (3 of 3).


--- If available, an administrative TACSAT network should be designated CSAR
command and control (C2). This can be designated as a contingency alternative for
use of an existing net. Primary and secondary frequencies within each frequency range
(i.e., UHF or VHF) should be designated in advance to support CSAR operations.
--- If survival radios and/or GPS are being used for recognition, ensure a consolidated
list of serial numbers (PLS codes) is available at key nodes to support rapid
identification.
- PRCC Requirements
-- Develop CSAR incident/mission checklists to facilitate PRCC actions.
-- Start a phone list of frequently called phone numbers.
-- Bring admin supplies and/or establish a local account to procure the supplies.
-- Get two clocks (one local and one Zulu).
-- Establish requirements for administrative personnel and watch standers as well as
representatives from units essential to CSAR operations.
-- Set up daily read files to get information to all shifts.
-- Set up message files (incoming and outgoing).
-- See intel for threat overlays and get markers and acetate to mark maps with assets and
locations.
--- Mark maps with threat zones (low, medium, and high) for quick determinations on
how to accomplish a mission.
--- Plot all shoot downs or incidents of isolated personnel on a map to determine
trends (notify J-3 of trends).
-- Establish a suggested manning table for the PRCC within the command plans to
substitute personnel with appropriate qualifications when primary personnel are not
available.

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Table 2.58 Personnel Recovery Reference Material.


DoDD 2310.2, Personnel Recovery.
DoDD 5110.10, Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO).
DoDI 1300.21, Code of Conduct Training and Instruction.
DoDI 1300.7, Training and Education to Support Code of Conduct.
DoDI 2310.3, PRCC Procedures.
DoDI 2310.4, Repatriation of Prisoners of War (POW), Hostages, Peacetime Governmental
Detainees and Other Missing or Isolated Personnel.
Joint Publication 1-0, Joint Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations,
(Chapter 3 and Appendix S).
Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.
Joint Publication 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Joint Special Operations
Task Force Operations.
Joint Publication 3-50, Doctrine For Personnel Recovery (Draft).
Joint Publication 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue.
Joint Publication 3-50.3, Joint Doctrine for Evasion and Recovery.
Joint Publication 3-50.21, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for CSAR.
AFPD 16-12, Pararescue.
AFPD 16-13, SERE.
AFPD 10-4, Operations Planning.
AFPD 31-1, Physical Security.
AFPD 2-1.6, Personnel Recovery Operations (PRO).
AFDD 34, Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR).
AFDD 35, Special Operations.
AFI 10-401, Operation Plan and Concept Plan Development and Implementation.
AFI 10-403, Deployment Planning.
AFSOCI 10-3001, Personnel Recovery.
AFI 16-1202, Pararescue Operations, Techniques, and Procedures.
AFMAN 36-2216, Survival, Evasion, and Recovery Training.
2.4 Considerations for Immediate Surface Operations. This section will mainly deal with
PR/RO missions requiring a quick launch with minimal planning time. For PR/RO missions

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requiring deliberate planning such as extended surface operations, refer to AFTTP 3-1.8, Chapter
3, Mission Planning Considerations.
NOTE: The successful conduct of PR/RO operations requires meticulous pre-planning,
preparation, and training. PR/RO mission procedures will be initiated as soon as awareness and
notification is received, the position of the IP is known, it is verified the IP is still alive, and the
threat will allow or can be reduced to affect a successful recovery.
2.4.1 Opportunity for Success. The best chance of success is immediately after the need
for PR has been declared. Extensive mission planning may be required for specific objectives.
PR by its very nature implies justification of risk. PR planning should focus on a single
catastrophic event conducted under worst case circumstances. PR coverage is defined by the
capability and risk involved in the delivery and recovery of the recovery team in a reasonable
period. For casualties with severe medical complications or located in high risk environments
of urban, water, extreme weather and non-permissive environments, the response time should
be less than 1 hour if possible.
2.4.2 Control/Coordination Agencies. T h e t h e a t e r u n i f i e d c o m m a n d e r d e l e g a t e s
responsibilities for coordinating rescue and recovery to the joint personnel recovery center
(JPRC) or (PRCC.) The JPRC is a collateral function and requests needed Air Force resources
from approving authority. When other service resources are needed, the JPRC has the
authority to coordinate directly with the Army tactical operations center (TOC), Marine
tactical air control center, and the Navy combat information center (CIC) or the joint
operations center (JOC). The units operations staff and pararescue team leader (PJTL) direct
all requests for coordination and support through command channels to the JPRC/PRCC.
2.4.3 Notification. GUARDIAN ANGEL will receive notification of isolated personnel via
the theater or joint task force command and control structure. A PR/RO mission could involve
an aircrew bailout over hostile territory, crash landing, ditching at sea, foundering naval
vessels, or ground forces cut off from friendly lines. Typical operations might include the
following:
Awareness and notification.
Assessing the situation.
Planning the mission.
Launching the recovery vehicles.
Refueling at a forward operating location or air refueling prior to ingress.
Ingressing enemy territory to locate isolated personnel.
Locating the isolated personnel.
Authenticating the isolated personnel.
Recovering the isolated personnel.
Egressing enemy territory.
Conducting air refueling (as required).

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Recovering at a suitable friendly base.


2.4.4 Recovery Teams. Recovery teams (RT) should be selected, PR/RO and E&R plans
implemented, well before the need. This reduces confusion and increases response/recovery
times. Planning should include recovery teams to recover isolated personnel, treat injuries,
destroy sensitive equipment, provide evader assistance, crash site security, or provide a quick
reaction force (QRF).
2.4.5 Assets and Capability. Vertical lift assets should reflect a lift capability for delivering
the recovery team to the objective area (OA) and recovering the IP/equipment. Vertical lift
assets are limited by altitude, heat, and weight capability. Fixed wing aircraft should be
capable of delivering the recovery team to the OA and inserting the force and their equipment
by landing or by air (i.e., free-fall or static-line parachuting). During immediate response
missions, any mission aircraft may be used in a secondary role in the PR effort.
2.4.6 Recovery. The specific method of recovery will be driven by terrain, threat, condition
of isolated personnel, ability of IPs to continue to survive, equipment to be recovered,
specialized equipment required, time available, and insertion/extraction vehicles availability
and capability. Because increasingly sophisticated weapons are available to a wider variety of
military forces, para-military forces, and insurgents, the use of all PR assets must be planned
carefully and used appropriately.
2.4.7 Location. Location of the IP should be passed as described in the theater special
instructions (SPINS). PR should be initiated over the pre-briefed mission frequency when
communications with the survivor permit.
2.4.8 Authentication. Prior to insertion, authentication of personnel and threat will be
verified. On-scene aircraft will normally conduct this authentication. Authentication will be
initiated using the authenticator card or using theater SPINS. Once the proper answers/actions
are received and confirmed, recovery procedures will continue. When utilizing vertical lift
aircraft, the primary insertion/extraction method should be air landing. If terrain does not
permit landing, alternate methods of insertion/extraction should be available for use.
2.4.9 Extraction. Evacuation and exfiltration of the recovery team should be initiated as
soon as possible. If necessary, the recovery team may be required to change location to
expedite extraction or avoid threats. If the recovery vehicle is delayed, the recovery team
should follow pre-briefed procedures to minimize confusion during the recovery phase.
During exfiltration, contact the PR coordinating authority. Transmit special requirements to
include additional medical intervention needs, security or force requirements, re-supply
requirements for follow-on operations, and critical intelligence data.
2.4.10 Mission Termination. Close the mission only after IPs/equipment is delivered to a
competent authority, debriefing has occurred, and the recovery team has began the
reconstitution process.
2.5 Pararescue Team Leader Specific Considerations. Any employment of PJs into a hostile
or potentially hostile surface environment, for however brief a period, is considered a tactical
employment. The operation must be trained for, planned, and executed as such. The
responsibility for operations planning and preparation is shared jointly by the operations staff,
intelligence, applicable aircrew members and PJTL. Decisions concerning employment

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feasibility and duration must consider the worst probable circumstances and be mutually
understood by both the commander and the deploying PJTL. Long before mobility actions, and
before combat operations are conducted, the PJ NCOIC will establish the requirements necessary
for safe and effective operations.
2.5.1 Team Leader Checklist. The PJTL should use a checklist in planning and preparing
for a mission. (See Table 2.59, Team Leader Checklist.) The TL considers all the checklist
items but accomplishes only those items which the operational situation requires.
Table 2.59 Team Leader Checklist (Example).
Team Leader Checklist
1. Study the mission.
2. Plan use of time.
3. Study terrain and situation.
4. Organize the team.
5. Select men, weapons, and equipment.
6. Issue warning order.
7. Coordination (continuous throughout).
8. Request reconnaissance/study intelligence.
9. Complete detailed plans.
10. Issue operations order.
11. Briefback (to the tasking authority).
12. Supervise (at all times), inspect, rehearse.
13. Execute the mission.
NOTE: Considering all, accomplish those necessary in any order.
2.5.2 Receive and Study the Operation.
2.5.2.1 Operations Order. The overall outline for the tasking and planning for an
operation is titled the recovery team operations order. When completed, the operations
order provides in sequence, information, instructions and guidance followed by a complete
detailed plan on how to accomplish the assigned objective. The tasking order contains the
necessary information and instructions from which to develop a comprehensive plan for
execution. When initial tasking is set forth by the tasking authority, the intelligence
section and operations section are responsible for compiling the information necessary to
complete the operations order. The operations officer will ensure sufficient copies are
available in the operations section. These standard outlines provide concise and
standardized information for issuance of the tasking order to the PJTL.
2.5.2.2 Capabilities. When operations or the threat conditions exceed aircraft
capabilities, recovery teams may be tasked to perform ground operations necessary to
extract the IP. Another concept is employed when mechanized rescue is impracticable or
impossible. The primary considerations for this type of employment are that the
transportation resource must be afforded ample standoff in order to avoid an enemy
threat/that the geographic and climatological features in the OA create a situation that is
beyond the capability of the rescue vehicle. Depth and duration for the later concept of

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operations is limited only by the transportation resources used to deliver the recovery team
to the operational objective.
2.5.2.3 Information. The type of situational information about the enemy that the
intelligence and operations sections must attempt to provide for the PJ team leader is listed
below.
2.5.2.3.1 Terrain. Detailed knowledge of the terrain and climatology of the area of
operations is essential. The location of the existing road net and railroads, if any, must
be determined. Information regarding soil trafficability, vegetation, water routes and
expected ice thickness, snow conditions, wind velocity and direction, and average
snow depth should be available to the PJTL. The PJTL should also know the general
features of the terrain from the viewpoint of cross-country movement. For summer
operations in barren lands, it will be necessary to determine water routes suitable for
transportation and dry ground routes. Occasionally, maps may be unreliable or even
nonexistent. Therefore, the requirement for timely aerial photographs must be used as
a source of terrain information. Does the terrain offer passive security because of its
ruggedness? How would the area lend itself to a survival situation? Are there any
cultivated areas?
2.5.2.3.2 Identification. A description of physical features, mannerisms, and types of
clothing is essential for both civilian and military. Special unit recognition by attire and
function should be addressed.
2.5.2.3.3 Location. The PJTL needs to be briefed about the location of enemy within
the periphery of the designated area of operations (AO) and the expected response time
and type of support the enemy may have from contingents outside the AO. In
particular, the PJTL needs an assessment of enemy strength within close proximity to
the OA.
2.5.2.3.4 Activity. The assessment of activity must address whether the enemy is
mobile or static and the type of enemy forceconventional, unconventional or
guerrillas. What is the enemy known to be doing in the AO? Does the enemy patrol
the AO regularly and what routes are usually taken? Are there any established
observation posts or secured areas?
2.5.2.3.5 Strength. Strengths include both population density and military order of
battle or troop strength. Relative quantities of loyalists, conventional, unconventional,
and specialized search and destroy elements must be identified.
2.5.2.3.6 Sociological Summary. Outline any significant political, economical and
cultural aspects of the indigenous enemy within the periphery of the AO to include the
overall influence of the military and the possibility of indigenous sympathizers. State
of health and especially the possibility of incapacitating disease affecting those within
the AO should be noted.
2.5.2.3.7 Equipment Types/Abilities.
Air Forces. Fixed/rotary wing aircraft?
General air defense?

Night and weather capabilities?

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Ground Forces. AAA, SAM, and small arms; size, range, mobility,
engagement parameters, optics/radar capabilities and Radar Warning Receiver
(RWR) indications?
Comm. Communications jamming and direction finding capabilities?
Radar. Infrared, night vision, antipersonnel radar capabilities?
2.5.2.4 Tasking Order. Do not confuse the tasking order with the operations or warning
orders. During issuance of the tasking order, the PJTL should listen carefully to ensure
clear understanding of all information, instructions, and guidance, taking notes for later
use in planning. The PJTL should ask questions if any points are not clear.
2.5.2.5 Study. The PJTL carefully studies the operation. Through study of the terrain
and situation, the PJTL identifies the essential tasks to be accomplished in executing the
mission. These essential tasks become submissions of the team for which organization,
personnel, and equipment must be considered.

2.5.3 Plan Use of Time. Combat situations seldom allow the PJTL as much time for
planning and preparation as desired. Plan the proper use of available time. Pre-plan as much
of the operation as-possible.
2.5.3.1 Schedule Preparation. As soon as mission study is completed, quickly make a
mental or written time schedule. (See Table 2.60, TL Time Schedule [Reverse Planning]
and Table 2.61, PJTL Time Schedule [Chronological Planning] which allots time for each
action of the team.)
2.5.3.2 Time Schedule. Plan the PJTL time schedule around any times specified in the
tasking order (i.e., time of departure, time to make reconnaissance, or time of return). Use
reverse planning. This method plans from the last action for which a time is specified and
works back to the receipt of tasking orders. This allocates time for all necessary actions.
In planning use of time, the PJTL ensures subordinate leaders and team members are
allowed time necessary to prepare for the mission.
2.5.4 Study Terrain and Situation. The PJTL studies the terrain over which the team will
operate and the friendly and enemy situations, relating these to the study of the operation and
identification of essential tasks to be accomplished.
2.5.4.1 Terrain. If available, make a detailed study of the map and of aerial photos, if
available. Note fields of fire and observation, cover, concealment, obstacles, key terrain
features, and avenues of approach and withdrawal. Study the OA very closely. Consider
the influence of terrain on execution of the operation. Terrain may influence the recovery
teams size, organization, and equipment. For example, a stream or lake to be crossed may
require personnel/equipment flotation. Team formations while moving depend on the
terrain, that is, for difficult terrainclose formations, for open terrainextended
formations. Terrain will effect speed of movement. Terrain in the OA helps determine
security needed, positioning of fire support, manner of conducting the leaders
reconnaissance, and the plan of action at the objective.

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Table 2.60 TL Time Schedule (Reverse Planning).


TL Time Schedule Extraction (Example)
Date

Time/(Zulu)

Activity

19

0200

Return friendly area

18

2330/0200

Movement en route

18

2300/2300

Accomplish operation, reorganize

18

2230/2300

Leaders recon

18

2000/2230

Movement en route

18

2000/

Departure friendly area/insertion

18

1945/2000

Movement to departure area

18

1930/1945

Final inspection

18

1845/1930

Night rehearsals

18

1800/1845

Day rehearsals

18

1745/1800

Inspection

18

1700/1745

Supper meal

18

1630/1700

Issue operations order

18

1530/1630

Complete detailed plans

18

1430/1530

Make reconnaissance

18

1415/1430

Issue warning order

18

1330/1415

Preliminary planning
- Coordinate
- Select team, weapons, equipment
- Organize the team
- Study terrain and situation
- Plan use of time
- Study the operational tasking

18

1330

Tasking order received

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Table 2.61 PJTL Time Schedule (Chronological Planning).


PJTL Time Schedule Extraction
Date

Time/(Zulu)

Activity

18

/0900

Warning order completed

18

0900/1230

TL requests reconnaissance/studies intelligence: makes coordination:


completes detailed plans
- Assist. TL supervises drawing, issue, preparation of equipment,
ammunition, rations
- Assist. TL supervises practice of immediate action drills
- Special elements rehearse (stream crossing, aerial resupply)
- Team members prepare individual equipment
- Subordinate leaders inspect

18

1230/1300

Noon meal

18

1300/1330

Operation order

18

1330/1430

Team members complete preparation

18

1430/1630

TL inspects
- Daylight rehearsals
- Element rehearsals
- Team rehearsals

18

1630/1730

Rest

18

1730/1800

Evening meal

18

1800/1900

Final inspection
- By subordinate leaders
- Spot checks by TL
- Questions on plans, signals, use of equipment

18

2000/2030

Aircraft briefing

18

2030/2100

Aircraft on load

18

2100/2130

Dark adaptation of eyes

18

2200/

Depart

2.5.4.2 Situation. Study the strengths, locations, dispositions, and capabilities of both
friendly and enemy forces that may affect the teams operation.
2.5.5 Make Tentative Plan. From the study of the operation, terrain, and situation, the PJTL
formulates a tentative plan of action for accomplishing the operation. This plan includes the

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number of people needed and how they will be organized, the weapons and equipment needed,
and the manner in which they will be employed. Manner of employment or scheme of
maneuver is the concept of operation. The tentative plan is later developed into the complete
and detailed plan of operation.
2.5.6 Select and Organize the Recovery Team, Weapons, and Equipment.
2.5.6.1 Select the Team. Selection of recovery team members should be based on
knowledge of the individuals performance as certified in the AF Form 623, On-the-Job
Training Record. More personnel than necessary are not taken merely to maintain unit
integrity.
2.5.6.1.1 Personnel Readiness. Personnel with poor health/physical condition are not
taken. For example, an individual with a cold may endanger security by coughing or a
person with foot trouble may slow-down the team.
2.5.6.1.2 Grub Down. Establish a grub down period, this is essential to team
survivability. For PJ combat operations this period begins approximately 72 hours
prior to deployment but may be longer as the operational situation dictates. Grub down
is the reduction and control of shaving, haircuts, using scented soaps, after shaves,
shampoos, lotions, colognes, deodorants, mouthwashes and toothpaste; and wearing
clothing that has been starched or scented by softeners. During periods of perpetual
immediate response in the combat environment, PJs will maintain a continuous state of
grub down. Good hygiene is still essential. This will be achieved using an
unscented cleaning agent for bathing (i.e., Ivory soap, Phisoderm, and sodium chloride
[table salt] for brushing teeth). Shaving waivers and haircut waivers (not necessary for
most mission situations) will be coordinated with the host base commander by the
senior deployed combat rescue officer/pararescuemen.
2.5.6.2 Organize the Recovery Team. Organization consists of determining the
individual responsibilities required to accomplish essential tasks, selecting the right person
for each responsibility, and determining the weapons and equipment the team will need.
Organization is a two-step process: (1) general organization and (2) special organization.
2.5.6.2.1 General Organization. A basic recovery team consists of three
pararescuemen, with one being the overall PJTL. A three or four man movement, with
a simple operation, is not organized into elements. Instead, the entire team becomes a
single reconnaissance and security element. A larger team with a more complex
operation requires a reconnaissance element and a security element or a combination
thereof.
2.5.6.2.2 Special Organization. The team is further organized when needed to
perform essential tasks.
2.5.6.2.2.1 Elements. The recovery team should be organized into smaller
elements corresponding to unique duties such as communication, search, IP
contact, and medical.
2.5.6.2.2.2 Weapons of Support. More than one support element may be
required when the support element leader or the PJTL cannot directly control the

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weapons of the support element. This may be the case when there are too many
supporting weapons for direct control or when weapons are positioned too far apart
for direct control.
2.5.6.3 Weapons. Selection of weapons and ammunition is based on this question:
What is needed to do the job? The difficulty of transporting some weapons because of
bulk or weight must be considered but is seldom a decisive factor. Personnel should be
knowledgeable about the weapons they are using. Aerial re-supply of ammunition is
considered for operations extended in time or distance.
2.5.6.4 Equipment. When possible, the same equipment is used for more than one
purpose or in more than one area. A unit operating instruction prescribing routine uniform
and equipment saves the TL and the team valuable time in planning and preparing. Inspect
and pre-stage all mission equipment. This will save time during the launch phase of the
PR mission.

2.5.7 Issue a Warning Order. The time a team needs to prepare depends on such factors as
the nature of the operation, the proficiency of the recovery team, and the preparations made (if
any) when the PJTL received the tasking order and made a tentative plan. The PJTL provides
team members the maximum preparation time possible by issuing a warning order as soon as
a tentative plan is made. The warning order should be issued to all team members. If this is
not feasible, the order is issued to subordinate leaders, in turn, they issue warning orders to
their elements.
2.5.7.1 Situation. Minimum details are given to include only the information the
recovery team needs to prepare while the PJTL plans in detail. The complete situation is
given in the operations order.
2.5.7.2 Mission. This is a brief but clear statement of what the recovery team is to
accomplish and the location or area in which it is to be done.
2.5.7.3 Organization. General and special organization are prescribed and explained.
2.5.7.4 Uniform and Equipment Common to All. This includes clothing, personal
equipment, rations and water to be carried, camouflage measures to be taken, and the
means of identification the recovery team will carry. Prohibited items are also stated, (i.e.,
wallets, letters, and personal papers, which might reveal information if lost or captured).
2.5.7.5 Chain of Command. Individuals are assigned a place in the chain of command.
In larger teams, subordinate leaders are assigned relative positions and required to
establish chains of command within their elements.
2.5.7.6 Times and Places for Inspection and Rehearsal. The PJTL announces the
times and places to inspect the team. If known at the time, the time and place of rehearsal
for the full team is given. Complete uniform and equipment are worn and carried at all
such inspections and rehearsals.
2.5.7.7 Specific Instructions. Specific instructions are given to/for:
Subordinate leaders for obtaining, checking, and distributing rations, water,
weapons, ammunition, and equipment.

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Preparation of recovery team members for the operation.


Initiating and supervising other activities to be accomplished. This may include
practice of immediate action drills, rest and sleep periods, or the practice of hazard
crossing procedures. Reconnaissance, coordination, inspections, and rehearsals require
all key individuals for their preparation, such as function checks of radios and
specialized recovery equipment. Map study by point and compass personnel is
mandatory, regardless whether electronic means (i.e., GPS) is used or not.
2.5.7.8 Safeguarding of Information. In all situations, precautions must be taken to
prevent compromising the team or other operations. All information is given on a strict
need-to-know basis observing all the rules of COMSEC and OPSEC. Other security
measures must include isolation of the team from non-essential personnel, withholding of
information until the latest feasible time and continuous security education. When filled
in, the operations order and its annexes are classified SECRET or higher.
2.5.8 Coordination. Coordination is a continuous, joint effort by all tasked and tasking
agencies, to never assume anything. It is imperative to mission accomplishment that the PJTL
possess detailed knowledge of the various organizational structures and their contacts and the
skills required to assess each is working toward the same goal. All activities requiring
coordination should be documented. Coordinating frequently overlaps to ensure that
coordination is continuous, complete, and properly accomplished. This is particularly true of
extended operations since the dispatching units areas of influence and interest may overlap
those of others.
2.5.8.1 Coordination. Coordination must continue throughout planning, preparation, and
conduct of the operation. The PJTL coordinates all possible arrangements before leaving
the place the tasking order site. Communications are better at that site and the advice and
assistance of trained and interested personnel are most readily available.
2.5.8.2 Examples of Coordination. Examples of coordination, that must be made are:
Movements In Friendly Areas. Units in whose areas the recovery team will
operate must be informed so the team will not be endangered or unnecessarily be
restricted.
Departure and Re-Entry of Friendly Areas. Guides may be necessary, especially
if the team must pass friendly obstacles such as mines or wire.
Fire Support. Carefully planned and properly coordinated fire support can decrease
thepotential for fratricide and can help in six ways.
Destroy. Destroy enemy opposing the team en route, at danger areas, and at the
objective.
Deceive. Deceive the enemy as to the true location or direction of movement of the
team by cloaking withdrawal or other routes upon breaking contact.
Deny. Deny the enemy use and access of roads, trails and other terrain features from
which they may detect or bring action against the team. The enemy can also be denied
the use of approaches into the OA.

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Defend. Defend the recovery team against attack en route, at danger areas, and at
the objective.
Direct. Assist in location of objectives.
Detect. Detect the enemy by firing on likely positions.

2.5.9 Make Reconnaissance. Visual reconnaissance confirms, clarifies, and supplements


information provided by maps, aerial photos, and other sources.
2.5.9.1 Reconnoiter. When possible, an aerial reconnaissance is made of the OA and of
the terrain. This is the only useful means of reconnoitering a large area.
2.5.9.2 Ground Reconnaissance. A ground reconnaissance of the teams area of
operations is desired, but is generally impossible. The PJTL should attempt to gather
information from units who operated in these areas.
2.5.10 Complete Detailed Plan. The warning order has been issued; reconnaissance has
been made; recovery team members are preparing themselves and their equipment. The PJTL
now develops the tentative plan into a detailed plan for accomplishing the operation. The
tactical situation and designated mission objective provides the substance from which the
PJTL draws on to build the detailed plan of execution.
2.5.10.1 Essential Tasks. The PJTL first assigns essential tasks to be accomplished by
individual recovery team members. The PJTL then plans other phases of the mission in
the sequence most convenient under the circumstances. The sequence in which planning
is discussed below may be followed or modified, as appropriate, and as time permits.
2.5.10.2 Execution Plan. This plan is a complete outline of the actions necessary to
accomplish the assigned objective and should be included in the operations order.
2.5.10.2.1 Concept of Operations. In the execution plan the concept of operation is
stated in the lead paragraph. This is a concise statement summarizing the method to be
used to achieve the objective.
2.5.10.2.2 Coordinating Instructions. To the extent required by the situation, the
PJTL plans when and how the team, its elements, and the individual team members are
to accomplish assigned responsibilities.
2.5.10.2.3 Critical Times/Dates. Critical times and dates are addressed throughout
the PJTLs time schedule and the recovery team time schedule. Times of departure and
return require special attention and are addressed in detail in the following paragraphs.
2.5.10.2.3.1 Times. Times of departure and return are based on careful
consideration of the times required to:
Reach the objective. Considerations include distance, terrain, anticipated
speed of movement, the friendly and enemy situation, and (if applicable) the
time at or by which the operation must be accomplished.
Accomplish essential tasks in the OA; (i.e., reconnaissance) movement of
elements and individuals and actual accomplishment of the operation.

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Return to friendly areas/extraction point. This may differ from time required
to reach the objective. IP(s) may slow the team. The use of a different return
route may change the time required.
2.5.10.2.3.2 Advantage. Advantage is taken of light and weather conditions
which will aid departure and return (e.g., greater darkness before moonrise and
after moonsetdarkness and noise of wind and rain during stormy periods).
2.5.10.2.4 Specific Individual Responsibilities. Essential tasks are identified and
assigned. These are the tasks whose successful performance enables the team to reach
the objective and return. Such tasks as navigation, team security, security during halts,
survivor contacts, as well as the authentication procedures are to mention a few.
2.5.10.2.5 Organization for Movement. Formations must be planned for movement
of the team to and from the OA. Location of elements and individuals in the various
formations used must be planned.
2.5.10.2.5.1 Ground Movement. Ground movement formations should be
adaptable to any size team. Each formation has its advantages and disadvantages.
They may be varied to fit the terrain and situation. For example, a situation may
require some sacrifice of control in order to achieve greater dispersion. Another
situation may require great stealth at the expense of speed in movement.
2.5.10.2.5.2 Factors Influencing Movement.
2.5.10.2.5.2.1 Enemy Contact. The most important consideration is the plan
of action to take if the team makes enemy contact.
2.5.10.2.5.2.2 Tactical Integrity. As far as possible, organization for
movement maintains element and team integrity. This helps in control, security,
employment at the objective, and on enemy contact.
2.5.10.2.5.2.3 Employment At Objective. Consistent with other
considerations, organization for movement permits quick and easy
employment at the objective.
2.5.10.2.5.2.4 Control. How important is control in relation to other factors?
The size of the team is always an important consideration.
2.5.10.2.5.2.5 The Enemy Situation. Where is the enemy? How strong is
he? What/where are ambush dangers?
2.5.10.2.5.2.6 Speed of Movement. When must the team reach the objective?
When must it return? Rate of movement is governed by the threat, terrain,
mission equipment, and security. A pace consideration is where to place the
slowest team member.
2.5.10.2.5.2.7 Stealth. Can the team move quietly? Does the formation force
the flanks to move through noisy underbrush? Which is most important, stealth
or speed?
2.5.10.2.5.2.8 Security. From which direction is contact with the enemy most
likely to come? Will the team have a 360-degree security? Will speed or

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stealth provide the best security? A carefully controlled combination of speed
and stealth is usually best.
2.5.10.2.5.2.9 Dispersion. Consistent with control, the team is dispersed so
that a sudden burst of fire will cause the fewest casualties.
2.5.10.2.5.2.10 Terrain. How does terrain affect movement? Is it wooded or
open? Are there roads or streams to cross?
2.5.10.2.5.2.11 Visibility. Is visibility good or poor? Can the enemy see the
team? Can the team be seen and controlled?
2.5.10.2.5.2.12 Weather. How will the weather affect the ground, streams,
and visibility and equipment requirements? The operations order should
provide a detailed synopsis of meteorological, celestial, nautical and
atmospherics data as it affects the mission.
2.5.10.2.6 Primary and Alternate Routes.
2.5.10.2.6.1 Routes. A primary route and one or more alternate routes of return
are selected.
2.5.10.2.6.2 Legs. Routes are divided into legs with each leg starting, if
possible, at a point which can be recognized on the ground and a pace count is used
between each point. This makes it easier to stay oriented at all times. When it is
not possible to start and stop legs at recognizable points, a continuous pace count
can be used.
2.5.10.2.7 Delta Reference Points. This is a pre-determined point used for secure
reference of locations. The reference points are significant landmarks or geographic
features and pre-designated rallying points. Pre-planned ground fire support as with
fire suppression for pre-designated targets should not be designated as a reference
point but should be referred to by target number. However, aerial ordnance delivery
can be directed based on bearing/direction from a reference point when the aircraft,
reference point, and target are within view of the person directing the strike. The PJTL
selects enough reference points so that during most of the route of travel the team
maintains a reference point within line of sight except when made impossible by
heavily forested or desert terrain.
2.5.10.2.8 Support Utilization. Based on the objective the PJTL assesses the
information from the situation report to determine what support is available and what
is necessary in order to achieve the mission objective. Before determining support
requirements, the TL must develop a thorough understanding of the enemy situation,
then incorporates the necessary support into the teams plan of execution. There are
four types of support to consider aircraft support, ground support, logistic and
re-supply support, and maritime support. (See Table 2.62, Types of Support.)

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Table 2.62 Types of Support.


Type of Support

Aircraft

Activity
Reconnaissance

Visual, photo, tactical electronic


reconnaissance, strike control and
reconnaissance.

Insertion operations

Airlanding, rappelling, freefall swimmer,


hoist, parachute, or vehicle.

Electronic warfare

Area jamming for insertion and extraction


operations.

Defense suppression

Hunter/Killer, interdiction for destruction of


radiation emitters (SAM, AAA, GCI, etc.).

Airborne command and


control communications

Communications relay, TACAIR


coordination, air/ground threat advisories, and
friendly aircraft vectoring.

Ordnance delivery

TACAIR bombs, rockets, bullets,


harassment/incapacitation ordnance, and
smoke screening.

Re-supply

Freefall bundle drop, parachute bundle drop,


parachute cargo delivery system, container
delivery system (CDS), low altitude parachute
extraction system (LAPES), high altitude low
opening (HALO), SUU21/22 re-supply pods.

Extraction operations

Airlanding, rope (STABO/SPIES), hoist, rope


ladder, and vehicle.

Fire support (artillery


ordnance delivery)

Destroy, deceive, deny, defend, direct, and


detect.

Fire support (infantry)

Raid patrols, ambush patrols, security patrols,


contact patrols, search and attack patrols,
motorized patrols, and airmobile and
waterborne patrols.

Logistics and re-supply

Caches for unconventional warfare (UW)


operations, or direct support from UW forces
and forward operating indigenous forces.

Insertion/extraction
operation

Swift boat, inflatable boats, swimmer


deployment vehicle (SDV), and submarine wet
deck operations.

Naval gun fire support

Ground

Maritime

Example

2.5.10.2.9 Departure and Re-Entry of Friendly Areas. Team movements must be


coordinated with the units areas the team will move. Methods for accounting for

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personnel during departure and re-entry must be thoroughly planned. Use any method
which, least endangers the team and other friendly forces.
2.5.10.2.10 Annexes. Actions not included in other parts of the detailed plan are
planned as other actions. This includes plans for stream crossing, adverse terrain
rescue, and aerial re-supply of ammunition or rations. Annexes are the plans, in a
written operations order, that are placed in specific attachments.
2.5.10.2.10.1 Insertion Plan. The insertion plan is included with the operations
order and contains only the necessary details required for the insertion phase of the
operation. A copy of this plan with a large scale map identifying all critical points
and known threat locations will be presented to the operations staff, TL, or the
person in charge of the insertion vehicle.
2.5.10.2.10.2 Collateral Unit Coordination Plan. The collateral unit
coordination plan is included with the operations order and contains the
information necessary to link-up with a collateral clandestine ground element in
order to accomplish a common assigned objective. If necessary, a copy of this plan
is presented to the command authority in direct control of the collateral unit.
2.5.10.2.10.3 Re-Supply Plan. The re-supply plan is included with the
operations order and contains only a basic outline of the necessary details required
for pre-planned re-supply during a mission. A copy of this plan with a large scale
map identifying primary and alternate re-supply drop zones and known threat
locations will be presented by the RCC/JSRC/JOC or operations staff to the agency
or person in charge of re-supply transportation.
2.5.10.2.10.4 Extraction Plan. The extraction plan is included with the
operations order and contains only the necessary details required for the extraction
phase of the operation. A copy of this plan with a large scale map identifying all
critical points, Delta points and known threat locations is presented by the
operations staff or the PJTL to the person in charge of extraction. The alternate
extraction point is included in this plan only if the primary extraction vehicle is
expected to divert to the secondary point; otherwise, another attachment must be
developed for the alternate extraction point in order to maintain operations security.
2.5.10.2.10.5
order.

Master Maps. These maps become attachments to the operations

2.5.10.2.10.5.1 A large-scale map of 1:50,000 or larger scale will show the


OA and if possible, the complete area of operations. The TL uses this map to
outline the complete plan of execution in the area of operations. Required
entries are: the primary and alternate routes of travel, the primary and alternate
insertion points, initial rallying point, Delta points, fire suppression of
pre-designated targets, survivors probable location, primary and alternate
objective rallying points, primary and alternate link-up points, primary and
alternate extraction points, safe areas, designated areas for recovery, emergency
recovery points, and known threat locations. This map is classified SECRET

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or above and remains with the operations order in a classified file.


2.5.10.2.10.5.2 A medium scale map of 1:250,000 scale will show the
complete area of operations. The TL should plot the area covered by the
large-scale map onto this map, and thereby develop a total perspective for the
area surrounding the area of operations and the OA. This map is classified
SECRET or above and the disposition is the same as in the previous paragraph.
2.5.10.2.10.6 Evasion Plan of Action. The PJTL develops this plan based on
guidance and information contained in the SPINS and extracted from intelligence.
This plan is absolutely essential in order to cover the contingencies that would
develop when the integrity of the team is disrupted to the point that the operational
objective is no longer paramount and the primary objective becomes survival. For
example; 50 or more percent of the team members are casualties in a chance enemy
contact, failure of scheduled re-supply in extreme cold weather operations, or a PJ
element is temporarily abandoned during immediate response combat rescue
operations.
2.5.10.3 Logistics and Administration. Logistics and administration should be part of
the operations order. Use unit standard operating procedures as much as possible to
streamline the equipment preparation process. For the immediate response scenario,
sufficient quantity and types of equipment must be pre-packaged and pre-positioned
onboard the mission-alert aircraft to cover a variety of contingencies. The pre-planned
surface operation will require only the quantity and types of equipment necessary for that
operation alone. Special consideration must be given to the impact that shortages of
essential equipment items would have on successful operation accomplishment.
2.5.10.3.1 Rations and Water. The amount of water and rations that must be carried
varies with the environment. All natural water sources must be considered un-potable.
The quantity of chemical purification agent carried or filters for mechanical purifiers
should be sufficient to cover the duration of an evasion plan of action. If the threat of
NBC agents is a possibility, the team must carry enough water for the duration of the
mission. Aerial re-supply is considered for extended operations.
2.5.10.3.2 Arms, Ammunition and Pyrotechnics. The warning order specifies the
arms, ammunition, and pyrotechnics needed to support the tentative plan.
2.5.10.3.3 Individual Uniform and Bivouac Equipment. Unit standard operating
procedures (SOPs) should address variations required by the environment. The PJTL
must determine in the detailed plan, if any additions, deletions, or other changes to the
uniform and equipment are required based on what is specified in the warning order.
2.5.10.3.4 Communications Equipment. Communications equipment is grouped
into two basic categories: electronic and visual. The PJTL must determine the types of
radios and beacons required.
2.5.10.3.5 Medical Equipment. What is the known condition of the operational
objective? The PJTL must include enough medical equipment to cover any known or
suspected requirements. Additional equipment must be available to provide treatment
for team members who become injured or wounded. Special medical equipment items

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like pole/poleless litters, stokes litters and litter accessories are determined based on
the plan of action for survivor treatment and survivor movement should be identified in
the operations order.
2.5.10.3.6 Special Equipment. Areas of special significance are wet operations,
parachute operations, adverse terrain operations, and specialized crash egress
equipment requirements. Each of these areas requires special consideration based on
the type of insertion and extraction planned and the type of terrain within the area of
operations.
2.5.10.3.7 Color Topographic Maps and Aerial Photos. Maps of both large and
medium scale are necessary for planning and executing the operation. Through the
assessment, the PJTL decides what mapping is essential or if the available mapping is
sufficient. It may require reconnaissance in order to effectively plan and execute.
2.5.10.3.8 Administration. Handling of wounded, dead and prisoners is usually
addressed in this section. In recovery operations, these problems become an integral
part of the execution plan. Other administrative items the PJTL should consider are as
follows:
Physical and mental condition of individual team members.
Immunization and preventative medicine requirements.
Personal affairs and emergency data records (i.e., last will and testament, or
financial arrangements).
Identification requirements (i.e., ID card, dog tags and passport [as required]).
Facilities available (i.e., messing or billeting, isolation).
Code of conduct review.
Sterilization of personal effects.
Standardized location of all sensitive items (i.e., classified documents, manual
and electrical encryption devices).
General and unique rules of conduct and engagement.
Handling of victims effects.
2.5.10.4 Command and Signal.
2.5.10.4.1 Chain of Command.
2.5.10.4.2 Locations of Leaders. The location and communications requirements of
the PJTL and assistant PJTL are planned for all phases of the operation, during
movement, at danger areas, and at the objective. The PJTL plans to be where the team
can be best controlled and directed at each phase. The assistant PJTL maybe assigned
specific duties in a sensitive location during any phase of the operation or may assist
the PJTL in control of the entire team being located in the best position to assume
command, if required.

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2.5.10.4.3 Communications. When communication with outside C2 and support


elements is required or anticipated, the plan must include radio call signs, frequencies,
times to transmit or monitor, and when appropriate, the special codes to be used.
2.5.10.4.4 Signals. Signals break down into three basic areas. These are: (1) signals
for team movement, (2) recognition symbols, and (3) evasion and recovery signals.
2.5.10.4.4.1 Signals for Team Movement. When and where will signals be
needed to control the team? These signals must be planned and rehearsed. Some
instances where they may be needed are to signal freeze or take cover, enemy in
sight, to order withdrawal from the objective, to signal all clear, and to stop and
start the team. Visual and audible signals such as arm and hand signals,
pyrotechnics, voice, radios, and infrared equipment may be used. All team
members must know any signals planned.
2.5.10.4.4.2 Photo Recognition. The photo recognition symbol is a simple signal
(i.e., a dash and dot) that can be positioned through photo-reconnaissance to track
long-range ground movement.
2.5.10.4.4.3 E&R Signals. Evasion and recovery signals (letters and colors) are
assigned by intelligence and usually published in the SPINS. The recovery team
will only use these signals when the basic plan of execution has reverted to the
evasion plan of action.
2.5.11 Issue the Operations Order. From the planning done in the previous step, the PJTL
should have all the information to brief the team on the operation (issue the operations order).
2.5.12 Briefback. A good method is for the team to assemble for a short conference before
the brief-back. Notes, thoughts, and observations are compared so complete, concise, and
accurate information can be quickly given at the brief back.
2.5.13 Briefback the Command Releasing Authority. This is where the PJTJ sells the
intended operation. Approval, disapproval with a recommendation to scrub the entire mission,
amend/re-do the plan, or put the operation on hold as is, should occur at this point.
2.5.14 Supervise (At all Times), Inspect, Rehearse. Inspections and rehearsals are vital to
proper preparation. They must be carefully planned and conducted even though a team may
be experienced in PJ combat operations. Use a rehearsal area resembling the OA. Plans must
provide for inspections by subordinate leaders as well as the PJTL, when required.
2.5.15 Include Provisions for Test Firing all Weapons. A functional check is not enough.
Conduct live test firing in all modes. Limit test firing to as few rounds as possible. Ensure the
weapons are clean and lubricated as required by the environment.
2.6 SERE Specialist Specific Mission Planning Considerations. T h i s s e c t i o n p r o v i d e s
general information and procedures for operational taskings. Additionally, it defines roles and
duties of Air Force SERE specialists (1T000/1T0X1) and outlines activities conducted while
supporting PR operations. In conjunction with AFPD 16-13, Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and
Escape (SERE) Program Directive, and specialized training, it serves as a base document for units
to develop and maintain the required capabilities to successfully accomplish PR operations.

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2.6.1 Documents. Refer to AFPD 16-13 Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE)
Program Directive, JP 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue, JP 3-50.21,
Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for CSAR, JP3-50.3, Joint Doctrine for Evasion and
Recovery, DoDI 1300.7, Training and Education to Support Code of Conduct, DoDI 1300.21,
Code of Conduct Training Instruction, CCR 525-21.
2.6.2 Qualification and Training. SERE specialists will be qualified IAW their career field
education and training plan (CFETP), MAJCOM master task list, and unit level training
requirements. Operations supported may dictate additional training.
2.6.3 Concept of Employment. SERE support to PR operations covers the spectrum of
engagements from regional conflict to small-scale contingencies (SSC) and consists of three
mission areas which form the SERE triad. These include (1) initial training, (2)
refresher/continuation training, and (3) deployed operations supporting high-risk-of-capture
(HRC)/high-risk-of-isolation (HRI) personnel. Deployed responsibilities include: assignment
to the joint personnel recovery center (JPRC), personnel recovery coordination cell (PRCC) or
equivalent; unit level positions in operational flying units, rescue squadrons, sister service or
allied units, and SOF/OGA elements as requested. Actions taken prior to mission execution
are designed to facilitate planning and preparation for possible IP events and the ensuing PR
mission. SERE specialists will assist in all facets of PR mission planning by ensuring
incorporation of all available and pertinent SERE information. Actions taken after recovery
facilitate reintegration and ensure lessons learned are documented and forwarded. Procedures
for the mission areas may overlap and each specific operating location may have collateral
support requirements identified and supported by the assigned SERE specialist.
NOTE: In SSC situations a single SERE specialist may be required to perform the functions of
both mission areas.
2.6.4 PR Operational Support Duties at Home Unit. Provide oversight, manage, and
conduct operations and training activities supporting PR operations IAW AFPD 16-13,
Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) and MAJCOM requirements.
2.6.5 PR Duties while Deployed.
Provide oversight and conduct theater specific PR briefings to HRC/MRC
personnel (i.e., environmental, cultural, HRC/HRI, and STEP briefings).
Serve as PR LNO to JPRC/PRCC director/coordinator.
Conduct reintegration debriefings of recovered personnel to extract and integrate
lessons learned IAW Chapter 12, Reintegration Operations.
Assist in development and update PR SPINS.
In cooperation with unit intelligence personnel, evaluate suitability/availability of
selected areas for evasion (SAFE), designated areas for recovery (DAR), and other
designated PR areas to determine suitability for mission requirements. Communicate
new requirements through appropriate channels.
2.6.6 SERE Program Manager. The senior ranking or designated SERE specialist in the
JPRC/PRCC will act as the SERE program manager (PM) and has final responsibility for the
theater SERE program. The SERE program manager (PM) may delegate tasks and duties as

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necessary to facilitate mission accomplishment but does not relinquish responsibility.


2.6.6.1 Responsible to ensure EPAs, ISOPREPs, and other SERE-related documents meet
the combatant commanders theater requirements. Establish/enforce procedures for
receiving and reviewing unit level EPAs and ISOPREPs.
2.6.6.2 Identify all unit-level POCs and assist/advise them as necessary; develop, review,
and update theater specific PR TTPs for the joint/combined force. When developing PR
plans, consider the following to ensure joint/combined interoperability:
2.6.6.2.1 Electronic communications plans must be clear/precise and must detail
procedures for the various radios and electronic devices that are being used throughout
the theater (i.e., PRC 112 versus PRC 112B1/2/G, PRQ-7 (CSEL) or PRC 90).
Capabilities and limitations of sister-service/allied personnel must be factored into the
communication plan.
2.6.6.2.2 Signaling procedures will incorporate current, available technologies to
ensure standardization among the force to the most practical extent. As much as
possible, use current and established TTPs when selecting the appropriate signaling
method for a specific situation (i.e., night no radio [NORDO]).
2.6.6.2.3 Authentication procedures will be tailored specifically to the AOR using
current TTPs.
2.6.6.2.4 Evasion considerations will reflect the threat level, legal status and will
incorporate the appropriate use of evasion techniques to mitigate that threat. Consider
climate, terrain, life forms, and indigenous people. SERE specialists may be required
to evaluate and recommend SAFEs and/or DARs, evasion corridors, recovery points,
rally points, and evasion re-supply points to the appropriate command level for
inclusion in the PR planning process.
2.6.6.2.5 Recovery procedures will be included in the SPINS and follow established
TTPs contained in this volume as well as applicable joint doctrine.
2.6.6.2.6 Isolated personnel guidance will be tailored to the specific AOR and its
unique requirements.
2.6.6.3 PR Kits. Ensure unit-level SERE specialists have the following items available
for inclusion into PR kits:
Blood Chits. Collect requirements, order, and distribute blood chits to the unit-level
POCs as necessary, ensuring all blood chits distributed are accounted for.
Pointee-Talkies. Ensure unit-level SERE specialists have access to the appropriate
pointee-talkies.
Evasion Charts. Ensure unit-level SERE Specialists have access to the most
current evasion charts (EVC) covering the AOR. National Imagery and Mapping
Agency (NIMA) is the agency responsible for this evasion product.
2.6.6.4 Advisory Role. SERE specialists act as the combatant commanders focal point
to ensure inbound personnel have accomplished the mandatory SERE theater entry-level
requirements. Provide guidance to determine these requirements as well as assisting in

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identifying HRC/MRC personnel. Entry requirements may include the following areas:
properly prepared and electronically forwarded ISOPREPs; theater-specific SERE
indoctrination briefings that include items, as a minimum, environment (e.g., climate,
terrain, and life forms), customs and culture of indigenous people, theater PR capabilities
and procedures, legal status of isolated personnel, theater-mandated-level CoCT and
appropriate level resistance TTP review.
2.6.6.5 Resource Management. SERE PM provides survival equipment oversight to the
theater, identifying and suggesting appropriate survival equipment upgrades required for
successful PR. May task unit level SERE specialists for operational testing and evaluation
(OT&E) of the equipment. Identify theater requirements for communications and
signaling equipment (i.e., GPS, radios) and act as liaison to fill these requirements and
provide oversight to the unit level ensuring compliance with theater directed procedures.
2.6.6.6 Personnel Recovery Exercise Execution. SERE PM provides input to personnel
recovery exercise (PRX) planning to ensure all scenarios are executed to meet theater
training objectives. Upon notification of an isolated personnel incident, execute mission
utilizing current theater incident report formats and checklists. Care must be taken to
ensure PRXs mirror an actual PR event as closely as possible with minimal notional
events and work arounds.
2.6.6.7 PR Incidents. SERE PM for actual PR incidents, advise and assist the JPRC
director as necessary, providing SERE PM specific information and SME for each
incident.
2.6.6.8 Assist the CRO or designated personnel in establishing and executing a
comprehensive plan for the reintegration of isolated personnel IAW Chapter 12,
Reintegration Operation.

2.6.7 Sere Specialist Assigned to a Unit Other Than the JPRC/PRCC (i.e., flying unit,
joint ground unit, coalition unit, rescue squadron, or SOF/OGA). Responsibilities may
include some or all of the tasks listed in the JPRC/PRCC if the SERE specialist is the only
GUARDIAN ANGEL asset assigned during a SSC. The primary responsibilities for the
SERE specialist are as follows.
2.6.7.1 SERE specialists recommend and evaluate designated evasion areas to determine
suitability for mission requirements and communicate new requirements through
appropriate channels. To provide SME, policy guidance, oversight, and management of
the units EPAs, ISOPREPs, EVCs, blood chits, pointee-talkies, and PR kits. The specialist
may be required to provide specific guidance for integrating theater specific SERE
information and resources into SOF/OGA planning. In-depth evasion planning will be
done in conjunction with relevant intelligence resources. Planning considerations may
include the development and evaluation of evasion corridors, evasion rally points, evasion
re-supply points, and recovery points, as well as unit-level PR SPINS.
2.6.7.2 SERE specialists provide operational level SME to the JPRC/PRCC or equivalent
organization to develop PR JTTP. The specialist may be tasked to develop, review, update,
and make input to E&R procedures contained in SPINS, E&R annexes, and other
documents for RC or SSC.

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2.6.7.3 SERE specialists prepare assigned units for combat operations by conducting
theater specific SERE indoctrination briefings that include, as a minimum; environment
(climate, terrain, and life forms), customs and culture of indigenous people, theater PR
capabilities and procedures, legal status of isolated personnel, theater-mandated-level
CoCT, and appropriate level resistance training refresher.
2.6.7.4 SERE specialists provide subject matter expertise to identify and incorporate
appropriate survival equipment required for successful PR. During OT&E of new survival
equipment, SERE specialists offer a unique capability based on first hand knowledge of
both survival skills and the threats facing the isolated personnel. When evaluating new
SERE-related items use the following guidelines: ensure interoperability with current
systems, safety for the isolated personnel, durability, ease of maintenance, bulk and
weight, availability and cost. Forward the item recommendation through appropriate
channels.
2.6.7.5 SERE specialist act as the units focal point for PRX planning and execution.
Conduct observe/controller (OC) for the IP during the PRX. Compile data to assess
whether objectives are being met and formulate lessons learned for after-action reports
(AAR). Provide AAR to all players and/or JPRC as directed. As a minimum, the AAR
should include the following: IPs use of issued equipment, interaction between IP and
rescue assets, interaction between CSARTF assets, limiting factors (i.e., terrain or line of
sight for radios), and recommendations for future operations/exercises.
2.6.7.6 During PR operations, unit-level SERE personnel may be required to forward
ISOPREPs and EPAs to the JPRC/PRCC. Information will be passed via secure means
(i.e., MIRC/CSARnet/TAC/STE). The SERE specialist may be tasked to provide a SME
to the JPRC/PRCC or equivalent organization during recovery of isolated personnel or
may be tasked to identify PR unique intelligence requirements. SERE specialists may also
function as a liaison to isolated personnels unit and a survivor equipment/capability SME.
2.6.7.7 SERE specialists assist the theater SERE PM and CRO in establishing and
executing a comprehensive plan for reintegration operations IAW Chapter 12,
Reintegration Operation. SERE specialists may be assigned to the medical facility or to
the rescue/SOF/OGA unit that executed the PR mission and may by virtue of location have
to initiate the reintegration process. If a CRO is not available, the SERE specialist will
provide guidance and assistance to the command level designated to execute the theater
reintegration plan, and ensure the theater plan is followed. The SERE specialist will
extract, document and forward lessons learned IAW Chapter 12, Reintegration
Operation.
2.6.8 Evasion Plan of Action Guide. Evasion plan of action (EPA) is a guide developed to
standardize explanations pertaining to the evasion plan of action blocks. An EPA should be
filled out and used by aircrew, ground teams, and HRC/MRC personnel (i.e., convoys, AFOSI,
and personnel leaving a controlled area) that could find themselves isolated. Some areas
need not be changed if day-to-day mission does not change; however, it still must be reviewed
before each mission launch along with ISOPREPs. Potential isolated personnel must realize
and maintain mind set that an EPA is designed for use by rescue forces. This form is the only
avenue the IP uses to inform rescue personnel of their intentions and assist in their recovery. It

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is paramount the form be complete, specific, up-to-date, and accurate.


2.6.9 Evasion Plan of Action. For explanation purposes, the EPAs titled Sample Aircrew,
Ground Team, Mounted/Misc EPA, and Stand-Alone Operations are used to demonstrate
aspects of EPAs. The explanation for filling out these EPAs are found in Table 2.63 through
Table 2.65, Instructions for Filling Out EPAs. Many of the items on the first page can be
found in the ATO SPINS. The first page contains essential data used by coordination centers
and recovery forces within the first few minutes of any recovery effort.
2.6.9.1 Communication Procedures. Write down the procedures from the SPINS to help
impress it upon memory. Make any additions directed that might be unit or team-specific.
2.6.9.2 Survival/Life Support Equipment. Fill in equipment contained in each area.
This will help recovery forces determine what the survivor may have and what they may
ask the survivor to use to aid in rescue. Itemizing will provide the crew member with
awareness of what they have to include personal and PRK items.
2.6.9.3 DAR and Safe Information. Location to address the use of and/or availability of
these special items if active in the AO.
2.6.9.4 Legal Guidance. Explains the status of forces from a legal standpoint to protect
and make isolated personnel aware. That in turn dictates the actions or behaviors expected
of isolated personnel in the permissive and nonpermissive atmosphere. It further may
indicate how a survivor may be treated and/or how to act when coming in contact with
local and/or hostile individuals.
2.6.9.5 Evasion Intentions. Provides recovery forces with the proposed actions the
survivor will take once on the ground. Using intelligence information, the crew member
will write down their immediate (24 hours) and extended intensions as related to survival
and evasion.
2.6.9.6 Additional Data. Items in this block may originate for the SPINS, intel, unit,
and/or the individual. The space is available to make any addition information that might
assist in the isolated person recovery. (See Table 2.66 through Table 2.69, Sample
Aircrew Evasion Plan of Action, and Table 2.70 through Table 2.73, Sample Ground
Evasion Plan of Action.)
2.6.10 Isolated Personnel Report (DD Form 1833) Guidance.
2.6.10.1 The ISOPREP is the most important source of authentication. Proper
completion, use, and archiving are critical to successful recovery and repatriation. As a
permanent record, it is a vital part of long-term POW/MIA accountability. All high risk of
capture (HRC) or designated personnel need to have two completed ISOPREPs on file.
The ISOPREP must be reviewed at least every 6 months and before each combat/high-risk
mission. It contains personal data known only to the isolated individual and is used by
recovery forces to positively authenticate the survivor. Once completed, the ISOPREP is
classified confidential and is maintained by the appropriate unit intelligence, SERE, PR, or
operations personnel.

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Table 2.63 Instructions for Filling Out EPAs (1 of 3).


Item

Remarks

Date prepared

Actual date the form was filled in. Change the date when any
changes are made.

Mission date

Date and day the EPA will be used on an actual mission launch.
This is important due to SPINS changes, crew reassignment, and
numerous other variables.

Mission number

ATO mission number or aircraft tail number per aircraft or aircraft


formation. This is used to verify aircraft to the ATO.

Call sign

Identifies the aircraft within the system verified against the ATO.
Call sign is one of the first bits of information passed during any
aircraft incident. Ensure call sign listed on EPA is the assigned
tactical callsign.

Aircraft

Quick reference to all potential recovery players as to how many


isolated personnel may be anticipated and type of bailout/crash.

Departure base/location

Airstrip the airframe originates from for each mission. Provides


coordinators with better situational awareness for IFE returns and
channels to obtain more information if needed.

Unit

Provides a point of contact to gather more information and


notification.

AC initial

Verify the aircraft commander/team leader filled in and/or


reviewed the form data. By initialing, the AC also verifies that the
crew (if applicable) has also seen and been briefed on the contents.

EPA POC

Unit ISOPEREP/EPA manager.

Review by SERE/Intel

Ensures completion and accuracy of information by an outside


party prior to filing the form. This may also be accomplished by
one of the ISOPREP/EPA managers

Intel/Unit DSN TAC e-mail Contact point for ISOPREP/EPA information. Quick reference to
those who can provide more information on the crew, mission,
passengers, and so forth. This contact should be manned and
accessible while aircraft are in flight.
Crew identification

Detailed list of all those aboard the aircraft. A passenger manifest


or team EPA should be included if applicable.

Call sign identifier

Various aircrew positions following initial call sign.

Rank

Help determine the amount of training and experience the isolated


person may have.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 2.64 Instructions for Filling Out EPAs (2 of 3).


Item

Remarks

Name

Last name, first name, and middle initial. Used to identify


ISOPREP.

Crew position

Self-explanatory.

Radio type

Handheld survivor radio located in the survival vest and/or any


kits. Identify what and how many frequencies are available, data
burst capability, and GPS functionality.

PLS ID code

The PLS ID code shall be based upon the numeric portion of the
radio serial number located on the radio. Ignore any leading
zeros and any Alpha designators in the serial number. If the
remaining numeric portion of the radio serial number has less
than six digits, enter zeros for the last numbers.

Blood chit number

List tracking number found on each corner of the blood chit.


This can be used as an authentication tool to identify isolated
personnel, if it is used.

Allergies

Precautionary measure to inform medical personnel conducting


immediate and long-term care.

Authentication

Methods listed in the SPINS to verify that the person being


contacted/recovered is friendly. (1, 2)

CSAR number of the week


CSAR letter of the week (3)
CSAR word of the week
CSAR duress word of the week Use IAW SPINS following current TTP.
Location

Coded methods in the SPINS to inform rescue forces of the


isolated personnels location without compromising the location.

- SARNEG

Alphabetic code word using 10 letterswhich do not repeat or


duplicatethat are paired with the numbers 0 through 9. This is
used when sending an unsecured voice transmission of isolated
evaders coordinates.

- SARDOT

Predetermined point used by isolated personnel to inform rescue


forces of their location without using coordinates and/or land
features. This is used when transmitting in the clear or coded
message traffic and is given by providing range and bearing
from survivors location to SARDOT.

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Table 2.65 Instructions for Filling Out EPAs (3 of 3).


Item
CSAR frequencies/signals

Remarks
Items listed in the SPINS for communication and identification
between isolated personnel and recovery forces.

- CSAR A and CSAR B

Primary CSAR frequencies loaded into handheld survival radios.

- Primary and secondary

Refers to primary and secondary day and night signaling devices


found in survival kits or vest.

Recovery activation signal

Recovery activation signal specific ground-to-air and/or


ground-to-ground signal put out by the IP. Can be near hole-up
site. May be briefed as to specific location and at a specific
time.(4)

Signal procedures

Mandatory guidance found in the SPINS. General and/or


specific actions to be taken by isolated personnel to identify
and/or communicate their location to recovery forces. List
additional procedures used by special teams or additional signal
equipment that might be available.

NOTE:
(1) All authentication material should be memorized.
(2) Authentication procedures will be tailored specifically to the AOR, utilizing current TTPs.
(3) Can be addressed as an alphabetic word (e.g., P would be PAPA).
(4) When deployed, one can depict where one is awaiting recovery in relation to the signal (e.g.,
I WILL BE 50 METERS TO NORTH OF THE RAS.)

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Table 2.66 Sample Aircrew Evasion Plan of Action (1 of 5).


Evasion Plan of Action
Date
Mission Date/ Mission
Call Sign
Aircraft
Prepared
Day
Number
Unit

EPA POC

Contact DSN/STU/STE/TAC:

AC Review

Departure
Base/Location
SERE/Intel Review

E-mail:
Crew Identification

Call Sign
Rank
Identifier

Aircrew
Position

Name

Radio
Type

PLS or
CSEL ID

Authentication
CSAR Letter
CSAR Word

CSAR Number
CSAR Color

GTAS

Blood
Allergies
Chit
and Blood
Number
Type

CSAR Duress Word

Challenge/Response
Location

SARNEG

SARDOT

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Radio

PRC-90-2

CSEL Voice Freq

CSEL UHF
SATCOM

CSEL LPE Freq

Primary-

Ch A

Ch A

Ch 1

Alternate-

Ch B

Ch B

Ch 2

Ch C
Ch D

Ch C
Ch D

Ch 3
Ch 4

Ch E

Ch E

Ch 5

Ch F

Ch F

Ch 6

PRC-112B1
CSAR A
CSAR B

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Table 2.67 Sample Aircrew Evasion Plan of Action (2 of 5).


Signals
Primary

Alternate

Day
Night
Signals

Day

Far Recognition Signal


No RadioNORDO
Recovery Activation SignalRAS
Signal Procedures
Signal Procedures:
Recovery Activation Signal (RAS):
Ground To Air Signal (GTAS):
Nighttime No Radio Signal (NORDO):
Contact Signal:
Far Recognition Signal:
- Challenge
- Response
Near Recognition Signal:
- Challenge
- Response
Communication Procedures
Permissive Environment:
Nonpermissive Environment:
PRC-90-2/PRC-112 Procedures:
Hook-112B/B1/G Procedures:

Night

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 2.68 Sample Aircrew Evasion Plan of Action (3 of 5).


SurvivalLife Support Equipment (Itemized List)
Survival Vest:

Survival Kit: 20-Man Life Raft Kit

Individual KIT: ML-4 Kit (1 man life raft plus the following items.)

Personal Weapons/E&R Kit


Personal Weapons:
E&R Kit Contents:
DAR and Safe Information

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

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Table 2.69 Sample Aircrew Evasion Plan of Action (4 of 5).


Legal Guidance

Evasion Intentions (Nonpermissive)


Immediate Evasion Intentions

Extended Evasion Intentions: NOTE: Due to the unknown minefield situation throughout
the AO, movement will be kept to a minimum.

Additional Data: (e.g., theater-specific requirements)

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 2.70 Sample Ground Team Evasion Plan of Action (1 of 4).


Ground Team Evasion Plan of Action (EPA)
Date
Prepared

Mission Date /
Day

Mission
Number

Unit

Call Sign

EPA POC

Means of
Travel

Departure Base/
Location

Team Leader Review SERE/Intel Review

Contact Information
DSN/STU/STE:

NIPR:

TAC/Other:

SIPR:
mIRC:

Staging Location
Team Identification
Call Sign
Identifier

Rank

Name

Team
Position

Radio
Type

PLS/
Blood
Allergies
MBITR/
Chit
&Blood Type
CSEL ID Number

Authentication
CSAR Number
CSAR Color

CSAR Letter
GTAS

CSAR Word
Challenge/Response

Location
Primary SARDOT
Identifier:

Location:

SARNEG

Blue Force Tracker


0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

CSAR Duress Word

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

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Table 2.71 Sample Ground Team Evasion Plan of Action (2 of 4).


Communication Information
Primary Comm Device:

VOICE:
UPLINK:
DOWNLINK:

PRC-112 CSAR Frequency


CSAR Alpha
CSAR Bravo

CSEL Frequencies
Voice

CSEL Frequencies
UHF SATCOM

CSEL Frequencies
LPE

Ch A:

Ch A:

Ch 1:

Ch B:

Ch B:

Ch 2:

Ch C:

Ch C:

Ch 3:

Ch D:

Ch D:

Ch 4:

Ch E:

Ch E:

Ch 5:

Ch F:

Ch F:

Ch 6:

Initial Communication Schedule/Procedures:

Extended Communication Schedule/Procedures:

Back-up Communication Schedule/Procedures:

Personal Weapons/Survival Equipment/E&R Items


Personal Weapons:
Team Equipment:
Individual Equipment:

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 2.72 Sample Ground Evasion Plan of Action (3 of 4).


Signal Plan
Primary

Alternate

Day
Night
Signal Procedures:

Day

Night

No Radio (NORDO) Signal:


Recovery Activation Signal
Far Recognition Signal:
Near Recognition Signal:

Challenge Response -

Signaling Equipment

Plan Route of Travel

Evasion Intentions
Immediate Actions:

Rally Points:
GTH (Go-to-hell point)
Injured:
First 48 Hours/Uninjured

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

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Table 2.73 Sample Ground Evasion Plan of Action (4 of 4).


Extended Evasion Actions or Intentions After 48 Hours:

Emergency Resupply Sites:


Emergency Exfil:
Back Up Plan:
RAS:

Legal Guidance

Other
Level of SERE Training:
Clothing and Shoe Size:

2.6.10.2 During operations, ISOPREPs should be stored with or in close proximity to the
individual evasion plans of action.
2.6.11 SERE Specific Mission Planning/Execution Tools Terminology. This section is
designed to give the operator a basic understanding of some of the tools used to support
mission planning and operations and the correct terminology for those tools. The intent here is
to clear up any common misconceptions about what SERE can and cannot provide, as well as
give the operator a better understanding of what to ask for to meet his particular needs. The
definitions here are not going to be all inclusive. For example, there is only one short

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

paragraph on FalconView. Anyone that is ever used FalconView knows that you could spend
several days in a classroom learning all the ins and outs of the system. Mission planning tools
include, but are not limited to:
2.6.11.1 Geospatial Information and Services. This is the term used to describe all the
products and services that fall into the realm of geospatial information. Examples of
geospatial information and services (GI&S) products are maps (both hard and soft copies)
and imagery (again, both hard and soft).
2.6.11.1.1 FalconView. This is a computer program that is part of the portable flight
planning system (PFPS) suite of software. Much in the way that Microsoft Word is a
member of the MS Office suite of software, FalconView is a large part of the PFPS
suite. It allows users the ability to take mapping, image, and elevation data, which is
all geo-corrected, and use it to mission plan in a digital environment. The maps and
imagery are layered by scale, so you can start out viewing the entire world, and then
zoom into the country, AOR, or AO that you are specifically interested in.
2.6.11.1.2 Digital Terrain Elevation Data. This is elevation data that covers a
specific geographic area. It can be displayed graphically to show relief; however, the
data is more commonly used to compliment other digital GI&S data. In FalconView
(e.g., if DTED is loaded for the same area that have digital map coverage, you will be
able to pull the estimated elevation of any given point on the map), DTED is also used
in the production of 3-dimensional images. SERE specialist will use this to show a RT
the terminal area from a ground level point of view. Can also digitally walk evasion
corridors.
2.6.11.1.3 mIRC Chat. (M)icrosoft (I)nternet (R)elay (C)hat, is a web-based
(SIPRNET) collaborative tool used to disseminate secure information quickly and
widely. A written log is produced. This typically is used to pass SARIR, SARSIT and
mission coordination to include attaching a digital copy of EPA and ISOPREP.
2.6.11.1.4 Imagery. There are several types of imagery that might come across in the
mission planning process. Some will be more helpful than other at different times.
These products will typically be acquired from intelligence. Examples of the different
types of imagery available through intelligence are as follows:
2.6.11.1.5 National Technical Means. There are actually three types of images that
come from the NTM. They are electro-optical (EO), infrared, and radar. Each has its
own strengths and weaknesses.
2.6.11.1.5.1 Electro-Optical. Electro-optical is basically a greyscale image. A
simplified explanation of EO imagery is a 35mm camera in space with a really big
zoom lens. Its strength is that it is easy to use and interpret. The weaknesses of
EO imagery are that it is daytime only and can be defeated by weather (rainy
days = no good imagery), it is susceptible to denial and deception techniques (use
of camouflage and or dummy aircraft and vehicles), and it only captures on
moment it time (it does not necessarily show intent; for this you would need
multiple images shot over a period of time).

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2.6.11.1.5.2 Infrared. Infrared is fairly self-explanatory in that these images


show heat patterns in either day or night conditions. The strengths are that you can
sometimes see intent in an infrared image (e.g., engine temperature of an aircraft),
and you also may pick up on things that are not readily noticeable to the naked eye
(e.g., heat patterns may be able to show you the presence of underground facilities).
You might also be able to pick up on personnel activity with IR images (e.g., heat
from fires in a dense jungle for example). Some of the weaknesses of IR imagery
are that it too can be defeated by weather and it is not nearly as clear of an image as
EO is (which makes it not so great for mission planning).
2.6.11.1.5.3 Radar. The last category of imagery from the NTM is radar. Radar
is generally used to complement the other two systems. With it you may be able to
pick up fence lines and wires that were not visible with EO imagery. Unlike the
other two systems though, radar is an all weather, day or night system. The major
weakness of radar imagery is that it requires a highly skilled imagery analyst to
interpret the data, which means it is generally not used for mission planning
purposes.
2.6.11.1.5.4 Controlled Image Base. Controlled image base (CIB) is an
unclassified seamless data set of orthophotos, made from rectified greyscale aerial
images. Translation; this is basically multiple passes of imagery that has been shot
for a given area and meshed together to form a large image-map of sorts. The data
is then converted to a format that GI&S programs can use for
viewing/manipulation. The easiest example of this is FalconView. FalconView
imports the data and displays the imagery of a given area and can navigate through
the data with digital map data. CIB comes in several different resolutions. The
most common are 10 meters, 5 meters, and 1 meter. The number designation is
what is known as ground sample distance which basically means the measure of an
object or distance between two objects that is visibly detectable without
enhancement. The way it all translates is as follows: in a given image, two objects
of the same size must be x meters apart for those items to be distinguished as
separate items. For a very basic example, let us say you are looking at 10-meter
CIB of your neighborhood where you live. In order for your house to be
distinguished separately from your neighbors house, they would have to be more
than 10 meters apart. If they were less than that, you would only see one blob on
the image, versus two. In 5-meter CIB, you would be able to distinguish the
difference between the houses better. With 1 meter, you might be able to
distinguish the difference between your house and your doghouse if it were sitting
just a couple of feet away from the main structure of your house. A note should be
made here about the currency of CIB data. It generally is not very current. If the
area is a priority for national level collection (i.e., if theres a war going on in the
area), then it might be current within a year or maybe several months. If it is in an
area that is not a priority (some remote area here in the CONUS, for example), then
you might see data that is 5 or 10 years old, if there is any coverage at all. CIB is
not quick to produce either. It is much easier to request stand-alone images than to
request CIB of an entire area be reshot.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


2.6.11.1.6 Collection Considerations. There are a few basic things to keep in mind
when developing requirements for imagery. The more specific the requirements are,
the harder it may be to actually get the collection approved. Specify a specific look
angle, time of day, and number of revisits all in one RFI, this may slow down the
request. Additionally, asking for a high resolution shot every time may also slow the
requirement. However, one is needed to make the request. The best thing to do is be
flexible and express the requirements to the intelligence analysts. Let them work with
the collection managers to determine what will work best (i.e., what collection
platform).

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

3-1
CHAPTER 3
GENERAL AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS

3.1 Airmanship. This chapter contains information involving general aircraft operations. It
addresses tactics, techniques and procedures enabling CRO/PJs to perform aircrew duties on
vertical-lift (VL) and fixed-wing (FW) aircraft.
3.2 General. Pararescuemen may function as crew members on rescue-tasked aircraft. Crew
members are those personnel who enable the aircraft to accomplish the mission. In this role, PJs
are an integral part of the rescue crew and require knowledge of aircrew procedures and aircraft
systems. They must be able to communicate effectively with the aircrew, integrate team tactics
with aircrew tactics, and coordinate deployment/employment of the team/aircrew. Airmanship is
a critical skill PJs bring to the fight and proficiency must be maintained.
3.2.1 Responsibilities. General responsibilities of a qualified PJ functioning as a mission
crew member are outlined in Table 3.1, Mission Crew Member Responsibilities.
3.2.2 Crew Coordination/ Duties. Crew coordination is essential to all flying. PJs must
know what their aircraft responsibilities are and how they relate to the rest of the crew. They
must also have an awareness of other crew members functions and duties, to increase their
own situational awareness (SA).
3.2.3 Aircraft Communications. GUARDIAN ANGEL members must refer to the specific
MDS-1 series TO for instructions on proper use of the internal communications system (ICS).
In aircraft with limited ICS connection ports, to facilitate the passage of critical information,
recommend the PJTL have the team come up as required on their interteam radios or monitor
constantly during the entire flight.
NOTE: Team members should utilize a PRC-148 MBITR 5590 adapter or carry additional
batteries for this option.
3.2.4 Interphone. Keep unnecessary interphone conversation to a minimum. When
speaking, talk in short bursts and half sentences. This allows breaks in which other radios may
be heard or necessary interruptions can be added.
3.2.4.1 Interphone discussions are prioritized by aviate (fly the plane), navigate (in the
right direction), and then communicate (talking to other airplanes or agencies). This
implies, for example, it is okay to interrupt a pilot talking about navigation waypoints
(navigate) to say STOP LEFT (aviate).

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 3.1 Mission Crew Member Responsibilities.


- Flight rules
- Briefings
- Alert procedures
- Individual equipment
- Alert equipment
- Aircraft configuration
- Emergency procedures
-- Equipment
- Flight duties
-- Crew coordination
--- Inter-phone terminology
--- Situational awareness
-- Flight following
-- Scanning
-- Parachuting/jumpmastering
-- Aircraft systems
--- Radios
--- Hoist
--- Weapons
--- Oxygen/flare/chaff dispensers
- Objective area
-- Employment
-- Survivor authentication
-- Surface employment
-- Survivor evacuation
- Egress
-- Provide in-flight emergency medical care
-- En route medical updates/requirements
- Post flight
-- Survivor hand-off/patient transfer
-- Debriefings
- Regeneration

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

3-3

3.2.4.2 Clear and concise communications are imperative for safe and effective aircraft
operations. Effective communication happens when the receiver responds with desired
information and/or action. Situational awareness is dependent on good communications.
The following are techniques for good communications.

Be clear and concise; words should express thoughts clearly.

Make verbal, tone, and nonverbal cues express the same message.

Ensure the receiver is listening.

Avoid times of distractions or remove distraction.

Be aware of prejudices, bias, and attitudes.

Avoid emotion.

Avoid overloading the receiver.

Avoid too technical terminology.

Provide enough information.

Do not provide too much information.

Avoid excessive complexity.

Listen to the message, not what you think the message will be.

Do not process the message until you have heard it all.

3.2.5 Common Crew Terminology. To enhance communication and crew coordination, use
words or phrases that are understood by all participants. Use clear, concise terms that can be
easily understood and complied with in an environment full of distractions. Avoid multiple
terms with the same meaning. The DoD flight information publication (FLIP) contains
standard terminology for radio communications. AFTTP 3-1.1, General Planning and
Employment Considerations, contains standard terminology for tactical operations. (Table
3.2 and Table 3.3, Common Terminology, list standard words and phrases that crew members
should use.)
NOTE: Ensure the proper use/definitions of ROGER, WILCO, AFFIRMATIVE, and CLEARED
are thoroughly understood. COPY is not listed in the pilot-controller glossary, except when
confirming a list of items such as, I COPY N350201.
3.2.6 Voice Procedures. The scanners direct the pilot flying (PF) over the survivor or hover
point using standard terminology. Instructions should be clear, concise, and directive (versus
descriptive) for approach and hover operations. The scanners can aid the PF with airspeed
control during the approach by describing the reduction of distance, in a numerical sequence,
from a given point from the survivor, to a hover point over the survivor. The frequency of
numerical calls made should indicate the speed of the helicopter toward the survivor or the
closure rate. A closure rate is not necessarily given in a preset distance of feet, yards, or
meters. An example would be SURVIVOR AT TWELVE FOR 100, 75, 50, 40. The faster
the call, the more rapid the closure (e.g., 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 STOP). If the approach is too fast and
the helicopter cannot be safely slowed down in time, call GO-AROUND, GO-AROUND,

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


GO-AROUND. While this call should only be used for safety of flight, it can be called by
anyone in a primary crew position. Standardized terminology for directions and motion may
be added to better describe actions necessary for safe operation (e.g.,SLOW FORWARD,
NOSE RIGHT, or STOP BACK).

Table 3.2 Common Terminology (1 of 2).


Informative Terms (1, 2)

Meaning

CLEAR BACK LEFT/RIGHT

The aircraft is clear backward in the direction indicated

CLEAR DOWN LEFT/RIGHT

The aircraft is clear to descend in the direction indicated

CLEAR FORWARDLEFT/RIGHT

The aircraft is clear forward in the direction indicated

CLEAR LEFT/RIGHT

The aircraft is clear to turn in the direction indicated

CLEAR UP RIGHT/LEFT

The aircraft is clear to climb in the direction indicated

CLOSURE FAST/SLOW

The aircrafts closure is fast/slow

DESCENDING/CLIMBING

(Trend) The aircraft is descending/climbing

DRIFTING FORWARD/BACK/
LEFT/RIGHT

(Trend) The aircraft is drifting in the direction indicated


and the PF has not indicated the intent to do so

LEFT/RIGHT TURN

The PF intends to turn the aircraft in the direction


indicated

LOADS HOOKED/RELEASED The cargo sling and load is attached to/released from the
cargo hook
ON THE APPROACH

The PF is commencing the approach

ON THE GO

The PF is commencing takeoff

NOSE CLEAR LEFT/RIGHT

The aircrafts nose is clear in the direction indicated

ROPES
DEPLOYED/RELEASED

Alternate intrusion and extraction (AIE) devices are


deployed/released

SLIDING FORWARD/BACK/
LEFT/RIGHT

The PF is commencing aircraft movement in the direction


indicated

TAIL CLEAR LEFT/RIGHT

The aircrafts tail is clear in the direction indicated

NOTES:
(1)

Informative terms are not directive in nature and indicate the intent to perform a maneuver,
provide trend information, or provide information necessary to safely perform a maneuver.

(2)

Terms may be combined (e.g., CLEAR LEFT 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, STOP LEFT).

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

3-5

Table 3.3 Common Terminology (2 of 2).


Directive Terms (1, 2, 3)
CHECKCLOSURE/DESCENT/
CLIMB

Meaning
Closure/descent/climb seems excessive and may need
correction

FAST FORWARD/LEFT/RIGHT Increase aircraft movement in the direction indicated


FORWARD/BACK/LEFT/RIGHT/ Move the aircraft X units in the direction indicated, this call
UP/DOWN X (units)
is usually followed by a countdown (e.g., LEFT 5, 4, 3, 2, 1)
GO-AROUND, GO-AROUND,
GO-AROUND

Initiate a go-around

HOLD

Maintain present position, heading, and altitude

LEFT/RIGHT PEDAL TURN

Aircraft will make a hovering turn (yaw) in direction indicated

PILOT/COPILOT CABLE
DOWN/UP

Pilot/copilot use cyclic hoist switch to move the hoist cable


up/down

POWER UP/DOWN (units)

Move collective up/down to increase/decrease power applied

POWER UP/DOWN

Increase collective/decrease collective

ROLLOUT/STOP TURN

Roll wings-level

ROPES, ROPES, ROPES

The aircraft is in a stabilized hover and PF is signifying it is


clear to deploy the briefed AIE devices

SLOW FORWARD/BACK/
LEFT/RIGHT/UP/DOWN

Slow aircraft movement in the direction indicated

SLOW/INCREASE CLOSURE

Slow/increase closure rate

STEEPEN/SHALLOW TURN

Increase/decrease bank angle in the direction of the turn

STOP FORWARD/BACK/LEFT/
RIGHT/UP/DOWN

Stop aircraft movement in the direction indicated

STOP NOSE LEFT/RIGHT

Stop aircraft nose movement in the direction indicated

STOP TAIL LEFT/RIGHT

Stop aircraft tail movement in the direction indicated

SWIMMERS, SWIMMERS,
SWIMMERS

The aircraft is in prebriefed parameters and team is cleared to


deploy into the water

TURN LEFT/RIGHT

Turn in the direction indicated; this call may be followed by a


desired heading, a clock position, or X degrees

NOTES:
(1)

Directive terms indicate that immediate action is required because of the possibility of contact with
obstacles, injury to deploying/enplaning personnel, or mission requirements.

(2)
(3)

Terms may be combined (e.g., CLEAR LEFT 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, STOP LEFT).

Use pitch, tone, inflection, and repetition, as necessary, to indicate the urgency of the directive
terms.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


3.2.7 Disabling of Aircraft Systems and Destruction of Classified. I n t h e e v e n t a n
aircraft has crashed and must be abandoned, all crew members must be able to quickly locate
and zeroize all electronic radio and navigational encryption equipment. Refer to the MDS-1
series TO for specific instructions. Crew members must be capable of disabling aircraft
weapons systems. This may be done by thermite grenades, taking the crash axe to critical soft
parts, or disassembling the weapons and scattering/destroying/burying the parts (e.g., firing
pins or safety sector).
3.2.7.1 Classified materials must be destroyed or retrieved. To effectively accomplish this,
all classified material carried on the aircraft must be identified and the exact location
known to the entire crew. Identify a crew member prior to flight for destruction of
classified or to remind the crew to retrieve/destroy all the classified, if needed.

3.3 Alternate Loading Operations. The primary method of restraining personnel in all aircraft
is via the troop seats. The primary means of inserting or recovering personnel is landing. The
following techniques are used to restrain a team or survivor when it is impractical or impossible to
use normal seating arrangements.
3.3.1 Alternate Loading Methods. These methods are normally used during contingency
operations and tactical training missions when standard passenger seating reduces the crews
ability to accomplish the mission effectively. The cabin floor itself is defined as the seat and
either a seatbelt or personal restraint device restrains the occupants. Alternate loading
expedites team deployment and recovery, maximizes cabin space, and allows maneuverability
of the team during mission execution. Restrain all personnel by the safest means possible for
the type mission being flown. Restraints may be removed upon landing in the landing zone
(LZ), when cleared by the aircraft commander (AC), or while taxiing to the off-load point. For
hover operations (including water operations), restraint devices are removed as required.
3.3.2 Restraining Devices. The primary alternate load method used by most teams use the
gunners belt or personal restraint device (alternate load belt/sit harness with cows tail). The
secondary alternate load method is fastening the troop seatbelts to the floor tie-down rings.
The least desirable alternate load method uses a cargo tie-down strap. The tie-down strap is
fastened to the floor tie-down rings and runs across the lap. When using this method, have
passengers face forward to absorb the most common displacement forces of aircraft
maneuvering or a crash landing.
3.4 Aircraft Marshalling. CRO/PJs may direct and control movement of aircraft during air land
operations (e.g., transload, FARP, EROs, and so forth). Because of to these situations, it is
important to know and practice standard hand and arm signals to direct aircraft on the ground.
Standard marshalling signals for Air Force operations are outlined in AFI 11-218, Aircraft
Operations and Movement on the Ground.
3.5 Aircraft Egress. GUARDIAN ANGEL members must be familiar with egress procedures
for the aircraft that they are going to be operating on. For egress procedures, members must refer
to the specific MDS-1 series TO for that aircraft. (See Table 3.4, Aircraft Egress, Familiarization,
and Destruction Briefing Guide, for general information.)

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

3-7

Table 3.4 Aircraft Egress, Familiarization, and Destruction Briefing Guide.


User-force personnel will be briefed on the following areas.
1. Location and operation of all emergency exits, overhead hatches, and escape ropes.
2. Location and use of crash axes.
3. Location of chopping locations.
4. Location and operation of fire extinguishers.
5. Location and use of emergency exit lights.
6. Location of engine shut-down T-handles.
7. Location of first aid kits.
8. Location of life raft deployment T-handles.
9. Location of areas to place explosive charges for aircraft destruction (fuel tanks, SPR panel
LOX converter).
10. Instructions for locating and destroying sensitive equipment and materials.
11. Location of egress assembly areas.
12. Alarm bell/horn signals.
a.

Ground evacuation.

b. Crash landing.
c.

Ditching.

d. Bailout.
13. Danger areas.
a.

Engines.

b. Propellers50 feet behind, 150 feet in front.


c.

GTC/APU.

d. ALE-40 chaff/flare dispensers.


e.

IRCM pods (MC-130)10 feet when in use.

f.

Radar300 feet when in use.

g. Hydraulic systems.
h. Wave guide.
i.

Oxygen vents.

j.

Pitot tubes.

Hot brakes/wheel well fires.

3.6 Pararescue/CRO Duties. Aircrew duties may include flight following, providing en route
emergency medical care, operating aircraft defensive systems, equipment
preparation/configuration and scanning as required during flight. They serve as the essential

3-8

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

surface to air link when employed in the terminal area (TA) via airland, hover, rope insertion and
extraction, hoist, and free-fall swimmer, to locate, contact, secure, assist, and recover IPs. PJ
surface employment is a tactic used to decrease time in the TA by expediting IP preparation and
extraction. They provide a reliable and experienced command, control, and communications (C3)
link between the aircrew and IP. Limited size and firepower dictates the recovery teams attempt
to avoid enemy contact, suppress enemy fire to the extent required, withdraw, evade, or revert to
an avoidance posture as necessary.
3.6.1 En Route Operations. Immediately after aircraft launch and during the ingress/egress
of the objective area (OA), CRO/PJs follow route progress of the aircraft on designated,
sanitized maps or other electronic/manual flight following aids, and confirm way point
passage as applicable. They should scan the sky and surface for the presence of air-to-air and
ground-to-air threats. Suspected threats are called out to the aircrew in accordance with
MDS-specific AFTTP 3-1. Preparations for aircraft evasive actions commence immediately
upon sighting a suspected threat. They continue to visually monitor the location and actions of
the suspected threat until a no-threat condition is determined. A confirmed threat is reacted to
IAW rules of engagement (ROE) for the OA and mission design series (MDS) aircraft tactical
doctrine.
3.6.2 Objective Area Threat Assessment and Control. The function of assessing the OA
threat situation is based primarily on the ability to recognize the threat. A second factor is
based largely on ability to quickly associate the type of threat with its correct characteristics
and capabilities. From these two factors, a determination can be made regarding the safety or
danger to the rescue aircraft and aircrew.
3.6.2.1 OA Threat Control. OA threat control is the responsibility of all personnel
involved in the combat search and rescue (CSAR). It is a function of location, recognition,
communication and action or reaction. There are several methods for assisting with or
effecting typical OA threat control measures. Specific guidance can be found in
MDS-specific AFTTP 3-1 Volumes.
3.7 Vertical Lift Operations. This section presents TTPs for employment and aircrew duties of
GUARDIAN ANGEL recovery teams on-board vertical lift aircraft. Vertical lift (VL) operations
will primarily be conducted from HH-60G and MH-53J aircraft. However, these TTPs can be
modified to employ teams from any DoD or foreign service aircraft.
3.7.1 Pre-Mission. A successful rescue mission must start with a through PJTL brief to the
recovery vehicle (RV) aircrew. Detailed coordination and planning are key to success in the
terminal area. PJTLs should brief a primary, alternate and contingency plan. The primary
plan is based on knowledge of the anticipated threat, IP location and condition for the most
efficient recovery possible. The alternate and contingency plan should be based on how to
deal with an increased threat or a decrease in assets. If operating in the joint SOF
environment, discuss criteria concerning the employment of an attached SAR security team
(SST). (See AFTTP 3-1.8, Chapter 17, Special Tactics Mission Profile.)
3.7.2 Pararescue Minimum Force. CRO mission planner and the PJTL will determine the
correct team composition to complete the mission. Testing by the 60 CTF (formerly known as
the 422 TES) shows advantages in the TA with the three-man PJ team concept over the
two-man PJ team. Furthermore, consistent employment of pararescue personnel during USAF

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

3-9

Weapons School terminal area sorties confirms the tests done by the 60 CTF in relation to
having a third PJ per aircraft which makes teams of three and three. During the insertion and
extraction phase, testing has demonstrated little difference, in terms of time, by adding one PJ
per aircraft. The additional PJ gives the team the ability to perform critical tasks
simultaneously such as communicating with the CSARTF, constant 360-degree security,
reacting to enemy fire, treating/packaging the litter bound patient, directing ICAS, extraction
from trees, cliffs, and aircraft wreckage, and assisting a wounded team member. Additionally,
GUARDIAN ANGEL recovery team composition considerations are discussed in various
chapters of AFTTP 3-1.8, Tactical Employment GUARDIAN ANGEL.
3.7.2.1 The PJTL and mission planners must remember that additional team members
reduce loiter time in the terminal area and recovery capability. For example, in the
MH-53M, each additional team member reduces the loiter time by 6 minutes. Because of
the complexities of working PR/RO in the joint environment of SOF, PJ team employment
with a SST will be covered in a separate section.
3.7.3 Time Warnings and Alternate Insertion Extraction Preparation. N o r m a l t i m e
warnings for alternate inspection extraction (AIE) operations and infiltrations may not be
practical in the PR/RO environment. The particular insertion method will not normally be
determined until immediately prior to PJ team employment. Upon entering the terminal phase
of the operation, it is recommended that all team members are ready to employ by all AIE
techniques.
3.7.3.1 Time Calls. The PF should keep the crew/team informed of position and distance
to the LZ. Standard announcements at the 20-, 10-, 5-, and 1-minute-out points greatly aid
in preparation. Employ these calls regardless of the specific type of AIE. (Time calls may
be modified to meet the situation when the crew is unable to comply with normal methods;
deviations/required time calls should be briefed prior to the operation.) The scanners
should keep the pilots informed of the status of AIE equipment prior to and throughout the
operation (e.g., THE H/FRIES-BAR IS EXTENDED AND PINNED).
3.7.4 Vertical Lift Transload Procedures. (See paragraph 3.11, Airland Operations.)
3.7.4.1 Patient Treatment. (See paragraph 3.11.4, Patient Treatment.)
3.7.5 Combat Search and Rescue Terminal Area Operations. The goal is to build an
in-depth foundation of the most current terminal area tactics for PR/RO. (See specific aircraft
MDS TTPs, 3-1 and 3-3)
3.7.6 Individual/Team Equipment. Pararescue equipment should be tailored to the
minimum necessary, mission dependent, to prosecute the operation. (See Table 3.5 and Table
3.6, Pararescue Individual Equipment Requirements; Table 3.7, Pararescue Team Equipment
Requirements; Table 3.8, Team Equipment RequirementsLogistics Requests; Table 3.9,
Individual Equipment RequirementsWeapons, Munitions, and Pyrotechnics; and Table
3.10, Individual Equipment RequirementsHelicopter Configuration.)

3-10

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 3.5 Pararescue Individual Equipment Requirements (1 of 2).


Item

Quantity Location

Remarks

Carbine (M4)

Body

Camouflaged

IR strobe

A/R

Low light/night identification

Chemlights

A/R

One blue, one IR, one red, and one green

Watch

A/R

Wrist compass

A/R

Lip/finger light

A/R

Flashlight

A/R

With blue and red lenses

A/R

A/R

GLINT tape
AN/PEQ-2/4 or equivalent

Optics

A/R

Hand gun (M-9)

Holster

Thermal scope

A/R

As required

Magazine, 5.56mm

LBE

7 minimum, last mds tracer, 1 full mag


tracer for infil/exfil

Magazine, 9mm

LBE/
holster

Grenade, fragmentation

A/R

LBE

Tape pull rings

Grenade, smoke, HC

A/R

LBE

Tape pull rings

LBE

Tape pull rings

1 set

A/R

A/R

1 set

A/R

Extra batteries

IR pointer for ICAS

A/R

For example GCP, IZLID

Inter-team radio (PRC 148)


with headset and PTT

Head

Extra batteries

Survival radio (PRC-112)

LBE

Programmed IAW CSAR SPINS/extra


batteries one per two to three man element

Helmet, ballistic

Head

With NVG mount

Body armor

A/R

METT-T dependent

Grenade, nonlethal
Pengun flares
Flare, MK-124/MK-13
NVG

LEGEND:
A/Ras required

Weapon Extra batteries (may substitute INWS)

With silencer (EPA) METT-TC dependent

45 rounds minimum

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

3-11

Table 3.6 Pararescue Individual Equipment Requirements (2 of 2).


Item

Quantity

Location

Remarks

Uniform/flop hat/flight
gloves/boots

Body

METT-T

Compass

A/R

Sit harness (w/aircraft tie in)

Body

With carabiner and quick release

Load bearing equipment

Body

IAW Tactics SOP

PJ med ruck

Body

METT-T dependent

Cold weather gear

1 set

Rucksack METT-T dependent

Food

A/R

LBE/body/

rucksack

Water

A/R

A/R

Extra batteries

A/R

A/R

A/R

Fins, mask, snorkel, AAOPS suite/dry


suit/wet suit, dive tool, MK-13 flare,
butt-bag, carabiner, gloves, 1st line belt,
UDT vest, strobe, and chemlights

Wet gear
Weapons cleaning kit

1 set
1

LBE/body Complete

1 set

Body

Heavy leather gloves, flight gloves, or


wool inserts, eye protection, knee and
elbow pads as required

Survival kit

LBE

GPS

A/R

Medical blow out packs

A/R

IAW Unit SOP

AIE gear

LEGEND:
A/Ras required

3-12

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 3.7 Pararescue Team Equipment Requirements.


Item

Quantity

Location

A/R

A/R

Oxygen

1 per
airframe

A/R

Miller board

1 per
airframe

A/R

Hypothermia kit

A/R

A/R

METT-T

Adverse terrain kit

A/R

A/R

METT-T

Extrication kit

AR

A/R

METT-T

Stokes litter

A/R

Aircrew may supply

Israeli litter

1 per
airframe

A/R

A/R

A/R

METT-T

1 per
airframe

A/R

Fast rope

A/R

Aircrew may supply

Rope ladder

A/R

Aircrew may supply

Tag line

A/R

Medical accessory kit

REDS kit
Rappel ropes

Poleless litter

A/R

Remarks

Easily accessible

Immediate response (IR) medical


kit

A/R

Designated medic

Man packable radio (PRC-117)


with PTT

A/R

One per TL or CCT

Maps

A/R

A/R

IAW specific AO

M203 grenade launcher

A/R

A/R

Team leader discretion

Special weapons

A/R

A/R

Team leader discretion

T-Duck

A/R

A/R

METT-T

RAMZ

A/R

A/R

METT-T

LEGEND:
A/Ras required

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

3-13

Table 3.8 Team Equipment RequirementsLogistics Requests.


Nomenclature

Quantity

Remarks

Man packable radio with all


accessories

Inter-team radio with all accessories

Survival radio

Loaded IAW CSAR SPINS/PR plan

Thermal scope

Survival radio loader

KYK-13

IR pointer

Fire fly kit

GPS

Headsets

Bench stock

A/R

IAW UTCs

Chemlights

5 boxes of
10 each:
IR, red, Consider mass casualty
green, blue,
yellow

Batteries (as required)

5590,
1574, 9
Based on mission and weather
volt, AA,
5800, 1372

NVG

KED board

Miller back board

LSP oxygen with accessories

Israeli litters with straps

A/R

Israeli litter is preferred; folding litters may


be substituted if required.

Medical resupply

A/R

IAW UTCs

Hypothermia kit

LEGEND:
A/Ras required

A/R

3-14

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 3.9 Individual Equipment RequirementsWeapons, Munitions, and Pyrotechnics.


Quantity
Remarks
Nomenclature
M4A1 with AN/PEQ-2

Individual issue

M-9

Individual issue

ACOG/CQB site/INWS

A/R

As required

5.56mm ball

10,000 rounds

5.56mm tracer

2,000 rounds

9mm ball

4,000 rounds

9mm subsonic

200 rounds

40mm HEDP

200 rounds

40mm M663/M664

24 each

Green and red star cluster (option


if handheld not available)

Grenade, fragmentation

72

Flare, MK-124

36

Grenade, thermite

18

Grenade, smoke, HC

36

Grenade, nonlethal

36

Grenade, smoke, red

A/R

Grenade, smoke, green

A/R

Grenade, smoke, yellow

A/R

Demolitions

A/R

METT-T

LEGEND:
A/Ras required

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

3-15

Table 3.10 Individual Equipment RequirementsVertical Lift Configuration.


Item

Quantity
3 x PJ recovery team
3
LBE, weapon, rucksack
3
PJ rucksack
1
Wet gear (if water rescue is possible)
3
Miller board package
1
Hypothermia kit (as required based on environments)
1
Fast rope (may be supplied by aircrew if coordinated)
1
Specialized equipment
1

Weight (pounds)
3 x 200 equals 600
3 x 100 equals 300
75
3 x 40 equals 120
50
40
60
200

Cube

0.5
0.5
0.5
0.75
0.5
0.5
0.5

3.8 Fixed-Wing (FW) Operations. This section presents TTPs for employment and aircrew
duties of GUARDIAN ANGEL teams on-board fixed-wing aircraft. FW operations will primarily
be conducted from HC-130 and MC-130E/H/P aircraft. However, these TTPs can be modified to
employ teams from any DoD or foreign service aircraft.
3.8.1 General. FW operations can be accomplished in permissive to high-threat
environments based on specific aircraft, crew capabilities, and supporting assets. Missions
can be flown single or multi-ship or as part of a larger force package (day or night) in variable
weather conditions from low altitudes (surface to 5,000 feet AGL), moderate altitudes (5,000
to 25,000 feet AGL), and from high altitudes (25,000 feet AGL and above). These operations
provide a multitude of benefits to GUARDIAN ANGEL operations. They can fly faster,
farther, and more direct than VL assets; typically have considerably longer endurance times;
and can carry large amounts of mission gear to include large parachute aerial delivery
packages and pallet loads. They provide excellent standoff loiter capabilities outside the threat
area for CSAR airborne alerts. Known as a Duckbutt, a FW aircraft can position itself along
an overwater route as a low threat, overwater precautionary SAR procedure. The airdrop and
airland employment of a team is used when IPs require immediate assistance and are not
accessible by VL aircraft or other modes of recovery and time and distance is a factor. FW
teams may also augment VL teams who are in need of additional support. Accessibility
limitations of VL aircraft are range, air refueling support, and transit time to the IP. Airborne
teams provide a rapid response capability for on-scene assistance, assisted evasion and
medical treatment in an overland or maritime environment until recovery is possible. They
can insert by parachute (military free fall or static-line A/R) from FW aircraft, operate
independently of the delivery aircraft for limited or extended periods of time, and be recovered
by vertical lift aircraft, link up with friendly ground forces, or navigate to a maritime coastal
extraction. To increase mobility, teams can employ specialized vehicles. They can also insert
into openwater and recover by helicopter, surface vessel, or movement to a coastal area. To
facilitate multiple IP/E recoveries and extended operations, teams employ bundles containing
additional medical and rescue equipment. MC-130E/H/P crews may conduct landing
operations to unimproved airfields and roads in austere locations. The overall goal is to
minimize the time from launch to recovery of an objective. (For additional information, see
AFPD 16-12, Pararescue; AFI 16-1202, Pararescue Operations, Techniques, and
Procedures; and JP 3-50.21, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for CSAR.)

3-16

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

3.9 Fixed-Wing Airborne Operations. During airborne operations, PJ/CRO provide critical
expertise to and from the terminal area via flight following, threat identification, and real-time
on-scene evaluation using visual and electronic means. PJ/CROs should be involved in planning
fixed-wing CSARTF operations. When a tactical situation or IPs medical condition dictates,
fixed-wing assets can utilize tactical airdrops or airland to deploy, teams, vehicles, and other
equipment as required in advance of the VLs. Factors include the threat level, IP or objective
exploitation potential, IP injuries, IP protection, time considerations, and the recovery plan. These
factors can change in real-time tactical environments and require experienced re-evaluation. A
non-deploying CRO or PJTL on board a fixed-wing asset can enhance mission effectiveness by
mediating real-time mission dynamics, assisting in pre-deployment activities, and providing post
deployment support to the team and aircrew. Once on scene, the deployed team will stabilize and
protect the IPs, secure objectives, assist in evasion, and prepare the IPs for recovery.
3.9.1 Fixed-wing aircraft launched on rescue operations may carry flight surgeons to act as a
medical control element in support of GUARDIAN ANGEL assets. The nature of the
survivors injuries may require the flight surgeon to be in direct radio contact with the PJTL.
3.9.2 As an operational support tasking, SERE specialists may be part of the aircrew to
operate the Quick Draw and/or participate on a repatriation team.
3.10 Aerial Delivery. HC/MC-130 aircrews are specially trained in procedures for airdropping
GUARDIAN ANGEL resupply equipment by viable rescue aerial delivery tactics (free fall,
parabundle, rigging alternate method zodiac, and all-terrain vehicles airdrop). See Chapter 6,
Aerial Deployment Equipment, for deployment altitudes and limitations.
3.10.1 Special Equipment. The (HC/MC-130) MA-1/MA-2 sea rescue kit consists of five
cylindrical shaped bundles connected by four 210-foot long ropes. Bundles 1 and 5 are life
rafts and bundles 2, 3, and 4 are waterproof supply containers. The MA-1 kit employs 6- or
7-person rafts and the MA-2 uses 20-person rafts. Equipment packed in the supply containers
can be tailored to meet the survivor's needs.
3.11 Airland Operation. Fixed-wing airland operations is the use of aircraft operating in and
out of assault landing zones for the delivery and or recovery of personnel, supplies and equipment.
Assault landings are normally made on short, unprepared fields in a low-threat environment.
Consider fast, lightweight, mechanized modes of surface transportation (e.g., ATV and RATTV)
for surface employment conducted in support of fixed-wing assault landing operations. Greater
mobility can provide for quicker recovery of the mission objectives and enhance the ability to
provide physical security of the aircraft.
3.11.1 Engine Running On-Load/Off-Load. The purpose of engine running on-load (ERO)
is to expedite ground operations when mission handling equipment (MHE) is in short supply
or the threat to an aircraft on the ground is a factor. EROs are an entirely different type of
operation than combat loading, and should not be confused or incorrectly interchanged.
Ensure ground support personnel and aircrew members understand the method and proper
operating procedures to use. EROs may be necessary when the time or capability to shut down
and restart engines is not available.
3.11.1.1 ERO Requirements. Most on-loads/off-loads at improved fields are conducted
with MHE using normal procedures. An unusually busy airflow and weather

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

3-17

considerations are examples of the requirement for EROs. Planners and aircrews should
determine which type of on-load or off-load support is required for operations. Size,
composition, and qualifications of load teams, combined with the type and amount of
MHE available, determine the type of on-loads and off-loads that can be performed and
how quickly they are completed. Good communication links through CCT/STT, airfield
operations control nets, and tanker airlift control element (TALCE) Mobility Air
Reporting and Communication System (MARCS) will enhance the flow and increase
safety.
3.11.2 Combat Loading. Combat loading is comprised of three types of operations: (1)
combat off-load, (2) passenger combat loading, and (3) rapid infiltration. Some aircraft cargo
compartments are modified with NVG-compatible lighting.
3.11.2.1 Rapids. Rapid infiltration is a tactically sound method to on-load or off-load
dedicated unconventional forces under covert conditions. Spring-loaded, latch-activated,
folding ramps (canary slides) or ground loading ramps are used to off-load and on-load
vehicles and personnel in a matter of minutes. Fixed-wing and vertical-lift assets may be
used to insert PJ teams with or without vehicles to airfields, assault zones, roads, or any
suitable landing area. Rapids are a viable means to insert PJs where threats, terrain,
weather, or other factors do not allow for insertion by parachute or require a stand off
capability. The PJ team may be recovered by the insertion platform or by other means.
Planning and crew coordination should include team and aircrew intentions if attacked,
recall procedures as required, communication and signaling, and team actions on and
around the aircraft.
3.11.2.2 Preparation. All restraint devices except one forward and one aft (opposite
corners) may be removed during taxi to the off-load point. Self-propelled vehicles must
have drivers in place with brakes set prior to removing restraints. Exceptionvehicles
will not be started in flight.
3.11.2.2.1 Fuel Tanks. Vehicle fuel tanks will not exceed 3/4 full when positioned on
the cargo floor. Fuel tanks for vehicles transported on the ramp will not exceed 1/2 full.
3.11.2.2.2 Prohibited Maneuvers and Procedures.
Motorcycle, quad, and mini-bike drivers will not be on their vehicles for
takeoffs and landings.
Vehicles will not be onloaded/offloaded while the center anchor cable supports
are in the installed position.
Vehicle IR lights will not be used in or around aircraft.
Personnel will not loiter between vehicles while on the aircraft.
Personnel will not extend arms or legs under vehicles.
The cargo ramp will not be lowered below horizontal until the aircraft comes to
a complete stop at the offload point.
Vehicles will not be started in-flight.

3-18

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

3.11.3 Recovery and Transload. Circumstances may warrant using fixed-wing aircraft for
recovery or transload operations in situations where greater range and speed are essential to
the timely recovery of critically wounded personnel from the area of conflict to a location
where proper medical attention can be provided. The most common tasking for these
operations is during noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO). Aircrews may conduct
short-field operations to unimproved airfields or roads in austere locations.
3.11.3.1 Transload operations are normally conducted at secure airfields where a security
element is present to provide ground aircraft security or remote sites where ground
security is assessed as unnecessary.
3.11.3.2 Vertical lift transloads normally have the aircrafts landing close behind each
other, normally one rotor disc away (perpendicular or tail to tail as appropriate), to
facilitate quick off-loading and on-loading of IPs and allow possible egress avenues for
both aircraft should the area come under attack. Ideal locations are runway hammerheads
and ends of runways. Procedures should take place with the aircraft as close together as
possible.
3.11.3.3 During transload execution, the PJTL will assign aircraft security elements and
litter bearers as situation dictates. Normally, PJs from the helicopter and PJs from the
transload aircraft will act as litter bearers. Additional PJs can provide security as required.
Patient information will be transferred as required prior to landing.
3.11.3.4 To maintain crew, aircraft will not swap PJs during the transload process in most
circumstances. This requires a thorough, but concise information exchange between the
airframe PJTLs and CROs.
3.11.3.5 Information is relayed to JPRC by PJTL/CRO, in turn, to aeromedical evacuation
(AE) flight surgeon from medical/transload facility; rotary-wing will relay NLT 30
minutes out, and fixed-wing will relay NLT 60 minutes out.
3.11.3.6 Relay number of casualties by triage category: immediate, delayed, minimal, and
expectant. Report the following information for immediate category patients only:
injuries, to include mechanism of injury (MOI), stable or unstable, and treatment
performed.
3.11.3.7 The JPRC/PRCC will determine the real-time status of available medical
facilities and will coordinate with closest suitable facility to receive the patients. The
JPRC/PRCC will arrange with the recovery force for transport to and reception at this
facility. In the event the patients are translated from vertical lift to fixed-wing aircraft, the
JPRC/PRCC will also arrange for a vehicle and qualified reception team at the final
destination airfield to move the patients from runway to the treatment facility.
3.11.4 Patient Treatment. It is imperative for the PJ/CRO to coordinate all mission
restrictions and requirements to ensure the safety and success of the patient treatment. At
times, a crew of three aeromedical personnel may augment the flight crew. Items of
coordination should include a crew briefing at showtime with the medical crew (to establish a
plan of action and minimize confusion in the aircraft); the number of patients, passengers, and
cargo carried; any special requirements, aircraft configuration, medical and aircrew leaders,
interphone and communication procedures while airborne.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

3-19

3.11.4.1 The aircraft commander, PJ/CRO, and loadmasters need to ensure the aircraft
configuration is correct, establish any flight restrictions (cabin altitude, temperature,
mixture with other cargo and passengers), and facilitate patient on-load.
3.11.4.2 Ensure litter stations are prepared and secured. Consider a privacy/blackout area
near a communication station.
3.11.4.3 Litters are loaded feet first, front to back, top to bottom and left to right. Critical
patients are loaded in the most advantageous position to facilitate on going treatment.
3.11.5 Forward Arming and Refueling Point. The forward arming and refueling point
(FARP) is a tactical ground refueling and possible arming operation primarily performed by
MC-130 and special operations forces (SOF) attached DoD aircraft. An MC-130, with its
large fuel capacity and ability to land at unimproved sites, lends itself well to this mission.
FARP may be used to extend the combat radius of receiver aircraft. Combat radius should not
only be considered in terms of distance but also in terms of time. FARP is normally conducted
clandestinely at night in austere environments with engines running. Fuel can be carried in
palletized rubber bladders or pumped directly from the aircraft fuel tanks. FARP provides fuel
necessary for highly mobile and flexible vertical lift or fixed-wing operations. The size of the
FARP site varies with the mission and the planned number of receivers refueled. FARPs are
normally temporary facilities and established for a specific duration and mission. (See Figure
3.1, FARP Refueling Site Layouts.) FARP required equipment and personnel lists are
contained in AFI 11-235, Forward Arming and Refueling Point Operations.
NOTE: Be aware of aircraft separation, turning radius, and rotor distances when marshalling
aircraft around a FARP site.
3.12 Aircraft and Airfield Security. The PJ team provides security for themselves, the IP, and
in certain situations, the aircraft on the ground. The size of the PJ team and equipment required is
mission dependent. Refer to mission planning for factors effecting PJ team selection and security
requirements. The PJTL will assign security responsibility based on team composition and threat.
During fixed-wing assault landing operations, the team may be tasked to provide or assist with
providing aircraft security. Minimum equipment for security personnel loading out of the aircraft
will include necessary items for survival and evasion should the aircraft be disabled or committed
to an expedient departure. The security element must be large enough to provide 360-degree
coverage for the aircraft. Primary crew members have specific responsibilities on the aircraft and
should not be considered as part of the security element for planning purposes.
3.12.1 Security Element Procedures. When committed to airland, the PJ team must load
out of the aircraft rapidly. Any delay could unnecessarily expose the aircrew and aircraft to a
threat and would compromise the position of the employed PJ team.
3.12.1.1 Load out will be accomplished after the appropriate signal is received from a
designated crew member.
3.12.1.2 PJ team members will charge and safe weapons prior to load out of the aircraft to
provide immediate defense of the aircraft when required.

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Figure 3.1 FARP Refueling Site Layouts.

FARP Refueling Site Layouts

Single Point Refueling

Double Point Refueling

Three Point Refueling

FAM Cart

UNCLASSIFIED
3.12.1.3 The PJTL should be the last team member off headset and the last to load out in
order to facilitate an immediate team recall if necessary. At a minimum, the PJTL, at the
minimum, should have radio contact with the aircraft crew. Having the security element
on an inter-team radio frequency is highly recommended.

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3.12.1.4 An exit may be used during assault landing operations, provided it can
accommodate the personnel and equipment to be loaded in or out. The ramp is usually the
safest and most expeditious exit and entrance route.
3.12.1.5 The PJ team may be responsible for suppressing enemy ground fire and initiating
a recall when it is determined to be necessary or in the best interest of the employed forces.
3.12.1.6 The PJTL may implement a recall at the airfield if resistance is encountered or if
the PJTL believes the operation has been compromised. Compromise might result from an
unexpected visual or physical contact with a nearby enemy force. The absence of an
expected reception party could also signal eminent compromise or the presence of a threat.
3.12.1.7 The team members will move to a predetermined assembly point to orient
themselves or to pre-designate security positions and observe for enemy activity. If a
reception party is anticipated, contact will be made according to the contact plan outlined
by the PJTL in the operational plan.
3.12.2 Basic Plan for all Fixed-Wing Aircraft. 3.12.2.1 The below plan identifies four
security positions for the HC-130-/MC-130-series aircraft but can be utilized as a basic
plan for all fixed-wing aircraft. Areas of security and observation responsibility are
recommended as follows:
3.12.2.2 Number One Position. This team member will be positioned in the forward
overhead escape hatch. Number one is responsible for the 9 through 3 oclock position.
3.12.2.3 Number Two Position. This team member is positioned in the left paratroop
door or outside the left wing tip. Number two is responsible for the 6 through 12 oclock
position.
3.12.2.4 Number Three Position. This team member is positioned in the right paratroop
door or outside the right wing tip. Number three is responsible for the 12 through 6
oclock position.
3.12.2.5 Number Four Position. This team member is positioned on the ramp or aft of
the aircrafts tail. Number four is responsible for the 3 through 9 oclock position.
3.12.2.6 Security Element Extraction. A voice recall will not be audible over running
engines or during an engagement. Maximum use of interteam radios will be utilized to
implement a recall. Actions upon recall include the following:
Number one positionremains in place as long as possible, secures hatch, and
takes seat prior to take off roll.
Number two positiontakes position in left paratroop door, secures door, and takes
seat prior to take off roll.
Number three positiontakes position in right paratroop door, secures door, and
takes seat prior to take off roll.
Number four positionenters through ramp or designated door, assists load master
with accounting for personnel, and takes seat prior to takeoff roll.

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CHAPTER 4

INSERTION/EXTRACTION OPERATIONS
4.1 General. Insertions and extractions are normally accomplished via air-land. When mission
enemy terrain time troops available, and civilians (METT-TC) precludes air-land
insertion/extraction, other methods of insertion and extraction should be considered; these other
methods are referred to as alternate insertion/extraction (AIE). The fundamentals discussed in this
chapter may be performed day or night. The information contained in this chapter is not
all-inclusive and may be adapted; following realistic and sound safety principles.
4.2 Alternate Loading. The primary method of restraining personnel in the helicopter is via the
troop seats; however, during contingency operations and tactical training missions when standard
passenger seating reduces the crews ability to accomplish the mission effectively, alternate
loading should be considered. During alternate loading the cabin floor is defined as the seat, and
either a seat belt or personal restraint device restrains the occupants. Alternate loading expedites
team deployment and recovery, maximizes cabin space, and allows team maneuverability during
mission execution. Restraints may be removed upon landing in the landing zone (LZ), when
cleared by the aircraft commander (AC), or while taxiing to the off-load point. For hover
operations (including water operations), restraint devices are removed as required.
4.2.1 Restraining Devices. The primary alternate load method is the gunners belt or
personal restraint device (alternate load belt/sit harness with cow tail). The secondary alternate
load method is fastening the troop seat belts to the floor tie-down rings. The least desired
alternate load method uses a cargo tie-down strap. When using this method, it is best to face
forward to absorb the most common displacement forces of aircraft maneuvering or a crash
landing.
4.2.2 Equipment. The team leader/AIE master is responsible for coordinating with the
mission support aircraft/crew on installation and inspection of the equipment necessary to
conduct the operation. Aircraft space requirements must be pre-coordinated to facilitate the
removal of aircraft seats or equipment.
4.3 Contingencies and Emergency Procedures. When unsafe conditions are encountered, use
pre-briefed hand signals to stop any additional team members from exiting the aircraft. Avoid
physically stopping a person in the act of deploying because this may cause the person to lose
control of the rope and increases the possibility of injury to the team member. If the helicopter
experiences an engine malfunction or other critical emergency during any AIE operation, the team
members on AIE devices should descend as rapidly as possible and move from beneath the
helicopter. Normally, personnel move away from the deploying side of the helicopter (terrain
permitting). The helicopter should move away from the team. If the aircraft gains altitude or
starts to fly away, the team should dismount immediately. If the team cannot dismount the device,
they should stop their descent and lock-in. (This is very difficult during fast rope operations and
should not be an option except in the most critical circumstances.) When terrain does not
permit flying out with the team attached, the AC should make the call whether to cut the ropes free
or, if able, lower them to the ground. If the aircraft comes under fire while performing a rope
ladder, the deploying team may consider securing themselves to a rung of the ladder. Team
members must maintain positive hand and foot placement on the rungs of the ladder so the aircraft

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

can depart the immediate area. If flight characteristics and power requirements allow, the aircraft
will accomplish slow, forward flight to a safe area.
NOTE: The rope ladder was not designed to support personnel while in forward flight. Use of the
rope ladder for emergency personnel extraction should only be attempted if the threat to personnel
remaining on the ground is higher than the risk associated with in-flight rope ladder failure
WARNING: This particular contingency method is for real world operations only and will not be
used in a training environment.
WARNING: The TL should thoroughly brief the aircrew on team security procedures to prevent
individuals manning aircraft defensive systems from inadvertently firing on the team.
NOTE: Comm-out and non-standard comm-in procedures for recalling the team should be
pre-briefed and understood by all members of the crew and team.
4.4 Alternate Insertions and Extractions. Performing an AIE requires additional power,
demands greater crew coordination, increases exposure time, and is more hazardous and difficult
for the survivor and recovery team. The team leader (TL) should determine if the increased
difficulty of performing an AIE is justified when compared with the risks or benefits of an offset
air-land insertion; or moving to an extraction site that permits an air-land. Consider team member
training and overall competence on the intended AIE prior to execution. All the AIE methods
discussed in this chapter are considered acceptable means of insertion and extraction for most
situations. Aircrew/Recovery Team coordination and communication are essential in performing
any air-to-ground function quickly and safely.
4.4.1 Time Calls. The pilot flying (PF) should keep the crew/team informed of position and
distance to the LZ. Time calls should be made at 20-, 10-, 5-, and 1-minute-out points
(regardless of the AIE type). Time calls may be modified to meet the situation when the crew
is unable to comply with normal methods; deviations/required time calls should be briefed
prior to the operation. The TL or scanners should keep the pilots informed of the status of AIE
equipment prior to and throughout the operation.
4.4.2 Rope Deployment. The PF should call ROPES, ROPES, ROPES when the aircraft
is within the correct parameters for the intended AIE. The scanners should give the
appropriate signal for the rope deployment (point down and out with hand or chemlight), at
which time the team is cleared out. After the scanner gives the signal for rope deployment, it
is at the discretion of the rope master to deploy ropes and send the team.
NOTE: Because the PF is the only one who knows precisely when the nose should be rolled over,
the PF should be the individual who initiates the ROPES call.
4.5 AIE Master. The AIE master is responsible for making the final determination on the safety
of the deployment. As a minimum, the AIE master should brief the AIE type, intended hover
height, emergency procedures, safety man responsibilities/designation and AIE device length.
During operations where the AIE master cannot safely determine operational parameters (aircraft
altitude, drift, obstacles, and rope position), the AIE master will coordinate with the crew for
assistance.

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4-3

4.6 General Setup and Preparation. Cabin configuration is the key to safe and effective AIE
operations. Ensure intercom cords are clear of deployment and recovery pathways and AIE
devices. Crew members may route the cords up the walls, along ceilings, and down to the
deploying team leader. The team leaders cord should only be long enough for necessary
movements. Ensure gunner belts are clear of personnel and paths of travel. The V-blade knife or
other similar tool should be readily available if the ropes need to be cut during emergencies or
rope entanglement. To facilitate night operations, configure devices with chemlights. Brief
chemlight requirements prior to the operation. See Table 4.1, Chemlight Configuration, for
recommended configuration.
Table 4.1 Chemlight Configuration.
Operation
Cabin

Cockpit

Recommended Chemlight Configuration


1 NVGcompatible chemlight on each normal and emergency exit handle.
1 NVGcompatible chemlight above each normal and emergency exit.
1 NVGcompatible chemlight on each emergency exit handle.
1 NVGcompatible chemlight above each door.
1 NVGcompatible chemlight on windshield wiper/washer, back up pump.
2 chemlights at the bottom of the rope.

Fast rope

1 chemlight 10 feet from the bottom.

1 chemlight at the top of the rope.


Hoist hook
1 flexible band on top of hook bumper.
Penetrator
1 chemlight on bottom of each forest penetrator paddle.
Raft
1 chemlight on tiedown release.
Rappel
1 chemlight on the top of the drop sack.
1 chemlight on each side of the ladder at the first and fifth tube from the
Rope ladder
bottom.
2 chemlights at the bottom of the rope, at 3 feet above the first set of D-ring
SPIE
attachment points.
Stokes litter
2 chemlights on head; 1 on foot.
OVERALL NOTE:
* Available illumination and user preference should be considered when choosing chemlight
color. On low-illumination nights, consider blue or green chemlights. On high- to
medium-illumination nights, consider red chemlights.
4.7 Rope Ladder. The rope ladder provides a quick method for recovering team personnel
from the surface when the LZ is not landable. The decision to use a rope ladder should be
weighed against time constraints and the difficulty to personnel climbing the ladder with
equipment. The rope ladder is not a suitable method of recovering injured personnel or personnel
who are not familiar with the device. The rope ladder can be used simultaneously with hoist
operations.
WARNING: There should not be more than three people on the rope ladder at one time.

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4.7.1 Setup and Preparation. The flight crew is responsible for providing, inspecting, and
rigging rope ladders. The TL should also check for oil or grease on the cabin floor and the
ladder for frayed cable and fabric; ensure all climbing steps are secured by checking for cracks
and any sharp edges that may cause cuts or scratches. If the device has a quick release, ensure
it is serviceable and reject the device otherwise. There should be some type of spacing device
elevating the ladder from the cabin floor to ease team entry. Ladders should be rolled up and
secured before flight.
4.7.2 Installation. The rope ladder can be installed on a large variety of aircraft using basic
principles of attachment and safety. When using cargo tie-down straps to install the rope
ladder, do not use any strap with signs of grease and oil contamination or corroded hardware.
Reference the appropriate MDS Tech Order for installation specifics.
4.7.3 Etrier Assist. A climbing etrier, or similar man-rated device, may be attached from the
ceiling of the aircraft to the floor near the ladder. This effectively provides the team a few
more feet of climbing device to assist with aircraft entry.
4.7.4 Caving Ladder. The caving ladder is a very lightweight device that requires little
space inside the aircraft. It may be used in lieu of the standard rope ladder using the same
limitations and guidelines when space and weight are considerations. Operators experienced at
using the caving ladder often find the caving ladder to be easier to climb than the standard
ladder. Consider the teams experience before using this device. Caving ladders are typically
rigged on smaller helicopters with side doors. When rigging a caving ladder, attach the end of
the caving ladder to an overhead ring with two locking carabiners. Overhead rigging makes it
easier for personnel to enter the helicopter. If an overhead ring is not available, then attach the
ladder to a deck ring. Attach a separate safety strap from the ladder to a deck ring. The safety
strap can be made of one inch tubular nylon or cargo straps and attached using carabiners.
Multiple ladders may be joined together to increase its length if needed.
4.7.5 Advantages. The rope ladder allows for multiple operators to begin exfil without
delay. It does not require power (i.e., hoist operations).
4.7.6 Disadvantages. The operators will not be able to carry large quantities of weight and
may have to use the hoist for additional gear. Rope ladder operations may take considerable
time depending on the length of climb.

4.8 Rappel. Rappelling has historically proven to be a successful backup for insertion if the
hoist fails. Deploying personnel are responsible for aircraft rigging and proper hookup of
rappellers and may be responsible for providing the safety man. Rappelling allows the user to
control descent into uncertain terrain and obstacles; however, it requires more specialized
equipment and preparation than a fast rope.
4.8.1 Setup and Preparation. Pad or tape any sharp edges that could damage ropes. Ensure
a V-blade or sharp knife is available in the event the rope becomes entangled and endangers
the aircraft.
4.8.2 Installation. Ropes may be anchored to any attachment point capable of holding the
weight of the team. The primary anchor points for the HH-60G are the cabin rappelling fittings
or the H/fast rope insertion and extraction system (H/FRIES)-bar. When using the cabin
rappelling rings as the primary anchor point, a cargo net ring may be used as a secondary

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

4-5

safety attachment point. During training, all ropes should be attached to the anchor points
using locking carabiners.
4.8.3 Rope Diameter. Rappel ropes should be static, with a minimum diameter of 9mm. If
used in conjunction with heavy equipment, single 11mm will suffice; 9mm should be doubled.
4.8.4 Deployment Bag. Rappel ropes are best deployed from the aircraft with a deployment
bag. Back coil the rappel rope into the deployment bag until 2 to 3 feet are left. Close the
deployment bag in a manner that contains the rope yet allows the rope to feed out freely. Use
the 2 to 3 feet left out of the bag to attach to the anchor point in the aircraft. As the bag is
deployed, the rope will feed out only the amount needed to reach the ground. This method
keeps positive control of the rope in the aircraft, during deployment, and on the ground. If not
using a deployment bag, the rappel rope should be daisy chained and weighted to prevent
possible contact with the rotors.
4.8.4.1 Leg Bag. The deployment bag may be worn attached to the operators leg. This
procedure is recommended because positive control of the rope is maintained at all times.
It also facilitates rappelling through obstacles. When using a leg bag, the rope should be at
least 50 feet longer than the deployment hover height.
WARNING: To facilitate rappelling through obstacles (i.e., trees, ship masts), rappels may be
accomplished using rappel deployment bags attached to the lower leg of the rappeller. If this
procedure is used, a stitch plate style descender (air traffic controller/Petzl Reverso) should be
used to minimize rope twist. Twist associated with leg bag use can be dangerous as the running
end (bottom) of the rope does not have the full length to accommodate twisting effects. This is
especially true when using a figure eight or rescue eight rappel device with a leg bag. Twist may
result in friction knots causing a loss of the break hand. Descent rate should be slow and controlled
to manage any friction knots that may appear and to more easily navigate through obstacles. In
addition, the rope should be at least 50 feet longer than the intended deployment altitude. The rope
will be secured to the inside of the rope bag using a figure eight knot to ensure the rappeller cannot
rappel of the end of the rope.
4.8.4.2 Throw Bag. The bag may be weighted when not attaching to leg. Weighting the
bag assists the rope in penetrating dense forest or jungle canopy and prevents the bag from
being blown around by rotor wash. Do not tie the weight directly to the rope. The weight
should be tied to the bag or rope with a weak link.
4.8.5 Personal Equipment. Operators intending to insert via rappel should use a sit harness
(commercial or improvised), heavy leather gloves worn over flight gloves, eye protection, and
a descending device.
NOTE: The improvised sit harnesses must be properly tied, with the correct safety knots, and
inspected prior to deployment.
4.8.6 Deployment Preparation. Rappellers should be ready for deployment prior to the
5-minute time call. The safety man (normally the scanners) relays communications, monitors
the deployed ropes to ensure ground contact is maintained, and recovers or releases the ropes
when rappelling is complete.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


4.8.7 Hook Up. Once hooked to the rope, personnel may release other restraints in
preparation for the exit. On final approach, personnel may position themselves to facilitate
immediate deployment.
4.8.8 Rope Deployment. Do not deploy ropes until the PF gives the ROPES call, and the
AIE master confirms the deployment area. The scanner should confirm the deployment
location and relay signals when a hover is established.
4.8.9 Rope Retrieval. After the team members are on the ground, the scanners should direct
the PF to descend approximately 5 to 10 feet. This is to ensure there is enough slack in the
ropes to allow the team member to disconnect. The scanners should release or retrieve the
ropes after the last rappeller is off the rope. The safety man should ensure personnel are clear
before dropping ropes.

NOTE: During training, carabiners should not be dropped with the rope.
4.8.10 Contingencies and Emergency Procedures. If the helicopter gains altitude above
the length of the rope, the rappeller should immediately brake, lock-in, and wait for the
helicopter to descend to a safe rappelling altitude.
4.8.11 Advantages. Rappelling equipment is light and small. The teams descent is easier to
control. Deploying personnel stay secured to the device while deploying. Personnel can
deploy with more equipment.
4.8.12 Disadvantages. Rappelling requires more time than fast roping. Rappellers may
have difficulty connecting to the rope in the aircraft and/or disconnecting from the rope once
on the ground.
4.9 Short Haul. The short haul is used as an alternate method of recovery for short distances
when no other recovery devices are available and the immediate recovery of rescue personnel is
required. It is not a recommended method of recovery for untrained personnel. When rescue
personnel are available, the rescuers, as well as a stokes litter may be recovered using this
technique. The equipment required to perform a short haul consists of a climbing rope and a
minimum of two carabiners.
4.9.1 Setup and Preparation. Tie one figure eight knot approximately 5 feet from the end
of the rope and another figure eight at the end of the rope. Attach a single 5,000-pound
locking carabiner through the open end of each knot. Normally one carabiner is attached to a
rappel ring and the carabiner at the tail of the rope is connected to a cargo net ring. It is
recommended that the rope be deployed using a rope bag in which the rope has been back
coiled (to prevent fouling) and secured. A 5-pound weight is used to prevent excess slack
from coming in contact with the rotor blades. During training, two cross-connected ropes
should be used for additional safety.
4.9.2 Execution. Normally the short-haul technique should not be used unless the hoist fails.
It may be necessary for the helicopter to move away from the deployed team and configure the
ropes for deployment. The helicopter should communicate intentions to the deployed team by
radio if possible. If radio communications are not possible, the team may have to rely on
intuition once the rope is deployed. The helicopter will move over the team/survivor and
deploy the rope at a height which reduces the amount of rotor wash over the team or offset

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

4-7

from them. It may be necessary to wait a short period of time while the team readies the rope
for extraction of personnel. The team attaches themselves to the rope into the figure eight
knots by their sit harness and chest harness. Once the team is ready, they give a thumbs up.
Tension will slowly be placed on the rope and the helicopter will transition to forward flight as
soon as the team is clear of the ground and/or obstacles. As airspeed increases above 20 knots,
the team should begin to stabilize and stop oscillating. Aircraft should stay below 60 knots
forward airspeed.
4.9.3 Contingencies and Emergency Procedures. Short Haul emergency procedures are
the same as those discussed for SPIES/FRIES.
4.9.4 Advantages. The advantages of the short-haul system are the length of the rope, ease
of flying for the team, and the ability to recover a survivor using the stokes litter. Weight is
limited only by rope strength. It is faster and safer than using a hoist in adverse terrain
environment
4.9.5 Disadvantages. Few are trained in this technique. The short haul cannot be set up in
flight.
4.10 Fast Rope. Fast roping is used to quickly lower personnel and equipment from a hovering
helicopter. Fast ropes are made of interwoven hemp, approximately 2 inches in diameter, with an
aircraft hook-up point on one end. (See Figure 4.1, Fast Rope Eyesplice, and Figure 4.2, Fast
Rope Metal Sleeve.) Lengths vary, depending on the needs of the mission, but usually are found
to range between 60 and 120 feet. Fast ropes are typically used for hovers up to 50 feet and do not
provide the same descent control as rappels. Normally, the deploying team is responsible for
providing and inspecting the ropes.
4.10.1 Setup and Preparation. Coil and secure fast ropes with a cargo tie-down strap or
seat belt next to the deployment location to be used. Coil the ropes toe-to-head with the
attachment point (head) on top. This method of securing the ropes should provide trouble-free
deployment.
4.10.1.1 If using a G-12 clevis with the eye splice rope, the rope master must ensure the
bolt end is drilled and the castle nut is retained using a cotter pin or safety wire.
4.10.1.2 To prevent the screws in the metal sleeve assembly from vibrating loose, water
hose clamps should be securely fastened over the screw heads. The hose clamps should
then be taped to prevent snagging.
4.10.2 Installation. The fast rope can be installed on a large variety of aircraft using basic
principles of attachment and safety. Reference the appropriate MDS Tech Order for
installation specifics.

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Figure 4.1 Fast Rope Eyesplice.

Fast Rope Eyesplice

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 4.2 Fast Rope Metal Sleeve.

Fast Rope Metal Sleeve

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

4-9

4.10.3 Time Warnings. Because fast rope operations are designed to be tactical infiltrations,
timing is critical to optimize the success of the mission (speed and surprise). When the aircraft
arrives at the insertion point, the deploying team needs to be prepared to exit immediately. To
accomplish this, standard time warnings are used to ensure both the deploying team and the
crew are ready. Standard time warnings of 20, 10, 5, and 1 minute are announced by the
aircrew based upon their calculated arrival, time on target (TOT).
4.10.3.1 The rope master may require more than the minimum time calls and should be on
intercom until at least the 5-minute call. The 20- and 10-minute time warnings are
designed to inform the crew of the approaching TOT; usually no actions are required.
4.10.3.2 At the 20-minute call, all personnel should begin preparations for deployment
and receive final instructions from the team leader.
4.10.3.3 At the 10-minute call, personnel inspect equipment and complete final
preparations for deployment.
4.10.3.4 At the 5-minute call, move to the exit point. The safetyman or designated team
member disconnects the fast rope from its storage point and prepares it for deployment by
handing it to the first man out of each stick or by setting it up on the edge of the exit.
Ensure it is back-coiled and held secure. Activate chemlights for night deployments.
4.10.3.5 At the 1-minute call, the safetyman checks should be done and all team
members move into position for deployment at the door or ramp. It is recommended the
team not disconnect from their alternate loading device until the aircraft is on short final
(50 feet/50 knots).
4.10.3.6 At the command ROPES or the signal (the designated crewmember pointing
out the exit), the first man of each team kicks out the rope, determines the rope is on the
ground (a minimum of 10 feet of rope on the ground is recommended), then exits the
aircraft. Off the aft ramp, deploy the rope at a 45-degree angle away from the rear of the
aircraft.
4.10.4 Unsafe Drift or Premature Lift Off. If the helicopter gains altitude so that the fast
rope no longer touches the ground, or if the helicopter drifts off the target, The rope master
must initiate the following procedures.
4.10.4.1 The rope master with a clenched fist, directs fast ropers already descending to
brake and await helicopter descent. The ground crew will relay this command.
4.10.4.2 The rope master directs additional fast ropers to hold to prevent any additional
descents.
4.10.4.3 Once back on target/altitude the Rope master may continue with approval from
the aircraft commander.
4.10.5 Fastroping With Combat Equipment. Combat equipment will be worn in the
normal manner. Use caution when placing equipment on or near the fast ropers legs to
prevent injury during landing. Fast ropers must not wear sharp devices that will come in
contact with the fast rope.

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4.10.5.1 Weapons. When fastroping with a rifle, the rifle should be slung across the back
with the sling tight and the muzzle pointing down. A bungee cord can be used to ensure
the weapon is tight against the fast ropers body. Machine guns are worn in the same
manner as rifles. The feed cover, cocking handle, barrel locking lever, and carry handle
should be padded and taped if possible. Care should be taken not to snag the weapon in
the aircraft when using troop seats.
4.10.5.2 Equipment Size and Weight. Fast ropers should minimize the amount of large
and heavy equipment they fast rope with. Large and heavy equipment should be belayed
down to the personnel after they fast rope. Bundles up to 500 pounds can be belayed
concurrently with fastroping personnel. Heavy rucksacks may be belayed individually or
clipped in with a carabiner to loops tied one or two feet apart on the rope; this will ease
removal of the rucksacks from the rope, once on the ground.

NOTE: Ensure that there is either a quick release system or V-blade knife at the belay end of the
rope. The system must be able to be disconnected from the helicopter if the rucksacks get
snagged or the helicopter is unable to maintain hover while the team disconnects the rucksacks
from the rope.
4.10.6 Night Deployments. Procedures are the same as day deployment. Use chemlights to
identify ropes and exits. Use a minimum of four chemlight on each fast rope. Tape two at the
bottom, one 10 feet from the bottom and one at the top of the rope to identify where to place
hands. The chemlight 10 feet from the bottom ensures at least 10 feet of rope is on the ground.
A chemlight may also be taped horizontally just above the crew entrance door in line with the
rope. Tape over the chemlights to provide enough light for the team to ensure the rope is on
the ground.
4.10.7 NVG Overwater Operations. With the exception of the final approach, the fast
rope pattern is the same as the hoist pattern for the aircrew. On final, the aircraft descends to
intended hover height while decelerating to the deployment ground speed. The fast rope is
deployed as the aircraft enters the insertion zone. Depending on the mission profile, a slow
forward movement of the aircraft may be requested. This can assist deploying personnel by
spacing them apart upon water entry. When fast roping into the water, wet/dry suit material
may be vulnerable to damage from rope friction. Duct tape wet/dry suit on locations where
rope may come in contact with suit.
4.10.8 Advantages. Fastroping is preferred over rappelling for helicopter insertion because
of the speed and ease of execution. The fast rope is fast, simple, and easy to release from the
aircraft.
4.10.9 Disadvantages. The main disadvantage of using a fast rope is that once deployed,
there is no expedient method for immediate extraction unless the crew is using the fast rope
insertion and extraction system (FRIES) rope. Extraction loops integral to the FRIES rope
allows the team to be lifted and moved to an alternate location. Equipment is heavy, takes up
cabin space, serves one purpose, and is limited in length. Preparation can be time consuming;
descent is uncontrolled; deploying personnel are susceptible to injury; personnel are not
tethered to the device; deploying personnel are limited on equipment; and stable hover is
crucial in confined LZs.

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4.10.10 Extractions Using Fast Rope Insertion Extraction System. A t t a c h o n l y t w o


people per personnel attaching loop on the FRIES. Use the top and bottom loops when
extracting four personnel. When extracting an odd number of personnel, position the odd man
on the higher personnel attaching loop. Attach any combat equipment to the last bridle loop so
it will be lower than the personnel. As the aircraft approaches the pickup point, the ropes will
be deployed from the aircraft. After the ropes have been deployed, the personnel to be
extracted will move under the helicopter and secure themselves. Personnel to be extracted will
face in the direction of travel of the helicopter, ensuring that none of the connections and ropes
are crossed or entangled, and squat side by side. Personnel being extracted will interlock arms
or grasp harnesses. This will prevent collisions between personnel while airborne. Extraction
is limited to an altitude to permit terrain/obstacle clearance of at least 100 feet. Maximum
forward speed is 80 KIAS.
4.11 Hoist Operations. Hoist operations provide a controlled means of descent as well as
ascent. There are many different ways to employ the hoist. Capabilities and limitations of the
hoist are dependent on the manufacturer. Prior to conducting operations, it is the responsibility of
each PJ to understand the capabilities and limitations of the hoist type used. As a minimum, the PJ
must know the maximum load, cable shear procedures, general control and function, and
emergency procedures. The primary hoist operator is the flight engineer; however, a PJ may be
designated when the mission dictates. It is recommended that personnel wear goggles and a
helmet when riding the hoist. The aircrew or PROTEC-type helmet may be used. The PJ team
and crew determine which device to use. A survivor unfamiliar with the rescue device should be
briefed over the radio, provided printed instructions attached to the device, or directly assisted by
a PJ to ensure proper device use for a safe pickup.
4.11.1 Primary Rescue Device. The primary rescue device used in helicopter rescue is the
hoisting cable and double rescue hook assembly. The rescue hook assembly is attached to the
end of the helicopter hoisting cable. This hook assembly consists of two gated hooks and an
eyelet. The larger hook is used to attach all personnel and/or any elected rescue devices. The
smaller hook is used for handling equipment or light cargo. The eyelet is used strictly for cargo
hoisting. The upper section of the hook is a ball bearing swivel, which prevents unwinding of
the hoisting cable, bumper assembly, and cable stop. (See Figure 4.3, Double Rescue Hook
Assembly.)
4.11.2 Climbing Harness. The climbing or body harness is the method of choice for hoist
insert into all environments. A Swiss seat, climbing harness, or body harness provides a
secure attachment point for hoist operations in lieu of other devices.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 4.3 Double Rescue Hook Assembly.

Double Rescue Hook

Cable
Cable Stop

Bumper
Assembly

Safety
Latch
Personnel
Hook and
Rescue
Device

Safety
Latch

Equipment
Hook

Equipment Ring

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

4-13

4.11.3 Forest Penetrator. The forest penetrator is used for single or multiple recoveries
from land or water. The forest penetrator may be attached to the rescue hook assembly for
land and sea rescue operations. The unit is bright yellow for high visibility. The forest
penetrator is 34 inches long and 8 inches in diameter with the three seats retracted. Each seat
is approximately 12 inches long and is spring loaded in the retracted position. A spring-loaded
retaining latch under each seat secures the seat in the extended position. To release the seat
from the extended position, push down on the seat and pull down on the latch. The seat will
then snap back into the retracted position. Three webbing safety straps are provided to secure
survivors. The straps terminate with a yellow fabric marked Tighten. Yellow webbing tabs
marked Pull Out, are sewn to the safety straps and extend from one of three stowage
openings. Attachment of a flotation collar allows the forest penetrator to float during air-sea
rescue operations. The collar is made of bright orange foam rubber for high visibility. When
the flotation collar is installed, the diameter of the penetrator is 9 inches. (See Figure 4.4,
Forest Penetrator for details.)
4.11.4 Rescue Seat. The rescue seat is a compact, lightweight, and simple to use rescue
device. Equipped with two friction-controlled folding seats that can be positioned for use
within seconds. The device is suitable for both land and marine rescue operations as it
incorporates a flotation collar. Each fold-down seat is equipped with a safety strap and printed
instructions with pictorials, located on two opposite sides of the float collar. Patterned after
the forest penetrator, the rescue seat has been designed for simple operation, ease of
maintenance, and is ideal for confined area rescues requiring a narrow profile (such as through
tree canopies). Because of this devices ease of use, weight (18 pounds), and cost, the forest
penetrator is rapidly being replaced by this device by all services. (See Figure 4.5, Rescue
Seat.)
4.11.5 Stokes Litter. The stokes litter is constructed of mesh and lightweight steel tubing
that holds a survivor immobile in a supine position. The sides of the litter protect the survivor
from bumping against obstructions or the side of the helicopter during retrieval. The stokes
litter should be configured with sling, flotation devices (if required), and three restraining belts
when stowed on the aircraft. A tag line should be used during live stokes operations. (See
Figure 4.6, Stokes Litter with Floatation.)
4.11.6 Tag Line. The tag line (trail line) is a rope of varied construction and length used by
surface personnel to prevent oscillation and/or spinning of hoist rescue devices. It may also be
used to guide the rescue device or survivor to or from confined areas, such as ships, trees, or
canyon areas. The tag line may aid the pilot during water operations by reducing time required
to hover directly over small watercraft without a reference. The tag line should not be attached
directly to the rescue device; a weak link should be used. A weight should be attached to the
tended end of the tag line. This keeps it from being blown about by the rotor wash and gives
the crew member better control delivering the line to a confined or restricted surface position.
The weak link end of the tag line may be fastened to the hoist hook or the rescue device, before
the device goes out the door.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 4.4 Forest Penetrator.

Forest Penetrator

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

4-15

Figure 4.5 Rescue Seat.

Rescue Seat

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 4.6 Stokes Litter with Floatation.

Stokes Litter with Floatation

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

NOTE: The weak link is created using a single loop of gutted 550 cord or two wraps of
80-pound test tape between the rope end and carabiner
NOTE:

Leather work gloves should be provided for tag line tenders other than the team.

NOTE: Reconsider using a tag line if the likelihood of entanglement with tenders, trees, or
aircraft skis is greater than the anticipated benefits thereof.
4.11.6.1 To deliver the tag line to a large vessel with a restricted pickup area, the tag line
should be lowered after the helicopter is in a hover over the vessel.
4.11.6.2 Once the tag line is on the ground/vessel and the team/boat crew is tending it, the
hoist operator will direct the pilot clear of the survivor/vessel while paying out slack in the
tag line. The tag line weak link will be attached to the rescue device. When the pilot can
again see the survivor/vessel, the hoist operator begins to lower the hoist. At this point the
team/shipboard personnel use the tag line to guide the rescue device into the desired
location.
4.11.6.3 When the rescue device is on the ground/vessels deck and the survivor is ready
for hoisting, the hoist operator gives directions to position the helicopter back over the
survivor/deck. Retrieving the rescue device vertically may not always be possible. Be
prepared to recover the rescue device at any angle. When conditions permit, recover the
rescue device vertically. As soon as the survivor is clear of the deck or obstructions, the
hoist operator clears the helicopter away from the obstacles/vessel, usually left or back.
The crew maintains this position until the survivor is in the cabin and the tag line is either
retrieved or discarded and the crew member has reported ready for forward flight.
4.11.6.4 The tag line may be used in lieu of the hoist cable to lower small items to a boat.
The item to be lowered will be attached to the snap link with a weight. Use the same
procedure for delivery of the tag line to small and large vessels. The weak link end of the
tag line will be attached to a cabin tiedown ring.
4.11.6.5 For aircraft with skis installed, attach the tag line to the head of litter, as opposed
to the foot. This allows the tag line attendant to avoid the worst of the helicopters rotor
wash. When PJs utilize the Barrelman technique for survivor rescue and recovery, they are
able to ensure the tag line does not become entangled with the skis.
4.11.6.6 When rappelling, the PJs in prior to the stokes litter, the rappel rope can then be
quickly used as a tag line provided, a carabiner with a weak link has been attached to the
foot or head end of the stokes litter.
4.11.7 Rescue Basket. The compact rescue basket has been selected as standard equipment
aboard all US Coast Guard rescue helicopters. It is also in service with the US Air Force, US
Navy and foreign governments. The rescue basket is mostly constructed of stainless steel. The
bail assembly folds into the basket for compact stowage. The basket weighs 39 pounds. The
rescue basket is particularly useful for recovery of personnel not familiar with the forest
penetrator or rescue strop. Because entry is easier and more rapid for a survivor than a forest
penetrator, it may be one of the best devices for recovery of survivors from frigid waters. The
disadvantage is the size of the device. (See Figure 4.7, Rescue Basket.)

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

4-17

Figure 4.7 Rescue Basket.

Rescue Basket Assembled

UNCLASSIFIED
4.11.8 Rescue Net. The rescue net is constructed of stainless steel tube framing and
5/16-inch polypropylene netting. The net weighs approximately 20 pounds. A sea anchor
drogue is provided to position and stabilize the net and allow for flight path corrections. The
sea anchor drogue may be replaced by a 10-foot line with a 3- to 5-pound bag of shot for
stability. The rescue net is a collapsible, buoyant device designed to accommodate two
survivors. A lifting ring for hoisting is located at the top or upper portion of the net, along with
flotation collars and locking support rods. These rods incorporate sliding sleeves to prevent the
net from collapsing when it is occupied and to make it easy for storage when not in use. The
rescue net is particularly useful for recovery of personnel not familiar with the forest
penetrator or rescue strop. Because entry is easier and more rapid for a survivor than a forest
penetrator, it may be the best device for recovery of survivors from frigid waters. The
disadvantage is the size of the device.
4.11.9 Rescue Strop (Horse Collar). The rescue strop is used to hoist uninjured personnel
during helicopter operations. The strop is placed under the arms and across the back; the safety
strap located on the outside is pulled loose, placed over the arms, under the front of the strop
and attached across the front of the chest and adjusted to a snug fit. The arms must remain
down to prevent possible slippage during hoisting. Pictorials are printed on the strop.
Personnel must be trained in the proper and safe use of this item. The rescue strop is designed
to be unaffected by repeated use in the marine environment; constructed of nylon, closed-cell
foam and stainless steel hardware. A weight may be attached to the strop to aid in stability.
The rescue strap is useful in all environments except the forest or jungle where it can get
snagged on branches. (See Figure 4.8, Rescue Strop.)

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 4.8 Rescue Strop.

Rescue Strop

UNCLASSIFIED
4.11.10 Quick Strop. Originally designed for the US Coast Guard, the quick strop is now
available to all rescue activities. (See Figure 4.9, Quick Strop.) Constructed of military
specification webbing and stainless steel hardware, the quick strop provides a quick, safe
means of hoisting uninjured personnel. The quick strop is smaller and lighter than the rescue
strop and is replacing the rescue strop in most services. The strop can be placed under the
arms, around the back, or over the head of the survivor in one quick motion. To prevent the
survivor from slipping out, a slide buckle is slid down the strop and attached to an adjustable
crotch safety strap which is stored in a zipper pocket on the rear of the strop. Instructions and
pictorials are printed on the strop. A weight may be attached to the strop to aid in stability. A
pararescue man may ride the hoist with the survivor using another strop or by directly hooking
in with his harness. The quick strop is useful in all environments except the forest or jungle
where it can get snagged on branches.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

4-19

Figure 4.9 Quick Strop.

Quick Strope

UNCLASSIFIED
4.11.11 Execution. Optimally, the pilot flying should establish a right-hand rectangular
pattern with the final approach oriented into the wind. This aids in keeping the survivor in
sight while preparing for pickup. The pilot should keep the crew informed of the helicopters
position in the pattern and the hoist operator advises the pilot when ready to deploy smokes or
accomplish the pickup.
4.11.11.1 Hoist retrievals from trees must be slow enough to allow survivors to fend off
branches and prevent cable entanglement. Radio communication or pre-briefed signals for
lost visual procedures should be briefed prior to deployment. It may be possible for a crew
member on the hoist to recover the survivor without disconnecting from the device.
Maximum loading of the hoist cable should not occur unless critical to mission
accomplishment.
4.11.11.2 Crew briefings should include actions to be taken in the event of equipment
malfunctions or impending failures. During training missions, terminate live hoisting
immediately at the first indication of equipment malfunction. Existing circumstances will
dictate actions to be taken, if required, the individual may be returned to the surface by
lowering the aircraft.
4.11.11.3 Ensure cable slack is held to the minimum necessary to perform the recovery.
Excessive slack can be especially dangerous during water recovery when the hoist
operator cannot see the cable.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

NOTE: Exercise caution to keep from anchoring the hoist hook or cable around an immovable
object.
4.11.11.4 Cable shock loading can occur when the cable is subjected to a sudden heavy
loads (i.e., entanglement, stokes litter being caught by waves, or weights being rapidly
applied). The effects of shock loading are worse when the device is close to the full up
position when the loading occurs.
WARNING: Cables suspected of shock loading will be reported to the crew and replaced IAW
published directives.
4.11.11.5 The hoist should be grounded prior to pickup to discharge static electricity.
WARNING: The hoist should not be grounded near spilled fuel; the static electricity could ignite
it.
4.11.11.6 Severe oscillations/pendulum may occur when the hoist cable is raised and
lowered without a weight attached. Be prepared to be lowered or the aircraft to transition
to forward flight to correct.
4.11.11.7 When pulling the survivor into the helicopter, the easiest method is to turn the
survivors back to the helicopter and pull in. This reduces the possibility of semiconscious
or injured survivor fighting the hoist operator.
4.11.11.8 Forest Penetrator/Rescue Seat. Fold the seat paddles and stow safety straps
before lowering the penetrator through trees or dense foliage.For water recoveries, install
the flotation collar before lowering the penetrator. Place at least one seat paddle in the
down position and remove one safety strap from the stowed position. Do not unhook the
safety strap fastener from the penetrator. If the penetrator is left to assist the survivor, fold
the seat paddles and stow the safety straps so they will not snag on obstructions if the
helicopter moves or the hoist cable has to be retrieved.
WARNING: The aircraft may depart the area with the PJ/survivor still suspended on the cable.
When conducting hoist operations using the forest penetrator, keep arms down, elbows locked
against the body, and do not attempt to grab the cable or weighted snap link above the device.
NOTE: If the penetrator strap is not used (will not fit around bulky equipment), use an alternate
means of securing (e.g., chest strap, or alternate load belt.)
4.11.11.9 Stokes Litter. To lower the stokes litter, attach the stokes litter to the cable,
maneuver it outside the aircraft foot end first and then parallel to the side of the helicopter.
The FE/PJ may be required to lean out of the door to maneuver the stokes litter.
NOTE: An alternate method of lowering the stokes litter is to connect the hook to the head of the
stokes litter so it hangs vertical during lowering.
NOTE: It is common practice to place a locking steel carabiner between the stokes cable
attachment rings and the rescue hook. This is an acceptable practice only when a safety pin is
installed on the rescue hook.
CAUTION: Services other than US Air Force usually do not have a safety pin installed on the
rescue hoist hook. If a hook is encountered without a safety pin, do not use a carabiner between
the cable rings on the stokes and the hook. A carabiner is large enough that it can rotate out of the

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

4-21

hook. Place the rings directly into the rescue hook. These rings were specifically designed and
sized to be used in this manner.
4.11.11.9.1 Lower the stokes litter to the survivor after the helicopter is established in
a hover. When raising or lowering an empty stokes litter for water recoveries, the use
of the cable safety/retaining pin is not required.
4.11.11.9.2 Once the stokes litter is on the surface, the hoist operator should provide
slack in the hoist cable allowing it to be disconnected from the stokes litter. The aircraft
can then move to a holding position while securing the patient or hover above the site.
In a low-threat environment, it is advisable to have the helicopter move away so the PJ
can complete a patient assessment and secure the patient in the stokes litter without the
added burden of noise and rotor wash.
4.11.11.9.3 After the survivor is secured in the stokes litter and ready for hoisting, the
team reconnects the hoist cable ensuring the rescue hook safety pin and carabiner
locking sleeves are properly positioned/secured. Ensure the survivor is securely
strapped in the stokes litter prior to hoisting. For small patients, the belt can be routed
directly across the patient. For large patients, the belt can be routed outside and over
the top bar before securing the patient to the stokes litter.
4.11.11.9.4 Consider tag line procedures to prevent or control common problems
during hoisting like pendulum, spinning, and oscillation. After the patient is secured in
the stokes litter and is ready for hoisting, reconnect the hoist cable and reinstall the
rescue hook safety pin. A stokes litter attendant may be required. The stokes litter
attendant will hook directly into the cable hook. PJs should always move to the far
side of the stokes litter from the helicopter so it is not pulled into them when it is lifted
off the ground. Signal the aircraft for the pick-up.
NOTE: Installation of the snow shield on the stokes litter may result in uncontrollable spinning.
Consider using a tag line when the snow shield is installed.
4.11.11.10 Rescue Net. The rescue net will be lowered to the water short of the survivor
at an approximate ground speed of 3 to 5 knots and raised as soon as the last person enters.
There is no requirement for hand signals. Due to the size of the net, the survivor must be
removed from the net before bringing the net into the helicopter.
WARNING: The rescue net must be secured against the helicopter while the survivor or PJ
departs the net to prevent falling.
4.11.11.11 Rescue Basket. The basket is designed for only one person. It will be lowered
to the water short of the survivor at an approximate ground speed of 3 to 5 knots and raised
as soon a thumbs up is given by the PJ in the water, or it looks like the survivor is safely in
the basket. The basket may be brought entirely inside the helicopter.
4.11.11.12 Rescue Strop/Horse Collar/Quick Strop. The procedures for the use of the
rescue strop are the same as those described for the forest penetrator with the exception of
the obvious differences between the two devices. Up to three slings may be lifted at one
time, not to exceed hoist weight limitations.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

WARNING: Improper donning of the rescue strap may result in a fall. Before use, consult
manufacturer operating instructions for type device used.
4.11.11.13 Barrelman Hoist Technique. The Barrelman Hoist Technique is a method for
trained PJ personnel to attach directly to the hoist hook using a climbing harness and sling
with carabiner. This method was first developed and used by civilian SAR agencies,
primarily for having a litter attendant ride up the hoist with a stokes litter. The climbing
harness and Barrelman Technique can be used for both land and water. When selecting a
harness for water use, the simpler the better. Continuous loop harnesses remain strong
even with a single point failure. The sit harness should ride high on the waist area and be
adjustable to fit over bulky clothing or wet/dry suits. This allows the harness to handle the
bulk of the load and is the primary attachment point for the retaining strap. A chest
harness may be used, but is not always necessary. The chest harness prevents the PJ from
slipping into a head-down attitude when carrying a pack or other equipment that makes
him top-heavy. The chest harness functions primarily as a balance point, as most of the
load is on the sit harness. A carabiner through the front load bearing equipment or pack
straps is an alternative to wearing a commercial chest harness. A retaining strap is the
primary anchor line used to attach the PJ from the sit harness to the hoist hook. The type of
retaining strap, method, or combination of retaining strap/chest harness used, will depend
on the availability of equipment and type of pick-up operation that will be performed.
NOTE: The retaining strap may be used as an alternate loading belt provided a separate pelican
hook is attached to one end.
WARNING: Do not use snap shackles (pelican hooks), non-locking carabiners, or similar
quick release devices on the primary anchor line/retaining strap.
4.11.11.13.1 Simple Nylon Strap. This retaining strap is constructed of one-inch
tubular nylon (or equivalent) and locking carabiners (auto-lock recommended).
Running the tubular nylon strap through a carabiner attached to the LBE, chest
harness, or backpack provides a balance point for stokes litter pick-ups when the
backpack is worn.
4.11.11.13.2 Daisy Chain Strap. A daisy chain may be used instead of a tubular
nylon strap. The main advantage of using a daisy chain strap is the ability to quickly
size the strap for the operation involved. Additionally, the daisy chain strap provides a
fixed loop for a chest area carabiner when performing stokes litter pick up while
wearing a backpack. Attach the daisy chain strap to the sit harness either with a looped
bight through itself or a locking carabiner in one end. (See Figure 4.10, Daisy Chain
to Hoist Cable Attachment.)

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4-23

Figure 4.10 Daisy Chain to Hoist Cable Attachment.

Daisy Chain to Hoist Cable Attachment

UNCLASSIFIED
4.11.11.13.3 Rope Strap (Kernmantle/Perlon/Dynamic or Mountain-Lay/
Hawser-Laid/Gold Line/Static) with Ascender. The rope strap with Jumar ascender
is more complicated than daisy chain straps or the tubular nylon strap, but may be
useful if daisy chain and tubular nylon straps are in short supply or movement inside
the helicopter is desired. The ascender also facilitates quick strap length sizing in
situations where proper static sizing could not be accomplished prior to the operations
commencing. The rope strap may be used with or without the Jumar/ascender instead
of a tubular nylon or daisy chain straps. The method of attachment is the same for the
rope strap as the tubular nylon, however a separate line is necessary for hoists when the
chest sling is required. The ascender is attached to the same carabiner on the sit harness
as the rope strap. The ascender may quickly be disconnected once inside the
helicopter, while still allowing the PJ to be connected to the aircraft via the hoist hook.
This allows greater freedom of movement once inside to assist in strapping the stokes
and securing oneself or others prior to forward flight. (See Figure 4.11, Rope Strap
with Jumar Ascender.)
4.11.11.13.4 Prusik Strap. Method and use of the prusik strap is the same as for the
rope strap. Other types of friction knots may be utilized (e.g., climb heist, or double
Prusik). (See Figure 4.12, Prusik Strap.)

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 4.11 Rope Strap with Jumar Ascender.

Rope Strap with Jumar Ascender

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

4-25

Figure 4.12 Prusik Strap.

Prusik Strap

UNCLASSIFIED
4.11.11.13.5 Typically, the ends of the strap are connected to the sit harness by
carabiner leaving a short loop from between the chest to chin level depending on the
PJs body size. This allows the strap to be placed onto the hook end of the hoist using a
carabiner, or by itself, while maintaining the proper distance once the sit-harness slack
is pulled up. The strap must be adjusted to place the PJ approximately belly button
level to the stokes litter. This is the desirable distance as the length of the strap is
normally fixed and it is a comfortable distance for using the strap as an alternate
loading belt. The PJ may not have time to re-adjust the length.
4.11.11.13.6 Ensure the strap is the correct length prior to the operation being
conducted. If the strap is too long, the PJ may be below the level of the cabin floor. If
the strap is too short, the PJs legs will be unable to reach the floor underneath the
stokes litter. Size the strap on a static aircraft with the stokes litter on the ground first.
If necessary, the strap may need to be adjusted after the first hoist mission to find a
better position for comfort and control.
4.11.11.14 Barrelman Procedures. Hoisting using the climbing harness is relatively
simple. Place the strap/carabiner through the rescue hoist hook. Ensure the pin is in the
hook and the gates are locked on the carabiners. The rescue hoist hook should have a
chemlight secured to it for night/NVG operations to facilitate the FE/crew knowing where
it is. Use standard signals and detach once reaching the ground.
4.11.11.14.1 One-Man Pick-Up. Hoisting one man using the Barrelman Technique is
the simplest and fastest method for hoist retrieval. Perform the pick-up using the

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


previously discussed methods of attachment to the hoist. Because the PJs hands and
feet are free, arms and legs can freely be used to counter spinning, fend off obstacles,
and prepare for a controlled landing. The PJ does not require any assistance to enter the
helicopter except when injured, bringing up a survivor or other objects, or during water
pick-ups where the PJ has not removed fins. Any retaining strap method previously
described may be used. The chest harness/backpack strap/LBE balancing point/strap
is not needed if the PJ is without a pack and is able to keep from becoming inverted.
When entering the cabin, place feet on the hoist bumper bar and then the aircraft floor
and grab the ceiling strap, H-bar, FRIES bar, or airframe as necessary to facilitate entry
into the helicopter. Do not grab any cables, wires, or the FE. Be cautious of taking hold
of the forward edge of the door because this may inadvertently move/depress switches
and wheels attached to the FEs hoist cabin control panel (CCP).
4.11.11.14.2 Two-Man Pick-Up. The two-man pick-up is similar to the one-man in
both restrictions and methods. It is easier to enter the cabin if both PJs, or a PJ plus the
survivor, are eye level with each other. When picking up a survivor using the rescue
strap, ensure the PJ is at a comfortable height to control the survivor. Ensure the
survivor does not remove the device or attempt to grab cables, wires, or the FE. If the
survivor is incapacitated, maneuver the survivor to enter the cabin first toward the FE.
4.11.11.15 Stokes Litter Deployment. Hoisting using the stokes is also simple, however
a few techniques will help make it more successful. Although deploying the stokes litter
using Barrelman Techniques is quicker and simpler than previous methods. Seriously
consider the tactical threat before deploying a stokes litter. It was learned late in the
Vietnam War that deploying the stokes was a greater threat to the rescue mission than
picking up a survivor with a back injury using a penetrator strap (without paddles) or the
rescue strap. The practice of deploying the stokes litter and two PJs during CSAR
missions was discontinued because of this. The amount of risk in longer hover periods has
to be weighed against the probable reaction time and capability of the enemy. There is still
a viable use for this technique in non- or low-tactical threat scenarios/operations.
4.11.11.15.1 Horizontal Stokes Litter Deployment. One or two PJs and the stokes
may deploy from the door. During insertion, PJs connect to the rescue hoist hook
along with the stokes. The stokes litter is positioned on the outside of the cabin and the
two PJs position themselves in the door. Do not wear backpacks. Either secure them
in the stokes litter or remove them. Move the stokes out the door first, slowly place
weight on the straps, and once PJ/PJ team is ready, give the hoist operator the signal to
begin lowering. PJs should stabilize themselves and fend off the aircraft until below
aircraft ensuring stokes litter does not become entangled/caught on anything in cabin
doorway. Once the stokes litter and PJs are on the ground and secure, they detach
from the rescue hook. Following rescue hook detachment, the PJs detach from the
litter.

NOTE: PJ/FE should ensure the combined pick-up weight of PJs and survivor do not exceed the
hoist up maximum weight.
4.11.11.15.2 Vertical Stokes Litter Deployment. An alternate method is to deploy
the stokes litter vertically. This method may be useful for deployment into wooded

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

4-27

areas and is a better method to control the litter during the descent. The PJ attaches to
the rescue hoist hook in the normal manner. Place a carabiner on the head (or foot) end
of the stokes litter; then attach a large snap shackle (pelican hook) to the carabiner.
The snap shackle is then attached to the rescue hoist hook. The pelican hook gives the
PJ the ability to cut the litter away should be needed during the descent. The FE then
(using the hoist) pulls the PJ and the litter toward and out the cabin door. Because
there is no tag line, it is possible uncontrolled spinning, pendulums, and oscillations
could occur. Unless the situation warrants, consider rappelling the PJs in first and then
using the rappel rope as a tag line for the hoist.
CAUTION: Use care when using this method from altitudes higher than 25 feet AGL.
4.11.11.15.3 Stokes Litter Pick-up. When using the stokes litter, ensure the patient
is securely strapped into the litter prior to hoisting. Ensure the carabiner locking
sleeves are positioned towards the inside of the stokes litter. After the patient is
secured in the stokes litter and is ready for hoisting, reconnect the rescue hoist hook to
the stokes litter cables and reinstall the rescue hoist hook safety pin.
4.11.11.15.4 Pararescue Barrelman on the Outside. Outside is the normal position
for the Barrelman and is the only method allowable for aircraft with skis installed. PJ
should always move to the far side of the stokes litter from the helicopter so it is not
pulled into them when lifted off the ground. PJs with short legs may have to adjust their
retaining straps lower than the belly button. When nearing the aircraft, the PJ
maneuvers to place the stokes litter towards the inside. The PJ should place feet on the
hoist bumper. If aircraft has skis installed, the PJ should use the forward foot to
maneuver the stokes litter outside the skis. The PJ may place a foot on the ski, tire, or
bumper as necessary to clear the stokes litter from the aircraft. (See Figure 4.13, Foot
Placement.) As the FE raises the hoist cable, the PJ will maneuver the head of the
stokes litter inside the helicopter (overhead straps greatly facilitate the hoist entry).
After the PJ has his feet on the cabin floor, the FE will begin to lower the hoist while
the PJ pulls/pushes the litter inside. If done correctly, the FE should not have to assist
the PJ in pulling the litter inside the aircraft.
4.11.11.15.5 Pararescue Barrelman on the Inside. This may be necessary, for
example, on a hoist pick-up over water when the PJ has not been able to removed his
fins. The disadvantages are the PJ is actually coming up under the floor of the
helicopter and the stokes litter must be turned to the outside. Patient and PJ individual
size are the primary considerations when using this technique. Always move to the far
side of the stokes litter from the helicopter so it is not pulled into you when lifted off
the ground. When nearing the aircraft, the barrelman, or to place the stokes litter
towards the outside, enters the aircraft first and then maneuvers the stokes litter inside.
The hoist operator may assist by turning both the stokes litter and the barrelman
sideways in order to maneuver them into aircraft. The stokes litter is pulled inside and
secured (normally head first). The hook is then sent down to retrieve the other PJ.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 4.13 Foot Placement.

Foot Placement

UNCLASSIFIED
4.11.12 Water Hoist Operations. Because of heavy rotor wash, the PJs should never swim to
a device that has been lowered to them. Instead the pilot should deliver the device to the PJs,
placing the PJs and survivor in the sweet spot underneath the helicopter where there is little
rotor wash. This greatly reduces the amount of time the helicopter needs to be in a hover. This
also greatly reduces the PJs and survivors time in the water connecting to the device. A
pararescuemans excellent physical condition is not a substitute for poor crew coordination
and pilot skills. The PJ also should not swim to a cable while tending to a survivor.
4.11.12.1 Day Water Hoist. While in the water, prepare a signaling device to assist the
aircraft in locating the rescue position and don a facemask to shield eyes from the rotor
wash. After sighting the PJ, the aircraft will maneuver to approximately 100 feet
downwind and make a low reconnaissance pass over rescue position. Once past the site,
the pilot may initiate a climbing right turn and deploy a sea dye or smoke marker to act as
a hover reference during the hoist operation. The pick-up will normally be on the
following pass, depending on the hover reference device.
4.11.12.2 Night Water Hoist. The aircraft may deploy chemlights to mark survivor/PJ
location and provide them an approach pattern and hover references. This will also ensure
the rescue position can be reacquired if the hoist pattern is flown wider than intended. The
PJ can also mark the position with an IR strobe, chemlights, or a flashlight. NVG water
operations are more difficult for the aircrew to accomplish than other hoist operations
because of reduced light, lack of hover references, and reduced field of vision from NVGs.
PJs may have difficulty seeing because of the darkness and rotor wash. Be on alert for the

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

4-29

hoist devices to prevent injury to the PJ or the survivor. Be aware of the hoist cable around
the PJ and the survivor in the water to prevent entanglement.
4.11.12.3 Signals from Swimmer to Helicopter. For successful night water extraction,
pre-brief swimmer to helicopter signals that indicate ready for pickup and for immediate
emergency extraction. One method used in night operations is for the PJs to turn on strobe
lights when ready for pickup. Once the rescue device starts its decent, the PJs turn off their
strobes. Another method used during heavy seas or periods of low visibility is for the PJs
to leave their strobe lights on once deployed. This aids the crew in maintaining rescue
position. Indicate ready to be picked up by turning off the strobes for a brief period, then
follow the procedures listed above.
4.11.13 Free-Fall Swimmer Deployment. Free-Fall swimmer deployments, also known as
low and slow, provide an effective method of delivering PJs, stokes litter, or equipment (boat
delivery) to a defined objective in the water by flying the aircraft low and slow enough to
allow PJs to deploy from the aircraft into the water. (See Table 4.2, Standard and
Recommended Equipment.)
Table 4.2 Standard and Recommended Equipment.
Standard equipment.
Alternate loading belt.
Carabiner.
Mask.
Fins.
Snorkel.
Emergency signaling device.
Lighting (as required).
Knife.
Personal flotation device.
Wet/dry suit (as required).
Stokes litter with flotation/tag line (as required).
Recommended equipment.
Helmet.
Sit harness/improvised harness.
Single para-scuba utility deployment system (SPUDS).
Fanny pack.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

4.11.14 Predeployment Considerations. The flight path of the aircraft should not pass
directly over the survivor until the hoist pickup phase to reduce rotor wash over the objective.
Determine the wind direction prior to delivery. Set up for a delivery downwind and downdraft
of the survivor allowing the survivor to drift into position. At the intended insertion point, the
aircraft should be flying at a maximum of 10 KIAS and 10 feet above water level (AWL).
When mission circumstances warrant, the PJ may be delivered upwind or off-wind. If this is
the case, the PJ should be prepared to swim hard to reach survivor. In heavy winds/seas or
during low-light conditions, delivery away from the survivor may complicate procedures
because of team separation and/or loss of contact with the survivor.
4.11.15 Aircraft Procedures. Deployment procedures vary depending on the airframe,
number of personnel, and special equipment being deployed. The H-60 or a similar platform
can allow the deploying team members to sit in the door in the order of deployment. Because
the aircraft is in forward flight, the order of deployment starts at the rear of the aircraft and
moves forward. This should limit the chance of team members deploying on top of one
another. When deploying from a larger airframe like the H-53, the team lines up as if it is
performing a static line parachute deployment and everyone follows the first person out.
Spacing should be 1 second between team members. If the team is deploying from both the
aircraft crew entrance door and the ramp simultaneously, deploy all ramp team members first.
This avoids deploying teams on top of each other. Last minute corrections of the flight path
are made by the FE/PJ team leader. The PJ team leader passes hand signals for aircraft up,
down, left, and right, by moving the open palm of the hand in the direction desired. Continue
signals until reaching intended deployment location. During high seas, the aircraft flies 10
feet above the wave crests. Time PJ exit to land on or near the wave crest. Team deployments
in high seas usually require deploying no more than two team members per wave crest in order
to avoid some members deploying the additional distance into the trough of the wave. During
high sea states consider using the fast rope for deployment.
4.11.16 Deployment Procedures. The team leader should be in a position to view the
objective area at approximately 50 feet AWL. All deploying exits will be open at 50 feet AWL
and below. Deploying personnel will be secured until final approach. The thumbs up from
the safetyman to the deploying team on final approach indicates 10 feet AWL and 10 knots is
confirmed, and the team is cleared to deploy at the team leaders discretion. Deploying at night
with non-NVG equipped crew members may require a non-IR chemlight attached to each
individual deploying. Personnel exit the aircraft in a manner that reduces possibility of
entanglement and expedites delivery of personnel and equipment. The exit maneuver should
not be forceful. Exit by stepping off or pushing away from the aircraft. After the exit, bring
legs together with the fins pointed upward so the heels contact the water first. Recommend
taking/wearing a facemask with snorkel for water operations. When wearing a facemask
during deployment, use one or both hands to prevent the mask from coming off, hold it in
hand, or secure it in a cargo pocket. Once in the water, deploying team members surface with
raised clinched fist over head and immediately locate other team members. Team members
indicate a thumbs up signal after water entry to indicate they are okay and have not
sustained injuries. Deploying with scuba tanks can provide a tremendous advantage for search
and recovery operations. If deploying with scuba tanks, grab the tanks support strap just
behind the hip and hold it firmly down and against the back. This technique prevents the tank

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

4-31

manifold from rising and striking the head. Holding the tank tight against the back also
prevents a water surge between the tank and the back that could cause injury or damage
equipment. When deploying to an injured survivor, always consider deploying with a stokes
litter. This saves time and keeps the helicopter, with its rotor wash, away until the survivor is
packaged and ready for the pick up. To ensure the PJ maintain control of the stokes litter,
deploy the litter between PJ number one and PJ number two with number 2 deploying stokes
litter. PJ number two must ensure PJ number one is clear before deployment.
4.11.17 Safety Considerations. When deploying from the H-53 crew entrance door,
exercise caution to avoid contacting main landing gear. When you deploy from the ramp of
the H-53 be cautious of the tail rotor after water entry.
4.12 Special Patrol Insertion/Extraction System. The special patrol insertion/extraction
(SPIE) system was developed to rapidly insert or extract team members from an area where
landing is not possible. However, it is relatively slow and impractical compared to fast rope and
rappelling techniques. SPIE has gained applicability for extracting personnel from water. Thus, a
SPIE operation can either be a dry or wet operation. This system can pick up 1 to 10 personnel at
a time. The rope and personnel are treated as an external load so airspeeds, altitudes, and
oscillations must be closely monitored. (See Table 4.3, Standard Equipment.)
Table 4.3 Standard Equipment.
Standard equipment.
SPIES rope.
SPIES harness (commercial/improvised) with safety sling.
Two 9-foot, Type 13 cargo suspension slings.
Type IV links.
Leather work gloves.
Eye protection.
Helmet (as required).
4.12.1 Planning. Although SPIE is an expedient method of extraction, the need for special
equipment such as the SPIE harness necessitates deliberate planning. In preparing for an
operation, planners must determine if the tactical situation suggests the possible need to
extract personnel using SPIE.
4.12.2 Setup and Preparation. The SPIE system consists of the SPIE rope, a harness, and
a safety line. The SPIE rope assembly (NSN: 1670-01-065-0851) is approximately 120 feet in
length and consists of a doubled tapered eye splice at each end. The top tapered eye is
encapsulated in polyurethane to protect it from abrasions. The rope is one inch in diameter
and is coated with a nylon solution protecting the core of the rope. D rings are located in pairs
on opposite sides of each other, spaced 1 foot apart and 7 feet from center of one set to center
of the succeeding set. Four additional D rings can be added to the rope to provide a total
carrying capacity of 14 personnel. The rope assembly has a tensile strength (dry) of 24,000
pounds and a recommended maximum load of 5,000 pounds. (See Figure 4.14, SPIE Rope

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

for details.) The SPIE harness is a parachute type harness. A 20-inch looped strap is
connected to the crossover portion of the back straps. This serves as the primary anchor
device when secured to a SPIE rope D ring with a locking carabiner. (See Figure 4.15,
Commercial SPIE Harness.) The safety line consists of a standard 12- to 15-foot sling rope.
The safety line serves as the secondary anchor device and is worn underneath the harness.
Figure 4.14 SPIE Rope.

SPIE Rope
Lower Eye

D-Ring

Label

Encapsulated Eye
(aircraft Attachment
Point)

UNCLASSIFIED
4.12.3 Installation. Two 9-foot, Type 13 nylon cargo suspension slings (NSN:
1670-00-856-0266) are routed through the top tapered eye of the rope assembly and secured to
t h e f o u r r a p p e l l i n g r i n g s o f t h e H - b a r w i t h Ty p e I V l i n k s ( N S N :
1670-783-5988/MIL-L40085). (See Figure 4.16, Cargo Suspension Sling with Type IV
Connector.)
4.12.3.1 Pad the entire left edge of the cargo hook well with appropriate material (e.g., two
thickness of 0.5-inch felt pads, carpet, and fire hose) to prevent damaging the SPIE rope.
If the cargo hook is installed, the rope assembly should be routed through the hook during
deployment.
4.12.3.2 For night operations, attach chemlights to the SPIE rope assembly. Using three
chemlights; tape two chemlights at the bottom of the rope and one chemlight 3 feet above
the first set of D ring attachment points.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


Figure 4.15

4-33

Commercial SPIE Harness.

Commercial SPIE Harness


Shoulder
Pad

Steel Locking
Carabiner

Attaching
Strap

Pile
Tape

Chest
Strap
Adopter

Chest
Strap

Hook
Tape
Label

Pile
Tape

Ejector
Snap
V-Ring

Leg
Strap

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 4.16 Cargo Suspension Sling with Type IV Connector.

Cargo Suspension Sling with Type IV Connector


Type IV Link
Body
Type IV Link
Plate
Loop

Keeper

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


4.12.3.3 For water operations, tie three LPU bladders or any type of flotation device to the
SPIE rope to provide buoyancy for the rope while in the water. Tie one flotation device at
each end of the D ring attachment point areas and one flotation device in the middle of the
attachment point area, just above the middle two sets of D rings.

WARNING: The tensile strength of the SPIE rope is reduced when wet.
4.12.4 Land Operating Procedures. Once established over the LZ, the pilot will call
ROPES, ROPES, ROPES. At the ropes call, the scanners will deploy the rope through the
cargo hook bay or cargo doors and call ROPES DEPLOYED (ensure rope is not entangled
with personnel or equipment). As soon as the ropes reach the ground, the team members hook
into the D rings. When all members are secure and ready, the team leader will give the aircrew
thumbs up (at night, prearranged light signals may be used). If possible, the radio man will
hookup close to the bottom of the rope and maintain radio contact with the helicopter in order
to provide a verbal backup for the extract, clearing of obstacles, and descent into the LZ. Upon
receiving the thumbs up from the team, the scanners inform the pilot they are ready to lift.
The aircraft should ascend once the SPIE rope is clear of all obstacles and slowly accelerate to
40 to 60 knots (do not exceed 70 knots in clear weather or 50 knots in cold weather)
proceeding to a secure area. Scanners inform the pilot when the last person is off the ground
and once 100-foot clearance is reached, clear the pilot for forward flight. A minimum of
100-foot clearance should be maintained between the bottom of the SPIE assembly and
ground obstacles, tactical situation permitting. During the flight, the scanners should advise
the pilot of team status and check rigging frequently.
4.13 Rapid Equipment Delivery System and Equipment. The insertion techniques discussed
to this point have all dealt with insertions of personnel. Many missions require the additional
support of equipment that would not be practical or possible to carry during personnel
deployments. The rapid equipment delivery system (REDS) technique was developed to provide
insertion of mission essential equipment. REDS uses the traditional mountaineering skill of
belaying in an untraditional environment.
4.13.1 REDS Container/Contents Inspection/Storage Requirements. Proper inspection,
storage, and setup is critical to proper usage. REDS kits and associated components are stored
in the rescue equipment storage room. Ensure REDS kits and components have been
inspected before and after each use, are controlled by hand receipts, and are returned in
serviceable condition. Ensure any equipment maintenance/repair discrepancies are reported to
the appropriate personnel in order to replace kit contents when necessary.
4.13.1.1 REDS Container Inspection.
4.13.1.1.1 REDS Container. The REDS container should be smooth on the outside to
avoid getting hung-up during the deployment, and rigid to provide protection of its
contents during deployment. Inspect corners, bottom, and lid/lid attachments for any
cracks, bending, or bowing.
4.13.1.1.2 Lowering Harness. Inspect for any tears or excessive wear and ensure all
hardware is present and operational. If the harness looks as if it wont withstand
another deployment, replace it.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

4-35

4.13.1.1.3 Belay Rope/Equipment. Belay rope should be inspected prior to each use
for serviceability. Units should establish a shelf-life for ropes used to belay REDS
based on manufacturers specifications for rope strength/use. All belay/lowering
hardware must be inspected for metal fatigue, cracks, unusual bends, and friction
burns.
4.13.1.2 REDS Equipment Inspection/Storage Requirements.
4.13.1.2.1 Ryobi Saws. When saws are stored with blades installed, the blades must
be protected with a rigid covering to prevent blade breakage. PVC pipe works well for
this purpose. Include extra blades in the REDS maintenance kit. Ensure the tool kit for
the Ryobi saw is included in the REDS kit. Ryobi saws need a mixture of gas and oil
to operate properly. Include extra oil in the REDS maintenance kit for fuel mixture.
4.13.1.2.2 Hydraulic Pump. Hydraulic pumps may be stored with fluid in the tank.
Fluid in connected hydraulic hoses should only be non-flammable hydraulic fluid or
mineral oil. Ensure the generator hydraulic pressure switch is in the tank position to
take the pressure off the system while not in use. If hoses are disconnected, any
exposed hose fittings should be covered with dust caps to keep dirt out of the fittings.
Keep extra fluid for the generator with the REDS maintenance kit. Ensure the throttle,
hydraulic, and choke levers are working properly. Clean the spark plug to prevent plug
failure.
4.13.1.2.3 Rescue Combination Tool (Jaws). Must be kept clean and free of dirt
and rust. The recommended procedure for storage is to close the tool fully, then open
the tips approximately one half inch. Next, release the pressure at the pump/tank and
disconnect fittings as required. Hydraulic connections can remain connected while in
storage, although it is not recommended for extended periods of time. Any
disconnected coupler fittings on the jaws need to be kept covered with dust caps to
keep those fittings free of dirt. Inspect jaw blades for warping. If any discrepancies are
found with the tool, it should be replaced immediately.
4.13.1.2.4 Air Bags. Air bags should be stored to keep them relatively free of
petroleum products. The recommended inspection procedure is to inflate each bag and
keep inflated for at least 3 hours.
4.13.1.2.5 REDS Maintenance Kit. Maintenance kits can be any suitable container
that will accommodate the extra fluids and hardware needed for normal REDS
maintenance. The maintenance kit need not be deployed unless recurring use of the
REDS is anticipated.
4.13.1.3 Packaging for Deployment.
4.13.1.3.1 The entire REDS deployment system consists of a belay system and the
REDS kit in a lowering harness. Additional equipment, depending on the mission,
may be added to the package with optional rigging configurations. For example, a
stokes litter or me/SAR gear may be integrated and deployed with the kit.
NOTE: If a stokes litter is used, the footend is the attachment point to lower the stokes litter
with REDS attached.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


4.13.1.3.2 SKEDCO SKED Stretcher. The SKED stretcher may be attached as
transport medium. It offers a hard plastic smooth surface (skid plate) on which to drag
the REDS. The SKED may be full-sized, or modified to fit the REDS container. A
pole-less litter wrapped around the container is another option to make ground
transport easier. If the SKED is used, its straps should be modified with quick-snap
fasteners for quick and easy disconnect. The SKED can be removed and used as an
additional litter if required, after the REDS is in position.
4.13.1.3.3 Padding should be added inside and outside of the REDS container. Inside
should be 1-inch rubberized foam pad on the floor of the container. Bubble wrap
should be inserted as required into spaces between tools to keep them from banging
together. Crushboard should be secured to the bottom of the kit between container and
harness to cushion deployment impact.
4.13.1.3.4 The harness is designed to enclose the container and allow a connecting
point for belay or air drop. It is made of 2-inch nylon webbing in a cross pattern.
V rings are sewn into the straps to allow riser extensions to be attached.
4.13.1.4 Belay System and Configuration. A stitch plate may be the device of choice if
9mm or 11mm rope is used. If smaller than 9mm rope is used, the belay device should be
a Figure Eight with a double-wrap, allowing positive control of the REDS package.
Whichever belay system is used, it is important to maintain an emergency quick-release
capability from the helicopter and at the REDS kit connection.
4.13.1.4.1 Belay System Equipment.
Pelican hook one each.
Tubular nylon sling extension, 2 feet one each.
Locking steel carabiners two each.
Figure 8, Stitch plate or other suitable belay device 1 each.
7,125 feet of 9mm rope, in a rope bag.
Leather gloves one pair.
Rope bag one each.
Belay system anchor points.
H-60s with internal tanks: Ceiling belay point forward of right door or FRIES
bar.
H-60s without internal tanks: Ceiling belay point aft of right door or FRIES bar.
H-53s/H-47s/H-46s: Floor tie-down ring or FRIES bar.
4.13.1.5 Pre-Deployment Preparation.
4.13.1.5.1 If a rope bag is used (recommended), the rope should be back-coiled in bag.
If the bag is not used, the rope should be bird nested.
4.13.1.5.2 The equipment package should have a snap shackle (pelican hook), but a
locking carabiner will work for a lowering point to ensure a quick release once on the

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

4-37

surface. If a stokes litter is used, the lowering point for the pelican hook will be at the
foot end of the litter.
4.13.1.5.3 Select a belay point on a ceiling tiedown ring, floor ring (closest to exit), or
the FRIES bar. Insure belay system does not interfere with fast rope operations. System
can be connected on the same side as the fast rope. Monitor rope for contact with edge
of door.
4.13.1.5.4 Clip locking steel carabiner with snap shackle and belay device to the belay
point.
4.13.1.5.5 Route rope through belay device and snap shackle to make a quick release
system.
4.13.1.5.6 For safety of flight, the REDS package will be secured using a tether or
cargo strap and positioned away from the door and removed 2 minutes prior to
deployment. The rope bag (or bird-nested rope) will be stored overhead in the cabin,
or on top of package, whichever position allows the easiest access and use.
4.13.1.5.7 During night operations the kit should be marked with blue chemlights on
top and two sides.
4.13.1.6 Deployment Sequence and Belay Duties. Belayer should position himself to
monitor descent of REDS kit while maintaining full control of the belay. Belayer is last to
exit the helo.
4.13.1.6.1 At the 1-minute call, position the REDS kit halfway out the helo door.
Maintain enough control on the kit to ensure it can be retrieved in case of a go-around
or mission abort.
4.13.1.6.2 On the command ROPES, deploy the REDS. REDS and fast rope can be
deployed simultaneously.
4.13.1.6.3 Belayer needs to maintain positive control while lowering the kit. The kit
should reach the surface before the first fast rope.
4.13.1.6.4 Once the surface is determined clear, the belayer releases the pelican hook
and deploys any excess line from the aircraft. Jettison may also be accomplished from
the FRIES bar, if so equipped.
4.13.1.7 Surface Personnel Duties for REDS Deployment.
4.13.1.7.1 Ensure all events are pre-briefed and personnel have rehearsed assigned
duties as much as possible.
4.13.1.7.2 A team member should be assigned to disconnect the REDS belay system
from the kit once the kit is on the surface. At least two team members also should be
assigned to take the REDS to the choke point.
4.13.1.7.3 PJs are dispatched from the choke point to the downed aircraft to conduct
initial casualty sweep, casualty marking, and scene assessment. Aid and litter (A&L)
teams may be dispatched to the downed aircraft to assist PJs in area sweep.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


4.13.1.7.4 If extrication is indicated, A&L teams will transport the REDS kit to the
site. PJ team members will orchestrate extrication and medical stabilization. Assisted
extrication will always be a team effort. (See Table 4.4, Heavy REDS Kit Contents,
and Table 4.5, Light REDS Kits Contents, for more information.)

Table 4.4 Heavy REDS Kit Contents.


Quantity
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
4
1
1
6
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
OVERALL NOTES:

Item
REDS container
O-cutters
Spreader
Hydraulic pump
Set of chains
Crash ax
Hacksaws
Spare blades for hacksaw
Fire blanket
Reciprocating saw
Spare blades for reciprocating saw
Air pump
Airlift bag, 12-ton
Airlift bag, 24-ton
Airlift bag, 36-ton
Ram, small with extensions
Crosshead for ram tip
Flat base plate
Pulling heads
Extension pipe, 6-inch
Extension pipe, 13-inch

* Approximate weight will be 300 pounds.


** Employment methods: Heavy REDS kit should be inserted with follow-on air/ground assets.
Due to the weight and associated problems with movement, the kit should only be used at
relatively secure incident sites. The heavier-duty tool are made primarily for extrication from
larger structural components found in large aircraft, vehicles, and buildings.
*** Storage and Inspection: Ramwith the pump running and pressure to the Ram, close the
bars fully. Extend the Ram arms out approximately one-half inch and release pressure at the
pump. Disconnect the Ram from hoses and cover fitting with dust caps.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

4-39

Table 4.5 Light REDS Kit Contents.


Quantity
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
2
1
1
OVERALL NOTE:

Item
REDS container
Lowering harness2-inch nylon webbing with hardware and
risers.
Generator (hydraulic pump)
Combo tool
Hose extension (for extraction tools)
Crash ax
Hack saw (double blades)
Tool kit for saw
Ryobi saw with extra blades taped to saw
1-ton lift bag
7-ton lift bag
10-ton lift bag
Air pump
One-way valve hose for lift bags
Fire blanket (2- x 3-foot)
Chains (1 long/1 short)
Set tip pins
REDS maintenance kit(1)

* Approximate weight 225 pounds. Kit is maintained separately in another container.


** Container must be of sufficient size to hold all REDS components, and offer protection when
deployed (air-dropped or belayed from a hover).
NOTE:
(1)

Oil for gas mixture, mineral oil for generation, saw tool kit, Ryobi saw blades, hacksaw
blades, and hose caps.
4.14 Tethered Duck Operations. The tethered duck (T-duck) is the deployment method for a
deflated and rolled combat rubber raiding craft (CRRC). The CRRC is an F-470 Zodiac weighing
280 pounds empty. T-Duck consists of deploying a deflated CRRC and personnel from the cabin
of a helicopter.
4.14.1 Set Up and Preparation. The CRRC is prepared by the team. A harness holds the
boat in its deflated and rolled configuration. This harness is equipped with a single-point
quick release, which also serves as the attaching point for the rope lowering the boat. The
CRRC is loaded through the opposite door planned for deployment, usually loaded through the
left door and pushed to the edge of the right door. CRRC is placed on the left side of the ramp
on a H-53 series aircraft. The motor should face the door and be the first part to exit the
aircraft. Normally, the CRRC is positioned at the right door of the H-60 with the engine

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

protruding over the edge of the door. Coil fast rope and secure it out of the way on fuel tank
(60) or side-wall of aircraft. Activate one red chemlight at inflation handle (prior to takeoff in
case the team cannot reach it during the time warnings sequence). Before conducting
operations, personnel unfamiliar with T-Duck operations should see an actual CRRC installed
on the aircraft. Preparation of the aircraft cabin is accomplished by the team under the
supervision of the cabin NCOIC. Ensure anchor points are capable of suspending the weights
of personnel/equipment and do not interfere with deployment procedures. Normal equipment
is a standard H-bar, two carabiners, chemlights (for night), brake device, and a rope. The rope
should be compatible with the intended hover height and the weight of the load. It is stored in
a deployment bag. One carabiner is attached to the left forward rappelling ring on the H-bar.
If the load does not exceed 600 pounds, extend and use the H-bar. The second carabiner is
attached to the 3,500-pound top cargo tiedown ring on the left forward cabin wall and is the
primary anchor. The running end of the rope is routed through the carabiner on the rappel ring
or fast rope connection point. A brake device is established at the anchor point or a friction
knot is used on the anchor carabiner and all slack is pulled in. The brake device or friction
knot allows the designated belayman to control the boats rate of descent.
4.14.1.1 FRIES Bar Alternate Lowering Configuration. The FRIES bar is configured
with a carabiner and pulley to act as a high directional. The lowering rope is then routed
from the T-Duck harness up and through the pulley and down to a floor ring where a belay
device controls the lowering of the package. The team has two options of release.
4.14.1.1.1 Let the lowering line run through the belay device and pulley ensuring it
does not get into the tail rotor by throwing it into the water.
4.14.1.1.2 Attach a snap shackle to the belay device to allow the belayer to release the
friction device from the floor ring, release the pulley and carabiner and then allow the
hardware and rope excess to be thrown in the water. This technique is only
recommended for use when the loss of equipment is not an issue.
NOTE: If the CRRC is placed in the right door, the fast rope can be recovered and coiled in the
left door without affecting hoist/penetrator operations. However, the pilot cannot see the team
deploy by fast rope. There are no requirements for location, coordinate with the aircrew, and use
mission, enemy, terrain, troops available, and time (METT-T).
4.14.1.2 Inspections.
C02/compressed air assembly.
Inspect bottle.
Teflon tape threads on all male connectors for high-pressure hoses.
Check for proper washers for high-pressure hoses.
NOTE: All washers should be replaced every time the tank is changed.
4.14.1.3 Harness.
Check stitching for fraying and tearing.
Check harness webbing to ensure serviceable.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

4-41

Check quick releases for smooth operation/actuation.


Belay.
Check rope for fraying and tearing (check sheath and inner core).
Check belay device for wear.
Check carabiners for wear and locking mechanism works properly.
4.14.1.4 Aircraft Configuration.
4.14.1.4.1 Aircraft Inspection. Check write-ups for doors, floors, FRIES bars,
intercom systems, UHF radios, installation of special mission equipment (which might
take up valuable cabin space), ramp controls, hoist controls, penetrator, and stokes
litter.
4.14.1.4.2 CRRC Secured (In-Door/On Ramp).
4.14.1.4.3 Install Restraint Strap. Connect carabiner end to package and quick
release end to floor.
4.14.1.4.4 Install Motor. Install Motor and A-3 bag with fuel bladders, if not
previously installed.
4.14.1.4.5 Attach Device. Attach belay device to the FRIES bar overhead cargo ring
(T-Duck may bend the older H-bar. If the aircraft has the H-bar, attach the belay device
to a red cargo ring.)
4.14.1.4.6 Install Rope. Install belay rope and secure all locking carabiners.
4.14.1.4.7 Attach Rope. Attach fast rope to FRIES bar (left door in H-60 series, right
side ramp in H-53 series).
4.14.1.4.8 Coil Rope. Coil fast rope and secure out of the way on fuel tank (H-60) or
side wall of aircraft (H-53/H-47/H-46).
4.14.1.4.9 Extend Bar. Extend FRIES bars or arrange with crew to extend bars at the
5-minute warning.
4.14.1.4.10 Chemlight. Activate one red chemlight at inflation handle (prior to
takeoff in case the team cannot reach it during the time warnings sequence). Ensure
there is unrestricted access to the inflation handle.
4.14.1.5 Time Warnings. Standard time warnings are used to ensure both the deploying
team and the crew are ready. Standard time warnings of 20, 10, 5, and 1 minute are
announced by the aircrew based upon their calculated arrivalTOT. The rope master may
require more than the minimum time calls and should be on intercom until at least the
5-minute call. The 20- and 10-minute time warnings are designed to inform of the
approaching TOT; usually no actions are required other than mental preparation. At the
5-minute call, don fast rope gloves, fins, and facemask, receive update on
survivor/incident site data, activate chemlights, and inflate ends of CRRC tubes. Extend
the fast rope bar and ready it for deployment prior to the 5-minute call. At the 1-minute

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


call, ensure belayman is in position and release restraint straps from the CRRC. At this
point, the AIE master may go off intercom.
4.14.1.6 Deployment Procedures. A standard fast rope is attached to the left side of the
H-bar. Use standard fast rope and low and slow procedures for personnel deployment. The
recommended minimum hover altitude is 30 feet AWL and airspeed less than 5 KIAS,
hover preferable. Boat and personnel deployment procedures should be thoroughly
briefed with the personnel involved. During night deployments, chemlights are
recommended for equipment identification. Chemlight colors and their specific use
should be properly briefed to all deploying personnel to avoid confusion between types of
equipment, emergency exits, and their corresponding colors. When the aircraft is
established in a hover over the intended deployment site the pilot clears the cabin crew to
begin the deployment. After ensuring the CRRC deployment rope is manned, and all slack
is taken out of the rope (so as not to overload belay system), the personnel in the cabin
slide the CRRC out the cabin door in a controlled manner (belayman and one team
member deploy the CRRC). The belayman lowers the CRRC to the water slowly. One or
more persons then deploy from the opposite door and release the CRRC from the rope. The
remaining personnel deploy while any additional equipment (e.g., rucks, spares, and
radios) is attached to the belay rope and lowered to the water. Aircraft departs as soon as
team deploys and the fast rope is recovered. Personnel may low-and-slow deploy if a
sufficiently low hover is maintained, however, this is not the recommended method
because of increased injury potential. Fast rope insertion is considered the insertion
method of choice during T-Duck operations. In calm seas, H-53 and H-47 helicopters can
get the ramp low enough to the water for freefall deployment of the T-Duck and
low-and-slow of personnel. This method is only possible with calms seas and the ramp is
within 5 feet or less of the water. Be cautious of the tail rotor on H-53 series aircraft.

WARNING: Ensure belay rope is slack prior to releasing from the CRRC to avoid springing back
up to the aircraft fuselage
4.14.1.7 Procedures in the Water. First swimmer to the CRRC stabilizes the CRRC and
places one hand on the inflation handle. The second swimmer to the CRRC stabilizes the
CRRC; confirms someone has the inflation handle in-hand prepared to inflate. Once
handle in hand is confirmed, release the quick releases one at a time. Ensure the inflation
valve is in hand prior to harness release. This must be a synchronized event. Release one
side of the harness; swimmer re-positions to release the second side of the harness; calls
for inflation, and release the second side of the harness once the inflation begins.
NOTE: Do not release quick releases until inflation has begun. Climb into CRRC, pull in all
equipment, pull in and stow harness, connect fuel, dewater engine. Get underway (same as
RAMZ procedures).
4.14.1.8 Emergency Procedures. Brief all personnel involved in the deployment
concerning the actions required of them in case of an emergency. The AIE master should
be on interphone during equipment deployment. The rope master must understand the
pre-briefed hand signals and emergency procedures. A V-blade knife will be available in
the cabin area during equipment deployments. The weight of the CRRC or any other load
to be lowered from the fast rope bar must not exceed 600 pounds.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

4-43

4.14.1.9 Considerations. The belayman will maintain control of belay rope until the first
swimmer has control of the CRRC. In high seas, the belayman should maintain control of
the CRRC until de-rigging has begun. The Stokes litter and additional gear can be
attached to package/rope or deployed to the team upon completion of inflation sequence.
Pre-planned procedures will be briefed with crew as part of pre-deployment briefing.
4.15 Helicopter Freefall Equipment Delivery. PJ teams are require to deploy with additional
equipment to prosecute their mission that would be unsafe/unmanageable to deploy with directly.
Equipment should be packaged in order to withstand the forces of being dropped. Utilizing the
helicopter freefall equipment delivery method allows PJ teams to deploy safely with the required
equipment. Seven- or Twenty-Man Life Raft. It is not recommended to use any aircraft
emergency equipment intended to be used by the crew for the rescue of others except in
emergencies. Mission planning should provide the information needed to elect carrying extra
equipment for deployment to survivors.
4.15.1 Preparing Raft for Drop. Remove the raft inflation D ring from its pocket and leave
the pocket unsnapped. Securely tie a 14-inch piece of web tape through the D ring to form an
approximate 5-inch loop. Secure the raft near the appropriate exit. Attach a 10-foot lanyard to
the tiedown ring that is located by the forward most part of the side cargo door. Attach the
other end to the 5-inch loop of web tape. Snap the carrying handles together beneath the raft.
Attach chemlights to the raft at night prior to deployment.
4.15.2 Delivery Procedures. The aircraft makes a shallow approach in order to establish
level flight at 40 knots and 75 feet altitude on final approach. Two crew members should work
together, one to control the raft and one to monitor the survivor and signal the other crew
member when to deploy the raft. After the crew drops the raft, call RAFT AWAY and
immediately recover the lanyard. To aid the survivor, drop the raft upwind. This allows the
wind/drift to push the raft towards the survivor. Use a smoke device on all life raft drops to
assist in determining the exact wind direction and a drop reference. Use normal traffic pattern
airspeeds and altitudes. Establish the final approach into the wind and delay the drop 1 second
for every 5 knots of wind over 10 knots.
4.15.3 Safety Procedures. When conducting raft deployments, all personnel should wear the
safety harnesses to preclude accidental exit from the helicopter. It may be necessary to use
two crewmen to deploy the 20-man life raft. A V blade knife must be available to cut the raft
if it should become entangled. Do not hold the 10-foot lanyard after the raft is deployed.
4.16 Kangaroo Duck Operations. Kangaroo Duck (K-Duck) operations are used when cargo
space in the H-60 cannot support a T-Duck or the mission requires such speed and surprise that an
already inflated CRRC is necessary. The fully inflated CRRC is placed on a canvas harness and
then the H-60 (with its lower main landing gear struts inflated to the rapid deployment force
[RDF] extension) hovers over the CRRC and lands on top of it. The CRRC is then cradled to the
belly of the H-60 by attaching the harness to the 4,000-pound rappelling rings on the
H/FRIES-bar. The team is carried inside the H-60 cabin. The teams equipment, to include the
motor for the CRRC, is securely stowed inside of the CRRC. These procedures are for delivering
a fully inflated CRRC and a team (approximately eight people) during day or night operations.
Once the H-60 is at 5 KIAS and 10 feet, the shear strap of the harness is cut, the CRRC is deployed
and the team exits the helicopter.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

4.16.1 Equipment Installation and Configuration. Normally the aircrew will provide and
install the necessary equipment for conducting K-Duck operations. The PJ team is responsible
for proper configuration of the CRRC.
4.16.2 CRRC Preparation. The following procedures are for preparing and rigging the
CRRC for the double-door K-duck. (See Figure 4.17, Harness System for Double-Door
K-Duck, for illustration of the harness system.) Install the floor (also the wooden bow floor)
and fully inflate the CRRC. The optional CRRC floor extension is required when transporting
the K-duck at airspeeds greater than 130 knots. The required materials are listed in the
equipment paragraph above. (See Figure 4.18, Optional CRRC Floor Extension for Double
Door K-Duck, for an illustration when following the constructing procedures.) The following
are procedures for construction and installation into the CRRC. Cut the plywood so that it
will fit into the nose of the CRRC. Cut an access hole for the skeg inflation. Be sure to bevel
the edges of the plywood to avoid damage to the CRRC. Drill the required four holes in the
aluminum plate and boat wood floor base. The boat wood floor base is located in front of the
removable boat floor. Drill the required eight holes in the plywood. Place the plywood
cutout in place. Assemble the floor using the four socket head cap screws, washers, and tee
nuts to connect the aircraft rails, aluminum plate, and boat wood floor together. Use the eight
flat socket head cap screws and tee nuts to connect the aircraft rails to the plywood. Lay the
harness cradle flat on the ground. Place the CRRC on the cradle so that the bow is at the
triangular end of the harness. Lines 1 and 2 should be at the rear handles. Prepare and stow
the motor with the motor arm down and strap the engine in place near the transom. Use
suitable padding between the motor and floor, and pad the prop. Ensure the paddles and gas
tanks are placed in their positions and tied down. Accompanying payload will be put into the
CRRC as close to the center as possible. Do not store more than 50 pounds in the bow, even
with the wooden bow floor installed. All items must fit completely inside the CRRC. Only the
CRRC will touch the H-60. If payload items are large, (e.g., rucks or water cans) tie capsize
line of 1-inch tubular nylon to the front towing ring. Run the line through each large item and
tie off the line on the last item making sure the free end of the line can reach the transom. All
small items will be snap linked to the floor or tied to a larger item. Pad all items that need it.
Route line 1 and line 2 through the front handles. Attach together, tighten, and then fold/tape
excess line to the ejector. Route line 3 and line 4 through the rear handles. Route line 5
through the front towing ring, over the bow, then under line 1 and line 2. Route line 6 over the
transom and line 3 and line 4. Attach line 5 and line 6 with the ratchet and then fold/tape
excess line to the ratchet. Route the nose strap (line 20) through the loop located on line 5 at
the nose of the CRRC and below the front towing ring. There should be an even length of nose
strap (line 20) on each side of the loop. Place the free ends of the nose strap (line 20) inside
the CRRC so that they can be easily accessed during hookup to the aircraft.
WARNING: Externally transporting the CRRC without the floor installed could cause the
CRRC to fold up and possibly make contact with the rotors. Do not transport the CRRC without
the floor installed. The optional floor extension is only necessary if it is desired to travel in excess
of 130 KIAS.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

4-45

Figure 4.17 Harness System for Double-Door K-Duck.

Harness for Double Door K-Duck


Small Suspension
Clevis

Rachet
Nose Strap
Rachet

Connector Link
Crows Feet
Quick-fit
Ejector

Loop for
Nose Strap

(Items not to scale


with each other)

Rachet
D-Ring
CRRC Cradle Harness

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 4.18 Optional CRRC Floor Extension for Double-Door K-Duck.

Optional CRRC Floor Extension for Double Door K-Duck


Cut Out for inflation

Aircraft Tiedown Rail

Plywood

Aluminum Plate
Boat Wood
Floor Base

(Not to Scale)

UNCLASSIFIED

CRRC Floor

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

4.17 Soft Duck Procedures. The soft duck insertion method involves attaching a semi-inflated
CRRC, pre-loaded with equipment, to a wooden platform. Two CRRCs can be stacked opposite
each other on the same platform. The out board motor (OBM) can be attached to the transom
during insertion for quick de-rigging. Because of the size of the soft duck, a helicopter with a
ramp (e.g., H-46, H-47, or H-53) is required for insertion. Larger aircraft, such as the H-53, allow
the CRRC to be fully inflated during the cast. Fully inflated CRRC loads are called hard ducks.
The helicopter proceeds to insert point and deploys the soft duck followed by the personnel from
a 10 foot at 10 knot flight profile. This method allows more equipment to be inserted with the
CRRC as compared to the other cast insertion methods.
4.17.1 Construction of the Soft Duck and Platform. The soft duck platform can be made
of any type of smooth material that provides protection to the CRRC underside and allows the
soft duck to easily move on the aircraft roller rails.
4.17.1.1 The H-53 and H-47 are rigged similar to the H-46; however, H-53 and H-47
hard ducks can be fully inflated because of the size of the aircraft cabin. Additionally, the
platform can be a full-sized sheet of plywood with the 4 inch x 4 inch runners spaced to
properly fit the roller rail system used.
4.17.1.2 Figure 4.19, Soft Duck Platform Configured for H-46 with Internal Roller Rails,
shows the platform for a H-46 soft duck. The recommended construction of the H-46
platform and soft duck is as follows (deviations to the procedures are noted in bold italic
for a stacked soft duck):
Cut a sheet of 0.75 inch, 4- x 8-foot plywood to 44 x 96 inches.
Drill four pairs of holes, equally spaced on each long side of the plywood. Drill one
pair of holes centered in each short side. The holes that make up a pair are three inches
apart and 1.5 inches from the edge.
Place a 45 degree beveled cut on the end of two 120-inch, 4- x 4-inch pieces of
wood. Place the 4- x 4-inch rails on the ground parallel to each other and spaced 40
inches apart (measured from the outside edge) with the beveled edge facing down.
4.17.1.3 Place the 44 inch x 96 inch sheet of plywood on the 4- x 4-foot rails aligning the
long side of the plywood with the rails. The leading edge of the plywood is even with
beveled end. Secure the plywood with screws or nails.
4.17.1.4 Cut two plywood 4- x 40-inch braces from the scrap wood remaining. Attach the
braces perpendicular to the rails at the open end of the rails. The braces are spaced 9
inches apart with the first brace starting 2 inches from the end of the rail. Secure using
screws or nails. The brace is used to secure the lower unit of the OBM.
4.17.1.5 Girth hitch a 14-foot length of 0.5-inch tubular nylon through one of each pairs of
side holes and a 20-foot length through one of each pair of end holes.
4.17.1.6 Mount the OBM to the transom temporarily locked in tilt position. Place two
layers of cut honeycomb on the platform braces to cushion the lower OBM unit. Unlock
from the tilt position and secure the lower unit to the honeycomb and platform using
0.5-inch tubular nylon.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

4-47

NOTE: Ensure the OBM is free floating (unlocked) when mounted to the transom to prevent
damage to the transom.
Figure 4.19 Soft Duck Platform Configured for H-46 with Internal Roller Rails.

Soft Duck Platform Configured for H-46 with Internal Roller Rails

UNCLASSIFIED
4.17.1.7 The equipment in the CRRC is secured in a similar fashion as the hard duck (see
Army FM 10-542) using 0.5-inch tubular nylon.
4.17.1.8 Partially deflate the CRRC prior to securing it to the platform. Bring the 14-foot
side and 20-foot end tiedowns up to meet and tie off in the center using a donut ring as
outline in the Hard Duck manual (Army FM 10-542). Keep the sides square when securing
the tiedowns by pulling equally from all sides. The limiting factor of the soft duck is that it
can be no wider than 60 inches for H-46 helicopters.
4.17.1.9 Additional 0.5-inch tubular nylon can be used to help keep the load square and
within the maximum 60-inch width.
4.17.1.10 For stacked soft duck procedures, refer to Naval Special Warfare Air
Operations Manual, COMNAVSPECWARCOMINST 3000.3A.
4.17.1.11 Sand bags may be placed on the platform to sink the platform and minimized
floating debris after the CRRC is de-rigged.
4.17.2 Loading the Soft Duck in the Aircraft. The boat may be loaded bow or stern first;
two boats may be loaded if loaded bow first in the H-53/H-47. Secure the boats with at least
two cargo tiedown straps per boat, with a short bow or stern line attached to the aircraft. The
load is positioned partially on the ramp. The 4- x 4-inch runners on the platform will sit on top

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

of the aircrafts internal roller rail system. If rollers are not available in the helicopter, portable
roller rails or a field expedient roller assembly can be rigged in the aircraft. A field expedient
roller assembly can be rigged using lengths of PVC cut to 2.5 feet and placed under the
CRRC.
4.17.3 Deployment Procedures.
4.17.3.1 At the 5-minute call, team members who will deploy from the front, if this
method is used, will move to the front of the cabin area. The team members who will
deliver the boat will prepare for exit in the aft.
NOTE: The H-53 must have the tail skid retracted prior to drop.
4.17.3.2 At the 1-minute call, the team members and crew members will prepare the
boat for drop by removing tiedown straps except bow or stern line.
4.17.3.3 The pilot will approach a 10-foot wheel height above the waves while slowing to
10 knots ground speed. The hover coupler may be used. The pilot not flying or flight
engineer will call out radar altimeter readings to the pilot.
4.17.3.4 When cleared to drop, the pilot will say BOATS, BOATS, BOATS. When
cleared, the designated crew member or team member will release the bow or stern line
from the aircraft and push the boat out.
NOTE: The team may exit the aircraft from either the door, ramp, or both. If both are used,
execute the ramp delivery first. These measures will reduce adverse pitch oscillations during
deployment.
4.17.3.5 The delivery team leader will remain on intercom until the 1-minute call. A
pre-briefed crew member on intercom will relay the clear to drop signal to the team.
4.17.4 De-Rigging the Soft Duck. The first two personnel out of the helicopter are
designated as the de-riggers. The de-riggers can cast with their fins carabinered inside the
boat. The de-riggers must be thoroughly briefed on the de-rigging procedures of the soft duck.
A hook knife works best for cutting lines and preventing damage to the CRRC.
4.18 Vehicle On/Off Loading. The primary rotary-wing aircraft used for transporting vehicles
are the H-53, H-47, and H-46 series. Virtually any vehicle that will fit inside the aircraft can be
transported for tactical operations. For purposes of this document only all-terrain vehicles (ATV)
will be discussed. The principles remain the same for all other vehicles.
4.18.1 Preparation/Infiltration. Vehicle should be backed in to allow for quick offloading
at the offload point. All restraint devices except one forward and one aft (opposite corners)
may be removed during taxi to the offload point (large vehicles requiring multiple tiedown
straps). ATVs only require a single cargo strap placed over the seat. Self-propelled vehicles
must have drivers in place with brakes set prior to removing restraints. Vehicles will not be
started in flight.
4.18.1.1 Execution. Use standard pre-briefed time calls. At the 1 minute call the driver
may mount the ATV and prepare to disconnect the cargo strap. When the helicopter lands
and comes to a complete stop, the driver may release the cargo strap and start the engine.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

4-49

When the ramp is lowered to the ground and a crew member has cleared the exit, the driver
may immediately drive out of the back of the helicopter.
4.18.1.1.1 H-53 Helicopters. The driver must immediately turn left after leaving the
ramp in order to avoid the tail rotor.
4.18.1.1.2 H-47/H-46 Helicopters. The driver may drive straight out the back.
4.18.1.1.3 Aircraft Departure. The drivers must drive far enough away from the
aircraft to allow other vehicles room to exit the aircraft and for the aircraft to depart.
4.18.2 Preparation/Exfiltration. Cargo straps should be pre-positioned in the helicopter to
allow the vehicles to be quickly secured prior to takeoff.
4.18.2.1 Execution. Vehicles are driven directly onto the helicopter and secured after a
crew member has cleared the team to board.
4.18.2.1.1 H-53 Helicopters. The team should approach the helicopter from the right
side of the tail between the tail rotor and the ramp being careful not to drive under or
near the tail rotor.
4.18.2.1.2 H-47/H-46 Helicopters. The team may approach these helicopter directly
from the tail.
4.18.2.1.3 Vehicle Placement. Place the vehicles according to a crew members
direction to allow for CG.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

5-1
CHAPTER 5
PARACHUTE OPERATIONS

5.1 General. This chapter supports the recover task of PR/RO by providing GUARDIAN
ANGEL forces the ability to infiltrate personnel and equipment to isolated, time-sensitive, or
augmented missions via parachute operations. Parachute operations can be conducted in hostile
sensitive and denied areas; day and night in all environmental disciplines. For most missions, the
reason for using parachute deployments is because of the lack of available assets to insert via AIEs
or airland or the time involved in getting assets or aircraft is such that there is a high probability
that the objective will be compromised, further damaged, dead, or destroyed. For general
purposes and mission planning specifically for non-preplanned missions, if the insertion can be
accomplished 1 hour prior to the extraction asset time over target (TOT), then it pays to execute
the jump operations. The 1-hour rule is not a firm number, rather a planning guide. If the team is
already prepared for the jump, then it may be possible to reduce the time to 45 minutes; the idea is
that there will be enough time for the jump team to insertion and have time to perform their
required duties prior to the insert of the helicopter or other asset arrival. There are some missions
where the objective is so isolated that nothing but a parachute insertion will accomplish the
mission; whether that isolation is because of remote location, environmental factors (e.g., storms
or mountains), or threat. On some missions, the jump team may be augmenting an existing team
with personnel (e.g., manpower required for a mass casualty) and/or equipment (e.g., existing
ground team needs equipment to execute their mission).
5.1.1 Regulatory Guidance Overview. AFI 11-410, Personnel Parachuting, is the USAF
primary guidance for intentional parachute operations. When attached to USSOCOM and
performing joint missions, the USOCOM 350-series will be used. The Army is the proponent
for parachute operations for the Army and the Marine Corps and is tasked to develop
operational procedures for the Army and Marine Corps IAW DoDR 5100.1 6.6.1.2.3.2.
Develop, in coordination with the other Military Services, the doctrines, procedures, and
equipment employed by Army and Marine Corps forces in airborne operations. The Army
shall have primary responsibility for developing those airborne doctrines, procedures, and
equipment that are of common interest to the Army and the Marine Corps. However, the
Air Force retains the ability to develop its own equipment and TTPs in support of it own
operations: .6.6.3.2.10. To develop, in coordination with the other Services, doctrines,
procedures, and equipment employed by Air Force forces in airborne operations.
5.1.2 Recovery Considerations. An exact recovery plan is not required prior to
commencing jump operations; however a method to communicate such a plan should be in
place prior to conducting the insertion. A jump mission 1,000 miles from the nearest coast
with no communication and no extraction plan would not be recommended.
5.1.3 Operational Risk Management. Operational risk management (ORM) is a tool to
ensure that the team leader and mission commander have a clear understanding of the
premeditated risk that the current operation has. Clairvoyance is not a team leader skill so the
unknown risk cannot be determined and the risk of the unknown has to be assumed. ORM is
also a tool to ensure, specifically in this chapter, parachute mission success, by making the

5-2

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


team leader and all of the team members evaluate what is going to be done and constantly
reduce the risk of the parachute insertion.
5.1.4 Insertion Considerations. Before the discussion of actual parachuting is tackled
there are some definitions and considerations that need to be agreed upon: exit altitudes, drop
zone elevation, surface wind speeds, drop zone conditions, and parachute type.
5.1.5 Exit Altitudes. Exit altitudes will be defined as low, medium, and high. Low is
between 400 to 800 feet AGL; medium is between 800 to 3,000 feet AGL; and high is above
3,000 feet AGL. These exit altitudes are based on the ability for the different parachute
systems to function. Low altitude is traditionally where only static line round canopies are, as
opposed to ram air static line canopies which have a safe training altitude, depending on the
system, in the medium category. The lowest of the operational free-fall canopy openings
begin at 2,000 feet. (See Table 5.1, Exit Altitudes.)

Table 5.1 Exit Altitudes.


Altitude

Feet AGL

Low

400 to 800

Medium

800 to 3,000

High

More than 3,000

5.1.6 Drop Zone Elevation. Drop zones are also defined as low, medium, and high. Low is
considered from 0 to 3,000 feet MSL. Medium is 3,000 to 5,000 feet MSL, and high is 5,000
feet and above. Static line canopies operate with little change until 3,000 feet MSL where
their descent rate begins to affect the operational outcome of missions. The 3,000 to 5,000 feet
area is the transition between round and ram air canopies and is also where ORM for missions
starts to dictate that ram air static and free-fall canopies should be used. At 5,000 feet, the
amount of equipment jumped on static line canopies should be seriously evaluated. Above
5,000 feet MSL raises limitation of even ram air canopies. (See Table 5.2, Drop Zone
Elevation.)
Table 5.2 Drop Zone Elevation.
Altitude

Feet MSL

Low DZ

0 to 3,000

Medium DZ

3,000 to 5,000

High DZ

5,000 and above

5.1.7 Surface Winds. Winds follow the same basic formatting. Low wind is 10 knots and
below. Moderate is 10 to 25 knots, and high is anything above 25 knots. In low winds static
lines can be safely deployed in intermediate terrain; whereas in medium winds, the ORM for
static line will depend on the surface that the DZ is made of. At 25 knots, jumping static line
rounds into the water is low to moderate on the ORM scale; however, it is high in rough
terrain. At 25 knots and above, ORM starts to creep upwards even on a ram air canopy. (See
Table 5.3, Surface Wind.)

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

5-3

Table 5.3 Surface Wind.


Wind

Knots

Low

0 to 10

Moderate

10 to 25

High

25 and above

5.1.8 Drop Zone Conditions. Parachuting must consider the landing zones. There are three
zone categories: easy, intermediate, and rough. On an easy DZ one can jump round or ram air
canopies in even moderate winds; however, landing a round canopy in moderate winds on an
intermediate DZ could have severe consequences. Landing a round on a rough DZ is not
advised and would be an advanced skill even on a ram air canopy. (See Table 5.4, Drop Zone
Conditions.)
Table 5.4 Drop Zone Conditions.
Terrain
Easy

Obstacles
Water/open field free of major obstacles

Intermediate

Broken terrain with clear areas among obstacles

Rough

Broken terrain with little to no obstacle clearance

5.1.9 Parachute Types. There are three basic types of personnel parachutes in the
GUARDIAN ANGEL parachute program: static line, ram air static line, and free-fall. Each
type of parachute has its advantages and uses.
5.1.9.1 Static Line. Static line parachutes are used for low-altitude drops that do not
require parachute glide and can accept a higher ORM due to high opening shock, low
ability to steer, and high impact on landing. They work basically on the umbrella off the
roof principal. The only difference is the ability to create forward drive and steering by
having one fixed and two variable holes or T/U modifications in the rear of the canopy.
When the three holes are unrestricted, the parachute is pushed forward. If one side is
close, then the opposite side pushes the parachute into a turn. If both of them are closed,
then the parachute losses forward drive as well as it ability to float and increase its
descent rate as well as its forward drive.
5.1.9.2 Ram Air Static Line. Ram air static line parachutes are hybrid free-fall
parachutes that reduce the ORM for all the static line round down falls but traditionally
require a medium deployment altitude (system dependant). They, like their free-fall
brethren, are capable of carrying large loads even at high altitude in high winds. One of the
benefits of ram air static line parachute system is that because of the greater forward glide
ratio there is a much lower degree of accuracy required for the navigator or jumpmaster.
Ram air static lines also are used for high altitude high opening (HAHO) deployments
where the parachute opening altitude is critical. Ram air and free-fall canopies fly on the
same basic flight characteristic as a wing, which gives them the ability to steer during
forward flight, gain lift and reduce impact with the earth and/or anything that has, or is
currently attached to the earth.

5-4

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


5.1.9.3 Free-Fall. Free-fall parachutes are very flexible in their deployment altitude and
have high weight carrying capability even at higher altitudes. Their high forward glide
ratio allows for a very low degree of accuracy in the deployment as well as, when
performed correctly, much safer landings at higher weight and altitude. Their draw back is
that they require more skill to land and are only good for high altitude exits.
5.1.10 Coordination for Airdrop. The amount of coordination for airdrop operations can
sometimes be daunting. The key with all complex problems is to divide the complex task into
several simpler tasks and delegate them to the appropriate personnel for execution. If
possible, the team leader should not be the jumpmaster and, when possible ensure the mission
commander, be a CRO and handle command and control issues so that the team leader and the
jumpmaster can focus on mission execution. If there is going to be other than tactical
coordination on the jump aircraft, ensure the CRO is on board; however delays or alteration to
a mission should not be made just to bring a CRO on board. If anticipation of complex
mission execution authority exists, the plan to bring a CRO on board should be made prior to
mission execution; hence that same mission will bring high likelihood that the coordination
problem will exist on the ground and the CRO should be ready to support the team on the
ground. Specific coordination that the employment team will have to conduct is the aircrew
coordination.
5.1.10.1 Classification. Brief the classification to ensure the safety of the team and limit
the total number of personnel with knowledge of the mission to the minimum number and
still ensure total coordination. Ensure those people know the classification of the mission
and its compartmentalization.
5.1.10.2 Roll Call. Ensure that all the people are present at the same time to avoid the
telephone affect that will degrade the information and prevent re-briefing or worse,
making later changes that will require re-briefing the original personnel.
5.1.10.3 Time Hack. All personnel involved in missions in the AOR should be working
in Zulu time. Should an operation not be in an active AOR or with foreign forces,
especially if time zones are crossed, a coordinated time should be agreed upon.
5.1.10.4 Mission Overview. A mission overview should be conducted to ensure that all
the personnel on the mission have a good grasp on the big picture so they can make rapid
and informed decisions in case of a crisis decision. The below information should be
covered as appropriate.
5.1.10.5 Objective. Discuss and inform the crew what the objective of the mission is and
ensure that they have the same objective and not other priorities that will affect the PR/RO
mission. Be as descriptive as possible without re-briefing intel. As a minimum, the
following should be briefed if it applies:
Mission objective information.
Type/quantity.
Sex/nationality/race.
Name/rank/age.
Call sign.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

5-5

Medical condition.
Last known location.
How event occurred.
ISOPREP information/personnel information.
EPA.
Survival equipment and training.
Special instructions.
Equipment or information.
Size/shape.
Color.
Weight.
Classification.
5.1.10.6 Type Mishap. If the mission is due to a mishap, the crew should want to ensure
that they are not flying into a similar problem without knowing what the original problem
was (e.g., storm or threat). This will also get the crew thinking of any additional support
they might be able to give that the pilot does not know about (e.g., native speaker or rescue
equipment threat sensor).
5.1.10.7 Immediate/Delayed. Everyone on the mission should have the same amount of
urgency and be based on the same information. Brief the urgency and why there is
urgency to ensure that the correct amount of ORM is applied.
5.1.10.8 Permissive/Non-Permissive. The amount of threat is normally briefed by intel;
however, how that applies to specific mission procedures and tactics needs to be
highlighted to ensure, that once again, everyone on the crew is flying with the same
amount of ORM by ensuring that the crew is informed as to the threat and what is involved
to all MDSs.
5.1.10.9 Enemy Situation. The bulk of the enemy situation is briefed by intel. What
they do not brief is how different threats affect the ground team verses the aircraft and
crew.
5.1.10.10 Terrain. Terrain is one of the hardest considerations to evaluate in a launch off
alert status. With the time allotted prior to launch, getting detailed mission planning is
very hard. Make every attempt to get current satellite imagery with contour overlays.
When possible, a laptop with FalconView and satellite imagery or similar product should
be kept on the jump aircraft for mission planning en route. The terrain is one of the
considerations that will drive parachute type and exit altitude.
5.1.10.11 Weather. Weather is a standard consideration for the aircrew and will be
briefed either by the weather shop or flight crew. What is not briefed is how this effects
the teams employment. This, along with terrain and threat will drive the decision on
which means of parachute insertion will be chosen.

5-6

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


5.1.10.12 Assets. Intel will normally brief what assets are available but not how they
affect the mission. The crew should be briefed on how they can help the pilot control the
assets around the aircraft. They may be the only asset in the AO and should be briefed on
how best they can help the pilot. Remember the crew may have capabilities the pilot does
not know about. Make sure that this briefing is interactive.
5.1.10.13 Time Line. Ensure that this time line incorporates not only things such as
aircraft show, take-off, and TOT but also mission capable fuel, loiter time, or any timing
issues that may show up to interfere with the mission.
5.1.10.14 Go/No-Go Criteria. The crew as well as the team will have criteria that it can
or can not do. The team leader and the aircraft commander need to work closely together
to ensure they are both aware of the others capabilities and limitations and have
effectively communicated them to the mission authority to avoid confusion as to what the
particular weapons systems can or cannot do.
5.1.10.15 Alert Requirements. An alert should be on a capabilities base, with the team
and aircraft ready and configured to perform its mission in the required time line. Any
mission not in the capabilities requirement should not have to be performed in the alert
launch time. The following requirements should be coordinated prior to standing alert.
Response time.
Notification.
Scramble procedures.
5.1.10.16 Concept of Operations. The concept of operations should be derived from the
MDS TTPs, theatre concept or operations, and the SPINs if there are any. If the AO is not
in an active AOR, then the concept should still come from the MDS TTPs. When
conducting operations with organization that do not have TTPs, ensure the following are
covered:
Pre-MissionBriefings, loads, and alert responsibilities.
Infiltration/InsertionMethods and conditions.
Actions at Objective AreaBrief enough that they have an understanding unless the
have an integral part in the mission.
Extraction/ExfiltrationIf the infiltration and extraction MDS is the same, this
will be very detailed. If not, then ensure that they have an awareness level.
Post-MissionBrief any requirement that may affect the insertion aircraft.
Communications/SignalingEnsure that all emergency electronic and visual
signals are briefed as well as when they will be used and the expected response. Also
ensure they have a good awareness as to when the pilot should be communicating with
them.
HazardsHazards to the aircraft, to the aircrew, and their affect on each MDS.
Crash Access.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

5-7

Key EquipmentEnsure that both the front end and back end operators know what
equipment is what and when the pilot expects to use it, especially if the pilot expect to
automatically drop it.
Other.
5.1.10.17 Special Instructions. Ensure rescue crews and the assigned MDS are operating
on the same special instructions (SPINS). The following are suggested briefing items prior
to missions and alert. If the AO does not have SPINS, put procedures in place as shown in
Table 5.5, Briefing Items.
Table 5.5 Briefing Items.
Briefing Items
- Letter/color of the day
- Communications/signal
- Bullseye/SARDOT
- SAFE/SAID
- Rules of engagement
- On scene commander
-- Call sign/frequency
-- Reporting instructions
- Airborne mission commander
-- Call sign/frequency
-- Reporting instructions
- Ground Mission Commander
-- Call sign/frequency
-- Reporting instructions
- Close air/fire support
-- Call sign/frequency
-- Reporting instructions
- Joint/rescue coordination center
-- Call sign/frequency
-- Reporting instructions
- Recovery facilities
-- Call sign/frequency
-- Reporting instructions

5-8

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


5.1.10.18 Command and Control. The team leader must know who has mission
authority, who is mission commander, and who has the following at all times:
OPCON.
TACON.
5.1.10.19 Specific Insertion Requirement.
5.1.10.19.1 Parachutist Insertion Brief.
5.1.10.19.2 Narrative of Operation. Provide a general narrative of the jump
operations. Ensure that wind drift indicators (WDI) and any passes that are required
are briefed.
5.1.10.19.3 Number of Aircraft. In the coordination efforts with the crew, pass
aircraft types and quantities involved, including call signs.
5.1.10.19.4 Type of Drop. Provide the types and number of drops and whether there
are combination jumps or just one type. Ensure the following are included.
SL/HALO/HAHO/tandem/RAMZ.
Type of release.
JMDD/NAV/ground.
5.1.10.20 Altitude/Airspeed/Pattern. For operational missions, the employed TTP,
based on threat, environmental/geographical conditions, and equipment used will help
determine these factors. For training operations, the equipment and training restrictions
will provide the required guidelines.
5.1.10.21 Number of Iterations. Inform the crew how many iterations are required if
they are different from the number of passes above.
5.1.10.22 Timing Calls/Time Warnings. The deploying team needs to have the
appropriate time calls and warnings to safely execute. Regardless of what the MDS uses,
it must be briefed and coordinated between the crew and team (e.g., 20, 10, or 5).
5.1.10.23

Type of Exit (Left, Right, or Ramp).

5.1.10.24 Clearance to Deploy. The visual and verbal signals are of great importance
for the safety of the employing team. The jumpmaster may be off intercom prior to the
clear to drop is given. The jumpmaster needs to have a clear to drop signal to ensure
proper team deployment.
5.1.10.25

Route of Travel (HAHO Only).

Intended pull altitude.


Intended route of travel.
NOTE: Aircraft will maintain radio contact with team/DZSO until released.
5.1.10.26 Team Information. The team information needs to be reflected correctly on
the orders, letter of X, and go/no go. If there are students or unqualified personnel on

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

5-9

board, the aircraft commander needs to know who they are as well as who their
instructor/certifier is.
5.1.10.27 Number Involved/Manifest. The number of personnel and when they are on
the aircraft is required in case there is an aircraft mishap. It may be required that the roster
be radioed to a command post after the Infil or written and kept on the ground with the
ground party.
5.1.10.28 Call Signs. All call signs for operation should be briefed.
5.1.10.29 Duties and Responsibilities. Duties for individuals need to be briefed if they
have an inner operation with the crew. The requirements for systems or equipment need to
be deconflicted prior to flight unless they are considered standard. The following are
suggested items:
Team leader.
Jumpmaster.
Intercom requirements.
Equipment delivery.
Physiological training officer/oxygen NCO.
5.1.10.30 DZ Information. If DZ information is known, it should be briefed and shown
on map or pictures if available. The below is suggested briefing considerations.
Name.
Coordinates.
Elevation.
Run in.
Wind direction relative to run in and or DZ.
5.1.10.31 Markings and Features.
Recognition symbol.
Required time on target.
Known hazards.
Range procedures/requirements.
Desired heading.
Point of impact.
Opening point.
Release point.
Alternate DZs.
Emergency DZs.

5-10

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


5.1.10.32 Communications. For operational mission, there may or may not be a DZ
controller or reception committee. If there is, then the items in Table 5.6, Briefing Items
for Target Procedures, are suggested briefing items. Specifics for training are in AFI
13-217, Assault Zone Procedures.

Table 5.6 Briefing Items for Target Procedures.


Briefing Items

Target Procedure

DZ controller call sign

- NA.

DZ controller frequencies

- NA.

Team call sign/frequencies

- NA.

Visual signals (day/night)

- NA.

Clear to jump

Drop canceled

- Landtarget displayed.
- Watertarget displayed (boat circling off wind line).
- Landtarget removed and replaced by two streamers
forming two parallel bars, placed perpendicular to the
line of flight and/or red smoke on the DZ.
- Waterboat positioned at target or stationary in
waterJump cancelled.

No drop this pass

- Landtarget removed.
- Watertarget removed.

Injured jumper

- Ignite one (1) MK-13 flare or similar flare.

Communications failure

- No comm procedures are listed in AFI 13-217, Assault


Zone Procedures, for training.

5.1.10.33 Suggested Approach/Departure. There may be DZ restrictions (e.g., terrain,


hazard, threat, and DZ survey) that forces an approach path.
5.1.10.34 High-Altitude Airdrops. AFI 11-409, High Altitude Airdrop Mission Support
Program, covers high-altitude parachute operations. Before conducting operations above
10,000 feet, refer to Table 5.7, Briefing for Operations Above 10,000 Feet, for guidance.
5.1.10.35 Loadmaster/Flight Engineer Coordination. Aircraft cargo compartment
coordination is paramount during airdrop operations. Table 5.8, Coordination Duties for
Airdrop Operations, identifies a suggested list.
5.1.10.36 Equipment Delivery. Mission equipment should be configured IAW the
aircraftspecific TTPs and the 9 for the MDS performing the airdrop operations.
Specifics on equipment delivery and the associated parachutes are located in the Chapter
6, Aerial Deployment Equipment. Be sure to declare any hazardous material and be sure
to have a Hazardous Declaration if the equipment is not standard equipment with the
flying organization. Special requests are at the discretion of the flying crew, do not
surprise them.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

5-11

Table 5.7 Briefings for Operations Above 10,000 Feet.


- Oxygen requirements and times.
- Physiological technician requirements and briefings (required at or above 18,000 feet MSL in
accordance with AFI 11-409, High Altitude Airdrop Mission Support; waiver required above
25,000 feet MSL).
- Aircraft depressurization.
- Walk around bottle requirements.
- Suspected decompression sickness.
-- Immobilize affected area.
-- Place patient horizontal.
-- Administer 100 percent oxygen.
-- Adjust cabin altitude to sea/evacuation level.
-- Contact nearest facility with flight surgeon.
-- Fly to nearest hyperbaric chamber.
5.1.10.37 Post Insertion Information. Ensure the crew is briefed on any support
required after the airdrop, specifically radio relay for injured or lost jumpers, help with
searching and contacting injured or lost jumpers, or medical evacuation to medical care.
5.1.10.38 Static Line Round Parachutes. The basic concept of static line round
canopies is above. GUARDIAN ANGEL uses only two variations of the static line round
canopies: the MC-1C and the MC-1D. There may be some MC-1B and T-10 canopies in
service, but they are going to be mostly in the joint arena and not specifically in PR. The
MC-series round canopies are all steerable, whereas the T-10 is not. The MC-1C/D and
soon the MC-1E are low porosity canopies and have a reduced fall rate; when open,
however, they have a much greater opening shock. (See Table 5.9, Parachute Information,
for more details.)
WARNING: Exit airspeeds in excess of 135 KIAS on the MC-1C/D parachute system can cause
structural failure in the parachute or parachutist.

5-12

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 5.8 Coordination Duties for Airdrop Operations.


- Deployment procedures.
- Aircrew duties and responsibilities.
- Aircraft and equipment rigging.
- Safetyman duties.
- Working area clear of non-essential equipment.
- Monitor static lines.
- Relay visual signals.
- Course corrections.
- Clear to deploy.
- No drop.
- Advise pilot on exit of deployed personnel.
- Advise pilot of condition of deployed personnel.
- Good chute or malfunction.
- Advise pilot when clear to turn.(1)
- RAMZ.
-- Positioning.
-- Static line lengths.
-- Tie-down removal.
-- Gate.
-- Deployment bag retrieval.
NOTE:
(1)

During helicopter jump operations; recover static lines prior to giving clearance.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

5-13

Table 5.9 Parachute Information.


T-10B/C/D

T-10
Reserve

MC1-1B

MC1-1C/D/E

360 pounds

360 pounds

360 pounds

360 pounds (Ensure


D-ring modification
has been completed.)

Rate of descent

19 to 23 fps
(T-10B=19 fps)

18 to 22 fps

System weight

31 pounds

31 pounds

31 pounds

Steerable

No

No

Yes

Yes

Fall rate toggles

No

No

Yes

Yes

Turn rate for 360 degrees

8.8 seconds

7.7 seconds

Minimum altitude

400 feet

400 feet

475 feet

Maximum altitude

10,000 feet

10,000 feet

10,000 feet

Maximum exit speed

150 knots

150 knots

135 knots

Characteristics
Max weight

5.1.10.39 Descent Rates. Table 5.9, Parachute Information, does not specify nor does
the TO state what the suspended weight or altitude was used to derive the descent rates.
Figure 5.1, Descent Versus Weight and Altitude, is from the S-17/18 parachute, which is
the equivalent of the MC-1B, and should only be used for a reference for the Table 5.9,
Parachute Information, as to the parachute descent rate in comparison to weight and
altitude.
5.1.10.40 Sea Fall Rates. Table 5.10, Sea Level Fall Rate, lists the sea level fall rate for
the different types of parachutes that can be encountered by GUARDIAN ANGEL
recovery teams. This table is generic and considers weight and descent rates but not
altitude.
5.1.10.41 Minimum Exit Altitude. Table 5.10, Sea Level Fall Rate, lists the minimum
exit altitude that the TO lists for the main opening not including the altitude required for
the reserve to function as well. The Army lists the reserve as optional at exit altitudes
below 500 feet; however, AFI 11-231, Computed Air Release Point Procedures, lists the
required altitude for reserve usefulness at 750 feet AGL. Normally exit altitudes should
not be below 800 feet AGL without an accepted risk assessment of high.
5.1.10.42 Exit Airspeeds. Also not listed is the airspeed at which the parachutes can be
used. Table 5.11, C-130 Personnel Airdrop Data, lists exit airspeeds for common
parachute systems. The T-10 and the MC-1B can be deployed from lower altitude because
the airspeed can be increased to 150 knots. The Table 5.11, C-130 Personnel Airdrop
Data, does not consider the TO limitation of the MC-1C/D/E

5-14

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 5.1 Descent Versus Weight and Altitude.

Descent versus Weight and Altitude


26

24

22
FEET PER SECOND

nds

pou

300

nds

pou

250

20

200

18

nds

pou

150

16

nds

pou

Note: Weights shown include


man and equipment
14

12

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

18000

20000

ALTITUDE

UNCLASSIFIED
Table 5.10 Sea Level Fall Rate.
Type Chute

Rate of Fall Column

S-10/11/12/17/18, T-10A/B, MC1-1A/B

T-10C, MC1/3, MC1-2/3, MT1X/S, MC-4/5

II

MC1-1C/LOPO Set 10

III

Load
Weight

Load
Weight

Rate of Fall
I

II

III

150

14.5

14.3

13.0

175

15.5

15.2

200

16.4

225

Rate of Fall
I

II

III

350

21.7

20.7

19.7

13.8

375

22.4

21.5

20.5

16.0

14.6

400

23.1

22.3

21.4

17.4

16.8

15.4

425

23.8

23.0

22.2

250

18.3

17.6

16.3

450

24.4

23.8

23.1

275

19.2

18.4

17.1

475

25.0

24.6

23.9

300

20.0

19.2

18.0

500

25.6

25.4

24.7

325

20.9

20.0

18.8

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

5-15

Table 5.11 C-130 Personnel Airdrop Data

Type

Description
35 feet Parabolic
(T-10)

Minimum
Altitude
(AGL)

Drop
Airspeed
(KIAS)

- Jump altitude providing reserve


parachute capability in event of
main parachute malfunction.

750

T-I0A/B/C

125 to 150

MCI-IA/B/C
35 feet 11 Gore
TU Cut-out
(MCI-1)

400

Remarks

- All parachute canopies equipped


with skirt anti-inversion net.
- Combat jump altitude providing
no reserve parachute capability.
- Minimum altitude to evacuate
aircraft in an airborne emergency
using the main parachute.

5.1.10.43 Airdrop Speeds. Table 5.12, C-141/C-5/C-17 Airdrop Speeds, lists the exit
airspeeds for the C-141 and the C-5. Use caution when conducting coordination with the
crews of heavy lift aircraft. They frequently have weights that will force them to have
airdrop speeds in excess of the safe exit limitations of the MC1-1C/D/E. Along with the
consideration for airspeed comes exit weight. The maximum exit weight for all the round
parachute systems is 360 pounds. There are two limiting factors on exit weight: landing
altitude and safe opening force. Above 3,000 feet, a combat-equipped jumper will exceed
the safe descent rate of the canopies, which by the Army is considered 22 feet per second.
To control the descent rate, the Army suggests that 5 pounds per 1,000 feet be removed
from the maximum allowed exit weight above 3,000 feet. This concept also reduces the
opening shock of the parachute which can be figured by using Force = Mass x Velocity
squared. If velocity can not be reduced, then at least reduce the mass.
5.1.10.44 True Versus Indicated Airspeed. Parachutes also open on true airspeed verses
indicated airspeed. The indicated airspeed is what is on the airspeed indicator in the
cockpit. It is a function of air molecule being rammed into a tube which exerts pressure on
the indicator showing airspeed. As the aircraft climbs, there are less molecules thus less
pressure and a lower speed indication; hence, the aircraft is actually traveling faster
through the air mass, which is called true airspeed. The parachute opens on the true
airspeed of the aircraft which may be quite violent as the aircraft climbs to altitude. If the
drop altitude is 6,500 feet and the indicated airspeed is 125 KIAS, the true airspeed is over
160 knots. The Army does not recommend static line jump operations above 10,000 feet,
and jumping equipment at these altitudes will make the ORM very high indeed. Static line
round parachutes should not be jumped at altitudes above 14,000 feet.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 5.12 C-141/C-5/C-17 Airdrop Speeds.


Equipment
Personnel static line
Personnel HALO and HAHO
Equipment/Combination
CDS/Combination
Door Bundle
SATB

(2)

(1)

C-141/C-5 (KIAS)

C-17 (KIAS)

130 to 135

130 to 135

1.3 Vs (130 minimum to 180


maximum)

138 to 145

150

145 5

150

145 5

130 to 135

130 to 135

Same as type load simulated

Not Applicable

NOTES:
(1)

Combination drops will use the highest airdrop KIAS.

(2) Includes

free fall, high velocity CDS, wedge, Ahkio sled, and CRR.

5.1.11 Ram Air Static Line. There are three question types of ram air static line capable
systems in the inventory. The MC-4 and MC-5 parachutes in the static line configuration have
exit altitudes of 5,000 feet, which makes them mostly ineffective. The opening characteristics
of these canopies is hard enough to make them questionable at even low altitude, and their ram
air static line programs are pretty much obsolete. Their exit speeds are 125 to 135 knots.
5.1.11.1 The MT-1X packed IAW the Navy TO is still used. It is restricted to an exit
altitude of 1,500 feet for training and an operational altitude of 1,250 feet. Its opening
characteristics are moderate to good, depending on altitude and weight of exit. Its exit
speeds are 125 to 135 knots.
5.1.11.2 The SOV-3 HH is regulatory restricted for training by AFI 16-1202, Pararescue
Operations, Techniques and Procedures, to 1,250 feet. The static line test for the system
recommended the minimum training altitude of 800 feet with an ORM review to allow for
jumper orientation to the ground. The parachute uses 122 feet to open at 145 knots with a
suspended weight of 425 pounds. The reason it can be deployed so much lower is the safe
consistent opening which allows for a much higher airspeed, and the sky hook reserve
deployment system which requires only 150 feet for reserve opening. Thus, operational
altitudes without the use of the reserve could be as low as 400 feet; however, the canopies
fly at 20.8 knots at half brake and the chances of a downwind landing become high below
600 feet. Its exit speeds are 125 to 150 knots.
5.1.12 Free-Fall. This section is intended to provide specific information regarding
planning and performance numbers and considerations.
5.1.12.1 Exit Speed. Free-fall exit speeds are not critical to the parachute performance in
general. AFI 11-231, Computed Air Release Point Procedures, lists the exit speeds for
free-fall parachute systems as between 125 to 170 knots. The speed of exit becomes
critical for the opening of the parachute if the velocity exceeds the safe opening speeds.
Thus, there is a delay required for the MT- and MC-series free-fall parachutes that require

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5-17

delays in opening starting at altitudes above 10,000 feet. (See Table 5.13, Opening Delays,
for clarity.)
Table 5.13 Opening Delays.
Exit Altitude in Feet MSL

Delay

Below 20,000

10 seconds

Above 20,000

Pull altitude will be predetermined.

Pull altitude will be no less than 1,500 feet


below drop altitude rather than a set time delay.

5.1.12.2 Fall Rates. The average jumper takes 10 seconds to fall the first 1,000 feet and
then an additional 5 seconds per 1,000 feet. This is an average and depends on altitude and
weight. Normal airdrop speeds for the HC/MC-130 will not exceed 150 knots due to the
door restriction.
5.1.12.3 Exit Altitude. The exit altitude is listed as 35,000 feet which has nothing to do
with the parachute system but the current oxygen system which is rated to 35,000 feet.
The training exit altitude is based on the FF-2 at 5,000 feet when it is used, which is for all
land jumps on standard parachute systems. See AFI 11-410, Personnel Parachute
Operations, for training altitudes. The operational exit altitude is listed in AFI 11-231,
Computed Air Release Point Procedures, as 2,500 feet with a pack opening of 2,000 feet.
Use caution when viewing these numbers. They do not consider the human factor of
proficiency. Good ORM must be applied to these numbers. These numbers, unlike the
static line numbers, do not give reserve altitudes.
5.1.12.4 Opening Altitude. The opening altitudes for parachute systems are dependent
on the structural integrity of the system, reliability of the opening system, and the reserve
activation system. The maximum opening altitude of the MT- and MC-series parachute is
25,000 feet. Above that, the terminal airspeed of the parachute system exceeds the
maximum opening speed of the parachute. The SOV-3 has a maximum opening altitude of
30,000 feet in both the static and free-fall configurations. The spring-loaded pilot chute is
an unreliable system due to the randomness of the low pressure area behind the jumper
which causes pilot chute hesitations and entanglements. The larger and heavier (faster) the
jumper, the larger the negative pressure behind the jumper and the stronger the high
pressure wall on the sides of the jumper; making it harder for the spring-loaded pilot chute
to reach escape velocity. (See the Pilot Chute Hesitation Equipment video, and Figure
5.2, Negative Pressure.)

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 5.2 Negative Pressure.

Negative Pressure

AIRFLOW

UNCLASSIFIED
5.1.12.5 Entanglements. While the pilot chute is trying to escape, it bounces around the
jumpers back with a 6-foot bridle that can entangle on any piece of equipment.
WARNING: The spring-loaded pilot chutes in the MT- and MC-series parachutes may cause
entanglements that lead to horseshoe malfunctions.
5.1.12.6 Hard Deploy Parachutes. To avoid this malfunction and have a predictable
opening, hand deploy pilot chutes on such parachute systems as the SOV-3. Opening
shock is also a large factor to consider when using free-fall parachutes. The MT- and
MC-series parachutes are fully cross ported with small sliders which open violently at
altitude and with heavy weight. (See Hand Deploy Pilot Chute 1 video, Hard Deploy Pilot
Chute 2 video, and Hand Deploy Pilot Chute Equipment 3 video.)
WARNING: Violent openings can occur with MT- and MC-series free-fall parachutes at high
altitudes and high weights causing structural damage to the parachute system and jumper.
5.1.12.7 Opening Systems. Newer parachute designs in the SOV-3 system have a
three-stage opening system that greatly reduces opening shock with even high openings
with heavy weight. This also gives the SOV-3 the additional altitude as its maximum
opening altitude.
5.1.12.8 Exit Weight. The exit weight for the MT- and MC-series parachute is 360
pounds. Despite it being listed in AFI 11-231, Computed Air Release Point Procedures, as
450 pounds, use caution in full exit weight based on altitude opening and landing
limitations. The exit weight for the SOV-3 HH is 425 pounds and it has no opening or

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5-19

landing issues. The MT- and MC-series parachutes begin to loose lift at 5,000 feet, and
exit weight should be managed. They can be jumped up to 10,000 feet with greatly
reduced weight. Jumping the MT- and MC-series parachutes above 8,000 feet for
operational mission should only be accomplished after an ORM risk decision has been
conducted and the mission risk is accepted as high.
WARNING: Jumping the MT- and MC-series parachute above 8,000 feet can cause structural
failure in the parachutist upon landing.
5.1.12.9 Performance Numbers. Natick Soldier Center has evaluated the performance
numbers given for the MT- and MC-series parachutes and advises to use the Army FM
3-05.211, Special Forces Military Free-fall Operations, numbers with caution due to an
over evaluation of the parachutes capability.
NOTE: Natick Soldier Center has expressed concern over the performance numbers for the MTand MC-series parachutes. Be conservative in safety factor while using these parachute systems.
5.1.12.10 MT- and MC-Series Parachutes. The MT- and MC-series parachutes have
the following paraflight: Army FM 3-05.211, Special Forces Military Free-fall
Operations, performance data; K=25, HAHO K=48, Velocity of 20.8, Maximum exit
weight 360 pounds.
5.1.12.11 SOV-3 HH. K=25, HAHO K=45, Velocity of 28.8, Maximum exit weight 425
pounds.
5.1.12.12 Tandem. For a complete understanding, see military tandem and tethered
bundle (MTTB) program. The following text is for planning and comprehension only.
The MTTB provides a force multiplier by being able to bring non-jump-qualified
specialist and large loads of equipment to the PR/RO parachute mission. (See Tandem
Equipment video and Tandem Personnel video.)
5.1.12.13 T-10R. The T-10R is the most prevalent Reserve used. Due to the multitude
of missions that are conducted in the GUARDIAN ANGEL weapons system, the use of the
belly band and reserve pin are very specific.
5.1.12.13.1 Belly Band. The belly band is not required as shown in Figure 5.3, Static
Line Belly Band.
5.1.12.13.2 Reserve Pin. The right reserve should be used as a standard to prevent
confusion during water jumps. (See Figure 5.4, Reserve Pin.)

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 5.3 Static Line Belly Band.

Static Line Belly Band

UNCLASSIFIED
5.1.12.14 Weapons. Two new weapons have been introduced in the resent past: the M-4
and the M-14 MOD1 EBR. Both can be jumped in a weapons bag or exposed. When
exposed, the challenge faced is the absence of a carrying handle to route the belly band
through. This is solved by tying a piece of 550-pound cord around the front of the receiver
and tying the other end around the base of the collapsing stock. The loop is made from
approximately a 1-foot piece of cord and should, when tied by approved climbing knots,
extend 2 to 3 inches from the top of the receiver so that the belly band can easily route
through the loop where the carrying handle would have been. Tape any optics and
anything that can fall off the weapon. Tie the stock of the weapon to the container of the
parachute with 80-pound tape. The leg tie of 80-pound tape is optional. The barrel of the
weapon should be configured with tape, muzzle cover, ear plug in barrel, or some means of
preventing contamination or occlusion of the barrel by foreign debris. The magazine
should be in the weapon and may contain ammunition, but the chamber should remain
empty. The magazine should be taped to prevent untimely departure. The dust cover
should be closed, but use caution in taping the dust cover shut because it will prevent fire
of more than one round from the weapon due to malfunction (failure to eject.) (See Figure
5.5, M-4 Jump Configuration.)

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5-21

Figure 5.4 Reserve Pin.

Right Reserve Pin

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 5.5 M-4 Jump Configuration.

M-4 Jump Configuration

UNCLASSIFIED
5.1.12.15 Weapon Bags. The M-1950 is still authorized and used as required, but for
shorter weapons, Eagle has made weapons bags that may be used. The weapon being
jumped is configured and placed in the jump bag with or without a magazine in the well,
but no round in the chamber. The bag is then donned as if it were a weapon with a piece of
80-pound tape looped through the top carrying strap attachment point and tied to the
container. The belly band is routed through the carrying handle and a second piece of
80-pound tape is then looped through the bottom carrying handle attachment point and tied

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

5-23

around the leg (optional for static line operations). (See Figure 5.6, Weapons Bag
Configuration, and Figure 5.7, Free-Fall M-4/EBR Configuration.)
Figure 5.6 Weapons Bag Configuration.

Weapons Bag Configuration

UNCLASSIFIED
5.1.12.15.1 When the M-4/EBR is jump exposed, the challenge that is faced is the
lack of carrying handle to route the belly band through. This is solved by tying a piece
of 550-pound cord around the front of the receiver and tying the other end around the
base of the collapsing stock. The loop is made from approximately a 1-foot piece of
cord and should, when tied by approved climbing knots, extend 2 to 3 inches from the
top of the receiver so that the belly band can easily route through the loop where the
carrying handle would have been. Tape any optics and anything that can fall off the
weapon. Tie the stock of the weapon to the container of the parachute with 80-pound
tape. The leg tie of 80-pound tape is optional. The barrel of the weapon should be
configured with tape, muzzle cover, ear plug in barrel, or some means of preventing
contamination or occlusion of the barrel by foreign debris. The magazine should be in
the weapon and may contain ammunition, but the chamber should remain empty. The
magazine should be taped to prevent untimely departure. The dust cover should be
closed, but use caution in taping the dust cover shut because it will prevent fire of more
than one round from the weapon due to malfunction. (Failure to eject.) The weapon
may be prepared IAW AFMAN 11-412. (See Figure 5.8, Weapons Bag Free Fall.)

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 5.7 Free-Fall M-4/EBR Configuration.

Free Fall M-4/EBR Configuration

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

5-25

Figure 5.8 Weapons Bag Free Fall.

Weapons Bag Free Fall

UNCLASSIFIED
5.1.12.15.2 Free fall jump of the Eagle Weapons Case. The weapon being jumped is
configured and placed in the jump bag with or without a magazine in the well, but no
round in the chamber. The bag is then donned as if it were a weapon with a piece of
80-pound tape looped through the top carrying strap attachment point and tied to the
container. The belly band is routed through the carrying handle and a second piece of
80-pound tape is then looped through the bottom carrying handle attachment point and
tied around the leg.
WARNING: The bottom 80-pound tape must be tied around the leg. Failure to do so may allow
the weapon bag to pivot forward and act as a wind vane, causing the jumper to loose stability.
5.1.12.16 Jump Containers, Lowering Lines, and Releases. The standard jump
containers, lowering lines, and releases are described neatly in Army FM 3-05.211,
Special Forces Military Free-fall Operations. This section will show the snap shackle
release, lowering line configuration, and three additional jump containers: the eagle jump
bag (small, medium, and large are all configured the same), special tactics rucksack
lowering line system (STRLLS), and the special operation medical kit (Dave Cruz Pack).
There is no method for knowing all the types of equipment that will be required for
missions; hence, there is no way to have a written procedure to jump the unknown. There
are, however, guidelines to ensure that the equipment being jumped does not cause
damage to the parachutist. (See Table 5.14, Guide to Safely Jump Containers.)

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 5.14 Guide to Safely Jump Containers.


- All equipment should be jumped in an approved container/harness whenever possible.
- All containers should have releases that are attached and can be found and released when
donned.
- All containers should have at least one leg strap (two in free fall).
- All leg straps must be tight and releasable.
- All containers should have a lowering line that is attached to the harness and is releasable.
5.1.12.16.1 The snap shackle release (stainless steel pelican release) should be rated at
2,500 pounds, have a welded attachment ring, and not allow the main closing pin from
falling through the body. Pelicans that do not have these features should not be used
due to the potential for equipment failure. The pelicans should be attached to the
equipment by either French links or rated nylon that was sown by a qualified rigger. If
the need exists to manufacture an expedient system, then use rated material of no less
than type 8 nylon with approve climbing knots. When designing the length of the
release attachment, keep the length of the attachment as short as possible. Frequently
handles manufactured from loops of inch tubular nylon with Velcro attached are used
to allow for single hand release and convenient location. Ensure that the handles are
not so tight that when exiting the aircraft, the jumpers body position will not release
one or both of the pelicans.
WARNING: Failure to allow enough slack on the snap shackle releases (pelicans) will cause one
or both to release, causing instability and premature equipment departure.
5.1.12.16.2 Lowering lines are allowed to be attached to either the left or right
equipment V-ring. Lowering lines are usually attached to the left side during static line
operations and left side on free fall; however there are times when it is unsafe to leave
them hooked up to a specific side. This is specifically true when jumping weapons and
containers. The lowering line can be routed either over or under the leg strap.
WARNING: For static line jumps, use a leg strap on static line equipment to prevent the
equipment from contacting the jumpers face.
WARNING: Leg straps on free-fall equipment front or rear must be tight to preclude instability
in free fall.
WARNING: Free-fall equipment must not be configured in such a manner that it is loose and can
shift in free fall and cause instability.
WARNING: Light equipment loads are hard to control when front mounted. Any load under 45
pounds needs to be evaluated for surface area in the relative wind to determine whether it is safe
to jump. (See the Light, Loose Equipment video, and Figure 5.9, Leg Strap Tension.)

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5-27

Figure 5.9 Leg Strap Tension.

Leg Strap Tension

UNCLASSIFIED
WARNING: During static line jumps, the leg strap should not be tightened such that it will bare
the weight of the parachutist during opening shock. (See Figure 5.10, Free Fall Leg Strap.)
5.1.12.16.3 In free-fall operations, there should be two leg straps and they should be
tight enough to force the jumpers legs apart.
WARNING: Loose equipment due to loose leg straps can cause instability. (See Figure 5.11,
Lowering Line Attachments.)
5.1.12.16.4 The left picture in Figure 5.11, Lowering Line Attachments, shows the
danger of burying the lowering line release and attached STRLLS. The right picture in
Figure 5.11, Lowering Line Attachments, shows the right side lowering line
attachment and special operations medical kit.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 5.10 Free Fall Leg Straps.

Free Fall Leg Straps

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 5.11 Lowering Line Attachments.

Lowering Line Attachments

UNCLASSIFIED

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5-29

5.1.12.16.5 The lowering line on free-fall parachute systems may be hooked on either
the right or the left, whichever is safer for the parachutist. Frequently, the lowering
line release will be covered by oxygen systems on the right and oxygen and weapon on
the left. (See Figure 5.12, Free Fall Lowering Line Attachment.)
Figure 5.12 Free Fall Lowering Line Attachment.

Free Fall Lowering Line Attachment

UNCLASSIFIED
5.1.12.16.6 The eagle jump bags are bags that have integrated harnesses and
hardware. The operator needs to fill the bag with a kit, zip it shut, fasten the buckles,
ensure the lowering line is attached, configured, and has a quick release. The STRLLS
has its origins from a modified spider harness with the top straps cut off of it to allow
access to the top flap. The releases, usually snap shackles (pelican hooks) are attached
to the holes in the side of the frame and the lowering line is attached to the STRLLS.
The critical part of the lowering line is to ensure that it is attached and the gate is
closed. The special operations medical kit (Dave Cruz Kit) has integrated attachment
points for the releases and the lowering line. The attachment points for the special
operations medical kit is a long narrow container and the attachments are at the very
top of the pack, causing the pack to hang low; coupled with the fact that the pack straps
are very long, this can lead to minor potato chipping and instability problems. (See
Figure 5.13, Eagle Jump Bag.)

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 5.13 Eagle Jump Bag.

Eagle Jump Bag

UNCLASSIFIED
5.1.12.17 At some point multiple equipment loads become a necessity. Any
combinations of equipment loads are multiple (e.g., weapon-container, two containers, or
ML-4 kit and container). (See Table 5.15, Rear Load Guide, and Figure 5.14, Multiple
Container Configuration.)
Table 5.15 Rear Load Guide.
- Release rear-mounted containers when the size is larger than the ML-4 kit.
- Use the equipment V-rings to attach the equipment on static line parachutes.
- For spring-loaded free-fall parachutes, use the front equipment D-rings.
- For static line parachutes, do not use the leg straps on the rear equipment for static line.
- Ensure load releases are accessible.
- Ensure lowering line releases are accessible.
5.1.12.18 Land and Equipment. This section is for land base equipment only that does
not fit in the general category.

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5-31

Figure 5.14 Multiple Container Configuration.

Multiple Container Configuration

UNCLASSIFIED
5.1.12.18.1 Oxygen Jumps. Normal static line operations are not conducted above
10,000 feet; however, if a mission should dictate the need to jump at altitudes where
oxygen is required, the AirOx 8 system can be donned like a single para scuba
deployment system (SPUDS). Attach a belt to the AirOx 8 system at the manufacture
belt loops. Put the oxygen system on and then don the parachute. The bottles can be
pulled through the opening for the arm or hang below the V for the leg strap. Pulling
the bottles through the arm opening ensures the system does not drop with time. Route
the AirOx 8 hose under the arm, with the excess rubber banded and push the into the
oxygen pouch. Take two MT-1X or Tandem rubber bands and girth hitch them
together and place one loop over the regulator. Take the other loop and route it around
the chest strap and loop it over the regulator, securing the regulator to the chest strap.
The mask hose can be routed either under or over the chest strap, depending on how
much slack is in the hose. (See Figure 5.15, Static Line Oxygen Donning.) Free-fall
operations frequently are above 13,000 feet and require the use of supplemental
oxygen. To prevent the oxygen bottles from slipping down, tie a piece of 80-pound
tape through the loop on the parachute container and the manifold of the AirOx 8 to
prevent it from slipping down. Use of the Crew 60 attachment point is not required
and frequently not available. To substitute, take two MT-1X or Tandem rubber bands
and girth hitch them together and place one loop over the regulator. Take the other
loop and route it around the main lift web or belly band, depending on equipment.
Then loop the second loop around the regulator, securing the regulator to the chest
strap. Route the hose through one of a pair of girth-hitched MT-1X bands and the

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


other loop around the chest strap. Ensure there is enough slack in the hose to not kink
it and provide free movement of the head. (See Figure 5.16, Free-Fall Tied Oxygen,
and Oxygen Hose Routing.)

Figure 5.15 Static Line Oxygen Donning.

Static Line Oxygen Donning

UNCLASSIFIED
5.1.12.19 Floatation. MAJCOM-approved flotation is required to be used on all water
jumps and as a precaution during land drops in the vicinity of water. If the flotation is
mechanical, it should be donned with the chest strap under the flotation. This prevents the
flotation from choking the jumper and venting air from the vest. When inflating the UDT
vest only, inflate one bottle at a time. Since there are no emergency handles on the chest
of the static line parachute system, there is no reason to rubber band the flotation. Hard or
non-mechanical flotation is allowed and safe on the insertion; however if the individual
ditches on the insertion or on extraction aircraft, egress of the aircraft may be
compromised.
5.1.12.19.1 Once in the water, hard or mechanical flotation prevents short and long
term under water duties (e.g., type 4 release). (See Figure 5.17, UDT Vest, the
Para-Swimmer Vest, LSP Pararescue Flotation.)

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


Figure 5.16 Free-Fall Tied Oxygen and Oxygen Hose Routing.

Free Fall Tied Oxygen and Oxygen Hose Routing

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 5.17 UDT Vest, the Para-Swimmer Vest, LSP Pararescue Flotation.

UDT Vest, Para-Swimmer Vest, and LSP Pararescue Flotation

UNCLASSIFIED

5-33

5-34

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

WARNING: Obstruction of emergency handle can cause failure of the emergency cut-a-way and
reserve ripcord system, resulting in sudden stops.
5.1.13 The ML-4 kit or Pararescue Flotation. The pararescue flotation is derived from a
ML-4 kit. To reduce duplication and weight, several items were removed from the kit and
renamed Pararescue flotation. The ML-4 kit is donned by placing the kit with the writing
TOP FRONT and the arrow pointing up. When donned, the arrow should be pointing up the
PJs spine. The boat lanyard and buckle should be on the left and the quick release on the
right. For training jumps, ensure that flotation is attached to the parachute harness such that it
does not come off and does not interfere with the function of the canopy. (See Figure 5.18,
ML-4 Kit, and Figure 5.19, ML-4 Configuration.)
Figure 5.18

ML-4 Kit.

ML-4 Kit

UNCLASSIFIED
5.1.13.1 For free-fall, the system is donned the same as static line with the exception of
attaching the ML-4 kit to the equipment V-rings. (See Figure 5.20, Configuration Left,
and Figure 5.21, Configuration Right.)

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Figure 5.19 ML-4 Configuration.

ML-4 Configuration

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 5.20 Configuration Left.

Configuration Left

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 5.21 Configuration Right.

Configuration Right

UNCLASSIFIED
5.1.13.2 SPUDs. The system allows the compressed air cylinder to be worn on the leg.
The system comes with a pouch A-7 belt, and the regulator needs a longer hose (34-inch
hose). The system is donned prior to the parachute by putting the belt around the waist and
then donning the parachute system. Once the parachute is on, the Velcro leg strap is
fasten. Place the regulator in the regulator pouch with the mouthpiece facing the scuba
cylinder. If the regulator is placed in the regulator pouch with the purge valve facing the
scuba cylinder, the regulator tends to be difficult to remove from the pouch. Secure the
Velcro on the regulator pouch so the regulator hose is against the main pouch. The excess
regulator hose is pushed down inside the pouch and the second stage of the regulator is
then rubber banded to the first stage such that it will not inadvertently come loose but can
be pulled out by the parachutist. A second option is to take the excess regulator hose and
push it down inside the pouch. The second stage of the regulator is then rubber banded to
the first stage such that it will not inadvertently come loose but can be pulled out by the
parachutist. (See Figure 5.22, Free-Fall Configuration Left, and Figure 5.23, Free-Fall
Configuration Rear.)
5.1.13.3 Free fall donning is the same for SPUDS. (See Figure 5.24, Static SPUDS
Right, and Figure 5.25, Static SPUDS Rear.)

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Figure 5.22 Free-Fall Configuration Left.

Free Fall Configuration Left

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 5.23 Free-Fall Configuration Rear.

Free Fall Configuration Rear

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 5.24 Static SPUDS Right.

Static SPUDS Right

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 5.25 Static SPUDS Rear.

Static SPUDS Rear

UNCLASSIFIED

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5-39

5.1.13.4 Fins. Fins are a necessity while conducting water operations. If worn on the
feet, they should be either taped or fix-e-palmed to prevent them from departing. Tape by
routing the tape around the buckles and then around the ankle. Make sure to leave a cows
tail for removal. While conducting free fall operations, taping the fins is suggested to
prevent pilot chute snag hazard. (See Figure 5.26, Free-Fall SPUDS Right.)
Figure 5.26 Free-Fall SPUDS Right.

Free Fall SPUDS Right

UNCLASSIFIED
5.1.13.5 Front Accessory Gear Bag. The front accessory gear (FAG) bag is worn to
allow immediate access to emergency equipment. Place knives, flares, and any pilot chute
snag hazards in the FAG bag for free-fall jumps. See Pilot Chute Hesitation video.
5.1.13.6 Tree and Adverse Terrain Suits. When adverse terrain and/or wooded areas
are prevalent, a tree/adverse terrain suit can be used. The suit is donned by putting on first
the top, then the trouser. Don the parachute system. A 300-foot, bird-nested, 1-inch
tubular nylon coil goes into the right trouser leg, down the pocket. The tree suit is
designed to minimize possible injury. Adjustable pads are placed in positions to protecting
bony prominences. The jacket is equipped with a high collar to protect the neck and face.
The trousers have an adjustable strap running up and down the inside of each leg, which is
sewn into the trousers to make an inverted U at approximately 4-inches below the crotch
to protect the groin area. When deploying in cold climate areas, winter clothing may be
worn under the tree suit. Tree suit pads may be removed to accommodate the added bulk
of winter clothing. An additional option is to wear only the trousers, with pads removed,
to afford the availability of the tape rings and the pockets. For free-fall operations, the
system is donned the same way. (See Figure 5.27, Free-Fall SPUDS Front.)

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 5.27 Free Fall SPUDS Front.

Free Fall SPUDS Front

UNCLASSIFIED
5.1.13.7 Night Parachute Configuration. Night operations present increased hazards
over those encountered during daylight operations. Lack of visual references and jumper
visibility make night lighting a necessity. The mandatory lighting requirements are in AFI
16-1202, Pararescue Operations, Techniques and Procedures, (three volumes, when
published); however, as a general guide, place red on the back and green on the front such
that it does not interfere with the function of the canopy. Not shown here are the chemlight
sleeves that are manufactured by several companies. They fit over the reserve flap and on
the chest strap and main lift web. While jumping equipment, place red chemlights such
that they are visible and do not interfere with the function of the parachute system, the
lowering system, or the equipment. Rear-loaded equipment should not be lit or should be
lit with a different color to avoid confusing fellow jumpers. (See Figure 5.28, Fin Taping;
Figure 5.29, Tree Suit; and Figure 5.30, SOV 3 Lighting Rear.)
5.1.13.8 Equipment Rings. Red chemlights can also be placed on the equipment rings as
shown on the SOV-3HH. (See Figure 5.31, MC4/T10 Lighting.)

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5-41

Figure 5.28 Fin Taping.

Fin Taping

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 5.29 Tree Suit.

Tree Suite

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 5.30 SOV 3 Lighting Rear.

SOV 3 Lighting Rear

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 5.31 MC4/T10 Lighting.

MC-4/T-10 Lighting

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

5-43

5.1.13.9 T-10R. Red chemlights can be attached to the front of the T-10R by girth
hitching two rubber bands together and looping them around the ends of a red chemlight.
WARNING: Placing pilot chute snag hazards on any part of the parachutist that the pilot chute
will frequent can cause a horseshoe malfunction and death.
5.1.13.10 Static Line Jump Procedures. PJs utilize static line parachuting techniques
(day or night) when the threat scenario and/or weather dictate low-altitude airborne
insertion, when deploying as part of a joint airborne assault force, and during both land and
open sea search, rescue, and recovery missions. PJ teams may be inserted
over-the-horizon at sea with an amphibious combat rubber raider craft, rigged alternate
method zodiac (RAMZ) in support of the Space Shuttle program, kayak, hard hull boat,
swimmer/scuba equipment, or on land with all terrain vehicles or other special vehicles to
enhance operations. A PJ must be a highly qualified precision parachutist, capable of
performing parachute deployments into any type of terrain, into open seas, and during the
hours of daylight or darkness.
5.1.13.10.1 DZ Wind Determination. During training deployments, the drop zone
controller (DZC) may have a windsock, streamer tied to a pole, smoke (not red), or
some other device to help indicate ground wind direction to the jumpers. If authorized,
block letters are used (A, C, J, R, or S), coordinated with the jumpmaster, navigator,
and aircraft commander to ensure they are aligned into the wind and not to the DZ axis
or aircraft line of flight. All parachutists should make the effort to learn the wind
direction while under canopy without the use of drop zone wind direction aids. (See
Table 5.16, DZ Wind Determination, for some suggestions as to how to determine the
wind.)
Table 5.16 DZ Wind Determination.
- Look for movement of trees and vegetation on the ground.
- Watch for noticeable drift of the canopy while toggles are up.
- Look for smoke or blowing dust or sand.
- Watch other parachutists landing.
- Fly an S pattern and watch for the difference in drift.
- Note the direction of wind in relation to the aircraft prior to exit.
5.1.13.10.2 Parachute Manipulation Using Modified Canopy. To successfully
maneuver the parachute to the target, a parachutist may have to hold into the wind, run
with the wind, and crab to the right or left while holding or running. To turn a canopy,
the toggle on the side of the direction of turn is pulled. This distorts the side of the
canopy and increases the thrust of the opposite side which causes the canopy to turn.
(See Figure 5.32, Parachute Manipulation.)

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 5.32 Parachute Manipulation.

Parachute Manipulation

Back view

Control
line down

UNCLASSIFIED
5.1.13.10.2.1 Maneuvering Upwind (Holding). Hold into the wind line if you
are on the wind line and you will overshoot or go past the target. This will decrease
movement across the ground (counteracting the wind drift) without affecting the
rate of descent.
5.1.13.10.2.2 Maneuvering Downwind (Running). Run with the wind if you are
on the wind line and you will undershoot or fall short of the target. This will
increase movement across the ground, giving the maximum forward speed
possible. If the running maneuver is made slightly off the wind line, the final turn
into the wind will place the jumper back on the wind line for correct target
approach.
5.1.13.10.2.3 Holding or Running (Crabbing). If your position is to either side
of the wind line, perform a quartering or crabbing maneuver. This maneuver will
allow running toward the target and moving towards the wind line or holding into
the wind moving towards the target and wind line at the same time.
5.1.13.10.2.4 Maneuvering to the Target. Each parachutist must determine the
wind line, the distance and direction off the wind line from the release point, the
drift rate, and the descent rate.
5.1.13.10.2.5 Wind Line. The wind line is an imaginary line of wind direction
passing directly over the intended target. With a variable wind, the average wind

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direction would be the wind line. The parachutist should attempt to land on the
wind line with a proper closure rate toward the target.
5.1.13.11 Release Point. If deployed on the correct line-up, the parachutist should be on
the wind line and at the correct distance from the target. However, the parachutist may
have to correct errors in aircraft alignment or for wind shifts in velocity or direction. The
normal deployment airspeeds for all types of C-130s are 125 to 130 KIAS. The HC-130
aircraft travels 210 feet (75 yards) per second and a delay in exit of 1 second will cause the
PJ to be 210 feet off the exit release point. This distance will be less during helicopter
deployments due to the slower drop airspeed (50 to 110 KIAS) 108 feet per second at 110
knots. Errors to the side or off the wind line caused by wind shifts, exiting the aircraft too
soon or too late, or inaccurate alignment of the aircraft will usually be within the distance
a parachutist can make up by maneuvering the canopy. If both the count and the lineup are
off, it will be difficult for the parachutist to maneuver to the target.
5.1.13.12 Drift Rate. Drift rate is the direction and rate of travel (target closure speed).
5.1.13.13 Direction and Rate of Travel. To determine direction/rate of travel and wind
line, attempt to determine movement in relation to the target location. Various methods
can be used. (See Table 5.17, Determine Direction and Rate of Travel.)
Table 5.17 Determine Direction and Rate of Travel.
- Look at the target or some fixed object on the ground to use as a reference point.
- Sight over your feet at the ground.
- Look for the canopy shadow.
- Listen. High winds can cause the suspension lines to whistle (22 knots).
- JMs/navigators normally deploy jumpers in such a manner to open, fly, and turn 180 degrees to
land.
5.1.13.13.1 After parachute opening, the parachutist is normally facing the aircraft
flight path. Before initiating a maneuver (except to avoid a collision/entanglement
with another parachutist), determine the location of the target and make the initial turn
towards the target in the direction of the wind line. Determine direction and rate of
movement across the ground and maneuver combining, thrust of the canopy, wind
velocity, and rate of descent to arrive at the landing site. In effect, a parachutist
maneuvers towards a target within an approach cone that is wider at the exit point and
progressively narrows as he approaches the target. If remaining within the approach
cone, the parachutist should land at the target area. If allowing himself/herself to turn
or drift outside the cone (vertically or horizontally), the parachutist may not be able to
reach the target. The approach cone will vary with wind velocity/direction and the
parachutists rate of descent. Approach the target area using a combination of holding,
running, or crabbing. A series of left and right running turns allows the jumper to
remain in the approach cone varying movement across the ground reaching the
selected target. (See Table 5.18, Wind Cone, for clarification.)

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 5.18 Wind Cone.


Jumper

Location

Above the wind cone and will land downwind of the target at (a).

Below the wind cone and off the wind line. The landing point will be upwind and
off to the side at (b).

Within the wind cone and can maneuver to target (c).

5.1.13.14 Team Parachuting. Team parachuting ensures all parachutists approach small
or restricted target areas in a controlled manner. Critical to the success of a team
deployment is an experienced parachutist leading the team to the intended target area.
When making a team deployment, the higher parachutist should follow the lower
parachutist mimicking the lower parachutist parachute manipulation, without interfering
with the lower parachutist approach to the target area. The parachutists should stagger
their approach on the wind line to either side, remaining clear of each other during landing.
Normally the lower parachutist will take the right side.
5.2 Land Parachute Deployment Procedures.
5.2.1 Prepare to Land. Prepare to land at approximately 200 feet AGL/AWL.
5.2.2 Landing. Most injuries in parachuting result from incorrect landings. The parachute
landing fall (PLF) is a precise method of landing which enables the parachutist to distribute the
landing shock over the entire body and reduce the possibility of injury. However, if the
ground is extremely rough or full of holes, PLF can result in injury.
5.2.3 Equipment Release Procedures. Release of equipment on a lowering line is optional
if it weights less than 35 pounds or jumping to rough terrain DZ. Release is recommended if
equipment weight is over 35 pounds or a high altitude DZ is used. When the deployment
situation dictates, release of the equipment on the lowering line will be accomplished at
approximately 200 feet above the surface.
5.2.4 Delivery Containers. Use MAJCOM approved procedures for the rigging of all
delivery containers with integrated parachute harnesses.
5.2.4.1 Tree Parachute Deployment Procedures.
5.2.4.1.1 Tree/Adverse Terrain Suit. Complete PJ tree suit, heavy leather gloves,
and appropriate helmet with visor should be worn on all intentional tree parachute
deployments. Due to discomfort and body fluid loss incurred when wearing the tree
suit for long periods, do not don equipment until nearing the deployment area. Don the
tree suit jacket first, then bring the trousers over the jacket. This will prevent branches
from going under the jacket during a descent through the trees. After donning the
parachute, the letdown webbing will be threaded IAW AFI 16-1202, Pararescue
Operations, Techniques and Procedures. Secure the end by snapping the snap fastener
on the end of the letdown webbing into the right reserve D ring. The remainder of
letdown webbing will be coiled into a loose bird's nest and carried in the tree suit
pocket. The portion of webbing between tree suit D ring and suit leg pocket will be
secured by the knife pocket snap cover flap located on the right leg of the trousers.

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5-47

5.2.4.1.2 See Table 5.19, Tree Entry Procedures.


Table 5.19 Tree Entry Procedures.
- Pick a tree or close group of trees to land in.
WARNING: Failure to correctly land in the targeted tree may result in the collapse of the
parachute when descending into the tree line and cause damage to endangered foliage and plant
life below.
- Plan final approach to tree entry so the body enters the trees one-quarter of way down from top.
- Before tree contact, place elbows on top of reserve parachute and forearms in front of faceplate.
- After tree entry, maintain the tight body position until the parachute is caught in the trees and
descent is stopped.
WARNING: The parachute may not catch in the tree; be prepared to perform a PLF.
- Once descent is stopped, do not bounce in the harness to check security of the canopy hang-up.
- Perform the tree letdown procedure immediately.
- Initiate letdown procedures, using the letdown tape stowed in the tree suit pocket. After
hang-up, letdown must be accomplished as expeditiously as possible to reduce the possibility of
tearing free and falling. The following procedures will be utilized:
-- Release right side of reserve parachute.
-- Release right side of medical kit or other equipment attached to the reserve D ring.
NOTE: If necessary, lower the kit or equipment only if it will make contact with the ground.
Take care when lowering to preclude the kit or equipment from tangling.
- Pull approximately 4 feet of webbing through letdown D ring.
- Unsnap the end of the letdown webbing, pass through right and left risers twice, and snap onto
itself and remove slack for webbing.
- If a secure tree anchor point is readily available, use it instead of the risers.
- While holding tension on the letdown webbing with the right hand, apply a brake to the right
hip area and release the safety covers on both releases.
- Hold head back, face to the opposite side to be released, and actuate the canopy release on the
slack side of the risers.
- While holding head back, face to the opposite side to be released, reach around the letdown
tape, release the other side, and descend.
- Tree Letdown Tape Manufacture. Letdown tape will be manufactured using 1 inch by 200
feet tabular nylon tape. A static line snap fastener will be sewn to the end IAW TO 14D1-2-396
(Figure-13B, Rework of 23 Foot Static Line, provides a visual).
Equipment will not be released on the lowering line during parachute descent.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


5.2.4.2 Water Parachute Deployment Procedures. To prevent excessive body fluid
loss, donning of equipment should be delayed as long as possible without delaying the
deployment. (Minimum suggested equipment worn on water deployments in addition to
the parachute assembly [e.g., harness, main and reserve] is in Table 5.20, Suggested Water
Equipment. See also Table 5.21, Post Water Entry Procedures, for more information.)

Table 5.20 Suggested Water Equipment.


- Wet suit/dry suit/uniform as dictated by the water/air temperature.
- Single para scuba deployment system (SPUDS) with regulator (as required).
- Face mask.
- Parachutist flotation device (PFD) which is MAJCOM-approved.
- Swim fins (on feet using tape for fix-e-palms).
- Knife or hook knife.
- MK-13/MK-124 flare.
- Whistle.
- ML-4 kit (as required).
- Protective head gear (as required).
- Gloves (as required).
- Wrist compass (as required).
- Carabiner (as required).
- Snorkel (as required).
- Fanny pack (as required).
NOTE: For water deployments, consider a full wet suit or dry suit when water/air temperatures
indicate or when fuel spills, contaminated water, jelly fish, or coral reefs must be negotiated.
5.2.4.3 Ram Air Static Line Procedures. This section provides specific operating
procedures for ram air static line operations. Ram air static line operation are a
combination of static line round operations and free fall operations. Use this section in
conjunction with AFI 11-410, Personnel Parachute Operations; AFI 13-217, Assault Zone
Procedures; and Army FM 3-05.211, Military Free Fall Parachuting Tactics.
5.2.4.3.1 To exit on ram air static line it is very important to know and use the relative
wind. (See free fall section on exits and free fall.) The opening of the parachute is
dependent on having the lines straight. The basic exit is a modified-airborne exit.
Instead of the arms remaining across the chest, the arms are held out so that the
parachutist can fly the exit. Legs are up almost in an exaggerated fashion. The
knees may bend. The exit is basically a sit fly exit. The parachutist needs to fly the
exit until parachute opening so as not to induce line twist. The ram air static line has a
high forward velocity; thus do not exit with less than 2 seconds between jumpers.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

5-49

(See the Ram Air Static Line Exit video, and Ram Air Static Line Equipment Exit
video.)
Table 5.21 Post Water Entry Procedures.
- Signal All OK (extend arm overhead in the all OK signal or shout Help, blow on whistle,
deploy MK-13/MK-124 flare, or activate SDU-5/E or MS-2000M strobe light (remains on).
WARNING: Immediately inflate personnel flotation equipment if entangled in the canopy or
suspension lines. Some combinations of equipment (i.e., heavy equipment, weapons,
ammunition, fatigues versus wet suit) and water conditions (i.e., fresh water provides less
buoyancy) will decrease buoyancy.
- Release leg straps.
- Arch out of container.
- Inflate LPU on parachute waist strap.
- Swim clear of the canopy.
- Use face mask (as required).
- Close canopy releases if still attached.
- Release medical kit or equipment (as required).
- Swim to objective, recovery boat, or wait for recovery of individual parachute as briefed.
WARNING: Exit intervals of less than 2 seconds can cause canopy entanglements.
5.2.4.3.1.1 Ramp exits are straight forward and uncomplicated; they should be the
primary exit. If door exits are required, the jumpers must exaggerate the exit
position and keep the relative wind foremost in their minds.
NOTE: Ramp exits are the primary exit for ram air static line operations. Side door exits have
been know to cause line twist.
5.2.4.4 Procedures. All equipment procedures are the same as for free-fall operations.
Aircraft rigging is the same for static line operations. Emergency procedures for hung and
towed jumpers are IAW static line operations, and the remaining emergency procedures
are the same as free fall.
5.2.4.5 Free-Fall Procedures. This section provides specific operating procedures for
pararescue (PJ) military free-fall (MFF) operations. Use this section in conjunction with
AFI 11-410, Personnel Parachute Operations; AFI 13-217, Assault Zone Procedures; and
Army FM 3-05.211, Special Forces Military Free-fall Operations. (See the 130 Dive Out
video and the 130 Poised video.)
5.2.4.6 Exiting. To exit in a stable fashion, a parachutist must enter the relative wind in a
body position that will keep the jumper in a stable fashion. That means the equipment and
body are in a configuration such that the parachutist will be stable in the relative wind.
The parachutist must be flying in a stable body position prior to entering the relative

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


wind. Once in the wind line, staying on the wind line is what is called stable. (See
Figure 5.33, Relative Wind.)

Figure 5.33 Relative Wind.

Relative Wind

AIRFLOW

UNCLASSIFIED
5.2.4.7 Equipment. Equipment that is light and/or loose will cause stability problems.
Equipment that is less than 45 pounds needs to be evaluated for size and attachment
locations. Lighter packs and containers are more conducive to rear loading because they
are out of the relative wind. Equipment needs to be worn as high on the parachutist as
possible and as tight as the parachutist can make it and still arch. When a jump container
is on and ready for deployment, the jumpers legs should not be able to go together. The
load carried should be as light as possible and consist of only the essential equipment
needed until re-supplied. All items of individual combat equipment are normally carried
in the rucksack during the deployment. Individual load bearing equipment (LBE) or
survival vests may be worn underneath the tree suit or carried in the rucksack or in a small
equipment bag separate from the main equipment load. Consider covering Alice packs or
similar containers. Rigging for combat pack and equipment containers is explained in this
manual and Army FM 3-05.211, Special Forces Military Free-fall Operations. (See Light
and Loose Equipment video.)
WARNING: Equipment that is large, light, and loose may cause instability, leading to
malfunctions and death or serious injury.
5.2.4.8 DZ Wind Determination. During training deployments, the DZC may have a
windsock, streamer tied to a pole, smoke (not red), or some other device to help indicate

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5-51

ground wind direction to the parachutists. If authorized block letters are used (A, C, J, R,
or S), coordinated with the jumpmaster, navigator, and aircraft commander to ensure they
are aligned into the wind and not to the DZ axis or aircraft line of flight. All parachutists
should make the effort to learn the wind direction while under canopy without the use of
DZ wind direction aids. Parachutists can determine ground winds by using guides in
Table 5.22, Free-Fall Drift Determination.
Table 5.22 Free-Fall Drift Determination.
- Looking for movement of trees and vegetation on the ground.
- Watching for noticeable drift of the canopy while in deep brakes (not a stall).
- Looking for smoke or blowing dust and/or sand.
- Watching other parachutists landing.
- Flying a Box pattern at 50 percent brakes and watching for the difference in drift.
- Use drop aircraft as a reference to the wind line.
5.2.4.9 Night Deployments.
5.2.4.9.1 Aircraft Lighting. Generally, the same procedures utilized in static line
parachuting at night apply to night free-fall deployments.
5.2.4.9.2 Electro-Luminescent (EL) Lighting. Although part of the canopy
purchase, the electro-luminescent (EL) lighting system is rarely used and may have
been removed. Refer to manufacturers instructions for proper installation and use.
5.2.4.9.3 Night Landings. Even on the darkest nights, parachutists will have an idea
when they are descending close to the ground. There is normally enough illumination
to perform a flared landing except on nights void of moonlight. Landing at night
requires more skill than a day landing due to the decrease in depth perception at night.
The most desired landing point is just short of the target. It is better to undershoot than
to over shoot the lights and land without references. Perform a 50 to 75 percent braked
landing and parachute landing fall (PLF) if any doubt exists as to the flare point.
Notify the DZ controller as soon as possible after landing by shouting All OK
(extend arm overhead in the all OK signal) or shout Help, blasts on whistle, deploy
MK-13 flare, or activate SDU-5/E or MS-2000M strobe light (remains on).
5.2.4.9.4 Water Deployment Procedures. Free-fall parachuting into the water is
different from the standard free fall to land. The biggest difference, and most
important one, is the low altitude with no altimeter or ARR. A good stable exit is
essential for a clean deployment of main canopy pilot chute at assign delay. (See Table
5.23, Free-Fall Water Entry Procedures, for more information.)
WARNING: Any flotation device placed between harness and parachutist must have a safety
valve or be rigged in such a manner as to not injure the parachutist should inflation occur.
NOTE: For operational water deployments, a full wet suit or dry suit should be worn when
water/air temperatures allow or fuel spills, jelly fish, or coral reefs must be negotiated.

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Table 5.23 Free-Fall Water Entry Procedures.


- Release reserve static line system.
- Sit well back in the harness.
- Release chest strap and waist strap.
- Maneuver to land slightly downwind/drift of the target.
- Fly a normal approach to a flared landing (visibility permitting). If unsure during final
approach die to lack of visual cues, fly final approach into the wind using 50 percent brakes.
Hold until water entry.
- Use regulator (if equipped).
- Post water entry procedures.
- Release the right toggle so the right hand is free to cut away the main parachute, if being drifted.
- Signal All OK (extend arm overhead in the all OK signal) or shout Help, give three blasts
on whistle, deploy MK-13 flare, or activate SDU-5/E or MS-2000M strobe light (remains on).
WARNING: Immediately inflate personnel flotation equipment if entangled with canopy or
suspension lines. Some combinations of equipment (i.e., heavy equipment, weapons,
ammunition, fatigues versus wet suit) and water conditions (i.e., fresh water provides less
buoyancy) will decrease buoyancy.
- Release leg straps and swim free of harness/chute.
- inflate LPU on parachute waist strap.
- Use face mask/goggles (as required).
- Inflate one man raft (as required).
- Release medical kit or equipment (as required).
- Swim to objective, recovery boat, or wait for recovery of individual parachute as briefed.
5.2.4.10 Tree Parachute Deployment Procedures.
5.2.4.10.1 Wear PJ tree suit, gloves, and appropriate helmet with visor on all
intentional tree deployments.
5.2.4.10.2 Tree/Adverse Terrain Suit. Donning and utilization of the tree/adverse
terrain suit and let down webbing are identical to those identified in static line round
with the exceptions noted in Table 24. (See Table 5.19, Tree Entry Procedures and
Table 5.24, Free-Fall Tree Let Down.)

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Table 5.24 Free-Fall Tree Let Down.


- The let down webbing will be coiled into a loose birds nest and completely stowed in the tree
suit pocket. The let down webbing will not be uncoiled or snapped to the equipment D ring
until after tree let down is required.
- Ensure the tree suit pocket zipper is firmly closed to prevent opening in free fall.
- Remove the shoulder pads (for mobility) and tuck the collar inside the suit and expose the collar
once under the canopy.
5.2.4.11 Tree Entry Procedures.
WARNING:

Do not release equipment on the lowering line during parachute descent.

5.2.4.11.1 After tree entry, maintain a tight body position until the parachute is caught
in the trees and descent is stopped.
WARNING: The parachute may not be solidly entangled in the tree; be prepared to perform a
PLF.
WARNING: If vertical descent is achieved as the parachute enters the tree line, it is possible for
the parachute to collapse and the parachutist to fall to the ground.
5.2.4.12 Grouping and Assembly. A primary consideration of the MFF parachuting
insertion technique is to be able to expeditiously assemble once on the ground, either by
grouping in the air and landing as a team or to rendezvous at a predetermined geographic
location, organized and ready to accomplish a specific mission. Team members will exit
the aircraft as rapidly as possible at the exit point and remain in a group until break away
when they track away from the group and open. All parachutists will activate their main
parachute at a specified altitude. Parachutists will group in the air, guiding on the team
leader, low man, or as briefed. Team integrity is paramount. Parachutists will attempt to
land as close together as possible without interfering with each others landing pattern and
proceed to a preselected geographical point for rendezvous. Electronic/lighting equipment
may be used to facilitate assembly of personnel.
5.2.4.13 High Altitude/Oxygen Procedures. AFI 11-409, High Altitude Airdrop
Mission Support Program, is the governing AFI for parachuting oxygen requirements.
5.2.4.13.1
drops.

Airdrops conducted above 3,000 feet AGL are considered high-altitude

5.2.4.13.2 Parachutists may operate without supplemental oxygen during


un-pressurized flights up to 13,000 feet MSL provided the time above 10,000 feet
MSL does not exceed 30 minutes for each sortie. Jumpmasters may operate without
supplemental oxygen for an additional 60 minutes within the 10,000- to 13,000-foot
MSL envelope provided their duties do not include parachuting. (See Table 5.25,
Prebreathing Requirements and Exposure Limits for High-Altitude Operations, for
more information.)
5.2.4.13.3 Flights above 13,000 feet MSL require supplemental oxygen.
5.2.4.13.4 Flights above 18,000 feet MSL will use pre-breathing procedures.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 5.25 Prebreathing Requirements and Exposure Limits for High-Altitude Operations.

Altitude

Aircrew/Minute Jumpers/Minute

Maximum
Exposure Time
Per Sortie

Maximum
Sorties Per
24-Hour Period

From FL 180 to
FL 249

30

30

120

From FL 250 to
FL 299

45 HALO and

30

60

From FL 300 to
FL 349

60

60

30

FL 350 and
Above

75

75

30

45 HAHO

5.2.4.14 Physiological Technician.


5.2.4.14.1 A minimum of two physiological technician (PT) will be on MFF
parachute deployments conducted at 18,000 feet MSL or higher.
5.2.4.14.2 One PT is required per 16 parachutist, up to a maximum of three PTs.
5.2.4.15 If a physiological incident occurs, do the following:
5.2.4.15.1 Abort the mission and ensure parachutist/crew member is secured during
ramp/door deployments.
5.2.4.15.2 Begin descent (de-arm ARRs prior to descent).
5.2.4.15.3 Proceed to nearest base with qualified medical assistance available.
5.2.4.15.4 Advise the control tower of the emergency and request an ambulance meet
the aircraft.
5.2.4.15.5 Advise attending physician to call Brooks AFB Hyperbaric Medicine
(DSN 240-3281/3278, commercial [512] 536-3281/3278).
5.3 Rescue Jumpmaster Procedures. Rescue jumpmaster (JM) procedures are utilized to
enable the rapid deployment of personnel and treatment of survivors through precision
parachuting. Minimizing the distance to the survivor increases their chance of survival while
decreasing the PJs exposure to the elements and the threat. It is the most accurate method of
jumpmastering when used with wind drift indicators (WDI), as it is the only method able to
accurately determine the actual winds and currents at the time of deployment from surface to
parachute activation altitude. It provides rapid control of the incident area, less time to get to the
survivor, positive control of the survivor; it decreases dispersion of the jumpers and takes into
consideration terrain, weather, and unusual wind conditions. When RJM procedures cannot be
executed because of time or enemy threat, rescue jumpmasters can still perform CARP and HARP
procedures.

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5.3.1 Terms and Definitions.


5.3.1.1 High Glide Ratio Parachute. The high glide ratio parachute (HGRP) is a ram air
parachute used in military parachuting for delivery of personnel.
5.3.1.2 Point of Impact. The point of impact (PI) is the point on a drop zone, where the
lead jumper or the first bundle.
5.3.1.3 Preliminary Release Point. The preliminary release point (PRP) is the point
above ground at a specific heading, distance, and altitude from the OP which is computed
to be the transition point between forward throw and vertical free fall. This point is used as
the release point for slow flying aircraft (less than 80 KIAS) because of negligible forward
throw.
5.3.1.4 Release Point. The release point (RP) is the point above ground at a specific
heading, distance, and altitude from the PRP jumper aircraft exit (including the aircrafts
forward throw) is computed to occur.
5.3.1.5 Jumpmaster Responsibilities. For operational missions, the JM is either the
team leader or is appointed by the team leader. The JM has the authority to delegate any
duties but is still responsible for the conduct/completion of those duties.
5.3.2 General Responsibilities. Determine mission requirements and brief all participating
parachutist on the following.
5.3.2.1 Aircraft inspection and aircrew coordination.
5.3.2.2 Coordination of support requirements to include transportation, drop zone,
ground party, aircraft utilization, and support equipment requirements.
5.3.2.3 Rigging and inspection of parachutists/equipment.
5.3.2.4 A pre-deployment evaluation is conducted at the staging area and on scene.
Jumpmasters should make an initial assessment of the proposed drop zone (DZ) area at the
unit prior to parachute deployment/operational mission. On-scene evaluation is conducted
jointly by the aircraft commander and the JM to evaluate factors in determining the
feasibility of a parachute deployment. When determining deployment is required, the
mission team leader/JM will advise the aircraft commander (AC) of this intent. The
predeployment evaluation is one of the most critical phases in a rescue deployment.
Depending on the situation, the deployment aircraft should be flown on as many low-level
passes as necessary to accomplish this evaluation. The JM must evaluate all aspects of the
conditions and terrain features located around the intended deployment area.
5.3.2.4.1 A site evaluation must be conducted. Terrain features and possible hazards
at the deployment sites may include rocks, trees, stumps, snow cover and
avalanche/rock slide conditions, streams, lakes, mountains, cliffs, crevasses, frozen
ground, or man-made objects. Water hazards may include temperature versus time
deployed, chill factor, sea state, hazardous marine life, vessel traffic, and channel
buoys.

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5.3.2.4.2 DZ size and location (i.e., a small clearing on the side of a hill or deep snow
drifts) may make it necessary to deploy the parachutists and equipment separately. It
may be better to deploy the equipment first, then deploy the team to the equipment.
5.3.2.4.3 DZ elevation should be considered during a site evaluation. DZ elevation is
a factor when parachuting with equipment at elevations as low as 5,000 feet. Taking
temperature and density altitude into account, an appreciable increased rate of descent
is noticeable at higher elevations. Altitude is not considered a factor for deployments
below 14,000 feet MSL without equipment.
5.3.2.4.4 The recovery of the team will be considered before deployment. The method
of recovery, possible delays in recovery, and hazards involved must be considered.
5.3.2.4.5 A weather evaluation must be made to determine on-scene conditions and
forecast future conditions.
5.3.2.4.6 Lower ceilings may prevent the team from using more accurate square
parachutes versus static line parachutes.
5.3.2.4.7 Deployment of back-up kits and housekeeping kits may be mandated with
forecasted storms and delays in recovery.
5.3.2.4.8 Wind velocity is one of the most important items of evaluation. A maximum
allowable velocity will depend on many factors: the experience and ability of the
rescue team, type equipment used, and urgency of the mission. Life or death missions
may justify a calculated risk.
5.3.2.5 Wind Drift Determination. Wind drift determination is the art of establishing an
accurate release/exit point for precision parachuting to a pre-selected impact point. Wind
drift determination is critical to accurate target deployment. If the situation allows, the
most accurate method of determining wind drift is the WDI. Especially in mountainous
terrain, wind and current conditions can change dramatically from the surface to parachute
activation altitude. The JM should deploy a minimum of one WDI prior to personnel
delivery, with consideration to deploying additional WDIs as necessary for verification.
Consider additional WDIs if:
Delivery site is restrictive.
Wind velocity appears marginal or gusty.
Lost sight of or unsure of the landing location of the previous WDI.
Suspect the wind conditions have changed since the last deployment.
Any doubt as to delivery conditions.
5.3.2.5.1 Wind Drift Indicators and Configurations. The AF/B 28J-1 Wind Drift
Determination Parachute (with MK6 MOD 3 Smoke/Flare, MK 58 MOD 1
Smoke/Flare, or a 16 to 21 pound weight), crepe paper streamers with 0.75 of 1 ounce
weight, or the search and rescue light are the only devices authorized for determining
wind drift.

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5.3.2.5.2 AF/B 28J-1, Wind Drift Determination Parachute. When using the
AF/B28J-1 parachute, use the 16- to 21-pound weight provided with the parachute, a
MK 6 Mod 3, or a MK-58 Mod 1. When the AF/B 28J-1 is used in conjunction with
MK 6 Mod 3 smoke/flare, it will be configured by installing two MK 6 Mod 3
Suspension Bands (NSN 1370-00-069-9946) 4 inches from the weighted end of the
MK 6 Mod 3, with the attaching rings at 90 degree angles to each other and tightened
sufficiently to prevent separation during delivery. The same procedures apply when
using the MK 58 Mod 1 except MK 58 Mod 1 suspension bands (round instead of
square), will be used. Chemlight or strobe lights will be attached to the AF/B 28J-1
risers for night land deployments.
5.3.2.5.3 Strobe Lights. Strobe lights should be upright on one side and inverted on
the other side of the single portion of the risers above the weight/MK 6 Mod 3/MK 58
Mod 1. Use tape and 80-pound test tape to secure the strobe lights. For night water
deployments, attach chemlights to the AF/B 28J-1 risers to aid in recovery of the wind
drift chute in case the MK 6 Mod 3/MK 58 Mod 1 malfunctions. The MK 6 Mod
3/MK 58 Mod 1 signal may also be used for land deployments when a fire hazard does
not exist (i.e., snow-covered terrain). The signal will be easier to see than a streamer or
wind drift parachute.
5.3.2.5.4 Crepe Paper Streamers. The crepe paper streamer is 20 feet long and 10
inches wide. The metal rod is 10 inches long, weighing 0.75 of one ounce. For night
deployments, the metal rod will be replaced with 2 six-inch long high intensity
chemlights. Crepe paper streamers can be procured assembled or assembled from
locally obtained materials. They can be made of any color crepe paper, but they should
be of a color that contrasts with the terrain. Be careful to prevent squeezing the rolled
streamers prior to delivery. The paper may compress, causing the streamer not to
unroll to its full extent. A number of streamers should be deployed simultaneously on
each release point determination pass to provide a better reference. Ensure the tape has
been broken and 1 or 2 feet pulled from the roll prior to deployment.
5.3.2.5.5 Search and Rescue Light. The search and rescue light (SRL) is a durable
light sphere used during search and rescue missions carried out at night. The lights are
used to mark targets and landing sites and to indicate wind drift. The SRL is currently
produced in white, red, green, and yellow colors. The SRL has either a steady or
flashing mode, selected by a three-position toggle switch recessed into the outer
surface of each half of the ball. A steel band wraps around the sphere, providing a
secure anchor for a standard drag chute and a watertight seal. When the SRL is used to
assess wind drift, it is deployed from the aircraft using a drift parachute NSN
1670-21-812-7369. (The SRL is locally purchased through Quantaflex Canada
Incorporate NATO Stock Number 6230-21-910-3387 White, 6230-21-910-5796 Red,
6230-21-910-3386 Green, and 6230-21-910-5797 Yellow.)
5.4 Airdrop Release Methods.
5.4.1 Computed Air Release Point. The computed air release point (CARP) is the most
often used method to deploy conventional airborne forces. CARP is computed by the aircrew
(navigator). Procedures for calculating the CARP are found in AFI 11-231, Computed Air

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Release Point Procedures. The navigator uses updated winds obtained from the aircraft
instrumentation/ forecasted winds on the DZ to calculate the release point. CARP is also
referred to as a navigator release. When a CARP deployment is performed, the aircrew
takes responsibility for the accuracy of the deployment. However, the JM has No Drop
authority and can prevent an incorrect release. Close coordination between the aircraft
navigator and JM is essential to ensure deployment over the correct spot. Prior to exit on
navigator release deployments, the JM and aircraft navigator should separately determine the
release point, compare their results, and resolve any differences. All parachutists will be
briefed on selected exit and opening points.
NOTE: Suspended equipment weights greater than 35 pounds increases the rate of descent and
may require adjusting the constant value to a lower number (i.e., a constant value of 25 for a 35pound load to 18 for a 115-pound load).
5.4.2 High Altitude Release Point. The high altitude release point (HARP) is similar to
CARP but is used for obtaining the release point for a HAHO or HALO deployment. HARP
considers the amount of drift of the parachutist in free fall plus the drift from canopy opening
to landing. This method may be used for both JM or navigator release jumps. JMs may learn
how to perform a HARP calculation by consulting Army FM 3-05.211, Special Forces
Military Free-fall Operations as compared to the updated aircrew version found in AFI
11-231, Computed Air Release Point Procedures. When performing a navigator-release
HARP deployment, the JM should also accomplish a separate HARP and compared these
results with the navigator for accuracy.
5.4.3 Ground Marking Release System. The ground marking release system (GMRS) is
computed by the drop zone support team leader (DZSTL) and determines the release point
from the ground by placing panels/lights in strategic locations for visual identification/release
point by the deployment aircraft. It is most often used by Special Forces teams for insertion of
personnel and equipment from low altitudes to small DZs.
5.4.4 Verbally Initiated Release System. The verbally initiated release system (VIRS) is
used by the Army and Marine Corps to deploy small numbers of personnel from rotary- or
small fixed-wing aircraft to small DZs. The release point is indicated by an oral command
from the DZ to the deployment aircraft. VIRS is performed only by qualified CCT or TALO
personnel.
5.4.5 Wind Streamer Vector Count. The wind streamer vector count (WSVC) is a JMDD
utilizing streamers and count for establishing the release point from the air. This is the method
most often utilized by PJs as it is the most accurate method for inserting small teams into
confined or unprepared areas utilizing both static line and free-fall canopies.
5.4.6 Other Airdrop Methods. The United States Air Force has developed other airdrop
methods utilizing radar systems in conjunction with navigator release airdrops for instrument
meteorological conditions. Some examples of these are adverse weather aerial delivery system
(AWADS), radar beacon airdrops, ground radar aerial delivery system (GRADS), ground
control approach (GCA)/computers aerial delivery system (CADS), and self-contained
navigation system (SCNS)/station-keeping equipment (SKE)/zone marker (ZM) airdrops.

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5.5 Jumpmaster Directed Drops.


5.5.1 Sight Alignment. Sight alignment is the method utilized by the JM to obtain an
accurate sight picture from the aircraft to the target. The sight picture from each aircraft will
be different and requires an understanding of the principles involved and training in a variety
of aircraft.
5.5.2 Head Alignment. The JM should be in a position that affords him the best
opportunity to determine whether the aircraft is flying the correct track. The head should not
be too far inside or too far outside the aircraft. Improper head alignment can cause the JM to
align the aircraft right or left of the track. Proper sight alignment should be parallel to the
ground directly over the intended track.
5.5.3 Movement. When the JM changes position from the prone or kneeling position to
standing position, it is imperative that the proper sight alignment be maintained.
WARNING: For all aircraft, parachute ripcord handles will be guarded to prevent accidental
deployment.
5.5.4 Location. The JM must be able to inform the pilot of the location of an object in the
air or on the ground (e.g., wind drift device, equipment, or parachutist). The JM can use two
methods. One method is to identify the objects position in respect to the aircraft giving a
clock position, distance, and altitude. The other method uses the PI and heading of last final
flown to provide reference information only for locating an object on the ground. The
direction of the last final flown will always be identified as 12 oclock. Any reference using
this method should include the word PI in the statement and should be stated as follows: THE
STREAMER LANDED AT THE PIS 5 OCLOCK POSITION, 300 METERS.
5.5.5 Jumpmaster Release. Using For fixed-wing aircraft utilizing JMDD instead of a
CARP/HARP (navigator release) drop, the aircrew will allow the JM to begin spotting at a
minimum of 2 minutes out. The green light will be turned on 1 minute prior to the calculated
release point. This will still allow the aircrew the use of the red light for stopping the
deployment. Do not confuse a JMDD with a CARP deployment (i.e., going on the green light)
as this will result in an early release and probably an off-DZ landing. Parachutists will not exit
the aircraft if the green light is not illuminated or a no-drop condition exists.
5.5.6 Fixed (Normal) Target Pattern. The fixed target pattern/normal flight pattern will be
a Rectangular or Racetrack pattern with the final approach from WDI to target. Each leg of the
pattern must be long enough to allow the JM and parachutists preparation time needed prior to
deployment. The legs of the pattern, in order, are crosswind, downwind, base, and final.
5.5.6.1 Pattern Leg Lengths. A pattern with crosswind and base legs of not over 30
seconds and with downwind and final legs of 1 to 1.5 minutes will allow time for heading
corrections on final and keep the objective area in sight. This also permits the JM and
aircrew to observe the descent of parachutists or WDI.
5.5.6.2 Wind Drift Indicator. The turn to the crosswind leg will be made as soon as
possible after the WDI is released. This ensures JM does not lose sight of the WDI. If
necessary, request the pilot to lift a wing or turn more left or right as necessary to keep the
WDI in sight. Relay directions to the pilot to allow him/her to sight the WDI. If a delay is

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expected, another full pattern should be flown, as opposed to extending the downwind leg
or performing a 360-degree turn on final; this maintains the aircraft close to the area for
continued evaluation. This pattern will place the aircraft a maximum of 5 minutes from the
site at any one time. The aircraft will be flown over the target at a predetermined altitude
and airspeed. When directly over the target or PI, a minimum of one WDI will be dropped.
The WDI will be deployed at the planned parachute opening altitude. The JM and aircrew
will make every effort to keep the WDI in sight from release to impact with the
ground/water. Over land, the pilot may have to circle over the WDI to ensure the location
of, or orientation from, the impact point of the WDI to the target/intended PI of the
jumpers. After the first WDI has reached the ground and its position noted, the aircraft will
return to the normal pattern. The final approach should pass directly over the WDI and the
intended target. This pattern automatically aligns the final approach of the aircraft into the
wind. A right or left hand pattern may be flown depending on terrain and aircraft
configuration. The aircraft will be flown in this pattern with minor course corrections on
final. As the aircraft passes directly over the first WDI, the JM will start a uniform count
to measure the time from the WDI to the target. When the aircraft is over the target, the
count will be stopped and immediately a new count will begin; when that count equals the
first, the second WDI or jumper will be deployed. The count will measure the same
distance past the target with the accuracy of the deployment dependent upon the JMs
alignment and uniformity of the count. If subsequent passes or sticks of jumpers are
necessary, the JM should have noted the release point of the first jumpers. (See
paragraph 5.9.7.2, Spotting Techniques.)

5.5.7 Moving Target Pattern. Deployment procedures to a moving target are similar to
those employed for a stationary target. The moving target procedures takes into consideration
target drift and will place the team on the downdrift line of the moving target and not
necessarily on the target. It is always better to land downwind/down drift of the target to allow
the target to drift towards PJ team rather than land upwind/updrift forcing the PJ team to
swim/chase after the target in the water. The pattern must be adjusted so the initial pattern
over the target after WDI deployment will return over the intended release point not less than
5 minutes and not more than 9 minutes, even minutes being ideal. If the initial pattern requires
more than 9 minutes, the team will be too far downdrift/downwind and with a high target drift
rate may not be able to locate the target visually. Less than 5 minutes may put the team
upwind/updrift of the target depending on the targets drift rate. Although a target can be
moved by the ocean current, wind will affect a stationary object to travel a greater distance.
When the wind and current are heading in the same direction, the target may be moving at a
greater speed than the PJ will be able to make up with fins alone. On the initial pass after the
WDI deployment, an accurate count can be obtained by the JM and the heading noted by both
the JM and pilot. All subsequent passes will be made on this initial heading using the count
obtained on the first pass. No attempt should be made to recheck the count or change the
initial heading because the target will have drifted.
NOTE: On subsequent passes requiring a course correction to place the aircraft over the target,
ensure the pilot corrects back to original heading.
5.5.7.1 Crosswind Pattern. This involves deploying the team in a crosswind direction,
90 degrees to the known wind line. A crosswind pattern may be required due to terrain or

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sun reflection on the surface of the water preventing a desirable release into the wind. The
pilot and JM must accurately judge the upwind distance from the target in order for this
technique to be effective. The easiest method for obtaining an accurate upwind distance is
the utilization of a reference/release point. Judging distance over water is more demanding
because of the lack of fixed reference points and tests the distance judging of the JM. (See
paragraph 5.9.7.2, Spotting Techniques.) The JM must ensure the spot is at a right
angle from the heading of the initial pass. Error towards the target if in doubt. Consider
throwing a check streamer if heading cannot be determined to verify the spot is downwind
and down drift. This will ensure a downwind impact point. It is imperative the
parachutists are deployed prior to reaching the reference point due to the forward throw of
the parachutist in the direction of aircraft travel. The object is to place the reference point
at the center of the stick after forward throw is considered.
5.5.7.2 Spotting Techniques. Reference points should be used on all JMDD, CARP, and
HARP land deployments. The utilization of reference points will increase the JMs
accuracy in determining the proper release point. An established reference/release point
will allow the aircraft to fly in any direction as long as it will pass over the
reference/release point. Approaching from a different flight heading may confuse the
parachutist with the actual wind line. However, the parachutist may find the direction of
the wind line while under canopy by drawing a straight line from their release point to the
target/PI, then course correcting onto the proper wind line.
5.5.7.3 Finding and Using a Reference Point. Upon completion of the initial pass over
the target for WDI deployment, establish the impact location of the WDI. Pick out a spot
that is an equal distance on the opposite side of the target as the WDI. This spot can be any
readily identifiable feature (e.g., discolored ground, bushes, or trees.) Back up this
location using the JM count from the first deployment and by looking at the ground after
releasing the first stick of parachutists. Fix that location in your memory. For water
deployments, find the correct distance equal to the WDI to target distance for your release
point. The JM should pass the reference/release point to the pilot to ensure both are
utilizing the same point.
5.5.7.4 Voice Terminology and Hand Signals. During JM-directed airdrops, the JM
must use clear and concise communications with the aircrew. If wearing a helmet for
communications, the JM will ensure the chin strap is fastened. If unable to wear a helmet,
such as during water operations or prior to the JMs own exit, the JM will communicate
using hand signals. When communicating with the aircrew, the JM will use standard voice
terminology and hand signals. Refer to TO 14D1-2-1-121 for standard static line
deployment commands and signals. Refer to Army FM 3-05.211, Special Forces Military
Free-fall Operations for standard free-fall deployment commands and signals. In addition
to the standard visual/verbal commands listed for CARP deployments, JMDD requires
visual/verbal deployment commands for directing the aircraft over the intended RP. These
hand and voice signals are normally relayed to the pilot over intercom and, when
necessary, to the safetyman for relay to the pilot when the JM is off intercom.
5.5.7.4.1 STEADYA voice or hand signal indicating the present direction of
flight is satisfactory. The hand signal is an open hand, palm vertical pointing the
fingers toward the flight deck.

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5.5.7.4.2 LEFT/RIGHTA voice or hand signal indicating the direction of flight
should be changed to the left or right 5 degrees. The hand signal is a closed fist, thumb
extended lateral hand movement with the thumb pointing to the left or right side of the
aircraft.
5.5.7.4.3 LEFT/RIGHT X DEGREESA voice or hand signal indicating a change
of flight direction required in excess of 5 degrees. The hand signal is the
LEFT/RIGHT hand signal from above followed by indicating the desired number of
degrees. Multiple hand movements will indicate directional changes in 5 degree
increments.
5.5.7.4.4 THUMBS UPA hand signal from the safetyman indicating the aircraft
commander has given the clear to jump command. This is to be used by safetymen
for the JM who is off intercom. Do not confuse this hand signal with the JM's thumbs
up for Standby to the jumpers.
5.5.7.4.5 NO DROPA voice, hand, or light signal indicating an unsafe condition
exists and all jump activities will cease until the unsafe condition is corrected. The
hand signal is a clenched fist held in front of the face. If a jumper is in the door, the
clenched fist will be placed in front of his/her face. The red jump light (if
used/available) is turned on as the light signal. The JM or any crew member noting an
unsafe condition will immediately call or signal a NO DROP. The standard Army
free-fall hand signal is a shaking head from left to right without any hand movement.
Army personnel may also use the term Abort to mean No Drop. These signal may
also be used by the JM, but ideally, within the Air Force, the No Drop signal for
static line and free-fall use should be standardized to avoid confusion.

WARNING: If the parachutist is exiting the aircraft, do not attempt to physically restrain/stop the
parachutist.
5.6 General Jumpmaster Information/Requirements. Specific aircraft parachute deployment
procedures are contained in each aircraft MDS, specific AFIs, or MCI, Volume 3, and amended as
necessary by MAJCOM/wing supplements, flight crew information files (FCIF), and unit flight
crew bulletins (FCB). JMs should be familiar with and review the paradrop procedures used by
the deployment aircraft. All JMs and assistant jumpmasters (AJM) should review the applicable
portions of the FCB of the flying organizations routinely supporting PJ parachute operations.
5.7 Chief, Standardization Certifier/Evaluator (Stan/Eval) Responsibilities. I t
is
the
responsibility of the PJ unit chief, standardization certifier/evaluator to monitor/be on distribution
for those FCBs of flying units supporting PJ parachute operations on four or more separate
occasions per year. Multiple paradrops accomplished during a single exercise may constitute a
single occasion. The chief, standardization certifier/evaluator is responsible to inform unit
assigned JMs and AJMs of a change to an FCB or MDS-specific Volume 3 affecting procedures
used for parachute operations. It is still the individual JMs responsibility to keep abreast of all
changes.
5.8 Static Line Aircraft Deployment Procedures. General guidance on specific aircraft types
is found in TO 14D1-2-1-121.As paradrop procedures rarely change, some of the more important

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procedures (as well as some general JM tips) of the more common jump platforms are provided in
this section.
5.8.1 HH-60 Aircraft. Delivery will be made from straight and level flight. Without
internal auxiliary tanks installed, the maximum number of parachutists is four per door per
pass. With the twin 185 auxiliary fuel tanks installed, only two parachutists with equipment
per door may be deployed on a single pass. Without equipment, three parachutists per door
may be deployed on a single pass. Parachutist deployments will be accomplished at 1-second
intervals. Order of deployment of parachutist is from the left rear parachutist forward. The
right door will not be used for static line parachuting if the internal hoist has been installed.
The deployment position for the H-60 aircraft is sitting on the cargo floor with the legs outside
the aircraft. At the Standby command, the parachutists place both hands, palm down, on the
cargo floor alongside their thighs. On the Go command, the parachutist pushes
himself/herself out and grasps the reserve, performing normal procedures.
5.8.1.1 Doors/Exits. Double door exits are authorized. On double door exits, the first
parachutist of the second stick will exit 1 second after visually observing the exit of the last
parachutist from the opposite side. The opposite door should be closed during single-door
parachute operations. It may be opened for JM spotting training in concurrence with an
actual deployment. Doors may be opened or closed in flight as necessary with the pilot's
approval. JM duties may be performed from any position in either door.
5.8.1.2 Configuration.
Passenger seats will be removed from the cargo compartment.
Tape sharp edges, cargo floor troop seat, and tie-down fitting wells, and door jambs
that could cut or fray static lines or snag parachutists equipment.
Tape must not interfere with closing or opening the doors in flight.
Seat belts/personnel restraint devices will be used for all parachutists for take-off
and cruise flight.
Safetyman/JM, when secured with a gunner's belt, will be attached to a location on
the airframe that will not interfere with parachutist exit.
5.8.1.3 JM Responsibilities.
Seat belts will not be removed until the aircraft is at 1,000 feet AGL or higher. The
aircraft commander should be informed before seat belt removal.
Parachutists will not remove seat belts unless wearing a manual release (reserve or
HGRP) type parachute.
The static lines of the parachutists seated in the left and right doors should be routed
directly behind them and down to the anchor line. Ensure any excess static line slack
is stowed in the pack tray retainer band.
The static line anchor line cable is never rigged to the cargo doors or overhead
repelling rings, since training D-bags might foul the main rotor system.

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The pilot must maintain the aircraft in level flight and airdrop speed during D-bag
retrieval to preclude D-bag entanglement with the cargo doors. The aircraft will not be
cleared to turn until the D-bags have been retrieved.
The D-bags will be retrieved before disconnecting the static lines.
When parachutists assume a door position, the pilot will be advised of delivery
status.
The JM may perform wind drift determination before or after the parachutists
assume a door position.
The wind drift chute, if used, will be attached on the anchor line cable aft of the first
parachutist in the first stick and delivered on the JMs signal.
The JM will acknowledge all calls from the pilot.
5.8.1.4 JM Sight Alignment. The H-60 sight alignment is accomplished by sighting
along the edge of the aircraft. When the PI reaches a position directly below the JM, on the
edge of the floor, an over the PI position has been reached. The JM can accomplish this
from the kneeling or deployment position.
5.8.1.5 In-flight Visual/Verbal Signals. The pilot will normally give 10-, 5-, and
1-minute warnings. After turning final, the JM will advise the pilot when the target is in
sight and when going off intercom. The pilot will call 1 minute prior to drop and will
acknowledge CLEAR TO DROP after receiving, SAFETYMAN CHECK
COMPLETED. If the JM is not on intercom, the safetyman will relay the CLEAR TO
DROP to the JM. The words NO DROP over the intercom or a clenched fist visual
signal by any person will serve as notification to terminate parachute operations until the
situation is resolved.

NOTE: The term No Drop instead of Abort should be briefed to the pilot before parachute
operations are conducted.
WARNING: When parachutists are in the door, ensure the aircraft clears terrain at the minimum
safe deployment altitude.
5.8.1.6 Safetyman Responsibilities. Flight engineers/aerial gunners may be used as
safetymen and will relay hand signals between the JM and pilot.
5.8.1.7 Parachutists Responsibilities. Seat belts will be adjusted to ensure the
connection is above the reserve parachute. Crowded conditions inside the cargo
compartment make accidental activation of the reserve parachute more likely. During
movement inside the aircraft, parachutists must protect their ripcord.
5.8.2 C-130 Aircraft. Personnel required to be mobile in the cargo compartment during
low-level phases will wear protective headgear, as a minimum, from the start of the
pre-slowdown checklist until the completion of the deployment checklist. (Exception:
Personnel performing day water jumps.) During an airdrop, occupants in the cargo
compartment will either have a seat belt fastened, wear a restraint harness, or wear a parachute
before doors are opened. Static lines are attached to the anchor cables before doors are
opened. (Exception: Parachutists exiting on subsequent passes may stand and hook up with

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doors open if they are forward of the aft edge of the wheel wells [Flight Station (FS) 617].)
The aircraft must be at or above drop altitude and stable no later than 1 minute out (2 minutes
out for JM-directed drops) to allow the JM access to the paratroop door. At no time will both
paratroop doors be opened for paratroop drops if only one loadmaster is on board. When more
than 20 static line parachutists are dropped on a single pass, the paratroop doors will be used.
5.8.2.1 JM Responsibilities. JMDD releases will not be mixed with any other type of
airdrop method, (i.e., GMRS, VIRS, or standard CARP deployments). Checklist times
may be compressed during Racetrack patterns, but the one-minute advisory is never
compressed and is always given on time.
5.8.2.2 JM Sight Alignment. The JM should use the forward edge of the deployment
platform support and the forward edge of the air deflector door to obtain sight alignment.
The target should pass from the V in the air deflection door to the leading edge of the
deployment platform. When the PI reaches the leading edge of the deployment platform,
a direct over the PI position has been attained. The JM can be in a kneeling, prone, or
standing position during sight alignment. This sight alignment may have to be modified if
the aircraft is required to crab to maintain proper ground track. It is especially valuable to
have the ground reference point when this situation occurs. For ramp procedures, ensure
paratroop doors are closed. JM will be in a position to visualize the target and exit point.
The JM will make course corrections to the aircraft alignment until the aircraft flies
directly over the exit point.
5.8.3 HC-130 Aircraft. The authorized exits for static line parachuting from an HC-130
aircraft are the left and right paratroop doors and ramp exits if the aircraft is configured IAW
the applicable TO. Standard static line delivery procedures are single door exits. Double door
exits require a qualified safetyman to be available for each door. Single or multiple exits are
authorized from either door.
5.8.3.1 Configuration. Standard configuration for the HC-130 requires deployment
platforms to be extended when using the paratroop doors. If an air-to-air recovery system
(ATAR) is installed, static line parachuting is restricted to the right paratroop door.
Further, the ATAR cover plate and hydraulic lines must be removed to gain parachutist
access to the right door. In order to preclude damage to the parachutists parachute canopy
by contacting with the overhead delivery system (ODS) rails during the opening sequence,
the aircraft cargo door must be open during parachute deployments. The only authorized
parachute static line hook-up point is the installed anchor line cables. During WDI
delivery, the door not being used will be closed unless a PJ trainer or certifier elects to
have it open to conduct training or evaluations.
5.8.3.2 JM Responsibilities. JM duties can be performed from any position in either
parachute door. It is recommended the JM use the right door for right-hand patterns and
the left door for left-hand patterns. The safetyman will be hooked up to the personnel
restraint system. The JM will use either a personnel parachute or the personnel restraint
system. When using a parachute, the JM will hook-up the static line forward of the center
overhead anchor line cable support. A static line restrainer will be used to hold the JMs
static line (if the JM is not the first parachutist) to the rear against the overhead anchor line
cable support and clear of exiting parachutists. The static line restrainer will be looped

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around the support at FS 770 below the cargo door uplock manual release lever and
hooked to the anchor cable forward of static lines to be restrained. If the parachutists are
to exit using a JM-selected exit point, the team leader may elect to have a JM who will not
deploy, but stay with the aircraft. This will preclude a parachutist who is suited up with
cumbersome gear from having to perform JM duties.

WARNING: Prior to opening the ramp, cargo door, or paratroop door, all personnel aft of FS
617 will be wearing a restraint harness with the safety line properly attached to the aircraft, a
parachute with the static line attached to the anchor cable, or a seat belt when seated in a troop
seat. Exception: Parachutists with reserve parachutes properly installed may proceed aft of FS
617 for the sole purpose of hooking their static lines to the anchor line cable. Parachutists wearing
free-fall parachutes may proceed aft of FS 617, if the aircraft is 1,000 AGL or above, to perform
jump duties.
5.8.3.3 In-flight Visual/Verbal Signals. The JM will visually relay steering signals to
the loadmaster, who will verbally relay the signals to the pilot. The JM may spot from the
aircraft ramp or paratroop door. If exit of jumpers becomes unsafe (aircraft emergency or
similar circumstances), the aircrew will turn on the red light and the loadmaster will direct
the JM to stop remaining parachutists. After turning final, the JM will advise the pilot
when the PI is in sight and when the JM is going off intercom. One minute prior to the
navigators release point, the copilot will indicate Clear to Drop by turning on the
green jump light. When the JM is not the first parachutist to exit, the JM will move to
the aft edge of the door and signal the first parachutist to assume the deployment door
position by slapping the deployment platform with his/her hand. The JM will move clear
of the door to give clear access to the deploying parachutists. Parachutists will not exit the
aircraft unless the green light is illuminated.
NOTE: During SCUBA/SPUDS/oversized equipment parachute deployments, parachutists fully
mission equipped may remain seated with seatbelts fastened until the wind drift device has been
deployed. Seating should be opposite the deployment exit. All equipment including the reserve
parachute should be worn while seated to preclude unnecessary delays. Parachutists will stand up,
hook up, and be checked prior to final approach.
5.8.3.4 Safetyman Responsibilities. The safetyman is responsible for monitoring the
JMs static line until the JM exits and each following parachutists static line after they
approach the door to exit and pass the static line to him/her. When the JM is not deploying
first, the JM will determine who (himself/herself or the safetyman) has responsibility for
monitoring the parachutists static lines as they exit. During instruction or evaluation, the
safetyman may be required to monitor a PJ trainers or certifiers static line when they are
aiding or observing the JMs duty performance. The trainer/certifier may assist by
monitoring the JMs static line. The safetyman will relay all hand signals given by the JM.
The safetyman will assist in the delivery of supporting equipment. The Safetyman will
recover the deployment bags of deployed parachutists. If the JM did not deploy, the JM
must monitor his/her own static line during deployment bag recovery.
5.8.3.5 Parachutists Responsibilities. When two or more parachutists are to be
deployed, each parachutist is responsible for monitoring his/her own static line. Once the
static line is hooked to the anchor line cable, parachutists will remain standing and avoid

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movement away from the anchor line cable except to jump. The parachutists will line up
from the paratroop door forward either in file or slightly staggered paralleling the side of
the aircraft and the respective anchor line cable. This is necessary to avoid excessive static
line from playing out which would create an exit hazard to the parachutists. By staggering
the file, as many as six fully mission-equipped parachutists can be safely lined up in the
space between the paratroop door and the Benson fuel tank. Three fully equipped scuba
parachutists can fit in the same space. When parachuting from the left door, the
parachutists static line will be over the left shoulder and held in the left hand. When
parachuting from the right door, the parachutists static line will be over the right shoulder
and held in the right hand. The parachutist will form a bight in the static line of
approximately 4 to 6 inches and hold it to his/her front. The remainder of the static line
will be carried over the shoulder with all excess stowed in the static line retainer bands to
reduce any possibility of entanglement.
WARNING: Parachutists must exercise caution as they approach and prepare to exit the door to
avoid becoming entangled with their own static line or the static lines of proceeding parachutists.
To preclude entanglement; as much static line as possible will be stowed in the retainer bands;
parachutists will passnot throwtheir static lines to the safetyman; each parachutist must use
caution to ensure other static lines do not entangle his/her hand.
5.8.3.6 Towed Parachutist. Towed parachutists on an actual tactical mission will be
recovered into the aircraft. By the time the parachutist could be identified as towed,
conscious and capable of deploying a usable reserve, the aircraft would be off the DZ. If
cut away, the towed parachutist could compromise the security of the team and the
mission. Plan for a safe area for cut-away of a towed parachutist if retrieval is not possible.
These procedures must be briefed to the aircraft commander prior to flight.
5.9 Free-Fall Deployment Procedures. General guidance on how to jumpmaster specific
aircraft types is found in Army FM 3-05.211, Special Forces Military Free-fall Operations. All
static line parachute procedures apply to free-fall except as noted here and in Army FM 3-05.211,
Special Forces Military Free-fall Operations.
5.9.1 C-130 Aircraft. The ramp or paratroop doors (single- or double-door) may be used
for deployment for free-fall parachutists. Deployment platforms are not necessary.
5.9.1.1 Loadmaster Requirements. Two loadmasters will be used on actual equipment
deployments utilizing the ramp and door. Two loadmasters will be used on all HALO
personnel deployments (13,000 feet MSL and above). One loadmaster may be used on
HALO personnel deployments (up to 13,000 feet MSL) when utilizing the ramp and door
or only one paratroop door.
5.9.2 H-1 Aircraft. Free-fall parachutists may use either door or both doors simultaneously
for deployment. When opened, the doors will be pinned in the open position.
5.9.3 H-60 Aircraft. Free-fall parachutists may use either door or both doors
simultaneously for deployment. Parachutists will use caution when exiting the right door if
the internal rescue hoist is installed. Deployment position may be standing (bent over at the
waist).

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5.9.4 Other Aircraft. When using aircraft other than those listed for deployment of
free-fall parachutists, use the procedures outlined in TO 14D1-2-1-121, unit OIs for contract
use of civilian aircraft, and the appropriate operations regulations.
5.9.5 Visual Meteorological Conditions Restrictions. All free-fall parachute deployments
using wind drift devices for wind drift determination will be restricted to visual meteorological
conditions (VMC) at deployment altitude. When the target is obscured, the JM can deploy
himself or other parachutists if he has at least two known points in sight for cross-reference
and is familiar with the DZ.
5.9.6 Deployment to a Vessel. The many factors affecting the decision to deploy a team to
vessels at sea preclude the establishment of a single procedure that will apply to all situations.
In all cases, thorough pre-deployment planning and coordination with the recovery vessel is
vital to a safe and successful operation. In sea conditions other than calm, it is essential that
large vessels, where boarding may be difficult, have a small motorized launch in the water
prior to team deployment. Alternatively, if deploying a boat, the team should inform and
coordinate the boat and personnel requirements with the captain of the vessel.
Positioning/maneuvering of the ship and the launch is the captains decision. However when
possible, the rescue team should coordinate with the captain prior to deployment. The PJ Team
Leader should consider the following:
Can the vessel/ship remain stationary in the water?
Will the vessel/ship be steered into the wind, crosswind, or other direction?
Where will the launch be positioned?
What are the procedures for boarding the vessel from the launch?
If deploying a boat with the team, can the boat safely be brought along side for boarding
and can it be moored or retrieved?
WARNING: Any time a team member is in the water alongside a vessel, the vessels propellers
should be shut down or placed in neutral.
5.9.6.1 In the rare case a decision is made to deploy the team without the use of a
motorized launch, the team should land upwind and drift/swim to the vessel. An
alternative/extra safety measure may be to have the ship put a raft/launch on a securing line
to the stern of the vessel and pick-up the parachutistsimilar to the method of retrieving a
water skier or giving a water skier a line in recreational boating.
5.9.6.2 Additional. Other items to be considered by the JM include the following:
5.9.6.2.1 SCUBA/SPUDS should always be considered as an option because it
enhances parachutists safety in the water and allows the PJ to work on the RAMZ
package underwater if required.
5.9.6.2.2 Do low visibility conditions require additional parachutist/bundle lighting?
5.9.6.2.3 Is an additional life raft needed for PJ equipment? This may prevent the
unnecessary loss of equipment.
5.9.6.2.4 What action is to be taken if ship boarding is not possible after deployment?

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5.9.7 Spotting and Aerial DeliveryCrosswind Procedures. Fly over target on heading
in a direction to permit a left-/right-hand pattern. Release the spotter chute/streamer directly
over target. Accomplish a 180-degree turn (terrain permitting) in direction of drift and
observe distance of spotter chute/streamer from target. Make another 180-degree turn to place
the aircraft on the approach leg the same distance upwind from the target as the spotter chute
is downwind. Deploy PJs, equipment, or additional spotters chutes/streamers (as required)
just prior to when the aircraft is in direct line with the target and spotter chute/streamer.
5.9.7.1. Crosswind Pattern. A crosswind pattern may be required by terrain conditions
or possible sun reflection on the waters surface. The pilot and JM must accurately judge
the upwind distance from the target in order for this technique to be effective. The easiest
method for obtaining an accurate upwind distance is the utilization of a reference/release
point. It is imperative that the jumpers be deployed prior to reaching the reference point
due to the forward ballistics of the parachute as opening occurs. The objective is to place
the reference point at the center of the stick after forward throw is considered.
5.9.7.2. Spotting Techniques. Reference points may be used on all JMD land
deployments. The utilization of reference points will increase the JMs accuracy in
determining the proper release point. Also an established reference/release point will
allow the aircraft to be flown in any direction as long as it will pass over the
reference/release point. These points are a necessity when accomplishing a crosswind or
downwind deployment pattern. The correct method for establishing a reference/release
point is as follows:
5.9.7.2.1 Upon completion of the initial over the target WDI deployment, establish
the impact location of the WDI.
5.9.7.2.2 Pick out a spot that is an equal distance on the opposite side of the target as
the WDI. This spot can be any readily identifiable feature (e.g., discolored ground,
bushes, or trees).
NOTE: The JM should pass the reference/release point to the pilot to ensure that both are utilizing
the same point of reference.
5.9.7.2.3 Head directly toward the target, regardless of the wind direction.
5.9.7.2.4 Release the spotter chute/streamer directly over the target.
5.9.7.2.5 Immediately upon release, make a left/right turn to observe descent and
position of spotter chute/streamer.
5.9.7.2.6 Establish rectangular drop pattern oriented so that the final approach will be
aligned with the spotter chute/streamer and the target, respectively.
5.9.7.2.7 Turn on approach. Make minor changes in heading to pass over the spotter
chute and the target on a direct line. Aircraft drift correction should be established
prior to passing over the spotter chute.
5.9.7.2.8

Initiate uniform count over the spotter chute/streamer.

5.9.7.2.9. Reverse count over the target.

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5.9.7.2.10. Deploy the second spotter chute/streamer or PJ at last digit of reverse
count.
5.9.7.2.11 After the jumper clears the aircraft, turn to observe the accuracy of the
drop.
5.9.7.2.12 The normal flight pattern will be a Rectangular or Racetrack pattern with
the final approach from WDI to target. Each leg of the pattern must be long enough to
allow the JM and jumpers the preparation needed prior to deployment.
5.9.7.2.13 For high performance aircraft, the turn to the crosswind leg will be made as
soon as possible after the WDI is released. A pattern with crosswind and base legs of
not over 30 seconds and with downwind and final legs of 1 to 1.5 minutes will allow
time for heading corrections on final. This allows the JM time to observe the descent
of WDI device or jumpers. If a delay is expected, another full pattern should be flown,
as opposed to extending the downwind leg; this maintains the aircraft close to the area
for continued evaluation. This pattern will place the aircraft a maximum of 5 minutes
from the site at any one time.
5.9.7.2.14 The aircraft will be flown over the target at a predetermined altitude and
airspeed. When directly over the target, a minimum of one WDI will be dropped. The
JM and aircrew will make every effort to keep the WDI in sight from release to impact.
Over land, the pilot may have to circle over the WDI to ensure the definite location of
or orientation to the impact point to the target. After the first WDI has reached the
ground and its position noted, the aircraft will return to the normal pattern. The final
approach should pass directly over the WDI and the intended target, in that order. This
pattern automatically aligns the final approach into the wind.
5.9.7.2.15 A right- or left-hand pattern may be flown, depending on terrain and
aircraft.
5.9.7.3 Configuration. The aircraft will be flown in this pattern with minor course
corrections on final. As the aircraft passes directly over the first WDI, the JM will start a
uniform count to measure the time from the WDI to the target. When the aircraft is over
the target, the count will be stopped and immediately a new count will begin; when that
count equals the first, the second WDI or jumper will be deployed. The increasing count
will measure the same distance past the target with the accuracy of the deployment
dependent upon the JMs alignment and count.
5.9.7.4 Moving Target Procedures.
5.9.7.4.1 Head directly toward the target, regardless of the wind direction.
5.9.7.4.2 Release the spotter chute directly over the target.
5.9.7.4.3 Immediately upon release, make a left-/right-hand turn to observe the
descent and position of the spotter chute.
5.9.7.4.4 Establish rectangular drop pattern oriented so the final approach will be
aligned with the spotter chute and the target, respectively. The pattern should be
adjusted so that the aircraft will be over the target 5 to 9 minutes after the spotter chute
is deployed.

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5.9.7.4.5 Make minor changes in heading to pass over the spotter chute and the target
on a direct line. Aircraft drift correction should be established prior to passing over the
spotter chute. Initiate a uniform count over the spotter chute.
5.9.7.4.6

Reverse count over the target.

5.9.7.4.7 Deploy PJs when the last digit in reverse count is reached.
5.9.7.4.8 After the jumper clears the aircraft, turn to observe the accuracy of the drop.
5.9.7.4.9 Deploy additional jumpers using the drop heading and count established in
steps 5, 6, and 7.
5.9.7.4.10 Disregard the spotter chute for subsequent passes.
5.9.7.4.11 When the target drift rate is changed (e.g., drogue chute is installed on
target or know wind shift occurs), the entire spotter chute procedure must be
re-accomplished and a new drop heading and count established starting with Step 1.
5.9.7.5 Moving Target Pattern. Deployment procedures to a moving target are similar
to those employed for a stationary target. The moving target procedures consider target
drift and will place the team on the downdrift line of the moving target and not necessarily
on target. Pay special attention to the following items:
5.9.7.5.1 The pattern must be adjusted so that the initial pass over the target after WDI
deployment is not less than 5 minutes and not more than 9 minutes7 minutes being
ideal. If the initial pattern requires more than 9 minutes, the team will be too far
downdrift/downwind and, with a high target drift rate, may not be able to locate the
target visually.
5.9.7.5.2 On the initial pass after the WDI deployment, an accurate count can be
obtained by the JM and the heading noted by both the JM and pilot. All subsequent
passes will be made on this initial heading using the count obtained on the first pass.
Because the target will have drifted, no attempt should be made to recheck the count or
change the initial heading.
NOTE: On subsequent passes requiring a change of heading to place the aircraft over the target,
ensure the pilot corrects back to original heading. Moving target procedures are normally
conducted from fixed-wing aircraft.
5.10 High Altitude/High Opening. The overall concept of HAHO or standoff jumping is to
avoid the over flight of threat rings and still deploy PJs to their objective.
5.10.1 DZ Limitations. Ensure the jump has adequate emergency/abort DZs that the team
can safely land in. Ensure that the terrain in which the team is deploying in is conducive to
landing. Avoid steep valleys (wind and no LZs) and steep mountains (for the same reasons.)
5.10.2 Weather. Avoid freezing conditions and thunderstorms. If the clouds are high and
the temperature is below freezing, then condensed moisture will freeze on the canopy
impairing its proper function. All HAHOs will be canceled if the storms are within 20 NM.
5.10.3 Altitudes.
5.10.3.1 The maximum opening altitude for the MT-1X is 25,000 feet.

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5.10.3.2 AirOx 8 is approved to 35,000 feet.
5.10.3.3 Standard training is preformed below 18,000 feet; no oxygen techs are required.
5.10.3.4 As aircraft climbs, the air pressure decreases and the indicated airspeed
increases. When the actual airspeed (true) is greater than the terminal airspeed of the
jumper, then a delay must be added to the exit before opening above 10,000.
5.10.3.5 Failure to use delay may cause parachute/jumper malfunction due to opening
shock.
5.10.3.6 Opening shock increases with altitude.
5.10.3.7

Clouds should be 1,000 feet above intended pull altitude.

5.10.3.8 FF-2 must be set 2,500 feet above highest obstacle within 5 NM of release.
5.10.3.9

FF-2 must be set 2,500 feet below aircraft flight.

5.10.3.10 Clear obstacles such as freeways and power lines by 1,000 feet.
5.10.3.11 If jumping 18,000 feet and higher, equipment checks must be complete prior to
pre-breathing 1 hour prior.
5.11 Container Ramp Loads. This section is the deployment section for container ramp loads
(CRL). CRLs are loads that are individually gated, manually cut, and gravity released. These
loads are usually tactical vehicles and water craft. When performing combined CRL personnel
drops, the most conservative exit altitudes and limitations will be used. Free-fall and ram air static
line drops are done into the wind; static line round drops are performed downwind.
5.11.1 Building. IAW AFJI 13-210, Joint Airdrop Inspection Records, Malfunction
Investigations, and Activity Reporting, only certified riggers can build and sign the JAI for
CRLs.
5.11.2 Loading. The CRLs are loaded IAW the loading TO for the aircraft that is
performing the air drop. Ensure that the floor type (e.g., HC-130 N or P) is known because of
the various roller configurations that can be installed.
5.11.3 Deploying/Exit. There are two types of parachute systems for CRL. There are direct
bag deployments like the T-10C on the RAMZ and a free bag deployment like on the ATV.
Remember that a direct bag deployment will be directly in front on opening while on static line
and ram air static line, but above on free-fall. On a free bag system, the load will be well
below on opening of static ram and round systems, and even with you on free-fall.
5.11.4 Watercraft. The rigging alternate method-zodiac (RAMZ) is a pararescue
employment system developed for peacetime, military operations other than war (MOOTW),
or combat missions to be utilized in any water environment. It can be deployed from rotaryor fixed-wing aircraft. Parachutists can deploy either static line or free-fall configured. The
optimal PJ compliment on a RAMZ deployment is three: a team leader and two team
members. Any one of the three can serve as the jumpmaster.
NOTE: Use chemlights on all actuation/release handles during day/night operations.

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WARNING: If the RAMZ and parachutists static lines are different lengths, they will not be
hooked up to the same anchor cable. RAMZ deployment bags (D-bags) must be retrieved before
parachutists deploy from the opposite anchor cables. It is recommended if RAMZ and parachutists
static lines are different lengths, the RAMZ be deployed on one pass and parachutists be deployed
on a different pass using moving target procedures.
WARNING: Parachutists must deploy on separate passes if parachutists are using different
static lines lengths.
CAUTION: Ensure airspeed does not exceed parachute limits.
5.11.4.1 RAMZ Package Predeployment Preparation. Prior to deployment, ensure
chemlights/strobe lights/LPUs on the T-10s (for training use) are activated and remove the
forward horizontal and vertical axis tie-downs prior to the aircraft turning final for live
deployment. Remove the aft horizontal axis tie-down after the aircraft has turned final.
5.11.4.2 Team Positioning. The TL/JM will be allowed to move freely on the left side of
the aircraft (between package and left side of aircraft) to monitor deployment preparations.
For actual deployment, the TL/JM will be forward of the package. The number 2
parachutist monitors safety and assists the TL/JM as required. The number 3 parachutist
monitors safety and assists the number 2 parachutist and loadmaster as required.
5.11.4.3 Exit/Deployment Sequence. The pilot will call for the green light backed up by
a verbal green light call to the loadmaster. This indicates a clear to deploy. The red
light/no drop will be used to stop the RAMZ deployment. The loadmaster will cut the load
restraint strap (gate), with a verbal cut the gate from the JM, unless pre-briefed
otherwise. After the pilot has received an affirmative response to the 1-minute call, the
pilot will turn on the green light. The red light/no drop will be used to stop the RAMZ
deployment. The loadmaster will cut the load restraint strap (gate), with a verbal cut the
gate from the JM, unless pre-briefed otherwise. The JM will keep eyes on the package at
all times and ensure the cargo chutes deploy. Approximately 6 seconds after the RAMZ
has successfully deployed at a minimum, the JM will exit, provided the RAMZ static lines
have been retrieved within the 6-second window. The best time is to deploy parachutists
between a 6- to 14-second window. Parachutists exit at 1-second intervals. A good stable
exit is important for three reasons as it allows the parachutist to (1) maintain eye contact on
the RAMZ and parachutist in front, (2) pull on assigned altitude or delay, and (3) maintain
proper body position for proper parachute deployment.
WARNING: The loadmaster must retrieve the RAMZ deployment bags prior to any parachutist
exiting. The JM/TL will not initiate deployment until visually ensuring the D bags have been
retrieved. This will preclude any parachutist entanglement with the D bags during the deployment
phase..
5.11.4.4 De-Rigging Procedures. Teams should brief alternate downwind landing
procedures to intercept a RAMZ being dragged by the cargo parachutes. Team leaders and
JMs need to be aware of this limitation and consider the using moving target procedures
after the RAMZ is deployed.
5.11.4.4.1 Orient the RAMZ to the proper axis for inflation as required.

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5.11.4.4.2 Container release system.
5.11.4.4.3 Release type IV connector.
5.11.4.4.4 Release the starboard quick release.
5.11.4.4.5 Release the stern quick release.
5.11.4.4.6 Remove upper portion of A-22 container diaper from package.

CAUTION: Use extreme caution to avoid the cargo chutes when the FXC parachute release
system has not disengaged the parachutes, the RAMZ is being dragged through the water by the
wind, and the PJ is attempting a moving intercept of the moving RAMZ package in the water.
CAUTION: During high winds and depending on sea state, the FXC may not release. If the
parachutes do not release, place tension on the FXC in attempt to release the device. If the FXC
does not release, cut the riser extensions.
CAUTION: Failure to remove straps before inflation may result in severe damage to the boat.
5.11.4.5 Inflation.
5.11.4.5.1 Identify compressed air tank valve and turn counterclockwise, starting
inflation and check for leaks. After three-quarters inflation, disconnect engine strap,
clear box, and enter the boat. Inflation time is approximately 1 minute and 40 seconds.
5.11.4.5.2 Release air tank quick disconnect.
5.11.4.5.3 Tilt engine to remove shock board from between transom and engine.
5.11.4.5.4 De-water and start the engine IAW manufacturers instructions.
WARNING: Ensure propeller is clear prior to starting engine.
5.11.4.5.5 Boat crew duties.
5.11.4.5.6 Secure all equipment.
5.11.4.5.7 Inflate keel.
5.11.4.5.8 Turn all valves to the navigate position.
5.11.4.5.9 Clamp shock-absorbing tubes.
5.11.4.5.10 Parachuting the CRRC.
5.11.4.6 Supporting Aircraft. CRRCs can be dropped from C-130, C-141, or C-2
fixed-wing aircraft. Availability and mission requirement will determine which aircraft to
use.
5.11.4.7 C-130 Aircraft. The C-130 has flexibility, range, and load capabilities making
it the primary aircraft of choice for NSW CRRC S/L operations. The C-130 can hold a
total of two CRRC platforms with 18 jumpers. The CRRC platform can be single or
stacked. Personnel and equipment both exit from the ramp. CRRC loads with jumpers can
be dropped on a single or two separate passes.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

6-1
CHAPTER 6
AERIAL DEPLOYMENT EQUIPMENT

6.1 Purpose. The initial aerial supply or mission resupply to a deployed recovery team (RT) is a
necessary capability which enhances mission success. No two missions require the same type of
equipment to be airlifted. RTs should be familiar with the packing and rigging of aerial delivery
components. Additionally, each PJ must know the aerial delivery procedures used by the aircrew
to deploy equipment to the RT.
NOTE: Prior to loading hazardous cargo, determine packing requirements for the specific aircraft
involved.
6.2 Types of Airdrops. PJ container loads are delivered by low-velocity airdrops and free-fall
air drops.
6.2.1 Low-Velocity Airdrop. A low-velocity airdrop is the delivery of supplies from an
aircraft using cargo parachutes. Such loads are specially prepared for airdrop either by
packing the item in air-dropable containers or by lashing them to air-dropable platforms.
Cargo parachutes are then attached to the load or the platform to slow the descent of the load
and to ensure the minimum landing shock
6.2.2 High-Velocity Drop. A high-velocity drop is the delivery of items of supply that are
specially packed and rigged in containers having layers of energy-dissipating material
attached to the underside with a stabilizing device rigged on top. The stabilizing device, such
as a ring-slot parachute, is designed to minimized oscillation of the load and to create just
enough drag to keep the load upright during descent so it will land on the energy dissipater.
6.2.3 High-Speed/Low-Level Aerial Delivery System. The high-speed/low-level aerial
delivery system was developed for airdrop resupply from the Combat Talon flying at 250
KIAS and as low as 76 meters (250 feet) AGL. This system employs a modified container
using A-21 covers and a modified 22 feet or 28 feet extraction parachute. This system can
deliver up to four cargo containers weighing a minimum of 250 pounds each but not exceeding
a total of 2,200 pounds at delivery altitudes ranging from 76 to 299 meters (250 to 750 feet)
AGL. A slingshot ejection system ejects the cargo load over the designated area.
6.2.4 Free-Fall Airdrops. Free-fall airdrop is the delivery of non-fragile items of
equipment or supply from a slow-flying aircraft at low altitude, without the use of parachutes
or other retarding devices. Normally, the special packaging required for fragile items greatly
limits this technique. The technique is most effective when the drop can be made into a river,
stream, or other body of water and immediate action is taken to recover the supplies.
6.2.5 Cushioning Materials for Aerial Delivery Loads. Pieces of equipment packed
within various containers may require padding or cushioning materials. Items can be
separated with styrofoam, cellulose wadding, felt sheets, or any material energy dissipating
pads (honeycomb) suitable to protect them from breaking. Exercise care when packing
components of assemblies to ensure all items necessary for operation of the assembly are
packed in the same airdrop container.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

6.3 Methods of Airdrops.


6.3.1 Door Loads. Door loads are pushed or rolled out of the parachute troop doors or ramp
and door. This method is suitable for free-fall airdrops, low-velocity air drops, and highvelocity air drops. The opening in the aircraft and physical capability to eject the load will
limit the load in size and weight. This method is most commonly used for resupply door
bundles.
6.3.2 Wing Loads. Wing loads are rigged in containers attached to the shackles on the
underside of the aircraft wings. The aircraft load capacity, the containers size, and the
containers asymmetrical flight characteristics limit the size, weight, and shape of the load.
Containers that are rigged to the underside of fast moving aircraft are also available and being
developed to meet mission specific needs.
6.3.3 Gravity-Release Loads. Gravity-release loads work by cutting the load-restraining
ties and allowing the load to roll out of the cargo compartment by gravity alone. The aircraft
flies at drop altitude in a nose-up attitude. An example of this method is the rigged alternate
method zodiac (RAMZ).
6.3.4 Extraction Loads. Extraction loads use a drogue parachute to extract a platform from
the aircraft cargo compartment. This is not a commonly used method to resupply a RT during
PR/ROs.
6.3.5 External Transport Loads. External transport works by hanging a load from a hook
clevis on a helicopter. The load is then flown to the delivery site and dropped by using the
free-fall, low-velocity, or high-velocity air drop method. An example of this method is the
K-Duck
6.4 Cargo Parachutes.
6.4.1 General. The inspection, repacking and maintenance of cargo parachute assemblies
will be performed by base support. PJs only need be familiar with the time criteria for
inspections and the routine inspection requirements. Refer to the appropriate TO for complete
inspection, packing instructions, and storage.
6.4.2 Routine Inspection. Check the external condition of the parachute packs, risers and
static lines for visible defects, weak spots, broken threads, cuts, frays, or other damage.
6.4.2.1 Check all hardware for rust, corrosion, and smoothness of operation.
6.4.2.2 Inspect pack closing and static line break cords for defects in material, incorrect
cord, improper routing, or improperly tied knot.
6.4.2.3 Inspect condition of parachute pack and ensure parachute canopy material is not
showing.
6.4.2.4 Check parachute pack for tears, loose stitches, stains caused by oil or grease, and
weakened areas. Parachutes will not be stored in a cramped or damp condition.
6.4.2.5 If the routine inspection reveals conditions indicating a need for repairs or a more
thorough inspection, the parachute will be turned over to the parachute repacking facility,
regardless of the date of last repack.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

6-3

6.4.3 Parachute Types. The are several different types of cargo parachutes currently in
use. Use Table 6.1, Cargo Parachute Data, to determine which one is best suited for the
equipment to be airdropped:
Table 6.1 Cargo Parachute Data.
Parachute

Diameter (feet)

Weight (pounds)

Capacity (pounds)

G-8/M390

11

100

T-7A

28

16

100 to 500

G-13

24.25

45

200 to 500

G-14

34

37

200 to 500

T-10C

35

20

90 to 350

G-12

64

128

501 to 2,200

6.4.4 Poncho Expedient Parachute. The poncho expedient parachute can be used to drop
up to 65 pounds of equipment. This can be useful if other parachutes are not available. The
following illustrates and describes rigging the poncho expedient parachute:
6.4.4.1 First pull the hood drawstring loop to close the hood opening and wrap the excell
drawstring tightly around the base of the hood and tie it off so no air will escape.
6.4.4.2 Fold the poncho in half (bottoms together) with the snaps down.
6.4.4.3 Cut eight suspension lines 6 feet in length.
6.4.4.4 Tie one suspension line to each of the grommets on the poncho with a bowline
knot.
6.4.4.5 Ensure there are no tangles in the suspension lines and they are the same length.
6.4.4.6 Fold the poncho. Lay the half folded poncho flat. On both sides of the poncho,
make S folds 6 to 8 inches wide to meet in the center (there should be the same number of
folds on each sides). Next fold the narrow-folded poncho into an M fold.
6.4.4.7 Tie the loop end of the static line to the drawstring (which is wrapped around the
hole of the poncho) with one loop of 25-pound test cord (or lightweight string that will
break when the bundle is deployed from the aircraft) and tie with a square knot.
6.4.4.8 Attach the load to the snap line attached to the suspension lines.
6.4.4.9 Fold the suspension lines on top of the load.
6.4.4.10 Then place the M-folded poncho parachute on top of the folded suspension lines.
6.4.4.11 Affix the poncho parachute to the top of the load with one wrap of 25-pound test
cord in the same manner as tying a package, ensuring the cord goes through the loop in the
static line. Tie with a square knot. This will deploy the suspension lines prior to breaking
loose from the aircraft.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


6.4.5 Packaging and Deploying. The two methods in which cargo parachutes are packed
and deployed are direct deploy and free bag deployment.
6.4.5.1 Direct Deploy. An example of direct deploy is a T-10 parachute modified for
cargo. It is hooked up to the anchor cable via static line. When the equipment is deployed
the static line directly deploys the parachute.
6.4.5.2 Free Bag Deployment. An example of a free bag deployment is when equipment
is deployed using a G-12 cargo parachute. When the equipment is leaves the aircraft it
deploys a 15 feet extraction chute via a static line. The 15 feet extraction chute in-turn
deploys the G-12 parachute. When the G-12 is free of the D-bag the 15 feet extraction
chute flies free from the G-12.

WARNING: Jumpers should follow 1 second after the package exits the aircraft. This ensures the
package is free from the D-bag.
WARNING: Jumpers and ground party should be briefed, not to mistake the 15-foot extraction
parachute for a personnel parachutist. This is especially important at night.
6.5 Aerial Delivery Containers. With the exception of fuel containers, types and sizes of
containers are not specified. Regardless of content or container, the personnel using the
equipment should be familiar with the content, placement of equipment, and peculiarities
necessary for the operation of the equipment (e.g., catalytic heater).
6.6 Aerial Delivery Equipment. There are several different aerial delivery systems currently in
use to facilitate packaging and deploying equipment bundles. (See Table 6.2, Aerial Delivery
Systems, for details.) This section contains information on the use of cargo slings, bags, and
airdrop containers. The load may be packed with supplies, disassembled equipment, or small
items of ready-to-use equipment prepared for airdrop. The container load may require cushioning
material such as honeycomb, felt, or cellulose wadding, depending on the load requirements and
the method of airdrop.
Table 6.2 Aerial Delivery Systems.
Delivery
Type
System

Weight (pounds)

Capacity (pounds)

A-7A

Sling

6.0

500

A-10

Net

7.0

300

A-13

Rigid

7.0

100

A-16

Rigid

45

200

A-21

Bag

31

500

A-22

Bag

58

625 to 2,200

AKIO

Sled

38

200

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

6-5

6.6.1 A-7A Cargo Sling. The A-7A cargo sling consists of four identical 188-inch sling
straps. Each sling strap has a stationary parachute quick-fit friction adapter and a floating
D-ring. Use a combination of two, three, or four sling strap for rigging a load depending upon
its size, weight, and shape. It is used to drop non-fragile supplies. Its maximum load capacity
is 500 pounds. The minimum load is dependent on the type parachute used and the method of
airdrop (low- versus high-velocity). Two A-7A sling straps have a maximum weight limit of
300 pounds, three straps 400 pounds, and four straps 500 pounds.
6.6.2 A-21 Cargo Bag Assembly. The A-21 cargo bag assembly is an adjustable container
consisting of a sling assembly with scuffpad, a quick release assembly, two ring straps, and a
97- X 115-inch canvas cover. The A-21 cargo bag weighs approximately 31 pounds. Use it to
drop both fragile and non-fragile supplies. The maximum load capacity is 500 pounds. The
minimum load capacity is dependent on the type parachute used and the method of air drop.
6.6.3 A-22 Cargo Bag Assembly. The A-22 cargo bag assembly is an adjustable, cotton
duck cloth and webbing container consisting of a cotton or nylon webbing sling assembly, a
cover, and four cotton or nylon suspension webs. The modified A-22 cargo cover is the only
part of the system is the only part of the system used when rigging the deflated F470 CRRC.
The A-22 cargo bag has a maximum load capacity of 2,200 pounds. The maximum allowable
dimensions for a rigged load are 48 inches wide and 55.5 inches long. The maximum height
is normally 83 inches but may extend up 100 inches with Air Force approval. For a lowvelocity air drop, a standard cargo bag skid (48 X 53.5 inches) serves as a base for the
container load. For a high velocity air drop, the standard cargo bag skid or an appropriate size
piece of plywood for the base of the container load is used. The A-22 assembly weighs
approximately 58 pounds. Only ammunition listed in FM 10-553 may be air dropped.
6.7 Aerial Delivery Operational Restrictions. Each cargo aerial delivery method and
parachute has operational restrictions specific to wind, altitude, airspeed, and aircraft. The
following tables list those restrictions as they apply to C-130 aircraft only. (See Table 6.3,
Operational Mission Altitudes [1 of 2]; Table 6.4, Operational Mission Altitudes [2 of 2]; Table
6.5, Operational Airspeeds; and Table 6.6, Equipment Surface Wind Limitations for more
details.)
NOTE: For altitude and airspeed restrictions for other aircraft see AFI 11-231, Computer Air
Release Procedures.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 6.3 Operational Mission Altitudes (1 of 2).


Type of Airdrop/Chute

Number of
Parachutes/Containers
Personnel

Combat operations
Tactical training
Basic airborne trainees
HALO (minimum opening)
SATB-P
G-12D/E
G-12D
G-12D
G-12E
CRRC (G-12D/E)
G-13/14
High velocity (HVCDS)/12
feet, 22 feet, 26 feet ring slot
(See remarks)
SATB-C

CDS/CRS(2)
1 to 6 containers
7 or more container
2 or more parachutes
2 or more parachutes

1 to 2 containers
3 or more containers

Operational Mission Altitude


(feet AGL)
Jointly determined by the airborne and
airlift commanders
800(1)
1,250
2,500
500
400
600
600
550
600 (boat only), otherwise determined
by personnel drop altitude
400
500
100 feet plus vertical distance for the
load being dropped
See chute type being simulated

Equipment(2)

G-11A

G-11B

G-11C/X

G-12D
G-12E

Heavy
1 parachute
2 to 7 chutes
8 chutes
1 parachute
2 to 4 chutes
1 to 2 chutes
3 to 4 chutes
5 chutes
6 to 7 chutes
8 chutes
2 to 3 chutes
2 to 3 chutes

900
1,100
1,300
700
750
1,050
1,100
1,150
1,200
1,300
650
550

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

6-7

Table 6.4 Operational Mission Altitudes (2 of 2).


Type of Airdrop/Chute
SATB-H

Number of
Parachutes/Containers

Operational Mission Altitude


(feet AGL)
See chute type being simulated

Recovery Kit (22-foot ring slot)


Land
Water
HSLLADS

250 (minimum)

250 (minimum)

300 (maximum)

250 (minimum)

Door Bundle
G-13/14

300 (minimum)

T-10

400 (minimum)

T-7A

300 (minimum)

Free Fall
Day

Night

100 (minimum)

200 (maximum)

- No lower than minimum TF


altitude, or NVG contour altitude as
applicable.
- Without TF capability, the
minimum is 300.

REMARK: A-22 container with 26-foot ring slot chutes airdropped below 10,000 feet MSL
during unilateral training will be rigged with non-breakaway static lines, and those airdropped at
10,000 feet and above will be rigged with breakaway static lines.
EXCEPTION: A-22 containers with 26-foot ring slot chutes airdropped below 5,000 feet AGL
during unilateral training will b rigged with non-breakaway static lines IAW TO 13C7-1-11.
NOTES:
(1)

If the following criteria are not met, the minimum altitude is 1,000 feet AGL: (a) Static line
are used. (b) Parachutes are equipped with anti-inversion devices. (c) When using T-10
parachutes, use established exit control procedures. (d) When using MC1-1A/B/C parachutes,
use alternating door exit procedures (ADEPT). ADEPT does not apply to combat operation or
special tactics personnel.
(2)

Plan minimum IMC airdrops altitudes at 500 feet above the highest man-made obstacle or
terrain feature and spot elevation, or 400 feet plus on contour interval above the highest depicted
basic terrain contour, whichever is highest, within 3 NMs either side of the run-in centerline from
DZ entry point to DZ exit point. Not applicable to aircraft with a fully operational terrain
following system.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 6.5 Operational Airspeeds.


Equipment

C-130
125/130(1)

Personnel static line


Personnel HALO/HAHO

130 (110 minimum to 150 maximum)

Equipment/Combination

130 to 140(2)

Heavy equipment

140

CRRC, RAMZ, CDS/CRS (except G-12E),


HVCDS, Wedge, Ahkio sled

130/140(2)

CDS/CRS (G-12E)

130/140(2)

Door bundle

130

SATB

Same as type load simulated

Recovery kit

130

HSLLADS

En route airspeed

PSYOPS(3)

NOTES:
(1)

Use 125 KIAS only for pararescue deployment.

(2 ) Used

when gross weight is above 120,000 pounds. For combination drops, use the higher
airspeed KIAS.
(3) Material

as required for desired area coverage (Chapter 7, Combat Marksmanship and


Munitions).

Table 6.6 Equipment Surface Wind Limitations.


Type Equipment Drop

Surface Wind Limits (KTS)

AF equipment

17

AF CDS using G-12 parachutes

13

AF CDS using G-13/14 parachutes

20

HAARS, high-velocity CDS or HSLLADS


AF training bundles (SATB)
Non-AF equipment

No restriction
25
At discretion of supported unit commander

WARNING: When equipment is to be dropped in combination with personnel, the operational


restrictions for personnel altitude and airspeed apply.
6.8 Aerial Delivery Procedures.
6.8.1 General. The ability to deliver PJ support supplies and equipment to an incident site is
of the utmost importance and overall mission success may be dependent upon support
airdrops. The jump master is responsible to ensure the equipment is packed in an appropriate

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

6-9

container. When the equipment is loaded in its container the appropriate delivery system and
cargo parachute must be chosen depending on the total equipment weight. Usually the
deployment is performed by the aircrew loadmaster however, the jumpmaster may also deploy
it using standard delivery procedures. IAW AFJI 13-210.
6.8.2 Airdrop Patterns. The cargo airdrop patterns flown by the aircraft are similar to
personnel deployment patterns. The minimum altitude for day equipment bundle
paradrop is 300 feet and day free-fall equipment drops is 150 feet.
6.9 Water Equipment Delivery. Items dropped to personnel in the water are normally dropped
with retrieval lines attached. For drops to surface vessels, the MA-1/2 kit may be used as a
delivery vehicle and the equipment to be delivered substituted for the number 2, 3, or 4 bundles. If
the life rafts are not needed, a delivery kit can be constructed by replacing the life rafts with MK 6
Mod 3 flare smokes. When a parabundle is dropped using the above procedure, a parachute must
be attached to the MK 6 Mod 3.
6.10 Night Equipment Delivery. Equipment delivered at night will have a cargo marker light
attached. Attach the light by securing a double length of 5-foot nylon 550 cord to the marker light,
then attach the other end to the equipment. Stabilize the light to the equipment with type Number
5 cord. Pass the parachute static line under the type Number 5 cord to ensure light break-away
when deployed. The SDU-5/E strobe light or chemlight may be used in lieu of the cargo marking
lights.
6.11 Tree Let Down Sling. Equipment delivered into areas of rough terrain or dense forest the
tree let down sling should be considered. Using this procedure will allow the equipment to
penetrate the obstacle (e.g., tall trees) and fall to the ground prior to the parachutes hanging up.
The following is how the procedure is performed:
6.11.1 Rope Length. Take a suitable length of rope (dependent on height of obstacle to be
penetrated) and double that length.
6.11.2 Knot Type. Tie a double figure eight at the bite end of the rope and attach it to the
load using two locking carabiners (one on each bite of the figure eight); usually to the two
attachment points on an A-7 sling.
6.11.3 Remaining Rope. S fold the remaining length of rope, bottom to top, onto the load
using double wrap rubber band stows.
6.11.4 Running Ends. Take the two running ends of the remaining rope and attach it to the
cargo parachute risers using a locking clevis.
WARNING: Jumpers exiting the aircraft after the equipment bundle must exit when the
parachutes are free from the D-bag and not free of the ramp and door. Parachutists may become
fatally entangled in the tree let down sling if exiting immediately after the bundle.
CAUTION: Double wrap stows must be used on the tree let down sling. Using single wrap
stows may cause line dump, which could produce terminal results for the equipment bundle.
6.12 Crew Coordination. To facilitate crew coordination, the impact point of spotter
chutes/streamers and bundles will be identified using clock positions relative to the final approach
flown when relaying a drop report to the aircraft overhead (e.g., the spotter chute landed at 12
oclock, 45 meters).

6-10

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

6.13 Surface-Directed Equipment Delivery. This provides for a method of aerial delivery to a
PJ team when visual contact cannot be established due to cloud formation, fog, or trees. The
following procedures are recommended:
6.13.1 Comm. The ground controller using radio communications, flare signaling, or
smoke devices will assist the aircrew in positioning the aircraft directly overhead. It may be
necessary for the ground controller to suggest a compass heading or a term such as turn left
10 degrees now. It may also be necessary to state YOU ARE DIRECTLY OVERHEAD
NOW. The situations are too varied to provide specific guidance, however, these procedures
have proven successful in the past.
6.13.2 Reference Points. Once the position directly overhead has been established, the pilot
using navigational aids/visual reference points should establish a pattern to return the aircraft
to that spot each time.
6.13.3 Release Point. The actual release point will have to be estimated by both aircrew and
the ground controller. An into-the-wind drop heading is suggested, however conditions may
dictate otherwise. The release point will have to be calculated based on ballistic data altitude,
type of parachute, surface wind, and aircraft heading.
6.13.4 Coordination. To be effective, this procedure will require close coordination
between all parties concerned. The pilot should keep the ground controller aware of his
intentions, position in the pattern and countdown to drop.
6.13.5 Ground Marked Release System. When controlling an airdrop, the drop zone
controller (DZC) can mark a point on the ground with a visual signal to designate the
computed release point (RP) to the aircrew. This signal may be a four marker L, six marker
T, or seven marker H and is placed abeam, and 100 meters (110 yards) left of the desired
release point. The drop is executed when the aircraft is directly abeam, and 100 meters (110
yards) right of this marker on the pre-briefed inbound heading. A pre-briefed code signal or
beacon may be collocated with the markers to aid in DZ identification.
6.13.6 Verbal Initiated Release System. Combat control team (CCT) and pararescue
personnel use this procedure when normal drop procedures are not tactically feasible. The
ground party determines the desired release point, gives verbal steering guidance to the pilot to
align the aircraft over that point, and then initiates the release. Instructions transmitted to the
aircraft must be concise. Transmit TURN LEFT or TURN RIGHT to align aircraft on
desired inbound heading Transmit STOP TURN after alignment instructions when aircraft
is on course. Transmit STANDBY to the aircraft approximately 5 seconds prior to the
release point. Transmit EXECUTE, EXECUTE, EXECUTE when the aircraft reaches the
release point. Upon hearing the first EXECUTE, the navigator/pilot not flying calls
GREEN LIGHT.
6.14 Fuel. Units operating in or subject to operate in cold climate areas must have special fuel
(Coleman/white gas, butane/propane) readily available to deploy with PJ forces. Lanterns, stoves,
and heaters carried, stored, or deployed from aircraft will be empty and void of fuel or fumes.
When this equipment is required as part of the alert load, fuel must accompany it. Fuel carried
aboard aircraft will be in standard metal fuel containers and be padded to prevent accidental
rupture. The following examples are the preferred methods of carrying fuel on aircraft:

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

6-11

6.14.1 One-Gallon Cans. Place one to three 1-gallon cans of Coleman fuel, which are
factory sealed, into a metal 1,500 round ammunition component box. An absorbent,
non-flammable packing material such as vermiculite will be placed around fuel cans to
prevent shifting and contact with other cans. Prior to placing the lid on the ammunition
box, ensure rubber gasket is intact to provide seal.
6.14.2 Small Cans. Aluminum fuel bottles (pint or quart, no pour spout) must have an
unvented screw on cap and gasket. They can be carried as stated above, or in a field
pack. When carried in a field pack, it will be centrally located where it is protected on all
sides and not in contact with hard objects, or in the center of a rolled sleeping bag.
NOTE: Recommend fuel bottles be filled at temperatures of 75 to 80 degrees Fahrenheit.
6.14.3 Shipping Requirements. Butane/propane cylinders should be carried in a container
provided by the manufacturer or carried in metal ammunition component boxes with sufficient
packing material to prevent shifting and contact with other cylinders.
6.14.4 Labelling. When fuel containers are carried on aircraft with floor heating systems,
containers will be insulated from the floor. Ammunition component boxes or other similar
containers used as storage/delivery containers will have the word FLAMMABLE stenciled
in one-inch letters on two sides. Under the word FLAMMABLE, in one-inch letters, will be
the type fuel contained within. Different type fuels such as white gas and butane will not be
stored in the same container. Field packs containing fuel will have tags affixed in a
conspicuous location. Tags will be stenciled in one-inch letters as stated above. If fuel
containers are required to be airlifted on Air Mobility Command aircraft, the containers must
meet packing requirements for hazardous cargo.
6.14.5 Storage. Storage of fuel at rescue units must be coordinated and approved by base
civil engineering, ground safety office, and fire department.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

7-1
CHAPTER 7

COMBAT MARKSMANSHIP AND MUNITIONS


7.1 Purpose. This chapter provides backgrounds and weapons training techniques for
GUARDIAN ANGEL. The basis of information for these guidelines is unclassified information
listed in the references section. Personal opinion and changing information is always a factor
when planning lethal confrontations. Making decisions based on solid information rather than
personal opinion is most improtant. If you do not understand interior, exterior, terminal ballistics,
how they relate to weapons configurations and can make a connection between what you believe
and qualified experts, then you probably are not in a position to determine your weapons load outs
for a specific mission. For example, if you believe in the knockdown power of the .45 caliber
pistol over the 9mm, then you should be able to display some scientific basis for that belief.
Psychology is a factor in successful outcomes of lethal confrontations. Scientific methods of
determining terminal ballistics cannot take into account all the dynamics of an actual fight. In
application, no amount of planning can make up for a lack of consistent and realistic operant
conditioning to fight.
7.2 General. Regular training and realistic rehearsals are the pillars of self-protection
capabilities. It is far better to be well trained with basic equipment than poorly trained with
special equipment. Regardless, certain capabilities such as long range anti-personnel and antivehicle weapons require the team proficiency in the employment of specific equipment.
7.3 Safety. Four rules govern firearms safety. Following any one of them will almost certainly
prevent accident.
Consider all weapons to be loaded
Never let your muzzle sweep anything you are not willing to destroy
Keep your finger off the trigger until your sights are on the target
Be sure of your target and what is around it
7.4 Mindset. The combat triad is a three-concept ideamindset, gun handling, and
marksmanship. These areas must be mastered to become an expert gunfighter. Of these mindset
is the most important. People with only warriors mindset have settled many real confrontations.
(See Figure 7.1, Diagram Combat Triad.)

7-2

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 7.1 Diagram Combat Triad.

Diagram Combat Triad


MINDSET

Combat Triad

Gunhandling

Marksmanship

UNCLASSIFIED
7.5 Moving, Shooting, and Communicating. Moving, shooting, and communicating are the
three elements of any shooting program. Learn to move balanced and efficiently. Communicate
what you are doing and what needs to be done with teammates. Last, you must shoot while doing
so.
7.6 Moving Targets. It is a fact that shooters engage moving targets. Training should
emphasize moving targets whenever possible.
7.7 Terminal Ballistics. Terminal ballistics is the study of the behavior of a projectile, on a
target. The result is lethality. Lethality is the effect of incapacitating targets for the purpose of
negating their impact on the mission and personnel survivability. In special operations missions,
lethality is essential to success.
7.7.1 Slews and Cavities. The terminal ballistics of the M855, A059 Green Tip, ammunition
in the M16 series rifle is a subject that has been studied extensively by the services. M16
series rifles must have barrel lengths and twists that stabilize the bullet sufficiently to penetrate
the target 3- to 5-inches and then slews or cavities. This breaks up the bullet and causes a
severe wound cavity that will disable the target. If the round slews in the target too soon or not
at all, it fails to create a substantial wound cavity and fails to stop the target. Therefore,
performance of the rifle depends on the round fired, the length and twist or rifling of the barrel.
The best effects of the M855 round occur when the target is hit in the heart, great vessels or
high in the central nervous system. The M16 series rifles are roughly 4MOA accurate. This
presents a problem in that the desired target is smaller than the accuracy of the weapon at very
limited ranges. (See Figure 7.2, Picture of Wound Ballistics.)

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

7-3

Figure 7.2 Picture of Wound Ballistics.

Picture of Wound Ballistics

Maximum Fracture Diameter (FPMD),


and its location (FPMDL)

2 inches

UNCLASSIFIED
7.7.2 M-16 Information. M-16 series rifles have been in use for decades and much
information regarding their use and configuration exists. If the velocity of the A059 (Green
Tip) round drops below 2,500 feet per second (FPS), the bullet will fail to produce a
substantial wound cavity.
7.7.3 Better Performance. The Mk-262 5.56mm LR ammunition has much better terminal
ballistics performance than the M855 round. Very little data exists on the capabilities of this
round. Team leaders can plan on the ammunition increasing the effective range of their rifles
by a factor of 2. The Mk-262 ammunition does not have a steel penetrator core. (See Figure
7.3, M855 Terminal Performance at Muzzle.)
7.7.4 Special Ball. The terminal ballistics of the M118 & M118 LR special ball 7.62mm is
excellent to the maximum effective range of the rifle. (See Figure 7.4, Excellent Terminal
Performance at the Muzzle.)
7.7.5 Handguns Versus Rifles. All handgun terminal ballistics are inferior to all rifle
terminal ballistics. Do not expect the M9 pistol and A363 ammunitions to have positive
lethal effects on any target.

7-4
Figure 7.3

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


M855 Terminal Performance at Muzzle.

M855 Terminal Performance at Muzzle

Estimated effective range 10.0 in <20m

Estimated effective range 14.5 in <200m

Estimated effective range 20.0 in <300m

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 7.4

Excellent Terminal Performance at the Muzzle.

Excellent Terminal Performance at the Muzzle

Estimated effective range 5.56 LR <400m

Estimated effective range Barret 6.8mm <600m

Estimated effective range M14in <800m

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

7-5

7.8 Training Concepts.


7.8.1 Marksmanship. Combat marksmanship is the ability of an individual to consistently
place fast, accurate, and lethal fire on the enemy without hesitation, in adverse conditions,
under mental and physical stress. The eight fundamentals of combat marksmanship are:
Stance.
Grip.
Sight alignment.
Sight picture.
Breathing.
Trigger control.
Follow-through.
Recovery.
7.8.2 Rifleman. The rifleman is responsible for the effective employment of his rifle and
for the condition and care of the weapon and equipment. The rifleman can shoot the rifle to a
skill level commensurate with the table on basic carbine training and execute all the battle
drills. All GUARDIAN ANGEL personnel become riflemen via the Air Force Qualification
Course.
7.8.3 Advanced Carbine Training. GUARDIAN ANGEL conducts operations without
the aid of higher echelon supporting infantry elements. The weapon system needs to conduct
advanced carbine training to provide force multiplication.
7.8.4 Designated Marksman. The designated marksman (DM) is an individual with
additional training in the fundamentals of marksmanship and observation. This marksman is
equipped with an optic mounted on his M16A2 Service Rifleor M4 Carbine, when
available. In support of any military operations, he delivers precision fire on positively
identified threats and gathers and reports intelligence.
7.8.5 Marksmanship Definition. The Marine Corps definition is a more accurate
definition for the GUARDIAN ANGEL DM as a marksman tasked with engaging point
targets, such as enemy snipers, when the tactical situation does not permit massed or
indiscriminate fires. This individual is not specifically assigned to any element and operates
primarily in the urban environment 0 to 300 yards and is commonly used to support the assault
or maneuvering element.
7.8.6 Arms Configuration. GUARDIAN ANGEL small arms equipment configuration
results in differences in DM training used by other services. The Marine Corps uses 4X
ACOG scopes, conducts 40 hours of initial training, and requires 30-day proficiency shooting
requirements as well as 3 days of semi-annual training. Units are encouraged to use the DM
training programs from other services if equipment becomes available. The 4X ACOG is not
useful as a night optic. The 4X ACOG is slow to use and requires a cheekweld to shoot.

7-6

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


7.8.7 DM Training. A GUARDIAN ANGEL DM has completed training on a course of fire
that emphasizes stress shooting, shot placement, angle firing and night firing using various
methods. They can employ precision fire with an optic mounted weapon under 200 yards.
The reasoning is that, due to the size restriction of GUARDIAN ANGEL operations any team
member may be called upon to provide precision rifle fire in support of actions on the
objective or movement. DM training is not mandatory. The Marine Corps X-File 3-15.31, has
a complete training program for DM. (See Table 7.1, Designated Marksman Qualification
Course, and Table 7.2, Designated Marksman Sustainment Course for more details.)
7.8.8 Target Types. The Marine Corps ABLE and DOG targets are used for the DM
program. The targets type can be drawn on any type target available. (See Figure 7.5, Picture
Marine Corps DM Target for details.)
7.8.9 Long-Range Anti-Personnel. Long-range anti-personnel weapons can hit a point
target at 500 yards with the average shooter and 800 yards with an expert. This is not a sniper!
Although sniper-style training provides the basis for this capability, the weapons employed
shoot in the 2 to 3 MOA accuracy range and are not sniper weapons. The current weapon is
the MK-14 Mod 0 enhanced battle rifle (EBR). Fully configured, these are deployed in the
support or base of fire element under control of the assistant team leader. This is a specific and
defensive capability for the purpose of pinning down advancing forces in order to (1) facilitate
withdrawal of the team, (2) accomplish actions on the objective, or (3) destruction of the
enemy forces by close air support. This differs from the DM in that an observer/spotter is
generally used. Long-range anti-personnel training is more substantial than DM training.
Personnel with this training will naturally fill the DM role on operations. A DM may not have
the training to accomplish long-range anti-personnel roles.
7.8.10 Range Safety Officer Duties. Each unit develops their own training program for
running ranges. Combat arms must certify all AF personnel to operate ranges. In addition to
the safe rules for gun handling, the most important thing for a range safety officer (RSO) to
consider is the safety zone for shooting steel target and the surface danger zone for the range.
The RSO must follow the manufacturers guidelines for whatever targets used. The general
rules for shooting steel are as follows.
Body armor should be worn when shooting steel anywhere near the minimum range.
Shoot no closer than 7 yards on handgun targets and no closer than 30 yards on rifle
targets.
7.8.10.1 GUARDIAN ANGEL. GUARDIAN ANGEL operations include the conduct of
non-linear training events on AF ranges. Even though this training is authorized, personnel
cannot shoot from positions where rounds will exit the surface danger zone of the
engineering technical letter (ETL) for that specific range.

WARNING: Splash or ricochets from steel targets can result in death or serious injury to the
shooter or bystanders. Always read and follow the manufactures guidelines for use, repair, and
replacement of targets.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

7-7

Table 7.1 Designated Marksman Qualification Course.


Distance
Stage A

Rounds
10

50 yards
Stage B

10

100 yards
Stage C

15

Target

Technique

Scoring

Limited exposure
targets (ABLE)

5 seconds per
exposure

V ring = 2 points

Limited exposure
targets (DOG)

5 second
exposure

ABLE center = 2 points

Head Shots (ABLE)

10 seconds per
exposure

V ring = 2 points

Moving targets
(DOG)

Left/right,
Right/left 10
seconds per
exposure

ABLE center = 2 points

Center mass body


(ECHO)

10 seconds per
exposure

DOG silhouette = 2
points

200 yards
Stage C

15

200 yards
Stage D

15

300 yards

5 ring = 1 point
Black = 1 point
5 ring = 1 point
Black = 1 point

Black = 1 point
Stage E

15

Center mass body


(ECHO)

10 seconds per
exposure

Hit or miss (1 point)

15

Moving targets
(ECHO)

Left/right,
Right/left 15
seconds per
exposure

Hit or miss (1 point)

20

Limited exposure
(DOG)

100 to 300 yards Hit or miss (1 point)

30

Stage B-10

100 to 300 yards Hit or miss (1 point)

500 yards
Stage E
500 yards
Stage F
Unknown
distance
Stage F
Low light

Stage C-5/5
Stage E-5/5

LEGEND:
Total points possible: 240 points.
Points to qualify: 220 points.
Goal: First round engagement and hit.
Head shots at 200 yards.
Center mass body shots at 3 to 500 yards.
Moving targets at 2 to 500 yards.
Limited exposure targets at 100 yards.

7-8

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 7.2 Designated Marksman Sustainment Course.


Distance
Stage A

Rounds
10

100 yards
Stage B

10

Target

10

200 yards
Stage C

10

300 yards

Scoring

Limited exposure
targets (DOG)

5 second
exposure

ABLE center = 2 points

Head Shots (ABLE)

10 seconds per
exposure

V ring = 2 points

Moving targets
(DOG)

Left/right,
Right/left 10
seconds per
exposure

ABLE center = 2 points

Center mass body


(ECHO)

10 seconds per
exposure

DOG silhouette = 2
points

200 yards
Stage B

Technique

Black = 1 point
5 ring = 1 point
Black = 1 point

Black = 1 point
Stage D

10

Center mass body


(ECHO)

10 seconds per
exposure

Hit or miss (1 point)

10

Center Mass Body


(ECHO)

10 seconds per
exposure

Hit or miss (1 point)

10

Limited Exposure
(DOG)

100 to 300 yards Hit or miss (1 point)

30

Stage B-10

100 to 300 yards Hit or miss (1 point)

500 yards
Stage D
500 yards
Stage E
Unknown
distance
Stage F
Low light

Stage C-5/5
Stage E-5/5

LEGEND:
Total points possible: 110 points.
Points to re-qualify: 95 points.
Goal: Sustainment of qualification skills.
Increased center mass and moving target engagement ranges to 600 yards.
Limited exposure targets for all qualification goals.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

7-9

Figure 7.5 Picture Marine Corps DM Targets.

Picture Marine Corps DM Targets

4" = 2 pts.

ABLE Target

12" = 1 pt.

4" = 2 pts.

DOG Target

Silhouette = 1 pt.

2 pts.

DOG
Center

Center
of mass
= 2 pts.

ECHO
Target
Lower 1/3 of target
length = 0 pts.

UNCLASSIFIED
7.8.11 Night Shooting. Each rifle system can employ different types of IR laser sighting
devices. See the technical order for specific capabilities and mounting solutions. Shooting the
IR laser can be very easy. The rifle can be shot from the hip; however, shooting from the hip
slows down follow-up shots. Some NVD and optic combinations can allow the shooter to
shoot through the optic at night. This has the advantage of not emitting ID and using near
standard shooting positions; permitting fast follow-up shots.

7-10

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

7.8.12 Sighting in IR Lasers. There is a simple and effective method of sighting in an IR


laser that takes no tools and is 100 percent effective. Lasers can be zeroed at any distance.
Because of the difficulty in identifying targets at night, a 100-yard zero is recommended.
Zeroing is a three-person technique. With an unloaded weapon, place a target at the desired
distance. A flat wall also works. Tape a chemlight to the target. One person assumes the
prone position and without NVGs looks through the sighting system at the chemlight. A
second person operates the laser that is attached to the gun. The third person donned with
NVGs looks at the laser impact and directs the second person on how to move the laser back
on the target. Once the laser is zeroed using this technique, it should be live-fire tested.
7.8.13 Advanced Carbine Training.
7.8.13.1 Specification Standard. The following course of fire is based on the Marine
Corps force recon level close-quarters battle qualifications standards, the Gunsite 223
training program. The shooter shouts contact to build muscle memory in preparation for
battle drills at the initiation of each drill. In order to build muscle memory, the shooters
should conduct the training with all of their equipment, body armor, helmets, and radios.
This course of fire should be shot in the day and at night. It also should be shot using the
iron sights and laser as appropriate. This represents that basic level of individual carbine
skills necessary to continue on to live fire battle drills. (See Table 7.3, and Table 7.4,
Advance Carbine Course of Fire, for more information.)
7.8.13.2 Explanation of Drills and Positions. See the following figures for visual
clarity:
Figure 7.6, Picture Curb Prone.
Figure 7.7, Picture SBU Prone.
Figure 7.8, Picture Kneeling.
Figure 7.9, Picture Double Kneeling.
Figure 7.10, Picture Shooting Around Obstacles.
Figure 7.11, Picture Rapid Kneeling.
Figure 7.12, Picture 180-Degree Pivot Step 1.
Figure 7.13, Picture Indoor Ready.
Figure 7.14, Picture Locking the Bolt to the Rear.
Figure 7.15, Picture Operating the Charging Handle.
Figure 7.16, Picture Ready Position.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

7-11

Table 7.3 Advanced Carbine Course of Fire (1 of 2).


Distance

Time
Drill

(Yards)

(Seconds) Reps

Rounds

Total

Non standard response drill (NSR)

12

NSR transition NSR handgun

Mask NSR

Mozam double kneeling

Mozam

Head single shot

1.5

Mozam

Box drill

12

180 pivot box drill

12

Right step box drill

12

Left step box drill

12

Gas Mask Mozam

Mask box drill

12

Mask 180 pivot box drill

12

Mask right step box drill

12

Mask left step box drill

12

Moving box drill

12

10

Mozam

10

FBI two-man reload drill

12

16

15

Mozam

15

Head

25

Pair

25

Curb prone

41

25

SBU prone

25

Rifle el presidente

10

12

24

50

Pair

50

2 Reload 2

10

10 to 3

7-12

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 7.4 Advanced Carbine Course of Fire (2 of 2).


Distance

Time
Drill

(Yards)

(Seconds) Reps

Rounds

Total

100

Cooper Olympic shooting drill

100

Sitting

100

Squatting

10

100

Kneeling

10

100

Mask sitting

100

Mask squatting

100

Mask kneeling

200

Prone pair

14

10

200

Prone 2 reload 2

20

200

Mask prone

15

200

2 shots prone touch target 2 shots prone

10

10

Total Rounds

308

Figure 7.6 Picture Curb Prone.

Picture Curb Prone

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

7-13

Figure 7.7 Picture SBU Prone.

Picture SBU Prone

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 7.8 Picture Kneeling.

Picture Kneeling

UNCLASSIFIED

7-14

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 7.9 Picture Double Kneeling.

Picture Double Kneeling

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 7.10 Picture Shooting Around Obstacles.

Picture Shooting Around Obstacles

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

7-15

Figure 7.11 Picture Rapid Kneeling.

Picture Rapid Kneeling

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 7.12 Picture 180-Degree Pivot Step 1.

Picture 180-Degree Pivot Step 1

UNCLASSIFIED

7-16

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 7.13 Picture Indoor Ready.

Indoor Ready

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 7.14 Picture Locking the Bolt to the Rear.

Picture Locking the Bolt to the Rear

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

7-17

Figure 7.15 Picture Operating the Charging Handle.

Picture Operating the Charging Handle

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 7.16 Picture Ready Position.

Picture Ready Position

UNCLASSIFIED

7-18

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


7.8.13.2.1 Transition Drill. Team members should be trained to automatically
transition to their handgun; if they are in handgun range and the primary weapon
malfunctions or if they need to assume cover to clear the primary weapon. (See Figure
7.17, Picture Transition.)

Figure 7.17 Picture Transition.

Picture Transition

UNCLASSIFIED
7.8.13.2.2 Box Drill. The box drill is a multiple target engagement drill. Two targets,
two shots to the body, two shots to the body, one to the head and one to the head. (See
Figure 7.18, Box Drill.)
Figure 7.18 Box Drill.
7.8.13.2.3 Stress Fire Drills. Stress is an essential element of any shooting program.
7.8.13.2.4 Cooper Olympic Shooting Drill. This drill is part of the carbine course of
fire. Starting at the 100-yard line. The shooter fires two rounds from kneeling; then
reloads, runs to the target and touches it and runs back to the 100-yard line. The
shooter fires two rounds from squatting position, reloads, and runs to the target and
back; finishing with firing two rounds from prone. (See Figure 7.19, Cooper Olympic
Shooting Drill.)

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

7-19

Figure 7.19 Cooper Olympic Shooting Drill.

Cooper Olympic Shooting Drill

Drill can be run from any distance,


100-yard line is preferred

First two rounds


from each position,
reload between positions
Squat

Kneeling

Prone

UNCLASSIFIED
7.8.13.2.5 Rifle El Presidente. With three targets down range, start with back to the
firing line. The shooter executes a 180 degree pivot and fires two rounds at each target.
The shooter takes a knee, reloads and fires two more rounds at each target.
7.8.13.2.6 NSR Drill. Starting at the three-foot line, step left or right, fire 4 to 5
rounds into the center mass of the target. This drill is designed to train shooters to
move off-line and shoot their target to the ground at very close ranges.

7-20

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


7.8.13.2.7 FBI Two-Man Reload Drill. Two Shooters stand side by side. One loads
a magazine of 6 rounds with a magazine of 2 rounds in their mag pouch. The other
loads with a magazine of 2 rounds and has a magazine of 6 rounds in their magazine
pouch. On the command of fire, both shooters fire 2 rounds standing. The shooter
with an empty rifle takes a knee and reloads, sounding off with LOADING. The
standing shooter positions himself over the shooter on a knee and fires 2 rounds,
sounding off with COVERING. Once the shooter who has taken a knee is loaded, he
sounds off with READY. The covering shooter steps back to his original position
and orders the kneeling shooter UP. Both shooters fire two more rounds from
standing. One shooter will be empty at this point in the drill and the other shooter will
have four rounds remaining. The empty shooter assumes a knee and reloads,
RELOADING. The standing shooter positions himself over the kneeling shooter,
fires two rounds and sounds off with COVERING. Once reloaded the kneeling
shooter sounds off with READY. The covering shooter steps back to his original
position and orders the kneeling shooter UP. Both shooters fire their last two rounds
from standing. This drill is not designed to teach a specific tactic. This is an exercise
in teamwork.
7.8.13.2.8 FBI 360-Degree Movement Drill. This drill can be done at any distance.
A series of obstacles is placed on the range. The diagram list four barrels. A team of
shooter lines up on one side of the obstacles and moves around the obstacles on the
RSO commands. While moving, the shooters will be ordered to engage the targets
down range, conduct reloads, transition, complete malfunction drills, throw smokes or
flashbangs. The specifics are up to the RSO. The purpose is to throw more and more
tasks at the shooter until they are overloaded with information input. This is not a
timed event or one listed in the carbine course of fire. This is a stress shooting drill. It
teaches the shooter to accept more input, concentrate on directions and add stress.
Once the shooter is successfully completing this exercise they are ready to move on to
battle drills. (See Figure 7.20, FBI 360-Degree Movement Drill.)

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

7-21

Figure 7.20 FBI 360-Degree Movement Drill.

FBI 360-Degree Movement Drill


Hostage

"RELOAD"

"MALFUNCTION"

Barrel

Barrel

Barrel

Barrel

Drill can be run with 1 to 6 people


360 degree movement as a team
Smokes, flash bangs can be used to add confusion
Targets can be numberef out of order

"TRANSITION"

UNCLASSIFIED
7.8.13.3 MK14 Mod 0 EBR Training Guidelines. The EBR is a support element
weapon. It is an expert shooters gun. It is designed to support the weapon system by
filling the gap between the capabilities of the M4, M240, and M249. The EBR can
function as a designated marksman rifle, long-range (800 yard) anti-personnel weapon,
base of fire (light machine gun) weapon, and as a close-quarters battle rifle.

7-22

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


7.8.13.3.1 The EBR safety is located inside the trigger guard of the weapon. As a
result, the weapon should be carried in the aircraft in condition 3 (empty chamber with
magazine in the weapon)

WARNING: Less experienced shooters will not shoot well with the EBR. Carrying this weapon
without proper training could result in serious injury or death.
7.8.13.4 Transition Training. The AFQC for the M4/M16 is used for qualification
firing. Shooters should fire 1,000 rounds each, using the attached course of fire before
carrying the weapon. Much of the training can be done on a 25-yard range. Training with
the M4 3.5X10 scope should be done at a minimum on a 100-yard range for designated
marksman missions and on a minimum 300-yard range (preferred 800-yard range) for
long-range anti-personnel employment.
7.8.13.5 Full Auto Feature. Training to use the full-auto feature of the weapon may not
be practical. The recoil of the weapon may cause the scope mount to shake loose. The
weapon may begin cooking off rounds after as few as 50 rounds. Additionally, full-auto
fire may cause the weapons to wear out in short order. Last, its unnecessary, extremely
accurate and rapid semi-auto fire can be employed very effectively when the user is
properly trained. Suggest extremely limited full auto fire.
7.8.13.6 Ammunition. The preferred ammunition for the rifle in the M118LR round.
Very little of this is available. The most common round available is the M118 round. All
training for long range shooting and sighting in should be done with the M118 or
M118LR. The M80 rounds and tracer rounds available in linked ammunition should not
be used to sight in the weapon unless they are the only rounds available and the unit
intends to carry them on alert. No information exists as to the effectiveness of or the
external ballistics for the 7.62mm slap rounds and their use is not authorized by the
technical order. Linked ammunition may substantially degrade the long-range capability
of the EBR.
7.8.13.7 Training. There are two categories of training for the EBR, carbine training
(DM) and long-range anti-personnel suppression. If training for long range shooting
cannot be done at actual distance, then the weapon should be configured with the M68
sight and laser only (no scope). See Table 7.5, and Table 7.6, EBR Course of Fire, and
Figure 7.21, 100 Yard EBR Target, for proficiency standards. Shooters should be
proficient with each stage of fire prior to carrying the weapon.
7.8.13.8
scope.

Targets. The following includes three 100-yard targets for sighting in the

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

7-23

Figure 7.21 100-Yard EBR Target.

100-Yard EBR Target

UNCLASSIFIED

7-24

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 7.5 EBR Course of Fire.(1 of 2).


Distance

Time
Drill

(Yards)

(Seconds) Reps

Rounds

Total

Mozam double kneeling

Mozam

Head single shot

1.5

Mozam

Box drill

12

180 pivot box drill

12

Right step box drill

12

Left step box drill

12

Gas mask mozam

Mask box drill

12

Mask 180 pivot box drill

12

Mask right step box drill

12

Mask left step box drill

12

10

Mozam

10-3

Moving box drill

12

Non-standard response drill (NSR)

12

NSR transition NSR handgun

Mask NSR

10

FBI two-man reload drill

12

16

15

Mozam

15

Head

25

Pair

25

Curb prone

41

25

SBU prone

25

Rifle el presidente

10

12

24

50

Pair

50

2 Reload 2

10

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

7-25

Table 7.6 EBR Course of Fire (2 of 2).


Distance

Time/
Drill

(Yards)

Seconds

Reps

Rounds

Total

100 yard
drill

Cooper Olympic shooting drill

NA

100

Sitting

100

Squatting

10

100

Kneeling

10

100

Mask sitting

100

Mask squatting

100

Mask kneeling

200

Prone pair

14

10

200

Prone 2 reload 2

20

200

Mask prone

15

200 yard
drill

2 Shots Prone touch target 2 Shots Prone

NA

10

10

Total Rounds
Distance
(Yards)

Target/Standing-Long Range

318
Rounds
Fired

Hits Hit Zone

Time

100

Sighting target

10

Center
square

1 minute

100

Medium range simulator

10

Person

1 minute

100

7MOA Doepeing target

10

7MOA
high
target

1 minute

100

TACMAN

10

Any

2 minute

100

TACMAN

10

Any

2 minute

100

TACMAN

10

Any

2 minute

Total Rounds

60

7.8.13.9 .50 Caliber Training Guide Lines. (See Figure 7.22, Picture .50-Caliber Rifle.)

7-26

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 7.22 Picture .50-Caliber Rifle.

.50 Caliber Rifle

UNCLASSIFIED
7.8.13.9.1 History. The M82A1/M-107 rifle was fielded to pararescue sometime in
the 1990s for the mission Operation SOUTHERN WATCH in response to the potential
vehicle threat during a potential airdrop mission in denied or hostile territory. Training
on these rifles was handed down rotation by rotation. Since the rifle was based on the
M16 rifle series weapons, that the AFQC and CFETP training already being conducted
and access to the TO was sufficient for safe operation of the weapon. Pararescuemen
trained in Operation SOUTHERN WATCH began informal testing of the weapon in
order to configure the rifle for the mission and develop tactics techniques and
procedures. Fielding of this equipment is essential to a directed mission. The military
does not offer a formal training program for this rifle and mission. The following
guidance will provide the weapon system with a basis of information to build the
capability.
7.8.13.9.2 Equipment Configuration.
Leupold Mark 4 M1 16X40mm scope part #50541, 150 MOA scopes, with
Mildot.
30mm Steel Leupold rings with 1913 rail topcap.
SIMRAD KN/203FAB-4 GEN-III Omni-IV Weapon Sight.
The book .50 sniper course Hard Target Interdiction is the units lesson plan
outline.
The Barnes Ballistics 2.0 computer program, or suitable substitute.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

7-27

Chronograph (Measures the speed of the bullets).


AF technical orders.
1,500 yard day only eye safe laser range finder.
Wind speed/barometers for measuring wind speed, temp, altitude, and
barometric pressure.
Factory pelican case.
7.8.13.9.3 Operator Level Training. Information from the US Navy snipers was
obtained regarding the shooting standards for shooters of our experience, training and
mission. Standard; with a rifle zeroed point of impact/point of aim at 500 yards and a
range card. The shooter should be able to dope the weapon and fire one magazine
into a 72-foot square target at 800 yards with no time limit. The operator is able to
assemble and disassemble basic weapon. The shooter is able to identify the M8 .50
caliber round used for shooting. The weapons will be airdropped in its pelican case.
The shooter is able to identify and clear malfunction IAW the lesson plan outline. The
rifles are choreographed (bullet speed was measured) and the information is saved in
the ballistics computer program. Each rifle operates at a different speed and when
precision shooting is required individual range cards can be created. Because the
SIMRAD scope operates as a prism and no change in shooting position is required day
and night operation/installation and removal of the night scope is considered a
familiarization. Shooting from the seated position in the ATV is how the weapon is
normally used. During movement, the weapon is tied down in the ATV litter with
the shooting bag underneath for protection. (See Figure 7.23, ATV.) Normally 3 to 5
magazines of M8 ball are carried as ammunition load out for the weapon. The range
card is taped to the butt stock for easy reading. Familiarization training is conducted
day and night at 0 to 1,200 yard ranges with exercises in rapid setup, doping, loading,
shooting multiple ranges and targets on either 72 -inch squared targets or vehicles.
7.8.13.9.4 Trainer-Level Training. Trainers are expected to be able to execute all
operator-level tasks. They must conduct factory-level inspection of the weapon IAW
manufactures directions, the AF technical orders and ID or fix problems trained on at
the factory operator armorers course. They also create range cards; use the Mildot
recital, slip the scope rings and zero the weapon; determine when deviations to the
operator-level training are acceptable to meet unit needs. Assemble/disassemble and
adjust weapon IAW factory operators manual deviation will be reported to the training
department. Identify M8, M20, Mk-211, and other standard training round issued in
the AF inventory.
7.8.13.9.5 Maintenance. Factory certified armorers mount scopes and sights and
conduct factory authorized maintenance IAW the AF technical orders, when
authorized.

7-28

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 7.23 ATV.

ATV

UNCLASSIFIED
THIS PAGE

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

8-1
CHAPTER 8

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
8.1 Desert Combat Operations. A desert operation is one of the more demanding aspects of
recovery team (RT) combat operations. Accomplishment of a limited surface operation
(LSO)/extend surface operation (ESO) requires close team coordination. The hazards involved in
ground desert operations are both physical and psychological. Disregard of the basic
fundamentals of desert operations may result in an unsuccessful recovery and possible injury or
loss of a RT. Remembered that the principles and fundamentals of pararescue surface operations
do not change in the desert. Priorities may differ, techniques may vary from those in temperate
climates, but a RTwho if fit and well-trained to fight in other environmentswill have little
difficulty adjusting to desert warfare. For detailed information, see Army FM 90-3, Desert
Operations, and Army FM 3-05.214, Special Forces Mounted Operations.
8.1.1 Environmental Considerations. In order to prepare for desert operations and
function in the desert environment, it is first necessary to understand the environment.
8.1.1.1 Terrain. Terrain varies considerably from place to place, high mountain desert
and plateaus to sea level, sandy or rocky.
8.1.1.2 Mountainous. Mountainous areas may be more permissive to day time
movement and less so for vehicular travel. Canyons or wadis offer good cover and
concealment but may be hazardous due to flash floods.
8.1.1.3 Sandy/Plateaus. Flat open dessert is best negotiated by nighttime vehicular
movement. Rockier roads and trails may damage vehicle tires. Care should be taken to
avoid driving into wadis at night. Movement on foot should be the least optimal choice.
8.1.2 Climate. Made up of temperature, precipitation, and wind.
8.1.2.1 Temperature. Very high, daytime temperatures limit movement to hours of
darkness. Daytime activities should be minimal and limited to hold-up site activities. Hot,
dry air will adversely affect helicopter performance. Team members must remember that
the flying time and performance of a helicopter is degraded as the altitude and heat
increase. Anticipate significant reduction of payloads. Night operations will provide the
best operating envelope for helicopter performance. During the winter months some
desert areas (specifically high desert) may be very cold. Cold weather survival gear will
be a necessity.
8.1.2.2 Precipitation. Generally, there is a lack of water and precipitation and very low
humidity. Water sources in the field will not be readily available. Plan on resupply for
prolonged operations or attempt desert survival techniques as a last resort.
8.1.2.3 Winds. High winds can generate blowing sand and dust storms. Dust storms can
cause brownout conditions. Visibility can be reduced for hours and can last for days.
8.1.3 Life Forms. Plant, animal, insect, and indigenous personnel.

8-2

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


8.1.3.1 Vegetation. Typically, vegetation ranges from very sparse to nonexistent and
cannot be relied on for concealment. Plant life may vary from none to scrub, reaching over
6 feet high.
8.1.3.2 Insects. Drawn to humans as a source of moisture or food, lice, mites, and flies
can be extremely unpleasant and carry diseases such as scrub typhus and dysentery. The
stings of scorpions and the bites of centipedes and spiders are extremely painful, though
seldom fatal. However, some species of scorpion, as well as black widow and recluse
spiders, can cause death. Preventative measures include use of insect repellent, PPE, and
situational awareness.
8.1.3.3 Population. Population will be concentrated around water sources, but nomadic
peoples may be encountered far from water. Avoid moving upwind of population areas.
8.1.4 Environmental Effects on Equipment and Personnel.
8.1.4.1 Sand and Dust. Dusty areas will brownout helicopters when landing. Dust from
vehicle operations or helo infils may reveal the position. Dust clouds are easily visible for
thousands of meters. Additional considerations include the following:
8.1.4.1.1

Practical use of goggles for all helicopter insertions and extractions.

8.1.4.1.2 False insertions to counter enemy observation of insert point.


8.1.4.1.3 Aircraft landing whenever possible to minimize time in a hover. Team
members must be ready to deploy immediately on touchdown to reduce aircraft
exposure. Landing sites should be selected when possible to minimize loose sand and
grit.
8.1.4.1.4 Blowing sand and dust pit helicopter windshields, damage rotor blades, and
increase in maintenance problems. Some desert-deployed helicopter units have
required engine changes at twice as regular rate due to sand ingestion. Speed of
insertion/extraction in the total rescue effort is paramount and will ultimately
determine the overall effectiveness of the rescue unit
8.1.4.2 Reflective Surfaces. A powerful sun and low cloud density combine to produce
unusually bright and glaring light conditions during the day. Sun glasses are vital to desert
operations. Avoid mirrored sunglasse lenses. Cover reflective items on gear and vehicles.
When using optics (e.g., gun sights and binoculars), shade the front of the lenses to prevent
reflection. Turbulent air currents and mirages may limit observation. Observation should
be from higher elevations. In addition, protect any exposed skin from sun light to prevent
sun burn.
8.1.4.3 Clothing. Select loose-fitting clothing that covers all exposed skin. Use a scarf
or cravat to cover the neck and face. Also, use goggles to protect eyes from sun and dust.
Select clothing made from materiels that will maintain body heat when wet, because air
temperature may fall at night. Avoid cotton clothing at all costs during cooler months.
Consider wearing gaiters to keep sand out of boots.
8.1.5 Tactical Vehicle in the Desert. The use of tactical vehicles is the preferred mode of
ground movement in desert terrain. This section will cover tactical vehicle movement in desert
terrain.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

8-3

8.1.5.1 When using tactical vehicles, rate of travel will be affected by terrain and
likelihood of contact.
8.1.5.2 Vehicle speed will be affected by terrain such as traveling on roads or
cross-country. Traveling on roads will be faster but will increase chance of enemy contact.
Cross country is slower, leaves more noticeable vehicle tracks and signs of passage,
increases vehicle stress, and makes navigation more difficult. Some desert terrain is so
rough that tactical vehicles may have trouble traversing it faster than a man can walk.
Rehearse cross-country movement in terrain as close as possible to that of the target area
before deployment.
8.1.5.3 Wheel slip is when the vehicles wheels turn disproportionately (e.g., tires spin),
causing the odometer to read greater distance traveled than the actual distance traveled.
Moderately soft sand will cause the wheel to slip up to 10 percent.
8.1.6 Vehicle Lessons Learned. The following paragraphs address different areas of
vehicles and what was learned during actual operations.
8.1.6.1 Clean all filters regularly to maintain engine efficiency and avoid complications.
Use fuel filters or strainers when refueling to avoid fuel contamination and clogged fuel
lines. Remove all sand and dust from the caps before removing them to fill fluid levels.
This action will prevent contamination.
8.1.6.2 Keep the tires at proper tire pressure and filled with industrial sealant to avoid
flats. Carry extra tire plugs and repair kits.
8.1.6.3 Severe terrain consisting of rough, uneven ground, steep mountains, and loose
sand and rocks will cause vibrations and result in the loosening of nuts and bolts and fuel
and hydraulic lines. It could also disrupt electrical components. Rough terrain can
severely affect wheels, transmissions, and suspension systems. Therefore, frequent
inspections and maintenance periods are necessary to ensure vehicles function properly
and to prevent long downtime due to repairs.
8.1.6.4 The abrasive effects of sand and dust adversely affect equipment. Any moving
part faces the probability of being damaged or impaired by sand or dust. Brakes, recoil
systems, bearings, hydraulics, and relays are susceptible to incapacitation by sand or dust.
Also, sand and dust mixed with lubricants turns into an abrasive paste that can easily wear
and score moving parts. Cover equipment when not in use. Frequent preventive
maintenance will help to alleviate these problems to a manageable degree.
8.1.6.5 Intense heat and low humidity can cause overheating of the vehicles and batteries
and the degradation of seals and tires. Surface temperatures can heat parts and accessories,
making them unable without protection. Surface temperatures can reach 140 degrees and
reflect heat under and into vehicles. Remember, frequent inspections, protection with
covers, and regular maintenance will reduce the effects of these environmental factors.
8.1.6.6 Vehicle overheating is a major problem in the desert. Overheating is a greater
problem during that day than at night. Keep the fan belts at the right tension. Keep the
radiator free from debris. Use a corrosive inhibitor in the water and coolant mixture.
Inspect the water pump shaft bearing often to determine if it has worn bearings.

8-4

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


8.1.7 Driving Techniques.
8.1.7.1 Good off-road driving technique is the first preventive step in limiting broken
vehicle parts or becoming stuck. All drivers must become well trained in judging terrain
and negotiating various ground conditions. Most movements will be at night, so drivers
training should focus on the use of night vision devices. In addition, drivers should
develop the following skills:
Selecting proper gear ratio and shifting.
Using momentum.
Knowing the vehicles capabilities.
Estimating and using proper speeds.
Avoiding sudden forward and braking thrusts.
Applying traction theory.
8.1.7.2 In some deserts, thorny and spiny plants pose a problem to tires, especially at
night. They can puncture radiator hoses. Secure all equipment to the vehicles to avoid
loss. Using a driving technique is the first preventive measure in preventing flats.
8.1.8 Driving Environment.
8.1.8.1 Terrain Conditions. Drivers must become familiar with varying terrain
conditions found in the desert and considerations for crossing the conditions encountered.
8.1.8.2 Sand Dunes. In non-vegetated sandy areas, the wind can sweep sand, packing it
into high sand dunes. These sand dunes can be extremely high and steep and almost
impossible to traverse when fully loaded. Sand dunes can form a crust on the surface,
usually about 2 inches deep, which makes the dune surface appear to be hard. If crossing
under these conditions, the surface will break under the vehicles weight, leaving the
vehicle stuck in loose sand. Avoid crossing sand dunes. If crossing is necessary, conduct
a reconnaissance, if possible, to determine the best route to limit chances of becoming
stuck. The best bet is to traverse these large sand areas by driving around the sand dunes
at their lowest point. To increase traction when driving in sand, the driver can reduce tire
pressure all the way around. Take care not to reduce the tire pressure too much, the tire
will come off the rim. When reducing tire pressure, the tires footprint increases, giving
the vehicle more flotation or surface area to grip the sand. Remember to re-inflate the tires
to correct operating pressure once clear of sandy areas. When approaching large areas of
deep sand, increase vehicle speed before entering and keep the vehicles momentum
steady. Do not turn the vehicles wheels sharply, as this move can cause loss of
momentum.
8.1.8.3 Rugged Terrain. Rocky and boulder-strewn areas may extend for miles in all
directions. Rocks in desert environments are very often sharp-edged due to erosion or
from volcanic origin. These sharp rocks are very hazardous to tires. Often rocks are so
numerous that it is impossible to avoid all but the largest ones. Driving in such areas
causes extreme wear on tires, suspension, and drive train components. The shock incurred
when traversing rocky areas can also break equipment stored on the vehicle if not secured

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

8-5

properly. Tire pressure can be lowered to reduce the bumpy ride and shock that is
transferred to the vehicle. However, lessons learned indicate that a higher than normal tire
pressure helps reduce punctures from smaller rocks. Rocks scraping the wall of the tires
may cause a sidewall puncture that is difficult to repair.
8.1.8.4 Riverbeds. Wadis are dry riverbeds caused by fast-moving runoff water from
higher elevations after a rain. Most wadis have a smooth bed and prove to be excellent
tracks for travel. Never travel in a wadi when it has been or is raining because of flood
danger. When coming across a wadi, look for a good entry and exit point. Many times the
banks will be steep. If the wadi is not too steep or narrow, cross it by entering head on or at
a slight angle. Be careful not to turn the wheels too much in any direction so that if the
vehicle hits a hole or slides down into the wadi, the wheel will not be torqued and break the
ball joint. Use a ground guide to walk the path, then ease the vehicle into the wadi using
low gear. Cross small ditches at an angle to prevent the vehicle from becoming high
centered. Enter these obstacles at a low speed. High-speed entry may cause the vehicle to
tip or roll over.
8.1.8.5 Marshes. Salt marshes are mostly impassable due to the powdery silt and wet,
muddy areas. Mud-packed tire treads will deny traction. Although salt marshes should be
avoided, small areas not on maps may have to be crossed. Use rocks, sandbags, perforated
steel planking (PSP), or dry sand to construct a passable bed. Loss of momentum in sand
results in getting stuck.
WARNING: Do not stand behind a vehicle when using PSP.
8.1.9 Operations.
8.1.9.1 Night Operations. Team members should be familiar with the following
considerations of desert operations: temperature, high winds and dust storms, and night
operations. Light and noise at night may be seen or heard from miles away, so strict light
and noise discipline is necessary. Enemy passive night vision devices are capable of
picking up light sources of any color at ranges far in excess of the unaided eye. One
momentary lapse may be sufficient to attract enemy attention.
8.1.9.2 Air Support. Tactical air support operations are extremely effective in a desert
environment, although dust storms may hide ground targets from air assets.
8.1.9.3 IP. Most likely, recovered IP will be suffering from environmental (hot or cold)
related injuries such as dehydration, hyper/hypothermia, or sun burn. Be prepared to
rehydrate the IP and provide protection from the environment.
8.1.9.4 Resupply. Extremely low humidity and high temperature will greatly increase
drinking water requirements. Prior to employment, an exercise should be conducted to
determine logistical requirements such as water requirements, filters on gas masks,
lubrication of weapons, and battery life on radios and optical gear.
8.1.9.5 Communications. Desert operations will require good communications for
successful mission accomplishment. Team members should understand the following
points in desert communication.
8.1.9.5.1

All RT surface operations will require a SATCOM capability.

8-6

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


8.1.9.5.2 The desert environment is also likely to degrade the transmission range of
radios, particularly VHF (FM) fitted with secure equipment.

NOTE: This degradation is most likely to occur in the hottest part of the day, approximately
1,200 to 1,700 hours. Additional relay support may be required for communication, depending on
the distance involved. Ground-mounted whip antennas may be degraded in performance by
one-third. Directional antennas must be faced exactly in the required direction. Approximate
azimuths will not do. Radios and batteries should be kept cool and clean. Carry and store them
covered and in the shade when possible. Long distance visual signals may be distorted by heat
waves.
8.2 Maritime Combat Operations. Because so much of the Earths surface is covered with
water, the GUARDIAN ANGEL weapons systems may have a greater than average chance of
conducting operations in this environment.
8.2.1 Environmental Considerations. In order to prepare for maritime operations and
function in the maritime environment, environmental understanding is necessary to
understand the environment.
8.2.1.1 Characteristics. Recovery teams (RT) need to understand the basic
characteristics of the maritime environment. Some characteristics are waves, ice, tides,
current, and lightning.
8.2.1.1.1 Waves. Wave formations and activity are extremely important in planning
the successful execution of any waterborne operation. Waves impact on all
surface-related activities, including boating or swimming. Waves can likewise affect
the subsurface activities of the combat diver; therefore, divers must be totally familiar
with the effects of waves.
8.2.1.1.1.1 Waves are a transfer of energy through water particles. Energy, not
water, is what moves as waves pass. The actual water particles in a wave describe
a circular orbit and return very nearly to their exact starting point at the end of a
wave cycle. Like a cork bobbing freely, water particles in the open ocean move up
and down in circular motion. There is very little lateral or horizontal movement.
8.2.1.1.1.2 When planners study waves, they break them into deep water waves
and shallow water waves. In deep water waves, the orbit is intact or circular. In
shallow water waves, the orbit reflects off the bottom and becomes elliptical. As
the orbit becomes elliptical, the energy transfers and the breaking wave becomes
surf. The following paragraphs discuss wave terms, the formation of waves, and
types of waves.
8.2.1.1.1.3. Planners and operators must understand wave activity and wave
formation terminology. (See Figure 8.1, Wave Characteristics.) The common
definitions that can assist personnel in understanding waves are as follows:
8.2.1.1.1.3.1 The crest is the very top of the wave or the highest point in the
wave.
8.2.1.1.1.3.2 The trough is the lowest portion of the wave and is that point
between two crests.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

8-7

Figure 8.1 Wave Characteristics.

Wave Characteristics

Crest

Wave Period (Time in Seconds)

Still Water Level

Wave Length

Wave
Height

Trough

Amplitude (1/2 Wave Height)

UNCLASSIFIED
8.2.1.1.1.3.3 Wavelength is the horizontal distance between a wave crest and
the crest of the preceding wave. Wavelength can also be measured from trough
to trough.
8.2.1.1.1.3.4 Wave height is the total vertical distance from the crest of a wave
to its trough.
8.2.1.1.1.3.5 Amplitude is the height of a wave above or below sea level.
Amplitude is equal to one-half of the wave height.
8.2.1.1.1.3.6 Wave period is the time it takes, in seconds, for two consecutive
wave crests to pass a fixed observation point.
8.2.1.1.1.3.7 Planners and operators must also know how waves are formed.
With this knowledge, the combat swimmer, when exposed to certain
conditions, can anticipate what type of wave activity and wave action will most
likely be prevalent. The swimmer must also know how waves react under
certain conditions so that he can anticipate and react to sea conditions. Wave
formation is primarily a wind function. As the wind blows across the waters of
the ocean, it imparts energy onto the surface of the water, causing it to oscillate.
Wave height depends on three factors: force, duration, and fetch. Force is the
speed of the wind. Duration is how long the wind blows; it takes roughly 12
hours for fully developed waves to build. Fetch is the open distance over which
the wind blows uninterrupted by land masses such as islands or reefs. As a rule

8-8

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


of thumb, the maximum height of a wave will be equal to one-half of the wind
velocity, providing the fetch is great and the duration is sustained.
8.2.1.1.1.4. Secondary causes of wave formation include geological disturbances
such as earthquakes, landslides, volcanic action, or nuclear explosions. Any of
these events can cause tsunamis (commonly referred to as tidal waves). Tsunamis
may only be 1 meter high on the open ocean but can routinely reach heights of 60
feet as they approach shallow water. Other types of waves are storm surges, tidal
bores, seiches, and internal waves.
8.2.1.1.1.4.1 Storm Surges. These surges always occur during bad weather.
They result from the combination of tides and rising sea level. Low
atmospheric pressure coupled with the high winds and rising tides, forces large
amounts of water inland, causing extensive flooding that can last through
several tidal cycles. The worst storm surges normally occur with hurricanes,
due to the extreme low pressure and high winds.
8.2.1.1.1.4.2 Tidal Bores. Tidal bores occur when land masses serve to
restrict the flow of water. Normally, as in the Amazon Basin and the Bay of
Fundi in Nova Scotia, the area is fed by a freshwater river. As the large amount
of water is rapidly channelized, its speed increases dramatically. Large
amounts of water are rapidly carried upstream due to the incoming tide,
creating a wall of water. These occur throughout the tidal cycle, moving
upstream during flood tides and downstream during ebb tides. Most tidal bores
are found in Asia.
8.2.1.1.1.4.3 Seiche. This type of standing wave is normally found in lakes or
semi-closed or confined bodies of water. It is a phenomenon where the entire
body of water oscillates between fixed points without progression. Depending
on the natural frequency of the body of water, these oscillations may be
mononodal or multinodal. A seiche can be caused by changes in barometric
pressure or strong winds of longer duration pushing the water in a lake to the
opposite shore. When the wind diminishes, this buildup of water seeks to
return to its normal level and the lake level will oscillate between the shores
until it stabilizes. It is a long wave, usually having its crest on one shore and its
trough on the other. Its period may be anything from a few minutes to an hour
or more. Strong currents can accompany this movement of water, especially if
it passes through a restriction.
8.2.1.1.1.4.4 Internal Waves. Internal waves or boundary waves form below
the surface at the boundaries between water strata of different densities. The
density differences between adjacent water strata in the sea are considerably
less than that between sea and air. Consequently, internal waves are much more
easily formed than surface waves, and they are often much larger. The
maximum height of wind waves on the surface is about 60 feet but internal
wave heights as great as 300 feet have been encountered. The full significance
of internal waves has not yet been determined but it is known that they may

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

8-9

cause submarines to rise and fall like a ship at the surface and they may also
affect sound transmission in the sea.
8.2.1.1.1.5 Breaking Waves. Breaking waves (breakers) are another area of
concern and interest. These waves form the different types of surf. Breaking
waves can be spillers, plungers, or surgers. (See Figure 8.2, Types of Breaking
Waves.) The type of breaker is normally dependent upon the bottom gradient.
Figure 8.2 Types of Breaking Waves.

Types of Breaking Waves


Spilling Breaker
Still
Water
Line

Breaking
Point

Foam
5

3 2

Beach bottom is very flat

Plunging Breaker
Foam

Still
Water
Line

Breaking
Point
1

Beach bottom is steep

Surging Breaker
Still
Water
Line

Foam

3
2

3
2

Beach bottom is very steep

UNCLASSIFIED

8-10

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


8.2.1.1.1.5.1. If the slope of the bottom is very gentle or gradual, the breakers
force will be very gentle. Thus, the waves will create a spilling action or what
is normally the white water at the crest of the wave. These breaking waves are
called spillers.
8.2.1.1.1.5.2. If the slope of the bottom is steep, the breakers force will be
more pronounced. Thus the waves crest, as it is unsupported, causes a
plunging effect. These waves are called plungers and literally pound the beach.
8.2.1.1.1.5.3. With an extremely steep or near vertical slope, the wave literally
surges onto shore all at once. These are surging waves and are very violent.
8.2.1.1.1.6. Knowing the types of breaking waves and what causes them is
important for conducting any boat or swimmer operation in a surf area. Also,
knowing the type of bottom (from a chart or survey) allows the swimmer to
determine wave activity in the AO. From another standpoint, the swimmer can
determine bottom slope by observing wave action in a surf zone. This information,
when reported, could prove useful for future operations.
8.2.1.1.1.7 Impact of Wave Activity. Obviously, wave activity can have a
positive or negative impact on any waterborne operation. Careful planning and
consideration of all possible wave activity will greatly enhance the operational
success of any mission. The operational planner should remember the following
points:
The height of the waves is about one-half the speed of the wind.
The depth of the water is four-thirds the height of a breaking wave. Example:
Height of wave is equal to 6 feet, 1/3 of 6 = 2, 2 x 4 = 8, depth of water is about
8 feet.
The likely existence of a sandbar or reef just under the water when waves are
observed breaking offshore and again onshore.
The wind must blow across the water about 12 hours to generate maximum
wave activity.
8.2.1.1.2 Ice. Operational personnel must consider ice and its effects on people and
equipment when planning mission requirements.
8.2.1.1.2.1 The freezing of a body of water is governed primarily by temperature,
salinity, and water depth. However, winds, currents, and tides may retard the
formation of ice. When strong gusty winds are present, the mixing of the water
brings heat from lower depths and raises the temperature enough to prevent the
forming of ice, even if the air is at subzero temperatures. Fresh water freezes at 0
degrees C or 32 degrees F but the freezing point of seawater decreases about 0.28
degrees C per 5 percent increase in salinity. Shallow bodies of low-salinity water
freeze more rapidly than deeper basins because a lesser volume must be cooled.
Once the initial cover of ice has formed on the surface, no more mixing can take
place from wind or wave action, and the ice will thicken. The first ice of autumn
usually appears in the mouths of rivers that empty over a shallow continental shelf.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

8-11

During the increasingly longer and colder nights of autumn, ice forms along the
shorelines as a semipermanent feature. It then widens by spreading into more
exposed waters. When islands are close together, ice blankets the sea surface and
bridges the waters between the land areas.
8.2.1.1.2.2 If personnel must enter an ice field, they should proceed cautiously. Ice
1-inch thick will stop most recreational boats and can do serious damage to the
hull. Boat operators should take into account the time of ebb and flood tides; ice is
generally more compact during the flood and is more likely to break up on the ebb.
They should move at idle speed, but keep moving. It is important to be patient.
Personnel will not be able to tell how thick ice is just by looking at the field in front
of them. They should look at the broken ice at the stern of the boat. The boat
should make no sharp turns. Operators should watch engine temperatures carefully
because ice slush causes problems with water intakes; it rapidly clogs up filters and
strainers. Personnel should also keep a good watch on the propellers, especially if
encountering large chunks of ice. When backing down, operators should keep the
rudder amid ship to minimize damage.
8.2.1.1.2.3. One of the most serious effects of cold weather is that of topside icing,
caused by wind-driven spray, particularly if the ice continues to accumulate. Ice
grows considerably thicker as a result of splashing, spraying, and flooding. It
causes an increased weight load on decks and masts (radar and radio). It introduces
complications with the handling and operation of equipment. It also creates
slippery deck conditions. Ice accumulation (known as ice accretion) causes the
boat to become less stable and can lead to a capsizing.
8.2.1.1.2.4 Crew members should break ice away by chipping it off with mallets,
clubs, scrapers, and even stiff brooms. However, crew members must be very
careful to avoid damage to electrical wiring and finished surfaces.
8.2.1.1.3 Tides and Tidal Currents. Successful amphibious landings are based on
careful planning and a comprehensive knowledge of the environmental conditions that
influence the landings. Weather, with its immediate effects on wind and waves, and the
hydrography and topography of the BLS, are two of these environmental conditions.
The third element is tide and tidal current data. Mistiming tides and tidal currents will
have an immediate and obvious effect on the potential success or failure of a
waterborne operation. History is full of invasion forces and raiding teams trapped and
wiped out while crossing tidal flats at low tide. There were also many reconnaissance
elements lost at sea or compromised by daylight because they could not make headway
against contrary currents. Many of these operational disasters could have been avoided
with proper prior planning. Environmental conditions can affect every operation in a
positive or negative manner. The height of the tide and the speed and direction of the
tidal current can impede or halt a waterborne operation. These two elements require
the detachment to properly conduct mission planning to ensure a positive impact. For
operational teams to be successful, the height, direction, and speed of the tide must be
compatible with the chosen infiltration method and must coincide with the hours of
darkness. Adverse environmental elements can pose immediate threats to the

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


detachments infiltration plan. Therefore, compensating for these elements helps
ensure successful completion of the mission.
8.2.1.1.3.1 After the detachment examines the environmental conditions and
selects an infiltration time, it must develop viable contingency plans. To assist in
developing contingency plans, the detachment should calculate the tide and tidal
current data for at least 3 days before and 3 days after the desired time on target.
For some missions, the environmental data may need to be computed for several
weeks.
8.2.1.1.3.2 Tides. Tide is the periodic rise and fall of the water accompanying the
tidal phenomenon. A rising or incoming tide is called a flood tide and a falling or
outgoing tide is called an ebb tide. This variation in the ocean level is caused by
the interaction of gravitational forces between the earth and the moon and, to a
lesser extent, between the earth and the sun. Because the lunar day or tidal day is
slightly longer than 24 hours (it averages 24 hours and 50 minutes), the time
between successive high or low tides is normally a little more than 12 hours. When
a high or low tide occurs just before midnight, the next high or low tide occurs
approximately at noon on the following day; the next, just after the ensuing
midnight, and so on.
8.2.1.1.3.3 The highest level reached by an ascending tide is called high water; the
minimum level of a descending tide is called low water. The rate of rise and fall is
not uniform. From low water, the tide begins to rise slowly at first but at an
increasing rate until it is about halfway to high water. The rate of rise then
decreases until high water is reached and the rise ceases. The detachment can then
graphically plot the rate of rise and fall, as well as the speeds of the accompanying
tidal currents, to determine optimal conditions for maritime operations. At high
and low water, there is a brief period during which there is no change in the water
level. This period is called stand.
8.2.1.1.3.4 The total rise or fall from low water to high, or vice versa, is called the
range of the tide. The actual height of the water level at high and low water varies
with phases of the moon, variations of wind force and direction, atmospheric
pressure, and other local causes. The average height of high water, measured over
an extended period, is called mean high water. The average height of low water,
measured in the same way, is called mean low water. The plane midway between
mean high and mean low water is called mean sea level (at sea) and called mean
tide level near the coast and in inshore waters. (See Figure 8.3, High and Low
Tides.)

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8-13

Figure 8.3 Figure High and Low Tides.

High and Low Tides

Higher High Water


Mean High

Stand

Mean Tide Level


(Coast and Inland Waters)

Mean Sea Level


Stand

Mean Low
Lower Low Water

UNCLASSIFIED
8.2.1.1.3.5 Spring tides occur near the time of full moon and new moon, when the
sun and moon act together to produce tides higher and lower than average. When
the moon is in its first or last quarter, it and the sun are opposed to each other, and
neap tides of less than average range occur. (See Figure 8.4, Neap and Spring
Tides.)
8.2.1.1.3.6 Tides at a particular location are classified as one of three types:
semidiurnal, diurnal, or mixed. In the semidiurnal tide, there are two high and two
low waters each tidal day, with relatively small inequality in the high- and
low-water heights. Tides on the Atlantic coast of the United States are
representative of the semidiurnal type.
8.2.1.1.3.7 In the diurnal tide, only one high and low tide (diurnal tide) occur
each tidal day. These tides occur along the north coast of the Gulf of Mexico, in
the Java Sea, in the Gulf of Tonkin (off the Vietnam-China coast), and in a few
other localities.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 8.4 Neap and Spring Tides.

Neap and Spring Tides


1st Quarter Moon

Sun

Neap
Tides
Tide
Pattern
Last Quarter Moon

Sun

Spring
Tides

Full
Moon
New
Moon

UNCLASSIFIED
8.2.1.1.3.8 In the mixed type of tide, the diurnal and semidiurnal oscillations are
both important factors, and the tide is characterized by a large inequality in the high
water heights, low water heights, or in both. There are usually two high and two
low waters each day (semidiurnal), but occasionally the tide may become diurnal.
Such tides are prevalent along the Pacific coast of the United States and in many
other parts of the world. Where an inequality in the heights of high or low tides
exists, the higher (or lower) of the two tides will be referred to as higher high water
(or lower low water). Nautical charts in areas affected by mixed tides normally use
this information to determine the depth or overhead obstruction datum.
8.2.1.1.3.9 A tidal datum is a level from which heights and depths are measured.
Because water depths (soundings) measured during the initial charting of an area
vary with tidal conditions, all soundings are converted to a common chart sounding
datum. There are a number of such levels that are important to the mariner.
8.2.1.1.3.10 Detachment personnel should already be familiar with the tiny figures
that indicate depth of water on a nautical chart. It is important to remember that
mean low water is only an average of the various depths actually sounded in one
particular area at low water during the survey. When working in shallow water
areas, the navigator should know the minimum depth of water the vessel will pass
through. Depth varies with stages of the tide. The actual water level at low water
may be above or below mean low water at different times because of the height of
tide. The charted depth, shown by one of the small figures on the chart, is an

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

8-15

average. It does not indicate the lowest depth to be found at all times at that
particular point.
8.2.1.1.3.11 The charted depth is the vertical distance from the reference plane,
called datum, on which soundings are based (usually, but not always, mean low
water), to the ocean bottom. As discussed earlier, the actual depth of water can be
less than the charted depth or below the reference plane. This number is shown by
a minus (-) sign placed before the height of tide in the tide tables. The depth of
water is equal to the algebraic sum of the charted depth and the height of tide.
8.2.1.1.3.12 Frequently, operations take place near reefs, rocks, shallows, flats,
sandbars, or shoals. Navigators should use the tide tables to determine the actual
depth of the water at a particular time and place. As a further safety measure, a
lead line is a valuable adjunct.
8.2.1.1.3.13 Currently, charts are being changed to use mean lower low water as
datum. Mean lower low water is the average of the lowest of the low waters each
day and can differ significantly from mean low water
8.2.1.1.4 Currents. As discussed earlier, tide is the vertical rise and fall of the
oceans water level caused by the attraction of the sun and moon. A tidal current is the
result of a tide. Tidal current is the horizontal motion of water resulting from the
vertical motion caused by a tide, distinguished them from ocean or river currents or
from those created by the wind. Tidal currents are of particular concern in small-boat
operations.
8.2.1.1.4.1 Flood Current. The horizontal motion of water toward the land
caused by a rising tide is called flood current. The horizontal motion away from the
land caused by a falling tide is known as ebb current. Between these two, while the
current is changing direction, is a brief period when no horizontal motion is
perceptible. This time is called slack water.
8.2.1.1.4.2 Ebb. An outgoing or ebb current running across a bar builds up a
more intense sea than the incoming or flood current. This sea results from the rush
of water out against the incoming ground swell that slows the wave speed and
steepens the wave prematurely.
8.2.1.1.4.3 Longshore. Some currents run parallel to the shore and inside the
breakers. The water the waves carry to the beach causes these currents. They are
called longshore currents. A navigator should pay close attention to this type of
current because it can cause his boat to broach (capsize), or cause an object that he
is searching for to move farther than he would expect.
8.2.1.1.4.4 Currents Affect Boat Speed. When going with the current, the boats
speed over the ground is faster than the speed or revolutions per minute (rpm)
indication. The effect is the same as that experienced by an aircraft affected by
head or tail winds. When going against the current, the boats speed over the
ground is slower than the speed or rpm indication.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


8.2.1.1.4.5 Currents Affect Boat Maneuverability. When working in current,
the navigator must remember that the boats maneuverability depends on its speed
through the water. The boat may have significant speed in relation to fixed objects
(a pier, for example), but because the current is carrying it, the boat may lack
maneuverability if too little water is flowing past its rudder.
8.2.1.1.4.6. Boat Navigation. When crossing the current to compensate for the
set, the navigator may have to put the boat in a crab. That is, the navigator he
must turn the bow slightly into the current or wind. As a result of this maneuver,
the boats heading and the actual course made good will be different. Therefore,
the navigator must play the current or wind by either sighting on a fixed object,
such as a range, or by marking bearing drift on some object as nearly in line with
his destination as possible.
8.2.1.1.4.7 Eddy Currents. Eddy currents (eddies) are swirling currents,
sometimes quite powerful, that occur downstream (down current) of obstructions
(for example, islands, rocks, or piers) at channel bends, near points of land, and at
places where the bottom is uneven. Eddies can be dangerous to small boats.
Navigators should watch for and avoid them.
8.2.1.1.4.8 Wind Affects Current Speed. A sustained wind in the same
direction as the current increases current speed by a small amount. A wind in the
opposite direction slows it down and may create a chop. A very strong wind
blowing directly into the mouth of an inlet or bay can produce an unusually high
tide by piling up the water. (Similarly, a very strong wind blowing out of a bay can
cause an unusually low tide and change the time of the high or low tide.)
8.2.1.1.4.9 The time of a tidal currents change of direction does not coincide with
the time of high or low tide. The currents change of direction always lags behind
the tides turning. This time interval varies according to the physical characteristics
of the land around the body of tidewater. For instance, there is usually little
difference between the times of high or low tide and the time of slack water along
a relatively straight coast with only shallow indentions. But where a large body of
water connects with the ocean through a narrow channel, the tide and the current
may be out of phase by as much as several hours. In this case, the current in the
channel may be running at its greatest speed during high or low tide.
8.2.1.1.4.10 Winds, variations in stream discharges produced by heavy rain, or
snow and ice melt, and other weather factors frequently affect current direction and
speed. When any of these occur, actual current conditions vary from those
predicted. The ability to estimate the amount by which they vary can be acquired
only through experience in a particular area.
8.2.1.1.4.11 Like the tidal difference in time, the time differences are applied to
the slack and maximum current times at the reference station to obtain the
corresponding times at the subordinate station. Maximum speed at the subordinate
station is found by multiplying the maximum speed at the reference station by the
appropriate flood or ebb ratio.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

8-17

8.2.1.1.4.12 Flood direction is the approximate true direction toward which the
flooding current flows. Ebb direction is generally close to the reciprocal of the
flood direction. Average flood and ebb speeds are averages of all the flood and ebb
currents. Tidal Current Table 3 is similar to Table 3 of the Tide Tables. It is used
to find current speed at a specific time.
8.2.1.1.4.13 Actual conditions often vary considerably from those predicted in the
Tide Tables and the Tidal Current Tables. Changes in wind force and direction or
in atmospheric pressure produce changes in ocean water level, especially the
high-water height. For instance, the hurricane that struck the New England coast in
September 1938 piled up a huge wall of water in Narragansett Bay. This wall of
water increased to such a point that it became a huge storm wave when it struck the
city of Providence. Generally, with an onshore wind or a low barometer, the
high-water and low-water heights are higher than the predicted heights. With a
high barometer or offshore wind, those heights are usually lower than predicted.
8.2.1.1.4.14 When working with the tidal current tables, the navigator should
always remember that the actual times of slack or strength of current may
sometimes differ from the predicted times by as much as .5 hour. On rare
occasions, the difference may be as much as 1 hour. However, comparison
between predicted and observed slack times shows that more than 90 percent of
slack water predictions are accurate to within .5 hour. Thus, to fully take advantage
of a favorable current or slack water, the navigator should plan to reach an entrance
or strait at least .5 hour before the predicted time.
8.2.1.1.4.15 Tidal current calculations are by far the most critical factor pertaining
to environmental conditions. The entire waterborne operation can be jeopardized
without precise knowledge of the speed and direction of the tidal current. For
example, a 1-knot ebb tidal current will halt any forward movement of a combat
swimmer in the water. Even a 0.5-knot current will cause excessive fatigue on a
combat swimmer.
8.2.1.1.4.16 The predicted slacks and strengths given in tidal current tables refer to
the horizontal motion of water, not to the vertical height of the tide. Therefore, it is
important to compute both tide height and tidal current to gain a complete picture
of the tidal forces in the chosen AO.
8.2.1.1.4.17 The graphical method of depicting the tide and current predictions is
an excellent tool for extended calculations. It provides a complete visual picture of
the tidal forces during the operational time period.
8.2.1.1.5 Lighting. A team member can judge the distance from a thunderstorm by
knowing that light travels at about 186,000 miles per second and sound at about 1,100
feet per second (or about 1 mile in 5 seconds). If the member times how long the sound
of the thunder takes to reach the members after seeing the lightning flash, the distance
to the storm can be roughly estimated. (Counting ONE THOUSAND ONE, ONE
THOUSAND TWO, ONE THOUSAND THREE will aid the member in counting
seconds.) Detachment personnel should reduce their exposure or risk of being struck
by lightening by getting out of or off of the water and seeking shelter.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


8.2.1.1.5.1. If caught in a lightning strike area in a relatively unprotected boat (as
in a CRRC), the team should:
8.2.1.1.5.1.1 Stay inside the boat, keep the crew centrally positioned and low
down in the vessel, and stay dry.
8.2.1.1.5.1.2 Avoid touching metal objects such as weapons, equipment,
outboard motors, shift and throttle levers, and metal steering wheels.
8.2.1.1.5.1.3 Avoid contact with the radio, lower and disconnect antennas, and
unplug the antenna to save the radio in case lightning strikes.
8.2.1.1.5.1.4 Quickly remove people from the water.
8.2.1.1.5.2 If a lightning strike occurs, expect the compass to be inaccurate and to
have extensive damage to on board electronics.
8.2.1.2 Climate. When conducting operations in the maritime environment an individual
could experience almost all of the major biomes of the world. These range from the
extremes of warm tropical environments to frigid arctic environments. The approach of
high- and low-pressure systems can also be tracked and anticipated with a barometer.
Some wrist watches have an altimeter and barometer function. Barometers are most useful
when monitoring trends. Normal barometric pressure is 29 inches of mercury (Hg).
Planners should take readings at regular intervals and record changes. A drop in
barometric pressure signals deteriorating weather (an approaching low-pressure system).
8.2.1.2.1 Temperature. The surface temperature of the ocean ranges from 28 degrees
Farenheit (-2 degrees Celsius) in the polar regions to 86 degrees Farenheit (30 degrees
Celsius) in the tropics. In the depths, temperatures vary throughout the ocean. But
generally, the greater the depth, the lower the temperature. In the deepest parts, it is
near freezing. Water changes temperature more slowly than air and land, therefore it
takes much longer for the sun to warm up the ocean. The ocean controls the earths
climate because of the great area of the ocean. The ocean has a steadying influence on
the land temperatures.
8.2.1.2.2 Precipitation. Since the maritime environment comprises 70.8 percent of
the earths surface, the amount of precipitation expected to be received will vary from
region to region. RTs must study AO and determine availability of precipitation.
8.2.1.2.3 Winds. High winds are a genuine concern for personnel conducting
waterborne operations. High winds can greatly impact on almost every type of
waterborne operation. High seas are directly related to wind speed. The Beaufort
Wind Scale is the internationally recognized guide to expected wave height and sea
states under varying wind conditions. When planning waterborne operations, planners
should use this scale to define a particular state of wind and wave action. (See Table
8.1, Beaufort Wind Scale.)

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

8-19

Table 8.1 Beaufort Wind Scale.


Beaufort
Wind Force
0

Wind
Range
(knots)

Sea Indications

Less than 1 Mirror like.

Wave
Height (feet)
0

1 to 3

Ripples with appearance of scales.

0.25

4 to 6

Small wavelets; glassy appearance; no breaking.

7 to 10

Large wavelets; some crests begin to break; scatter


whitecaps.

11 to 16

Small waves becoming longer; fairly frequent


whitecaps.

3.5 to 5

17 to 21

Moderate waves; pronounced long form; many


whitecaps.

6 to 8

22 to 27

Large waves begin to form; white foam crests are


more extensive; some spray

9.5 to 13

28 to 33

Sea heaps up; white foam from breaking waves


begins to blow in streaks along the direction of the
wind.

13.5 to 19

34 to 40

Moderately high waves of greater length; edges of


crests break down into spindrift foam blown in well
marked streaks along the direction of the wind.

18 to 25

41 to 47

High waves; dense streaks of foam; sea begins to


roll; visibility affected.

23 to 32

10

48 to 55

Very high waves with overhanging crests; foam in


great patches blown in dense white streaks; whole
surface of the sea takes a white appearance;
visibility affected.

29 to 41

0.5 to 1
2 to 3

8.2.1.2.4 Life Forms. RTs can encounter a wide variety of life forms. These life
forms can produce a wide range of hazards through biting, stinging, and poisoning.
For more information refer to AFR 64-4, Search and Rescue Survival Training.
8.2.2 Environmental Effects on Equipment.
8.2.2.1 Unless small-boat operators have a compelling reason to go out in dense fog, they
should not do so. If fog seems to be developing, they should try to run in ahead of it. The
small boat operating on larger bodies of water or oceans should always maintain a running
dead reckoning (DR) plot. If, for some reason, no plot has been maintained and fog rolls
in, the boat operator should attempt to get a position-fix immediately. With an accurate
heading to port and an accurate knowledge of speed over the bottom, it is possible to plot
a course back home.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


8.2.2.1.1 When in fog, the boat operator should slow down so the boat will have time
to maneuver or stop if another vessel approaches. If the boats size and configuration
permit, an observer should stand lookout well forward and away from the engine
sounds and lights to listen and look for other signals. The observer should also listen
for surf in case the DR is incorrect. The observer should use all electronic aids
available, but not depend upon them without reserve. Boat personnel should even
consider anchoring to await better visibility, especially if their return to port includes
transiting congested areas or narrow channels. As a warm front passes, cumulus clouds
replace stratus clouds, and the temperature and barometer both rise.
8.2.2.2 Equipment Preparation and Considerations. Individual combat loads should
be as light as possible and include only mission essential equipment, weapons, and
munitions. Equipment bundles should be limited to the smallest size possible to reduce
water drag, to allow easier handling, and to present a low profile in the water. The weight
and size of equipment depend on mission requirements, swim distance, and method of
transport and delivery. Final equipment preparation should take place prior to the PJTLs
equipment shake down. Weapons, communications, and other mission-essential
equipment must be packaged as ready operating units. The weapons or radio will be
useless if component parts (e.g., ammunition and batteries) are packed separately and are
lost or temporarily separated.
8.2.2.3 Weapons Employment. Weapons for water operations should be light weight,
automatic, easily assembled and disassembled, suppressed, and lend themselves to
waterproofing. The M4 and MP5 serieswhen properly prepared and maintainedworks
well in this environment. Waterproof weapons in such a way to allow quick employment
at the BLS if necessary. Weapons may be placed in a waterproof container for sub-surface
infiltration. Consider that weapons do not need to be totally waterproof. As a minimum,
water must be kept out of the barrel and sand and grit must be kept out of the receiver and
magazines. Once on land, rinse with fresh water and oil weapons as soon as practical. As
a minimum, oil moving parts and work bolt action and selector lever to prevent corrosion.
Specialized submersible shoot-through weapon bags exist that have an internal latex
glove for the team member to operate the weapon while in the bag in emergency situations.
The barrel end of the bag has a latex cap that can be easily repaired in the event of a
contact.
8.2.2.4 Waterproofing. All equipment selected for swimming operations must be
waterproofed. Radios, cameras, binoculars, infrared signaling and detection devices, and
other sensitive equipment are particularly susceptible to water damage. PJ teams should
maximize use of submersible bags and procure vacuum sealers, zip lock bags, heavy
lubricants, sealants, silicone-type lubricants, and other materiels for waterproofing prior to
water operations. Do not waterproof anything that does not require it. Disassemble
equipment into component parts when the tactical situation permits; it is easier to
waterproof the smaller items. Identify each with tags or tape to enable quick assembly.
Waterproof each item with more than one layer of protection.

WARNING: If equipment is tethered to the swimmer, a quick release must be included to allow
release if equipment becomes negatively buoyant and sinks.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

8-21

8.3 Jungle Combat Operations. Operations in dense jungle increase the importance of RT
members acting in their ground-air role due to the restrictions in air to ground observation.
Successful accomplishment of ground missions in the jungle require high levels of team member
tactical team proficiency and operational support. A team member who is not familiar with the
jungle may be apprehensive when faced with the prospect of living and fighting in the jungle
environment. RT members must understand that with thorough training and acclimation, the
jungle is less hazardous than other types of climates. The more knowledge a team member
acquires, the more team member will respect the jungle and be able to operate more effectively.
Detailed information on Jungle operations can be found in Army FM 90-5, Jungle Operations, as
well as AFI 16-1202, Pararescue Operations, Techniques, and Procedures.
8.3.1 Purpose. The purpose of this section is to establish guidance and outline general
consideration for employment of a recovery team (RT) in a jungle environment. It should be
remembered that situations will be encountered that have not been addressed in previously.
Jungle operations will require flexibility in the planning and conduct of specific operations.
8.3.1.1 Environmental Considerations. The jungle environment includes densely
forested areas, grasslands, cultivated areas, and swamps. Jungles are classified as primary
or secondary jungles based on the terrain, climate, and vegetation. Since the jungle
environment includes multiple variations on terrain, climate, and life forms, it is easier for
the team member to break it down into the primary and secondary jungles.
8.3.1.1.1 Primary Jungles. These are tropical forests. Depending on the type of trees
growing in these forests, primary jungles are classified either as tropical rain forests or
as deciduous forests.
8.3.1.1.1.1 Tropical Rain Forests. These consist mostly of large trees whose
branches spread and lock together to form canopies. These canopies, which can
exist at two or three different levels, may form as low as 10 meters from the
ground. The canopies prevent sunlight from reaching the ground, causing a lack of
undergrowth on the jungle floor. Extensive above ground root systems and
hanging vines are common. These conditions, combined with a wet and soggy
surface, make vehicular traffic difficult. Foot movement is easier in tropical rain
forests than in other types of jungle. Except where felled trees or construction
make a gap in the canopy of the rain forest, observation from the air is nearly
impossible. Ground observation is generally limited to about 50 meters (55 yards).
(See Figure 8.5, Tropical Rain Forest)
8.3.1.1.1.2 Deciduous Forests. These are found in semitropical zones where
there are both wet and dry seasons. In the wet season, trees are fully leaved; in the
dry season, much of the foliage dies. Trees are generally less dense in deciduous
forests than in rain forests. This allows more rain and sunlight to filter to the
ground, producing thick undergrowth. In the wet season, with the trees in full leaf,
observation both from the air and on the ground is limited. Movement is more
difficult than in the rain forest. In the dry season, however, conditions for
observation and traffic flow improve. (See Figure 8.6, Deciduous Forests.)

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 8.5 Tropical Rain Forest.

Tropical Rain Forest

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 8.6 Deciduous Forests.

Deciduous Forest

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

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8.3.1.1.2 Secondary Jungles. These are found at the edge of the rain forest and the
deciduous forest, and in areas where jungles have been cleared and abandoned.
Secondary jungles appear when the ground has been repeatedly exposed to sunlight.
These areas are typically overgrown with weeds, grasses, thorns, ferns, canes, and
shrubs. Foot movement is extremely slow and difficult. (See Figure 8.7, Secondary
Jungles.)
Figure 8.7 Secondary Jungles.

Secondary Jungle

UNCLASSIFIED
8.3.1.1.2.1 Swamps. These are common to all low jungle areas where there is
water and poor drainage. There are two basic types of swampsmangrove and
palm.
8.3.1.1.2.1.1 Mangrove Swamps. These are found in coastal areas wherever
tides influence water flow. The mangrove is a shrub-like tree which grows 1 to
5 meters high. These trees have tangled root systems, both above and below
the water level, which restrict movement to foot or small boats. Observation in
mangrove swamps, both on the ground and from the air, is poor. Concealment
is excellent. (See Figure 8.8, Mangrove Swamps.)

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 8.8 Mangrove Swamps.

Mangrove Swamp

UNCLASSIFIED
8.3.1.1.2.1.2 Palm Swamps. These exist in both salt and fresh water areas.
Like movement in the mangrove swamps, movement through palm swamps is
mostly restricted to foot (sometimes small boats). Vehicular traffic is nearly
impossible except after extensive road construction by engineers. Observation
and fields-of-fire are very limited. Concealment from both air and ground
observation is excellent. (See Figure 8.9, Palm Swamps)
8.3.1.1.2.2 Savanna. This is broad, open jungle grassland in which trees are
scarce. The thick grass is broad bladed and grows 1 to 5 meters high. Movement in
the savanna is generally easier than in other types of jungle areas, especially for
vehicles. The sharp-edged, dense grass and extreme heat make foot movement a
slow and tiring process. Depending on the height of the grass, ground observation
may vary from poor to good. Concealment from air observation is poor for both
troops and vehicles. (See Figure 8.10, Savanna)
8.3.1.1.2.3 Bamboo Forest. This grows in clumps of varying size in jungles
throughout the tropics. Large stands of bamboo are excellent obstacles for wheeled
or tracked vehicles. Troop movement through bamboo is slow, exhausting, and
noisy. Troops should bypass bamboo stands if possible. (See Figure 8.11,
Bamboo Forests.)

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Figure 8.9 Palm Swamps.

Palm Swamp

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 8.10 Savanna..

Savanna

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 8.11 Bamboo Forest.

Bamboo

UNCLASSIFIED
8.3.1.1.2.4 Cultivated Areas. These exist in jungles throughout the tropics and
range from large, well-planned and well managed farms and plantations to small
tracts cultivated by individual farmers. There are three general types of cultivated
areasrice paddies, plantations, and small farms.
8.3.1.1.2.5 Rice Paddies. These are flat, flooded fields in which rice is grown.
Flooding of the fields is controlled by a network of dikes and irrigation ditches
which make movement by vehicles difficult even when the fields are dry.
Concealment is poor in rice paddies. Cover is limited to the dikes, and then only
from ground fire. Observation and fields of fire are excellent. Foot movement is
poor when the fields are wet because team members must wade through water
about 0.5-meter (2 feet) deep and soft mud. When the fields are dry, foot
movement becomes easier. The dikes, about 2 to 3 meters tall, are the only
obstacles. (See Figure 8.12, Rice Paddies.)
8.3.1.1.2.6 Plantations. These are large farms or estates where tree crops, such
as rubber and coconut, are grown. They are usually carefully planned and free of
undergrowth (like a well tended park). Movement through plantations is generally
easy. Observation along the rows of trees is generally good. Concealment and
cover can be found behind the trees, but team members moving down the
cultivated rows are exposed. (See Figure 8.13, Plantations.)

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Figure 8.12 Rice Paddies.

Rice Paddies

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 8.13 Plantations.

Plantations

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


8.3.1.1.2.7 Small Farms. These exist throughout the tropics. These small
cultivated areas are usually hastily planned. After 1 or 2 years use, they usually are
abandoned, leaving behind a small open area which turns into secondary jungle.
Movement through these areas may be difficult due to fallen trees and scrub brush.
(See Figure 8.14, Small Farms.)

Figure 8.14 Small Farms.

Small Farms

UNCLASSIFIED
8.3.1.1.3 Climate. The discomforts of tropical climates are often exaggerated, but it
is true that the heat is more persistent. In regions where the air contains a lot of
moisture, the effect of the heat may seem worse than the same temperature in a dry
climate. Many people experienced in jungle operations feel that the heat and
discomfort in some US cities in the summertime are worse than the climate in the
jungle.
8.3.1.1.3.1 Strange as it may seem, there may be more suffering from cold in the
tropics than from the heat. Of course, very low temperatures do not occur, but
chilly days and nights are common. In some jungles, in winter months, the nights
are cold enough to require a wool blanket or poncho liner for sleeping.
8.3.1.1.3.2 Rainfall in many parts of the tropics is much greater than that in most
areas of the temperate zones. Tropical downpours usually are followed by clear
skies, and in most places the rains are predictable at certain times of the day.
Except in those areas where rainfall may be continuous during the rainy season,
there are not many days when the sun does not shine part of the time. People who

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live in the tropics usually plan their activities so that they are able to stay under
shelter during the rainy and hotter portions of the day. After becoming used to it,
most tropical dwellers prefer the constant climate of the torrid zones to the frequent
weather changes in colder climates.
8.3.1.1.4 Life Forms. Life form consist of plant, animal, insect, and indigenous
personnel.
8.3.1.1.4.1 Vegetation. Trees interconnected by a network of thick vines are the
principle identifying features of a jungle. Primarily responsible for the lushness of
the vegetation is a combination of high temperature and relative humidity
throughout the year and a heavy annual rainfall. Much of this rainfall is in the form
of torrential showers, the runoff from which causes flash floods and scours the
stream courses. As a result, most jungle areas are cut by many steep-sided gullies.
Another important consideration in the jungle is the absence of moving air, a factor
which makes conditions extremely uncomfortable. These are the characteristics
that prevail in all jungles, but not all jungles provide the same operational
environment.
8.3.1.1.4.1.1 Poisonous Vegetation. Nettles, particularly tree nettles, are one
of the dangerous items of vegetation. These nettles have a severe stinging that
will quickly educate the victim to recognize the plant. There are ringas trees in
Malaysia which affect some people in much the same way as poison oak. The
poison ivy and poison sumac of the continental US can cause many of the same
type troubles that may be experienced in the jungle. The danger from poisonous
plants in the woods of the US eastern seaboard is similar to that of the tropics.
8.3.1.1.4.1.2 Thorny thickets, such as rattan, should be avoided as one would
avoid a blackberry patch. Some of the dangers associated with poisonous
vegetation can be avoided by keeping sleeves down and wearing gloves when
practical.
8.3.1.1.4.2 Indigenous Personnel. Like all other regions of the world, the jungle
also has its native inhabitants. Team members should be aware that some of these
native tribes can be hostile if not treated properly. There may be occasions,
however, when hostile tribes attack without provocation. If they attack, a small
force should be able to disperse them.
8.3.1.1.4.3 To prevent a conflict, leaders should ensure that their team members:
Respect the natives' privacy and personal property.
Observe the local customs and taboos.
Do not enter a native house without being invited.
Do not pick fruits or cut trees without permission of their owners.
Treat the natives as friends.

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8.3.1.2 Environmental Effects on Equipment and Personnel.
8.3.1.2.1. RT members must understand that the environment affects everyone. The
degree to which Team members are trained in harsh environments will determine their
teams success or failure. There is very little to fear from the jungle environment. Fear
itself can be an enemy. Team members must be taught to control their fear of the
jungle. A man overcome with fear is of little value in any situation. Team members
in a jungle must learn that the most important thing is to keep their heads and calmly
think out any situation.
8.3.1.2.2 Clothing. The importance of preventing Jungle Rot cannot be over
emphasized. Particular attention should be paid to the feet. The jungle boot is the
standard footwear for this environment. Socks should be changed frequently.
Underwear, T-shirts, and socks should be a silk weight polypropylene type materiel, to
allow wicking and rapid drying. Uniform sleeves should be pulled down, buttoned,
and gloves worn to prevent the minor abrasions and insect bites. Uniform maintenance
should be addressed, as the breakdown of clothing occurs much faster in the jungle.
All team members should wear the same pattern sole on the combat boot.
8.3.1.2.3 Malaria. Team members can contract malaria if proper precautions are not
taken. Precautions against malaria include: avoiding the worst-infested areas when
possible, use repellent on exposed skin, treat uniforms with permethrin, wearing
clothing that covers as much of the body as possible, and using nets or screen at every
opportunity. Mosquitoes are most prevalent early at night and just before dawn. Team
members must be especially cautious at these times. Malaria is more common in
populated areas than in uninhabited jungle.
8.3.1.2.4 Team members must also be especially cautious when operating around
villages, because mud packs applied to mosquito bites offer some relief from itching.
Wasps and bees may be common in some places, but they will rarely attack unless their
nests are disturbed. When a nest is disturbed, the troops must leave the area and
reassemble at the last rally point. In case of stings, mud packs are helpful. In some
areas, there are tiny bees, called sweatbees, which may collect on exposed parts of the
body during dry weather, especially if the body is sweating freely. They are annoying
but stingless and will leave when sweating has completely stopped, or they may be
scraped off with the hand.
8.3.1.2.5 The larger centipedes and scorpions can inflict stings which are painful but
not fatal. They like dark places, so it is always advisable to shake out blankets before
sleeping at night, and to make sure before dressing that they are not hidden in clothing
or shoes.
8.3.1.2.6 Ants can be dangerous to injured men lying on the ground and unable to
move. Wounded team members should be placed in an area free of ants. In Southeast
Asian jungles, the rice-borer moth of the lowlands collects around lights in great
numbers during certain seasons. It is a small, plain-colored moth with a pair of tiny
black spots on the wings. It should never be brushed off roughly, as the small barbed
hairs of its body may be ground into the skin. This causes a sore, much like a burn, that
often takes weeks to heal.

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8.3.1.2.7 Personnel operating in the jungle should watch for leeches on the body and
brush them off before they have had time to bite. When they have taken hold, they
should not be pulled off forcibly because part of the leech may remain in the skin.
Leeches will release themselves if touched with insect repellent, a moist piece of
tobacco, the burning end of a cigarette, a coal from a fire, or a few drops of alcohol.
Straps wrapped around the lower part of the legs (leech straps) will prevent leeches
from crawling up the legs and into the crotch area. Trousers should be securely tucked
into the boots. (See Figure 8.15, Leech Straps.)
Figure 8.15 Leech Straps.

Leech Straps

UNCLASSIFIED
8.3.1.2.8 Snakes. A soldier in the jungle probably will see very few snakes. When he
does see one, the snake most likely will be making every effort to escape. Most jungle
areas pose less of a snakebite danger than do the uninhabited areas of New Mexico,
Florida, or Texas. This does not mean that team members should be careless about the
possibility of snakebites, but ordinary precautions against them are enough. Team
members should be particularly watchful when clearing ground. Treat all snakebites
as poisonous.
8.3.1.3 Health and Hygiene. The climate in tropical areas and the absence of sanitation
facilities increase the chance that team members may contract a disease. Disease is
fought with good sanitation practices and preventive medicine. In past wars, diseases
accounted for a significantly high percentage of casualties. Before going into a jungle
area, leaders must:

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8.3.1.3.1 Make sure immunizations are current.
8.3.1.3.2 Instruct team members in personal hygiene.
8.3.1.3.3 Upon arrival in the jungle area, leaders must:
8.3.1.3.4 Allow time to adjust (acclimate) to the new environment.
8.3.1.4 Insect Borne Diseases. The mosquito headnetting and insect repellent should be
used to help prevent insect causing diseases such as malaria, yellow fever, and scrub
typhus.
8.3.1.5 Waterborne Diseases. Water is vital in the jungle and is usually easy to find.
However, water from natural sources should be considered contaminated. Water
purification procedures must be taught to all team members. Germs of serious diseases,
like dysentery, are found in impure water. Other waterborne diseases, such as blood fluke,
are caused by exposure of an open sore to impure water. Team members can prevent
waterborne diseases by:
8.3.1.5.1 Obtaining drinking water from approved engineer water points.
8.3.1.5.2 Using rainwater; however, rainwater should be collected after it has been
raining at least 15 to 30 minutes. This lessens the chances of impurity being washed
from the jungle canopy into the water container. Even then the water should be
purified.
8.3.1.5.3 Insuring that all drinking water is purified.
8.3.1.5.4 Not swimming or bathing in untreated water.
8.3.1.5.5 Keeping the body fully clothed when crossing water obstacles.
8.3.1.6 Skin Diseases. The jungle promotes fungus and bacterial diseases which are
caused by poor hygiene. Immersion skin and chaffing are caused by long periods of
wetness of the skin. To prevent these diseases, team members should:
8.3.1.6.1 Bathe often and air- or sun-dry the body as often as possible.
8.3.1.6.2 Wear clean, dry, loose-fitting clothing whenever possible.
8.3.1.6.3 Do not sleep in wet, dirty clothing. Team members should carry one dry set
of clothes just for sleeping. Dirty clothing, even if wet, is put on again in the morning.
This practice not only fights fungus, bacterial and warm water immersion diseases but
also prevents chills and allows team members to rest better.
8.3.1.6.4 Not wear underwear during wet weather. Underwear dries slower than jungle
fatigues, and causes severe chafing.
8.3.1.6.5 Take off boots and massage feet as often as possible.
8.3.1.6.6 Dust feet, socks, and boots with foot powder at every chance.
8.3.1.6.7 Always carry several pairs of socks and change them frequently.
8.3.1.6.8 Keep hair cut short.

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8.3.1.7 Operations. Observation. All movements of animals and men are marked by
tracks and signs. Team members must learn to read signs left in soft ground, in
streambeds, on roads and trails, and near watering places and salt licks. Animals seldom
move without a reason; a few fresh tracks supply information about their maker, the
direction, and probable intentions. Animals avoid people. The animals, their tracks, and
their behavior can reveal whether or not people are in the area. Jungle fighters can listen
to the cries of animals and learn to recognize their alarm calls. The ability to track and to
recognize signs in the jungle are valuable skills. Throughout the time in the jungle, the
fighter should practice these skills.
8.3.1.7.1 Observation and Fields of Fire. In dense jungle, observation and fields of
fire are limited by the undergrowth. In the other rain forests, however, although good
observation into the forest from the outside or above may be nonexistent, it is possible
to have fair observation and good fields of fire for a reasonable distance at ground
level. This condition exists where the branches of tall trees interlace to form a canopy
through which few sunrays penetrate, thereby prohibiting the growth of grass, bushes,
or other foliage. Where old forests have burned or have been destroyed, the resulting
tangle or undergrowth seriously limits both observation and fields of fire. In open
areas, observation and fields of fire may be limited by the height of the jungle grass,
which sometimes grows several feet over a persons head.
8.3.1.7.2 Restrictions. Generally, observation and fields of fire are less restricted in
cultivated areas than in uncultivated jungles. However, much of the natural cover and
concealment are removed by cultivation, and troops will be more exposed in these
areas.
8.3.1.7.3 Planning Use of Time. A team planning for jungle operations follows the
same planning sequence as in any other type of combat operation. In planning the use
of available time, leaders must consider that many tasks in the jungle take more time
than the same tasks in other environments. More time must be allowed for movement
and security. This means that units may have to begin movements earlier in order to
accomplish their missions within a specified time. This may leave less time for
planning and preparation.
8.3.1.7.4 Recovered IPs. Individuals accompanying team member elements need to
maintain the same rate of movement as the rest of the team. However, they may not be
as well equipped for long ground movement as the team member team (i.e., standard
issue aircrew boots) and should be allowed sufficient time for food, water, and rest.
8.3.1.7.5 Communications. In general, radio communications are adversely affected
by thick vegetation, multiple tree canopies, and mountainous terrain. Prior thought
should be given to site selection when trying to establish SATCOM; openings in the
canopy that are not blocked by a ridgeline in the desired direction of the antennas will
assist in acquiring positive communications. Consider constructing a field expedient
antenna and hoisting it up to a tree limb to improve degraded communications in the
other bandwidths.
8.3.1.7.6 Obstacles. Many natural obstacles exist within the various types of jungle
area. In the older forests there is generally no obstacle to foot movement other than

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


incidental swampy areas and occasional fallen trees and vines. However, the trees
themselves, depending on their spacing, and the moist ground, may act as obstacles to
rapid movement. Man-made obstacles are often more effective in jungle areas than in
normal terrain, due to the limited communication routes. A dead fall tree barrier across
a trail or protected booby-trap across an open area may cause a marked increase in the
delay to the opposing force and may require a greater amount of effort for its removal
or the preparation of a bypass.
8.3.1.7.7 Avenues of Approach. Suitable routes, considering the aspects of good
observation, field of fire, use of key terrain, cover and avoiding obstacles, may be
virtually impossible to find. A compromise must be made because of the limited
existing routes. Cutting of new trails and of those already in existence are constant
tasks. In selection of avenues of approach available to the enemy, RT members should
consider no portion of the jungle as impassable, no matter how difficult or thick.
8.3.1.7.8 Night Operations. Night operations in the jungle are extremely difficult but
team member must be conditioned to the fact that it is not impossible. In primary
jungle where there is a canopy, night brings complete darkness to the ground. This
condition forces the team member to develop his senses of smell, hearing, and touch to
a high degree. Team member should be made aware that thick vegetation and heavy
rain tend to muffle sounds, slow movement, and increase the difficulties of
maintaining contact within groups. All of these factors should be related to the
problems normally associated with night operations in any type terrain. Employment
considerations of the senses in a jungle environment breaks are:
8.3.1.7.8.1 Sight. The RT members should not expose their eyes to any light after
they have adapted them to the dark. The principles of night vision are especially
important in the jungle. Due to the complete darkness, the team member must be
particularly alert to note any indications of light. Care must be taken, however, as
some types of rotten wood are phosphorescent and give off light.
8.3.1.7.8.2 Smell. Wet, decaying vegetation has a characteristic odor. The team
member must learn to distinguish this smell and mot permit it to cover other smells
that may give indication of enemy troops who might be very close. Their
perspiration may be permeated by odors peculiar to certain foods; for instance,
fish, garlic, and curried rice give off very definite, characteristic odors. Troops
must learn to be alert for these signs.
8.3.1.7.8.3 Touch. It may be necessary for RT members to identify the enemy or
one another by touch. For example, members of the same element can be required
to wear an item of equipment in a certain way or on a certain part of the body.
When identifying a man in this manner the team member should be prepared to
strike a killing blow immediately if identification reveals an enemy soldier. The
enemy's racial characteristics (e.g., custom of wearing beards or long hair, or body
build) and the nature of his clothing and equipment should be known. Knowledge
of these items will enable the team member to identify the enemy by touch under
conditions of complete darkness and absolute silence. Of particular importance is
the team members ability to operate, load, and maintain a weapon by touch.

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8.3.1.7.8.4 Hearing. Generally, nightfall imposes a requirement for absolute


silence by RT members in tactical situations in the jungle. Sound is a primary
means of target detection, especially at night. RT members will become aware that
the jungle is never silent. Animal and bird calls, buzzing insects, movement of the
wind through the crowns of trees, and the dripping of water from trees are heard
constantly. A sound that is characteristic of the jungle is the dull thumping noise
made by a falling tree or large limb. Jittery and edgy personnel unaccustomed or
unfamiliar with this sound can cause a fire fight among friendly forces at night or
give away a teams position to the enemy by firing at these noises. RT members
must be taught to distinguish these noises and be required to learn more common
sounds associated with friendly troops and their equipment
8.3.1.7.9 Voice Communications at Night. Just as RT members may be able to
identify the enemy by sounds, the enemy may be able to identify the RT members. RT
members must eliminate unnecessary noise when communicating by voice. A good
way to talk at night is to cup the hand to the other person's oar and whisper or use a low
voice for instructions. The rustle of leaves and natural noises will cover such low level
conversations.
8.3.1.7.10 Night Movement and Maintaining Contact. During the night, movement
in the jungle is most successful when confined to established trails and stream beds, it
must be remembered, and however, that such trails and defiles are potential killing
grounds for enemy ambushes. Elements using these routes must be prepared for
immediate action. If it is not possible or feasible to use these routes, RT members
should be prepared to move cross country. This movement will be slow, arduous, and
exhausting, Extensive night movement is not practical, especially for sizable teams.
The problems of control and maintaining contact will be difficult and will require
thorough planning. Some suggestions to aid night movement are:
8.3.1.7.10.1 Attach some luminous material to the back of each man. Compasses,
luminous watch dials, phosphorescent wood, or luminous tape may be used. If
luminous tape is available, one method is to sew the tape to the back of the collar or
cap to help maintain control and the desired interval.
8.3.1.7.10.2 Have a set of simple, silent, but well rehearsed signals for the more
common action expected. This could be anything from covering the tape on the
back of the cap two or three times, to tapping the man next to the front or rear a
specified number of times.
8.4 Urban Combat Operations. An urban operation is one of the most demanding
environments of GUARDIAN ANGEL recovery team operations. For specific tactics, techniques
and procedures (TTP) for conducting urban PR/RO see AFTTP 3-1.8, Tactical Employment
GUARDIAN ANGEL and Special Tactics Forces. For detailed information on urban analysis,
weapons effects, and maneuver operations see Army FM 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in
Urban Terrain, and MCWP 3-35.3, Military Operations in Urban Terrain.

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8.4.1 Environmental Considerations. Urbanized terrain is a complex and challenging


environment. It possesses all of the characteristics of the natural landscape, coupled with
man-made construction, resulting in an incredibly complicated and fluid environment that
influences the conduct of military operations in unique ways.
8.4.2 Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain. Military operation on urbanized terrain
(MOUT) is defined as all military actions planned and conducted on a topographical complex
and its adjacent terrain where man-made construction is the dominant feature. It includes
combat in cities, which is that portion of MOUT involving house-to-house and street-by-street
fighting in towns and cities. MOUT effects the tactical options available to a commander. A
built-up area is a concentration of structures, facilities, and populations, such as villages,
cities, and towns that form the economic and cultural focus for the surrounding area.
8.4.2.1 Categories of Built-Up Areas. Built-up areas are generally classified as:
8.4.2.1.1

Villages (populations of 3,000 or less).

8.4.2.1.2 Strip areas (industrialized zones built along roads connecting towns
or cities).
8.4.2.1.3 Towns or small cities (populations of up to 100,000 and not part of a major
urban complex).
8.4.2.1.4 Large cities with associated urban sprawl (populations in the millions,
covering hundreds of square kilometers).
8.4.2.1.5 Cities. Cities are centers of finance, politics, transportation, communication,
industry, and culture. They generally have large population concentrations ranging
from tens of thousands to millions of people. Because of their psychological, political,
or logistical value, control of cities have often been the scenes of pitched battles.
Operations in built-up areas are normally conducted to capitalize on the operational or
tactical significance of a particular city. In developing nations, control of only a few
cities is often the key to the control of national resources. The side that controls a
major city usually has a psychological advantage, which can be enough to significantly
affect the outcome of a countrywide conflict. The abundance of guerrilla and terrorist
operations conducted in built-up areas demonstrates the importance many insurgent
groups place on urban warfare. In the past 40 years, many cities have expanded
dramatically, losing their well-defined boundaries as they extended into the
countryside. New transportation systems (highways, canals, and railroads) have been
built to connect population centers. Industries have grown along those connectors,
creating strip areas. Rural areas, although retaining much of their farm like character,
are connected to the towns by a network of secondary roads.
8.4.2.2 Characteristics of Urbanized Areas. A typical urban area consists of
combinations of the city core, commercial ribbon, core periphery, residential sprawl,
outlying industrial areas, and outlying high-rise areas. Each of the urban areas regions
has distinctive characteristics that may weigh heavily in planning for MOUT. (Most
urbanized areas resemble the generalized model shown in Figure 8.16, Typical Urban
Area.)

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Figure 8.16 Typical Urban Area.

Typical Urban Area

Commercial
Ribbon

Residential
Sprawl

Outlying Industrial
Area

Core
Periphery
City Core
Outlying High Rise
Areas

Core
Periphery

UNCLASSIFIED
8.4.2.2.1 City Core. In most cities, the city core has undergone more recent
development than the core periphery. As a result, the two regions are often quite
different. Typical city cores are made up of high-rise buildings which vary in height.
Modern urban planning for built-up areas allows for more open spaces between
buildings than in old city cores or in core peripheries. (See Figure 8.17, City Core.)
8.4.2.2.2 Commercial Ribbon. Commercial ribbons are composed of rows of stores,
shops, and restaurants that are built along both sides of major streets through built-up
areas. Typically, such streets are 25 meters wide or more. The buildings in the outer
areas are uniformly two to three stories tallabout one story taller than the dwellings
on the streets behind them.
8.4.2.2.3 Core Periphery. The core periphery generally consists of streets 12 to 20
meters wide with continuous fronts of brick or concrete buildings. The building
heights are fairly uniformtwo or three stories in small towns, five to ten or more
stories in large cities. (See Figure 8.18, Core Periphery.)

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 8.17 City Core.

City Core

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 8.18 Core Periphery.

Core Periphery

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

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8.4.2.2.4 Residential Sprawl. Residential sprawl areas consist mainly of low houses
or apartments that are one to three stories tall. The area is primarily composed of
detached dwellings that are usually arranged in irregular patterns along streets, with
many smaller open areas between structures.
8.4.2.2.5 Outlying Industrial Areas. These areas generally consist of clusters of
industrial buildings varying from one to five stories in height. Buildings generally
vary dramatically in size and composition to match the needs of the particular
businesses they house. Industrial parks are good examples of this category. (See
Figure 8.19, Outlying Industrial Areas.)
8.4.2.2.6 Outlying High-Rise Areas. These areas are similar in composition to city
core areas but may be composed of clusters of more modern multistory high-rise
buildings in outlying parts of the city. Building height and size may vary dramatically.
Generally, there is more open space between buildings located in the outlying high-rise
areas than is found within the city core area.
8.4.2.3 Urban Battlespace. Urbanized terrain is a unique battlespace that provides both
attacker and defender with numerous and varied avenues of approach and fields of fire.
The urban battlespace is divided into four basic levels: building, street, subterranean, and
air. Operations can be conducted from above ground, on ground level, inside buildings, or
below the ground. Most operations will include fighting on all levels simultaneously.
(See Figure 8.20, Urban Battlespace.)
8.4.2.3.1 Building Level. Buildings provide cover and concealment; limit or increase
fields of observation and fire; and canalize, restrict, or block movement of forces,
especially mechanized forces. They provide optimum perches for sniper and anti-air
weapons. Buildings also provide anti-tank weapons optimum positioning to allow
engagement from above, exploiting an inherent weakness found in most armored
vehicles.
8.4.2.3.2 Street Level. While streets provide the means for rapid advance or
withdrawal, forces moving along streets are often canalized by buildings and have little
space for off-road maneuver. Because they are more difficult to bypass, obstacles on
streets in urbanized areas are usually more effective than those on roads in open
terrain.
8.4.2.3.3 Subterranean Level. Subterranean systems are easily overlooked but can
be important to the outcome of operations. These areas may be substantial and include
subways, sewers, cellars, and utility systems. The city of Los Angeles alone has more
than 200 miles of storm sewers located under the city streets. Both attacker and
defender can use subterranean avenues to maneuver to the rear or the flanks of an
enemy. These avenues also facilitate the conduct of ambushes, counterattacks, and
infiltrations.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 8.19 Outlying Industrial Areas.

Outlying Industrial Areas

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 8.20 Urban Battlespace.

Urban Battlespace
Airspace
Intrasurface
(inside building)

Supersurface
(top of building)

Surface (street)

Cutaway Views

Subway

Sewers and Utility


Cellars
Tunnels

Subsurface (subterranean)

UNCLASSIFIED

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8.4.2.3.4 Air Level. The air provides another avenue of approach in urbanized areas.
Aviation assets can be used for high speed insertion or extraction of troops, supplies,
and equipment. While aviation assets are not affected by obstacles on the streets, they
are affected by light towers, signs, power lines, and other aerial obstructions. They are
also vulnerable to the man-portable surface-to-air missile threat, crew-served weapons,
and small arms fire.
8.4.2.4 Life Forms. The following are definitions of the classifications of personnel that
may be encountered in the urban battlefield.
8.4.2.4.1 Combatants. Combatants are uniformed enemy forces and other
individuals who take an active part in the hostilities in a way that poses a direct threat
to US personnel.
8.4.2.4.2 Noncombatants. Noncombatants are civilians in the area of operations
who are not armed and are not taking an active part in the hostilities in a way that poses
a direct threat to US personnel. Noncombatants can include refugees, local inhabitants
affected by operations, civilian personnel belonging to US governmental agencies,
civilian personnel from NGOs, and media personnel. Military chaplains, medical
personnel, prisoners of war, and the wounded and sick are also noncombatants.
8.4.2.4.3 Prisoners of War. A prisoner of war (POW) is an individual, such as a
member of the armed forces or militia, a person who accompanies the armed forces
without being a member, or other category of person defined in the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, who has fallen into the
power of the enemy.
8.4.2.4.4 Detained Personnel. A detained person is any individual who is in custody
for committing hostile acts against US forces or committing serious criminal acts.
8.4.2.4.5 Dislocated Civilian. This is a broad term that includes a displaced person,
an evacuee, an expellee, or a refugee.
8.4.2.4.6 Displaced Person. A displaced person is a civilian who is involuntarily
outside the national boundaries of the persons country.
8.4.2.4.7 Evacuee. An evacuee is a civilian removed from a place of residence by
military direction for reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military
situation.
8.4.2.4.8 Expellee. An expellee is a civilian outside the boundaries of the country of
the persons nationality or ethnic origin who is being forcibly repatriated to that
country or to a third country for political or other purposes.
8.4.2.4.9 Refugee. A refugee is a civilian who, by reason of real or imagined danger,
has left home to seek safety elsewhere.
8.4.2.5 Encounters with Noncombatants. Unless combat has been taking place in an
urban area for an extended period of time, units will encounter large numbers of
noncombatants. Noncombatants may be encountered during offensive operations as a
result of clearing buildings and city blocks or when preparing for defensive operations.
The nature of stability and support operations will most likely result in having to deal with

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noncombatants. Units will have to know whether to expect noncombatants to be friendly,
neutral, or hostile and know how to deal with them. Handling noncombatants can be as
simple as moving them out of immediate harm's way or as complicated as noncombatant
evacuation operations (NEO).

NOTE: Experience in Somalia has shown that noncombatants can be hostile, friendly, or neutral.
Hostile noncombatants do not necessarily become detained personnel if they are not perceived as
a threat to friendly forces. For example, political opponents of US involvement may be hostile
towards the US military presence but do not pose a threat to US forces.
8.4.2.5.1 Noncombatants and Rules of Engagement. All team leaders and members
must understand the potential urban battlefield and the fact that they will most likely
encounter noncombatants. If you must deal with noncombatants, refer to the ROE.
ROE should be very specific on the treatment of each type of noncombatant.
8.4.2.6 Communication with Civilians. Learn basic commands and phrases in the
language most common to the area of operations. When giving these commands or
phrases, speak loudly and clearly at a normal rate and use gestures whenever possible. All
team members should be given a basic language translation card and carry it in an
accessible location. (See Table 8.2, Example of Basic Language Translation Card.)
Table 8.2 Example of Basic Language Translation Card.
English Word or Phrase
HALT
WHAT IS YOUR NAME?
STAND UP
WALK
SIT DOWN
YOU WILL BE SEARCHED NOW
DON'T TALK
YES
NO
NOT PERMITTED
MEDICAL AID
FOOD
WATER
USE THE LATRINE?

Foreign Word or Phrase

Pronunciation

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8.4.2.7 Cultural Issues. Team members must be educated on the types of cultural issues
that may offend the local inhabitants. For example, a gesture that may be innocent to
Americans may deeply insult the inhabitants.
8.4.2.8 Considerations for Handling Noncombatants. If the mission involves handling
noncombatants, team leaders should consider using civil affairs, psychological operations,
military police and civil leaders and authorities. Other considerations include the
following:
8.4.2.8.1 Carefully analyze the ROE concerning when deadly force can be used and
what type of weapons may be employed (e.g., using lethal as opposed to non-lethal
weapons and capabilities).
8.4.2.8.2 Do not assume that noncombatants will be predisposed for or against US
forces. Always treat civilians with dignity and respect. Use force against civilians
only in self-defense or, otherwise, in accordance with the ROE. Detain civilians only
in accordance with command directives.
8.4.2.8.3 When maneuver units conduct offensive operations, they plan to move
noncombatants away from the engagement. Normally this task will be given to a
support element after rooms and buildings have been secured. When available,
supporting organizations assist with this task. A covered and concealed location away
from the immediate combat area should be chosen. Noncombatants should be
controlled and not permitted to enter the immediate combat area, unless they have been
cleared to do so and will not compromise combat operation (i.e., media personnel,
governmental, or NGO personnel that have a reason and authority to enter the combat
area).
8.4.2.8.4 When maneuver units conduct defensive operations, they plan to move
noncombatants away from the immediate combat area. Companies and below
normally escort personnel to a designated location where they are turned over to civil
authority, battalion, or higher control. In many cases, friendly or non-hostile civilians
may be directed to a clearing point and allowed to go there without escort.
8.4.2.8.5 Security is not normally provided for media or NGO personnel if they are
permitted in the immediate combat area. Security requirements for civilians should be
clarified at the mission briefing.
8.4.2.9 Humanitarian Aid. As in example of the United Nations Embassy bombing in
Baghdad, team members may have to render some type of immediate humanitarian
assistance (medical attention and feeding). Any plan that provides for the provision of
medical care to the civilian population must be developed in conjunction with the staff
judge advocate. If this type of assistance is necessary, clarify questions in the mission
briefing.
8.4.2.10 Determining the Status of Personnel. Recovery teams do not determine the
status of individuals in the combat area. Any persons that are initially detained should be
treated as POWs, and higher authorities should be notified with a request for assistance in
evacuating these individuals.

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8.4.3 Operations.
8.4.3.1 General Weapons Considerations. The characteristics and nature of combat in
urban areas affect the employment of weapons. Leaders at all levels must consider the
following considerations in various combinations when choosing their weapons.
8.4.3.1.1 Hard, smooth, flat surfaces are characteristic of urban targets. Rounds rarely
impact perpendicular to these flat surfaces, but rather, at an oblique angle. This reduces
the effect of a round and increases the threat of ricochets. The tendency of rounds to
strike glancing blows against hard surfaces means that up to 25 percent of
impact-fused explosive rounds may not detonate when fired into urban areas.
8.4.3.1.2 Deflected rounds can easily ricochet or rabbit causing injury and death from
strange angles. A rabbit round is a round or fragment that strikes a surface at such a
steep angle that it glances off and continues to travel parallel to that surface.
8.4.3.1.3 Engagement ranges are close. Studies and historical analyses have shown
that only 5 percent of all targets are more than 100 meters away. About 90 percent of
all targets are located 50 meters or less from the identifying combatant. Few personnel
targets will be visible beyond 50 meters and they usually occur at 35 meters or less.
Engagement times are short. Enemy personnel present only fleeting targets.
8.4.3.1.4 Depression and elevation limits for some weapons create dead space. Tall
buildings form deep canyons that are often safe from indirect fires. Some weapons can
fire rounds to ricochet behind cover and inflict casualties. Target engagement from
oblique angles, both horizontal and vertical, demands superior combat marksmanship
skills.
8.4.3.1.5 Smoke from burning buildings, dust from explosions, shadows from tall
buildings, and the lack of light penetrating inner rooms all combine to reduce visibility
and increase a sense of isolation. Added to this is the masking of fires caused by rubble
and man-made structures. Targets, even those at close range, tend to be indistinct.
8.4.3.2 Situational Awareness. Urban fighting can become confused melees with several
small units attacking on converging axes. The risks from friendly fires, ricochets, and
fratricide must be considered during the planning phase of operations, and control
measures must be adjusted to lower these risks. Team leaders and members must maintain
a sense of situational awareness.
8.4.3.2.1 The team member and target may be inside or outside buildings, or they may
both be inside the same or separate buildings. The enclosed nature of combat in urban
areas means that all the weapons effects including the muzzle blast and backblast, must
be considered as well as the rounds impact on the target.
8.4.3.2.2 Usually the man-made structure must be attacked before enemy personnel
inside are attacked. Therefore, the decision to employ specific weapons and
demolitions will often be based on their effects against masonry and concrete rather
than against enemy personnel.
8.4.3.2.3 Modern engineering and design improvements mean that most large
buildings constructed since World War II are resilient to the blast effects of bomb and

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artillery attack. Even though modern buildings may burn easily, they often retain their
structural integrity and remain standing. Once high-rise buildings burn out, they may
still have military utility and are almost impossible to damage further. A large
structure can take 24 to 48 hours to burn out and become cool enough for soldiers to
enter.
8.5 Mountain Combat Operations. Mountain combat rescue encompasses operations in
extremely rugged and high-angle terrain where conditions require modification of pararescue
organization, training, equipment, and tactics. This section provides the recovery team (RT) with
information on TTP employed during the prosecution of operations in mountainous terrain.
Mountain combat operations is categorized in terms of mountainous and/or alpine operations.
Additional information can be found in TC 90-6-1, Military Mountaineering, as well as numerous
excellent civilian texts.
8.5.1 Mountain Operations. Mountain operations are those which can be conducted by a
RT team on or near an axis of communications in mountainous country. These operations
require specialized training to adapt the team member and the equipment to the environment;
normally, there is no involvement of advanced rock and cliff climbing nor major movement by
skis or snowshoes.
8.5.2 Alpine Operations. Operations are conducted by a RT team specially organized and
equipped for CSAR over snow-covered and/or precipitous terrain which may be inaccessible
to any other rescue personnel. Operations in alpine terrain require the highest level of rock
climbing, mountaineering, and ski employment. Expedient and efficient movement over
alpine terrain cannot be accomplished without focused training, specialized equipment, and
thoroughly detailed planning.
8.5.3 Environmental Considerations. Mountain regions have their own unique terrain,
climate and life forms.
8.5.3.1 Terrain. The planning and execution of mountain operations, associated with a
CSAR operation, require a thorough knowledge of the area of operations and the ability to
cope with the special conditions of the environment.
8.5.3.1.1 Mountains. Mountain terrain displays the resistant qualities of the rocks
from which the mountains were formed. The ridges, canyons, cliffs, and valleys are
evidence of the process of erosion. Rugged reliefwith steep slopesresults in swift
streams.
8.5.3.1.2 These heights may possess heavy woods or underbrush, rocky or
snow-covered peaks, glaciers, and snowfields characterized by erratic weather.
8.5.3.1.3

Slopes in the mountains generally vary from 4 to 45 degrees.

8.5.3.1.4 Cliffs and/or precipices may be vertical or even overhanging. Mountains


may consist of isolated peaks, single ridges, or complex ridges extending for many
miles.

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8.5.3.2 Climate. Climate is made up of temperature, precipitation, and wind.
8.5.3.2.1 Temperature. Normally, a temperature fall from 3 to 5 degrees per
300-meter gain in altitude will be encountered. At high altitudes, solar heating is
responsible for the greatest temperature contrasts. Less atmospheric interference may
create differences of 40 degrees between the temperature in the sun and that in the
shade. The clear air also favors rapid cooling at night. Consequently, the temperature
rises fast after sunrise and drops quickly after sunset.
8.5.3.2.2 Winds. Air currents are stronger and more variable at mountain altitudes.
Prevailing winds are channelized and funneled by mountain terrain. Each time the
wind velocity doubles, its force against an object quadruples. The passage of the sun
across a mountain range generally causes a valley breeze in the morning and a
mountain breeze in the afternoon/evening. Local winds assume a highly erratic pattern
because the sun shines with varying intensities on the uneven terrain.
8.5.3.2.3 Precipitation. Rainfall and snow occurs more often on the windward side
than on the leeward side of a range producing frequent fogs and/or denser vegetation.
8.5.3.2.3.1 Erratic variations in solar heating create and dissipate clouds suddenly,
causing violent thunderstorms of short duration. Pressure fronts may be trapped by
the terrain and cause snow or rainfalls of long duration. Heavy rain or snow is
channelized by the terrain creating dangerous water races and avalanche paths.
8.5.3.2.3.2 Lightning. Storm-generated lightning is frequent in the mountains. It
is attracted to high points, metal structures, and dominant objects such as lone
trees, buildings, antennas, and ridges. Keep the hands and upper torso insulated
from the ground. Avoid metallic objects extending from the upper body to the
ground. Turn off all radios until the storm has passed. Disconnect all radios from
remotely-sited antennas.
8.5.3.3 Life Forms. Compared to other environments of the world, life forms are in
limited numbers.

8.5.4 Environmental Effects on Equipment and Personnel.


8.5.4.1 Pressure. Atmospheric pressure is lower in mountainous areas due to altitude.
The barometer drops 1 inch for every 1,000 feet of elevation. Decreased pressure causes
the air to expand, decreasing the amount of oxygen and moisture content in a given
volume. The decrease in atmospheric pressure proportionally lowers the partial pressure of
oxygen which has a marked effect on individual performance, usually hindering the teams
progress.
8.5.4.2 Altitude. In mountainous terrain, the effects of altitude cannot be
overemphasized. Not only the gain and loss of altitude but also its effects on the individual
RT. Due to the decrease in partial pressure of oxygen, a routine task at sea level may
require a fair amount of energy at altitude. For a preplanned operation into mountainous
terrain, the RT team may want to acclimatize to a higher elevation than that of the
operation. A good rule of thumb is 1 day per 1,000 feet. There are altitude injuries that can
debilitate the team and render them ineffective. There is no predicting who will be affected

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by altitude injuries. Experience of working at high altitudes may allow RTs a chance to
see the effects. Team members should become familiar with and plan to bring drugs for the
management of high-altitude sickness when entering a mountainous area of operations.
Refer to the Pararescue Medical Procedures Handbook for a more thorough description of
altitude-related illness.
8.5.4.3 Elevation. In the mountains, elevation is not the sole indication of the degree of
difficulty encountered in such operations; the general configuration of the mountain and its
gradient is indicative of the problems to be encountered. Decreased atmospheric pressure
at altitude requires considerable acclimatization of men and animals; frequently, this
dictates major adjustments of the RT, weapons, and equipment
8.5.5 Operations. Principal effects of the mountain environment on CSAR operations are
discussed below.
8.5.5.1 Weather. Generally, the weather produced by mountain terrain is extremely
severe and subject to erratic patterns. Short-range weather forecasts normally cover 1- to
8-day periods and provide information as to the probable temperature, precipitation,
humidity, visibility, cloud conditions, and direction/velocity of the wind.
8.5.5.2 Reorganization. The degree of reorganization required to equip team members
for mountain operations depends on actual weather conditions in the projected area of
operations. Seasonal and weather conditions exercise a marked influence on the
performance of troops and equipment; mud, high water, humidity, continuous rain, fog,
cold, snowstorms, snow conditions, and numerous obstacles to fire and maneuver may
dictate some reorganization of RT elements and substitution or addition of major items of
equipment to cope with the conditions. Effects of these conditions should be anticipated
and considered in detail and the resulting problems resolved during the formulation of
CSAR plans.
8.5.5.3 Mounted. The slopes themselves often limit or prevent the movement of
mechanized or motorized means of transportation. The inaccessibility of mountain areas is
reflected in the lack of roads and railroads. Those roads and railroads which do exist are
found where passes or gaps cross the ranges. Canalization of traffic with the attendant
danger of ambush is a prime consideration in planning and conducting mountain
operations. This can be an advantage or disadvantage for the small RT team operating in
the mountains. These heights must be controlled or neutralized to permit the use of
corridor.
8.5.5.3.1 Difficulty in Movement. Mountain terrain presents great difficulties to the
movement of a RT team. Vehicular traffic is restricted to the vicinity of roads and
improved trails, thus having a direct effect on ground fire support and resupply. Fourand six-wheel ATVs as well as snow machines provide a limited yet viable
high-mobility vehicle for hilly terrain. Allocate prolonged time for team movements,
as progress is arduous and taxing on personnel and equipment. In limited visibility
where terrain navigation is not possible, it is still possible to navigate with the
compass. Team members who have acquired the proper technique for traveling in
mountains are capable of covering much greater distances than untrained troops. The
prime consideration is to conserve the individual's strength and combat efficiency.

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8.5.5.4 Rate of Movement. The pace of the team is governed by the most heavily loaded
individual. It is advisable to make a 5-minute halt to adjust clothing and equipment after
the first 15 minutes of movement.
8.5.5.4.1 Factors Affecting the Rate of Movement. The rate of movement is
seldom calculated exactly; time is emphasized over distance when considering
movements. It is normal to express distance in terms of the time required to cover it
since lateral distances are often irrelevant in a mountainous environment.
8.5.5.4.2 Time and distance required to reach destinations are invariably
underestimated because of the optical illusion created by clear air and the perspective
gained when looking down from heights and across intervening depressions. Too fast
of a pace in traveling uphill will render men ineffective quickly. Improper descending
procedures continually jar the body, causing great muscular fatigue and can lead to
serious knee injury.

8.6 Cold Weather Combat Operations. The term cold weather operations, arctic operations,
and northern operations are virtually synonymous. Each refers to an area of the world where
conditions of climate and terrain require a recovery team (RT) to use special equipment and
special techniques to operate successfully. While the probability of a RT being employed in the
Arctic may be remote, it is not necessary to conduct operations in arctic areas to encounter deep
snow and extreme cold. Wherever it may be encountered, extreme cold weather presents problems
that cannot be ignored. For detailed information, Army FM 31-70, Northern Operations, and
Army FM 31-71, Basic Cold Weather Manual.
8.6.1 Purpose. This section identifies procedures for the tactical employment of RTs in an
extreme cold weather environment. The RT faces no changes in tactical doctrine or principles
for cold weather operations. The team leaders responsibilities are increased by the extremes
of the environment. Difficulties of terrain, visibility, and climate complicate command.
Maneuver, supporting fires, supply, and evacuation require detailed knowledge of the regions
to properly apply basic tactical principles. Resourceful leadership, proper training, suitable
equipment, and a positive approach to personnel recovery operations can convert natural
difficulties into relative advantages.
8.6.2 Terrain and Weather. Team members must be familiar with the great effects that
terrain and weather have in the cold weather environment.
8.6.2.1 Terrain. In subarctic regions, erosion by glaciation and weathering has produced
rugged and irregular shorelines. There are many fjords, coves, deep inlets, and offshore
islands, as well as vast areas of prairies, lakes, rivers, forests, and inland mountains. Soil
is often thin and is underlaid by permafrost or permanently frozen soil and rock. In
summer, the ground above the permafrost thaws. This produces a multitude of small
shallow lakes and ill-defined meandering streams which freeze over during the winter.
Vegetation varies from large, heavy, generally coniferous forests to scrub growth, grass,
and tundra.
8.6.2.1.1 Summer Operations. In the summer, extensive swamps, muskeg areas,
lakes, and rivers act as barriers to overland movement. This generates a requirement
for boats and rafts. In the absence of roads, maximum advantage is taken of inland

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waterways for surface transportation of teams and supplies. Helicopters and


fixed-wing aircraft assume increased importance. Aircraft equipped with pontoons are
advantageous. Almost continuous daylight requires special care in movement,
particularly in areas of barren tundra.
8.6.2.1.2 Seasonal Transition Operations. During the spring transition period, ice
melts. Temporary winter roads, ice routes, airfields, and landing zones disintegrate.
Winter field bivouac areas or FOLs may become unusable. During the fall transition
period, transport by watercraft ceases due to freezing of inland waterways. At the same
time, the ice is usually too thin to permit use as ice routes. Partly frozen mud on trails
create severe conditions for foot movement. Cross-country movement is limited until
the ground and water are sufficiently frozen. Reduced load bearing is required during
movement. Before the transition begins, a repositioning of forward operating locations
may be necessary to cope with changes in terrain conditions (e.g., a frozen river in the
winter may become an obstacle in the spring). Careful advance planning to position
ammunition and other supplies in the vicinity of the relocated FOLs is frequently
necessary. Large-scale surface operations during the break-up and freeze-up seasons
are usually considered risky and may have to be postponed.
8.6.2.2 Weather. Sudden changes in weather are common. Changes include severe
frosts, mild weather, sudden freezing, snowstorms, strong winds, and dense fog. Accurate
weather forecasts are essential. While all weather factors are considered in planning
personnel recovery operations, those which exert the greatest influence on operations are
the extreme temperatures, seasonal transition, high winds, and fog. While there is little
precipitation along arctic coastal areas, the ground remains very wet throughout the
summer months because of poor drainage. Snow may fall in any month.
8.6.2.3 Types of Cold. Weather in cold environments is categorized as wet cold, heavy
winter, or arctic dry cold.
8.6.2.3.1 Wet Cold. In wet cold, temperatures range from 20 to 40 degrees Fahrenheit
with short periods of lower temperatures. Snow remains on the ground for only short
periods. There is much humidity and precipitation, fog, rain, and snow. The ground
alternately freezes and thaws and is generally wet and muddy.
8.6.2.3.2 Heavy Winter. In heavy winter, temperatures average from 25 degrees F
down to 5 degrees. Occasionally, temperatures are much lower. There is moderate
snowfall, remaining on the ground for extended periods. The ground generally remains
frozen.
8.6.2.3.3 Arctic Dry Cold. In arctic dry cold, temperatures range from 0 to -40
degrees F. There is a moderate, dry snowfall with depths to 4 or 5 feet and drifts much
deeper. The ground is deeply frozen. Streams and rivers are frozen.
8.6.2.4 Temperature. Temperature ranges are greatest in continental areas, least over
areas where there is open water throughout the year. In areas where surface frost melts in
summer and subsurface permafrost remains, the melted surface water is held so that areas
take on the characteristics of ocean areas and do not have extremes in temperature. In areas
that are clear of snow and ice, temperatures may remain well above freezing, allowing

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


absorption of solar energy and storage of heat. Inland temperatures in midsummer may
reach 110 degrees F in Canadian and Alaskan valleys. Temperatures in coastal areas may
reach a maximum of 75 degrees F. In winter, the entire surface of the subarctic is covered
with snow and ice except for the large ocean areas. Temperatures are consistently in the
subfreezing range.
8.6.2.5 Humidity. In coastal areas of the subarctic, humidity is high because of the open
water areas. In winter, humidity is low over snow and ice surfaces.
8.6.2.6 Wind. Prevailing and local wind speed and direction vary widely in different
areas. These variations are produced by the topography and by air masses and fronts in the
area. An outflow of continental air usually brings more favorable weather inland than does
an onshore flow of maritime air. When a low pressure center moves from ocean areas
inland, there is a flow of maritime air from behind it. Rough weather often results.
Increasing winds and clouds may be an indication of approaching storm conditions.
8.6.2.6.1 Blinding Snow. Blinding snow is a hazard to all operations. Winds of 9 to
14 miles per hour raise the snow a few feet off the ground. This blowing snow obscures
surface objects. Winds of 15 miles and over raise the snow to greater heights. With
high winds, all movement is impossible. The blowing snow penetrates most types of
buildings and equipment.
8.6.2.6.2 Fog. There is more fog in summer months than at any other time of the year.
Fog in summer is damp and tenacious, sometimes persisting in winds of 50 miles per
hour or more. It occurs most frequently with the movement of warm air over cold
water. Over open sea areas in the early winter, the interaction of intensely cold
outbursts of air from the interior with relatively warm water produces sea smoke. This
type of fog is seldom deep. It is rapidly dissipated by turbulent air. Sea smoke
normally occurs with an up-slope wind. Fogs are more frequent in the late night and
early morning hours than at any other time. Minimum incidence occurs at noon or
shortly thereafter. Fog formed over open water areas may envelop coastal areas when
the wind shifts to an onshore flow.
8.6.2.6.3 Cloudiness. Cloud heights are lower in high latitudes than in temperate
zones. Ceilings of 1,600 feet are not common. Cloudiness is greatest in summer and
fall least in winter and spring.
8.6.2.6.4 Precipitation. While there is little precipitation along arctic coastal areas,
the ground remains very wet throughout the summer months because of poor drainage.
Snow may fall in any month, but rain falls only from June through September.
8.6.2.6.5 Mirages. As daylight and twilight lengthen in polar regions in the summer,
temperature inversions produce well defined mirages.
8.6.2.7 Daylight and Darkness. Short days and long nights decrease the amount of
daylight available for working and fighting in winter. Nights are often made bright by the
moon, northern lights, and stars. In summer, the short nights may permit personnel
recovery operations throughout the entire 24-hour period. Conversely, clandestine night
recovery operations may be executed by necessity during the long winter nights.

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8.6.3 Environmental Effects on Equipment and Personnel.


8.6.3.1 Equipment. The equipment carried varies with mission, weather, and duration of
operation. At a minimum, each team member must be equipped for two functions:
surviving the cold and accomplishing the primary mission.
8.6.3.1.1 Communications Equipment. Extreme cold affects communications
equipment by reducing the efficiency of certain components and by making operating
conditions particularly difficult. The need for regular and careful maintenance must,
therefore, be combined with intelligent siting and a particularly high standard of
operating.
8.6.3.1.1.1 Radios. Cold affects radios and their component parts in other ways.
All flexible cables and some metal parts become brittle at low temperatures. Rough
handling easily breaks power connections and cables. If a radio is dropped or jarred
when very cold, it is far more likely to become damaged. All moving parts become
stiff or may jam because of the varying contraction rates of different metallic parts
and because of frozen condensation. Handle all cables carefully. Warm cables so
they can be easily manipulated before connecting them. Condensation becomes a
problem when temperatures fluctuate above and below freezing. Radio equipment
is susceptible to the same dangers from condensation (sweating and freezing) as
weapons, with the added problem of internal condensation (caused by battery
heat). Internal condensation may take a long time to dry and may cause short
circuits and damage. Anticipate the need of additional radio equipment and
additional time/labor to dry out equipment. Moisture from the breath freezes onto
handsets and quickly coats them in ice; the button or switch may also become ice
covered. Protect handsets by a cover which can be improvised from plastic battery
bags and tape. Do not cover handsets with cloth that absorbs moisture and makes
the problem worse. Do not place radios operated outside directly on ice or snow.
8.6.3.1.1.2 Batteries. All batteries give less power at low temperatures. The
conventional dry cell battery loses efficiency very rapidly as the temperature drops.
Store dry batteries at a temperature above 10 degrees Fahrenheit and warm them
before use. Take portable sets into shelters overnight. Avoid overheating lithium
batteries.
8.6.3.1.1.3 SATCOM. At northern latitudes, the angle required to establish
communications via satellite decreases greatly. Natural obstructions such as
mountain ranges can compound this problem. Consideration should be given to
omnidirectional antennas. If omnidirectional antennas are not available, varying
the angle and azimuth of a directional antennae may be required to establish
positive communications. After communication has been established, remember to
note and record the angle and azimuth.
8.6.3.1.1.4 Weatherproofing. By performing weatherproofing and
waterproofing on communications equipment, reliability and dependability are
enhanced. Conventional materiel for weatherproofing includes multipurpose
waterproofing covers and waterproofing tape. Field expedient materiels include a

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poncho, raincoat, plastic bags, sheets of pliofilm (e.g., cling wrap), and flexible
plastics. Any protection is better than no protection.
8.6.3.1.2 Optics. Optics being mechanical devices are prone to failure in the cold.
Take the following into consideration: lasers, night vision devices, and fogging.
8.6.3.1.2.1 Lasers. Laser capabilities are degraded by ice fog and blowing or
falling snow as a result of refraction off snow and ice particles (the human eye sees
farther in these conditions). When clear, cold, and dryit is accurate to within 1
meter at 10,000 meters. There is an increased eye hazard from refraction off snow
or icewear protection. False signals are possible with laser target designators due
to refraction or bouncing of laser off snow- or ice-covered target. (This can cause
the guided-bomb to impact 1,000 meters from the target.)

CAUTION: Laser range finders give line of sight. Trajectory is only affected by gravity over the
horizontal distance (aiming points and data for uphill and downhill are the same).
8.6.3.1.2.2 Night Vision Devices. Use a cold weather battery adapter if equipped,
and keep spare batteries next to the body. Plastic parts become brittle; use caution
in handling. Keep them in a case, protected from snow when not in use. Light
amplification devices are more effective in snow cover because of increased
ambient light reflection.
8.6.3.1.2.3 Fogging. Use care not to unnecessarily breathe on lenses and sights to
avoid fogging of the glass. Team members who wear face masks may increase this
occurrence. Fogging is also a concern when moving from a cold environment to a
warmer environment (from outside cold air to inside a structure that has a warmer
air temperature).
8.6.3.2 Personnel. Team members ability and will to survive the cold will be enhanced
by knowing how it effects them, what they need to do to increase their survival, and how
to use their equipment to get the maximum advantage.
8.6.3.2.1 Clothing. As technology improves, efforts should be made to equip RTs
with these advanced materiels. There is a direct relationship between comfort and
performance. The uniform should be as light as possible, consistent with the weather.
A good rule of thumb is to ensure operators dress comfortably cool. Experience
should decide the amount of underclothing to be worn. Then after 10 to 15 minutes,
make a rest stop; remove unnecessary layers, and vent the neck, waist, and under the
arms to avoid overheating. Military cold weather clothing systems are designed to
change with needs of the individual. Varying the parts of the clothing system they are
using, RTs can be comfortable when performing vigorous activities in the cold if
proper principles of wear are adhered to. The basic principles for clothing worn can
be remembered by using the acronym COLD:
Ckeep clothing Clean.
Oavoid Overheating.
Lwear clothing Loose and layered.
Dkeep clothing Dry.

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8.6.3.2.1.1 Wicking Layer. This layer soaks up the body moisture and draws it
away from the body to keep it dry. Significant progress has been made with such
synthetics as polypropylene.
8.6.3.2.1.2 Insulating Layer. This is the layer that holds the warm air around the
body. Preferably, it is made of polyester pile, but wool is adequate. Although wool
is a good insulator, it is heavy and bulky.
8.6.3.2.1.3 Protective Layer. This not only protects the insulating layer from
getting dirty but also from getting wet. It should be made of wind resistant and
water repellent materiel.
8.6.3.2.1.4 Components of the Sock System. The first layer is a lightweight
single layer polypropylene sock. It should fit snugly. It is designed to wick
moisture away from the foot and prevent blisters by reducing friction. The
intermediate layer of the system is a vapor barrier sock. (This layer is only worn in
extreme cold temperature. The problem is that it also traps all of the moisture.)
This sock should be worn between the wicking and the insulating layers. This
keeps the foot warm and protects the insulating layer from perspiration. Never
wear the VB socks over the insulating socks, as it will cause the socks to become
saturated and lose its heat retention properties. Also, be careful of using the VB
sock when it is warm as it can cause blisters due to excessive sweating. The third
layer is a hook stitch pile fiber made of 50 percent wool and 50 percent
polypropylene. This combination provided the warmth needed for prolonged ski
movements and still allows the moisture to pass through the sock. When looking at
this sock one will see that there is a smooth side and a rough side. The smooth side
is worn on the inside next to the foot. Two pairs of the wicking and insulating socks
should be used. This enables the wearer to continually rotate the socks, allowing
the other pair to be dried in whatever method is available. Body heat works well.
8.6.3.2.1.5 Sizing. Proper sizing of the boot is critical. Done wrong, the operator
may suffer from blisters or frostbite. Larger boots may be required when using a
layered sock system because of bulk. RTLs must ensure boots are properly sized.
8.6.3.2.1.6 Waterproofing. There are many commercially available products that
effectively waterproof boots.
8.6.3.2.1.7 Gaiters. Gaiters can be used to keep snow and debris from entering
the boot. They also have limited insulating qualities.
8.6.3.2.1.8 Over Boots. As their name implies, over boots are worn over the
boot. The over boots are fully insulated and have a hard sole for walking. They are
worn in extreme cold weather operations.
8.6.3.2.1.9 Gloves. When operators wear mittens or heavy gloves, the speed of
handling/firing weapons is reduced. However, this is not an excuse for not wearing
hand protection. Under extreme cold, bare flesh freezes instantly to super-cooled
metals. Thin contact gloves work best for dexterity in weapons handling. For
extended operations in extreme cold, armorers should remove the trigger guards.

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8.6.3.2.2 Diet. In cold weather operations, team members must eat more than usual in
order to function without suffering significant weight loss. The body burns a larger
percentage of calories to maintain body temperature, leaving less energy to perform
physical work. In a cold climate, at least 4,500 calories are needed to perform hard,
physical work and sustain life. Without proper intake, individuals will weaken
physically in a short period of time. Lethargy induced by the cold, combined with the
difficulties and inconvenience of cooking, may sometimes tempt operators to skimp or
miss meals. The principles of sound leadership and discipline in cold weather require
that meals are prepared and entire rations are eaten.
8.6.3.2.2.1 Cold weather rations provide the 4,500 calories needed for the average
operator to function in a cold environment if all portions of both packages are
eaten. They contain the correct proportion of carbohydrates, fat, and protein. MREs
may freeze in cold environments. Team members can prevent this by carrying the
individual food packets in their shirt or trouser pockets. Each MRE contains 1,200
calories. Therefore, four entire MREs must be eaten in order to provide the
necessary calories. It may be necessary to augment diet with high caloric additives
such as butter and olive oil.
8.6.3.2.3 Water. Water daily requirements for fluid vary from 6 to 8 quarts per day
during heavy exertion. The body loses liquid at an exceptional rate in arctic conditions
because of evaporation, exertion, and low humidity. However carefully one adjusts
clothing and ventilation, the heavy exertion of movement on foot and other field
activities will exact a toll in sweat and loss of moisture in the breath. These problems
are combined with decreased thirst in a cold environment and potentially a lack or
readily available water.
8.6.3.2.3.1 To prevent serious dehydration, fluids must be regularly replaced,
preferably with hot drinks. If those drinks contain sugar, they have the additional
advantage of providing extra calories. RTLs must insist that team members take as
much of the daily fluids as possible in the form of hot liquids. Team members
should be cautioned to drink coffee, cocoa, and other caffeine drinks in moderation
because of their diuretic effects. Water is generally available from streams and
lakes or by melting snow and ice. Fuel and time must be made available to melt
snow or ice. The milky water of glacial streams should be allowed to stand until the
coarser sediment settles.
8.6.3.2.3.2 Holes cut in ice to obtain water should be protected to prevent
refreezing. In very cold weather, the hole should be broken open frequently. If
water is not available, melting ice provides more water in less time than snow.
When melting snow, a small amount of snow is initially put in the pot and melted.
Additional snow is added to the resulting water. Water taken from streams or lakes
should be disinfected to prevent potentially devastating disease. Storage of water
needs to be addressed as well. To keep canteens from freezing, consider sleeping
with bottles. Care must be taken when closing bottles to ensure a tight, ice free seal
or bottles may leak. If temperatures are not extremely cold, bottles can stay thawed
by placing them under sleeping bag. Additionally, bottles can be buried in snow.
Ensure 2 feet of snow surrounds the bottle to prevent freezing. Wide-mouth

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canteens also help in accessing the water even when partially frozencanteen
insulators also help. Turning bottles upside down when traveling prevents water
from freezing at the top of the container. If using a camel-back type device, one
should remember to blow water back through the tube after drinking to prevent
freezing.
8.6.3.2.4 Factors Affecting Movement. Both snow and ice in cold weather regions
may affect movement. Consider the following factors:
8.6.3.2.4.1 Snow Cover. Movement in a snow-covered environment can be the
RTs worst enemy if the team does not understand track discipline. Tracks left in
snow are quite visible to both ground and air assets for great distances. Use of
existing tracks is encouraged, minding the likelihood of ambush. Traveling in a
previous units tracks minimizes evidence of recent activity and can work to help
improve deception. In open space terrain, break only one track. Follow the tree line
or natural terrain feature. Avoid dense forest, if possible. Stay at the edge of
wooded areas or in less dense portions. Use gentle traverses to ascend or descend
mountainous terrain. Once altitude is gained, follow slope contours. Avoid
avalanche-prone slopes. Frozen streams can provide excellent routes. Check ice
thickness before proceeding. Move close to a shore or bank. Bypass obstacles, if
possible.
8.6.3.2.4.2 Ice Cover. The freezing of rivers, lakes, and swamps increases
possibilities for movement. Some waterways which are obstacles in summer are
the best routes of advance and lines of communication in winter. At times, an
overcast sky and snow-covered terrain create a condition of visibility which makes
recognition of irregularities in terrain very difficult.
8.6.3.2.4.3 Unaided Foot Movement. RTs on foot cannot move easily through
fresh or powder snow which is more than 8-inches deep. At depths of over 15
inches, unaided movement becomes laborious and very tiring. In such conditions,
troops with no over-snow capability are road bound. Unable to maneuver
effectively, they are at a great disadvantage relative to troops who can move freely
over the snow.
8.6.3.2.4.4 Aided Foot Movement. In most conditions, using skis or snowshoes
can enhance individual mobility, and equipment can be carried in team sleds.
Troops can be trained to use snowshoes quite rapidly; however, their use is very
tiring and restricted by steep terrain. Use of skis gives greater speed than
snowshoes and opens up more terrain but requires more training. Ski-equipped
troops pulled behind vehicles (skijoring) can achieve considerable speed. They
arrive at their destination faster and more fit to fight than those who expended
energy on laborious foot movement do. In any movement in cold weather,
straggling cannot be tolerated for survival depends on staying with the unit.
8.6.3.2.4.5 Military Skiing. Skis are used by RTs to travel over the snow.
Military skiing is not to be confused with downhill skiing in the traditional sense.
Route selection is of the utmost importance. The goal is to move RTs safely and
efficiently to the objective. Trained pararescuemen can move as fast as men

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marching on hard ground can. Skis give mobility and encourage swift maneuvers
to exploit surprise. Ski training is not easy to accomplish. It takes about 4 weeks to
achieve proficiency. Some pararescuemen who take longer to teach should be
trained to snowshoe until their skills increase. Military skiing requires RTs to
negotiate all types of terrain in many different weather and snow conditions. RTs
must carry a weapon, heavy pack, and often have to pull a team sled. They must
master the techniques of moving uphill and downhill across difficult country with
the minimum effort and at a pace to keep up with the rest of the team. A military
skier must become so proficient that skiing is second nature so that the military
skiers whole concentration can be given to the mission. Refer to TC 90-11-1,
Military Skiing, for specifics on military skiing operations.
8.6.3.2.4.5.1 Skiing Speeds for Planning Purposes. Movement on skis is a
combat multiplier that enables units to move over terrain unattainable without
this advantage. However, skiing makes great physical demands, and ski troops
must be very fit and capable of prolong feats of endurance. Do not contemplate
moving on skis until team members are fit and have mastered the basic skills.
Snow and weather conditions and team ability influence the speeds of all skiers
to such an extent that no accurate figures can be quoted for likely speeds. Each
RTL must know the abilities of the team and evaluate its movement capabilities
and rate IAW the abilities of the least experienced individual. Generally,
movement rates can be calculated by adapting the following speeds to ones
situation. Skiers carrying rifles and packs can achieve between 3 to 5
kilometers per hour. When team members pull team sleds, speed falls to 2 to 3
kilometers per hour. Add 1 hour to estimated time for journey for every 300
meters ascended and for every 800 meters descended.
8.6.3.2.4.6 Skijoring. Skijoring is the term for moving troops on skis by towing
them with vehicles. It is faster and less tiring than skiing or snowshoeing.
Over-snow tracked- and wheeled-vehicles can be used. The best routes for
skijoring are snow-covered roads and trails, frozen lakes and rivers, and paths
made by tracked vehicles. Normally, an over-snow vehicle can tow one squad
across country or two squads along a road. On long marches out of contact with the
enemy, skiers can be towed behind a vehicle in suitable country, saving time and
energy. When skijoring, speeds of up to 15 kilometers per hour can be achieved,
dependent on the teams level of training. Towing more than two squads with one
vehicle is impractical because of the length of the column, difficulty in making
turns, and the increased problems of negotiating steep or wooded country and of
keeping up an even pace in inconsistent snow conditions.
8.6.3.2.4.6.1 Dangers. Skijoring is potentially dangerous. No skier should be
secured to the rope in any way. A half hitch over a ski pole is secure method of
attachment, which is easy to release. Skijoring can be extremely cold. Team
members should wear adequate clothing and face protection. When covering
long distances, one may need to halt periodically to restore circulation.
8.6.3.2.5 Vehicle Observer. Always station an observer in the rear of the vehicle to
signal the driver immediately if a skier falls

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8.6.3.2.6 Military Snowshoeing. Snowshoes enable a team member to progress at


about the same pace over the snow as the team member would achieve in boots on hard
ground but at the expense of considerable effort. Speed varies with the depth and
consistency of the snow. Trained and conditioned team members on snowshoes
average 15 kilometers a day over flat or gently rolling terrain and 20 kilometers a day
on a forced march. Snowshoes are very useful when pulling and carrying heavy loads
since the hands and arms remain free. On steep slopes, their use is limited because
traction deteriorates. The snowshoes slide, causing loss of footing. Snowshoes will not
glide over the snow like skis. Very little maintenance is needed as long as snowshoes
are checked regularly and minor repairs are carried out promptly. Snowshoes are most
likely to be damaged when negotiating tree stumps or rocky ground that may snag or
fray the webbing. When such types of terrain are encountered, frequent inspections are
desirable.
8.6.3.2.7 Formations. In areas where tracks are unavoidable, the file formation is
recommended, this also reduces the amount of trail breaking for each man. Rotation of
the pointman or trail breaker is imperative to reduce fatigue. If contact is expected or
imminent, consideration should be given to changing the formation to increase fields
of fire. As one gets close to the enemy, shift emphasis from ease of movement to
concealment.
8.6.3.2.8 Halts. Proper march discipline increases the RTs survivability in many
aspects. Schedule frequent but short rest halts, thus preventing sweat-drenched team
members from freezing. During halts, minimize the amount of movement outside of
the march tracks; packs will typically be dropped to the rear of each team member,
facilitating the ability to sit on an insulated item. Security measures are enforced,
alternating inboard and outboard fields of fire. Ensure the buddy system is employed to
conduct frostbite checks during halt
8.6.3.3 Factors Affecting Defensive Tactics. The defensive action is executed in winter
recovery operations for the same reasons as under normal conditions. However, some
winter phenomena such as sudden, severe snow storms, or excessively low temperatures
may compel RTs to take a defensive posture. The defense may be assumed deliberately to
force the enemy to move under unfavorable conditions, such as in long, narrow avenues of
approach to the objective area (OA) or through deep snow and obstacles, where movement
is made difficult for the aggressor and the firepower is less effective. Enemy troops should
be forced to fight under the exhausting conditions of extreme cold while the defender
occupies better positions, cover, and concealment. In the northern latitudes, the defense
usually is concentrated in a relatively small area. Defensive positions are relatively narrow
and susceptible to envelopment by an enemy with good over-snow mobility. Under these
conditions, a perimeter type of defense is most effective. In addition to normal security
measures employed in the defense, a warning system should be established for the
defensive positions. Positions are located in terrain where the enemy is forced to approach
through deep snow and, if possible, up a slope. The value of elevated defensive positions
is greater during winter than under normal conditions. To reach them, the enemy must
abandon skis. Defensive positions located in deep snow suffer less from the effects of
enemy fire. Deep snow conceals many ground forms, thereby reducing the protection of

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attacking enemy troops. Natural obstructions such as dense forests, thickets, and cliffs
collect snow and create obstacles to the attacker. Snow-covered rocks and fallen trees
become obstacles. A rifle bullet rapidly loses its killing power, depending on the density of
the snow. Snow packed in layers tends to deflect the bullet at each new layer. Loose snow
spread over a defense position will help smother ricochets.
8.6.3.3.1 Establishing Bivouacs. Tracks made in snow-covered terrain will lead the
enemy directly to defensive positions unless a track plan or deception plan is strictly
enforced. The track plan must be determined and the information disseminated before
the position is occupied. RTLs must strictly enforce the track plan, and mention of the
plan should be made in all subsequent team orders. The use of deception is a necessity.
Tracks should be continued well beyond the entrance to the bivouac and defensive
position. If possible, the entrance track should lead into the rear of the position and be
covered by an automatic weapon. Dummy positions and dummy tracks can be used to
lead an enemy force into the killing zone. Some inevitable tracks will be visible to
enemy ground troops and aircraft. Take care to minimize the enemys ability to find
them. Where possible, tracks should not cross an open area. Move in forests and along
tree lines; use dips and hollows in the ground or small watercourses to hide tracks.
Move in old tracks, when possible, and disguise ski pole marks to prevent the enemy
from determining the unit size. Fighting positions should be relatively close to shelters.
The security rotation will be more frequent than in temperate weather for the purpose
of minimizing the potential for cold weather injuries. Team members will typically
sleep in full gear in order to expedite this rotation.
8.6.3.3.2 Employment of Weapons. Most individual weapons are suitable for use in
the north and require only minor modification and winterization. The most effective
type of fire in deep snow is direct fire. Impact bursts of artillery are less effective
because of the dampening effect of deep snow. All fuzes become unreliable at
temperatures lower than -20 degrees F.
8.6.3.3.3 Small Arms Ammunition. The effect of cold on small arms ammunition is
minimal. Velocity is lowered slightly which causes rounds to drop slightly. To
overcome this, battle sight zero all weapons when they arrive in the cold weather
operating area. Range estimation will improve with experience. Use tracers if the
tactical situation permits. Tracers provide the best method. When firing uphill or
downhill, estimate the horizontal distance for sight settingnot line of sight range.
Effective field expedient methods are using map distance or to aim at 6 oclock and
adjust. Increase ammunition allocation. Because of the effects of cold weather
clothing, differences in range estimation, and the effect of cold on the human body,
marksmanship will be reduced. Consequently, ammunition allocations must be
increased.
8.6.3.3.4 Small Arms. The cold greatly affects the operation and employment of
weapons and causes equipment to malfunction. All team members must be aware of
these conditions to effectively employ and care for their weapons, ammunition, optics,
and communications equipment under winter conditions. Snow and ice in the
operating mechanism or improper lubrication cause sluggishness. Cleaning must be
done more often in cold and snow. If team members do not have the right lubricant for

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the temperature, they should fire the weapon dry. Malfunctions occur from too much
snow and ice in the weapon. Use gun covers, muzzle covers, and improvised materiels
to cover every access point to the weapon. Breakage occurs in the first few rounds and
at a higher rate in the cold. Fire slowly to allow the weapon to warm up. (For
automatic weapons: fire three single shots, then three short bursts, then normal bursts.)
As a result of slower burning propellants in the cold, chamber pressure and muzzle
velocity are reduced, thus decreasing the projectiles range. Cold air is denser which
increases the drag on projectiles during flight (which reduces range further). Test fire
and zero weapons frequently in the cold to maintain accuracy. Ammunition should be
kept at the same temperature as the weapon; this can effectively be accomplished
outside to prevent condensation.
8.6.3.3.5 Pistol. It is very difficult to handle with gloves or mittens, use contact gloves
only. The magazine can freeze in the magazine well. The slide can freeze and cause a
malfunction. Breakage of the firing pin and extractor or ejector can occur in extreme
cold, carry spares.
8.6.3.3.6 M4 Carbine. The M4 has a very close tolerance on its moving parts. It is
vital that the M4 be cleaned of all oil and grease and then lubricated with a light coat of
CLP/LAW. CLP is recommended for cleaning. But remember that it freezes at -35
degrees F (keep CLP next to body to keep it fluid and quickly WIP dry or clean and dry
M4 in a heated shelter). Ammunition should not be lubricated. The M4 performs well
under extreme temperature conditions, provided the magazines are free of firing
residue. Be sure to clean the tops of magazines between firing. Care must be taken not
to accidentally fire the weapon when inserting gloved fingers into the trigger guard
area. Operators should always attempt to keep the weapon dry. Under combat
conditions, it is necessary to cycle the weapon every 30 minutes to prevent freezing of
functional parts. Additionally, to ensure proper functioning, keep the insides of
magazines and ammunition wiped dry; leave weapon outside when entering a heated
shelter to prevent condensation. This is called sweating. Weapons will continue to
sweat for 1 hour. Weapons must be cleaned after an hour. If not, when the weapons are
taken back out into the cold, the condensation freezes, forming a thin film of ice that
can adversely affect the weapons operation. To prevent this problem, leave weapons
outside and protected from falling/blowing snow but readily accessible. Tape the butt
plate to prevent the vent hole in the upper butt plate screw from becoming plugged
with snow/ice and to provide a nonslip surface for firing. A butt plug may detract from
mission capability. Tape the stock with white medical tape to provide camouflage and
prohibit the stock from falling apart if cracked or broken. Tape underneath the ejection
port cover to eliminate the metallic sound of its opening. Tape the handguards to
prevent snow from packing in around the barrel, to camouflage the weapon, and to
prevent it from pinching or falling apart if cracked or broken. Place white cloth
medical tape, prophylactic, muzzle cap, and so forth, over the muzzle of the weapon to
prevent snow or ice from plugging the bore.
NOTE: Anything placed over the muzzle must be able to be fired through. Tape the pistol grip
with the folding trigger guard in the lowered position to prevent it from closing, provide a nonslip
grip, and allow firing while wearing mittens/gloves.

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8.6.3.3.7 The M203 40mm Grenade Launcher. The M203 is not susceptible to
breakage in the cold. However, 12 inches of snow can reduce fragmentation effect up
to 80 percent and increase the dud rate. For this reason, variable time and airburst is a
preferred fuse in snow. Aim into trees for an airburst, if possible. Noticeable range
reduction in cold weather occurs. Rocky or ice-covered terrain will increase the
fragmentation effect. Use a prophylactic for a muzzle cover. Protect sights from
snow.
8.6.3.3.8 Grenades. The casualty radius of fragmentation grenades is reduced in
snow. Attach a stick or other device for flotation, but do not milk the fuse for an
airburst. Wear dry contact gloves (wet ones can freeze to the grenade causing it to drop
short). Do not wear thick mittens or gloves as it is easy to mishandle and drop the
grenade. Make a platform for smoke grenades or set upside down in packed snow to
prevent sinking and smoke absorption in snow (do not throw).
8.6.3.4 Additional Considerations.
8.6.3.4.1 RT Size. Sufficient team members are employed to ensure the complete
success of initial recovery effort. Objective area operations are directed toward a
complete execution in the least possible time. Consequently, a larger RT may be
required than is considered essential for normal operations. A recovery operation that
is permitted to lag may result in a stalemate or an opportunity for the enemy to seize
the initiative.
8.6.3.4.2 Planning Use of Time. When planning for operations in the cold weather
environment, rate of movement, supplies and availability of resupply, protection
against the cold, and expected weather are all factors that can significantly affect how
long the operation will take to complete. All of these factors are stacked against how
long a particular IPs ability to survive.
8.6.3.4.3 IP Contact. The primary determining factor for how quickly the RT must
conduct the recovery is how well equipped the IP is able to withstand the cold weather
environment.

NOTE: The particular methods for establishing contact are covered in AFTTP 3-1.8.
8.6.3.4.4 Recovered IP Considerations. Consideration should be given to bringing
additional equipment/clothing for IPs so they have the ability to survive and move with
the team. If the IP is injured, medical treatment should be weighed against exposing
them to the cold. Consider constructing a hasty shelter for the purpose of medical
treatment and rewarming if evacuation is going to be delayed. Remember that active
rewarming may cause wounds to start bleeding again once vessels become dilated. The
RT should review cold weather treatment protocol during the mission planning phase.
8.6.3.4.5 Resupply. Personnel and supplies are carried as near to the enemy as is
possible by air transport. Plans provide for alternate means of logistic support;
requirements for fuel, shelter, and clothing increase and special equipment and/or the
modification of standard equipment is often necessary. Only minimum essential
supplies and equipment can be moved by team members; supply economy is achieved
by self-sufficiency and maintaining austere living conditions. Extreme cold weather

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conditions magnify all normal supply problems. Critical points in the supply plan are
anticipated, and provision is made for possible contingencies. Failure to deliver
supplies to the RT at the proper time may cause the entire recovery operation to fail.
Heated storage is required for many items of supply, notably medical supplies.
8.6.3.4.6 Supervision. The effects of extreme cold numb personnel, increase the need
for maintenance of materiel and weapons, and slow up activities. These factors are
important considerations when making time and space calculations.
8.7 CBRNE Combat Operations.
8.7.1 NBC Warfare. NBC warfare is not a separate, special form of war, but instead
battlefield conditions just like rain, snow, darkness, electronic warfare, heat, and so on.
Units must train to accomplish their wartime missions under all battlefield conditions.
Whenever NBC is separated from other training events or conditions, our soldiers
regard operations under NBC conditions as a separate form of warfare; Officer
comment during chemical training SOLID SHIELD 87, Army Chemical Review,
January 1988
8.7.2 Environment. NBC weapons and hazards can directly influence the battlespace and
physical environment in which GUARDIAN ANGEL operates. The most notable influences
of the physical environment are weather and terrain. Weather conditions are the
uncontrollable wildcard of NBC employment and provide useful clues to probable times and
places for NBC use (e.g., employment windows). Diligent tracking of weather conditions aids
in the assessment of risks to GUARDIAN ANGEL from NBC weapons, as well as toxic
industrial materials (TIM) hazards. In concert with weather conditions, the terrain influences
where NBC effects may concentrate (e.g., chemical agents in low-lying areas) and in many
cases, it influences enemy NBC targeting (e.g., exploiting or creating chokepoints). The areas
of responsibility (AOR) in which RT operate may contain several environments, each with a
distinct set of NBC planning factors and considerations. Trained to operate in the worlds
environments, GUARDIAN ANGEL must adapt standard operating procedures to NBC
threats.
8.8 Environmental Considerations. In order to prepare for NBC operations and function in
the NBC environment, it is first necessary to understand the environment.
8.8.1 Urban Areas. Urban structures such as sewers, storm drains, reinforced concrete
buildings, subways, and basements, can protect against spray attacks of chemical or biological
agents and the effects of nuclear blast and radiation. However, this exchange for overhead
cover creates other problems. Chemical agents tend to act differently in urban areas and will
tend to collect in low areas; non persistent agents may enter buildings or seep into piles of
rubble. GUARDIAN ANGEL personnel should avoid these low areas. Also, GUARDIAN
ANGEL personnel should attempt to shut down ventilation systems in urban structures to
prevent the spread of vapor or aerosol hazards. The persistency of an agent can greatly
increase when it has settled in these areas. Once an attack has occurred, detection of chemical
contamination becomes very important. Personnel must thoroughly check areas before
attempting to occupy or traverse them.

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8.8.1.1 The stable environment of an urban area may increase the persistency of live
biological agents and the effectiveness of toxins. Existing food and water supplies are
prime targets for biological agents. Personal hygiene becomes very important. Leaders
must establish and consistently enforce sanitary and personal hygiene measures, including
immunizations. They also must ensure that all personnel drink safe water and never
assume that any local water is safe.
8.8.1.2 The population density of an urban area must be considered. During planning, the
potential of encountering a large number of contaminated, panicked, injured, and dying
people must be considered.
8.8.1.3 Urban areas can be susceptible to an adversarys use of TIMs as a weapon,
especially if there is a sizable chemical industry or storage facilities associated with the
area. Personnel should be aware of potential hazardous materials they may encounter.
8.8.1.4 For additional information see Army FM 3-4, NBC Protection, Appendix A.

8.8.2 Desert Areas. Desert operations may present additional problems. Desert daytime
temperatures can vary from 90 to 125 degrees F resulting in unstable temperature gradients
that are not particularly favorable to biological/chemical (BC) attacks. Evaporation of
chemical agents during the day will rapidly create a downwind hazard and an inhalation
problem. However, with nightfall, the desert cools rapidly, and a stable temperature gradient
occurs creating the possibility of night or early morning attacks.
8.8.3 Low Terrain, Temperate Zone Areas. An adversary's use of BC or TIMs can be
effective in this environment when forces are not prepared. Uses of these weapons (non
persistent) are more efficient when employed at night and during periods of inversion
conditions. Terrain features such as tall grass or scrub brush have the tendency to retard the
flow of an agent cloud, thus reducing the overall size of the contamination. Also, the grass and
brush may absorb the chemical agent, which would not pose a significant effect on the
mission. However, movement through the area requires care because the absorbed agent may
be released when the vegetation is disturbed or crushed, creating a secondary toxic hazard.
Persistent agents can cling to vegetation, creating surface exposure and an off-gasing during
daylight. TIMs, such as chlorine, may tend to meander, as would a fog.
8.8.3.1 Movement of a biological aerosol over grass and brush reduces the concentration
as the particles impact on vegetation and settle out of the air. However, the cover provided
by vegetation protects the biological agent from the weather and; thus, favors its
survivability, specifically wet aerosols.
8.8.3.2 For additional information see Army FM 3-6, Field Behavior of NBC Agents.
8.8.4 Mountain Areas. Terrain and weather in mountainous areas magnify the requirement
for a high degree of NBC defense preparedness. Rugged terrain limits the employment of
large forces, reduces maneuver, and impedes logistical support. Shelters are difficult to dig
and may require improvisation using existing rocks, snow, and timber. However, this same
terrain may also provide caves, ravines, and cliffs as a natural source of protection.

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8.8.4.1 Chemical agents are heavier than air and will settle in valleys and depressions.
Subject to mountain breezes, agents will move down and within the valley. Thus, high
dosages are less likely on crests or sides of ridges or hills.
8.8.4.2 Radiation contamination will be erratic due to rapid changes in wind patterns but
at the same time, the range of thermal effect increases with the clarity of mountain air. The
location of hot spots may be erratic. Additionally, a nuclear blast can produce rock and
snow slides.
8.8.4.3 Colder mountainous temperatures may affect biological agents in the same manner
as cold weather.
8.8.4.4 For additional information see Army FM 3-4, NBC Protection, Appendix A.
8.8.5 Jungle Areas. Tropical climates require the highest degree of individual discipline
and conditioning to maintain effective NBC defensive readiness. Leaders and staff planners
must expect and plan for a rapid decrease in unit efficiency. They also must anticipate heat
casualties. Strict adherence to field sanitation is necessary. In addition, they must ensure that
special precautions are taken to maintain unit NBC defense equipment in usable condition.
The rapid mildew, dry rot, and rust inherent in jungle areas necessitate this requirement.
8.8.5.1 Dominant climatic features of jungle areas are high, constant temperatures; heavy
rainfall; and very high humidity. These features increase the survivability of biological
agents. In thick jungle, there is usually little or no wind and the canopy blocks most of the
sunlight from the ground, thus providing excellent conditions for adversary use of
biological agents and toxins.
8.8.5.2 The same canopy that may provide slight shielding from radiation may also
enhance blast effect with tree blow-downs and projectiles. Also, a lack of penetrating wind
may result in decreased downwind hazards.
8.8.5.3 A jungle canopy creates good overhead cover from aircraft spray. However,
persistent agents delivered by artillery or bombs may penetrate the canopy before being
released, thus creating a hazard in the immediate area of impact.
8.8.5.4 Additionally, rains can wash radiation into water collection areas producing hot
spots.
8.8.5.5 For additional information see Army FM 3-4, NBC Protection, Appendix A.
8.8.6 Cold Weather Regions. Cold weather conditions create many added problems in
NBC defense. During the winter months, 45 percent of the North American landmass and 65
percent of the Eurasian landmass are characterized by extreme cold and deep snow. These
areas include Korea, China, Bosnia, Kosovo, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and the United
States. The former Soviet Union developed procedures to weaponize a series of agents to be
effective in extreme cold weather. Some of those agents do not have known freezing points. In
temperatures from -20 degrees to -40 degrees F, agents such as Sarin (GB) become like a
thickened Soman (GD). Choking agents have increased persistency from 0 to -40 degrees F.
Even hydrogen cyanide (AC) which solidifies at -14 degrees F can be disseminated as fine
particles, thereby increasing its effective time and threat. Mustard agents employed through
pyrotechnic devices create effective vapor hazards far below the freezing point of mustard.

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8.8.6.1 Most decontaminates have reduced effectiveness at temperatures below 0 degrees
F. In field conditions decontaminate effectiveness would be reduced due to impurities in
agents and decontaminates. Present detection technology is not effective in cold
environments. An agent must be in liquid or vapor form and in significant quantities in
order to be detected by currently available equipment. In cold environments agents may be
undetectable, yet still hazardous.
8.8.6.2 Frozen contamination must be prevented from being tracked into a warmed area
such as a tent, heating to form a vapor and then producing a deadly off-gassing hazard.
Agents mixed with frozen water can adhere to protective clothing, thereby preventing
removal of the hazard. These hazards may occur as temperatures increase from night to
day and decrease from day to night.
8.8.6.3 Special precautions and actions to be considered for conducting cold weather
chemical decontamination:

8.8.7 Special Precautions Checklist.


8.8.7.1 Whenever possible, conduct detailed troop decontamination (DTD) in a warm tent,
gross contamination must be removed prior to DTD.
8.8.7.2 Provide warming tents for contaminated soldiers working on the decon line.
8.8.7.3 Place chemical agent alarms in all warming tents. In most cases the alarms would
not detect contamination outside.
8.8.7.4 Drain all decon equipment of water during storage to prevent water freezing and
damaging the equipment.
8.8.7.5 Minimize digging because it increases the risk of vapor hazards. Contaminates
may be trapped in frozen layers below the surface. When soldiers dig, the layer becomes
exposed to the surface, where the temperature creates a different vapor pressure. The
change in vapor pressure may create a new hazard.
8.8.7.6 Check a core snow sample when entering a new assembly area. Contaminants can
become preserved in snow and ice.
8.8.7.7 This makes detection difficult and may increase the spread of contamination.
Snow may drift for miles.
8.8.7.8 Contaminants may be trapped in a layer beneath the surface. NBC recon teams
should take samples of snow from several layers by digging in a few areas.
8.8.7.9 Test the snow with detection paper: M8 or M9 paper.
8.8.7.10 If possible, warm the snow to a liquid and test it with a chemical agent monitor
(CAM).
8.8.7.11 Mission oriented protective posture does not prevent cold weather injuries.
8.8.7.12 Use of nuclear weapons in arctic conditions can increase the effects and potential
casualties at greater distances from ground zero (GZ). Personnel should be aware of
potential snow blindness and burns, avalanches as far as 30 kilometers (km) from GZ,
quick thaws and freezes, and frozen material/snow storms.

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8.8.7.13 In cold temperatures, biological agents are more persistent.


8.8.7.14 For additional information refer to Army FM 3-4, NBC Protection, Appendix A;
and TC 3-10, Commanders Tactical NBC Handbook.
8.8.8 Maritime Environments and Riverine Areas. G U A R D I A N A N G E L a s s e t s
operating in maritime environments have the potential of encountering chemical, biological,
or radiological attacks from the shoreline; however, a chemical attack is considered the most
likely. Delivery of a non persistent chemical agent, in favorable climatic conditions, is no
different across open water from that of low, rolling terrain. The effects of wind and heavy surf
will tend to disperse a chemical cloud. Direct use of persistent agents against deploying forces
is not considered feasible but contamination of a beach would provide a formidable barrier.
8.8.8.1 Riverine Areas. Operations on and around rivers present situations that have a
potential to disrupt operations. Use of both persistent and non persistent agents will require
GUARDIAN ANGEL to establish mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) levels that
could degrade personnel effectiveness. During inversion climatic conditions, non
persistent chemical agent clouds have the tendency to follow a rivers path when
channeled by the high grass and brush along the banks. Persistent agent could be used to
contaminate the riverbanks.
8.8.8.2 Surface vessels operating in support of CSAR risk being attacked by artillery,
missile, or from the air depending on their offshore location. The feasibility of the use of
biological agents, except against large targets, would be considered low, however,
radiological contamination as a barrier should be considered in any plan.
8.8.8.3 For additional information refer to Army FM 3-6, Field Behavior of NBC Agents.
NOTE: Mustard agents can remain for extended periods of time on the surface of the water.
8.8.9 Atmospheric Environments. GUARDIAN ANGEL planning involving aviation
assets should consider the possibility of both external and internal aircraft contamination.
Three primary regimesoperating/staging bases, en route, and objective area operations
need to be considered:
8.8.9.1 Operating/Staging Bases. The possibility of NBC use against airfields where
GUARDIAN ANGEL aviation assets are operating should always be considered. Airfields
are typically wide-open and have well known, publicly available, and highly accurate
coordinates making them easy to target. To minimize the effects of NBC attacks,
GUARDIAN ANGEL personnel, aircraft, supplies, and support assets should be dispersed
and covered (situation permitting). The typically clear, wide-open nature of most airfields
will allow non persistent chemical agents to disperse quickly. Assets should be protected
against NBC contaminants that adhere to surfaces; covering allows quick reuse after an
attack.
8.8.9.2 En Route. The likelihood of NBC contamination while airborne is remote, with
the odds decreasing as altitude increases. Increasing altitude, however, increases the risks
of detection by threat systems, and must be weighed against mission requirements. Flying
through rain and clouds increases the possibility of partial decontamination to outside
surfaces when transiting to and from objective areas.

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8.8.9.3 Objective Area Operations. The greatest potential for contamination is during
objective area operations: infiltration/exfiltration (infil/exfil), airdrop, or other operations
that require GUARDIAN ANGEL aircraft to operate in close proximity to the ground. The
aircraft will typically be opened up, increasing the possibility of internal aircraft
contamination from the effects of NBC agents and the blast from propellers/rotors and
contaminated personnel/equipment requiring infil/exfil. Aircrews must be prepared to
operate in an NBC environment and anticipate the additional requirements of passengers
during missions.

8.8.10 Deployment Decisions. The decision to send aircraft into situations where they will
likely become internally contaminated should factor in the inability to effectively
decontaminate (decon) aircraft in a timely manner. Sending an aircraft into a
contaminated environment will likely require the aircraft to be maintained and flown in
a dirty condition.
8.8.11 Potential Threats.
8.8.11.1 Biological Agents.
8.8.11.1.1 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defines a biological agent
as a microorganism (or its toxin) that causes disease or deterioration of material.
Biological agents are generally directed against the respiratory system to maximize the
organisms ability to diffuse directly into the bloodstream and bodily tissue. Individual
protective equipment (IP) generally provides protection against a biological warfare
(BW) attack.
8.8.11.1.2 Generally, biological warfare agents may be classified into two broad
groups: pathogens and toxins.
8.8.11.1.3 Pathogensmicroorganisms that produce disease in humans, animals,
and/or plants (e.g., protozoa, fungi, bacteria, rickettsia, and viruses).
8.8.11.1.4

Toxinsany toxic substance that can be produced by a living organism.

8.8.11.1.5 Most organisms are naturally occurring and can be found in almost any
environment. Lack of proper hygiene and appropriate vaccines, contribute to the
organisms ability to rapidly cause incapacitating or lethal illness. When employed as
a warfare agent, biological agents can be disseminated in aerosol form, by vectors such
as mosquitoes and ticks, or through contaminated food or water.
8.8.11.2 Chemical Agents.
8.8.11.2.1 Chemical warfare (CW) agents produce both immediate and delayed
effects that will degrade operations through lethal, incapacitating, or other damaging
effects to individuals as well as contamination of equipment, supplies, and critical
terrain features. The types of chemical warfare agents that could be encountered by
GUARDIAN ANGEL forces are classified as lethal and incapacitating. Agents may
exist as solids, liquids, or gases. In addition, toxic industrial materials (TIM) and
potentially dangerous herbicides/pesticides could be encountered accidentally or
employed by an adversary.

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8.8.11.2.2 CW agents are grouped according to use. They can either be lethal or
incapacitating. Lethal agents produce serious injury requiring medical attention (death
may occur when used in field concentrations). Incapacitating agents produce
temporary physiological or mental effects and may not require medical treatment to
recover. Both types of agents may hinder the ability to carry out the mission.
8.8.11.2.3 Lethal agents are chemical substances intended for use in military
operations to kill, seriously injure, or hinder military operations through their
physiological effects. They are classified as nerve, choking, or blood agents. Nerve
agents are considered the primary agents of threat to the US military because of their
high toxicity and effectiveness through multiple routes of entry. Nerve agents attack
the bodys nervous system. Even small quantities are extremely toxic and can cause
death in less than 15 minutes, if not treated.
8.8.11.2.4 Incapacitating agents include blister (mustards) and compounds that effect
the nervous system (e.g., BZ or LSD).
NOTE: Blister agents such as mustard when received in high enough doses and/or not treated
properly may be lethal.
8.8.11.2.5 Attack by these agents may cause additional constraints by taxing the
logistical force to provide additional medical support personnel and treatment.
8.8.11.2.6 Lethal and incapacitating agents may be disseminated by artillery, mortar
shells, rockets, bombs, or aircraft spray. They may be persistent or non persistent and
produce immediate casualties among unprotected troops, restrict friendly use of
terrain, objectives, and equipment, degrade friendly combat effectiveness by forcing
protective posture and creating confusion and stress, especially among leaders.
8.8.11.2.7 Nerve agents also have been produced and used by terrorist groups as
evidenced by the use of Sarin (GB) in the Tokyo, Japan subway attack.
8.8.11.3 Toxic Industrial Materials.
8.8.11.3.1 Although less lethal than current chemical warfare agents, industrial
materials often are available in enormous quantities, do not require expensive research
programs, are easily mass produced, do not violate the chemical weapons convention,
and can still produce mass casualties. TIMs could be released from industrial plants or
storage depots through battle damage, as consequence of a strike against a particular
facility, or as a desperation measure during military operations. They could also be
utilized as improvised chemical weapons and have potential for inclusion in
clandestine programs or contingency plans.
NOTE: IP does not protect against all TIMs (e.g., IP will not protect the wearer from
ammonia-based or chlorine-based industrial chemicals).
8.8.11.4 Riot Control Agents.
8.8.11.4.1 Riot control agents (RCA) are chemicals that produce temporary irritating
or disabling effects when in contact with the eye or when inhaled. Generally used in
the control of violent disorders, they can be effectively employed to contaminate
terrain and to cause degrading effects on individuals, requiring them to use IP for

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protection. US policy does not classify RCAs as chemical warfare agents. Presidential
Executive Order 11850 establishes the national policy for the use of RCAs by US
forces in combat.
8.8.11.5 Nuclear.
8.8.11.5.1 Nuclear weapons are similar to conventional weapons as their destructive
action is due mainly to blast or shock. However, nuclear explosions can be millions of
times more powerful than the largest conventional detonations. For the release of a
given amount of energy, the material mass required for a nuclear explosion would be
much less than that of a conventional explosion. Nuclear effects are divided into four
categories: blast/overpressure, heat and light (thermal radiation), radioactivity (alpha,
beta, gamma, and neutron), and electromagnetic pulse (EMP).
8.8.11.5.2 Blast/Overpressure. The blast wave created by an explosion produces a
shock front that travels rapidly away from the fireball behaving like a moving wall of
highly compressed air (approximately 900 miles per hour). When this blast wave
strikes the surface of the earth, it is reflected back causing a second wave to be formed,
which will eventually merge with the first wave (called Mach effect). When this
occurs, the overpressure will essentially double. Winds generated by the blast of the
weapon could reach several hundred miles per hour at ground zero and be as high as 70
mph as far as 6 miles away.
8.8.11.5.3 Thermal Radiation. Immediately after a detonation, weapon residues
emit primary thermal radiation (x-rays), which are adsorbed within a few feet of air.
This energy is then re-emitted from the fireball as thermal radiation consisting of
ultraviolet, visible, and infrared rays. There are two distinct thermal pulses that result
from the detonation.
8.8.11.5.3.1 First pulse lasts about 1 second, high temperatures, and can cause
flash blindness or retinal burns.
8.8.11.5.3.2 Second pulse lasts about 10 seconds, carries about 99 percent of the
thermal radiation energy, and causes skin burns and fires.
8.8.11.5.4 A detonation emits various forms of nuclear radiation (alpha, beta particles,
gamma rays, and neutrons) that are referred to as initial and residual radiation. The
initial radiation is emitted within the first minute of the detonation, and residual is that
radiation released after that time.
8.8.11.5.5 Initial radiation requires extensive shielding, creates additional radiation
contamination, and can affect materials such as those used in electronic systems (e.g.,
radio and radar sets, gyroscopes, and computers).
8.8.11.5.6 Residual radiation primary hazard is fallout.
8.8.11.5.7 Electromagnetic pulse is an electromagnetic signal produced by a nuclear
detonation is commonly known as EMP. EMP induced currents and voltages can
cause electronic component equipment failure, affecting a wide range of electric and
communication equipment, global positioning systems, command control nodes,
vehicle ignition systems, avionics, and fire control systems.

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8.8.11.6 Radiological. Nuclear threats are associated with the explosive detonation of
special nuclear material. The radiological threat deals with radiation hazards and
radioactive materials that may be in more common use. The threat of low-level radiation
exists in all operations. This threat can exist in certain expended rounds (depleted
uranium), damaged or destroyed equipment, or contaminated shrapnel. It also may occur
from inadequate nuclear waste disposal, deterioration of nuclear power facilities, damage
to facilities that routinely use radioactive material/sources, and the direct employment of
radioactive materials/compounds by an adversary (terrorism). Specialized detection
equipment is required to detect lower levels of radiation.

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9-1
CHAPTER 9
MARITIME OPERATIONS

9.1 Purpose. This attachment establishes the general guidelines and procedures for the conduct
of GUARDIAN ANGEL recovery team maritime operations to include surface and underwater
search, rescue, and recovery. The techniques described in this attachment may be accomplished
day or night. The information contained in this chapter is not all-inclusive. Recovery team
maritime operations can be conducted in many geographical locations on any given mission.
These missions may begin with insertion by means of parachute, helicopter, surface craft, or from
the shoreline. Regardless of the method used to enter the maritime environment, using the
following TTP will provide for a safe operation and enhance the recovery teams chances for a
successful mission.
9.2 Surface Search, Rescue, and Recovery Operations. This section is intended to expand on
various TTPs to be considered when executing search, rescue, and recovery operations on the
water surface when employing from a recovery vehicle (RV), shoreline, or combat rubber raiding
craft (CRRC); as a swimmer or as a team CRRC member. The TTP detailed has been successfully
employed by GUARDIAN ANGEL recovery teams, the US Coast Guard, and other water rescue
agencies. Joe Mokry of Ocean Rescue Systems, Portland, Maine, a subject matter expert (SME)
commonly consulted by GUARDIAN ANGEL recovery teams assisted greatly in this text.
9.2.1 Water Hoist Rescue Techniques. The following procedures are specialized
helicopter water rescue hoist techniques and procedures used to affect the rescue of survivors
in the water.
9.2.1.1 Rescue Strop Water Deployment. A rescue strop deployment can be used at
night or any time that conditions dictate, such as debris or broken ice in water,
questionable water depth, and sea state. The following are procedures for performing a
strop deployment.
9.2.1.1.1 The team member keeps arms crossed over strop while being lowered to the
water. The strop safety straps are not used during this maneuver. While being lowered
on the strop, he should try to maintain visual contact with the survivor. The inherent
spinning of the hoist cable may prevent constant visual contact.
9.2.1.1.2 After being fully immersed in the water, slip out of the strop. In high seas,
the team member may slip out after his fin tips hit the crest of a wave. Once out of the
strop, swim toward the survivor.
CAUTION: Do not send the strop to survivors without a team member, as it may become caught
or an entanglement hazard and survivors may not know how to properly use it.
9.2.1.2 Barrelman Harness Water Deployment. A harness deployment can be used at
night or any time that conditions dictate, such as debris or broken ice in water,
questionable water depth, and sea state. The following are procedures for performing a
harness deployment.
9.2.1.2.1 While being lowered in the harness, the team member should try to maintain
visual contact with the survivor. Spinning of the hoist cable may prevent constant

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visual contact. After being fully immersed in the water, disconnect from the rescue
hook and swim towards the survivor.
9.2.1.3 Direct Deployment Over Solid Ice. Keeping the survivor outside rotor wash,
perform direct deployment to the ice, and proceed to the survivor. The team member and
survivor are then hoisted using established procedures.

CAUTION: Do not expose survivor to rotor wash prior to contact, as this may cause the survivor
to slide radically on ice, possibly causing injury.
9.2.1.4 Water Direct Deployment. The following are procedures for performing a direct
deployment water approach.
9.2.1.4.1 The team member is lowered to a position just above the water's surface.
The aircraft is in a position that allows him to be lowered into the water and placed
within 2 to 3 feet of the survivor.
9.2.1.4.2 Using the same shoulder that the quick strop is on, grasp the wrist of the
survivor, slide the strop down his arm, maneuver the strop over the survivor's head and
other arm, and snug the strop under the survivors arm pits. Slide the friction keeper as
tight as possible and hold with one hand.
9.2.1.4.3 If the survivor is facing away from the team member, the strop is placed over
the head and shoulders, snugged into the armpits, and the friction keeper is secured.
The strop may also be applied by moving the strop over the feet and up the body to the
armpits.
9.2.1.4.4 Securing the safety strap is accomplished by routing the hook located at the
end of the safety strap between the survivors legs, and securing it to the slide assembly
(the larger of the two slots) on the quick strop. Signal the RV when ready for recovery.
WARNING: Failure to connect the crotch strap on an unconscious or incapacitated survivor may
result in survivor slipping out of the quick strop.
9.2.1.5 Hypothermia Lift. When dealing with severe hypothermia and employing from
aircraft with no hoistable litter, employ the double-lift method or hypothermia lift. The
survivor strop is used in conjunction with the quick strop to hoist the survivor in a
semi-supine position.
9.2.1.5.1 The survivor strop is attached to the hoist hook between the harness and the
quick strop.
9.2.1.5.2 Once in the water, place the survivor strop around the survivor's torso and
attach the safety strap.
9.2.1.5.3 Move down to the legs and slide the quick strop up the legs and under the
knees.
9.2.1.5.4 Secure the friction keeper and signal the RV for pick-up. Straddle the
survivor while being hoisted.
9.2.1.5.5 The survivor is brought into the cabin first regardless of whether facing
toward or away from the team member.

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9-3

9.2.1.6 Tri-SAR Harness. The Tri-SAR rescue harness is flotation, lifting harness, and
equipment storage all compiled into one piece of equipment. It is standard equipment for
the USCG and USN rescue swimmer and in use with some recovery teams. The Tri-SAR
can be inflated either manually through an oral inflation valve or pneumatically by pulling
on the inflation lanyard that activates a CO2 inflation system. This will fill the one
continuous flotation bladder encased in the denier nylon housing. There are five storage
pockets on the vest; strobe light pocket, folding knife pocket, flare pocket, chemlight
pocket, and miscellaneous equipment pocket. The USN and USCG variant of the Tri-SAR
has an integrated nylon webbing harness with a lifting V-ring as well as a gated lifting ring.
The USAF version of the vest has a few differences. As USAF Rescue and SOF
helicopters equipped with rescue hoists utilize pip pins on the rescue hook, the USAF
variant of the Tri-SAR harness is equipped with a sewn loop for use with a large carabineer
in lieu of the lifting V-ring. For land operations, the flotation vest is removable by use of a
stainless-steel mini-buckle. The olive drab vest is has removable retro-reflective tape
panels. (See Figure 9.1, Tri-SAR Harness.)
Figure 9.1 Tri-SAR Harness.

Tri-SAR Harness

UNCLASSIFIED
9.2.1.7 Tag Line. The use of a tag line during water hoist rescue operations will aid the
recovery team and RV by reducing the time required to hover directly over a small vessel
without a reference.
9.2.1.7.1 A weight may be attached to the end of the tag line without the weak link.
The weak link end of the tag line may be fastened to the hoist hook or the rescue device
before the device goes out the door.

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9.2.1.7.2 The weak link is created using a single loop of gutted 550-cord or two wraps
of 80-pound test tape between the rope end and carabiner.
9.2.1.7.3 The tag line is delivered from a hover while using extreme care to avoid
fouling the line in the rotor system.
9.2.1.7.4 To deliver the tag line to a small vessel, the RV establishes a hover short of
the vessel and lowers the tag line to the water, the tag line is then raised about 5 feet
above the water or vessel. The tag line is then moved to the vessel.

CAUTION: Team members working with tag lines should wear gloves. If the survivors handling
the tag line are without gloves, aircrews attach a pair of leather gloves to the tag line before
deployment.
9.2.1.7.5 To deliver the tag line to a large vessel with a restricted pickup area, the tag
line is lowered after clearing the obstacles over the vessel; otherwise follow small
vessel techniques.
9.2.1.7.6 Once the tag line is on the water or vessel and the team or survivors is
tending it, the aircrew plays out slack as the RV clears the area. The tag line weak link
is attached to the rescue device. Once the immediate area is cleared and the pilot can
again see the survivor/vessel the hoist is lowered.
9.2.1.7.7 The tag line is utilized to guide the team member or rescue device into the
desired location.
9.2.1.7.8 When the team member or rescue device is on the vessels deck and the
survivor is ready for hoisting, the RV is directed to position back over the deck. As
soon as the survivor being hoisted out is clear of the deck or obstructions, the RV is
cleared away from the obstacles/vessel usually left and/or back. The RV maintains this
position until the survivor is in the cabin and the tag line is either retrieved or
discarded. Other team members on the vessel use the tag line to steady the
survivor/team member while being hoisted up. In rough seas, the RV needs to keep
away from the vessel and obstructions and an offset hover during recovery may be
necessary.
NOTE: The tag line may be used in lieu of the hoist cable to lower small items to the surface. The
item is lowered attached to a carabiner with a weight. The same technique is utilized for delivery
of the tag line to small or large vessels. The weak link end of the tag line is attached to a cabin
tie-down ring.
9.2.1.8 Shipboard Hoist Operations. If the RV is in communication with the vessels
crew, have the vessel turn to the optimal heading based upon the pickup position and true
winds. The primary objective is to have the vessel turn to a heading to provide the RV a
relative headwind while conducting the desired operation. RVs need to consider the
turbulence caused by wind disruption around the vessels superstructure and temperature
increases from the ship exhaust. The vessel is slowed to clutch or steerage speed to make
the ship more stable to conduct operations. Larger ships may not be able to comply with
this request. The ships captain is informed of the required ships course and speed,
intended pickup location (e.g., bow, stern, or midship) requested lighting, type of rescue

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

9-5

device, intentions, safety considerations, number of personnel aboard the aircraft and
emergency intentions. If it is an option, have the ships crew lower or stow all antennas,
booms, rigging, flag masts, and loose gear from the hoisting area. Ship captains may be
hesitant to turn off their navigation lights; it may be necessary to specifically request it.
CAUTION: Do not use the vessels equipment for recovery, except as a last resort. Do not allow
the hoist cable or tag line to be secured to any part of the vessel.
9.2.1.8.1 Rafts and Small Boats. When the RV approaches a raft, the pilot does not
excessively slow the closing speed, but moves smoothly toward and directly over the
raft. Moving too slowly towards a raft will cause it to be blown away from the RV at a
rate equal to the RVs movement. Slow hovering over small boats may present the
same drift difficulties as a raft. Survivors supported by life jackets will present with
little to no drift problem during RV approach.
9.2.2 In-Water Survivor Approaches, Carries, and Releases. T h e b e s t s w i m m i n g
approach to a survivor on the surface is the rescue stroke. The rescue stroke is a modified front
crawl with the head up to keep the team members eyes on the survivor. This also allows him
to observe if the survivor submerges or makes a lunge towards him. Stop short of the survivor
and observe the behavior of the survivor before making contact. Prior to executing the
following approach, attempt to establish communication with the survivor. Be aware of the
added buoyancy of the wet/dry suit and avoid premature surfacing. If the survivor seems
under control, instruct the victim to roll over face up and to take several deep breaths to help
calm himself/herself. (See Figure 9.2, Rescue Stroke.)
9.2.2.1 The Defensive Position. It is recommended that the legs be the primary
defensive tactic when dealing with a panicked survivor on the surface. By reclining
backward away from a lunging survivor, the team member helps ensure that the legs and
fins will be ready to block any attack made with the survivors arms. Keep the legs
extended toward the survivor and keep moving horizontally, ready to react. Maintaining
this position will generally prevent the survivor from grabbing your equipment, face, head,
and neck area.
9.2.2.1.1 Rear Surface Approach. The following are procedures for performing a
Rear Surface Approach.
9.2.2.1.1.1 Approach the survivor with head out of the water and eyes on the
survivor.
9.2.2.1.1.2 With forward momentum, grab survivor under the armpits and rotate
toward the rescuer.
9.2.2.1.1.3 Secure survivor with in a cross-chest, collar tow or equipment carry.
NOTE: Avoid placing the survivor in a choke hold around the neck as this may induce panic.
9.2.2.1.2 Underwater Approach. The following are procedures for performing an
Underwater Approach. (See Figure 9.3, Underwater Approach.)

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 9.2 Rescue Stroke.

Rescue Stroke

UNCLASSIFIED
9.2.2.1.2.1 Approach the survivor with head out of the water and eyes on the
survivor.
9.2.2.1.2.2 Upon reaching a distance of 6 to 8 feet from the survivor, execute a
surface dive and swim under the survivor.
9.2.2.1.2.3 Execute a half-turn (survivors back should be toward the rescuer) and
surface.
9.2.2.1.2.4 While surfacing, place the survivor in a cross-chest carry.
WARNING: Do not use an underwater approach when a raft, lines, debris, or a parachute is
attached to or in the immediate vicinity of the survivor.
9.2.2.1.3 Front Surface Approach. The following are procedures for performing a
front surface approach. (See Figure 9.4, Front Surface Approach.)
9.2.2.1.3.1 Approach the survivor with head out of the water and eyes on the
survivor.
9.2.2.1.3.2 Upon reaching an arms length distance from the survivor, execute a
quick reverse.

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9-7

Figure 9.3 Underwater Approach.

Underwater Approach

UNCLASSIFIED

9-8

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 9.4 Front Surface Approach.

Front Surface Approach

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

9-9

9.2.2.1.3.3 Timing the movement, the rescuer should quickly cross his arm over
the survivors arm and firmly grasp the back of the survivors wrist, right hand on
right wrist or left hand on left wrist. Then lean back and pull the survivors arm
across and in front of the rescuers body, turning the survivor around.
9.2.2.1.3.4 When the survivors back is fully turned, place the survivor in a
cross-chest, collar tow or equipment carry.
9.2.2.1.4 Cross-Chest Carry. This procedure may be difficult to perform on military
aircrew members because of their flotation and survival equipment. The equipment
carry is appropriate in this situation. The following are procedures for performing a
cross-chest carry. (See Figure 9.5, Cross-Chest Carry.)
9.2.2.1.4.1 From a position behind the survivors shoulder or under the survivors
arm, reach across the chest and pull the survivor from under the armpit with the
back of the hand.
9.2.2.1.4.2 The survivors shoulder is then tucked securely into the rescuers
armpit and the arm firmly clamped against the survivors chest.
9.2.2.1.4.3 Turn to the side with the hip directly against the small of the
survivors back, stroke vigorously with the legs, using a flutter kick to provide
propulsion.
9.2.2.1.4.4 Should the survivor be aggressive, lock the free hand under the
survivors armpit.
9.2.2.1.5 Collar Tow or Equipment Tow. Do not grasp the survivor in a manner
which may result in restricted breathing or circulation. The following are procedures
for executing the collar tow or equipment tow. (See Figure 9.6, Equipment and Collar
Tow.)
9.2.2.1.5.1 Grasp the survivors shirt collar or flight equipment from behind and
between the shoulder blades.
9.2.2.1.5.2 Assume the side stroke position and stroke vigorously with the legs,
using a flutter kick.
9.2.2.1.6 Front Head Hold Release. The following are procedures for performing a
front head hold release. (See Figure 9.7, Front Head Hold Release.)
9.2.2.1.6.1 As soon as the survivors arms are felt encircling the head, tuck the
chin down and to the side while taking a quick breath of air. Submerge taking the
survivor underwater.
9.2.2.1.6.2 If the survivors head is on the right of the rescuers head, bring the
right arm up and over the encircling arm and places a hand securely against the
survivors right cheek, the little finger against the side of the survivors nose, and
the thumb hooked under the jaw.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 9.5 Cross-Chest Carry.

Cross-Chest Carry

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

9-11

Figure 9.6 Equipment and Collar Tow.

Equipment and Collar Tow

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 9.7 Front Head Hold Release.

Front Head Hold Release

UNCLASSIFIED
9.2.2.1.6.3 Should the survivors head be on the rescuers left side, the method is
reversed.
9.2.2.1.6.4 The remaining hand is brought up beneath the survivors other arm
seizing it in a grip with the thumb just above the elbow.
9.2.2.1.6.5 In one continuous motion, the survivors head is pressed out and
around with the right hand over your head and sweeping it across the far side. This

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

9-13

is a continuous movement until the survivors back is to the rescuer.


9.2.2.1.6.6 The left hand continues to hold the arm until it can be moved into a
cross chest carry, then the right arm is shifted from the survivors face to the chest
to lock in the controlled cross-chest carry.
9.2.2.1.6.7 Should the survivors head be on the left side of the rescuer, the
method is reversed.
9.2.2.1.6.8 If the survivor places a scissor lock on the rescuer with their legs, the
scissors rarely is held after the head hold is released. However, if it is not released,
use one hand between the ankles to unlock the crossed feet.
9.2.2.1.7 Front Head Hold Escape. The following are procedures for performing a
front head hold escape. (See Figure 9.8, Front Head Hold Escape.)
9.2.2.1.7.1 As soon as the survivors arms are felt encircling the rescuers head,
tuck the chin down and to the side while taking a quick breath of air. Submerge
taking the survivor underwater.
9.2.2.1.7.2 Without pause, place both hands on the survivors hips with the heels
of the hands against his/her body, fingers extended and grasp the survivors sides.
By forcefully pressing and extending the arms, push the survivors body back and
up toward the horizontal position. This leverage will loosen the survivors grasp.
9.2.2.1.7.3 By tucking the chin inward and hunching the shoulders, the head is
freed. The survivor is then pushed away.
9.2.2.1.8 Rear Head Hold Release. The following are procedures for performing a
rear head hold release. (See Figure 9.9, Rear Head Hold Release.)
9.2.2.1.8.1 As soon as the survivors arms are felt encircling the head, tuck the
chin down and to the side while taking a quick breath of air. Submerge taking the
survivor underwater.
9.2.2.1.8.2 Place both hands on the survivors top arm wrist, and pull down toward
his/her waist, rotate the hand and slide the other hand up to the survivors elbow.
9.2.2.1.8.3 By twisting inward and down on the survivors wrist, and pushing the
survivors elbow upward, the grasp is released. The survivors forearm is straight
across survivors back and survivor is in front of the rescuer.
9.2.2.1.8.4 From this position behind the survivor, place the survivor in a
controlled cross-chest carry.
9.2.2.1.9 Rear Head Hold Escape. The following are procedures for performing a
rear head hold escape. (See Figure 9.10, Rear Head Hold Escape.)

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 9.8 Front Head Hold Escape.

Front Head Hold Escape

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

9-15

Figure 9.9 Rear Head Hold Release.

Rear Head Hold Release

UNCLASSIFIED

9-16

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 9.10 Rear Head Hold Escape.

Rear Head Hold Escape

UNCLASSIFIED
9.2.2.1.9.1 As soon as the survivors arms are felt encircling the head, tuck the
chin down and to the side while taking a quick breath of air. Then submerge taking
the survivor underwater.
9.2.2.1.9.2 Bring the hands up to the underside of each of the survivors elbows.
While keeping the chin tucked in and hunching the shoulders, push forcefully
upward freeing his/her head.
9.2.2.1.9.3 The survivor is then pushed back. Turn to face the survivor, prepared
to prevent any subsequent grasps.
9.2.2.1.9.4 Swim well out of the reach of the survivor, surface, and decide what
rescue procedure to use.
9.2.3 In-Water Rescue Breathing. A non-breathing survivor or team member in the water
is an emergency where every second counts. Rapid and skillful rescue breathing may be the
survivors best chance for survival and an important skill a team member can bring to an
in-water rescue. Circumstances where conditions are too rough or otherwise unsafe or the
hoist into the helicopter will take only a few seconds, waiting until the survivor is removed
from the water to start rescue breathing may be too long and the opportunity for a successful
resuscitation lost. Breaths must be free of water with full exhalations.

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9-17

9.2.3.1 Turning the Survivor Face Up. It is easier to turn a survivor in the water face
down if you cross your arms just prior to grasping the survivors. In crossing the arms, the
strongest one is placed on top. Then pull with the strongest arm and push with the weaker
one. This technique positions the survivor face up.
9.2.3.2 Barrier Devices. It is recommended in the medical community to employ a
barrier device for the conduct of rescue breathing. This is a matter of disease prevention as
well as simple preference to avoid direct contact. Pocket type masks can be used in the
water, though their application takes practice to use correctly. The most common problem
is the lack of a good seal around the mouth, and not enough hands to hold the survivor,
position his/her head, and hold the mask at once. The best position is to stay at the head
and place the mask over the survivors face. Maintaining the mask in place throughout the
rescue has the advantage of keeping water out of the survivors airway. Hold a finger over
the air intake port to prevent the entry of water in rough seas.
9.2.3.3 Do-Si-Do Technique. The Do-Si-Do technique for in-water rescue breathing
gives good control and close monitoring of the survivor, especially under the rotor wash of
a rescue helicopter. This is particularly important in the event the survivor vomits during
the tow or resuscitation effort. If this happens, roll the survivor to keep the airway clear
and ensure there is no more vomitus left in the mouth. The following are procedures for
performing the Do-Si-Do rescue breathing technique in the water. This technique can be
performed from either the left or right side of the survivor.
9.2.3.3.1 Position the survivor on his/her back in the water.
9.2.3.3.2 From the survivors left side, slide left hand and arm between his/her left
arm and his/her body.
9.2.3.3.3 Reach under the survivor with left hand to grasp the survivors collar,
equipment, clothing or tank valve.
9.2.3.3.4 The rescuer rests the right hand on the survivors forehead to extend the
neck and keep the airway open.
9.2.3.3.5 Use your left hand and arm to roll the survivor toward the rescuer
sufficiently to begin rescue breathing. Use the right hand to pinch his/her nose closed
as the rescuer exhales into the survivor.
9.2.3.3.6 It is recommended that the rescuer stops swimming when delivering breaths
to the victim. Position so as to rise slightly in the water bringing fins back under the
rescuer. This will give better control.
9.2.3.3.7 If surface conditions are poor, use the right hand to cover the survivors nose
and mouth to prevent aspiration of water.
9.2.3.4 Chin Carry Technique. The Do-Si-Do is not the most streamlined tow technique
for rescue breathing in the water, especially if the survivor is larger than the team member.
The principle advantage of the chin carry technique is the increased speed that the team
member can swim and deliver effective rescue breaths. The team member swims on his
back allowing a very powerful fin stroke with the survivor in alignment. The following are
procedures for performing the chin carry technique for rescue breathing in the water.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


9.2.3.4.1 Makes the survivor buoyant if possible.
9.2.3.4.2 Position yourself at the victims head and use the left hand, placed between
the shoulder blades or center of the back, to provide enough lift to keep the survivor
clear of the water.
9.2.3.4.3 Grasping the survivors with chin the right hand, cradle the survivors head
with the right shoulder. Be careful with the hand placement so that it does not put
pressure on the airway or carotid arteries.
9.2.3.4.4 To start rescue breathing, slide the right hand up to the forehead to pinch the
survivors nose closed during the breaths. The left hand must stay where it is to
maintain sufficient lift.
9.2.3.4.5 When swimming, position the body under and in front of the survivor. This
permits rapid swimming and protects the helpless person from wave break. The right
hand can easily be used to seal the nose and mouth to keep water off the survivors
face.

9.2.4 In-Water Cervical and Spinal Stabilization. When the situation allows and the
survivors injuries indicate a potential for spinal damage, cervical spine precautions are
mandatory. Conventional cervical stabilization; a hand on each side of the head, will not work
in the water. Any water movement could compromise the integrity of the survivors spine.
Any stabilization technique utilized must maintain the head and body in line as a complete
unit.
9.2.4.1 Deep Water Roll. If the team member responds to an incident site with a
non-moving survivor face down in the water, assume spine injury unless clearly informed
otherwise or the conditions or threat dictate speed is of the essence. This roll involves
placing the arms against the survivors upper back and chest, then dipping under the
victim. Do not twist the survivor over by solely turning his/her head. The following are
procedures for performing the deep water roll.
CAUTION: Rolling the survivor by solely turning the head could cause permanent paralysis.
9.2.4.1.1 Place the survivors arms directly down alongside his/her body.
9.2.4.1.2 Splint the survivor with your arms by placing one elbow in the middle of
his/her back, with your hand on the rear of his/her head. Place your other elbow in the
middle of his/her chest, with your hand cradling his/her chin.
9.2.4.1.3 Takes a breath, firmly holding the survivor in the splinted position, then
swim under the survivor, using the legs to kick as the survivor rotates onto his/her
back. Emphasize using your elbows to lever the survivor over.
9.2.4.2 Shallow Water Roll. This is another alternative to rolling over an unconscious
survivor found face down in the water. This procedure is normally used in shallow water.
The following are procedures for performing the shallow water roll.
9.2.4.2.1 Stand alongside the survivor with your side perpendicular to the survivor,
facing the survivors near arm.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

9-19

9.2.4.2.2 Reach across the survivors back with the closest hand and grasp his/her arm
between the elbow and shoulder and gently pin his/her upper arm on the far side
against the far ear.
9.2.4.2.3 Then pin the survivors near upper arm against the near ear
9.2.4.2.4 Then push down on the survivors near arm while pulling up with the other
hand. Keep the survivors arms pinned to his/her head as you executes this.
9.2.4.2.5 The survivor should roll over with his/her upper back cradled in your arm.
Then squeeze the survivor against the chest to maintain the splint as you removes the
nearest hand.
9.2.4.3 Spine Boarding in the Water. Securing a survivor to a spine board in the water
will require more than one team member. The spine board should be of a floating type and
secured within a Stokes basket with a flotation kit and counterweight to keep the survivors
face out of the water. The following are procedures for performing spine boarding in the
water.
9.2.4.3.1 One team member maintains cervical stabilization while another one applies
a cervical collar.
9.2.4.3.2 The cervical collar is applied and maintained by one team member as the
spine board is brought in from the survivors side. The board is pushed completely
underwater and aligned below the survivor. The board is then gently raised up until the
survivor is on it. If the survivor is incorrectly positioned, the board should be raised
and repositioned. As the board is raised, the team member maintaining cervical
stabilization removes his hands as best as possible without sacrificing control from the
survivors neck to not interfere with placement.
9.2.4.3.3 Straps are then secured to the survivor starting at the chest and downward
toward the feet. Once the survivors torso is secure, the head is secured utilizing foam
blocks. Straps can be s-folded and secured with retainer bands or masking tape to
streamline and facilitate quick attachment.
9.2.5 Uncooperative Survivor in Water. A recovery team may be faced with situations
where the survivor can be categorized as uncooperative. Uncooperative survivors can be
categorized into two distinct types: panicked and combative. A panicked survivor normally
desires to be rescued but is in an uncomfortable or unfamiliar environment and is usually so
frightened of drowning that they could pose a danger to the recovery team and themselves.
Calming a panicked survivor can usually be accomplished by verbal assurances from the team
member and/or being provided with flotation. Once the panicked survivor has been calmed
down and is willing to be rescued, utilize standard rescue procedures. Combative survivors
may not initially desire to be rescued, and may actively resist assistance from the team
member. The combative survivor may intentionally try to harm the team member or
themselves when approached. This type of behavior can continue indefinitely, even after
repeated attempts by the team to provide assurance and recovery. Indications that a survivor
might be combative are: prior mental instability, a suicide attempt, or demonstration of
hostility. The following are procedures for handling a combative survivor in the water.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


9.2.5.1 Approach survivor and establish verbal communication. Attempt to calm the
survivor with verbal reassurance and commands.
9.2.5.2 If survivor is actively combative, do not attempt to immediately gain physical
control of the survivor. Remain a safe distance (6 to 8 feet) from the survivor and assess
the situation.
9.2.5.3 If survivor does not have operable flotation, attempt to provide a flotation device
to the survivor while still maintaining a safe distance.
9.2.5.4 If equipped with in-water communications communicate with the team leader or
RV and brief the situation
9.2.5.5 Request assistance utilizing radio and/or hand signals. If additional team
members are required, they are to act as a back-up to the primary team and have the
following responsibilities: ensure the safety of the other team, assume control of the scene
if needed, and deploy with additional rescue equipment requested by the primary team.
Once on scene, the other team may assume/help with communication duties to the RV.
9.2.5.6 Maintain 6- to 8-feet distance from survivor, remain vigilant and wait for the
survivor to tire, calm down, and/or ask for assistance.
9.2.5.7 Be patient and attempt to calm the survivor and provide flotation to the survivor
if needed and/or practical.
9.2.5.8 Assume physical control of the survivor only when deemed safe. Do not attempt
to rescue an actively combative survivor unless the survivor requests assistance or become
unconscious/incapacitated.
9.2.5.9 Ensure the survivor has no weapons
9.2.5.10 If conscious, direct the survivor to maintain hands in view at all times.
9.2.5.11 Once physical control is established, remain vigilant for survivor to become
actively combative or for the presence of any weapons.
9.2.5.12 Recover survivor utilizing the appropriate device.
9.2.5.13 Prepare security assistance at the transload or recovery location.
9.2.5.14 The RV crew shall remain vigilant during transit. The team remains stationed
next to the survivor at all times during transit to provide immediate physical control if
required.

9.2.6 Wet Rock Rescue. Survivors may be forced upon wet rocks in breaking waves
requiring the team to utilize TTP specific to that environment.
9.2.6.1 Tethered Swimmer Considerations. A team member conducting a boat based
approach to wet rocks can be tethered and tended by another team member in a CRRC. It
may be necessary for the team member to be removed from the rocks expeditiously due to
changing sea state or weather conditions and the tether will facilitate this. Once the team
member has landed on the rocks the tether can be utilized to bring a litter with medical and
additional rescue equipment to the rock for treatment and packaging of the survivor. Once
the survivor is packaged, this method facilitates the movement of the packaged survivor or

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

9-21

two survivors and team member through the waves back to the CRRC.
9.2.6.2 Wet Rock Approach. Approach the rocks and stop a safe distance away to
continue scene assessment. Hazards may include debris from the crash, fuel, lines, danger
from striking submerged rocks and kelp entanglement.
9.2.6.2.1 Determine the best place to attempt landing.
9.2.6.2.2 If you decide that a closer approach and landing on the wet rock is possible,
take careful measure of the surf beat. Specifically, you need to know the number of
waves in each set, the period between them, their height relative to the emerged rocks
and the length of the lull.
9.2.6.2.3 If you are able to reach firm footing with good hand-holds at low water in
the lull, exit the rocks at this time. If you require assistance to mount the rock await for
returning waves to assist.
9.2.6.2.4 The use of following waves as assistance may present a hazard. It is
extremely dangerous to be caught between breaking waves and emerged rock. You
must time the swim to the rocks to follow on the back of the wave arriving with the
high water. Typically, there will only be about 1 or 2 seconds for you to establish good
hand-holds and footing before the water retreats. If you fail to establish good holds
that allow you to climb quickly out of the way of the next wave, you must immediately
abandon that attempt and swim away with the withdrawing water.
9.2.6.2.5 Once on the rocks, evaluate the survivors condition and begin the
extrication. If working on jetties or other areas with boulders, consider use of small
short fins to facilitate movement without removal of fins.
9.2.7 Surf Rescue. In addition to the rescue of survivors in the surf, team members must be
prepared to rescue other team members in distress during the conduct of maritime infiltration
and exfiltration techniques.
9.2.7.1 Surf Entry. Entries into the surf from shore are readily accomplished in calm
conditions. In these conditions enter the water without fins on to speed entry. Once in
waist deep water, stop to don fins and swim towards the survivor. In rougher conditions,
have all gear in place before attempting to enter the water. Walk backward or sideways
while wearing fins and edge closer to the breaking waves. If time permits, study the wave
intervals to determine the lull periods. When waves approach that are to large to ignore but
too small to dive under, turn sideways to the wave and brace for impact. When deep
enough to swim with fins, dive under the next approaching wave and surface beyond the
breaker zone.
9.2.7.2 Surf Extrication. Moving a hapless survivor from the water and onto the beach
may be the most difficult part of a water rescue. If all else fails, the rescuer could simply
grasp the survivor under the arms and walk backward, dragging the survivor behind. In
circumstances such as a flat sloping beach and breaking surf, this may be the only option.
In conditions of breaking waves and surf, it is possible for the survivor or team member
executing the rescue to be injured getting in or out of the water. Learn to use the waves as
an aid to get in and out of the surf. Plant feet firmly as the wave approaches and brace for

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


impact. Movement should be timed so that the water is not being fought. In addition to
fireman and saddle back carry; the following survivor carriage techniques can be utilized
as well.
9.2.7.2.1 Backpack Carry. When recovering a survivor onto rocky shores, consider
using the backpack carry. Even smaller stature team members can remove a large
hapless survivor from the water without much difficulty utilizing this technique.
9.2.7.2.1.1 Stop the tow in water about mid-chest deep, remove and secure fins
and stand up.
9.2.7.2.1.2 Position the survivor face up with his/her head towards the shore or exit
point.
9.2.7.2.1.3 For a right-handed team member, it is best to stand on the survivors
right side near the waist.
9.2.7.2.1.4 Reach across to grasp the survivors left wrist with the left hand and
hold the survivors right wrist in the right hand. If the survivor is so large that the
hands cannot hold the wrists tightly enough, grab the thumbs or sleeves instead.
9.2.7.2.1.5 To be most effective, lift up on the survivors left arm while pushing
down on the right. This will cause the survivor to rotate around on axis. Before the
survivor becomes face down in the water, however, sink your body underwater and
the survivor will roll up on your back.
9.2.7.2.1.6 Stay underwater while adjusting the survivors position on your back.
The key is to maneuver the survivor to rest as high as possible with their arms over
your shoulders and crossed on your chest.
9.2.7.2.1.7 When you rise from the water, the survivor will ride easily on the back
and can be carried out of the water. You may only need one hand to hold the
survivor and thus be able to grab hand holds that might be available.
9.2.7.2.1.8 If there are incoming waves during this lift, use the waves to your
advantage to facilitate floating the victim onto your back.

CAUTION: In circumstances where the waves are dangerously high, however, it would be wiser
to wait for a lull between the breakers to attempt the lift.
9.2.7.2.2 Two-Person Carry. The following are procedures for removing a survivor
from the water with the assistance of another team member.
9.2.7.2.2.1 Team members remove fins and position themselves on either side of
the survivor.
9.2.7.2.2.2 Drape one of the survivors arms over each team members shoulders
and wrap their survivor-side arm around the survivors waist or back. The team
members will then slide their free arms under the survivors legs and grasp each
others wrist.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

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9.2.7.2.2.3 The survivor will now be in a sitting position in your arms with his/her
back supported by both your other arms.
9.2.7.2.2.4 The team members will walk out of the water to safety.
9.3 Small Boat Operations. A recovery team can conduct CRRC operations as an infiltration,
search, rescue, recovery, and exfiltration platform in support of PR/RO. The organization for a
particular operation is dependent on the nature of the mission. When organizing for the mission,
team and individual qualifications or experience should be matched to the specific requirements of
the mission or training event. The following information provides planning guidelines for a safe
and successful CRRC operation. Detailed information on environmental factors, tides and tidal
currents, nautical charts and publications, small boat navigation and basic boat handling skills can
be found in Army FM 3-05.212, Special Forces Waterborne Operations. Operation and
maintenance instructions for the CRRC can be found in Marine Corps TM 09665A-13&P/1-1,
Operation and Maintenance Instructions with Component and Repair Parts Listing For Combat
Rubber Raiding Craft and Zodiac Field Service Manuals. Specific mission planning factors to
CRRC operations are discussed in the following paragraph.
9.3.1 Load Planning. As a rule, the team leader should not load the CRRC to its maximum
capacity when preparing for a mission. In a crowded CRRC, team members in the forward
positions are subjected to a greater degree of physical discomfort owing to the turbulence
created by the effect of swell and wave activity. This concern is especially significant during
long-transit periods. Increased physical stress may diminish an individuals ability to perform
once he has arrived in the objective area. Furthermore, in the tactical or rescue environment
the team leader must take into account the possibility of prisoners, casualties, and the
evacuation of friendly forces. Thus, it is always wise to have sufficient additional boat space
for unforeseen contingencies. For example, although the F470 CRRC with an outboard motor
(OBM) is capable of transporting ten personnel, no more than six personnel should be
embarked. The optimum weight ceiling for the F470 CRRC is 2,000 pounds. Any weight
above this ceiling significantly reduces the CRRCs efficiency. Experience has shown that six
team members, with mission-essential equipment, on average, come closest to this weight
ceiling. In marginal sea states or when there are extended distances to be covered,
consideration should be given to limiting embarked team members to four. As with the
planning of any operation, provisions must be made to deal with uncertainty. Plans should be
developed to address contingencies and emergencies during CRRC transits to include:
9.3.1.1 Outboard Motor Breakdown. The team has a trained technician and brings tools
and spare parts or spare motor, if space and time permit.
9.3.1.2 Navigational Error. The team studies permanent geographical features and
known tides, currents, and winds, take into account the sea state, and intentionally steer
left or right of the target beach landing site (BLS) so once landfall is reached, a direction to
the incident site is already established.
NOTE: When using the GPS, the CRRC should aim directly at the BLS; it should not offset left
or right of target. Proper use of the GPS will take the CRRC directly and accurately to the BLS.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


9.3.1.3 Low Fuel or Empty. Teams run trials with a fully loaded CRRC in various sea
states to calculate fuel consumption rates. The CRRC takes enough fuel for a worst-case
scenario.
9.3.1.4 Emergency Procedures. The team knows the locations of the nearest medical
treatment facilities and develops primary and alternative plans for evacuating casualties.
9.3.1.5 CRRC Puncture. Teams carry expedient plugs.
9.3.1.6 Tow Operations. All CRRCs are rigged and equipped for both tow and towing
operations. When a CRRC fails, team members should do the following:
9.3.1.6.1 Immediately prepare the craft for towing. Towlines should be long enough to
sag under their own weight. Taunt towlines result in accidents.
9.3.1.6.2 Cross-deck a trained technician to repair the OBM.
9.3.1.6.3 If towing is required, cross-deck team members to an alternate craft to
lighten the load.
9.3.1.6.4 Tow the inoperable CRRC with only the coxswain and OBM technician
onboard.
9.3.1.6.5 Ensure the principles below are followed while towing. CRRC teams
should:
9.3.1.6.5.1 Tow at a slower speed than the CRRCs normally travel.
9.3.1.6.5.2 Do not make quick turns.
9.3.1.6.5.3 Assign a lookout in the towing craft to observe the towed CRRC.
9.3.1.6.5.4 Do not make sudden stops.
9.3.1.6.6 Maintain steering control of the towed CRRC. If the towing craft stops
suddenly, the towed CRRC must be able to steer clear without ramming the towing
boat.
9.3.1.6.7 Raise the engine on the towed craft.
9.3.1.7 Capsized CRRC. If a CRRC begins to capsize, the coxswain should warn the
crafts occupants and attempt to stop the engine. When the team members are in the water,
they should protect their heads with their arms. Actions taken after capsizing include the
following:
9.3.1.7.1 All team members inflate life jackets if required, orally if possible, when
clear of the CRRC.
9.3.1.7.2 The team leader conducts a head count.
9.3.1.7.3 All team members swim to the seaward side of the craft to keep it from
being pushed by swells over the top of them. They should remain in a group.
9.3.1.7.4 Team members attempt to right the craft. If unable to do so, they stay with
the CRRC. If capsized in the surf zone, the CRRC will be pushed ashore. If in the
near-shore area but outside the surf zone, personnel try to swim the CRRC to shore. If

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at sea, it is easier for search assets to spot a capsized CRRC than individual swimmers.
9.3.1.8 Loss of Contact. If contact is lost between crafts when conducting operations
involving multiple CRRCs, the usual procedure is for the lead craft to wait a preplanned
period of time for the missing CRRC to catch up. Make every attempt to reestablish
contact as soon as possible. Factors to consider include the following:
9.3.1.8.1 CRRCs are most likely to lose contact at night and in reduced visibility (fog,
rain, and heavy seas). To reduce the likelihood of lost contact, the following measures
should be followed:
9.3.1.8.1.1 Formations are kept tight and the coxswain maintains visual contact
with the other craft.
9.3.1.8.1.2 Other team members in the CRRC are assigned to assist the coxswain
in his duty.
9.3.1.8.2 If a CRRC falls behind the formation or stops, the other craft will stop to
render assistance. In the event that a CRRC cannot maintain the formation speed, the
CRRCs will travel at the slow crafts best possible speed.
9.3.1.8.3 If contact is lost, the lead CRRC should stop and wait for the lost craft to
catch up. If after a short period, the lost craft does not catch up, the lead CRRC follows
a reciprocal bearing until contact is made. Contingency plans include the following:
9.3.1.8.3.1 If contact is not made along the track, the lead CRRC will proceed to
a pre-designated rally point and wait until the lost craft arrives.
9.3.1.8.3.2 The coxswain of the lost craft attempts to reestablish contact. If
contact is not swiftly made, the coxswain moves to the pre-designated rally point to
await the rest of the force.
9.3.1.8.3.3 The team leader decides if the mission or the lost craft takes
precedence, taking into account the time available for the mission and the
preplanned abort criteria.
9.3.1.9 Man Overboard. If a team member falls overboard, the coxswain will alert the
team leader and other craft in the area using voice, radio, or visual signals. To facilitate
recovery, each team member will have a pre-briefed signaling device (these may be IR
depending on the tactical situation) attached to a personal flotation device (PFD). It will
be activated upon falling overboard.
9.3.1.9.1 Unless the CRRC is in a dangerous surf zone, where stopping would
endanger the entire CRRC team, the coxswain will maneuver to avoid the team
member and shift the engine into neutral until past the man to prevent the propellers
from striking him.
9.3.1.9.2 Depending on the tactical situation, a team member overboard in the surf
zone will either return to the beach where a designated boat will recover him, or he will
swim through the surf zone and be recovered.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


9.3.1.9.3 The CRRC from which the team member fell will normally perform the
recovery. If it cannot, the coxswain will request assistance from another craft and
direct it to the vicinity of the team member.

9.3.2 Equipment Configuration. F o r t h e p u r p o s e o f t h i s s e c t i o n , a C R R C i s a


non-commissioned inflatable rubber boat. It is powered by an OBM and capable of limited
independent operations. CRRCs are not designated as service craft. Equipment will be used
IAW applicable service and command regulations, instructions, and appropriate technical
manuals. A dangerous oversimplification exists when relying on any general minimum
equipment list. The requirements of each operation will dictate the equipment necessary. The
team leader must take all facets of the mission profile into consideration before issuing the
equipment list for a particular CRRC operation. In addition to required rescue and medical
equipment for the mission consider the following items for each operation:
9.3.2.1 Foot Pumps. Two sets of foot pumps with hoses should be stowed in the forward
pockets on the buoyancy tubes.
9.3.2.2 Water and Food. Team leaders determine the requirements for food and water
based on a mission analysis on how long the team is expected to be operating on the water
until recovery. Desalination pumps can be utilized to minimize the amount of water the
team employs with.
9.3.2.3 Fuel. The team should compute and then employ with the fuel required for the
operational transit. If employing from aircraft, bundles can be configured for dropping
additional fuel to the team.
9.3.2.4 Personal Floatation Device. One device is required for each embarked team
member. A PFD must be worn by each individual in the CRRC and must have sufficient
lift to support the individual and his combat load. When wearing combat equipment, each
team member should conduct a float test to ensure that he has adequate flotation before the
CRRC mission or training evolution. For flotation devices that use gas bladders for
buoyancy, the activation mechanism (for example, gas cartridges and activators) should be
inspected for proper functioning and ease of access while team members are in full combat
dress.
WARNING: Team members could drown due to the negative buoyancy of additional equipment.
Fresh water has less buoyancy than salt water.
9.3.2.5 Radio. A complete waterproofed radio set, with sufficient spare batteries, will be
carried in each CRRC.
9.3.2.6 Navigation Equipment. Passive electronic methods of navigation such as GPS
are recommended. However, they should not be totally relied upon due to problems in
propagation, signal interruption in adverse weather conditions, and the delicacy of
electronic instruments. As a minimum, the following navigation equipment is
recommended marine binoculars, marine compass with speed measuring device, and
navigation charts for the AO. (See Figure 9.11, Navigation Board with Knot Meter.)
9.3.2.7 Signaling Devices. These devices include smoke, flares, chemlights, sea dye
markers, and submersible strobe lights.

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Figure 9.11 Navigation Board with Knot Meter.

Navigation Board with Knot Meter

UNCLASSIFIED
9.3.2.8 Signaling Devices. These devices include smoke, flares, chemlights, sea dye
markers, and submersible strobe lights.
9.3.2.9 Paddles. A sufficient number of paddles should be transported to provide
propulsion and steering for the CRRC in case of OBM failure.
9.3.2.10 Repair Kit. This kit should contain provisions for the CRRC and OBM. (See
Table 9.1, OBM and CRRC Repair Kit Contents.)
9.3.2.11 Sidelights. Colored lights are used as follows: red on port and green on
starboard. Consider using battery powered light sticks opposed to chemlights. During
tactical operations, the battery powered light sticks can be easily turned off.
9.3.2.12 Lines. Bow and stern lines should be at least 15 feet long.
9.3.2.13 Protective Clothing. Generally, protective clothing will be worn at the
discretion of the team leader as dictated by the environment and mission. Team leaders
consider the desires of the individual crew. Planners consider that team members can
suffer hypothermia during prolonged exposure to sea spray and wind even in relatively
mild air temperatures.
9.3.2.14 Equipment Loading. Place all organizational equipment that is not worn by the
team (e.g., medical gear, rescue equipment, and radios) in waterproof bags (as required)
within rucksacks or submersible bags. Pad sharp corners and projections on equipment to
prevent damage to the boat. Stow and lash the bags or rucksacks securely in the boat before
launching.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 9.1 OBM and CRRC Repair Kit Contents.


Tools

Extra Parts

3/8 inch socket, or breaker bar

One extra coil.

13/16 inch spark plug wrench

One extra power pack (for older engines).

8-inch pliers

Two extra spark plugs.

Number 2 phillips head screwdriver

Two extra spark plug wires.

3/8 inch wide regular screwdriver

Fuel filter cap. (This item will break during a


duck drop; remove cap from fuel pump. Using
a small plastic bag, wrap fuel cap and gasket
together, then secure with a rubber band or
riggers tape.)

1/4 inch wide regular screwdriver


8-inch adjustable wrench

Gasket for fuel filter cap, or fuel pump.


Emery cloth.
Extra tie ties.
Emergency patches; one large patch, two small
patches.
9.3.2.14.1 There are numerous equipment tie-down procedures available to the team.
The most common ones include securing each bundle or rucksack to a fixed D-ring on
the CRRC with carabiners, and rigging a series of individual equipment tie-down lines
at right angles between opposing D-rings to secure the equipment to these lines with
carabiners.
9.3.2.14.2 An alternate method that offers some advantages if the boat capsizes is to
rig a single equipment line from the lifting ring on the transom, forward to a D-ring on
the opposite bow. Tie a loop near the bow end of the line and carabiner a equipment
container to act as a stopper into the loop. Secure the remainder of the equipment into
the equipment line between the stopper and the transom. The equipment should be free
to slide the length of the equipment line and to be retained on the line by the stopper. If
the CRRC capsizes, a team member can release the bow end of the line and this allows
the cargo to float free (secured at the transom) while the CRRC is righted. This method
removes a significant portion of the weight from the CRRC and makes it much easier
to right the boat. The team can then recover the equipment over the stern; or it can be
towed, if the situation requires.
9.3.3 Outboard Motor Familiarization. The purpose of this section is to describe the
operation of the OBM used in conjunction with the CRRC. General characteristics, fuel
mixture, mounting procedures, start up checks, operational procedures, and trouble shooting
will be covered. See USMC TM 08509B-14&P, Operation and Maintenance Instructions
with Repair Parts List for 35 HP Outboard Motor Models AM-35D & AML-35D, for specifics
for the Outboard Marine Corporation Military Amphibious Reconnaissance System (MARS)
35-horsepower OBM. See applicable manufacturer operation and maintenance manuals for
other engines in use.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

9-29

9.3.3.1 General Characteristics. An OBM is a detachable power plant complete with


drive shaft and propeller that operates on two cylinders. The operating controls are
mounted on the power head and the fuel containers are separate. The OBM is clamped to
the transom and can be tilted into or out of the water by hand. It is steered by a hand-held
steering arm which includes the throttle.
9.3.3.2 Within the GUARDIAN ANGEL community, the MARS 35-horsepower and
Johnson 30-horsepower Military two-stroke OBM are normally utilized in conjunction
with the CRRC. With minor modifications the CRRC can accommodate other engine
packages such as the 55-horsepower OBM, that will enhance performance. Some units
employ the Improved-MARS (I-MARS). This is a combination of the 35-horsepower
MARS outboard motor and a pump jet. The pump jet takes the place of the propeller in
order to provide the user with a safer outboard motor. I-MARS gives the GUARDIAN
ANGEL recovery team the capability to conduct operations more safely without degrading
the overall performance of the old MARS outboard motor or CRRC. (See Figure 9.12,
Johnson 30-Horsepower Military Two-Stroke OBM.)
Figure 9.12 Johnson 30-Horsepower Military Two-Stroke OBM.

Johnson 30-Horsepower Military Two-Stroke OBM

UNCLASSIFIED
9.3.3.3 Fuel Mixture Procedures. All two-stroke engines require a 50:1 fuel oil mixture.
A rule of thumb is 1 pint of lubricant oil to 6 gallons of fuel oil. If utilizing non-standard
engines follow the manufacturers guidance. Suggest utilizing a high-octane fuel, 91 or
greater, or an octane booster. The use of TCW-2 two-stroke oil is recommended.
Procedures and considerations for mixing fuel and oil are as follows:

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


9.3.3.3.1 Add 1 pint of lubricant to 1 gallon of fuel. Mix well, and then add remaining
fuel. When using flexible fuel bladders do not fill over half-full to allow for expansion
of the bladder due to fumes caused by changing temperatures and pressures. All
remaining air needs to be purged out of the bladder.
9.3.3.3.2 If the fuel container is left standing for a prolonged period of time, mix
again.
9.3.3.3.3 If water is suspected to be in the container, use an additive fuel conditioner.
The fuel conditioner will break the water down, and restore the oil lubrication
properties.
9.3.3.3.4 If the fuel or oil mixture is too thick the engine will run sluggish and excess
smoke will be produced. It is better for the fuel or oil mixture to be too thick than too
thin.

CAUTION: If the fuel oil is too thin, excess wear and possible damage will occur.
9.3.3.3.5 Discard fuel mixtures after 30 days.
9.3.3.4 Mounting and Start Up. The procedures for mounting the OBM to the transom
and starting are listed below:
9.3.3.4.1 Secure the lanyard from the OBM to the CRRC transom. The lanyard will be
a cable with a carabiner or snap hook. This will secure the OBM from loss.
9.3.3.4.2

Center the motor on the transom and tighten the clamp screws.

9.3.3.4.3 Make sure tilt lock lever is down. When the lever is this position the motor
is locked down. When the lever is up this allows the motor to tilt up in shallow water.
9.3.3.4.4 Make sure shallow water bar is down.
9.3.3.4.5 Ensure that the tilt pin is placed in the proper hole, so that the lower linkage
is 90 degrees to the bottom of the CRRC. Ensure that the tilt pin has a lanyard.
9.3.3.4.6 Push the pin back in the mount. Ensure to push the plastic ear all the way in.
This will lock the pin in and will prevent it from falling out.
9.3.3.4.7 Hook up the fuel container. Make sure the hose connector is all the way on
the motor. Open the fuel vent valve if equipped on the fuel container and squeeze the
priming bulb until it is hard.
9.3.3.4.8

Turn the throttle grip to the shift position.

9.3.3.4.9 Move the shift lever to the neutral position. The engine will only start when
in the neutral position.
9.3.3.4.10 Turn the throttle grip to the start position.
9.3.3.4.11 If the engine is cold, pull the primer knob through its full stroke three times
to prime the engine.
9.3.3.4.12 Leave the primer knob in the warm up position (color line showing) to
provide for enrichment.

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9.3.3.4.13 Pull starter handle slow until the starter engages and then pull forcibly. Pull
as needed until the OBM starts. Do not over extend pull strokes as this may damage
the starter.
9.3.3.4.14 If the OBM does not turn over, squirt starter fluid into the carburetor, pull
the choke out and pull start again.
9.3.3.5 Shifting. To shift the OBM while underway, use the following procedures:
9.3.3.5.1 After the engine is running smoothly, turn the throttle control to the shift
position. Move the shift forward with a quick motion.
9.3.3.5.2 For reverse, decrease the speed and turn throttle control clockwise to the
shift position and move the shift lever to reverse.
9.3.3.6 Stopping the OBM. To stop the OBM while underway or when stationary:
9.3.3.6.1 Slow the OBM to idle speed.
9.3.3.6.2 Move the shift lever to neutral.
9.3.3.6.3 Press the stop button which is located on the end of the steering handle or in
the front of the motor by the primer.
9.3.3.7 Tilt Use. To adjust the tilt of the OBM:
9.3.3.7.1 Move the tilt lever up. The OBM will be able to come to the up position.
9.3.3.7.2 Move the tilt lever and use the tilt on the engine cover to raise the motor to
the full tilt position. Tilt support will automatically engage. Make sure the propeller is
always underwater. Do not operate the OBM in reverse when the tilt is up. Motor will
tilt up causing loss of control. Always run the OBM at slow speeds. Ensure you check
the water pump indicator often.
9.3.3.8 Fuel Delivery Checks.
9.3.3.8.1 Squeeze the primer bulb until definite pressure is felt. If pressure holds, the
system is good.
9.3.3.8.2 If no pressure is felt or the bulb looses pressure, check for leaks.
9.3.3.8.2.1 Check the fuel container and vent, if necessary.
9.3.3.8.2.2 Check the fuel hoses.
9.3.3.8.2.3 Check fuel filter cap.
9.3.3.8.2.4 Check the fuel pump.
9.3.3.8.3 Carburetor Considerations.
9.3.3.8.3.1 If the primer bulb does not firm up and no leakage is present, check
carburetor for flooding.
9.3.3.8.3.2 If the pressure is good and there are no leaks and the OBM still does
not start:
9.3.3.8.3.2.1 Remove the fuel filter cap.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


9.3.3.8.3.2.2 Check the screen for dirt or varnish.
9.3.3.8.3.2.3 Reinstall the fuel filter cap.
9.3.3.9 Dewatering. RAMZ and T-Duck employments, capsizing and underwater
caching will require that team members dewater the engines prior to starting. The
procedures for the MARS and Johnson Military are very similar with the differences in
procedures noted as follows:
9.3.3.9.1

Connect fuel to motor.

9.3.3.9.2

Squeeze primer bulb.

9.3.3.9.3 Drain valve.


9.3.3.9.4

Turn throttle to start position.

9.3.3.9.5 Put shift lever in neutral.


9.3.3.9.6 Pull drain valve out. On the Johnson Military, the drain valves are turned
counterclockwise to the drain position.
9.3.3.9.7

Move tilt lever to tilt.

9.3.3.9.8

Tilt motor up until it locks in full tilt position.

9.3.3.9.9 One team member should steady the engine while another team member
pulls starter handle.
9.3.3.9.10 Pull starter by using slow continuous pulls. Turn the engine over until it
pulls over easily.
9.3.3.9.11 Move tilt lever down.
9.3.3.9.12 Pull starter handle rapidly about ten times. This will remove any remaining
water in the carburetor and the crank case.
9.3.3.9.13

Double check all connections, squeeze the primer bulb.

9.3.3.9.14 Start engine.


9.3.3.9.15 Run the engine for 30 seconds with the drain plug open.
9.3.3.9.16 Push the drain plug in. Do not operate the OBM at full throttle when the
drain is open. This may damage the engine.
9.3.3.9.17 If necessary, remove spark plugs and continue start up procedures
beginning from the first step. If the engine still fails to start, remove the filter cap from
the fuel pump and pull the cord twice. This will remove any water remaining in the fuel
pump, or fuel lines.
9.3.3.10 Fuel Containers. Turn the bladder upside down so where the fuel line enters the
bladder is at the lowest point. Do this slowly and allow time for water to separate from
fuel.

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9.3.3.10.1 Take a blunt object and press the ball in the fuel line connector, then
squeeze the primer bulb several times. This can be done any time water is suspected to
be in the fuel line.
9.3.3.11 Cooling System. Make sure that a thin stream continuously pours out of the
water pump indicator. If water fails to stream out of the water pump indictor, stop the
engine immediately.
9.3.3.11.1 A weak or intermittent discharge may indicate an obstructed intake.
9.3.3.11.2 Check the intake screen located down by the propeller. If it is clogged
remove any debris. If no obstruction is apparent, it may indicate a bad water pump.
9.3.3.11.3

The procedure for clearing intakes in foul water is:

9.3.3.11.3.1 Idle engine.


9.3.3.11.3.2 Back engine down.
9.3.3.11.3.3 Move shift forward.
9.3.3.11.3.4 Rapidly accelerate to full throttle.
CAUTION: If you have a good discharge with no obstructions and the engine over heats, this may
indicate that the thermostat is closed, or there is a blockage in the power head.
CAUTION: A good discharge is observed when the engine is operating at full throttle, but at an
idle there is no stream. This means that the Teflon key is bad. This problem cannot be fixed in the
field.
9.3.3.12 Broken Starting Cord. In the event the team has a broken starting cord, do the
following:
9.3.3.12.1 Remove the cover.
9.3.3.12.2 Remove the three bolts from the recoil assembly using a wrench.
9.3.3.12.3 Make a pull cord, by using about four feet of inch tubular nylon. Tie a
knot in one end of the cord.
9.3.3.12.4 Place knot in the notch of the flywheel and wrap clockwise.
9.3.3.12.5 Pull sharply. Do not wrap the line around the hand or wrist.
9.3.3.12.6 If unable to shift into neutral, remove the neutral starting switch cable by
using a standard screwdriver. The engine will start in gear with neutral starting switch
cable removed.
9.3.3.13 Repair Kit. Team members should take care of the repair kit to ensure all items
in it are serviceable when needed. Consider storing items in a watertight box. If a
watertight box is not utilized, air the repair kit out, lube tools with light oil and wipe tools
and parts down regularly. (See Table 9.1, OBM and CRRC Repair Kit Contents.)
9.3.3.14 General Maintenance. Flush the OBM in fresh water using a dip tank or engine
rinsing ears. Do not put the engine in gear when using the engine rinsing ears. The engine
is flushed for 5 minutes to remove any salt water and marine life. The cover is removed

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


and the motor head sprayed with fresh water. Disconnect the fuel line and run the engine
until it stops. As the engine begins to sputter pump, the primer to remove all residual fuel.

9.3.4 Boat-Based Search Operations. GUARDIAN ANGEL recovery teams conducting


CRRC operations need to plan and be prepared to conduct search operations in order to affect
the rescue of survivors. Several reasons may prevent the team leader from utilizing overhead
aviation assets as a search platform to vector the recovery team to the survivors location.
9.3.4.1 Basic Search Planning. Before the team is employed to conduct an open water
search, careful planning is needed to accurately determine the area where the survivors are
or will be located upon arrival at the scene. Good search planning significantly increases
the probability of successfully locating and rescuing those in distress. Planning the search
involves calculating datum and then outlining the boundaries of the search area. Due to
the alert nature of GUARDIAN ANGEL recovery team operations, the team will have to
conduct basic search planning enroute within the aircraft or on the water after deployment.
(See Figure 9.13 and Figure 9.14, Search Planning Work Slate.)
9.3.4.1.1 Datum. The term datum refers to the most probable location of the search
object, corrected for drift over a given period of time. Depending on the information
available and its accuracy, datum may be a point, line or area. As the incident
develops, datum must be corrected to account for wind and current. A point is
established at the center of the area where it is estimated that the search object is most
likely located. The probability of detection (POD) is maximal at that point and
decreases as you get away from that point.
9.3.4.1.1.1 Datum Area. When the team cannot determine the exact position of
the survivor or object, a datum area is developed based on many factors, but
including as a minimum:
Fuel endurance of the vessel in distress.
Wind and currents which affect the search object.
The operators pre-planned intentions.
9.3.4.1.1.2 Forces Affecting Datum. As time progresses, datum must be
corrected to compensate for the effects of wind and current. Some of the many
natural forces which affect a search object are listed below. (See Figure 9.15,
Search Object Drift.)

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

9-35

Figure 9.13 Search Planning Work Slate (1 of 2).

Search Planning Work Slate (1 of 2)


Time

Date

Last Known Position (LKP)


Elapsed time from incident
Drift:
Current
Set

Incident
@ time
Drift

@ Time

North of 10 Lat, current angles 30 to right


South of 10 Lat, current angles 30 to left
Between 10 North and South, angle = 0

Wind Current
(due to wind)

Total water current = Sea or tidal current + wind-generated current


Leeway (wind)

Datum
Position 1
N/S
F/W

Direction

Speed

Leeway factor

@ Time

Leeway in knots

Total object movement = Total Water Current + Leeway


0
330

15

345

30

315

Position 2
N/S
E/W
Time

45

300

60

285

Position 3
N/S
E/W
Time

75

270

90
255

Position 4
N/S
E/W
Time

105

240

120
225

Position 5
N/S
E/W
Time

135
210

195

165

150

180

Position object's LKP at the center of the plotting board. Enter vectors for Total
Water Current and Leeway to determine datum.

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 9.14 Search Planning Work Slate (2 of 2).

Search Planning Work Slate (2 of 2)


Universal Search Pattern Format

Expanding Square Pattern

Object
Pattern type
On scene conditions:

3X

Surface visibility
Sea state
Air/water temp

X
5X

Start point
Stop Point
Search speed

3X

2X

CSP

4X

Est. search time


2X
Length

Time to run

Search leg
Track space
Initial heading
Leg 4

Leg 2
Leg 5

Leg 3

4X
X is the basic unit of expansion
and is equal to the Track Spacing.
Units may be seconds, minutes, miles
or parts of a mile.

Creeping Line Search


CSP

Search leg
Track space

Pattern compensated for current

Trackline and Parallel Leg Searches


Object's intended route
CSP
LKP

Direction
of creep
CSP

SL
Direction
of current

0.5
TS

TS
Pattern not compensated for current

Max
object distance
Use when route is known or can be assumed,
an LKP is known, but datum is uncertain.
Always calculate the effect of drift and leeway
on unknown portion of route and orient search
legs accordingly.

Use compensated in uneven, variable or weak currents.


Use uncompensated in strong, uniform currents only.

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

9-37

Figure 9.15 Search Object Drift.

Search Object Drift

Total Water
Current Vector

Last Known
Position (LKP)
0830Z

Leeway
Factor

Total Drift Vector

Datum
1030Z

UNCLASSIFIED
9.3.4.1.1.2.1 Leeway. Leeway is the movement of a search object through the
water. Leeway is caused by local winds blowing against the exposed surface of
the search object.
9.3.4.1.1.2.2 Local Wind-Driven Current. Wind blowing over the water's
surface tends to push the water along in the same direction the wind is blowing.
This wind current affects the movement of a search object in open waters.
Wind-driven current may not be a factor when searching in coastal waters,
small lakes, rivers, or harbours because nearby land masses may block or
reduce the effect of wind.
9.3.4.1.1.2.3 Sea Currents. Sea current refers to the movements of water in
the open sea.
9.3.4.1.1.2.4 Tidal Currents. Tidal current is caused by the rising and falling
of tides.
9.3.4.1.1.2.5 River Currents. The flow of water in a river is called river
current. These currents can quickly move a search object over a long distance.
This factor should be considered in rivers or at the mouth of a large river.
9.3.4.2 Search Patterns. Once a search area has been determined, a systematic search
for the object must be planned. The team determines which the best search pattern to use
is. Consider the following to determine which search pattern to use:
Weather conditions.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


Size of the search area.
Size of the search object.
Number of search platforms available.
Search area location.
Time limitations.
9.3.4.2.1 Expanding Square Search Pattern. The expanding square search pattern is
used when the last known position (LKP) of a search object has a high degree of
accuracy, the search area is small, and a concentrated search is desirable. Units used to
set leg lengths may be based on time or distance depending on the search objects size
and visibility. (See Figure 9.16, Expanding Square Search Pattern.)

Figure 9.16 Expanding Square Search Pattern.

Expanding Square Search Pattern


6x
4x
2x
5x

3x

1x

CSP

2x

4x

6x

1x
3x
5x
7x
Leg lengths set in units
of time or distance

UNCLASSIFIED
9.3.4.2.2 Sector Search Pattern. A sector search pattern is used when datum is
established with a high degree of confidence but the search object is difficult to detect,
such as a person in the water (PIW). The team navigates through datum several times,
each time increasing the chances of finding the search object. Datum should be marked
by the team with a buoy or other floating object. By marking the center of the search
pattern, the coxswain has a navigation check each time the boat comes near the center
of the search area. This pattern consists of nine legs. All legs and crosslegs of this
pattern are of equal length. After running the first leg, the teams first turn will be 120
degrees to starboard to begin the first cross leg. All subsequent turns will be 120

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

9-39

degrees to starboard to a course determined by adding 120 degrees to their previous


course. Notice that after completing the first leg and crossleg, the second and third legs
of the pattern are completed in sequence without turning between. This pattern may
appear complicated but can be simplified by starting on a heading of 0 degrees, the
second leg being 120 degrees and legs three and four being 240 degrees. All remaining
search legs will alternate through these three headings. (See Figure 9.17, Sector
Search Pattern.)
Figure 9.17 Sector Search Pattern.

Sector Search Pattern

120
0
120
0

240
CSP
STOP

240

120
0 240

All search legs are of equal length


All inside angles equal 60 degrees

UNCLASSIFIED
9.3.4.2.3 Parallel and Trackline Search Patterns. The Parallel And Trackline
search patterns are used when there is a probability that the search object could be
anywhere in the search area. It is a good pattern to use when the approximate location
of the search object is known and uniform coverage is desired. Parallel track patterns
are the simplest of the search patterns. The team steers straight courses on all legs.
Each leg is one track spacing from the other. The legs are parallel to the long side or
major axis of the search area. The Trackline pattern is used to search when the only
information available is the intended track of the vessel the team is searching for.
9.3.4.2.4 The Creeping Line Search Pattern. The Creeping Line search pattern is
used when the probable location of the search object has been determined to be more
likely at one end of the search area than at the other end. This is best used to cover large
areas where datum is vague and the search object is easy to spot. In areas of relatively
static water the creeping line search will track relatively true over the ground giving
very complete coverage. Searches in areas of strong current should not attempt to

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


compensate for drift but follow a compass heading and allow the current to drift the
search craft downstream. This is to ensure that the search craft will eventually
overtake the drifting object. (See Figure 9.18, Creeping Line Search Pattern.)

Figure 9.18 Creeping Line Search Pattern.

Current

Current

Creeping Line Search Pattern

SL

CSP

TS
LKP

Preplanned
Stop Point
Search compensated
for current

CSP

SL
LKP

TS

Preplanned
Stop Point
Search uncompensated
for current

UNCLASSIFIED
9.3.4.2.5 Barrier Pattern. The Barrier pattern is used in areas with strong current
such as a river. The search lies along the path of the current. The boat moves back and
forth over the same track. This can be done by steering on an object on each side of the
river bank. The boat moves from one side of the search area to the other while the
current carries the water and objects past the search barrier. Since river currents can
vary across the width of a river, a more effective barrier might be established by
forming a line abreast. This is done by placing observers on each bank and having a
boat in the area of swiftest current hold station between the observers on shore.
Additional boats, if available, could be added to the line abreast to reduce the effective
track spacing and increase the effective coverage. This technique produces a more
effective, and predictable, barrier.
9.3.4.2.6 Shoreline Search. CRRCs can perform a shoreline search, since their draft
allows them to get close enough to the shoreline to permit careful inspection. Search
craft engaged in shoreline searches must be aware of navigational constraints and any
limitations imposed by sea conditions. Team leaders consider the possibility of
survivors clinging to navigational aids such as buoys, or to rocks off shore. Survivors
may make their way to any dry land they drift close enough to see. Survivors may also

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

9-41

anchor their boat or raft or tie it to an offshore navigational aid if they drift into shallow
water but still cannot see land or believe they cannot make it to shore unaided.
9.3.4.3 Search Area Determination Procedure. Draw a circle with a 6-NM radius
centered at the LKP.
9.3.4.3.1 If drift is considered significant, the team should estimate the drift based on
local knowledge/on scene conditions, and center the 6-NM circle around the drifted
LKP.
9.3.4.3.2 Remember that the time of datum must take into consideration the underway
transit times for the search craft.
9.3.4.3.3 Next draw the search pattern within the tangent of the circle. Datum for the
search is the commence search point (CSP). Orient the search area in the same
direction of drift, that is, in the same direction as the total drift vector.
9.3.4.3.4 If the reported position of a distressed craft is in shallow water, it could be
at anchor, and a search down the drift line may be appropriate.
9.3.4.4 Commence Search Point. The CSP is a point identified by datum in which a
search craft begins its search pattern.
9.3.4.5 Track Spacing. Track spacing (TS) is the distance between adjacent parallel legs
within a search area. These tracks may be conducted simultaneously by multiple units
separated by fixed intervals, or they may be the result of successive sweeps conducted by
a single search craft. Most of the search patterns described in this chapter consist of
equally spaced, parallel search legs (tracks). The distance between adjacent search legs is
called the TS. The best TS is a distance which permits maximum expectation of search
object detection in the shortest period of time. (See Table 9.2, Track Spacing to determine
track spacing.)
Table 9.2 Track Spacing.
Good Conditions

Poor Conditions

MDM

Wind <14 Knots

Wind >15 Knots

Search Object

Seas >3 Feet

Seas >3 Feet

Person in Water

0.1

0.1

Object < 15 feet long

0.5

0.2

Object > 15 feet long

1.0

1.0

9.3.4.6 Search Preparation. Before beginning a search, you must collect all available
facts about an incident. The checklist below will help team members determine whether
they have everything they need to begin a mission. Once the team has collected all
available facts and performed the required search planning, they are ready to get underway.
What is the object of this search and what equipment did the survivors aboard have?
How many survivors are involved?

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


What is the assigned search area?
What are the circumstances of their distress?
What search pattern will be used?
What is the desired search speed?
What special equipment is required?
What radio frequencies will you use?
Are other supporting units assigned? If so:
What kind and capabilities?
What are their search areas?
What are their search speeds?
What search patterns will they employ?
What radio frequencies will they use?
Do you have all required charts aboard?
What are the weather and sea conditions?
Who controls the aerial and surface search?
What unusual circumstances may be encountered? How will you compensate for
them?
9.3.4.7 Locating Distressed Aircraft. With the exception of seaplanes, aircraft usually
sink rapidly after ditching, and the only objects normally found are pneumatic rafts and
buoyant pieces of debris. If the aircraft has crashed rather than made a controlled ditch,
there may be nothing more than an oil slick. Large aircraft flying over water have an
adequate supply of life rafts, visual aids, and emergency portable radios. The rafts in
transport aircraft are, for the most part, the large 20-man type. In military aircraft, the
7-man type is still in wide use, as well as the 20-man type. Single engine military aircraft
will usually be equipped with a 1- or 2-man raft. Small civilian aircraft will probably carry
only the one-man life raft if they carry any at all.
9.3.4.8 Locating Person In the Water. Locating a PIW water can be a difficult task due
to sea state, weather conditions, time of day, and most importantly, absence of a PFD. If the
survivor is not wearing a PFD, in most instances all that will be visible is the head. If they
are wearing a PFD, the head and shoulders will probably be visible. Be on the lookout for
floating debris. The missing survivors may be clinging to the debris.

9.3.5 Boat Rescue Operations. In addition to providing an infiltration, search and


exfiltration platform for recovery teams, the CRRC acts as a rescue and recovery platform in
the event of maritime incidents.
9.3.5.1 PIW Recovery. The team must be briefed of the coxswains intentions for the
method of recovery and maintain situation awareness at all time. All required rescue and
medical equipment should be prepared in advance. The system for approaching a person

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

9-43

in the water should be well-known to all team members. Make a turn toward the survivor.
A team member to act as a pointer must be designated and always keep the PIW in sight.
The pointer will position himself in visual and verbal contact with the coxswain and direct
him to the PIW until the survivor is alongside the buoyancy tube of the CRRC. The
coxswain maneuvers into position under the guidance of the pointer and stops the
propellers upon approaching the person. Before reaching the man overboard, reduce speed
and cut the engine off or put the OBM in a quick reverse to prevent running the survivor
over. The team takes direction from the coxswain regarding the pick-up side and positions
itself to aid the survivor out of the water. (See Figure 9.19, PIW Recovery by CRRC.)
Take the following into consideration when conducting PIW recoveries:

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 9.19 PIW Recovery.

PIW Recovery by CRRC


Current or wind
(whichever is stronger)

PIW identified
PIW
"LEFT
SIDE!"
Use quick reverse
to prevent running
PIW over

Reduce speed

Steer into current


or wind

UNCLASSIFIED
9.3.5.1.1 Approach the survivor facing into the current or wind, whichever is the
stronger of the two. By steering into the elements, the coxswain will maintain steerage
even at slow speed and can use the elements to slow and stop the CRRC.
9.3.5.1.2 Survivors immersed in cold water will rapidly lose muscle strength and
coordination and may not be able to help themselves. They may have to be assisted
every step of the way to recovery.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

9-45

9.3.5.1.3 Suspected hypothermia victims should always be recovered gently and


horizontally to reduce the chance of rapid blood pressure drop.
9.3.5.1.4 Treat all immersed survivors for hypothermia.
9.3.5.1.5 Recover survivors who are without flotation aid before those with flotation.
9.3.5.1.6 Recover survivors without hypothermia protection before those with
hypothermia protection.
9.3.5.1.7 Interview all survivors at the earliest opportunity to determine whether
others are in the water and were seen.
9.3.5.1.8 In cases of locating multiple PIW, provide temporary flotation during
recovery operations. Employ aircraft life rafts to act as a floating collection point for
triage and recovery staging.
9.3.5.1.9 If the RV is acting as an overhead search platform, it can vector the team to
the PIWs location by marking the position where the PIW is between the team and the
RV. The team in the CRRC steers towards the RV which will eventually lead them to
the PIW.
9.3.5.1.10 Do not leave the scene until you are sure that all survivors have been
recovered and the component RCC concurs.
9.3.5.2 Methods of Recovery. Two broad categories of recovery methods exist. Direct
methods involve direct contact between the team and the survivors, while indirect methods
involve the use of various devices to assist the recovery. Indirect rescue methods should be
used first. When all indirect methods have failed, use direct methods to execute the
recovery. When you need to rely on a direct method, ensure that the team member
attempting the recovery is familiar with possible hazards (e.g., panicked survivor grabbing
the rescuer, or cold water) and have him configured as required to conduct these recovery
methods. Indirect methods to recover survivors in the water involve the use of various
pieces of equipment. The usual methods of recovery for GUARDIAN ANGEL recovery
teams conducting boat based rescues generally involve the use of throw lines.
9.3.5.2.1 Survivor Removal from the Water. Removing a helpless or unconscious
survivor from the water and onto a CRRC can be a challenging task. The CRRC poses
a challenge, though low in the water, that the buoyancy tube is much wider than a rail
in a standard boat, causing the team member to have to reach far out to pull the
survivor on board.
9.3.5.2.1.1 Unconscious Survivor Lift. Every attempt will be made to recover
unconscious survivors with a floatable spine board. The following is an alternative
procedure for removing an unconscious survivor from the water into a CRRC:
9.3.5.2.1.1.1 Positions the survivor as close as possible to the side of the boat
to limit how far you have to reach. To keep from falling overboard, the rescuer
keeps a center of gravity well within the boat.
9.3.5.2.1.1.2 Keeping low, position the survivor facing away from the boat.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


9.3.5.2.1.1.3 Reach under the survivors arms so arms are between the
survivor and the boat. This limits the amount of friction between the survivor
and the boat.
9.3.5.2.1.1.4 Grasp the survivor tightly and lift with your legs. It may be of
use to wiggle the survivor side to side slightly, thereby lifting each side in
increments.
9.3.5.2.1.1.5 When you can brace your elbows on the top of the boats side,
use your legs to lift the survivor until his/her waist is at the rail.
9.3.5.2.1.1.6 Gently lower the survivor to the deck or take a step back into the
boat pulling the survivor further inside the boat.
9.3.5.2.1.1.7 If more than one team member is available to lift, it will help to
use a short length of webbing to give them something to lift with. Starting
again with the survivors back to the boat, pass the webbing under one arm,
around the chest, and under the other arm. Cross the ends of the webbing
behind the survivor. Each team member will haul up on the end of the webbing
until the survivor is in the boat.
9.3.5.2.1.2 Bounce Lift. It may be possible to use the survivors buoyancy to get
them onboard the boat. Upon reaching the boat, secure the survivor to the boat and
climb aboard. You can secure the survivor by keeping one hand constantly pinning
the survivors. The survivor is then freed and turned to face the boat. Push the
survivor low in the water, about chin level, and then aggressively pull on the victim
up. This will often bring the survivors torso over the edge of the boat.
9.3.5.2.1.3 Roll-Up Nets and Straps. Some CRRC may be equipped with these
devices which attach the inboard portion of the device to the inside of the buoyancy
tube and the rest of the device drapes into the water. The survivor is positioned on
his back in the water and then pulled across the net or straps. The team reaches to
the outboard edge of the net and pulls it back up to the boat. As the team hauls the
net aboard, the victim will roll up in the net or straps and up to the top of the
buoyancy tube. At this stage the survivor is removed from the net or strap and
gently lowered by hand to the deck.
9.3.5.2.1.4 Hoisting from CRRC. Once a survivor is recovered they should not
be placed back into the water to facilitate hoisting. Rotor wash from RVs will push
a stationary CRRC around necessitating the survivor to be hoisted out while
underway. The RV may have to deploy a Stokes basket to the team prior to
conducting the hoist. To assist the hoisting process, do the following:
9.3.5.2.1.4.1 Change the CRRCs course to the wind on the bow, preferably on
the port bow. The RV aircraft commander sits in the starboard side of the
helicopter which helps to give the pilot the best view of the CRRC. (See
Figure 9.20, Hoisting from CRRC Underway.)
9.3.5.2.1.4.2 Reduce speed to ease the CRRCs motion but continue to remain
underway.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

9-47

9.3.5.2.1.4.3 Conduct the hoist operation on the bow of the CRRC in


conjunction with a tag line.
9.3.5.2.1.4.4 If floating collection points are utilized for multiple survivors,
the team will have to make multiple trips to and from the collection points.
9.3.6 CRRC Recovery by Large Vessels. Standard USCG boat recovery procedures are
the primary method to recover or deploy the CRRC from large vessels. The CRRC must be
pre-rigged with a bow line (Zodiac part number 2973) or a locally manufactured line with a
pulley is preferred to allow the boat to self center while being towed, attach to the two D300
towing rings located on the bow. The two D300 rings are located just above the water line on
the bow. (See Figure 9.21, CRRC Bow Line Attachment Points.) The lifting harness should
also be installed to facilitate lifting or lowering. Approach the larger vessels leeward side.
The larger vessel should establish a 3 to 5 knots troll. The larger vessel will deploy a painters
line to attach to the bow line. The forward motion of the two vessels will bring the CRRC
along side the larger vessel. Kill the CRRC engine and raise it out of the water. A stern line
will usually be attached to steady the CRRC during lifting operations. A hook or davit will be
lowered and should be attached to the lifting harness. Transfer heavy equipment and the
recovery team to the larger vessel prior to raising the CRRC.
WARNING: Recovery of the CRRC is a dangerous operation, due to large size of recovery vessel
and lifting/lowering the CRRC with large industrial cranes and davits. The recovery team and
ships crew need to coordinate the operation and personal protective equipment must be worn.
9.3.6.1 The Commercial Recovery System (CRS) allows recovery teams an alternate
method to recover/deploy the CRRC. This system was developed and then implemented
on several operational missions by the 131 RQS, Moffett Federal Airfield, California.
Specifications for the lifting harness are available from the 131 RQS. (See Figure 9.22,
CRRC CRS.)

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 9.20 Hoisting from CRRC Underway.

Hoisting from CRRC Underway

Wind on CRRC port bow

Hoist conducted
off CRRC bow

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

9-49

Figure 9.21 CRRC Bow Line Attachment Points.

CRRC Bow Line Attachment Points


Bow Line Attachment Points

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 9.22 CRRC CRS.

CRRC CRS

UNCLASSIFIED

9-50

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


9.3.6.2 General Considerations. To effectively raise and lower a CRRC in the water,
make sure that the ship has 3 knots of water speed for steerage. This also allows the
CRRC an escape in four directions. The CRRC comes along side the ship and matches
speeds and checks for hazards and stability of the ship. The coxswain first offloads any
extra team members on the Jacobs ladder or some form of ascending device. When he off
loads he also sends up the Nichols Zodiac raising device. The ships crew then sends down
the Nichols device with a 30-foot rope attached. At this time the coxswain then deploys
the sea anchor and matches speed with the crane shackle that is lowered to the mean water
line. This configuration allows the CRRC to come along side the shackle with out getting
under it. The Nichols device is then attached to the 12-point sling. Once the ships crew
starts raising the cable they do not stop unless the CRRC team releases themselves from
the Nichols device. The team does not kill the engine until they are safely above the water.
The sea anchor will still maintain directional control should they ever need to be lowered.
9.3.6.3 The process to go down is about the reverse of the above. The sea anchor is
attached to about a 30-foot polypropylene line that floats so as not to interfere with the
engine. First the CRRC team deploys the sea anchor once they are clear of the ship. At
this point it should be noted that if at any time the CRRC is close enough to the ship a
painters line (CRRC bow line with a quick release) is used both up and down for
directional control. A sea anchor is only used when the CRRC is to far away from the ship
for the painters line to keep the Zodiac in line. As the CRRC is lowered and the sea
anchor inflates or the painters line assumes tension the CRRC is ready for water entry.
The engine is started prior to water entry and the quick release in physically manned. On
water contact the boat is released and coxswain immediately clears the ship shackle and
releases the sea anchor. The Nichols device has a 20-foot rope on it precluding shackle
contact.
9.3.6.4 Directional control will be achieved before any raising or lowering of the CRRC.
It will, when possible, be done with a painters line. A painters line is attached to the bow
of the CRRC with a quick release. It will be manned on the ship at all times. The purpose
is to keep the CRRC in line with the direction of water travel. If the ships boom is too
long and directional control is not achievable with the painters line, then a sea anchor will
be used going both up and down. The sea anchor will have a quick release and be attached
with floating line such that it dose not interfere with the propeller.
9.3.6.5 The CRRC must have a single-point single-hand release. The Nichols device is a
three-ring release assembly with two strands of 20 feet of line that is the fusible link in the
system with a breaking point of 3,500 pounds. The three ring release only requires 3 to 5
pounds to release. The CRRC with engine and inflation system weights 500 pounds.
Two types of line are used. One is dynamic and one is static. The dynamic is 20 inches
longer than the static, giving it a shock absorbing quality. The release is attached with a
carabiner to keep it from flapping and making it easy to find.
9.3.6.6 Contact with the ship shackle is accomplished by providing distance between the
shackle and the coxswain and or team members. In seas over 20 feet be careful not get
severely injured by the swinging 600 to 800 pounds shackle.

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9-51

9.4 Underwater Search, Rescue, and Recovery Operations. The requirement exists for
GUARDIAN ANGEL recovery teams to be capable of an underwater search, rescue and recovery
of personnel and material. The success of any underwater operation is based on the teams
knowledge and ability to safely and accurately execute its assigned tasks. In order to meet this
requirement, training in specific equipment modification and TTP is necessary. This section deals
specifically with scenarios and problems encountered in GUARDIAN ANGEL diving operations
under adverse conditions with an emphasis on limited to no underwater visibility and
contaminated water. All TTP in this section have been utilized successfully by Pararescue teams
and major metropolitan police and fire dive teams. Much of the TTP detailed has been developed
and refined by Walt Hendrick of Lifeguard Systems Inc. of Lake Hurley, New York, a SME
commonly consulted by GUARDIAN ANGEL recovery teams. Topics such as diving policy,
principles, physiology, general scuba air diving and closed circuit oxygen Underwater Breathing
Apparatus (UBA) diving procedure can be found in SS521-AG-PRO-010 USN Navy Diving
Manual, Revision 4. Information on tactical underwater operations can be found in AFTTP 3-1.8,
Tactical EmploymentGUARDIAN ANGEL and Special Tactics Forces, and Army FM 3-05.212,
Special Forces Waterborne Operations.
9.4.1 Equipment Considerations and Techniques for Adverse Conditions.
GUARDIAN ANGEL recovery team scuba operations give a shallow underwater (generally
less than 130 feet) search, rescue, and light recovery capability that can be rapid deployable,
easily portable and with minimum support requirements. Disadvantages of scuba operations
include the limited endurance of open-circuit systems (depth and duration), physical
protection offered in contaminated water, current influences, and if not equipped, a lack of
voice communication. Team safety and effectiveness can be increased for operations in
adverse conditions by taking into consideration the following considerations and techniques.
9.4.1.1 Face Masks. Traditional face masks are unacceptable for contaminated water
conditions but suitable for clean warm water operations. Divers should keep the mask on
until they are out of the water and place the mask strap under the hood to prevent loss in
the event the mask becomes dislodged while underwater. Cleaning the face plate regularly
with a mask cleaner or any soft abrasive cleanser will prevent fogging. A fogged up mask
will not affect a diver in no-visibility conditions but may increase the chance of the diver
wanting to remove his mask upon surfacing.
9.4.1.2 Snorkels. The snorkel may present an entanglement hazard for the diver
executing operations along the bottom in limited visibility conditions. The snorkel can
dislodge the mask if it strikes against an object and does not facilitate streamlining of the
diver. If operating in adverse conditions transferring the regulator to a snorkel during a
surface swim may cause the diver to aspirate and ingest contaminated water.
9.4.1.3 Protective Helmets. If diving in an overhead environment or moving water, head
protection should be worn. If the mission requires the helicopter free fall employment of
scuba-equipped team members, wear a protective helmet to prevent hitting the head on the
tank manifold/regulator first-stage when making impact with the water. Utilize a
lightweight plastic helmet. Because of the buoyant characteristics of the helmet padding,
consider taking out the padding and wearing the helmet over a hood. Protective helmets
also give versatility by their ability to mount submersible lights or cameras. (See Figure
9.23, Protective Helmet with Divator FFM and Underwater Communications.)

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Figure 9.23 Protective Helmet with Divator FFM and Underwater Communications.

Protective Helmet with Divator and Underwater Communciations

UNCLASSIFIED
9.4.1.4 Full Face Masks. The full face masks (FFM) ability to keep the divers face
warm allows for underwater communications system use and helps protect the face from
hazardous materials. These attributes make it ideal and recommended for pararescue
operations. FFMs are designed to enclose a divers eyes, nose and mouth but not the rest
of the head. Seriously consider using the FFM in conjunction with an attached dry suit
hood to protect the diver when diving in contaminated water. No FFM on the market will
guarantee that no water will enter the mask. An additional safety consideration is that the

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mask, with a good seal and positive pressure, will protect the airway of an unconscious
diver. Important features for a FFM to have include; an equalizing device, automatic
defogging, earphone pockets for underwater communications systems, low volume, large
buckles with wide straps and modular communications. Disadvantages of diving FFMs is
that without the proper hood they are difficult to seal around the divers face without a
constant stream of bubbles from under the mask seal and inadvertent inflation of the
divers hood with air. A positive-pressure mask will also cause the diver to use and lose air
at a higher rate than a diver equipped with a standard regulator. New divers can increase
their rate of air consumption by approximately 20 percent.
CAUTION: Prior to the use of FFM divers must be trained in their use and be thoroughly familiar
with the operation of these masks.
9.4.1.4.1 Divator FFM. The Approved for Navy Use (ANU) Interspiro MKII Divator
FFM has been in use for many years and is a good, lightweight FFM currently in use
with many recovery teams. The divator automatically de-fogs with each breath the
diver takes and the attached second-stage regulator has proved reliably resistant to
freezing in cold water in exhaustive USN tests. The divator can be bought as a
positive-pressure mask which means during an accidental break in the mask seal the
regulator will go into free-flow mode to keep water out of the mask. This feature will
work in shallow water but has been proven to be ineffective in deep water. Even in
shallow water, at peak inhalations during moderate work, positive pressure does not
exist. If the diver is in a head down position, water pressure will be greater than
positive pressure and the mask is vulnerable to leaks. The divator is equipped with an
adjustable nose block device to facilitate valsalva maneuvers. The height of the block
can be varied according to each divers face size. The diver pushes the mask against his
face brings the block into contact with his nostrils and permits him to build the pressure
necessary to valsalva. The divator requires specialized service tools and instruments
for proper adjustment. The divator lacks ear pockets to hold underwater
communication earphones.
9.4.1.4.2 EXO Balanced Regulator Military Standard FFM. The Diving Systems
International EXO Balanced Regulator Military Standard (BRMS) is also ANU for
scuba operations. The EXO BRMS has a unique suspension and face seal that allows
the mask to move in many directions on the divers face without losing a seal and
flooding. All parts are large and designed to be utilized by a gloved hand. Pockets for
underwater communication earphones are integrated with the face seal of the mask.
The mask is also equipped with a regulator adjustment knob to allow the diver to adjust
the regulator for ease of breathing at depth. A nose pocket is provided to facilitate
valsalva maneuvers. The EXO BRMS was not designed to be a positive-pressure mask
and will free-flow if it should become loose. Because of the low volume of the design,
it is simple to clear and it is designed to defog the lens with each breath the diver takes.
(See Figure 9.24, EXO BRMS FFM.)

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Figure 9.24 EXO BRMS FFM.

EXO BRMS FFM


Buckle
Spider
Mask lens
Mask frame

Communications module
Regulator adjustment knob

Inlet angle assembly

Purge button

Regulator exhaust

UNCLASSIFIED
9.4.1.4.3 Surface Vents. A disadvantage of FFM is that divers wearing them on the
surface awaiting deployment will breathe from their main tank. Standby divers can not
have their masks in place and be ready to employ without depleting a significant
amount of air from their tanks. Vents are available that allow the diver to breath
ambient air with the mask in place. The diver simply manipulates the vent and
automatically switches to air from his tanks.
9.4.1.4.4 FFM Diving Techniques. FFM diving requires modification from
traditional diving procedures. Water entry should be done deliberately. Avoid sudden
movements or jumps from height that could dislodge or loosen the mask enough to
permit water to get past the face seal. The diver holds the mask tightly against his face
when he enters the water. Equalization of pressure of middle ear spaces is practiced
prior to operational diving to familiarize divers with the procedure. Yawning and
swallowing are alternatives to the use of the mask equalizing device. Divers should be
familiar with clearing a completely flooded mask underwater and complete mask
removal and replacement underwater.
9.4.1.4.5 FFM Emergencies. In contaminated water conditions, three emergency
situations could exist if divers are utilizing a FFM. These are; an out-of-air situation,
mask leak or flood and a loss of communication. The divers first step is to notify the
tender. In an out-of-air situation in contaminated water, there is no satisfactory way to
share air with another diver (e.g., octopus, emergency gas supply [EGS] bottle, or
contingency cylinder). In clean water, this procedure would work but without a

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back-up mask, the diver would be essentially blind. Removing the mask, mask
leaking, or flooding in contaminated water could be dangerous and should cause
immediate dive termination. Consider the use of an EGS to a manifold block as a
personal back-up supply. Divers employing the FFM in conjunction with underwater
communications systems should have redundancy in the form of line pull signals.
9.4.1.5 Gauges. All divers should be equipped with a depth gauge and submersible
pressure gauge. Most recovery team dive operations will occur in limited visibility
conditions, it is recommended that phosphorescent analog gauges be utilized to facilitate
visibility of the gauge. Low visibility may even hamper being able to visualize the
numbers on the gauge. If only the needle can be seen, divers can remember the clock
position of the needle on the gauge when at the minimum return to surface pressure
reading. An example would be, If 1,000 PSI is at the 2 oclock position on the gauge, the
diver has to remember to return to the surface at 2 oclock. For no-visibility conditions,
the diver can fill a zip-lock bag with clear water and tape it to the top of the gauge. To
view the gauge; the diver can press the bag against his mask in conjunction with a small
light.
9.4.1.6 Nitrogen-Oxygen. Nitrogen-oxygen (NITROX) diving is a unique type of diving
using nitrogen-oxygen breathing gas mixtures ranging from 75 percent nitrogen/25 percent
oxygen to 60 percent nitrogen/40 percent oxygen. Using NITROX significantly increases
the amount of time a diver can spend at depth without decompressing. It also decreases the
required decompression time compared to a similar dive made to the same depth using air.
NITROX may be used in all diving operations suitable for air, but its use is limited to a
normal depth of 140 feet salt water (FSW). NITROX breathing gas mixtures are normally
used for shallow dives. The most benefit is gained when NITROX is used shallower than
50 FSW, but it can be advantageous when used to a depth of 140 FSW. Detail information
on NITROX diving operations can be found in Chapter 10, Nitrogen-Oxygen Diving
Operations, in SS521-AG-PRO-010 USN Navy Diving Manual, Revision 4.
9.4.1.6.1 Advantages and Disadvantages of NITROX Diving. The advantages of
using NITROX rather than air for diving include:
Extended bottom times for no-decompression diving.
Reduced decompression time.
Reduced residual nitrogen in the body after a dive.
Reduced possibility of decompression sickness.
Reduced Nitrogen Narcosis.
The disadvantages of using NITROX include:
Increased risk of CNS oxygen toxicity.
Producing NITROX mixtures requires special equipment.
NITROX equipment requires special cleaning techniques.
Long-duration NITROX dives can result in pulmonary oxygen toxicity.

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Working with NITROX systems requires special training.
NITROX is expensive to purchase.

NOTE: Nitrox is not currently approved for use by GUARDIAN ANGEL personnel.
9.4.1.7 Emergency Gas Supply Bottles. Small additional tanks allow divers to
self-rescue when their primary air source has been depleted. Small 18- to 30-cubic foot
pony bottles with an independent regulator give the standby diver an EGS that can be
transferred to another diver allowing the standby diver to leave and return with even more
back-up air. The EGS is mounted to the main tank with a quick release mechanism that
both the diver and standby diver can easily get to in an emergency. Mount the EGS on the
right side of the tank so that the regulator second stage on the cylinder is properly
configured for the entrapped diver to use. (See Figure 9.25, EGS Bottle.)
9.4.1.7.1 EGS Techniques. When passing off an EGS aluminum bottle underwater,
maintain control of the buoyant cylinder to prevent it from loss or injuring another
diver. There are two methods to pass off an EGS bottle to another diver.
9.4.1.7.1.1 Remove the regulator and switch to another regulator mouthpiece from
the EGS. If the diver is in contaminated water, the regulator mouthpiece will be
contaminated when it enters the divers mouth. A diver wearing a FFM will be
required to move his mask to make the transition exposing his mouth, nose, eyes,
and skin to the same hazard.
9.4.1.7.1.2 Use a dive block designed to make the transfer from the main air
supply to an EGS. This is the safest method and connects the main air supply with
an EGS. These blocks are simply activated and then the unit shifts the divers
breathing source from the primary air source to the EGS. (See Figure 9.26, Dive
Block.)
9.4.1.8 Contingency Cylinders. In addition to the safety offered by the standby diver,
there should be a contingency tank within easy access of the surface team. A contingency
tank is a designated emergency scuba tank configured to be taken to a diver trapped
underwater after he has been given the standby divers EGS bottle. The contingency
cylinder should have a regulator attached, a carrying handle, a least one extra cutting tool,
a carabineer, and a light marker. On the incident site, it should be full, and the dive
supervisor should check its status before the primary diver enters the water. Take into
consideration that if the team is utilizing a single aluminum 80 ft scuba tank that it will
become buoyant once some of its air is used. To prevent possible loss of the tank by the
entrapped diver weigh it with a 2-pound weight about 8-inches above the bottom. (See
Figure 9.27, Contingency Cylinder.)

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Figure 9.25 EGS Bottle.

EGS Bottle

UNCLASSIFIED

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Figure 9.26 Dive Block.

Dive Block

UNCLASSIFIED

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9-59

Figure 9.27 Contingency Cylinder.

Contingency Cylinder

UNCLASSIFIED
9.4.1.9 Underwater Communications Systems. Due to the complexities, dangers, and
challenging conditions of underwater search, rescue, and recovery operations, there should
always be communication between the divers and surface team. A underwater
communications system will reduce the chance of miscommunication and ensures the
surface team always knows the divers status. Psychologically when dealing with mishaps
it can be reassuring for the primary diver to have someone to communicate with. Systems
require either a FFM or oral cup to allow the diver to speak. Before employments ensure
team members are trained in use and emergency procedures. Voice-activated (VOX)
systems are preferable to push-to-talk models since the searching diver will not have to
stop searching with one hand whenever he needs to communicate. These systems can be
either hardwired or wireless.
9.4.1.9.1 Hardwired Communications. These are usually comprised of a topside
communications box, communications wire, ear phones for the tender and a
microphone in the divers FFM. Hardwired communication systems are very reliable
coupled with good communication. (See Figure 9.28, Hardwired Underwater
Communications.)

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Figure 9.28 Hardwired Underwater Communications.

Hardwired Underwater Communications

UNCLASSIFIED
9.4.1.9.2 Wireless Communications. Single sideband is the principal technology
employed by current manufacturers of these systems. Before employing wireless
systems, consider factors that can affect the quality of underwater communications.
These include gas density of breathing gas, underwater work level, nitrogen narcosis,
bubble noise, regulator noise, FFM oral-nasal cavity size, microphone type, hood and
mask restrictions, loss of natural feedback, diving dress, placement of transducers used
to generate and receive the signals, and underwater features. All factors need to be
overcome for a topside dive supervisor to communicate with a diver or for two divers
underwater to communicate. The basic components of a wireless system are a FFM
speaking chamber coupled with an electronics housing. Attached to the housing are
connections for the microphone and earphone. (See Figure 9.29, Wireless Underwater
Communications.)

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Figure 9.29 Wireless Underwater Communications.

Wireless Underwater Communications

UNCLASSIFIED
9.4.1.10 Swim Fins. Due to entanglement hazards diving in limited visibility waters,
consider taping the outside strap of each fin or route straps backward through the buckles
so that the running end pull tab is on the inside of the fin strap. Keeping the inside strap
free for adjustment is easier to reach for most divers. Highly buoyant fins and booties may
provide a hindrance for search and recovery operations in shallow water decreasing
effectiveness of the search pattern. Having buoyant feet can be a hazard to dry suit
equipped divers increasing the risk of inadvertent feet first ascents. A pair of ankle

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weights will assist in prevention. Divers operating in no-visibility conditions can keep
their fins on the bottom as they search with their entire body.
9.4.1.11 Wet Suits. Wet suits should be utilized with caution when conducting search,
rescue, and recovery operations when the water quality is unknown. Wet suits allow water
to come in contact with a divers skin and they offer no protection against hazardous
materials. Petroleum products such as gasoline will break down neoprene causing the suit
to disintegrate. Wet suits also tend to absorb body fluids and tissues from victims during
body recoveries.
9.4.1.12 Gloves. Gloves should always be worn by divers conducting search, rescue and
recovery operations. Divers may be required to run their hands along a debris covered
bottom in no-visibility water. Some environments may be so hazardous that divers may be
required to wear thick leather gloves over thin neoprene or dry suit gloves for additional
protection. Kevlar glove liners or reinforcing neoprene gloves with duct tape can be used
to protect a diver from sharp objects. As neoprene tends to absorb body fluids and tissue
from handling decomposing victims, all gloves used in this capacity should be destroyed
after use.
9.4.1.13 Variable Volume Dry Suits (VVDS). Dry suits provide superior thermal
protection to the diver in the water and on the surface. They are constructed so the entry
zipper or seal and all wrist and neck seals are waterproof, keeping the interior dry. They
can be inflated orally or from a low-pressure air source via an inlet valve. Air can be
exhausted from the suit via a second valve, allowing excellent buoyancy control. The level
of thermal protection can be varied through careful selection of the type and thickness of
wool or synthetic long underwear. However, too much underwear is bulky and can cause
overheating, sweating, and especially if wearing cotton garments, subsequent chilling of
the standby diver. Because of superior environmental protection the dry suit is an essential
component of cold and contaminated water diving.

CAUTION: Prior to the use of dry suits, divers must be trained in their use and be thoroughly
familiar with the operation of these suits.
9.4.1.13.1 Dry Suits Limitations. Use of dry suits is limited by the following:
9.4.1.13.1.1 Horizontal swims may be fatiguing due to suit bulk.
9.4.1.13.1.2 If the diver is horizontal or head down, air can migrate into the foot
area and become trapped there causing the diver to lose attitudinal control.
Because there are no exhaust valves in the legs, the diver may find himself
ascending feet first and out of control. The expanding air in the legs can cause over
inflation, loss of buoyancy control, and a rapid uncontrolled ascent. The expanding
air trapped in the feet may also cause the divers fins to pop off.
9.4.1.13.1.3 Inlet and exhaust valves can malfunction.
9.4.1.13.1.4 A collapsing or parting seam or zipper or a rip in the suit can result in
sudden and drastic loss of buoyancy and in thermal shock.
9.4.1.13.1.5 Extra weight is required to achieve neutral buoyancy. It is generally
best to use oversized weights.

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9-63

NOTE: Divers must receive proper training in and be thoroughly familiar with the dry suit before
they attempt to use it operationally. Any diver planning to use a dry suit in any water, especially
while diving under adverse conditions should be thoroughly familiar with the functioning of the
suit and the manufacturers operational literature. Divers should have experience with the suit
before deployment to the dive site. In addition to gaining experience using the suit, the diver
should get a thorough checkout on the proper method of donning and doffing, suit care, and
maintenance. Three dives to increasing depths are normally sufficient for an experienced diver to
become familiar with the suit.
9.4.1.13.2 Dry Suit Risks. The two greatest risks to the diver using a dry suit are
floodout and blowup.
9.4.1.13.2.1 Floodout is the sudden compromise of the dry suits watertight
integrity usually caused by a tear or the failure of one of the watertight seals. The
diver may experience thermal shock caused by the sudden exposure to the very
cold water. The result of catastrophic buoyancy loss has been greatly exaggerated
within the diving community.
9.4.1.13.2.2 Blowup is the sudden loss of buoyancy control caused by the rapid
expansion of air trapped inside the suit. It is most commonly caused by an
inadvertent ascent without venting the suit, a stuck (often frozen) low-pressure
inflator, or a closed or jammed exhaust valve.
WARNING: Proper training prepares the diver to deal effectively with these emergencies. Cause
of death for untrained divers is usually drowning, air embolism, decompression sickness, or a
combination of these factors.
9.4.1.13.3 Cold Water Considerations. Do not subject the dry suit to an ambient
outside temperature below 32 degrees F before a dive. Such exposure can result in
super cooling of the inlet and exhaust valves and can cause icing on immersion. If it is
necessary to expose the suit to extreme temperatures before diving, the diver should
lubricate the valves with silicone. Attempt to re-warm the valves before entering the
water.
9.4.1.13.3.1 Dry Suit Hoods. The primary function of the hood is to prevent heat
loss through the head. In water less than 70 degrees F, hoods should be a minimum
of 3mm thick to decrease heat loss and help prevent vertigo induced by having cold
water flood the ears. Dry suits are available with built-in latex hoods in which the
diver will be required to wear an insulated skull cap under the hood to provide
thermal protection. The dry suit will offer its best protection if it includes an
attached hood that seals around the divers face and under a FFM. Latex hoods are
great for sealing with a FFM but they are very susceptible to puncture. When
equipping team members order the attached latex hood a size smaller to prevent it
from filling with air and becoming very uncomfortable. If a wet suit hood is worn,
it should have vents to prevent the build-up of air under the hood. Two vents
should be installed on at the top for when the diver is vertical and one at the back of
the head for when the diver is horizontal.

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9.4.1.13.3.2 Dry Suit Gloves. Gloves are required for divers conducting searches
by feel over a debris covered bottom. In addition to protecting the diver, they also
provide thermal protection. It may be necessary to wear Kevlar or leather work
gloves over thin neoprene or dry suit gloves for increased protection. For diving in
contaminated water, the use of a dry glove system is highly recommended. They
are usually constructed of thin, flexible rubber and worn with a liner to keep them
warm and to protect from squeeze. Dry gloves are not a permanent attachment to
the suit but are considered an accessory which can be removed for replacement
when necessary. Dry gloves attach to the dry suit by use of inner and outer cuff
rings. The inner rings are constructed of hard plastic to serve as rigid mounting
point for the flexible mounting flange on the gloves. They are machined with a
groove to provide a locking point for the outer ring and are positioned inside the
dry suit sleeve at the cuff. Outer rings are made of soft rubber. They have an inner
lip that snaps into the groove on the inner ring, trapping the suit sleeve between two
rings creating a waterproof seal. There is a second lip on the exterior of the outer
rings where the dry gloves attach. To further provide security in contaminated
water conditions, divers may attach stainless steel hose clamps over the cuff rings.
9.4.1.13.3.3 Insulation Considerations. Consider the water temperature, length
of the dive and the amount of exertion the diver is expected to perform.
9.4.1.13.4 Dry Suit Diving Techniques. Dry suit diving is an acquired skill which
requires specialized training, practice under controlled conditions and adequate
exposure time for the diver to adapt to the open water diving in a dry suit system.
9.4.1.13.4.1 Entering the Water. Prior to entering the water exhaust all excess air
in the dry suit. Partially inflate the BC and enter the water. When entering the
water feet first, excess air in the suit will be forced to the upper parts of the dry suit.
Ensure the exhaust valve is completely open before entering the water.
9.4.1.13.4.2 Achieving Neutral Buoyancy at the Surface. Weighting should be
checked by a dive supervisor who is knowledgeable on dry suit diving. Do not
dive in a dry suit until the weights have been adjusted so that they are neutrally
buoyant at the surface with an empty tank. To check weighting, enter a controlled
environment fully equipped for local diving conditions.

CAUTION: Weight requirements will change from fresh water to salt water.
CAUTION: Weight requirements will change with changes in the amount of thermal protection
worn under the dry suit.
9.4.1.13.4.2.1 Vent all of the air from the BC.
9.4.1.13.4.2.2 Vent all of the air from the dry suit. All air can be vented by
assuming a vertical position in the water and opening the dry suit exhaust valve
completely by turning it counterclockwise until it stops.
9.4.1.13.4.2.3 Raise the left elbow and allow the suit to vent. Water pressure
will force air from the lower point of the suit up through the torso and out the
exhaust valve.

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9.4.1.13.4.2.4 Fill the lungs with air and then you should float at eye level.
When you completely exhale all of your air, you should slowly begin to sink. If
both conditions are met, you are neutrally buoyant.
9.4.1.13.4.2.5 As you consume more air in the tank, you will become more
buoyant. After achieving neutral buoyancy at the surface with a full tank of air,
add an amount of weight equal to the weight of the air in the tank.
9.4.1.13.4.2.6 Before adding the weight, inflate the BC. Add just enough
weight to offset the change in buoyancy of the tank you are using.
CAUTION: Different tank sizes and tank materials will require different amounts of weight to
compensate for the change in buoyancy from a full tank to an empty tank.
9.4.1.13.4.2.7 Once in a vertical posture with your head out of the water, you
will notice that there is more pressure on the legs than the chest. This is normal
anytime you are in the water and have your head higher than your feet. The dry
suit should feel as though it is squeezing the diver gently, but firmly, all over
the body.
9.4.1.13.4.3 Dive Start. Ensure that the exhaust valve is completely open. To
open, turn it counterclockwise until it stops. Lift the left elbow to raise the valve to
the highest point of your body. Keep the wrist lower than your elbow. With the
mask on, you may not be able to see the valve, but should be able to hear air exiting
the valve. Descend by venting all of the air from the BC.
9.4.1.13.4.4 Descent. Once you descend past 10 feet, you will descend faster.
Leave the exhaust valve open. Do not close the exhaust valve. Add air to the suit
is short bursts, the short bursts will control the volume of air going into the suit and
will help keep the valve from freezing open when air or water temperatures are
below 40 degrees F. Just enough air is added to eliminate any uncomfortable
squeeze. To equalize a foot squeeze, you must get air into the boots. Air can only
enter the boots if you are parallel to the surface or in a slight feet-up attitude.
WARNING: Do not close the dry suit exhaust valve all the way while underwater. The valve has
been designed to vent automatically whenever the valve is at the highest point of the body.
Closing the valve increases the amount of air trapped in the suit and may lead to a loss of control.
Rapid ascent is dangerous and may cause pulmonary over inflation injuries or decompression
sickness, either of which can result in serious injury or death.
9.4.1.13.4.5 Attaining Neutral Buoyancy at Depth. When you reach the desired
depth, add just enough air to the dry suit to make yourself neutrally buoyant. A key
to dry suit diving is to dive with the minimum volume of air in the dry suit. Proper
weighting is essential to dive with a minimum volume of air in the dry suit.
9.4.1.13.4.5.1 Use the dry suit to adjust buoyancy. If you recovery additional
weight during the dive, use a lift bag to raise the additional weight to the
surface. If the lift bag becomes too buoyant and you are unable to control it,
you can release it.

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9.4.1.13.4.5.2 Do not use the dry suit as a lift bag. If you lose your grip on the
object, you may become excessively buoyant and have a rapid ascent.
9.4.1.13.4.5.3 As you utilize more air from the tank during the dive you will
become more buoyant. Vent air from the dry suit by raising the left arm.

WARNING: Do not inflate the BC while using the dry suit. Controlling two independent air
bladders is a very difficult skill to master. If not carefully performed, the diver may experience a
rapid and uncontrolled ascent.
9.4.1.13.4.5.4 In the event of a damaged dry suit and it is unable to hold air,
consider inflating the BC.
9.4.1.13.4.6 Trim. When swimming underwater, you should be neither foot down
nor head down. You should be in level trim. When in both level trim and neutrally
buoyant you can move in any direction with a minimum of effort.
9.4.1.13.4.7 Ascent. Prior to ascent, ensure the exhaust valve is completely open.
The ascent must be slow and controlled. As you start towards the surface, you will
become positively buoyant as the air inside the suit expands. Vent air from the
exhaust valve as needed to maintain neutral buoyancy. You should be able to stop
the ascent at any time by simply exhaling.
WARNING: New divers should ascend next to a weighted line for their first few dry suit ascents
which can be used to gain control if necessary.
9.4.1.13.4.7.1 Monitor the ascent rate utilizing a dive timer and depth gauge
and stay within ascent rate limits.
9.4.1.13.4.7.2 If you ascend too fast, raise the left arm higher to allow the dry
suit to vent more air. If raising the left arm does not slow the ascent, push in on
the exhaust valve to activate the manual override.
9.4.1.13.4.7.3 If negatively buoyant and you have difficulty ascending, lower
the left arm and add a burst of air to the dry suit to add buoyancy. Once you
begin the ascent, be prepared to vent air through the exhaust valve.
9.4.1.13.4.7.4 Be prepared to stop the ascent at any time.
9.4.1.13.4.8 Surface Swimming. Inflating the BC will allow you to swim
comfortably on the surface without inflating the dry suit. Inflation of the dry suit
on the surface will place pressure on your neck. Consider adjusting the exhaust
valve all the way closed during surface swimming to prevent water from leaking
into the suit through the valve. Although it is acceptable to close the valve
completely while on the surface, ensure you open it to the open position before
submerging again.
9.4.1.13.4.9 Dry Suit Diving Emergencies. Master the following emergency
skills before using the dry suit in open water.
WARNING: The following emergency procedures should be practiced in a controlled
environment under the supervision of a dive supervisor experienced in dry suit diving before the
dry suit is used in open water.

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9.4.1.13.4.9.1 Diver Inversion. If positively buoyant and you turn upside


down, you will find yourself drifting toward the surface feet first. Regain
control immediately due to the air not being able to be vented in this position.
9.4.1.13.4.9.1.1 If upside down when close to the bottom:
9.4.1.13.4.9.1.1.1 Swim hard toward the bottom.
9.4.1.13.4.9.1.1.2 Push off the bottom with both hands.
9.4.1.13.4.9.1.1.3 Roll to an upright position.
9.4.1.13.4.9.1.1.4 Immediately vent the dry suit through the exhaust
valve.
9.4.1.13.4.9.1.2 If upside down in mid-water.
9.4.1.13.4.9.1.2.1 Kick hard toward the bottom.
9.4.1.13.4.9.1.2.2 Bend forward at the waist.
9.4.1.13.4.9.1.2.3 Roll to an upright position.
9.4.1.13.4.9.1.2.4 Immediately vent the dry suit through the exhaust
valve. If unable to recover and are experiencing an uncontrolled ascent
flare your body to reduce the speed of ascent. Spread the arms and legs
away from the body and maintain the fins parallel to the surface to
create drag while continuously exhaling.
WARNING: Flaring is a last-ditch effort to be used in an emergency.
9.4.1.13.4.9.1.3 Inflator Valve Stuck Open. The inflator may become
stuck in the open position. Immediately disconnect the low pressure
inflator hose from the suit and vent any excess air through the exhaust
valve.
9.4.1.13.4.9.1.3.1 If you forget which direction to turn the exhaust
valve to open it, you can manually vent through the automatic valve by
pushing in on it.
9.4.1.13.4.9.1.3.2 If unable to vent enough air through the exhaust
valve, open the neck or wrist seals to allow air to escape. This will
allow water to enter the dry suit.
9.4.1.13.4.9.1.3.3 If sufficient air still cannot be vented and you are
still experiencing an uncontrolled ascent, flare the body to reduce the
speed of ascent.
CAUTION: If the diver continues to push in on the valve after all of the air is exhausted from the
suit, water may enter the dry suit.
9.4.1.13.4.9.1.4 Inflator Valve Stuck Close. If the inflator valve is stuck
in the closed position, stop the ascent and terminate the dive immediately.
Use the BC as needed to control buoyancy. Return to the surface while
venting the expanding air in the suit.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


9.4.1.13.4.9.1.5 Leaking Exhaust Valve. If the exhaust valve is leaking,
the dry suit will not hold air properly. Terminate the dive immediately. Use
the BC as needed to control buoyancy and return to the surface.
9.4.1.13.4.9.1.6 Exhaust Valve Stuck Open. If the exhaust valve is stuck
open, the dry suit will not hold air properly. It is also likely that water will
enter the dry suit through the open valve. Terminate the dive and use the BC
as needed to control buoyancy and return to the surface.
9.4.1.13.4.9.1.7 Exhaust Valve Stuck Closed. If the exhaust valve is
stuck in the closed position, air cannot be properly vented from the dry suit.
This may result in an uncontrolled ascent. Immediately open the neck seal
or wrist seal to release air. If sufficient air still cannot be vented and you are
experiencing an uncontrolled ascent, flare the body to reduce the speed of
ascent.
9.4.1.13.4.9.1.8 Slow Air Leak in Inflator Valve. If you experience a
slow leak in the inflator valve, disconnect the low pressure inflator hose
and terminate the dive immediately. Ascend while venting the expanding
air in the dry suit through the exhaust valve as normal.
9.4.1.13.4.9.1.9 Flooded Suit. In the event you have a zipper failure or
other catastrophic dry suit failure, the dry suit will flood. The diver
executes the following:
9.4.1.13.4.9.1.9.1 Inflate the BC as required to establish positive
buoyancy.
9.4.1.13.4.9.1.9.2 Position the leak as low as possible to minimize air
loss.
9.4.1.13.4.9.1.9.3 Perform a controlled ascent.
9.4.1.13.4.9.1.9.4 Terminate the dive.

WARNING: If the diver is unable to establish positive buoyancy by inflation of the BC, only then
should the diver consider dropping his weight belt. A small amount of cold water introduced into
the dry suit may seem like a catastrophic failure. If the suit is not flooded, the inflation of the BC
plus the ditching of the weight belt will result in extreme positive buoyancy. The diver needs to
ensure that every effort is made to ascend using only the BC before ditching the weight belt. Such
buoyancy would be impossible to control and would result in a very rapid and uncontrolled ascent.
9.4.1.13.4.9.1.10 Dropped/Lost Weight Belt. If the weight belt is
dropped or lost execute the following:
9.4.1.13.4.9.1.10.1 Attempt to recover the weights.
9.4.1.13.4.9.1.10.2 Grab hold of anything you can and vent the suit.
9.4.1.13.4.9.1.10.3 If unable to control the ascent, assume the flare
position.
9.4.1.13.4.9.1.10.4 Continues to exhale as you ascend.

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9.4.1.14 Diving Harness. A diving harness allows a tethered diver to have both hands
free during the execution of a search dive. Properly configured, a harness will allow a
diver to maintain a taut line without any discomfort or effort, and feel line pull signals
through up to 150 feet of line. Keeping the attachment point in a constant location, a diver
can monitor his ascent rate by the change in the angle of the line across his chest. The
angle of the line also indicates that the tether became snagged on an underwater obstacle.
The harness should sit across the solar plexus so that it will not interfere with the divers
breathing. Good characteristics of a dive harness include adjustable shoulder straps,
reinforced stitching, stiff webbing, and crossing back straps to prevent unnecessary
pressure on the divers neck and back. The diver is tethered by securing a line to a D-ring
on the front of the harness with a Figure-8 knot with a locking carabineer or snap shackle.
The D-ring tether point should sit off-center so that when the diver is in the proper search
position the line will not run between the divers legs. (See Figure 9.30, Diving Harness
with Cutting Tools.)
Figure 9.30 Diving Harness with Cutting Tools.

Diving Harness with Cutting Tools

UNCLASSIFIED
9.4.1.14.1 Alternative Configurations. Seat harnesses and loops tied around the
divers waist should be avoided due to putting the diver at a low tether point which will
put the diver in a vertical position under the water. Loops tied around the divers waist
may also rotate around the body causing difficulty in locating it to clear an
entanglement or signal the line tender. Divers should avoid holding the tender line
with one hand and searching with the other. If the diver was to drop the line, there is
no way of locating it in limited visibility. Holding the tender line with one hand also

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


leads to inaccuracies due to the random position of the hand in respect to the divers
body.
9.4.1.15 Weight Systems. To search more effectively when conducting search operations
along the bottom, divers should be over weighted by two pounds. The following weight
systems can be utilized.
9.4.1.15.1 Weight Belts. The weight belt is one of the simplest and least complicated
pieces of equipment a diver will use but also one of the most dangerous. Learn to ditch
the weight belt properly in an emergency by pulling it out and away from the body with
their right hand before dropping it. Traditional weight belts are not very comfortable
and position the weight high up on the body. If the diver is wearing the buoyancy
compensator military (BCM) or other horse collar style BCs with a crotch strap, the
weight belt should be the last piece of equipment donned. Regardless, if wearing a
BCM or jacket style BC, the weight belt is the first item ditched when the diver leaves
the water.
9.4.1.15.2 Weight Belt Configuration. The webbing on the weight belt should
extend 10 to 12 inches beyond the buckle. This allows the end to be long enough to
grab quickly if the buckle inadvertently opens underwater and is short enough in that it
does not present a snagging hazard. Never tuck the free end of the belt below the
webbing since this will negate the quick release features of the buckle. Metal buckles
are recommended for use due to their reliability. Weights should be placed
symmetrically for buoyancy control purposes and buckle placement. If the weights are
asymmetrically placed they may rotate and make the buckle less accessible in an
emergency situation. Orient the buckle for a right-hand release so that the diver has his
left hand free to inflate his buoyancy compensator. This also simplifies diver rescue
procedures so that any diver by reflex can perform the ditching maneuver on any other
diver.
9.4.1.15.3 Weight Harnesses and Weight Integrated BCs. If employing weight
harnesses or weight integrated BCs, it is imperative that all team members are familiar
with how to ditch the divers weight. It is recommended to utilize a combination of
weights on the weight belt and in the integrated BC so that the diver can remove some
weight at the surface and to prevent an uncontrolled ascent in the event the diver
should have to ditch the BC assembly underwater. If a back-mounted flotation weight
integrated BC is utilized, use counterweight assemblies to float an unconscious diver
face up in the event of a mishap.
9.4.1.15.4 Ankle Weights. Weights worn on the divers ankles distribute his weight
requirements. Weighing no more 3 pounds, they may help relieve lower back pain
caused by wearing a weight belt. Ankle weights add versatility by being a simple fix
to add weight to a buoyant diver. If the divers require the weight before descending,
another diver can clip the weight around the tank valve where it will be out of the way.
Another technique is to clip the ankle weight around the tether line and sliding it down
with a push. The diver can then clip it around the BC strap. Ankle weights also help
to keep the divers feet and fins on the bottom. Ankle weights will offset the problem
that dry suits, thick booties and plastic fins will float the feet and legs off the bottom.

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9.4.1.16 Cutting Tools. Utilize bandage shears underwater to handle entanglement


problems due to the fact that they do not pose the accidental cutting hazard associated with
knifes. Shears can cut through fishhooks, fishing line, and wire with only the use of one
hand. Divers operating in a search, rescue, or recovery mode carry at least two sets of
shears, a small blunt-tipped dive tool and any other cutting tools the mission may require
(e.g., wire cutters, seat belt cutters, or window punches). In an entanglement, the tool can
be dropped therefore redundancy is a must. Mount two on the divers harness and one on
another location. Two mounted to the harness allow the diver to have the tools on
themselves in the event they ditch their other equipment. Do not mount cutting tools on
the legs where they can be difficult to reach and become an entanglement hazard. Tools
can be mounted in the golden triangle; the area from the mouth down to the bottom of
the rib cage on both sides of the diver. Any equipment within this area will be easily
accessible by both hands, increasing the chances for self-extrication and facilitating the
rescue of another diver.
9.4.1.17 Dive Lights. Invaluable for night searches in clear water, dive lights are worn on
the back of the hand or mounted as headlights because they leave both hands free for
conducting searches by feel. If diving in no-visibility conditions, dive lights have no use
other than for illuminating gauges. No-visibility water is limited by the particles in
suspension, not just the lack of light at depth.
9.4.1.18 Tender Lines. Tender lines 3/8-inch in diameter with a tensile strength of 1,200
to 1,500 pounds offer the best compromise between strength and drag. Braided
polypropylene rope is recommended because its dynamic and floating characteristics.
Ideal qualities include tender lines being pliable, easy to knot and pack. Ideal lines allow
a submerged diver to feel line pull signals up to 150 feet. Mesh rope bags protect the rope
and facilitate transport and tender use.
9.4.1.19 Line Markings. Mark the lines for distance to manage a searching divers
progress and what area has been searched. No standard marking system exists but one
popular with the public safety diving community is shown in Figure 9.31, Line Markings,
utilizing narrow and wide wraps of duct tape with various colors for each 25-foot
increment. Previous guidance has suggested marking distance searched with knots or
loops in the tender line. This technique is no longer recommended because it can lead to
line entanglement and increases the drag of the line.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 9.31 Line Markings.

Line Markings
Narrow band every five feet
Diver

25 feet

50 feet
75 Feet

100 feet
125 feet

Tender

UNCLASSIFIED
9.4.1.20 Contingency Strap. A standby diver responding to an emergency needs to be
able to descend swiftly through limited visibility water along the primary divers tending
line. If he attempted to descend with only one hand, leaving the other to fend obstacles he
will only have one hand available to assist the diver in need. A contingency strap is
utilized secured to the standby divers harness and snapped into the primary divers tether
line. The recommended set-up is to use a 1-inch plastic side-release buckle in the middle,
a carabiner at one end to snap onto the primary divers tether, and a brass ring at the other
end with affixes to the standby divers harness attachment. Divers should not attach
themselves to someone else without a quick release capability. A contingency strap offers
the advantage of having the standby diver descend the primary divers tether without
pulling on it hand over hand which might worsen an entanglement or worsen an injury.
Having both hands also allows the standby diver to be able equalize, adjust buoyancy,
descend holding equipment, assess and deal with an emergency. (See Figure 9.32,
Contingency Strap.)

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Figure 9.32 Contingency Strap.

Contingency Strap

UNCLASSIFIED
9.4.1.21 Diver Propulsion Vehicles. Diver propulsion vehicles (DPV) allow divers to
cover great distances while reducing swimming effort and air consumption. This
capability is utilized by some GUARDIAN ANGEL recovery teams to search large areas
of clear water and to facilitate subsurface infiltration or exfiltration. Tow-behind DPVs are
preferred to sit on top models and are considered more versatile because of streamlining
and the lessened chance of the divers gear getting caught in the propeller. Tow behind
DPVs also have propellers that are located where they can be seen by the diver, allow
better maneuverability, and facilitate the carriage of extra equipment. The Farallon
MK-VIII and MK-VIIIS are the only DPVs currently available that are ANU and divers
employing them should reference the manufacturers instruction and maintenance manual
for additional information. (See Figure 9.33, Farallon MK-VIII DPV, and Figure 9.34,
MK-VIIIS DPV.) The following are some planning and configuration considerations for
the use of DPVs in recovery team operations:

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 9.33 Farallon MK-VIII DPV.

Farallon MK-VIII DPV

Length: 62 inches (1.57m)


Weight in water: +/- 4 pounds (3.6Kg)
Speed: 3.2 MPH maximum
Depth: Tested to 400 Fsw (122 M)
Charger: 48V Fast Charger included
Battery: 48V Lead Acid battery (standard)
48V Polymer Lithium Ion (option)

Weight on land: 125 pounds (57Kg)


Construction: T6061 aluminum
Electronics: Variable speed control
Range: To 3 Miles (4.8 Km)
Charges battery in less than 5 hours
Burn Time: Approximately 70 minutes

Note: Performance tests were conducted by a 160 pound (73Kg) diver using a single
tank open circut SCUBA configuration. Speed and range of each Farallon DPV
will vary based on current flow, diver size, diver equipment configuration, diver
posture and battery status..

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 9.34 Farallon MK-VIIIS DPV.

Farallon MK-VIIIS DPV

Length: 42 inches (1.07m)


Weight in water: +/- 2 pounds (1Kg)
Speed: 2.7 MPH maximum
Depth: Tested to 400 Fsw (122 M)
Charger: 24V Fast Charger included
Battery: 24V Lead Acid battery (standard)
24V Polymer Lithium Ion (option)

Weight on land: 80 pounds (36.3Kg)


Construction: T6061 aluminum
Electronics: Variable speed control
Range: To 2 Miles (3.2 Km)
Charges battery in less than 5 hours
Burn Time: Approximately 48 minutes

Note: Performance tests were conducted by a 160 pound (73Kg) diver using a single
tank open circut SCUBA configuration. Speed and range of each Farallon DPV
will vary based on current flow, diver size, diver equipment configuration, diver
posture and battery status..

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

9-75

CAUTION: Divers piloting DPVs must closely monitor ascent and descent rates to prevent
pulmonary overexpansion injuries and decompression sickness which can result in death.
NOTE: The vehicle is steered by the divers body positioning and fin movements. These
maneuvers should be practiced in shallow water and at slow speeds until the diver is proficient in
the operation of the vehicle. It is recommended that the diver be experienced in the operation of a
DPV prior to open water use.
9.4.1.21.1 Team members must consider the DPVs speed and power with the ability
to return to a start point without it, should it fail.
9.4.1.21.2 Too much speed over distance causes thermal problems for the diver.
Divers not swimming will need to consider additional thermal protection to stay warm.
9.4.1.21.3 Power required for speed rises exponentially and drag rises exponentially
with speed. There is an immediate point of diminishing returns where the battery
capacity required to burn even a short time at high speeds becomes prohibitive. Divers
streamline their equipment as much as possible to reduce drag.
9.4.1.21.4 The best method of attaching a DPV is by a tow cord that runs from the
DPV handles to a sit harness on the diver with either a front and rear tie-in or D-ring.
This configuration allows the diver to be pulled by the D-ring attachment and not by
the arms. This allows the divers hands to remain relaxed, with only wrist action
required to guide the DPV and a finger on the trigger.
9.4.1.21.5 The best position for a diver on a DPV is where the propeller wash will not
hit the diver at all.
9.4.1.21.6 The best handle position is riding with the DPV out in front with the divers
arm extended, relaxed with the hand lying on the handle and not grasping it.
9.4.1.21.7 In the event a team member experiences a disabled DPV it is essential to
tow him and his DPV. The first step is to configure the disabled DPV by threading a
tow cord through the disabled DPVs forward lifting handle and then clipping it off
onto the rear D-ring of the divers harness. The diver on the disabled DPV then clips
into his buddys rear D-ring which allows him to be towed himself. The towed diver
must maintain being streamlined by resisting the temptation to look where he is going
by keeping his head down. This will generate less drag.
9.4.1.21.8 Should the DPV begin to flood it must be turned off immediately. The unit
should be abandoned if it becomes too heavy causing problems with the divers
buoyancy. As a precaution, a lift bag may be carried (120 pounds of lift) to prevent the
loss of the vehicle in this situation.
9.4.2 Diving Personnel. When planning underwater search, rescue and recovery
operations matching qualifications and experience of diving personnel to specific
requirements of the operation, knowledge of the duties, responsibilities and relationships of
the various members of the diving team is essential. This paragraph specifically deals with the
team configuration to support a search under adverse conditions where tethered diver TTP is
essential. Team members diving under normal circumstances can configure IAW
SS521-AG-PRO-010, USN Navy Diving Manual, Revision 4.

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9.4.2.1 Team Leader. The team leader (TL) is the diver who has been designated in
command of the GUARDIAN ANGEL recovery team. The TL is responsible for all
criteria of the mission to include planning and execution. The team leader should ensure
that the incident site is secure and security is set before the conduct of operations in threat
environments. The TL will also act as a liaison with a ground force and or any local
authorities. If qualified, he may also act as the dive supervisor.
9.4.2.2 Diving Supervisor. While the team leader is in charge of the overall recovery
operation, the dive supervisor is in charge of the actual diving operation for a particular
dive or series of dives. The dive supervisor will be included in preparing the operational
plan. The dive supervisor shall consider emergencies, determine equipment requirements,
recommend diving assignments, and establish back-up requirements for the operation.
The dive supervisor will be familiar with all divers on the team and shall evaluate the
qualifications and physical fitness of the divers selected for each particular job. The dive
supervisor inspects all equipment and conducts pre-dive briefings of personnel. The safety
of the teams divers is the primary responsibility of the dive supervisor. The initial action
of the dive supervisor at every scene is to conduct a risk-to-benefit analysis and then to
report his findings to higher mission authorities. Taking various factors into consideration,
the dive supervisor should also decide if the operation should be executed in rescue or
recovery mode. As the search progresses, the dive supervisor needs to stay informed about
the rates of air consumption, since excessive consumption may indicate an equipment
problem, fatigue or an inexperienced diver. The dive supervisor ensures that a profile map
of each divers exact movements and the entire search area is made by the standby tender.
The dive supervisor may also be the team leader.
9.4.2.3 Primary Diver. The primary divers role in a low- to no-visibility environment is
to search the bottom as directed by the tender. The diver searches at the end of the tether
that he keeps taut going wherever the tender directs him to go. Because the dive is
tethered, tender-directed, solo diving, the diver has no buddy to distract from the search.
9.4.2.4 Diver Tender. The tender has the greatest responsibility on the site. It is the
tenders job to take care of the needs of the diver. A tender has the best situational
awareness of what is occurring on the search scene. By watching the divers bubbles, the
tender can track the divers progress, knows the angle of the tether, the movement of the
line and how much line is out. A tender is always focused on the diver. On arrival at the
site, a tender has the following responsibilities:
9.4.2.4.1 Assist in the dressing of the diver.
9.4.2.4.2 Check the gear in conjunction with the dive supervisor.
9.4.2.4.3 Maintain an organized dive site.
9.4.2.4.4 Accompany the diver to the point of entry.
9.4.2.4.5 Receive a briefing from the dive supervisor with the diver prior to the diver
entering the water.
9.4.2.4.6 Reviews line signals, safety procedures and contingency plans prior to the
diver entering the water.

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9.4.2.4.7 Ensures that the stand-by and 90 percent diver (if available) are in place
before allowing the diver to descend.
9.4.2.4.8 Ensure the safe entry of the diver, noting the time in and the starting tank
pressure.
9.4.2.4.9 Directs the diver where to search, monitors the tether line, give signals as
appropriate and alerts the profiler of any slack in the line.
9.4.2.4.10 Decide whether an area can be secured; having been properly searched.
9.4.2.4.11 Monitor the divers air bubbles, record the breathing rate every five
minutes and continuously access diver status.
9.4.2.4.12 Assist the diver out of the water and through the dress down phase.
9.4.2.5 Profiler. The profiler, also the standby diver tender, is to record the progress of
the search by keeping a sketch map showing exactly where the divers have been and what
areas have been covered. Without documenting the divers profile, there is no way for the
TL to know whether a diver has missed an area or not.
9.4.2.6 Standby Diver. In addition to primary diver duties, a standby diver must be ready
to replace the primary diver if he is unable to execute his tasks and be ready to render
assistance if the primary diver runs into any trouble. The standby diver is also the next in
line in the normal rotation of divers. The standby diver monitors the progress of the search
as reported by the tenders. He is constantly alert to any circumstance that might demand
his participation. A standby diver at the incident site should do the following:
9.4.2.6.1 Have all gear, except for primary regulator or FFM in place.
9.4.2.6.2 Have the contingency line in place and ready for attachment.
9.4.2.6.3 Be properly weighted to prevent any problems with descent.
9.4.2.6.4 Be mentally prepared to deploy at any moment.
9.4.2.6.5 Be fully capable of performing well-rehearsed and tested contingency plans.
9.4.2.7 Ninety Percent Diver. Because of the complexities of diving, it is possible that
the standby diver may experience a problem when deployed. Likely problems range from
equipment problems to an inability to equalize. A second standby diver is identified and
available with his exposure suit on and with his gear fully checked and functioning. If the
standby diver is called on to make a dive, the 90 percent diver completes the dressing
process so that the diver is ready to enter the water. Because a 90 percent diver replaces
the standby, a tender is not required. The standby tender operates in conjunction with
whichever diver makes the dive.
9.4.2.8 Buddy Diver. When conditions dictate that buddy diving techniques are
adequate, a buddy diver is the divers partner for the operation. The buddy divers are
jointly responsible for the assigned mission. Each diver keeps track of depth and time
during the dive. Each diver shall watch out for the safety and well being of his buddy and
shall be alert for symptoms of nitrogen narcosis, decompression sickness, and carbon
dioxide build-up. A diver shall keep his buddy within sight and not leave his buddy alone

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except to obtain additional assistance in an emergency. If visibility is limited, a buddy line
shall be used to maintain contact and communication. If scuba divers get separated and
cannot locate each other, both divers shall surface immediately.
9.4.2.9 Cross-Training and Substitution. Each member of the diving team should be
qualified to act in any position on the team. Because it is probable that substitutions will
be made at some point during a lengthy operation, dive plans and diving schedules should
organize personnel and work objectives so that experienced personnel will always be
available on site. All personnel who participate in the operation should be included in
initial briefings.
9.4.2.10 Other Considerations. When employing four-man recovery teams, there is a
primary tender and diver, and a standby diver and tender. The standby tender fully dresses
as a standby diver. This technique requires multiple dive supervisor qualified personnel,
frequent and intense training, and a higher degree of physical fitness on the part of the
backup tenders/profilers/90 percent-ready diver position.

9.4.3 Communication and Line Signals. Divers conducting tethered underwater search,
rescue and recovery operations have two means of communicating with the surface depending
on the type of equipment used and available. Voice communications and line pull signals can
be utilized. While on the surface, tenders and divers can communicate using hand signals.
9.4.3.1 Voice Communications. The dive team makes every attempt to communicate
with each other with the same terminology by using standard phases. The following
terminology in Table 9.3, Diver-To-Tender Voice Communications. is considered standard
and employed whenever possible. All persons using the intercom system should lower the
pitch of their voices and speak slowly and distinctly. The conversation should be kept brief
and simple, using standard diving terminology. Divers repeat verbatim all directions and
orders received from topside.
Table 9.3 Diver-To-Tender Voice Communications.
Voice Communication

Meaning

DIVER LEAVING THE SURFACE

The diver alerts the dive supervisor to start timing


the dive.

ROGER

Used by either the diver or surface team to signify


they have understood the other team members
message.

DIVER ON THE BOTTOM

Message from the diver to the surface team to


notify them that the diver is on the bottom.

ON THE SURFACE

Message from the diver to tender upon reaching


the surface.

9.4.3.2 Surface Signals. While in the water, divers should take care not to communicate
verbally unless they are utilizing a communications system. If the tender wants the diver
to move to a specific location, the tender should point in the desired direction.

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9.4.3.3 Line Signals. A line pull signal consists of one pull or a series of sharp, distinct
pulls on the tether that are strong enough to be felt by the diver. All slack must be taken
out of the tether before the signal is given. The line pull signal code has been established
through many years of experience. Standard signals are applicable to all diving operations;
special signals may be arranged between the divers and diving supervisor to meet
particular mission requirements. Most signals are acknowledged as soon as they are
received. The diver should stop to face the line to orient himself towards the starting point
every time he receives line signals. This also gives the opportunity for the diver to move
backward and take up any slack in the tether. This acknowledgment consists of replying
with the same signal. If a signal is not properly returned by the diver, the surface signal is
sent again. A continued absence of confirmation is assumed to mean one of three things:
(1) the line has become fouled, (2) there is too much slack in the line, or (3) the diver is in
trouble.
NOTE: If communications are lost, the dive supervisor must be notified immediately and steps
taken to identify the problem. The situation is treated as an emergency.
9.4.3.3.1 Tender-To-Diver Signals. (See Table 9.4, Tender-To-Diver Line Pull
Signals.)
Table 9.4 Tender-To-Diver Line Pull Signals.
Number of Pulls

Tender-to-Diver Communication

1 Pull

STOP, FACE THE LINE, TAKE UP THE SLACK, AND PREPARE


FOR A NEW SIGNAL.

3 Pulls

GO TO THE TENDERS LEFT, DIVERS RIGHT.

4 Pulls

GO TO THE TENDERS RIGHT, DIVERS LEFT.

2 plus 2 Pulls

SEARCH THE IMMEDIATE AREA.

3 plus 3 Pulls

STAND BY AND PREPARE TO LEAVE THE BOTTOM.

4 plus 4 Pulls

SURFACE.

9.4.3.3.2 Diver-To-Tender Signals. (See Table 9.5, Diver-To-Tender Line Pull


Signals.)
Table 9.5 Diver-To-Tender Line Pull Signals.
Number of Pulls

Diver-to-Tender Communication

1 Pull

IM OK.

2 Pulls

TENDER, MAKE A NOTATION.

6 plus 6 Pulls

I FOUND THE OBJECTIVE.

2 plus 2 plus 2 Pulls

IM OKAY, BUT IM TANGLED. ALERT THE BACK-UP DIVER.

3 plus 3 plus 3 Pulls

IM OKAY, BUT I NEED HELP FROM THE STAND-BY DIVER.

4 plus 4 plus 4 Pulls

I NEED HELP IMMEDIATELY.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


9.4.3.4 Underwater Contingency Signals. The primary diver and standby diver must
establish an underwater communication method. This ensures the standby diver can
communicate once reaching the troubled primary diver. Having a rehearsed plan to follow
will help lower diver anxiety and lower complexity of the problem. After signaling for the
standby diver, the primary diver should stop and put one hand on the harness carabineer,
relax, concentrate, and slow breathing. The primary diver will be able to feel the standby
diver coming down the tether and should be confident that help is imminent. On arrival at
the bottom, the standby will know where to find the primary divers hand since it is located
on the carabineer. The two divers then clasp hands so that the primary can indicate to the
standby exactly what is wrong. The divers use one or more of the following hand signals
to communicate their needs.
9.4.3.4.1 Tapping the standby divers hand to the primary divers second stage
indicates, Im already on my EGS and I need more air. Air is the number one
priority for any underwater emergency. If the primary divers main tank is exhausted
the signal is given immediately. Once the standby diver receives, the signal the
standby diver places the primary divers hand on the first stage of the new pony bottle.
The primary diver removes the EGS bottle from the standby diver and inserts the
mouthpiece.
9.4.3.4.2 The standby diver placing the primary divers hand on the carabineer and
giving three squeezes meaning, Im leaving, but Im coming right back. This signal
should immediately follow the standby diver giving the primary diver his pony bottle.
Air is still the immediate concern so the standby diver needs to retrieve the
contingency bottle and another EGS bottle. In returning to the primary diver, the
standby diver should connect the contingency tank to the tether line so that it will not
become lost and handle the weight of the tank during descent.
9.4.3.4.3 The primary diver indicates, This is where my entanglement is by making
a large circular motion with the standby divers hand and then placing his hand on
where the entanglement is. Locating it for the standby also avoids him getting
entangled in the hazard.
9.4.3.4.4 Tapping the standby divers hand on the primary divers chest is used in the
event the primary diver is injured and needs to indicate Im hurt. After tapping the
chest the primary diver guides the standby divers hand to the injured area. The
standby diver must move slowly and gently to prevent further injury.

9.4.4 Search Operations. One of the GUARDIAN ANGEL recovery team tasks is to locate
and recover objects underwater. There are several well established and proven search methods
to choose from, depending on the location, depth, water condition, and size of the object.
Techniques and patterns that may work well for finding a weapon lost in a water employment
may not be suited to finding a victim in a fast flowing irrigation canal. Recovery teams do not
have the luxury of planning where and when they will operationally dive. The team needs to
pre-plan for the types of operations they are expected to perform.
9.4.4.1 Rescue Versus Recovery. Time will be the determining factor for whether to treat
the incident as a rescue or a recovery. The rescue mode should be maintained for a given
length of time after the incident occurred, usually from 60 to 90 minutes. Beyond that time

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

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period, it would be impossible to make a successful rescue of a drowning victim. For the
period after, the team will stop and evaluate whether to continue in rescue or recovery
mode.
9.4.4.2 Gathering Information. The team should interview witnesses to gain
information at the incident site and assign another diver to do additional research if the
situation does not seem credible. Many would-be victims are discovered at other locations
alive and well if no one actually observed them go under the water. This is a serious
consideration prior to the committing of limited GUARDIAN ANGEL resources.
9.4.4.2.1 Interviewing Witnesses. The manner in which witness interviewing is
approached can make the difference between minutes and hours when conducting an
underwater search. Every witness is a potential resource and the team leader should
establish control and an objective attitude of the situation. Compassion must be
carefully balanced with firm authority when dealing with emotionally charged
witnesses. It is essential for the team leader to record notes during the interview. The
team leader should be in a physical location where he can see as many of the witnesses
as possible and the surrounding land. It will assist the team leader in putting together
the pieces of the incident. Consider separating the witnesses to obtain individual
accounts so others do not influence their accounts.
9.4.4.2.2 Establishing the Last Seen Point. When asking a witness to point to the
last seen point (LSP), the first step is to take the witness to the exact spot where they
were at the time of the accident. The team can establish the LSP with a reference
object by the following:
9.4.4.2.2.1 The team leader assigns team members to individual witnesses. If
there are many witnesses and the operation is in rescue mode, then the team may
want to concentrate initially on key witnesses that are able to communicate quickly
and effectively. The team member conducting the interview takes the witness back
to the exact location where he or she was at the time of the accident. A reference
object, similar to the size and shape of the search object, is placed in the water. The
team member conducting the interview asks the witness to direct the object to the
LSP.
9.4.4.3 Search Area Determination. Team members must be familiar with not only the
LSP of the victim or object but where it now located is. The following considerations will
assist team members in determining the search area.
9.4.4.3.1 Wind and Current Effects. Wind will not affect a victim or any other
object on the bottom. If the victim struggles on the surface or the object takes awhile
to sink, it will certainly have an affect. The wind will move an object in direct
proportion to both its strength and the surface area of the object above water. Water
currents will move an object. At the surface, the object will be carried at the same
speed and in the same direction as the current. If the wind and the water are flowing
together, the submergence point is a matter of adding the distances together. If the
current and wind are moving in different directions, the position is calculated by
trigonometry. A calculator with a trigonometric function is useful in this calculation.
(See Figure 9.35, Current Effects.)

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 9.35 Current Effects.

Current Effects
Point of Emergence

Current = 200 ft/min


The location of a body can

be established based on the


Point of Submergence, strength
of the current, and the water depth.
Depth = 40 feet
2 ft/sec to 40 ft = 20 sec

67 feet

UNCLASSIFIED
9.4.4.3.2 Sink Rates. A human body will sink at a rate of about 1.5 feet per second in
salt water and 2 to 2.5 feet per second in freshwater. Variations will result because of
muscle-to-fat ratios, body composition, and clothing. Because of these variables,
SMEs estimate that bodies will sink at a rate of 2 feet per second in any environment.
Except in shallow water or in the presence of extremely fast currents, once a body
lands on the bottom, it will not move until it has putrefied enough to gain buoyancy
from the gases produced within. Once the body has enough buoyancy, it may only
float partially. It may drift and scrape along the bottom for some time before finally
rising to the surface. If a body sinks in water in which there is little or no current, it
will be on the bottom within an imaginary circle, the radius of which is equal to the
depth. (See Figure 9.36, Body Sinking in Water.)

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9-83

Figure 9.36 Body Sinking in Water.

Body Sinking in Water


Point of Submergence

When a body sinks in still water,it will normally


touch bottom within an imaginary circle, the
radius of which is equal to the depth.

UNCLASSIFIED
9.4.4.3.3 Grids. The first step in narrowing a search area is to eliminate areas of
impossibility or lesser likelihood. On a large scale map divide the body of water into a
grid. Based on information collected, observed currents designate areas upstream of
the submergence point and those that are too far or too near. Once the team has
outlined the overall search zone on the map, place outer perimeter buoys in the water
according to the grid. Place the buoys 50 to 75 feet apart to designate the box. Divers
will search in patterns within this boundary using these buoys as guidelines. When
divers complete the search in that area, additional buoys are dropped within the box to
section off each area. Emplacing the buoys after the search is conducted prevents
divers from becoming snagged during the search.
9.4.4.4 Search Pattern Considerations. Once the dive supervisor determines the search
area, the supervisor determines which pattern to employ. The decision is based on many
factors, such as the size of the area to be searched, the area from which the team is
working, available resources, current, depth, search objective, bottom contour, and
obstacles.
9.4.4.4.1 Tether Considerations and Length. When conducting tethered diver
searches, the primary diver should make every effort to work toward shore during the
conduct of the search. This provides a psychological benefit to the primary diver of
working back home as cold and fatigue set in as a result of the search effort. The
primary diver is sent out along the surface until reaching the descent point. The dive
supervisor needs to consider the arc involved with diving tether lines. The deeper the

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


water being searched, the farther out the primary diver needs to travel out before
descent. For example, a primary diver who is tasked to begin the search 50 feet out and
20 feet deep will require 54 feet on line. Consider that the standing tender may be
standing 2 feet or more above the waterline and if the tender is standing on a platform
its height needs to be considered as well. (See Table 9.6, Tether Length Table.) Diver
tether lengths greater than 125 feet do not relay line pull signals as well; increase drag
resulting in irregular patterns, increases the tenders difficulty in monitoring the diver,
and increases standby diver response time in the event of an emergency. If distances
greater than 150 feet from shore are required, the dive supervisor should switch to a
boat-based operation.

Table 9.6 Tether Length Table.


Depth in

Surface Distance in Feet

Feet

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110

120

130

140

10

14

22

32

41

51

61

71

81

91

100

111

121

131

141

20

22

28

36

45

54

63

73

82

92

102

112

122

132

142

30

32

36

42

50

58

67

76

85

95

104

114

124

133

143

40

41

45

50

57

64

72

81

89

98

108

117

127

136

146

50

51

54

58

64

71

78

86

94

103 112

121

130

139

60

61

63

67

72

78

85

92

100 108 117

125

134

143

70

71

73

76

81

86

92

99

106 114 122

130

140

143

80

81

82

85

89

94

100 106 113 120 123

136

144

150

OVERALL NOTE:
* If the tender is standing on a platform, then the height of the platform needs to be added to the
depth.
9.4.4.4.2 Descent. In limited visibility, divers should always descend feet first to
protect their head from hidden obstacles, prevent sinus squeeze, and facilitate the
valsalva maneuver.
9.4.4.4.3 Searching the Bottom. Using the body, the tethered diver searches at a 45
degree angle to the tether, with the divers head away from the tender. This position
allows keeping the line taut, provides easy access to the tether for signal response and
allows the tender in no-visibility conditions to use the whole body in the search. Dive
supervisors should limit divers to a 20-minute bottom time because of the mental
fatigue, hypothermia, or other distractions.
9.4.4.4.4 No-Visibility Search. Psychologically searching in no-visibility can lead to
fixation of the diver attempting to see anything. This leads to the diver missing or
misidentifying the object of the search. Divers should close their eyes and concentrate
on feel. A diver searching in no-visibility conditions must use the entire body to
conduct a search, visualizing what is felt with the fingertips, arms, torso, legs, and toes.

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9-85

The technique by which a diver uses his hands is critical. The divers hands should not
grope randomly. Divers should have their own individual search pattern to be used for
every dive. Divers start with their hands in front of them palm down and sweep them
out to each side and bring them together again. They then move them forward one
hand-length and repeat the sweep. Searching utilizing this technique ensures that no
area along the divers path is missed.
9.4.4.4.5 Clearwater Search. When searching in water with good visibility, the
primary diver should not crawl along the bottom but utilize buoyancy skills to swim
over observing the bottom, scanning visually side to side, looking for the search
objective.
9.4.4.4.6 Obstacles. In the event that the diver encounters a large obstacle in the
search path (e.g., old car, submerged trees, or rocks) to maintain the search pattern, the
diver must go up and over the object. Going up and over the obstacle will increase the
risk of entanglement in limited visibility water. The area should be then divided so that
the diver can search one side of the object and then the other. If snags remain an issue,
the team may want to consider a boat-based operation, allowing an increase in the
angle of the tending line.
9.4.4.4.7 Discovery. The discovery of the search objective underwater can lead to
excitement of the diver. The diver waits for breathing to come under control before
giving the Found object line signal or employing a small marker buoy, if conducting
the search untethered. If the object of the search is a victim, the tender will discreetly
notify the dive supervisor of the find. This gives the team leader the opportunity to
remove family members, spectators and the media from the general area. Once the
incident site is secure, the tender gives the Ascend slowly signal to the diver, giving
clearance to surface with the victim. If the diver needs assistance, the diver signals
Okay, but I need help from the standby diver after the Found object signal is
acknowledged. If the objective is a piece of evidence and needs to be documented, it
should be marked with a buoy, noted on the profile map, and left in place. If the team
is operating in recovery mode, the victim will be bagged underwater, especially if
badly decomposed. Lift bags relieve the diver of having to handle the body bag all the
way to the surface.
9.4.4.4.8 Re-Searches. Divers and tenders should be constantly alert to anything
that might cause them to miss the object of their search. Divers should signal tenders
to make note of objects on the bottom, such as weeds, trees, vehicles, debris, or
anything else that may mandate searching the area again. If the diver is not holding a
good pattern, the diver should be recalled before the entire span of time is wasted. If
the search is thorough and the object not found, the object is not underwater, the team
is searching the wrong location, or the scope of the search was not wide enough. Team
members can expand the area of operations with the first approach being to move in
increments of about 20 feet farther out than the initial sweep of the last search.
Another approach is to begin searching outward from the boundaries of the original
search. An area should be re-searched if any of the following conditions apply:

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A diver shows frequent slack in the tether line.
A divers breathing rate was too high, indicating that the diver may have been
distracted or stressed, and therefore not focused on the search.
Divers missed test items that were placed in the search area. These items should
be of equal or lesser size than the search object, thus indicating whether the divers
are searching thoroughly.
The angle of the tether line shows that a diver has come off the bottom during a
low- or no-visibility search.
A diver has covered too many linear feet. If moving too quickly, the diver may
not only be searching too fast but may have also totally missed an area along the
way.
A tender is unable to follow correct tending procedures, allowing the diver to
take out line, bringing the diver in too quickly, or not using the correct turn-around
points.
9.4.4.4.9 Rule of Thirds. In limited to no-visibility, divers use the Rule of Thirds
meaning they are halfway through their dive when their tank reaches two-thirds of
their starting pressure; they should be out of the water at one-third. Utilizing this
technique gives the diver a reserve of air in the event the diver becomes entangled
when attempting to surface or finding the object on the last sweep.
9.4.4.4.10 Ascent. Tethered divers should ascend prior to being pulled in by their
tenders. This will allow the diver to control the ascent. If the diver needs to be pulled
by the tender at depth, the tender should not pull no faster than 1 foot every 2 seconds.
Ascents in no-visibility can be difficult. The diver is oriented to the surface by the
divers search position on the bottom and the tether will lead to where boat or shore is.
The diver should hold the BC power inflator in the left hand, hold it straight out, and
place a finger or thumb over the dump button, not the inflator button. The divers
buoyancy should be neutral or slightly negative and the diver should slightly kick
toward the surface. The diver raises the right hand overhead to protect against any
obstacles. The diver should occasionally feel the angle of the tether line as the change
in angle will give some idea of the ascent rate. The diver will vent air from the BC and
dry suit as required to prevent a buoyant ascent.
9.4.4.5 Search Patterns. A designated area underwater can only be effectively searched
by a team that thoroughly understands the intent and proper execution of effective search
patterns. Search patterns can be conducted from shore with a tethered diver, with a dive
buddy pair, tow sleds, or even the use of compasses. However, the simplest method is
usually the most effective. An effective search pattern must have the following attributes:
Starts at a known point, covers a known area, and ends at a known point. This
results in the team finding the object or confirms that the object is not in the specified
area.
Allow for clear communication between the diver and surface through line pull
signals or underwater communications for direction and assistance.

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Is adaptable to various environments.


Should not require sophisticated, heavy or expensive equipment.
Provides the ability to mark the location of located objects.
Can be adapted to finding objects of various sizes.
Is simple enough that the dynamics of the pattern can be explained to the least
experienced team member.
Does not require great amounts of manpower.
Can be run from shore or boat.
9.4.4.5.1 Shore-Based Patterns. The most practical arrangement of search patterns
involves a relationship between the tender and a single tethered diver. The following
searches are shore-based and extremely simple to effectively conduct.
9.4.4.5.1.1 Arc Search. One of the simplest, most effective and most frequently
used patterns is the arc search. The tender remains in one spot as the diver sweeps
back and forth at the end of a taut tether, gradually toward the shore. At the end of
each pass, the tether pulls in an appropriate amount of line, from 2 to 5 feet,
depending on the parameters of the search. To ensure that the diver stays within
the boundaries of the search area, the tender should pick a landmark on each side of
the pattern. Arc searches allow for a rapid search of the bottom and works well in
a lot of environments. This technique is not ideal for areas with copious amounts
of weeds due to the line constantly getting caught. This will cause the diver to lose
the pattern and the weight of the weeds will be a safety issue. (See Figure 9.37,
Arc Search.)
9.4.4.5.1.2 Windshield Wiper Search. For a fast search of a wide area, two arc
searches can be combined to create a windshield wiper pattern in which the two
primary divers search partially overlapping areas, moving back and forth in unison.
Tenders should generally stand out as far as the primary divers employ. For
example, if the diver employs out 50 feet, they should stand 50 feet apart. A steep
bottom or other restrictions might narrow the search arcs and cause the tenders to
close their distance. Keeping the primary divers at the same search pace is the job
of the tenders. If one diver is seen to be getting ahead of the other, the signal can
be sent from the tender to diver for him to stop until the slower diver catches up. It
is recommended that when diving multiple primary divers that each one has his
own standby diver. In the event one of the primary divers experience an
emergency, the other divers are stopped and if required, slowly brought into shore.
9.4.4.5.1.3 Walking Shoreline Search. This search requires a long straight shore,
dock, pier, or other area for the tender to walk along. The tender moves along with
the primary diver, creating parallel, straight-line passes along the bottom. When
executed properly, the tender paces the diver as closely as possible ensuring that he
remains perpendicular to the shore at all times. This is one of the most efficient and
through patterns in use. Its advantages include being a simple rectangular pattern
that is easy to follow and profile. (See Figure 9.38, Walking Shoreline Search.)

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 9.37 Arc Search.

Arc Search

Reference
Point Line

Reference
Point Line

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 9.38 Walking Shoreline Search.

Turnaround

UNCLASSIFIED

Turnaround

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

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9.4.4.5.1.4 Double Walking Shoreline Search. Shoreline searches can be set up


with two divers who search at a distance from each other. It is recommended that
one diver works twice as far out as the near-shore diver to prevent their lines from
tangling. The tenders walk separate, parallel paths and one ducks under the others
line as they pass. The divers do not need to work in unison.
9.4.4.5.1.5 Snag Method. When a large object is being sought; i.e. vehicle, in
clear water and a large area in need of being searched, the snag method may be
utilized when using either an arc or walking pattern. This allows a substantial
distance to be covered with each pass. When the object is snagged by the line, the
diver simply swims to it and marks it with a buoy.
9.4.4.5.1.6 Frame Search. Searching for extremely small objects can be tedious
and difficult. Even with a tender, a primary diver may experience difficulty
ensuring he has searched every inch of the bottom. Construct a square frame of
plastic to use as a small template for a concentrated search. During construction,
ensure it is weighted so that it remains on the bottom. The primary diver places the
frame down at the beginning of the first sweep then searches with detail within its
confines, under the frame and within a hands width around the outer edge. If the
search needs to be meticulous, utilize a sieve in combination with the frame. When
the primary diver is finished with that area, he lifts up the side closest to him,
leaving the opposite side on the bottom; flip the frame over so that it covers a new
area adjacent to the area just searched. At the end of a sweep, flip the frame
laterally. This search works best in conjunction with at shoreline-walk pattern as
they both cover a rectangular area. When the primary divers bottom time has been
reached and the search passed to another diver, the primary simply leaves the frame
in place on the bottom. Both divers are utilizing tethers so it simple for the
replacement to locate the current diver and resume the search.
9.4.4.5.1.7 Free Search. This search is not recommended for low visibility water
due to search deficiencies and for dealing with diver contingencies. Free search
requires reliance on the buddy system for safety. In the event of separation in
limited visibility and the diver has an emergency, there is no effective means of
notification and locating him immediately. Some considerations for employing
this search are when in an extremely restricted area choked by trees and other
debris where the diver would be continuously hindered by having a tether and in
very fast water. When working in currents of more than 3 knots, the diver deploys,
drifts across the bottom, and is retrieved after surfacing by the rest of the team. The
diver is then taken upstream to begin again. Fast-water drift searching requires
detailed tracking of the divers movement if the risks of diver loss or injury are to
be mitigated.
9.4.4.5.1.8 Walking Search. If the water is clean and shallow the team may opt to
conduct a walking search in lieu of scuba operations. The team walks in search
patterns, literally in an attempt to stumble over the search objective. This method
is not suitable for searching for small items but it can be quite effective when
searching for a body sized object.

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9.4.4.5.2 Boat-Based Patterns. Searching an area on the bottom from a small boat
requires precise positioning and movement allowing the team to cover areas that barely
overlap. If the boat moves even a few feet there will be a gap in the search pattern. In
minimal wind and current conditions, a boat can still move. If a boat moored by one
anchor line, it will swing by the movement of the diver. If the boat swings back and
forth, the anchor will pivot resulting in the boat possibly drifting.
9.4.4.5.2.1 Hurricane Anchoring System. Team members should utilize a
three-point hurricane anchoring system. This technique utilizes two anchors
secured to the bow and one off to one side of the stern. Three anchors set this way
will prevent the boat from moving, even with a current or wind. (See Figure 9.39,
Hurricane Anchoring System.) To configure the anchors this way:

Figure 9.39 Hurricane Anchoring System.

Hurricane Anchoring System


d

in

Anchor

io

ct

re

Di

Anchor

Buoy on anchor line

Buoy

Area of
Search

Anchor

UNCLASSIFIED
9.4.4.5.2.1.1 Maneuver the boat past the first point where you wish to begin
searching and deploy a buoy at that point. The buoy only marks the position
where the boat will be. It will be recovered once the boat has been properly
anchored.
9.4.4.5.2.1.2 Position the boat so that the wind or the current, whichever is
stronger, is at a 45 degree angle to the bow and you are reapproaching the buoy
from the downwind or down current side. Before passing the buoy, drop the
stern anchor, placing it on the same side of the boat as the buoy. To avoid
tangling the line, anchors should always be lowered.

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9.4.4.5.2.1.3 Continue moving past the buoy, paying out stern anchor line as
you go. Once past the buoy, drop a bow anchor on the same side as the stern
anchor so that the bow anchor is directly into the wind or current.
9.4.4.5.2.1.4 Move the boat laterally, away from the stern anchor, to deploy
the second bow anchor.
9.4.4.5.2.1.5 Taking in and paying out line as necessary, set the boat at the
focus of these anchors. There should be an anchor 45 to 90 degrees off both
sides of the bow and one off the stern. The engine should not be turned off until
the boat is anchored securely.
9.4.4.5.2.1.6 To ensure that an anchor will hold, the anchor line played out
should ideally be seven times the depth of the water.
9.4.4.5.2.1.7 When the team has searched all of the area possible, change
position by hauling in and giving out line as necessary. When the team has
exhausted the search range of these buoys, have another boat deploy a fourth
anchor and bring the end of the line. This anchor will replace one of the
original three. The remaining anchors are reset and the team continues the
process of taking in and giving out line to move around the new, adjoining
search area.
9.4.4.5.2.2 Running Line Search. This tethered search is useful in areas of heavy
grass, debris or strong currents. The diver searches straight out from shore or from
a boat to the extent of the determined search area. If the water is moving, the diver
deploys with the current. Once the diver reaches the end of the first sweep, he
surfaces, then he and the tender move as a unit anywhere from two to five feet to
one side, depending on the parameters of the search. The diver then searches
toward the tender and the process repeats itself. This technique affords a
reasonable degree of control while reducing somewhat the problem of snagging
weeds. If the problem is debris, the diver will be able to crawl over it and untangle
himself on his return, minimizing the areas that he misses. Deploying with and
returning against the current means that the diver will not be pushed off his search
pattern. (See Figure 9.40, Running Line Search.)
9.4.4.5.2.3 Direct Overhead Search. This tethered search is used in areas of
exceptionally heavy weeds or debris. For this pattern, the diver descends straight
below the tender, who is on a platform, and searches the immediate area. The diver
is then raised above the weeds and lowered again a foot or two to one side. Tenders
should ensure that they do not pull up the divers too quickly. The repetitive up and
down motion greatly increases the risk of barotraumas and pulmonary
overexpansion injuries. (See Figure 9.41, Direct Overhead Search.)

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Figure 9.40 Running Line Search.

Current

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 9.41 Direct Overhead Search.

Direct Overhead Search

UNCLASSIFIED

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9.4.4.5.2.4 Jack-Stand Search. This search is utilized for bottoms that are nearly
flat and for searching for very small items. It is intended for a methodical search,
rather than one covering a large area in a short time. This technique can be utilized
with a single diver who is tethered back to the surface, or it can be used with two
divers and no tether. It can also be used perpendicular to a light current (1/4 or 1/2
knot) or parallel to a current of up to one knot. Configure one running line on the
bottom weighted with 15 to 25 pounds at each end and no more than 125 feet in
length. A vertical line to the surface, carrying a float of at least 10 pounds
buoyancy is attached at each weight. The diver or dive pair descends to one end of
the weighted running line. On reaching the other end, after searching in detail
along its length, the diver moves the weight 2.5 to 3 feet, or as visibility and the
size of the object in question dictate. When operating in a current, the line should
be moved upstream. This allows silt to pass and not settle on the search area. (See
Figure 9.42, Jack-Stand Search and Figure 9.43, Jack-Stand Search Kit.)
9.4.4.5.2.4.1 Jack-Stand Search Disadvantages. This search works poorly
with a tethered diver system because the diver is easily entangled in the
attendant lines. In less than clear water conditions, the employment of a dive
pair will decrease the efficiency and effectiveness of the search. Divers
conducting this search typically keep one hand on the running line, limiting
their search capability. The running line on the bottom may become snagged
on debris when the diver moves the weight forward. If a diver discovers such a
snag while searching along the line, the diver will have to unsnag the line, pull
it taut, and re-search the area. The weights that anchor the ends of the line must
be heavy enough that a diver can pull against them to tighten the line.
9.4.4.5.2.5 Circle Search. The primary diver following this technique executes a
circular pattern over the bottom while tethered to a central point. A second diver
can sit at the hub to let out line as required or the tether can be rigged through a
weighted swivel, with the line run up to a tender aboard a boat. Another method is
to use a MacKin pivot which is a weighted unit with a free-moving spool, allowing
a diver to make unimpeded circles around it. In this case, the diver lets out his own
tether line from a spool attached to his harness. Whenever a MacKin pivot is used,
it should have a buoy line to the surface, indicating the center of the search pattern
and also to act as a signal line. If a diver is controlling his own search, he must
place a marker on the bottom so that each time around he will know when to extend
the search. If there is no tether line back to the surface, an additional diver needs to
be in the water. The buddy should remain at the hub where can monitor and send
line signals. Circle searches have their disadvantages to include entanglement risk
and not being tender directed. Conducting multiple searches utilizing this pattern
may leave large areas unsearched unless the circles are well overlapped. (See
Figure 9.44, Circle Search.)

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Figure 9.42 Jack-Stand Search.

Jack-Stand Search

Odd numbers depict


diver buddy team movement

11

Even numbers depict


weighted line movement
9
10

UNCLASSIFIED

5
6

Start
Point

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Figure 9.43 Jack-Stand Search Kit.

Jack-Stand Search Kit

UNCLASSIFIED

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Figure 9.44 Circle Search.

Circle Search

Descent
Line with
Surface Bouy
Diver
Buddy
Team

Start
Point

Makin
Pivot

Weighted
Reference
Line

UNCLASSIFIED
9.4.4.5.2.6 Sleds and Tow Bars. In clear water conditions, sleds and tow bars can
be used to search large areas quickly. The effectiveness of the search depends on
the coxswain of the tow boat, that must be able to follow close reciprocal courses
to maintain even, overlapping sweeps of the search area. Use of these devices
creates a tremendous amount of drag on the tow boat. The line must be rigged so
that it is centered on the stern or it may force the boat to veer off course. To ensure
that the tow boat follows a predictable course, buoy the lines of the search pattern
with floats about 50 feet apart. Place different colored buoys at the ends to signify
the turnaround point. The distance to the turnaround point is governed by the
length of the tow line. The diver trails a long way behind the tow boat and he will
not have searched an entire leg of the pattern until the boat is far past the end of the
leg. The diver lands on the bottom and waits for the tow line to go slack during the
turnaround. The tender at the stern of the boat will need to handle the lines to
ensure that they do not go slack and become caught in the propeller. Divers should
not be towed faster than 2.5 knots. Faster speeds increase diver heat loss, put too
much pressure on regulator diaphragms causing them to free-flow, and flood or rip
off a mask. Divers flying the sled or tow bar should maintain as high an altitude
above the bottom as visibility will allow. On finding the object of the search, the
diver lets go of the device, drops a buoy, and either recovers the object or signals
the tow boat. Hazards include the diver entering areas of low visibility, increased
cold stress, decompression sickness and pulmonary overexpansion injuries if the
diver makes ascents at to high a rate. Any ascents or descents should be made

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slowly enough for the diver to properly equalize. At the end of the search
operation, the diver never rides the sled to the surface; the diver releases the sled
and makes a normal ascent.
9.4.4.5.2.6.1 Sled and Tow Bar Communications. Attach small sections of
rubber hose or plastic pipe every few feet along the tow line. A secondary line
is run through them from the tender. That line can be utilized for line pull
signals or a hard-wired communications system. With line pull signals, new
signals will have to be pre-briefed for special commands.
WARNING: Divers should never be tethered to sleds or tow bars because of chance of
entanglement and strangulation.
9.4.4.5.2.7 Large Area Searches. A large area is searched by dividing it into
blocks. Each block should be football field sized a rectangle 300 feet long and 150
feet wide. Each block of an area to be searched can be marked with buoys. On the
long side of the block, place four buoys 100 feet apart, numbered 1 through 4.
Along the shorter side, where the team will start, place two buoys 75 feet apart.
Designate these as A and B. Start the boat at the buoyed end of the grid, along the
centerline. If enough team members are available, divers can work on both sides of
the boat simultaneously. Deploy the divers just beyond the edges of the block;
ensuring overlap with the adjoining block and have them work inward toward the
boat. Once the divers have covered these sections, move the boat 25 to 35 feet
farther down the centerline of the block and have them repeat the procedure until
the boat is even with buoy 2. A diver should then be deployed to search the area
that has been underneath the boat during the previous search patterns. The tender
should work the diver from the bow, sweeping the diver in a narrow path along the
centerline from buoy A to the boats present position. Repeat this procedure until
the entire block has been covered. (See Figure 9.45 and Figure 9.46 Large Area
Searches.)

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Figure 9.45 Large Area Search #1.

100 feet
1

75 feet

Search
Area

Search
Area

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 9.46 Large Area Search #2.

100 feet

75 feet

Centerline
Search Area

UNCLASSIFIED

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9.4.4.5.3 Moving Water. As the speed of water increases, the problems and
complexities of the search also increase. A current greater than 1.5 knots could pin a
diver against an obstacle and make an entanglement more difficult to manage. A 2.5
knot current can easily tear a divers mask off and depress the purge button on the
regulator second stage. Moving water will also affect tenders since they may be unable
to fight the drag of any current greater than 1.5 knots. A tender may not be able to
bring a diver back toward the platform or even be pulled overboard. Team leaders
need to be aware of these problems and make an intelligent ORM decision if the
current is to fast to warrant a dive. In rivers and canals downstream safety control
measures will need to be in place before divers are committed to the water. Consider
that some rivers and canals cannot be searched until flood conditions subside. Other
hazards for diving in rivers and canals include:
Strong currents that may carry away a diver.
Surface and submerged debris being washed down river that could become an
entanglement hazard.
Extremely low visibility.
Increased heat loss for divers in moving water.
Increased fatigue working in moving water.
Entanglement in submerged roots and trees.
Unsuitable entry and exit points.
Insecure footing for surface personnel.
Biological or chemical contamination from up river.
9.4.4.5.3.1 Moving Water Search Planning. Victims can get hung-up on
submerged stumps, roots, branches, lines, rock crevices, and weeds. The team may
chose to dive some of the more obvious features before conducting a bottom
search. Diving for an object will still require a systematic search pattern because
they are less affected by the current. In planning an underwater search in a river
and canal, consider several important things:
Where the object or victim entered the water?
When and where if the object was observed floating downstream?
Would the object sink and remain in place?
Would the object be carried downstream by the current?
Are there any natural traps that may hold the object?
9.4.4.5.3.2 Static-Line Platform Search. Team members construct a Telfer lower
in which a line is anchored from one shore to the other and rigged so the platform
can be maneuvered upstream, downstream, left, and right of the search area. If
only one shore is accessible or if the distance between shores is more than 200 feet,
anchor the platform with the hurricane anchoring system. Once the platform has

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been established, the divers let out enough tether line so that they will not be pulled
up from the bottom by the current. Generally, the shallower the water, the farther
out the diver must be to avoid being ripped off the bottom. Divers will have to add
4 to 5 pounds of weight to their weight belts to help them stay submerged in a
strong current. Once they are on the bottom and have searched the immediate area,
the tender signals the diver and the entire platform is pulled right or left. The diver
again searches the immediate area. Once the span of the search area is been
covered, the platform is lowered 2 to 3 feet downstream and the process repeated.
Advantages of this system are that the diver is always at a fixed distance from the
platform and does not have to fight the current. Problems with this technique are
that the bottom must be free of debris since the shallow angle of the tether line will
increase the chance for entanglement. If the standby diver is deployed down the
tether, the standyby may be pushed into the primary diver. (See Figure 9.47,
Static-Line Platform Search.)
9.4.4.5.3.3 Straight Line Pattern. This pattern is used to search small inlets or
channels where the distance covered is commensurate with the length of the search
line. For effective use of this pattern, there can be no noticeable current or the line
must be laid to run according to the current run. The procedures are the same
except that the lines are angled slightly to take advantage of the slight current.
There are two ways to work the pattern.
9.4.4.5.3.3.1 Attach an anchor point on either shore, keeping the line taut.
Using one diver one ach side of the line, they search the width of the channel.
Move the shoreline points down the number of feet commensurate with the
visibility and repeat the process.
9.4.4.5.3.3.2 Attach the search line at the shore on one end and the other end
at the bottom, allowing it to run with the current if necessary, and work the
pattern as above. In order to keep the pattern intact, small weights are
sometimes necessary to be placed along the search line. This is especially true
when working on an irregular bottom.
9.4.4.5.4 Surf Considerations. One of the most physically strenuous environments
that a recovery team may have to conduct underwater search, rescue and recovery
operations is when the victim or object to be recovered is believed to be in the surf
zone. It is imperative that the dive supervisor and team members assess their
capabilities prior to the operation and take into consideration the surf conditions. In
many cases, the recovery is necessitated during a period of large surf in which a victim
panicked.
9.4.4.5.4.1 Scuba Equipment Surf Considerations. In general, equipment for a
surf zone dive should be modified to allow for the most streamlined, minimal
amount of gear while maintaining appropriate safety systems. The diver will want
to be able to make himself slightly negative buoyant so that the diver can get under
the waves and have more stability in the strong bottom surge. Care must always be
exercised to keep regulators, inflators and other moving parts free of sand. Take
the minimum amount of equipment necessary to mark or recover the victim or

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object. Small marker buoys are compact and convenient although the weight is
insufficient to hold in any surf and may require securing to the object or victim.
Figure 9.47 Static-Line Platform Search.

Static-Line Platform Search

Right Tag
Line

Lin
Track

Lowe

ring

Line

g
t Ta
Lef ine
L

Current

UNCLASSIFIED
9.4.4.5.4.2 Surf Diving Techniques. It is important to recognize that even in
rather small surf; the diver cannot overpower the forces of the water. The diver
must be knowledgeable with surf technique and the water conditions, using the
conditions to his advantage for exit and entry. Observe surf conditions for at least

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10 to 15 minutes prior to attempting an entry. The diver should watch for the set
waves, noting the number of waves in the set and the period between sets. The
diver must observe the development of rip currents, both those that are continuous
and those that develop following the set waves. Note their relation to shore
markers since the diver will be looking to shore from outside the surf line. If the
diver intends on only entering and exiting through the surf, the dive should begin at
least neutral, and possibly slightly negative. It is best for the diver to make entry
and exit on snorkel with the divers head above water to observe the waves
approaching. Once the diver has attained a depth where he can swim, the diver
should move through the drop zone as quickly as possible, waiting for his buddy
to join outside of the drop zone. The only buddy assist within the drop zone should
be for a rescue. At all times that the diver is in the drop zone, the diver should
maintain one hand in contact with the mask or be ready to hold it quickly for
approaching waves. The diver should always dive under waves since the gear may
act as a sea anchor when riding up a large wave, slowing the diver down and
bringing the diver over the falls, likely leading to injury. In extreme surf
situations, if caught in the drop zone, the diver should dive under the wave to the
bottom, securely holding mask in place and crossing his feet to help prevent the
loss of a fin. There should be adequate air remaining in the scuba tank for any
emergent need on the return. In some circumstances it may be appropriate to
utilize the regulator to dive under large waves. Remember that the diver should
breathe shallowly and never hold the breath where he is in shallow water with large
overhead waves. In most cases, attempting to make an exit or entrance through
large waves entirely underwater will lead to confusion and possibly the need to
surface in the middle of incoming large waves.
9.4.4.5.4.3 Searching in the Surf Zone. In some cases, there may be a need to
conduct searches directly in the surf zone. These searches are difficult at best, and
in many cases completely futile. Since there have been some victims located in
in-shore holes in the past, these searches will remain an option. The most
effective search technique is to follow the currents as one would expect the victims
body to be taken. Rip currents will lead to relatively easy entries on scuba out past
the surf line. Return can be made on the bottom by compass reading and carefully
maintaining compass protocol. Each diver must have their own compass since
separation of buddies is most likely to occur. Any return on the bottom should not
be commenced until the last set wave has passed the divers, at which time, they
should immediately descend and begin on their compass heading.
9.4.4.5.4.4 These searches are not thorough and require multiple passes if there is
any hope of success. They can be extremely hard on both diver and equipment,
requiring careful consideration by each diver of their own exhaustion limits.

NOTE: Exhaustion in the surf line will most certainly lead to panic, lost gear and a rescue.
9.4.4.5.4.5 Recovering Victims in the Surf. If possible, secure a line and float to
a victim found in large surf, moving to shallow water or past the drop zone;
whichever is closer, as quickly as possible. In large surf, a diver will probably
loose his grip on a victim when the wave hits. Whenever feasible, victims should

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be removed from the water by boat outside the surf line to avoid additional trauma
to the body and privacy.
9.4.4.5.5 Night Operations. In general, underwater search and recovery operations
should be conducted during the hours of daylight. This is primarily to maintain the
safety and efficiency of the operation and to avoid the potential for confusion. There
are however, situations where conducting night diving operations may be unavoidable:
Anytime there is a realistic possibility for a rescue.
When critical objects or victims may be lost in moving water, changing tidal
conditions or consumption by marine life.
It has been determined that the object of the search may be subject to rapid
deterioration underwater (e.g., documents, paper products, or soluble narcotics).
Where an operation was initiated during the hours of day light and can be safely
and efficiently completed by continuing after dark.
In support of tactical operations conducted during the hours of darkness.
9.4.4.5.5.1 Night Search Hazards. Conducting operations during the period of
darkness carries the potential of hazards not normally encountered during the hours
of daylight:
Increased confusion.
Monitoring the progress of untethered divers.
Potential for equipment loss.
Difficulty in controlling surface boat traffic.
Increased psychological stress.
Possibility of missing the search object because of the lack of available light.
9.4.4.5.5.2 Night Equipment Considerations. Night diving operations require
additional equipment for both divers and support personnel.
9.4.4.5.5.2.1 Each diver should have a primary and back-up light with
sufficient intensity and battery life for the duration of the underwater search
9.4.4.5.5.2.2 Adequate chemlights to mark divers, underwater equipment,
search area, surface buoys, and underwater objects.
9.4.4.5.5.2.3

A buddy line is recommended between buddy pairs.

9.4.4.5.5.2.4 If the tactical situation permits, topside illumination for dive


support team members and diver entry and exit points.
9.4.5 Rescue Operations. A rescue mode underwater operation is run when there is a
chance to save a human life. In rescue mode, the team must make quick decisions, conduct
brief eyewitness interviews, and initiate the running of search patterns as other team members
pursue additional information. Rescue operations in this text can be an alert response to a
rescue incident or the rescue of another team member underwater.

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9.4.5.1 Diver Contingencies. During tethered diver operations, the designated standby
diver should be prepared to deal with emergencies involving the primary diver.
9.4.5.1.1 Entangled Diver. Diver entanglements are not uncommon and should be
considered an inconvenience to a well-trained team. Divers usually find themselves or
their buddies entangled by their tank valves, fin buckles, or dangling hoses and gauges.
Most divers will snag themselves and not realize they are entangled continuing to
swim not realizing they are entangled. Divers may realize they are entangled often
react with impatience resulting in further entanglement.
9.4.5.1.2 Self-Rescue in Entanglements. Divers realizing they are entangled should
stop, keep themselves in control and consider their options before acting. In
no-visibility situations the diver should conduct a through head to fin assessment of his
predicament and utilize his personal cutting tools to free himself from the situation. In
the event he is unable to free himself, he signals the standby diver using underwater
communications or line pull signals.
9.4.5.1.3 Standby Diver Assistance to Entangled Diver. The standby diver will
descend and utilize underwater contingency signals to determine the entangled divers
problem. In no-visibility conditions when the primary diver is unaware of where the
entanglement is, the standby diver conducts a head to fin assessment and utilizes
cutting tools to free the primary diver.
9.4.5.1.4 Entangled Tending Line. If the primary divers line is entangled the
standby diver will descend and clear both the line and ensure the diver is free. In the
event that the tending line is too entangled to clear, the standby diver will clip into the
divers harness with a contingency strap, cut the tender line and take the diver to the
surface.
9.4.5.1.5 Unconscious Diver. An unconscious, unresponsive diver underwater will
surely die if not brought immediately to the surface. Ensuring the diver can ventilate
to the surface is paramount. Pulmonary overexpansion injury is a hazard regardless of
the dives depth and duration.
9.4.5.1.5.1 The diver checks the unconscious diver for responsiveness.
9.4.5.1.5.2 The diver checks the unconscious divers mask. If the mask is full of
water, the diver removes it. If the mask is not full of water, the diver will leave it
on. The diver will check the divers regulator mouthpiece and if out, the diver
leaves it out. If the divers regulator mouthpiece is in, the diver holds it in during
ascent.
9.4.5.1.5.3 The diver taps the BC low-pressure inflator to determine if there is air
in the unconscious divers BC. Is so, the diver is prepared to control it through out
the ascent.
9.4.5.1.5.4 The diver drops the unconscious divers weight belt or other integrated
ballast. The diver is not concerned with ankle weights.
9.4.5.1.5.5 The diver raises the unconscious diver to the surface as quickly as he
can without risking decompression sickness. If necessary, the diver inflates the

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victims BC and escorts him/her to the surface at an appropriate ascent rate.


9.4.5.2 Submerged Vehicle. There is an increasing response to vehicle in the water
accidents among civilian public safety dive teams. Such operations require special
precautions and techniques for the dive team. A rapid scene evaluation must be made to
direct the divers to a good last seen point. In addition to information from eyewitnesses,
the team should look for tire tracks and possible debris from the wreckage on shore leading
to the water. Damage to natural and man-made structures, such as trees and guardrails, and
skid marks are often helpful clues to a vehicles location. Air bubbles, shortly after the
accident, or a gas or oil slick on the surface often are good markings of a vehicles location.
They are also an indicator that the vehicle has not been underwater for an extended period
of time. An evaluation of the accident scene and vehicle condition can be an indication of
the drivers condition. If the vehicle is submerged in a ditch or canal, the initial search may
be done by surface personnel probing with pike poles. Recommend positioning personnel
downstream to watch for floating victims, debris, or other evidence of the vehicle.
9.4.5.2.1 Tow Trucks. A tow truck can play an essential role in the recovery of an
in-water vehicle mishap. If incidents are expected, TLs should have a plan to summon
appropriately capable vehicles.
9.4.5.2.2 Rescue Mode. Should the dive team decide to respond in rescue mode,
every second is used with the single objective of removing the survivors from the
water. The team may decide to save time by having the survivors taken from the
vehicle prior to removing it from the water.
9.4.5.2.3 Diver Observation. Divers underwater may have to make observations on
such factors as jammed doors and trapped survivors which may dictate the need to
surface the vehicle before extricating the survivors.
9.4.5.2.4 Submerged Vehicle Hazards. Experiments with vehicles purposely
submerged in water have shown that a vehicle usually loses all air retaining capabilities
once it goes underwater. Chances of an air pocket are further decreased by such factors
as carpet and head liners floating around, vehicle body damage, and floating debris.
The potential of an air pocket should not be a driving factor for a team to operate in
rescue mode.
9.4.5.2.4.1 Most vehicles will float momentarily prior to sinking. A vehicle
floating and then sinking into water deeper than the vehicles length will often flip
upside down. An upside down vehicle can be disorienting to the diver conducting
an assessment of the situation.
9.4.5.2.4.2 Badly damaged vehicles present a hazard to divers in the form of
jagged and sharp edges. This is a particular hazard in water where a current is
present and the diver against the vehicle. Always approach a submerged vehicle on
the downstream side. The current will eddy on the downstream side and eventually
dig a hole in a soft bottom that the vehicle may eventually fall into.
9.4.5.2.4.3 Large vehicles will seem very cramped for the diver and the roof and
portals limit access to the surface and access to a responding standby diver.
Vehicles should be moved over and never around which limits the ability for the

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tether to be snagged. Divers should stay low when searching a vehicle underwater.
An ordinary item such as a bottle and spare tires can be dangerous underwater is
they are jarred loose and floats toward the surface.
9.4.5.2.4.4 Contamination from petroleum products is another hazard from
submerged vehicles. In a short period, these products can break down latex and
neoprene dive equipment items. On contact with the skin, they may cause burning
and irritation. Petroleum products will float to the surface and divers can avoid this
slick by using dishwashing liquid to disperse the slick momentarily enough for the
diver to enter the water.
9.4.5.2.5 Equipment Considerations. When dealing with a vehicle underwater,
bungee cords are the most necessary items to have when working. Closed doors are
extremely dangerous to a diver and these cords can be creatively used underwater to
secure doors open. Any opened entrance should be immediately secured with a bungee
cord. Wedges can also be carried by the divers and placed in the door hinges in the
event the bungee cords are dislodged. If wedges are utilized, divers need to ensure that
the door is fully opened to prevent it from falling out. A window punch can be utilized
to shatter automobile glass but the diver may have to loosen the spring about a
half-turn to improve the operation of the tool underwater. Shears or seat belt cutters
allow the diver to safely remove survivors without hazarding themselves. Small
marker buoys allow divers to mark the vehicles location. If the divers are to use lift
bags, underwater communications allow the divers to communicate more freely than
traditional hand or line pull signals allow.
9.4.5.2.6 Extrication Tools. Without excellent dive skills and extensive training,
utilizing hydraulic extrication tools underwater can come with many hazards. Unless
specially fitted buoyancy collars are utilized, the heavy tools may pull a diver down to
depth to quick. For the diver to move the tool at the bottom, he will have to inflate his
BC, posing the risk of uncontrolled ascent if the diver drops the tool. Heavy rescue
tools may require leverage at the bottom something difficult to do underwater.
Restricted visibility will also complicate tool use because the diver will not be able to
observe placement and observe potential hazards from the removal of metal.
9.4.5.2.7 Extrication of Victims. Extricating victims from a submerged vehicle is
complicated by having to deal with limited access. Doors may be locked or jammed
shut. Survivors or victims may have to be removed through the windows. Cut the seat
belt into several pieces to ensure it is clear. If the divers cannot move the survivor or
victim through the side window or door, they should consider the windshield or back
window. Windshield glass is laminated and therefore difficult to remove underwater.
Victims may be located anywhere within the vehicle. Divers may arrive to find the
drivers seat empty and find the victim in the rear of the vehicle if they were not
wearing a seat belt. It is also possible that they followed the last pocket of air into the
backseat area. Divers should always search the entire vehicle, including the rear deck
and under the dashboard.
9.4.5.3 Capsized Vessel. A vessel can become capsized when it is knocked over so it lies
on its side in the water or turned over. This is a frequent occurrence among small sailboats

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that are especially sensitive to sudden changes in the wind. Most small boats will remain
in that position, unless able to be righted, and will float enough to support any crew that
had been aboard. Survivors may be trapped inside the capsized hull requiring a search and
eventual rescue. As US Coast Guard helicopter rescue swimmers are not scuba qualified,
the US Coast Guard will ask for assistance from GUARDIAN ANGEL or local public
safety dive teams to employ from its aviation assets to search the underside of these
vessels. Sea state may prevent a hazard as the vessel rises, falls or crashes with large
swells and waves. Sails, deck lines, fuel, and masts may present an entanglement hazard
and searching underneath the vessel requires the divers to consider it an overhead
environment. Divers should not enter underneath the vessel without a protective helmet,
harness, and EGS. In limited visibility water, two divers can be employed, one as an
underwater tender on the edge of the vessel with a tether tending the diver conducting the
search and escort of the survivors to the surface. (See Figure 9.48, Diver Configured for
Helicopter Operations.)
Figure 9.48 Diver Configured for Helicopter Operations.

Diver Configured for Helicopter Operations

UNCLASSIFIED
9.4.6 Recovery Operations. A recovery mode operation is run without the goal of saving a
life. Victim and material retrieval can give a recovery team a physically and mentally
challenging task. The operation requires a different approach that a rescue operation. The rule
of thumb applied in most cases is that if the victim has been underwater for more than an hour,
there is no chance for resuscitation. The shifting of an operation from rescue to recovery mode
should be made discreetly for the sake of bystanders if present. In recovery mode, the
operation is executed at a slower, more deliberate pace. Witnesses are interviewed in more

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detail, and more time is taken for documentation. Often, team members may determine
through the scene that hazardous conditions such as depth, current, and weather diminish the
reasons for diving at all.
9.4.6.1 Body Recovery. Team members should be familiar with the variety and range of
conditions involved with a death in the water. Divers may have to testify about the
condition of a recovery victim in the event an investigation is launched.
9.4.6.1.1 Positioning. Often the body of a drowning victim will found in a prone,
semi-fetal position. At times, the bodys position in the water may cause postmortem
wounds and abrasions. Viewing the body, the diver will want to check and see if the
body is entangled, or contorted in the position it was found. Hands often are
significant and the diver should note if the victim is holding any objects.
9.4.6.1.2 Rigor Mortis. Rigor mortis, the stiffening of the muscle tissue after death,
is caused by the buildup of lactic acid in the muscles. This condition will vary with the
time elapsed since death and water temperature. Depending upon conditions such as
ambient temperature, rigor mortis does stop and the muscles become lucid again. In
the event that the body must in some way be manipulated to fit into the body bag
because of rigor mortis, the procedure used should be noted in the team documentation
of the event. Rigor mortis will be more pronounced if the victim struggled prior to
death. In some cases, a rare phenomena of instantaneous rigor mortis, cadaveric
spasm, may affect a specific part of the body such as a hand and arm of a victim who
clutched an object in the throes of death.
9.4.6.1.3 Algor Mortis. Algor mortis is the cooling of the body temperature. After
death, a body in the water normally cools at a rate of 1.5 degrees F per hour. The
cooling is subject to many variables including victim body composition, clothing
worn, and ambient temperature.
9.4.6.1.4 Postmortem Lividity. Soon after death, the blood will settle into the lowest
points of the body. Postmortem lividity is the cooling and settling of blood and is
denoted by splotches of pink or red coloring. Lividity in victims found in the water is
less pronounced. Should postmortem lividity be observed in a position not close to the
bottom contour then the condition may indicate the body was put underwater after
death occurred.
9.4.6.1.5 Trauma. Wounds or obvious injuries may often have contributed to the
cause of death to a victim recovered underwater. A wound received at least minutes
prior to death will normally display more blood than one received at the moment of
death or afterwards.
9.4.6.1.6 Victim Re-Float. There are a number of factors which will affect when, if at
all, the body will resurface. Once a body sinks, it will go all the way to the bottom.
Once the body begins to float, it will come all the way back to the surface. Body
re-floating is caused by the buoyancy of the gases trapped in the body. The major
cause of body re-float is internal decomposition, particularly as it creates a gas buildup
within the victims intestinal tract.

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9.4.6.1.7 Water Temperature. The faster the decomposition process occurs, the
sooner the body is likely to re-float. Water temperature is the major factor affecting
decomposition of the body. Generally, the process will occur in the body unless the
bodys internal temperature drops to 38 degrees F or less. The cooler temperatures
inhibit bacterial growth necessary for decomposition and subsequent gas buildup.
Gasses will diffuse into cool water more rapidly than in warmer water, a factor which
also inhibits re-float because of the limited gas buildup.
9.4.6.1.8 Water Depth. Normally, deeper water is cooler than the water closer to the
surface. The gases created by the body will diffuse into the water much more quickly
in cooler waters, thus decreasing the internal gas buildup needed for re-float. The
greater the water depth, the greater the degree of pressure which limits the buoyancy of
the gases accumulating within the body. In some cases, depth can prevent a body from
floating at all. If a slight amount of buoyancy can be achieved by the bodys gas
buildup, then the body is certain to float back to the surface as the pressure against the
gases will continually decrease as the body ascends. This increase often causes the
body to travel upward at an accelerated pace by the time it reaches the surface. Once
the body is on the surface, it may sink again after gases escape from the body. The
length of time for the body to re-sink depends of multiple variables. The body may
even re-float again under certain conditions. Variables affecting re-float must be
considered differently in each situation. Predicting when a body will re-float with any
accuracy is extremely difficult, yet team members will be asked regularly during the
operation. Additional factors which can contribute to body re-float are as follows:
9.4.6.1.8.1 The type of water may affect the rate of decomposition; clean water is
less conductive than murky water. The more bacteria in the water, the faster the
decomposition process and gas buildup will occur.
9.4.6.1.8.2 Marine life feeding upon a victim can affect its buoyancy; in some
instances the feeding can prevent re-float entirely.
9.4.6.1.8.3 The victims clothing can often promote or inhibit buoyancy.
9.4.6.1.8.4 Trauma caused by large open injuries could cause a body to decompose
faster. However, open wounds could also make it more difficult for the internal gas
buildup needed for re-float to occur.
9.4.6.1.8.5 Recent food intake can affect victim re-float. A victim who has not
eaten anything hours before the incident will take longer to produce gases required
than a victim that did eat. A high carbohydrate meal will contribute to gas
production more than a light diet.
9.4.6.2 Bagging the Victim Underwater. Whenever possible, the body should be bagged
underwater. Body bags designed especially for this purpose are available with screen
mesh panels for water drainage. A conventional body bag is not practical for this purpose
because of the weight of the water which would become trapped during bagging the body
underwater. If the events surrounding the death are suspicious, the hands should be
bagged individually with small plastic bags up to the elbows and banded in place. When
bagging the hands underwater, be cautious when surfacing the victim so that water in the

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bags does not cause the bags to fall off. It is easier to re-float the victim with a small lift
bag than to pull the body along the bottom contour. (See Figure 9.49, Body Recovery
System with Lift Bag and Figure 9.50, Mesh Body Bag.)

Figure 9.49 Body Recovery System with Lift Bag.

Body Recovery System with Lift Bag

UNCLASSIFIED

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Figure 9.50 Mesh Body Bag.

Mesh Body Bag

UNCLASSIFIED
9.4.6.3 Light Salvage Recovery. Underwater material recovery operations will require a
GUARDIAN ANGEL recovery team to locate an object and then bring it to the surface for
recovery. Once the object is located, the team immediately marks the object with a marker
buoy which accomplishes two things; notifies the surface team that the divers located the
object and should the team lose sight of the object it is easy to relocate. The team
establishes the deepest depth of the object to determine the length of line required for the
lift. The size, weight, center of gravity and potential attachment points of the object are
then determined to identify what equipment for rigging and rising is necessary. If the
object is too large to be recovered into a CRRC or other small vessel, the team evaluates
the distance and depth of water between the dive site and shore for the object to be towed.
The team may want to coordinate a larger towing or crane-equipped vessel to bring the
object back to shore. The following considerations apply when planning a lift:
Minimize the number of divers in the water.
Never fill lift bags from personal air supply.
Match the lift capacity to the objects weight.
Minimize the number of bags in use.
Ensure an adequate safety factor in the rigging.
Use shackles or carabiners not knots.
Put a small amount of air in the bag and reinspect rigging.

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Avoid entanglement at all times.
Always treat the lift as if it is going to fail.
Never get above the lift.
Never get below the load.
Move the load to shallow water.
9.4.6.3.1 Dangers of Lift Bag Operations. Due to the effects of Boyles Law, the gas
within a lift bag inflated at depth will expand as it ascends leading to the possibility of
an out of control ascent possibly endangering dangers in the water. Due to the afore
mentioned effects, consider the following safety considerations when conducting lift
operations.
9.4.6.3.1.1 Out of Control Ascent. A diver should actuate the dump valve as
required during the lift to prevent uncontrolled ascents.
9.4.6.3.1.2 Too Large Lift Capacity. Overfilling a lift device can result in an out
of control lift bag ascent that could break the surface, rise completely out of the
water, dump air and cause the object to rapidly descend and striking or trapping a
diver.
9.4.6.3.1.3 No vent or purge valve.
9.4.6.3.1.4 Poor or weak rigging.
9.4.6.3.1.5 Entanglement in the rigging.
9.4.6.3.1.6 Getting above the lift, boats, and divers.
9.4.6.3.1.7 Lack of training.
9.4.6.3.1.8 Lack of awareness.
9.4.6.3.1.9 Confusion and miscommunication.
9.4.6.3.2 Lift Bag Design. Lift bags work according to Archimedes Principle, Any
body wholly or partially submerged in a fluid is buoyed up by a force equal to the
weight of the fluid displaced. This law of physics allows a small bag to lift many
times its weight. Lift bags are available in different designs and configurations giving
team members the ability to custom tailor specific bags to specific operations. They
are easily inflated underwater by a stand alone scuba tank with an inflation yoke and an
air gun or quick disconnect inflation port.
9.4.6.3.2.1 Open Bottom Lift Bags. These are the most common bags utilized by
recovery teams due to their ease of use and portability. They are parachute or
square shaped and have an open bottom. Open bottom bags usually range in lift
capacity from 25 to 500 pounds for pararescue operations; they are available up to
77,000 pounds, and may or may not be equipped with a dump valve. (See Figure
9.51, Open Bottom Lift Bags.)

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Figure 9.51 Open Bottom Lift Bags.

Open Bottom Lift Bags

UNCLASSIFIED
9.4.6.3.2.2 Enclosed Flotation Lift Bags. Enclosed flotation bags are totally
enclosed and have over-pressure valves to vent expanding air as they ascend. Also
known as pillow bags, these allow the object to be lifted in any position, inside or
outside of the object. They have the advantage over open bottom bags in that they
can attain their max lift in much less water. These bags are ideal for the recovery
of vehicles and can even be utilized as emergency flotation for a distressed vessel
or aircraft floating at the surface. Enclosed flotation lift bags range in various sizes
with a lift capacity from 220 to 6,600 pounds. These bags are equipped with quick
disconnect inflation ports. Specialized bag systems are available for the recovery
of submerged vehicles. (See Figure 9.52, Enclosed Flotation Lift Bags.)
9.4.6.3.2.3 Salvage Tubes. These cylindrically-shaped bags are utilized when the
team needs to raise an object very close to the surface. This is invaluable for when
a long tow to shore of the object is expected. Salvage tubes range in various sizes
with a lift capacity from 1,100 to 77,000 pounds. These bags are equipped with
quick disconnect inflation ports and pressure relief valves.
9.4.6.3.2.4 Boulder Lift Bags. These flat square bags are designed to get a
maximum amount of lift from a single lift point in a minimum depth of water.
They can also be used as air jacks capable of exerting force over a large area. (See
Figure 9.53, Boulder Lift Bag.)
9.4.6.3.3 Light Salvage Rigging. Be aware of the load rating of all rigging hardware
involved in the lift. Low stretch is normally utilized as lift line with webbing,

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low-stretch rope slings or roundslings being utilized to attach the lift line or bag to the
object. Attachment to the lift bag should be accomplished through the use of
carabiners, shackles, or other hardware opposed to knots to take full advantage of the
rope load rating. (See Figure 9.54, Roundslings.)

Figure 9.52 Enclosed Flotation Lift Bags.

Enclosed Flotation Lift Bag

UNCLASSIFIED

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Figure 9.53 Boulder Lift Bag.

Boulder Lift Bag

UNCLASSIFIED
9.4.6.3.4 Inflation Method. For GUARDIAN ANGEL recovery team operations, lift
bags are normally inflated by stand alone scuba tanks configured for inflating the type
in use. A tank is usually configured with a regulator first stage configured with an air
nozzle or a connection fitting.

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Figure 9.54 Roundslings.

Roundslings

UNCLASSIFIED
9.4.6.3.5 Staged Lift Operations. When the team conducts a lift, it must be made in
a controlled manner. The team must consider the remaining air spaces within both the
lift bag and the object to be recovered. As the object begins to rise within the water
column, the air in the lift bags and that trapped in the object will expand and want to
accelerate the load to the surface. If the diver is not confident that it is possible to vent
both the lift bags and control the lift, the diver should use a series of staged lifts of
usually not more than 20 feet at a time. For the team, it is a good policy to assume the
rigging will fail and that the load will drop to the bottom and the bag will rocket to the
surface. (See Table 9.7, Staged Lift Equipment Requirements, Table 9.8 Basic
Underwater Salvage Physics, and Figure 9.55, Staged Lift.) The procedures for
conducting a staged lift are as follows.

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Table 9.7 Staged Lift Equipment Requirements.


Equipment Requirements for Staged Lift
Large surface buoy.
Lift line (1/2-inch low-stretch rope).
Lift bags (each of sufficient lift capacity to lift the object).
Mechanical ascenders.
Locking carabiners or shackles.
Webbing or round slings.
Scuba tanks with hoses and filling attachments.
Table 9.8 Basic Underwater Salvage Physics.
Equivalent Air Capacity at Depth
ATA

Depth in Feet

Cubic Feet

80

33

40

66

26.7

99

20

132

16

165

13.3

OVERALL NOTES:
* 80 cubic foot only produces 20 cubic foot of air at 100 feet.
** Divide lift bag capacity 64 or 62.4 to find cubic feet. Multiply by depth in atmosphere for air
requirements:
1 cubic foot of sea water equals 64 pounds.
1 cubic foot of fresh water equals 62.4 pounds.
1 liter of sea water equals 1 kilogram.
1 cubic foot equals 7.481 gallons.
1 cubic foot of air displaces 1 cubic foot of water at sea level.
1 US gallon equals 8.56 pounds of lift in sea water/8.34 pounds in fresh water.
50 gallon drum equals 428 pounds of lift in sea water/417 pounds in fresh water.

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Figure 9.55 Staged Lift.

Staged Lift
Lift 2

Lift 1
Buoy
Lift Bag

Lift Bag

Lift 3
Attachment
Point
20 feet
Lift 4
Attachment
Point

Final Lift
Attachment
Point

Object

UNCLASSIFIED
9.4.6.3.5.1 Establish weight of the object to be recovered.
9.4.6.3.5.2 Establish depth of object to be recovered.
9.4.6.3.5.3 Pre-rig the lifting line with loops every 20 to 30 feet or utilize
mechanical ascenders.

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9.4.6.3.5.4 After surveying the site, the dive team will secure the lift line to the
optimum lifting point on the object.
9.4.6.3.5.5 Attach a small lift bag just above the load and partially inflate the bag
to put tension on the line.
9.4.6.3.5.6 Double check all rigging and add additional webbing as required.
9.4.6.3.5.7 Attach a lift bag to the mechanical ascenders 10 feet below the surface
and partially inflate the bag without lifting the object.
9.4.6.3.5.8 Make a final check that the rigging is secure and that all divers are
clear of the load.
9.4.6.3.5.9 When all divers are clear, fully inflate the top bag and lift the object
from the bottom
9.4.6.3.5.10 The object will now drift from the original site allowing divers to
inspect the bottom for additional fallen debris or bodies. Divers should not swim
under the load
9.4.6.3.5.11 Attach another mechanical ascender 20 feet below the surface and
repeat the process
9.4.6.3.5.12 Raise the object in a series of 20- to 30-foot increments
9.4.6.3.5.13 The final lift will bring the object to just below the surface where the
object can be recovered by crane, or towed to shore.
9.4.6.4 Firearms Recovery. When searching for a weapon in no visibility, pat or scrape
the ground very lightly. The diver must consider that the weapon could discharge
underwater. Care should be given to preserve potential fingerprints if involved in an
investigation. Guns and other metal objects are highly susceptible to oxidation once
removed from the water. A gun that has been immersed for several months can still fire
while in the water but 30 minutes of exposure to air can rust the weapon beyond repair.
Any gun or metal object should be kept in the same water that it was recovered in. During
investigations solid objects should be placed in a rigid container to prevent loss of
evidence.
9.4.6.5 Submerged Aircraft. The primary objectives when responding to water related
aircraft incident is to locate the wreckage and recover the victims that may be found in and
around the submerged vehicle. In the event of aviation mishaps, the team may be
requested to raise components of the wreckage and record observations to assist authorities
in the mishap investigation. Team members should note that IAW Federal Law CFR 14,
NTSB 830, no one may recover a civil aircraft that has not been released by the Federal
Aviation Administration or the National Transportation Safety Board.
9.4.6.5.1 Locating Submerged Aircraft. Many aircraft carry crash locators which
are simple transceivers that activates upon crashing. Unfortunately, these devices do
not work well for aircraft that have crashed and sunk underwater. Larger commercial
aircraft may be equipped with an underwater locating device or beacon signal which
utilizes a pulsed acoustic signal to transmit its location. In order to intercept this signal

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it is necessary to utilize a specific receiver. Immediately after submerging there will a
large quantity of fuel observed rising to the surface immediately above the wreckage.
These slicks are difficult to locate and observe from the shore but easily identified from
the air. Depending on the degree of structural damage to the aircraft, fuel may escape
for up to two days. In the event that the fuel slick is circular, it should be marked in the
center with a large surface buoy with a heavy anchoring weight. In water with a
current, the marker should be set at the prominent upstream point of the surface slick.
Often debris will be found will be found washed ashore or floating in the vicinity of the
crash site. In order for this information to be of any value, the wind direction at the
time of the crash needs to be determined as well as any currents considered. A
boat-based snag-line search with a weighted line towed between two small CRRC can
provide a simple method for searching large areas. This method is only practical in
bodies of water where the bottom is relatively free of other snag hazards (e.g., logs,
stumps, kelp, or rocks).
9.4.6.5.2 Submerged Aircraft Hazards. Submerged aircraft often present a unique
set of hazards not found in any other recovery situation. Before any operation is
executed, team members should be informed on the type of aircraft and what type of
cargo was on board. The cargo aboard will have a direct result on the precautions the
recovery team will have to take.
9.4.6.5.2.1 Fuel. Aviation fuel can cause skin irritation in divers not
environmentally protected. Even though it is not highly visible, a fuel slick on the
surface may coat the divers and dive equipment while entering or leaving the water.
Some team members have a hypersensitivity to this fuel and a severe skin irritation
can develop.
9.4.6.5.2.2 Sharp Metal. Metal found on and around the aircraft wreckage may
be extremely sharp and present a hazard to both the divers and the divers
equipment.
9.4.6.5.2.3 Control Cables. Small cables constructed of relatively thin stainless
steel wire may be exposed between pieces of wreckage and present a challenging
entanglement hazard. Further complications may arise when lift bags are used to
raise the main section of the wreckage and other large sections are still laying on
the bottom connected by these cables.
9.4.6.5.2.4 Tires. Large commercial aircraft employ high-pressure pneumatic
tires which if ruptured could easily injure or kill a diver nearby.
9.4.6.5.2.5 Hydraulic Lines and Systems. On larger aircraft, hydraulic lines and
systems have the potential to severely injure a diver as they contain pressures well
in excess of that found on the average scuba tank. If ruptured, both the potential
explosive force and the hydraulic fluid represent hazards for any team members
involved in the recovery.
9.4.6.5.3 Submerged Military Aircraft Considerations. There are two major
hazards when dealing with military aircraft; munitions and ejection seats. If the
aircraft was carrying any sort of munitions, it must be avoided and Navy explosive

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ordnance disposal forces employed to deal with it. Weapons armed with devices which
detonate on contact or by magnetic influence cannot be safely approached using
conventional diving equipment. Ejection seats are potential hazards underwater
because they are activated by small explosives that could be lethal underwater. Either
the explosive concussion of the blast or the seat can be a hazard. The diver removing
a victim from an aircraft needs to familiar with the emergency egress locations and the
cockpit ejection handles of the aircraft involved.
9.4.6.5.4 Recovering Aircraft Victims. Whenever possible, the victims should be
recovered before the wreckage is removed. There are many reasons for this.
9.4.6.5.4.1 When an aircraft contacts the water the forces on the aircraft are also
exerted on the victims inside. To expect all victims to be intact and not injured is
not realistic. The victims may be badly disfigured or even dismembered by the
crash.
9.4.6.5.4.2 When the victims are badly disfigured or dismembered, they must be
removed prior to moving of the wreckage. Small portions of the body essential to
identification; teeth and fingers for fingerprints, must be recovered. All body parts
must be recovered. It is not acceptable to leave human remains underwater
because their recovery was inconvenient. Small portions of the bodies remaining
in the aircraft fuselage may fall out during the lift and tow to shore.
9.4.6.5.4.3 If the victims are removed from the wreckage underwater and carefully
bagged prior to raising to the surface, personal effects (e.g., jewelry, paper, or
wallets) will not be lost. This may be crucial to the identification of the victims.
9.4.6.5.5 Aircraft Recovery. Prior to beginning the actual recovery, the location of
the wreckage and the location of any wreckage scattered on the bottom should be
recorded. Investigators must be able to return to the exact site years later. Since the
wreckage of a small aircraft is twisted, contorted, and loosely connected mass of metal;
a typical salvage operation is usually not possible. After documenting the position of
each piece of wreckage, the aircraft will be removed piece by piece. The fuselage and
or the tail section may be intact but the forward part of the cabin, the wings, and even
the engine may be missing and located on the bottom some distance away. When the
use of lift bags is planned, the wreckage will have to be raised and then towed to shore.
The complexity of this operation should always be considered. What may appear to be
a small section may have components attached by small control cables strewn over the
bottom. Prior to rising any components ensure that it is free and independent from
other components.
9.4.6.5.6 Aircraft Towing. The towing of the wreckage to shore is a slow process.
Most lift bags come with a hitch point installed by the manufacturer for towing. This
point should be utilized opposed to the wreckage. If towing the wreckage utilizing
open bottomed lift bags, some loss of buoyancy should be expected. A quick
disconnect mechanism should be established on the tow boat. A secondary marker
should be established to the wreckage in the event is lost. This is accomplished by
adding a small buoy to the towline near the boat or a marker and line behind the

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wreckage. The length of this marker or buoy should be a length greater that the
deepest water over which the wreckage will be towed.

9.4.7 Overhead Environments. An overhead environment is any dive where the divers
must enter into a situation where they do not have a clear, unobstructed path to the surface.
This situation may be found under ice, wrecks, large crashed aircraft, caves, pipelines, sewers,
or even large vessels. In the event of an emergency, the diver will not be able to make a
controlled or emergency ascent because of the overhead structure. Due to the complexities
involved in these operations they are not within the scope of this document.
9.4.8 Contaminated Water. Contaminated water is defined as water which contains any
chemical, biological, or radioactive substance which poses a chronic or acute health risk to
exposed personnel. Some degree of contamination and/or pollution is evident in practically
every body of water in the world. The contamination may be naturally occurring or come from
a variety of sources including terrorist acts, leaking vessels, industrial discharges and/or sewer
effluent. However, much of the contamination that enters the water is not readily apparent. The
biggest concern is from relatively enclosed bodies of water, such as lakes, rivers, or harbors
which are within close proximity to large populations and wrecks, where contamination can
accumulate and/or concentrate. These contaminants could present a potential health risk to
divers and may additionally impact mission and operational readiness. The effects on
personnel may become evident immediately or may be delayed for many years especially in
the case of exposures to carcinogenic substances. For most microbiological exposure, illness
will not develop for several hours after diving and could possibly be delayed for days. With the
exception of chemical/biological warfare agents, acute toxicity and/or incapacitation is
unexpected for most chemical exposures. However, chronic sub-toxic exposure to a variety of
chemical hazards may affect illnesses such as cancer, neurodegenerative disease, hormonal
disregulation and others. Only general guidance can be provided because of the wide
variability in contaminants, potential exposure levels and other variables. Team members are
encouraged to contact local agencies to obtain information on local water contaminants and
hazards. (For detailed information on hazards and diving in contaminated water, see
SS521-AJ-PRO-010, Guidance for Diving in Contaminated Waters.)
9.4.8.1 Contaminants. The three types of contaminants divers can expect to encounter
are chemical, biological, and radiological. The potential routes of exposure for divers are
inhalation, ingestion, absorption, and impingement (forcing of material into the body, such
as through a wound). Unless the response is to a specific incident, the availability of
quantitative data on the contaminants present in any specific body of water is problematic.
Real-time, or even near real-time, water analysis is not currently feasible.
NOTE: Both chemical and biological contaminants tend to concentrate in sediment rather than in
the water column.
9.4.8.2 Equipment Considerations. There is no single equipment configuration or
material which will protect the diver under all conditions or from all contaminants. The
standby diver must be equipped with a level of protection at least equal to that worn by the
divers. Additionally, tenders and other team members may experience as great a hazard as
the diver. The mucous membranes are the most vulnerable regions on the body and,
assuming intact skin, are essentially the only route microorganisms can enter and infect the

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body. Therefore, isolating these vital areas from the source of contamination is the primary
concern when diving in a biologically contaminated environment. Respiratory and
physical protection must be available for team members on the surface. For recovery team
contaminated water diving operations, the use of dry suits with attached hood and gloves
coupled with an FFM are employed. However, there will be situations when additional
protection will be required and beyond the capability of a GUARDIAN ANGEL recovery
team.
9.4.8.3 Tender Considerations. Tenders and other topside personnel may also require
protection from hazards while supporting diving operations in contaminated water. A
thorough hazard analysis will address the degree of protection required by topside
personnel as well as the divers. Every effort should be made to position the dive station
outside the contaminated area with a transition zone between the work area and the dive
station. Some degree of contamination of the work area and topside equipment will occur
and it is expected the tenders will come into intimate contact with contaminated water and
must be appropriately protected. Rubberized gloves are worn to protect the tender while
tending the divers tether which is in contact with the contaminated water.
9.4.8.4 Dive Site Zones. Even before diving operations in contaminated water begin, the
dive site should be divided into three zones for proper sequestration of contamination
throughout the operations. (See Figure 9.56, Contaminated Water Dive Site.) A zone
immediately surrounding the point of water entry/exit must be deemed one of high
contamination. The zone to which divers and gear progress after completing their initial
decontamination following a successful dive is one of low contamination. A final zone
into which divers progress after they have been decontaminated and had all their diving
equipment removed is clean. If feasible, the clean zone should be positioned upwind
from the contaminated zones. Positioning of topside personnel may need to be adjusted to
keep from spreading contamination.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Wind Direction

Figure 9.56 Contaminated Water Dive Site.

Initial Rinse
HOT
Remove Ancillary Dive Gear
LOW
Personnel DECON

All team members


involved with the
decontamination will
not eat, drink, smoke,
touch face, or void until
decontaminated.

Wash and Second Rinse


Skin DECON

Equipment
Secondary
DECON

CLEAN

Undress

A/R
Shower

Equipment
Post-Dive
Maintenance

UNCLASSIFIED
9.4.8.5 Initial Decontamination. The initial decontamination step is to spray bulk
contaminants off a diver with a high pressure, clean, fresh water rinse. Use salt water if
fresh water is unavailable. The diver should be sprayed upon initial exit of the water to
limit the quantity of contaminants being transferred to the dive station. Team members
should be careful to direct water flow away from potential points of leakage (e.g., exhaust
valves, or seal junctions) in the divers rig; a high-pressure jet of water directed at such
potential breach points may inject contaminants inside the protective gear and into contact
with the diver. Tenders should also exercise care that overspray does not spread
contamination. Carefully remove the bulk of contaminants at this stage to ensure the
greatest effectiveness of subsequent decontamination steps.
9.4.8.5.1 Initial Equipment Removal and Wash Down. Ancillary dive gear such as
harnesses, weight belts, and EGS tanks are removed for subsequent decontamination.
After the diver has been initially rinsed and the ancillary gear removed, the diver
should be scrubbed with a stiff-bristle synthetic brush and cleaning solution. The
composition of the cleaning solution should be appropriate for the contaminant to be
removed; 5 percent bleach solutions are adequate for most situations and should not
degrade equipment when used for short periods of time and then rinsed away.
Commercially available household bleach is usually approximately 5 percent. One
method for preparing a 5 percent bleach solution is to mix 3 pounds of HTH (high-test
hypochlorite, calcium hypochlorite) into 5 gallons of fresh water. Long handled
brushes will facilitate the cleaning process. Handheld brushes should be used for
detailed cleaning of the divers equipment. Once the diver has been thoroughly

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

9-125

scrubbed with cleaning solution applied from head to toe, he should be rinsed with
fresh water. Again, attending team members should be careful when directing
high-pressure water toward potential breach points of the diving rig. After the diver
has received his final rinse, he should progress toward the clean zone.
9.4.8.5.2 Clean Zone. After the diver has been adequately decontaminated and
moved into the low-contamination zone adjacent to the clean zone, the dive gear
should be removed in a step-wise fashion. First, the FFM is removed. Then the dry suit
and gloves should be removed. Next, dry suit should be removed. If nothing indicates
that the diving rig has been breached during the dive, the diver may proceed to the
clean zone and take a routine post-dive shower, which should include washing of the
entire body with soap and shampoo. Diver should use Domboro solution in each ear
for a minimum of 60 seconds per side. Additionally, the area under each fingernail
should be thoroughly scrubbed with soap and a nailbrush. The diver should use
antiseptic mouthwash to rinse his mouth. If there are indications of possible dermal
exposure to contaminants, then additional decontamination steps will be required. This
includes scrubbing the bare skin with a 0.5 percent bleach solution for approximately
10 minutes and then washing with soap in a shower. The 0.5 percent solution can be
prepared from a 1:9 dilution of the equipment decontamination solution already
prepared. Label solutions carefully as applying 5 percent directly to a divers skin can
be very irritating. Care should be taken not to introduce decontamination solution into
abdominal or central nervous system wounds, if present.
9.4.8.5.3 Equipment Decontamination. The entire divers equipment must undergo
secondary decontamination after it has been removed from him during the personnel
decontamination procedure. This secondary decontamination procedure entails rinsing
contamination from the equipment and then soaking it in a bleach-based solution for at
least thirty minutes. Drums or wading pools may be effective repositories for this
process. After soaking, equipment should be rinsed thoroughly until no foaming
occurs.
9.4.8.5.4 Tender Decontamination. The tender decontamination procedure is the
same as that for divers. The last person out of the contaminated zone will have to self
decontaminated.
9.4.8.5.5 Medical Documentation. Team members in contact with the diver and
water have a medical evaluation conducted to ensure there have been no ill effects as a
result of the dive. This also aids in documentation in the event the team members
becomes ill at a later date due to the dive.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-1
CHAPTER 10

TECHNICAL RESCUE/RECOVERY OPERATIONS


10.1 Introduction. The primary intent of this chapter is to provide pararescuemen with sufficient
information to grasp the wide scope of challenges associated with a technical rope rescue. The
concepts in this chapter follow the Pararescue Career Field Education Training Plan (CFETP) and
are intended as a supplement to complement technical training and certification. Technical rope
rescue work has some inherent dangersunpredictable weather, unstable rock/snow/ice and other
anchor medium.
10.2 Physics Principles. Technical rope rescue is really just applied physics. Certain principles
simply cannot be ignored such as Newtons laws of physics. The goal is to learn how to work
with these principles in the most efficient manner. This reduces strain on the rescuers and the
equipment, thereby allowing PJs to be able to perform another rescue. The first part of this manual
deals with the application of those principles under field conditions. Even if you have not had any
formal education in physics, the section on mechanical advantage will explain in easy to follow
terms how to visualize the concepts and apply them safely.
10.2.1 Intended Scope. This information is not intended to be an all encompassing reference
for every rope rescue operation. The primary purpose for the overview on physics and
principles is so that the technician can apply them to the situation at hand. Relying on one or
two techniques to fit all scenarios is setting oneself up to fail.
10.2.2 Historical Background. Lastly, technical rope rescue is a relatively new science,
beginning in about 1982 with the British Columbia Council of Technical Rescue. Methods and
equipment are continually being tested and refined. Rescuers should make every effort to stay
in touch with the latest technology and improvements in the application of these changes.
10.2.3 Technical Merit. The described techniques have been proven under field conditions
with a variety of experience levels of the rescuers. It should be obvious to seasoned rope
rescuers that many of the principles previously learned are now obsolete because they were
either unsafe or unable to hold up to the unsubstantiated claims as to their strength and or
safety.
10.3 Safety.
10.3.1 Rescuer Safety. Rescuer safety is paramount. Before you don your hero hat (or
helmet), think about the consequences of catastrophic system failure, bad weather turning
worse, or your ride home failing to show up for a few days.
10.3.2 Elements. These elements seem to be the first ones tossed aside when the rescue siren
goes off and everyone is anxious to get in the fight and save a life. They also tend to be the
reason the rescuers become the rescuees.
10.3.3 Checklist. Following the operational risk management checklist is an absolute
necessity prior o employing on a rescue mission.
10.3.4 Technical Rope Rescue. Rope rescue operations are frequently defined in terms of
the type and steepness of the terrain they are to be performed on. The steeper the ground, the

10-2

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

more difficult and more technical the rescue becomes. Ropes may have to be relied upon to
gain access to the victim and to support the team members and the victims during the rescue in
order to remove them from the rescue site.
10.3.4.1
degrees.
support
footing?

A low-angle rescue is considered to be terrain that has a slope angle from 15 to 35


The condition of the terrain will determine the need for and the amount of rope
required. Are there loose rocks or other debris that would cause poor or slippery
How many rescuers are needed to transport the victim and litter to safety?

10.3.4.2 A medium-angle rescue is considered to be terrain that has a slope angle from 35
to 60 degrees. Again, the condition of the terrain will determine the level of technical
expertise required to perform this rescue safely.
10.3.4.3 A high-angle rescue is considered to be terrain that has a slope angle of 60
degrees and higher.
10.3.5 Rescue Necessities.
10.3.5.1 Rescuers are totally dependent upon the ropes used to keep them and the victims
from falling and to gain access to and egress from the rescue location.
10.3.5.2 Competent technical rescue skills involving ropes, anchoring and belaying
systems, lowering and hauling systems and litter work are mandatory for the safe
performance of the rescue team.
10.3.6 Safety Definitions.
10.3.6.1 Two terms that are frequently confused are safety factor and margin of safety.
10.3.6.2 The safety factor is the ratio of the breaking strength of the materials in reference
to the force applied. A multiplier is applied to the calculated maximum force to which a
component will be subjected. Typically, for components whose failure could result in
serious injury or death, a safety factor of 10:1 is used. Non-critical components generally
have a safety factor of 2.
10.3.6.3 Safety factors (SF) are needed to account for imperfections in materials, flaws in
assembly, material degradation, and unexpected stresses. For example, a 2kN load requires
system strength of 20kN, resulting in an SF of 10:1.
10.3.6.4 The margin of safety is an index indicating the amount beyond the minimum
necessary or the strength of the material minus the anticipated stress. The difference
between those two values is less than that of the safety factor. This does not protect the
rescuer well as the SF either. The following illustrates the margin of safety: if the breaking
strength of your system is 20kN and the anticipated stress is 17kN, then the margin of
safety would be 3kN or 15 percent.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-3

10.3.6.4.1 Safety Factor as Compared to Margin of Safety. In Figure 10.1, Typical


System Load Factors, and Table 10.1, Units of Measurement, the safety factor for each
of the critical points is identified. Starting at the lower left and working clockwise,
they are:
1 = 18:1
2 = 12.5:1
3 = 12.5:1
4 = 18:1
5 = 10:1
6 = 10:1 for the Barrelman.
10.3.6.4.1.1 The margin of safety for each of the same points would be:
1 = 34kN
2 = 23kN
3 = 23kN
4 = 34kN
5 = 28kN
6 = 18kN for the Barrelman.
10.3.6.5 Units of measurement.
10.3.6.6 Base units.
10.3.6.7 Length in meters = M, mass = kilograms (Kg), time = seconds (s).
10.3.6.8 Understanding metric equivalencies and the numbers.
10.3.6.9 Derived units.
10.3.6.10 Force (F) and acceleration (A): F = MA
10.3.6.11 Force = Newton, which is kilograms per meter per second squared: Kg m/s2
10.3.6.12 Velocity, speed, and direction, or change in direction over time.
10.3.6.12.1 Example: 100 Kg multiplied by the force of gravity = (100Kg)(10m/s2) =
1000 Kg m/s2 = 1000N or 1kN.
10.3.6.12.2 A 1kN load is approximately equal to one rescuer (200 pounds plus
protective gear, or about 225 pounds).
10.3.6.12.3 A 2kN load would be representative of the rescuer, the patient and the
stokes litter.
10.3.6.12.4 All tests of rope rescue systems are performed with a standard load of 2
kN. Hence the need for a system strength of 20 kN, thereby giving a safety factor of
10:1.

10-4

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.1 Typical System Load Factors.

Typical System Load Factors


Anchor

#3
Wrap 3, pull 2
<25 kN (12.5:1)
<36 kN (18:1)

#4

30 kN (10:1)

#5

<25 kN (12.5:1)
Brake Bar

#2

20 kN (10:1) >

#6

2 kN Load

Wrap 3, pull 2
<36 kN (18:1)

#1
Anchor

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-5

Table 10.1 Units of Measurement.


Weight

1 kg (kilogram) =

2.2046 or 2.2 Pounds

1 meter =

1.1 yards or 39.7 inches

30.48 cm =

1 foot

2.54 cm =

1 inch

25.4 mm =

1 inch

Length

Fahrenheit to Celsius

C = (Degrees F 32) x 5/9

98.6 F 32 = 66.6 x 5/9 = 37 C

Celsius to Fahrenheit

F = (9/5 x Degrees C) + 32

9/5 x 37 C = 66.6 + 32 = 98.6 F

10.3.6.12.5 If understanding these principles is difficult, the recommended referrence


is Physics Demystified, authored by Stan Gibilisco. The following Table 10.2,
Conversion Factors, gives conversion values for computing factors such as force,
energy, or mass.
Table 10.2 Conversion Factors.
For This Quantity
Mass
Length

To Convert From
Outdated Unit
Pound-mass

Kilogram (kg)

Foot

0.304

Meter (m)

0.304

Meter per second


(m/s)

0.304

Meter per second


squared (m/s2)

Acceleration

Feet per second squared

Energy

Kilogram (kg)

25.4

Feet per second (ft/s)

Stress

0.453 14.593

Inch

Speed (velocity)

Force

Multiply By:

To Obtain This
SI Unit

Poundal

0.138 255 0

Millimeter (mm)

Newton (N)

Pound-force

4.448 222

Kg * m/s2

Pound-force per square


inch (lbf/in2) (psi)

6.894 757

Kilopascal (kPa)

Foot pound force

1.355 818

(ft * lbf)

(kN/m2)
Joule (J)
(N * m)

10-6

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10.3.7 New Descriptive Name. A mass, which is hanging statically from a rope, will cause
a force (tension) to exist in the rope, which is proportional to the mass and the value of
gravitational attraction at the location where the mass is suspended. The tension in the rope is
the MG-force and is expressed in Newtons (N).
10.3.7.1 The standard international value for acceleration of gravity (G) is 9.806 650 m/s2
(32.174 05 ft/s2) and this is the assumed value often applied when mass is mistakenly
equated to force.
10.3.7.2 The actual value of G ranges between 9.77 and 9.83 m/s2 over the surface of the
earth and even more widely above and below the surface.
10.3.7.3 The MG-force is not an intrinsic value of an object but will vary depending on the
buoyancy and the local gravity acting on the object.
10.3.8 Deprecated Unit. The term kilogram-force (kgf or kilopound, kp) is not appropriate
for describing force. The proper term for force is the Newton.
10.3.9 Rope in Service. The term rope in service refers to the amount of rope that is under
load (or could be put under a load, (i.e., belay line) at a given point in a rescue operation. It is
also the amount of rope between the descent control device and the attachment to the litter
bridle.
10.3.10 Fall Factor. Fall factor is determined by dividing fall distance by the rope in service.
In the case of static rope, an acceptable fall factor would be 1m drop/3m rope = Fall Factor 1/3
or 0.33.
10.3.10.1 Fall Factor is simply the length of the fall divided by the length of the rope from
faller to the fixed point, whether belayer or anchor, the equation looks like this:
Fall Factor x Length of Fall = Rope in Service
10.3.11 Rope Stretch and Rope Strength. Contrary to popular belief, the terms static and
low stretch are not universally interchangeable. According to the Cordage Institute rope
standards, at 10 percent of a given ropes Minimum Breaking Strength a static kern mantle
rope may have an elongation of up to 6 percent (2 to 3 percent ideally), while low stretch kern
mantle ropes may range in elongation from 6 to 10 percent.
10.3.11.1 The static rope is ideally suited for technical rope rescue. Compliance with the
previous specifications is based upon testing according to the Cordage Institute Standard
Testing Methods for Fiber Rope and/or ASTM D-4268, Standard Methods of Testing Fiber
Ropes.
10.3.11.2 Tensile strengths are approximate averages for new, unused ropes. To estimate
the minimum tensile strength of a new rope, reduce the approximate average by 10 percent
(Cordage Institute defines minimum tensile strength as two standard deviations below the
average tensile strength of the rope).

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-7

10.3.11.3 The kern mantle construction used in these ropes features a double-twist cable
core for low-static elongation and resistance to spinning while ascending or descending,
yet will elongate to absorb energy in the event of an accidental dynamic loading. It is
important for a static rope to be able to absorb the energy of an accidental dynamic
loading. This type of loading could possibly cause damage to the sheath and/or core of the
rope, bodily injury, or anchor failure.
10.3.11.4 Often a key point in rope selection, rope strength is a function of what the rope
is made of, how the rope is made, and how much fiber is in it.
10.3.11.5 Desired strength must also be balanced against other factors such as diameter
(compatibility with other gear), weight, flexibility, and anticipated use. In other words,
how strong is strong enough?
10.3.11.6 A comparative analysis of rope stretch among popular brands of dynamic rope
is found in the index of this manual. The title of the research paper is the 1999
International Technical Rescue Symposium, Qualifying a Rescue Rope.
10.4 Command.
10.4.1 Operational Risk Management. Operational risk management (ORM) is a tool
used to make informed decisions by providing the best baseline of knowledge and experience
available. Its purpose is to increase operational readiness by anticipating hazards and reducing
the potential for loss, thereby increasing the probability of success in recovering personnel.
10.4.1.1 ORM. The ORM process is a five-step, closed-loop process.
Identify Hazards. Identify conditions with the potential to cause damage, injury, or
mission degradation.
Assess Hazards. For each hazard identified, determine the associated degree of risk
in terms of probability and severity.
Make Risk Decisions. First, develop and implement a set of risk control options to
minimize risk consistent with mission accomplishment. Then, decide if benefit of the
mission outweighs the new risk levels. If risks outweigh benefits, seek further risk
reduction.
Implement Controls. When risks are reduced to acceptable levels, implement the
appropriate control measures.
Supervise. Conduct follow-up evaluations of the control measures to ensure the
desired effect. Adjust, as necessary.
10.4.1.2 Levels of ORM. The ORM process is utilized on three levels based upon time
and assets available.
Time-Critical. An on-the-run mental process when time is limited.
Deliberate. Adding time, assets, and techniques to provide a more in-depth level of
application.
In-Depth. A working-group level of application employing detailed qualitative and
quantitative techniques.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


10.4.1.2.1 The ORM process is guided by three rules:
Accept Risk When Benefits Outweigh Costs. Recognizing that some degree of
risk is associated with all operations, minimize and manage risk so that the mission
can be accomplished with minimal acceptable loss.
Accept No Unnecessary Risk. Take only the risks that are necessary to
accomplish the mission.
Anticipate and Manage Risks By Planning. This is a rule of efficiency and
economy. Risks are more easily managed when addresses in the initial planning
stage of the mission. (See Table 10.3, Operational Risk Planning Worksheet.)

10.5 Control.
10.5.1 Individual Responsibilities. The team leader has overall responsibility of the
operation and all team members. His word is final, and as such no one does anything without
his approval. He does however relinquish command in the event a federal agency (i.e., FEMA)
arrives on scene.
The belay manages belay line.
The mainline can be a brake, winch, or a haul team.
The edge may be one or more people; keep edge clear, place edge protection, assist load
over edge.
The attendant manages handling of patient (with or without stokes liter) and cleans route
if required.
The vector is used in some lowering operations to direct main/belay line over edge.
The control gives commands to lower or raise the load, especially during the critical
edge phase.
10.5.1.1 Briefing the Team.
Conducting a whiteboard analysis.
Analysis.
Critical points.
Whistle test.
Static system safety factors.
Comparative analysis.
Pro or con list.
Ease of use and training.
Equipment requirements.
Amount.
Commonality.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-9

Speed of setup.
Field trials.
Failure analysis.
Do backups work as intended?
Worst case scenario.
72 hour weather forecast.
10.5.1.1.1 The underlying goal of this process is for the team leader (TL) to convey the
necessary steps required for mission completion. Broken down into its elements, this
is what the team leader should come away with after everyone has been briefed:
Here is what I think we face.
Here is what I think we will do.
Here is why.
Here is what we should keep our eye on.
Now, talk to me. (What else do we need and how are we doing?)
10.5.1.1.2 This format allows team members an opportunity to voice concerns or
oversights, and if properly executed, will achieve a team consensus. After the briefing,
the TL assigns operational roles, and then delegates authority to the Control person. At
this time the TL begins the process of inspecting every component of the
systemincluding operator technique.
10.5.1.1.3 Ideally, to free up the TL and to reduce risk by having single-task roles, a
separate control person is used. The control person should be in a location where the
edge transition can be easily seen, yet still communicate with the main and belay line
operators. Communication can be achieved through verbal commands, radio, whistle
blasts, or through the edge person. Commands follow the YOU this is ME,
followed by the specific command (e.g., EDGE, CONTROL, PREPARE TO GUIDE
THE LITTER).

10-10

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 10.3 Operational Risk Management Planning Worksheet.


Planner:
Mission/task:

Mission Steps

Total Time
Required:

Date:
Potential
Hazards

Risks Level

Circle Overall

Controls

APPROVED BY:
_____________

Rating.
Hrs:

Min:

Low (L)
Medium (M)
High (H)
Extremely High
(EH)

Residual Risk
Level

DATE:______

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-11

10.6 Communications.
10.6.1 Lowering Operations.
First stage (role call)ensure everyone is physically and mentally ready.
Second stage (positioning the load)position the attendant/victim to allow for a
smooth transfer over the edge. The Edge people may need to help to the Attendant
carry the litter to the edge. To make this easier, the Control can ask for slack in the
mainline as required.
Third stage (pre-tensioning)pre-tension the system and transition the load over
the edge. There are several ways of pre-tensioning the system; the appropriate
technique is dependant on the number of available rescuers and terrain, and must be
briefed by the TL prior to roll call. Commands given during this phase must be very
concise to ensure minimal exertion by the entire crew.
Fourth stage (attendant needs)commands specific to the needs to the attendant,
such as speed, belay or edge protection requirements, and an indication of progress.
10.6.2 Raising Operations.
First stage (role call)ensure everyone is physically and mentally ready.
Second stage (raising)use a pulley system or winch to raise the load; includes
sets and resets.
Third stage (edge transition)reset the haul system when the load is just below
the edge, to ensure that the load can be cleanly and smoothly brought completely up
over the edge without having to reset during the critical edge transition.
10.6.3 Communications Checklists. The following checklists (Table 10.4, Command and
Communication for Rising, Table 10.5, Command and Communication for Raising, and Table
10.6, Team Leader Briefing) are to be used by the control person when conducting raising or
lowering operations. Individual teams should develop alternate signals in the event radio
communications fail (e.g., whistle blasts). Adherence to the commands in the check-off list
must be enforced, even in training.
10.7 The Science of Rope Rescue.
10.7.1 As mentioned in the introduction, the science of rope rescue is relatively new. Prior to
1982, the majority of rope rescue principles were developed from other applications such as
caving, rock climbing, and sailing.
10.7.2 The technique of a high line or guiding line has been around since the 1600s. The
evolution of some of these principles go so far back that they simply cannot be traced
(e.g., mechanical advantage).
10.7.3 The downside to this is that many unsafe and untested techniques, especially in the
area of anchors, remain in use today. For instance, the belief that a self-equalizing anchor
exists is a myth.

10-12

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 10.4 Command and Communication for Lowering.


Command and Communication for Lowering
Control

Response

Action

First Stages (Roll Call)


BELAY READY?

READY!

Belayer is physically and mentally


STANDBY! ready; no slack.
If not ready), give indication of time.

ADVISE WHEN READY! (if he


hears STANDBY) MAINLINE
READY?

READY!

Device is unlocked and ready to feed.

EDGE (1 and/or 2) READY?

READY!

In position to move to load, edge clean


and protected.

ATTENDANT READY?

READY!

Patient briefed; tie-ins properly adjusted.

READY!

Second Stage (Position the Load)


ATTENDANT APPROACH THE
EDGE!

ATTENDANT STOP!

MAINLINE, LOAD THE BRAKE!

EDGE, READY?

READY!

Edge protection placed and ready to


push out.

ATTENDANT, READY?

READY!

Patient briefed; hand on litter, ready for


pre-tension.

Third Stage (Pre-Tensioning the System)


A. Vectoring the Mainline

Used if a high directions exists.

-VECTOR MAINLINE!

1 or 2 people deflect the mainline, no


rope through the brake.

-ATTENDANT LEAN BACK!

Pull litter away from obstructions.

-EDGE PUSH OUT!

On mainline only, not litter.

-RELEASE VECTOR!

Slowly at first, then gradually increase


speed.

-BRAKE DOWN SLOW!

Gradually break static friction at end of


vector to allow for feed.

B. No vector

Just exclude the vectoring commands


above. High directional may not exist.

C. Jigger

Where there is no room to vector.

D. Edge lift

Used with overhead directional.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-13

Table 10.5 Command and Communication for Raising Checklist.


Command and Communication for Raising
Control

Attendant

Mainline (Haul Team)

First Stage (Roll Call; Same as Lowering)


Second Stage (Raising)
MAINLINE READY?
ATTENDANT READY?

READY!
READY!

MAINLINE UP!

MAINLINE UP!
SET!

SET (to attendant), RESET!

READY!

ATTENDANT READY?

READY!

Third Stage (Edge Transition)


STOP, SET, RESET, LAST HAUL!

READY!

MAINLINE UP!
STOP, STOP, ALL STOP!
Additional Commands:
STOP!Given by anyone; this means freeze.
STOP, STOP, WHY STOP?If load has stopped for unknown reason.
DOWN, DOWN!Go down faster.
SLOW!Self explanatory.
UP ROPE!Pull rope through device and ensure there is no slack.
SLACK!Too much tension, need more rope.
Whistle Commands:
One BlastStop!
Tow BlastsUp!
Three BlastsDown!
Three Long BlastsHelp!

READY!

10-14

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 10.6 Team Leader Briefing.


Team Leader Mission Execution BriefingHigh-Angle Ops
General:
- Roll call.
- Time hack and team fitness check.
- 72-hour weather check.
Staging Area Activities:
- Assign specific dutiesbelay, mainline, edge, attendant, vector, control.
- Map study.
- Medical condition of patient.
- Communications check.
- Equipment assignmentsropes, anchors, litter, medical, comm.
Mission:
- Who?
- What?
- When?
- Where?
- Why?
- How?
10.7.4 However, this was not examined until the BCCTR attached a dynamometer to the
individual strands of a supposed self-equalizing anchor and found out not only were they of
unequal tension, they could not equalize after a failure.
10.7.5 Another unsafe technique still in use is that of utilizing any type of mechanical
ascender for a belay device. Research by Rigging for Rescue conclusively demonstrates that
hardware such as jumars, gibbs, and petzls will without exception cause catastrophic rope
failure when subjected to a 2kN load on 1 meter of rope for a 3-meter fall. The only safe way
to belay a rescue load is with two tandem Prusiks of the proper diameter for the belay line in
use discussed in Chapter 7, Combat Marksmanship and Munitions. (See Figure 10.2, Gibbs
Ascender No 11mm Rope After Sustaining 2 kN Load.)
10.7.6 The bottom line is that every technique shown in this manual has been devised and
tested using sound scientific methodology.
10.7.7 The Physics Behind the Techniques.
10.7.7.1 All bodies take up space and therefore have a mass. If these bodies are within the
Earths field of gravity, there is an attraction to the Earths center due to this pull of gravity,
and bodies which are allowed to fall, will fall toward the Earth at an increasing velocity
(acceleration) because the force of gravity.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


Figure 10.2 Gibbs Ascender on 11mm Rope After Sustaining 2kN Load.

Gibbs Ascender on 11mm Rope After Sustaining a Two-Kiloton Load

UNCLASSIFIED

10-15

10-16

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


10.7.7.2 Mass, force, and acceleration due to gravity are therefore related and must be
clearly defined and understood.

10.7.8 Definitions.
10.7.8.1 Mass is the quantity of matter a body contains. The unit of mass in the SI system
has been chosen as the kilogram (kg).
10.7.8.2 Force may be defined as any action on a body which tends to change its size or
shape, its state of rest, or its state of motion.
10.7.8.3 In the SI system, the unit of force is called the Newton (N). (See Table 10.7, SI
System.)
Table 10.7 SI System.
Term

Definition
Acceleration is the rate of change of velocity, i.e. it is the change in
velocity in a given time.

Acceleration
Acceleration = Change in velocity
Time
Velocity

As velocity is measured in meters per second in the SI system, and time


in seconds,
Acceleration = meters/second =
second

meters
second x second

All this means is that if a velocity changes from 10m/s to 20 m/s in 2


seconds, then its acceleration is:
Summary

change in velocity
Time

20 - 10 m/s =

10 m/s = 5m/s2

2s

2s

10.7.9 Dynamic Force Calculations.


10.7.9.1 The potential energy (PE) of an object is determined through multiplying mass x
gravity x height (mgh).
EXAMPLE: A 1m fall with a 200kg load (200g x 9.81 m/s2 x 1m) = 1,962kg or 19kN.
10.7.9.2 The average drop force (ADF) of an object is determined through multiplying
mass x gravity x (drop + stop) divided by stop [mg (drop + stop)/stop].
(200kg) (9.81/s2) (0.5m+1m) 6000N or 6kN
1m

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10-17

10.7.9.3 The peak dynamic force (PDF) is approximately two times the ADF or as in the
example above, 6000N x 2, or 12 kN.
NOTE: 8 to 10 kN is the maximum sustainable fall the human body generally can withstand.
10.7.9.4 Where this becomes critical for the rescuer is when a piece of equipment, such as
a daisy chain is subjected to a fall. An 80kg load falling 1m will induce a shock load of
17.6 kN. The daisy chain will absolutely fail under this load as will most likely the person
attached to the daisy chain. (See Figure 10.3, Spectra Daisy Chains After Sustaining an
80 kg Load Falling 1 Meter.)
10.7.10 Pulley Systems and Mechanical Advantage. Mechanical advantage is the ratio of
output force divided by input force. Mechanical advantage in pulley systems is gained by
increasing the number of times your initial one unit of tension is applied to the load. If the
output force is bigger than the input force, a machine has a mechanical advantage greater than
one. This can be accomplished through several means.
10.7.10.1 The amount of effort saved when using simple or complex machines is called
mechanical advantage or MA. A pulley is a chain, belt or rope wrapped around a wheel.
The mechanical advantage of a pulley system is approximately equal to the amount of
supporting ropes or strands.
10.7.10.2 Therefore, if you had a mass of 60kg and wanted to lift it using two supporting
ropes, you would have mechanical advantage (MA) of 2. The mass will feel like one half
of what it really is. When lifted with the help of the pulley system your 60kg would only
feel like 30kg. Thus the effort force equals 30kg.
10.7.10.3 The simplest example of a pulley system is shown below. Here the fixed pulley
provides no mechanical advantage (MA) but rather only changes the direction of pull. The
force required to life the load is approximately the same as the load itself and the same
amount of rope is brought in for the distance that the load is raised. (See Figure 10.4,
Simple 1:1.)
NOTE: All diagrams in this chapter are for instructional purposes only. They are not to be
construed as endorsements of any particular type of equipment or specific system. Certain items
such as progress capture Prusiks have intentionally been omitted for reasons of clarity.
10.7.10.4 The MA changes however, if the same pulley is moved to a different location so
that it is now a traveling pulley; one that moves toward the anchor as the load is raised.
Now only half as much effort is required, but over twice the distance. (See Figure 10.5,
Simple 2:1.)
10.7.10.5 Even if a second pulley is added so that the direction of the pull is reversed, the
pulley does not affect the Ideal Mechanical Advantage (IMA), though in some cases it may
make it more practical for the haulers to pull. (See Figure 10.6, Simple 2:1 With a Change
in Direction.)

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Figure 10.3 Spectra Daisy Chains After Sustaining an 80 kg Load Falling 1 Meter.

Spectra Daisy Chains After Sustaining an 80 kg Load Falling One Meter

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10-19

Figure 10.4 Simple 1:1.

Simple 1:1

Load

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 10.5 Simple 2:1.

Simple 2:1

Load

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.6 Simple 2:1 With a Change in Direction.

Simple 2:1 with a Change in Direction

Load

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.10.6 Mechanical advantage is gained from the moving pulleys in exchange of effort
for distance. If the last pulley in the system is fixed, it does not affect the IMA but may
improve the practical use of the pulley system by changing the direction of pull. In both of
the above figures, twice as much rope is required on the pull side to raise the load a certain
distance, although only half the force is required.
10.7.10.7 This is referred to as a system with an MA of 2, or a 2:1 system.
10.7.10.8 A pulley system is just one of many ways to achieve MA. The key to learning
pulley systems is in understanding the basic concepts and principles that distinguish one
system from another. All to often rescuers are shown just one or two pulley systems and
end up force fitting them to all rescue situations. Learning a few pulley systems by rote
does not provide rescuers with the knowledge and flexibility to make the best use of
resources.
10.7.10.9 To be efficient, flexible, and effective, rescuers need to have the ability to
quickly decide which system is most appropriate for the given working conditions such as
the amount of tension the load places in the mainline, the availability of equipment,
working room, friction points, and the number of haulers.
10.7.10.10 Pulley systems can be divided into three categories: simple, compound, and
complex. It addition, most pulley systems can be rigged either by using the mainline itself
or using a separate rope, often referred to as acting on the mainline, as shown below.
While most pulley systems used in rope rescue will be either be simple or compound,

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-21

rescuers still need to be able to recognize and understand the advantages and
disadvantages of all types of pulley systems. (See Figure 10.7, Pulley System.)
Figure 10.7 Pulley System.

Pulley System
(a) Pulley System using Mainline

(b) Pulley System acting on the Mainline

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.10.11 There are some components that can be added to a pulley system to make its
operation more practical during a rescue. The first is a self-minding ratchet. This device
enables the haulers to maintain lift distance gained without having to hold onto the rope at
all times. One such device is the Prusik and a Prusik minding pulley (PMP), shown below.
(See Figure 10.8, Ratchet Prusik.)
10.7.10.12 Devices that act as ratchets also enable resets of the pulley system as the
maintain tension in the mainline while the pulley system is slackened and reset. This can
also be accomplished by having a rescuer tend the device that will grab the rope when the
pulley system needs a reset.
10.7.10.13 Simple pulley systems are characterized by having one continuous rope
flowing back and forth alternately between the pulleys under load and the anchor (or the
anchor and the load) and all pulleys at the load side (referred to as traveling pulleys) travel
towards the anchor at the same speed. (See Figure 10.9, Simple Pulley System, details
this movement.)

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.8 Ratchet Prusik.

Ratchet Prusik

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 10.9 Simple Pulley System.

Simple Pulley System

Stationary Pulley

Traveling Pulley

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10-23

10.7.11 Summary of Simple Pulley Systems Principles.


10.7.11.1 If the end of the rope is at the anchor, the IMA will be an even number (2:1, 4:1,
6:1, and so forth). If the end of the rope is toward the load, the IMA will be an odd number
(1:1, 3:1, 5:1). A handy way to remember this is anchor even load odd, or A-E-L-O.
10.7.11.2 If the last pulley in the system (one closest to the haulers) is at the anchor
(fixed), it does not add MA but just changes the direction of pull.
10.7.11.3 The IMA of a simple system is determined by counting the number of ropes
under tension at the load side of the pulley.
10.7.11.4 The number of pulleys required for a simple system (without change of
direction) is always the IMA minus one.
10.7.11.5 To incorporate a self-minding ratchet located at the anchor, the IMA of the
simple pulley system must be an odd number. (See Figure 10.10, Simple Pulley System
Examples.)
NOTE: Simple pulley systems work out best most of the time due to altitude, cold, and team
fatigue (KISS principle).
Figure 10.10 Simple Pulley System Examples.

Simple Pulley System Examples

Simple 1:1 with Change of Direction

Simple 2:1

Simple 2:! with Change of Direction

Simple 2:1

Simple 3:1 with Ratchet Prudik

Simple 3:1 with Change of Direction

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10.7.12 Compound Pulley Systems.


10.7.12.1 These are characterized as one simple pulley system puling on another simple
pulley system; the traveling pulleys travel towards the anchor at different speeds.
10.7.12.2 Compound pulley systems are useful because they can provide greater MA than
simple systems for the same number of pulleys, thereby reducing overall friction loss for
the same IMA.
10.7.13 Summary of Compound Pulley System Principles.
10.7.13.1 The IMA of a compound pulley system is determined by multiplying the IMA
of each simple pulley system together. For example, a simple 3:1 pulling on a simple 2:1
becomes a compound 6:1 as 3 x 2 = 6; also note that a simple 2:1 pulling on a simple 3:1
is also a compound 6:1 as 2 x 3 = 6.
10.7.13.2 If it is important to get the load up with the least number of resets and you are
using a compound pulley system comprised of two dissimilar MA simple pulley systems,
have the higher MA system pull on the lower MA system. In other words have the 3:1 pull
on the 2:1, resulting in a compound 6:1. Recall from the simple pulley systems section that
if you want to use a self-minding ratchet, you need an odd-numbered pulley system. You
will have to decide which factor is more important or change your compound pulley
system to another combination that can meet both those needs.
10.7.13.3 Longer throw distances per reset can be achieved by positioning the anchor
pulleys of the last (closest to the hauler) simple pulley system, far enough back to allow
each simple pulley system to collapse at the same time; the last 3:1 must have three times
the reset distance of the first simple 3:1. This is due to the fact that 3 times more rope will
be pulled through the last simple 3:1 than the first simple 3:1.
10.7.13.4 The highest MA with the least number of pulleys is achieved by repeatedly
compounding a simple 2:1 on a simple 2:1. When constructing a compound pulley system,
think of all the possible combinations that when multiplied together will equal your
desired MA; then consider the advantages and disadvantages of each and determine which
will best meet your needs given the available equipment and working constraints. (See
Figure 10.11, Compound Pulley Systems.)
10.7.14 Complex Pulley Systems. These are characterized by being neither simple nor
compound. There is no one definition that characterizes all complex systems due to their great
diversity.
10.7.14.1 With only 4 pulleys, more than 100 combinations of pulley systems can be
made, with most of them being complex types.
10.7.14.2 With the exception of a few common complex pulley systems such as the
Spanish Burton, complex pulley systems are not often used in rescue work. Typically,
similar objectives can be met using simple or compound pulley systems that are easier for
rescuers to recognize and are more flexible for modifications as required.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-25

Figure 10.11 Compound Pulley Systems.

Compound Pulley Systems

Compound 4:1 - Simple 2:1 pulling on a Simple 2:1

Compound 6:1 - Simple 2:1 pulling on a Simple 3:1

Compound 9:1 - Simple 3:1 pulling on a Simple 3:1

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


10.7.14.3 Theoretical mechanical advantage (TMA) is the estimated actual mechanical
advantage (AMA) that you calculate after taking into consideration factors that would
affect IMA. These include several factors, the largest component of which is friction.
10.7.14.4 Calculating the TMA is covered later in this chapter but it is important to note
that with pulleys and carabiners within the pulley system, the TMA, and AMA will always
be less than the IMA.

10.7.15 Vector Angles. One of several considerations when building a mechanical advantage
using pulleys is that of vector angles and resultant loads. (See Figure 10.12 and Figure 10.13,
Vector Angle and Resultant Loads.)
Figure 10.12 Vector Angle and Resultant Loads I (1 of 2).

Vector Angles and Resultant Loads (1 of 2)

1.4
90
1

120

2
1

.7
1

120

90
.5 .5

.7

160

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.15.1 Of primary concern to the rescue technician is the fact that as the angle increases
(widens) the resultant load increases proportionately.
10.7.15.2 Notice the increased load on a pulley as the angle widens from 90 to 120 to 160
degrees.
10.7.15.3 This has a direct effect on the anchors as well as the entire system. Make sure
the load factor does not exceed the capacity of the overall system.
10.7.15.4 To achieve an SSSF of 10:1, the number of people on a raising team must be
limited to four for a 3:1 MA system and to two for a 5:1 MA system with an 11mm rope.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-27

Figure 10.13 Vector Angle and Resultant Loads II (2 of 2).

Vector Angle and Resultant Loads (2 of 2)


50% 50%
58%

58%
60

100%

120

100%

!
UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.15.5 A reasonable rule of thumb is that the number of people hauling multiplied by
the MA should not exceed 12. The hauling should be done hand over hand and not by
attaching a Prusik to the rope.
10.7.15.6 These values are based on the following assumptions and calculations.
10.7.15.7 Based on several tests, the average pull is 50 pounds per person or 150 pounds
for three people. With an MA of 3:1, the load on the rope becomes 150 x 3 = 450 pounds.
With a 10:1 SSSF, this value becomes 4,500 pounds.
10.7.15.8 The tensile strength of our 11mm ropes is 6,500 pounds, and with a knot, it is
30 percent less or 4,550 pounds. With a 5:1 MA, two people pulling, and a 9:1 SSSF, the
maximum load on the rope will not exceed 100 x 5 x 9 = 4,500 pounds.
10.7.16 The Tension-Method for Pulley Systems. A pulley systems ideal mechanical
advantage (IMA), which does not factor in friction, is expressed as a ratio of the amount of
output force to the amount of input force (e.g., 6:1 or 6 to1). The input force is the tension
you apply to the system and is always expressed as 1.
10.7.16.1 One method of calculating the IMA of any pulley system is referred to as the
Tension method or T-method. This factor is increasingly critical as the slope increases.
10.7.16.2 Some basic physics principles need to be understood and applied to knowing
how tension is distributed through a pulley system. Mechanical advantage in pulley
systems is gained by increasing the number of times the initial one unit of tension is
applied to the load.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


10.7.16.3 Recognize that there are many ways that this can be accomplished, or rigged,
using simple, compound, or complex pulley systems.
10.7.16.4 By assigning one unit of tension (called T) to where you pull on the pulley
system, then following the path of the rope through the pulley system to the load itself, the
IMA can be determined.
10.7.16.5 This is done by keeping track of how that initial unit of tension is distributed
throughout the system.
10.7.16.6 Simply compare the amount of tension the load receives to the initial input unit
of tension.
10.7.16.7 The key to understanding the T-method is in recognizing what happens to the
tension in the rope as it flows through the pulley system. Whenever there is a junction in
the ropes of the pulley system, where either more than one rope acts on another rope, or
one rope acts on more than one rope, then the tension on the side of the junction must be
equal to the tension on the other side of the junction.
10.7.16.8 Conversely, for each side of the junction, the tension must be distributed
appropriately (not always equally) to each rope. For example, if a rope having one unit of
tension makes a 180 degree change of direction through a pulley (a junction), then
whatever that pulley is connected to receives two units of tension. In essence, two ropes
each having a tension of one (for a total of two units of tension) are acting on (and being
opposed by) what the pulley is connected to.
10.7.16.9 Figure 10.14, Tension Distribution, are some illustrations of tension
distribution in ropes at junctions.
10.7.16.10 Summary of the T-Method is calculation and application.
10.7.16.10.1 Assign one unit of tension to where you pull on the pulley system.
10.7.16.10.2 Follow the rope through the pulley system and when you encounter a
junction, apply the principles of tension distribution. Keep track of all units of tension
through to the load.
10.7.16.10.3 Total all units of tension that reach the load; the ideal IMA is the ratio
between this total and the initial one unit of tension.
10.7.16.10.4 Some examples of using the T-method to calculate the IMA of pulley
systems are shown in the following figures: Figure 10.15, Simple 3:1, Figure 10.16,
Compound 9:1, and Figure 10.17, Complex 3:1.
10.7.16.11 The theoretical mechanical advantage (TMA) is the estimated actual
mechanical advantage (AMA) calculated after taking into account factors that affect IMA;
the largest component of which is friction.
10.7.16.12 The greatest friction losses occur as the rope comes into contact with the
pulleys. Sometimes carabiners are used in place of pulleys which results in an even greater
amount of friction.

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10-29

Figure 10.14 Tension Distribution.

Tension Distribution

.5T

1T

2T

1T

1T

.5T

1T

2T
1T

2T

1T
3T

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 10.15 Simple 3:1.

Simple 3:1

1T
1T

2T (1T + 1T = 2T)

1T
1T

2T

1T

3T (1T + 2T = 3T)
Load

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.16 Compound 9:1.

Compound 9:1

1T

1T
1T

A
A

1T

1T

2T

3T
3T

6T

2T (1T + 1T = 2T)
1T 3T (1T + 2T = 3T)
6T (3T + 3T = 6T)
3T
3T

9T (6T + 3T = 9T)
Load

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 10.17 Complex 3:1.

Complex 3:1

2T (1T + 1T = 2T)
1T
2T
4T

2T

1T

1T 1T
2T
Load
3T (1T + 2T = 3T)

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-31

10.7.16.13 To calculate/measure the losses due to friction, one must know the efficiency
of the pulleys or carabiners being used. Efficiency is the measure of friction loss
calculated as the input force over the output force, expressed as a percent. For example, if
90N is required on one side of a pulley to hold a 100N load on the other side, the efficiency
of the pulley is stated as 90 percent or 90/100. With efficiency information, the friction
loss through the system can be calculated. Figure 10.18, Theoretical Mechanical
Advantage, shows calculations for a pulley system with pulleys having an efficiency rating
of 0.90. Paragraph 10.7.16.15.1, Friction Coefficient, discusses friction theory in greater
detail and is illustrated in Figure 10.19, Points of Friction.
10.7.16.14 Assuming that the pullers pull at the pulley system with one unit of Tension
(1T), only 0.90T will be transferred past the first pulley. When that 0.9T reaches the second
pulley, only 0.81T will be transferred on (0.9 x 0.9 = 0.81) as the friction loss is now
compounded over two pulleys. Follow this process all the way through the pulley system.
When complete, use the T-method to determine the final TMA, which in this example is
2.71:1. If higher efficiency pulleys are used, the TMA is increased, bringing it closer to
the IMA of 3:1. Also important to note is that if you are using pulleys of different
efficiencies, less losses occur if the most efficient pulley is placed closest to the pullers.
This is because the loss at the first pulley is compounded throughout the system.
10.7.16.15 Friction is a force that opposes motion. Friction acts in a direction opposite to
the objects direction in motion. Without friction, the object would continue to move at a
constant speed forever. There are different forms of frictionsliding, rolling, and fluid.
The formula to calculate the normal force is FN = - mg.
FN is the normal force in Newton (N).
m is the mass in kg.
G is the gravitational force in m/s2.
EXAMPLE: The normal force acting on a 70-kg person would be FN = - (70 kg) (-9.8 m/s2) =
686N. What this means in rope rescue is that friction incurred when lowering a victim and
attendant can work to our advantage, whereas friction incurred while raising the same load makes
for substantially more work. This sounds overly simple, but friction takes its toll on equipment and
rescuers. For example, a 2000N load being raised over a pulley that changes direction 90 degrees
will incur friction such that the haul team is only operating at 0.9 efficiency. In other words, they
are only capable of hauling 1800N. (See Figure 10.19, Points of Friction.)
10.7.16.15.1 Friction Coefficient. Additional examples regarding friction coefficient
are as follows:
Rock edge coefficient of 0.59. Therefore, a 2kN load (2kN/0.59) would equal
3.38.
Metal edge coefficient of 0.83. Therefore, a 2kN load would equal 2.40.
Munter Hitch coefficient of 0.15. Therefore, a 2kN load would equal 13.33.
The challenge here is that the human hand can only hold 209N for a short
duration, therefore the friction coefficient generated is 0.32, or 209N x 0.59 = 150.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.18 Theoretical Mechanical Advantage.

Theoretical Mechanical Advantage

1T
1.9T (1T + 0.90T)

0.90T
0.81T

2.71T (1.9T + 0.81T)

1.71T

Load

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 10.19 Points of Friction.

Points of Friction

Friction Points

Haul team effectiveness


based on Friction Points:
Pulley 1 =
Pulley 2 =
Rock edge =

.9 Efficiency
.9 Efficiency
.59 Efficiency

Total:
= 5.84 kN required
to lift a 2 kN load

Rock edge transition


2 kN Load

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-33

10.7.17 Litter Raises and Lowers on Slopes. L i t t e r t r a n s p o r t u p o r d o w n s t e e p


embankments is an often used rope technique for transporting patients involved in
over-the-side vehicle accidents.
10.7.17.1 In mountainous terrain, this technique may also be referred to as scree
evacuation.
10.7.17.2 Usually there are three or four litter bearers, and the mainline is attached to the
head end of the litter. While there are several different ways to rig the litter for a
raise/lower on a slope, consideration must be given to the escalating tension that the
mainline is subjected to as the slope angle increases. If the objective is to operate at or
above a static systems safety factor (SSSF) of 10:1, then there is a limit on how steep this
technique can be used.
10.7.17.3 Several operating guidelines need to be considered when determining maximum
slope angle for a given rope type and number of litter bearers. While it is impractical to
take a calculator or a set of force table to the rescue, some rules of thumb have been
developed for understanding the relationship between mass, force, and slope angle.
10.7.17.4 The graphical use of force vectors provides both a reasonable level of force
approximation and a better understanding of the forces produced within the system.
10.7.17.5 Recognizing that many variables affect the resulting force or tension in the
mainline, s ome assumptions need to be made to simplify it toward the rule of thumb.
10.7.17.6 These assumptions include:
The first two persons (rescuer and patient) have masses of 100 kilograms each,
including equipment, and each additional persons have masses of 80 kilograms each.
Each litter bearer walks with their body positioned perpendicular to the slope.
The rope angle is the same as the slope angle.
The path traveled by the liter bearer is that of the fall line.
10.7.17.7 There are basically three forces acting on the system (Figure 10.20, Force
Diagram).
mg: the mg-force (mass x gravity) due to gravity acting on the combined mass of
the litter bearers, patient and equipment.
R: the resisting force of the ground on which the litter bearers walk.
T: the tension in the rope.
10.7.17.8 Statically, these forces are in equilibrium meaning they have resolved
themselves. Each of these forces can be represented graphically as force vectors since they
have both magnitude and direction. Knowledge of the total mass involved, provides
knowledge of the direction and magnitude of the mg-force.
10.7.17.9 By selecting a scale for force, such as 1 centimeter (cm) = 1 kiloNewton (kN),
you can draw the force vectors to scale, and determine the T in the rope by physically
measuring that force vector.

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Figure 10.20 Force Diagram.

Force Diagram

mg

UNCLASSIFIED

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10-35

10.7.17.10 Since the system is in equilibrium, the combined effect of the R and T force
vectors result in an opposite and equal force to the mg vector, thereby countering its effect.
10.7.17.11 To draw the vectors, start with the mg force vector, indicating both its
magnitude and direction.
10.7.17.12 Next draw the vectors which counter the effect of mg; draw the resistance R
vector (Figure 10.21, Force Vectors)in this case you only know its direction and have
the tail of the R vector start at the tip of the mg vector. Draw the T vector from the tip of
the R vector, and draw it parallel to the slope angle until it intersects the tail of the mg
vector. The magnitude of the T vector which is the tension in the rope is determined by
measuring its length, and comparing it to the scale to which you drew the mg vector. For
example, if you used the above scale, and drew the mg vector 2cm long representing 2 kN
of force, the resultant T vector is 1.2cm in length, then the corresponding force would be
1.2 kN.
Figure 10.21 Force Vectors.

Force Vectors

mg

mg

mg

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.17.13 It becomes apparent that as the slope angle increases, the force vector T
becomes larger, to the point where T and mg are the same when the angle is 90 degrees
(free-hang).
10.7.17.14 Conversely, the tension T becomes nil when the angle of the slope is 0 degree
(level).

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


10.7.17.15 Simple guidelines can now be developed for a 10:1 SSSF by comparing the
knotted breaking strength of a rope to the resultant tension or T in mainline for changing
levels of mass and/or slope angle. Table 10.8, Resultant Force (kN) for a Given Slope
Angle and Mass, shows the resultant force for given slope angles (in degrees) and different
sized rescue loads (kg).

Table 10.8 Resultant Force (kN) for a Given Slope Angle and Mass.
Mass (kg)
Angle

200 kg
(2 people)

280 kg
(3 people)

360 kg
(4 people)

440 kg
(5 people)

520 kg
(6 people)

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.17

0.24

0.31

0.37

0.44

10

0.34

0.48

0.61

0.75

0.88

15

0.51

0.71

0.92

1.12

1.33

20

0.67

0.94

1.21

1.47

1.74

25

0.83

1.16

1.49

1.83

2.16

30

0.98

1.37

1.76

2.16

2.55

35

1.12

1.57

2.02

2.46

2.91

40

1.26

1.76

2.27

2.77

3.28

45

1.39

1.95

2.50

3.06

3.61

50

1.50

2.10

2.70

3.30

3.90

55

1.61

2.25

2.90

3.54

4.19

60

1.70

2.38

3.06

3.74

4.42

65

1.78

2.49

3.20

3.92

4.63

70

1.84

2.58

3.31

4.05

4.78

75

1.89

2.65

3.40

4.16

4.91

80

1.93

2.70

3.47

4.25

5.02

85

1.95

2.73

3.51

4.29

5.07

90

1.96

2.74

3.53

4.31

5.10

OVERALL NOTE:
* Under certain conditions a rescue team my choose to deviate from a 10:1 SSSF. This element
should be factored into the ORM checklist.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-37

10.7.17.15.1 The green shaded areas in the table represent acceptable levels of
mainline tension (kN) for a 10:1 SSSF using a 11.1 millimeter (mm) or larger nylon
kernmantle low-stretch rope, assuming a knotted breaking strength of at least 22 kN.
10.7.17.15.2 The yellow shaded region shows acceptable combinations of mass and
slope angle for a 12.7mm mainline, assuming a breaking strength of approximately 33
kN. Force levels that exceed 10:1 SSSF for both 11.1mm and 12.7mm mainline ropes
are shown in the red region. As an example, three litter bearers and a patient can
maintain a 10:1 SSSF on slopes to just under 40 degrees using an 11.1mm mainline. If
instead, they are using a 12.7mm mainline, then the maximum slope angle can be
increased to 70 degrees.
10.7.17.15.3 It is important to note that the yellow and red areas of the table do not
represent go or no go from an operational standpoint.
10.7.17.15.4 The different colors simply represent where a 10:1 SSSF does or does not
exist given a certain slope angle, rope type, and rescue mass. Under certain conditions
a rescue team may choose to deviate from a 10:1 SSSF for specific reasons. This
element should be factored into the ORM checklist.
NOTE: All diagrams in this chapter are for instructional purposes only. They are not to be
construed as endorsements of any particular type of equipment or specific system. Certain items
such as progress capture Prusiks have intentionally been omitted for reasons of clarity.
10.7.17.16 Table 10.9, Summary of Leg Tension Forces, Figure 10.22, Leg Tensions, and
Figure 10.23, Ropes, incorporate all of the principles described above so that the rescue
team can safely develop a solution for establishing safety lines and high lines. Utilizing the
Vector Angles chart along with Table 10.8, Resultant Force (kN) for a Given Slope Angle
and Mass, the leg tension forces can be computed accordingly. The desired outcome is the
determination as to whether or not it is safe to suspend a rescuer and victim on the line by
maintaining a SSF of 10:1.
Table 10.9 Summary of Leg Tension Forces.
Angle Leg

Tension

90

70 percent

120

100 percent

150

200 percent

170

575 percent

OVERALL NOTE:
* Leg Tension = distance across span x hanging force 4Y (vertical drop).

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.22 Leg Tensions.

Leg Tensions

75 feet
10 feet

A 75 foot high line sags 10 feet at the center with a 150 pound
load. What is tjhe tension on each leg?
Leg Tension = Distance Across x Hanging Force / 4Y
(75 x 150) /40 = 281.25 T on each leg
With a 30 kN rope, this meets the SSSF of 10:1 as 281.25 is
less than 300

120 degrees

3 kN
Force
What is the total tension with a spread of 120 degrees and a
suspended force of 3 kN?
120 degrees = 100% on each leg, or 3kN

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-39

Figure 10.23 Ropes.

Ropes

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.18 Ropes for Rescue Work.
10.7.18.1 Perhaps one of the most difficult concepts to grasp is that of using a rope with
the least amount of stretch for rescue work. Climbing ropes or dynamic rope, which offer
8 to 10 percent stretch, are great for reducing injuries in climbing falls, but these are
unacceptable for rescue work. The last thing you want a rescuer and patient to have to
endure is rope elongation after a main anchor has failed.
10.7.18.2 Static rope is a type of rope that typically only stretches 2 to 3 percent when a
1kN force is experienced.
10.7.18.3 No one rope size or strength will be perfect for every need. Rope strength is the
more important of the two attributes. Strength is usually expressed as tensile strength at
break. There are as many ways to measure and describe rope strength as there are
manufacturers of rope. In testing, many factors come into play, any of which can move
scores up or down. The rate at which the pull is applied, the temperature, the diameter of
the mandrel, along with other factors can change test results. Descriptions can be just as
bad. Maximum, average, and minimum all are terms used to describe tensile strength.
Obviously, you should not compare one manufacturers maximum strength to anothers
minimum strength. Beware, there are manufacturers who only list a nebulous safe
working load, not a tensile strength at all.
10.7.18.4 The minimum strength is the only one that counts when a life will hang on the
rope. Ropes are tested according to Federal Standard 191A Method 6106. The NFPA also

10-40

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


endorses the use of this standard. The testing of ropes is performed by an independent
certified testing laboratory. Keep in mind that a laboratory test which is repeatable any
time anywhere cannot accurately reflect the conditions in the field. The actual performance
in the field may not measure up to laboratory standards. A laboratory test does not take
into account things such as knots or building edges. Ropes in the field are definitely
affected by these and other factors.
10.7.18.5 Before selecting a rope you should first determine the greatest working load you
will expect the rope to support in its lifetime. Will it be a rappel line for one person, a
lowering line for two people with a litter and equipment, or a highline in a long traverse?
The current NFPA standard for one man ropes is a safe-working load of 300 pounds
(136kg), minimum tensile strength of 4,500 pounds (2041kg), minimum diameter of 3/8
inch (10mm), and a maximum of 1/2 inch (12.5mm). NFPA standards for two man ropes
are: safe working load of 600 pounds (272kg), minimum strength of 9,000 pounds
(4,082kg), minimum diameter of 1/2 inch (12.5mm), and a maximum of 5/8 inch (16mm).
10.7.18.6 Further guidance regarding the selection of rescue ropes can be found in the
attachments of this manual. (See Figure 10.24, Accessory Cord.)

Figure 10.24 Accessory Cord.

Accessory Cord

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-41

10.7.19 Accessory Cord.


10.7.19.1 Accessory cords are scaled down kernmantle rope. Diameters smaller than 5/16
inch (8mm) are accessory cords, larger sizes are rope.
10.7.19.2 A single accessory cord should not be used in a life supporting situation. Do
not use static accessory cord for climbing, rappelling, or rescue. Accepted uses for
accessory cords include noncritical applications.
10.7.19.3 Exceptions to this rule are ascending systems and hauling systems utilizing
knots.
10.7.19.4 However, in these cases, the live or critical load must be supported by a
redundancy in the system that will protect the load should a single accessory cord sling
fail.
10.7.19.5 Most authorities recommend that the climber be attached to the standing line by
three or more points when ascending.
10.7.20 Care and Maintenance of Accessory Cords.
10.7.20.1 This generally is the same as for ropes. Be especially vigilant when inspecting
accessory cords. Due to their compact design and small diameters, accessory cords tend to
wear out much quicker than ropes.
10.7.20.2 Inspect prusik slings religiously. Prusik hitches under heavy loading can slip.
The resulting frictional heating can glaze or melt the sheath. Keep a sharp eye for this type
of damage.
NOTE: When using Prusiks on 11mm rope, 8mm nylon is the optimum diameter for safety
reasons.
10.7.21 Types of Webbing.
10.7.21.1 Flat webbing is thicker, stronger, and more abrasion resistant than its tubular
counterpart. The increased strength of flat webbing is often preferred in harsh and abrasive
environments for use with technical rigging and in heavy rescue loads. (See Figure 10.25,
Types of Webbing.)
10.7.21.2 Tubular webbing is easily identified because of the hollow center or tube-type
construction.
NOTE: Products like SPECTRA cord, have a low melting point and are extremely slippery, their
use should be avoided.
10.7.21.3 All hardware should have a load rating stamped on it. If it does not, do not use
it.
10.7.21.4 Keep in mind the SSSF of 10:1, which means a rating of at least 20kN. Several
pieces of rock climbing hardware do not meet this criteria: daisy chains, quick draws, and
some pulleys for climbing haul systems.
10.7.21.5 The optimum piece of hardware for lowering a mainline is still a brake rack or
brake tube.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.25 Types of Webbing.

Types of Webbing

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.22 Pulleys.
10.7.22.1 There are three main types of pulleys: ball bearing, needle bearing, and bushing.
10.7.22.2 In general, pulleys with ball bearings deliver about 95 percent efficiency while
pulleys with bushings deliver about 85 percent efficiency. Rope stiffness also greatly
affects pulley efficiency. Use pliable ropes when using multiple pulleys. Prusik minding
pulleys have sides that are squared off and are used in conjunction with Prusiks to create a
belay system. This squaring off helps to prevent the Prusiks from being pulled through the
pulley. (See Figure 10.26, Pulleys.)
10.7.23 Carabiners. Carabiners come in a multitude of sizes, shapes, and styles. Of all the
features including material and strength, shape, gate type, gate opening, and reservoir space,
strength is paramount. Remember that the spine (side opposite the gate) is the strongest part.
10.7.23.1 A carabiner with an open gate looses approximately 50 percent of its strength.
10.7.23.2 Tri-loading (3-way) results in a 70 percent loss in strength.
10.7.23.3 D or offset D carabiners are typically used for rescue rigging.
10.7.23.4 In part, the shape of the carabiner determines how many slings, pulleys, or ropes
can pass through the widest end. The tendency is to load it up until no more material can
be mashed through the gate. Unfortunately this can cause side loading which significantly
reduces the strength of the carabiner.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-43

Figure 10.26 Pulleys.

Pulleys

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.23.5 The carabiner pictured in Figure 10.27, Carabiners, manufactured by Petzl,
features a push button release. This item is absolutely worthless in the types of
environments that PJs typically work in, becuase of the push button being inaccessible
with gloves on. Screw locks remain the best since they have less to malfunction and can
be manipulated easily.
10.7.24 Descenders. These are used for belaying and rappelling. All these devices apply
friction across the rope to impede the movement of the rope through the device. Plates have
been around for some time and are the precursor to tubes but their use is getting scarce with the
invention of tubes. Called an ATC by most, the proper name for these popular devices is a
tube device. Just about all companies make a tube device but those with slots in one side to
increase the friction really shine on the new generation small diameter ropes and wet or icy
ropes such as alpine climbing. Tubes add twists to the rope but can be kept to a minimum with
proper use.
10.7.24.1 There are a host of specialized friction devices that their primary function is for
sport climbing or climbing in gyms. While these will work for traditional climbing, their
climbing action can clog with dirt, which could decrease their safety margin.
10.7.24.2 Even more specialized friction devices are those designed for solo climbing
applications and a high knowledge of their peculiarities and advanced rope skills is
mandatory for their use.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.27 Carabiners.

Carabiners

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.24.3 There exists a controversy among rescuers and climbers regarding which
descending device is acceptable for rescue work. Figure 8s have been in use by pFigure
Eightsararescuemen since the 1970s, when they replaced multi-carabiner stacks. Although
they have their place and are hard to beat in the area of safety, their usefulness in technical
rope rescue is limited. The major downfall comes from the amount of twist that is induced
into a descent line. This can become disastrous for a small rescue team that has only one
mainline attendant. Attempting to clear twists as they enter a Figure Eight will cause an
irreversible jam.
10.7.24.4 Brake racks have the inherent benefit of being adjustable dependant upon the
load. The tie-off also is easier to manage under load. Given their robust construction,
brake racks are one of the most reliable pieces of hardware for this task.
10.7.24.5 Brake tubes also fall in the category of safe, reliable, robust, and able to handle
knots well. (See Figure 10.28, Descenders; Figure 10.29, Test Data; and Figure 10.30,
540 Belay Device, for more clarification.)

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-45

Figure 10.28 Descenders.

Descenders

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 10.29 Test Data.

Test Data Chart


24

Knots only 21.6 kN

Force (kN)

20

540

16
12

Tandem Prusiks 17.3 kN

12.9 kN

8
4
0
0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

Time(s)
All tests 1m drop of 280kg onto 3m of 12.5mm PMI EZ Bend rope

UNCLASSIFIED

0.8

10-46

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.30 540 Belay Device.

540 Belay Device

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.25 Belaying Devices.
10.7.25.1 This device relies on a common principal of the rope generating a frictional
force with the object upon which it is wrapped in proportion to the load. The load can be
easily controlled as long as the number of wraps is sufficient to generate enough friction to
counteract the force generated at the contracting surfaces.
10.7.25.2 A very desirable further attribute of this principal is the ability of these systems
to absorb large momentary increases in load forces. When the system is subjected to a
sudden increase in force the rope grips the object harder creating a proportional increase in
friction. The increase in friction effectively compensates for the sudden load increase and
only a fraction of this force is transferred to the operator of the system.
10.7.25.3 The belay spool works essentially on this principal with the additional
advantage of the internal friction of the rope fibers created by the bending and
straightening of the rope as it moves over its lobed surface under load. This same principal
makes the brake bar rack an effective device given its relatively small contact surface with
rope.
10.7.25.4 Rope moves relatively easily through the belay spool when not under load by
virtue of the rope's tendency to form a loose coil around the drum. This coil generally only
makes contact with the top of the lobes so friction is low. This is especially advantageous
when belaying a rescue load being raised (e.g., taking rope in through the device). When

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-47

this is reversed, as in a lower, the belayer needs only to maintain a firm grip on the rope
and allow the device to self feed.
10.7.26 Rigging Plates. This piece of hardware is designed for organizing the work position
and to create a multiple anchor system very easily. It also serves to optimize the distribution
of forces at the belay.
10.7.26.1 These are an excellent tool and offer a clean way to bring together multiple
anchor points. (See Figure 10.31, Rigging Plates; Table 10.10, Hardware Characteristics;
and Table 10.11, Rope Characteristics, for information.)
Figure 10.31 Rigging Plates.

Rigging Plates

UNCLASSIFIED
Table 10.10 Hardware Characteristics.
Device

Strength

Large diameter pulley

32 kN

Prusik minding pulley (PMP)

32 kN

Radium release hitch (RRH)

36 kN

Wrap 3/pull 2 (W3P2) anchor

35 kN

W2P1 anchor
540 lowering device

24-26 kN
70 kN

10-48

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 10.11 Rope Characteristics.


Material

Strength

6mm cord

7.5 kN

7mm cord

10 kN

8mm cord

15 kN

11.1 rope

30 kN

12.7 rope

40 kN

25mm web

18 kN

10.7.27 Knots and Hitches. Proper utilization of knots is a science unto itself. The
following section is a compilation of the knots deemed most efficient for modern rope rescue
work. It is not all inclusive, but each of the knots depicted are reliable and easy to tie. (See
Figure 10.32, Knot Cartoon; Figure 10.33, Definition Diagram; and Table 10.12, Rope
Strength Decrease Due to Knot.)
10.7.27.1 Some tips on knot tying:
10.7.27.2 Practice tying knots with the same size and type rope intended for use in the
field.
10.7.27.3 Knot loops should be small and about as big as that which is intended to go into
it. Space is often a luxury PJs do not have. Compact rigging skills afford maximum use of
resources.
10.7.27.4 Know relative strengths and use the stronger knots when possible. Realize that
a ring bend (water knot) only provides about 50 percent efficiency and when wet is only
about 35 percent as strong as the original piece of webbing.
10.7.27.5 Back-up knots are not always necessary. Concentrate on tying each knot the best
it can be tied.
10.7.27.6 Rig and tie as if you were an engineer. Directionally tension, use what is
necessary and no more.
10.7.27.7 Definitions.
10.7.27.7.1 Knota strand of material is tied to itself.
10.7.27.7.2 Bendtwo or more strands of material are tied to each other.
10.7.27.7.3 Hitcha strand (or two strands) of material is tied around another object
in such a manner that if the object were removed, the hitch would undo itself.
10.7.27.7.4 Running Endthe end of the rope or material that is being worked with.
10.7.27.7.5 Standing Endthe bulk of rope or material not being actively used.
10.7.27.7.6 Bighta 180-degree turn in the strand of rope material.
10.7.27.7.7 Loopa 360-degree turn in the strand of rope or material.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-49

Figure 10.32 Knot Cartoon.

Knot Cartoon

"I hope my knot


is holding."

UNCLASSIFIED

10-50

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.33 Definition Diagram.

Definition Diagram

Bight

Loop

Half Hitch
Running End

Standing End
Turn

Round Turn

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.28 Basic and End-of-Rope Knot.
10.7.28.1 Double Fishermans Knot. The double fishermans knot (also called double
English or grapevine) is used to tie two ropes of the same or approximately the same
diameter. It is a joining knot. (See Figure 10.34, Double Fishermans Knot.)
10.7.28.1.1 Tying the Knot.
Step 1. With the working end of one rope, tie two wraps around the standing
part of another rope.
Step 2. Insert the working end (Step 1) back through the two wraps and draw it
tight.
Step 3. With the working end of the other rope, which contains the standing part
(Steps 1 and 2), tie two wraps around the standing part of the other rope (the
working end in Step 1). Insert the working end back through the two wraps and
draw tight.
Step 4. Pull on the opposing ends to bring the two knots together

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-51

Table 10.12 Rope Strength Decrease Due to Knot.


Knot

Percent of Rope Strength Lost


Bends

- Double Fishermans Knot

21 percent

- Figure Eight Bend (Flemish Bend)


- Water Knot (actually a bend)

19 percent
36 percent
Loops

- Figure Eight Loop (with bight)

20 percent

- Figure Eight Loop (follow through)

19 percent

- Double Figure Eight Loop

18 percent

- In-Line Figure Eight Loop

25 percent

- Butterfly Knot

25 percent

- Bowline

33 percent

- Overhand Loop (with a bight)

15 percent

- Overhand Double Loop

26 percent
Rope With A Loop In It

- Figure Eight Loop

35 percent

- In-Line Figure Eight Loop

41 percent

- Butterfly Loop

31 percent
Knots in Web

- Overhand Loop

35 percent

- Figure Eight Loop (with a bight)

30 percent

- Figure Eight Loop (follow through)

26 percent

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.34 Double Fishermans Knot.

Double Fisherman's Knot

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.28.2 Figure Eight Knot. The Figure Eight bend is used to join the ends of two ropes
of equal or unequal diameter within 5mm difference. (See Figure 10.35, Figure Eight
Knot.)
10.7.28.2.1 Tying the Knot.
Step 1. Grasp the top of a 2-foot bight.
Step 2. With the other hand, grasp the running end (short end) and make a
360-degree turn around the standing end.
Step 3. Place the running end through the loop just formed creating an in-line
Figure Eight.
Step 4. Route the running end of the other ripe back through the Figure Eight
starting from the original ropes running end. Trace the original knot to the
standing end.
Step 5. Remove all unnecessary twists and crossovers. Dress the knot down.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-53

Figure 10.35 Figure Eight Knot.

Figure Eight Knot

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.28.3 Water Knot. The water knot is used to attach two webbing ends. It is also
called a ring bend, overhand retrace, or tape knot. It is used in runners and harnesses and is
a joining knot. (See Figure 10.36, Water Knot.)
10.7.28.3.1 Tying the Knot.
Step 1. Tie an overhand knot in one of the ends.
Step 2. Feed the other end back through the knot, following the path of the first
rope in reverse.
Step 3. Draw tight and pull all of the slack out of the knot. The remaining tails
must extend at least 4 inches beyond the knot in both directions.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.36 Water Knot.

Water Knot

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.28.4 Bowline. The bowline is used to tie the end of a rope around an anchor. It may
also be used to tie a single fixed loop in the end of a rope. It is an anchor knot. (See
Figure 10.37, Bowline.)
10.7.28.4.1 Tying the Knot.
Step 1. Bring the working end of the rope around the anchor, from right to left
(as the climber faces the anchor).
Step 2. Form an overhand loop in the standing part of the rope (on the climbers
right) toward the anchor.
Step 3. Reach through the loop and pull up a bight.
Step 4. Place the working end of the rope (on the climbers left) through the
bight, and bring it back onto itself. Now dress the knot down.
Step 5. Form an overhand knot with the tail from the bight.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-55

Figure 10.37 Bowline.

Bowline

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.28.5 Round Turn and Two Half Hitches. This knot is used to tie the end of a rope
to an anchor, and it must have constant tension. It is an anchor knot. (See Figure 10.38,
Round Turn and Two Half Hitches.)
10.7.28.5.1 Tying the Knot.
Step 1. Route the rope around the anchor from right to left and wrap down (must
have two wraps in the rear of the anchor, and one in the front). Run the loop around
the object to provide 360-degree contact, distributing the load over the anchor.
Step 2. Bring the working end of the rope left to right and over the standing part,
forming a half hitch (first half hitch).
Step 3. Repeat Step 2 (last half hitch has a 4-inch pigtail).
Step 4. Dress the knot down.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.38 Round Turn Two Half Hitches.

Round Turn Two Half Hitches

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.28.6 Figure Eight (Retraced Figure Eight). The Figure Eight retrace knot
produces the same result as a Figure Eight loop. However, by tying the knot in a retrace, it
can be used to fasten the rope to trees or to places where the loop cannot be used. It is also
called a rerouted Figure Eight and is an anchor knot. (See Figure 10.39, Figure Eight
[Retraced Figure Eight].)
10.7.28.6.1 Tying the Knot.
Step 1. Use a length of rope long enough to go around the anchor, leaving
enough rope to work with.
Step 2. Tie a Figure Eight knot in the standing part of the rope, leaving enough
rope to go around the anchor. To tie a Figure Eight knot form a loop in the rope,
wrap the working end around the standing part and route the working end through
the loop. The finished knot is dressed loosely.
Step 3. Take the working end around the anchor point.
Step 4. With the working end, insert the rope back through the loop of the knot in
reverse.
Step 5. Keep the original Figure Eight as the outside rope and retrace the knot
around the wrap and back to the long-standing part.
Step 6. Remove all unnecessary twists and crossovers; dress the knot down.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-57

Figure 10.39 Figure Eight Retraced.

Figure Eight Retraced

UNCLASSIFIED

10-58

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


10.7.28.7 Butterfly Knot. The butterfly knot forms a single, fixed loop in the middle of
the rope. It is a middle rope knot. (See Figure 10.40, Butterfly Knot.)
10.7.28.7.1 Tying the Knot.
Step 1. When tying this knot, face the anchor that the tie-off system will be tied
to. Take up the slack from the anchor, and wrap two turns around the left hand
(palm up) from left to right.
Step 2. A loop of 30 centimeters is taken up in the second round turn to create
the fixed loop of the knot.
Step 3. Name the wraps from palm to fingertips: heel, palm, and fingertip.
Step 4. Secure the palm wrap with the right thumb and forefinger, and place it
over the heel wrap.
Step 5. Secure the heel wrap and place it over the fingertip wrap.
Step 6. Secure the fingertip wrap and place it over the palm wrap.
Step 7. Secure the palm wrap and pull up to form a fixed loop.
Step 8. Dress the knot down by pulling on the fixed loop and the two working
ends.
Step 9. Pull the working ends apart to finish the knot.

Figure 10.40 Butterfly Knot.

Butterfly Knot

UNCLASSIFIED

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10-59

10.7.28.8 Directional Figure Eight. The directional Figure Eight knot forms a single,
fixed loop in the middle of the rope that lays back along the standing part of the rope. It is
a middle rope knot. (See Figure 10.41, Directional Figure Eight.)
Figure 10.41 Directional Figure Eight.

Directional Figure Eight

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


10.7.28.8.1 Tying the Knot.
Step 1. Face the far side anchor so that when the knot is tied, it lays inward.
Step 2. Lay the rope from the far side anchor over the left palm. Make one wrap
around the palm.
Step 3. With the wrap thus formed, tie a Figure Eight knot around the standing
part that leads to the far side anchor.
Step 4. When dressing the knot down, the tail and the bight must be together.
10.7.28.9 Bowline-on-a-Bight (Two-Loop Bowline). The bowline-on-a-bight is used to
form two fixed loops in the middle of a rope. It is a middle rope knot. (See Figure 10.42,
Bowline-on-a-Bite.)

Figure 10.42 Bowline-On-a-Bite.

Bowline-on-a-Bite

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.28.9.1 Tying the Knot.
Step 1. Form a bight in the rope about twice as long as the finished loops will
be.
Step 2. Tie an overhand knot on a bight.
Step 3. Hold the overhand knot in the left hand so that the bight is running down
and outward.
Step 4. Grasp the bight with the right hand; fold it back over the overhand knot
so that the overhand knot goes through the bight.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-61

Step 5. From the end (apex) of the bight, follow the bight back to where it forms
the cross in the overhand knot. Grasp the two ropes that run down and outward and
pull up, forming two loops.
Step 6. Pull the two ropes out of the overhand knot and dress the knot down.
Step 7. A final dress is required: grasp the ends of the two fixed loops and pull,
spreading them apart to ensure the loops do not slip.
10.7.28.10 Two-Loop Figure Eight. The two-loop Figure Eight is used to form two fixed
loops in the middle of a rope. It is a middle rope knot. (See Figure 10.43, Two-Loop
Figure Eight.)
Figure 10.43 Two-Loop Figure Eight.

Two Loop Figure Eight

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.28.10.1 Tying the Knot.
Step 1. Using a doubled rope, form an 18-inch bight in the left hand with the
running end facing to the left.
Step 2. Grasp the bight with the right hand and make a 360-degree turn around
the standing end in a counterclockwise direction.
Step 3. With the working end, form another bight and place that bight through
the loop just formed in the left hand.
Step 4. Hold the bight with the left hand, and place the original bight (moving
toward the left hand) over the knot.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


Step 5. Dress the knot down.
10.7.28.11 Figure Eight Loop (Figure Eight-on-a-Bight). The Figure Eight loop, also
called the figure-eight-on-a-bight, is used to form a fixed loop in a rope. It is a middle of
the rope knot. (See Figure 10.44, Figure-Eight-On-a-Bight.)

Figure 10.44 Figure Eight On a Bight.

Figure Eight on a Bight

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.28.11.1 Tying the Knot.
Step 1. Form a bight in the rope about as large as the diameter of the desired
loop.
Step 2. With the bight as the working end, form a loop in rope (standing part).
Step 3. Wrap the working end around the standing part 360 degrees and feed the
working end through the loop. Dress the knot tightly.
10.7.28.12 Prusik Knot. The Prusik knot is used to put a moveable rope on a fixed rope
such as a Prusik ascent or a tightening system.
10.7.28.12.1 This knot can be tied as a middle or end of the rope Prusik. Static
accessory cord, braid on braid cord, or twisted cords may be used for Prusik loops.
Make absolutely sure that whichever type is used is strong enough for the intended
load and that it is small enough in diameter (relative to the standing line) and will have
enough friction to grab the standing line effectively. As a general rule, the Prusik loop
material diameter should be approximately 60 to 80 percent of the standing line
diameter. If the diameter is too small, the hitch will tend to be tight making it difficult

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-63

to move upward. On the other hand, if the diameter is too large, the hitch will not
tighten up enough to grip the standing line. In life supporting applications such as
rescue, recommend that two tandem triple wrap Prusik hitches be used. Use 8mm
Prusiks with 11mm rope and 9mm Prusiks with 12.5mm rope.
10.7.28.12.2 Tying the Knot.
10.7.28.12.2.1 Middle-of-the-Rope Prusik. The middle-of-the-rope Prusik knot
can be tied with a short rope to a long rope as follows:
Step 1. Double the short rope, forming a bight, with the working ends even.
Lay it over the long rope so that the closed end of the bight is 12 inches below
the long rope and the remaining part of the rope (working ends) is the closest to
the climber; spread the working end apart.
Step 2. Reach down through the 12-inch bight. Pull up both of the working
ends and lay them over the long rope. Repeat this process making sure that the
working ends pass in the middle of the first two wraps. Now there are four
wraps and a locking bar working across them on the long rope.
Step 3. Dress the wraps and locking bar down to ensure they are tight and not
twisted. Tying an overhand knot with both ropes will prevent the knot from
slipping during periods of variable tension.
(See Figure 10.45,
Middle-of-the-Rope Prusik.)
Figure 10.45 Middle-of-the-Rope Prisik

Middle-of-the-Rope Prusik

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


10.7.28.13 End of the Rope Prusik. (See Figure 10.46, End of Rope Prusik.)
Step 1. Using an arms length of rope and place it over the long rope.
Step 2. Form a complete round turn in the rope.
Step 3. Cross over the standing part of the short rope with the working end of the
short rope.
Step 4. Lay the working end under the long rope.
Step 5. Form a complete round turn in the rope, working back toward the middle of
the knot.
Step 6. There are four wraps and a locking bar running across them on the long rope.
Dress the wraps and locking bar down. Ensure they are tight, parallel, and not twisted.
Step 7. Finish the knot with a bowline to ensure that the Prusik knot will not slip out
during periods of varying tension.

NOTE: Six-wrap Prusiks are required for rope ascension or Purcells.


Figure 10.46 End of Rope Prusik.

End of Rope Prusik

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.28.14 Bowline-on-a-Coil. The bowline-on-a-coil is an expedient tie-in used by
climbers when a climbing harness is not available. It is a specialty knot.
10.7.28.14.1 Tying the Knot.
Step 1. With the running end, place 3 feet of rope over your right shoulder. The
running end is to the back of the body.

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10-65

Step 2. Starting at the bottom of your rib cage, wrap the standing part of the rope
around your body and down in a clockwise direction four to eight times.
Step 3. With the standing portion of the rope in your left hand, make a clockwise
loop toward the body. The standing portion is on the bottom.
Step 4. Ensuring the loop does not come uncrossed, bring it up and under the
coils between the rope and your body.
Step 5. Using the standing part, bring a bight up through the loop. Grasp the
running end of the rope with the right hand. Pass it through the bight from right to
left and back on itself.
Step 6. Holding the bight loosely, dress the knot down by pulling on the
standing end.
Step 7. Safety the bowline with an overhand around the top, single coil. Then,
tie an overhand around all coils, leaving a minimum 4 inch pigtail.
10.7.28.15 Checkpoints. (See Figure 10.47, Bowline-on-a-Coil.)
A minimum of four wraps, not crossed, with a bight held in place by a loop.
The loop must be underneath all wraps.
A minimum 4 inch pigtail after the second overhand safety is tied.
Must be centered on the mid-line of the body.
Figure 10.47 Bowline-on-a-Coil.

Bowline-on-a-Coil

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


10.7.28.16 Frost Knot. The frost knot is used when working with webbing. It is used to
create the top loop of an etrier. It is a special-purpose knot. (See Figure 10.48, Frost
Knot.)
10.7.28.16.1 Tying the Knot.
Step 1. Lap one end (a bight) of webbing over the other about 10 to 12 inches.
Step 2. Tie an overhand knot with the newly formed triple-strand webbing; dress
tightly.

Figure 10.48 Frost Knot.

Frost Knot

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.28.17 Munter Hitch. The munter hitch, when used in conjunction with a
pear-shaped locking carabiner, is used to form a mechanical belay. (See Figure 10.49,
Munter Hitch.)
10.7.28.17.1 Tying the Knot.
Step 1. Hold the rope in both hands, palms down about 12 inches apart.
Step 2. With the right hand, form a loop away from the body toward the left
hand. Hold the loop with the left hand.
Step 3. With the right hand, place the rope that comes from the bottom of the
loop over the top of the loop.
Step 4. Place the bight that has just been formed around the rope into the pear
shaped carabiner. Lock the locking mechanism.

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10-67

Figure 10.49 Munter Hitch.

Munter Hitch

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.28.17.2 Check Points.
A bight passes through the carabiner, with the closed end around the standing or
running part of the rope.
The carabiner is locked.
10.7.29 Anchor Choices.
10.7.29.1 As the interior angle (A) increases, the force on the web (T1), and in example 2,
the anchor points (T2) increases. Load L1 is a typical rescuer plus equipment of 220
pounds (100kg). Load L2 is the NATRS consensus standard rescue test load of 440
pounds (200kg). (See Table 10.13, Angle Calculations.)
10.7.29.2 The bottom line here is to keep the interior angle to an absolute minimum, while
still using enough anchor points to keep the system safe. The following diagram depicts
another way of visualizing load forces on the angles created through multiple anchor
rigging.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 10.13 Angle Calculations.


Angle A Degrees

Multiplier

Force (T) for Load


L1 (kN)

Force (T) for Load


L2 (kN)

0.5

0.493

0.985

30

0.5

0.511

1.020

45

0.5

0.533

1.066

60

0.6

0.569

1.137

90

0.7

0.699

1.393

120

1.0

0.985

1.970

135

1.3

1.286

2.574

150

1.9

1.905

3.806

175

11.5

11.304

22.582

180

8.0

8.000

8.000

10.7.29.3 Basic Anchors.


10.7.29.3.1 A wrap three, pull two anchor is tied using 1-inch webbing completing
three wraps around the anchor. A water knot is used to secure the ends. This should be
tied at the front of the anchor, or facing the load. This puts the weakest link furthest
away from the load and makes untying it significantly easier. (See Figure 10.50, Wrap
Three Pull Two.)
10.7.29.3.2 The wrap two, pull one anchor is the same as a wrap three pull two but
with one less wrap.
10.7.29.3.3 The two point distributive anchor system utilizes a Figure Eight knot to
bring both legs from the anchor together. This is an excellent choice if two or three
marginal anchors, especially rock, are being used. Also, it tends to stabilize the point
of attachment. (See Figure 10.51, Two-Point Distributive.)
10.7.29.3.4 A minimum of two wraps is sufficient for the high-strength tie off hitch.
The diameter of the tree should be at least 8 to 10 times that of the rope (e.g., 11.5mm
x 8 = 92mm). It should also be mentioned that the overall stability of the tree should
be determined before attaching a mainline to it. (See Figure 10.52, High Strength Tie
Off.)
10.7.29.3.5 Be aware of the atmospheric conditions. For instance, is the tree
significantly taller than surrounding trees, exposing it to prevailing winds? If so, it is
most likely robust enough for your purpose. Conversely, if has been raining a lot lately
and the ground is soggy, look closely to see if the tree is truly stable or likely to pull out
when under load.

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10-69

Figure 10.50 Wrap Three Pull Two.

Wrap Three Pull Two

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.51 Two-Point Distributive.

Two-Point Distribution

UNCLASSIFIED

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10-71

Figure 10.52 High Strength Tie Off.

High Strength Tie Off


Canvas wrapped to protect rope and tree

No deviation in mainline

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.29.3.6 With the exception of rock gear, a minimum of two anchor leads should be
concentrated into one anchor focal point. For rock gear, four anchor leads should be
used due to the strength of the wire and likelihood that the rock itself might fail.
10.7.29.3.7 This concentration of the anchor points, defined as load sharing, is the
center of all forces, and has leads of fixed lengths. The front of a rigging plate can also
be tied into the anchors.
10.7.29.3.8 The concept of a load distributing anchor, inappropriately referred to as a
self equalizing anchor can be built using a variety of materials and techniques.
Several examples are shown, but the bottom line here is that all anchors must be
reliable, pretensioned with back ties if necessary, and double checked.
10.7.29.3.9 The same type of methodology needs to be used for the belay line as for
the main line. Keep this in mind when inventorying equipment.
10.7.29.3.10 After the patient or load has been located the rigging team should look
for a location that is as flat as possible and free from tripping hazards. If directional
pulleys are to be used, they should be prepositioned.
10.7.29.3.11 Later in this section typical anchor/mainline/belay line configuration will
be discussed. Included in the calculations for the working area should be adequate
space for anchor focal points.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


10.7.29.3.12 The following pictures demonstrate an anchor focal point. (See Figure
10.53, Focal Point Utilizing Snow Anchors; Figure 10.54, Focal Point Utilizing Three
Rock Anchors; and Figure 10.55, Standard Anchor Focal Point for a Mainline
Lowering Package.)
10.7.29.3.13 When using marginal anchors in an otherwise acceptable location,
pretensioned back-ties are a necessity. The underlying principle is that the back-tie will
add rigidity to the system as well as remove the slack and reduce shock loading. The
system is tensioned with a simple 3:1. (See Figure 10.56, Pretensioned Back-Tie.)
10.7.29.4 This system is used when the anchors are a significant distance from the ideal
focal point, thereby inducing the potential for significant slack in the system. This too
helps to stabilize the focal point before tension is applied to the system. (See Figure 10.57,
Pretensioned Front-Tie.)
10.7.29.5 There are two primary reasons for protecting ropes against abrasion. (See
Figure 10.58, Edge Protection; Figure 10.59, Improvised Soft Edge Protection; and
Figure 10.60, System Overview.)
10.7.29.5.1 The first is to reduce friction, which has already been addressed.
10.7.29.5.2 The second reason, and certainly related, is that of safety.
10.7.29.5.3 Rock edges can severe a rope under load if enough friction is incurred
through the raising or lowering process.

Figure 10.53 Focal Point Utilizing Snow Anchors.

Focal Point Utilizing Snow Anchors

UNCLASSIFIED

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10-73

Figure 10.54 Focal Point Utilizing Three Rock Anchors.

Focal Point Utilizing Three Rock Anchors

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 10.55 Standard Anchor Focal Point for a Mainline Lowering Package.

Standard Anchor Focal Point for a Mainline Lowering Package


Mainline Anchor
Point

Mainline Anchor
Point

Directional line to Anchor Point


Rigging Plate

Mainline

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.56 Pretensioned Back-Tie.

Pretensioned Back Tie

Interlaced Webbing

Focal Point

Load

Two Half Hitches or Blocking Knot

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 10.57 Pretensioned Front-Tie.

Pretensioned Front Tie

Load
3:1 MA

Anchor

UNCLASSIFIED

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10-75

Figure 10.58 Edge Protection.

Edge Protection

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.59 Improvised Soft Edge Protection.

Improvisied Soft Edge Protection

UNCLASSIFIED

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10-77

Figure 10.60 System Overview.

System Overview
Type, number, condition, and placement of anchor device
Type, condition, and placement of carabiner
The rope end section which goes
to either another person or load
Improper procedures, and/or
complacency, inexperience,
as well as no or little margin
of safety, and a row of other
unhealthy applications.......
ROPE-OVER-EDGE-PROBLEMS:
If all other "chains" in the entire
rope system are alright, this is
usually the WEAKEST POINT.
Most stress is excerted where
rope runs over corners and edges!

Wrong type of knot


for the job, or tied
improperly

Features of
anchor host
Angle of rope turn

ROPE:
Wrong type, wrong diameter,
damaged, overaged, weak, and
used improperly/overloaded

ESPECIALLY DANGEROUS
DURING RAPPELING OR
JUMAR-ASCENDING WHEN
ROPE IS RUBBED WHERE
IT RUNS OVER EDGES!

NOTE: Falling rock, hitting onto


a rope, can cut it!

Rockfall or falling equipment


Locking type
carabiner,
gate not locked

Depict: Only a few examples

BODY HARNESS:
Inadequate type,
weak, damaged,
not properly done,
not intergrated

UNCLASSIFIED

Depending on what and how


a system is used, and for what
purpose, there are many variations
and possibilities of things which
could go wrong.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


10.7.29.6 Edge protection can either be of the commercial variety which includes sewn
tubes that are Velcro and ride over the rope or homemade such as tubular insulation, rubber
mats, or a rucksack and foam pad.
10.7.29.6.1 Whichever is used, they should be secured with utility cord so as not to
drift or fly away.
10.7.29.6.2 Hard protection consists of metal devices with or without rollers for use
with moving ropes.
10.7.29.6.2.1 Advantages include ultimate protection and substantial reduction in
friction.
10.7.29.6.2.2 The disadvantages are that they are heavy and expensive.
10.7.29.6.3 Soft protection is most often used for stationary ropes such as with a
rappel or safety lines.
10.7.29.6.3.1 Advantages include their being less expensive and weighing much
less than hard protection.
10.7.29.6.3.2 The disadvantages are that they may not give as much protection
and definitely do not reduce friction to the level of hard protection.
10.7.29.7 The Purcell Prusik system/soft link is a multi-purpose configuration and should
be a mandatory tool for rescuers. When configured as shown, a set of these can be used to
attach the rescuer to a stokes litter, as an attachment point to an aircraft, or for ascending a
fixed line.
10.7.29.8 For self-reliance, safety, and flexibility, the rescuer should always have the
ability to either descend or ascend a rope. Therefore, while rappelling, being lowered or
raised, or working an edge, rescuers should always have their ascending system with them
and be competent in its use. A rescuer should have a separate, untensioned belay rope as a
back-up in case something happens, or if the main line, anchors, or ascending system fails.
10.7.29.9 Many types of ascending systems exist. Some of these systems have been
highly refined for special applications such as long free hanging ascents in caving. In rope
rescue, there are strong arguments for equipment that has multi-purpose capabilities to
increase efficiency, minimize equipment requirements and reduce cost. The Purcell Prusik
system is an ascending system was developed by members of the Columbia Mountain
Rescue group in British Columbia. It evolved from a need to combine equipment that
would allow rescuers to ascend in either a free-hang or sloping environment, tie-in to an
anchor system or edge/safety line, or have an adjustable tie-in link for litter work. (See
Figure 10.61, Purcell Prusik System.)
10.7.29.10 Several other uses have come about since their introduction in the 1980s. The
system incorporates the use of three Prusiks: 2 each foot Prusiks and 1 harness Prusik. The
2 foot Prusiks allow for easier movement in non-free-hanging terrain. Also, if one-foot
Prusik is being used as an adjustable tie-in, then the other can be used to ascend a short
distance.

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10-79

Figure 10.61 Purcell Prusik System.

Purcell Prusik System


Rope Required: 10m x 6mm cord to
make all three component parts

S - Short Harness Loop


navel to top of head
L - Long Leg Loop
ground to mid-chest

M - Medium Leg Loop


ground to inseam
Some Uses:
Litter tending
Personal protection (travel limiting)
Ascending fixed lines
Improvised rigging
Crevase rescue
Adjusting daisy chains

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.29.11 An excellent checklist format for sizing the system can be found in the
Technical Rescue Riggers Guide.
10.7.29.12 The knot bypass system for a mainline lowering package consists of a
five-step process: (See Figure 10.62, Knot Bypass Lower.)
Knot approaches to within 1 to 2 feet of the brakebar.

A load releasing hitch is attached to the mainline with a Prusik.

Tension is applied to the LRH until the Prusik grabs and assumes the load.

The brakebar is slack and the knot is passed around the brakebar.

The mainline is tensioned and the LRH is slackened. Lowering continues.


10.7.29.13 The knot bypass system for a mainline raise package also consists of a
five-step process: (See Figure 10.63, Knot Bypass Raise.)
Knot approaches to within 1 to 2 feet of the MA.
Tension is placed on the second Prusik/pulley, slack on the first.
First Prusik/pulley is tensioned and assumes the load.
An additional Prusik/pulley at the main anchor is attached and tensioned.
Mainline is reconfigured with secondary Prusik/pulley and bypasses

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.62 Knot Bypass Lower.

Knot Bypass Lower


Anchor

Anchor

1)

Anchor

Anchor

2)

Anchor

4)

3)

Anchor

5)

6)

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 10.63 Knot Bypass Raise.

Knot Bypass Raise


Anchor

1)
Anchor

4)

UNCLASSIFIED

Anchor

Anchor

3)

2)
Anchor

5)

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-81

10.7.30 Components of a Rescue System. (See Figure 10.64, Components of a Rescue


System.)
Figure 10.64 Components of a Rescue System.

Components of a Rescue System

Main Line Focal Point


Main Line

7 to 10 metrers from edge

Edge Line
Safety line for
monitoring edge
and beyond

Belay Line Focal Point


3 to 5 meters from edge

Belay Line
Line
Belay

Edge Transition

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.30.1 High-angle rescue consists of many elements such as rope, hardware, and
anchors all working together as a system. Just as a chain is only as strong as its weakest
link, the high-angle system is only as effective as its weakest link.
10.7.30.2 For example, if the system uses a mainline rope that has a test strength of 40 kN
but is attached to an anchor that pulls out at 2.2 kN, the strength of the entire system is only
2.2 kN.
10.7.30.3 Study the strengths of the component pieces of equipment carefully and learn
how to best engineer them so as to maximize their strength in regard to the overall system.
10.7.30.4 The mainline is the primary attachment for the patient and stokes litter. The
main line focal point in a rescue system should be between seven and ten meters from the
edge. This will allow adequate space for the belay sequence to occur yet not consume
excess rope and anchor material.
10.7.30.5 Control person should also be able to observe the mainline crew.
10.7.30.6 The photo below (Figure 10.65, Tying a Brake Rack) shows the proper
technique for tying off the brake rack.
10.7.30.7 The belay line should be the strongest line in the system in the event it has to
endure dynamic loading.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.65 Tying of Brake Rack.

Tying of Brake Rack

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.30.8 The belay line focal point in a rescue system should be between 3 and 5 meters
from the edge.
10.7.30.9 This will allow adequate space for the attendant and edge transition team to
prepare the litter and attendant for descent, as well as recover the litter during a raise.
10.7.30.10 The edge line in a rescue system should be secured to a separate anchor from
the main or belay line. (See Figure 10.66, Edge Lines.)
10.7.30.11 They are solely for the edgemen to safely observe the litter attendant, assist
with vectoring duties, or while initially laying ropes and anchors.
10.7.30.12 The following figures demonstrate the proper use of safety lines by edge and
control. (See Figure 10.67, Edge Attendant Tie-In; Figure 10.68, Cliff Rescue Example;
and Figure 10.69, Effective Rope Management by Edge Personnel.)

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10-83

Figure 10.66 Edge Lines.

Edge Lines

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 10.67 Edge Attendant Tie-In.

Edge Attendant Tie-In

2-Point LDA with locking carabiners


(preferred method). SOLID 1-Point okay.

Figure 8 on a bight.
Safety end

One Prusik for position


adjustment

Tie-in to edge attendant


harness with figure 8

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.68 Cliff Rescue Example.

Cliff Rescue Example


Jim, Belayer Two

Leader and
belayer on
safetyline

Bombproof
Main Anchor
System

Fred, Belayer One

Fred's safetyline anchor


and adjustable safetyline

Arriving member
of the mule team

Secured Edge Roller System


Team gear
Leader

I wonder why they


didn't just walk up here?
McPork,
rescuer
McObvious,
victim

McSmart,
reporter

UNCLASSIFIED

Notice that the rescuer descended on two ropes, and had


picked a lane to the side, not directly above victim (this is
to prevent rock and dirt falling onto the victim). Notice
that all rescue gear not in use has been secured away
from the edge. Victim could be evacuated straight up, or
transverse, or downward. If regular edge rollers are not
available, use packs, logs, or clotjhing; assure that they
are secured against falling. Litter, if need, is brought
down by a second rescue member. A third rescuer will
be needed for litter loading. There also are other ways.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-85

Figure 10.69 Effective Rope Management by Edge Personnel.

Effective Rope Management by Edge Personnel

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.30.13 Belaying Techniques.
10.7.30.13.1 A belay is a method of protection against a fall by handling a tensionless
rope in such a manner that it may be taken in or let out as another person climbs,
rappels or ascends a fixed rope or is raised, lowered or transported, yet be secure to
hold this load in case of failure of the main support.
10.7.30.13.2 The following table (Table 10.14, Types of Belays) outlines several types
of belays.
Table 10.14 Types of Belays.

The Belay Is
Managed by others

A Totally Separate
Tensionless Rope
Belay

Managed by the people in need Self Belay

A Rope Already Under


Tension From Part or
All of the Load
Conditional Belay
Conditional Self Belay

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


10.7.30.13.3 The belay rope must never be used without back-up for shifting the load
during a working operation.
10.7.30.13.4 The belay method is with tandem Prusik knots and pulley.
10.7.30.13.5 Use two 8mm Prusiks, (tied with a double Fishermans knot) of different
length (53 and 65 inches). Three wraps are used around the belay rope. Make sure the
knots are tied neatly with the knots bridges on the same side.
10.7.30.13.6 Clip the two Prusiks and the Prusik minding pulley (PMP) into a
pear-shaped locking carabiner in the following order: long Prusik first, then the shorter
Prusik and then the pulley. This locking carabiner is then clipped into the belay LDA
in series with the load releasing hitch. When properly positioned, the Prusik knots will
be about 4 inches (one hand width) apart.
10.7.30.13.7 The belayer must be experienced in using the Prusik belay and must be
very attentive to keep the knots taut but free running using the tips of the fingers with
the thumbs pushing on the knots bridge.
10.7.30.13.8 The rope should be flaked so it will enter the tandem Prusik system
smoothly from the side without twisting.
10.7.30.13.9 When belaying a load, the tandem Prusik may be tended by the Prusik
minding pulley as the belay rope is pulled through it. For passing a knot safely, two
sets of Prusik slings must be available. (See Figure 10.70, Prusik Minding Pulley in
Belay Sequence, and Figure 10.71, Prusik Minding Pulley and Hand Placement.)
10.7.30.13.10 A load releasing hitch is required in case the Prusik knots lock up. After
using the load releasing hitch always retie it, so it will be ready for its next application.
10.7.30.13.11 The belayer should make every effort to avoid inducing too much slack
as well as excessive tension during the belaying process. His primary responsibility is
rope management, not arresting a dynamic fall. Again, the sequence of components is:
spine, long Prusik, short Prusik, pulley. (See Figure 10.72, Belay Package Lower, and
Figure 10.73, Belay Package Raise.)
10.7.30.14 The only difference between the belay package raise and the belay package
lower is the direction of rope travel. This makes the belay persons job much easier in that
no changeover takes place. The belay person simply takes up slack using the same hand
position. The only exception to this would be in the case of a knot bypass.
10.7.30.15 The load releasing hitch (LRH) is required for the Tandem Prusik Belay during
a lowering. It is also used with the main line for passing knots and when changing from
lowering to raising or vice versa.
10.7.30.16 The most effective hitch to use is the Radium Release Hitch demonstrated by
Mauthner in his Rigging for Rescue lecture. Ten meters or 33 feet of 8mm low stretch rope
and two locking carabiners are required. (See Figure 10.74, Radium Release Hitch Tying;
Figure 10.75, Completed Load Releasing Hitch; and Figure 10.76, Litter Evacs Litter
Evacuation Techniques, shows how to tie the radium release hitch.)

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-87

Figure 10.70 Prusik Minding Pulley in Belay Sequence.

Prusik Minding Pulley (PMP) for Belay Sequence

Load

Loading sequence for a Prusik Minding Pulley (PMP)


1) Spine 2) Long 3)Short 4) Pulley

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.71 Prusik Minding Pulley and Hand Placement.

PMP and Hand Placement

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-89

Figure 10.72 Belay Package Lower.

Belay Package Lower

Load

Belay Line
Loading sequence for a
Prusik Minding Pulley (PMP)
1) Spine 2) Long 3)Short 4) Pulley

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 10.73 Belay Package Raise.

Belay Package Raise

Load

Belay Line
Loading sequence for a
Prusik Minding Pulley (PMP)
1) Spine 2) Long 3)Short 4) Pulley

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.74 Radium Release Hitch Tying.

Radium Release Hitch Tying

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-91

Figure 10.75 Completed Load Releasing Hitch.

Complete Load Releasing Hitch

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 10.76 Litter Evacs Litter Evacuation Techniques.

Litter Evacuations

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


10.7.30.17 Litter Evacuation Techniques.
10.7.30.17.1 Whenever a raising system is being designed, the number of available
haulers has to be considered.
10.7.30.17.2 Table 10.15, kN Calculations for Number of Haulers, shows average
force in kN generated by one to five haulers. This should be factored in when
determining optimum mechanical advantage for the raising system.

Table 10.15 kN Calculations for Number of Haulers.


Number of Pullers

Pulled With

Average Force kN

Gloved hands, walking

0.74

Gloved hand-over-hand

0.69

Gloved hands holding Prusik, walking

0.92

Harness, Prusik on front

0.77

Harness, Prusik on back

0.62

Gloved hands, walking

1.44

Gloved hand-over-hand

0.83

Gloved hands holding Prusik, walking

1.61

Harness, front

1.47

Gloved hands, walking

1.98

Gloved hand-over-hand

1.48

Harness, front

1.86

Gloved hands, walking

2.61

Gloved hand-over-hand

2.28

Gloved hands, walking

3.18

10.7.30.17.3 The optimum system will be the one that requires the least amount of
effort to safely raise the load with the minimum amount of equipment in the shortest
time.
10.7.30.17.4 Simple pulley systems are preferred especially when working at altitude
or extreme cold. This will aid in preventing the rescuers from incorrectly building a
system that may not fall within a 10:1 safety factor.
10.7.30.17.5 Lowering Systems.
10.7.30.17.5.1 Low Angle, High Angle, Single Attendant, and Multiple
Attendants.
10.7.30.17.5.2

Harness Configuration for Stokes Litter.

10.7.30.17.5.2.1 Interlocking long-tail bowlines are used as the primary


attachment point.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-93

10.7.30.17.5.2.2 The mainline attaches to the victims harness with a retraced


Figure Eight knot or a bowline.
10.7.30.17.5.2.3 The belay line attaches to the attendants harness with a
retraced Figure Eight or a bowline.
10.7.30.17.5.2.4 The attendant uses a Purcell Prusik between his harness and
the interlocking long-tail bowlines in order to adjust his position relative to the
litter. (See Figure 10.77, Litter Rigging; Figure 10.78, Interlocking Long-Tail
Bowlines and Bowlines with Carabiners for Harness; and Figure 10.79,
Checking Interlocking Long-tail Bowlines and Attachment Points.)
Figure 10.77 Litter Rigging.

Litter Rigging

Attendant's Harness
Patient's Harness

Interlocking bowlines
with dual locking "D"
carabiners

Litter - Head (red)

Litter - Shoe (blue)

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.30.17.5.2.5 Either dual locking D carabiners or a tri-link is used to join
the interlocking long-tail bowlines and the litter harness.
10.7.30.17.5.2.6 The attendant needs to wear a sit and chest harness; one that
fits comfortably as he may have to endure long periods of suspension below a
litter.
10.7.30.17.5.2.7 A loop connecting the sit harness to chest harness ballows for
flexion of the attendants spine and hips allowing for greater ease in
manipulating the litter. (See Figure 10.80, Attendants Sit/Chest Harness
Configuration.)

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.78 Interlocking Long-Tail Bowlines and Bowlines with Carabiners for Harness.

Interlocking Longtail Bowlines and


Bowlines with Carabiners for Harness

Belay line

Mainline
A Tri-link can also be used
to reduce congestion at this
junction

Interlocked long
tail bowlines
Attendant

Patient

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.30.17.5.2.8 Use high directional anchors whenever possible. (See Figure
10.81, Mainline Package, Lower.)
10.7.30.17.5.2.9 Have a load releasing hitch configured and ready to be
attached in the event of a knot bypass or other obstruction.
10.7.30.17.5.2.10 Mainline person should face the brake rack and be positioned
at the rope end, not the anchor end.
10.7.30.17.5.2.11 Brake rack should always be locked off before performing
any other duties. (See Figure 10.82, Brake Rack Set-Up.)
10.7.30.17.5.2.12 With double pulleys paired up, a 4:1 mechanical advantage
system (personal jigger) can be easily constructed.
10.7.30.17.5.2.13 One or both of the two pulleys must have a connection
becket below the sheave for connecting the end of the haul rope. (See Figure
10.83, Jigger Set-up.)
10.7.30.17.5.2.14 This is a system set up with a short length of rope that is used
for making small movements to a load, which might be a stretcher, a fallen
person awaiting rescue, or the rescuer. It is becoming standard practice to use
not one but two jiggers on a rescue stretcher. (See Figure 10.84, Prusik Sling
Holding the Load on a Jigger Pulley.)

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


Figure 10.79 Checking Interlocking Long-Tail Bowlines and Attachment Points.

Checking Interlocking Long-Tail Bowlines and Attachment Points

UNCLASSIFIED

10-95

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.80 Attendants Sit/Chest Harness Configuration.

Attendant's Sit/Chest Harness Configuration

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-97

Figure 10.81 Mainline Package, Lower.

Mainline Package, Lower

Main
Line

Belay Line
Attendant
Edge

Control

Edge

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 10.82 Brake Rack SetUp.

Brake Rack Setup


Load

ain

Lin

Interlocked Long-Tail Bowline

Anchor

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.83 Jigger Set-Up.

Jigger Setup

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 10.84 Prusik Sling Holding the Load on a Jigger Pulley.

The Prusik Sling Holding the Load on a Jigger Pulley

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-99

10.7.30.17.5.2.15 One is attached to the head of the stretcher and controls the
tilt, while the other forms the rescuers attachment, to enable easy freedom of
movement.
10.7.30.17.5.2.16 With this type of system, the attendant straddles the litter
until the edge transition is complete. The two Edgemen will carry the litter
package as close to the edge as possible. (See Figure 10.85, Harness
Configuration for Vertical Litter; Figure 10.86, Vertical Litter, Single
Attendant; and Figure 10.87, Attendant Prepares to Transition Edge with
Vertical Litter.)
10.7.30.17.5.2.17 The litter should be lowered to a point approximately 2 to 3
meters below the edge. At this time, the attendant slackens the jigger system
and lowers himself to the foot of the litter. This allows maximum control and
ability in redirecting around terrain. The following pictures show the sequence
of events. (See Figure 10.88, Patient is Secured to Litter Prior to Attendant
Moving Into Position; Figure 10.89, Lowering Sequence; and Figure 10.90,
Lowering Sequence Part II.)
10.7.30.17.5.2.18 The mainline configuration for operation is the same as the
horizontal litter technique.
10.7.30.17.5.3 Horizontal Litter, Single Attendant. (See Figure 10.91,
Horizontal Litter.)
10.7.30.17.5.3.1 The attendant is attached to the interlocking longtail bowlines
by means of a Barrelman. This allows flexibility to move up or down in
relation to the litter. The attendant can then also climb on top in the event of on
overhang or to provide medical treatment, if required.
10.7.30.17.5.3.2 The minimum number of members on the team is four:
mainline, belay, attendant, and edge (may have to double as control).
10.7.30.17.5.3.3 Raising Systems.
10.7.30.17.5.3.3.1 All mainline raises are based on proper selection of the
appropriate mechanical advantage.
10.7.30.17.5.3.3.2 Use the smallest and most efficient mechanical
advantage pulley system possible. This reduces the likelihood of
over-engineering and inducing system errors. Before constructing a
mainline raise, the amount of force the system will endure needs to be
calculated. As mentioned earlier it is imperative the team leader avoid a
cookbook solution such as a 3:1 MA as this may not be adequate to raise
the load if only a few individuals are available on the haul team.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.85 Harness Configuration for Vertical Litter.

Harness Configuration for Vertical Litter

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-101

Figure 10.86 Vertical Litter, Single Attendant.

Vertical Litter, Single Attendant

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.87 Attendant Prepares to Transition Edge with Vertical Litter.

Attendant Prepares to Transition Edge with Vertical Litter

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


Figure 10.88 Patient is Secured to Litter Prior to Attendant Moving Into Position.

Patient is Secured to Litter Prior to Attendant Moving Into Position

UNCLASSIFIED

10-103

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.89 Lowering Sequence.

Lowering Sequence

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-105

Figure 10.90 Lowering Sequence Part II.

Lowering Sequence Part 2

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 10.91 Horizontal Litter.

Horizontal Litter

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


10.7.30.17.5.3.3.1 Be sure to allow enough room for the haul team to
safely and efficiently move while raising the load. Transitioning from a
lower to a raise can become hectic and confusing. The haul team and
control position tend to become stressed as they work to raise the load in a
smooth yet efficient manner. It is also easy to forget the basics of a pulley
system when the pressure is on. (See Figure 10.92, Haul Team Prepares to
Raise the Load While Control Communicates with the Attendant.)

Figure 10.92 Haul Team Prepares to Raise the Load While Control Communicates with the
Attendant.

Haul Team Prepares to Raise the Load While


Control Communicates with the Attendant

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.30.17.5.3.3.1 The steps to follow when transitioning from a lower to a
raise are as follows:
Mainline is tied off to the lowering device.
9mm Prusik is set in place to hold the mainline.
Pre-rigged MA is now attached to mainline.
Haul team is in place.
Prusik is released as haul team begins the raise.
Prusik is set as a progress capture while MA is reset.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-107

10.7.30.17.5.3.4 Vertical Pickoffs. (See Figure 10.93, Pickoff.) The primary


reason for conducting a vertical pickoff is to access the patient and remove him
from the environment as quickly as possible. This should not however, be done
at the risk of jeopardizing rescuer safety.
Figure 10.93 Pickoff.

Pickoff

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


10.7.30.17.5.3.5 Overview. The attendant is attached to the belay line using
the same interlocking bowlines as before. The attendant is lowered to the
victim where and attaches the Victim to the mainline with a sling (Purcell
Prusik). The attendant then releases the victim from any rope or other anchor
point and loads the system.
10.7.30.17.5.3.6 Pickoff and changeover should take less than 2 minutes to
perform.
10.7.30.17.5.3.7 The Prusik Clamp technique is an alternative for use on
single-man pickoffs. Rather than the normal scenario of having a separate haul
system employed at the top of the cliff or wherever the mainline lower system
is setup; a team could use the clamp technique.
10.7.30.17.5.3.8 The single man-pickoff technique is used to rescue a subject
that is on a vertical face. The subject does not have significant injuries
requiring immobilization or extrication in a litter. This technique looks at the
case where the subject is hanging from their climbing rope.
10.7.30.17.5.3.9 The rescue is effected by lowering the rescuer to the victim on
a normal mainline/belay combination. The victim is attached to the lowering
system via Prusiks. In order to detach the victim from the rope, the rescue team
usually employs a haul system attached to the mainline to raise both the rescuer
and the victim until there is slack in the victims rope. At this time, the rescuer
can detach the victims rope from the victim without subjecting the system to a
shock.
10.7.30.17.5.3.10 The problem with this technique can come from the stretch
in the victims rope. While this may not ordinarily be a problem for the haul
system, it may be at the least inconvenient, and in some cases dangerous for
both the rescuer and/or the victim (the victim may be suspended just below an
overhang which must be surmounted to overcome the rope stretch)?
10.7.30.17.5.3.11 As an alternative to the not always convenient method of
attaching a haul system with haulers to the mainline from above, the Clamp
technique allows the rescuer that is lowered to perform the operation of
detaching the victim from the rope without shock loading the system.
10.7.30.17.5.3.12 Before being lowered the rescuer pre-rigs the small haul
system he will need later. The system is a 3:1 pulley system with a ratcheting
change of direction. This pre-rigged setup is referred to as a jigger. The Aztek
accomplishes the same purpose, but it does add to the gear load if it is only
used for this scenario. (See Figure 10.94, Aztek Set-Up.)

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-109

Figure 10.94 Aztek Set-Up.

Aztek Setup

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.30.17.5.3.13 The rescuer is lowered to approximately the same level as
the subject. A Prusik is then used to attach the subject to the mainline/belay
lines using 2 Prusik loops (6 to 7mm perlon, 45cm or 18 inches tied length).
These may be attached at the top before beginning the lower.
10.7.30.17.5.3.14 If the subject is wearing a chest harness, clip into both the
chest harness and waist harness using standard locking carabiners. It may be
possible to place a chest harness on the subject depending on their physical
condition. The use of both the chest and waist harness allows the subject to
hang at a much better angle. If the descent is to be short it may not be
warranted.
10.7.30.17.5.3.15 The rescuer then uses a Purcell Prusik attached to the
mainline (either should be attached below the subjects attachment points) to
reach up and triple wrap a Prusik around both the mainline and the subjects
rope. This will be the clamp. The rescuer will then attach the ratchet end of
the small haul system first to the clamp Prusik, and then the other end to the
subjects harness.
NOTE: The haul must be attached at the same point as the climbers rope is attached to be
effective.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


10.7.30.17.5.3.16 By either tying a foot loop (Figure Eight or overhand on a
bight) as high on the mini system haul line as the rescuer can lift his foot or
simply making a wrap around his foot and then holding then loose end of the
rope, the rescuer then uses his leg to work the haul system lifting the subject in
relation the rescuer and to the clamp. Because the clamp is only one meter
(approximately 3.2 feet) or so above the subject, the subject will only have to
be raised 5 to 9cm (2 to 3.5 inches) to overcome the stretch between his harness
and the clamp. Once the subjects rope is slightly loosened, the rescuer will
then tighten the Prusiks from the mainline and belay lines to the subjects
harness and then lower the subject on to the Prusik.
10.7.30.17.5.3.17 The subject may then be detached from the rope without
shock loading the system. Make sure that there are no knots in the subject rope
below the clamp Prusik. The tension is released from the mini haul system
and the rescuer steps up in the entire breaks the clamp Prusik (leather gloves
suggested), the subjects rope will normally be pulled upwards through the
Prusik by the tension in the rope. The mini haul system may be removed after
tension has been released. (See Figure 10.95, Buddy Rappel.)
10.7.30.17.5.3.18 Rappelling, Knot Bypasses.
10.7.30.17.5.4 High Lines and Traversing Systems.
10.7.30.17.5.4.1 Overview of Highlines and Traversing Systems.
10.7.30.17.5.4.1.1 The drooping highline using Kootenay carriage system
uses only one track line, a low stretch 11mm rope. Its purpose is to send a
load across an expanse in a safe and controlled manner. (See Figure 10.96,
Drooping Highline Utilizing a Kootenay Carriage System.)
10.7.30.17.5.4.1.2 The tag lines, low-stretch 11mm ropes, are used as belay
lines. The track line is tensioned with a 2:1 MA that is attached to the rope
with tandem triple-wrapped Prusiks. Use only one person to pull for
tensioning without a load. Failure to follow this rule could overstress the
track line when a load is on the line.
10.7.30.17.5.4.1.3 With a rescue load hanging from the track line, up to a
total of six persons may be used with a 2:1 MA to tension the track line.
The tension should be backed off when it is not needed any more to clear
obstructions. The maximum practical length of this highline is 300 feet.
10.7.30.17.5.4.1.4 Figure 10.97, Track Line Rigging, illustrates the
rigging for the track line and tag lines at the anchors on each side.
10.7.30.17.5.4.1.5 The tag lines are connected to the anchor with tandem
triple-wrapped Prusiks and a brake bar on one side and a 2:1 MA on the
other side.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-111

Figure 10.95 Buddy Rappel.

Buddy Rappel

UNCLASSIFIED

10-112

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.96 Drooping Highline Utilizing a Kootenay Carriage System.

Dropping Highline Utilizing a Kootenay Carriage System

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-113

Figure 10.97 Track Line Rigging.

Track Line Rigging


Kootenay Carriage
Track Line

Tag Line

Tag Line

To Litter/Attendant

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.30.17.5.4.1.1 The two tag lines are attached to the pulley with
triple-wrapped Prusiks and a Figure Eight. The figure below illustrates the
rigging. The pulley should be a Kootenay pulley with three holes to attach
the stretcher and the two tag lines or a two-inch pulley with a rigging ring
or plate clipped into the pulley with a locking carabiner. Each tag line must
be secured like a belay line. A person on each end must operate the belay
system in complete coordination with each other to make sure that there is
never any slack in either tag line.
10.7.30.17.5.4.1.2 There are several other applications for the Kootenay
carriage system.
10.7.30.17.5.4.1.3 These include double drooping highline, English Reeve,
and the Norwegian Reeve.
10.7.30.17.5.4.1.4 Each of these utilizes several common pieces of
equipment to get the litter and attendant either across an expanse or up and
over the same.
10.7.30.17.5.4.1.5 Rigging for rescue has tested a variety of systems and
proven conclusively that ailing to use tag lines on both sides will result in
certain death in the event of a mainline failure. The following systems are
explained along with the rigging requirements for each.

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10.7.30.17.5.4.1.6 The purpose of the English Reeve system is to send an
attendant across an expanse, either with or without a litter, descend to the
victim by way of the tag lines, then recover up to the mainline. This an
extremely labor intensive effort requiring belayers on both sides of the
expanse. The rescue team also must be skilled in sending messenger cord
for retrieval of the mainline. The benefit of this system is that it allows the
team to place the attendant on the victim with extreme precision. (See
Figure 10.98, English Reeve.)
10.7.30.17.5.4.1.7 Through a coordinated effort, the belayers send the
attendant and litter across the expanse to a point directly over the victim.
The belayers then lower the attendant and litter with the tag lines running
through the Kootenay carriage.
10.7.30.17.5.4.1.8 Once the victim is secured in the litter, the belayers raise
the litter with the tag lines up to the carriage. At this point the attendant
secures the litter to the carriage then is hauled across the expanse to either
side.
10.7.30.17.5.4.1.9 Reliable communications is absolutely essential to
ensure a coordinated effort between the belayers.
10.7.30.17.5.4.1.10 The purpose of the Norwegian Reeve reeving system
is also to send a carriage across an expanse but with gravity acting as one of
the tag lines (downhill side). (See Figure 10.99, Norwegian Reeve.)
10.7.30.17.5.5 Tactical and Improvised Systems.
10.7.30.17.5.5.1 Tactical Considerations.
10.7.30.17.5.5.1.1 Phase I Arrive On-scene. Take command; size-up.
10.7.30.17.5.5.1.2 First Arrival. The first arriving pararescueman should
assume command after arriving on scene.
10.7.30.17.5.5.1.3 Secure Responsible Party or Witness. PJTL should
secure a witness as soon as possible after arriving on scene. This will help
in identifying the problem and locating the victim.
10.7.30.17.5.5.1.4 Locate the Victim. In most cases, command will have
to send a recon team to the area of the victim to determine the exact location
of victim and nature of injuries. Command may designate this as the recon
sector. The recon sector should have medical equipment to begin to
administer the first aid to the victim. If the terrain is greater than 60o
inclination, command may decide to wait until additional PJs arrive with
the proper equipment to reach the victim. Command may also choose to use
a helicopter for aerial recon.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-115

Figure 10.98 English Reeve.

English Reeve

UNCLASSIFIED

10-116

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.99 Norwegian Reeve.

Norwegian Reeve

UNCLASSIFIED
10.7.30.17.5.5.1.1 Assess the Need for Additional Resources. The recon
sector should provide command with enough information or recommend
the need for additional resources. Information that will be helpful in
determining the need for additional resources would include: number of
victims, location and condition of victims, estimated angle of terrain,
distance to victim, and estimated time of extraction. Command should put
in an early call for additional resources.
10.7.30.17.5.5.1.2 Assess the Hazards. Identify all potential hazards to
rescuers.
10.7.30.17.5.5.1.3 Decide on Rescue or Recovery. The recon sector
should advise command whether the operation will be conducted in the
rescue or recovery mode. In the rescue mode personnel assigned to the
recon sector will be reassigned to the treatment sector and recon sector will
be terminated. If the operation is to be conducted in the recovery mode,
command may wish to leave the victim and any related equipment in place
for investigative purposes.
10.7.30.17.5.5.1.4 Decide on an Action Plan. With a recommendation
from the treatment sector, command will have to decide on an action plan.
The extrication sector and safety sector shall be made aware of the specific
action plan.

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10.7.30.17.5.5.2 Phase II Pre-Rescue Operations.


10.7.30.17.5.5.2.1 Make the General Area Safe. The command or a
designee should begin to make the general area safe. This may include
securing the area and not allowing civilian personnel into the area.
10.7.30.17.5.5.2.2 Make the Rescue Area Safe. The command or a
designee should make the immediate rescue area safe. This may include
removing all civilian personnel and all nonessential rescue personnel from
the area. If it is not possible to secure all the hazards in the immediate
rescue area, all personnel operating in that area shall be made aware of
those hazards.
10.7.30.17.5.5.2.3 Pre-Rescue/Recovery. Depending on the action plan
established, the command may want to establish an extrication sector. The
extrication sector will be responsible for gathering all equipment and
personnel necessary to operate according to the action plan. The
extrication sector will assign rescue personnel to conduct the rescue, and
support personnel to support the rescuers, during the actual rescue phase.
The extrication sector should have an alternative action plan should the first
choice plan fail. This alternate plan should be communicated to all
personnel operating in the rescue area.
10.7.30.17.5.5.3 Phase III Rescue Operations.
10.7.30.17.5.5.3.1 After pre-rescue operations are complete, the
extrication sector shall put forth the action plan removal of the victims.
Conduct rescue operations from low risk to high risk. Conduct rescues
with the least amount of risk to rescuers necessary to rescue the victim.
Low risk operations are not always possible but should be considered first.
If the rescue of the victims is only possible by means of a high risk
operation, the extrication sector shall communicate with command the
risk/benefit of the operation.
10.7.30.17.5.5.3.2 The order of rescue from low risk to high risk would be:
10.7.30.17.5.5.3.3 Talk the victim into self rescue.
10.7.30.17.5.5.3.4 If the victim is not exposed to a life threatening
situation, it may be possible to talk the victim into self-extrication.
10.7.30.17.5.5.3.5 If the victim is exposed to a life-threatening situation, it
may be best to advise the victim to stay in place until a rope rescue system
can be set up.
10.7.30.17.5.5.3.6 The litter extrication should be conducted with a
minimum of 4 litter bearers. Bearers should face the direction of travel
during the extrication. If appropriate, a tag line should be attached to the
litter for assistance through unstable areas.

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10.7.30.17.5.5.3.7 For low-angle evacuation, the victim shall be called in
to assist with the extrication. If the victim is ambulatory, assistance may be
rendered by the rescuers with the use of a belay/tag line. If appropriate,
rescuers should set up an anchor system for the belay. A body belay may
also be used by rescuers, if appropriate.
10.7.30.17.5.5.3.8 If the victim is not ambulatory, rescuers shall build an
anchor system and prepare for a high angle evacuation. The patient shall be
packaged properly in a litter and prepared for the extrication. There shall
be at least three litter attendants assisting with the litter evacuation.
Attendants should face the anchor during the evacuation an be clipped into
the litter. A separate raising/lowering line and belay line shall be set up for
raising or lowering during steep angle evacuations.
10.7.30.17.5.5.3.9 In any case, a 10:1 safety factor shall be maintained and
a double rope technique shall be used if at all possible. Proper care shall be
taken to assure that the victim will not come out of the harness or litter used
to extricate him/her.
10.7.30.17.5.5.4 Phase IV Termination.
10.7.30.17.5.5.4.1 Prepare for termination.
10.7.30.17.5.5.4.2 Personnel accountability.
10.7.30.17.5.5.4.3 Equipment accountability.
10.7.30.17.5.5.4.4 Consider debriefing.
10.7.30.17.5.5.4.5 Secure the scene. Return to service.
10.7.30.17.5.5.4.6 Additional Considerations:
Heat. Consider rotation of crews.
Cold. Consider effects of hypothermia on victim and rescuers.
Rain/Snow. Consider the effects of rain on the hazard profile.
Time Of Day. Is there sufficient lighting for operations extending
into the night?

10.7.31 Equipment Lists. (See Figure 10.100, Accessory KitIndividual; Figure 10.101,
Tubular Nylon Color Codes; and Table 10.16, Harness Testing for further guidance.)

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Figure 10.100 Accessory KitIndividual.

Accessory KitIndividual

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 10.101 Tubular Nylon Color Codes.

Tubular Nylon Color Codes

Standardized Color Codes for 1 Inch Tublar Nylon Webbing

Green - 5 feet (1.5m)


Yellow - 12 feet (3.5m)
Blue - 15 fet (4.5m)
Red - 20 feet (6m)
Black - 25 feet (7.5m)

UNCLASSIFIED

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Table 10.16 Harness Testing.


Testing Method

Body Belt/Chest Harness

Full-Body Harness

Number of Tests

13

13

Range (minutes)

13

Median (minutes)

0.35 to 4.76
5.08 to 30.12

0.62 to 13.13

Mean (minutes)

1.32 to 14.23

5.30

1.25

3.35

Standard deviation
Type of Decision

Body Belt Harness

Chest Harness

Full-Body

Medical

11

Voluntary

10

10.7.31.1 Personal.
10.7.31.1.1 On Harness (Sit/Chest Harness Combination).
Prusik minding pulley, two small.
Ascending device.
Ice screws, two.
Sewn slings (2 x 60cm and 2 x 120cm).
Rappel device (not Figure Eight).
Carabiners, four to six non-locking, 6 locking.
Tandem Prusiks (Purcells)8mm: one is 1.65m and one is 1.35m untied (the
avalanche probe has centimeters on it100cm = 1m).
2 to 7mm Prusiks each 1.35m untied.
Third tool (hammer).
Snow picket (two minimum).
Ski pack.
Beacon/probe/shovel crampons.
Glacier glasses head lamp.
Ice axe snow saw.
Snow shoes.
Surveyors tape (recommended).
Trail wands (optional).
Compass and GPS.
Helmet: adjustable to fit over knit hat.

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Rain gear: abrasion resistant.


Leather gloves suitable for rappelling and belaying.
Aztek kit or pre-rigged 4:1 jigger.
10.7.31.1.2 Team.
Hardware: Belay devices, bear claw, litter with support items (e.g., straps, slings,
carabiners or ring), and padding.
Helmet: for victim.
Ropes: 11.2mm low-stretch rescue line, 150 foot or greater, 3 each.
Slings: long, medium, short1-inch tubular webbing or 11mm rope.
8 or 9 mm cord for Prusiks.
Anchor hardware.
Carabiners: locking D for litter work (wide gate openings), 20 kN rating.
Pulleys.
Edge Roller: fabricated or improvised.
Radios.
Medical Kit.
Maps.
10.8 Snow, Ice, and Glacier Operations.
10.8.1 Crevasse Travel and Rescue.
10.8.2 Introduction. The snow and ice environment is dynamic and ever changing. The
principles of travel and rescue are the mainly the same as any where else, but have some added
considerations. This is not an environment that allows many mistakes or one that should be
under taken without prior training and thought, especially at higher altitudes and extreme
temperatures. The intent of this chapter is not to tie a PJ team down to certain operating
procedures. It is to continue adding to what has already been discussed in the above section,
as well as, give a starting point for operating in the snow and ice arena using tactics,
techniques, and procedures that have been proven in extreme cold and high altitudes.
10.8.3 Definitions. There are many definitions and terms that apply to the snow and ice
arena. Terms that relate to snow, ice, glaciers, and avalanche will be covered focusing on the
more relevant ones. (See Table 10.17, Snow and Ice Environment Terms.) More definitions
can be found in the books referenced in the introduction.
10.8.4 Glacier Terms: (See Figure 10.102, Glacier Terminology and Figure 10.103,
Glacier.)

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Table 10.17 Snow and Ice Environment Terms.


Term
Glacier

Definition
A body of permanent ice slowly flowing downhill under the pull of gravity.
Not to be confused with a snowfield which is a body of snow that does not
move.

Abalation Zone Where more snow melts than falls. (See Figure 10.104, Abalation Zone.)
Accumulation
Zone

Where more snow falls than melts. (See Figure 10.105, Accumulation Zone.)

Bergschrund

The crack that develops at the base of steeper slopes, separating the moving ice
from the stationary ice higher up. These do not follow the 200 foot rule of
crevasses and will seem to drop infinitely. (See Figure 10.106, Bergschrund.)

Cornice

A build-up of snow on ridge crests, overhanging on the leeward side and created
by the wind. (See Figure 10.107, Cornice.)

Couloir

A natural concave groove between steeper walls of rock; usually wider than a
gully. (See Figure 10.108, Couloir.)

Crevasse

A crack in the glacier, sometimes hidden by snow cover. Can go as deep as 150
to 200 feet. Crevasses are formed in predictable areas on the glacier called
zones of tension. (See Figure 10.109, Crevasse.)

Moraines

Rock and debris areas on the glacier, will be labeled lateral, medial, and
terminal moraines. (See Figure 10.110, Moraines.)

Moulins

A giant water drain hole in the crevasse.

Serac

A tower or block of ice that is separated from the mass. One of a mountaineers
greatest hazards. (See Figure 10.111, Hanging Glacier.)

Snowbridge

A formation of snow that spans a crevasse. Snowbridges are formed when


snow falls on a glacier. The snow will accumulate on the edge of the crevasse;
they will form much faster when temperatures are near freezing. Wind also
plays a major role in the formation of snowbridges. The wind will create a
cornice over the glacier until it reached the other side. (See Figure 10.112,
Snow Covered Crevasse Field and Figure 10.113, Collapsed Snowbridge.)

Toe

The end of the glacier ice.

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Figure 10.102 Glacier Terminology.

Glacier Terminology
Lateral
Crevasses

Radial
Crevasses

Lateral
Moraine

Ice
Fall
Medial
Moraines

Firn
Zone

Exposed
Ice
Below
Fern Line

UNCLASSIFIED

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Figure 10.103 Glacier.

Glacier

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 10.104 Abalation Zone.

Ablation Zone

UNCLASSIFIED

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Figure 10.105 Accumulation Zone.

Accumulation Zone

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 10.106 Bergschrund.

Bergschrund

UNCLASSIFIED

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Figure 10.107 Cornice.

Cornice

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 10.108 Couloir.

Coulior

UNCLASSIFIED

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Figure 10.109 Crevasse.

Crevasse

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 10.110 Moraines.

Moraines

UNCLASSIFIED

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Figure 10.111 Hanging Glacier.

Hanging Glacier

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 10.112 Snow Covered Crevasse Field.

Snow Covered Crevasse Field

UNCLASSIFIED

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Figure 10.113 Collapsed Snowbridge.

Collapsed Snow Bridge

UNCLASSIFIED
10.8.5 Avalanche Terms.

Terms are described in Table 10.18, Avalance Terms.

10.8.6 Runout Angle. The angle, measured from horizontal, between the toe of the
avalanche and the crown. Also called the alpha angle.
10.8.7 Settling, Settlement. The slow deformation and densification of snow under the
influence of gravity. Sometimes settling is incorrectly used to describe collapsing or
whoomphing snow.
10.8.8 Slope Cut. Moving rapidly across an avalanche starting zone, aiming at safe terrain
on the side, so that if an avalanche breaks, your momentum will carry you off the moving slab
onto safe terrain. Skiers call them ski cuts.
10.8.9 Sympathetic Trigger. One avalanche triggers another avalanche some distance away.
10.8.10 Terrain Trap. Terrain in which consequences of an avalanche are especially
hazardous. Common terrain traps include gullies, an abrupt transition, or an avalanche path
that terminates in trees, crevasse field, or cliff.
10.8.11 Trigger. A disturbance that initiates fractures within the weak layer, allowing the
slab to slide off the slope. In 90 percent of avalanche accidents, the victim or someone in the
victims party triggers the avalanche. Other triggers include new snow, cornice falls, wind,
rapid warming, or percolated water. Avalanches are not triggered by noise.

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Table 10.18 Avalance Terms.


Term

Definition

Anchors

Trees, rocks, bushes that help to hold the snowpack in place.

Aspect

The direction the slope faces with respect to sun and wind. For
instance a slope may be north-facing, or it may be a leeward slope.

Beacon

An electronic device used to locate buried avalanche victims. Also


called transceivers or locators.

Bed Surface

The snow surface on which an avalanche slides.

Collapsing

A snowpack collapsing onto a buried weak-layer, which is an


obvious sign of instability

Continental Climate

The snow climate found in mountains far from the influence of the
oceans weather. Characterized by thin snowpacks, cold
temperatures, and more persistently unstable snowpack.

Grid Search

A rescue technique with beacons in which the rescuer uses a series


of perpendicular grids to find the transmitting beacon.

Induction Line Search

A rescue technique with beacons in which the rescuer follows the


curving electromagnetic lines that emanate from a transmitting
beacon. Also called tangent search.

Intermountain Climate

The snow climate commonly found in intermountain areas midway


between maritime and continental climates. Characterized by
intermediate snow depths and intermediate temperatures.

Leeward

The downwind side of an obstacle such as a ridge. Wind can deposit


snow onto leeward terrain creating wind slabs or wind pillows,
which are often dangerous.

Maritime Climate

The snow climate near the oceans. Characterized by deep snow and
warm temperatures.

Remote Trigger

When a person triggers an avalanche some distance away.


Sometimes called a sympathetic trigger.

Probe

A rod used to probe avalanche debris for buried victims.

Runout

The zone where an avalanche looses speed and deposits debris.

10.8.12 Weak Layer. A relatively less cohesive layer of snow underlying a relatively more
cohesive layer of snow. In a slab avalanche, the weak layer fractures, allowing the overlying
slab to slide of the slope.
10.8.13 Whoompf. Snowpack collapsing on a buried weak layer; an obvious sign of
instability.
10.8.14 Wind Loading. Loading of weight on top of a snowpack when wind drifts snow
onto lee terrain. Wind can deposit snow ten times more rapidly than snow falling from clouds.
Wind loading is a common denominator in most avalanche accidents.

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10.8.15 Windward. The upwind slope of an obstacle such as a ridge. Usually snow is
eroded from the windward slopes making them relatively safer. (See Figure 10.114 through
Figure 10.116, Avalanche Sequence Parts I, II, III.)
Figure 10.114 Avalanche Sequence Part (1 of 3).

Avalanche Sequence (1 of 3)

UNCLASSIFIED

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Figure 10.115 Avalanche Sequence Part (2 of 3).

Avalanche Sequence (2 of 3)

UNCLASSIFIED

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Figure 10.116 Avalanche Sequence Part (3 of 3).

Avalanche Sequence (3 of 3)

UNCLASSIFIED

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10.8.16 Gearing Up For Travel.


NOTE: The climber should set up his harness in the same manner as above in the technical
rescue chapter.
10.8.16.1 Sit Harness. The sit harness is a vital piece of gear for all glacier travel.
10.8.16.1.1 Proper fit of the sit harness is crucial for glacier travel. It is vital to pay
attention to the sit harness since the climber will often find themselves dangling in free
space after a crevasse fall. (See Figure 10.117, Sit Harness Fit.)
Figure 10.117 Sit Harness Fit.

Sit Harness Fit

Bone

Improper

Proper

UNCLASSIFIED
10.8.16.1.2 Care should be taken when selecting a harness. The harness should have
broad webbing or fabric, while its waistband cinches just above the climbers hipbones.
This will support the climber with a high center of gravity. It is recommended that the
operator try it on with a backpack to insure a comfortable fit for traveling. Weight is
also a factor in selecting a harness for glacier travel.
10.8.16.2 Chest Harness.
10.8.16.2.1 Along with the sit harness, the traveler should wear a chest harness. The
use of the chest harness will keep the fallen climber upright while hanging in a
crevasse.
10.8.16.2.2 Chest harnesses can either be purchased or made with tubular nylon.
10.8.16.2.3 A chest harness can be as simple or complex as the climber wants. The
only thing that is important is that the harness is adjustable.

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10.8.16.2.4 It is easy to make a simple chest harness


Take an eight-foot piece of one inch tubular nylon and tie it into a loop using a
fishermans bend. The reason for the fishermans bend is that it allows the climber
to adjust the harness.
Make it into a Figure Eight and put a shoulder through each loop, ensuring that
the X is in the back.
Link the front two loops with a non-locking carabiner.
10.8.16.2.5 Once the chest harness is fitted to the climber it is recommended that the
front chest strap of the chest harness be connected to the sit harness. When doing this
it is important to note that the climber is able to bend forward and that the chest strap is
free floating on at least one end. If traveling while roped up the rope can be used to
connect the two harnesses.
10.8.16.2.6 The climber should take into account what he is using the harness for. On
a rescue operation the harness should have enough gear attachment loops to allow for
organization of gear and this will also keep all of the kit off of his hips which is easier
to reach and more comfortable when wearing a pack. If the harness is only to be used
for traveling then light is right.
10.8.16.2.7 A disadvantage of the chest harness is that when the climber arrests a fall
the rope will squeeze the climbers chest towards his waist causing discomfort to the
climber until an anchor is set and the weight transferred off the climber.
10.8.16.2.8 The use of a full body harness is an alternative to the chest and sit harness
combo. This will alleviate the torso squeeze. It is also very comfortable and effective
in the rescue arena.
WARNING: Falling into a crevasse without a properly fitted chest harness can lead to serious
injury to the climbers back.
10.8.16.3 The following is a recommended gear list while traveling on a glacier. This list
is for self rescue of a team with two or more climbers traveling together. It can be used to
affect a rescue in an emergency situation.
Sit harness/chest harness, or body harness.
Helmet- if environment suggests it.
Four to six non-locking carabiners.
Four to six locking carabiners.
Two snow pickets- can be placed on outside of pack.
One ice screw.
10m x 7mm cordelette.
Two sewn slings.
One belay device.

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Two Prusik minding pulleys.
One pair tandem Prusiks.
Some means of ascention either Purcell Prusiks or mechanical ascenders.
10.8.16.4 For additional gear see the high-angle section of this chapter.

10.8.17 Rope Techniques.


10.8.17.1 The rope is the climbing teams life line while traversing through crevasse filled
terrain. If not careful, the rope can also be the teams worst enemy. Once tied into the
rope, the climbers must act as a team because no one will be able to move without the
other. Communication is paramount while climbing roped up.
WARNING: If the climber does not communicate effectively or remain attentive to the rope, it
could lead to serious injury or death.
10.8.17.2 As with any gear the rope must be cared for before, during, and after its use.
10.8.17.3 The manufactures recommendations should always be followed for the care
and storage of the rope while not in use.
10.8.17.4 When using the rope, take care not to step on it while wearing crampons and
keep it as dry as possible. Even though the rope is constantly being drug through the snow
and ice while traveling, try to dry it at the end of the day or bag it up to prevent it from
further saturation. Using a dry rope will help to keep it dry when in use. If a team
member falls, be sure to inspect the rope for any damage caused by the fall, ascention
device, or hauling system.
10.8.17.5 The team will need to configure the rope for traveling. This usually will entail
taking coils in. Multiple reasons exist for taking in coils, as well as, not taking in coils.
These will be dictated by the type of terrain traveling, and the number and experience of
climbers on the rope.
10.8.17.6 Reasons For Taking Coils.
Shortens rope making communication easier.
The first and last climbers have extra rope to set an anchor or set up a system for
rescue.
Allows for adjustability while moving.
10.8.17.7 Reasons Against Taking Coils. Crevasses are so big that the entire team will
be on the same Snowbridge.
10.8.17.8 Types of Coils. There are several types of coils. There is no right or wrong way
to take in coils. There are ways that are safer than others and easier to use. Some
examples of coils are the Kiwi and Mountain coil.
10.8.17.9 The Kiwi coil is carried around the climbers neck and shoulder. It is easy to
adjust the length of the rope with this type of coil. It will also act as an improvised chest
harness.

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10.8.17.10 The mountain coil is a style that most climbers are familiar with. It may be
either worn on the climber or stowed in the back pack.
10.8.17.11 The climber or team leader determines how the rope will be coiled and carried.
10.8.17.12 Quartering the Rope. Depending on the climbing team configuration, the
rope will need to be divided equally. This is extremely important when traveling in a team
of two.
10.8.17.13 To divide the rope into three equal parts follow these steps:
Step 1. Back-coil the rope finding both ends.
Step 2. Climbers will stand facing one another, each with a separate end of the rope
inhand.
Step 3. One climber than will reach across to the other climbers rope, grasping the
rope below the other climbers hand. A carabiner can be used for this.
Step 4. One climbers will now back away from one another while maintaining their
end and letting the section they grabbed move trough their hand or carabiner.
Step 5. Once the rope is stretched the climber will then tie into the rope and coil up
the slack between him and the running end.
10.8.17.14 For a Party of Three:
Step 1. Back coil the rope finding the center.
Step 2. Tie a knot into the rope
Step 3. Back coil the opposing ends
Step 4. Determine the amount of coils needed to take in and coil the rope.
Step 5. The end climbers will then tie into the rope. For some methods of coils the
end climber must first tie into the rope than coil it. For example, the Kiwi coil requires
this.
10.8.17.15 For a party of four or more, follow the above steps. Try to space the additional
knots in the rope equally if traveling.
10.8.17.16 If a member of the team or a patient needs to be short roped, adjust the spacing
as required.
10.8.18 Tying into the System.
10.8.18.1 Now that the rope is divided as required the team must tie into it and prepare for
traveling.
10.8.18.2 There are several ways to tie into the rope. Every climber has a personal
preference for the type of knot to use but the main principles are the same. The first and
last climber will use a retraced Figure Eight of retraced over-hand knot tied directly into
their harness. The middle climbers will use a butterfly of middle of the line Figure Eight,
the butterfly being the preferred method.

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10.8.18.3 Once the climber is tied into the rope they must prepare for travel. This is done
by readying themselves for a crevasse fall.
10.8.18.4 Attach all ascenders to harness and rope ready to ascend the rope if a fall is
taken. This is easy for the climbers on the ends, because there is only one side of the rope
that they can possibly climb.
10.8.18.5 The climber in the middle will have either the front or back side of the rope to
climb.
10.8.18.6 In this case it may be beneficial to attach a Prusik on both sides of his rope.
10.8.18.7 This also allows for speed when belaying the climbers teammates in and out of
areas while traveling.
10.8.18.8 As previously stated, mechanical ascenders or Prusiks may be used for
ascention. Both have advantages and disadvantages.
10.8.18.9 Advantages of Prusiks.
Able to keep on the rope while traveling.
Light weight.
Can be used in a rescue system, it has multiple uses.
10.8.18.10 Disadvantages of Prusiks.
Not able to tie quickly.
Not always easy to use when wearing heavy mittens.
10.8.18.11 Advantages of Mechanical Ascenders.
Easy and quick to fasten on a rope.
Easy to use with heavy mittens.
Easy to ascend with do to handle, if equipped with one.
10.8.18.12 Disadvantages of Mechanical Ascenders:
Not able to keep on rope while traveling.
Heavy.
Single use.
10.8.18.13 Once the climber is tied into the rope, the climber is ready to tie equipment into
the system. The climber must remember that if the gear is not attached, it is lost in a
crevasse fall.
10.8.18.14 In the next few paragraphs, methods for tying in sleds back-packs, skis, and
snow shoes will be covered

10.8.19 Tying in the Sled.


10.8.19.1 There are many types of sleds available to the climber. These range from sleds
specifically manufactured for climbing to plastic kiddie sleds.

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10.8.19.2 Manufactured sleds are very sturdy but weigh a lot, where as, kiddie sleds are
light weight and work just as well even though they are not as sturdy as a manufactured
sled.
10.8.19.3 The sled can be tied into the system a couple of ways.
10.8.19.4 The first way is to tie it directly into the rope in between two climbers. This is
done by attaching the sled to the rope via two Prusik cords. One will be tied from the front
of the sled to the rope and the other from the back to the rope. This allows the sled to be
moved along the rope as needed. A disadvantage to this is that the sled may move on the
rope due to the Prusik slipping when no tension is applied to it.
10.8.19.5 The second way is to attach the sled to the climbers pack with cordellete. The
rope then would be ran through a carabiner on top of the sled and tied by a clove hitch in
the back. (See Figure 10.118, Traveling with a Sled.)
Figure 10.118 Traveling with a Sled

Traveling with a Sled

UNCLASSIFIED
10.8.19.6 This will prevent the sled from moving along the rope. The clove hitch in the
rear will also keep the sled from sliding forward in a fall and colliding with the climber.
10.8.19.7 For the last climber, the options are to not carry a sled or attach it to the pack.
In the event of a crevasse fall, the climb will have nothing to stop the sled from falling.
10.8.20 Tying in the Back-Pack.
10.8.20.1 Tying in the back pack is very important, especially if it is a large pack. The
pack can be rigged several ways.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


10.8.20.2 One way is to tie cordellete around the entire pack ensuring that if a fall is taken,
it will not rip out. Some packs are sewn well enough that a sewn sling may be
girth-hitched around the carrying handle and shoulder strap.
10.8.20.3 Once you have a sling on the pack, it needs to be attached to the rope. The
climber does this by attaching it with a carabiner to a clove-hitch in the rope.
10.8.20.4 By tying the pack into the rope it prevents the pack from pulling the climber
away form the rope in during a fall. (See Figure 10.119, Back Pack Set-Up.)
10.8.20.5 Even with a chest harness on, the pack must still be attached.
10.8.20.6 Tying the pack into the rope can substitute as a chest harness as long as it is
rigged properly and will absorb the fall.

10.8.21 Tying in Snow-Shoes and Skis.


10.8.21.1 Snow shoes and skis are tied into the system while traveling. This being said,
the climber must still have a way to attach them to the rope in case of a fall.
10.8.21.2 This is accomplished by fixing a small loop of cordage to the tips of the skis or
snow shoes.
10.8.21.3 Some skis come pre-drilled for this, but some may need to be drilled.
10.8.21.4 The last thing about tying into the rope a climber should know is how the set up
works. It will save a lot of time and heartache after a fall if the climber has tested the kit.
Before any glacier operation the climber should test his set up by hanging in it.
10.8.22 Traveling Techniques. Glacier travel is a very demanding and dangerous task, yet
can be done safely with a little training and practice. Several things will make traveling more
efficient and pleasurable. These include rope management while moving, route selection,
properly crossing crevasses, time of day traveling, method of travel, and towing the sled.
10.8.23 Rope Management. Rope management is critical to safe and efficient travel.
Managing the rope requires the climbers to remain diligent, communicate, and work together.
10.8.23.1 To do this effectively it may require a teammate to speed up, slow down, stop or
back up.
10.8.23.2 The Prusik or ascender may be used to belay fellow climbers into a rest area, or
over a snowbridge that is questionable. This will prevent the climber from falling anymore
than nessecary.
10.8.23.3 This is a learned skill and must be practiced before going out on the glacier.
WARNING: Slack in the rope will add distance to a fall greatly increasing the chance of injury.
10.8.24 Route Selection. Route selection is a vital component before attempting to travel on
a glacier. Ways to accomplish this are via aerial photos, maps, and/or local knowledge.
10.8.24.1 Maps are good place to start the route planning, but remember that a glacier is
constantly moving and changing year to year and season to season.
10.8.24.2 Current aerial photos of the glacier will confirm anything needed from the map.
It is a good way to see the glaciers current condition.

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Figure 10.119 Back Pack Set-Up.

Back Pack Setup

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


10.8.24.3 Using the locals who are guides or climb in the area are always a good source
to compare notes with.
10.8.24.4 Once all of the resources have been gathered it is important to make a general
plan for the route of travel. Since the glacier is in constant change, be prepared to fine tune
the route as you move along.
10.8.24.5 When planning the route it is vital to know which way the crevasses will be
crossed. If the crevasses are perpendicular to the route of travel, the team will need to be a
file formation. If the crevasses are parallel to the route, the team will need to travel in an
echelon or line. These two formations will minimize the teams exposure to the slot and
allow the best chance of arresting a fall.

EXAMPLE: If the team is moving in a file while the crevasses are running parallel to the
direction of travel, there is a good chance the entire team is on a single snowbribge. If the bridge
was to give away, the result could be catastrophic.
10.8.25 Crossing Crevasses. Crossing a crevasse requires the team to effectively
communicate and manage the rope properly. Depending on the size and conditions of the
snowbridge, there are a several ways to cross. (See Figure 10.120, Crossing the Crevasse.)
10.8.25.1 The first way is to simply keep the rope taught and the team continues to move
over the bridge.
10.8.25.2 The second way is to have team stop and belay one another across.
10.8.25.3 The final and most time consuming yet safest way is to set a picket and belay
the first climber across the bridge. Once safely across, the climber will set another picket
and belay the middle man across. Once the middle man is across, he will belay the next or
final climber across the snowbridge.
10.8.25.4 If a crevasse is too big to cross or the snowbridge is not study enough, the
climbing team may have to find the end run of the hole and go around. This is done by
probing along the edge until an area safe enough to cross is found.
10.8.25.5 Time of day is a important factor in deciding when to travel.
10.8.25.6 Late night or early morning is a very good time to travel on a glacier. It is colder
during this time of day and the snowbridges have had time to reconsolidate becoming
stronger.
10.8.25.7 Late afternoon early evening is not the safest time to travel since the
temperature usually rise and the bridges begin to melt making them weaker.
10.8.25.8 If the temperature has remained constant, than the team can decide which is the
best time to move due to mission requirements.
10.8.25.9 Temperature plays a big role in deciding when and how to travel. Too cold can
be just as bad as too hot.
10.8.25.10 Many considerations revolve around towing the sled. Several of the
considerations are the weight of the sled, number of sleds, whether the sleds are attached
while traveling, and terrain covered.

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Figure 10.120 Crossing the Crevasse.

Crossing the Crevasse

Rope secured
to harness,
swami, or
coil A/W
Probing with
ice axe

Hidden
Crevasse

UNCLASSIFIED

About 50 ft distance
Keep rope off snow

Axe ready
for selfarrest

Carry two loops


in hand
About 50 ft distance
Rope secured
to self

Axe ready
for selfarrest

Extra
length
of
rope
Rope
secured

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


10.8.25.11 The weight of the sled is an ever changing factor. If traversing over relatively
flat terrain, more weight in the sled is better than more weight on the climbers back. If
climbing steep terrain, the climber should have the sled as light as possible.
10.8.25.12 The sled must also be packed properly so that the weight is evenly distributed
and its center of gravity is a low to the ground as possible.
10.8.25.13 The number of sleds is something to consider. If it is possible, take one sled
and take turns pulling it. The fewer sleds the better.
10.8.25.14 If everyone has a sled, the placement is a mute point. If only one or two sleds
are being used placement should be considered. This is mainly a factor during descent and
while traversing steep terrain.
10.8.25.15 For the case just mentioned, the sled should be attached to the first two
climbers so that the weight of the sled can be managed by the climber behind it.

EXAMPLE: The team is descending a steep buttress and the first person on the rope has the sled.
The second climber is maintaining space so that the sled does not slide up into the partners legs
causing the partner to trip or be pulled off balance.
10.8.25.16 Escape Techniques and Procedures.
10.8.25.16.1 The crevasse fall can be as simple as one leg falling through a
snowbridge to a dynamic fall resulting from a complete failure of the bridge. With
proper rope management and traveling techniques, the risks can be greatly mitigated.
In theory, as the team moves across a crevasse and a climber punches through the
teammates will arrest the climbers fall using an ice axe arrest.
10.8.25.16.2 Once the fall is stopped, the team will communicate if the fallen climber
can ascend without the help if assistance is needed.
10.8.25.16.3 Once a fall has been arrested, the team needs to set an anchor.
10.8.25.16.4 Once the anchor is in place, the team needs to ensure good
communication.
10.8.25.16.5 If able, the climber will begin to escape the crevasse.
10.8.25.16.6 There are several ways the climber can ascend. The climber may does
this by using the Purcell Prusik set up discussed in the previous section or use
mechanical ascenders. There are other numerous ways to ascend but the discussed
methods have been proven the quickest and most effective means of ascension.
10.8.25.16.7 Once ascension has begun, the climber must be prepared to cross the lip
of the crevasse. This can be very difficult due to the fact that the rope cuts into the
snow. The team above can help by protecting the edge with an ice axe or other pieces
of gear.
10.8.25.16.8 The following graphics depict glacier travel, a crevasse fall, and escape.
(See Figure 10.121, Step 1 through Figure 10.130, Step 10.)

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-145

Figure 10.121 Step 1.

Step 1

Throwing loops
away and falling
into proper arrest position
Hand carried loops
allows belayers to
assume self-arest
"FALLING!"

Push the pick


of axe into
snow or ice
Throw self on top
of axe handle
Hold handle with
other hand
Dig-in feet

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.122 Step 2.

Step 2

Toes dug in
Stay cool,
calm and collected

Pick in snow
and at shoulder
heigth --Body weight on
top of axe handle

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-147

Figure 10.123 Step 3.

Step 3

Waits for signal


of secure arrest
and belay

Stays in an
arrest-position
until last man
signals: "ON BELAY"

"ON BELAY"
or
"BELAY ON"

Stomped down snow

NOTE: Alternate Method


2nd man remains in the
arrest position as anchor,
while last man stays ropes-in
and moves to crevasse to
check on leader

UNCLASSIFIED

Ice axe handle firmly


in snow with foot against
handle, hands holding
rope tight. Best with
one hand on top of axe,
other hand holding rope.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.124 Step 4.

Step 4

Snow picket
anchors
2nd man gets
gets his feet dug
into snow, belays
temporarily, gets
Z-system ready

Dig a good
butress for
anchoring feet
Axe to keep
rope from
cutting into
snow/ice

UNCLASSIFIED

2nd man's
figure-8
knot

Prusik on rope

Snow picket
or ski pole, etc.,
to secure the axe

When pickets in
place, gradually release
tension on rope to see
if pickets hold

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10-149

Figure 10.125 Step 5.

Step 5

Party Rope
Rescue rope

Frozen in

Cut hole for


rescue

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.126 Step 6.

Step 6
Pullys
or
biners

Pully
or
carabiner

ll

Pu

Anchors
3 carabiners

Figure-8 knot
Biner

Short Sling

lac

s
ets

er
ast

ling

ty S

e
Saf

The more anchors,


the better the hold.
Put in more than
two if possible.

Prusiks

Carabiners
Hauling
Prusik
Push Prusik when
needed to hold rope
sh
pu

Line
already
hauled up
Master Safety
Prusik

1 to 5 Z-Pully System

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-151

Figure 10.127 Step 7.

Step 7

Fallen
team mate

Direction
of
pull
Gibbs ascenders (2)

Carabiners (3)

Figure-8 knot
in Party Rope

Pullys (2)
pull

Master Safety Line

Pullys (2)

Note: Gibbs are better


on iced rope

Party rope
Anchors (3)

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.128 Step 8.

Step 8

Self-Rescue
(Prusiks must
be attached to
rope prior to
glacier operations)

Prusik System

Nose-Level

Through carabiner
Below
waist

Wrap
around
legs

UNCLASSIFIED

Extra
length
allows
for wrap
around
legs

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-153

Figure 10.129 Step 9.

Step 9

To initiate
self-rescue
Prusik Climb...
First prusik
to be raised

in
conjunction
with

Once the top prusik


is raised above head,
step on the particular
sling and lift self up.
Then, do same with
the lower prusik
and other leg.

UNCLASSIFIED

first leg
to be
raised

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Figure 10.130 Step 10.

Step 10

prusik sling
to harness

Slide prusik
ahead of
jumar

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-155

10.9 Confined Space and Collapsed Structure.


10.9.1 Introduction to Confined Space and Structural Collapse. Co n f i n e d s p a c e a n d
collapsed structure are areas of rescue that pararescue has had varying degrees of familiarity
with for some time. Notable events include the California earthquake of 1985 where PJs
reacted to help to treat and extract trapped victims under collapsed highway structures; they
were often the only persons willing to enter the dangerous and often unstable environments.
After the September 11, 2001, attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center, PJs responded
to assist with recovery operations. Both these disasters combined the dangers of unstable
collapsed structures with the additional perils of enclosed spaces and accompanying hazards
of fire, smoke, toxic fumes, and dust.
WARNING: It cannot be overemphasized that PJs receive thorough introductory training in the
areas of confined space and structural collapse. This is an extremely dangerous type of rescue
activity with many potentially fatal factors that fall outside the control of the rescuer. A thorough
course of qualified instruction will greatly enhance the rescuers ability to successfully execute a
recovery in this environment while mitigating risks.
10.9.1.1 Confined space and collapsed structure are areas that have developed primarily
from response to natural disasters, public service rescue, urban fire department response,
and industrial rescue applications.
10.9.1.2 Confined space and collapsed structure each have unique considerations but the
approach to both can often be combined because of the very common safety concerns they
share. Collapsed structures nearly always result in confined spaces.
10.9.1.3 Confined space and collapsed structure rescue and recovery is a very broad area
of expertise that requires a lot of practical experience in order to grasp a reasonable
understanding of the myriad of factors that may effect the conditions and environment of a
recovery operation.
10.9.1.4 While a PJ is most likely to recover victims and patients using the concepts in this
section, it is very possible that the objective could be the recovery of a material object. For
the purpose of this chapter, the term recovery will be used generically for any type
recoverymaterial or person.
10.9.1.5 This section will break the scope of this study into two areas. Each area has
unique considerations that must be taken into account even though a potential recovery
could take place in an environment that is a combination of both confined space and
collapsed structure. The principles of safety and evaluation of the scene are common and
can encompass principles found within both disciplines and other rescue disciplines.
10.9.1.6 In the execution of a confined space or collapsed structure scenario, many
different rescue skills will be used, (e.g., climbing, rappelling, hauling, anchors, rope
work, extrication tools, and patient treatment and packaging). This section will not repeat
these specific skills that are highlighted in other areas of this publication. However,
particular methods and considerations not already covered will be explained.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


10.9.1.7 As with most types of rescue, it is in the best interest of the rescue team to have
rescue equipment kits pre-built, tested, and ready for immediate selection and deployment.
Once tasked for a mission, the PJTL can select additional gear as required, and have
equipment shortfalls delivered to the site of operations if possible.

10.9.2 General Tactical Considerations. Confined space and collapsed structure rescue is
typically a complex and time consuming task. In peacetime, this type of rescue is demanding
enough without the considerations of a tactical or combat environment. Teams still must focus
and be as cautious, safe, and thorough as possiblea demanding endeavor when life is in the
balance, the area is not completely secure, or in the case of terrorist activities. Teams must be
cautious about dangerous residual materials or agents, UXOs, and secondary explosive
devices. Having NBC specialists and EOD present on-site to provide expertise, detection and
mitigation equipment is desirable. In the event a recovery of this type must take place in the
mist of hostilities, the rescue team will require a sizable security force with required support in
order to secure the site. Additionally, the operational site should be free from direct assault in
order to keep the structure as viable as possible during recovery or rescue activities, and the
team focused on rescue as opposed to defensive or offensive activities.
10.9.3 Confined Space Rescue. A confined space is defined as a space that is big enough to
bodily enter but is not meant for continuous human occupancy, and has limited means of entry
and escape. A confined space can exist by deliberate construction of a space or structure, or by
the result of collapsed structures or in nature such as a cave. In confined space, the primary
thing of concern is rescuer safety as in all rescue situations. A prevalent situation that seems
to arise from this type of rescue is rescuers and rescuers of disabled rescuers being
overwhelmed by fumes or gases that render them unconscious. This dangerous domino effect
only complicates the entire scenario by an exponential factor. (See Figure 10.131, Vertical
Confined Space Entry and Figure 10.132, Vertical Confined Space Post-Entry.)
WARNING: No PJ is to enter a confined space without a gas monitor on their person.
10.9.3.1 Hazard Identification. First, assess the scene and identify hazards. These can
be comprised of physical, chemical, electrical, munitions, and atmospheric hazards.
10.9.3.1.1 Atmospheric Conditions. The first thing a rescuer must do prior to
entering a confined space is to evaluate the atmosphere. Is the air safe to breathe? Is
there sufficient oxygen content? Is there an over abundance of oxygen? Is there the
presence of a combustible gas? Is the gas detectable by smell or by monitor
exclusively? It will be discussed mostly from the standpoint of combustible gases
being of explosive concern. The presence of combustible gases (even low levels) can
affect human occupancy resulting in everything from nausea to seizures and to
incapacitation and to unconsciousness. Hydrocarbons do not feed the human
respiratory system.

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Figure 10.131 Vertical Confined Space Entry.

Vertical Confined Space Entry

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 10.132 Vertical Confined Space Post-Entry.

Vertical Confined Space Post-Entry

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


10.9.3.1.2 Gas Monitors and Basic Principles of Gas Monitoring. There are a great
variety of gas monitors. They come in various degrees of sensitivity, type of sensitivity,
and complexity of construction and operation. For tactical use, the smaller handheld
devices (size of small GPS) are more than adequate for PJ purposes. (See Figure
10.133, Hand-Held Gas Monitor.) They can be placed in stealth modes where they
do not audible alarm or flash lights when limits are reached, instead they can be set to
vibrate. These devices measure:

Figure 10.133 Hand-Held Gas Monitor.

Hand-Held Gas Monitor

UNCLASSIFIED
10.9.3.1.2.1 The lower explosive level (LEL) is a minimal level at which a
concentration of combustible gas will readily explode or burn with a sufficient
ignition source. This area encompasses all hydrocarbons. Typically the default
level on a gas monitor is set at 10 percent and will provide a safe conservative level
of monitoring. This level can be changed but should only be done by a person
qualified to evaluate the conditions of monitoring in a particular environment.
Once a gas reaches the LEL of 100 percent, the probability of explosion with an
ignition source is a given. Theoretically the area between 0 and 99 percent is an
environment too lean to ignite.
10.9.3.1.2.2 The oxygen level (O2) indicates two things; if there is an adequate
supply of oxygen in the ambient air to support human occupancy and if there is an
over abundance of oxygen in the air. Remember at sea level, O2 content is 21
percent (79 percent nitrogen and other gases), O2 is fuel for combustion, and it
feeds fire. There is also the concern of oxygen toxicity in high O2 atmospheres for

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-159

prolonged periods of exposure. O2 at less than 19.5 percent is considered oxygen


deficient, oxygen enriched above 23.5 percent.
10.9.3.1.2.3 Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) is by-product gas is produced at heat and power
facilities that use oil or coal containing sulfur. It is also produced through other
types of combustion. Additionally it is a product at sulfuric acid plants.
10.9.3.1.2.4 Hydrogen Sulfide (H 2 S) is a poisonous, toxic gas in high
concentrations, it is present in large quantities in geothermal reservoirs and coal
mines. It has the smell of rotten eggs.
10.9.3.1.2.5 Carbon monoxide (CO) is a by-product of combustion. It usually
occurs as a result of internal-combustion engine exhaust, however it can occur in
underground mines as a by product of a methane gas explosion.
10.9.3.1.2.6 Sulfur compounds, though occurring naturally, are often deliberately
added to industrial and domestically available combustible gases so that their
presence can be detected by human smell (as well as electronic monitors)
producing the well known odor of rotten eggs. This is a passive safety measure
to alert humans to the presence of dangerous combustible gases. (See Figure
10.133, Hand-Held Gas Monitor.)
10.9.3.1.3 Gas Monitors. Every PJ that enters a confined space needs to be outfitted
with a personal gas monitor. Gas monitors set up at the entrance to a confined space are
fine, but their measurements do not account for higher concentrations of gases deeper
into an enclosed space.
10.9.3.1.4 Self-Contained Breathing Systems (SCBA). For teams that choose to
deliberately train to respond to environments that may be contaminated, there are many
options.
SCBA open-circuit systems are similar to the well known SCOTT back-pack
bottle air supply system used by firefighters. Their usable time is limited by type of
bottle, volume, and pressure and the work load of the rescuers. They are usually
quite bulky and difficult to utilize in a confined space. Typical time is 15 to 30
minutes.
SCBA closed-circuit systems operate like a diving re-breather by scrubbing the
carbon from exhaled breath. They are usually smaller and lighter than an
open-circuit system and provides 30 minutes to several hours.
The supplied air-line respirators (surface) consist of an open-circuit face piece,
regulator, and egress/walk-about cylinder. Some systems allow the user to detach
from the low-pressure hose in order to move about more easily or deeper beyond
the length of the hose which is usually limited to around 300ft. Some systems
allow hoses to be joined at their ends by a regulated high-pressure manifold to
increase the overall distance.
10.9.3.1.5 Rescuer Recovery and Emergency Egress. Active and passive rescuer
recovery and emergency egress need to be rigged onto the rescuer prior to entry into a
confined space. The rescuer needs to have the ability to actively egress the confined

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


space immediately upon identifying a condition that could render the rescuer
unconscious, incapacitated, injured, or trapped. The entry system should be set up as
such that the monitor team/belay team outside the confined space could raise, lower, or
drag the rescuer out of the danger area.
10.9.3.1.6 Communications. Communications systems in confined spaces are
absolutely essential. Direct line-of-sight is not always possible. Often the confined
spaces are such that sound and voice projection can be severely diminished or
absorbed by debris, materials, or the container. Sometimes the confined spaces can
magnify or reflect voice and sound so that it becomes unintelligible. The environment
may be high noise. The entrant/rescuer needs to have a radio on their person, and also
consider of a secondary backup radio. This radio needs to be lanyard to the rescuers
body to ensure it does get lost or dropped into an inaccessible area. Movement down a
deep shaft or crawling along a tunnel can create movement that will result in loss of the
radio. Wireless radios can be affected by the surrounding debris, metals, magnetism,
and electrical interference from generators and power lines. There are hard-line
communications systems but they are limited by the length of their cable lines and
lower versatility.
10.9.3.1.7 Light Sources. Enclosed spaces may be lit but the rescuer must not depend
upon any other light source than their own. The rescuer should have more than one
light source to include a backup and the light sources should be bright enough to allow
conducting of safe operations and necessary illumination of the working area. The light
source should affix to the head or helmet of the rescuer so that the hands are free to
work. The rescuer may want to consider bringing other light sources such as chemical
lights to affix to the survivor, other patients, deceased, or illumination of the primary
working area inside the confined space.

WARNING: Open-flame lamps should not be used in confined spaces because of the possibility
of explosive conditions and the close proximity of other rescuers, survivors, combustible
materials, and loaded rope systems.
10.9.3.1.8 Ropes and Associated Rope, Belay, Climbing Hardware. Care,
maintenance, and inspection of all applicable equipment remain the same as with
regular climbing and mountaineering operations. Because a great number of confined
spaces are accessed from a top entry, the importance of an overhead anchor is
especially important when hauling litter patients and heavy objects. Since overhead
anchors are typically rare, the team should have a heavy-duty tripod available. (See
Figure 10.134, Anchor Tripod.)

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Figure 10.134 Anchor Tripod.

Anchor Tripod

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


10.9.3.1.9 Patient Treatment and Contact. The rescuer must take into account an
extremely traumatic experience that may be affecting a conscious patient. The patient
may be claustrophobic, feel suffocated, feel impending doom, or have any
combination of traumatic injuries to include being trapped. The patient may have acute
amnesia due to trauma induced unconsciousness and may become extremely agitated
and frightened once consciousness is regained. Talking to and physically touching
these patients will provide a lot of calming effect but a pharmaceutical aid may be
required to calm the victim to help expedite to recovery.
10.9.3.1.9.1 The situation or environment may dictate that the patient be removed
from the space ASAP. In this case, there may not be enough time to package a
patient to a litter. A full body harness can be placed on the patient in about 15 to 30
seconds to expedite recovery.
10.9.3.1.9.2 Many confined space entry/exits are extremely tight. The patient may
have to be packaged in a manner that provides the narrowest profile possible to
clear the exit. Keeping an arm free prior to passing through the exit will allow the
rescuers to position an arm overhead of the patient, with a possible shoulder tilt,
thus reducing the shoulder profile of a wide patient to assist in passage.
10.9.3.1.9.3 Hazard Reduction and Lock-Out Tag-Out. Prior to commencement
of operations in and around a structure, ensure that servicing utilities are shut off in
an effort to minimize dangers to working personnel and victims and damage to the
area.
Electrical: Secure energy at the source and along the circuit, visibly
marking at as DO NOT ACTIVATE OR ENERGIZE and placing a physical
lock on the switch to keep it from inadvertent activation.
Hydraulic: Charged and pressurized lines.
Mechanical: Blades, belts, gears, and flywheels.
Thermal: Liquified gases at sub-temperatures, and thermal steam-operated
systems and steam venting.
Forced Ventilation: The use of fans or blowers with flexible plastic ducts
routed into the areas that need to be ventilated to reduce presence of gas or
change temperature extremes.
10.9.3.2 Equipment. (See Table 10.19, Equipment; Figure 10.135, Circular Masonry
Saw; Figure 10.136, Gas Powered Saws; Figure 10.137, Crash-Axe Extended; and
Figure 10.138, Miscellaneous Entry Tools [e.g., axe, lamps, hacksaw, leverage bar,
Haligan tool, mini-wheel sled].)

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10-163

Table 10.19 Equipment.


PJ Rescuer/Entrant
Equipment Minimums

Optional Equipment

Entry Tools

- Gas detector.

- Elbow/knee/skin pads.

- Avalanche/location beacon.

- Additional light sources:


- Pick-axes
LEDs, lamps, chemical lights. - Chopping axes
- Clamp meter.
- Haligan tools

- High decibel whistle.


- Head protection (ProTec
helmet, - climbing/
mountaineering helmet).

- Sledge hammers

- Patient protective equipment: - Crash axes


eye, ear, breathing protection.
- Hammers
- Helmet light source
- Wired sound detection,
(recommend halogen and LED microphone/communications - Hack saws
combo light).
systems.
- Kinetic energy tools
- Secondary light source:
- Remote camera systems.
- Gas powered tools such as
helmet or handheld.
(masonry) circular saws and
- Ventilation fans and ducts.
chain saws.
- l Leather work gloves
(recommend leather reinforced
- Battery operated tools such as
Nomex).
drills and blade saws.
- Eye protection (fog free
ballistic goggles or Oakley).
- Climbing/body harness.
- Ropes, nylon, spectra,
climbing hardware, as
required.
- Dust mask, respirator, or self
contained breathing apparatus
(SCBA).
- Radio.
- Medical equipment as
required.
- Extrication gear as required.
OVERALL NOTE:
* Several gallons of water are necessary for operation of the masonry saw in order to keep the
blade cool and the dust sludge wet. The chain saw requires additional oil to keep the chain well
lubricated. Extra fuel will and batteries will be required for extended or complex recovery
operations. (See Figure 10.135, Circular Masonry Saw; Figure 10.136, Gas Powered Saws;
Figure 10.137, Crash-Axe Extended; and Figure 10.138, Miscellaneous Entry Tools [e.g., axe,
lamps, hacksaw, leverage bar, Haligan tool, mini-wheel sled].)

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Figure 10.135 Circular Masonry Saw.

Circular Masonry Saw

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 10.136 Gas Powered Saws.

Gas Powered Saws

UNCLASSIFIED

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Figure 10.137 Crash-Axe Extended.

Crash-Axe Extended

UNCLASSIFIED

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Figure 10.138 Miscellaneous Entry Tools.

Miscellaneous Entry Tools

UNCLASSIFIED
10.9.3.2.1 PJ Rescuer/Entrant Equipment Minimums.
Gas detector.
Head protection (ProTec helmet, climbing/mountaineering helmet).
Helmet light source (recommend halogen and LED combo light).
Secondary light sourcehelmet or handheld.
Leather work gloves (recommend leather reinforced Nomex).
Eye protection (fog free ballistic goggles or protective glasses (e.g., Oakley and
WileyX).
Climbing/body harness.
Ropes, nylon, spectra, climbing hardware, as required.
Dust mask, respirator, or self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).
Radio.
Medical and patient packaging equipment, as required.
Extrication gear, as required.
10.9.3.2.2 Optional Equipment.
Elbow, knee, or shin pads.

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Additional light sourcesLEDs, lamps, or chemical lights.


Patient protective equipmenteye, ear, and breathing protection.
Wired sound detection, microphone or communications systems.
Remote camera systems.
Ventilation fans and ducts.
10.9.4 Structural Collapse Rescue. The study of this area includes the basic understanding
of construction and laws of physics to the complexities of structural engineering. The
pararescueman should have a basic understanding of construction methods and materials.
Prior to an event that causes damage or shift of a structures foundation or load, a structural
engineer can with great accuracy determine the load and weight dispersal of a structure. Once
significant damage occurs to a building or structure, even a structural engineer can be
relegated to the arena of guesswork when determining the stability of a fallen structure. If an
architectural engineer does not have the answer, what does that mean to you, the rescuer?
Evaluate the circumstances as best you can; Listen to the advice of all available experts; Use
your experience, knowledge and gut instincts combined with all safety mitigating equipment
and procedures.
10.9.4.1 Structural collapse can include buildings, tunnels, bridges, mega-structures such
as ships, ocean oil platforms, complex scaffolding, caves, and man-made below-ground
complexes.
10.9.4.2 General Considerations.
10.9.4.2.1 Prior to entering a collapsed structure, the rescuer needs to ask some
questions. How stable does the structure appear? How old is the structure? Was it in a
state of disrepair prior to its collapse? Are water, electricity, and gas still being feed
into the building? By themselves, these utilities are less of a concern but in concert
they can spell disaster. Were any types of fuels stored within the structure or basement
of the structure to include such as natural gas, propane, heating oil, diesel or unleaded
fuels for generators? What made the structure collapse or unstable: natural disaster,
poor construction, fire, aerial bombing, terrorist bombing, utility explosion?
10.9.4.2.2 Before operations commence around a collapsed or highly unstable
structure, a few things must be accomplished.
A safety zone (or safety buffer) perimeter must be set up around the structure
equal to one and a half times the distance of any remaining standing structure of
the collapsed or unstable target structure.
Designate an entry/exit control point. Closely monitor the number and names of
personnel within the structure.
Clearly identify escape routes in the event of an emergency.
Maintain electronic communications with the entry personnel.

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Tie a line to the entry teams. This will help to quickly facilitate locating the
teams in the event of an emergency. Entry teams should be equipped with locator
beacons.
Station safety observers/lookouts around a structure so that the PJTL and entry
team can be informed of shifting structures or other significant activities.

WARNING: No PJ is to enter a collapsed structure without a gas monitor on their person.


10.9.4.3 Lock-Out-Tag-Out. As soon as possible, the team needs to stop all utilities
being feed into the structure or area of the collapse. When possible, the switches, valves, or
controls to these various utilities need to be marked very clearly that they are to remain in
an OFF position. Additionally, if these switches can be locked into an off position, then
do so. If it is critical that utilities not be inadvertently turned on, station personnel at the
activation location to ensure that they are not turned on.
10.9.4.4 Rescuer/Entrant. The rescuer/entrant needs to have a safety line attached to
their body, along with a gas monitor, locator beacon, and communications radio. A whistle
provides another signaling option should they become entrapped.
10.9.4.5 Search and Observation Equipment and Options. There are many pieces of
equipment available to assist in collapsed structure events.
10.9.4.5.1 Auditory. There are microphone systems that allow rescuers the ability to
insert listening devices into small cracks and feed the devices into areas to listen for
survivors before committing precious resources to uncovering an unknown area. Some
of these devices are two-way equipped and allow the rescuers to hail or talk to, as well
as listen to a remote survivor or rescue team. Some electronic listening devices work in
tandem like directional finding equipment by listening to acoustic and seismic
s i g n a t u r e s t o l o c a t e s u r v i v o r p o s i t i o n s . ( S e e F i g ure 1 0 . 1 3 9, R e m o t e
Microphone-Communications System.)
10.9.4.5.2 Visual. There are small flexible camera systems that allow rescuers to peer
into inaccessible areas to look for survivors or potential areas of entry prior to
committing resources and time. These include fiberscope, bore-scopes, and
flex-scopes. They can provide black and white, color, and infrared/thermal imaging
capability. (See Figure 10.140, Flex-Scope Camera System, and Figure 10.141,
Flex-Sscope LCD Camera.)
10.9.4.5.3 Dogs. In a CONUS peacetime environment, dogs may be present to assist
in survivor location. Their reliability varies based on training and conditioning of the
animal. Secondary electronic means used in tandem with dogs provide a very good
level of reliability.
10.9.4.6 Structure Stabilization. For pararescuemen, the purpose of shoring and
cribbing is to provide an essential amount of stabilization to a weakened route of entry in
order to quickly and as safely as time will allow, gain access to and retrieve a survivor.
(See Figure 10.142, T-Shore; Figure 10.143, Vertical Shore Diagonal Brace Joints, and
Figure 10.144, Window Frame Brace.)

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Figure 10.139 Remote Microphone-Communications System.

Remote Microphone Communications System

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 10.140 Flex-Scope Camera System.

Flex-Scope Camera System

UNCLASSIFIED

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Figure 10.141 Flex-Scope LCD Camera.

Flex-Scope LCD Camera

UNCLASSIFIED
10.9.4.6.1 Mechanical Pipe Posts and Jacks: Used to shore overhead a side
bearing/trench loads. (See Figure 10.145, Mechanical Jack; Figure 10.146, Trench
For Jack 4 x 4 Placement; and Figure 10.147, Jack Supporting Cross Beam Members.)
10.9.4.6.2 Raker Shores: Used for stabilizing free-standing walls while rollers,
pipes, and wheels are used for moving extremely heavy objects. (See Figure 10.148,
Move Concrete Slab on Poles, and Figure 10.149 through Figure 10.151, Move
Concrete Slab Over Object.)
10.9.4.7 Forced Entry. It may be necessary to break through a level of building material
to get access to an adjacent area. The barrier may be as simple as a door or as hearty as a
slab of concrete wall or floor. Obviously, some barriers will necessitate looking for
alternative entry areas, as in the case of plate metal. Attempt the simplest method first. In
a display of efficiency and speed, a PJ team of six was able to crash through 6 double walls
of 2 x 4s, drywall, and wood paneling using only three sledgehammers and boots in
roughly 3 minutes. The following figures display entry into a reinforced concrete slab. One
entry was made using only a Haligan tool, sledgehammer, and saw with metal-cutting
blade. This entry took about 12 to 15 minutes. The other entry was made using a masonry
circular saw and took about 25 minutes. Choice of tools is based on quality and thickness
of the barrier material. (See Figure 10.152 through Figure 10.154, Concrete Entry 1, and
Figure 10.155 and Figure 10.156, Concrete Entry 2.)

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Figure 10.142 T-Shore.

T-Shore

UNCLASSIFIED

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Figure 10.143 Vertical Shore Diagonal Brace Joints.

Vertical Shore Diagonal Brace Joints

UNCLASSIFIED

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Figure 10.144 Window Frame Brace.

Window Frame Brace

UNCLASSIFIED

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Figure 10.145 Mechanical Jack.

Mechanical Jack

UNCLASSIFIED

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Figure 10.146 Trench for Jack 4 x 4 Placement.

Trench for Jack 4x4 Placement

UNCLASSIFIED

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Figure 10.147 Jack Supporting Cross Beam Members.

Jack Supporting Cross Beam Members

UNCLASSIFIED

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Figure 10.148 Move Concrete Slab On Poles.

Move Concrete Slab on Poles

UNCLASSIFIED

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Figure 10.149 Move Concrete Slab Over Object (1 of 3).

Move Concrete Slab Over Object (1 of 3)

UNCLASSIFIED

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Figure 10.150 Move Concrete Slab Over Object (2 of 3).

Move Concrete Slab Over Object (2 of 3)

UNCLASSIFIED

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Figure 10.151 Move Concrete Slab Over Object (3 of 3).

Move Concrete Slab Over Object (3 of 3)

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

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Figure 10.152 Concrete Entry 1 (1 of 3).

Concrete Entry 1 (1 of 3)

UNCLASSIFIED

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Figure 10.153 Concrete Entry 1 (2 of 3).

Concrete Entry 1 (2 of 3)

UNCLASSIFIED

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Figure 10.154 Concrete Entry 1 (3 of 3).

Concrete Entry 1 (3 of 3)

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 10.155 Concrete Entry 2 (1 of 2).

Concrete Entry 2 (1 of 2)

UNCLASSIFIED

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Figure 10.156 Concrete Entry 2 (2 of 2).

Concrete Entry 2 (2 of 2)

UNCLASSIFIED
10.9.4.8 Clamp Meters. Clamp meters are handheld devices that wrap around power
lines. They have digital readouts that will provide the user with a variety of information
depending on the model. The information these units typically display activily state of the
line, type current (AC/DC), direction of current, amperage, voltage, resistance,
temperature, and frequency. This information is very useful when determining weather to
cut a line or if you are experiencing radio interference. (See Figure 10.157 Clamp Meters
and Figure 10.158, Clamp Meter.)
10.9.4.9 Cribbing and Shoring Materials and Equipment as Required: Wood lumber
and plywood: 6 x 6s, 4 x 4s, 2 x 4s, plywood/gusset plates, and nails to construct: t-shores,
vertical braced shores, laced post shores, horizontal shoes, and various raker shores.
Prefabricated: metal mechanical pipe shores and trench jacks, pneumatic shoring posts,
feet, brackets and extensions. Also, sandbags are a hot commodity.

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Figure 10.157 Clamp Meters.

Clamp Meters

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 10.158 Clamp Meter.

Clamp Meter

UNCLASSIFIED

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10.9.4.10 Kit Construction and Employment. There are a variety of methods to
package and employ confined space kits. The material required for this type of rescue is
heavy, bulky, and usually cumbersome. Ideally you want to off-load it as close to the
objective as possible. There are soft ballistic bags that can be dragged or carried by two or
more personnel, and there are wheeled sleds that can be loaded and stacked with gear and
drug by one of two personnel over somewhat level terrain. Both can be rigged for belay
out of a helicopter. Some examples are featured below. (See Figure 10.159, Collapsed
Structure Kit In Two Bags and Figure 10.160, Collapsed Structure Kit Bag 1 Contents.
Also, see Figure 10.161, Wheeled Equipment Sled with Pull Harness and Figure 10.162,
Contents Of Wheeled Equipment Sled.)

10.9.5 Final Recommendations. As was highlighted throughout this chapter, confined


space and collapsed structure are areas that can run the gamut from simple to the dangerous
and highly complex. It is possible to make dangerous conditions very safe but do so may
require extensive experience, excellent planning and preparation, and attention to detail, and
continuous vigilance of the rescue environment. It may also require at lot of time. As with
any real world operation, it is not always possible to mitigate all risks or dangers. The
variations of situations, environments, and considerations that can be encountered in this type
of rescue runs well beyond the scope of this chapter and is covered in great depth in a variety
of publications and texts. It is highly recommended that pararescuemen attend an extensive,
highly focused course of instruction that features a tactical approach to this type of rescue. A
successfully instructed course of this type requires much logistical planning and access to
structures in which safe but very realistic and complex exercises can be conducted to illustrate
how the principles are applied and executed. This type of course should also include the
requirements and standards of National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI) so that pararescuemen are attuned to the universal practices and standard operating
procedures that other rescue forces utilize and can integrate and function with CONUS,
overseas US, and certain international rescue forces in the event of a major disaster response.
One highly recommended course that meets all these criteria is Rock Rescue of Baton Rouge,
La at www.rocorescue.com.
10.10 Extrication Techniques and Equipment.
10.10.1 General. Extrication rescue typically centers on the extrication of victims trapped in,
under, and around vehicles and aircraft. The entrapment is usually caused by a crash or impact
of some type which usually results in traumatic injury to the victim. There may be other
accompanying hazards such as fuels, live power wiring, fires, toxic fumes and smoke,
munitions, or other types of explosive, combustible, toxic, or dangerous cargo. It is possible
that the extrication target may be an object or piece of sensitive equipment. When tasked with
a material object, pre-briefing the recovery team in the best methods of removing a fixed piece
of equipment will help expedite the process at the terminal site.
10.10.2 General Tactical Considerations. In a tactical environment, speed is criticalin
and out. A fast execution minimizes exposure of the rescue team and starts life saving patient
treatment sooner. Little time should be wasted contemplating extrication options. Tools may
not be necessary. Pure manpower may be all that is required to lift or move a heavy object off
a victim, saving many precious minutes.

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Figure 10.159 Collapsed Structure Kit in Two Bags.

Collapsed Structure Kit in Two Bags

UNCLASSIFIED

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Figure 10.160 Collapsed Structure Kit Bag 1 Contents.

Collapsed Structure Kit Bag 1 Contents

UNCLASSIFIED

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Figure 10.161 Wheeled Equipment Sled with Pull Harness.

Wheeled Equipment Sled with Pull Harness

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 10.162 Contents of Wheeled Equipment Sled.

Contents of Wheeled Equipment Sled

UNCLASSIFIED

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10.10.2.1 On a rotary-wing insert, the PJTL needs to quickly determine the minimal
required gear needed to effectively prosecute an extrication prior to stepping off the
aircraft. Dragging an overage of rescue equipment around a terminal area is undesirable.
The decision is made based upon all available information enhanced by a possible fly-over
of the terminal area prior to insert.
10.10.2.2 Depending upon the complexity of the extrication scenario and the threat level
at the terminal area, a security force, and fire support may be necessary to provide site
security while the PJs perform the extrication recovery.

10.10.3 Extrication Techniques and Equipment. F o l l o w p r o t o c o l i n s i t e s e c u r i t y,


evaluation, search, triage of patients, and removal from the danger area. Start extrication of
live trapped victims immediately but ensure life threatening injuries are addressed first or in
concert with the extrication, based upon number of rescue personnel. Compartment
syndromes are the most obvious concern of traumatically entrapped victims, and the team
should be prepared to stabilize the freed victim prior to and immediately after to the best of
their ability.
10.10.3.1 Use the Simplest Approach First. Use knobs, handles, levers, and normal
methods of activating and open doors or devices. Second, try prying and them beating.
Breaking a window or prying off a panel to reach inside a vehicle and open it from the
inside may be a lot quicker than going for a heavier tool and attacking the locking
mechanism. Once the simple solutions are quickly exhausted, and then go for the heavy
tools.
10.10.3.2 Personal Equipment. When working extrication, there is usually an
abundance of sharp jagged metal and broken, sharp glass and plexiglass and other plastics.
These wreakage hazards can cause significant injury to the rescue team members, as well
as any survivors. It is important that the recovery team members are wearing protective
clothing and accessories prior to enter wreakage. Minimum items include:
Full uniform coverage of exposed skin.
Heavy leather working gloves (consider insulated and kevlar reinforced glove
options.
Ballistic eye protection.
Ear protection when required.
Requiered extrication gear.
Required medical gear.
Recommended: clamp meters and gas monitors.
10.10.3.3 Extrication Equipment.
10.10.3.3.1 Crash Axe. The most basic piece of extrication gear. It is versatility
allows for axe cutting, spike piercing, prying, and sheet metal cutting action. (See
Figure 10.137, Crash-Axe Extended.)

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10.10.3.3.2 Haligan Tool/Crow-Bar. These tools can be used by itself for prying or
in tandem with a hammer of sledge for more power. (See Figure 10.138,
Miscellaneous Entry Tools.)
10.10.3.3.3 Sledge Hammer/Battering Rams/Axe. Provide kinetic power, and
cutting ability.
10.10.3.3.4 Straight Blade Battery Operated Saw. One of the best tools at a PJs
disposal is the simple 24-volt battery operated straight blade sawAKA saw-saw.
When fitted with a quality rescue blade, this tool will cut through most items twice as
fast a hydraulic jaws of life. It creates clean cuts of metal unlike the jaws which can
create sharp edges of shredded metal. Materials include a wide variety of steels, iron,
aluminum, and other alloys. Most metals used in vehicle and aircraft body
construction will not be a problem. Exceptions include hardened steels and alloys like
lock retension pins, locks, and plate armor. (See Figure 10.163, 24-Volt Straight Blade
Saw with Bag and Spare Batteries.)
Figure 10.163 24-Volt Straight Blade Saw with Bag and Spare Batteries.

24-Volt Straight Blade Saw with Bag and Spare Batteries

UNCLASSIFIED
10.10.3.3.5 Pneumatic and Hydraulic Jaws/Rescue Combination Tool. These
devices cut and spread, and usually have a several head/cutter/spreader options; They
also have positional head adjustments and are easily operated by a single rescuer. They
come in various sizes and have various operating mechanisms. They can be either
pneumatic or hydraulic and some are operated by a hand pumping action, some with
battery attachment, and others with air or hydraulic line attachments. Their portability

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is also dependent on which system they utilize. Their sizes run from self-contained
hand held units, to units that require an Alice size ruck that contain a battery system, to
others that require a portable gas engine generator, or even a full size rescue vehicle
hydraulic generator. The benefit to the more elaborate systems is that you can perform
whole lot more cutting and spreading, a lot faster, with more power pressure, and with
longer operator endurance. The smaller units are more portable and lighter, and work
well with small extrication missions. A smaller unit can exhaust the operator if the
extrication becomes complicated and requires a lot of cutting and spreading. These
devices are also great at lifting objects. Used in tandem with a piece of cribbing if the
ground is soft, the jaws can lift an object up to almost a foot in some cases. See Figure
10.164, Hand-Pump Jaws and Figure 10.165, Powered Jaws.)

Figure 10.164 Hand-Pump Jaws.

Hand Pump Jaws

UNCLASSIFIED
10.10.3.3.6 Chain-Saw. It is use is reserved to trees, bushes, lumber, and soft
construction materials (i.e., 2 x 4s, drywall). (See Figure 10.136, Gas Powered Saws.)
10.10.3.3.7 Shovel or Entrenching Tool. For clearing dirt and debris from under an
object, or digging trenches.

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Figure 10.165 Powered Jaws.

Powered Jaws

UNCLASSIFIED
10.10.3.3.8 Lift Bags. Are constructed of reinforced nylon reinforced rubberized
materials. They operate on a low-pressure system and depending on size and
construction, a single bag can lift from 1 ton, upwards of 20 tons and more. The bags
are inflated using gas-operated air generators, SCUBA cylinders, or foot pumps. The
SCUBA cylinders provide an excellent option because they provide a large volume of
air very quickly, can inflate the larger size bags 2 to 5 times, and are very portable.
Some of the newer tanks are constructed of Kevlar and or carbon fiber and are able to
hold higher pressures as well.
10.10.3.3.9 Lift Pads. Are constructed of reinforced rubberized materials. They
operate on a low pressure system as well and can be stacked on top of each other in
order to increase the lift distance. The pads are inflated using gas-operated air
generators or foot pumps. The pads can be laid on cribbing materials or sandwich
stacked between alternating layers of pads and cribbing to control direction and
distance of lift. (See Figure 10.166, Lift Pads with Foot Pump.)
10.10.3.3.10 Cribbing. Cribbing is used to secure a load once it is lifted to the desired
height. It can also be used to set alternating platforms for staged lifting of an object.
There are many different items that can be utilized as cribbing.
10.10.3.3.10.1 Pre-constructed cribbing is extremely strong and varies in dessign
from 15 to 30 degree wedges, to square block lenghts, to narrow step designed
blocks. They are constructed of many lightweight materials such plastics, Kevlar,
composites, and metal.

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Figure 10.166 Lift Pads with Foot Pump.

Lift Pads with Foot Pump

UNCLASSIFIED
10.10.3.3.10.2 Various type of block and wedged wood is used: pieces of 6x6, 4x4,
2x2, railroad ties, and logs.
10.10.3.3.10.3 Sandbags are a great alternative to minimizing your kit. You can
pack a large number of empty sandbags, and fill them up at the operational site.
This is a great SOP if you are in an area with an abundance of sand such as the
desert. Just remember to pack an entrenching tool.
10.10.3.3.10.4 Anything made of a large study mass can be used (e.g, rocks, pieces
of steel I-beam).
10.10.3.4 Portability and Kits. Extrication kits can be built and customized a number of
ways. They can be constructed as minimalist man-packable system to large
comprehensive kits that require a team of rescuers or a vehicle to move. All these rescue
tools can be air-dropped or belayed. Kits should be pre-built and inspected for quick
reaction. Kits should be staged and built with a tiered approached to extrication
complexity and size of objective. If an extrication tasking proves to be a large
undertaking, then choosing the largest kit or all parts of a multi-stage kit becomes the
option. As operations dictate, the larger the kit, the closer to the operational area you want
to insert the kit with the team.
10.10.3.4.1 Rucks. A variety of ALICE, custom, and pre-fabricated rucks exist for
employing with smaller extrication tools that function with manpower or foot pumps.
Small hand-pump jaws, crash axes, battery saws, and lift pads can be carried and
employed by PJs by personnal parachute or AIE insertion. (See Figure 10.167, Small

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ALICE Rigged with 24 Volt Saw; Figure 10.168, Small ALICE Rigged with Jaws; and
Figure 10.166, Lift Pads with Foot Pump.)
Figure 10.167 Small ALICE Rigged with 24 Volt Saw.

Small ALICE Rigged with 24-Volt Saw

UNCLASSIFIED
10.10.3.4.2 Haul Bags. Large amounts of extrication gear can be packed into these
reinforced bags. Bags such as the Yates Mountain Equipment are constructed to hold
large amounts of mountain gear and are durable in those types environment. They
have multiple hand holds for team carry, usaully are rigged with shoulder straps, and
can be easily rigged for belay operations and even door bundle drop.
10.10.3.4.3 Sleds. Sleds are usually wheeled and are great for relatively flat terrain or
urban environments. They can hold a great deal of weight and equipped, and can be
belayed or even air-dropped.
10.10.3.4.4 Boxes. Large equipment boxes can be packed with large amounts of gear
but are less versitle. They are constructed of metal and high impact plastics. They can
belayed, but it is desirable to belay the box as close to the target area as possible. It can
be air-dropped, but good precision is desired in order to minimize the distance the box
has to be carried. This container option is well known for storing the REDS Kit.
10.10.3.4.4.1 REDS Kit. As the standard for an common extrication kit, the
packing list below is an example of good extrication kit options. See Table 10.20,
Heavey REDS Kit Contents and Table 10.21, Light REDS Kit Contents.)

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Figure 10.168 Small ALICE Rigged with Jaws.

Small ALICE Rigged with Jaws

UNCLASSIFIED
10.10.4 Extrication Capability. Extrication capability is a field that requires a continous
commitment to proficiency training and acquisition of refined up-to-date equipment to include
improvements in increased versitility and capability, reduced weight, increased strenght, and
smaller size for portability and function. These improvements will greatly enhance the rescue
teams ability to conduct a successful extrication with great speed, minimal resources, and
reduced footprint. The PJTL is responsible to ensure a team is trained and equipped to perform
a broad spectrum of extrication capability.
10.11 Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and Explosives.
10.11.1 General. Contaminated environments are the most chanllenging of environmental
considerations because of the serious risks and high probablity of fatalities they can pose to the
rescue team and victims. Rescue operations that must be conducted in these type
environments pose a myriad of problems that must be overcome or mitigated. Not all rescues
are feasible in these environments and serious risk management issues must be weighed
against risking a rescue team, security, and supporting assets to execute a recovery.
10.11.1.1 The challenges of simply surviving in NBC environments is concern enough,
before any other tactical considerations can be evaluated. The logistics and security
concerns of performing operations in contaminated areas with protective gear is such that
in most cases, the operations have to be conducted in remote isolated areas or areas that are
under friendly control. The wearing of NBC protective gear seriously hampers and reduces
the tactical capability of the operator/rescuer/PJ.

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Table 10.20 Heavy REDS Kit Contents.


Based on Approximate Weight of 300 Pounds
Quantity

Item

REDS container

O-cutters

Spreader

Hydraulic pump

Set of chains

Crash ax

Hacksaws

Spare blades for hacksaw

Fire blanket

Reciprocating saw

Spare blades for reciprocating saw

Air pump

Air lift bag (12-ton)

Air lift bag (24-ton)

Air lift bag (36-ton)

1
1

Ram, small wtih extensions


1 x Crosshead for ram tip

Flat base plate

1 x Pulling heads

1 x Extension pipe (6 inches)

1 x Extension pipe (13 inches)

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Table 10.21 Light REDS Kit Contents.


Based on Approximate Weight of 225 Pounds
Quantity

Item

REDS container

Lowering harness; 2 inch nylon webbing with


hardware and risers

Generator (hydraulic pump)

Combo tool

Hose extension (for extraction tools)

Crash ax

2
1

Hack saw (double blades)


1 x Tool kit for saw

Ryobi saw with extra blades taped to saw

1 x 1-ton lift bag, 1 x 7-ton lift bag, 2 x 10-ton


lift bags, and 1 air pump

2 x one-way valve hose for lift bags

Fire blanket (2-foot x 3-foot)

Chains (1 long and1 short)

10.11.1.2 Explosive environments include a wide variety of situations. They include


things such as fertilizer plants, munitions plants or storage facilities, chemical plants and
storage facilities, fossil fuel power plants, fuel depots, and oil and gas refineries. They also
can include any facility that stores or manipulates any combination of combustable
materials. Transport of dangerous exposive materials must also be considered, everything
from underground and above ground pipelines, vehicles, trains, and aircraft. These
environments create everything from dangerous atmosphereic conditions to dangerous
geographic conditions. Instability of these environments can be caused by mechanical or
procedural problems, accidents, direct attack, and terrorist activity.
10.11.2 Unknown and Reactionary Environments. In this type of mission execution, the
team is inserted into the terminal or operational area and discovers the area is contaminated
and then either immediately exits or exfiles the area or, if properly equipped, dons protective
measures and continues on with the mission. The type of agent present in the area may or may
not be determined depending on the type of detection equipment carried by the team or
observation of casualties.
10.11.2.1 A reactionary situation occurs after the team is inserted and they are attacked
deliberately with NBC weaponry or are exposed by an indirect attack and don protective
measures. Depending on circumstances and equipment, the team may continue on with
the mission or discontinue and exfil.

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10.11.3 Known Environments.


10.11.3.1 Unplanned. The team is properly equipped and expects a high probablilty of
NBC usage. They may be in a ground or airborn alert posture and are called to respond to
a recovery in a contaminated environment. If time is permitted prior to the tsking, some
generalized pre-palnning and gear preparation may be accomplished. Protective measures
will be donned prior to entering the terminal and operational area.
10.11.3.2 Planned. The team receives word prior to employment and may have time to
pre-plan the recovery operations. The team will have protective measures donned prior to
entering the terminal and operational area.
10.11.3.3 Agent Type. The contaminating agent may be completely identified or
classified prior to entering the area. This information is essential to protecting the rescue
team to the best possible level.
10.11.4 Tactical Considerations.
10.11.4.1 Team survivability is paramount. All steps to prevent exposure will be taken.
Pararescuemen may find themselves operating in these environments but are not experts in
these conditions. Generally speaking PJs are not equipped to operate efficiently in these
environments. The number one consideration in these type of environments is safety and
protection from exposure. Any team member becoming acutely symtomatic in a NBC
environment is grounds for withdrawl and mission cessation.
10.11.4.2 Survivability and persistence of these contaminants and agents in the field after
induction can range from minutes, to days, to weeks and to months. Persistence depends
on weather conditions and how the contaminant or agent was engineered and dispersed.
10.11.4.3 Enemy activity must be neutralized not present or highly ineffective. In all
likelyhood, if the area is seriously contaminated, there will be little to no enemy activity.
Isolated areas are preferred but depend entirely on where the operation must be conducted.
Conducting effective defensive and offensive activites in these environments is extremely
difficult. Commiting additional security ground forces is a recipe for increase casualties
from exposure, in addition to hostile fire. This also increases overall logistical difficulty in
the decontamination of a greater number of direct action troops and post operational
medical care of exposure casaulties.
10.11.4.4 When possible, specialists in NBC environments can help prepare, equipe, or
accompany the team in certain cases. NBC specialists have the specialized and unique
training and equipment to operate in and evaluate these environments.
10.11.4.5 In a worse case scenario, a team working in a contaminated environemnt may
be exposed to a contageous fatal biological agent. Infection of the team and survivor(s),
may preclude extraction in order to prevent the rampant spread of a highly infectious
contagent.
10.11.5 Specific NBC and Explosive Considerations.
10.11.5.1 Nuclear. Acute radiation injury results from high doses of radiation associated
with a nuclear explosion, leak of radioactive material, or detonation of a radiation dispersal
device made from highly radioactive material. Radiation can come from a variety of

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sources. It is most prevalent in nuclear reactors and weapons-grade nuclear materials.
Radiation related materials and machines are also present in the medical diagnostic and
treatment field. Of leas concern, contaminant radioactive material is a by product of spent
depleted urinanium rounds.
10.11.5.1.1 The number one consideration is avoidance. Distance and barriers are your
greatest allies. It is generally safe to treat victims of radiation exposure as long as they
are clean of radioactive materials. A Geiger counter is essential in a known incident
area.
10.11.5.1.2 A gas mask or respirator is important in an environment that may have
radioative dust present.
10.11.5.2 Biological. Biological agents are drawn from nature. Dozens of biological
organisms and toxins are potential weapons of war or terrorism. They can range from
simple exposures to mass quantities of a naturally occuring toxin or they may be a
genetically engineered and altered organism that can cause contageous, fast acting, fatal
diseases. Of significant concern are anthrax, botulism, pnuemonic plague, smallpox,
tularemia, and viral hemorrhagic fevers.
10.11.5.3 Chemical. Chemicals include the whole gamut of blood, blister, nerve, and
choking agents. Chemical exposure and release can also occur from a legitimate chemical
production plant from accidental release, attack damage, and terrorist activity. As with
other types of contaminants symptom onset and severity depends on:
Wheather the agent is a vapor, liquid, or powder.
Temperature, wind conditions, terrain, and humidity.
Route of absorption.
Specific agent, quantity, and duration of exposure.
Pre- and post-exposure treatment and protection.
10.11.5.4 Explosive. The primary concern is being physically present at the site of the
explosion. Other proximity injuries can be caused by heat and fire, and percussion. Some
explosives residue can cause dermalogical reactions and burns. Some materials can cause
irritation when inhaled.

10.11.6 Decontamination Operations.


10.11.6.1 General. A pararescue team uses decontamination procedures modified to fit
the peculiar situation of the element. The pararescue team may be in denied or hostile
territory and therefore, require a high degree of stealth in all phases of a mission. The
modified decontamination procedures described herein do not compromise the critical
survival principles of stealth, contamination avoidance, or preventing the spread of
contamination throughout the battlefield.
10.11.6.1.1 Principles for Planning Decontamination Operations. (See Figure
10.169, Planning Decontamination Operations.)
Decon as soon as possible.

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Decon only what is necessary.


Decon as far forward as possible.
Decon by priority.
Figure 10.169 Planning Decontamination Operations.

Planning Decontamination Operations

Actions on
the DECON site

Security
Final PCI
Rehearsals

SECURITY
HALT

DECON SITE

Alternate
Route

ORP

TLPs
PCIS
Rehearsal
WARNORD
OPORD
AA

CONCEPT OF DECONTAMINATION OPERATION


Unit leader conducts Troop Leading Procedures (TLP) in assembly area (AA)
Decon unit moves on primary route to a security halt
Unit leader conducts reconnaissance of ORD
Decon unit occupies ORP, maintains security, conducts final pre-combat inspections
(PCIs), and rehearsals
Unit leader conducts recon of DECON site for security, contamination, and site layout
Unit leader orders decon unit to move to the DECON site and conduct actions on the
DECON site
Decon unit moves out on an alternate route and returns to AA after actions on the
DECON site are complete

UNCLASSIFIED

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


10.11.6.1.2 Planning Considerations for Coordinating Decontamination
Operations.
Type of decontamination to be performed.
Type of agent the unit is contaminated with.
Prime movers and trailers needing decontamination.
Largest vehicle to decontaminate.
Dirty entry/clean exit.
Enough room to conduct decontamination.
Wind direction.
Augmentees from contaminated unit.
Logistics, security, fire support availability.
Weather and terrain effects.
Current combat situation.
Direction of enemy forces.
Frequencies, call signs, brevity codes.
Action on enemy contact in the decontamination site.
Supported unit tactical operation center/command post grid.
Challenge and password.
Fuel resupply (diesel/gas).
Water resupply.
Maintenance support.
CSAR.
Link-up point and direction of movement.
Near/far recognition.
Designate supply/access routes.
Designate fuel/water pre-stock points.
Communications positions.
Disposition of contaminated clothing and equipment.
Collateral damage of DECON operation (e.g., water supply, local populace,
other troops in area).
10.11.6.1.3 Planning Considerations for Decontamination Site Reconnaissance.
Look for good overhead cover, drainage, access, water source, size.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


Mark detailed equipment decontamination
decontamination (DTD), and link-up point.

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(DED),

detailed

troop

Identify routes, holding areas, water source and resupply, fire and logistic
support.
Set security and medical plan.
Check prevailing and current winds.
Draw a sketch of the site.
Note any special considerations.
10.11.6.2 Immediate Decontamination.
10.11.6.2.1 The purpose of immediate chemical or biological decontamination is to
allow a force to sustain its mission and improve survivability of personnel while in a
contaminated area. Individual actions include: skin decon, personal wipe down, and
operators spray down. Immediate decon techniques are initiated individually without
command, once contamination on bare skin is detected.
NOTE: Skin decon is started within one minute of being contaminated and operators spray down
is most effective when done within 15 minutes after personal wipe down.
10.11.6.2.2 Radiological. Contamination hazards have different affects but the same
decontamination principles. Remove radiological contamination from equipment and
personnel by brushing and/or using soap and water.
10.11.6.2.3 Commanders Inherent Responsibilities Checklist.
Ensure all personnel are trained on procedures to conduct immediate decon.
Ensure personnel are proficient on the use of chemical defense equipment
(CDE).
Ensure appropriate security and force protection measures are taken during skin
decon procedures executed away from base.
10.11.6.2.4 Individual Decon Responsibilities Checklist.
Skin decontamination.
Start self-decontamination within 1 minute of becoming contaminated.
Personal wipe down.
Every soldier wipes down his mask, hood, gloves, and other essential gear.
Do not attempt to remove chemical contamination from your protective
overgarment, unless the agent is thickened and globbed on the over garment.
Brush off radiological contamination from your overgarment.
Operators spray down

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After decontaminating yourself and your personal equipment, you may need to
decon other mission essential portions of your equipment before continuing your
mission.
To ensure you do not pick up contamination from these items, decontaminate
those surfaces you or your soldiers must touch while operating the equipment.
10.11.6.3 Operational Decontamination. Operational decon generally follows immediate
personnel skills decon. The objective is to reduce the level of contamination to regenerate
needed combat power. Operational decon will further reduce the risk of contamination
transfer, the spread of contamination, and speed the weathering process by removing much
of the gross contamination. It can include IPE exchange and vehicle wash down. Both
operations are conducted with or without support of an external chemical unit. (See Figure
10.170, Unsupported One-Lane Washdown.)

NOTE: Operational decontamination is normally conducted within 1 to 6 hours following an


attack.
Figure 10.170 Unsupported One-Lane Washdown.

Unsupported One-Lane Washdown

WIND

Step 1
Button up
vechicle and
equipment

Step 2
Washdown
vechicle and
equipment
Step 3
Assembly Area
IPE
Exchange

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

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10.11.6.3.1 Operational Decontamination Considerations.


1 0 . 11 . 6 . 3 . 1 . 1 P a r a re s c u e D e c o n t a m i n a t i on Te a m A c t i o ns a t t he
Decontamination Site Checklist.
Element leader conducts leaders recon with one person.
Do not leave anything at ORP.
Pararescue decon element occupies site and unloads decontamination
apparatus (M17LDS).
Wash down team sets up decontamination apparatus (M17LDS).
IPE exchange team sets up IPE exchange area and begins to dig sump.
Maintain security at all times.
When decontamination apparatus is set-up, washdown team begins second
sump at IPE exchange area.
Maintain 50 percent security at all times while digging.
Element leader mans contact point, conducts near/far recognition.
Gives arm signal to go to MOPP 4 upon arrival of contaminated unit.
Element leader controls all vehicle movement.
Drivers maintain visual contact with element leader.
Assistant leader runs IPE exchange.
Element leader conducts IPE exchange.
Pararescue decon element personnel spray vehicles for two to three minutes.
Driver moves vehicle, then IPE exchange.
Close site.
Detection team checks for contamination.
Decon team spot decontaminates contamination.
Pack team loads equipment, avoiding contamination, buries refuse.
Parking team marks contaminated areas.
SOF decon element leader sends NBC 5 higher.
Return to ORP.
10.11.6.3.1.2 Critical Tasks Checklist.
Set-up site within 30 min of arrival.
Maintain security until arrival of contaminated unit.
IPE exchange.
Vehicle wash down.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


Check contamination.
Close and mark site.
10.11.6.3.2 IPE Exchange/Vehicle Washdown.
10.11.6.3.2.1 Commanders Responsibilities Checklist.
Ensure all personnel are trained on procedures to conduct IPE exchange.
Ensure personnel are proficient on the use of chemical defense equipment.
Ensure appropriate security and force protection measures are taken for
decontamination/IPE exchange executed away from base.
10.11.6.3.2.2 Equipment/Logistical Requirements Checklist.
Decontamination apparatus (M17 LDS and 65 GPM pump).
Adequate fuel for water heaters and pump units.
Adequate water supply (approximately 100 to 150 gallons per wash point per
vehicle).
Liquid detergent.
Engineer tape (one roll).
Replacement IPE.
10.11.6.3.2.3 Site Operation Checklist.
Both the vehicle wash down and IPE exchange operations should operate
concurrently.
Ensure decontamination apparatuses are positioned properly and ready to
dispense hot, soapy water.
Ensure that the contaminated unit operates the IPE exchange.
10.11.6.3.2.4 Site Closure Checklist.
Decon NCOIC ensures proper disposal of contaminated IPE.
Decon NCOIC has his team properly mark the decon site and send NBC 5
report forward.
10.11.6.3.3 Thorough Decontamination. The purpose of thorough decon is to reduce
contamination to a negligible level to allow contaminated units to reduce their
protective posture from MOPP level 4 to MOPP level 0. As depicted in Figure 10.171,
Thorough DecontaminationEquipment, and Figure 10.172, Thorough
DecontaminationTroop, includes detailed equipment decontamination and detailed
troop decontamination. Thorough decontamination requires the support of a chemical
unit and should be completed as soon as tactically feasible after contamination.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

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Figure 10.171 Thorough DecontaminationEquipment.

Thorough DecontaminationEquipment

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 10.172 Thorough DecontaminationTroop.

Thorough DecontaminationTroop
Station 1
Equipment
Decon

Station 2
Hood/Boot
Decon

(1)

DTD LOGISTICS

Station 3
BDO
Removal

(1)
(1)

Station 4
Glove/Boot
Removal

M22

(1)
Liquid Control

(2)

Station 7 (3)
Mask Decon

Station 6
Mask (2)
Removal

O
H2
O
H2
ap
so
C
SH

Station 5
Monitor
First Aid

Equipment
Check
(1)

(1)

Vapor Control
Station 8
Reissue

UNCLASSIFIED

Station 1 - 3x30gal, CAM, 10xM256, tarp, 6 long-hand brush,


100 trash bags, 5xM8 books, 50xM295
Station 2 - STB, cutting tool, 50xM295
Station 3 - 2x30gal, 100 trash bags, 50xM295
Station 4 - 2x30gal, 50 trash bags, cutting tool
Station 5 - CAM, CLS bag
Station 6 - M22 ACADA
Station 7 - 4x3gal, tarp, 2xsponge, case paper towels, im heat
Station 8 - tarp, mask PLL, 1 roll engr tape (for whole site)

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


10.11.6.3.3.1 Thorough DECON Specific Planning Considerations.
Leaders reconnaissance of the DECON Site.
Equipment stored at the ORP.
Security of the ORP.
Link-up procedures with contaminated unit (e.g.,frequencies, call signs, and
recognition signals).
Briefing of key personnel from the contaminated element.
Segregation of contaminated/non-contaminated vehicles.
Security of DECON site (contaminated unit responsibility).
Traffic control at DECON site.
Sustainment of DECON site (water, decontaminants, rotation of personnel).
Augmentation of DECON site (18 for DED, 13 for DTD).
Medical requirements.
10.11.6.3.3.2 Thorough Decontamination Close-Out Procedures.
Equipment stored at the ORP.
Pararescue decon element leader designates one or more individuals to check
for and decontaminate along the DED line beginning at station 1 and moving
in order to station 5.
Pararescue decon element leader designates four or more individuals to load
equipment and bury refuse, avoiding contaminated areas.
Pararescue decon element leader designates one or more individuals to mark
contaminated areas.
All decon element personnel process through the DTD when above steps are
completed.
Utilize same process to close the DED as used with DTD.
Pararescue decon element leader sends NBC 5 to higher headquarters.
10.11.6.3.4 Pararescue Element Decontamination. A pararescue element entering a
contaminated environment to conduct a mission or becoming contaminated while
operational has three options for decontamination as depicted. Commanders must
evaluate the threat, tactical situation, and decontamination system availability when
deciding how to decontaminate. Unsupported pararescue team decontamination
expedient personnel decontamination system (EPDS) dirty exfiltration
decontamination
10.11.6.3.4.1 Unsupported Pararescue Team Decontamination. When
conducting unsupported pararescue-element decon, the initial action to be taken is
to locate and secure an upwind decontamination site (also serves as an objective

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-209

rally point [ORP]). The same personnel tasked to set up the ORP secure the site.
The remaining members of the element move to the contaminated area to conduct
the mission. The personnel at the decontamination site go to MOPP 4 as the
operational element returns from the contaminated area. The ORP security
personnel prepare to decon the returning element. The element members are
checked for contamination at a liquid/vapor contamination control line or hot line
with available detection equipment. If decontamination is necessary, the following
operational element decontamination procedures should be applied.
10.11.6.3.4.1.1 Unsupported Pararescue Team Decontamination Steps.
Step 1. While the operational element moves to the objective, the
remaining element members at the ORP set up a modified hasty
decontamination site that includes a hot line and a sump for disposal of
contaminated equipment and clothing. As the element members return
from their mission, one member in the ORP acts as station
operator/monitor while the other members provide security for the
ORP/decon site.
Step 2. The operational element halts at the hot line.
Step 3. If a sample or equipment has been recovered, it is checked for
contamination and decontaminated if necessary.
Step 4. Samples or recovered equipment are then placed into a Mylar
bag (or acceptable substitute) held by the clean ORP member. Bag is
sealed and placed on the clean side of the hot line.
Step 5. SOF personnel and their personal equipment are now checked
with the appropriate detectors. Equipment is either disposed of in the sump
or decontaminated and checked again before declaring it clean.
Step 6. After Step 5 is completed on the second soldier using the buddy
system, decontaminate the buddys protective mask hood using personnel
and equipment decontamination kits, then roll protective mask hood. The
risk during this step is the transfer of contamination to the neck and the
accidental breaking of the mask seal during rolling.
Step 7. The first and second personnel use the buddy system to remove
the first soldiers chemical protective over garment (CPOG)/battle dress
overgarment (BDO) and discards it into the sump. Use of a knife, surgical
scissor, or other cutting tool is appropriate during this step; however, the
instrument used must be decontaminated after each cut. The first person
moves to the next station 10 to 15 meters away.
Step 8. At the second station, the first person removes overboots and
gloves. A contamination control line (CCL) is established and clearly
marked. It is on the upwind side and delineates the dirty side from the clean
side. Standing on the dirty side, individuals will remove one boot, leaving
it on the dirty side, and stepping, with the same foot over, the CCL to the

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


clean side. Likewise, the individual will perform the same procedure with
the other boot. Once completely standing on the clean side, individuals will
remove their gloves ensuring they fall on the dirty side of the CCL. The
risk during this procedure is the transfer of contamination across the CCL
and the potential of personnel falling during boot removal.
Step 9. The second person moves to the second station and removes his
boots and gloves.
Step 10. Each persons protective mask is rechecked for contamination
and decontaminated, if necessary. Then each person moves upwind and
removes the mask after the air is checked for contamination. If a
replacement mask is available, the mask will also be discarded.
Step 11. The next personnel continue in sequence from the beginning.
Step 12. Continue in sequence.
Step 13. When all personnel have been cleared, the station monitor
polices all contaminated clothing left in the dirty area, places them in the
sump, closes the sump, decontaminates gloves, and removes protective
clothing.
Step 14. Record/report the grid coordinates of the decon site and
continue the mission.
10.11.6.3.4.1.2 Expedient Personnel Decontamination System. Expedient
personnel decontamination system (EPDS) is designed to address pararescue
equipment shortfalls in personnel decontamination procedures and equipment.
The system is a one-man portable, lightweight system that does not displace an
undue amount on an individuals combat load. The EPDS is a validated system
that provides rapid effective decontamination procedures that are easily
integrated into existing AFSOC tactics. This system weighs less than 20
pounds; can be set up within 10 minutes, and can decontaminate up to 20
personnel at a rate of less than 5 minutes per individual. (See Figure 10.173,
Expedient Personnel Decontamination System [EPDS]).

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

10-211

Figure 10.173 Expedient Personnel Decontamination System (EPDS).

Expedient Personnel Decontamination System


Wind Direction

Check out
with doctor

EMT Area
CCP
Triage
Area

Med Kits

Remove gross
contamination

Shuffle Pit

ine

lL

tro

Deflation
pump

on

nC

Puff pad
for DECON
of hands

tio

HOT LINE

Trash

na
mi

Drop non-sensitive
equipment here

Trash

nta

Trash

SDS MATT

Co

Drop sensitive
equipment here

Contamination Control Area

UNCLASSIFIED
10.11.6.3.4.1.2.1 Expedient Personnel Decontamination System
Tactical Planning Guidelines.
Decontamination of the force will occur at the closest permissive site
to the target permitted by the tactical situation. In some missions, such
as maritime interdiction operations (MIO), decontamination will likely
occur directly on the objective after it is secure.
Timely and effective decontamination is critical to prevent NBC
casualties. SOF contamination challenges may be considerably higher
than the standard 10/m2 that JSLIST approved material (JAM) is
designed to protect against.
Chemical warfare (CW) break-through times on SOF personnel
protective equipment (PPE) dictates the need to conduct
decontamination at the soonest opportunity consistent with the tactical
situation. CW break-through times are significantly reduced in the case
of salt water exposed PPE, further heightening the importance of rapid
decontamination.
The nature of CSAR operations in the NBC environment dictates the
use of a supporting force to conduct decontamination is often tactically
infeasible. The pararescue teams decontamination capability must

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


reside completely within the force and be effective post mission for
both the healthy personnel and casualties.
Contamination control is paramount. The reduction or elimination of
the spreading of liquid or solid contamination off target and back to
friendly forces, mission critical mobility platforms, or forward staging
bases is critical.
The procedure and equipment should not produce undue logistical
burdens in terms of training, acquisition, or maintenance.
10.11.6.3.4.1.3 Generic EPDS Mission Sequence and Basic EPDS Site
Layout.
Determine presence of contamination or possibility of contamination.
Establish contamination control area (CCA).
Ensure all personnel that are contaminated remain in that area.
Call for EPDS.
Designate operating and security personnel for EPDS.
Establish hot line (HL), mark HL, and contamination control line
(CCL).
Set up DECON line considering environmental factors; wind rain,
poor ventilation. Breakout equipment and set up according to space
availability.
Upon completion of set up direct contaminated personnel to begin
equipment drop. (All personnel working EPDS should DECON boots
and gloves first.) Place all sensitive equipment that requires DECON
into equipment bags. WORK IN PAIRS WHEN POSSIBLE.
Establish Litter DECON line if indicated. Include emergency
medical treatment (EMT) station in Hot Zone.
Establish the triage area as the casualty control point (CCP) and
locate it on the clean side of the CCL.
Begin DECON process.
10.11.6.3.4.1.4 The EPDS Decontamination Process. The following
procedures are specific to the EPDS.
10.11.6.3.4.1.4.1 One Piece Cut Out.
Direct breakout of Mk 1 medical kits.
Take out M291s and M295s. Place kits in a pile at the Hot Line.
Decon each others hoods with the M295. If time permits, decon as
much area as possible to reduce any gross contamination and off
gassing.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

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Direct into first shuffle pit.


Decon feet (shuffle feet in pit).
Direct to the next shuffle pit, cutters begin cut out procedures.
Cut both straps off hood (required), loosen neck cord.
Contaminated person bends forward at the waist.
Cutterroll hood up from the rear bottom as far as possible, gather
bottom into neck cord. Cut tails of cord if needed (cutter decon hands).
Cut wrist, waist, and ankle closures as appropriate for the ensemble
worn (cutter decon hands).
Release/cut boot closures (cutter decon hands).
Contaminated person steps out of boots (cutter decon hands).
Unzip zipper across back (if FREIS) (cutter decon hands).
Start at the lower side of zipper center (if dry suit cut from center rear
neckline) down one leg as far as possible (cutter decon hands).
Cut down other leg from area of buttocks down as far as possible
(cutter decon hands).
Cut up from top edge of zipper through neck dam (if FREIS) (cutter
decon hands).
Remove suit forward, stripping down, have contaminated person
step, put one foot at a time. Gloves should be removed with garment, if
not strip gloves prior to chemical protective undergarment (CPU)
removal (cutter decon hands) CPU REMOVAL
Start at top rear center, cut down middle of back. (cutter decon hands)
Contaminated person extends arms forward/down, cutter pull
forward and down. (Folding it inside out as best as possible to contain
external contamination.) (Cutter decon hands).
Cut down one side of CPU trouser leg, have contaminated person
step out of CPU trouser.
Cutter decon hands.
Strip off one Gore-Tex sock, then second, then one CPU sock, and
then the second, having the contaminated person step onto safety pad.
(cutter decon hands)
Contaminated person proceeds to mask drop area, decon hands, use
breath hold technique with assisted mask removal from decon line.
Move to redress area/redressmove to exfil area.

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Monitor and administer buddy aid if necessary. Personnel developing
symptoms of exposure should be taken to the triage area for treatment.
10.11.6.3.4.1.4.2 Two Piece Cut Out.
Direct breakout of Mk 1 medical kits.
Take out M291s and M295s. Place kits in a pile at the Hot Line.
Decon each others hoods with the M295. If time permits, decon as
much area as possible to reduce any gross contamination and off
gassing.
Direct into first shuffle pit.
Decon feet (shuffle feet in pit).
Direct to the next shuffle pit, cutters begin cut out procedures.
Cut both straps off hood (required), loosen neck cord. (cutter decon
hands)
Contaminated person bends forward at the waist.
Cutter - roll hood up from the rear bottom as far as possible, gather
bottom into neck cord. Cut tails of cord if needed. (cutter decon hands)
Cut wrist, waist, and ankle closures as appropriate for the ensemble
worn. (cutter decon hands)
Start at the top rear center and cut down the back. (cutter decon
hands)
Contaminated person extend arm forward/down, cutter pull top
forward and down. (Folding in on itself as best as possible to contain or
isolate.) Gloves should come off with the top. (If not, remove gloves.)
(cutter decon hands)
Cut down each side of legs (cutter decon hands), grasp rear center of
trouser, cut straps (above X if indicated), and allow to fall having
contaminated person step forward and away. (Fold trouser in on itself
and contain as best as possible, contain in bag or isolate.) (cutter decon
hands)
Cut boot closures, cutter secure boot and have contaminated person
step forward out of boots. (cutter decon hands)
10.11.6.3.4.1.4.3 CPU Removal.
Start at top rear center, cut down middle of back. (cutter decon hands)
Contaminated person extends arms forward/down, cutter pull
forward and down. (Folding it inside out as best as possible to contain
external contamination.) (cutter decon hands)

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Cut down one side of CPU trouser leg, have contaminated person
step out of CPU trouser. (cutter decon hands)
Strip off one Gore-Tex sock, then second, then one CPU sock, and
then the second, having the contaminated person step onto safety pad.
(cutter decon hands)
Contaminated personnel proceed to mask drop area, decon hands, use
breath hold technique with assisted mask removal from decon line.
Move to redress area/redress move to exfil area.
Monitor and administer buddy aid if necessary. Personnel developing
symptoms of exposure should be taken to the triage area for treatment.
Basic operating principles of litter decontamination.
Management of life saving ABCs (check airway, check for
breathing, and check for circulation) always comes first.
Spot decon and cut away of protective garment or mask removal to
facilitate care of ABCs.
Patient triage is an important and dynamic part of litter decon, if a
casualty has a compromised airway, is not breathing, or has
uncontrolled bleeding, they should not be in the litter decon area.
Current decon media is 0.5 percent hypochlorite solution, M-291,
M-295, SDS.
Appropriate litter is the Raven decon litter.
Litter decon will be a cut out procedure similar to the onion peel
procedure.
The exact cut template will be determined by the ensemble worn
(currently JSLIST VII, FRIES, DUI).
To control the spread of contamination, every opportunity to decon
the hand of the cutter must be used.
Decon of hands and cutting tool must be accomplished prior to each
cut.
Decon of the patients boots and gloves should be the first step for
successful decon.
10.11.6.3.4.1.4.4 EPDSLitter Casualty. The following procedures are
specific to the EPDSlitter casualty.
Set up parallel to standard EPDS line.
All considerations to wind, environmental factors and casualty flow
are unchanged.

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Casualty should be brought from the EMT station to litter decon on a
Raven stretcher.

NOTE: Although not stated after each step, cutter should decon hands and tools between every
step or touch!
One piece cut out procedure checklist.
Initial step.
Decon any gross contaminated areas, decon exterior of mask and
hood.
Decon patients gloves.
Decon patients boots.
Liberal use of SDS and D-295 on the members.
PPE prior to cut out is encouraged and will reduce the potential
spread of contamination.
Mask hood cut out.
Cut arm strap.
Cut center through elastic.
Roll hood back.
Cut lines. (Dipicted as dotted line in Figure 10.174 and Figure
10.175, Cutout Diagram.)
Fold lines (depicted as solid line).
Remove boots/gloves and wound management.
Cut or unlace boots, remove boots. Do not remove sock.
Remove gloves from fingers.
Dressings should be removed and wounds irrigated as needed after
removal of PPE. Clean dressings should be reapplied by
non-contaminated personnel.
FRIES or DRY (one piece cut out).
Cut from neck line down each arm.
Cut from neck line down one leg.
Cut from crotch down other leg.
Fold down upper chest.
Roll from center out.
Roll sleeves outcut, roll, and fold.
Undergarment Removal (BDU/CPU/Other).

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Cut procedure is basically the same as two piece protective over


garment.
Cut away top.
Cut away trousers.
Remove Gore-Tex sock if worn, remove CPU sock.
When casualty is basically nude, skin may be decontaminated using
0.5 percent hypochlorite or M-291.
Cutter should continue to decon own hands and cutting instrument
prior to each cut.
Casualty Moves Across CCL.
Two man cutter team repeats self decon.
Using three man lift picks up casualty and carries over CCL through
dry shuffle pit and places on clean Raven litter.
Casualty may be placed into Chemical Protective Patient Wrap for
transport.
Figure 10.174 Cut Out Diagram (1 of 2).

Cut Out Diagram (1 of 2)

UNCLASSIFIED

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Figure 10.175 Cut Out Diagram (2 of 2).

Cut Out Diagram (2 of 2)

UNCLASSIFIED
10.11.6.3.4.1.4.1 Casualty Care Past the CCL.
The patient should be managed at the CCP for injuries and any
symptoms from contamination or other injuries.
Two piece cut out procedure checklist
Initial step.
Decon any gross contaminated areas, decon exterior of mask and
hood.
Decon patient's gloves.
Decon patient's boots.
Liberal use of SDS and D-295 on the members PPE prior to cut out is
encouraged and will reduce the potential spread of contamination.
Mask Hood Cut Out.
Cut arm Straps.
Cut center through elastic.
Roll hood back.
Cut lines. (Shown in Figure 10.174 and Figure 10.175, Cut Out
Diagram, dotted lines.)

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Fold lines. (Solid lines.)


Top Cut (Two Piece).
Cut from neckline down each arm.
Unzip, fold down upper chest.
Roll from center out.
Roll sleeves out.
Trouser cut (two piece).
Cut shoulder straps away.
Cut from top center of bib down leg.
Cut from crotch apex down leg.
Roll out each side.
Boot and glove removal.
Cut closures of over boots, slide over boot off.
Remove over sock (Gore-Tex), remove CPU sock.
Roll cuff of glove, pull off from fingers.
Undergarment removal (BDU/CPU/Other).
Cut procedure is basically the same as protective over garment.
Cut away top.
Cut away trousers.
Cut boot laces, slip off boots.
When casualty is basically nude skin may be decontaminated using, 5
percent hypochlorite.
Cutter should continue to decon his hands and cutting instrument
prior to each cut.
Casualty moves across CCL.
Two man cutter team repeats self decon.
Using three man lift picks up casualty and carries over CCL through
dry shuffle pit and places on clean Raven litter.
Casualty may be placed into chemical protective patient wrap for
transport.
10.11.6.3.4.1.4.2 Casualty Care Past the CCL.
The patient should be managed at the CCP for injuries and any
symptoms from contamination.

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EPDS key decontamination considerations checklist.
Site selection.
Security and good overhead concealment.
Wind direction, environmental factors.
Plan for litter casualties/ambulatory/non-injured contaminate.
Management of ABCs always comes first. Take action to spot decon,
cut away of PPE, and remove mask to support ABCs.
Decon media for equipment and clothing is the sorbent decon system
(SDS).
Never remove any PPE or gear over the head.
Appropriate litter is the Raven.
Cutters should take every opportunity to decon hands.
Always cut from top to bottom.
Unmask station may require removal from immediate decon area due
to off gassing of agent(s) from removed PPE.
Contain removed PPE to reduce off gassing of agents in area of decon
and move decon stations away from immediate area of off gassing
hazard.
Personnel required at site:
(1) Hot line director.
(2) Scrubber/cutters.
(3) Medical personneldriven by number of medical/chemical
casualties.
EPDS equipment/purchase/order.
10.11.6.3.4.1.5 Dirty Exfiltration Decontamination. The purpose of dirty
exfiltration is to remove a contaminated Pararescue Team from its tactical
environment so that decontamination can take place in a permissive
environment. Dirty exfiltration decon activities include decontamination for
personnel using either a DTD or EPDS, and may or may not include spot
decontamination of the e xf iltr ation platform. Dirty exfiltration
decontamination should occur as soon as tactically feasible after
contamination.
Decontamination of exfiltration platform considerations.
Aircrews remain in place in aircraft.

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Pararescue decontamination element removes any additional protective


lining/cover/equipment from exfil platform after contaminated CSAR
element has exited the platform.
Pararescue decon element checks exfil platform for any residual
contamination.
Pararescue decon element decontaminates the exfil platform to the
maximum extent possible with available equipment.
10.11.7 NBC Casualty Processing and Handling Techniques.
10.11.7.1 The priority to evacuate casualties and prevent loss of life and limb in an NBC
environment requires commanders to consider to what extent they will commit evacuation
assets to actually enter the contaminated area. If it is possible to keep evacuation assets
free from contamination, every effort should be made to do so.
10.11.7.2 On the modern battlefield there are three basic modes of evacuating casualties:
personnel, ground vehicles, and aircraft. Using personnel to physically carry the casualties
incurs a great deal of inherent stress. Cumbersome IPE, climate, increased workloads, and
battle fatigue will greatly reduce the effectiveness of unit personnel.
10.11.7.3 If evacuation personnel are to be sent into a radiologically contaminated area,
operational exposure guidance (OEG) must be established. Radiation exposure records are
maintained by unit chemical NCOs and made available to the commander and staff.
10.11.7.4 Evacuation Considerations.
10.11.7.4.1 Evacuation resources will become contaminated. Optimize the use of
resources, medical or nonmedical, which are already contaminated before employing
uncontaminated resources.
10.11.7.4.2 Once a vehicle has entered a contaminated area, it is highly unlikely that it
will be able to be spared long enough to undergo a complete decon. This will depend
upon the contaminant, the operations tempo, and the resources available to the
evacuation unit. Normally, contaminated vehicles both air and ground are confined to
dirty environments.
10.11.7.4.3 Use ground evacuation instead of air evacuation in a contaminated area.
Vehicles are easier to decontaminate and can be replaced more easily. However, this
does not preclude the use of aircraft in a contaminated environment or in the
evacuation of contaminated patients.
10.11.7.4.4 The location of a contaminated area, forward line of own troops (FLOT),
threat air defense systems, and patients medical condition will determine if and where
air evacuation may be used in the evacuation process. One or more air evacuation
resources may be restricted to contaminated areas. To the greatest extent possible, use
ground vehicles to cross the line separating contaminated and clean areas. Ground
ambulances can proceed to a medical treatment facility with a patient decon station and
decontaminate and treat the patient. Patients are then transferred to a clean ground or
air resource, if further evacuation is required. The routes used by ground vehicles to
cross between contaminated and clean areas should be considered dirty routes and

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should not be crossed by clean vehicles. The effects of wind and time upon the
contaminants must also be considered.
10.11.7.4.5 Always keep rotorwash of helicopters in mind when evacuating patients,
especially in a contaminated environment. Intense winds will undoubtedly disturb the
contaminants causing increased vapor hazards.
10.11.7.4.6 Ideally, aircraft must be allowed to land and reduce to flat pitch before
patients are brought near. This allows some reduction in the effects of the downwash.
Additionally, a helicopter should not land too close to a decon station (especially
upwind) because any trace of contaminants in the rotorwash will compromise the
decon procedure. Operational decon of aircraft and ground vehicles should be
accomplished to minimize crew exposure. Patient evacuation must continue, even
under NBC conditions.

10.11.8 Casualty Decontamination Considerations.


10.11.8.1 Casualty decon presents special problems for SOF service support personnel. In
an NBC environment, contaminated wounded soldiers create increased hazards to rescuers
and health service support personnel.
10.11.8.2 On the NBC battlefield, two classifications of casualties will be
encounteredcontaminated and uncontaminated. Those contaminated may suffer from
the effects of an NBC agent, a conventional wound, or both. Some may suffer battle
fatigue or heat casualties, induced by the stress of NBC conditions and extended time spent
in MOPP 4. It is important to follow proper decon procedures to limit the spread of
contamination to others and equipment.
10.11.8.3 Casualty decon begins with the individualself-care.
10.11.9 Patient Decontamination at a Medical Facility.
10.11.9.1 Patient decontamination at a designated aid station.
10.11.9.1.1 When conditions prevent decon procedures forward, the casualty may
have to be evacuated to an aid station before decon. Upon arrival at the aid station,
patients are monitored with a CAM, or other detection equipment, or material to
determine if they are contaminated. Contaminated patients arriving at the aid station
must be decontaminated before admission into the clean treatment area.
10.11.9.1.2 Patient decon is the systematic removal of clothing and contaminants from
patients who are unable to decon themselves. Patient decon is performed by a patient
decon team consisting of eight nonmedical personnel from the supported unit to
support the aid station. The patient decon team operates under the supervision of
medical personnel to ensure that no further injury is caused to the patient by the decon
process.
10.11.9.2 Patient decontamination at a clearing station. A clearing station may receive
patients from the aid station or directly from other areas which have not been
decontaminated. The clearing station, as well as the aid station, must have a patient decon
area.

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10.11.9.3 Patient decontamination at a hospital.


10.11.9.3.1 To the maximum extent possible, hospitals are located away from tactical
or logistical targets. Patients evacuated from forward areas should have been
decontaminated; however, patients may arrive from units located within the
geographical area of the hospital that are contaminated and require decon. Patient
decon at Army medical facilities can be performed by medical or trained non-medical
personnel from units located in the geographical area/base cluster of the hospital.
Patient decon at Air Force medical facilities is conducted by medical personnel (i.e.
wartime medical decontamination team).
10.11.9.3.2 If the hospital does not have collective protective shelters (CPS) and
becomes contaminated with a persistent agent, patients would be re-routed to other
hospitals. If possible, all inpatients would be evacuated and the hospital
decontaminated.
10.11.9.3.3 Upon completion of decon, the hospital will return to normal operations.
Hospitals with CPS capabilities will decontaminate areas around the entry to these
facilities, then continue receiving and caring for patients. Patients decon procedures
used in forward medical facilities also apply to hospital operations. However, several
patient decon stations can be operated at this site. All patients arriving at a hospital are
monitored for contamination before being admitted into the clean areas of the hospital,
if possible. Decon is performed, as required.
10.11.9.4 Chemical Patient Decontamination Procedures.
10.11.9.4.1 Before most patients receive medical treatment, they must be
decontaminated. Standard procedures include: placing bandage scissors/cutting device
used in this procedure in a container of Sorbent Decontamination System (SDS) and/or
five percent chlorine solution between each use, decontaminating decon team
members gloves and aprons, decontaminating the patients skin, bandages, mask, and
splints, and using the detector paper (M8) or a CAM to determine the extent of
contamination on each patient before beginning decon procedures. Patients wounds
are then irrigated with sterile saline solution. (Validated at Dugway Proving Grounds)
NOTE: If possible, wear of a mask by the patient is always desirable. However, patients with
compromised airways, damaged masks, or injuries to the head and/or face may not be capable of
wearing a mask throughout the decontamination process. Medical personnel either conducting or
supervising the patient decontamination process must decide, based on their judgement, to either
remove or retain a mask in place. The Resuscitative Device, Individual Chemical (RDIC) is
designed to ventilate a patient in a contaminated environment and may be used when required. For
additional information on treatment procedures, refer to FM 3-5, NBC Decontamination; FM 8-9,
NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive Operations; and FM 8-285,
Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries.
10.11.9.4.2 The litter patient (Raven NBC Litter) is decontaminated and the two-piece
suit of the IPE is undressed as follows:
Step 1. Decontaminate any grossly contaminated areas.

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Step 2. Decontaminate exterior of mask and hood.
Step 3. Decontaminate casualtys gloves.
Step 4. Decontaminate casualtys boots.
Step 5. Liberally decontaminate the front of the casualtys IPE including the
extremities, transfer the patient to a decon litter.

NOTE: Before receiving another patient, decon team members drink approximately half a quart
of water each. The amount consumed is increased or decreased according to the work level and the
temperature.
Step 6. Logroll the casualty toward either side and liberally decontaminate his
backside and the underlying litter. DO NOT remove splints. Splints are
decontaminated by applying a 0.5 percent chlorine solution (include the padding
and cravats). Splints are not removed until the patient has been evacuated to an
appropriate echelon of care. This may include a corps level Combat Support
Hospital or Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (CASH or MASH), Air Force
Expeditionary Medical Support/Air Force Theater Hospital (EMEDS/AFTH)
medical treatment facility, or Navy Fleet Hospital. The patient is checked with
detector paper (M8) or a CAM for completeness of decon. Dispose of
contaminated bandages and coverings by placing them in a contaminated waste
bag. Seal the bag and place it in the contaminated waste dump.
WARNING: DO NOT use the M291 pads or wipes from the M258A1 kit around the wounds.
NOTE: Other monitoring devices may be used when available.
Step 7. Logroll the casualty toward the opposite side and liberally
decontaminate his backside and the underlying litter
Step 8. Roll casualty back to supine position and cut arm straps of mask hood.
Step 9. Cut hood and roll hood back.
Step 10. Cut, fold, and roll the upper half of the casualtys IPE. Cut from the
neckline down each arm. Fold down upper chest. Roll from center out. Roll
sleeves out.
Step 11. Cut shoulder straps away from casualtys trousers.
Step 12. Cut and roll casualtys trousers. Cut from top center down leg. Cut from
crotch apex down leg.Roll out to each side.
Step 13. Cut closures of over-boots and slide over-boots off.
Step 14. Remove Gore-Tex over-socks and chemical protective uniform (CPU
socks).
Step 15. Roll cuffs of gloves and pull gloves off from fingers.
Step 16. Use same cutout procedures for undergarments as for IPE.
Step 17. Decontaminate skin with 0.5percent hypochlorite solution as required.

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Step 18. Irrigate wounds with sterile saline.


Step 19. Decon team performs self decon and then picks up casualty using
three-man lift.
Step 20. Carry casualty through shuffle pit and place on clean Raven litter for
turnover to clean disposition team.
10.11.9.4.3 One-piece suit of the IPE is undressed as follows:
Step 1. Decontaminate casualty as described in two-piece procedure.
Step 2. Cut and roll hood as previously described.
Step 3. Cut, fold, and roll IPE. Cut from neckline down each arm. Cut from
neckline down one leg. Cut from crotch down other leg. Fold down upper chest.
Roll from center out. Roll sleeves out.
Step 4. Remove undergarments and perform remaining procedures as previously
described.
NOTE: Before decontaminating another patient, each decon team member drinks approximately
half a quart of water. The exact amount of water consumed is increased or decreased according to
the work level and temperature.
10.11.9.4.4 The ambulatory chemical patient is decontaminated and undressed as
follows:
Step 1. Remove load-carrying equipment. Remove load-carrying equipment
(LCE) by unfastening/unbuttoning all connectors or tie straps; then place the
equipment in a plastic bag. Place the plastic bag in the designated storage area for
later decon.
Step 2. Decontaminate the patients mask and hood. Send patient to clothing
removal station. After the patient has been triaged and treated (if necessary) by the
senior medic in the patient decon station, he walks to the clothing removal station.
Decontaminate and remove mask hood. Sponge down the front, sides, and top of
the hood with a five percent chlorine solution. Remove the hood by cutting or, with
the quick-doff hood or other hoods, by loosening the hood from the mask
attachment points. Before cutting the hood, dip the scissors in the five percent
chlorine solution. Begin by cutting the neck cord, zipper cord, and the small string
under the voicemitter. Next, release or cut the hood shoulder straps and unzip the
hood zipper. Proceed by cutting the hood upward, close to the filter inlet cover and
eyelens outserts, to the top of the eyelens outsert, across the forehead to the outer
edge of the other eyelens outsert. Proceed downward toward the patients shoulder,
staying close to the eyelens and filter inlet. Cut across the lower part of the
voicemitter to the zipper. After dipping the scissors in the five percent chlorine
solution again, cut the hood from the center of the forehead over the top of the
head and fold the right and left sides of the hood away from the patients head,
removing the hood. Decontaminate mask and patients face by using the
M291/M258A1 kit or a 0.5 percent chlorine solution.

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NOTE: This solution is a 0.5 percent solution, considerably weaker than the five percent used for
scissors.
Wipe the external parts of the mask; cover both mask air inlets with gauze or
your hands to keep the mask filters dry. Continue by wiping the exposed areas of
the patients face, to include the neck and behind the ears.
Step 3. Remove field medical card (FMC). Cut the card tie wire, allowing the
card to fall into a plastic bag. Seal the plastic bag and rinse it with the five percent
chlorine solution. Place the plastic bag under the back of the protective mask head
straps.
Step 4. Remove all gross contamination from the patients. Remove all visible
contamination spots by using the M291/ kit or a sponge dipped in a 0.5 percent
chlorine solution.
Step 5. Remove overgarments. Remove overgarment jacket. Have the patient
stand with his feet spread apart at shoulder width. Unsnap the jacket front flap and
unzip the jacket. If the patient can extend his/her arms, make a fist and extend both
arms backward at about a 30-degree angle. Move behind the patient, grasping the
jacket collar at the sides of the neck; peel the jacket off the shoulders at a
30-degree angle down and away from the patient. Avoid any rapid or sharp jerks
that spread contamination. Gently pull the inside sleeves over the patients wrists
and hands. If the patient cannot extend his/her arms, cut the jacket to aid in its
removal. Dip the scissors in the five percent chlorine solution between each cut.
As with a litter patient, cut both sleeves from the inside, starting at the wrist, up to
the armpit. Continue cutting across the shoulder to the collar. Cut around bandages
or splints, leaving them in place. Next, peel the jacket back and downward to avoid
spreading contamination. Ensure that the outside of the jacket does not touch the
patient or any inner clothing. Remove the patients butyl rubber gloves by grasping
the heel of the glove, peel the glove off with a smooth downward motion. Place the
contaminated gloves in a plastic bag with the overgarment jacket. Do not allow the
patient to touch his/her trousers or other contaminated objects with exposed hands.
Remove the patients overboots by cutting the laces with scissors dipped in the five
percent chlorine solution. Fold the lacing eyelets flat on the ground. Step on the toe
and heel eyelets to hold the overboot on the ground and have the patient step out of
it. Repeat this procedure for the other overboot. If the green vinyl overboot (GVO)
is worn, first try to remove the overboots without cutting; if necessary cut the
overboot along the front. If the overboots are in good condition, they can be
decontaminated and reissued. Remove overgarment trousers. Unfasten or cut all
ties, buttons, or zippers before grasping the trousers at the waist and peeling them
down over the patients combat boots. Again, the trousers are cut to aid in removal.
If necessary cut both trouser legs starting at the ankle, keeping the cuts near the
inside of the legs, along the inseam, to the crotch. Cut around all bandages,
tourniquets, or splints. Continue to cut up both sides of the zipper to the waist and
allow the narrow strip with the zipper to drop between the legs. Place the scissors
in the decon solution. Peel or allow the trouser halves to drop to the ground. Have
the patient step out of the trouser legs one at a time. Place the trousers in the

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10-227

marked and contaminated disposal bag. Have the patient remove cotton glove
liners to reduce the possibility of spreading contamination. Have the patient grasp
the heel of one glove liner with the other gloved hand, peeling the glove off. Hold
the removed glove by the inside and grasp the heel of the other glove, peeling it
off. Place both gloves in the contaminated waste bag. Place the patients personal
effects in a clean bag and label with the patients identification. If they are not
contaminated, return them. If personal effects are contaminated, place the bagged
items in the contaminated storage area until they can be decontaminated, then
return to patient.
Step 6. Check patient for contamination. After the patients overgarments have
been removed, check BDUs by using detector paper (M8) or a CAM. Carefully
survey all areas of the patients clothing, paying particular attention to discolored
areas on the uniform, damp spots, tears, areas around the neck, wrist, ears, and
dressings, splints, or tourniquets. Remove spots by using the 0.5 percent chlorine
solution, using the M291/M258A1 kit or cutting away the contaminated area.
Always dip the scissors in the five percent chlorine solution after each cut.
Recheck the area with the detection equipment.
Step 7. Decontaminate the patients skin. Use the M291/M258A1 kit, or the 0.5
percent chlorine solution to spot decontaminate exposed neck and wrist areas,
other areas where the protective overgarment was damaged, dressings, bandages,
or splints. Have patient hold breath and close eyes. Have patient or assist patient in
lifting mask at the chin. Wipe face with M291/M258A1 or the 0.5 percent chlorine
solution. Wipe quickly from below the top of one ear, being careful to wipe all
folds of the skin, top of the upper lip, chin, dimples, ear lobes, and nose. Continue
up the other side of the face to the top of the other ear. Wipe the inside of the mask
where it touches the face. Have the patient reseal and check mask.
CAUTION: Keep the decon solution out of the patients eyes and mouth.
Step 8. Remove bandages and tourniquets. During the clothing removal, the
clothing around bandages, tourniquets, and splints was cut and left in place. The
aidman will replace the old tourniquet by placing a new one 1/2 to one inch above
the old tourniquet. When the old tourniquet is removed, the skin is decontaminated
with the M291/M258A1 kit or the 0.5 percent chlorine solution. Do not remove
splints. Decontaminate them by thoroughly rinsing the splint, padding, and cravats
with the 0.5 percent chlorine solution. The aidman gently cuts away bandages. The
area around the wound is rinsed with the 0.5 percent chlorine solution, and the
aidman irrigates the wound with the 0.5 percent chlorine solution. The aidman
covers massive wounds with plastic secured with tape. Mark the wound as
contaminated. The aidman also replaces bandages that are needed to control
massive bleeding. Dispose of contaminated bandages and coverings by placing
them in a plastic bag and sealing the bag with tape. Place the plastic bags in the
contaminated waste dump.
Step 9. Proceed through the shuffle pit to the clean treatment area. Have the
decontaminated patient proceed through the shuffle pit to the clean treatment area.

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Make sure that the patients boots are well decontaminated by stirring the contents
of the shuffle pit as the patient crosses it. Patients combat boots and protective
mask will be removed in the entrance of the CPS.
10.11.9.4.5 Biological Agent Patient Decontamination Procedures. The decon
station as established for chemical agent patients can also be used for biologically
contaminated patients. The eight-man patient decon team is required for biologically
contaminated patient decon procedures.
10.11.9.4.5.1 Decon a litter biological agent patient.
Remove the field medical card (FMC) by cutting the tie wire and allowing
the FMC to drop into a plastic bag. Keep the FMC with the patient.
Patient decon team members first apply a liquid disinfectant, such as
chlorine dioxide solution, to the patients clothing and the litter.

NOTE: Disinfectant solution for use during patient decon procedures is prepared in accordance
with the label instructions on the container. The solution strength for skin can also be used to
irrigate the wound.
Patient decons team members remove the patients clothing as in decon of
chemical agent patients. Do not remove bandages, tourniquets, and splints.
Move patient to a clean litter as described for a chemical agent patient. Place
patients personal effects in a clean plastic bag; label the bag. If
uncontaminated, give to patient. If contaminated, place in contaminated
storage, decontaminate when possible, and then return to patient. Place
patients clothing in a plastic bag and dispose in a contaminated waste dump.
Bathe patient with soap and warm water, followed by reapplication of a
liquid disinfectant. The medic places a new tourniquet one-half- to one-inch
above the old tourniquet, then he removes the old one. The medic removes
bandages and decontaminates the skin and wound with the disinfectant
solution or the 0.5 percent chlorine solution; he replaces the bandage, if
needed, to control bleeding. Splints are disinfected by soaking the splint,
cravats, and straps with the disinfectant solution.
NOTE: Use a 0.5 percent chlorine solution to decontaminate patients suspected of being
contaminated with mycotoxins.
Two decon team members move patient to the hotline and transfer him/her to
a clean litter as described for chemical agent patients. Keep the FMC in the
plastic bag on the clean litter with the patient. Two medics from the clean side
of the hotline move the patient from the hotline to the clean treatment/holding
area.
10.11.9.4.5.2 Decontaminate an ambulatory biological agent patient.
Remove the patients FMC by cutting the tie wire and allowing it to drop into
a plastic bag. Keep the bagged FMC with the patient.

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Apply a liquid disinfectant solution, such as chlorine solution, over the


patients clothing.
Remove the patients clothing as described for a chemical agent patient. Do
not remove bandages, tourniquets, or splints. Place patients clothing in a
plastic bag and move the plastic bag to the contaminated waste dump.
Have the patient bathe with soap and warm water. If the patient is unable to
bathe, a member of the decon team must bathe the patient. Reapply the
disinfectant solution. A medic places a new tourniquet one-half- to one-inch
above the old one and removes the old one. A medic removes bandages and
decontaminates the wound and surrounding skin area with the disinfectant
solution or the 0.5 percent chlorine solution. The medic replaces the bandage,
if required, to control bleeding. Splints are decontaminated in place by
applying the disinfectant solution or the 0.5 percent chlorine solution to the
splint, cravats, and straps.
NOTE: Use a 0.5 percent chlorine solution to decontaminate ambulatory patients suspected of
being contaminated with mycotoxins.
Direct the patient to cross the hotline to the clean treatment area. Boots must
be decontaminated at the hotline before entering the clean treatment area.
Now this patient becomes a litter patient and must be placed in a patient
protective wrap before evacuation.
10.11.9.5 Nuclear Patient Decontamination Procedures. The practical decon of nuclear
contaminated patients is easily accomplished without interfering with the required medical
care.
NOTE: Patients must be monitored by using a radiac meter before, during, and after each step of
the decon procedure.
10.11.9.5.1 Decontaminate a litter nuclear-contaminated patient.
Patient decon team members remove the patients outer clothing as described for
chemical agent patients. Do not remove bandages, tourniquets, or splints. Move
the patient to a clean litter. Place the patients contaminated clothing in a plastic
bag and move the bagged clothing to the contaminated waste dump.
Wash exposed skin surfaces with soap and warm water. Wash the hair with soap
and warm water, or clip the hair and wash the scalp with soap and warm water.
Move the patient to the hotline. Two medics from the clean side of the hotline
move the patient into the clean treatment area.

Decontaminate an ambulatory nuclear-contaminated patient.

Have the patient remove his outer clothing (or have a decon team member assist
him). Place his contaminated clothing in a plastic bag and move the bagged
clothing to the contaminated waste dump.

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Wash exposed skin surfaces with soap and warm water. Wash hair with soap and
water, or clip the hair and wash the scalp with soap and water.
Direct the patient to move to the hotline. Decontaminate boots before crossing
into the clean treatment area.
Now the patient becomes a litter patient. Patients are protected by using a
blanket or other protective material during evacuation.

10.12 Swift Water Rescue.


10.13 Tree Recovery Procedures.
10.13.1 General. The safe extraction of patients and equipment from trees requires each PJ
to be proficient in the proper use of tree climbers and procedures for patient
evacuation/equipment removal. A thorough understanding of equipment and patient
evacuation procedures leads to successful extraction.
10.13.2 Tree Climbing. Trees which are completely dead should be approached with
extreme caution. Dead trees may lack the support of a sound root system. If dead trees must be
climbed to effect a rescue or recovery, then a support/safety line should be used. Hang the line
over a sound limb of an adjacent tree while being belayed by a safetyman on the ground. In
this case, the adjacent tree must be climbed first to install the safety rope. If this is not possible,
then the climber must exercise great caution during the climb, rescue/recovery operation, and
during descent.
10.13.2.1 Do not trust the last 10 feet of any treetop. This part of the tree is very weak and
has no hardened core. If the tree is between 60 and 80 feet in height, the weak section
might be the last 15 or 20 feet of the treetop. A climber, required to work near the top of a
tree, should be secured to a safety line. Run the safety line once around the trunk about 10
to 15 feet below the working area, and then straight to and once around an adjacent tree
trunk to the ground-belayer (safetyman).
10.13.2.2 In addition to the attached safety rope, the climber should be safetied to the tree
trunk. Leaning outward or swaying while working in the tree should be avoided; this
increases the chance for a fall.
10.13.3 Using Tree Climbing Equipment. Tree climbing equipment consists of a pair of
spiked tree climbers which are strapped to the lower legs and feet, a climbing safety belt
which is worn around the waist, gloves, and a helmet.
10.13.3.1 Tree climbers are worn on the inside of each leg. They are securely strapped to
the legs below the knees and to the feet on the outside of the ankles. Many models have
thick leather bound pads to help relieve pressure on the ankle/leg. The spike of each tree
climber protrudes down-ward and at a slight angle inward from the foot. Tree climbers
typically have a slight curve to them which aids in the piecing of surface bark to set the
spike into the sub-surface wood. These spikes provide the necessary support for ascent and
descent when jammed into the trunk of the tree. There are pole climbers which are
designed for pole climbing/lineman duties, have a much straighter spike and are not as
highly recommended for tree acsents, but can be used.

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10.13.3.2 The climber must ensure his knees never get too close to the trunk when using
spiked climbing aids; his buttocks should be the farthest part of his body away from the
trunk. His arms are either holding onto the trunk, branches, or moving and holding the
climbing safety belt.
10.13.3.3 The climbing safety belt comes in two parts, a leather belt worn around the
waist, and a safety belt which is adjustable. Each end of the safety belt snaps to the waist
belt. This belt keeps the climber from falling backwards and aids the climber when
working to free equipment or personnel. The belt allows the climber to use both hands
while working and in case of a fall, keeps the climber close to the trunk.
10.13.3.4 When used in ascending or descending, the belt should be kept between the head
and waist. The length of the belt around the trunk must be adjusted to aid in comfortable
climbing.
CAUTION: If the spikes come free of the bark/wood causing a fall, arrest the fall by pinching the
tree trunk with the climbing safety belt. Do not try to reset the spikes into the tree until the fall has
been arrested.
10.13.3.5 A short rope or sling can be used in conjunction with the belt. This ensures
ascent and descent procedures are safely performed when branches are bypassed. Attach
the rope or sling to a solid limb or trunk for additional security.
10.13.3.6 Caution must be exercised when wearing and using tree-climbers. Unless
experienced, individuals may have to look down to observe the spot where the spike is
being placed.
10.13.3.7 Care and caution must be exercised in the transport of spiked tree-climbers. For
a tree parachute deployment, the tree-climbers can be packed into a container and attached
securely underneath the medical kit or below the parachute on the buttocks.
10.13.4 Recovery of Personnel Suspended in Trees. C a l l t o t h e s u r v i v o r t o c h e c k
consciousness. If the survivor is conscious, inform then not to move or try to climb down. Ask
if they are injured and what type of injuries; then explain your intentions.
10.13.4.1 Evaluate the situation and coordinate with the team on a plan of action.
10.13.4.2 One PJ will climb the tree to the patients location. The climber will carry
sufficient equipment to perform a tree let-down and medical supplies to treat
life-threatening injuries. Minimum equipment will consist of:
Tree climbers and belts (2 or 3).
One end of a climbing rope or let-down tape (1 inch minimum width).
Three sling ropes.
Three locking carabiners.
Medical kit.
10.13.4.3 Initial action upon reaching the patient will depend on the severity of the
injuries and security of the parachute hang-up. The PJ should use one sling to secure
himself to the tree while working on the survivor. If the tree climbers and belt are used, the

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belt may be routed above the tree branches to hold the belt from slipping down the tree. If
the survivor has a secure hang-up, life-threatening injuries must be treated immediately.
However, if the security of the hang-up is in doubt or the possibility of a fall exists, the first
action should be to secure the patient to prevent additional injuries. The second sling may
be used to secure the patient to the tree. Tie one end of the sling to the tree and the other
end to the patients parachute harness. The security of the survivors harness should be
checked to ensure the survivor has not unfastened any of his harness straps. After the
patient has been secured, initial medical treatment may be administered.
10.13.4.4 The survivor letdown is accomplished by a modified belay. The end of the rope
or letdown tape is passed through a carabiner secured to a large limb or tree trunk above
the survivor, and back to the survivor. The limb or tree trunk must be strong enough to
support the weight of the survivor. If a rope is used, a two-loop knot is tied in the end of the
tope. A locking carabiner is attached to the main lift-web of the harness above the capewell
release on each shoulder. One loop from the knot is clipped into each carabiner. If the
letdown tape is used, a Figure Eight knot is tied approximately six feet from the snap
fastener. The snap fastener is routed under one shoulder of the survivors harness, back up
through the Figure Eight knot, down to and around the other shoulder of the harness and
connected back on itself. If a suitable limb is not available to pass the rope over, the third
sling carried by the climber may be used. One end of the sling may be secured around the
main trunk of the tree with a Prusik knot safetied with a bowline. The end of the sling will
have a Figure Eight knot with a carabiner clipped into the knot. The rope used to lower the
patient will be passed through the carabiner.
10.13.4.4.1 While one PJ is tending to the survivor, the remaining member will
establish a belay system. A rapid belay may be accomplished by passing the standing
end of the rope around the base of the tree or the team may use a standard belay used
for adverse terrain operations.
10.13.4.5 To lower the survivor, the belayer will take up as much slack as possible and
place a brake on the system. The climber will release the capewell on the patients harness
which supports the least weight. If both capewells are under equal tension, release the one
further from the tree. Ensure the patient, if conscious, is aware of the procedures used.
Release the remaining capewell. As the survivor drops free, keep him from slamming
into the trunk or large limbs. A short fall will occur when the last capewell is released due
to the stretch factor of the rope. This fall may be minimized by holding the harness when
releasing the last capewell. The PJ must have tension on his anchor sling for this action to
avoid being pulled off the tree.

WARNING: The PJ must ensure his fingers are not caught in the capewell release cable upon
release.
10.13.4.6 As the survivor is lowered by the belaying teammate, the PJ in the tree should
descend with the survivor and guide him between branches to avoid further injuries. The
commands to be used by the climber are BRAKE for immediate stop and SLACK for
continuing a slow descent.
10.13.4.7 If the survivor is unconscious, you should have a litter in place directly below
the lowering point. Lower the survivor directly into the litter. Initiate immediate medical

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care if needed, ensure the patient is on the ground before disconnecting the carabiners and
rope.
10.13.4.8 Heavily branched or high trees might require two rescuers to climb the tree
while a third remains on the ground as the belayer. One PJ guides and holds the victims
feet and legs, while the other supports the upper body during descent procedures.

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CHAPTER 11

INDIVIDUAL COMBAT SKILLS AND EQUIPMENT


11.1 General. Individual combat skills (ICS) are the necessary skills the individual operator
must learn and remain proficient at to become an effective member of a team conducting PR/ROs.
Not being intimately familiar with all of the following ICSs and equipment could lead to
catastrophic results to the individual operator and his team, resulting in total mission failure.
11.2 Purpose. This chapter will define the basic ICSs and specific equipment and how they
relate to those skills.
11.3 Tactical Clothing and Individual Combat Equipment. I n o r d e r t o m a x i m i z e t h e
protection afforded by clothing and to maximize the use of equipment, it is important to
understand the function of each. The operator must also understand how they are affected by
certain types of terrain and weather and how specific missions may dictate their use.
11.4 Tactical Clothing. The first consideration when choosing the appropriate tactical uniform
is the specific area of operation (AO) and its environment. Other considerations include insulating
properties, camouflage patterns and the scope of the mission. Clothing should be as lightweight,
rugged, and able to be worn for extended periods of time. It should also be soft and well fitting to
prevent excessive noise and snagging. Tactical uniforms should never be starched because this
breaks down the fibers, increases heat retention and IR detect ability. Operators may choose to
sew additional pockets on the sleeves of the uniform top to maximize the use of pockets hidden by
body armor and other equipment. Trouser legs should be tucked into the boots to prevent
migration of insects. Whenever possible, the soft cap is worn. It provides a less distinctive outline
and makes less noise. Footwear should be durable, fit comfortably, be waterproof and either
insulated or non-insulated depending on outside temperature. In cold weather climates, clothing
should be worn in layers to avoid over-heating. Additionally, inner layers should be manufactured
from a material that has moisture wicking capabilities with an outer layer with the same principal
but, providing protection from outside environmental elements such as wind and rain.
11.5 Individual Combat Equipment.
11.5.1 Durability and Functionality. Equipment should be chosen for durability and
functionality. Items should be camouflaged for tactical operations and not cause excessive
noise. When selecting equipment, carefully consider need versus weight and performing
function. In environments where individual load out weight must scrutinized (e.g., extreme
altitude or excessive heat), the operator should re-evaluate the need to bring equipment items
which perform only one function.
11.5.2 Fighting Load. The typical fighting load consists of clothing, equipment, weapons,
and ammunition. Some items are as required based on the operational tasking.
Arrangement of these items for wear may be determined by team leader discretion or
individual preference.
11.5.3 Load Bearing Equipment. The tactical load bearing equipment (LBE) is used to
hold the basic equipment and munitions necessary to prosecute a mission. Items carried in the
LBE must be readily accessible to use and not difficult to locate or remove. Although not

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every operator will be using the same type LBE, the contents should be as standardized as
possible. All operators should be familiar with what equipment and where it is worn on their
teammates, LBE. The following is a breakdown of items carried in the LBE:
11.5.3.1 Munitions. The typical combat load is seven magazines (one in the weapon, six
on the LBE) of 5.56mm for the M4 and three magazines of 9mm for the M-9. Ammunition
should be placed on the LBE where it is secure and easily accessible. Typically on a
Rhodesian-type vest, this is in the very front of the operators chest. The amount may be
increased or decreased to meet specific mission requirements. Normally, munitions are
selected based on the degree of threat, rules of engagement (ROE), time and distance to be
traveled, and total equipment load. (See Chapter 7, Combat Marksmanship and
Munitions, for additional information.)
11.5.3.2 Interteam Radio. The current radio fielded by teams is the PRC-148 multiband
interteam radio (MBITR). It is primarily used for operators to communicate with other
team members, usually via a VHF/FM low band frequency (e.g., 45.75 mHz). However, it
may also be used by any team member to communicate ground-to-air via a VHF/UHF AM
frequency. It should be placed on the LBE where it is secure and easily accessible. It
should be where the operator can manipulate the radio unaided by his team mate (e.g.,
changing volume or switching between frequencies).
11.5.3.3 Signaling. Multiple sources of both day and night signaling devices are carried
to include the following: (1) chemlights of multiple colors to include infrared (IR). They
may also be used for marking patients during a mass casualty, marking cleared rooms
during close quarters combat (CQC), or marshalling aircraft. (2) A VS-17 panel, cut down
in size to reduce space, is carried for day marking of the individual/team location during
emergency close air support (ECAS) or marking a helicopter landing zone (HLZ). (3)
Flashlight that is compact, powerful, and night vision device (NVD) friendly; it should
include multiple filters to include IR, blue and red. Besides its typical use of illumination,
a flashlight can be used as a sign/countersign method. (4) Pyrotechnic flares to include the
dual-end MK-13 with a day orange smoke and night red flare end. (5) Also, the
Gyrojet/Pen-gun flare may be considered where penetrating large trees or high terrain is
necessary.
11.5.3.4 Navigation. Either a commercially available compass or military lensatic
compass is carried and used in conjunction with a map as a primary land navigation tool.
A global positioning system (GPS) is also carried as a back-up land navigation tool. Both
items should be placed in the LBE where they are secure and readily accessible. Specifics
on their use is explained in later in this chapter.
11.5.4 Rucksack. The type and size of pack used will be dictated by the mission concept
(e.g., jumping, extended surface operations ESO, or direct action DA type missions). Proper
fit is essential for comfort and safety. An improper fitting rucksack will cause the operator to
fatigue much more quickly. Prior to mission execution ensure it is properly adjusted. It
should have to ability to be jettisoned via a quick release and in no way interfere with firing of
the weapon. It should lightweight and durable. On a team where multiple types of rucksacks
are being used the medical contents should be placed in standardized locations to the largest

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extent possible. All operators should be intimately familiar with their other teammates
rucksacks and arrangement of its contents.
11.5.5 Sleep Gear. Typically, sleep gear will not be carried on short duration no-notice
PR/RO missions. On pre-planned ESO in support of PR/RO, the average outside ambient
temperature is the key consideration of what type, if any sleep gear will packed for the
mission. Sleep gear may consist of a poncho and poncho liner up to a complete cold weather
system to include sleeping pad, bivy sack, inner bag, outer bag, and vapor barrier. As with
clothing, sleep gear should be layered for maximum effectiveness. Compression sacks help
reduce size and keep items together for rapid access or storage. When conducting operations,
consider the survivor, as well as team.
11.5.6 Food and Water. Food should be nutritionally balanced for the individual and the
operating environment. When deciding on water requirements you must consider the potential
duration of the mission, ability to purify, and degree of purification based on military and
biological threat. Purification systems, which do not require heat and remove the greatest
amount of bacteria, should be chosen (e.g., chlorine bleach).
11.5.7 Communications Equipment. Each recovery team (RT) usually carries at least one
man packable multiband radio. All communications used during PR/RO missions will be
encrypted. The following is the most current equipment fielded by RTs.
11.5.7.1 PRC-117F. The AN/PRC-117F is an advanced multiband, multimission
manpack radio providing reliable tactical communications performance in a small,
lightweight package that maximizes user mobility. The AN/PRC-117F provides reliable
operation with embedded communication security (COMSEC), satellite communications
(SATCOM), and electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) capabilities. The radio
operates from either two BB-590/U nickel-cadmium (Ni-Cd) rechargeable batteries, two
BA-5590 lithium batteries, two BB-390AU nickel metal-hydride, or two BB-490/U
lead-acid batteries. The AN/PRC-117F frequency range is continuous from 30 MHz to
512 MHz, providing AM and FM and various data waveforms. The AN/PRC-117F
provides line of sight (LOS), SATCOM, and ECCM frequency hopping operation (i.e.,
HAVE QUICK and SINGCARS), and is compatible with all tactical VHF/UHF radios.
The radio may also be coupled with a ruggedized laptop computer using HARRIS high
performance waveform software to receive near real-time intelligence or mission updates.
11.5.7.2 PRC-148 Multiple Band Interteam Radio. MBITR is a multiband radio
providing the operator to communicate to other team members on a VHF/FM low-band
frequency, ground-to-air via a UHF/AM frequency, or over-the-horizon (OTH) long-haul
communications via satellite communications. Additionally, it has frequency hopping
capability allowing the operator to communicate with aircraft using HAVE QUICK or
other ground components using SINGCARS. Additionally, the MBITR supports
VINSON and ANDVT cryptologic keys. The MBITR is limited to only 5 watts of output
limiting its range making it not the radio of choice for overall mission control. However,
when total individual operator weight is a concern, the PJTL may considering carrying an
additional MBITR with a BA-5590 battery adapter as the primary mission control radio. It
should be placed in the operators equipment where it is secure and easily accessible
allowing the operator to change between frequencies unaided or to verify the frequency.

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11.5.7.3 KYK-13. KYK-13 is a device that facilitates the loading of cryptological keys
such as VINSON and ANDVT. It holds up to six cryptological keys. Typically, keys 1
through 5 will hold 5 weeks of keys required for ground-to-air communications. Key 6 is
reserved for KEK/Transec which is used for over-the-air-rekey (OTAR) of cryptological
keys which is sent by remote terminals. It is loaded by running the COMSEC tape through
a KOI-18 which is connected by a cable to the KYK-13. It can also be loaded from another
KYK-13 loaded with the desired key. The keys are loaded directly from the KYK-13 to
PRC-117F and MBITR. Other COMSEC equipment available include the CZY-10 which
has the ability hold several more keys than the KYK-13. See specific equipment TOs for
detailed use and capabilities.

11.5.8 Night Vision Devices. NVDs give the operator expotential superiority over the
enemy during night time PR/ROs. The equipment chosen should be ruggedized and carefully
maintained. Night vision equipment such as night vision goggles (NVG) should be carried on
all missions, planned and unplanned, day and night. A mission executed during the day may
continue into the night, and without night vision capability the RT loses an element of
superiority. NVDs increase the effective range of the eye at night. The two types currently in
service are active (infrared) and passive (image intensification) in nature.
11.5.8.1 Active (Infrared). Active devices provide their own light source providing a
night-viewing capability regardless of the level of ambient light. An example of an active
IR device is a Surefire flashlight with IR filter lens.
11.5.8.2 Passive (Image Intensification). Passive devices intensify ambient light levels
to provide visible images. Starlight and moonlight ordinarily provide sufficient light to
employ these devices. Artificial illumination at low intensity or an IR filtered light source
increases their effectiveness during particularly dark periods. Direct or bright non-IR
filtered artificial illumination renders these devices temporarily ineffective. Image
intensification devices generally provide a surveillance capability at greater ranges than
infrared equipment.
11.5.8.3 Advantages of NVDs.
11.5.8.3.1 The unaided eye cannot detect infrared light.
11.5.8.3.2 NVDs can be used to detect the enemys use of infrared source.
11.5.8.3.3 Image intensifier NVDs do not require an artificial light source; therefore,
these devices cannot be detected.
11.5.8.3.4 On moonless nights when ambient light is not adequate, image
intensification devices may be used effectively by providing small amounts of IR
filtered artificial illumination.
11.5.8.4 Limitations. If employed improperly, some NVDs may be detected. Such
detection by the enemy may disclose friendly positions. Operators using them must be
intimately familiar with the equipment and its limitations. See the appropriate technical
manual for specific use and limitations. Some general limitations are listed include the
following:

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11.5.8.4.1 Infrared light can be detected and the source located. Infrared light is
subject to countermeasures by physical means (e.g., IR vector-aided fire) by chemical
smokes or counter illumination.
11.5.8.4.2 NVDs are line of sight instruments. Dead spaces in surveillance
experienced during the day are generally the same at night. Most NVDs are adversely
affected by bright non-IR filtered light.
11.5.8.4.3 NVDs may be adversely affected by bad weather conditions. If the
objective lens gets fogged or wet, the image will be distorted.
11.5.8.4.4 Image intensifier devices require clear moonlit night sky conditions to
optimize performance. Infrared devices are best suited for clear, dark conditions.
11.5.9 Influencing Factors. Many factors influence the decision as to what items of clothing
and equipment an operator should wear or carry. These include the weather, mission concept,
mission assigned duty, overall physical condition of the operator, and their degree of
proficiency. If a movement is anticipated, consider the distance to be traveled and method of
travel. The weight of individual clothing and equipment is extremely important. When total
operator weight is of concern as with certain AOs, each piece of equipment carried must be
scrutinized as to its primary use and importance and whether it should be carried at all.
Equipment performing only one function and does not have multiple uses should be
scrutinized first. It is important to note that, if movement is by foot, the maximum weight an
individual can wear and carry and still fight and perform effectively, is 65 to 70 pounds. These
factors should be considered at all levels of planning.
11.5.10 Individual Combat Equipment Levels. Individual equipment and clothing can be
broken down into three defense levels: first, second, and third line. Each line is based on the
equipment required to execute and continue the mission. This also includes equipment
required for self-preservation in the event the operator now becomes an IP.
11.5.10.1 First Line. First line equipment and clothing are the basic necessities required
for personal defense, survival, evasion and escape. It is the minimum equipment, when
combined with individual knowledge, to retain survivability when a mission has been
compromised and can no longer be accomplished. It is the operators last line of defense
in the event the tracker has had to shed the second and third lines and has become an IP.
Examples include: mission uniform, personal survival kit, navigation tools, food, water
gathering materials, and signaling/recovery devices. This line also contains the sidearm
and ammunition. These items are lightweight and carried on the person, usually on the
operators first line belt.
11.5.10.2 Second Line. Second line equipment and clothing consists of the combat load.
The combat load includes the equipment essential to performing a PR/RO. Weapons and
munitions, communication/signaling devices, medical blow out kits, limited rations,
protective mask (gas), and a fixed blade knife are examples. These items are normally
carried in the LBE. The combat load must fit properly and be appropriately camouflaged.
A final check should be made to ensure that the equipment placed in or attached onto the
LBE is secure and does not cause excessive noise, both while patrolling and running.

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11.5.10.3 Third Line. Third line equipment and clothing supplement the combat load
and provide added protection as well as extended operational capability. Examples of
these items include, but are not limited to: rations, additional uniforms, batteries, sleeping
gear, additional munitions, medical equipment, stoves and special use equipment. The load
is designed to provide the minimum necessities for living in the field and is normally
carried in the rucksack. Only those items essential to mission accomplishment are carried.
Excess weight induces fatigue and subsequent decreased combat efficiency.

11.5.11 Essential Elements. It is essential that prior to any operation the TL scrutinize the
mission requirements to ensure each person is adequately equipped. The TL will acquire
information from essential elements of information (EEIs) to determine the type of
camouflage and basic clothing needs. TLs should always plan on the worst case scenario.
11.6 Cover and Concealment.
11.6.1 Artificial and Natural Cover. Cover is protection from the fire of enemy weapons.
It may be natural or artificial. Natural cover (ravines, hollows, reverse slopes) and artificial
cover (foxholes, trenches, walls) will protect individuals from grazing fires and partially
protect from plunging fires. The habit of locating and taking advantage of every bit of cover
the terrain offers combined with the proper use of movement techniques will ensure effective
protection from enemy fire. Concealment is protection from enemy observation. It, too, may
be natural or artificial. Remember that concealment is not protection from enemy fire.
Individuals must not make the mistake of believing they are protected from enemy fire merely
because they are concealed from enemy eyes.
11.6.2 Natural Concealment. Natural concealment is frequently provided by the
surroundings and needs no alteration to be used. Examples are: bushes, grass, and
shadows. Artificial concealment is made from materials such as burlap or nets. Natural
materials such as bushes, leaves, and grass, which are moved from their original
location, can also be arranged to form artificial concealment. Care must be taken to
consider the effects of seasons on the concealment provided by both natural and artificial
materials.
11.6.3 Individual Concealment Techniques.
11.6.3.1 Avoid Unnecessary Movement. Remain still as much as possible, movement
attracts attention. An individual may be concealed when still, yet easily detected when
moving. Movement against a stationary background causes an individual to stand out
clearly. When changing positions, move carefully over a concealed route to the new
position.
11.6.3.2

Use All Available Concealment.

11.6.3.3 Background is Important. Blend with the background to prevent enemy


detection of individual positions. Trees, bushes, grass, earth, and man-made structures
forming the background vary in color and appearance. It is possible to blend with them.
Move to trees or bushes, that blend with the uniform and absorb the outline of the human
figure.

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11.6.3.4 Shadows Help Concealment. An individual in the open stands out clearly.
Shadows are found under most conditions of day and night.
11.6.3.5 Stay Low to Observe. Observe from a crouch, squat, or the prone position.
Present a low silhouette, making it difficult for the enemy to see.
11.6.3.6 Expose Nothing That Shines. Reflection of light on a shiny surface instantly
attracts attention and can be seen for great distances.
11.6.3.7 Keep Off the Skyline. Human figures on the skyline can be seen from a great
distance, even at night, because a dark outline stands out against the lighter sky. The
silhouette formed by the human body makes a good target.
11.6.3.8 Alter Familiar Outlines. Military equipment and the human body are familiar
outlines to all soldiers. Alter or disguise these revealing shapes.
11.6.3.9 Keep Quiet. Noise, such as talking or rattling, can be picked up easily by enemy
patrols or listening posts.
11.7 Environmental Camouflage, Cover and Concealment Considerations.
11.7.1 Desert Environment. Basic techniques of camouflage cover, and concealment also
apply to the desert environment with some additional considerations.
11.7.1.1 The colors tan, light brown, and loam green may be used for camouflage. Avoid
black since it is easily detected using NVDs. When utilizing camouflage face paint,
consider using darker colors around the eyes; this will reduce sun glare reflecting into the
eyes. Burlap bags spray painted to match the colors of the operational area make excellent
pack covers and help distort the shape. Ponchos spray painted or manufactured in desert
camouflage to match the area make acceptable shade trench shelters and reduce the chance
of aerial observation. All optical devices must be covered when not in use, even at night.
When using optics such as weapon sights and binoculars, consider placing a nonreflective
lens cover over the front of the lens. Panty hose can be placed over the lens as an
improvised method. When stopping for long periods of time and natural cover and
concealment cannot be found, dig in and use an overhead cover. Digging in will provide
cover and lower the profile to the enemy. It will also reduce the amount of shadow
required to cover the position.
CAUTION: Weapons should be painted to match camouflage scheme. Follow appropriate
painting protocols to prevent weapon malfunction. Ensure wet paint does not seep into the
receiver and jam the firing mechanism. Keep in mind there Is no approved procedure for
painting weapons in any AF technical order.
11.7.1.2 When stopping for long periods of time and natural cover/concealment cannot be
found, dig in and use a desert poncho or camouflage netting for overhead cover. Digging
in will provide cover and lower the profile to the enemy. It will also reduce the amount of
shadow required to cover the position.
11.7.2 Urban Environment.
11.7.2.1 Unlike other environments, the urban setting is a 3-dimensional area. Because of
the population density, possible observation from above is more likely.

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11.7.2.2 Structures in built-up areas throw sharp shadows that shift during the day. Stone,
brick, and masonry predominate, yet intermittent bursts of color from trash and debris may
be common; the particulars matter greatly and can vary from block to block. Soft, organic
curves are far less frequent in urban terrain than in any other. Light penetrates poorly into
the interiors of buildings. Smog, soot, dust, and haze are regular features of most urban
cityscapes and in conflict this is worsened by the presence of smoke. Also, urban
backgrounds generally require more straight edge camouflage, vertical and horizontal
designs to blend with homes, buildings and other urban structures.
11.7.2.3 Standard camouflage, cover, and concealment principles used in other
environments apply in the urban environment as well. Cover and concealment from
observation are readily available from man-made structures. Operators should take full
advantage of existing shadows and periods of darkness. Camouflage material can be
improvised from available man-made materials by spray painting to suit the surrounding
area.

11.7.3 Mountain Environment.


11.7.3.1 Individual Cover and Concealment. High wind speeds and sound often mask
the noises of movement. Conversely, the nature of the terrain and weather can be used to
provide concealment from observation. Mountainous regions are subject to intense
shadowing effects when the sun is low in relatively clear skies. The contrast from lighted
to shaded areas is such that visual acuity in the shaded regions is considerably reduced.
These shadowed areas can provide increased concealment when combined with other
camouflaging disciplines and should be considered in maneuver plans. Periods of
darkness provide excellent opportunities for unobserved movement by teams.
11.7.3.2 Cover and Concealment. Cover is usually readily available in deep defiladed
areas and broken terrain. This may permit a team to advance along a covered approach to
within a few yards of an objective. Digging temporary fortifications is generally difficult
because of strong soil and hard bedrock. Concealment in the mountain environment is
variable. Increased ground observation from heights and narrow fronts may make
concealment difficult to achieve. Accordingly, during CSAR operations, teams must be
ready to take full advantage of darkness, traveling storms, fog, and other conditions of
reduced visibility.
11.7.4 Cold Weather Environment.
11.7.4.1 Individual Camouflage and Concealment. Shine is eliminated as in all
attempts to camouflage. Shine is often the only revealing feature of an object in snowy
terrain. Full use is made of available cover. Deciduous vegetation loses much of its
concealing value in winter when the leaves have fallen. When white covers for equipment
are not available, dark ones can be used if they can be partly covered with white paint.
Thawing conditions are advantageous to camouflage since they reveal dark patches and
form a disruptive pattern. Teams operating in open areas covered with snow wear a
complete white camouflage suit. Ski equipment is painted white. Individual equipment
and weapons are provided with white covers or painted. Troops operating in wooded areas
wear either white camouflage pants or a complete white camouflage suit, depending on the
snow condition.

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11.7.4.2 Team Cover and Concealment. From the air, snow-covered ground presents
an irregular pattern of white, spotted with dark tones produced by objects protruding above
the snow, and by irregularities in the snow surface such as valleys, hummocks, ruts, and
tracks. To ensure concealment, it is necessary to site dark objects on dark backgrounds,
control the making of tracks in the snow, and maintain the snow covering on camouflaged
equipment. No practical artificial materiel has been developed which reproduces the
texture of snow sufficiently enough to be a protection against photographic observation.
Concealment from direct observation is relatively successful through the use of white
snow garments, white paint, and whitewash. However, these measures can be detected by
aerial photography. In snow, tracks show up as lines of dark shadows. It is almost
impossible to obliterate them by brushing or other means. Tracks are continued past
installations to what appears to be a logical destination whenever possible. The degree of
whiteness of artificial materiels used for camouflage in snow terrain must be carefully
chosen. A hint of yellow or red betrays the camouflage. White with a blue tint is
preferable. Skillful exploitation of weather conditions increases opportunities for surprise
recoveries. This includes the exploitation of falling snow, blizzards, fogs, and low clouds
for concealment of pararescue team movements and of good snow conditions for the rapid
movement of teams on skis. With reliable weather forecasts, the effects of unfavorable
weather can be reduced.
11.7.5 Jungle Environment.
11.7.5.1 Individual Camouflage/Concealment. Certain individual protective measures
in the jungle are important. The normal close proximity of the enemy and the concealment
in the jungle make sound, light, and movement revealing to the enemy and constitute an
ideal danger to ground teams. In jungle operations, scanning of the terrain immediately
ahead for selection of a concealed position and a covered avenue of approach is important.
Arms and legs are kept covered. Shine from metal gear is dangerous. The dials of
luminous wristwatches can be a giveaway at night.
11.7.5.2 Team Cover and Concealment. Undergrowth, forest area, and high grass areas
afford excellent concealment from observation and also limit the distance sound travels. It
must be remembered that these advantages work for the enemy as well as for friendly
personnel. Artificial concealment and camouflage is very easy to make. Soft ground in
certain areas and the prevalence of riveting and covering materiel make artificial cover
easy to dig and conceal. Except in the primary evergreen rainforest, the trees in most
jungle areas will not provide extensive cover. Average tree trunks are generally not more
than 12 inches in diameter; in areas where large-trunked trees are located, the trees are
usually widely spaced. Most of the cover in jungle areas will be afforded by surface
irregularities, such as ravines, gullies, and large rocks. These are found in abundance.
11.8 Fundamentals of Movement. As with all types of tactical movement, your personal
attitude is the most important aspect. Accepted among many is the stop light method of
increasing your perception of a given situation. Green condition is reserved for when there is
likely to be no enemy contact. Yellow condition is reserved when enemy contact is likely to
occur and senses are extended, nothing is taken for granted and an increased perception is
required. Red condition is reserved for the enemy. In red condition all senses are excited and
you project yourself to see red (the color psychologically causes violent reaction). When in red

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condition, your most aggressive attitude is displayed. Follow these general rules to move without
being seen or heard by the enemy:
11.8.1 General Rules. Prepare yourself and your equipment.
Tape identification tags together and to the chain so they cannot slide or rattle.
Tape or pad any parts of the weapon or equipment that rattle or are so loose that they
may snag. Be sure the tape or padding does not interfere with operation of the weapon or
equipment.
Use the ankle ties when you do not blouse the field trousers. Do not tie them too tightly.
No other tie-down should be used. They may interfere with circulation in the legs and feet.
In cold weather, poor circulation may lead to frostbite or other cold injury.
Wear a soft cap, with its less distinctive outline.
Do not carry unnecessary equipment. One cannot move rapidly when weighted down.
Do not wear sunglasses or glasses unless they are of the non-glare variety. Otherwise
they may reflect sunlight and compromise your position.
Move by bounds in short distances and stop often. Stop, look, and listen, then begin
your movement again.
Look for the next spot to stop before leaving the concealment of the present position.
Observe that area carefully for enemy activity. Select the best available covered and
concealed route to the new location; take advantage of darkness, fog, smoke, or haze to
assist in concealing movement.
Change direction slightly from time to time when moving through tall grass. Moving in
a straight line causes the grass to wave with an unnatural motion, which may attract
attention. The best time to move is when the wind is blowing.
If birds or animals are alarmed, remain in position and observe briefly. Their flight or
movement may attract the enemys attention or provided a clue to the whereabouts of the
enemy.
Take advantage of the distraction provided by noises.
Cross roads and trails. Look for a large culvert, a low spot, or a curve. Cross quickly and
quietly.
Follow the furrows as much as possible when crawling over a plowed field
Avoid steep slopes and areas with loose stones.
Avoid cleared areas to prevent being silhouetted.
11.8.2 The Rush. The rush is the fastest way to move from one position to another while
under fire.
11.8.2.1 Short rushes from one covered position to another may be used when enemy fire
allows brief exposure. Maneuver teams, buddy teams, or individuals may advance by
short rushes to avoid accurate enemy fire.

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11.8.2.2 Try not to stay up any longer than 3 to 5 seconds. Do not give the enemy time to
track with automatic fire. The rule is rush from cover to cover. If cover and concealment
are not available, follow the principle of Im up, the tracker sees me, Im down, roll (no
more than 3 seconds), this ensures that the time of exposure to enemy forces is negligible.
11.8.2.3 Scout the area ahead. Get up and move in the lowest profile possible to the next
site. Keep weapon pointed and ready in the most likely spot the enemy may fire against
you. As soon as you hit the ground, come up ready to fire.
11.8.2.4 Do not rush from a position shortly after firing. Shift right/left or crawl before
springing to your feet.
11.8.2.5 After completing a rush to a position providing concealment but no cover, roll or
crawl to a new position before firing.
11.8.2.6 This type of movement is very difficult with a ruck, and may cause loss of
equipment. If carrying a large load and cannot roll, shift to one side.
11.8.2.7 If the enemy sees you, the enemy will fire at the last point you were seen. Vary
the direction you roll or shift.
11.9 Crawling Maneuvers. There are times when one must move with the body close to the
ground to avoid being seen. There are two ways to do this, the low crawl and the high crawl. Use
the method best suited to the conditions of visibility, cover and concealment available, and speed
required.
11.9.1 High Crawl. The high crawl is used when cover is more prevalent and speed is
essential to the outcome. The body is kept off the ground and your weight is rested upon
the elbows, forearms, and knees. If carrying a rifle, it is either carried across the body
slung in the crotch of the elbows, or across the back. Movement is made by alternately
pulling with each arm and pushing with one leg (if profile is to remain low) or both legs
if in adequate cover. Maintain a profile consistent with cover and speed consistent with
silence.
11.9.2 Low Crawl. The low crawl is used when cover and concealment are inadequate and
when an enemy response is expected. Normally this movement is used to bypass enemy
positions or barriers. The low crawl is extremely slow, so speed cannot be essential to the
outcome.
11.9.2.1 Lie as flat to the ground as possible, legs together and ankles placed flat. Hands
are outstretched in front and flat in position to seek out obstacles such as mines and trip
wires. The head is placed flat with eyes in a position to scout for obstacle. Heels and
buttocks must not rise above the ground. The purpose is to hug the ground as close as
possible.
11.9.2.2 Prior to movement, use the hands to clear an area large enough for the body to
follow. Do not transition out of the cleared area.
11.9.2.3 To move forward extend arms fully to the front and draw one leg far enough to
push and maintain a low profile. Pull with forearms and push with leg. Repeat procedure
as needed. All movement must be slow and deliberate.

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11.9.2.4 When transitioning barriers to the front, move by the most direct route possible
commensurate with the area cleared.
11.9.2.5 If crossing a large area, the low crawler on point may need to be swapped out, as
it is extremely dangerous and tiring. The point will move to a position which allows the
person behind to cross over the top. The person behind will act as if the point is an
extension of the ground.
11.9.2.6 Orders may be passed from team members as to direction by pressing on the foot
of the person in front. The member passing the instructions holds on to the foot in the
desired direction until it is achieved. Holding both feet signals for movement to stop.

11.10 Stealth Walking. There are two general types of stealth walkingthe toe first and heel
first. Walking in a stealthy manner can be very tiring as well as time consuming and is used when
silence is absolutely paramount. Usually this type of walking is for contact procedures and sentry
neutralization, but may be used whenever stealth is needed. When used during sentry removal,
consider removing any equipment that is not needed. Follow procedures for sentry removal for
additional information.
11.10.1 Body Position. The body must remain relaxed with just enough tension to impart
your movement with force if necessary. The upper body is straight and at an angle sufficient
to block a frontal attack. The arms are up and in a position to block blows. If a weapon is at
hand, hold the weapon with intent and consider it to be used as a bludgeon, if need be. Legs
are bent and shaped as a horseshoe, shoulder width apart, ready to transfer weight and
maintain balance. Maintain 360 degree awareness and do not stare at the objective (staring
may cause the sixth sense to be activated). Be prepared to attack in any direction.
11.10.2 Toe First Method. Pick a point about one-half normal stride, preferably free of dry
leaves and other obstacles. Slowly lift the forward foot and move it forward clearing obstacles
with the toes. Place the outside of the foot lightly down, putting pressure as needed to
maintain silence. Rotate the foot into position until the ball of the foot is placed and lower the
heel. Very slowly, shift the body weight forward until the weight is on the forward foot.
Repeat the process with the other foot, (ensuring that legs are not crossed), moving towards the
forward foot and place approximately shoulder width apart. Terrain and situation will
determine speed and silence.
11.10.3 Heel First Method. Pick a point about one half normal stride, preferably free of dry
leaves and other obstacles. Slowly lift the forward foot and move it forward clearing obstacles
with the toes. Use the outside of the foot to place it lightly down placing pressure as needed to
maintain silence. Rotate the foot into position until the heel of the foot is placed and lower the
toes. Very slowly, shift the body weight forward until the weight is on the forward foot.
Repeat the process with the other foot, (ensuring you do not cross the legs), moving towards
the forward foot and place approximately shoulder width apart. Terrain and situation will
determine speed and silence.
11.11 Combat Tracking. A knowledge of combat tracking techniques provides information
needed to evade enemy trackers and locate evading friendly personnel. Combat tracking
techniques may have to be employed in the final stages of locating the evader. In difficult threat

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situations, the IPs fear of being captured may cause reluctance in revealing the hiding place,
requiring a more extensive search to make contact.
11.11.1 Qualities of a Tracker. Tracking can be effectively employed using basic
techniques, common sense, and some degree of experience. There are traits and qualities that
must be developed and refined, to qualify as a worthy combat tracker. A tracker must have
patience. The tracker must be able to proceed slowly and quietly, yet steadily while observing
available indicators and interpreting them. The tracker must avoid using reckless speed that
may cause him to overlook important signs, lose the trail completely, or blunder into an enemy
force. A good tracker must be persistent. The tracker must have the ability and desire to
continue the mission even though indicators are scarce or conditions of weather or terrain are
difficult. If the tracker loses a trail, the tracker must have the determination and persistence to
find it again. The tracker must develop an acute sense of observation. The tracker must be able
to see things not obvious at a glance. The tracker must have the ability to use his senses of
smell and hearing to supplement personal observation. A good tracker must also develop a
sixth sense. The tracker may often be led to inspect an area simply because it does not look
right. This ability often enables a tracker to regain a lost spoor or discover new or additional
indicators. An effective tracker must also know the evader or element being tracked. The
tracker cannot properly interpret clues that are found unless the tracker has some knowledge of
the individuals, their habits, equipment, or level of training. A good tracker must also have an
understanding of nature, a good memory, intelligence, and the tracker must be physically fit
enough to accomplish the mission.
11.11.2 Tracking Terminology:
11.11.2.1 Spoor. Spoor means a set of tracks laid upon the ground and visible to a
tracker.
11.11.2.2 Tracker. The tracker is the member of a tracking team who is physically
looking for and following the spoor. The tracker is not, and at no time should be used as
the point man.
11.11.2.3 Quarry. Quarry is used as an alternative to fugitive, target, or the
pursued.
11.11.2.4 Time and Distance Gap. The theoretical distance which the quarry could
move over the ground between the time of incident and the time which the tracker arrive to
commence a follow-up.
11.11.2.5 Follow-up. A follow-up is the physical act of a tactically trained tracking
team, following a spoor made by the quarry.
11.11.3 Tracking Team Composition and Formation. The best team composition for
conducting combat tracking consists of a minimum of four trained trackers. A tracking team
as large as six to eight personnel can be effective as well; however, take care not to
contaminate the spoor with the additional personnel. The best suited movement formation for
tracking is the Y formation. The left and right flanks provide for security but additionally
scan for tracks that may cut across their line of travel. The primary tracker is in the center of
the formation and has the responsibility of following the spoor, marking the last known spoor
and communicating critical information to the team leader/controller. The tracker sets the

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pace for the formation. The controller is in the rear of the formation and provides for rear
security, control of the formation and communication with command and control elements.
Additionally the controller conducts scans with binoculars during extended halts to pick up
signs of any threats or the quarry.
11.11.4 Concepts of Tracking. As a tracker moves along the ground following a spoor, the
tracker begins to build a mental picture of the objective being tracked. To accomplish this, the
tracker constantly asks himself questions such as: How many people am I following? How
are they equipped? Do they know they are being followed? By comparing indicators, the
tracker begins to answer the internally posed questions. For example, if the tracker finds a
footprint and a scuff on a tree about waist high, it may indicate an armed individual passed this
particular spot. There are six concepts that apply to tracking: displacement, staining,
weathering, littering, deception, and interpretation/immediate use of intelligence data.
11.11.4.1 One or more of the first five concepts can define any indicator the tracker
discovers. Using the sixth concept, the tracker combines the other five concepts and uses
all discovered indicators to form a composite picture of the evader being followed. To
accomplish this, the tracker must interpret what has been seen. Once an interpretation has
been made, applicable intelligence data should be made available for the trackers
immediate use on the spot. For example, indicators may point out contact is imminent. If
intelligence data indicates extreme stealth and caution may be required, the tracker must be
appraised of this fact at the earliest possible moment. By examining each concept
individually, the tracker can see several concepts can apply to one indicator at the same
time. It is hard to visualize how any indicator would not be defined by at least one of the
concepts of tracking. There are six variants of spoor indicators:
11.11.4.2 Ground spoors are marks and impressions of footwear, other body parts,
equipment carried or left on the surface of the ground. Ground spoor can be observed by
regularity of the impression as with a uniform tread pattern; flattening from pressure on the
ground; transference from material transferred by the foot from one medium to another,
color change and disturbance. Following ground spoor is easiest in soil which holds the
spoor well (e.g., sand and snow).
11.11.4.3 Aerial spoor is any damaged created to vegetation as an individual moves
around or through the vegetation and can be identified as crushed, broken or bent grass,
leaf creases, skinned bark, or dew knocked off vegetation.
11.11.4.4 Signs are any indicator other than ground or aerial spoor.
11.11.4.4.1 Bits of clothing, threads, or dirt from boots can be displaced from a
persons uniform and deposited on thorns, snags, or the ground are signs. Thorns
should be inspected for bits of clothing or other matter ripped from the uniform of the
person being tracked.
11.11.4.4.2 In almost any area, there will be insects and spiders. The observation of
any changes in the normal life of these insects may be an indication someone has
recently passed. Bees that are stirred up, ants that have had their holes covered by
someone moving over them, or spiders that have had their webs torn down are valuable
clues. Spiders often spin webs across open areas, trail, or roads to trap flying insects.

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If someone is careless and does not move under these webs, an indicator is provided to
an observant tracker.
11.11.4.4.3 Wild animals and birds flushed from their natural habitat by the person
being tracked are examples of displacement. Cries of birds excited by unnatural
movement are an indicator. Tops of tall grass or brush moving on a windless day is an
indication someone is moving the vegetation from its original position. Displacement
can result from clearing a trail by either breaking or cutting ones way through heavy
vegetation with a machete. These trails are obvious to the most inexperienced tracker.
A person sleeping will also flatten the vegetation.
11.11.4.5 As a poorly trained or disciplined evader or element moves over a piece of
terrain, it is likely a clear trail of litter will mark its path. Gum or candy wrappers, ration
cans, cigarette butts, remains of fires, or even piles of human feces are unmistakable signs
of recent movement. Weathering must be taken into consideration when estimating the
age of litter. Rain flattens or washes litter away and turns paper into pulp. Ration cans,
exposed to weather, will rust first at the exposed edge when it is opened. Rust then moves
in toward the center. Again the tracker must use his memory to properly determine the age
of litter. The last rain or strong wind can be the basis for a time frame.
11.11.4.6. Blood spoor consist of any blood or other bodily fluids left behind due to
existing injury. Examples are blood, lung shot and matter left behind from a head wound.
Blood signs often will be in the form of spatters of drops left by the wounded person being
followed. Bloodstains are not always on the ground. Blood can be smeared on leaves or
twigs from a persons height to the ground.
11.11.4.7 Body waste consist of urine, feces, or oral ejecta such as spit or chewing
tobacco.
11.11.5 Analyzing Footprints. Footprints may indicate direction and rate of movement,
number of persons in the moving element, whether or not heavy loads are being carried, sex of
members of the element, and whether the members of the element realize that they are being
followed. If footprints are deep and the pace is long, rapid movement is apparent. Extremely
long strides, deep prints with the toe prints deeper than heel prints, indicate running. Prints
can be counted to determine the number of people in the element. If the prints are deep, short,
and widely spaced, with indications of scuffing or shuffling, the person who left the print is
carrying a heavy load. The sex of a member of the element being following can be determined
by studying the size and position of the footprints. Women tend to be pigeon-toed, while men
walk with their feet straight-ahead or pointed slightly to the outside. Prints left by women are
usually smaller and the stride is shorter than that taken by men. If the quarry realizes that they
are being followed, an attempt to hide their tracks may be made. Persons walking backwards
have short, irregular stride. The prints have an unnaturally deep toe. Soil will be kicked in the
direction of movement.
11.11.5.1 Once a clear foot print is found of the quarry, a detailed sketch which includes
precise measurements, should be made. This should include a detailed sketch of the
footwear pattern and measurement of overall foot length, width of heel and toe sections
and any other identifiable marks. This sketch is used to occasionally confirm that the
tracker is following the correct spoor or identify this specific print when intermingled with

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other prints. Additionally stride length (distance between heel and toe of left and right
foot) and straddle (width between left and right foot heels) should be annotated. Any
deviation in the stride and straddle will indicate increase or decrease in speed or adding or
losing weight carried.

11.11.6 Weathering. Weather may either aid or hinder the tracker. It affects indicators in
certain ways so that the tracker may determine their relative ages. Wind, snow, rain, or
sunlight may, however, obliterate indicators entirely, thus hindering the tracker. By studying
the effects of weather on indicators, the tracker can make a determination as to the age of the
sign. For example, when bloodstains are fresh, they are bright red. Air and sunlight change
blood first to a deep ruby red color, then to a dark brown crust when the moisture evaporates.
Scuff marks on trees or brushes darken with time, sap oozes, then hardens when it makes
contact with the air.
11.11.6.1 Identifying Footprint Age. Footprints are greatly affected by weather. When
a persons foot displaces soft moist soil to form a print, initially, the moisture holds the
edges of the print intact. As sunlight and air-dry the edges of the print, small particles that
were held in place by moisture fall by their own weight into the print. Careful study of this
process by the tracker can lead to a determination of the approximate age of the print. If
particles are just beginning to fall into the print, the tracker should become a stalker. If the
edges of the print are dried and crusty, the prints are probably at least an hour old. This
will vary with terrain and should be taken as a general guide.
11.11.6.2 How Weather Effects Tracking. A light rain may round out the edges of the
print. The tracker must remember when the last rain occurred in order to place these prints
into a proper time frame. A heavy rain may erase all signs. Wind also affects tracks.
Besides drying out the print, litter, sticks, or leaves may be blown into the print. By
remembering wind activity, the tracker may guess the age of the tracks. Trails exiting
streams may appear to have been weathered by rain because of water running from
clothing or equipment into the tracks. This is particularly true if the party exits the stream
in a file. This will permit each person to deposit water into the tracks. The existence of a
wet, apparently watered, trail slowly fading into a dry trail indicates the trail is fresh.
11.11.6.3 Effect of Wind. The effect of wind on sounds and odors is one aspect of the
effect weather has on tracking. If the wind is blowing from the direction of the trail the
tracker is following, sounds and odors may be carried to the tracker. If the wind is
blowing in the same direction as the trail being followed, the tracker must be extremely
cautious since the wind will carry the trackers sounds towards the enemy. Wind direction
can be determined by dropping a handful of dry dust or grass from shoulder height. By
facing in the same direction the wind is blowing, sounds can be localized by cupping the
hands behind the ears and slowly turning. When the sounds are loudest, the tracker is
facing the origin of the sound. In calm weather, when no wind is blowing, the air currents
that carry sounds to the tracker may be too light to feel. The tracker must remember that
the air cools in the evening and moves downhill to the valleys. If a tracker is moving uphill
in the day or at night, air currents will probably be moving toward the tracker, provided no
other wind is blowing. As the sun warms the air in the valleys in the morning, it moves
uphill. These factors should be considered when plotting routes for operations. Regardless
of these factors however the tracker has very few options other the following the spoor.

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11.11.6.4 Lumination Considerations. A tracker should also consider the sun, moon or
artificial light angles. A ground spoor indicator clearly seen when the sun is in the
trackers face can become nearly impossible to see with the sun at the trackers back. As a
general rule, the tracker should be facing into the light source with the track in between the
tracker and light source. Even though that may be the best position for tracking, it may
cause some tactical concern like the ability to effectively engage targets when looking into
the sun.
11.11.6.5 Anti-Tracking Techniques. Anti-tracking techniques are technique used to
disguise the spoor or fool the tracker into self doubt, resulting in the tracker getting further
and further behind the quarry. Walking backward to leave confusing prints, brushing out
trails, moving over rocky ground or through streams are examples of technique employed
to confuse the tracker. Walking on well used trails or path may be used to attempt to have
spoor obliterated by local foot or vehicle traffic. However, the tracker can follow the party
if the tracker is experienced and persistent by using the proper concepts. The evader or
element being followed may use several methods to attempt to minimize trail signs. Rags
wrapped around footwear, or soft-soled tennis shoes may make footprints more rounded
on the edges and less distinct. An element may exit a stream in a column formation or a
scattered, line abreast formation. This reduces the chances of leaving a well-defined exit.
A careful, observant tracker can determine by a study of the signs if an attempt is being
made to confuse the tracker. If the individual being followed attempts to throw the tracker
off by walking backward, the footprints will be deepened at the toe and soil will be scuffed
or dragged in the direction of movement. By following carefully, the tracker can normally
find a turnaround point. A trail can be brushed out. The experienced tracker could easily
recognize this technique. If the trail leads across rocky or hard ground, the tracker should
attempt to circumnavigate the area to pick up the exit trail. This process works in streams
as well. On rocky ground, even the most careful evader could displace moss or lichen
growing on the stones. An experienced tracker can trace these signs. If these methods fail,
the tracker should return to the last visible indicators and then head in the direction of
movement in ever-widening circles until the tracker again falls upon visible signs.
Remember that an evader that attempts to hide the trail moves at a reduced speed.
Therefore, an experienced tracker, who is not fooled by these attempts, gains time on the
individual being followed.
11.11.6.6 Counter-Tracking Techniques. Counter-tracking techniques are methods
employed to harm the trackers or do psychological damage so as to make them lose
interest in continuing the pursuit. Examples are the use of pursue deterrent munitions or
other explosive or improvised booby traps as well as employment of a sniper by the
quarry. Depending on the motivation of the tracking team, the use of these
counter-tracking techniques may discourage or encourage them to continue tracking.
Much thought must be given as to the merits of using booby traps and mines, because they
are nondiscriminatory in nature.
11.11.6.7 Lost Spoor Procedures. The lost spoor procedure is a sequential procedure
designed to incrementally increase the search area until the lost spoor is relocated. Prior to
starting formal lost spoor procedures, the primary tracker conducts a quick scan to
relocate any spoor. If the spoor is not found during the quick scan, the primary tracker

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checks out the likely lines of travel from the current position. The left and right flank will
conduct a quick scan in their immediate area, and look for any track traps ahead which
should hold a spoor if the quarry moved through them. If the spoor is not relocated at this
point, the primary tracker will mark the last known spoor location and move in a slow
methodical method to the left flank tracker, across to the right flank tracker and back to the
last known spoor. This procedure continues in ever widening circles until the spoor is
relocated.

11.11.7 Remember these general rules when conducting any tracking as part of the
operations. Correctly identify the spoor. Never walk on top of the spoor. Never overshoot the
last known spoor. When following aerial spoor, seek confirmatory evidence. Always know
where you are, maintain visual contact with other team members and anticipate what the
quarry will do. The tracker sets the pace.
11.12 Tactical River and Stream Crossing. The following additional information is provided
in addition to referring to Army field manuals. NOTE: Water temperatures must be determined
and planned for when conducting river/stream crossings, especially in the tactical environment.
11.12.1 Fording. If a wide, shallow (less than 1.5 meters deep) stream is encountered, a
secluded shallow spot for fording should be selected. A security element should cross first
after a suitable observation period of the opposite bank. It should move rapidly across in a
column, the lead person probing ahead with a fathoming stick. If the water is flowing rapidly,
a safety rope should be secured on both banks to prevent falling and being carried
downstream.
11.12.2 Swimming. If a stream is too deep to ford, swim across it. A UDT life vest makes
this a fairly easy task. Put the vest on, inflate the vest until adequate buoyancy is achieved and
breast stroke across. Clear any weapons immediately upon reaching the opposite bank. If the
possibility of crossing streams/rivers exists, the UDT vest should be taken on the operation.
Without a UDT vest, river crossing can become extremely hazardous. Never attempt to ford a
stream directly above, or close to, a deep or rapid waterfall or a deep channel. The stream
should be crossed where the opposite side is comprised of shallow banks or sandbars. Avoid
rocky places, since a fall may cause serious injury. However, an occasional rock which breaks
the current may be of some assistance. The depth of the water is not necessarily a deterrent.
Deep water may run more slowly and be safer than shallow water.
11.12.3 Rope Bridges. Rope bridges provide temporary means for crossing rivers where the
span is not great (less than 20 meters) and where there would be savings in time over other
methods. The technique for installing rope bridges is covered in Army FM 31-72, Maintain
Operations.
11.12.4 Inflatable Raft. If numerous rivers will have to be crossed, a one-person raft may be
a practical method of getting gear and personnel across. The gear is placed in the raft and the
personnel swim along side holding on to the raft. This method becomes especially valuable
when moving injured personnel or survivors who cannot swim.
11.12.5 Improvised Rafts. Rafts can be constructed from natural material in the area or from
ponchos or other gear carried. Care in construction is necessary to avoid having the raft come
apart during the crossing of the river. The Poncho (donut) raft can be used for transporting

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equipment but is not a good vehicle for people. The raft is constructed by using saplings or
pliable willows shaped in the from of a donut and covered with a waterproof cover.
11.12.6 Vegetation Raft. The vegetation raft is built of small vegetation which will float
and is placed within clothing or parachute to form a raft for a survivor and/or
equipment. Plants such as water hyacinth or cattail may be used. A good floating device
can be fabricated by using two balsa logs or other lightweight wood. The logs should be
placed about 2 feet apart and tied together. The operator sits on the lines and travels
with the current.
11.12.7 Boats. Individuals may have an occasion to use an opportune boat found on the
bank of the river that requires crossing. When this method is used, always consider that
someone is going to look for the boat and report it to the authorities. After using the boat, do
not pull it up on the opposite bank and leave. It will give away a critical position. After
crossing the river, get out of the boat where the water is about knee deep, and push it into the
current. Let it drift away.
11.13 Navigation.
11.13.1 Purpose. An operator and/or team on the ground must be thoroughly familiar with
all day/night navigation procedures, maps of the mission area, and navigation instruments
such as the lensatic/saliva compass and GPS receivers. This knowledge can be used
effectively to locate IPs and travel to their location, to pin-point positions for evacuation, for
route selection, or to select air evacuation sites. Most techniques and procedures for
navigation will be found in Army FM 21-26, Map Reading and Navigation.
11.13.2 Maps. Many types of maps exist and careful consideration should be given to
selecting the appropriate map for the mission. The most common and useful map for ground
navigation is a 1:50,000 scale map. Additionally, satellite imagery can be overlaid with
desired grid for critical areas in the mission. Regardless of the type of map used, given special
attention to ensure the map datum is known and loaded into GPS systems being used. Ensure
map datum and a declination diagram is attached to the map for quick reference. All operators
should be familiar with the map legend and symbols which may be critical to mission success.
Prior to use, the date of the map should be checked and considered during mission planning
and execution
11.13.3 Watches. Digital compass/altimeter watch would include watches such as the
Pathfinder and Suunto. Before leaving on a mission, confirm that the altimeter is set to a
known elevation and confirm that the digital compass is calibrated. Using the compass portion
of these watches will rapidly drain battery life. Consider only using these during emergency
situation when no other compass is available
11.13.4 Lensatic Compass. The lensatic compass is the standard issue military compass
and should be included in mission essential equipment. Used for orienting maps,
determining distance and direction, traveling, shooting azimuths and triangulation.
Ensure the luminous parts of the compass are functioning and the dial is free floating
prior to use.
NOTE: Lensatic compasses come in two types, southern and northern hemisphere. Although they
will work in both hemispheres, they will not be accurate outside their hemisphere.

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11.13.5 Silva Compass. The Silva compass is used in a similar fashion to the lensatic
compass. The Silva compass has a unique feature that precludes the user from having to orient
the map to North on the ground. However, once the distance and direction are established, use
of the lensatic for actual navigation should be considered. Instructions for use are provided by
the manufacturer. The numerical graduations on the compass dial may not be tritium based as
in the lensatic compass. There are luminous points on the compass which allow a heading to
be followed after being set. A local modification may be made in which a luminous dot is
made on the direction of travel line directly next to the compass housing. This will allow a
better alignment between the 0-degree mark and the line of travel arrow to dial in a heading
under total darkness.
11.13.6 Wrist Compass. Various small wrist compasses are available which attach to a
watch band. Although these are very useful in maintaining general direction and situational
awareness, they should not be used for precise point-to-point navigation. As with other
navigation aids, this compass should be checked before missions against other navigation aids
for accuracy.
11.13.7 Altimeter Used as a Compass Aid. The barometric altimeter is useful for weather
forecasting and as a navigation aid. The altimeter is used as a navigational aid to determine
elevation above sea level. For navigational purposes, the altimeter is always used in
conjunction with the map and compass.
11.13.7.1 Setting the Altimeter. The user must know present altitude to calibrate the
altimeter to local barometric pressure conditions. This is done by rotating the outer ring of
the altimeter until the altimeter needle reading corresponds to the known elevation. To
maintain the accuracy of the altimeter, periodic checks and the necessary adjustment must
be made from a known altitude at known locations. When the weather conditions have
changed, the altimeter will also have changed. Reset the altimeter from known locations
with quickly changing weather and always at the start of each days activity. Without the
periodic adjustment of the altimeter, the accuracy will be unreliable and result in faulty
readings that could be potentially dangerous. A fall or rise in barometric pressure of 0.10
millimeters of mercury will place the setting 100 feet low or high.
11.13.7.2 Field Applications. The most common and frequent use of the altimeter is to
maintain a given elevation or confirming a location with comparison to map and compass
navigational calculations.
11.13.7.3 Maintaining Elevation. The most basic use of the altimeter is to maintain a
given height while traversing a mountain. Continued travel up and down hill is, for the
most part, unnecessarily tiring for a team enroute to a victim. Maintaining a constant
elevation, as much as the topography of the terrain will prevents the expenditure of energy
that may be required once on scene or during the evacuation of a victim.
11.13.7.4 Confirming Location. In conjunction with the map and compass, the altimeter
may be used to confirm the present position of the user. This is particularly important in
adverse weather conditions such as a snow storm, fog, or low clouds which may prevent
the usual comparison between a suspected position and the surrounding terrain. A team
may believe their location to be on a summit (e.g., when in reality the true location is on a
false summit). If the weather was clear, higher ground could be easily seen. In limited

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visibility, a comparison may be made of the height given on the map for the summit and
the altimeter reading. This comparison will confirm you have not reached the summit and
aid in determining exact position. The altimeter can be compared with a like contour
reference on the map to determine the exact location. A more serious use of the altimeter
is to assist in position location when descending a ridge line with many connecting ridges
at various heights. If a change of direction is indicated which requires leaving the
presently traveled ridgeline for another ridge, accomplish the following procedures.
Determine the altitude of the connecting ridge to be traveled from contour lines on
the map.
Proceed on a compass bearing to the ridge.
Stop when on the ridge line and compare the altimeter with the contour line
elevation on the map.
Check the surrounding contour to compare the rise and fall of the terrain with the
map contours as a back up check.
11.13.8 Pace Count. Along with the compass, maintaining an accurate pace count is vital
for accurate navigation. Operators should determine their pace count prior to each mission
with the gear they will be carrying on a measured 100-meter distance. All team members
should review effects of terrain on pace count as outlined in Army FM 21-26, Map Reading
and Navigation.
11.13.9 Six-Point Navigation Checklist. A six-point checklist should be made, during
mission planning, for each ground navigation leg based on a detailed map study. The checklist
consist of the:
Heading in degrees to the next point
Distance to be traveled in meters.
Pace count for the entire navigation leg.
Terrain description of the terrain to be covered.
Estimated time of travel to the next point.
Point description of what the final point should look like.
11.13.10 Checklist. By completing the checklist and referring back to it during navigation,
the team can ensure it is staying on course and is able to determine its position at all times. It
is critical to use the checklist regardless of GPS availability. This is long-used and proven,
procedure is effective; it can not be over emphasized.
11.13.11 Global Positions System. GPS is a battery-powered, man-portable system, that
uses satellites to determine present location/position. If the operator is not in an area visible to
the sky (e.g., multiple canopy tree cover, drainages or urban areas) signal strength/accuracy
can be reduced. Operators should be intimately familiar with their individual GPS and the
effects of weather and terrain on signal strength.
11.13.12 Waypoints. Waypoints are spots loaded in the GPS unit that can be referenced by
the user once a GPS fix is acquired. These waypoints can be loaded via serial port prior to a

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mission (such as SARDOT or rally points) or once on the ground using the Mark button.
Waypoints can also be manipulated and loaded without actually being in the location.
11.13.13 GPS Properties. GPS is extremely accurate and highly portable. All operators
will be trained to load/maintain/use the GPS. Training will be documented in members
OJT record. GPS should be used to reconfirm your suspected location. Battery life is
limited in GPS units and they are affected by cold and prolonged use. Once a distance
and direction is established, use the Silva or lensatic compass for traveling.
NOTE: GPSs are mechanical systems and may break. Although highly beneficial for determining
your exact location, you should be proficient in land navigation using map and compass and
terrain following procedures.
11.13.14 Transmitting Coordinates. Many inaccuracies may exist when comparing an
actual site location with its identified map location. These inaccuracies come from reading
and plotting errors, datum transformation errors, symbol displacement errors, and incorrect
specifications. These errors can be compounded if datums are mixed when reporting
positional information. When passing or transmitting coordinates it is important the complete
source of the coordinates be given. In order to avoid confusion, the source will include the
map or chart producer, series, sheet number, edition, date and datum. Inaccuracies may exist
between actual and plotted position. These inaccuracies are caused by errors in reading and
plotting, using incorrect map datum, and GPS inaccuracies as well as other factors. Most
inaccuracies can be prevented by ensuring proper map datum and using approved navigation
and coordinate plotting and reading procedures. When passing coordinates ensure complete
coordinates are passed as well as the map datum to avoid confusion
11.14 Navigation. Navigation is a highly perishable skill that takes considerable practice to
obtain the required proficiency level. Various different terrain and climatic conditions will effect
the ability of a team to successfully navigate to desired points with accuracy.
11.14.1 Desert Environment Considerations. Navigating in flat, featureless desert can be
difficult at best because there are no easily identifiable features. Mirages can create
disorienting images on the horizon. Additionally distances are hard to judge. As a
general rule, multiply distance estimates times three. Occasional sand storms can cause
brownout conditions which are completely disorienting if you continue traveling.
Ensure GPS is available in this environment. Maintain an accurate pace count and plot
the route carefully. If needed, send personnel ahead and direct them onto the desired
course using the compass.
11.14.2 Jungle Environment Navigation.
11.14.2.1 Navigation in thick jungle areas is difficult even for the most experienced
navigators. Operators navigating in the jungle must use various aids. The compass is an
obvious aid, but an individual would never be able to move very fast in the jungle if
constantly moving along a magnetic azimuth. Movement along a terrain feature, such as a
ridgeline, is easier but can be extremely dangerous when establishing a pattern of
consistency. A soldier must trust the compass, map, and pace count. A soldier should not
keep his eyes riveted on the compass; however, it should be used as a check.

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11.14.2.2 The shadows caused by the sun are an easily observed and accurate aid to
direction. Make allowances for the gradual displacement of the shadows as the sun moves
across the sky.
11.14.2.3 Other aids to maintaining direction include prominent objects, the course of
rivers, prevailing winds, the stars, and the moon.
11.14.2.4 Maps are used with caution. When selecting routes, old maps are often
inaccurate. However, native trails normally follow the line of least resistance between two
points, and if a trail is indicated on a map, there is a good probability that it exists or there
is another trail close by. Roads and trails should be avoided. Although they are easy to
move on, they offer little concealment. These are the areas most likely to be under enemy
observation. They are easy to ambush and are very likely to be mined or booby trapped.
Team reconnaissance is the best source of information in selecting routes. All are
instructed to note, sketch, and report all variations from existing maps. Before conducting
a move in the jungle, leaders should make a map and aerial photograph reconnaissance.
This reconnaissance will indicate possible danger areas, obstacles, and roads or clearings
suitable for resupply. Danger areas, such as streambeds and draws, are usually more
thickly vegetated. They offer excellent concealment, but travel along them is slow and
difficult. Aerial reconnaissance can provide some assistance in route selection. Aerial
photographs supplement maps and reconnaissance and are invaluable. In addition,
helicopter aerial observation may be used to advantage in route reconnaissance. Trails
generally exist between native villages, even when none appear on maps. Natives usually
blaze or mark such trails, and operators should be taught to recognize such signs unique to
that AO. Existing trails and streams are used when the direction of movement and the
situation allow it. Streams may be used as trails if they are not too deep or swift. When
rafts or small boats are available, a deep stream is one of the fastest and most dependable
means of jungle travel. When teams move through close, hilly country, individuals should
avoid small saplings. The shaking of overhead branches can be seen and heard at a
distance. When moving through tree cultivations, team members must keep off trails, if
only by walking a few feet off these trails.
11.14.3 Cold Weather Environment Navigation.
11.14.3.1 Map Reading. Map reading and navigation in snow-covered terrain follows the
same principles as in temperate climates. In cold weather operations, however, navigation
and route selection are complicated by snow-covered terrain, which makes terrain look
different and hinders orientation. Weather conditions can reduce visibility. Use of
over-the-snow mobility devices such as snowshoes or skis with equipment loads (e.g.,
sleds) may determine route. Avalanche potential constantly dictates the route. A
snow-covered environment provides many challenges to navigation and route selection.
Deep snow will completely cover tracks, trails, streams, and roads limiting the
effectiveness of the map. Snowdrifts may hide small depressions and draws indicated on
maps. They may even give the impression of small hills. Lakes, ponds, marshes, and
rivers are often covered with snow and ice, which make detection difficult. They may or
may not be suitable to cross. In northern latitudes, increased periods of darkness during
winter months will require more night operations. Aerial photos taken during winter are
difficult to read because of the monotony of detail, absence of relief, lack of contrast, and

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in more isolated areas, the absence of man-made works for reference points. Handling
maps, compasses, and other navigational equipment with cold weather clothing can be
difficult. The standard military, lensatic compass functions well in the cold. If using a
liquid-filled compass, keep it warm, or it will become sluggish. GPSs are an invaluable
tool when operating wide open snow-covered terrain.
11.14.3.2 Difficulty of Navigation. Difficulty of navigation in northern latitudes is
caused by magnetic disturbance. The sameness of subarctic forests and snow-covered
tundra add to the difficulties. Roads and railroads are almost nonexistent. Frozen lakes
and waterways offer a good substitute road system. Snow is easily plowed on ice. Roads
thus made may be used to reach forward operating locations. Frozen waterways also
provide natural airstrips and helicopter pads.
11.14.3.3 Determining Pace Count. Determining pace count in snow-covered terrain is
difficult on snowshoes and impossible if movement is on skis. This is because
snow-covered terrain will almost always dictate the route by long traverses and numerous
kick-backs. Additionally, travel with sleds will require many turns through forested areas.
GPSs will be a much more accurate method for determining the actual distance traveled.
11.14.3.4 Lack of Maps. Maps are frequently nonexistent or very unreliable.
Snow-covered terrain may also alter the appearance of useful landmarks when attempting
to use maps for navigation. This makes operational planning difficult and places special
emphasis on reconnaissance and navigation. The importance of aerial photos is increased.
11.14.3.5 Route Selection and Planning Considerations. After all the route planning
considerations are evaluated carefully, the route is planned and recorded on a map overlay
or route card. The time-distance-factor (TDF) is a guideline and should not be considered
as the exact amount of time required for the movement. Furthermore, this formula is for
use in ideal conditions:
Standard rate: 3 kilometers per hour.
Add 1 hour for every 300 meters ascent.
Add 1 hour for every 800 meters descent.

11.14.4 Urban Environment.


11.14.4.1 Maps. When requesting maps of a city, consider all options ranging from joint
operations graphics (JOG) to tourist maps. While street maps and tourist maps do not
normally show terrain, they provide a wealth of information on current street and bridge
locations. Tourist maps also show significant buildings and details of culturally
significant areas and structures. Any maps with a scale smaller than 1:50,000 (i.e.,
1:250,000 or 1:500,000) are of little to no value for city navigation because of the lack of
detail provided. Units that regularly conduct operations in urban terrain recommend using
a 1:24,000 map (7.5-minute quadrangle). Using these large-scale maps (i.e., 1:50,000 or
1:24,000) requires familiarity with the use of Military Grid Referencing System (MGRS)
and universal transverse mercator (UTM). Planners must check what reference system the
map was prepared with (e.g., WGS-84, NAD 1927, and Tokyo Special). NEO Naval
Intelligence Support Handbooks (NEONISH) are available for every American Embassy.

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NEONISHs are classified SECRET and contain a wealth of information about conducting
an NEO or special missions, to include identifying pre-surveyed LZs.
11.14.4.2 Overhead Imagery. Current overhead imagery is also an excellent supplement
to military city maps and can also be substituted for a map. A topographic map or military
city map could be obsolete if compiled many years ago. A recent photograph shows
changes that have taken place since the map was made. More information can be gained
by using overhead imagery and maps together than using either separately.
11.14.4.3 Navigation in Built-Up Areas. Built-up areas present a different set of
challenges with regard to navigation. Deep in the city core, the normal terrain features
depicted on maps may not apply. Buildings become the major terrain features and units
become tied to streets. Fighting in the city destroys buildings whose rubble then blocks the
streets. Street and road signs are destroyed during the fighting if the defenders do not
remove them. Operations in subways and sewers present other unique challenges.
However, maps and photographs are available to help the team overcome these problems.
The global positioning system can enhance navigation accuracy in built-up areas.
11.14.4.4 GPS. Most GPS use satellite triangulation to calculate their position.
Preliminary tests have shown that small built-up areas, such as villages do not affect GPS
signals. However, large built-up areas with a mixture of tall and short buildings cause
some degradation of most GPS. This effect may increase as the system is moved into an
interior of a large building or taken into subterranean areas. Use these systems on the tops
of buildings, in open areas, and down streets where obstacles will not affect line of sight
(LOS) readings.
11.14.4.5 Reference Points. Once in the built-up area, use street intersections as reference
points. City maps supplement or replace topographic maps as the basis of navigation.
These maps enable teams moving in the area to know where they are, and to move to new
locations even though streets have been blocked or a key building destroyed.
11.14.4.6 Map and Compass. Techniques of compass use and pace count can still be
used, especially in a blacked-out city where street signs and buildings are not visible. The
presence of steel and iron in an urban environment may cause inaccurate compass
readings. Subterranean areas must be navigated much the same way. City sewer
departments maintain maps providing the basic layout of the sewer system. This
information includes direction the lines run and distances between manhole covers. Along
with basic compass and pace count techniques, such information enables a team to move
underground.
11.14.5 Mountain Environment.
11.14.5.1 Navigation Techniques. The techniques of navigation are the same for more
moderate terrain, although some additional considerations may be applied.
11.14.5.2 The altimeter is very useful for navigating in mountainous terrain and can be
used as a second azimuth to obtain a resection from a map. With known elevation, an
operator can trace the back-azimuth according to the map contour line as indicated with
the altimeter.

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11.14.5.3 Pace Count. This can be extremely difficult to maintain in the mountains, as
the rapid rise and fall of terrain will adversely affect a regular stride. Often, despite best
efforts, the pace count will be inaccurate because of frequent traversing (zig-zagging) that
occurs going up and down hills. Additionally, the actual map distance covered is much
less than the ground distance covered because of the significant angle of slope. This must
be closely considered when planning navigation routes. The contour intervals should be
counted and multiplied by their value in order to determine actual ground distance
covered.
11.14.5.4 Route Selection. Before any movement, the following considerations should
be used to determine a teams route:
11.14.5.4.1 Determine the Teams Ability. What type of terrain can the weakest
climber handle? Will the team carry heavy packs? Are vehicles attached? What type of
terrain can be handled? Is the team organized, equipped, and capable of crossing
foreseeable obstacles (e.g., cliffs, gorges, and streams)?
11.14.5.4.2 Analyze the Terrain. Is the route feasible with limited visibility? Does
the route cross potential avalanche slopes as indicated by map reconnaissance and
aerial photograph, if available? Does the route offer concealment from direct enemy
observation? What obstacles can be anticipated? How will slopes covered with scree,
talus, or thick brush impact movement?
11.14.5.4.3 Analyze the Predicted Weather. What allowance is made for weather?
Are designated bivouac sites identified if weather turns bad?
11.14.5.4.4 Analyze the Tactical Situation/Mission. How can tracks be
camouflaged? Where can speed be accomplished without undermining total security.

11.15 Combatives.
11.15.1 Purpose. The purpose of this section is to provide an overview of various combative
disciplines. A comprehensive combatives program is critical for operators involved in the
mission today. Recovery team members may find themselves in close proximity with the
enemy and other non-belligerents where lethal force may not be needed or stealth is required.
The information contained in this attachment is not all-inclusive and may be adapted to fit the
situation.
11.15.2 General. GUARDIAN ANGEL personnel may be trained in several different
fighting disciplines. Combatives training covers three basic dimensions of fighting: ground
fighting, standing grappling, and up fighting.
11.15.2.1 Ground Fighting. The warfighter is engaged in hand-to-hand combat with the
enemy while on the ground. Examples of this fighting discipline are submission grappling
and brazilian jiu-jitsu.
11.15.2.2 Standing Grappling. The warfighter is engaged in hand-to-hand combat while
standing in such close proximity that punching and kicking are ineffective. Examples of
this fighting discipline are Greco-Roman wrestling and Judo.

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11.15.2.3 Up Fighting. The warfighter is engaged in hand-to-hand combat with enough


distance where punching and kicking are extremely effective. Examples of this fighting
discipline are Muay-Thai kick boxing and Israeli Krav-Maga.

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CHAPTER 12
REINTEGRATION OPERATIONS

12.1 General. Reintegration is a critical task that allows the Department of Defense to gather
necessary intelligence and SERE information while coordinating multiple activities and protecting
the health and well-being of returned isolated personnel. Combat rescue officers (CRO), SERE
specialists, intelligence debriefers, SERE psychologists, and others who assist the recovered
isolated personnel to decompress and reintegrate to their unit, family and society are key to
accomplishing this task.
12.1.1 Reintegration Preparation. Planning for the reintegration process begins prior to
deployment and continues once in country.
12.1.1.1 Pre-Deployment Preparation. Personnel recovery team members should have
an in depth knowledge on general guidance, their roles, and specialized taskings as part of
the reintegration process (e.g., transfer of custody, team chief, and SERE debriefer).
Whenever possible, PR exercises and training should incorporate a reintegration tasker.
PR teams should have a reintegration kit as part of their team equipment (See Table 12.1
and Table 12.2, Reintegration Kit.)
12.1.1.2 In-Country Preparation. Once in theatre, team chiefs will need to ensure that
all members of the reintegration team are available, trained, and knowledgeable on their
roles and tasks involved with the returnees. Coordination and contact procedures for all
team members needs to be available. Training may need to be provided for all critical and
non-critical support personnel involved in the reintegration process. (See Table 12.3,
Phase 1 Reintegration Team Contacts). Additionally, all individuals assigned to the team
must ensure that they provide AOR departure information to the team chief to help ensure
their replacements are available and the contact sheet may be updated.
12.1.2 Planning Considerations. Reintegration is both a service and joint operational
mission. Reintegration is a component responsibility and will be conducted under
supported/supporting relationships for the joint force commander.
12.1.2.1 Whenever possible, reintegration consists of three mutually exclusive phases:
initial reception (Phase I), transition point (Phase II), CONUS evacuation/reintegration
(Phase III).
12.1.2.2 Prior to developing or implementing PR plans, consider general reintegration
guidance. The majority of captive or missing personnel will be returned to US military
control in an OCONUS area as part of a negotiated settlement. During an armed conflict,
some personnel may be returned to US control before a negotiated settlement or
termination of hostilities. This would generally be a result of early release or reintegration
for medical reasons, as a result of prisoner exchange, or return of retained medical or
religious personnel whose services are no longer needed to care for other prisoners.

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Table 12.1 Reintegration Kit (1 of 2).


Reintegration Kit
References Located With Kit:
Procedures for Conducting the Reintegration of Recovered Personnel in the Combatant
Command (date)
Repatriation Checklist: CRO/SERE (Attachment 3)
Repatriation Checklist: Intelligence Debriefer (Attachment 3)
Repatriation Checklist: Public Affairs (Attachment 3)
Repatriation Checklist: Legal (Attachment 3)
DoD Instruction 2310.4, Repatriation of Prisoner of War (POW), Hostages, Government
Detainees and Missing or Isolated Personnel
Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) Fact Sheet: Repatriation
JPRA Handling Guidance for Recovered, Returned, and Repatriated US Personnel
JPRA Repatriation Handout: Decompression/Debriefing Guidance
Intelligence Debrief Guide
Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office: Family Information Guide
DD Form 2810, November 1999 Promise of Confidentiality
Joint Personnel Recovery Agency Debriefing Guide
Debriefing Guide for Personnel Recovery Operations
AOR Instruction/Guidance for Reintegration
Repatriation Equipment Requirements
Digital Visual
1. Digital camcorder
2. Tripod/backpack kit
3. Digital still camera with memory cards
4. Camcorder tapes
5. Spare battery

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Table 12.2 Reintegration Kit (2 of 2).


Transcriber and Handheld Recorder
1 Dictation/transcription system
2. Portable cassette dictating machine
3. Standard AA batteries-minimum of 12-pack
4. 90-minute micro cassettes10-pack
5. High fidelity 90-minute audio cassettes
Laptop
1. Classified laptop
2. Power adapter
3. Pocket hard drives (two classified/unclassified)
4. Extra battery
5. Mouse
6. Carry case
Miscellaneous
1. Pelican case
2. Business traveler converter (international/power)
3. Surge protector power strip
4. Office supplies (e.g., pens, pencils, and sticky pads)
5. Extension cord
6. Steno and legal notepads
7. Memory sticks (classified/unclassified)

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table 12.3 Phase 1 Reintegration Team Contacts (1 of 2).


Team Composition:
1. OIC/NCOIC: Responsible for all activities associated with tactical reintegration effort.
Conducts initial returnee debriefing. Coordinates efforts of reintegration team. Interfaces with
JPRC and JPRA as required. Deployed location combat rescue officers will fill this role on a
rotational basis. Provide names and phone numbers to returnees.
2. Medical officer: Provides for immediate physical and mental health care needs of returnee.
No other reintegration activities will occur until the medical condition and requirement of the
returnee have been determined. Provide names and phone numbers to returnees.
3. Intel: Conducts initial tactical intelligence debriefing. Disseminates collected intel data to
military services. If returnees base of origin is at location, this debriefing should be conducted
by a member of the returnees own intel section. If not, CSAR intel will conduct the debriefing.
Provide names and phone numbers to returnees.
4. SERE: Conducts initial SERE debriefing. This individual is normally provided by JPRA but
may initially be performed by base SERE personnel because of manpower limitations. Provide
names and phone numbers to returnees.
5. SERE psychologist: Mental health provider will evaluate returnee and consult with specially
trained SERE psychologist at location. Provide names and phone numbers to returnees.
6. Public affairs: Provides PA guidance to the reintegration team and controls access and
provides information to external media. Remains with the returnee throughout the reintegration
process if possible. Provide names and phone numbers to returnees.
7. Chaplain: Present at initial reception point and remains an integral part of the reintegration
process. Provide names and phone numbers to returnees.
8. Legal (JAG): Coordinates legal advise to the reintegration team/returnee as required.
Provide names and phone numbers to returnees.
9. Unit or service representative: Peer member of returnees unit with some degree of
familiarity with the returnee. Should remain with the returnee at least until returnee enters Phase
II. Provides moral support only and is not assigned any additional duties. Serves as the direct
liaison between returnees and unit commander. Provide names and phone numbers to returnees.
10. Force protection security detail: Establishes crowd control at helipad or C-130 patient off
load point. Establishes crowd control at EMEDS facility. Provides escort for ambulance during
patient transfer from aircraft to EMEDS. Provide names and phone numbers to returnees.

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Table 12.4 Phase 1 Reintegration Team Contacts (2 of 2)


Nominal Sequence of Events:
1. Reintegration Team Chief notifies team of incoming returnee.
2. Security Forces will establish crowd control at both the EMEDS and the helicopter landing
zone or C-130 parking prior to aircraft arrival. The detail will escort the ambulance as it
transports the returnee from the aircraft to the EMEDS facility.
3. The repatriation OIC will report to landing area and follow the transfer of returnee to EMEDS.
4. PAO, chaplain, and a representative from returnees unit, if available, will report to but remain
outside EMEDS.
5. Returnee is delivered to EMEDS via ambulance and admitted.
6. Medical evaluation (physical and mental) and treatment will have first priority. When the
medical officer deems appropriate and the Reintegration TC, chaplain, and unit representative
will be granted access to the returnee.
7. The TC will conduct initial debrief followed by Intel, and the SERE.
8. The TC will coordinate with the medical officer, unit commander, JPRC, JPRA (as required)
to determine whether the returnee will return to duty or proceed to Phase II Reintegration.
OVERALL NOTES:
* IAW DoD Instruction 2310.4, Repatriation of Prisoners of War, Peacetime Government
Detainees, and Other Missing or Isolated Personnel and CENTCOM Regulation 535-10
Procedures for Conducting and Repatriation of Recovered Personnel individuals returned to US
control thorough CSAR operations will enter the reintegration process. The deployed location
has been designated by the JPRC as a Phase I reintegration facility and will stand up an
appropriate reintegration team.
** This is a general template to use when establishing a Phase I reintegration location. All
italicized and underlined words should be changed to match the appropriate
information/situation.
12.1.2.3 It is US policy that uniformed military members may not accept release upon
parole from a detaining power. Some personnel may be returned to US control through
other countries, repatriated to CONUS by groups not officially representing the US
Government, escape during captivity, or recovered by combat recovery forces.
12.1.2.4 Returned personnel require varying degrees of medical attention and reassurance
of their personal welfare. The physiological and psychological condition of most returned
personnel should permit their expeditious aeromedical evacuation to CONUS if required.
However, immediate aeromedical evacuation to CONUS may not be necessary or helpful.
12.1.2.5 Returned personnel may possess significant information concerning the
disposition and status of POWs, hostages, peacetime governmental detainees, other
unreleased personnel, IPs, and/or personnel identified as missing in action. Information
should be collected and disseminated as soon as feasibly possible.

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12.1.2.6 Develop an integral plan based upon reintegration phase that will be
accomplished in the AOR. Phase I will require the greatest coordination by the CRO and
SERE specialist at the deployed location. Knowledge of the Phases II and III location and
capabilities is key for a smooth transition between phases.

12.1.3 General Debriefing Guidance. The debriefs are designed to obtain specific
information regarding the experience of recovered isolated personnel. SERE and intelligence
debriefs may run separately or concurrently as dictated by mission circumstances, but must be
coordinated with one another. The SERE debrief must be allowed to follow accepted
protocols as established by the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) to produce verbal
and visual recordings that are essential to the JPRA SERE analysis and development of
lessons learned. If any debriefer determines, suspects, or has prior knowledge that the
recovered isolated personnel have experienced an encounter with NAR, the debriefing will
stop until JPRA provides a qualified NAR debriefer who can properly debrief the recovered
isolated personnel to protect sensitive information. The trained debriefer will also stop the
debriefing process if it becomes apparent that information reviewed may indicate possible
violations of the UCMJ. The debrief will then follow the reintegration team SOP or consult
with a judge advocate.
12.1.3.1 Decompression Protocols. An inherent and critical part of the reintegration
process is the decompression protocols. The long-term successful reintegration of
recovered isolated personnel into military and social/civil environments is directly affected
by proper decompression. Protocols have been established to maximize the benefit of
decompression and, at the very least under normal conditions, require a minimum of 72
hours to be effective. Deviating from established protocols can have a severe impact and,
under certain circumstances, create permanent psychological trauma to the recovered
isolated personnel. From past detention incidents, this trauma has manifested itself in
recovered isolated personnel separating themselves from military service, having
dysfunctional family relationships, and, in severe cases, committing suicide. Some of the
decompression protocols include: normalizing physical and emotional reactions to their
isolation experience; providing an opportunity to predict and control their environment;
allowing them to repeatedly tell their story in a positive manner; allowing a group of
recovered isolated personnel from the same event to have time together to rehash their
experience in a positive manner; allowing individual down time to come to grips with the
whole event; assisting them in developing an action plan for dealing with the media,
integrating into family, returning to duty, etc.; offering and providing follow-up care after
the formal reintegration process is over.
12.1.3.2 Debriefing Location. To the greatest extent possible, when more than one
person is returned, all returnees should be moved to the same OCONUS and CONUS
debriefing locations to facilitate their psychological adjustment. Historical reintegration
experiences consistently indicate that the returnees benefit greatly from the opportunity to
achieve closure with one another, thus improving their ability to eventually move beyond
the captivity experience and continue with their lives.
12.1.3.3 Confidentiality. The returnee debriefings shall be obtained under an expressed
written promise of confidentiality. Debriefings shall be treated as privileged information
under the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 1506(d)(1). The debriefs are the property of DoD and

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12-7

shall not be released to the public. Immediately after the medical screening, the returnee
should be presented with a Promise of Confidentiality document found in DD Form
2810, Promise of Confidentiality, to inform the returnee that debriefings will remain
confidential to the extent authorized by law. (See Table A2.9, DD Form 2810Promise
of Confidentiality.)
12.1.4 Combat Rescue Officer/SERE Specialist Responsibilities. Combat rescue officer
(CRO) and SERE specialists are assigned to theater or component commands. They ensure
coordination with the JPRC/PRCC occurs in all matters relating to the reintegration process.
The JPRC/component PRCC should be staffed with CROs and SERE specialists. These
individuals will serve in the JPRC/PRCC in multiple capacities (director, assistant director,
search and rescue duty officer [SARDO], search and rescue liaison officer [SARLO], and
watch supervisor.) SERE specialists are subject matter experts in the reintegration process;
responsible for the SERE debriefs. The SERE specialist will be consulted and deferred too
during both the reintegration planning and execution phases.
12.1.4.1 CRO/SERE specialists within the JPRC/PRCC architecture will coordinate
personnel recovery operations within the theater and component area of operations (AOR).
This includes all operational aspects of theater and component level reintegration. (See
Table A2.1 and Table A2.2, JPRC/PRCC Reintegration Checklist.)
12.1.4.2 When specifically directedJPRC, ICW JPRA will ensure information
pertinent to reintegration activities involving nonconventional assisted recovery (NAR)
operations is collected and disseminated as required. The focal point for NAR is generally
the unconventional assisted recovery coordination center (UARCC).
12.1.4.3 Whenever possible, the CRO will be assigned as the reintegration team chief.
The reintegration team chief will designate, task organize, and direct reintegration team
responsibilities. (See Table 12.5 and Table 12.6, Reintegration Team Tasks Organization,
and Responsibilities.) If a CRO is unavailable, a SERE specialist can function as
reintegration team chief.
12.1.4.4 The reintegration team chief will maintain a file on each recovery action, IP, and
person declared missing in action until the incident is declared closed and a duplicate file
is transferred to the JPRC/JPRA. This file will provide the identity, status, probable
location, and personal authentication date of the personnel who become isolated or who
are declared missing in action. The file has conventionally been numbered by the JPRC
assigned mission number, year group followed by the sequential numbering of PR events
that year. Example products to include in this file are the search and rescue incident report
(SARIR), search and rescue situational report (SARSIT), and search and rescue request
(SARREQ) found in Chapter 3 of the Joint Publication 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat
Search and Rescue. The mission folder should also contain electronic and hard copy
coordination relating to the mission (MIRC, facsimile, and news reports). Ensure that hard
copy documentation regarding duty status of the IPs is provided from the component prior
to closing out a mission folder. Message traffic from the joint- or service-level personnel
offices reporting the status of personnel as MIA/KIA, duty status whereabouts unknown
(DUSTWUN), or returned to military control (RTMC) should be saved for historical

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documentation in the mission folder. This is a lesson learned from the Captain Scott
Speicher incident during the Gulf War.

Table 12.5 Reintegration Team Task Organization and Responsibilities (1 of 2).


1. The following are essential reintegration team members to conduct initial reception point and
Phase I reintegration duties. Organizational responsibilities are specified below. JPRA may
provide several critical individuals to support the reintegration of personnel.
a. Team Chief: Responsible for all activities associated with the components tactical
reintegration effort. The team chief must have PR-specific expertise while not be focused on
specific responsibilities of medical, legal, security, and so forth. Ideally, they are assigned to the
components JPRC/PRCC.
b. Medical Treatment Specialists: Represents both physical and mental health disciplines.
Medical treatment specialists are coordinated to be in-place at the initial reception point to
conduct an assessment of the returnees physical and mental health and to provide treatment as
necessary. No other reintegration activities will occur until the senior medical provider
determines the condition/requirements of returnee.
c. Intelligence Debriefer (See Table A2.13 and Table A2.14, JPRC INTEL Checklist):
Responsible for the initial tactical intelligence debriefing. Ideally, they are assigned to the
components JPRC/PRCC.
d. SERE Debriefer (SERE Specialist): SERE specialist is responsible for the survival,
evasion, resistance, escape aspects of debriefing. Coordination with the JPRC, if SERE
specialist is unavailable.
e. SERE Psychologist (or if unable Psych Medical Officer): Provides psychological
oversight during the reintegration process. They will not provide medical treatment. They will be
coordinated to remain with the returnee throughout the reintegration process.
f. Chaplain: Present at the initial reception point and remain an integral part of the
reintegration process as required. This allows personnel an alternate decompression modality.
g. Legal Aid/JAG (See Table A2.15 and Table A2.16, Reintegration Legal Counsel
Checklist): Coordinated by the command to provide legal advice to the reintegration team and
the returnee as required.
h. PAO (See TableTable A2.17 and Table A2.18, JPRC PAO Checklist): Coordinated by the
command to provide PA guidance to the reintegration team. They provide appropriate
information to the external media as required. If possible, this individual should remain with the
returnee throughout the reintegration process.
i. Force Protection and Security Detail: Coordinated by the component command to
provide facility and personal security for reintegration activities.

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Table 12.6 Reintegration Team Task Organization and REsponsibilities (2 of 2).


2. When possible, the following person should also be on hand at the Phase I reintegration. Due
to logistical constraints, these individuals or services may not be available until the returnees
move to Phase II, theater level, or in some cases Phase III, CONUS, facilities.
a. Key Service/Unit Member: Member of the returnees unit or organization and should have
some degree of familiarity with the returnee. This individual should be coordinated to meet the
returnee immediately at the initial reception point and should remain with the returnee at least
through transition point activities. This individual will provide moral support only and not be
assigned duties such as administrative or operational debriefing. This individual should also
serve as the direct liaison between the returnee and the parent unit commander
b. NAR Debriefer: Provided by JPRA to debrief specified returnees that have indicated or
suspect that they might have information pertaining to sensitive or covert NAR or evasion and
escape plans, procedures, programs, or equipment. NAR debriefer may not be present in theater;
however, reintegration activities should not be delayed waiting for their arrival. Coordination
with the JPRC.
c. Reintegration Service Representative: This individual will be coordinated by the JPRC
for support during theater reintegration activities. The individual is provided by the returnee's
service and will ensure seamless transition to CONUS-based reintegration if this level of the
process is required.
d. Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) Representative: Conducts a
follow-up debriefing of the returnee, preferably after returning to duty, or transfer to the theater
transition point. Coordination for this individual is made through the JPRC to the Theater J-2-X.
e. Finance Representative: Should be available should the returnee require pay, benefits, or
other financial support. Ideally, this individual should have the same service affiliation as the
returnee.
f. Administrative specialist: Should be available to support awards, records, and other
administrative processes during the reintegration process. Ideally, this individual should have the
same service affiliation as the returnee.
g. Marriage Counselor/Marriage Counseling: Professionals from the medical team or
chaplains office may provide this counseling function. In some cases, a service marriage
counselor may be available to support reintegration actions. Ideally, this individual should have
the same service affiliation as the returnee to facilitate long-term treatment.
12.1.4.5 Transfer of Custody. The recovery force should pass all pertinent information
on, and possessions taken from, the recovered personnel to the reintegration team.
Pertinent information includes authentication status, significant information passed by the
recovered isolated personnel, and physical status. There may be occasions when the
recovery force that made the initial contact with the recovered IP cannot, for operational
reasons, deliver the individual safely to friendly territory. In such cases, the recovered
isolated personnel may be handed over to another group or PR force to complete the
extraction from hostile territory. The recovered IP should be kept informed (as much as
necessary). At no time will isolated personnel be abandoned. The recovered IP will be

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under positive control at all times by either the delivering force or the receiving force,
according to prior arrangements made by the two forces. Cooperation, trust, and discipline
by all are essential for mission success.

12.1.5 Reintegration Phases. Whenever possible, the processing of an IP should be


conducted in a three-phased procedure. Phases I and II are conducted in the theater of
operations, under the responsibility of a designated component command. Phase III is the
responsibility of the returnees service and is conducted in CONUS. Though conducted by
phase, the critical tasks within each phase are not necessarily conducted sequentially. Latitude
and flexibility remain with the component command authority to conduct reintegration
procedures within the context of ongoing military operations, allowing for sequential,
concurrent, or if needed, delayed conduct of reintegration procedures. Coordination of
debriefings is the primary responsibility of the reintegration team chief. (See Table A2.7 and
Table A2.8, Debriefing Checklist for Reintegration Team Chief.)
12.1.5.1 Phase I, Return to Friendly Control/Initial Reception. The initial reception
point is a predetermined location where specific Phase I reintegration tasks are completed.
Locating the initial reception point at the same location where the recovery force plans to
return postmission decreases the backside mission support requirements. This is
particularly true for transportation coordination and exposure for returned personnel. (See
Table A2.3 through Table A2.6, Reintegration Team Chief Checklist, provides a
suggested checklist for techniques to ensure the intent of DoD, service, theater, and
component reintegration programs are successful. Continuous coordination with theater
and component-level authorities is essential to diffuse higher echelon involvement during
the prosecution of reintegration activities. Forwarding a well organized, informative
message such as the sample supplied in, Recovery Reintegration Report (See AFTTP
3-1.8, Chapter 16, Reintegration); will assure the theater and component command
authorities that the reintegration process is operating as detailed in the theater operations
plans (OPLANS).
12.1.5.1.1 Immediate Actions. Once the IP is returned to friendly control,
reintegration procedures are initiated by a coordinator (reintegration team chief),
designated by the component commander. Immediately upon receiving the returnee,
the responsible component command authority will ensure that the returnees are
transported to a designated processing center called the initial reception point.
NOTE: Personnel who were imprisoned together should not be separated during the reintegration
process.
12.1.5.1.2 The initial reception point should provide a secure facility to coordinate
and conduct critical tasks that lead to a command authority decision on the returnees
disposition and reintegration requirements. The objectives of initial reception are to
evaluate and care for the physical and psychological needs of the returnee, debrief for
operational and intelligence information of immediat e tactical value,
establish/maintain a public affairs umbrella over the returnee/reintegration activities,
and provide a medical recommendation to the command authority regarding status.
The return of personnel will generate a high degree of media attention, public interest,
and requests to visit the returnee. Access to the returnee will be coordinated by the

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reintegration team, JPRA, the returnees command authority, and when indicated, key
medical staff. Additionally, theater level coordination by the JPRC will develop
connectivity with reintegration CONUS-based representatives. Special staff,
functional staff, and mission area experts need to be present or available at the initial
reception point. (See Table A2.13 and Table A2.14, JPRC INTEL Checklist; Table
A2.15 and Table A2.16, JPRC Legal Counsel Checklist; and Table A2.17 and Table
A2.18, JPRC PAO Checklist; and also Table 12.4, Reintegration Team Task
Organization and Responsibilities.)
12.1.5.1.3 Return to Duty. When the returnees command authority decides to return
the individual to duty, the returnee will be transported back to their unit as the situation
permits. At the returnees unit, continued debriefings (intelligence, operations, and
SERE) can occur with proper coordination with the returnees chain of command. If
the decision is to delay returning the individual to the unit and continuing the
reintegration process, the returnee will be transported and escorted to the theater
transition point for continued medical care, decompression, or debriefing as required.
In either case, ensure that returned personnel are aware of the requirement to withhold
classified materiel pertaining to their event by completing the form found in Table
12.7, Nondisclosure Agreement.
Table 12.7 Nondisclosure Agreement.
1. I, ___________________________, understand that the information concerning covert or
sensitive evasion and recovery plans, procedures, organizations, programs, and equipment
belongs to the United States Government. I understand that disclosure of this information is
punishable under title 18, United States Code, Section 798 Disclosure of Classified Information, as amended.
2. I do solemnly swear/affirm that I will never divulge, publish, or reveal by word, conduct, or
by any other means such classified information or knowledge, except in the performance of my
official duties and as specifically authorized by the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA).
3. I understand that no change in my assignment or employment will relieve me of my obligation under this agreement and that the provisions of the agreement will remain binding upon me
even after termination of my service with the United States Government.
4. I take this obligation of my own free will, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
WITNESS_____________________
NAME________________________
SSN__________________________
RANK/GRADE________________
ORGANIZATION_______________

SIGNED __________________________
NAME ____________________________
SSN ______________________________
RANK/GRADE ____________________
ORGANIZATION ___________________

12.1.5.1.4 Reintegration Process. The reintegration team chief should also


coordinate with the JPRC to request the personnel processing file (PPF) from the

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respective military service or agency. This is found in Enclosure 2 of DoDI 2310.4,
Reintegration of Prisoners of War (POW), Hostages, Peacetime Governmental
Detainees and Other Missing or Isolated. This file will accompany the reintegration
process as a debriefing document and will be disseminated to the service and JPRA
once reintegration has been completed. If the reintegration process ends prior to
receiving the PPF, the PPFonce receivedwill be included in the final disposition
of debriefing documents. When possible, Phase I activities should be concluded within
48 hours.
12.1.5.2 Phase II, Theater Transition Point Reintegration. If the returnees command
authority decides to continue the reintegration process and not return the returnee to local
unit control, the returnee will be moved to the theater transition point. The transition point
should be sufficiently isolated from the sights and sounds of battle and ideally should
facilitate an evacuation to CONUS if necessary. The objective of components actions at
the transition point are to continue reintegration processes in a much more deliberate
fashion, allowing additional time for the returnee to decompress. Reintegration actions
during this period are similar to those of Phase I, requiring essentially the same types of
people. Notable exceptions are the addition of theater intelligence debriefs by the joint
interrogation and debriefing center (JIDC) and recommended liaison with CONUS-based
service representatives. If recommended by the returnees command authority,
CINCCENT may direct the evacuation of the returnee from the theater to CONUS.
Theater-level coordination with service reintegration representatives is formalized in this
phase to develop evacuation plans, coordinate public affairs guidance, and pass relevant
debriefing and medical information. Phase II concludes with the returnee evacuated from
the theater or returned to returnees unit. When possible, Phase II activities should be
concluded within 5 days.
12.1.5.2.1 Family Members. Phase II is where reintegration with family members
may begin initially with contact by telephone. Rarely is there any benefit for family
members to travel to Phase II locations. In fact, until decompression/debriefing is
complete, the primary concern of recovered isolated personnel is the objective
assessment of how they conducted themselves while isolated; they have a need to
know the answer to "did I conduct myself well and with honor?"
12.1.5.2.2 Return to Duty. If the recovered isolated personnel are returned to duty,
the geographic combatant commander's reintegration team chief will transfer the PPF
and other records as directed in theater guidance. If the recovered isolated personnel
are recommended for Phase III, the PPF and other records will be positively controlled
by the reintegration team chief until properly transferred to the phase III team chief or
JPRA.
12.1.5.3 Phase III, Service Reintegration. Phase III is normally conducted in CONUS.
Phase III begins with the transition of recovered isolated personnel to the phase III team of
the appropriate Service. A Phase III team representative will meet the recovered isolated
personnel at the Phase II location. A designated personal escort, PA representative,
physician, chaplain, and SERE psychologist normally will accompany the recovered
isolated personnel. Phase III details are described in DODI 2310.4, Reparation of
Prisoners of War (POW), Hostages, Peacetime Government Detainees, and Other Missing

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

12-13

or Isolated Personnel. Phase III does not have a prescribed time limit and depends on
coordinated needs of the Service, SERE and intelligence debriefers, and the SERE
psychologist.
12.1.5.3.1 Medical Attention. During Phase III, returnees shall receive all required
medical and psychological treatment. Returned military personnel shall remain under
the care of a physician until the member is pronounced fit for duty, discharged, or
retired.
12.1.5.3.2 Debriefs. Qualified and trained military service SERE and intelligence
specialists and debriefers shall debrief each returnee in-depth under JPRA supervision.
This debriefing will include questions regarding their knowledge of wartime incidents
involving personnel declared killed in action/body not recovered in an effort to account
more fully for those individuals. If the returnee was not given an opportunity to sign a
DD Form 2810 (see Table A2.9, DD Form 2810Promise of Confidentiality) during
Phase I, provide the returnee an opportunity to do so now. These debriefings will last
as long as necessary, but will not be conducted in a manner that is physically or
mentally stressful to a returnee.
12.1.5.3.3 Conclusion of Phase III. For military personnel, Phase III will conclude
only when required SERE and intelligence debriefings are concluded, and the returnee
is declared fit for duty, discharged, or retired. There is no set time limit for Phase III
processing. Military service personnel will not return to duty until all medical
(including psychological care), intelligence, personnel, and casualty issues are
addressed.
12.1.6 After-Action. SERE psychologists will follow-up with recovered isolated personnel,
as needed, for at least one year. All POWs are eligible for follow-up medical and
psychological services at the Robert Mitchell Center for Repatriated POW Studies.
Intelligence organizations may require follow-up contact with recovered isolated personnel to
pursue additional intelligence requirements, particularly to support investigations of
unresolved POW/MIA incidents.

12-14

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A1-1
ATTACHMENT 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION


A1.1

References.
USSOCOM Publications

1. USSOCOM 350-3, Airborne Operations.


2. USSOCOM 35-6, Infil/Exfil Operations.
Air Force Publications
1. AFDD 2-1.6, Personnel Recovery Operations.
2. AFPD 16-12, Pararescue.
3. AFPD 16-13, Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE).
4. AFI 10-230, Participation in Key Exercises and War Games.
5. AFI 10-401, Operation Plan and Concert Plan Development and Implementation.
6. AFI 11-2C-130, Volume 3, C-130 Operations Procedures.
7.

AFI 11-231, Computed Air Release Point Procedures.

8.

AFI 11-410, Personnel Parachute Operations.

9. AFI 13-217, Assault Zone Procedures.


10. AFI 14-105, Unit Intelligence Mission and Responsibility.
11. AFI 16-1202, Pararescue Operations, Techniques and Procedures.
12. AFI 16-1203, Pararescue Training and Evaluation Program.
13. AFI 16-1301, Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Program.
14. AFI 36-2226, Combat Arms Program.
15. AFI 90-901, Operational Risk Management.
16. AFI 91-204, Safety Investigations and Reports.
17. AFI 36-2209, Survival and Code of Conduct Training.
18. AFJ 13-210(I), Joint Airdrop Inspection Records, Malfunction Investigations, and Activity
Reporting.
19. AFMAN 11-411(I), Military Free-Fall Parachuting.
20. AFMAN 11-420(I), Static Line Parachuting Techniques and Training.
21. AFP 91-215, Operational Risk Management Guideline and Tools.
Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Publications
1. AFTTP 3-3.24, Combat Aircraft FundamentalsHH-60G.

A1-2

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

2. AFTTP 3-3.33, Combat Aircraft FundamentalsHC-130/MC-130/MC-130P.


3. AFTTP 3-3.34, Combat Aircraft FundamentalsMH-53.
4. AFTTP 3-3.24, Combat Aircraft FundamentalsHH-60G.
Air Force Special Operations Command Tests
1. AFSOC Project 00-049, 18th FTS Final Report Force Evaluation of the Stokes Litter Hoist
with Team Member Attached.
2. MAC Project 3-79-84, Operational Test and Evaluation Skedco Litter.
Army Publications
1. Technical Order 13C7-1-11, Rigging Containers.
2. Technical Order 13C7-51-21, Rigging Special Operations Loads.
3. Technical Order 13C7-55-1, Rigging Motorcycles and Quad Runners.
Navy Publications
1. US Navy Diving Manual.
Miscellaneous
1. Freedom of the Hills, 6th Edition.
2. The Technical Riggers Guide, Revised Edition.
A1.2 Abbreviations and Acronyms.
A/R...................................
AAA.................................
AAFIF ..............................
AAR .................................
ABCCC ............................
AC ....................................
ACA .................................
ACC .................................
ACL .................................
ACO .................................
ACWDE...........................
AD....................................
ADCON ...........................
ADEPT.............................
ADVON ...........................
AE ....................................
AEF ..................................
AETC ...............................
AF.....................................
AFAC ...............................
AFCC ...............................

as required
antiaircraft artillery
automated airfield information file
after-action reports
airborne battlefield command and control center
alternating current/aircraft commander
airspace coordination area
air component commander
allowable cargo load
airspace control order
aircrew chemical warfare defense ensemble
aerial delivery
administrative control
alternating door exit procedures
advanced echelon
aeromedical evacuation
air expeditionary force
air education and training command
Air Force
airborne forward air controllers
Air Force component commander

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


AFCESA ..........................
AFCSS .............................
AFI....................................
AFMAN............................
AFO .................................
AFOSI ..............................
AFPD................................
AFRC ...............................
AFRCC ............................
AFSC................................
AFSOC.............................
AFSOF .............................
AFTH ...............................
AFWA ..............................
AGL .................................
AGM ................................
AI .....................................
AIE...................................
AIREP ..............................
AIS ...................................
AL ....................................
AM ...................................
AMA ................................
AMB ...............................
AMC ................................
AMP.................................
AMT.................................
ANG.................................
ANSI ................................
AO....................................
AOC .................................
AOR .................................
AOS .................................
API ...................................
APR..................................
ARC .................................
ARFF ...............................
ARS..................................
ASD..................................
ASOC...............................
ATA ..................................
ATAR ...............................
ATC ..................................
ATCALS ..........................
ATL ..................................

A1-3
Air Force Civil Engineering Support Agency
Air Force Contingency Supply Squadron
Air Force Instruction
Air Force Manual
advanced force operations
Air Force Office of Special Investigation
Air Force Policy Directive
Air Force Reserve Command
Air Force Rescue Coordination Center
Air Force Speciality Code
Air Force Special Operations Command
Air Force Special Operations Forces
Air Force theater hospital
Air Force Weather Agency
above ground level
air-to-ground missile
air interdiction/area of interest
alternate insertion and extraction
air report
automated information system
air land
azimuth monitor
actual mechanical advantage
air mission brief
airborne mission commander
airfield marking patterns
advanced MOUT techniques/training
air national guard
American National Standards Institute
area of operations
Air and Space Operations Center
area of responsibility
air operations squadron
armor piercing incendiary
alternate rally point
advance rescue craft
airfield rescue firefighter
air rescue service
Assistant Secretary of Defense
air support operations center
air terminal area
air-to-air recovery
air traffic control
air traffic control and landing systems
assistant team leader

A1-4
ATO..................................
ATV..................................
AUC .................................
AUTO CAD .....................
AWACS............................
AWADS............................
AZ ....................................
BAO .................................
BC ....................................
BCM.................................
BDA .................................
BDO .................................
BFT ..................................
BIT ...................................
BLS ..................................
BOS..................................
BW ...................................
C2 .....................................
C3 .....................................
C3I....................................
C4I....................................
C4ISR ...............................
CA ....................................
CAC.................................
CADS...............................
CAF..................................
CAM ................................
CANLS ............................
CAOC ..............................
CAP..................................
CARP ...............................
CAS..................................
CASH...............................
CBR .................................
CCIR ................................
CCL..................................
CCN .................................
CCP ..................................
CCT..................................
CCTL ...............................
CD ....................................
CDE .................................
CDS..................................
CEM.................................

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


air tasking order
all-terrain vehicles
advanced urban combat
automatic computer-aided drafting
airborne warning and control system
adverse weather aerial delivery systems
assault zone
battlefield air operations
biological/chemical
buoyancy compensator military
battle damage assessment
battle dress overgarment
blue force tracking
basic initial test
beach landing site
base operating support
biological warfare
command and control
command, control and communications
command, control, communication, and intelligence
command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance
civil affairs
conduct after capture
combat aerial delivery system
combat air forces
chemical agent monitor
contingency airfield lighting system
Combined Air Operations Center
combat air patrol
computed ail release point
close air support
combat support hospital
California Bearing Radio
commanders critical information requirements
contamination control line
cloud consideration nuclei
casualty collection point
combat control team
combat control team leader
counterdrug
chemical defense equipment
container delivery system
combined effect munition

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


CEU .................................
CFF ..................................
CFETP...............................
CFL ..................................
CFLCC.............................
CFR ..................................
CHOP...............................
CIB...................................
CIC...................................
CIS ...................................
CJCSI...............................
CJCSM..............................
CMR.................................
COA .................................
COC .................................
CoC..................................
CoCCT.............................
COCOM...........................
COMACC ........................
COMAFFOR ...................
COMSEC .........................
CONEMP.........................
CONEX............................
CONOPS..........................
CONPLAN.......................
CONUS ............................
COP..................................
CP.....................................
CPOG...............................
CPS ..................................
CPU..................................
CQC .................................
CR ....................................
CRC .................................
CRM.................................
CRO .................................
CRRC...............................
CRS ..................................
CSA..................................
CSAF ...............................
CSAR ...............................
CSARTF...........................
CSI....................................
CSP ..................................
CST...................................

A1-5
control electronics unit
call for fire
career field education and training plan
coordinated fire line
combined force land component command
crash fire and rescue
change of operational control
controlled image base
combat information center
combat intelligence system
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
combat mission ready
course of action
chain of command
Code of Conduct
Code of Conduct continuation training
combatant command
Commander, Air Combat Command
Commander of Air Force Forces
communications security
concept of employment
concept of execution
concept of operations
concept plan
continental United States
combined operational picture
control point
chemical protective overgarment
collective protective shelters
central processing unit
close quarters combat
combat rescue
control and reporting centers
crew resource management
combat rescue officer
combat rubber raider craft
container release system
combat supply activity
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
combat search and rescue
combat search and rescue task force
contingency SERE indoctrination
commence search point
combat survival training

A1-6
CT ....................................
CUBE...............................
CW ...................................
CWDE..............................
CWT.................................
DA....................................
DA....................................
DACO ..............................
DAMA .............................
DAP .................................
DAR .................................
DCM ................................
DCO .................................
DCP..................................
DEA .................................
DED .................................
DEU .................................
DIA ..................................
DLIFC...............................
DLS ..................................
DM ...................................
DME ................................
DO....................................
DOC .................................
DoD..................................
DoDI.................................
DOS .................................
DPMO..............................
DPSS ................................
DR ....................................
DSF ..................................
DSN .................................
DTD .................................
DTED...............................
DTG .................................
DUSTWUN .....................
DZ ....................................
DZC .................................
DZSTL .............................
E&E .................................
E&R .................................
EA ....................................
EALS ...............................
ECAS ...............................

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


counterterrorism
combined unconventional exploitation
coalition warfare/combat weather/continuous wave/chemical
warfare
chemical warfare defense equipment
combat weathermen
direct action
density/direct action
departure airfield control officer
demand assignment multiple access
defense aerial platform/direct action penetrator
designated area of recovery
downed crew member
disaster control officer
dynamic cone penetrometer
drug enforcement agency
detailed equipment decontamination
distance measuring electronic unit
Defense Intelligence Agency
defense language institute foreign language center
desert landing site
designated marksman
distance measuring equipment
director of operations
designed operational capability
Department Of Defense
Department of Defense Instruction
day optical scopes
defense prisoner of war/missing personnel office
digital precision strike suite
dead reckoning
defensive suppressive fire
defense switched network
detailed troop decontamination
digital terrain elevation data
date-time group
duty status whereabouts unknown
drop zone
drop zone controller
drop zone support team leader
escape and evasion
evasion and recovery
electronic attack
emergency airfield lighting system
emergency close air support

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


ECCM ..............................
EEFI .................................
EEI ...................................
EL.....................................
ELMO...............................
ELT...................................
EMEDS ............................
EMP .................................
EMT .................................
EMT-P..............................
EO ....................................
EOD .................................
EPA ..................................
EPDS................................
EPS...................................
ER ....................................
E&R..................................
ERO .................................
ERP ..................................
ESO ..................................
ETL ..................................
EVC .................................
EW ...................................
EXRP ...............................
FAA..................................
FAC ..................................
FACP................................
FAG..................................
FALOP .............................
FAM .................................
FAR ..................................
FARP................................
FARRP .............................
FDC..................................
FEBA ...............................
FEMA ..............................
FFIR .................................
FID ...................................
FISS .................................
FL.....................................
FLIR.................................
FLOT ...............................
FM....................................
FMC .................................
FO ....................................

A1-7
electronic countermeasures
essential elements of friendly information
essential elements of information
elevation/electro-luminescent
electronically linked mission overlay
emergency locator transmitter
Air Force Expeditionary Medical Support
electromagnetic pulse
emergency medical treatment
emergency medical technician paramedic
electro-optical
explosive ordnance disposal
evasion plan of action
expedient personnel decontamination system
external personnel system
emergency rescue
evasion and recovery
engine running on-load/engine running off-load
en route rally point
extended surface operation
engineering technical letters/estimated time of landing
evasion chart
electronic warfare
extraction rally point
Federal Aviation Agency
forward air controller
forward air control posts
front accessory gear
forward area limited observing program
familiarization/forward area manifold
federal aviation regulation
forward area refueling point
forward area rearming and refueling point
fire detection center
forward edge of the battle area
Federal Emergency Management Agency
friendly force information requirements
foreign internal defense
foreign intelligence and security services
flight level
forward-looking infrared
forward line of own troops
frequency modulation
field medical card
forward observer

A1-8
FOB..................................
FOL ..................................
FOV .................................
FRAB ...............................
FRAGORD ......................
FRIES...............................
FRN..................................
FSB ..................................
FSCL ................................
FSCM...............................
FTX ..................................
FZFG................................
G.......................................
GB ....................................
GBD .................................
GCA .................................
GCU .................................
GD....................................
GDI ..................................
georef ...............................
GFC..................................
GI&S ................................
GLO..................................
GPS ..................................
GMRS ..............................
GRADS ............................
GRG .................................
GVO.................................
GZ ....................................
HAARS ............................
HAHO ..............................
HALO ..............................
HAR .................................
HARP...............................
HAZDECS .......................
HE ....................................
HEDP ...............................
HEEDS.............................
HEI...................................
HEIT ................................
HF ....................................
Hg.....................................
HGRP...............................
HLZ..................................
HMX ................................

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


forward operating base
forward operating locations
field of view
fast rope anchor bar
fragmentary order
fast rope insertion/extraction system
forecast reference notebook
forward staging base
fire support coordination line
fire support coordinating measures
field training exercises
freezing fog
gravity
Sarin
green beam designator
ground control approach
ground control unit
Soman
ground directed interdiction
geographic reference
ground force commander
geographic information and services
ground liaison officer
global positioning system
ground marking release system
ground radar aerial delivery system
girded reference graphics
green vinyl overboot
ground zero
high-altitude airdrops resupply system
high altitude/high opening
high altitude low opening
helicopter aerial refueling
high-altitude release point
hazardous declarations
heavy equipment
high explosive dual purpose
helicopter emergency egress device
high explosive incendiary
high explosive incendiary tracer
high frequency
mercury
high glide ratio parachute
helicopter landing zone
high melting point

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


HN....................................
HNS .................................
hPa ...................................
HPW.................................
HRC .................................
HRS..................................
HSLLADS .......................
HUMINT .........................
HUMRO...........................
HV....................................
HVT .................................
IAD ..................................
ICAD................................
ICAS ................................
ICS....................................
IDAS.................................
IFE ...................................
IFF....................................
IFR ...................................
ILS ...................................
IMC ..................................
IMT ..................................
INMARSAT .....................
IP/E ..................................
IPB ...................................
IR .....................................
IRF ...................................
IRP ...................................
IRTSS...............................
ISB ...................................
ISOPREP .........................
ISR ...................................
JAG ..................................
JAI....................................
JAM .................................
JCCP ................................
JCEOI...............................
JCSAR .............................
JCT...................................
JDIC .................................
JFACC..............................
JFC ...................................
JFCOM.............................
JFKSWCS ........................
JFSOCC ...........................

A1-9
host nation
host nation support
hectopascals
high performance waveform
high-risk-of-capture
hot refueling supervisor
high-speed low-level aerial delivery system
human intelligence
humanitarian/disaster release operations
high velocity
high value target
immediate action drills
International Civil Aviation Organization
immediate close air support
internal communication system/individual combat skills
interactive defensive avionics system
in-flight emergencies
identification, friend or foe
instrument flight rules
instrument landing system
instrument meteorological conditions
individual movement techniques
international maritime satellite
isolated person/evader
intelligence preparation of the battlespace
infrared
immediate reaction force
initial rally point
infrared target scene simulation system software
intermediate staging base
isolated personnel report
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
Judge Advocate General
joint airdrop inspection
JSLIST approved material
joint casualty collection point
joint communications electronic operating instructions
joint combat search and rescue
jump clearing team
joint interrogation and debriefing center
joint force air component commander
joint force commander
joint forces command
John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
joint force special operations component commander

A1-10
JIC ....................................
JIDC .................................
JM ....................................
JMD .................................
JDD ..................................
JMFU ...............................
JMO .................................
JOC ..................................
JOG ..................................
JOPES...............................
JSTARS............................
JRTIC................................
JPRA ................................
JPRC ................................
JSOA ................................
JSOAC .............................
JSOTF ..............................
JSRC ................................
JTF ...................................
JTTP..................................
kbps ..................................
K-DUCK ..........................
KDU.................................
kg .....................................
kt/hr ..................................
LAN .................................
LAPES .............................
LARS ...............................
LAW.................................
LBE ..................................
LCC..................................
LCE ..................................
LEA..................................
LEP ..................................
LGB .................................
LiS02................................
LOA .................................
LOAC...............................
LOC .................................
LODA ..............................
LOS ..................................
LP.....................................
LPD ..................................
LPI ...................................
LRC..................................

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


joint intelligence center
joint interrogation and debriefing center
jumpmaster
jumpmaster-directed release
jumpmaster-directed drop
joint meteorological forecasting unit
Joint METOC Officer
joint operations center
joint operations graphics
joint operation planning and execution system
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
joint resistance training instructor course
Joint Personnel Recovery Agency
joint personnel recovery center
joint special operations area
joint special operations air component commander
joint special operations task force
joint search and rescue center
joint task force
joint tactics, techniques and procedures
kilobytes per second
Kangaroo duck
keypad display unit
kilogram
knots per hour
local area network
low altitude parachute extraction system
lightweight airborne recovery system
light antiarmor weapons
load bearing equipment
last cover concealment
load carrying equipment
law enforcement agencies
laser eye protection
laser-guided bomb
lithium sulfur dioxide
letter of agreement
law of armed conflict
lines of communications
large open danger arm
line of sight
listening posts
low probability of detection
low probability of intercept
logistics readiness center

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


LRF ..................................
LRH .................................
LSA .................................
LSO ..................................
LTD ..................................
LUP ..................................
LZ.....................................
LZC ..................................
LZSO ...............................
MA ...................................
MAAS ..............................
MACO .............................
MAJCOM ........................
MARS ..............................
MARSA ...........................
MASH ..............................
MAST ..............................
MATT................................
MAX ORD.......................
MBITR.............................
MCLOS............................
MCOO .............................
MDS.................................
MEDEVAC ......................
MEFP ...............................
MEF SOTG......................
METCON.........................
METL................................
METOC............................
METT-TC.........................
MEW................................
MFF .................................
MGRS ..............................
MHE.................................
MICAP.............................
MIO..................................
MISREP ...........................
MITO ..............................
MMB................................
MMLS..............................
MOB ................................
MOI..................................
MOOTW ..........................
MOPP...............................
MOUT..............................

A1-11
laser range finder
load releasing hitch
logistic staging area
limited surface operation
laser target designator
lay up points
landing zone/linear structure
landing zone controller
landing zone safety officer
mechanical advantage
mobile aircraft arresting systems
military airborne control officer
major command
military amphibious reconnaissance system
military assumes responsibility for separations of aircraft
mobile Army surgical hospital
military antishock trousers
multi-mission advanced tactical terminal
maximum ordinance
multiband inter-/intra-team radio
manual command line of sight
modified combined obstacle overlays
mission design series
aeromedical evacuation
mission execution forecast process
Marine Expeditionary Force Special Operations Training Groups
meteorological conferencing
mission essential task list
meteorological and oceanographic
mission enemy terrain time troops available, and civilians
mean effective wind
military free fall
military grid referencing system
medium and heavy equipment/material handling equipment
mission capability
maritime interdiction operations
mission report
minimum interval takeoff
multi-band beacon
mobile microwave landing system
main operating base
mechanism of injury
military operations other than war
mission-oriented protective posture
military operations on urbanized terrain

A1-12
MPA .................................
MPE...................................
MPI ..................................
MPP .................................
MR....................................
MRSP...............................
MRTB ..............................
MSA.................................
MSD.................................
MSL..................................
MSR .................................
MSS .................................
MTA .................................
MTW................................
N.......................................
NAF .................................
NAR .................................
NAS..................................
NAS ................................
NASA...............................
navaids .............................
NBC .................................
NCOIC .............................
NCST................................
NEO .................................
NEONISH ........................
NFA..................................
NFPA................................
NGA.................................
NIIRS ...............................
NIMA...............................
NIPRNET..........................
NiMH ...............................
NLT ..................................
NM ...................................
NOK.................................
NOWS..............................
NRO.................................
NRTD...............................
NTM.................................
NVD.................................
NVG.................................
OA....................................
OBM ................................

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


mission planning authority
mission planning element
multiple points of impact
mission planning process
mission ready
mobility readiness spares package
multifunction radar transponder beacon
minimum safe altitude
minimum safe distance
mean sea level
mission support request
mission support site
mission tasking authority
major theater war
Newton
numbered air force
nonconventional-assisted recovery
naval air station
national airspace system
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
navigation aids
nuclear, biological, and chemical
noncommissioned officer in charge
non-combat survival training
noncombatant evacuation operations
noncombatant evacuation operations naval intelligence support
handbooks
no-fire areas
National Fire Protection Association
National geospacial intelligence office
National Imagery Interpretability Rating Scale
National Imagery and Mapping Agency
non-secure internet protocol routing network
nickel metal hydride
not later than
nautical miles
next of kin
NVG operations weather software
national reconnaissance office
near-real-time data
national technical mean
night vision device
night vision goggles
objective area
outboard motor

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


OCOKA ...........................
ODA.................................
ODS .................................
OEG .................................
OI......................................
OIC...................................
OOTW .............................
OP ....................................
OPB..................................
OPCON ............................
OPDEC ............................
OPLAN ............................
OPORD ............................
OPSEC .............................
ORM.................................
ORP..................................
OSC..................................
OSHA...............................
OSS ..................................
OT&E...............................
OTAD...............................
OTAR ...............................
OTH .................................
OWA ................................
PACAF .............................
PAO..................................
PC.....................................
PCA..................................
PCN..................................
PDF ..................................
PDM.................................
PE.....................................
PEERS .............................
PFD ..................................
PFPS.................................
PGM.................................
PI ......................................
PI ......................................
PIBAL ..............................
PIC ...................................
PID ...................................
PIR ...................................
PIREPS ............................
PIW ..................................

A1-13
obstacles, cover and concealment observation key terrain avenues
of approach
operational detachment alpha
overhead delivery system
operational exposure guidance
operating instruction
officer in charge
operations other than war
observation point/observation post
operational preparation of the battlefield
operational control
operational deception
operations plan
operations order
operational security
operational risk management
objective rally point
on-scene commander
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Office of Strategic Services
operational testing and evaluation
over-the-air distribution
over-the-air rekeying
over the horizon
observed weather advisory
Pacific Air Force
Public Affairs Office
precious cargo
pre-crisis action
pavement classification number
peak dynamic force
pursuit deterrent munitions
potential energy
personal emergency escape systems
personal flotation device
pilot flight planning system
precision-guided missile
point of impact
probability of incapacitation
pilot balloon
pilot in command
positive identification
priority intelligence requirement
pilot reports
person in the water

A1-14
PJ......................................
PJTL.................................
Pk ......................................
PLANORD.......................
PLF...................................
PLGR ...............................
PLS...................................
PM....................................
PMP .................................
PMSV...............................
PNF ..................................
POD .................................
POL ..................................
POTUS.............................
POW.................................
PPE...................................
PPF...................................
PR.....................................
PRCC ...............................
PRIR.................................
PRK..................................
PRO..................................
PRP ..................................
PRX..................................
PSP...................................
PUC..................................
PYSOP .............................
PZ.....................................
QRF..................................
QRP..................................
RCC..................................
R&S .................................
R/SAOC ...........................
RAM ................................
RAMCC ...........................
RAMZ ..............................
RAS..................................
RATT ...............................
RATTV.............................
RC ....................................
RCC .................................
RCDU ..............................
RCP ..................................
RDIC ................................
REDS ...............................

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


pararescue specialist/pararescueman, (para-jumper)
pararescue team leader
probability of kill
planning order
parachute landing fall
external portable lightweight GPS receiver
personnel locator system
program manager
Prusik minding pulley
pilot to metroSerVice
pilot not flying
probability of detection
petroleum, oil, and lubricant
president of the United States
prisoner of war
personal protective equipment
personnel processing file
personnel recovery
personnel recovery coordination center
personnel recovery incident report
personnel recovery kits
personnel recovery operations
preliminary release point
personnel recovery exercise
perforated steel planking
pilot update codes
psychological operations
pickup zone
quick reaction force
quick response posture
rescue coordination center
reconnaissance and surveillance
Regional/Satellite Air Operations Centers
raised angle marker
regional air movement coordination center
rigging alternate method-zodiac
recovery activation symbol
rescue all-terrain transport
rapid all-terrain transport vehicle
reserve component
rescue coordination center
remote control display unit
runway crossing point
Resuscitative Device Individual Chemical
rapid employment deployment system

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


RELS.................................
RESCAP ..........................
RESCORT........................
RF.....................................
RFA ..................................
RFI ...................................
RJM..................................
RMWS .............................
RO ....................................
ROE .................................
ROK .................................
ROUT...............................
ROZ .................................
RP.....................................
RPG..................................
RPI ...................................
RPM .................................
RQS..................................
RQW ................................
RSTA................................
RT.....................................
RTD..................................
RTMC ..............................
RUT .................................
RV.....................................
RVF ..................................
RVT..................................
RW ...................................
RWR.................................
RWY ................................
S/A ...................................
SA ....................................
SAF...................................
SAFE................................
SAIR ................................
SAID.................................
SALUTE ..........................
SAM.................................
Sandy ...............................
SAP ..................................
SAR..................................
SAR CONOPS.................
SARSOPS........................
SARDO ............................
SARIR..............................

A1-15
rapid equipment lowering systems
rescue combat air patrol
rescue escort
radio frequency
restricted fire areas
request for information
rescue jumpmaster
remote miniature weather sensor
recovery operations
rules of engagement
Republic of Korea
rescue operations in urban terrain
restricted operating zone
rally point/release point
rocket-propelled grenades
random points of impact
revolutions per minute
rescue squadron
rescue wing
reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
recovery team
returned-to-duty
returned to military control
rule of thumb
recovery vehicle
remote video terminal
remote video terminal
rotary wing
radar warning receiver
runway
surface-to-air
situational awareness
Secretary of the Air Force
selected area for evasion
special aeronautical information request
SAFE area intelligence description
size activity location unit time equipment
surface-to-air missile
lead rescue escort support
special access program
search and rescue
search and rescue concept of operations
search and rescue standard operating procedures
search and rescue duty officer
search and rescue incident report

A1-16
SARLO ............................
SARREQ..........................
SARS IT...........................
SAT ..................................
SATCOM .........................
SATPHONE .....................
SAW .................................
SCA..................................
SCNS..................................
SDS ..................................
SEAD ...............................
SEAL ...............................
SELF-SAR .......................
SERE................................
SF .....................................
SFARTAEC......................
SFAUCC ..........................
SFW .................................
SIPRNET..........................
SIR ...................................
SITREP ............................
SKE ..................................
SL.....................................
SLACO ............................
SLDA ...............................
SLT...................................
SMAFU............................
SMC .................................
SME .................................
SMU.................................
SO ....................................
SOC..................................
SOCCE.............................
SODARS..........................
SOF ..................................
SODA...............................
SOFA................................
SOLE ...............................
SOPMOD.........................
SOR..................................
SORTS .............................
SPECAT ...........................
SPIE .................................
SPINS...............................

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


search and rescue liaison officer
search and rescue request
search and rescue situational report
satellite imagery
satellite communications
satellite phone
squad automatic weapon
survival contact area
self-contained navigation system
sorbent decon system
suppression of enemy air defense
sea, air, land
self search and rescue
survival, evasion, resistance, and escape
sensor-fuzed weapon/safety factor
Special Forces Advanced Reconnaissance, Target Analysis, and
Exploitation
Special Forces Group Level Advanced Urban Combat Course
sensor-fuzed weapon
secure internet protocol router network
specific information requests
situation report
station-keeping equipment
static line
sky landing area control officer
small linear danger area
static load training
synchronized mapping and feature updates
SAR mission coordinator
squadron medical element/ subject matter expert
special mission unit
special operations
special operations command
special operations command and control element
special operations debriefing and retrieval system
special operations forces
small open danger area
Status of Forces Agreements
special operations liaison element
special operations modification
statement of requirement
special operations readiness and training standards
special category
special personnel insertion extraction
special instructions

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


SPIREP ............................
SPR ..................................
SPUDS .............................
SR.....................................
SRL ..................................
SRU..................................
SSC ..................................
SSSF.................................
SST...................................
ST.....................................
STG ..................................
STL ..................................
STO ..................................
STOC ...............................
STS...................................
STT ..................................
STWO ..............................
STWT...............................
S-UAV..............................
SUFLAM .........................
T-DUCK...........................
TA ....................................
TAC..................................
TACA ...............................
TACAN ............................
TACON ............................
TACP................................
TACSAT...........................
TAL ..................................
TALO ...............................
TASKORD .......................
TAWS...............................
TCO .................................
TCT ..................................
TDA .................................
TDF ..................................
TERPS .............................
TF.....................................
TIM ..................................
TIP ...................................
TL ....................................
TMA.................................
TMD.................................
TN ....................................
TNG .................................

A1-17
supplemental intelligence report
single point refueling
single para scuba deployment system
special reconnaissance
search and rescue lights
search and rescue unit
small scale contingencies
static systems safety factor
SAR security team
special tactics
special tactics group
security team leader
special tactics officer
special tactics operation center
special tactics squadron
special tactics team
special tactics weather operator
special tactics weather team
small unmanned aerial vehicles
special operations forces laser acquisition/marker
tether duck
terminal area
terminal attack control
tactical air coordinator-airborne
tactical air navigation
tactical control
tactical air control parties
tactical satellite
trans-oceanic abort landing
theater airlift liaison officer
tasking order
target acquisition weather software
terminal control operations
time critical targeting
tactical decision aids
time-distance-factor
terminal instrument procedure
task force
toxic industrial materials
tactics improvement proposal
team leader
theoretical mechanical advantage
tactical munitions dispenser/target intelligence packages
technical note
training

A1-18
TOC..................................
TO&E...............................
TOF ..................................
TOT..................................
TPP....................................
TRB..................................
TRP ..................................
TST ..................................
TTP ..................................
TUC..................................
TWG ................................
UAR .................................
UARCC............................
UARM .............................
UAV .................................
UBA .................................
UCW ................................
UDM ................................
UHF .................................
USAFE.............................
USC..................................
USCENTCOM.................
USEUCOM ......................
USMTF ............................
USPACOM.......................
USSOCOM ......................
USSOUTHCOM ..............
USTRAINSCOM.............
UTC .................................
UTM.................................
UW...................................
UXO.................................
VAC..................................
VAMP ..............................
VFR..................................
VHF .................................
VIRS ................................
VISOB .............................
VL.....................................
VLZMP ............................
VMC ................................
WAN ................................
WDI .................................
WCMD.............................
WIC..................................

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


tactical operation center
table of organizations and equipment
time of flight
time on target
test parachutist program
tactics review board
target reference points
time-sensitive target
tactics, techniques, and procedures
threat update codes
threat working group
unconventional-assisted recovery
unconventional assisted recovery coordination center
unconventional assistance recovery mechanisms
unmanned aerial vehicles
underwater breathing apparatus
unconventional warfare
unit deployment monitor
ultra-high frequency
United States Air Forces in Europe
United States Code
United States Central Command
United States European Command
United States Message Text Formats
United States Pacific Command
United States Special Operations Command
United States Southern Command
United States Transportation Command
unit type code
universal transverse mercator
unconventional warfare
unexploded ordnance
volts, alternating current
vertical airfield marking panels
visual flight rules
very high frequency
verbally initiated release systems
visual observation
vertical lift
visual landing zone marker panel
visual meteorological conditions
wide area network
wind drift indicator
wind-corrected munition dispenser employment
weapons instructor course

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


WMD ...............................
WMP ................................
WMT................................
WOT ................................
WP ...................................
WRM ...............................
WSVC ..............................
WX...................................
ZAR .................................
ZM ...................................
A1.3

A1-19
weapons of mass destruction
war and mobilization plan
wireless messaging terminal
war on terrorism
white phosphorous
war reserve material
wind streamer vector count
weather
zone availability report
zone marker

Terms.

air component commanderThe Commander Air Force forces or joint force air component
commander, joint force special operations component commander, or joint special operations air
component commander.
airlift coordination cellThis is a cell within the air operations center which plans, coordinates,
manages, and executes theater airlift operations in the area of responsibility or joint operations
area. It normally consists of an airlift plans branch, an airlift operations branch, and an airlift
logistics branch.
Air Force Weather Agency (AFWA)A strategic weather center at Offutt AFB, Nebraska,
providing strategic atmospheric data and strategic analysis/forecast products required by the
regional operational weather squadrons, combat weather teams (CWT), joint METOC forecasting
units, and STWT or STWO worldwide. AFWA provides the centralized repository for global
observations and forecasts that are databased at AFWA and, in turn, disseminated to DoD weather
data users worldwide. In addition to global observations and forecasts collected from worldwide
sources, AFWA collects meteorological satellite data from multiple sources. Based on global
analysis of available data, AFWA creates global analysis and forecast products to meet the
strategic forecast requirements of its customers.
airmanshipAir Force airmen providing joint forces specific tactics, skills, and abilities defined
by the unique Air Force mission and requiring the specialized training and qualifications only
found in AF airmen.
air mobility elementThe air mobility element is an extension of the Air Mobility Command
Tanker Airlift Control Center, deployed to a theater when requested by the geographic combatant
commander. It coordinates strategic airlift operations with the theater airlift management system
and collocates with the air operations center whenever possible.
airfield marking patternA system of designations that differentiate between the various types
of airfield markings.
air report (AIREP)A pilot report made over areas where weather information is limited or
nonexistent (e.g., over an ocean or denied combat zone).
air mission commander (AMC)A general term applied to an airborne force combatant

A1-20

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

commander, authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational


control an employed air operations force.
ceilingThe lowest broken or overcast layer of clouds or obscuring phenomena aloft or the
vertical visibility into a total obscuration. When one-half or more of the sky has cloud cover, a
ceiling exists.
code of conduct training (CoCT)training that prepares US military personnel to meet the
obligations stated on the Code of Conduct and to return with honor from any combat, evasion, or
captivity situation. Levels of CoCT are:
Level-AThe minimum level of understanding for all members of the Armed Forces attained
by personnel during entry-level training.
Level-BThe minimum level of understanding needed by personnel who have moderate risk
of capture during peacetime or combat.
Level-CThe minimum level of understanding needed by personnel who have a high risk of
capture or are vulnerable to greater than average exploitation by a captor during peacetime or
combat. Level C includes senior Air Force officials assigned to or visiting high threat areas.
code of conduct continuation trainingTraining designed to refresh, update, and augment
information taught during formal Code of Conduct training.
Combat Survival TrainingA form of code of conduct training that prepares military personnel
to meet their obligations when they are involuntarily separated from friendly forces during
combat or as prisoners of war. Same as survival, evasion, resistance, and escape training. DoD
Directive 1300.7, enclosure 2, in the basis for this training.
density altitude (DA)The height above MSL at which the existing density of the atmosphere
would be duplicated in the standard atmosphere; atmospheric density expressed as height
according to a standard scale.
desired lead-timeThe amount of advance notice a supported agency desires before the onset of
a particular weather phenomenon.
drop-zone controllerQualified individual in charge of a drop-zone operation who represents
the appropriate commander as provided in the mission directive.
drop-zone safety officerThe appointed representative of the supported forces commander who
is responsible for the safe operation of the drop zone. Specific duties and responsibilities vary
according to the using airborne units standard operating procedures.
drop-zone support teamQualified US Army/Marine Corps team responsible for supporting
drop.
evasive plan of actionA course of action, developed before executing a combat mission, which
is intended to improve a potential evaders chances of successful evasion and recovery by
providing recovery forces with an additional source of information that can increase the
predictability of the evaders actions and movement.
forward area limited observing program (FALOP)A program implemented in the 1970s to
supplement battlefield observations taken by USAF STWT or STWOs. S-2 personnel at

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A1-21

maneuver brigades and battalions employ FALOP. The belt weather kit is normally used by the
S-2 to make limited measurements of weather conditions. Additionally, the S-2 provides
estimates of other weather and environmental conditions they may observe. The report is
encoded and forwarded to the closest CWT or JMFU.
forecast reference notebook (FRN)A local publication containing information on forecasting
for locations for which the unit has forecast responsibilities.
ground force commander (GFC)A general term applied to a ground forces combatant
commander, authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational
control an employed ground force.
ground-marked release systemA procedure used by ground forces to determine and mark the
release point for an airdrop.
gustThis is rapid fluctuations in wind speed with a variation of 10 knots or more between peaks
and lulls.
helicopter landing zoneThis is a specified ground area for landing helicopters to embark or
disembark troops and/or cargo. A landing zone may contain one or more landing sites.
Hostage Survival TrainingA form of Code of Conduct training that prepares military
personnel to meet their obligations while being held hostage by terrorists. DoD Directive 1300.7,
enclosure 3, is the basis for this training.
horizontal consistencyA weather data provided in one product must be consistent to data
provided in another product for the same area and time. For example, MCF/MEFs must be
consistent with all other products, including current observation, weather warnings and watches,
and so forth. Elements within each MCF/MEF must also be consistent; for example, if heavy
snow showers are forecast, the visibility will be restricted appropriately. Strong gusty winds or
hail would generally be expected if severe thunderstorms are forecast. Product consistency
prevents customers from receiving conflicting information.
infrared target scene simulation system software (IRTSS)This is a UNIX-server, (hosted by
AFWA and the OWSs) full-physics, tactical decision aid capability that illustrates the weapons
eye (sensors spectral response) view of the target area.
joint force air component commanderThe commander within a unified command,
subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for
making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available
for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such
operational missions as may be assigned. The air component commander is given the authority
necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander.
joint force commander (JFC)A general term applied to a combatant commander, sub-unified
commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command
(command authority) or operational control over a joint force.
joint meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) forecasting unit (JMFU)The element
responsible for theater-level weather planning and coordination. Coordinates for the utilization of
STWT, CWT (A), and CWT to effectively provide data coverage for the theater.

A1-22

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

joint meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) officer (JMO)This is the


officer-in-charge of the JMFU; lead METOC officer in theater, responsible overall for
theater-level weather support (may also be known as a SMOSenior METOC Officer).
joint force special operations component commanderThe commander within a unified
command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing
commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or
made available for tasking special operations forces and assets; planning and coordinating special
operations; or accomplishing such special operational missions as may be assigned. The joint
force special operations component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish
missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander.
joint special operations air component commanderThe commander within the joint force
special operations command responsible for planning and executing joint special air operations
and for coordinating and deconflicting such operations with conventional nonspecial operations
air activities. The joint special air operations component commander normally will be the
commander with the preponderance of assets and/or greatest ability to plan, coordinate, allocate,
task, control, and support the assigned joint special operations aviation assets. The joint special
operations air component commander may be directly subordinate to the joint force special
operations component commander or to any nonspecial operations component or joint force
commander as directed.
joint meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) officerOfficer responsible for assisting
the joint combatant commander and staff in developing and executing operational and
oceanographic service concepts in support of a designated joint force.
landing zoneA prepared or semi-prepared (unpaved) airfield used to conduct operations in an
airfield environment similar to forward operating locations. Landing zone runways are typically
shorter and narrower than standard runways. The amount of engineering effort required to
develop a semi-prepared landing zone depends on the planned operation, the service life needed
to support these operations, and the existing soil and weather conditions. Semi-prepared
construction/maintenance preparations may range from those sufficient for limited use to those
required for continuous routine operations. Options for surface preparation may include
stabilization, addition of an aggregate course, compaction of in-place soils, or matting. Since
training airfields are constructed for long-term operations, semi-prepared surface structural
requirements are more stringent than for contingency airfields.
landing zone controllerThis is an individual performing air traffic control duties during
landing zone operations.
landing zone safety officerThis is a qualified combat controller, officer aircrew, or qualified
civilian contractor personnel in charge of the landing zone operation.
light and illumination dataBattle planning requires accurate timing based on available light.
Light tables have been computed for any location that tell nautical twilights, sunrise, sunset,
moonrise, moonset, and moon phase. Illumination is a measure of sunlight, moonlight, starlight,
and airglow. Illumination is a critical factor in the consideration of NVG, cloud cover, and terrain
masking.
main operations base (MOB)In special operations, a base established by a joint force special

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A1-23

operations component commander or a subordinate special operations component commander in


friendly territory to provide sustained command and control, administration, and logistical
support to special operations activities in designated areas.
MCF/MEFMission Control Forecast or mission execution forecasta customized weather
product providing terrestrial, oceanographic, and/or space weather data and forecasts for a
specific mission or set of missions. It fully integrates ground, ocean, and aerospace weather with
the customers tactics, weapon systems, environmental sensitivities of equipment, and other
operational requirements. It is a forecast developed at a centralized weather forecast production
facility to provide weather forces within the same theater of operations one forecast from which to
tailor their supported elements information. A generic forecast, it covers weather concerns
across the entire theater in a broad spectrum.
mean effective windA theoretical wind of constant velocity and direction, extending from the
surface to a predetermined altitude above the ground.
METWATCHMonitoring aerospace weather for a route, area, or terminal and advising
concerned organizations when phenomena that could effect their operations or pose a hazard to
life or property are observed or about to occur.
military free fallAn employment concept encompassing both high-altitude low-opening and
high-altitude high-opening techniques of parachuting.
military grid reference systemThe military grid reference system is designed for use with the
universal transverse mercator and universal polar stereographic grids.
METOC(Meteorological and Oceanographic)A term used to convey all meteorological
(weather) and oceanographic (physical oceanography) factors as provided by service components.
These factors include the range of atmospheric and oceanographic phenomena, from the
sub-bottom of the Earths oceans up to the space environment (space weather).
METOC-C(Meteorological and Oceanographic Collection)Specialized collection tactics,
techniques and procedures used by STWTs to collect, analyze, and tailor and report information
to support the war fighter from permissive, semi-permissive, non-permissive, hostile, and austere
environments.
METT-TC(Mission, enemy, terrain, troops-time collateral damage)Items of consideration
in the planning cycle for elements preparing to conduct operations. It applies each listed area
specifically to allow the planner to evaluate the level of risk, training, equipment, and personnel
needed to conduct the operation.
microscaleThe smallest scale of weather systems, generally less than 1 NM (2 kilometers) with
duration from a few seconds to a few minutes (e.g., tornadoes, dust devils, thermals, or
turbulence).
mission execution forecast process (MEFP)A systematic, repeatable process for forecasting
mission limiting meteorological parameters. This process provides a basic framework for fusing
perishable meteorological data, tactical, operational, and strategic forecast products and an
understanding of the tactics that will be applied to any mission. The MEFP describes an
end-to-end process incorporating MEF management, MEF development, mission meteorological
watch, and postmission analysis of the units forecasts. The NOWCAST process is very similar,

A1-24

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

differing only in scale to the MEF.


MISSIONWATCHThe monitoring of aerospace weather for a specific mission (i.e., ground,
air, or space) and informing supported agencies when unforecast mission-limiting phenomena
could effect operations.
NOWCASTA forecast made by an STWT in the field utilizing the current MCF/MEF and
observed environmental trends. The team is capable of applying local terrain conditions,
moisture sources, and special local effects to more accurately describe the state of the atmosphere
for a period of at least 12 hours. The NOWCAST verifies and enhances the accuracy of the
MCF/MEF process and applies METOC information to operational impacts. The team can apply
this forecast to other areas of concern, such as the littoral region and avalanche potential
forecasting.
observed weather advisory (OWA)A weather advisory issued when a particular weather
event first occurs, and the mission requirements do not require the advanced notification of the
observed weather phenomenon.
obstruction (or obstacle)A natural or man-made object that violates airfield or heliport
clearances or projects into imaginary airspace surfaces.
operational controlCommand authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon
at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant
command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are
transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander
will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by
the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of
command over subordinate forces involving, organizing, and employing commands and forces;
assigning tasks; designating objectives; and giving authoritative direction necessary to
accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of
military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command.
Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations.
Normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and service
and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority
to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational
control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does notin and of
itselfinclude authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline,
internal organization, or unit training.
peacetimeA time when there is no armed conflict or, if armed conflict exists, the United States
is not directly involved.
peacetime detention trainingA form of Code of Conduct training that prepares military
personnel to meet their obligations as detainees of a foreign government. DoD Directive 1300.7,
enclosure 3, is the basis for this training.
pilot report (PIREP)A report of in-flight weather provided by an aircrew member.
point of impactThe point on the drop zone where the first parachutist or airdropped cargo item
lands or is expected to land.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A1-25

raised-angle markerA device used to mark the point of impact during airdrops. A
triangular-shaped marker constructed of bright orange material, 6 feet wide at the base
(minimum) and 6 feet high (minimum), displayed at a 60-degree angle into the direction of flight.
ram air parachute systemUS Army equivalent of a High Glide Ratio Parachute.
refractive indexA measure of the amount of refraction or bending of an energy wave (visual
light, infrared, radio, and others) passing from one density to another in a medium such as air or
water. The apparent bending of a stick when placed in a pool of water is an example.
regimeA synoptic and/or mesoscale weather pattern that effects a location.
release pointThe point over the drop zone where personnel or equipment should exit the drop
aircraft.
rule of thumb (ROT)A concise, empirical forecast rule providing a specific answer that can be
verified objectively.
safety zoneA distance established by agreement between the air mission commander and the
supported forces commander subtracted from the DZ trailing edge to reduce the potential for
off-DZ drops. For peacetime personnel airdrops, the safety zone will never be less than 200
yards. Do not compute safety zone distances for airdrops supporting unconventional warfare
forces as defined by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, Annex E or high-altitude
low-opening/high-altitude high-opening airdrops.
sea stateDescribes wind-generated waves on the surface of the sea.
ski landing areaA designated area for LC-130 ski operations not meeting the criteria for a
Skiway but marked and maintained IAW this instruction
skiwayA designated area for LC-130 ski operations marked and maintained IAW this
instruction. Skiways must have a published instrument or visual approach procedure and be
located near a surface camp with support facilities to include weather reporting, shelter, first aid,
food, communications, and grooming on a continual basis.
skiway landing area control officerAn experienced LC-130 pilot or combat controller
experienced in LC-130 ski operations responsible for certifying a skiway landing area.
slant-range visibilityThe distance a pilot can distinguish objects that are both forward and
beneath the pilots aircraft. For example, looking down at an angle as the pilot approaches a
target or a runway.
special mission unit (SMU)A generic term to represent a group of operations and support
personnel from designated organizations that are task-organized to perform highly classified
activities. STWTs are capable of operating with these elements as required for mission success.
station keeping equipmentAn aircraft avionics system used to maintain formation position in
instrument meteorological conditions. When used in conjunction with an adverse aerial delivery
system lead aircraft, instrument meteorological conditions airdrops are possible. C-130, C-141,
and C-17 station keeping-equipped aircraft have an instrument meteorological conditions airdrop
capability when employed with a ground-based zone marker.
special operations forcesThose active and reserve component forces of the military services

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to
conduct and support special operations.
special operations low levelC-17-, C-141-, and C-5-qualified aircrews that support special
operations using nonstandard procedures and criteria, including operations using night vision
goggles. Air Mobility Command provides night vision goggle-trained C-130 crews capable of
using procedures similar to special operations low-level aircrew.
special tactics teamUnited States Air Force special operations consisting of combat control,
pararescue, and combat weather personnel who are organized, trained, and equipped to establish
and control the air-ground interface at an airhead in the objective area. Functions include assault
zone reconnaissance and surveillance, establishment, and terminal control; combat search and
rescue; combat casualty care and evacuation staging; special operations terminal attack; and
tactical weather observations and forecasting.
ST combat weatherman (CWT)A fully qualified member of an ST CWT capable of operating
with any SOF organization to conduct METOC-C and trained to operate in all SOF mission areas.
ST CWT(Special Tactics Weather Team)This is an Air Force special tactics team
comprised of highly skilled tactical operators selected, organized, equipped, and trained to
collect, analyze, tailor, and report meteorological and oceanographic data critical to military
operations in permissive, semi-permissive, non-permissive, and austere locations. ST CWT can
deploy independently or as attachments to other SOF units. Teams employ by the most feasible
means (formerly known as special operations weather team tactical element [SOWT/TE]).
special tactics operations center (STOC)This is the operating center for special tactics
elements operating from forward locations. Planning, coordination, and command and control of
special tactics forces occur from a STOC.
surface observationsThese are weather and environmental observations measured or
estimated on the land or water surface and usually reflecting surface conditions. Cloud cover and
estimated upper-level winds are exceptions.
surface windsThese are wind speed, direction, and gust speeds measured over the land or
water.
tactical decision aids (TDA)These refer to the manual look-up tables and matrices or are
computer-driven algorithms by which such a product is generated. These tables provide the
critical thresholds that effect operations, systems, and personnel adversely. The tables, together
with a current forecast, are used to prepare an aid to the mission.
theater airlift liaison officerAn officer specially trained to implement the theater air control
system and to control tactical airlift assets. Theater airlift liaison officers are highly qualified,
rated airlift officers with tactical (airdrop) airlift experience and assigned duties supporting US
Army units.
thermal/IR crossoverThermal crossover is said to occur when the temperature of a target is
the same temperature as its background. This would cause the target to appear invisible to IR
sensors. Depending on cloud ceiling, this usually occurs soon after BMNT and soon after EENT.
tidal currentThe alternating horizontal movement of water associated with the rise and fall of
the tide. In relatively open locations, the direction of tidal currents rotates continuously through

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A1-27

360 degrees diurnally or semi-diurnally. In coastal regions, the nature of tidal currents is
determined by local topography as well.
tideThe periodic rising and falling of the oceans, large lakes, and the atmosphere. It results
from the tide-producing forces of the moon and sun acting upon the rotating Earth. This
disturbance actually propagates as a wave through the atmosphere and through the surface layer
of the oceans.
time cross sectional chart/compositeA representation of meteorological elements or features
and their variability in space and time. Time cross sectional charts/composites supplement, refine,
or help develop METOC products.
trafficabilityThe capacity of a soil to withstand traffic, especially the traffic of military
vehicles.
trailing edge of a drop zoneRepresents the imaginary line extending between the left and right
rear corners of a surveyed drop zone.
unilateralDescribes an Air Force-only operation. A unilateral mission will not be considered a
joint operation merely because the parachutists or loads are from another service, for example, an
Air Force reserve airlift unit conducting training airdrop missions using Army paratroopers or
when Army paratroopers jump with Air Force personnel on an Air Force units operation.
upper-level winds or winds aloftThis is the flow of air measured in speed and direction above
the surface. There is no distinct demarcation between winds aloft and surface winds, although
winds above 100 meters are usually referred to as winds aloft.
US Air Force Formal Survival Training ProgramThis program includes Code of Conduct
training courses as well as additional training in areas such as post-egress procedures and specific
environments.
vertical consistencyWeather features are 3-dimensional, but products are often 2-dimensional.
Vertical consistency ensures the proper vertical structure is maintained across different products.
visibilityThe greatest distance that prominent objects can be seen and identified by the unaided,
normal eye. Visibility distances increase when NVG or other infrared devices are used.
visual initiated release systemA method of positioning aircraft for airdrop by verbal
instruction from the drop-zone controller.
visual meteorological conditionsWeather conditions where visual flight rules apply;
expressed in terms of visibility, ceiling height, and aircraft clearance from clouds along the path
of flight. When these criteria do not exist, instrument meteorological conditions prevail, and
instrument flight rules must be followed.
weather warningA special notice provided to a supported agency when an established weather
condition of such intensityas to effect operations, pose a hazard to life or property, and requires
protective actionis occurring or is expected to occur.
windchill factorsThese factors are revised temperature values, based on the effect of wind and
temperature combined on exposed skin. This windchill temperature is the effective temperature
for troops. The effect of windchill differs individually because of body chemistry but is an
acceptable operating standard.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

zone markerAn electronic navaids used by specially-equipped aircraft to aid in positioning


over the landing zone, drop zone, or release point.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A2-1
ATTACHMENT 2

REINTEGRATION CHECKLISTS AND DEBRIEFING GUIDE


A2.1 Introduction. Use Table A2.1, JPRC/PRCC Reintegration Checklist, through Table
A2.18, JPRC PAO Checklist, for reintegration checklists and debriefing guides.
Table A2.1 JPRC/PRCC Reintegration Checklist (1 of 2).
1. Develop or refer to the operations plan (OPLAN) and fragmentation order (FRAGO) in order to
designate the initial reception points for Phase I reintegration.
2. Coordinate procedures with supporting commands (USJFCONM, USEUCOM, USTRANCOM,
USPACOM) to ensure essential information concerning isolated personnel in the AOR is provided as
soon as possible for rapid identification, location recovery, and reintegration. The JPRC entry point
for coordination of support external to the combatant command is frequently the J3-PP.
3. Coordinate with US intelligence agencies, theater J-2, and component intelligence organizations to
gather information of value to the command. Specifically coordinate for theater intelligence
debriefings by the joint interrogation and debriefing center (JDIC). The JPRC entry point for
supporting intelligence support to reintegration is the J-2-X.
4. IAW SAR/CSAR coordination directives, task component commands to conduct reintegration of
returnees, as required.
5. Ensure theater transition points are designated for appropriate phases of reintegration activities.
6. Coordinate with CONUS reintegration representatives concerning reintegration activities. This
includes service, JPRA and joint staff representatives. JPRC entry point for coordination of
reintegration support external to theater command is the J-3-PP.
7. Coordinate reintegration standing operating procedures among PRCCs focusing on notification,
debriefing, transportation, medical facilities, Public Affairs Office (PAO), and next-of-kin (NOK)
notification procedures.
8. Develop and coordinate reintegration mission requirements to include situation updates from the
initial reception and theater transition points (Recovery reintegration Report, SERE Debriefings,
SERE Debriefing Checklist, NAR Debriefings, SERE Psychological support, and follow-on
debriefings as required).
9. Develop and update reintegration information in the applicable theater guidance. Specific items to
include are theater transition point designation, locations and contact information for theater
reintegration support personnel (to include JPRA and other supporting personnel external to the
command), host-nation and combined reintegration activities and agreements if applicable, special
instructions for civilian, DoD civilian, and other designated personnel.
10. Develop and disseminate public affairs guidance as appropriate.
11. Develop and disseminate commanders critical information requirements (CCIR), as appropriate.
12. Ensure measures are planned, exercised, and validated that will provide for care, custody, and
safeguards of the returnee, including all required health care and protection from unwarranted
curiosity, including the media and other medical patients.
13. Confirm the returnees identity and receive necessary disposition instructions by contacting both
the individuals service component PRCC and unit of assignment, contacting the JPRC, and
coordinating with the component J-1 as stated in DODI 2310.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A2.2 JPRC/PRCC Reintegration Checklist (2 of 2).


14. If the individuals identity cannot be confirmed, provide care, custody, and security controls and
request appropriate instructions from the JPRC or nearest counterintelligence agency.
15. Develop procedures for ensuring that time-sensitive tactical and perishable intelligence obtained
from the initial debriefing is submitted through appropriate intelligence channels for evaluation and
dissemination. Once the returnee is medically cleared, the component unit or organization that
initially receives the returnee and the theater intelligence collection agencies may debrief the
returnee for tactical intelligence.
16. Develop procedures for ensuring that the JPRC is notified concerning returnees who are identified
during debrief that they had prior access to sensitive evasion and escape (E&E) information relating
to clandestine mechanisms and specialized capabilities, or have received assistance during their
isolation. The JPRC will coordinate with the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) for follow-on
debriefings or upon coordination, provide a qualified JPRA debriefer, if required.
17. Once the initial debrief is finished, the team chief, in conjunction with the component command
authority, will develop and release an initial recovery report. Provide this report and any follow-on
debriefing reports to combatant commander staff, JPRC, and JPRA.
18. Develop follow-on debriefing procedures to assure expeditious collection and transmission of
intelligence information concerning recovered personnel of their respective services.
19. Upon receipt of disposition instructions from the JPRC (or in certain situations, the parent
services of recovered and returned personnel), coordinate for transportation and security escort, as
required.
20. Coordinate with the JPRC and component command authority for public affairs guidance and
next-of-kin disclosure for returned personnel.
21. Maintain OPSEC IAW theater guidance.
22. Prior to returning the returnee to home station, coordinate with the component command
authority to afford the returnee access to all necessary support agencies in theater to continue
reintegration needs.
23. At conclusion of the reintegration process (if the reintegration process is terminated by the
component command authority at Phase I or Phase II), provide the returnee with a post detention,
captivity, evasion, and escape report.
a. This report is provided via the returnees command authority and is a report on the returnees
behavior in terms of the code of conduct. This report is essential for closure and positive post
detention, captivity, evasion, and escape adjustment of the returnee.
b. This report is the returnees report card and tells them, in the eyes of the military, they survived
with honor.
c. This report should be clearly articulated to each individual returnee by a recognized representative
of the components command authority.
d. An example of the tone of this report card could be, Your service has examined your behavior
during detention /captivity/evasion/escape; you did not violate the UCMJ; rather, you served your
country honorably under extreme conditions; we are proud of you; you should be proud of
yourself.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A2-3

Table A2.3 Reintegration Team Chief Checklist (1 of 4).


A. General. A successful reintegration process hinges on proper preparation. Logistic, medical and
debriefing support planning should begin as soon as personnel are reported missing, duty status
whereabouts unknown, captured or taken hostage.
B. Critical Tasks. The following are reintegration critical tasks:
1. Provide medical care and include psychological care.
2. Provide SERE psychological oversight. (Phase II)
3. Provide and maintain security and force protection.
4. Provide PAO oversight.
5. Provide access to a chaplain.
6. Provide access to legal assistance.
7. Provide access to financial assistance.
8. Provide for local and theater intelligence debriefings.
9. Provide for SERE debriefing.
10. Provide a contact roster for each reintegration event.
11. Provide command authority with pertinent information to make decisions regarding repratriation
processes.
12. Maintain OPSEC.
13. Appoint an initial reception point and transition point OIC/NCOIC.
14. Coordinate with service representatives for reintegration.
15. Provide accommodations for returnee and reintegration team.
16. Provide acceptable facilities for reintegration.
17. Identify and record lessons learned.
18. Maintain process to obtain service personnel processing file (PPF) from isolated persons service.
19. Maintain accountability for all component/theater personnel reported missing.
C. Return to Friendly Control of Returnee.
1. Security and Force Protection Plan.
2. Medical coverage plan. Be prepared to provide emergency medical care to the returnee.
3. OPSEC Plan with applicable essential elements of friendly information.
4. Obtain personnel processing file (PPF) from J-1 or the individuals service.
5. Transportation plan to initial reception point facility. Include medical coverage and security in this
plan.
6. Key unit member should be present if possible.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A2.4 Reintegration Team Chief Checklist (2 of 4).


D. Initial Reception Point.
1. Facilities.
a. Room, office, or other facility that provides maximum security and minimum distraction. Pleasant
and peaceful atmosphere conducive to the restoration of mental stability and maximum recall.
b. Messing, billeting, and medical facilities that promote restoration of physical strength as rapidly as
possible.
2. Equipment.
a. Adequate maps, reference materiels, tape recorders, current situation, and intelligence reports
should be on hand. This equipment will become classified immediately after use in debriefing the
returnees.
b. Personnel may be returning in clothing that is in disrepair or reminiscent of their period of evasion
and captivity. Be prepared to clothe personnel in uniforms or civilian attire that they will maintain
through the entire reintegration process
c. Hygiene issues should be addressed. Toiletry kits consisting of minimal essentials to shave, shower,
brush teeth, and hair are recommended
d. Military identification equipment (CAC/dog tags) may need to be replaced. Arrange for support
personnel to accomplish this en masse at the reintegration facility
E. Procedures.
1. Medical screening and assessment. Be prepared for potential emergency medical treatment and
long-term care.
2. If more than one returnee is returned to friendly control simultaneously, keep them aggregated.
3. Obtain returnees signature on a DD Form 2810, Promise of Confidentiality, reference, immediately
following medical screening. These forms must be signed before the initial tactical debriefing.
4. Advise returned DoD contractor employees upon initial reintegration that they may choose to be
processed through all phases of reintegration, including Phase III hospitalization in CONUS. Be
prepared to repatriate other US, coalition, or allied personnel as directed by USCINCCENT. Inform all
personnel outside of DoD, that if authorized by USCINCCENT they too can elect to be repatriated
through DoD reintegration mechanisms. If they initially refuse, they will not have a second opportunity,
or if they elect to leave the military processing sequence, they will not be allowed to reenter. When a
returned DoD employee elects to be processed through the DoD system, the DoD will coordinate with
the Department of State (American Citizens Services and Crisis Management Branch) to ensure that all
available personal, medical, dental, and family data is provided to reintegration processing centers.
5. Conduct initial debrief of returnee. Brief the individual about the reintegration process. (NOTE: It is
recommended that a chaplain be present at the initial reception.) Finalize action plan and brief
component command authority; coordinate final plan with the JPRC. Immediately determine if the
returnee has received assistance during the isolation period or is briefed on sensitive E&E plans and
procedures. If the individual states or indicates that they have information regarding sensitive or covert
recovery plans, procedures, organizations, programs, or equipment cease, this portion of the debriefing
immediately and coordinate with JPRC as soon as possible. At this time, obtain the returnees signature
on a nondisclosure statement and begin coordination with the JPRC for a JPRA NAR debrief. See
Table 12.7, Nondisclosure Agreement.
6. Prepare and transmit situational update, Recovery Reintegration Report.
7. Based on the action plan and the desired task organization, request additional reintegration support if
required. Coordinate with the JPRC for all external joint requirements.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A2-5

Table A2.5 Reintegration Team Chief Checklist (3 of 4).


8. If present, ensure the JPRA SERE psychologist is granted access to the returnee as early as possible
and begins a formal evaluation of the returnee.
9. If possible, once initially debriefed, the returnee should meet with their designated unit representative.
At this point, if possible, the returnee should be allowed to telephone home. Prior to any phone call, the
unit representative, in coordination with applicable professional such as doctors, chaplains, family
support personnel, and so forth, shall brief the returnee on any family issues that may have occurred
during the returnees absence (e.g., divorce and death in the family). The unit representative shall also
begin working with the returnee to ensure a smooth transition back to personal, professional, and family
life.
10. If public affairs or next of kin disclosure concerning status has been made, public affairs guidance or
next-of-kin guidance will be provided, including appropriate cover statements. Public Affairs shall
ensure any public statements the returnee makes are coordinated through the Public Affairs office and
JPRA. PA shall also provide security guidance on what aspects of the returnees captivity may and may
not be discussed publicly.
11. Begin to schedule follow-on debriefs as required.
F. Debriefing.
1. The tactical intelligence debriefing should include, but not be limited to:
a. Name, rank, service, or social security number.
b. Nature and extent of knowledge and competence of recovered personnel as observer and reporter.
c. A resume of the individuals experience while isolated in enemy territory.
d. General/specific information pertaining to the enemy, based on current essential elements of
information.
e. Routes of travel and identifiable points en route.
f. Time spent in travel.
g. Means and methods of travel, food, and rest.
i. Observation of unusual or significant indigenous activities.
j. Determination of type assistance received, if any. Again, if the individual indicates knowledge of
any assisted recovery, cease this portion of the debriefing and coordinate further NAR debriefings
with the JPRC.
k. Means of recovery.
l. Identification of personnel still captured, detained, or known to be dead.
m. Captors intentions toward those remaining in captivity or detention.
n. Details on prisoner routine, to include security, handling, processing, and treatment.
2. Depending on the results of the initial tactical intelligence debriefing, the returnee may have to be
debriefed one or more subsequent times.
3. If the JPRA SERE debriefer is present, conduct the SERE debriefing. If not, schedule later in the
process.
4. If required, schedule and coordinate the NAR debriefing.
5. Conduct the initial SERE psychological debriefing.
6. Following the debriefings, the individual will be informed of responsibilities and required actions in
accordance with existing security regulations.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A2.6 Reintegration Team Chief Checklist (4 of 4).


G. Follow-Up Procedures.
1. Continue the action plan to develop an assessment of the returnee. ICW the medical, psychological, and returnee command authority representatives; recommend to the component
command authority whether the returnee should be returned to duty or transported to the theater transition point for continued decompression and reintegration.
2. If returned to duty, continue follow-up reintegration procedures including administrative,
financial, and spiritual overwatch. Consummate the reintegration process with a post detention/captivity report to the returnee. Coordinate follow-up debriefings through the returnees
chain of command.
3. If the decision is made to transport to the theater transition point, conduct a hand-off with
the transition point reintegration team who will assume responsibility for this individual.
Develop a transition point action plan and continue reintegration procedures at this location.
Be prepared for evacuation of the returnee to CONUS. Be prepared for coordination with reintegration Representatives at this time.
4. Continue to develop an assessment of the returnees condition and recommend to the component command authority to return the individual to duty or evacuate from the theater. If
returned to duty, consummate the reintegration process with a post detention and captivity
report to the returnee.
5. Update the tracking mechanism that ensures full accountability of all missing and located
personnel. Ensure that mission folder is complete and saved for forwarding to JPRA at the end
of operations.
H. Return to CONUS.
1. An escort officer shall accompany each returnee to the Phase III processing center in
CONUS. The SERE psychologist or other trained mental health professional shall remain with
the returnee, as determined necessary in consultation with JPRA, through all phases.
2. Personal escorts may include representatives from any military service; however, when all
returnees are from the same service, escorts should be from that service as well. The primary
consideration is for returnees to have someone from the service immediately available to
respond to questions or provide assistance

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A2-7

Table A2.7 Debriefing Checklist for Reintegration Team Chiefs (1 of 2).


A. Debriefings and Visits. The components, in coordination with the JPRC, will establish appropriate
command procedures to ensure returnees under their control are debriefed by qualified personnel.
Requested and unannounced dignitary visits will occur during the recovery and reintegration of isolated
personnel. The purpose of the debriefings is to determine the effectiveness of theater recovery concepts,
plans, operations, tactics, procedures, techniques, security, training, and to develop intelligence of
immediate tactical value. The results of these debriefings and any associated operational after-action
reports will be forwarded to JPRA by the JPRC, who will:
1. Evaluate the debriefings and reports to determine worldwide trends.
2. Determine associated briefings, reports, and analyses to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
service SERE schools, and theater recovery resources or organizations.
3. Determine the validity of existing theater policy, doctrine, and procedures and institute changes as
required.
4. Maintain historical files of the debriefings, reports, and analyses.
B. Debriefings. All debriefings shall be focused timely and will last only as long as the returnee is able to
hold up mentally and physically. If the returnee is a military service member and reveals information
implicating himself or herself in a potential violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice or other US
criminal law and the debriefer is a military member or a DoD employee, the debriefer shall stop
debriefing and inform the returnee of his or her rights under Article 31(b), UCMJ. If the returnee requests
counsel or does not desire to continue the debriefing, the debriefing will cease until counsel is obtained. If
the returnee does not request counsel and agrees to continue with the debriefing, the debriefing may
continue. If the returnee is a DoD civilian or DoD contractor employee and reveals information
implicating himself or herself in a potential criminal offense under US criminal law, the debriefer will
cease questioning and consult with a judge advocate or an attorney assigned to the US Attorneys office
before continuing. There are five separate debriefings that may be required in the reintegration process:
1. Initial Debriefing. The purpose of the initial debriefing is to gather critical data to assist in
development of the components reintegration plan. This data is common mission data that is
disseminated to all reintegration participants and forwarded to the JPRC. The component reintegration
team chief should conduct the initial debriefing concurrent with, yet observant to the constraints of
initial medical evaluation and treatment. Questions will be composed to ascertain the following: name,
rank, serial number, organization, health and physical condition, and recovery details such as location,
date, time, and method; whether individual has been in contact with an assistance mechanism or was
held captive by the enemy at any time; and possesses any appropriate tactical and perishable
intelligence, or any appropriate POW/MIA identification and status information. Additionally,
individuals who state that they had assistance during their isolation or evasion will be advised not to
disclose details of this information except to a specific representative of the JPRC or JPRA. The
returnee should be given an explanation as to the expected duration of the various debriefings and
should be told to expect and be prepared for numerous visits.
2. Intelligence Debriefing. The purpose of the initial intelligence debriefing is to collect perishable
tactical information and time-sensitive information on US personnel last seen alive in a POW camp
system, but who are still unaccounted for. This debriefing should be conducted as soon as possible after
the returnee is medically cleared. The duration of this debriefing should be kept to a minimum, with
additional follow-up sessions coordinated with the reintegration team chief, and command authority at
a later date. During this debriefing, the returnee will not be debriefed about sensitive or covert recovery
plans, procedures, organizations, programs, or equipment unless directed by the JPRC or JPRA.

A2-8

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A2.8 Debriefing Checklist For Reintegration Team Chiefs (2 of 2).


3. SERE Debriefing. Only a SERE Specialist will conduct the SERE debriefing. The purpose of this
debriefing is to collect perishable information pertinent to SERE issues and to assess the returnees
exposure to sensitive recovery operations. JPRA, in coordination with the JPRC and Command
Authority, will determine if the returnees exposure to sensitive information warrants subsequent
debriefing or assignment restrictions. The JPRC, in coordination with JPRA, will notify the returnees
parent service if such action is required. The services will institute appropriate assignment restriction,
as required. Collected information is considered classified and will be kept confidential, but relevant
lessons learned will be immediately disseminated to the joint force.
4. NAR Debriefing. If required, only an authorized representative of JPRA will conduct the NAR
debriefing. This debriefing is conducted to collect information pertinent to assisted recovery operations. The content of this debriefing is classified. Prior to conducting the debriefing, the returnees will
sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA). See Lessons learned will be disseminated to the joint force as
expeditiously as possible. Coordination with the JPRC and CCJ3-PP is required to request NAR
debriefing support from JPRA.
5. SERE Psychological Debrief. Only an authorized representative of JPRA will conduct the SERE
debriefing. This debriefing is conducted to ascertain the psychological status of the returnee. Its recommendations delineate any special considerations that need to be afforded the returnee during the
reintegration process and glean valuable insights necessary to shape the medical treatment plan.
C. Recovery Reintegration Report. A situational report, (Recovery reintegration Report) will be transmitted as soon as possible to the recovered individuals parent service, with copies to HQ JPRA, joint
personnel recovery center (JPRC), and the individuals unit. Along with critical returnee data, the report
will include an assessment of potential support required and a road map for reintegration activities. The
report will be classified IAW SJS Info Memo 15-92, Subject: Security Classification of DoD POW/MIA
Information, dated 27 February 1992, and will request disposition instructions from the individuals parent service.
D. Visits. The returnee and reintegration team must be prepared for possible visits by dignitaries,
high-ranking government, authorities, and specialists. These may include command and service representatives, government representatives, media, well-wishers, and opportunists hoping to capitalize on the
returnees experience. The component command authority must develop a visit plan to deal with these
occasions. The Public Affairs representative and security team should be the focal point for these visits.
Use of the medical treatment or isolation area will facilitate the control of these visits.
E. Follow-On Debriefings. Follow-on debriefings may be conducted by the individuals parent service.
If required, follow-on debriefings will also be conducted by HQ JPRA personnel. Additionally, if
required, HQ JPRA will coordinate supplemental debriefing requirements with the other government
agencies (OGA).
F. Debriefing Markings. Once a debriefing has been completed and properly classified, the following
instructions will be marked on the front:
CONTENTS ARE CLASSIFIED BY _______________ IAW EXECUTIVE ORDER
12958. DECLASSIFY ON: __________________. IF DECLASSIFIED, THIS INFORMATION
MUST BE REVIEWED TO ENSURE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF DOD DIRECTIVE 5400.7,
DOD DIRECTIVE 5400.11, AND DOD.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A2-9

Table A2.9 DD Form 2810Promise of Confidentiality.


PROMISE OF CONFIDENTIALITY

(10 United States Code Section 1506(d))


It is in the interest of the United States that missing persons who are returned to the control of
the United States provide the fullest possible disclosure of information during their absence.
To ensure this fullest possible disclosure, the Secretary of the armed service to which you
belong or for whom you are employed promises to withhold from disclosure your debriefing
report or any part thereof as privileged information.
If your debriefing report contains non-derogatory information about the status and
whereabouts of someone else who remains a missing person (either named or unnamed), then
you should know that the Secretary of your armed force will prepare an extract of that
non-derogatory information. You will have an opportunity to review the extract. Thereafter, the
extract will be placed in the file of each missing person whom you name in your debriefing
report. However, the extract will protect your identity. The information in the extract will be
made reasonably accessible to the missing persons' primary next of kin, members of the
immediate family, and any person previously designated by the missing person to receive
information about his or her whereabouts and status. The reason we do this is to provide as much
information as possible to those who are trying to locate and recover missing persons and to let
the missing persons' loved ones know as much as we can lawfully tell them.
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Chapter 76, Title 10 U.S.C., and E.O. 9397.


PRINCIPAL PURPOSE(S): To aid in personnel recovery, SERE (survival, evasion,
resistance, and escape) training, operational planning, verification of Geneva
Conventions by captors, and re-integration of returning personnel.
ROUTINE USE(S): Information may be provided to the Central Intelligence Agency, the
State Department, and the National Security Council to facilitate interagency
cooperation on personnel recovery issues.
DISCLOSURE: Voluntary; however, failure to furnish requested information may
impede DoD efforts to assist you in the re-integration process.
RETURNEE
1. SIGNATURE
2. NAME (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE INITIAL)
3. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
6. ORGANIZATION OR UNIT
7. LOCATION OF DEBRIEFING

DD FORM 2810, NOV 1999

4. RANK/GRADE

5. SERVICE

A2-10

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A2.10 JPRC CRO C2 Checklist (1 of 3).


JPRC CRO C2 CHECKLIST
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS:
- Be competent! Review all PR Instructions and Directives. You are the system for reintegration!
- Continually update reintegration contacts list. DODI 2310.4 Chapter 5.4.5.10.
- Have your team members names, tent numbers, phone numbers, other contacts as appropriate,
etc., assembled for immediate scramble.
Events ChecklistInitial Incident.
- Notify SECDEFs office through appropriate COC. Begin with JPRC Director. Per DODI
2310.3 Chapter 4.1.1.
- Draft PR Incident Report within 3 hours of initial report. Per DODI 2310.3 Chapter 5.4.1.
- Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs shall appoint a rep. who is the sole agent for
release of official DoD information pertaining to PR incidents. DODI 2310.3 Chapter 4.7.
- Begin building Personnel Processing File (PPF) in conjunction with DODI 2310.4 Chapter E2.
- Notify JPRA PR Representative in respective Combatant Command. DODI 2310.4 Chapter
4.3.
D-minusReturn of IPs imminent.
- Implement Reintegration. Activate Phase I Reintegration Site; Component Commands prepare
to receive and process returnees, alert DoD and JPRA.
- Reintegration Team activated and augmented.
- Consider religious preferences of IPs when choosing Chaplains.
- Arrange airlift for Reintegration Team to meet IPs at Phase I Reintegration center.
- Ask CAOC Director for the use of a Tri-band worldwide cell phone to stay in contact with
ALLCON agencies.
- Ensure Phase III Processing Centers on stand-by, activated and prepared to receive returnees.
Escort from units activated as directed and escorts dispatched.
D+ Release/Phase I.
- Reception, identification, Medical attention, onward movement to Phase I Reintegration center.
- Ensure all returnees are kept together to the greatest extent possible. They will all get
transported to the facility of highest medical care dependant upon most critically injured patient.
DODI 2310.4 Chapter 6.2.1.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A2-11

Table A2.11 JPRC CRO C2 Checklist (2 of 3).


3) Ensure respective Military Service PA Offices coordinate their efforts through office of
Assistant SECDEF for Public Affairs. DODI 2310.4 Chapter 5.4.8.
4) Conduct initial debrief once returnee is medically cleared IAW 525-10.
a) Use DD Form 2810, Promise of Confidentiality for all debriefings IAW 10 U.S.C.
1506(d)(1).
b) Intel creates Initial Recovery Report (IRR) and forward to JPRC and JPRA IAW 525-10
Appendix C.
5) Notify Next of Kin (NOK), through proper component Casualty Affairs Office, confirm IP
NOK telephone numbers, prepare NOK for travel if necessary in cases of imminent death,
dispatch returnee records to CONUS Processing Center by special courier.
6) Arrange airlift/MEDEVAC to Phase II Reintegration site.
Phase IIArrival at Phase II Reintegration Site
1) Medical attention and treatment.
3) Personal needs, health and comfort of returnee.
3) Recall roster/contacts for Reintegration Team and other associated persons.
4) Receive NOK if medical necessity requires their presence before Phase III. Arrange
billeting and get telephone numbers.
5) Conduct tactical intelligence debriefing. Maximum of four hours/day.
a) JAG available for possible UCMJ and/or US Criminal Law violations. DODI 2310.4
Chapter E1.1.2.3.
6) Telephone call to IP NOK. Be sure IPs have been briefed by Service Rep., chaplain, etc., if
something significant has happened during their captivity.
7) If IP is returning to duty, SERE debrief must be completed before returned to their units.
8) At the conclusion of the Reintegration process (if concluded early) provide a
post-detenion/captivity/evasion/escape report IAW USCENTCOM Regulation 525-10.
9) Arrange airlift/medevac to Phase III if necessary. Consider flights in CONUS from port to
hospital.
10) Prepare escorts for onward movement.
11) Arrange same service escorts to meet and escort them to Phase III.
12) Prepare records & files for movement.
13) Ensure CONUS Components ready to receive IPs.
14) Instructions to press/media PAO reference arrival of IPs.
Arrival at CONUS Port of DebarkationBegin Phase III Processing
1) IPs meet same service escorts if not already done.
2) Prepare returnees for onward movement.

A2-12

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A2.12 JPRC CRO C2 Checklist (3 of 3).


3) Prepare and allocate escorts for onward movement.
4) Accommodate and brief NOK.
a) May require JAG, chaplain, etc.
5) Movement to hospital.
6) Briefing by Yellow Ribbon Team Chief and/or hospital commander.
7) Ensure convalescent leave arranged.
8) Conduct SERE debriefs in conjunction w/JPRA.
9) Case file assembled. All IPs assured that they can contact SERE Psych and get help when
needed.
Documents to Travel With During Reintegration
1) DODD 2310.2 (PR).
2) DODI 2310.3 (PRRC).
3) DODI 2310.4 (Reintegration).
4) DODI 2310.6 (NAR).
5) CENTCOM Regulation 525-10.
6) JPRA SERE Debriefing Guide.
7) USAF SERE Debriefing Guide.
8) INTEL Debriefing Guide.
9) DD Form 2810 Promise of Confidentiality.
10) 20031001 USD(P) Signed Reintegration Memo.
11) All Theater Reintegration Plans.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A2-13

Table A2.13 JPRC INTEL Checklist (1 of 2).


JPRC REINTEGRATION INTEL CHECKLIST
General Considerations:
- Much intelligence can be gleaned from recent returnees. It is very important to obtain this
intelligence as quickly as possible after their return. Intelligence gained from your debriefs will
instantly be used to save Americans still held hostage and to identify immediate threats to
coalition forces.
- During reintegration, physical health and medical care has priority over intelligence
exploitation. Whenever possible, the screening and exploitation of highly perishable
information will occur during Phase I to prevent loss or injury of US lives or damage to
operations, plans, or interests.
- Due to the high visibility of reintegration, intelligence debriefers will be selected on the basis
of experience, training, maturity, knowledge, and subject matter expertise. JPRA can provide
specialized training if required.
Consideration Checklist:
1) Obtain reintegration overview brief from JPRC Combat Rescue Officer (CRO) and/or
theater JPRA representative as necessary.
2) Obtain intelligence debriefing guide from JPRC CRO, JPRA representative or JPRC SERE
representative.
3) Ensure all returnees rights are protected by having them sign a DD Form 2810 (Promise of
Confidentiality) before any Intel debriefing or written statements are made.
4) An initial Phase I debrief will be conducted immediately upon return of personnel to U.S.
control to identify and exploit any perishable information that could prevent loss or injury to
coalition lives or the serious compromise to coalition operations or interests.
5) Be present for all debriefings. The initial Phase I debrief is very crucial. Its from this
debrief that we start to direct our questions. It is important to realize that the first debrief is low
stress by design. It begins the psychological recovery of the Isolated Person/Personnel (IP).
Any questions asked after the initial debrief will be limited to coalition threats, numbers of
enemy, SALUTE reporting, etc. The debriefer will not give an Article 31, UCMJ, warning
against self-incrimination.
6) Create Initial Recovery Report (IRR) and forward to JPRC and JPRA IAW
CENTCOM Regulation 525-10 Appendix C.
7) Intel debriefs may uncover information indicating that returnees may have violated the
UCMJ during captivity and indications of such violations may surface during debriefing. They
may surface in three ways:
A) Returnee may make a statement that indicates another returnee may have violated the
UCMJ.
B) Returnee may make a statement indicating that he/she may have violated the UCMJ.
C) Other sources may provide a basis for concluding that returnees may have violated the
UCMJ.
8) As the Intel debriefer, it is not your responsibility to determine guilt or innocence. If the
returnee asks for or the debriefer feels legal counsel during or after the initial intelligence
debrief is needed in regards to any misconduct, he/she will be referred to an investigator who
handles such matters. The investigator, rather than the debriefer, is charged with the
responsibility for complying with Article 31, UCMJ.

A2-14

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A2.14 JPRC INTEL Checklist (2 of 2).


9) Debriefer will not infringe on any legal rights of any returnee. Component Staff Judge
Advocate (SJA) or Judge Advocate General (JAG) officers will provide competent military
legal advice as required.
10) As the Intelligence expert, youre responsible for counseling returnees, Public Affairs, and
other team members concerning the unauthorized disclosure of classified/sensitive information.
11) Safeguard information obtained from returnees and disseminates such information only
within authorized channels. The JPRA representative will determine channels. In the absence of
a JPRA representative, the JPRC CRO or SERE Specialist will be able to help.
EXTRA CONSIDERTATIONS
A) Signals equipment (cell phones, computers, pagers, radios, etc.) are evacuated through
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) channels.
B) Documents (maps, manuals, lists, letters, plans, etc.) are evacuated through document
exploitation (DOCEX) channels.
C) Personal effects (currency, valuables) are returned to reintegrated individual, or, receipted
and evacuated through appropriate intelligence or security channels.
D) Materiel (weapons, vehicles, equipment, tools, etc.) are evacuated through intelligence
foreign materiel channels.
E) Include JPRA as an addressee on all reports, to ensure background data is available for Phase
II and III debriefings as appropriate, and to avoid subjecting the returnees to duplicative
debriefings.
F) Returned personnel are not subject to intelligence polygraph examinations.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A2-15

Table A2.15 JPRC Legal Counsel Checklist (1 of 2).


JPRC REINTEGRATION LEGAL COUNSEL CHECKLIST
General Considerations:
- Legal Counsel is very important during the Reintegration process. The Judge Advocate
General (JAG) and/or Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) are an integral part of the reintegration team.
Ideally, one legal representative should be available to remain with the returnees throughout the
reintegration process.
- Its Legal Counsels duty to ensure that returned IP, or otherwise isolated personnel are
afforded, during every stage of processing, the opportunity to fully exercise all rights and
privileges afforded by UCMJ, US Constitution, and other applicable laws, regulations, and
directives.
- Medical Treatment of any returnee is paramount in the reintegration process and holds higher
precedence than any other function.
- This document is meant to familiarize Legal Counsel with frequent considerations during
reintegration and is not definitive legal guidance under UCMJ.
Legal Counsel Checklist:
1) Obtain Reintegration overview brief from JPRC Combat Rescue Officer (CRO) and/or
theater JPRA representative as necessary.
2) Ensure appropriate legal counsel will be available to all returnees concerning any personal
legal problems or other administrative matters.
3) Ensure all returnees rights are protected by having them sign a DD Form 2810 (Promise of
Confidentiality) before any debriefings, questioning, or written statements are made.
4) Provide advice on personal legal problems due to the length of captivity experienced by the
returnees. These may include but are not limited to the following:
A) Death in the returnees family.
B) Divorce/change of marital status.
C) Financial responsibilities.
5) Be present and available for all debriefings except for the initial intelligence debrief. The
purpose of the initial intelligence debrief is to gain time critical information on immediate
threats to coalition forces and/or information that may speed the recovery of personnel still in
captivity. Therefore the debriefer will not give an Article 31, UCMJ, warning against
self-incrimination.
6) It is possible that returnees have violated the UCMJ during captivity and indications of such
violations may surface during debriefing. They may surface in three ways:
A) Returnee may make a statement that indicates another returnee may have violated the
UCMJ.
B) Returnee may make a statement indicating that he/she may have violated the UCMJ.
C) Other sources may provide a basis for concluding that returnees may have violated the
UCMJ.

A2-16

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A2.16 JPRC Legal Counsel Checklist (2 of 2).


7) If the returnee is a DoD civilian or DoD contractor employee and reveals information
implicating himself or herself in a potential criminal offense under U.S. criminal law, the
debriefer will cease questioning and consult with a judge advocate or an attorney assigned to the
U.S. Attorneys Office before continuing. (CENTCOM R 525-10 Chapter 8.b.)
8) If the returnee asks for legal counsel during or after the initial intelligence debrief in regards
to any misconduct, he/she will be referred to an investigator who handles such matters. The
investigator, rather than the debriefer, is charged with the responsibility for complying with
Article 31, UCMJ.
9) If information indicating a UCMJ violation arises as a result of debriefing, the debriefing will
stop. The information will be forwarded to the installation JAG Office to determine if an
Article 31, UCMJ, warning will be given before continuing the debriefing. It will be
determined whether a separate investigative case should be initiated, separate and apart from
any planned or on-going debriefing. The warnings required by Article 31, UCMJ, will be given
in all cases where a follow on debriefing or a subsequent investigation indicates such a
requirement.
A) If a returnee voluntarily acknowledges his own misconduct, the debriefer will not pursue
any such statements, but will report such facts to legal counsel and await further guidance as
to whether debriefing should be continued.
B) (2) Should a returnee report misconduct of a fellow prisoner or detainee, the debriefer will
record the particulars. The debriefer will advise the returnee that the debriefing is not to
gather information as to potential misconduct. If the returnee desires to pursue the matter
against the fellow prisoner or detainee, hell be given an opportunity to present information to
a criminal investigator.
10) Be prepared to pass the facts and circumstances of any case to higher command.
11) Provide guidance and ensure uniformity as to the appropriate procedures to follow during
the debriefing of all returnees.
12) Determine any concerns to national security interests that may require action by the
Secretaries of the Armed Forces.
13) Provide Next of Kin (NOK) with advice and assistance on their personal legal problems.
Assign additional Legal Counsel to NOK if necessary.
14) Act as legal advisor to the YELLOW RIBBON Processing Team Chief and debriefers.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A2-17

Table A2.17 JPRC PAO Checklist (1 of 2).


JPRC REINTEGRATION PAO CHECKLIST
General Considerations:
- Public Affairs (PA) is critically important to the success of the reintegration process. Duties
include providing guidance to the Reintegration Team, controlling access, and coordinating
information to the media through the office of the SECDEF and Joint Forces Command
USJFCOM. Reintegration is a very high visibility process. Ideally, one PAO should be available
to remain with the returnees throughout the reintegration process.
-This checklist outlines DoD and Combatant Command policies and provides guidance for the
conduct of PA activities associated with the reintegration of U. S. Military, civilian employees,
and contractor service employees who have been Prisoners of War (POW), held hostage by
terrorists, detained in peacetime by a hostile foreign government, evading enemy capture, or
otherwise missing under hostile conditions.
PA Duties Checklist:
1) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs OASD (PA) shall appoint a rep. who is the
sole agent for release of official DoD information pertaining to PR incidents. DODI 2310.3
Chap 4.7 Contact this representative.
2) Refer to theater and component reintegration plans as required. These can be obtained
through the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) Combat Rescue Officer or the Joint
Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) representative.
3) Notify office of SECDEF through JPRC and JPRA that you are the PAO assigned to the
reintegration process. Provide contact information and cell phone numbers at all locations.
4) Obtain Reintegration overview brief from JPRC Combat Rescue Officer (CRO) and/or
theater JPRA representative as necessary.
5) Provide maximum information to the public and concerned Commanders. Consider the
following:
A) The health and welfare of the returnees and their families.
B) National security.
C) The safety and interests of personnel still held in captivity or IP.

A2-18

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A2.18 JPRC PAO Checklist (2 of 2).


6) Ensure all concerned parties realize medical needs and personal welfare of the returnees is
the highest priority.
7) Do not confirm names of released prisoners until NOK have been officially notified. At that
time, release of the returnees name, grade, date of capture, branch of service and home of
record are authorized. Families of returned service members may receive initial information
about release through the news media. Nevertheless, official NOK notification procedures
must be complete before release of personal information.
8) Ensure that returnees have assistance during PA briefings.
9) Brief returnees against inadvertent disclosure of classified information. Work closely with
JPRA, SERE, and INTEL to assure non-disclosure.
10) Provide PA guidance and assistance to the families of the returnees.
11) Coordinate with sister service PA prior to and during recovery operations until reintegration
personnel are returned to CONUS.
12) Provide PA guidance to Casualty Assistance Officer as required.
13) The media has a right and a responsibility to gather information related to returned
prisoners. This right should be respected. Prompt and accurate responses to queries should be
forthcoming if they will not aversely affect the returnees or individuals still in captivity.
14) Returned U. S. personnel may be interviewed by news media only after reintegration is
complete and ASD (PA) and JFCOM grant permission.
15) Personal consent of the returnee must be received prior to any interview or press
conference.
16) PA guidance will be provided to NOK regarding anticipated return to CONUS as soon as
possible. Notification should be through the Casualty Affairs Office.
17) News media may observe and photograph the turnover, arrival and departure of returnees in
a manner precluding direct contact. Photographs of seriously wounded and ill personnel will
not be permitted.
18) No official file photographs will be released before returnees have been positively
identified, and next of kin notified of their return to U. S. military control. OASD (PA) will
make initial release of such photos.
19) During the Reintegration process, PA will keep the media informed of daily activities of the
returnees and their overall physical condition.
20) PA will attain authorized releasable information from returnees debriefing team in order to
prepare returnees to field media questions.
21) Be present for all interviews regarding returnees.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A3-1
ATTACHMENT 3

DEBRIEFING GUIDE FOR PR OPERATIONS


TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section Title

Page

General Information.........................................................................................................................2
Biographical Information.................................................................................................................4
Military Biographical Information...................................................................................................4
Premission Preparation ....................................................................................................................5
Events Leading Up to Isolation .......................................................................................................6
Incident Details ................................................................................................................................6
Survival & Evasion .........................................................................................................................7
Contacts with Local Populace........................................................................................................13
Cultural Aspects.............................................................................................................................14
Preparation for Recovery ...............................................................................................................14
Recovery Phase/Conventional Assisted Recovery (Planned)........................................................15
Non-Conventional Assisted Recovery (Planned) ..........................................................................15
Unplanned Contacts .......................................................................................................................15
On-Scene Military Forces ..............................................................................................................20
Unassisted Recovery......................................................................................................................21
Capture and Detainment Methodologies .......................................................................................21
Information Gathered at Capture ...................................................................................................23
Movement Phase............................................................................................................................23
Tactical Interrogation .....................................................................................................................25
Permanent Facility .........................................................................................................................27
Captivity Conditions and Treatment ..............................................................................................37
Escape From Capture, Movement, and Fixed Facility Phases ......................................................39
Detention........................................................................................................................................45
Interrogation...................................................................................................................................48
Exploitation....................................................................................................................................53
Resistance ......................................................................................................................................57
Communication and Organization .................................................................................................60
Lessons Learned ............................................................................................................................63

A3-2

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A3.1 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (1 of 62).


General Information
1. Introduction
DURING THE INTERVIEW/DEBRIEF, ONLY THE INTERVIEWER SHOULD ASK
QUESTIONS, INTERACT WITH, AND OTHERWISE ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN A
RELATIONASHIP WITH THE SUBJECT. THE OTHER TEAM MEMBERS, CAMERA,
NOTE TAKER, ETC., SHOULD MAINTAIN SILENCE. They may write down questions that
they would like the subject to answer, and pass them to the interviewer during breaks. Usually,
the other team members will find that they will end up crossing off the questions that they have
written down, as an experienced interviewer will, in their own way and time, get all the questions
in. The interviewer will introduce the other team members, providing the appropriate level of
pre-arranged details, and explain the above questioning procedures.
The interviewer should:
Express appreciation for his/her participation.
Explain how the information will be used.
Provide a general, but not rigid, structure of how the interview will proceed
Ensure he/she is comfortable, provide something to drink, engage in enough casual conversation
to put the subject at ease and then proceed with the interview. Items to have within reach of the
subject should include:
Pitcher or bottle of water and glass
Box of kleenex
Pad of paper and pen/pencil
Provide maps, charts and imagery (when available) for the operational area as an aid to the
subject in explaining actions taken and identify specific locations.
Note: Try and arrange for breaks to come between topic areas on the interview outline, as this
will facilitate picking up the dialogue again without losing continuity and momentum. However,
the interviewer should pay close attention to the subject's body language, taking breaks when
appropriate. Following each topic area, remember to ask if he/she would like to take a few
minutes to refresh/stretch/etc. Also ask if there was something related to the topic that was not
asked and they would like to mention/discuss. Allow for the camera operator to change setting
and angle, if necessary.
If there is ample debrief time available, and use of the debrief is anticipated for training (or will
be edited), request that the subject begin their response to each question by pausing (explain how
this will aid later in the editing process). Provide an example such as: if the question was What
type of aircraft were you on? You would begin with the aircraft I was on was an MH-53.
Explain that at the end of each of their responses, that you too (the interviewer) will pause
slightly, prior to asking the next question.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A3-3

Table A3.2 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (2 of 62).


2. Personal Information.
Gather personal demographic data. See question set below and select appropriate
demographic data for each situation.
3. Overview of Incident.
If not conducted before, ask subject to give a general overview of their experience from
beginning to end. Let subject know you will go back after this overview and systematically
walk through the entire experience in detail and by stages.
Listen carefully and take notes as you listen to his overview.
Avoid getting bogged down in any specific area too long.
Without abruptness, guide him/her along if necessary. Use comments like that is very
important and we will discuss that in detail when we are dealing with.
4. Take a break.
Take a break. As a team, review the general overview. Discuss modifications (if any) based on
the overview. After the break, come back and fill in the holes in the story. Compare the
information with the established interview questions.
5. Detailed Analysis of Incident.
Proceed through the interview as outlined below. Integrate any notes taken during the
subject's overview into the sections of the outline where they are appropriate. Allow the time
necessary for the subject to feel as if they have covered each area to their satisfaction. Stick
with the outline, but be flexible enough to meet the subject's needs to express information so
as not to stifle the conversational flow. Use the outline to expand on subjects that are of
interest.
If the subject was recovered via Non-Conventional Assisted Recovery (NAR) methods, then
the debriefing team MUST include a representative from J3-N. If J3-N is not present, and the
returnee indicates that his recovery may have been through non-conventional means, do not
ask any questions regarding non-conventional recovery until the J3-N representative is
present. Debriefings containing information pertaining to NAR methods must initially be
protected at the TS/NF/OC/SAR level until evaluated by J3-N.
6. Sample Questions.
NOTE:
The following question set is a guide to help debriefing team's select appropriate questions for a
variety of situations. It is not expected that every returnee answer all the following questions.
The debriefing team should review this question set and cut, paste, and add questions as
appropriate to create a tailored debriefing guide for each subject.

A3-4

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A3.3 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (3 of 62).


SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1. Biographical information.
1.1. What is your full name? What are any other names (AKAs) you are known by?
1.2. What is your rank (or civilian equivalent)?
1.3. What is your SSAN?
1.4. What is your place and date of birth?
1.5. Did you have any applicable childhood experiences, hobbies, or activities that may have
prepared you for your isolation experience?
1.6. Do you have any civilian training, skills, licenses, and/or certifications, that would have
assisted in preparing you for your survival/evasion experiences?
2. Military biographical information.
2.1. What is your branch of service?
2.2. What was the date you entered the service? If commissioned, source of commission?
2.3. What is your job title and code (AFSC, MOS, RATING, etc.)?
2.4. What is your current unit and parent organization?
2.5. What were your previous assignments?
2.6. What is you unit address and phone number?
2.7. Where is your unit based?
2.8. What was your radio call sign? List all call signs associated with your mission.
2.9. What was the name of your operation?
2.10. What was your crew or squad position?
2.11. What training had you received up to this point in your military career?
2.12. Do you have any special survival or resistance training?
2.13. Have you had any other SERE training or experiences?
2.14. Do you have JSTP training?
2.15. Did you attend any special military training?
2.16. Did you have any previous military campaign or conflict experience that helped prepare
you for your survival/evasion experience?

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A3-5

Table A3.4 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (4 of 62).


3. Premission preparation.
3.1. Did you prepare or have an evasion plan of action (EPA)?
3.2. Was this a directed plan or did you author it yourself?
3.3. Describe in general terms your EPA. (Note: Variations to the EPA due to situational
circumstances will be discussed in evasion phase of this debriefing.)
3.4. What clothing did you have for this mission?
3.4.1. Was it normal and appropriate for the circumstances?
3.5. What equipment did you have? Did you have any weapons? Did you use or attempt to use
them? Why or why not?
3.6. Did you have a map or an evasion chart (EVC)?
3.6.1. If so, how many were there? Were they of your operational area?
3.6.2. Did you have a compass?
3.6.2.1. If so, what type?
3.7. Did you have a blood chit?
3.8. Did you a have a pointee-talkee?
3.9. Did you have a survival or escape and evasion kit?
3.9.1. If so what did it contain?
3.9.2. Was it issued or self-made?
3.9.3. Did you attempt to pre-hide any survival/escape equipment in your clothing or on your
person? If so, what?
3.10. What other SERE equipment did you have?
3.11. What signaling equipment did you have?
3.12. Describe any pre-mission study (SERE Guides, SAIDS, IRs, WEB sites, maps, etc.) that
you conducted.
3.12.1. Was this study helpful?
3.13. Did you receive any theater-specific SERE guidance/intel briefings, including
communications, prior to your mission? If so, please describe.
3.14. Were you briefed on any unconventional recovery methods or pre-determined recovery
areas, which might be in the area of your mission? If so, please describe.

A3-6

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A3.5 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (5 of 62).


3.15. Did you receive any in-theater briefings on what type of treatment or interrogations to
expect if you were captured?
3.16. What was your attitude toward having to evade or being captured by the enemy prior to this
mission?
3.16.1. Was this attitude common among people in your group/crew?
3.17. Did you feel confident in your ability to survive and evade capture or survive captivity?
3.18. Had other members of your unit ever been shot-down, isolated, or captured?
4. Events Leading Up To Isolation.
4.1. What kind of mission were you on?
4.2. When did your mission start?
4.3. How long was the mission to last?
4.4. How long did the mission actually last?
4.5. Where was the mission to have taken place?
4.6. From what base did you initially stage?
4.7. At what point in the mission did the incident occur?
4.8. How many US/Allied personnel were involved in this incident? (present when the incident
occurred)
4.9. Were there any civilian personnel involved? If so, how many, who where they, what role did
they have?
4.10. Describe the circumstances leading up to the isolation from friendly forces of yourself or
your group.
5. Incident Details
5.1. To the best of your knowledge, what was your location at the beginning of the incident?
5.2. What time did the incident occur?
5.3. What was the date of the incident?
5.4. What were the weather conditions?
5.5. Did a border penetration actually take place?
5.6. If the incident began in the air:
5.6.1. What type of aircraft were you on?
5.6.2. What was your approximate airspeed?

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A3-7

Table A3.6 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (6 of 62).


5.6.3. What was your altitude?
5.6.4. What circumstances brought your aircraft down?
5.6.5. Were there any visual or electronic warnings prior to the incident?
5.6.6. What was your in-flight reaction to the emergency?
5.6.7. What sort of damage did your aircraft sustain?
5.6.8. Were there any injuries or fatalities associated with the incident?
5.6.9. Did you bail out, ditch, or crash-land the aircraft?
5.7. Did you report the incident?
5.7.1. To whom did you report the incident?
5.7.2. How did you report the incident?
5.7.3. If you reported the incident, what, if any, guidance were you given?
5.7.4. Did you attempt, but fail, to report the incident? Why?
5.8. Were you aware of any friendly forces that witnessed, or may have witnessed, the incident?
5.9. Are you aware of anyone else reporting the incident?
5.9.1. How do you know it was reported?
6. Survival & Evasion.
6.1. Once isolated, were you aware of enemy forces?
6.2. If you bailed out/ejected, did you look around to assess your situation while hanging in the
parachute?
6.2.1. What did you see?
6.2.2. How did it help you?
6.2.3. Were there any communications before hitting the ground?
6.2.4. What type of radio did you use?
6.2.5. What frequencies?
6.2.6. Duration?
6.2.7. What and with whom?
6.3. Were you injured/wounded before or during your evasion episode/situation?
6.3.1. What were the specific injuries?

A3-8

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A3.7 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (7 of 62).


6.3.2. When did you realize you were injured?
6.3.3. What was your initial treatment of injuries?
6.3.4. What materials did you use for treatment?
6.3.5. Did your injuries limit your initial evasion actions? How? Explain.
6.4. Did the group/crew become separated after the incident?
6.4.1. Was there a rally point position identified?
6.4.2. Did you use the rally point/location to re-group?
6.5. Was the aircraft commander in charge on the ground?
6.5.1. If not, who was in command? Why?
6.6. How did you communicate on the ground with the rest of the isolated crew members (e.g.,
radio, voice, hand signals, etc.)?
6.7. Describe the weather at the time of isolation (e.g., dry/wet, hot/cold, winds, clouds, etc.).
6.7.1. Was it a factor in your decisions?
6.7.2. How did it affect your ability to survive and evade (e.g., effects on physical health, mental
state, light or sound, cover, evidence or travel, etc.)?
6.7.3. Did you think it affected enemy search teams?
6.8. Describe the terrain in the isolation area (e.g., vegetation, elevation, slope, etc.).
6.9. Were there any people in the immediate area of isolation? If yes explain:
6.9.1. How many?
6.9.2. Military or civilians?
6.9.3. Were they armed?
6.9.4. What type of weapons?
6.9.5. Did they know you were in the vicinity/area?
6.9.6. What were their actions?
6.9.7. Were there any patterns to their activities?
6.9.8. How did their presence affect your actions (i.e. did you hide/move out)?
6.9.9. Do you have any information on internal security forces or population control measures
(reference REQMT: A-INU-2420-11-90)?
6.10. If you had an EPA,

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


Table A3.8 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (8 of 62).
6.10.1. Were you able to follow it?
6.10.2. If not, what variations did you make?
6.10.3. What caused you to make the deviations?
6.10.4. How were supporting assets notified of the deviations?
6.11. Did you make any attempts at communication during isolation?
6.11.1. How?
6.11.2. If the communication was by radio:
6.11.2.1. What type of radio did you use?
6.11.2.2. What were the frequencies used?
6.11.2.3. What was the duration?
6.11.2.4. Describe (in detail) the communication to the best of your ability.
6.11.3. With whom? When?
6.11.4. Were you successful? Any problems?
6.11.5. Was this a pre-briefed procedure?
6.12. Did you evade alone or in a group?
6.12.1. If in a group, were there any problems making decisions, communicating, etc.?
6.12.2. How were they resolved?
6.13. Did you know your approximate location when you started evading? Explain
6.14. Did you know your specific location?
6.14.1. How did you determine this?
6.14.2. Did you have maps/evasion charts (EVCs)?
6.14.3. How many EVCs?
6.14.4. Did the EVCs cover the area of isolation/evasion and recovery?
6.14.5. Did you have any problems with the EVCs?
6.14.6. Did you use a compass/GPS?
6.14.7. What type of compass/GPS?
6.14.8. How and when did you use it?
6.15. What equipment/clothing did you have with you?

A3-9

A3-10

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A3.9 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (9 of 62).


6.15.1. Was any of it lost or damaged? Explain.
6.15.2. Was the equipment protected against loss or damage?
6.15.3. How did you cope with equipment problems?
6.15.4. When you traveled, did you take everything with you?
6.15.5. If you left items behind, how did you make your selection?
6.15.6. What did you do with items left behind?
6.15.7. Did training prepare you for making the choices you made?
6.15.8. Do you think you made any mistakes in selecting the items? Why?
6.15.9. Did you make your choices prior to your mission?
6.15.10. What items would you add or delete?
6.15.11. What were the items you carried?
6.15.12. How did you carry them?
6.15.13. In relation to your survival or escape and evasion kit:
6.15.13.1. Was this kit sufficient for your particular experience?
6.15.13.2. If the kit was not sufficient, what was it lacking?
6.15.13.3. What specific items did you have with you that were not part of your issued kit, which
assisted you in your survival/evasion?
6.16. What were your water sources while evading?
6.16.1. How much water did you carry on the mission?
6.16.2. Was there additional water on the aircraft? Did you take it with you?
6.16.3. Approximately how much water were you able to obtain each day? Where, and from
what source?
6.16.4. How did you carry and store the water?
6.16.5. Did you purify the water? Did you filter the water? Why?
6.16.6. How did you purify water?
6.16.7. Did you have any ill effects from the water?
6.16.8. Describe your evasion actions to procure water.
6.16.9. Did you have to vary your travel plans to obtain water?
6.16.10. Did you go without water to remain secure?

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A3-11

Table A3.10 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (10 of 62).


6.16.11. Were there people around/near the water sources you used? Who/how many?
6.16.12. Was there a time of day were more/less people present at the water source?
6.17. Did you consume any food while evading?
6.17.1. What was its source? (i.e., survival kit, pocket, ruck sack).
6.17.2. Describe any problems.
6.17.3. Describe any natural foods you procured.
6.17.3.1. How did you know it was edible?
6.17.3.2. How much did you eat?
6.17.3.3. Did you use a taste test?
6.17.4. If you ate any animal life, describe your procurement techniques and your method of
preparation for eating.
6.17.5. Did you steal any food while evading? If so, describe your actions ( e.g., time of day,
observations/area layout, approach, items stolen and quantity, retreat, preparation for
consumption, and problems/suggestions).
6.18. When hiding, what type of sites did you select?
6.18.1. Describe as many as you can.
6.18.2. Did you use them as found or were modifications required?
6.18.3. Describe the modifications.
6.18.4. Did you have to make a shelter for protection? Explain?
6.18.5. How long did you stay at the various sites?
6.18.6. What precautions did you take for security?
6.18.7. Describe your use of camouflage in the site.
6.18.8. Did you observe potential hide-sites that you did not use?
6.19. Did you camouflage yourself throughout the episode?
6.19.1. Describe how you camouflaged yourself.
6.19.2. What problems did you note?
6.19.3. Describe how you maintained the camouflage.
6.20. Did you travel or not? Why? If you traveled:
6.20.1. What were your initial goals/intentions/objectives?

A3-12

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A3.11 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (11 of 62).


6.20.2. Did you plan to go to a predetermined recovery site?
6.20.2.1. Were you able to follow that plan?
6.20.2.2. Where was your planned recovery site?
6.20.2.3. How far away was it?
6.20.2.4. What was your direction of travel?
6.20.2.5. Describe your travel plans to get there.
6.20.2.6. What was your rate of travel?
6.20.2.7. How long did it take you to reach your objective?
6.20.2.8. Was there any evidence that the enemy was conducting a search for you? How was the
search conducted: what type of troops, their weapons and vehicles, tactics, use of NVD or other
illumination devices, dogs, and level of proficiency (disciplined and organized, or an
unorganized gaggle)?
6.20.2.9. How long did you wait at the recovery location prior to contact?
6.20.2.10. When did you travel (day, night, dusk, dawn, etc.)?
6.20.2.10.1. Why?
6.20.2.10.2. What was the best?
6.20.2.10.3. Were there any particular problems?
6.20.2.11. Did you have an alternate plan? Briefly what?
6.20.2.12. Did you select your own recovery site? Why?
6.20.3. Did you travel a straight line or travel a planned erratic pattern using the
terrain/vegetation, etc.?
6.20.4. What obstacles were encountered? Describe obstacles in detail. How did they effect your
plans?
6.20.4.1. Natural. (mountains, valleys, broad open areas, rivers, vegetation, etc.).
6.20.4.2. Man-made. (Enemy presence, borders, border obstacles, electronic devices, dogs,
population controls, roads, power lines, pipe lines, etc.) (If subject has information on border or
coastal areas, or security forces therein, please refer to RQMT: A-INU-2420-10-90.)
6.20.5. Did you use a map and/or compass/GPS during this time?
6.20.6. If you had evasion charts, describe how you used them.
6.20.6.1. Did you use the marginal information on navigation techniques?

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A3-13

Table A3.12 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (12of 62).


6.20.6.2. Was the evasion chart useful for other things, (i.e. medical, personal protection, shelter
or clothing, camouflage, plants, etc.)?
6.21. Did you have any specific problems with navigation or any survival problems associated
with travel?
6.22. How could you have been better prepared to cope with combat survival?
6.22.1. Briefings.
6.22.2. Formal training.
6.22.3. Clothing.
6.22.4. Equipment.
7. Contacts with Local Populace
7.1. Describe your initial contact.
7.2. What do you believe led to your contact?
7.3. Do you believe you were under surveillance before contact?
7.3.1. If so, how long did it last?
7.3.2. How many people did you observe?
7.4. What actions were observed before contact with local populace?
7.5. What actions did you take to prepare yourself for contact?
7.6. How did the local people contact you/your group?
7.6.1. How many were there?
7.6.2. Were they armed?
7.6.2.1. If so, what kind of firearms? Provide make, model, and country of fabrication if known.
7.6.3. Did the local people come across as being friendly or hostile?
7.6.4. How did they introduce themselves and whom did they say they represented?
7.6.5. What language did they speak?
7.6.6. Could they speak English?
7.6.7. Did you use a pointee-talkee or blood chit to communicate?

A3-14

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A3.13 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (13 of 62).


8. Cultural Aspects.
8.1.1. Were you at all familiar with the cultural characteristics of country/people?
8.1.2. Would it have helped if you had been more familiar?
8.1.3. Were there any specific events that occurred where your lack of knowledge of their culture
created an additional hardship on you? Describe.
8.1.4. Were there any specific events that occurred where knowledge of their culture may have
helped? Explain
9. Preparation for recovery.
9.1. Describe your recovery location.
9.1.1. Why did you select the site?
9.1.2. Was it a site that was prebriefed?
9.1.3. Were there any problems finding a recovery site?
9.1.4. How long did you wait there?
9.2. Communications with recovery forces.
9.2.1. When and where did you first attempt to make contact with friendly forces?
9.2.2. Were you able to pass your location, authentication, physical condition, and enemy
situation to friendly forces?
9.2.3. How (visual signals, radio, etc.)?
9.2.3.1. Describe your signals in detail, (i.e., materials, configuration, size, location, radio type,
mirror, flare, type, etc.)?
9.2.4. Any problems with signals and/or communications?
9.2.5. Were there any failed attempts to contact friendly forces?
9.2.6. If HOOK-112 equipped, explain and describe the location and process used during each
data burst.
9.3. Authentication.
9.3.1. Did friendly forces authenticate you upon initial contact at recovery location?
9.3.2. Was ISOPREP, DD Form 1833, data used? If so;
9.3.2.1. What parts were used?
9.3.3. Explain any problems with authentication.
9.3.4. Were you authenticated more than once?

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A3-15

Table A3.14 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (14 of 62).


9.3.5. Were you aware of when your identity was verified? How?
9.3.6. Were you authenticated by means other than ISOPREP data? Explain.
9.3.7. If you were not authenticated, describe the situation and reasons.
9.4. Enemy situation.
9.4.1. Did you observe enemy forces/civilians in the recovery area? Explain.
9.5. Physical conditionwhat survival difficulties were encountered while waiting for recovery?
9.5.1. Physical/medical condition.
9.5.2. Environmental conditions.
9.5.3. Food/water availability.
10. Recovery phasehow were you recovered/rescued?
NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: You will have to determine, based upon the returnees response,
which category of recovery applies to this situation, then refer to the proper line of questioning.
10.1. Conventional assisted recovery (planned)refer to paragraph 11.
10.2. Non-conventional assisted recoveryrefer to paragraph 12.
NOTE:
If the returnee was recovered via Non-Conventional Assisted Recovery (NAR) methods, then the
debriefing team must include a representative from J3-N. If J3-N is not present, and the returnee
indicates that his recovery may have been through non-conventional means, do not ask any
questions regarding non-conventional recovery until the J3-N representative is present.
Debriefings containing information pertaining to NAR methods must initially be protected at the
TS/NF/OC/SAR level until evaluated by J3-N.
10.3. Unplanned contactsrefer to paragraph 13.
10.4. Unassisted recoveryrefer to paragraph 14.
11. Conventional assisted recovery (planned).
11.1. Describe initial contact with the recovery force.
11.1.1. How was contact established?
11.1.1.1. Were there any problems?
11.1.2. Did you use any signals, loads, linkup procedures not mentioned previously?
11.1.2.1. Where? How? When?
11.1.2.2. Were you pre-briefed instructions? By whom?

A3-16

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A3.15 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (15 of 62).


11.1.2.3. Describe any problems with the signal/loads/radios.
11.2. Describe the recovery force.
11.2.1. Who: US Military, Allied, other?
11.2.2. What:
11.2.2.1. Aircraft (Helicopter or fixed wing aircraft).
11.2.2.1.1. What type?
11.2.2.1.2. Were there any problems with recovery devices or the landing?
11.2.2.2. Advancing troops or armor/Long range patrol/Scouts.
11.2.2.2.1. Unit designator and type?
11.2.2.2.2. Initial contact precautions? Any problems?
11.2.2.3. Ship, sub, small watercraft.
11.2.2.3.1. Type/name of ship/unit?
11.2.2.3.2. Describe initial contact? Any problems?
11.2.3. Describe the authentication procedures used by the recovery force to verify your identity.
11.2.4. Describe your treatment once recovered?
11.2.4.1. Was medical treatment rendered, if required?
11.2.5. Any suggestions regarding recovery operations?
12. Non-conventional assisted recovery (planned).
12.1. The sequence of events during NAR occurs in four phases. These are contact, move, hide
and support, and return or crossover. These four phases may be repeated several times before
successful return to friendly control takes place. The questions in the following sections have
been grouped by phases and will be repeated as many times as necessary to cover all aspects of
the NAR.
12.2. Describe in your own words the sequence of events from the time you were directed or
decided to seek assistance in return to friendly control until you were finally returned.
12.2.1. What guided you to the contact area?
12.3. How were you made aware of the contact area?
12.3.1. Technical communications? When, where and from whom?
12.3.2. Prebriefed with a contact plan and location? When, where, and from whom?

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A3-17

Table A3.16 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (16 of 62).


12.4. What route did you use to get to the contact area?
12.4.1. Describe in detail. Movement actions, hold-up/hide sites, contact with other evaders,
contact with indigenous personnel, actions/activities observed enroute.
12.4.2. How did you locate the signal site and/or contact point upon arrival?
12.4.3. What where your actions at the signal site and/or contact point? Describe in detail.
12.4.3.1. Security procedures at signal site and/or contact point.
12.4.3.2. Describe all activities in the vicinity of the signal site and/or contact point.
12.5. Contact Phase.
12.5.1. Describe actions at the contact point.
12.5.1.1. Who made contact? (Describe the group who made contact).
12.5.1.1.1. Military or civilian? Numbers and names if known. General appearance? Uniforms?
12.5.1.1.2. Nationality if known. How many English speaking?
12.5.1.1.3. Armed or unarmed? If armed, what type?
12.5.1.2. Describe the assistors initial security measures during the contact phase (i.e., search,
silence, segregate, safeguard, and speed to the rear).
12.5.1.2.1. Did they communicate with you on other than ISOPREP data? What subjects? How?
12.5.1.2.2. Was there an obvious chain of command? Describe the leaders?
12.5.1.3. What was said? (What instructions were you given?) Was a re-contact plan established?
12.5.1.4. When was contact made? (Approximate time). How much time elapsed between of the
activation signal and initiation of contact?
12.5.1.5. Where did contact take place?
12.5.1.6. Why did you make contact with that individuals?
12.5.1.7. How was contact initiated?
12.5.2. Did you see any people in the area before contact? What were their actions?
12.5.3. Describe any signals, loads, link-up procedures not mentioned previously.
12.5.3.1. Where? How? When?
12.5.3.2. Describe any problems with the signal/loads.
12.5.4. How was your identity authenticated? When and where?

A3-18

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A3.17 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (17 of 62).


12.5.5. Did all actions happen as planned?
12.5.6. Explain any problem areas.
12.6. Movement phase.
12.6.1. Describe the sequence of events immediately following contact.
12.6.2. How much time passed between contact and initial movement?
12.6.3. Describe any known security measures used in the movement phase to protect the
assistors and evader. Examples could include blindfolding the evader, masks, limited contact,
disguises, guards, lookouts, cutouts, dead drops, re-authorization, etc.
12.6.4. Travel times, distances, routes, and methods of travel.
12.6.5. Stops, hiding places, safe houses, with approximate time spent at each. Precise locations
if known.
12.6.6. Times you were handed over to the control of other groups or individuals and how it was
done.
12.6.7. Were you aware of any radio, cellular phone, or other external communications?
12.6.8. Did the assistors provide you with emergency procedures and/or re-contact instructions?
12.7. Hide and support phase.
12.7.1. Medical aide.
12.7.2. Water.
12.7.3. Food.
12.7.4. Clothing and bedding.
12.7.5. Shelter.
12.7.6. Sanitation and hygiene.
12.7.7. Mental and physical occupation.
12.7.8. Security measures employed at the hide site.
12.7.9. Briefing on evader actions at the hide site.
12.7.10. Emergency procedures and re-contact instructions.
12.7.11. Were re-authentication procedures used any time you were passed between
individuals/groups?
12.7.12. Explain your evader/assistors interaction and relationship.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A3-19

Table A3.18 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (18 of 62).


12.7.12.1. Attitude toward you? The U.S.? Why? Did you get the feeling that anyone disliked or
mistreated you?
12.7.12.2. What conversation subjects did they appear to like?
12.7.12.3. Did anything irritate them? What?
12.7.12.4. Did you make any mistakes that irritated, worried, or alienated your assistors?
12.7.12.5. Did the assistors do anything to irritate, worry or alienate you? What?
12.7.12.6. How did you cope with your problems?
12.7.12.7. Did you feel threatened? If so, explain.
12.7.12.8. Did you help your assistors in any way?
12.7.13. Prior to your mission had you received enough training to deal with non-conventional
assisted recovery? What would you change or add?
12.8. Return or crossover.
12.8.1. How were you returned to friendly control or crossed over between elements during your
evasion?
12.8.2. Travel times, distances, routes, and methods of travel.
12.8.3. Stops, hiding places, safe houses, with approximate time spent at each. Precise locations
if known.
12.8.4. How many times were you handed over to the control of other groups or individuals and
how was it done? Were you re-authenticated each time? What procedures were used for
re-authentication?
12.8.5. Other evaders encountered and observed?
12.8.6. Were you aware of any radio, cellular phone, or other external communications during
this phase?
12.8.7. How did the assistors get you to friendly forces?
12.8.8. Could you have survived and evaded on your own?
12.8.9. After the assistors delivered you to the control of a definitive recovery force (under
friendly control), did you discuss any details about the assistance you had received to that point?
What details did you discuss? With whom?
12.8.10. Is there anything else you think may be important to tell us at this time?
13. Unplanned contactsdescribe/explain any unplanned contacts.
13.1. Those contacts not resulting in assistance:

A3-20

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A3.19 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (19 of 62).


13.1.1. Who? Personal description/perception?
13.1.2. Where? Be as precise as possible.
13.1.3. Time of contact?
13.1.4. How did you break contact and what were your actions immediately after?
14. On-scene military forcesrecovery assisted by military forces that happened to be in area.
14.1.1. Who were they?
14.1.2. How many?
14.1.3. What were they doing in the area?
14.1.4. What contact procedures were used?
14.1.5. How were you treated?
14.1.6. How were you transported back to [your unit]?
14.2. Local populace assistance.
14.2.1. Describe initial contact.
14.2.1.1. How contact occurred; (i.e., accidental, selective, capture, etc.).
14.2.1.1.1. Where? Be as precise as possible.
14.2.1.2. Time of day?
14.2.2. Describe your assistors:
14.2.2.1. Who were they? Provide detailed description of individuals.
14.2.2.1.1. Names.
14.2.2.1.2. Features.
14.2.2.1.3. Age, height, and weight.
14.2.2.2. What was their motivation for providing assistance?
14.2.2.2.1. Opportunistic?
14.2.2.2.1.1. Sympathetic individual or group motivated by political goals, religious conviction,
and/or hatred of a common enemy.
14.2.2.2.1.2. Reward motivation (i.e. greedy individuals, criminals, smugglers, kidnappers, and
mercenaries).
14.2.2.2.1.3. Independent resistance movement.
14.2.2.2.2. Accidental contact with evader in which aid was rendered. Describe in detail.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A3-21

Table A3.20 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (20 of 62).


14.2.2.2.3. Acts of mercysought by evader/isolated person?
14.2.2.2.4. Attitude cautious, bold, meek, fearless, fearful, pro-U.S., anti-U.S. but hates enemy
worse?
14.2.2.2.5. Likelihood of helping other Americans.
14.2.2.2.6. Capability of helping other Americans?
14.2.2.2.7. Security measures to prevent detection?
14.2.2.2.8. Attitude toward you personally?
14.2.2.3. What form of aid did you receive?
14.2.2.4. Did you use your blood chit? How many times? If so, explain in detail. Describe how
the assistor reacted to the blood chit.
14.2.2.5. Did you make any promises? If so, explain in detail. Did the assistors demand or
request anything?
14.2.2.6. How did this group/individual help get you to friendly forces? Give details.
14.2.2.6.1. How long did it take?
14.2.2.6.2. Could you have survived without this help?
14.2.2.6.3. Could you have returned without help?
15. Unassisted recoveryevader/isolated person reached friendly forces/neutral territory on
his/her own.
15.1. Describe in detail.
15.2. Where and how contact was made.
15.3. Precautions used. Any problems?
16. Capture and detainment methodologies.
16.1. Describe your initial detention/capture.
16.2. Did you make the decision to turn yourself over voluntarily, was it chances encounters, or
were you captured?
16.3. What do you believe led to your capture?
16.4. Do you believe you were under surveillance before capture?
16.4.1. If so, how long did it last?
16.5. What actions were observed to warn of imminent capture?
16.6. What actions did you take to prepare yourself for capture?

A3-22

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A3.21 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (21 of 62).


16.7. Who captured you?
16.7.1. How many were there?
16.7.2. Were they armed?
16.7.2.1. If so, what kind of firearms? Provide make, model, and country of fabrication if known.
16.7.3. Did the captors come across as being professional or unprofessional?
16.7.4. How did they introduce themselves and whom did they say they represented?
16.7.5. What was their initial attitude toward you?
16.7.6. Did the capturing persons communicate freely in front of you?
16.7.7. What language did they speak?
16.7.8. Could they speak English?
16.7.9. Were any of your captors less hard and more sympathetic toward you? Describe.
16.8. What was your physical condition when you were captured?
16.9. What was their initial treatment of you like?
16.10. Did you sustain any injuries during your capture? If so, was medical treatment or first aid
provided?
16.11. Did you experience psychological capture shock?
16.12. What initial physical security measures did they take with you?
16.13. Describe any physical restraints used on you at this time.
16.13.1. Were you blindfolded at this point?
16.13.2. Was violence used against you or anyone in your party at time of capture?
16.13.3. Describe in detail any physical restraint device they used at this time.
16.14. What physical search procedures did they use us at the time of initial capture?
16.14.1. Were you searched immediately?
16.14.2. Was the search thorough or cursory?
16.14.3. Did they perform a body cavity search or closely examine private areas?
16.14.4. Did your captors appear to be looking for any specific items?
16.14.5. What personal items or clothing did they take from you?
16.14.6. What items were examined and returned to you?

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A3-23

Table A3.22 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (22 of 62).


16.14.7. What clothing or equipment was of great interest to the person conducting the search?
16.14.8. What clothing or equipment was of no or little interest to the person conducting the
search?
16.14.9. What did they let you keep?
16.14.10. Did you get any smuggled or hidden items past this search?
16.14.11. If so, what items and where were they hidden or how did you conceal them?
16.14.12. If any contraband items were found, what was the reaction of your detainer?
16.14.13. Could you have smuggled or hidden items past the search?
16.14.14. What advice do you have for getting something through their search procedures?
16.15. How long were you at the point of detention before being moved away?
16.16. How closely supervised were you before being transported?
16.17. What was done with the detainees that were injured or sick?
17. Information gathered at capture.
17.1. Was anything classified, to your knowledge, compromised?
17.1.1. What information/equipment was compromised?
17.1.2. When was the information/equipment compromised?
17.1.3. Where was the information/equipment compromised?
17.1.4. How did the captors achieve the compromise?
17.1.5. Who compromised the information?
17.1.6. Could the compromise have been prevented?
17.2. How could future missions prevent the occurrence from repeating?
17.3. How many of your crew/unit were detained?
17.4. During initial capture, were you physically restrained, gagged, or blindfolded?
NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: Refer to post-escape evasion question set, if applicable.
18. Movement phase.
18.1. What method was used to transport you from this point?
18.2. How many times were you moved during your captivity episode?
18.3. How far were you moved?

A3-24

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A3.23 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (23 of 62).


18.4. Are prisoners/detainees/hostages transported separately or as a group.
18.5. Can you describe the routes?
18.6. Did you know where you were?
18.6.1. If so, how and where were you?
18.7. Describe exact locations and physical characteristics, if known, of all intermediate
transit/holding areas and prison/detention facilities.
18.8. How long did the movements take?
18.9. How long did this movement phase last?
18.10. Why do you think you were moved?
18.11. Were there indicators that you were about to be moved that you could anticipate?
18.12. What mode of transportation is used to move captives to intermediate or final holding
facilities?
18.13. If you were moved in a motor vehicle, where were you placed, in the backseat, trunk, or
specially constructed compartment, etc.?
18.14. How long was it from time of capture to transport?
18.15. How closely supervised were you during transport?
18.16. How many captors traveled with you?
18.17. What physical security devices or personal restraints did they use?
18.17.1. Were you blindfolded?
18.18. Did you have any opportunity to hide anything on your person?
18.19. Were the doors of the transport vehicle locked or otherwise unavailable?
18.20. Were you able to see where you were going or determine your location during movement?
18.21. What was the security like during your movement?
18.22. Were there any opportunities for escape at this time? If so, describe?
18.23. Did you consider the possibility or make any plans/preparation for escape at this time?
18.24. What were the conditions during your movement?
18.24.1. What was the weather?
18.24.2. Were you protected from the elements?

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A3-25

Table A3.24 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (24 of 62).


18.24.3. Were you put into cramped conditions?
18.24.4. Did your captor provide food, water, and medical treatment?
18.24.5. Did you have contact with hostile civilians?
18.24.6. Did you have contact with friendly civilians?
18.24.7. How were you and any other prisoners/detainees/hostages treated during this movement
phase?
18.24.8. How did the prisoners/detainees/hostages support one another during the movement
phase?
18.24.9. Did your physical condition improve/worsen during this movement phase?
18.24.9.1. If so, why?
18.24.9.2. What was done with the detainees that were injured or sick?
18.24.10. Were you subjected to harassment during movement?
18.24.10.1. If so, what form did the harassment take, by whom, where does it take place, and for
what purpose?
18.24.10.2. Were you publicly harassed?
18.24.10.2.1. If so, was the general public allowed to physically engage you or the other
prisoners/detainees/hostages in any form? Describe.
18.25. Were you photographed during movement phase?
18.25.1. If so, by whom, where and for what purpose did the photograph take place?
18.26. Was there any difference in the treatment to the other prisoners/detainees/hostages?
18.26.1. If so, for what reason?
NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: Refer to Post-Escape Evasion Question Set if applicable.
19. Tactical interrogation.
19.1. How many times were you given a tactical (TAC) interrogation?
19.2. Describe the interrogator you normally encountered during the TAC.
19.2.1. What was their age?
19.2.2. Did they speak English?
19.2.3. If not, what language?
19.2.4. Was he skilled (professional interrogator) or unskilled (front-line soldier)?

A3-26

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A3.25 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (25 of 62).


19.3. What was their general attitude during the TAC?
19.4. Were any audio or video recordings made during the TAC? If so, what was the content of
the recordings?
19.5. How long did the TAC last?
19.6. Was it a single person or a team?
19.7. Were guards present?
19.8. Was an interpreter used during the TAC?
19.9. Were you ever taken to a special facility for the TAC interrogation? If so, describe the
interrogations and setting.
19.10. Were you photographed?
19.10.1. If so, by whom where, and for what purpose did the photograph take place?
19.10.2. Were any threats, physical abuse or torture used during interrogation?
19.10.2.1. If so, explain what was done.
19.10.2.2. Were threats usually carried out or just used as a means to scare you?
19.11. What physical restraints (cuffs, blindfolds, etc.) were used during the TAC?
19.12. Did you usually recognize the interrogation methods used against you?
19.13. What type of interrogation methods did you normally encounter?
19.14. Which methods do you think were the most effective on you? Americans in general?
19.15. Do you think you were prepared for the initial TAC interrogation that you received?
19.16. What kind of information was asked for?
19.16.1. Was the information noted or recorded?
19.16.2. Did you have any evidence this information was passed up their chain of command /
custody?
19.17. Describe in detail what resistance/posture techniques you were able to employ.
19.17.1. What was your personal motivation to resist at this time?
19.17.2. Did you have classified information that needed to be protected?
19.18. What information was divulged?
19.19. Were you able to improve your ability to resist interrogation as you learned more about
your interrogators and their methods and objectives?

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A3-27

Table A3.26 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (26 of 62).


19.20. Did your captors attempt to exploit you by asking you to write, make speeches, participate
in films, or other methods during the TAC?
19.20.1. Can you describe what happened and how you handled it?
19.21. Did your captors make special offers to you to gain your cooperation or gain additional
information?
20. Permanent facility.
20.1. What was the name of the facility you were taken to?
20.2. Where is this facility located?
20.2.1. Was this facility in a rural or urban location?
20.2.1.1. How could you tell?
20.3. Were you detained in more than one facility?
20.3.1. If so, how many?
20.3.2. How long in each location?
20.4. What was the security classification of the prison, e.g. minimum, medium or maximum
security?
20.5. Were you searched again once you arrived at either a prison or detention facility?
20.5.1. How thorough was this search?
20.5.2. Are body cavities searches conducted?
20.5.2.1. If body cavity searches are conducted, to male or female guards do them?
20.5.3. What personal possessions did the prison officials confiscate?
20.5.4. What personal possessions were you allowed to retain?
20.5.5. Are men and women treated/handled the same during searches? If not, explain.
20.6. What did the facility provide (e.g., bedding, clothing, toilet items, etc.)?
20.7. What was the estimated number of prisoners/detainees/hostages at this prison?
20.8. What was the estimated total capacity of the prison?
20.9. How were the prisoners/detainees/hostages segregated within the prison?
20.10. Were you in isolation or held with one or more other prisoners/detainees/hostages?
20.11. Was your cell a single or multi-person cell?
20.12. What were the physical dimensions and characteristics of your cell?

A3-28

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A3.27 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (27 of 62).


20.13. Describe the door, windows, locks, walls, ceilings and floor in detail.
20.14. Were cells subject to search?
20.14.1. If so, how often and how thorough were the searches?
20.15. Did you hide anything in your cell?
20.15.1. If so, describe what and how you did this.
20.15.2. Did you have to improvise any material to help hide contraband or disguise your hide
site?
20.16. Did you have running water or a toilet in your cell?
20.16.1. If so, did you have hot and cold water?
20.16.2. If you had a toilet, what type was it (e.g., hole in floor, bucket, or some type of flush
system)?
20.16.2.1. If not, describe the toilet facilities you had access to.
20.16.2.1.1. How often were you taken?
20.16.2.1.2. Could you request to be taken on demand?
20.16.2.1.3. How closely were you monitored in the toilet?
20.16.2.1.4. Were there any opportunities to communicate with other
prisoners/detainees/hostages in the toilet, either by voice, signal or message drops?
20.16.2.1.5. If you had a toilet bucket in your cell, who and how often was it emptied? Was this
bucket emptied on a regular schedule?
20.16.2.1.5.1. If it was yourself or another prisoner who emptied the buckets, were you under
guard while doing so?
20.16.2.1.5.2. How many guards were present? Were they armed?
20.16.2.1.5.3. How closely supervised was the prisoner when emptying the buckets?
20.16.2.1.5.4. Precisely where was the bucket taken to be emptied?
20.16.2.1.5.5. If the bucket was removed, did you always get back the same one?
20.17. Did the prison authorities set the daily schedule?
20.17.1. If so, provide a detailed account of the daily activities to include daily, weekly or
seasonal variations.
20.17.2. Was it rigid, or did it vary?
20.17.3. If so, why and under what circumstances did it vary?

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A3-29

Table A3.28 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (28 of 62).


20.18. Did you have access to other parts of the facility?
20.18.1. If so, where, how long, how closely monitored?
20.19. Did you have access to an outside area for exercise or any other reason?
20.19.1. If so, how big was this area?
20.19.2. Was it enclosed with an overhead screen, wires or other obstacles to prevent a helicopter
recovery?
20.20. Did the facility have any kind of air defense system?
20.20.1. If so, describe type and location.
20.20.2. Was this system continually manned or only during an alert?
20.21. What kind of sensors or other electronic monitors were in use within the facility, e.g.
video, access control, ground?
20.21.1. Describe in detail any that you were aware of.
20.21.2. Did the guards change behavior when in area of electronic monitoring or sensors?
20.21.3. Did the guards carry any emergency event electronic alert system on their persons?
20.21.4. How did the guards communicate (e.g. voice, telephone, radio, etc.)?
20.21.5. Did the facility have any area-wide alert system?
20.22. Did you have a light in your cell?
20.22.1. If so, what kind (fluorescent, halogen, incandescent, etc.)?
20.22.2. Could you access the light?
20.22.3. Could you remove and replace the light bulb?
20.22.4. What was the voltage?
20.22.5. Could you manually turn the light on or off?
20.22.6. Could you ask for the light to be turned on or off?
20.22.7. Were there set times of day the lights were on or off?
20.22.8. If you controlled the light switch, were you directed to turn the lights on or off?
20.23. Were there any video surveillance systems in the cell?
20.23.1. If so, describe.
20.23.2. Was it stationary or remote movable?
20.23.3. Was it overt or hidden from view?

A3-30

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A3.29 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (29 of 62).


20.23.4. Did it work and was it monitored?
20.23.5. Were there blind spots in the coverage?
20.23.5.1. How do you know?
20.23.6. Could you access the video camera?
20.23.7. Did you sabotage or manipulate the camera?
20.23.7.1. If so, how and what was the response?
20.23.7.2. Did they repair the camera?
20.23.7.3. If so, who repaired the camera, prison official or outside contractor?
20.23.7.4. How long did it take to respond?
20.24. Detention facility barrierscell walls/structural walls.
20.24.1. What was the height of the cell walls/structural walls?
20.24.2. How thick were the cell walls/ structural walls?
20.24.3. What type of material were the walls constructed of?
20.24.4. Did the walls appear to have any type of metal reinforcement?
20.24.5. Did the walls have cracks or any other gaps?
20.24.6. How old did the cell walls/ structural walls appear to be?
20.24.7. Were the walls painted?
20.24.8. Did the wall provide access to ventilation ducts or other systems?
20.24.8.1. If so, what were the dimensions?
20.24.8.2. What type of barrier separated you from the ventilation duct?
20.24.8.3. Could you access the duct?
20.24.8.3.1. If so, were any tools required?
20.24.9. Was there any kind of crawl space behind the walls?
20.24.9.1. If so, how big?
20.25. Detention facility barriersfloors.
20.25.1. What material were the floors constructed of?
20.25.2. Was there a crawl space under the floor or between floor levels?
20.25.2.1. If so, how big?

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A3-31

Table A3.30 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (30 of 62).


20.25.3. Did the floor have cracks or other gaps?
20.26. Detention facility barrierslocks.
20.26.1. What types of locks were on the doors, including cell and structural (e.g., pin, wafer,
lever or disc)?
20.26.2. How much access did you have to the locks?
20.26.3. Describe the keys in as much detail as possible.
20.26.4. Could you pick or impression the locks?
20.26.5. What type of blank keys would be required?
20.26.6. Did the guards carry keys or were the door locks controlled from elsewhere?
20.26.7. Did the guards cover or hide the keys from view?
20.26.8. Could you damage or cause a disruption in the working of the locks?
20.26.8.1. If so, how often were the locks repaired or replaced?
20.26.8.2. Who repaired the lock, a prison employee or an outside locksmith?
20.26.8.3. Did security procedures change when a lock was damaged?
20.27. Detention facility barriersdoors.
20.27.1. What type of material are the doors constructed of?
20.27.1.1. Are they solid or barred?
20.27.2. Does the door have any observation or food ports?
20.27.2.1. Could you open these ports?
20.27.3. How thick are the doors?
20.27.4. Describe the door frame and hinge construction.
20.27.5. Did the doors open inward or outward?
20.27.6. Are cell doors different from other doors within the facility?
20.27.6.1. If so, describe the differences.
20.27.7. Are cell doors locked / unlocked from a remote area?
20.27.7.1. Did you have access to the lock mechanism in the door?
20.28. Detention facility barrierswindows.
20.28.1. Were there any windows?

A3-32

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A3.31 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (31 of 62).


20.28.2. Were they open or closed?
20.28.3. Were the window openings bricked, boarded or otherwise closed up?
20.28.4. What types of material were windows constructed of (e.g., glass, plastic or nothing)?
20.28.5. Were they barred or covered with mesh or screens?
20.28.6. How thick are the windows?
20.28.7. Describe the window frame construction.
20.28.8. Did the window open inward or outward?
20.28.9. Were cell windows different from other windows within the facility?
20.28.9.1. If so, describe the differences.
20.28.10. Were cell windows locked?
20.28.11. Did you have access to the lock mechanism in the window?
20.28.11.1. If so, describe in detail?
20.28.12. Was the window opening large enough to crawl through?
20.28.13. What direction did the window face?
20.28.14. Would light from the cell be visible from outside the facility?
20.29. Detention facility barrierscell alarms.
20.29.1. Were there alarms or sensors in the cells?
20.29.1.1. What type of alarm or sensor was it?
20.29.1.2. Where were the sensors placed?
20.29.1.3. What did the sensors look like?
20.29.1.4. Did they function properly?
20.29.2. What was the reliability of the alarm system?
20.29.3. What was the power requirement of the system?
20.29.4. Did you have access to the alarm power?
20.29.5. Does the alarm system require a man operator?
20.29.6. Is the alarm activated at all times?
20.29.7. Were there any false alarms?
20.29.8. What was the guard response to an alarm?

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A3-33

Table A3.32 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (32 of 62).


20.29.9. Did you ever purposely set off the alarm?
20.29.9.1. If so, why?
20.29.9.2. What was the guard response when you did this?
20.29.10. Did the response change over time?
20.29.11. How long did it take for the guards to respond?
20.29.12. Could you access, sabotage or manipulate the sensor?
20.29.12.1. Did you? If so, how?
20.29.12.2. What was the guards response?
20.29.12.3. Who repaired the sensor, a prison official or outside contractor?
20.29.13. How big was the roof?
20.29.13.1. Was there an entrance to the facility from the roof?
20.29.13.1.1. If so, describe in detail, to include security features and monitoring.
20.29.13.2. Were there any structures or equipment on the roof (e.g., HVAC, etc.)?
20.29.13.3. Did the roof appear to be reinforced? If so, with what?
20.29.13.4. Could a helicopter land on the roof?
20.30. Detention facility barriersguard towers.
20.30.1. What was the number and location of the guard towers?
20.30.2. Give a description of the guard towers (e.g., structural material, size, height, number of
entry points, etc.).
20.30.3. Could you access the guard towers from inside the facility?
20.30.4. Could the guard towers be accessed from outside the facility (e.g., through doors,
windows, stairs, etc.)?
20.30.5. How many guards in each tower?
20.30.6. What was the frequency and times of shift changes?
20.30.7. What was the field of view/fire from the guard towers?
20.30.8. Did they monitor both inside and outside the facility?
20.30.9. Did the guards stand or sit inside a protective enclosure?
20.30.10. What type of communication system did the towers employ?
20.30.11. What type of weapons did the guards have in the towers?

A3-34

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A3.33 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (33 of 62).


20.30.12. Did the guard towers have movable or stationary spotlights?
20.30.12.1. What was the field of illumination?
20.30.12.2. Where did the tower power originate?
20.30.12.3. Did you have access to this power supply?
20.30.12.4. Were there occasions that the lights were turned off?
20.30.12.5. What was the lighting schedule?
20.31. Detention facility barriersanimals.
20.31.1. Were animals used as security barriers at the facility?
20.31.1.1. If so, what type and how many?
20.31.1.2. Where were they used?
20.31.1.3. Were they continually or periodically used?
20.31.1.4. Under what circumstances were they periodically used?
20.31.1.5. Were they dangerous?
20.31.1.6. Could they be tamed?
20.31.1.6.1. If so, how and with what?
20.31.2. Are the animals monitored or controlled by a person?
20.31.2.1. If so, who and how closely?
20.31.3. Were the animals specially trained for any special purpose (e.g., guard, tracking, or
attack)?
20.31.4. What special precautions did you have to take with the animals?
20.32. Detention facility barriersmail (incoming and outgoing) or delivered parcels
20.32.1. Did the prisons permit mail/parcels delivery?
20.32.2. Did you receive any mail/parcels?
20.32.2.1. If so, from whom and where?
20.32.3. Were the mail/parcels inspected?
20.32.3.1. What was the inspection process?
20.32.3.2. Were mail/parcels x-rayed, opened, disassembled or otherwise manipulated?
20.32.4. How were the mail/parcels delivered?

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A3-35

Table A3.34 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (34 of 62).


20.32.5. How often were mail/parcels permitted?
20.32.6. What, if any, restrictions applied?
20.32.7. Did the mail/parcels have to be delivered to you personally?
20.32.8. What items were confiscated or not permitted?
20.32.9. What items were allowed to you from the parcels?
20.32.10. Did the guards monitor your opening of mail/parcels?
20.32.11. Could you retain the mail/parcels in your cell?
20.32.12. Were you given original letters or copies of the letters?
20.32.13. Were you observed reading your mail?
20.32.14. Were photographs confiscated?
20.32.15. Could you keep photographs in your cell?
20.32.16. Could you write and send mail?
20.32.16.1. If so, how often?
20.32.16.2. What restrictions applied?
20.32.16.3. Were you observed when writing a letter?
20.32.17. Was your outgoing mail censored?
20.32.18. Was your mail copied?
20.32.19. Were original letters mailed?
20.32.20. Was your mail scanned, electronically screened or subjected to other scrutiny?
20.32.21. Did you personally close the envelope?
20.32.22. Did you attempt to use any covert communication in your mail?
20.33. Detention Facility Barriers Documentation
20.33.1. Were any specific forms of documentation required within the facility?
20.33.2. Were you given any special prisoner/detainee/hostage identification?
20.33.3. Describe in detail (e.g., size, color, photo, laminated, magnetic strip, barcode, special
paper, anti-tampering devices, etc.).
20.33.4. Were there special or restricted areas of the facility that require special or distinct
identification?
20.34. Detention facility barriersinternal communications.

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AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A3.35 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (35 of 62).


20.34.1. What type of internal communication systems was used within the facility (e.g.,
landline, handheld radio, cell phones, written, computer e-mail, etc.)?
20.34.1.1. If the system was centralized, where was the hub located?
20.34.1.2. Was it guarded?
20.34.1.3. Did you have access to it?
20.34.1.4. Could you gain access to it?
20.34.2. What type of power requirement did each system need?
20.34.3. How reliable was each system?
20.34.4. Did any of these systems have an encryption capability?
20.34.4.1. If so, describe (e.g., type, model, country of origin, etc.).
20.34.5. Were operators fully trained on these systems?
20.34.6. Did the operators practice COMSEC when prisoners/detainees/hostages were present?
20.34.7. Describe the internal reporting chain.
20.34.8. Describe the chain of command of the guard / prison staff.
20.35. Detention facility barriersexternal communications .
20.35.1. What type of external communication systems was used within the facility (e.g.,
landline, handheld radio, cell phones, written, computer e-mail, etc.)?
20.35.2. If the system was centralized, where was the hub located? Was it guarded?
20.35.3. Did you have access to it?
20.35.4. Could you gain access to it?
20.35.5. What type of power requirement did each system need?
20.35.6. How reliable was each system?
20.35.7. Did any of these systems have an encryption capability?
20.35.8. If so, describe (e.g., type, model, country of origin, etc.).
20.35.9. Were operators fully trained on these systems?
20.35.10. Did the operators practice COMSEC when prisoners/detainees/hostages were present?
20.35.11. Were external communications sent on schedule? If so, describe.
20.35.12. Describe the different type of external communications?

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A3-37

Table A3.36 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (36 of 62).


20.36. Detention facility barriersinternal prisoner movement.
20.36.1. How many guards were used to transport a prisoner?
20.36.2. Did the guards carry weapons while transporting?
20.36.3. If so, describe (e.g., make, model, and country of origin).
20.36.4. Was the weapon carried ready for immediate use? Or was the weapon slung over the
shoulder, stowed in a corner of a room or vehicle, or kept in a holster?
20.36.5. If so, what type of ammunition (e.g., ball, rubber bullet, bird-shot)?
20.36.6. What kind of physical or implied restrictions applied to prisoners/detainees/hostages?
20.36.7. What types of restraints are used when transporting a prisoner?
21. Captivity conditions and treatment.
21.1. What was the captors general treatment of the prisoners/detainees/hostages?
21.2. Did the treatment change during period of captivity?
21.2.1. If so, describe the reasons for the change.
21.2.2. Were you able to predict or anticipate changes in treatment?
21.3. Were you isolated from your crew or team?
21.3.1. If so, describe the affects of isolation on you, both physically and psychologically?
21.3.2. Was isolation a standard practice used by the captors?
21.3.3. How long were you isolated?
21.3.4. Were you able to covertly communicate with other prisoners/detainees/hostages during
isolation?
21.3.4.1. If so, what method did you use and how often?
21.4. Describe the food and water conditions within the facility.
21.4.1. Did you have to cook, or did other prisoners/detainees/hostages or camp staff prepare
food?
21.4.2. Was food brought to your cell, or were you taken to a feeding area?
21.4.3. Were you able to store or retain food for future use?
21.4.4. If so, how did you do this or hide it from the captor?
21.5. What were the general sanitary conditions within the facility?
21.5.1. Did these conditions cause any health or morale problems?

A3-38

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A3.37 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (37 of 62).


21.6. Did you receive or make any recreation equipment or games (e.g., cards, chess, etc.)?
21.6.1. Were you allowed to openly keep your recreational equipment?
21.6.2. Were you allowed to use the recreational equipment?
21.7. If applicable to the type of captivity, what was the captors attitude toward the Geneva
Convention?
21.7.1. Did they comply?
21.7.2. Could you discuss Geneva Convention with the captors?
21.8. What was the morale level of the prisoners/detainees/hostages?
21.8.1. Did it change from time to time?
21.8.2. If so, what were the normal causes for change in prisoner morale?
21.9. Was there the threat of reprisals or punishments for certain prisoner activities?
21.9.1. If so, what were the activities?
21.9.2. What were the threats or reprisals?
21.9.3. Did the captors carry out the threats?
21.10. Were you or any other prisoners/detainees/hostages threatened with being held
indefinitely?
21.11. Were you or any other prisoners/detainees/hostages threatened with physical abuse or
death?
21.12. Were you or any other prisoners/detainees/hostages accused of doing anything wrong? If
so, describe.
21.13. Were you ever taken to a special punishment facility? If so, why?
21.13.1. Describe this facility.
21.14. Did any of the captors physically abuse or mistreat you for no apparent reason other than
pure meanness?
21.14.1. How did you handle such situations?
21.14.2. Describe a typical incident of this nature.
21.14.3. How often would this happen?
21.14.4. What did you do to avoid further incidents of this nature or with this individual?
21.15. Were you or any other prisoners/detainees/hostages tortured during an interrogation or
during captivity? (Torture being the systematic application of pain in an attempt to extract
information, cooperation, or a confession.)

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A3-39

Table A3.38 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (38 of 62).


21.15.1. If so, describe.
21.15.2. Can you describe or name the individuals who physically abused or tortured you?
21.16. Were provisions made for religious observances?
21.17. Were the prisoners/detainees/hostages ever left unattended with other
prisoners/detainees/hostages outside cell areas?
21.18. What was a typical day in captivity like?
21.19. What constituted a good day?
21.19.1. What was your most memorable good day?
21.20. What constituted a bad day?
21.20.1. What was your most memorable bad day?
21.21. If you were held in more than one facility, did conditions or treatment vary from location
to location? If so, describe in detail.
21.22. Was the lighting, ventilation, heat, etc. adequate in the detention facility?
21.23. Were you allowed to shave, wash and bathe? If so, how often?
21.24. Describe your sleep routine.
21.25. Describe your exercise routine.
22. Escape from capture, movement, and fixed facility phases.
22.1. Did you or your crew/team give any serious consideration to escape at the time of initial
capture?
22.2. Did you or your crew/team give any serious consideration to escape during movement
phase?
22.3. What circumstances existed to make you believe that escape was possible?
22.4. What did you consider or evaluate to determine escape was possible?
22.5. Did you perform any escape analysis on the captor and facility?
22.5.1. If so, describe your observation process and factors you considered.
22.6. What was your personal motivation for escape planning?
22.7. Were you escape-minded?
22.8. When did you begin to consider escape?
22.8.1. What factors led you to consider escape as an alternative to captivity?

A3-40

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A3.39 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (39 of 62).


22.8.2. Was your escape planning an individual effort, or that of a group?
22.8.3. If it was an individual effort, why did you not include others?
22.9. Did you ask for any escape assistance? If so, what was the result?
22.10. Were there any prisoners/detainees/hostages who were not interested in supporting the
escape effort?
22.10.1. How did you or the organization deal with these individuals?
22.11. If it was a group effort, how large was the escape group?
22.11.1. How did you decide on this size of group?
22.11.2. Was it a formal group, or organized on an ad hoc basis?
22.12. Were lessons learned from previous escape attempts incorporated into ongoing escape
planning?
22.12.1. If so, how did you do this?
22.13. Escape committee.
22.13.1. Was there an escape committee organized?
22.13.1.1. Describe how the escape committee was organized.
22.13.1.2. Who were the individuals in the escape committee?
22.13.2. Did the escape committee have any special communications capability?
22.13.2.1. Was there a different or special/separate communications channel set up?
22.13.2.2. With whom did the escape committee head communicate or ask for guidance?
22.13.2.3. Describe how the escape committee maintained the security of its efforts.
22.13.3. Did you play any part in this security?
22.13.4. What were the high priority items and materials required by the escape committee?
22.13.5. How well could the escape committee outfit escapers?
22.13.6. Describe what supplies an escaper could get from the committee.
22.13.7. Was there a process for getting assistance or approval for an escape from the committee
or the SRO?
22.13.8. Were there unauthorized escape attempts made?
22.13.8.1. If so, how did the escape committee or the SRO deal with the unauthorized escape
attempts?

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A3-41

Table A3.40 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (40 of 62).


22.13.9. Did the escape committee establish criteria for approving escape attempts?
22.13.9.1. If so, what was this criteria?
22.13.10. Was the escape committee aware of the existence of any E&E nets or available outside
assistance and how an escaper could contact them once out of the facility?
22.14. Outside escape assistance (materials).
22.14.1. Did the escape effort have any contacts that acquired materials from local sources? If so,
from who?
22.14.1.1. How was this assistance rendered?
22.14.1.2. How many people knew about this connection?
22.14.1.3. Who were these people?
22.14.2. What type of items or materials did you or the escape committee receive from outside
sources?
22.14.3. Explain how these items were smuggled into the facility and then concealed.
22.14.4. Did the captors learn of the support from the outside or of your smuggling efforts?
22.14.4.1. What did they do about it?
22.15. Escape tools and materials.
22.15.1. What special tools, materials or aids did this escape require?
22.15.2. What tools did you prepare?
22.15.3. What tools did you have to make?
22.15.3.1. Describe in detail how you made your escape tools.
22.15.4. How did you get and conceal these tools?
22.15.5. Did you steal from the captors?
22.15.5.1. Describe how you were able to steal items from the captor.
22.15.6. Did you have the capability to manufacture some of your own materials?
22.15.7. Were you able to modify existing supplies to meet escape needs?
22.15.8. Did the escape effort engage in bribery or trading with the guards?
22.15.8.1. If so, was it successful?
22.15.8.2. If not, what happened when you tried it?
22.15.9. What tools did you use for the escape?

A3-42

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A3.41 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (41 of 62).


22.15.9.1. What were the most useful?
22.15.9.2. What tools did you wish you had?
22.15.9.3. What tools would you recommend for an escaper?
22.15.10. Was a disguise part of your plan? If so, describe in detail?
22.15.10.1. How did you decide on this disguise?
22.16. Escape tunnel.
22.16.1. How did you decide that a tunnel was to be built?
22.16.2. How did you decide where the tunnel was to be built?
22.16.3. How was the tunnel effort kept secure from the captors?
22.16.4. What were the tunnel dimensions?
22.16.5. Where did the tunnel originate?
22.16.6. Was the building, from which the tunnel originated, built on the ground or did it have a
crawl space underneath?
22.16.7. How did you determine how long the tunnel needed to be to reach your goal?
22.16.8. Was the tunnel goal to be outside the facility or elsewhere?
22.16.9. Did you and any of the escape group have experience with tunnel digging?
22.16.10. What special skills did you need?
22.16.11. Were any special tools required?
22.16.11.1. If so, what were they and how did you procure them?
22.16.11.2. Did you prepare any special dirt digging clothes? If so, where were they kept?
22.16.12. How did you decide where to make the entrance?
22.16.13. How big was the entrance?
22.16.14. How did you disguise the tunnel entrance?
22.16.15. Where did you hide the dirt and other tunnel spoil?
22.16.16. How did you haul the dirt from the tunnel?
22.16.17. How did you move inside the tunnel?
22.16.18. Did the soil composition give you any special problems?
22.16.19. How deep did you make the initial shaft?

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


Table A3.42 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (42 of 62).
22.16.19.1. Did you make any large space at the bottom of the shaft?
22.16.20. Did you have to shore up the roof or sides of the shaft?
22.16.20.1. Did the roof ever collapse?
22.16.20.2. Did the ground above the tunnel ever give way?
22.16.21. Did you have any problems with water in the tunnel?
22.16.21.1. If so, how did you deal with it?
22.16.22. What problems did you have keeping the tunnel flat and level?
22.16.23. How did you maintain direction and was it difficult?
22.16.24. How long did it take to dig the tunnel and its separate parts?
22.16.25. How did you cover or disguise the digging noise?
22.16.26. Describe a typical shift inside the tunnel.
22.16.27. Describe working conditions in the tunnel.
22.16.28. Did others have to cover your absence while digging?
22.16.29. Was the tunnel sealed while people were down digging?
22.16.30. How did you measure the distance?
22.16.31. Did you have problems with stale air?
22.16.31.1. What did you do for stale air?
22.16.31.2. If you built a ventilation system, describe in detail.
22.16.32. What did you do for lighting (e.g., use of candles or electrically wired)?
22.16.33. Describe how the up-shaft was made.
22.16.34. How long did it take to break the exit entrance?
22.16.34.1. How did you determine you were close to the surface?
22.16.34.2. Was there disappointment with where the exit was?
22.16.34.3. Was the exit camouflaged or in the open?
22.16.34.4. How far from the outside perimeter was it?
22.16.35. How did the group decide who was going to go first and how often?
22.16.36. Was there any special signal used to get people out of the tunnel?

A3-43

A3-44

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A3.43 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (43 of 62).


22.17. The operational escape plan. (Note: This section deals with the specific escape plan
versus the actual event.)
22.17.1. What was your post escape goal?
22.17.2. What was your specific plan for getting out of the facility?
22.17.3. How many prisoners/detainees/hostages escaped or were supposed to escape in this
plan?
22.17.4. Who were the other prisoners/detainees/hostages in this plan?
22.17.5. Was there a particular reason for this number of escapers?
22.17.6. Did you consider any perfect number of escapers for this plan?
22.17.7. How were the individual escapers involved in this plan chosen?
22.17.8. Did they have critical skills or knowledge or other factors?
22.17.8.1. If so, what were those factors?
22.17.9. Was this your first escape plan? If not, what other plans had you considered?
22.17.10. Did you incorporate lessons learned from other escapes into this plan?
22.17.10.1. If so, what were they?
22.17.11. How much and what support did the actual escape attempt require from other
prisoners/detainees/hostages?
22.17.12. How did you arrange this support?
22.17.13. Did this escape attempt require lengthy planning or rehearsals?
22.17.13.1. If so, describe.
22.17.14. How did factors such as time of day, day of week, or season impact on your escape
plan?
22.17.15. What facility obstacles or barriers did you have to plan for?
22.17.16. Did you plan for delaying captor recognition of the escape?
22.17.16.1. If so, what did you do and how long did you hope to delay a captor alert?
22.17.17. Did you consider reprisal to the remaining prisoners/detainees/hostages?
22.17.18. Describe this consideration and its affect on your plan.
22.18. The escape event.
22.18.1. Describe the actual escape.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A3-45

Table A3.44 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (44 of 62).


22.18.2. How did the actual escape follow the plan?
22.18.3. Did you have to make changes from the plan?
22.18.3.1. If so, what factors or events required these changes?
22.18.4. How were you able to penetrate the barriers that you encountered during the escape?
22.18.5. What obstacles did you encounter that you were unprepared for?
22.18.6. Were there any security barriers beyond the prison boundary?
22.18.6.1. If so, describe what they were and how you dealt with them?
22.18.7. What was the most difficult part of the escape?
22.18.8. What was the fear level and when was it most intense?
22.18.9. Were there periods of euphoria?
22.18.10. What time did the attempt begin and how long did it take?
22.18.11. Why was this escape successful?
22.18.12. Why was this escape unsuccessful?
22.18.13. What were the significant things you learned from this escape attempt?
22.19. Postescape evasion planning (planning versus actual event).
22.19.1. How were you going to navigate away from the facility?
22.19.2. Did you have a specific route selected?
22.19.3. What was your plan for traveling across country (e.g., roads, rail, through remote or
urban areas)?
22.19.4. What evasion supplies did you have and how did you carry them?
22.19.5. Did you have a plan for unexpected meetings with civilians?
23. Detention.
23.1. Was anyone left behind? If so, detail circumstances.
23.2. What are their identities?
23.3. Are they healthy?
23.4. Any idea on why they were kept back?
23.4.1. Was there anything that you saw while you were a captive that could have prevented a US
rescue force from completing their mission successfully? Explain.
23.5. Were any of your crew/unit released early?

A3-46

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A3.45 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (45 of 62).


23.5.1. How many?
23.5.2. Who were they?
23.5.3. Why were they released?
23.5.4. When were they released?
23.5.5. Who were they released to?
23.6. In general terms, describe your treatment by your detainers in the early stages of the
captivity at the permanent facility.
23.6.1. How did that treatment change over time?
23.6.2. Why did it change?
23.6.3. What was done with the detainees that were injured or sick?
23.7. How many Americans/crew/unit members were housed with you?
23.7.1. By cell?
23.7.2. By cell block?
23.7.3. By prison?
23.8. Did the facility house personnel other than your crew/unit?
23.9. Were you held with other prisoners?
23.9.1. If so, were they military, political or criminal prisoners?
23.9.2. What other nationalities were being kept there?
23.9.3. Approximately how many?
23.9.4. Why were they there?
23.9.5. Did you ever communicate with them?
23.9.5.1. How did you communicate with them?
23.9.5.1.1. Do you speak their language?
23.9.5.1.2. Did they speak English?
23.9.5.2. What topics were discussed?
23.9.6. Describe the conditions different in each of the facilities.
23.9.6.1. Describe the conditions under which you were kept (i.e., room, house, neighborhood,
etc.)
23.9.6.2. Where you segregated when you arrived in the facility?

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A3-47

Table A3.46 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (46 of 62).


23.9.6.2.1. How did they separate you from the others (i.e., rank, race, etc.)?
23.9.6.3. What communication did you have with the captors?
23.9.6.4. What communications did you have with US personnel?
23.9.6.5. What communications did you have with other prisoners?
23.9.6.5.1. How did you communicate with these individuals?
23.9.6.5.2. Were the detainers aware of the communication?
23.9.6.5.3. Did the detainers attempt to stop the communicating?
23.9.6.6. Were you always in isolation?
23.9.6.6.1. How long were you kept by yourself?
23.9.6.7. How did the guards treat you?
23.9.6.8. What patterns did the guards establish with you while being detained?
23.9.6.9. What kind of a formal routine did you have during the day?
23.9.6.10. What kind of an informal routine did you have?
23.9.6.11. How did you keep your mind active?
23.9.6.12. How did you keep your body active?
23.9.6.13. Did you receive any mail?
23.9.6.13.1. What kind of mail?
23.9.6.13.2. What size of letters/boxes were you allowed to have?
23.9.6.13.3. How often? From whom?
23.9.6.13.4. Was there any censorship of personal letters? Explain.
23.9.6.13.5. Did the detainer use your mail as leverage to make you comply with his wishes?
Explain
23.9.6.13.6. Would they allow you to keep your letters?
23.9.6.13.7. How many times were you allowed to write?
23.9.7. Were you held in a group situation?
23.9.7.1. At what point in the detention did this happen?
23.9.7.2. How many where in your group?
23.9.7.3. Who made up your group?

A3-48

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A3.47 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (47 of 62).


23.9.7.4. Anyone other than US personnel in the group?
23.9.7.5. How long were you in this situation?
23.9.7.6. Did they change the composition of the group at any time?
23.9.8. Did you have any fellow detainees near your cell? Yes continue, if no, go to 23.10.
23.9.8.1. Who was the individual?
23.9.8.2. How did you verify their status?
23.10. Could you keep personal items in the room?
23.11. Did you have any writing/reading materials? Describe.
23.12. Could you keep pictures of family?
23.13. What kind of personal hygiene materials were you allowed to have (i.e., razor, toothpaste,
soap, etc.)?
23.14. What kind of items did the detainers give you to aid in your comfort (i.e., blankets, linen,
etc.)?
23.15. What kind of messing facilities, if any did the detainer have?
23.16. How often would they feed you?
23.17. What was the routine like (i.e., schedules, cleanup, etc.)?
23.18. Were you ever allowed outside your cell?
23.18.1. What kind of activity were you allowed to do (i.e., bathroom, shower, exercise, or
work)?
23.19. How was the security situation overall from what you could see?
23.20. Could you see other inmates at this time? If so, who?
23.21. What were physical surroundings.
23.22. Describe your detainers in as much detail as possible.
23.22.1. Were their any cultural peculiarities between detainer and POW that caused difficulties?
23.23. Guards.
23.23.1. Describe your guards (e.g., age, gender, education, rank, and physical characteristics).
24. Interrogations.
24.1. Were there any US personnel questioned/interrogated while in transit, to the detention
facility?

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A3-49

Table A3.48 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (48 of 62).


24.2. While detained, did you ever encounter an interrogator?
24.2.1. Did they present themselves as interrogators or as someone else?
24.2.2. How did they approach you?
24.2.3. Did they attempt to exploit you?
24.2.3.1. How did they attempt the exploitation?
24.2.3.2. When?
24.2.3.3. How often?
24.2.3.4. Where?
24.2.3.5. Were they successful? Explain
24.3. How many interrogators did you have?
24.4. Where were you interrogated?
24.4.1. What was the name of the facility?
24.4.2. Where in the facility was the interrogation done?
24.4.3. Was the same room used each time? For each room describe:
24.4.3.1. Describe the room's dimensions?
24.4.3.2. What furniture was in the room?
24.4.3.3. Was it always the same?
24.4.3.4. How was it arranged?
24.4.3.5. What kind of lighting was present?
24.4.3.6. How many exits and entrances were there?
24.4.3.7. How were you brought to the room?
24.4.3.8. How many guards would normally escort you to the room?
24.4.3.9. Describe the procedures you would follow from the time you left your cell until you
arrived or interrogation.
24.4.3.10. What kind of props were used (i.e., equipment, torture devices, medical supplies,
etc.)?
24.5. How many interrogators did you have?
24.6. Can you describe your interrogator?
24.6.1. What sex was your interrogator? What is his/her physical description? Age?

A3-50

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A3.49 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (49 of 62).


24.6.2. What was his/her name?
24.6.3. Was he/she in the uniformed services?
24.6.3.1. Which service?
24.6.3.2. How did you know?
24.6.3.3. Describe the uniform?
24.6.3.4. What rank did he/she or claim to be?
24.6.3.5. What languages did he/she speak?
24.6.3.6. How well did he/she speak English?
24.6.3.7. Was he/she professional in his/her approach towards you?
24.6.3.8. Did he/she have an interpreter?
24.6.3.8.1. Was the interpreter male/female?
24.6.3.8.2. What languages did he/she speak?
24.6.3.8.3. How well did he/she speak English?
24.6.4. In your opinion, who was actually doing the questioning, the interrogator or the
interpreter?
24.6.5. Describe each person's role in the process.
24.7. What approaches did the interrogator use?
24.7.1. Friendly?
24.7.2. Threat and rescue?
24.7.3. Shock and surprise?
24.7.4. Disgrace?
24.7.5. Fear and despair?
24.7.6. Noninterrogator?
24.7.7. Accusation?
24.7.8. Electronic?
24.8. Did you recognize any of the above approaches? If so, how, when, and by whom were they
used?
24.8.1. How did these approaches affect you and your resistance?

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A3-51

Table A3.50 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (50 of 62).


24.8.2. Did you ever give them any information/propaganda after one of the approaches was
used?
24.8.2.1. What kind of information did you give them?
24.8.2.2. How did they use the information?
24.8.2.3. Did you give them any classified information?
24.8.2.4. Did they trick you into the release?
24.8.2.5. What approach did they use to achieve the release?
24.8.3. Did they use physical force, threats and if so, how?
24.8.3.1. When did it happen? How many times?
24.8.3.2. Who did it? Where did it happen?
24.8.3.3. What kind of injuries were sustained?
24.8.3.4. As a result of the force, did you give any information to the person?
24.8.3.5. How did you make it counterproductive for the interrogator?
24.8.3.6. Did you bounce back?
24.9. What lessons did you learn or problems did you encounter as a result of your captivity that
might benefit other potential detainees?
24.10. What kind of questions were asked?
24.11. What kind of answers did you give?
24.12. What was the general mood of the interrogation?
24.12.1. What did you do to successfully resist the interrogator?
24.12.2. Did an individual, team, or both interrogate you?
24.12.3. Were the interrogations generally conducted in English?
24.12.4. Were you or any member of your crew/team fluent in their language? Describe
24.12.4.1. If so, was your detainer/interrogator aware of that fact? Describe
24.12.5. Did you communicate with your detainer/interrogator in their language?
24.12.6. How many different times were you questioned?
24.12.7. Generally speaking, how long did the interrogation/questioning sessions tend to be
(shortest to longest)?
24.12.8. Were you kept blindfolded during any of the interrogations? Describe.

A3-52

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A3.51 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (51 of 62).


24.12.9. Can you describe the interrogation facility?
24.12.10. Was it separate from your detention facility?
24.13. How were you transported through the building (i.e., blindfolded, handcuffed, number of
guards, etc.)?
24.14. What were the security precautions?
24.15. Was there a special room designated for interrogation?
24.16. Where in the building where you interrogated?
24.17. Describe in detail the environment of the room you were questioned (i.e., table, chairs;
lighting, windows, mirrors on the wall, surveillance equipment, etc.)?
24.18. How large was the room?
24.19. What kind of electronic equipment, if any, was present in the room?
24.20. Can you describe your interrogators name, sex, age, physical description, scars, tattoos,
education, rank, etc.
24.21. Provided a pictures could you identify any of your captors, guards, interrogators, etc.?
24.22. Was the interrogator the only other person present during questioning or was there a guard
present? Describe.
24.23. Did the interrogators appear to be qualified to do the job?
24.24. What was the general attitude of your interrogators? Describe.
24.25. Were audio or video recordings made of your interrogation sessions? Describe.
24.26. How long were you detained by this groups of people?
24.27. Were you able to identify which interrogation methods were used against you?
24.27.1. Describe the various interrogations methods used against you.
24.27.2. Was there any particular methods used which was more difficult for you to deal with?
Describe.
24.27.3. Was there any particular methods used which was easier for you to deal with?
Describe.
24.28. Did any one conduct an interview with you?
24.28.1. How many interviews?

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A3-53

Table A3.52 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (52 of 62).


24.28.2. How long did the interview last? Did you ever see any products of the interview (i.e.,
written articles, TV coverage, etc.)?
24.28.3. In your opinion, was it a professional job? Explain.
25. Exploitation.
25.1. Were there any attempts made to get you or any member of your crew/team to make
propaganda? Describe.
25.1.1. Were there any photographs taken of you? Describe circumstances.
25.1.2. Do you feel that you or any members of your crew/team made any propaganda for your
detainer? Describe.
25.1.3. Did any prisoners/POWs try to exploit you? Were they US, Allied, or other nationality?
Were they military or civilian?
25.1.4. Was there any attempt made by your interrogator to obtain some type of confession from
you? Describe.
25.2. During your internment, were you ever exploited?
25.2.1. Did your guards ever attempt to exploit you?
25.2.1.1. How did your guards attempt the exploitation?
25.2.1.2. What methods did they employ?
25.2.1.3. Who among the guards attempted to exploit you?
25.2.1.4. When did they attempt it?
25.2.1.5. Were there any props to aid them (i.e., cameras, written confessions, radio broadcast,
etc.)? Explain.
25.2.1.6. What reasons did the guards give in order to justify their exploitation?
25.2.1.7. What did you do in each case to resist their attempts?
25.2.1.8. Did they ever offer you something to get you to comply with their demands?
25.2.1.9. What kinds of rewards did they offer you?
25.2.1.10. Did they ever make you sign for anything?
25.2.1.10.1. Who, what, when, where, why?
25.2.1.11. What kinds of threats were made against you to make you comply?
25.3. Were there any other prison officials/personnel, other than guards, attempting to exploit
you?

A3-54

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A3.53 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (53 of 62).


25.3.1. Who were they?
25.3.2. How did they attempt the exploitation?
25.3.3. When did they try?
25.3.4. How often?
25.3.5. What methods did they use?
25.3.6. In each case what did you do to resist their attempts?
25.4. Were you ever exposed to a news conference while being detained?
25.4.1. What was the format of the news conference?
25.4.2. Where was the conference held?
25.4.3. When was the conference held?
25.4.4. Who was in charge?
25.4.5. What was the stated purpose of the conference?
25.4.6. What was your assigned role in the conference?
25.4.7. Did you have a speaking part in the conference? Explain.
25.4.8. Who was in attendance?
25.4.9. How long did it last?
25.4.10. Was there any TV equipment present?
25.4.10.1. Were there cameras? How many?
25.4.10.2. In your judgment, was it a professional job? Explain.
25.4.10.3. Where was the equipment from? How could you tell?
25.4.11. What kind of instructions did you receive prior to the conference from your detainers?
25.4.12. What kind of threat did you receive for not cooperating with the detainers?
25.4.13. Where regular cameras and cameramen also there? Describe?
25.4.13.1. Did they take pictures of you?
25.4.13.2. Where were you while they were taking the pictures (i.e., on stage, sitting, standing,
etc.)?
25.4.13.3. Were you able to give them the full-face shot? Explain.
25.4.13.4. What did you do to degrade the propaganda value of the picture?

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A3-55

Table A3.54 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (54 of 62).


25.4.13.5. How did the detainers use the information/pictures (i.e., against you, others, etc.)?
25.5. Did you make any statements while being detained?
25.5.1. Where did you give it?
25.5.2. Who did you give it to?
25.5.3. Was it written?
25.5.4. Was it prewritten? What did it say?
25.5.5. How was the statement aired (i.e., TV, newspaper, etc.)?
25.5.6. Did you write it?
25.5.6.1. Was there any message hidden in the contents of the statement? Explain.
25.5.7. Was it an oral statement?
25.5.7.1. What kind of a statement did you make?
25.5.7.2. How long was the ststement?
25.5.7.3. What media did they have you use (i.e., TV, video tape, radio, etc.)?
25.5.7.4. Did you have a script?
25.5.7.4.1. Who was the author?
25.5.7.4.2. How long was it?
25.5.7.4.3. How long did they give you to prepare for it?
25.5.7.4.4. What did it say?
25.5.7.5. Did you attempt to communicate through any hidden messages?
25.5.7.5.1. What was the message?
25.5.7.5.2. How did you attempt to convey the message?
25.5.7.5.3. When did you make the attempt?
25.5.7.5.4. How many different times did you attempt the communication?
25.5.7.5.5. Did the detainer ever discover your attempts? Explain.
25.5.7.5.6. What kind of explanation did you give for your actions.
25.5.7.5.7. What kind of reprisals did you suffer if any?
25.6. How many different statements did you make?
25.7. Did you attempt to resist their efforts at exploitation? Explain.

A3-56

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A3.55 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (55 of 62).


25.8. Were you ever forced to confess/admit to any of their charges?
25.8.1. What charges did you confess to?
25.8.2. When did you confess? To whom did you confess?
25.8.3. What kind of treatment did you receive prior to the confession?
25.8.4. What kind of pressure/threats were you subjected to prior to the confession?
25.8.5. What did they say to convince you to confess to the allegations?
25.8.6. What promises did they make to you?
25.8.7. After you confessed, what happened?
25.8.8. Did you sign any documents to that effect?
25.8.9. Was the document written in English?
25.8.9.1. What did it say?
25.8.9.2. Who wrote the document?
25.8.9.3. Was it grammatically correct?
25.8.10. Was the document written in another language?
25.8.10.1. What language was it?
25.8.10.2. Was it translated? By whom? How accurately? How do you know?
25.8.11. Was the confession released to the public?
25.8.12. What change in treatment followed the confession?
25.8.13. Were you entered into their legal system as a result? Explain
25.8.14. How would you change your actions if you had to do it over?
25.9. Did they ever offer a special favor for any of your actions?
25.9.1. What was the favor? Who offered it to you?
25.9.2. How did you recognize it as a special favor?
25.9.3. How many times was it offered?
25.9.4. Did you ever accept the favor? Why?
25.9.5. Was there any publicity attached to the event? Explain what was the favor?
25.9.6. When was it provided?
25.9.7. Did anybody else accept favors? Who? Why?

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A3-57

Table A3.56 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (56 of 62).


25.10. What other ways do you feel the detainers exploited you or your fellow captives/hostages?
25.11. Media.
25.11.1. Did the detainers take any photographs/make movies of you or other US personnel? Yes,
continue,
25.11.2. What kind of equipment did they use (i.e., video, TV, cameras, etc.)?
25.11.3. What was the purpose of the pictures?
25.11.4. Did you know they were taking pictures?
25.11.5. How did you react?
25.11.6. Did you attempt to degrade the picture in anyway?
25.11.7. Were any threats made by the detainers to secure your cooperation?
25.11.8. How soon after capture/detention did they take the photographs?
25.11.9. Are you familiar with DOD guidance regarding being the subject of a picture?
25.11.10. Did you attempt to communicate while being photographed?
25.11.10.1. What messages did you attempt to convey to the camera?
25.11.10.2. How did you attempt the communication?
25.11.11. How many different times were you photographed?
25.11.12. In what kind of setting?
25.11.13. What kind of props did the detainers use in these photographs?
26. Resistance.
26.1. During your detention/interrogations were you able to adopt an overall resistance posture?
Describe.
26.2. Were you able to remember and use directed responses as resistance tools?
26.3. Describe how you used the directed responses concept?
26.4. Did you attempt to use any health and welfare topics in your resistance? Describe.
26.5. Did you request to see other members of your crew/team? Explain.
26.6. Were you allowed to see other members of your crew/team?
26.7. Did you request to see a representative from the Red Cross?
26.8. Were you allowed to see a Red Cross representative? Describe.

A3-58

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A3.57 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (57 of 62).


26.9. Did you request to be allowed to write a letter home?
26.10. Were you allowed to write any letters? Detail, how, when, how often, who, etc.
26.11. Did your receive any letters or packages? How many, etc.
26.12. Did you make additional requests regarding food, water, treatment, exercise, sleep,
medical care, etc.? Describe.
26.13. Do you feel that health and welfare gave you something to talk about with the interrogator
and that it was effective as resistance to interrogation?
26.14. Which specific resistance techniques were you able to recall? Describe.
26.15. Which specific resistance techniques did you use? Describe.
26.15.1. Review specific techniques.
26.15.2. Stall?
26.15.3. Pausing?
26.16. What other methods/techniques not listed did you use that were successful?
26.17. Which of these techniques seemed to work the best?
26.18. Explain how you made the techniques work (i.e., logical, persistent, consistent).
26.19. What evidence did you see convincing you the techniques were working?
26.20. Who did you use the techniques on?
26.21. When did you use them?
26.22. How often would you have to use it?
26.23. Where you able to change/control the tempo of the interrogation process as a result?
26.24. Was there ever a time when the techniques wouldnt work? Explain.
26.25. Were there ever any problems associated with a certain techniques?
26.26. Did you have difficulty recalling the specific techniques?
26.27. Did you have difficulty in using any specific technique? Explain.
26.28. Did you use resistance techniques postures such as physical disabilities or lack of
significant rank? Describe.
26.29. Were you successful in the use of this posture?
26.30. Were you able to consistently maintain this posture?
26.31. Were there certain times when it was more difficult to maintain this posture? Describe.

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A3-59

Table A3.58 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (58 of 62).


26.32. Did you have better success at using any specific technique? Explain.
26.33. Did any one particular technique seem to work especially well for you? Explain
26.34. What gave you the motivation to resist? Peers, crew/team, family, friends, challenge,
God, country, etc.
26.35. Did any of these motivations become any more or less important at different times during
your detention? Explain.
26.36. Was there anything that you saw while you were a captive that could have prevented a US
rescue force from completing their mission successfully? Explain.
26.37. Was anything classified, to your knowledge, compromised?
26.37.1. How did the captors achieve the compromise?
26.37.2. Who compromised the information?
26.37.3. Could the compromise have been prevented? If yes, explain.
26.37.4. How could future missions prevent the occurrence from repeating?
26.38. Were you able to maintain military bearing and courtesy?
26.39. How were you able to maintain your attitudes? Explain.
26.40. Were you able to maintain this attitude throughout the captivity
26.41. How did you show them you were a military person?
26.42. Was there any improvement or change in their treatment of you as a result?
26.43. When being questioned, were you able to hide your bodys emotional response system?
26.43.1. How were you able to explain the changes taking place in your system (i.e., sweating,
flushing, trembling, etc.)?
26.43.2. Did the interrogator believe your explanations?
26.43.3. How did you know this? Explain.
26.43.4. Did conditions change any after your explanations?
26.44. Were you ever tricked/deceived into reacting because you did not listen close enough to
what they were saying?
26.44.1. How did the interrogator trick you?
26.44.2. What did they say?
26.44.3. What was your response?
26.44.4. When did this happen?

A3-60

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A3.59 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (59 of 62).


26.44.5. How many times did they trick/deceive you?
26.45. Were you ever caught in a lie? Explain.
26.45.1. How did you react when faced with the facts?
26.45.2. did your treatment change any as a result? Explain.
26.46. What kind of attitudes did you take as a result of the questioning? Explain.
26.47. What did you learn that could be of benefit to others put in the same position?
27. Communication and organization.
27.1. Had you ever received any special communication training?
27.1.1. If so, where and when did you receive that training?
27.1.2. Were you able to use that training during this incident? Explain.
27.2. Describe communication methods attempted or used.
27.2.1. When did you attempt?
27.2.2. Who did you attempt communicating with?
27.2.3. How soon after capture/detention did you try?
27.2.4. Were there any specific problems encountered in attempting to communicate? Describe.
27.2.5. If there were specific problems, were you able to overcome them and if so how?
27.3. Describe communication channels between POWs.
27.4. Did you make any attempts to communicate with individuals/groups outside of the prison?
If Yes, explain.
27.5. By what methods did you communicate?
27.5.1. Were you successful?
27.5.2. How do you know whether you were successful?
27.5.3. What method proved to be the most effective?
27.6. What kind of messages would normally be sent?
27.7. Was the receiver American? For each American answer the following questions.
27.7.1. Where did the communication take place?
27.7.2. How many times did you communicate with this individual?
27.7.3. Was he part of your crew/unit or mission?

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006


Table A3.60 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (60 of 62).
27.7.4. What was his identity?
27.7.5. Was the communication two-way?
27.7.6. Was there visual contact between the two of you?
27.7.7. Where and when did this take place?
27.7.8. How many times did you see this person?
27.7.9. How many times were you able to talk to this person?
27.7.10. What did you say to the person?
27.7.11. Did the guards attempt to stop you? Explain.
27.7.12. What were the rules, if any, about talking?
27.7.13. How did you verify this individuals identity?
27.7.14. What method did you use?
27.7.15. Was there more than one individual communicating?
27.8. Did you communicate with any other allied POWs or detainees?
27.8.1. Who were they?
27.8.2. How long did it take to establish the communication?
27.8.3. What nationality were they?
27.8.4. Why were they there?
27.8.5. How did they/you establish communications?
27.8.6. Could they speak English?
27.8.7. Could you speak their language?
27.8.8. How was the communication completed?
27.8.9. What kind of communication was sent and received?
27.9. Could you communicate with the SRO?
27.9.1. What kind of policies did the SRO communicate?
27.9.2. How often would the SRO make contact?
27.9.3. What materials/methods did the SRO use to communicate?
27.9.4. Where in the facility did the SRO communicate from?
27.9.5. Did the detainer try to prevent SRO communication? Explain

A3-61

A3-62

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

Table A3.61 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (61 of 62).


27.9.6. How did the SRO get around the rules if any?
27.10. Covert communication.
27.10.1. Was there a security system involved in covert communication?
27.10.1.1. Did any of the guards impersonate or try to subvert the security of covert
communication?
27.10.1.1.1. How did they attempt entry?
27.10.1.1.2. Were they successful?
27.10.1.1.3. How did they do it?
27.10.1.1.4. What did they do that indicated to you they were not who they said they were?
27.10.2. Did you create your own communication system?
27.10.2.1. Who did you train in the system?
27.10.2.2. How did you train?
27.10.2.3. How long would it take for someone to become proficient with the security system?
27.10.2.4. Was the system ever compromised?
27.10.2.4.1. How? By whom? When? Where?
27.11. Was anybody ever punished for communicating?
27.11.1. Who? Why? When? Where? By whom?
27.11.2. What kind of punishment did they receive? For how long?
27.12. Is there anything you can include in your discussions about communications that you
think we can use?
27.13. Organization.
27.13.1. Were you held with other US or allied POWs.
27.13.2. Who was the senior ranking officer (SRO) of the group?
27.13.3. Was the SRO in communication with your group?
27.13.3.1. How did you communicate with SRO?
27.13.3.2. How did the SRO communicate with you?
27.13.4. Was there any conflict in the group?
27.13.4.1. What was the basis?
27.13.4.2. What action was taken if any?'

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

A3-63

Table A3.62 Outline For Isolated Personnel Interviews/Debrief (62 of 62).


27.13.4.3. What were the results?
27.13.5. What was your organizational structure (have them diagram the structure if possible).
27.13.6. Problems with the organization.
27.13.7. Recommendations for future.
28. Lessons Learned
28.1. Was anything classified, to your knowledge, compromised?
28.1.1.1. What information/equipment was compromised?
28.1.1.2. When was the information/equipment compromised?
28.1.1.3. Where was the information/equipment compromised?
28.1.1.4. Could the compromise have been prevented?
28.1.1.5. How could future missions prevent the occurrence from repeating?
28.2. How well did your prior SERE training prepare you for this incident? Discuss.
28.3. Was there any particular SERE course or theater specific SERE/PR preparation provided
which proved to be more helpful? Discuss.
28.4. Do you feel that the time interval between training and the actual incident (e.g., acceptble,
unacceptable, too long, etc.)? Discuss.
28.5. Had you done any outside readings in areas associated with SERE? If so, what?
28.6. Had you done any research prior to the incident? If so, what type?
28.7. Had you adequately prepared yourself for such an incident? Discuss.
28.8. Had you adequately prepared your family/loved-ones for such an eventuality? Discuss.
28.9. Was there anything left undone or unsaid prior to this mission, which caused you concern?
Discuss.
28.10. Did you adequately sanitize yourself/equipment prior to the mission? Discuss
28.11. With this experience behind you, what, if anything, will you do to better prepare yourself
for another such incident? Explain.
NOTE:
The preceding question set is a guide to help debriefing teams select appropriate questions for a
variety of situations. It is not expected that every returnee answer all the following questions.
The debriefing team should review this question set and cut, paste, and add questions as appropriate to create a tailored debriefing guide for each subject.

A3-64

AFTTP 3-3.8, 1 July 2006

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UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

AFTTP 3-3.8

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

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