Bill of Rights Cases

VICTOR ORQUIOLA and HONORATA ORQUIOLA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. VIVENCIO S. BACLIG, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 77, Quezon City, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY and HIS/HER DEPUTIES and PURA
KALAW LEDESMA, substituted by TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
1
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 28, 1999
in CA-G.R. SP No. 47422, which dismissed the petition to prohibit Judge Vivencio Baclig of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, from issuing a writ of demolition against petitioners, and the sheriff
and deputy sheriff of the same court from implementing an alias writ of execution. Also assailed is the
2
resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 29, 1999 which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Pura Kalaw Ledesma was the registered owner of Lot 689, covered by TCT Nos. 111267 and 111266, in
Tandang Sora, Quezon City. This parcel of land was adjacent to certain portions of Lot 707 of the Piedad
Estates, namely, Lot 707-A and 707-B, registered in the name of Herminigilda Pedro under TCT Nos.
16951 and 16952, respectively. On October 29, 1964, Herminigilda sold Lot 707-A and 707-B to Mariano
Lising who then registered both lots and Lot 707-C in the name of M.B. Lising Realty and subdivided
them into smaller lots.1wphi1.nt
Certain portions of the subdivided lots were sold to third persons including herein petitioners, spouses
Victor and Honorata Orquiola, who purchased a portion of Lot 707-A-2, Lot 5, Block 1 of the subdivision
plan (LRC), Psd-42965. The parcel is now #33 Doa Regina St., Regina Village, Tandang Sora, Quezon
City. The other portions were registered in the name of the heirs of Pedro, heirs of Lising, and other third
persons.
Sometime in 1969, Pura Kalaw Ledesma filed a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12918, with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against Herminigilda Pedro and Mariano Lising for allegedly
encroaching upon Lot 689. During the pendency of the action, Tandang Sora Development Corporation
replaced Pura Kalaw Ledesma as plaintiff by virtue of an assignment of Lot 689 made by Ledesma in
favor of said corporation. Trial continued for three decades.
On August 21, 1991, the trial court finally adjudged defendants Pedro and Lising jointly and severally
liable for encroaching on plaintiffs land and ordered them:
(a) to solidarily pay the plaintiff Tandang Sora Dev. Corp. actual damages in the amount of
P20,000 with interest from date of filing of the complaint;
(b) to remove all construction, including barbed wires and fences, illegally constructed by
defendants on plaintiffs property at defendants expense;
(c) to replace the removed concrete monuments removed by defendants, at their own expense;
(d) to pay attorneys fees in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) with interest
computed from the date of filing of the complaint;
(e) to relocate the boundaries to conform with the Commissioners Report, particularly, Annexes
3
"A" and "B" thereof, at the expense of the defendants.
As a result, in February 1998, the Deputy Sheriff of Quezon City directed petitioners, through an alias writ
of execution, to remove the house they constructed on the land they were occupying.
On April 2, 1998, petitioners received a Special Order dated March 30, 1998, from the trial court stating
as follows:
Before the Court for resolution is the "Ex-Parte Motion For The Issuance of A Writ of Demolition,"
filed by plaintiff, through counsel, praying for the issuance of an Order directing the Deputy Sheriff
to cause the removal and/or demolition of the structures on the plaintiffs property constructed by
defendants and/or the present occupants. The defendants-heirs of Herminigilda Pedro filed their
comment on the said Motion.
Considering that the decision rendered in the instant case had become final and executory, the
Court, in its Order of November 14, 1997, directed the issuance of an alias writ of execution for
the enforcement of the said decision. However, despite the service of the said writ to all the
defendants and the present occupants of the subject property, they failed to comply therewith, as
per the Partial Sheriffs Return, dated February 9, 1998, issued by the Deputy Sheriff of this
branch of the Court. Thus, there is now a need to demolish the structures in order to implement
the said decision.
WHEREFORE, the defendants are hereby directed to remove, at their expense, all constructions,
including barbed wires and fences, which defendants constructed on plaintiffs property, within
fifteen (15) days from notice of this Order; otherwise, this Court will issue a writ of demolition
against them.
SO ORDERED.
To prohibit Judge Vivencio Baclig of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City from issuing a writ of
demolition and the Quezon City sheriff from implementing the alias writ of execution, petitioners filed with
the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction
5
on April 17, 1998. Petitioners alleged that they bought the subject parcel of land in good faith and for
value, hence, they were parties in interest. Since they were not impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-12918, the
writ of demolition issued in connection therewith cannot be enforced against them because to do so
would amount to deprivation of property without due process of law.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on January 28, 1999. It held that as buyers and successorsin-interest of Mariano Lising, petitioners were considered privies who derived their rights from Lising by
virtue of the sale and could be reached by the execution order in Civil Case No. Q-12918. Thus, for lack
6
of merit, the petition was ordered dismissed.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition, where petitioners aver that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECISION IN CIVIL
CASE NO. Q-12918 CAN ALSO BE ENFORCED AGAINST THE PETITIONERS EVEN IF THEY
WERE NOT IMPLEADED AS PARTIES THERETO.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING PETITIONERS TITLE
DESPITE THEIR BEING BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH AND INNOCENT PURCHASER AND FOR
VALUE.
III.
PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CONSIDERING THAT THEY STAND
TO SUFFER GRAVE AND IRREPARABLE INJURY IF ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION AND THE
SPECIAL ORDER ISSUED BY THE COURT A QUO IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-12918 FOR THE
DEMOLITION OF ALL THE STRUCTURES ON THE DISPUTED PROPERTY WERE
ENFORCED AGAINST THE PETITIONERS WHO WERE NOT EVEN GIVEN THEIR DAY IN
7
COURT.
For our resolution are the following issues: (1) whether the alias writ of execution may be enforced
against petitioners; and (2) whether petitioners were innocent purchasers for value and builders in good
faith.
On the first issue, petitioners claim that the alias writ of execution cannot be enforced against them. They
8
argue that the appellate court erred when it relied heavily on our ruling in Vda. de Medina vs. Cruz in
holding that petitioners are successors-in-interest of Mariano Lising, and as such, they can be reached by
the order of execution in Civil Case No. Q-12918 even though they were not impleaded as parties thereto.
Petitioners submit that Medina is not applicable in this case because the circumstances therein are
different from the circumstances in the present case.
In Medina, the property in dispute was registered under Land Registration Act No. 496 in 1916 and
Original Certificate of Title No. 868 was issued in the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). In
1949, Benedicta Mangahas and Francisco Ramos occupied and built houses on the lot without the PRCs
consent. In 1959, PRC sold the lot to Remedios Magbanua. Mangahas and Ramos opposed and
instituted Civil Case No. C-120 to annul the sale and to compel PRC to execute a contract of sale in their
favor. The trial court dismissed the complaint and ordered Mangahas and Ramos to vacate the lot and
surrender possession thereof to Magbanua. The judgment became final and executory. When Magbanua
had paid for the land in full, PRC executed a deed of absolute sale in her favor and a new title was
consequently issued in her name. Magbanua then sought the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No.
C-120. This was opposed by petitioner Medina who alleged that she owned the houses and lot subject of
the dispute. She said that she bought the houses from spouses Ricardo and Eufrocinia de Guzman, while
she purchased the lot from the heirs of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. The latter held the
land by virtue of a Titulo de Composicion Con El Estado Num. 4136, dated April 29, 1894. In opposing
the execution, Medina argued that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her, claiming that she
was not a party in Civil Case No. C-120, thus, she could not be considered as "a person claiming under"
Ramos and Mangahas.
When Medina reached this Court, we held that the decision in Civil Case No. C-120, which had long
become final and executory, could be enforced against petitioner even though she was not a party
thereto. We found that the houses on the subject lot were formerly owned by Mangahas and Ramos who
sold them to spouses de Guzman, who in turn sold them to Medina. Under the circumstances, petitioner
was privy to the two judgment debtors Mangahas and Ramos, and thus Medina could be reached by the
order of execution and writ of demolition issued against the two. As to the lot under dispute, we sustained
Magbanuas ownership over it, she being the holder of a Torrens title. We declared that a Torrens title is
generally conclusive evidence of ownership of the land referred to therein, and a strong presumption
exists that a Torrens title was regularly issued and valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against
any informacion possessoria, or other title existing prior to the issuance thereof not annotated on the
Torrens title. Moreover, persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens certificate of title are not
required to go beyond what appears on its face.
Medina markedly differs from the present case on major points. First, the petitioner in Medina acquired
the right over the houses and lot subject of the dispute after the original action was commenced and
became final and executory. In the present case, petitioners acquired the lot before the commencement
of Civil Case No. Q-12918.Second, the right over the disputed land of the predecessors-in-interest of the
petitioner in Medina was based on a title of doubtful authenticity, allegedly a Titulo de Composicion Con
El Estado issued by the Spanish Government in favor of one Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, while
the right over the land of the predecessors-in-interest of herein petitioners is based on a fully recognized
Torrens title. Third, petitioners in this case acquired the registered title in their own names, while the
petitioner in Medina merely relied on the title of her predecessor-in-interest and tax declarations to prove
her alleged ownership of the land.
We must stress that where a case like the present one involves a sale of a parcel of land under the
Torrens system, the applicable rule is that a person dealing with the registered property need not go
beyond the certificate of title; he can rely solely on the title and he is charged with notice only of such
9
burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. It is our view here that the petitioners, spouses Victor
and Honorata Orquiola, are fully entitled to the legal protection of their lot by the Torrens system, unlike
the petitioner in the Medina case who merely relied on a mere Titulo de Composicion.
Coming now to the second issue, were petitioners purchasers in good faith and for value? A buyer in
good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or
interest in such property. He is a buyer for value if he pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase
10
or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property. The determination
of whether one is a buyer in good faith is a factual issue which generally is outside the province of this
Court to determine in a petition for review. An exception is when the Court of Appeals failed to take into
11
account certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. The
instant case is covered by this exception to the general rule. As found by the Court of Appeals and not
12
refuted by private respondent, petitioners purchased the subject land in 1964 from Mariano Lising. Civil
Case No. Q-12918 was commenced sometime in 1969. The Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that the
purchase of the land took place prior to the institution of Civil Case No. Q-12918. In other words, the sale
to petitioners was made before Pura Kalaw Ledesma claimed the lot. Petitioners could reasonably rely on
Mariano Lisings Certificate of Title which at the time of purchase was still free from any third party claim.
Hence, considering the circumstances of this case, we conclude that petitioners acquired the land subject
of this dispute in good faith and for value.
The final question now is: could we consider petitioners builders in good faith? We note that this is the
first time that petitioners have raised this issue. As a general rule, this could not be done. Fair play,
justice, and due process dictate that parties should not raise for the first time on appeal issues that they
could have raised but never did during trial and even during proceedings before the Court of
13
Appeals. Nevertheless, we deem it proper that this issue be resolved now, to avoid circuitous litigation
and further delay in the disposition of this case. On this score, we find that petitioners are indeed builders
in good faith.
A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the land he is building on is his, and is
14
ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title. As earlier discussed, petitioner spouses acquired the land in
question without knowledge of any defect in the title of Mariano Lising. Shortly afterwards, they built their
conjugal home on said land. It was only in 1998, when the sheriff of Quezon City tried to execute the
judgment in Civil Case No. Q-12918, that they had notice of private respondents adverse claim. The
institution of Civil Case No. Q-12918 cannot serve as notice of such adverse claim to petitioners since
they were not impleaded therein as parties.
As builders in good faith and innocent purchasers for value, petitioners have rights over the subject
15
property and hence they are proper parties in interest in any case thereon. Consequently, private
respondents should have impleaded them in Civil Case No. Q-12918. Since they failed to do so,
petitioners cannot be reached by the decision in said case. No man shall be affected by any proceeding
to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court.
In the same manner, a writ of execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did
not have his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are bound by the judgment therein and
16
by writs of execution and demolition issued pursuant thereto. In our view, the spouses Victor and
Honorata Orquiola have valid and meritorious cause to resist the demolition of their house on their own
titled lot, which is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 28, 1999,
and its resolution dated December 29, 1999, in CA-G.R. SP No. 47422, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing the decision in Civil Case No. Q-12918 through
a writ of execution and order of demolition issued against petitioners. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, and Corona, JJ., concur.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROBERT CASTILLO y MONES, accused-appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The trial court judge is not an idle arbiter during a trial. He can propound clarificatory questions to
witnesses in order to ferret out the truth. The impartiality of a judge cannot be assailed on the mere
ground that he asked such questions during the trial.
The Case
1
This is an appeal from the Decision dated December 23, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 88, in Criminal Case No. Q-93-45235 convicting Robert Castillo y Mones of murder and
2
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
3
On July 23, 1993, an amended Information was filed by Assistant City Prosecutor Ralph S. Lee,
charging appellant with murder allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of May, 1993, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill[,] qualified by evident premeditation, use of superior strength and
treachery did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and employ
personal violence upon the person of one ANTONIO DOMETITA, by then and there stabbing him
with a bladed weapon[,] hitting him on his chest thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal
wounds, which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the said ANTONIO DOMETITA.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, Appellant Castillo, assisted by Counsel Salacnib Baterina, entered a plea of not
4
guilty. After trial in due course, appellant was convicted. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused ROBERTO CASTILLO y MONES is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and [is] hereby sentenced to suffer [the] penalty
of reclusion perpetua. He is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Antonio Dometita
actual damages in the sum of P60,000.00, the sum of P50,000.00 by way of indemnity for the
death of the victim and moral damages in the sum of P100,000.00. He is likewise ordered to pay
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal.
The Facts
Evidence for the Prosecution
7
The Appellee's Brief presents the facts as follows:

On May 25, 1993, around one o'clock in the morning, Eulogio Velasco, floor manager of the Cola
Pubhouse along EDSA, Project 7, Veteran's Village, Quezon City, was sitting outside the
Pubhouse talking with his co-worker, Dorie. Soon, Antonio "Tony" Dometita, one of their
customers, came out of the pubhouse. As he passed by, he informed Eulogio that he was going
home. When Tony Dometita was about an armslength [sic] from Eulogio, however, appellant
Robert Castillo suddenly appeared and, without warning, stabbed Tony with a fan knife on his left
chest. As Tony pleaded for help, appellant stabbed him once more, hitting him on the left hand.
Responding to Tony's cry for help, Eulogio placed a chair between Tony and appellant to stop
appellant from further attacking Tony. He also shouted at Tony to run away. Tony ran towards the
other side of EDSA, but appellant pursued him.
Eulogio came to know later that Tony had died. His body was found outside the fence of the
Iglesia ni Cristo Compound, EDSA, Quezon City.
Dr. Bienvenido Munoz, the medico-legal officer who autopsied Tony's cadaver, testified that the
proximate cause of Tony's death was the stab wound on his left chest. Tony also suffered several
8
incised wounds and abrasions, indicating that he tried to resist the attack.
Version of the Defense
On the other hand, the defense viewed the facts in this way:
On May 25, 1993, the late Antonio Dometita was found dead by the police officers at the alley on
the right side of the Iglesia ni Cristo Church at EDSA in Bago Bantay.
It is the theory of the prosecution that the deceased Antonio Dometita was stabbed by the
accused Robert Castillo y Mones as testified to by Leo Velasco. The corroboration of Leo
Velasco's testimony is that of Melinda Mercado who (tsn Oct. 11, 1993) stated that Leo Velasco
informed her that Dometita was stabbed. Robert Castillo was walking away from the pubhouse
with the bladed weapon. Leo Velasco himself detailed the way Castillo stabbed the deceased
Antonio Dometita.
On the other hand the defense claims that the deceased died in the alley at the right side of the
church. That decedent Dometita was attacked by two malefactors as testified to by Edilberto
Marcelino, a tricycle driver who saw two people ganging up on a third. The same witness saw the
victim falling to the ground. (tsn January 5, 1994, page 8). A report of Edilberto Marcelino to the
Barangay Tanod's Office was made in the blotter of the Barangay and the extract (xerox of the
page) was marked as Exhibit "2"
The Trial Court's Ruling
The court a quo gave full credence to the testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses, who positively
identified the appellant as the killer. It explained:
From the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and the defense, it can be gleaned that
the accused, to exculpate himself from the liability, clung to the defense of alibi[,] saying that he
was not at the place where the incident took place at the time of the killing. This was supported by
the testimony of his mother and his neighbor and guide Malikdem. This, however, is contradicted
by the testimonies of the two eyewitnesses of the prosecution who positively identified accused
as the person who stabbed the victim. While the testimony of Mercado is to the effect that she did
not actually see the accused hit the victim, she however, saw him walking away and carrying a
bladed weapon at the scene of the crime. Velasco on the other hand, actually saw him lunged
[sic] his fan knife at the victim. These were further strengthened by the findings of the medico10
legal officer that the weapon used in killing the victim [was] similar to a balisong.
The trial court also found that the killing was qualified by abuse of superior strength, because "the
accused used a deadly weapon in surprising the victim who [was] unarmed." Although treachery was
present, the trial court held that this was absorbed by abuse of superior strength.
The Issues
The appellant raises the following assignment of errors:
11
I
That the trial court failed to appreciate the evidence presented by the accused that there was a
stabbing/mauling incident at the side street near the Iglesia ni Cristo Church at Edsa-Bago
Bantay, Quezon City (at about the time of the alleged stabbing of victime [sic] Antonio Dometita
according to the prosecution version), the same evidence for the accused being buttressed and
supported by the barangay blotter, marked Exhibit "2."
II
That the trial court failed to appreciate the implications of: the medical finding that the heart and
the lungs of the victim were impaled; that according to the testimony of the prosecution witness,
PO3 Manolito Estacio, the victim was found at the side street near the Iglesia ni Cristo Church;
and that side street distant from the place the witnesses for the prosecution stated the victim was
stabbed. These matters create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and cast distrust
on the testimony of the witness Eulogio Velasco who allegedly witnessed the stabbing of the
victim.
III
That the trial court in many instances showed its prejudice against the accused and in several
instances asked questions that [were] well within the duty of the prosecution to explore and ask; it
never appreciated other matters favorable to the accused, like the frontal infliction of the mortal
wound and the presence [of] "defense wounds" which negate treachery and superiority.
IV
That the trial judge was bias[ed] against the accused hence the judgment of conviction.
In the main, appellant questions the trial judge's (1) assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and
their testimonies and (2) alleged partiality in favor of the prosecution as shown by his participation in the
examination of witnesses.
This Court's Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
First Issue: Credibility of Witnesses
12
Time and again, this Court has adhered to the rule that the factual findings of the trial court, as well as
13
its assessment of the credibility of witnesses, are entitled to great weight and are even conclusive and
binding, barring arbitrariness and oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and substance. The
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is a matter that peculiarly falls within the power of the trial court,
as it has the opportunity to watch and observe the demeanor and behavior of the witnesses on the
14
stand. In this case, appellant failed to provide any substantial argument to warrant a departure from this
rule.
The testimony of Prosecution Witness Eulogio Velasco that he saw the appellant stab the victim is clear
and unequivocal. He was sitting outside the pub house when the victim came out. Dometita, who was
then only an arm's length away from him, turned around to say goodbye when, suddenly, the accused
came out of nowhere and stabbed the victim. Velasco narrated further that the victim asked him for help,
so he responded by placing a chair between the victim and the appellant to block the assault of the
15
accused. Thereafter, he told Dometita to run away. The accused then chased the victim towards the
16
other side of EDSA. The relevant portions of Velasco's testimony are reproduced hereunder:
Q Immediately thereafter, was there any unusual incident that happened?
A When Dorie went inside the pub house, that was the time Tony went out, sir.
COURT:
Q Who is this Tony?
A Antonio Dimatita alias Tony, Your Honor.
PROS. LEE:
Q When Antonio Dimatita [sic] alias Tony went out, what happened?
A Tony asked permission from me that he will go home, sir.
Q And what happened thereafter?
A When he ha[d] not gone far yet from me, Robert Castillo suddenly attacked him
and stabbed him, sir.
Q What happened to Antonio Dimatita [sic] alias Tony when he was stabbed by
accused Robert Castillo?
A He was taken aback. He was not able to cover up himself and he was hit by
the stab made by Robert Castillo, sir.
Q On what part of the body was he hit?
A On the left side of the chest, sir.
Q And did you see in what summer [sic] accused Robert Castillo stabbed Antonio
Dimatita [sic]?
A Like this, sir. (Witness demonstrating with his right arm above his shoulder with
downward stabbing position.)
Q As you stated, after Tony was hit on the left side of [his] chest, what happened
next?
A He was stabbed again and was hit on the arm, sir.
Q What arm? Left or right?
A On the left arm, sir. (Witness is pointing to his left arm in between the 1st and
second finger.)
Q After he was hit on the left arm, what happened next?
A He went near me and asked for help, sir. I placed a bench on the middle to
block the way so that Robert Castillo [would] not be able to reach him and I told
Tony to run away, sir.
Q Did Tony run away thereafter?
A Yes, sir.
Q How about accused Robert Castillo, what was he doing the[n]?
A He chased, sir.
Q What happened next?
A I heard Tony was already dead, sir.
The testimony of Velasco that the accused stabbed the victim on the left side of the chest and then on the
17
left arm was confirmed by the medical findings, particularly the autopsy report of Dr. Muoz, who
18
testified as follows:
COURT
Q Can you tell the Court the relative position of the victim and the assailant when
the stab wound was inflicted?
TRIAL PROS. RALPH S. LEE
Based on the wound, doctor.
WITNESS
A If the victim and the assailant were in a standing position, the assailant and the
victim would be facing each other and the fatal wound was delivered from
upward to downward, your honor.
Witness Velasco further testified that the accused used a bladed weapon which looked like a fan
19
20
knife. This was also supported by Dr. Muoz, viz.:
Q Dr. Muoz, in your learned medical knowledge, what could have caused this
stab wound marked as Exhibit "D"?
A This was inflicted by a sharp pointed single bladed instrument like kitchen knife
or "balisong" or any similar instrument.
Melinda Mercado, the other prosecution witness, corroborated the story of Velasco. She testified that
21
when she was inside the pub, she heard Velasco shout that Antonio Dometita was stabbed. She went
out to verify and saw the accused walking away. What she saw was not the stabbing incident itself, but
22
the accused wrapping a bladed weapon in his shirt. This confirms the assertion of Velasco that the
23
accused was still holding the bladed instrument as he chased the victim.
Clearly, the straightforward, detailed and consistent narrations of the government witnesses show that the
trial court did not err in giving credence to the account of the prosecution.
Appellant contends that the trial court failed to appreciate the testimony of Defense Witness Edilberto
Marcelino who narrated a "stabbing/mauling incident" on a side street that fateful night near the Iglesia ni
Cristo Church, where the victim's body was found. Said witness testified that he was driving his tricycle,
24
25
when he noticed a group ganging up on a man (pinagtutulungan). He then saw the person fall. He did
not notice if the assailants had weapons, as he was a bit far from them, illumination coming only from the
headlight of his tricycle. He stated that the appellant, with whom he was familiar because he often saw
26
him selling cigarettes along EDSA, was not one of those he saw ganging up on the person who fell to
the ground. He described one of the malefactors as long-haired and lanky, and the other one as fair27
complexioned with medium build, descriptions which did not fit the accused. Upon witnessing the
incident, Marcelino immediately proceeded to the barangay hall to report the matter.
The trial court did not accord weight to said testimony. We sustain this holding. Marcelino admitted that
28
he was about twenty-five meters away from the place of incident and that said place was not lighted.
29
Furthermore, his tricycle was then moving because he was in a hurry. Thus, we agree with this
statement of the trial court: "[C]onsidering that it was dark and the distance from where the witness saw
the incident [was] quite far, it could not have been possible for him to recognize the victim and his
30
attackers."
Appellant also asserts that the trial court failed to appreciate the implications of the medical finding that
the heart and lungs of the victim were impaled. He argues that these wounds made it impossible for the
victim to traverse the distance from the pub house to the Iglesia ni Cristo Church area, where his body
was eventually found. However, the testimony of the medico-legal expert did not rule out this possibility,
as gleaned from the following:
Q And if the stab wound was fatal, how long could have he [sic] lived after the
infliction of the wound?
A It would be very very difficult to give the duration of survival because different
individual[s] would have different types of survival. Others would [live] for five
minutes and others would survive for at least . . . in shorter time.
Q But five minutes doctor would be a long time already. It could be the survival
time of a person who has a strong constitution. Do you agree with me?
A No, sir. In this particular case considering that the involvement here of the
heart is the left ventricle which is a very thick portion of the heart, I don't think he
would die in less than five minutes because the thick portion of the heart serves
as sealer once the instrument is pulled out, the tendency of the thick muscle is to
31
close the injury so there is a much longer time for survival. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Second Issue: Partiality of the Trial Judge
Appellant declares that the trial judge was biased against him for propounding questions that were well
within the prerogative of the prosecution to explore and ask. More pointedly, appellant alleges that the
32
trial judge took over from the prosecution and asked questions in a leading manner, interrupted the
cross-examination to help the witness give answers favorable to the
33
prosecution, and asked questions which pertained to matters of opinion and allusions of bad moral
character, which would not be objected to by defense counsel, because they have been ventiliated by the
34
judge himself. To substantiate the alleged bias and prejudice of the judge, appellant in his brief cited
35
several pages from the transcript of stenographic notes.
The allegation of bias and prejudice is not well-taken. It is a judge's prerogative and duty to ask
36
clarificatory questions to ferret out the truth. On the whole, the Court finds that the questions
propounded by the judge were merely clarificatory in nature. Questions which merely clear up dubious
points and bring out additional relevant evidence are within judicial prerogative. Moreover, jurisprudence
teaches that allegations of bias on the part of the trial court should be received with caution, especially
when the queries by the judge did not prejudice the accused. The propriety of a judge's queries is
determined not necessarily by their quantity but by their quality and, in any event, by the test of whether
the defendant was prejudiced by such questioning. In this case, appellant failed to demonstrate that he
was prejudiced by the questions propounded by the trial judge. In fact, even if all such questions and the
answers thereto were eliminated, appellant would still be convicted.
As correctly observed by the solicitor general, "there was no showing that the judge had an interest,
personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of the case at bar. He is therefore presumed to have acted
regularly and in the manner [that] preserve[s] the ideal of the 'cold neutrality of an impartial judge' implicit
37
in the guarantee of due process (Mateo, Jr. vs. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18)." That the judge believed the
evidence of the prosecution more than that of the defense, does not indicate that he was biased. He
simply accorded greater credibility to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses than to that of the
38
accused.
Alibi
Appellant's defense of alibi and denial is unavailing. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must
prove not only that he was at some other place at the time the crime was committed, but that it was
39
likewise physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime. This
the appellant miserably failed to do. Appellant contends that he was then asleep in his house at the time
of the incident. This was supported by his mother who stated that he was asleep from 9:00 p.m. to 6:00
40
a.m. the next day and by Rosemarie Malikdem who said the she visited the accused on the night of
41
May 24, 1993 to counsel him, which was her task in the Samahang Magkakapit-bahay. Appellant failed
to demonstrate, however, the distance between the crime scene and his house. Indeed, he testified that
his house was "near" the crime scene. In any event, this defense cannot overturn the clear and positive
testimony of the credible eyewitnesses who located appellant at the locus criminis and identified him as
42
the assailant.
Aggravating Circumstances
The Court agrees with the trial court that appellant is guilty of murder for the death of Antonio Dometita.
We likewise agree that the prosecution was unable to prove the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation. For this circumstance to be appreciated, there must be proof, as clear as the evidence of
the crime itself, of the following elements: 1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime,
2) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination, and 3) a sufficient lapse of time between
43
determination and execution to allow himself time to reflect upon the consequences of his act. These
requisites were never established by the prosecution.
On the other hand, we disagree with the trial court that the killing was qualified by abuse of superior
strength. "To properly appreciate the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, the
prosecution must prove that the assailant purposely used excessive force out of proportion to the means
44
of defense available to the person attacked." The prosecution did not demonstrate that there was a
marked difference in the stature and build of the victim and the appellant which would have precluded an
appropriate defense from the victim. Not even the use of a bladed instrument would constitute abuse of
superior strength if the victim was adequately prepared to face an attack, or if he was obviously physically
superior to the assailant.
Nonetheless, we hold that the killing was qualified by treachery. "Treachery is committed when two
conditions concur, namely, that the means, methods, and forms of execution employed gave the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate[;] and that such means, methods, and forms of
execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his
45
person." These requisites were evidently present in this case when the accused appeared from
nowhere and swiftly and unexpectedly stabbed the victim just he was bidding goodbye to his friend,
Witness Velasco. Said action rendered it difficult for the victim to defend himself. The presence of
"defense wounds" does not negate treachery because, as testified to by Velasco, the first stab, fatal as it
was, was inflicted on the chest. The incised wounds in the arms were inflicted when the victim was
already rendered defenseless.
Damages
The trial court awarded indemnity and actual and moral damages to the heirs of the victim. We sustained
the award of indemnity in the amount of P50,000, but we cannot do the same for the actual and moral
damages which must be supported by proof. In this case, the trial court did not state any evidentiary basis
for this award. We have examined the records, but we failed to find any, either.
46
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED, but the award
of actual and moral damage is DELETED for lack of factual basis, Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
CAYETANO A. TEJANO, JR., petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. OMBUDSMAN and the HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with application for temporary restraining
1
order, seeks to nullify the Ombudsmans disapproval of the memorandum dated 03 November 1999 of
Special Prosecutor Jesus A. Micael of the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommending the dismissal
2
of Criminal Case No. 21654, as well as the memorandum dated 09 June 2003 denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
The instant petition stemmed from the report of Philippine National Bank (PNB) Resident Auditor
Alexander A. Tan, dated 15 October 1992, on his investigation regarding an alleged unfunded withdrawal
in the amount of P2.2 million by V&G Better Homes Subdivision (V&G) under Savings Account No. 3655355-6-4.
The report, as summarized by Special Prosecution Officer III Jesus A. Micael, is as follows:
. . . [I]n the morning of 17 July 1992, Emilio P. Montesa (Bank Executive Officer of PNB Cebu) handed a
note to Jane Rita Jecong (Cashier) instructing her to include her cash requisition for the day from Central
Bank Cebu, the amount of P2.2 M at P1,000.00 denomination; that on 20 July 1992 at about past 10:00
A.M., Juanito Mata (Cashier III), upon the instruction of Cayetano A. Tejano Jr. (Vice President and
Branch Manager of PNB Cebu), took the P2.2 M from Ms. Jecong and delivered the same to Mr. Tejano;
that at about noontime of same day, Mr. Mara handed to Ms. Jecong a pre-signed withdrawal slip against
SA No. 365-535506-4 under the name of V & G Better Homes for the same amount to replace the cash
withdrawn and to serve as cash-on-hand at the end of the days transaction; that the withdrawal slip was
approved by Mr. Tejano and was postdated 21 July 1992; that as of 20 July 1992 V & G Better Homes SA
No. 365-535506-4 has only P33,436.78; that in the afternoon of 20 July 1992 the amount of
P2,336,563.32 (consisting of P2,200,000.00 in cash; P100,000.00 in check; and P36,563.22 in withdrawal
slip) was received by Teller Mary Ann Aznar as payment for the loan of V & G Better Homes for which
PNB Official Receipt No. 952981E was issued; that the transaction was recognized as an increase in
PNB Cebu Branchs cash-on-hand and a decrease in the loan account of V & G Better Homes; that the
PNB Cebu Credit Committee approved the loan at the rate of 23% lower than the 26% interest rate on its
first renewal and 27% on its second renewal; that the loan proceeds was credited to the account of V & G
Better Homes on 21 July 1992, the same day that the withdrawal slip of P2.2 M was taken by Mr.
Montesa from Ms. Jecong and given to Irene Abellanosa to be taken as her transaction for the day; and
that upon the instruction of Montesa, Savings Account No. 365-535506-4 of V & G Better Homes was
debited and the withdrawal slip was validated by Teller Abellanosa although no actual cash withdrawal
was made.
The report of Resident Auditor Alexander A. Tan implicated Vice President Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr., the
petitioner herein, Executive Officer Emilio Montesa, and Supervising Branch Teller Jane Rita Jecong, all
of the PNB, Cebu City Branch, including Juana dela Cruz and Vicente dela Cruz of V&G, as persons
involved in the irregular withdrawal of P2.2 million of PNB funds.
In an order dated 22 December 1992, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas ordered
Tejano, Montesa, Jecong, Juana dela Cruz and Vicente dela Cruz to file their respective counter4
affidavits.
In a resolution dated 29 March 1993, Graft Investigation Officer Edgardo G. Canton recommended the
5
filing of the proper information for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
6
against petitioner Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr., Juana dela Cruz and Vicente dela Cruz of V&G. The case
against Montesa and Jecong was dismissed for lack of evidence. The resolution was approved by Deputy
Ombudsman for Visayas Arturo C. Mojica and then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez.
The resolution was thereafter referred for review to Special Prosecutor III Orlando I. Ines of the Office of
the Special Prosecutor.
7
In a Memorandum dated 25 October 1994, Ines affirmed the resolution of Graft Investigation Officer
Edgardo G. Canton.
On 28 October 1994, Deputy Special Prosecutor Jose De G. Ferrer recommended the approval of the
memorandum of Special Prosecution Officer Ines.
On 08 November 1994, Aniano A. Desierto, then the Special Prosecutor, concurred in the approval of
8
Ferrer. Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez concurred thereto on 11 November 1994.
Subsequently, on 24 November 1994, an Information for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019,
as amended, was filed before the Sandiganbayan, and docketed as Criminal Case No. 21654.
On 08 December 1994, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for a Period of Time to
File Motion for Reinvestigation.
9
In an order dated 12 December 1994, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reinvestigation.
On 22 December 1994, petitioner filed his motion for reinvestigation in the Office of the Special
Prosecutor.
On 20 April 1995, the Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of the Special Prosecutor to conduct the
10
reinvestigation. The reinvestigation was assigned to Special Prosecution Officer III Jesus Micael.
Convinced that no probable cause existed to indict petitioner Tejano, and spouses Juana and Vicente
11
dela Cruz, Special Prosecutor Micael, in a memorandum dated 03 November 1999, recommended the
dismissal of the case. The recommendation was approved by Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos
and concurred in by Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo.
On 10 December 1999, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, who earlier participated in the initial preliminary
investigation as Special Prosecutor, disapproved the recommendation for the dismissal of the case with
the marginal note "assign the case to another prosecutor to prosecute the case aggressively."
On 02 February 2000, Special Prosecutor Micael filed a Manifestation, to which was attached a copy of
his memorandum, informing the Sandiganbayan of the disapproval by Ombudsman Desierto of his
recommendation to dismiss the case.
On 10 February 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the disapproval by Ombudsman
Desierto of the recommendation of Micael.
Apparently, petitioners motion for reconsideration was not resolved on the merits because on 27 June
2000, Special Prosecution Officer III Joselito R. Ferrer filed a Motion to Set the Case for Arraignment
alleging therein that the prosecution did not give due course to the motion for reconsideration on the
ground that it was the second motion which is prohibited under the Ombudsman Act of 1989. He added
that the results of the reinvestigation were already submitted to the respondent court before receiving the
12
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner manifested before the Sandiganbayan the Office of the Special Prosecutors failure to resolve
13
his motion for reconsideration. Thus, in a resolution dated 24 March 2003, the respondent court directed
the Office of the Ombudsman to resolve the said motion.
14
In a memorandum dated 09 June 2003, Special Prosecutor Joselito R. Ferrer recommended the denial
of the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos changed
his previous position and recommended that the memorandum for the dismissal of the motion for
reconsideration be approved, with Special Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio concurring in the denial.
On 14 July 2003, Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, who succeeded Ombudsman Desierto when he
retired, approved Joselito Ferrers memorandum recommending the denial of the motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner thus filed the instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to
enjoin the Sandiganbayan from taking further action in Criminal Case No. 21654.
On 25 August 2003, the First Division of this Court issued the temporary restraining order prayed for.
On 28 July 2004, the instant petition was transferred to the Second Division of this Court.
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:

I
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT DISAPPROVED THE EARLIER RECOMMENDATION FOR THE DISMISSAL
OF THE CASE AGAINST ALL THE ACCUSED WITHOUT ANY COGENT OR VERIFIABLE REASON
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN THEY:
1. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THE DISAPPROVAL OF THE
RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1999 AGAINST ALL ACCUSED FOR LACK OF PROBABLE
CAUSE AS MANDATED UNDER SECTION 13 R.A. 6770 IN RELATION TO SECTION 3, RULE 112 OF
THE RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
2. THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROCECUTOR DID NOT DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE
CAUSE IN A RESOLUTION DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FOR
APPROVAL BY THE NEW OMBUDSMAN.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE FILED AGAINST THE ACCUSED IS A CLEAR CASE OF
PERSECUTION AND NOT PROSECUTION CONTEMPLATED UNDER R.A. 3019, AS AMENDED,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, REPUBLIC ACT NO.
1374 AND CHAPTER II, SECTION 2, TITLE VII, BOOK II OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
Ruling of the Court
Quite apart from the above, we find a focal issue apparently glossed over by the parties - whether or not
Ombudsman Desierto committed grave abuse of discretion in disapproving the 03 November 1999
memorandum of Special Prosecutor Jesus Micael recommending the dismissal of Criminal Case No.
21654 against petitioner Tejano, and spouses Juana and Vicente dela Cruz of V&G for violation of
Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, where he had earlier participated in the preliminary investigation of the
said criminal case recommending the filing of the information.
This Court has been consistent in holding that it will not interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of his
constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutory powers, and respect the initiative and
independence inherent in the Ombudsman who "beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people
15
and the preserver of the integrity of public service." Such discretionary power of the Ombudsman is
beyond the domain of this Court to review, save in cases where there is clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction of the latter.
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public
officer concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
16
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
Ombudsman Desierto, in this case, committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner attributes partiality on
the part of Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the reinvestigation of the instant case despite
the fact that he earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the same when he was a
Special Prosecutor by concurring in the recommendation for the filing of the information before the
Sandiganbayan.
We agree with the petitioner. Steadfastly, we have ruled that the officer who reviews a case on appeal
17
should not be the same person whose decision is under review. In Zambales Chromite Mining
18
Company v. Court of Appeals, the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was
set aside by this Court after it had been established that the case concerned an appeal of the Secretarys
own previous decision, which he handed down while he was yet the incumbent Director of Mines. We
have equally declared void a decision rendered by the Second Division of the National Labor Relations
Commission, because one of its members, Commissioner Raul Aquino, participated in the review of the
19
case which he had earlier decided on as a former labor arbiter. Likewise, this Court struck down a
decision of Presidential Executive Assistance Jacobo Clave over a resolution of the Civil Service
20
Commission, in which he, then concurrently its Chairman, had earlier concurred.
Having participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the instant case and having recommended the
filing of an appropriate information, it behooved Ombudsman Desierto to recuse himself from participating
in the review of the same during the reinvestigation. He should have delegated the review to his Deputies
pursuant to Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 6770, which provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions and duties:
...
(10) Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such authority or duty as shall
ensure the effective exercise or performance of the powers, functions and duties herein or hereinafter
provided; . . .
In earlier recommending the filing of information, then Special Prosecutor Desierto was already
convinced, from that moment, that probable cause exists to indict the accused. It becomes a farfetched
possibility that in a subsequent review of the same, Ombudsman Desierto would make a turnabout and
take a position contradictory to his earlier finding.
Due process dictates that one called upon to resolve a dispute may not review his decision on
21
22
appeal. We take our bearings from Zambales Chromite Mining Co. v. Court of Appeals which
succinctly explained that:
In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be farce, the
reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there
could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing
officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not
admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case.
23
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government concedes the applicability of the
prohibition on the reviewing officer to handle a case he earlier decided, thus:
Where the circumstances do not inspire confidence in the objectivity and impartiality of the judge, such
judge should inhibit voluntarily or if he refuses, he should be prohibited from handling the case. A judge
must not only be impartial but must also appear impartial as an assurance to the parties that his decision
will be just. His actuation must inspire that belief. This is an instance when appearance is as important as
reality.
The same rule of thumb should apply to an investigating officer conducting a preliminary investigation.
This is the reason why under Section 1679 of the former Revised Administrative Code, the Secretary of
Justice, who has supervision over the prosecution arm of the government, is given ample power to
designate another prosecutor to handle the investigation and prosecution of a case when the prosecutor
handling the same is otherwise disqualified by personal interest, or is unable or fails to perform his duty.
(Underlining supplied)
The fact that the motion for reconsideration of Ombudsman Desiertos disapproval of the 03 November
1999 memorandum of Special Prosecutor Jesus Micael recommending the dismissal of Criminal Case
No. 21654 was denied by another reviewing officer, Ombudsman Marcelo, does not cure the infirmity of
24
Ombudsman Desiertos actuation. As stressed in Singson v. NLRC:
. . . The infirmity of the resolution was not cured by the fact that the motion for reconsideration of the
petitioner was denied by two commissioners and without the participation of Commissioner Aquino. The
right of petitioner to an impartial review of his appeal starts from the time he filed his appeal. He is not
only entitled to an impartial tribunal in the resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Moreover, his right
is to an impartial review of three commissioners. The denial of petitioners right to an impartial review of
his appeal is not an innocuous error. It negated his right to due process. (Underlining supplied)
With the foregoing conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Ombudsmans disapproval of the memorandum dated 03 November 1999, where
Prosecutor Jesus A. Micael of the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 21654, as well as the memorandum dated 09 June 2003, which denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration, are SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the Office of the Ombudsman for
further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
JANE CARAS y SOLITARIO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
1
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92, finding petitioner Jane Caras y Solitario guilty of 15
counts of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) violations.
The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
JANE S. CARAS has appealed from the judgment of conviction in fifteen (15) related cases of
Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. The first Information (docketed as Criminal Case No. Q93-44420) against her reads as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of January 1992 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to
Chu Yang T. Atienza to apply on account or for value PCI Bank, Commonwealth Ave.
Branch Check No. 017744 dated March 18, 1992 payable to the order of CASH in the
amount of P14,125.00 Philippine Currency, said accused well knowing that at the time of
issue she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of
such check in full upon its presentment which check when presented for payment was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for Account Closed and despite receipt of
notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Chu Yang T. Atienza the amount
of said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking
days after receiving said notice.
In Criminal Case Nos. Q-93-44421 to Q-93-44434, the informations were similarly worded as
above, except for the respective amounts involved, dates, numbers of checks and dates of
commission.
When arraigned on August 16, 1993, accused Caras pleaded "not guilty". Thereafter, trial
proceeded.
The evidence for the prosecution tends to show that on or about February 18, 1992, up to May
31, 1992 at Quezon City, accused Jane Caras obtained from complainant Chu Yang T. Atienza
on installment various gift checks and purchase orders from Uniwide Sales and in payment
thereof, the accused issued to the complainant the following checks drawn against Philippine
Commercial Bank:
Check
No.
Date
Amount
017744
3-18- P 14,125.00
92
017743
3-03- P 14,625.00
92
017627
3-03- P 14,125.00
92
017745
4-03- P 14,125.00
92
017664
4-18- P 23,500.00
92
017746
4-18- P 14,125.00
92
017789
3-18- P 14,125.00
92
017790
4-03- P 14,125.00
92
017663
4-02- P 23,500.00
92
017662
3-18- P 24,440.00
92
017768
3-1892
P 7,062.50
017788
3-03- P 14,125.00
92
017665
5-02- P 23,500.00
92
017767
3-0392
017769
3-31- P540,318.35
92
P 7,062.50
When the checks were presented for deposit or encashment, they were all dishonored for the
reason "Account Closed". Despite repeated verbal and written demands made on her to replace
the dishonored checks with cash, she failed and refused to do so.
The accused admitted that she issued the fifteen (15) checks. She claimed, however, that they
2
were given to Marivic Nakpil, alleged sister of the complainant, as "guarantee deposit," that is,
for every gift check and purchase order given to the accused, she issued personal checks to
guarantee its payment. The checks are not to be encashed nor deposited with any bank. With
regard to Check No. 017769 in the amount of P540,316.35 (Exh. "O"), accused claimed that she
entrusted the said check to Marivic Nakpil in blank, with her signature but without any amount or
numerical figures on the face of the check.
On May 13, 1994, the Court a quo rendered its judgment with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. Q-93-44420 the Court finds accused Jane Caras GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of four (4) months and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P14,125.00
and to pay the costs;
reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambans Blg. 22 and is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of four (4) months and indemnify the offended party in the amount of P14,625.00
imprisonment of six (6) months and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P23,500.00
imprisonment of two (2) months and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P7,062.50
imprisonment of two (2) months and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P7,062.50
imprisonment of eight (8) months and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of
P540,318.35 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
On June 13, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the trial court in an
Order dated September 22, 1994. Petitioner then filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which
rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
On April 11, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals
in a Resolution dated July 15, 1997.
Hence, this petition, in which petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred:
I - IN NOT RESOLVING THE ISSUES BROUGHT OUT IN THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION;
II - IN COMPLETELY IGNORING THE PURPOSE OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE CHECKS;
III - IN COMPLETELY IGNORING THE LACK OF PERSONALITY OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT TO INITIATE AND PROSECUTE THESE CASES;
IV - IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED FOR LACK OF CONSIDERATION (AS TO PCIB
CHECK NO 017769 FOR P540,318.35) AND FOR LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE
INSUFFICIENCY OF HER FUNDS;
V - IN COMPLETELY IGNORING THAT THE COURT A QUO HAD NO TERRITORIAL

5
JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE.
Petitioner admits having issued the checks subject of this case, save for one, but insists that she issued
them merely to guarantee payment of her obligation to a certain Marivic Nakpil; they were not supposed
to have been deposited in a bank. Petitioner also denies having transacted with private complainant Chu
Yang T. Atienza, and asserts that the latter did not have personality to prosecute this case.
Petitioner argues that one of the checks, PCIB check no. 017769, was issued in blank. She claims that
this check was issued without consideration and that the element of the crime that the check must be
issued for value is lacking as regards this particular check. Also in relation to her fourth assignment of
error, petitioner asserts that she was not properly notified of the dishonor of her checks. She maintains
that the prosecution failed to show that she received the notices of dishonor purportedly sent to her. She
points out that no return card nor acknowledgment receipt for the first demand letter was presented in
evidence. While there was a return card attached to the second demand letter, this was not marked nor
6
offered in evidence, and hence must be ignored.
Petitioner also assails the jurisdiction of the Quezon City RTC over the case, maintaining that there is no
evidence showing that the checks were issued and delivered in Quezon City. Neither is there evidence as
to where the private complainant received the checks, and whether or not she received them from the
accused herself.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that B.P. 22 does not make any distinction
regarding the purpose for which the checks were issued. Thus, it is of no moment even if it were true that,
as claimed by accused, the checks she issued were meant only to guarantee payment of her obligation.
Criminal liability attaches whether the checks were issued in payment of an obligation or to guarantee
7
payment of that obligation. There is violation of B.P. 22 when a worthless check is issued and is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank. The OSG also points out that accused did not deny having
issued the subject checks.
After a careful consideration of the records and the submissions of the parties, we find that the resolution
of this petition hinges on the issue of whether the prosecution evidence suffices to convict the accused,
herein petitioner Jane Caras. The elements of the offense under Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 are: (1) drawing
and issuance of any check to apply on account or for value; (2) knowledge by the maker, drawer, or
issuer that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon presentment; and (3) said check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or would have been dishonored for the same reason had
8
not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which the check was
issued, nor the terms and conditions of its issuance. There are matters we need to pursue, because, as
9
said in Llamado v. Court of Appeals,
to determine the reasons for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their
issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of
checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in banking communities.
Thus, petitioners contention that she issued the checks subject of this case merely to guarantee payment
of her obligation is hardly a defense. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum and
is punishable under B.P. 22, provided the other elements of the offense are properly proved.
In particular, we note that the law provides for a prima facie rule of evidence. Knowledge of insufficiency
of funds in or credit with the bank is presumed from the act of making, drawing, and issuing a check
payment of which is refused by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds when presented within 90 days
from the date of issue. However, this presumption may be rebutted by the accused-petitioner. Such
presumption does not hold when the maker or drawer pays or makes arrangements for the payment of
10
the check within five banking days after receiving notice that such check had been dishonored. Thus, it
is essential for the maker or drawer to be notified of the dishonor of her check, so she could pay the value
thereof or make arrangements for its payment within the period prescribed by law.
Petitioner denies having received any notice that the checks she issued had been dishonored by the
drawee bank. After carefully going over the records of this case, we find that indeed no clear evidence is
shown on whether petitioner was informed that her checks had been dishonored.
11
The notice of dishonor, as held in Lao v. Court of Appeals, may be sent by the offended party or the
12
drawee bank. Complainant testified that she hired lawyers to prepare and send the demand letters. The
prosecution presented and marked in evidence two letters demanding payment which were purportedly
sent to petitioner. However, the prosecution presented no evidence that would establish petitioners
actual receipt of any demand letter which could have served as notice to petitioner. None of the letters
contained an indication that they were actually received by petitioner. No acknowledgement receipt nor
return card for the first and second demand letters were offered in evidence. Such omission and neglect
on the part of the prosecution is fatal to its cause.
There is testimony on record that private complainant asked petitioner to pay the value of the checks.
However, there is no mention of when the demand to pay was made, whether before or after the checks
13
were dishonored by the drawee bank. It is possible that payment was requested before the checks were
deposited, since, as testified to by petitioner, the usual arrangement was that she issues checks and then
she replaces them with cash. The checks were not deposited but were, instead, returned to
14
her. However, according to the prosecution, petitioner started having problems with her cash flow
resulting to her inability to replace the checks she issued with cash. But such problems leading to
illiquidity of petitioner are not material elements of the crime. What is pertinent here is prior notice to the
drawer that her checks have been dishonored, so that within five banking days from receipt of such notice
she could pay the check fully or make arrangements for such payment.
Even the testimony of Manuel Panuelos, branch manager of PCI Bank where petitioner maintained her
checking account, indicates that the bank also failed to send notice to petitioner for her to pay the value of
the checks or make arrangements for their payment within five days from the dishonor of the said checks.
Note his testimony on cross-examination:
Q:
Did you give the accused notice within five (5) banking days within which to make
arrangement with the bank within ninety (90) days regarding the bounced checks?
Atty. Palaa:
Your Honor, that is already answered by the witness.
Atty. Dela Torre:
No, that is not the answer, what I want is that.....
Court:
Reform
Atty. Dela Torre:
Is it not your procedure that when a check bounced, you give notice to the ....
A:
It is not our procedure.
Q:
It is not your procedure?
A:
No. In fact we do it verbally....
Q:
Is it not standard operating procedure in your bank to give customers notice within five (5)
banking days to make arrangement with the bank within ninety (90) days regarding the bounced
check?
A:
No, that is not our procedure.
Q:
You do not follow that procedure?
A:
We do not. That is not our standard procedure.
15
Petitioner on the witness stand denied receiving any notice from the bank.
Q:
Madam Witness, all these checks were deposited with the bank in one day. Will you
please tell this Honorable Court when the first check bounced by the reason of DAIF, were you
notified by your depositary bank which is PCIB within five (5) banking days to make arrangement
within...days regarding that bouncing checks?
A:
No, sir, I did not receive any notice.
16
The absence of proof that petitioner received any notice informing her of the fact that her checks were
dishonored and giving her five banking days within which to make arrangements for payment of the said
checks prevents the application of the disputable presumption that she had knowledge of the insufficiency
of her funds at the time she issued the checks. Absent such presumption, the burden shifts to the
prosecution to prove that petitioner had knowledge of the insufficiency of her funds when she issued the
17
said checks, otherwise, she cannot be held liable under the law.
Even more crucial, the absence of any notice of dishonor personally sent to and received by the accused
is a violation of the petitioners right to due process. This is in effect our ruling in Lao vs. Court of
18
Appeals, where we held:
It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator "a compromise by
allowing him to perform some act which operates to preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to perform
it the action is abated". This was also compared "to certain laws"(citing E.O. 107, 83 O.G. No. 7, p. 576
(February 16, 1987), and E.O. 122, 89 O.G. No. 44, p. 6349 (November 1, 1993) allowing illegal
possessors of firearms a certain period of time to surrender the illegally possessed firearms to the
Government, without incurring any criminal liability" (citing Nitafan, David G., Notes and Comments on the
Bouncing Checks Law (BP Blg. 22), pp. 121-122). In this light, the full payment of the amount appearing
in the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a "complete defense" (citing Navarro vs.
Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 639). The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused
an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins
that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand - and the basic
postulates of fairness require - that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford
her the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22. (Underscoring and emphasis supplied.)
Absent a clear showing that petitioner actually knew of the dishonor of her checks and was given the
opportunity to make arrangements for payment as provided for under the law, we cannot with moral
certainty convict her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The failure of the prosecution to prove that petitioner was
19
given the requisite notice of dishonor is a clear ground for her acquittal. Discussion of the other
assigned errors need no longer detain us.
However, it should be stressed that this decision in no way prejudices the civil obligations, if any, that she
might have incurred by reason of her transactions with private complainant. For we note that petitioner
20
does not deny having issued the subject checks. And while no criminal liability could be imposed in this
case for lack of sufficient proof of the offense charged, a fair distinction should be made as to civil aspects
of the transaction between the parties.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Jane Caras is ACQUITTED on the ground that her guilt has not
been established beyond reasonable doubt. This decision is without prejudice to the filing of an
appropriate civil case, if warranted, to determine the civil aspects of petitioners transactions.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
PANFILO V. VILLARUEL, JR., petitioner, vs. REYNALDO D. FERNANDO, MODESTO ABARCA, JR.
and MARILOU M. CLEOFAS,respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
[1]
[2]
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA[3]
[4]
G.R. SP No. 48233 dated 30 September 1998 denying due course to the petition for certiorari filed by
Panfilo V. Villaruel, Jr. and the Resolution dated 3 December 1998 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioner Panfilo V. Villaruel, Jr. (petitioner) is the former Assistant Secretary of the Air
Transportation
Office
(ATO),
Department
of
Transportation
and
Communication
(DOTC). Respondents Reynaldo D. Fernando, Modesto E. Abarca, Jr. (Abarca), and Marilou M.
Cleofas are the Chief, Chief Administrative Assistant, and Administrative Assistant, respectively, of the
Civil Aviation Training Center (CATC). The CATC is an adjunct agency of the ATO tasked to train air
traffic controllers, airway communicators and related civil aviation personnel for the local aviation industry
as well as for the Southeast Asian and Pacific region.
Petitioner issued a memorandum dated 27 April 1995 addressed to the respondents, detailing them
to the Office of DOTC Undersecretary Primitivo C. Cal effective 2 May 1995.
On 29 April 1995, respondents wrote to DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia and Undersecretary
Josefina T. Lichauco through petitioner requesting for reconsideration of the detail order.
On 7 May 1995, in compliance with the detail order, respondents reported to the Office of
Undersecretary Cal at DOTC.
Without acting on respondents request for reconsideration, petitioner issued a memorandum on 19
July 1995 addressed to Abarca placing him under preventive suspension for 90 days without pay
pending investigation for alleged grave misconduct.
On 10 August 1995, respondents requested Secretary Garcia to lift the detail order and to order their
return to their mother unit since more than 90 days had already lapsed. Respondents also sought the
intervention of the Ombudsman in their case. As a result, the Ombudsman inquired from Secretary
Garcia the action taken on respondents request for reconsideration of the detail order.
On 22 November 1995, Secretary Garcia replied to the Ombudsman that he had issued a
memorandum dated 9 November 1995 directing petitioner to recall respondents to their mother
unit. Secretary Garcia declared that the law does not sanction the continuous detail of respondents.
Despite repeated demands by respondents, petitioner failed and refused to reinstate respondents to
their mother unit.
On 24 January 1996, respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus and Damages with Prayer for a
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City docketed
as Civil Case No. 96-0139. Respondents prayed for the following:
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioners herein respectfully pray of this Honorable Court that:
1.
Pending the determination of the merits of this petition, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
be issued ex-parte directing respondent Panfilo V. Villaruel, Jr., to recall the petitioners herein within
twenty four (24) hours from receipt hereof to their mother unit, the Civil Aviation Training Center, Air
Transportation Office, DOTC, and to forthwith allow them to assume, perform and discharge the
functions, duties and responsibilities inherent, appurtenant and incident to their respective offices.
2.
After hearing on the merits, judgment be rendered confirming the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction earlier issued by this Honorable Court and declaring the same permanent, and ordering the
respondent Panfilo Villaruel, Jr., to pay petitioners herein the following damages, to wit:
a)
damages;
to pay petitioner Reynaldo D. Fernando the amount of P50,000 as actual and compensatory
b)
to pay petitioners herein moral, exemplary and temperate damages, in such amounts as
may hereafter be proven in the course of trial, which petitioners herein are leaving to the sound discretion
of this Honorable Court to determine and adjudge;
c)
to pay petitioners herein attorneys fees in the amount of P100,000;
d)
to pay petitioners herein the costs of suit.
Petitioners herein pray for such other and further relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.
[5]
On 23 February 1996, the trial court granted respondents prayer for a preliminary mandatory
injunction.
Meanwhile, Judge Aurora Navarette-Recia of the trial court was appointed Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights. Consequently, the case was re-raffled and assigned to Branch 231 of the
[6]
Regional Trial Court, Pasay City.
On 12 April 1996, the trial court issued an order modifying the 23 February 1996 order of Judge
Recia. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering petitioner to comply with
the 9 November 1995 order of Secretary Garcia directing petitioner to recall respondents to their mother
unit until further orders by the trial court.
For petitioners continued failure to comply with the writ of preliminary injunction, respondents moved
to cite petitioner in contempt. Respondents also moved to declare petitioner in default for not filing an
answer within the period prescribed in the trial courts order of 26 January 1996.
On 28 May 1996, the trial court granted the motion and declared petitioner guilty of indirect
contempt. The trial court issued a bench warrant against petitioner.
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a special civil action for certiorari
[7]
with the Court of Appeals assailing the trial courts order finding petitioner guilty of indirect
contempt. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41263.
Meanwhile, the trial court declared petitioner in default for his failure to file an answer to the petition
for mandamus and damages. Accordingly, respondents adduced their evidence ex-parte before the Clerk
of Court.
On 11 July 1996, the trial court rendered a Decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, considering the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioners
and against the respondent declaring mandamus permanent and thereby ordering respondent Panfilo V.
Villaruel, Jr., to pay the following:
(1)
One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) each as moral damages;
(2)
Twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) each as exemplary damages;
(3)
Twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) each as temperate damages, and;
(4)
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.
[8]
Aggrieved, petitioner, represented by the OSG, appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was
[9]
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 42447. With the filing of the appeal, the Court of Appeals granted
respondents motion for the dismissal of the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 41263 for being moot
and academic.
The Court of Appeals granted the OSG a non-extendible extension until 13 December 1996 within
which to file petitioners memorandum. However, the OSG failed to file the memorandum. Subsequently,
Solicitor Restituto Tuando, Jr. who was handling the case was appointed Regional Trial Court judge of
Dumaguete City. The case was re-assigned to Assistant Solicitor Luciano Joson, Jr. On 13 March 1997,
the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dismissing petitioners appeal for failure to file the required
memorandum. The OSG, through Assistant Solicitor Luciano Joson, Jr., filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied the same. The Resolution became final and executory
on 14 June 1997.
Consequently, the respondents filed a Motion for Execution with the trial court. Although served a
copy of the motion for execution, the OSG did not file any opposition.
Acting on the motion for execution, the trial court issued a Writ of Execution on 22 September
1997. On 3 February 1998, the Sheriff issued a Notice of Sheriffs Sale setting on 23 February 1998 the
sale of petitioners real property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 83030.
[10]
On 17 February 1998, petitioner, through his new counsel, filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of
Execution and to Suspend Sheriffs Sale. In his motion, petitioner alleged that the trial courts decision
never became final and executory as the trial court deprived him of his right to due process. Petitioner
claimed that the OSG failed to file petitioners memorandum in CA-G.R. SP No. 42447 resulting in the
dismissal of his appeal. Furthermore, petitioner alleged that the OSG failed to inform him of the dismissal
of his appeal and of the trial courts order granting respondents motion for execution. Petitioner further
[11]
asserted that the Resolution of the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM 0-96-0090 superseded the decision of
the trial court. The Ombudsmans Resolution approved the following recommendation of the reviewing
Assistant Ombudsman:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, respondent MODESTO ABARCA, JR., is hereby found GUILTY of violation
of Section 7(d) of Republic Act 6713, for which the penalty of Suspension Without Pay for Six (6) Months
is hereby recommended pursuant to Section 10(b), Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, in relation to
Section 25(2) of Republic Act No. 6770.
It is also respectfully recommended that the charge against respondents REYNALDO FERNANDO and
[12]
MARY LOU CLEOFAS be DISMISSED.
On 23 February 1998, the trial court issued an Order quashing the Writ of Execution because the
Sheriff failed to follow Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The trial court, however, issued an Alias
Writ of Execution. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the trial court denied the same on 28
April 1998.
Dissatisfied with the trial courts orders, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 48233 assailing the execution of the trial courts decision
of 11 July 1996. The Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition for certiorari and dismissed the
same in the Decision dated 30 September 1998. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the appellate
court denied the motion in a Resolution of 3 December 1998.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner raised before the Court of Appeals the following issues:
1. THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION DATED JULY 11, 1996 IS VOID FOR LACK OF DUE
PROCESS AND COULD NOT HAVE BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
2. SUPERVENING FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE TRANSPIRED WHICH RENDERED
[13]
EXECUTION OF THE JUDGMENT UNJUST AND INEQUITABLE.
On the first issue, the Court of Appeals ruled that the negligence of the OSG could not relieve
petitioner of the effects of such negligence and prevent the decision of the trial court from becoming final
and executory. In short, the OSGs negligence binds petitioner.
The Court of Appeals admonished petitioner for his failure to ascertain periodically from the OSG or
from the Court of Appeals the status of his appeal. The appellate court citedReyes v. Court of
[14]
Appeals, which held that it is the duty of a party litigant to make inquiries to his counsel on matters
concerning his case. A party litigant bears the responsibility of contacting his lawyer periodically to
apprise himself of the progress of the case. A lawyers negligence binds a party litigant who must suffer
the consequences of such negligence. The Court of Appeals further held that there was no proof that the
OSG failed to inform petitioner of the dismissal of his appeal.
On the second issue, the Court of Appeals concurred with the trial courts ruling that the nature of the
case before the Ombudsman is different from the case before the trial court. The former deals with a
[15]
violation of Republic Act No. 6713 (RA 6713) punished with suspension from office while the latter
deals with an ultra vires act punished with damages. The appellate court ruled that the findings of the
Ombudsman had nothing to do with the findings of the trial court, as the two forums are separate and
distinct from each other.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals opined that petitioner failed to prove that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion to warrant the writ of certiorari. The appellate court ruled that the trial court
acted in accord with law and prevailing jurisprudence in issuing the questioned orders.
The Issues
Petitioner presents the following issues for resolution of this Court:
[16]
1. Whether the award of moral, exemplary and temperate damages to respondents has legal basis.
2. Whether the trial court correctly ruled that the negligence of the OSG could not relieve petitioner
of the effects of such negligence and prevent the decision of the trial court from becoming final
and executory.
3. Whether petitioner was denied of his right to due process when the appellate court dismissed his
appeal for failure of the OSG to file the memorandum.
4. Whether the resolution of the Ombudsman finding Modesto Abarca, Jr. guilty of violating Section
7 of RA 6713 rendered the execution of the trial courts decision unjust and inequitable.
The main issue to resolve is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition
for certiorari assailing the trial courts orders dated 23 February 1998 and 28 April 1998. Resolving this
issue necessarily determines the validity of the questioned orders. This in turn resolves the questions of
whether the trial court denied petitioner of his right to due process and whether the Ombudsmans
resolution rendered the execution of the trial courts decision unjust and inequitable.
We can no longer resolve the issue regarding the validity and reasonableness of the award of
damages for three reasons. First, the decision of the trial court dated 11 July 1996 is already final and
executory. Second, the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner was simply a direct consequence of the
trial courts issuance of the writ of execution and notice of sheriffs sale. In other words, petitioner merely
questioned the execution of the trial courts decision in his petition for certiorari. Third, petitioner did not
raise the issue of the validity and reasonableness of the award of damages before the Court of
[17]
Appeals.
The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.
We begin by pointing out that petitioner failed to allege the essential requisites under Section 1, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court for a petition for certiorari to prosper. Specifically, petitioner never alleged that
the trial court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders. Neither did
petitioner allege that the trial court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. In other words, there is no issue that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in handing down the questioned orders. On this score alone, the dismissal
of the petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals is in order. However, in disposing of the instant
case, we shall still resolve the principal issues raised by petitioner.
No Denial of Petitioners Right to Due Process

Petitioner essentially contends that the judgment of the trial court in Civil Case No. 96-0139 is void
for lack of due process. Petitioner alleges that the trial court never gave him the chance to be heard and
to submit his evidence. Petitioner, formerly represented by the OSG, failed to file an answer to
respondents petition for mandamus and damages. Consequently, the trial court declared petitioner in
default. While the OSG filed a notice of appeal of the judgment by default, it failed to file with the Court of
Appeals the required memorandum resulting in the dismissal of the appeal. In petitioners words, the
[18]
OSG virtually abandoned his case. Petitioner argues that the inexcusable negligence of the OSG did
not bind him and prevented the decision of the trial court from becoming final and executory.
We do not agree.
[19]
Due process, in essence, is simply an opportunity to be heard and this opportunity was not denied
petitioner. Throughout the proceedings in the trial court as well as in the Court of Appeals, petitioner had
the opportunity to present his side but he failed to do so. Clearly, petitioners former counsel, the OSG,
was negligent. This negligence, however, binds petitioner. The trial and appellate courts correctly ruled
[20]
that the negligence of the OSG could not relieve petitioner of the effects such negligence and prevent
the decision of the trial court from becoming final and executory.
[21]
In Villa Rhecar Bus v. De la Cruz,
which petitioner himself cited, the Court ruled:
It is unfortunate that the lawyer of the petitioner neglected his responsibilities to his client. This
negligence ultimately resulted in a judgment adverse to the client. Be that as it may, such mistake binds
the client, the herein petitioner. As a general rule, a client is bound by the mistakes of his
counsel. Only when the application of the general rule would result in serious injustice should an
exception thereto be called for. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, no undue prejudice
against the petitioner has been satisfactorily demonstrated. At most, there is only an unsupported claim
that the petitioner had been prejudiced by the negligence of its counsel, without an explanation to that
effect. (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, there was no proof that petitioner suffered serious injustice to exempt him from
the general rule that the negligence of the counsel binds the client. Petitioner did not even attempt to
refute the respondents allegations in the petition for mandamus and damages.
Moreover, petitioner is not entirely blameless for the dismissal of his appeal. After the OSGs failure
to file the answer to the petition for mandamus and damages and to have the order declaring petitioner in
default lifted, petitioner should have already replaced the OSG with another lawyer. However, petitioner
still retained the services of the OSG, despite its apparent lack of interest in petitioners case, until the trial
[22]
courts decision became final. In Salva v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared:
Respondents reliance on Legarda is inapropos. Notably, the decision in said case was not yet final in
1991. The private respondent therein then filed a timely motion for reconsideration. In granting the
motion for reconsideration, the Court en banc held:
xxx
Neither Cathay nor Cabrera should be made to suffer for the gross negligence of Legardas counsel. If
she may be said to be innocent because she was ignorant of the acts of negligence of her counsel, with
more reason are respondents truly innocent. xxx In this case, it was not respondents, but Legarda, who
misjudged and hired the services of the lawyer who practically abandoned her case and who continued to
retain him even after his proven apathy and negligence.
At any rate, we find that respondent Governor Sato, as well as the Province of Occidental Mindoro which
she represents, were not denied their day in court. Responsive pleadings were filed before the lower
courts, and respondent was given all the opportunities to prove her case. Her chosen counsel did not
diligently exhaust all legal remedies to advance respondents cause, yet respondent did not
terminate his services. She was aware of the repeated negligence of her counsel and cannot now
complain of counsels errors. Hence, there is no justifiable reason to exempt her from the general
rule that clients should suffer the consequences of the negligence, mistake or lack of competence
of the counsel whom they themselves hired and had the full authority to fire at any time and
replace with another even without justifiable reason. (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, petitioner cannot now complain of the OSGs errors. Petitioner should have taken the
initiative of making periodic inquiries from the OSG and the appellate court about the status of his
[23]
case. Litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and
[24]
await the outcome of their case. To agree with petitioners stance would enable every party to render
inutile any adverse order or decision through the simple expedient of alleging negligence on the part of
[25]
his counsel. The Court will not countenance such ill-founded argument which contradicts long-settled
[26]
doctrines of trial and procedure.
The Ombudsmans Resolution Does Not Render the Execution

of the Trial Courts Decision Unjust and Inequitable
Petitioner contends that the Ombudsmans Resolution finding Abarca guilty of violating Section 7(d)
of RA 6713 superseded the trial courts decision finding petitioner liable for damages. Petitioner insists
that the Ombudsmans resolution rendered the execution of the trial courts decision unjust and
inequitable.
We are not persuaded.

Settled is the rule that a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and
[27]
may no longer be modified in any respect except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes. True, this
rule admits of certain exceptions. One of these exceptions is whenever circumstances transpire after the
[28]
finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. This, however, is not the case
here. In the present case, the Ombudsman issued his Resolution prior to the finality of the trial courts
decision. The Ombudsman issued his Resolution on 22 January 1997 while the trial courts decision
became final and executory on 14 June 1997. Therefore, the resolution of the Ombudsman is not a
supervening event to warrant the stay of the execution of the decision of the trial court.
Furthermore, the resolution of the Ombudsman finding Abarca guilty of violating Section 7(d) of RA
6713 did not and could not supersede the decision of the trial court holding petitioner liable for damages.
The action filed by the petitioner before the Ombudsman is completely different from the action instituted
by respondents before the trial court. The two actions, which are clearly separate and distinct from each
other, presented two different causes of action. Petitioners cause of action arose from respondents
alleged violation of certain provisions of RA 6713 whereas respondents cause of action resulted from
petitioners refusal to recall respondents to their mother unit at CATC. In the administrative case before
the Ombudsman, the issue was whether respondents were guilty of violating RA 6713. In contrast, the
issue in the civil action before the trial court was whether respondents were entitled to the issuance of the
writ of mandamus and damages.
The findings of the Ombudsman did not render the execution of the trial courts decision unjust and
inequitable. The resolution of the Ombudsman finding Abarca guilty of violating Section 7(d) of RA 6713
did not state that petitioner had a valid reason to detail respondents to the Office of Undersecretary
Cal. In fact, the Ombudsman dismissed the charges against Reynaldo Fernando and Mary Lou
Cleofas. Thus, the trial court correctly awarded damages to respondents. Contrary to petitioners
contention, awarding damages to respondents does not amount to rewarding respondents for their
alleged wrongdoing. The award merely compensates respondents for petitioners own unlawful
acts. Clearly illegal were petitioners acts of unjustifiably detailing respondents to the office of DOTC
Undersecretary Cal and refusing to comply with the 9 November 1995 directive of Secretary Garcia to
recall immediately respondents to their mother unit.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP
No. 48233 dated 30 September 1998 and the Resolution dated 3 December 1998 are AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., on leave.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 139884. February 15, 2001]
SPOUSES OCTAVIO and EPIFANIA LORBES, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RICARDO
DELOS REYES and JOSEFINA CRUZ,respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari arose from an action for reformation of instrument and damages
originally filed with the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, the decision on which was
reviewed and reversed by the Third Division of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners were the registered owners of a 225-square meter parcel of land located in Antipolo,
Rizal covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 165009. Sometime in August 1991, petitioners
mortgaged this property to Florencio and Nestor Carlos in the amount of P150,000.00.
About a year later, the mortgage obligation had increased to P500,000.00 and fearing foreclosure of
the property, petitioners asked their son-in-law, herein private respondent Ricardo delos Reyes, for help
in redeeming their property. Private respondent delos Reyes agreed to redeem the property but because
he allegedly had no money then for the purpose he solicited the assistance of private respondent
Josefina Cruz, a family friend of the delos Reyeses and an employee of the Land Bank of the Philippines.
It was agreed that petitioners will sign a deed of sale conveying the mortgaged property in favor of
private respondent Cruz and thereafter, Cruz will apply for a housing loan with Land Bank, using the
subject property as collateral. It was further agreed that out of the proceeds of the loan, P500,000.00 will
be paid to the Carloses as mortgagees, and any such balance will be applied by petitioners for capital
gains tax, expenses for the cancellation of the mortgage to the Carloses, transfer of title to Josefina Cruz,
[1]
and registration of a mortgage in favor of Land Bank. Moreover, the monthly amortization on the
housing loan which was supposed to be deducted from the salary of private respondent Cruz will be
reimbursed by private respondent delos Reyes.
On September 29, 1992, the Land Bank issued a letter of guarantee in favor of the Carloses,
informing them that Cruzs loan had been approved. On October 22, 1992, Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 165009 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 229891 in the name of Josefina Cruz was
[2]
issued in lieu thereof. On November 25, 1992, the mortgage was discharged.
Sometime in 1993, petitioners notified private respondent delos Reyes that they were ready to
redeem the property but the offer was refused. Aggrieved, petitioners filed on July 22, 1994 a complaint
for reformation of instrument and damages with the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, docketed as Civil Case No.
94-3296.
In the complaint, petitioners claimed that the deed was merely a formality to meet the requirements
of the bank for the housing loan, and that the real intention of the parties in securing the loan was to apply
[3]
the proceeds thereof for the payment of the mortgage obligation. They alleged that the deed of sale did
not reflect the true intention of the parties, and that the transaction was not an absolute sale but an
equitable mortgage, considering that the price of the sale was inadequate considering the market value of
the subject property and because they continued paying the real estate taxes thereto even after the
execution of the said deed of sale. Petitioners averred that they did not see any reason why private
respondents would retract from their original agreement other than that they (petitioners) and the
members of their family resigned en masse from the Mahal Namin Organization, of which private
respondent delos Reyes was the president and chairman of the board of directors, and private
respondent Cruz was the treasurer. In the same complaint, they demanded moral damages, exemplary
damages, and attorneys fees.
On July 29, 1996, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining private respondents
from ejecting petitioners from the premises of the disputed property; this was soon replaced by a writ of
preliminary injunction.
Summons and a copy of the complaint were served upon private respondents on August 1,
1994. Private respondents filed their answer beyond the reglamentary period, or only on September 1,
1994. Thus, on September 5, 1994, petitioners filed a motion to declare private respondents in default,
which the trial court granted in an order dated September 16, 1994. On September 30 of the same year,
petitioners presented their evidence ex parte before the trial court. The principal witness presented was
petitioner Octavio Lorbes, whose testimony was corroborated by his son, Atty. Salvador Lorbes.
On October 12, 1994, private respondents filed a motion to lift order of default and to strike out
evidence presented ex parte, which the court denied in an order dated October 26, 1994.
On June 20, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners, upon finding that: (1) the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 21, 1992 did not reflect the true intention of the parties, and (2) the
transaction entered into between petitioners and Cruz was not an absolute sale but an equitable
mortgage, considering that the price stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale was insufficient compared to the
value of the property, petitioners are still in possession of the property, and petitioners had continued to
pay the real estate taxes thereon after the execution of the said deed of sale. As explained by the trial
court in its decision:
The foregoing uncontroverted facts clearly show that the transaction entered into between the plaintiffs
and the defendants is not an absolute sale but merely an equitable mortgage as the sale was executed in
order to secure a loan from a certain bank to save the property from the danger of foreclosure and to use
it as collateral thereof for bank loan purposes and that the same does not reflect the real intention of the
parties in executing the said Deed of Sale. The court notes that at the time the transaction and the Deed
of Absolute Sale was executed by the plaintiffs sometime in 1992, the prevailing market value of the lot
alone was P400,000.00 per square meter such that the lot alone consisting of 255 square meters,
excluding the house and improvements thereon would already cost more than a million pesos already
hence, the consideration of P600,000.00 in the said Deed of Sale is considerably insufficient compared to
the value of the property. Further, the plaintiffs are still in possession of the subject property and had
been paying the realty taxes thereon even after the execution of the sale and the transfer of the title from
the plaintiffs to defendant Josephine Cruz which clearly evinces the true badge of the transaction which
occurred between the plaintiffs and defendants as that of an equitable mortgage and not an absolute sale
and that the plaintiffs were only compelled to enter into the said transaction of sale with the defendants as
the former were in extreme need of money in order to redeem their only conjugal property and to save it
from being foreclosed for non-payment of the mortgage obligation and that it was never the intention of
the plaintiffs to sell the property to the defendants, as it was their agreement that plaintiffs can redeem the
[4]
property or any member of the family thereof, when they become financially stable.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision thus provides:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendants, ordering the latter jointly and severally, as follows:
1. To reconvey the subject property to the plaintiffs upon payment of the price stipulated in the
contract of sale;
2. To pay plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages;
3. To pay plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees plus P1,000.00 per
court appearance;
4. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
[5]
The Court of Appeals reversed the above decision, finding that private respondents were denied due
process by the refusal of the trial court to lift the order of default against them, and that the transaction
between petitioners and Cruz was one of absolute sale, not of equitable mortgage. It also held the RTC
decision to be constitutionally infirm for its failure to clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on
which it is based.
The Court of Appeals held that the reformation of the Deed of Absolute Sale in the instant case is
improper because there is no showing that such instrument failed to express the true intention of the
[6]
parties by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct, or accident in the execution thereof. To the
Court of Appeals, the transaction was unmistakably a contract of sale, as evidenced by the numerous
supporting documents thereto, such as the Contract to Sell dated June 1992, Affidavit of
Waiver/Assignment dated August 14, 1992, Receipt of Partial Advance Payment dated September 9,
1992, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 229891 issued in the name of private respondent Cruz. Going
over the indicators giving rise to a presumption of equitable mortgage cited in the decision of the RTC, the
Court of Appeals held: (1) inadequacy of price is material only in a sale with right to repurchase, which is
not the case with herein petitioners and Cruz; moreover, the estimate of the market value of the property
came only from the bare testimony of petitioner Octavio Lorbes, (2) petitioners remaining in possession
of the property resulted only from their refusal to vacate the same despite the lawful demands of private
respondent Cruz, and (3) there was no documentary evidence that petitioners continued paying the taxes
on the disputed property after the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals also pointed out that under the usual arrangement of pacto de
retro the vendor of the property is a debtor of the vendee, and the property is used as security for his
obligation. In the instant case, the mortgage creditors (the Carloses) are third persons to the Deed of
Absolute Sale.
This petition raises three issues before the Court: (1) whether respondent court erred in ruling that
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 21, 1992 was an equitable mortgage, (2) whether respondent
court erred in ruling that by declaring private respondents in default they were denied due process of law,
and (3) whether respondent court erred in ruling that the trial courts decision violates the constitutional
[7]
requirement that it should clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based.
We shall first deal with the second and third issues, these being preliminary matters.
Well-settled is the rule that courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default for judgments of
default are frowned upon, unless in cases where it clearly appears that the reopening of the case is
[8]
intended for delay. The issuance of orders of default should be the exception rather than the rule, to be
allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the defendant to comply with the orders of the trial
[9]
court.
Under the factual milieu of this case, the RTC was indeed remiss in denying private respondents
motion to lift the order of default and to strike out the evidence presented by petitioners ex parte,
especially considering that an answer was filed, though out of time. We thus sustain the holding of the
Court of Appeals that the default order of the RTC was immoderate and in violation of private
respondents due process rights. However, we do not think that the violation was of a degree as to justify
a remand of the proceedings to the trial court, first, because such relief was not prayed for by private
respondents, and second, because the affirmative defenses and evidence that private respondents would
have presented before the RTC were capably ventilated before respondent court, and were taken into
account by the latter in reviewing the correctness of the evaluation of petitioners evidence by the RTC
and ultimately, in reversing the decision of the RTC. This is evident from the discussions in the decision
of the Court of Appeals, which cited with approval a number of private respondents arguments and
evidence, including the documents annexed to their opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
[10]
injunction filed with the RTC. To emphasize, the reversal of respondent court was not simply on due
process grounds but on the merits, going into the issue of whether the transaction was one of equitable
mortgage or of sale, and so we find that we can properly take cognizance of the substantive issue in this
case, while of course bearing in mind the inordinate manner by which the RTC issued its default order.
As regards the third issue, we reverse for being unfounded the holding of the Court of Appeals since
the RTC decision, some parts of which we even reproduced in our earlier discussions, clearly complied
with the constitutional requirement to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it was
based.
Thus, the one issue essential to the resolution of this case is the nature of the transaction between
petitioners and private respondent Cruz concerning the subject parcel of land. Did the parties intend for
the contested Deed of Absolute Sale to be a bona fide and absolute conveyance of the property, or
merely an equitable mortgage?
On the outset, it must be emphasized that there is no conclusive test to determine whether a deed
[11]
absolute on its face is really a simple loan accommodation secured by a mortgage. The decisive factor
in evaluating such agreement is the intention of the parties, as shown not necessarily by the terminology
used in the contract but by all the surrounding circumstances, such as the relative situation of the parties
at that time, the attitude, acts, conduct, declarations of the parties, the negotiations between them leading
to the deed, and generally, all pertinent facts having a tendency to fix and determine the real nature of
their design and understanding. As such, documentary and parol evidence may be submitted and
[12]
admitted to prove the intention of the parties.
The conditions which give way to a presumption of equitable mortgage, as set out in Article 1602 of
[13]
the Civil Code, apply with equal force to a contract purporting to be one of absolute sale. Moreover, the
presence of even one of the circumstances laid out in Article 1602, and not a concurrence of the
circumstances therein enumerated, suffices to construe a contract of sale to be one of equitable
[14]
mortgage. This is simply in consonance with the rule that the law favors the least transmission of
[15]
property rights.
Thus, under Article 1602 of the Civil Code, a contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage
when --- (a) the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate; (b) the vendor remains in
possession as lessee or otherwise; (c) upon or after the expiration of the right of repurchase another
instrument extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed; (d) the purchaser
retains for himself a part of the purchase price; (e) the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing
sold; and, (f) in any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that
the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation.
Applying the foregoing considerations to the instant case, the Court finds that the true intention
between the parties for executing the Deed of Absolute Sale was not to convey ownership of the property
in question but merely to secure the housing loan of Cruz, in which petitioners had a direct interest since
the proceeds thereof were to be immediately applied to their outstanding mortgage obligation to the
Carloses.
It is not disputed that before the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale petitioners mortgage
obligation to the Carloses was nearing maturity and they were in dire need of money to meet the
same. Hence, they asked for the help of their son-in-law delos Reyes who in turn requested Cruz to take
out a housing loan with Land Bank. Since collateral is a standard requirement of banks in giving out
loans, it was made to appear that the subject property was sold to Cruz so she can declare the same as
collateral for the housing loan. This was simply in line with the basic requirement in our laws that the
[16]
mortgagor be the absolute owner of the property sought to be mortgaged. Consistent with their
agreement, as soon as the housing loan was approved, the full amount of the proceeds were immediately
turned over to petitioners, who promptly paid P500,000.00 therefrom to the Carloses in full satisfaction of
their mortgage obligation. The balance was spent by petitioners in transferring title to the property to
Cruz and registering the new mortgage with Land Bank.
Understandably, the Deed of Absolute Sale and its supporting documents do not reflect the true
arrangement between the parties as to how the loan proceeds are to be actually applied because it was
not the intention of the parties for these documents to do so. The sole purpose for preparing these
documents was to satisfy Land Bank that the requirement of collateral relative to Cruzs application for a
housing loan was met.
Were we to accept, as respondent court had, that the loan that Cruz took out with Land Bank was
indeed a housing loan, then it is rather curious that Cruz kept none of the loan proceeds but allowed for
the bulk thereof to be immediately applied to the payment of petitioners outstanding mortgage
obligation. It also strains credulity that petitioners, who were exhausting all means to save their sole
conjugal real property from being foreclosed by the Carloses, would concurrently part with the same in
favor of Cruz.
Such urgent prospect of foreclosure helps to explain why petitioners would subscribe to an
agreement like the Deed of Absolute Sale in the herein case, which on its face represents their
unconditional relinquishment of ownership over their property. Passing upon previous similar situations
the Court has declared that while it was true that plaintiffs were aware of the contents of the contracts,
the preponderance of the evidence showed however that they signed knowing that said contracts did not
express their real intention, and if they did so notwithstanding this, it was due to the urgent necessity of
obtaining funds. Necessitous men are not, truly speaking, free men; but to answer a present emergency,
[17]
will submit to any terms that the crafty may impose upon them.
The facts further bear out that petitioners remained in possession of the disputed property after the
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the transfer of registered title to Cruz in October 1992. Cruz
[18]
made no demand on petitioners to vacate the subject premises until March 19, 1994; interestingly, this
was two days after petitioners signified their intention to redeem the property by paying the full amount of
[19]
P600,000.00. On this basis, the finding of respondent court that petitioners remained in possession of
the property only because they refused to vacate on Cruzs demand is not accurate because the records
reflect that no such demand was made until more than a year since the purported sale of the property.
Copies of realty tax receipts attached to the record also show that petitioners continued paying for
[20]
the taxes on the property for the period 1992 to 1994, or after the property was supposed to have been
sold to Cruz.
From the above, the Court is satisfied that enough of the circumstances set out in Article 1602 of the
Civil Code are attendant in the instant case, as to show that the true arrangement between petitioners
and private respondent Cruz was an equitable mortgage.
That a transfer certificate of title was issued in favor of private respondent Cruz also does not import
conclusive evidence of ownership or that the agreement between the parties was one of sale. As was
[21]
[22]
stated in Oronce vs. Court of Appeals, citing Macapinlac vs. Gutierrez Repide
xxx it must be borne in mind that the equitable doctrine xxx to the effect that any conveyance intended as
security for a debt will be held in effect to be a mortgage, whether so actually expressed in the instrument
or not, operates regardless of the form of the agreement chosen by the contracting parties as the
repository of their will. Equity looks through the form and considers the substance; and no kind of
engagement can be adopted which will enable the parties to escape from the equitable doctrine to which
reference is made. In other words, a conveyance of land, accompanied by registration in the name of the
transferee and the issuance of a new certificate, is no more secured from the operation of the equitable
doctrine than the most informal conveyance that could be devised.
Before we fully set aside this issue, it will be recalled that the instant petition originated as a
complaint for reformation filed before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal. The Court of Appeals found petitioners
action for reformation unmeritorious because there was no showing that the failure of the deed of sale to
express the parties true intention was because of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct, or
[23]
accident. Indeed, under the facts of the present case, reformation may not be proper for failure to fully
meet the requisites in Article 1359 of the Civil Code, and because as the evidence eventually bore out the
contested Deed of Absolute Sale was not intended to reflect the true agreement between the parties but
was merely to comply with the collateral requirements of Land Bank. However, the fact that the complaint
filed by petitioners before the trial court was categorized to be one for reformation of instrument should
not preclude the Court from passing upon the issue of whether the transaction was in fact an equitable
mortgage as the same has been squarely raised in the complaint and had been the subject of arguments
and evidence of the parties. Thus we have held that it is not the caption of the pleading but the
allegations therein that determine the nature of the action, and the Court shall grant relief warranted by
[24]
the allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed for.
Finally, on the award of damages. Considering the due process flaws that attended the default
judgment of the RTC, and applying the rule adopted by this Court that in instances where no actual
[25]
damages are adjudicated the awards for moral and exemplary damages may be reduced, we reduce
the award for moral damages in the instant case from P50,000.00 to P30,000.00. At the same time, we
sustain the award of attorneys fees in the amount of P50,000.00, it being clear that petitioners were
compelled to incur expenses and undergo the rigors of litigation to recover their property.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal is REINSTATED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of
moral damages is reduced to P30,000.00, and in all other respects AFFIRMED. Costs against private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 109721. March 11, 1999]
FELIX
A.
SAJOT, petitioner,
vs. COURT
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
OF
APPEALS
and
PEOPLE
OF
THE
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
[1]
What is before the Court is a petition to set aside a resolution of the Court of Appeals, denying
petitioner's "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" of the dismissal of his appeal for having been filed out of
[2]
time, and another resolution denying petitioner's "Motion for Reconsideration" for being a prohibited
pleading.
On April 23, 1991, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 118, Pasay City, convicted petitioner and
Antonio Tobias in Criminal Case NO. 97-12635, of estafa. The court sentenced each of them to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years of prision correctional to thirteen (13) years of prision mayor, and
to reimburse Father Modesto Teston in the amount of P75,000.00, as actual damages, P50,000.00, as
[3]
moral damages, P10,000.00, as attorney's fees and to pay the costs of the suit.
Antonio Tobias appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals,
brief, which appeal is now pending therein.
[4]
and, thereafter, filed an appellant's
On the other hand, on June 24, 1991, petitioner filed with the trial court a notice of appeal through
Attorney Mariano Cervo. Subsequently, the trial court elevated the records to the Court of Appeals. Per
notice dated January 14, 1992, the Court of Appeals required petitioner to file an appellant's brief within
[5]
thirty (30) days from receipt of notice.
On February 21, 1992, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a "Petition for Extension of Time to
[6]
File Brief," asking for an additional thirty-day period to file appellant's brief, which the court granted. On
March 20, 1992, petitioner filed a "Petition for Second Extension of Time to File Brief", which the court
[7]
likewise granted. Again, on May 14, 1992, he filed a "petition for Third Extension of Time to File Brief."
[8]
The court granted the motion.
On November 27, 1992, the Court of Appeals resolved to dismiss petitioner's appeal for failure to file
his brief within the third extension granted by the court. Petitioner contended that he only learned about
the dismissal through a friend. When confronted, his counsel could not give any plausible explanation for
[9]
his failure to file brief. On February 4, 1993, petitioner, "for and by himself," filed with the Court of
[10]
Appeals an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. The court denied the motion.
On March 12, 1993, petitioner, by a new counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration alleging the
following grounds:
"I. Substantial justice/Ends of justice can be fully served
"II. Excusable negligence on the part of the moving appellant
"III. Exercise of equity jurisdiction by this Honorable Court of Appeals"
[11]
Petitioner alleged further that his counsel, Attorney Mariano H. G. Cervo, never submitted the brief
because of "utter and gross ignorance of procedure and/or negligence or omission, intentional or
[12]
otherwise, in the performance of his avowed professional duty."
On March 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals resolved to deny the motion for being a prohibited
pleading. Petitioner received a copy of the resolution on April 12, 1993.
Hence, this petition.
The issue boils down to whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in
dismissing petitioner's appeal for failure to file appellant's brief.
Rule 50, Section 1 (e) of the Revised Rules of Court provides "Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal - An Appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its
own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
xxx
(e) Failure of appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum
within the time provided by these Rules;"
In a minute resolution,
[13]
we said:
"True, appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. As such, courts should proceed with caution so
as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, particularly if the appeal is meritorious. Respect for
the appellant's right, however, carries with it the correspondent respect for the appellee's similar rights to
fair play and justice. The appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply
with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court."
In Garbo vs. Court of Appeals,
[14]
we ruled that:
"Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are
thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in
the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to
violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only
in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances."
While litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is a truism that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals denied him the right to due process when it dismissed
his appeal because of his counsel's negligence.
We do not agree. Petitioner was himself guilty of neglect. He was aware of his conviction and of the
requirement of filing an appellant's brief. His excuse that he relied on the services of his counsel and that
[15]
he was busy is "flimsy". "Equally busy people have in one way or the other learned how to cope with
the same problem he had. Were we to accept his excuse, this Court would have to open cases
dismissed many years ago on the ground of counsel's neglect. In many cases, the fact is that counsel's
[16]
negligence is matched by his client's own negligence."
We note that even during the trial of the estafa case before the lower court, petitioner never
appeared in court except during the arraignment. Thus, the court issued a warrant for his arrest and
[17]
interpreted his non-appearance as "flight." Petitioner's lack of vigilance as found by the trial court in its
decision is emphasized when his counsel in the instant petition filed a motion to withdraw primarily on the
ground of irreconcilable professional relationship between Attorney Florentino Temporal and
petitioner. Despite petitioner's repeated assurances relayed by phone, letters and telegrams that he will
meet with Atty. Temporal to formulate the appellant's brief, he never did so. Moreover, petitioner paid
Atty. Temporal's professional fees with checks drawn against closed accounts.
Indeed, petitioner does not claim innocence of the crime charged. He invokes partial restitution as a
defense contending that long before the lower court's decision, complainant had been practically
[18]
restituted the amount of P65,000.00. The "reimbursement or restitution to the offended party of the
[19]
money or property swindled does not extinguish criminal liability. It only extinguishes civil liability."
We do not see that the Court of Appeals committed any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
appeal for petitioner's failure to file appellant's brief.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DISMISSES the petition for certiorari to annul the resolutions dated
February 11, 1993 and March 30, 1993, of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. CR No. 11912, entitled
People of the Philippines vs. Felix A. Sajot, et al.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Melo, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

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VICTOR ORQUIOLA and HONORATA ORQUIOLA, petitioners,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

The Appellee's Brief presents the facts as follows:

CAYETANO A. TEJANO, JR., petitioner,

Petitioner raises the following issues:

JANE CARAS y SOLITARIO, petitioner,

V - IN COMPLETELY IGNORING THAT THE COURT A QUO HAD NO TERRITORIAL

It is not our procedure.

It is not your procedure?

No. In fact we do it verbally....

No, that is not our procedure.

You do not follow that procedure?

We do not. That is not our standard procedure.

No, sir, I did not receive any notice.

to pay petitioners herein attorneys fees in the amount of P100,000;

to pay petitioners herein the costs of suit.

One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) each as moral damages;

Twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) each as exemplary damages;

Twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) each as temperate damages, and;

Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as attorneys fees.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Courts Ruling

No Denial of Petitioners Right to Due Process

In Villa Rhecar Bus v. De la Cruz,

which petitioner himself cited, the Court ruled:

The Ombudsmans Resolution Does Not Render the Execution

We are not persuaded.

[G.R. No. 139884. February 15, 2001]

[G.R. No. 109721. March 11, 1999]

and, thereafter, filed an appellant's

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