Habermas On Ideology and Social Change

HABERMAS ON IDEOLOGY AND SOCIAL CHANGE
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background of the study
The choice of this study on Jürgen Habermas was especially influenced by the
following basic reasons:
(a) Habermas understood the complexity in the nature of man, and thus, approached his
study of man and the solution to his problems in the society from various aspects of
man: language, psychology, sociology, among others, and very importantly, social
(and Critical) philosophy. This is necessary because any study of man from a single
point of view is inadequate.
(b) Secondly, and very importantly, Habermas gave attention to truth as an important
validity claim, and as a necessity in (social) communication and (human)
development. This is very much appreciated by this study because truth is pre-
eminent of all social/human values: only a correct representation of reality, of the
state of affairs - for example, of a collapsing human society, by means of the true
propositions (due disregard here for relativism) - can arouse the necessary
consciousness and collective ‘self-reflection’†, which alone can move the minds and
form the wills of the members of the society to work for the realization of the
necessary changes in the society.
(c) A third reason for the interest in Habermas is because he is a critical theorist whose
way of doing philosophy involves an integration of the normative aspects of
philosophical reflection with the explanatory achievements of the social sciences.
And like other critical theorists (in the Frankfurt School and elsewhere), his ultimate
goal, which this study appreciates, is to link theory and praxis; to provide the most
enlightened insight; to empower subjects and nations to change their oppressive
circumstances; and work to achieve human emancipation and a rational society that
satisfies human needs.
In addition to the above personal reasons for being attracted to Habermas, it is

necessary, as part of the background to this study, to try to situate Habermas and the
problems he tried to solve in history. Greek philosophy is traced as the cradle of Western
philosophy. In the Greek mythologies, ideas about the gods and their influences on human
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existent, with the attendant traditionalism, were predominant. Yet, there was at some time a
Socrates, presented by Plato, who argued against traditionalism, for the primacy of self-
knowledge, and the possibility of rational and just living. During the medieval era, the
Church was the determinant of which ideas went as valid and which ones should be
discarded. Gradually however, there was the era referred to as “dark ages” which ended
with the secularization of the sacred, a hold onto reason as the proper tool for meaningful
human existence. That was the era of enlightenment and reason. It led to so much
advancement in the understanding and control of nature. Reason then had so many
promises. That was the modern era during which a lot of things ‘flourished’. There were
theoretical advancements in knowledge for which Bacon exclaimed that knowledge is
power. And, the knowledge in question was most of the time seen from point of view of
how it enabled further control and exploitation of nature.
From the ability to exploit and control nature resulted the idea of producing more to
have more by means of putting more capital into the process of production. That was the
birth of capitalism which assessment and implications Karl Marx and Friedrich Engel’s
philosophical works and political economy were out to address. Marx and Engel exposed
the inherent contradictions that were evident in the society: men are now under the control
of the means of control they had produced. And based on the primacy of place given to
material means and relations of production, Marx and Engel argued that human societies
will keep experiencing revolutions and counter-revolutions. This was because of the
perceptible contradictions that Hegel had earlier noticed between thought and reality. From
their analysis, Marx and Engel argued that modernity has failed. Instead of leading man
further up the ladder of meaningful living, modernity has recoiled on itself to institute
structures of domination and dehumanization: of control, no longer of nature but, of human
subjects.
Marx Weber’s diagnosis further darkened the picture of the failure of modernity and its
project. Many modern and contemporary thinkers, some of them the members of the
Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, appropriated his analysis. No wonder then, Theodor
Adorno and Max Horkheimer, writing on “On the concept of Enlightenment” submitted:
In the most general sense of progressive thought, the enlightenment has always aimed at
liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty. Yet the fully enlightened
earth radiates disaster triumphant… What men want to learn from nature is how to use it
in order wholly to dominate it and other men… Enlightenment is totalitarian.1

Apart form this ontological and anthropological aspect of the turn-out of modernity, the
positivists were later, very eager to argue from point of view of epistemology. For them,
only knowledge gained by means of, and demonstrable through, the senses is the
acceptable knowledge. They ‘called’ for the death of metaphysics and any form of
rationality. They had lost hope in the modernity project. Some thinkers in this line of
thought are the likes of Richard Rorty, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and several
others who preferred to go the way of deconstructionism, pragmatism, relativism; and,
connecting all these trends, the idea of the “fall of the absolute truth” come to mind.
This picture of loss of hope in reason and modernity; this picture of pessimism, painted
by Max Weber’s diagnosis of “iron cage” of reason, and adopted by Max Horkheimer and
Theodor Adorno, was the predominant presentation of modernity which Habermas’
philosophical project was out to correct, re-paint, and re-orient. That was the general
scepticism about the role of reason in history which, as the backdrop to Habermas, makes
him unique. According to Theophilus Igwe, Habermas’ project was a rethinking, and
rewriting of Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment. Thus Habermas held
that the promise of modernity is still unfinished. It is a project whose continuous realization
is dependent upon our present praxis. But our praxis depends on our worldviews and
theories. Thus, Habermas worked for theoretical/rational reconstruction of paradigms: the
Western paradigms and the mythical worldviews of (most) African societies.
Introducing the text, German 20th Century Philosophy, The Frankfurt School, Wolfgang
Schirmacher began in these words: “There is no right way of living a damaged life”. This is
because there is from time to time the need to assess, reconstruct when necessary, and -
when its promises are for better and meaningful human living – keep pursuing “the goal of
changing social praxis”2. This warning and insight, which was at the root of the activities of
the Frankfurt School, and which in a special way, influenced and properly reflected in
Habermas’ Critical Social Theory as a critique of ideologies for social change, was also
part of what flamed the interest in researching on this aspect of Habermas’ philosophy.
1.2. Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to draw attention of every human society, and
somewhat specifically, African Societies, to the importance of critical social theories with
their usual calls to consciousness and self-reflection through deep and consistent critique of

ideology, for a re-evaluation and trans-valuation of values and interests, and also for
reconstruction and re-orientation of categorical frameworks as the determinants of
meanings given to social happenings, and as providing the coherence and explanations for
social occurrences. Simply put, the purpose of this study is to highlight the importance and
possibilities of critique of ideologies for the purpose of reorienting “social needs and
declared goals”3.
1.3. Statement of the problem
The following are the problematic issues which this work tries to investigate:
(a) Whether ideologies are simply ‘the mental tools of the ruling class’, or do they
constitute the mental/conceptual framework of the entire group/society that
possesses them.
(b) Whether modernity’s project is really worth abandoning.
(c) Whether the changes and transformations in the society which led to the feelings of
frustration about modernity project resulted from to changes in ideology/worldview,
as Habermas seems to suggest.
(d) Whether the ideologies of most African societies are closed or open?
(i) If they are closed, what are the negative implications of closed ideologies to
development and what can be done about them?
(ii) If they are open, how have they been affecting development in our societies
as Habermas claims they should?
1.4. Thesis of the study
This study is intended to be used to demonstrate: firstly, that at the core of every
social action and event which jointly result to change and development in any society, there
are ideologies which structure the conceptual framework, motives, interests, and values of
the members of the society. Secondly, that modernity’s project should not be abandoned.
Instead, there is really the need for some ideological and rational reconstructions as
Habermas suggests. Thirdly, the ideologies of most African societies are closed and this
has great and determining impacts on the low level of development in most of such
countries. Finally, Habermas’ theory of communicative action (and rationality), with its
conception of human beings and their use of language, can serve as a good conceptual

framework as paradigm both for the necessary ideological reconstruction and for progress
in the social development of any society – especially in our globalizing world where
cultures encounter themselves.
1.5. Scope of the study
The scope of this study is Habermas’ concept of ‘communicative rationality’ as a

conceptual/ideological framework/paradigm which results to ‘communicative action’ – and
which itself is a form of social interaction that determines the nature of social change(s).
The work will also give attention to Habermas’ concept of language use in intersubjective
interactions and the determining place of human interests in human actions.
1.6. Significance of the study
Sustainable development is a necessity for every human society – all human

societies need it; all African countries need it; Nigeria needs it. These structure the
theoretical and practical significance of this study. Its theoretical significance is that it will
add to existing literatures on how better to achieve and sustain human/social development.
The practical significance on the other hand is such that it draws attention to the fact that
by criticising our ideologies, where they are not very helpful, it will challenge us to
ideological reconstruction instead of sustaining whatever structures that perpetuate
poverty.4
1.7. Research Methodology
The data for this work were basically drawn from library materials. In this regard,
journals (online and hardcopy), biographies, books, interviews, authorized commentaries,
and relevant internet materials, were accessed. The historical method was used to properly
situate Habermas and the problems he tried to solve in the history of philosophy and
sociological theories – from the ancient to contemporary eras. The expository method was
employed in the attempt to get at the core of his variegated ideas on man as a being in the
society. Finally, the critical method was adopted to analyse the tenability of his views and
their contemporary relevance.

ENDNOTES
†
The concept, ‘self-reflection’ is used in this work as a form of deep-seated and consistent criticism.
According to Habermas’ view of the concept, which influenced its use in this work, self-reflection
begins with an account of the social forces, and goes through the process of providing knowledge of
the forces of social inequality. The knowledge that is provided in the process is required for any
form of social action. Basically and very importantly, the idea of self-reflection in the society aims at
social change through emancipation (or at least, it aims at diminishing domination). Such changes
are possible because the process of self-reflection which is a look into the society as a ‘self’, reveals
the contradictions inherent in the society. It thus enables possible reinterpretation and transformation
of the society. The importance of self-reflection, especially in the views of Habermas, is better
understood in his idea of critique of knowledge (both as epistemology and as social theory) which he
sees as the means through which false consciousness can be cured after the process of ‘reflection’.
See Jürgen Habermas. Knowledge and Human Interest, Trans. by Jeremy J. Shapiro. [Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1968(1998)], p. 308. See also his view that: “The self-reflection of a lone subject…
requires a quite paradoxical achievement: one part of the self must be split-off from the part in such
a manner that the subject can be in a position to render aid to itself”. See, Jürgen Habermas. Theory
and Practice, Trans. by John Viertel. [Cambridge: Polity Press, 1971(1996)], p. 28. And with these,
one understands as this work flows, the very relevant connection which the concept of self-reflection
has with that of ideology in the philosophy of Habermas.
1.
See W. Schirmacher (ed), German 20th Century Philosophy, The Frankfurt School, Trans. by
Virginia Cutrufelli. (New York: Continuum, 2000). p. 40.
2.
W. Schirmacher (ed), German 20th Century Philosophy. p. vii.
3.
Jürgen Habermas, Towards a Rational Society, Trans. by Jeremy J. Shapiro. (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1970), p.73.
4.
F.O.C. Njoku, Development and African Philosophy, A Theoretical Reconstruction of African
Socio-political Economy. (New York: iUniverse, 2004), pp. 81ff

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Review of related literatures
The following themes were taken into consideration while choosing the works (and
authors) that were reviewed below: Dialectics and negation; dialectics of negation and
critique; the power of knowledge and enlightenment; enlightened reason, committed reason
and will; self-reflection and emancipation; knowledge and human interests; and, ideologies,
worldviews, and their impacts on social change. These were chosen because each of them
in one way or the other forms a part of the larger theme of this study ‘Ideology and social
change’.
After the death of his friend Socrates, Plato (c. 429-347 B.C.) became a social critic
– both taking after his master and as a reactionary response to the shock at the reasons
behind the death of his master. He was out to argue on the need for, and to indicate the path
to, social change. The ‘Justice for the society’ which he sought in his The Republic is itself
a call for social change. Thus, it can be understood that social change is the central
theme/idea in The Republic. Able to dialectically go beyond what was the status quo, Plato
wrote in the Seventh Letter that he never stopped thinking how things might be improved
and the (faulty) constitution reformed. Still in the same letter, he noted that the realization
of this reform required a drastic treatment. Back in his The Republic, he held that the only
hope of realizing this needed reform laid in true philosophy; and, that mankind will have no
respite from trouble until either real philosophers gain political power or politicians
become by some miracle true philosophers. By these, it is clear that for Plato in The
Republic, the task of working towards social change needs the critical and analytical tools
of the philosopher who leads the society from self-reflection, through enlightenment, to
positive transformation.
His idea of training the character of the mind through education can be adequately
interpreted to mean both, enlightenment through self-reflection and analysis, and also
formation of will, which he referred to as the training of character. Thus, his conception of
the role of education, like psychoanalysis, is that it maks the ‘pupils’ to think for
themselves (through self-reflection as a re-living of experiences, remembering what was

previously known/done in the world of forms). In analysing the society’s experiences, the
educationist turns their eyes to the light, away from the shadows in the cave of ignorance.
Basically, Plato in The Republic, could dialectically, as already mentioned, negate

the ‘present situation’ and ‘concentrate on the job of proving that a better society can exist,
and that it is not merely utopian’ (since the term ‘utopian’, as Marcuse will note tens of
centuries after him, can be redefined to deepen control, leaving-off practical needs of the
society). Thus, Socrates in his dialogue with Glaucon noted that it is first and foremost
necessary to “show what fault it is in the constitutions of existing states”1. It was to show
these faults in the existing constitution of the society that Socrates, presented in the
Apology, referred to himself as that gadfly which God had attached to the state, and all day
long and in all places, always fasten upon the members of the state, arousing, persuading
and reproaching them.2 He could do this because, meeting the characteristics/qualities of a
true philosopher, he was out to pursue truth “at all costs”3. But, if/when unfortunately a
supposed critical theorist, as a lover of truth, allows himself to be corrupted, he will end up
behaving like a member of an uncritical and structurally transformed public sphere.4
Referring to the ‘real philosophers’ as independent critical social theorists, Plato described
them in The Republic as “these saviours of our society”5. And this concept of the critical
social theorists as ‘saviours’ will later influence Habermas’ idea of the role of critical
theory/theorists.
One characteristic and distinctive feature of “these saviours” is the type of inquiry
which they are interested in. Thus, Plato in The Republic distinguished, in his analogy of
the line, between four mental states: Intelligence/Dialectic Reason, Belief, and
Opinion/Illusion. For him, the philosopher’s interest is the dialectically-constitutive state of
mind (intelligence) which interest is in full understanding, culminating in the vision of
ultimate truth.6 Following from these, one understands why in the simile of the allegory of
the cave, Plato assigned to the philosopher the role of enlightening others, after having
achieved the supreme vision himself. He pictured that the released prisoner, “if he were to
look directly at the light of the fire, it would hurt his eyes and he would turn back and
retreat to the things he could see properly, which he would think really clearer than the
things being shown him”7. Thus, the philosopher, as the saviour of the society, needs to
drag him (representing the members of the society), through deep and consistent critique,
“up the steep and rugged ascent” of self-reflection “and not let go” despite the

psychological blockages, “till he had been dragged out into the sunlight – even [though] the
process would be a painful one”8. This is enlightenment through self-reflection. It leads to a
change of conceptual framework, ideologies, and lifeworld, because, as Habermas would
present later, it is the world- and self-understanding of people that determine how they
relate to the world and to themselves. When such change in ideology is realized, the
gradual result is social change.
With the increasing number of enlightened members of the society, the need for
self-reflection turns into something social and indeed, that is the path to the social change
which Socrates, the chief speaker in The Republic, sought, argued, and died for; that was
the social change, through enlightenment and change of conceptual framework, which
realization the social philosopher has, in a special way, a role to play as a social critic and
analyst – a seeker of truth. For this reason, Plato in The Republic informs the philosophers
that they “must therefore each descend in turn and live with their” fellows in the cave and
get used to seeing in the dark. And once “they get used to it”, they “will see a thousand
times better than they do and will distinguish the various shadows, and know what they are
shadows of, because” they “have seen the truth about things admirable and just and good”9.
Writing with the conviction that he had seen the truth, and following Plato’s bipolar
worlds of the ideal and the real; and having also been made to know about the good and the
just, St. Augustine (354-430) wrote the City of God. The central theme in that book leaves
no one in doubt that Augustine was a critical social theorist. Making use of dialectics and
transcendence of the dominating and dysfunctional ‘present’, Augustine, by presenting an
alternative, an ideal, which he termed the City of God, was negating the City of Man.
Between these two cities, he makes a mental polarization: each has its goals and values;
and all human history and culture may be viewed as an interplay of the competing values of
the two cities. Each has its own values because each has its own conception of what the
goal of existence is/should be.
His distinction between those who belong to the two cities based on the nature of
the object of their love can be likened to Habermas’ distinction between types of inquiry
and interest. And still like Habermas later, Augustine, in the City of God, was of the view
that the object of one’s love and interest which in several ways are structures and
components of his ideologies, determine his conception of reality, his actions, and in the

long run, his realizations in the society. And these actions chart the path for any possible
social change that may result from them.
Augustine’s arguments about the need to defend the City of God from its enemies10
- like the role assigned to philosophers by Plato and later also by Habermas - could be
interpreted in the context of this study to mean an invitation of social philosophers to
defend the supposed ideals of a liberated, emancipated and rational human society from
any form of domination and dehumanization. Such defence as critique is necessary so that
the prevalent situation will be stopped from leading “dignity to indecency”11 as Augustine
feared in the City of God.
Several centuries after the early medieval era of Augustine, the French social
philosopher, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78), had some ideas to offer in social theory.
Writing in The Social Contract, he noted that no nation would be other than what the
nature of its government made it. By this, upon further reading, one understands “the
nature of government” as used here, to imply the constitution and form of governance of
any nation. And also, the latter can be smoothly taken to be part of the ideology, as the
thought-pattern, of every society. With respect to the prevalent idea of his own time,
Rousseau’s philosophy was a critical theory. He was out to negate the prevalent political
societies which were institutionalizing and increasing inequalities.
In his view, the society is bound to change men. But, to do this, there is the need to
change the conception of what the happiness of man should be, and the conception too of
the contexts in which such happiness can be realized. Thus, against ideologies that
institutionalized inequality in societies, Rousseau, like Habermas centuries later, noted that
the solution to the problem of how to be at the same time ruled and free, is found in a form
of governance one could term democracy. For this he wrote in The Social Contract that ‘a
free people obeys, but does not serve; has magistrates, but not masters; it obeys nothing but
the laws’12. However, he accepts that ‘Men left alone will be led by their own passions and
folly into disaster’. Hence, they need someone to save them from themselves.13 Such
people (whom Plato had termed ‘saviours’) enlighten the members of the society on “what
ought to be done”.14 Without negation and criticism which persistence Socrates
highlighted, Rousseau noted that “cowardice perpetuates [human] slavery”.15 In The Social
Contract therefore, Rousseau argued that liberation and emancipation (which for Habermas
constitute the primary goal of critique of ideology, and which saves the society from
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slavery), if it will be realized, needs to be turned into a biological necessity (a view that
Marcuse strongly held in his One Dimensional Man) - a part of the ideology of the society -
so that in it, the separate interests of the members of the society will coincide.16
The elements of the grand philosophical system of G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) prove
very relevant at this stage. Both in his Phenomenology of Spirit and in Reason in History,
Hegel argued that the dialectic process is at the same time logical, ontological, and
chronological.17 In its logical nature, it exposes the contradictions between reality and
thought. It has at its basis a contradiction, dialectical in nature, between the supposed
ontological constitution of the human person and social structure, and what is obtainable in
the historically given. And, by the law of dialectics, things in history keep improving from
what they are (thesis), meeting contradictions (antithesis), and combining the effects from
the contradictions (synthesis) and result to freedom and improvements in the society. For
this, Hegel noted in Reason in History, that “World history is the progress of the
consciousness of freedom”18. This statement was for Hegel necessary because the goal of
Spirit in history is freedom, liberation, or emancipation, like the enlightenment outside the
Plato’s cave. This takes us back to his conceptualization of the triad components of the
dialectical process (logical, ontological, and chronological). Thus, the movement from the
consciousness of freedom to actual freedom is realized through the dialectical process. It is
an ontological progress. It is then, and only then, that the logical process is possible
through freedom. Then also can the negative tendencies of the society be transcended and
criticised in the search for social change from what has been chronologically the case.
On the very important place/role of interest in the realization of such transcendence

and freedom, Hegel argued that ‘Nothing… happens, nothing is accomplished, unless those
concerned with an issue find their own satisfaction in it’.19 And if “interest” can be taken to
be at the basis of every “passion” – we may then affirm without qualification that nothing
great in the world (like a radical social change to emancipation and freedom) has been
“accomplished without passion”20. When such interest is on what will benefit the society,
and carried out with passion, the result is, as Hegel agreed, a period of social “bloom”,
“excellence”, “power”, and “prosperity”21.
As an invitation to constant assessment through self-reflection of their lifeworld,

which leads to social change, Hegel noted in Reason in History that the highest point of a
people’s development is the rational consciousness of its life and conditions; the scientific
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understanding of its laws; its systems of justice, its morality, and indeed its ideology and
system structure.22 In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel noted that this development
requires, in line with the arguments of Plato, Augustine, Rousseau, Marcuse, Habermas and
many others, the negation of any “undisturbed domination” and/or false, naïve and
unreflective “insight, common to the mass of people”.23
As wonderful as these views of Hegel may seem, many thinkers qualified him as
simply too idealistic. Karl Marx (1818-83) understood him in such light. And, to place
Hegel’s dialectics in the real social context, Marx presented his interpretation of history
and social development from the materialistic point of view. Writing in his Capital, he
argued that the human nature is determined by historical and material circumstances. At the
base of everything in the society is matter; it is the ‘substructure’: the foundation upon
which every other sphere of social activity – social consciousness, political, legal, religious
and intellectual activities – is based. These ‘others’, put together, constitute the
‘superstructure’ of the social edifice.
Consequently for Marx, social change/development can be accounted for from point
of view of the means of production. This is reflected in his distinction between two types of
reason: practical manipulative reason and theoretical reason. The first aims at the creation
and preservation of the conditions of life. It is reason striving for life, serving the survival
instinct of self-preservation. This form of reason is manifest in such things as magic and
technology. Theoretical reason on the other hand is reason seeking understanding about
why things are as they are and the way they could be. Its concern is the synthesis of data in
order to provide wholeness of understanding. Philosophy, Myths and Science, manifest the
purpose of this form of reason. And, between these two forms of reason and their roles,
Marx placed theoretical reason and its products at the service of practical manipulative
reason and its motive force which is the survival and preservation of the human specie (and
self). In his view, the theoretical reason has no such motivational force as does the practical
manipulative reason (contrary to how Hegel had presented it). Therefore, purposeful
behaviour is rational to the degree which an act or proposed act is consistent with the
accomplishment of a given goal; the more consistent the more rational.
Marx, in his Capital and also in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of
1844, noted that labour, as the means of satisfaction of human needs, is at the core of social
relations: ‘The product of his labour embodies and manifests man’s abilities in an
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objectified form’. In this objectification through practical activity of labour, thought is

united with objective reality. The proper relationship therefore between our thought and
our products as objective reality, contrary to Hegel’s conception, is that the latter serves as
a point of departure for our thoughts, and the truth of our conjectures can be seen in the
extent to which it increases our control of nature.
From the foregoing, it is deducible that for Marx man is not so passive in the
process of social change. Applying Hegel’s concept of dialectics in what is termed
dialectical materialism, Marx argued in the Capital that the mode of management and
organization of labour and material production are the determinants of social change. But,
unfortunately, as labour develops, the means of production are not equally owned. There
are those who own more than others to the extent that the basic needs of some who do not
own the means of production may not always be satisfied. Thus, some people in the
society, though they participate through their labours in the means of production, are
denied the products of their labour. Consequently, there are different classes in the society:
there are those who have and those who have not. And, due to the structure of the capitalist
society about which the Capital and Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844
centre on, those who have do all they can to perpetuate their place in the society.
It is this problem that Marx’s dialectical and historical materialism was meant to
address. This is what Marx meant by alienation. This was what his theory of political
economy was aimed at criticising, correcting, eliminating, and/or suggesting, based on
Heraclitus’, Plato’s and especially Hegel’s dialectics, that the system contains the seed of
its destruction and overthrow. This was what motivated his tracing all through history, the
material determination of social changes from one form of society to another. This was also
the framework around which he projected into the future the realization of socialism as the
better form of social organization.
Having given such primacy of place to the means of production, Marx held that it is
the dominant class that formulates the worldviews/ideologies that guide the
conceptualization and approach toward development. Thus for Marx, ideology simply is
the mental instrument for domination at the service of the dominant class. Those who are
not in the Bourgeois class will aspire to be there. Changes in the society will require an
overthrow of this class. The mode of realizing this change is revolution. And Marx gave
the work to the Proletariats who, in the stratification of the social classes, are next below
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the Bourgeois class. Thus, they desire to overthrow those ruling, to take their place, and to,
like them, work to maintain their status. Such class struggles/conflicts will, following the
dialectical principles, continue. This is the mechanism for social change.
Marx was also of the view that it is not in the intended actions of the individuals,
but in those actions they perform the significance of which they do not know, that lay the
explanation of social facts. This is especially because in his social theory as explained in
the two texts already noted, there is no place for values. It is also connected to his
placement of theoretical reason at the service of practical reason. This was what formed the
background for his conception of ideologies, from which values are supposed to be
deduced - though only as the weapon of the dominant class. And all these, put together,
make up Marx’s paradigm of production which Habermas was out to reconstruct.
The primacy of practical reason, as presented by Marx, was taken up by Max Weber
(1864-1920) as manifest in the supreme place he gave also to instrumental-purposive
rationality. His The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism is one of the classical
texts on social theory in which there is quite a lucid connection between ideologies and
their impacts on social change. In this regard, while appreciating the controlling function of
ideologies, Weber noted that “the Reformation meant not the elimination of the Church’s
control over everyday life, but rather the substitution of a new form of control for the
previous one”24. It meant the repudiation of a control which was very lax, at that time
scarcely perceptible in practice.
The means of realizing such repudiation of a lax control - and in some other
contexts, of scarcely perceptible dehumanizing practices - is by the enlightening and
critical function of social philosophers as critical social theorists. It entailed the
secularization of the sacred. It involved also a form of rationalization – based on Weber’s
appropriation of the place of practical reason from Marx. Gradually, as was the case in
Weber’s presentation, the principal explanation of the difference between Protestant and
Catholic countries must be sought in the permanent intrinsic character of their religious
beliefs. And, changes in ideologies and values will require the processes of rationalization,
differentiation, and socialization, to become part of the society.
With particular reference to the technological advancements that resulted from the
said secularization and rationalization, Weber noted that instrumental reason at work in
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modernity was recoiling on itself. It was taking the shape of Frankenstein’s monster that
attacks its creator in Mary Shelly’s text Frankenstein or The Modern Prometheus. For this
reason, Weber was pessimistic about modernity and its project (and promises) which was
moving from rationality to irrationality – connecting Nietzsche and Heidegger. Reason in
history, for Weber, had led itself into an iron cage of no escape. There is no hope for
human beings because history is irreversible.
The social context of capitalist domination which led to Weber’s pessimistic

diagnoses was the same in which the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research (Frankfurt
School) was found. Within the Frankfurt School cycle, Max Horkheimer (1895-1973) and
Theodor Adorno stretched the pessimistic picture of modernity presented by Weber.
Instead of a golden age ahead, they saw hell.25 Assessing the critical social theorist as a
social philosopher, Horkheimer wrote on “The Present situation of Social Philosophy and
the Tasks of an Institute for Social Research”. Therein, he argued that the ultimate aim of
social philosophy is the philosophical interpretation of the vicissitudes of human fate - of
the phenomena that can only be understood in the context of human social life. The critical
social theorist is not a consoler for misfortunes, but through analysis and criticism of the
social facts, seeks to transfigure reality with all its apparent injustices and reconciles it with
the rational. Writing later on “The Social Function of Philosophy”, in Critical Theory:
Selected Essays, Horkheimer noted that philosophers, as critics, show a certain obstinate
disregard for the verdict of the outside world. Ever since the trial of Socrates, he noted, it
has been clear that they (Philosophers) have a strained relationship with reality as it is. This
is because by their insightful and rational self-reflection and negation of what is
uncritically prevalent, they desire the realization of what ought to be.
This opposition of philosophy to reality arises from its principle since philosophy
insists that the actions and aims of man must not be the product of blind necessity. Neither
the prevailing way of thinking, nor the prevailing mores should be accepted by custom and
practised uncritically. Philosophy, and by this, the critical social theorists, should
consistently set themselves against mere tradition and resignation to the decisive problems
of existence. They should keep shouldering the unpleasant task of throwing the light of
consciousness even upon those human relations and modes of reaction which have become
so deeply rooted that they seem natural, immutable, and eternal. This is because there is a
tendency embodied in philosophy not to put an end to thought, and to exercise particular
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control over all those factors of life which are generally held to be fixed, uncongurable
forces or eternal laws. This, according to Horkheimer, was precisely the issue in the trial of
Socrates who, against the demands for submission to the customs protected by the gods and
unquestioning adaptation to the traditional forms of life, asserted the principle that man
should know what he does, and shape his own destiny.
To properly rest his case on the role of the critical social theorist, Horkheimer still
submitted very strongly in “The Social Function of Philosophy” that ‘Every pattern of
thought… belongs to a specific group, with which it originates and with whose existence it
is bound up. Every pattern of thought is “ideology”’. Thus, the critical social theorists like
Socrates should relentlessly, each, protect the members of his society from any
dehumanizing pattern of thought. This is because, as he argued in the same text, “The real
social function of philosophy lies, not just in the examination of social problems but in the
development of critical and dialectical thought; it is in the criticism of what is prevalent”.
The purpose of holding unto this function is basically to prevent mankind from losing itself
in those ideas and activities which the existing institutions in the society instil into its
members. Above all, Horkheimer emphasised that the dialectical classification and
refinement of the conceptual world and thought patterns, through criticisms, are the proper
paths to sustainable and positive changes in the society.
As a contemporary and co-author of some texts, Theodore W. Adorno (1903-69),

argued along the same line of thought with Horkheimer on the importance of critique of
ideologies as thought-patterns. As a way of developing and nurturing the dialectical and
critical thought, Adorno, writing in his Aesthetic Theory, argued that a proper appreciation
of the existence of art itself would reveal that art stood as a sign for a great dissatisfaction
with reality as it was. Art is a sign for the need of a negation and reworking of social
reality. And like Marcuse, Adorno argued that arts are expressions of rejection and
negation that could have liberating effects.
Such negation, rejection, and reworking, are necessary because modern capitalism,
of which Adorno was an ardent critic, has its enormous success at integrating individuals
into its system of social organization. It has the ability to homogenize, leading to stultifying
conformism as it diffuses, marginalizes, and co-opts all opposition. The grand effect is the
problem of “identity-thinking”. The solution to this is consistent transcendence, negation
and critique of the ideological structures, foundations, and components of modern
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capitalism one of which is the totalization and homogenization which cripple negation and
critical thinking.
This is the specific framework that structures the ideas of Herbert Marcuse (1898-
1979). The concepts of “Great Refusal” and “Negative thinking” which run through most
of his works – An Essay on Liberation, One Dimensional Man, Reason and Revolution,
Repressive Tolerance, among others – were calls for social change through critical theory
that negates the passivity in the society, criticising the status quo, and dialectically working
for a positive alternative. As the title of the text One Dimensional Man indicates, Marcuse
was bent on exposing the self-destructive nature of the ideological stance: of suspending
critique of the social circumstances; of social irresponsibility and domination; of ‘stifling
conformity’; of the colonization of everyday life; of the robbing of freedom and
individuality by the prevalent (technological) structures and imperatives; of uncritical
thinking; and of “a comfortable, smooth, reasonable, democratic unfreedom” which
“prevails in advanced industrial civilization, a token of technological progress”26. Marcuse
properly connects his project to Plato when he admirably referred to him as “the original
ruthless critic of the existing social order” with his dialectical investigation [which got to
him (Marcuse) through Hegel] that refutes any sort of dogmatism or totalitarianism.
It was the above elements of the modern/advanced capitalist society that Marcuse
was committed to negate in the One Dimensional Man and Essays on Liberation. The
necessary social changes and transformation must begin with a change in the categorical
framework/ideological stance of the members of the society. The possibility of such
‘negative thinking’ is traced to a transcendence, by dialectical thinking, of the present
situation. This is the role of critical reason. It is emancipating: liberating the individual and
enhancing the society. It goes beyond the dominating power of the spread of ‘mechanics of
conformity’.
The necessity of going beyond and destroying the mechanics of conformity lies in
the fact that a society without opposition threatens the individual and consequently closes-
off possibilities of radical social change. Marcuse stresses this further in noting that in a
one-dimensional society, the private space is withheld. A one-dimensional man does not
know his true needs. And, as a matter of fact, there is a long historical erosion of
individuality that results to this status quo. The cognitive cost of such an establishment is
the loss of ability to perceive another dimension of possibilities as much as those in Plato’s
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cave do not know about the possibility of alternative objects and mode of perception.
Further, the very possibilities of radical social change, as human development, are
atrophied.
But then, for human beings to achieve some positive changes as development,
Marcuse noted that there is the need for ideological liberation. The possibility of this
liberation is primarily based on the fact that “all liberation depends on the consciousness of
servitude”27. It is necessary first of all - for social change to be realized - that the members
of the society raise and observe the tension between the actual and the possible28. They
need to conceive the contradictions and the alternatives: the tension between the “is” and
the “ought”29. These, which are possible only when the society is conscious of them, will
lead to the destruction of a repressive reduction of thought.30 The struggle that ensues when
consciousness is restored is a struggle for truth which transforms the modes of thought and
then of existence.31 It restores the rationality of a two dimensional universe of discourse
which contrasts with the one-dimensional modes of thought and behaviour. This is because
thinking in accordance with truth is the commitment to exist in accordance with truth.32
Philosophy, and specifically critical social theory, gives thought its abstract and
ideological quality. It dissociates from the material practice; and by virtue of this
dissociation, critical philosophic thought is necessarily transcendent and abstract. Thus, the
critical philosopher mentally undoes the social facts.33 This is because, logical abstraction
makes sociological abstraction possible. And, dialectical thought links the structure of
thought with the structure of reality; logical truth becomes historical truth; reason becomes
historical reason.34
By this transcendence, through analysis, alternatives are provided to the status quo.
There is a redefinition of thought which aims at a therapy. This, according to Marcuse, is
the therapeutic function of philosophical analysis – involving the correction of abnormal
behaviours in thought and speech; removal of obscurities, illusions, and oddities; or at
least, their exposure.35 By this function also, philosophical analysis provides the distinction
between true and false consciousness.36
About the best mental disposition that characterises an open society, Marcuse noted
in the One Dimensional Man that social change, which hinges basically on the possible
conceptualization of change, is possible if the present is negated through criticisms in
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aspiration for a better alternative. He also noted that every established society is confronted
with the actuality or possibility of a qualitatively different historical practice which might
destroy the existing institutional framework.37 And, the philosophical analyses which bear
fruits in the dialectical process involved, being a historical process, builds on
consciousness. The latter entails the recognition and seizure of the liberating opportunities
and it involves freedom.38 What results then is social change beginning with the
transformation of values into needs39; as the final causes which are transformed into
technical possibilities become a new stage in the conquest of operative, unmastered forces
in society as well as society. There is liberation which is possible, Marcuse reiterated,
because of ideological redefinition of values, or what in An Essay of Liberation he termed
“transvaluation of values”40 as components of a lifeworld. This redefinition is the primary
subjective prerequisite for qualitative (social) change.41
But, Marcuse wrongly notes that the greatest weakness of critical theory is its
inability to demonstrate the liberating tendencies within the established society.42 This is
one of the errors which Habermas tried to correct by means of his theory of communicative
action. One reads from Marcuse, in An Essay on Liberation, that solidarity is a
precondition for liberation. This solidarity, with liberation which it leads to, needs to be
transformed into a biological instinct forming part of the instinctual needs and reactions of
the bodies and minds of the members of the society. Without these, ‘the domesticated farm
animal and the laboratory rodent on a controlled regimen in a controlled environment will
then become true models for the study of man’42.
To avoid this, Marcuse argued further in his An Essay on Liberation that, there is
the need to transform the needs of a new type of man who must have different sensitivity as
well as consciousness. Freedom must be allowed to ingress into the realm of necessity
because only the free, conscious, non-one dimensional, critical, and self-reflective
members of a society can, by transcending their oppressive status quo, transform their
ideologies and thus their values and needs. Thus, they can in solidarity work for social
change and development which should be transformed to a social need.43
Because of the ontological place of ideologies, the views of Stephan Körner (1913–
2000) prove relevant here. Writing in his Metaphysics: Its Structures and Functions,
Körner assigned to categorical frameworks the role of providing criteria of meaningfulness,
coherence, and explanatory power to those who hold them44. Properly understood,
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categorical frameworks, which he referred to as Immanent Metaphysics, can be regarded as

the constituent and structural components of the ideologies of any human society. These
frameworks serve as the explanatory power that along the line provides meaning and
coherence to the perception, conceptualization, and approach to reality. Consequently,
Körner would readily agree, like Plato, Rousseau, Marcuse, and Habermas, that it is the
meaning provided by an ideology that determines the path to social change. And, where the
ideology, and thus society, is closed, not open to criticism, adjustments and improvement,
the stagnant meaning it provides leads to social stagnation.
In relation to the possibility and dehumanizing implications of the said social

stagnation; and mining from the liberating power of criticism, transcendence, and negation,
Körner argued against any presentation of frameworks as absolute and unalterable. Thus,
he argued that there are possibilities of logical, metaphysical, and linguistic
meaninglessness; of internal and external strains, demanding and deserving critique and
improvement of an ideology as a metaphysical system and/or conceptual/categorical
framework. It follows from Körner’s arguments in Metaphysics: Its structures and
Functions, that such critique and improvement of an ideology will lead to a change in the
meaningfulness, coherence, and explanatory power that the categorical framework
provides. Definitely, this will lead to social change.
In line with Habermas, Körner argued that internal strains can be removed by
reflection. But mistakenly, he regarded arguments and critiques from critical social
theorists as functioning for the removal of external pressures, not internal strains, on
ideologies.45 Körner has a conception of what he termed metaphysical conflicts as those
between supreme principles. According to him, metaphysical (ideological) strains can be
further removed by (a) rejecting them, (b) partly modifying their contents, (c) changing
their place in the system of beliefs, or (d) combining these methods in various ways.46 And,
it needs to be noted that any rejection or modification of beliefs requires what Habermas
refers to as raising a claim which may be accepted or contested.
The acceptance or rejection of good ideas leads to the stagnation or development of

a society. Exploring the intricacies and implications of Philosophy of Development, Joseph
Agbakoba (1961-????) argues that ideologies have fundamental roles to play in social
development. Reading through the article, “Towards a Philosophy of Technology and
Development for Africa”47, one will be faced with a consistent persuasion from Agbakoba
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to accept the thesis that the ideologies of every society have determining roles to play in the
social development as change in such a society. Besides, it is thus evident that he suggests
like Socrates in Plato, Hegel, Marcuse, Körner, and Habermas, that a critique of ideology is
a determining path to social change.
To elucidate these themes, Agbakoba presented in the article (“Towards a

Philosophy of Technology and Development for Africa”) a comparative study of ideologies
by means of which he noted that ideologies are considered based on: their degrees of
internal consistency or otherwise; their consistency with their goals; their degree of
objectivity, functionality, evidential supports, and plausibility; and their spiritual or
material orientations. These criteria, Agbakoba would readily agree also, could constitute
frameworks for analysis, assessment, and critique of ideologies. They function in the
society based on what Habermas refers to as world-understanding.
From his analysis in “Towards a Philosophy of Technology and Development for

Africa”, Agbakoba used the particular example of the structures of the ideologies of Igbo
societies to buttress what fundamental and primary place ideologies of a society occupy in
the organization, life and development of the society. Thus, he argued, as would Habermas,
that the route to social change and development in African Societies for instance is that of
consistent critique of their closed and mythical ideologies.
Writing also as a critical social theorist, Francis O. C. Njoku in his book,

Development and African Philosophy: A Theoretical Reconstruction of African Socio-
Political Economy, noted in his introduction that “since beliefs issue in rules of action, the
crisis of theory inevitably turns into a crisis of practice. The combination of the crises of
theory and of practice bubbles up as a crisis of value”48. This is because our view of
reality, as our ideologies, is like a map with which to negotiate the terrain of life. If the map
is true and accurate, we will generally know where we are, and if we have decided where
we want to go, we will generally know how to get there. If the map is false and inaccurate,
we generally will be lost.49
With this in view Njoku, in Development and African Philosophy, gave attention to
what he called ‘Machines and Structures that manufacture the poor’ for instance in some
African societies. About these, he submitted that “Our world is a machine that
manufactures the poor. Our structures are the facilities that hatch the eggs of poverty. Our
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land is a maintenance machine that services the structures that generate the poor”.50 But it
needs to be noted that behind, and at the basis, of “Our world”, “Our structures”, and “Our
land”, are our ideologies, worldviews, conceptual frameworks, and presuppositions.51
Thus, the sixth chapter of Development and African Philosophy was a critique of different
ideologies - national, international, ecclesial, and individuals - which in different ways
contribute to the co-operation of all in oppression.52 Such ideologies keep us away from
real social change as development. It is only when these ideologies are first criticised and
reconstructed - as Habermas does and suggests as the rational attitude - that we will
understand that “we are called to uproot structures that keep the poor in chains”. Then we
will understand that “poverty is contingent”. As both with the Philosopher in Plato’s The
Republic, and in the framework that Marcuse suggests, we would, by transcending and
negating the given, know that things could be otherwise. Thus, Njoku rightly noted that we
“need a new conceptual tool to re-interpret society”.53 And, he will not disagree with
Habermas that the path to acquiring these new conceptual tools, which will led to social
change and development, is the path of critical social theory as Njoku tried very admirably
to help to chart in every page of Development and African Philosophy.
AJAH, A. C. (PG/MA/07/43119) Page 22

ENDNOTES
1.
Plato. The Republic, Trans. & Intro. by Desmond Lee, (2nd revised ed.). (Middlesex: Penguin
Books, 1987), 473b
2.
Socrates in Plato. Apology, in The Dialogues of Plato, Intro. by Erich Segal. (New York: Bentam
House, Inc., 2006), pp. 17-18.
3.
Plato. The Republic, 490a
4.
see Plato. The Republic, 492c, p. 227.
5.
Plato. The Republic, 502d, p.239.
6.
Plato. The Republic, 509d - 511e, p. 251-255.
7.
Plato. The Republic, 515c-e, pp. 256-257.
8.
Plato. The Republic, 515e – 516a, pp. 257-258.
9.
Plato. The Republic, 520c, p. 263.
10.
Augustine. City of God, Trans. by Gerald G. Walsh, S.J., Intro. by Etienne Gilson. (New York:
Image Books, 1958), pp. 40-41.
11.
Augustine. City of God, p. 143.
12.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract, Trans. by Maurice Cranston. (London: Pengiun
Books, 1968), p. 32.
13.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract, pp. 42/43.
14.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract, p.49.
15.
16.
17.
Hegel, G.W.F. Reason in History, A General Introduction to the Philosophy of History, Trans. by
Robert S. Hartman. (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1953), p. xvii.
18.
Hegel, G.W.F. Reason in History, p. 24.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
Hegel, G.W.F. Phenomenology of Spirit, Trans. by A.V. Miller. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1977), no. 542, p.330.
24.
Weber, Max. The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism. Transl. Talcott Parsons, et al.
(London: Unwin Hyman, 1930). Available online at www.marxists.org/reference/archive/weber/
protetanst-ethic/index.htm (referred to from now onward as The Protestant Ethics).
25.
Schirmacher, W., (ed). German 20th Century Philosophy, The Frankfurt School, Trans. by
Virginia Cutrufelli. (New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group Inc., 2000), p. 219.
26.
Herbert Marcuse. One Dimensional Man, Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society,
Intro. by Douglas Kellner. (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 1. (referred to from now onwards as One
Dimensional Man).
27.
Herbert Marcuse. One Dimensional Man, p. 7.
28.
29.
Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, p. 97.
AJAH, A. C. (PG/MA/07/43119) Page 23

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
Herbert Marcuse. One Dimensional Man, pp. 139-141.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
Herbert Marcuse. One Dimensional Man, pp. 233/234.
40.
Herbert Marcuse. One Dimensional Man, p.
40.
Herbert Marcuse. One Dimensional Man, pp. 245/6.
41.
42.
Herbert Marcuse. An Essay on Liberation. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 18.
43.
Herbert Marcuse. An Essay on Liberation, pp. 21/22.
44.
Korner, Stephan. Metaphysics: Its Structures and Functions. (Cambridge: CUP, 1984), p. 3
45.
Korner, Stephan. Metaphysics: Its Structures and Functions, pp. 165- 166.
46.
Korner, Stephan. Metaphysics: Its Structures and Functions, see pp. 176/177.
47.
in J.O. Oguejiofor (ed.), Africa: Philosophy and Public Affairs. (Enugu: Delta Publications, Nig.
Ltd, 1998), pp. 217-240.
48.
Njoku, F.O.C. Development and African Philosophy: A Theoretical Reconstruction of
African Socio-Political Economy. (New York: iUniverse, 2004), p. xvii.
49.
Njoku, F.O.C. Development and African Philosophy, p. xviii. (Njoku here is quoting David L.
Bender).
50.
Njoku, F.O.C. Development and African Philosophy, p. 82.
51.
see Njoku, F.O.C. Development and African Philosophy, p. 93.
52.
53.
Njoku, F.O.C. Development and African Philosophy, pp. 92/93.
AJAH, A. C. (PG/MA/07/43119) Page 24

CHAPTER THREE
HABERMAS ON IDEOLOGY
3.0. Generalizations on the structure and components of ideologies
One obvious fact noticeable by anyone who has tried to study the concept, ‘ideology’ is
that there is a problem with regard to its specific definition. A historical survey of the
emergence and use of the term links the term with thinkers as from Destutt de Tracy,
through Napoleon Bonaparte, Karl Marx, Karl Mannheim, Max Horkheimer (and indeed
the entire members of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research), and for this study,
Jürgen Habermas. It would require a separate study to engage in a detailed analysis of the
views of each of these and other thinkers on the concept; but to move ahead with this study,
it suffices to present below a model of the structure and components of the concept.
Writing on “Ideology: Descriptive, Pejorative and Positive Views”, Raymond

Geuss, in his book, The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School,
presented three different senses of using the concept ‘ideology’, namely, the descriptive,
pejorative, and positive senses. According to him, in the descriptive sense, the use of the
term presupposes that every human group has an ideology. The term, used in this sense is
both ‘non-evaluative’ and ‘non-judgmental’. It contains both discursive and non-discursive
elements. By the first he meant such elements as concepts, ideas, beliefs; and by the non-
discursive elements he meant such things as characteristic of gestures, rituals, attitudes,
forms of artistic activity, and so on1.
The descriptive sense of the concept ‘ideology’ often can be taken to mean the
worldviews or world-picture of a group. In this regard, Geuss noted that the intuition which
motivates the introduction of a concept of ‘ideology as world-view’ is that individuals and
groups don’t just ‘have’ randomly collected bundles of beliefs, attitudes, life-goals, forms
of artistic activity, and so on. Rather, the bundles have some coherence; the elements of the
bundle are related to each other, they all somehow ‘fit’2. In therefore referring to an
ideology as a worldview, what is meant is that the subset of the beliefs which constitute the
ideology of a group do so in line with the following five properties:
(i) the elements of the subset are widely shared among the agents in the group;
(ii) the elements in this subset are systematically interconnected;
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(iii) they are central to the agents’ conceptual scheme as the agents won’t easily give
them up;
(iv) the elements in the subsets have a wide and deep influence on the agents’
behaviour or on some particularly important or central sphere of action; and,
(v) the beliefs in the subsets are central in that they deal with central issues of human
life (i.e. they give interpretations of such things as death, the need to work,
sexuality, and so on) or central metaphysical issues3
Still on this same line of interconnection between the components of a system and subsets
of beliefs, there is the concept of ‘form of consciousness’ about which Geuss noted that
“‘Form of consciousness’ is an ideology when it refers to a particular systematically
interconnected subset of all the beliefs, attitudes, and so on, which the agents of a
society/group hold”4.
With regard to ideology in the pejorative sense, a theory may arise as a programme
of criticism of the beliefs, attitudes, and wants of the agents in a particular society. This
(form) is initiated by the observation that agents in the society are deluded about
themselves, their position, their society or their interests. The aim of this conception of
ideology therefore is to demonstrate to the members of the society that they are deluded. It
aims at freeing the agents from a particular kind of delusion. Thus, the basic use of the term
in this sense, as Geuss rightly pointed out, is pejorative, negative or critical. In this
pejorative sense of the use of the term ideology, the concepts of ‘false consciousness’ and
‘a form of consciousness being ideologically false’ come to mind. And in this regard,
Geuss noted that a form of consciousness can be ideologically false in three ways, namely:
in virtue of some epistemic properties of the beliefs which are its properties; in virtue of its
functional properties; and in virtue of its genetic properties.5 And regarding the third sense,
which is the positive sense of the use of the term ideology, Geuss noted that,
from the wants, needs, interests, and the objective situation of a given human group, we
can set ourselves the task of determining what kind of socio-cultural system or what world-
view would be most appropriate for that group, i.e. what ‘ideology’ (in some descriptive
sense of the term) is most likely to enable the members of the group to satisfy their wants
and needs and further their interests. I will call this task of producing for the group an
‘ideology in the positive or laudatory sense’6.
Going by Geuss’s presentations of the structures of different ideologies based on the
different conceptions of them, it seems clear that he is making some not very necessary
polarizations of the three senses. Detailed as his conceptualization of the structure of
ideologies are; detailed also as his attempt to note the components of ideologies is, his
failure to notice that every critical social theorist, as an evaluator of the social
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circumstances, first of all describes the elements of the ideology of the society that he has
interest in; and only then can he look for the contradictory and dysfunctional aspects of the
ideology. But then, since social philosophy as rightly presented by Horkheimer is the
domain of critical social theorists; and since this domain not only analyzes and criticises
the social situations, but also prescribes alternatives, it should be understandable therefore
that the social theorists, apart form describing and criticising, should also proffer some
alternative ways of reconstructing the perceived social (ideological or structural) ills. This
is the connection missing in Geuss’s conception of the senses of ideology. This is the
connection evident in Habermas’ concept of ideology which takes up our attention.
3.1.0. Habermas’ conception of ideologies as worldviews
Based on the structures so presented, one can, following an aspect of Geuss’s

conceptualization/presentation of Habermas’ views on ideology, understand Habermas as
regarding ideology exclusively in the second sense of being pejorative. However,
Habermas’ attempt to trace the status quo before the cultural changes, as he did in the
earlier part of The structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, shows his usage of the
concept of ideology in the descriptive sense of presenting what is out there as a property of
the society: the worldviews of the society having different, but yet fixed, very related, and
systematically connected parts. In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, and
several places in the two volumes Theory of Communicative Action, he used the term
ideology to mean worldview, world-picture, world- and self-understanding. About this
descriptive aspect of Habermas’ conception of the concept of ideology, McCarthy in his
introduction to The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere noted that the book “is
a historical-sociological account of the emergence, transformation, and disintegration of the
bourgeois public sphere”7. In the later part of the same book, Habermas turned to use the
concept of ideology in the pejorative, negative, critical sense. In this sense - after he had
described the elements of ideology in the first sense; and after also he had traced the
changes in the society in comparison to what it was – he conceived ideology as false
consciousness in the three ways noted above, namely: in virtue of the epistemic properties
of the beliefs; in virtue of its functional properties; and in virtue of its genetic properties.
Like some Marxists, Habermas conceived ideology in the pejorative sense because
of its genetic properties, that is, simply for coming from the bourgeoisies and those
manipulating the society and the means of production. The other two points of view in
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virtue of which Habermas’ conception is pejorative are the dominating and stifling
functions of the ideas involved; and lastly, in virtue of the epistemic properties which,
among other things, Habermas tried to discuss in the texts: Knowledge and Human Interest,
Towards a Rational Society, Theory and Practice, and also in the two volumes of Theory of
Communicative Action.
Still on the pejorative sense of Habermas’ conception of ideology, one observes

from a good reading of his texts that he conceives the possibility of a group of people being
deluded by means of their ideologies. In this regard, the task of a critique of ideology,
connected to psychoanalysis, is to bring the people to a consciousness of what their real
situation and society are. In this regard, as Geuss noted, a theory of ideology arises as a
programme of criticism of the beliefs, attitudes, and wants of the agents in a particular
society. This is initiated by the observation - and if one may prefer, the assumption – that
the agents in the society are deluded about themselves, their position, their society, or their
interests. Thus, the aim of the theorist that conceived ideology in this sense is to
demonstrate to the members of the said society that they are deluded. The point, Geuss
stresses, is to free them from a particular delusion. The emphasis is on the critique of
ideology as false consciousness, as a tool of the ruling class, as functioning to support,
stabilize, or legitimize certain kinds of social institutions or practices.
With regard to this also, Habermas conceived the possibility of a ‘world-picture’

(Weltbild) which stabilizes or legitimizes domination or hegemony. Such a world-picture
supports or justifies reprehensible social institutions, unjust social practices, relations of
exploitation, hegemony, or domination. And, for this reason, it is called ideology.8
Yet, Habermas, being a committed social philosopher knows that his work is not
just to expose the social ills (legitimized through ideologies that stabilize these ills); but
very importantly, that his duty extends to offering some suggestions to make possible the
necessary re-orientation, re-construction and re-evaluation of the needs, values and
interests of the members of the society. This is a reflection of his use of ideology in the
positive sense. All his works so far mentioned, contain elements of this third conception of
ideology.
Thus, it seems evident that Habermas, the entire members of the Frankfurt Institute
for Social Research, and all social theorists, if they must be true to their function as social
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philosophers and ‘social engineers’, must make use of the concept of ‘ideology’ in the
three senses noted above. This is necessarily so because every evaluation of culture first of
all requires some outlining of the exact elements of the culture to be studied. This outlining
places the social theorist in a position to use the concept of ideology in the descriptive
sense because he must first of all describe these elements without being immediately
critical. Then, and only then, can he go ahead to evaluate and criticise the elements that he
had outlined. And finally, after the criticism, his work remains unfinished if he has no
suggestions on how to reconstruct the social realities to make the society to be more
humane.
Based on the foregoing, the terms ‘Ideology’ and ‘worldview’ shall be used
interchangeably in this study. This is because it is the concept that best fits the description
of an ideology as an understanding of the self and of the world. It will be evident as this
study progresses, that Habermas used the concept not only, and indeed less, in the
pejorative sense, but more in the descriptive and positive senses.
3.1.1. The framework of Habermas’ conception of worldviews
The following form the major parts of the framework for the larger structure of any
ideology. They are clearer in a conception of ideology as worldviews, as a system of
interconnected ideas. The four primary concepts are:
(a) the concept of supreme being,
(b) the concept of human nature,
(c) the concept of the end/goal of man, and
(d) the concept of ethics, that is, of the necessary behaviours/attitudes and modes of
action and interaction that make possible the realization of the said goal(s), needs
and interests.
They can be regarded as the pillars of all the other components of a system of ideologies
belonging to any society. Thus, they form the sub-structure for the presentation of the
elements of Habermas’ conception of ideology.
A. Habermas on Supreme Being
The primary idea about a supreme being is its transcendence (above the material
realities). It has also a totalizing character/attribute. With regard to the idea of a supreme
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being, probably God, Habermas made no specific allusions to it. However, it seems safe to
adduce from his critique of the materialism and anti-metaphysics of positivism; his critique
of the critique of the absolute and the universal by relativists and pragmatists; his concept
of the possibility of a universal ethics and truth; and some other related themes for which
he argued, that there is in his philosophical scheme the concept of a supreme being above
other beings. Even if it has no specific religious tone as the sacred, at least, it is
transcendent.
B. Habermas on Human Nature
Basically for Habermas, the human person is a social and rational being who: can
actualize himself in the society; and must communicate with, to be able to understand,
others by means of a given language which is a social property. This is at the core of the
anthropology which Habermas placed at the fore of his philosophical system as a model of
his critique of the modernists’ conception of the nature of man, and understandably, as his
primary base for further analysis of man in, and his society.
Apart from being fundamentally a social being, the human person for Habermas is
by his nature rational: not selfish in nature; not merely sensual and knowing only through
the senses. Habermas’ concept of epistemology is such that conceives man as able to
acquire knowledge, not only through the senses, but also through the faculty of reason,
retrospectively and analytically. Man, according to Habermas, can also, upon proper
analysis, with sufficient connection between series of acquired knowledge, project
correctly into the future. The truths which he claims to possess can be validated without an
inevitable reference to the senses. The propositional assertions of these truths - because of
the imperfection of the being which possesses them, and if they must be regarded as
rational - must be criticisable and thus should be open to improvement due to changes in
the conception of the reality around him. There are thus no absolute truths, neither does
man have an absolute method of inquiry.
Still with regard to knowledge and its acquisition, Habermas, from his
presentations, would not prefer an exaggerated placement of the senses as the primary
source of knowledge. His critique of positivism in Knowledge and Human Interest is there
to support this. On the other hand, his rationalism is to some extent sufficient to let one
deduce that he will also not agree to the use of intuition as a reliable source of knowledge.
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At most, one can agree that Habermas will prefer a combination of the senses and reason as
the preferred and more reliable source of human knowledge. Thus, McCarthy referred to
him as “the last great rationalist”9.
Because he can reason, man therefore is not composed only of matter, but of mind
and body. It is the mind which can transcend the given circumstances in the society, and
through self-consciousness and self-reflection notice the contradictions between reality and
thought – between ‘what is’ and ‘what can be/ought to be’. Thus, as he communicates with
others to reach rational understanding of the circumstances around him; and as he negates
the pathologies in “the present situation of the society”, he proves himself as a
fundamentally free being which cannot be completely dominated or coerced into what he
does not want – as long as he is still deserving to be qualified with the term ‘human’.
All these are connected with another idea that man is a bundle of potentials. No
matter how gloomy his situations may seem at any point in time, Habermas very strongly
argued, there is hope in the power of man’s rationality which enables him to analyze and
criticise his situation, take responsibility where he needs to, and work for change beginning
from mental reorientation and reconstruction. It is this hope in the nature of his rationality
as communicative; hope in his ontological freedom; it is hope in the positive character of
his will when it is properly enlightened, formed, informed and empowered through
knowledge; it is the hope that if man works consistently through criticism and self-
reflection, he will never be dominated but rather emancipated and liberated to change his
society - it is these rays of hope, based on his conception of the nature of man, that found
the greater hope that Habermas gives in his critique of those who think that the goal of
enlightenment has hopelessly ended in an unilluminable darkness.
Man for Habermas therefore, is imperfect. His ideologies are imperfect too. And,
his society, steered by these ideologies (as lifeworld) should be an open one if he must live
rationally. These ideologies must be criticisable. Thus, ideologies, and in the long run, the
societies that have them, deserve to be reoriented, reconstructed, and certain structures
changed, from time to time, if the members must live meaningfully within the social
system.
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C. Habermas on the goal(s) of man
Beyond mere self-preservation10; beyond mere adaptation, Habermas sees the goal
of man as self-supersesion: emancipation and liberation. That was why in Knowledge and
Human Interest, he argued that the best form of inquiry is the inquiry that leads to
liberation and emancipation. This is because, of the three types of interests, the best is the
one he termed “emancipator cognitive interest”11. Yet, as this primary goal is pursued,
there are forms of living that are expected to serve as more reasonable guidelines to human
interaction and communication.
D. Habermas on the epistemological character of ideologies as obstacles to the

realization of the goal(s) of man
This aspect of Habermas’ concept of ideology is traced first of all to the context of
modern/advanced capitalism which critique his philosophical system was. According to
him, since worldviews serve as pictures for viewing the world, they first of all determine
how we understand ourselves and the world around us. Capitalism, with its emphasis on
production and control, which gradually shifted the paradigm of social relation and control
from freedom of speech and attempt to reaching understanding to steering the society by
means of money, bureaucracy, market, products, mass media, and so on; and which also,
does its best to stabilise this system of domination, uses the very unnoticeable, yet
dangerous method of inclusion which in the end cripples all opposition. The result is
passivity of reason in the face of humiliation. And, the thought of a situation different from
the given is regarded as utopian.
This ability of the ideologies of capitalist societies to create and sustain one-
dimensionality of thought (as Marcuse rightly termed his text) in the society, blocks any
conception of the possibility of a change in the society. This is the epistemological
character of dehumanizing ideologies, which are mental obstacles to any conception of the
possibility of emancipation.
E. Habermas on the functional character of ideologies as the guide to the realization

of the goal(s) of man
Habermas’ conception of the rules of inter-human relationship as ethics is first of all

as a critique and then a presentation of an alternative. Because the goal of the modern man
is basically to retain his freedom by being liberated and emancipated from the
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dehumanizing structures that dominated him, Habermas began by criticising the

pathologically inhuman ethics of instrumental action or action towards control.
Suggesting a reconstruction, as a presentation of his conception of what the proper

human relationship should imply, Habermas argued that the better/proper inter-human
relationship should not be one transferred from our controlling relationship with nature but
that, if we must be emancipated: emancipation must be our motif; the value of our fellows
should constitute part of consciousness; the fact that we share a common rationality should
be obvious to us. And with these, our relationships and interaction with others should be
guided by the interest to reach mutual understanding based on truth, and which, whenever
it is the case, results to the good of all in the society, ‘the coordination of action for the
good of all’.
3.1.2. The components of Habermas’ conception of worldviews
The above presuppositions as held by Habermas form the background to his

interdisciplinary-inspired concept of how better to conceive, understand, approach, and
relate with the physical of mere objects and the social world of human beings. He
demarcates between the public space and the private/subjective space of individuals. To
present a construction, as a framework, of his multidimensional, yet intricately connected
ideas, this work will (.1) present very briefly Habermas’ critique of modernity and
traditionalism as the background to his social theory. Then, the work will continue with his
reconstruction of our perception of the world to involve (.2) three worlds and three validity
claims. And, because individuals’ interests and needs are defined by the
ideologies/worldviews of every society; and these worldviews are formed within a context,
this work will also (.3) give attention to Habermas’ concept of lifeworld as the context of
worldviews, and therefore, of agreement among communicating agents. Such agreements
can determine a very large percentage of the interests of the members of any society. Thus,
this work will (.4) link up Habermas’ ideas of three worlds with his other ideas of three
knowledge-constitutive interests. The above four themes are meant to provide the basis for
a reconstruction that resulted to his (.5) theory of communicative rationality and action
with an aim to evaluate what the goal of man is conceived to be; and thus, how it should or
can be realized. This will give some space to present his re-conceptualization of what the
term ‘rationality’ means and its role in the society.
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3.1.2.1. Critique of modernity and traditionalism as the background to Habermas
Although attention will be given to this later in the fourth chapter (4.2.1.) of this
study, any background to Habermas will prove shallow if it does not make reference to his
critique of modernity – that is, of the conceptual frameworks and structure of the modern
understanding of the world in Europe and North America, and of some African societies.
This is because the worldviews that were prevalent in these areas were (and still are)
constituting grave obstacles to human/social action, intersubjective communication, and
social-historical change which he considered as priorities.
In the first volume of Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas criticised the

rationality that emphasised action and placed priority on teleological conception of the
world, and individualism and self-preservation. Thus, language, for the modern concept of
rationality is useful to represent reality – a conception of language-use which sees every
reality, including the other subject, as an object, hence as a means. For Habermas, the
philosophy of consciousness, which provided the justification of, and grounding for, this
world-understanding, is part of the reasons for the failure of modernity which picture
Weber presented metaphorically as ‘iron cage’; and for which frustration and despair
Adorno and Horkheimer abandoned the noble project which was the aim for the
establishment of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research.12 This is at the root of,
connected epistemologically to, a rationality that emphasised a mastery of nature that
culminated in the dehumanization as reification of man. And to worsen it all, this
rationality is less assessable to self-reflection.13 Thus, to amend the faults of this system,
Habermas’ theory14 is a communications-theoretic turn that goes beyond the linguistic turn
of the philosophy of the subject. It is also a reconstruction of rationality that gives way for
the critique of dogmatism which blocks social criticism and thus delays change.
The above conceptualization of the world provided action/production paradigms.

They determined the principles of societal integration.15 Unfortunately, the effects of these
on the resultant lifeworld are societal disintegration. For this, and against the frustration
and despair that Weber, Adorno, Horkheimer, and several others exclaimed, Habermas
notes that the project of modernity is yet unfinished. Instead, a transition and a change of
paradigm is required. It must be, he insists, a transition from a paradigm dominated by the
lowly interest in self-preservation and teleologically dominated/motivated purposive-
rational action, to the action model of reaching understanding. And, it is, at the bottom, not
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only a transition from the philosophy of consciousness to the philosophy of language, but
also a development and radicalization of language analysis.16
3.1.2.2. Rooted in language analysis
To make-up for the inadequacies and problems caused by the above world-understanding,
Habermas’ reconstruction was diversified. However, he began on a simple note - what he
termed ‘formal-pragmatics’- based on his primary presupposition of the nature of man as a
communicating animal.
Speaking at the November 11, 2004 Kyoto Lecture on “Public space and political
public sphere – the biographical notes of two motifs in my thought”, Habermas noted:
the very social nature of human beings became the starting point for my philosophical
reflections…It is not forms of social existence in general that distinguish the mankind from
other species…Man is animal, that by virtue of being from the outset embedded in a public
network of social relationships, first develops the competence that make a person of him. If
we compare the biological features of new-born mammals, we soon see that no other
species enter the world as immature and as helpless as we do, nor is any other dependent
for so long a period of socialization on the family and a public culture shared
intersubjectively with all fellow members. We humans learn from one another… This
image of man’s position in the world expresses the intuitive sense of the deep-rooted
reciprocal dependence of one person on the other.17
The human being that lives in the society, in social relationships, in which and by means of
which (through socialization), he learns from others, is able to live meaningfully as a
human being because he can communicate. This seems secondary only when our minds are
distracted from the fact that
[F]ailures of communication direct attention to the reality of an interstitial world of

symbols that otherwise remains unobtrusive – symbols that cannot be touched like physical
objects. Only in a failing performance does the medium of linguistic communication
emerge as a shared stratum without which we could not exist as individuals either. We
always find ourselves existing in the medium of language. Only those who talk can be
silent. Only because we are by our nature linked to one another can we feel lonely or
isolated.18
This common fact, though ignored, of the primary place of language in human existence
and sociation; this place of language because of the need for communication, would
ordinarily make philosophers to give proper attention to language. Those who did, did so as
the prevalent ideology and conception of the world dictated. For this, Habermas noted that
philosophers have never been especially interested in (this) power that language has to
forge something held in common. He lamented and explained:
Ever since Plato and Aristotle, Western philosophers have preferred to analyse language as
medium of representation, not of communication. They studied the logical form of
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propositions with which we refer to objects and express facts. But, that is to forget that
language is first and foremost there to enable one person to reach agreement with another
person about something in the world, in which process each can take a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’
position to the validity claims of the other… language comes inscribed, as it were, with a
worldview.19
[And] for the members of the same culture the limits of the language are the limits of the
world.20
When therefore (as in modern Western culture and philosophy) the language-use is limited
to representation/expression of facts, there is then only one world - and it is the world of
objectivity wherein everything, even conscious human beings, is an object. And the attitude
to objects ordinarily is to use them as the means of one reaching an end. Hence, the
philosophical analysis of Heidegger and Sartre come to mind. In their philosophy, there are
efforts to emphasise that at every instance, I am an object to ‘the-other’ as much as ‘the-
other’ is an object to me. Consciousness is, according to Sartre, “a being such that in its
being, its being is in question insofar as this being implies a being other than itself”.21 “The
other and I can at different moments transcend and objectify ourselves as ‘transcending-
transcendence’ or ‘transcended-transcendence’”.22 And, to emphasise the self-preservative
and competitive imperative that the philosophy of consciousness held-out, Sartre noted that
“the Other is the hidden death of my possibilities”.23
Against these which are rooted in a single-world conceptual framework, that itself is
a result of a language that is used only as a medium for representation, Habermas presented
his linguistic analysis. He rightly argued that besides making reference to states of affairs,
we do also, as a matter of our nature, interact and relate with our fellows. In doing this, we
make use of language. But then, the linguistic expressions by means of which we make
known the facts must be different from those that we use as we interact with our fellow
subjects. There must be a mode of relating with others and this can be expressed through
language. Added to this second use of language, our interaction with the other may lead us
into trying to say what we as individual subjects know/have privileged access to, from
point of view of our individual experiences. Thus, in each of these cases (statements of
fact, interaction 1, and interaction 2), language becomes an act performed (most often)
along side speech: an act with unique effects as expectations. These distinct, though
related, uses of language thus enables us to have three theoretical and pragmatic worlds.
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3.1.2.3. Three worlds and three validity claims
At the basis of the above absolutely referential concept of language-use is the

single-world conceptual framework. As a result of these, there is, according to Habermas,
“a distorted understanding of rationality that is fixed on cognitive-instrumental aspects”24
which is thus particularistic in the actions that are oriented based on this form of world-
understanding. Contrary to this, the concept of the three worlds, Habermas writes,
serve here as the commonly supposed system of coordinates in which situation contexts
can be ordered in such a way that agreement will be reached about which the participant
may treat as a fact, or as a valid norm, or as a subjective experience.25
This theoretical construction of three worlds was necessary because human beings do
not just act (on objects), they have a relational attitude to the world. For this reason, a one-
world concept is inadequate. It deserves to be changed. And, thus, it is necessary to
establish the connection between the social action and the actor-world relations.26 This is
because, “the aspects of possible rationality of an agent’s action depend in turn on the
world relations that we thereby input to him. [And we have] four basic, analytically
distinguishable conceptions of action, [namely], teleological action, normatively regulated
action, dramaturgical action and communicative action”27. The first concept of action,
Habermas explains, centres on decision among alternative courses of action, with a view to
the realization of an end. The second emphasises the need to comply with a norm. The third
has to do with the presentation of one’s self and expression of one’s own personal
experiences. Finally, the plan of action of the fourth concept is aimed at coordinating the
actions of various (more than one) other subjects by way of agreement.28 With regard to the
world-understanding that serves as the ontological presupposition of the first three concepts
of action, Habermas rightly noted that the first has ‘a one-world concept’, the object world.
The second presupposes two worlds, the objective, and a social world. The third
presupposes two worlds also, but this time, the subjective and social worlds.29
Because his use of language, as Habermas presented it, places man in a ‘three-fold
relation to the world of communicative agents’30, and because each of the first three
concepts of action presupposes ontologically not more than two worlds, they are therefore
one-sided. Thus, ‘the corresponding types of communication singled out by them proved to
be limit cases of communicative action.31 None of these actions gave room for the use of
language as a medium for achieving understanding. And, whereas language, by doing this
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function, becomes a mechanism for coordinating action, these other concepts of action do
not put into consideration this very important idea of coordinating action.32
For these reasons therefore, only the fourth concept of action: communicative action,
which presupposes at once all the three worlds, is able to give room for a conception of
“language as a medium of uncurtailed communication whereby speakers and hearers, out
of the context of the preinterpreted lifeworld, refer simultaneously to things in the
objective, social, and subjective worlds in order to negotiate common definitions of the
situation”33. Communicative agents relate therefore to the world in this threefold manner.
They do so through speech acts aimed at reaching understanding. This reaching
understanding is supposed to be the pragmatically primary function of language such that
actors, in coming to an understanding with one another, coordinate their actions while
pursuing their particular aims.34
By this last clause, “while also pursuing their particular aims”, it becomes evident
how communicative action also has in its structure, the teleological concept of action. And,
within the concept of ‘reaching understanding’ is the interpretive structure inherent in the
subjective world of dramaturgical action. This interpretive structure further gives room for
another important idea of one deciding to respond ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to a validity claim raised by
other actors. Thus, communicative actions take into consideration the three worlds in which
teleological, normatively-regulated, and dramaturgical actions, differently by different
combinations, take place.
According to Habermas, it is only this form of conceiving the world and the relation
of man in it that will close-up the “in-group-out-group” divide.35 It also gives room for a
concept of rationality – communicative rationality – which alone ‘would make it possible
to establish internal relation “between their standards and ours”; between what is valid “for
them” and what is valid “for us”’.36 This type of rationality should be “understood to be a
disposition of speaking and acting subjects that is expressed in modes of behaviour for
which there are good reasons or grounds. This means that rational expressions admit of
objective evaluation”.37 But, what are we to evaluate rationally? And, what fora are
available for evaluation?
In response to the second question, the available fora are the situations provided by
communication toward reaching understanding, by means of communicative action. This is
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because it is only in situations of free communication that argumentation for evaluation is

made possible. It is evaluation based on “constraint-free force of the better argument”.
And, arguments “are the means by which intersubjective recognition of a proponent’s
hypothetically raised validity claim can be brought about and opinion thereby transformed
into knowledge”.38 As for the first question above, Habermas simply answers that what we
evaluate are validity claims.
Writing about validity claims, Habermas noted that communicative action of

reaching understanding functions as a mechanism for coordinating actions only through the
participants in interaction coming to an agreement concerning the raised validity of their
utterances, that is, through intersubjectively recognizing the validity claims they
reciprocally raise. And, any claim raised can either be accepted or contested.
[A]n actor who is oriented to understanding… must raise at least three validity claims with
his utterance, namely:
1. That the statement made is true (or that the existential presuppositions of the
propositional content mentioned are in fact satisfied);
2. That the speech act is right with respect to the existing normative context (or that the
normative context that it is supposed to satisfy is itself legitimate); and
3. That the manifest intention of the speaker is meant as it is expressed.39
Thus, the speaker claims truth for statements or existential propositions, rightness for
legitimately regulated actions and their normative contexts, and truthfulness or sincerity for
the manifestation of subjective experiences. We can easily recognize therein the three
relations of actions to the world. Such relations, Habermas notes, hold between an
utterance and,
1. The objective world (as the totality of all entities about which true statements are
possible);
2. The social world (as the totality of all legitimately regulated interpersonal
relations);
3. The subjective world (as the totality of the experiences of the speaker to which
he has privileged access).40
Each of the speech acts (locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary) by means of
which human beings try to communicate - to understand and be understood - are at the root
meant to raise a validity claim. But, due to the “rationality potential”41 of human beings,
where ever there is no distorted communication, and thus no intention to deceive, any claim
raised should be redeemed – that is, the reason or ground for the claim should be provided.
It is therefore irrational (as in mythical worldviews wherein - as hinted and will be
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elaborated in Chapter 4 of this study – worldviews are contemplated as a given and

legitimated by the concept of the sacred) to expect that a claim raised be accepted as
untouchable and uncriticizable.
Every claim is either contested or rejected. If it is contested, the contestant does so

because of some presuppositions. If it is rather accepted, the speaker and the hearer are
taken to have reached an agreement, some understanding. This is linked to the view of the
world that they share – their worldviews and their ontological presuppositions. Worldviews
themselves create a context - an unproblematic context - that enhances communication
toward mutual understanding. This context, Habermas, many others before him, referred to
as lifeworld.
3.1.2.4. Lifeworld as the context created by worldviews

If the investigation of the last decade in socio-, ethno-, and psycholinguistics converge in
any one respect, it is on the often and variously demonstrated point that the collective
background of context of speakers and hearers determine interpretations of their explicit
utterances to an extraordinarily high degree.42
This statement by Habermas is correct. And the concept that suits his description of “the
collective background and context of speakers” which “determines interpretations” is the
term ‘lifeworld’. It is both a phenomenological and sociological concept.
If we understand phenomenology as the branch of philosophy that studies the

“appearance of beings” as signs full of significations to be analyzed and interpreted
together, in order to arrive at the true nature of being;43 then, the concept of lifeworld
(especially in its phenomenological sense) which is traced to Husserl, means “the tissue of
intersubjective background understandings that first makes scientific objectifying
knowledge meaningful”.44 This objectification as the mode of appearance of beings to be
analysed, occurs in the society. It is the phenomenon that is known to consciousness that is
used in the further analysis of beings. It is also the conscious analysis of beings in their
various forms of appearance that, over time, form that background for the
‘mutual/background understandings’ that Husserls refers to. This contextualization of the
‘phenomenon’ and the lifeworld in the society forms the basis of the everyday
communicative and sociological interaction and the sociological view of the concept of
lifeworld.
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Seen from either way (phenomenological and sociological), the concept of lifeworld
emphasises the fact that social coordination and systematic regulation occur by means of
shared practices, beliefs, values, and structures of communicative interaction which may be
constitutionally based. For Habermas, fusing the phenomenological and sociological views,
lifeworld is more or less the “background” environment of competences, practices, and
attitudes representable in terms of one’s cognitive horizon. It consists of socially and
culturally sedimented linguistic meanings. It is “the correlate of processes of reaching
understanding”. And, “subjects acting communicatively always come to an understanding
in the horizon of a lifeworld”.
Their lifeworld is formed from more or less diffuse, always unproblematic, background
convictions. This lifeworld background serves as a source of situation definitions that are
presupposed by participants as unproblematic. [It] forms the horizon of processes of
reaching understanding in which participants agree or discuss something in the objective
world, in their common social world, or in a given subjective world.45
The lifeworld also stores the interpretive work of preceding generations.46
Thus, it is within the context and horizon, provided by a society’s lifeworld, that the
members view the world. Whatever happens to this horizon affects the worldviews and
forms of life and action that take it as a background of unproblematic presuppositions.
Consequently, a lifeworld immuned from critique blocks communicative rationality. None
of the elements of such a lifeworld, the worldviews, and the social actions can be criticised
or grounded. This is a form of colonization of the lifeworld. And very many times, in many
societies, social actions can be so immuned from criticism, and the lifeworld colonized,
because of the interests of some “powerful” members of such societies.
3.1.2.5. Three knowledge-constitutive interests and three forms of inquiries
Habermas had an earlier concept of a trilogy of knowledge-constitutive interests or, if one

may prefer, three forms of knowledge and the types of interests/motives that determine
who pursues which form of knowledge and for which purpose. The pursuit of knowledge is
a form of action. Thus for Habermas, “there exists an interpenetration of cognitive abilities
and action motives”.47 By the first (cognitive abilities), he meant knowledge. And by the
second (action motives), he meant interests. Thus, knowledge-constitutive interests
preserve the unity of the system of actions and experiences.
This is where we see the connection of knowledge and interests. Statements about the
object domain of things and happenings (or about deeper structures manifesting themselves
in things and happenings) can only be translated into orientations governing purposively
rational action (that is technologies and strategies. Likewise statements about the object
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domain of persons and utterances (or the deeper structure of social systems) can only be
translated into orientations governing communicative action.48
The first type of statements are made, and the attendant actions carried out, from the point
of view of technical control while the second are undertaken from the view point of
intersubjective communication.49 And thus, Habermas elucidates his ideas in this regard:
These two view points express anthropologically deep-seated interests which direct our
knowledge and which have quasi-transcendental status.50 These interests of knowledge…
result from the imperatives of a sociocultural lifeform dependent on labour and language.51
Based on his conception of the three fundamental interests in knowledge, Habermas
outlined three types of science. These are: (i) Natural empirical sciences, (ii) Social or
historical-hermeneutical sciences, and (iii) Critically oriented sciences. About these, he
noted that there are three processes of inquiry and thus a connection between logical-
methodological rules and knowledge-constitutive interests. And these can be demonstrated.
The approach of the empirical-analytical sciences incorporates a technical cognitive
interest; that of the historical-hermeneutic sciences incorporates a practical one; while the
approach of critically oriented sciences, like critical philosophy, incorporates the
emancipator cognitive interest.52 The last type of science, according to Habermas, helps to
“reorient social needs and declared goods”.53 Any reorientation of social needs and goods is
possible because ‘interest positions change’.54 In an open society in which agents engage in
communicative actions towards reaching understanding; in which validity claims are
redeemed by practical discourses and argumentations, and reasons are provided for forms
of life, it is possible to rationalize the worldviews of the society. This rationalization among
other things considers what the predominant interest of the society is.
Of the three interest forms, it is only the emancipator interest that falls smoothly
into the paradigmatic mode of communicative rationality. The practical interest of the
empirical sciences centres on the one-world of objects to be mastered and manipulated. The
two worlds of historical-hermeneutic sciences have interest both in manipulation of objects
and interpretation of human behaviours. The emancipator interest gives attention to these
worlds and more: it also gives attention to sociation, interaction and relationship with
others based on equality and mutual communication.
3.2.3. Connecting the components to the framework: A new paradigm
We read from Habermas:
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We have,… characterized the rational internal structure of processes of reaching

understanding in terms of (a) the three world-relations of actors and the corresponding
concepts of objective, social, and subjective world; (b) the validity claims of propositional
truth, normative rightness, and sincerity or authenticity; (c) the concept of a rationally
motivated agreement, that is, one based on the intersubjective recognition of criticisable
validity claims; and (d) the concept of reaching understanding as the cooperative
negotiation of common definitions of the situation.55
These ‘terms’ (a-d) which constituted what has been referred to in this study as the
components of Habermas’ concept of worldviews, and which Habermas in the above
quotation described as the ‘rational structure of processes of reaching understanding’,
jointly form what Habermas referred to as the new paradigm.
Writing on “The nature and necessity of Scientific Revolution” in his The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn submitted that,
Paradigms differ in more than substance, for they are directed not only to nature but also
back upon the science that produced them. They are the source of the methods, problem-
field, and standards of solution accepted by any mature scientific community at any given
time. As a result, the reception of a new paradigm often necessitates a redefinition of the
corresponding science.56
Their direction to ‘nature’ in Kuhn’s construction is in accordance with Habermas’ idea of
number of worlds as determined by the worldview, as paradigm, of human societies.
Connecting the paradigm from the attention directed to nature, ‘back upon the science that
produced them’, Habermas argued that the old paradigm of philosophy of consciousness, of
exaggerated individualism and self-preservation, should be replaced by that of
intersubjectivity and communication toward reaching mutual understanding. The new
paradigm is one of coordinated action for the particular good of all. What is lacking in the
old paradigm is a concept of rationality that would make it possible to establish internal
relations between ‘their standards and ours’, between what is valid ‘for them’ and what is
valid ‘for us’.57 For this lack, there is a problem. It is a problem both in the modern
capitalist societies, and in mythically structured worldviews. To say that the problem is
simply between types of action is to have gone through, and emerged from, a shallow
social analysis. The problem rather is between the principles of societal integration. It is a
problem resulting from the ‘disintegrative effect of the prevalent lifeworld’. It resulted
from ‘Weber’s rationalization concept’.58
This form of rationalization championed by Weber, according to Habermas,

constructed a model of action. It was at the basis of the old paradigm – of cognitive-
instrumental rationality and action. But then, in contrast to this, Habermas wrote that the
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action model of reaching understanding, which is part of the framework of the new
paradigm, presupposes not only a transition from the philosophy of consciousness to the
philosophy of language, but also the development and radicalization of language analysis.59
These presuppositions (the transition from the philosophy of consciousness to the
philosophy of language/communication based on the radicalization of language analysis)
therefore make evident the latent contradiction in the old paradigm. They form the basis of
a new form of rationality; a new paradigm; a new social theory with communicative action.
The new paradigm/rationality provides grounds for the analysis and assessment of the
‘context-forming horizon of lifeworlds’. Thus, Habermas connects:
It is only with the turn back on the context-forming horizon of the lifeworld, from within
which participants in communication come to an understanding with one another about
something, that our field of vision changes in such a way that we can see the points of
connection for social theory within the theory of communicative action: The concept of
society has to be linked to a concept of lifeworld that is complementary to the concept of
communicative action. Then communicative action becomes interesting primarily as a
principle of sociation [Vergesellschaftung]: Communicative action provides the medium
for the reproduction of lifeworlds. At the same time, processes of societal rationalization
are given a different place. They transpire more in implicitly known structures of the
lifeworld than in explicitly known action orientations (as Weber suggested).60
Habermas, from the above quoted connection between several themes in his philosophy
which ended with a moderated critique of a view of Weber and many philosophers who
took-up along same line of argument with him, has presented the framework of his new
paradigm. This is because the said critique “leads to a demand for a change of paradigm
(from teleological to communicative action) that Weber did not envision, let alone
accomplish”.61
To reconnect to the historical background to his philosophy with the Frankfurt

Institute for Social Research, Habermas noted, and I intentionally quote at much length:
A philosophy that withdraws behind the lines of discursive thought to the “mindfulness of
nature” pays for the wakening powers of its exercise by renouncing the goal of theoretical
knowledge, and thus by renouncing that program of interdisciplinary materialism” in
whose name the critical theory of society was once launched in the early thirties.
Horkheimer and Adorno had already given up this goal by the beginning of the forties,
without however, acknowledging the practical consequences of relinquishing a connection
to the social sciences… Nevertheless, as the forward to Dialectic of Enlightenment clearly
explains, they had given up the hope of being able to redeem the promise of early critical
theory.62
Against this, I want to maintain that the program of early critical theory foundered not on
this or that contingent circumstance, but from the exhaustion of the paradigm of the
philosophy of consciousness. I shall argue that a change of paradigm to the theory of
communication makes it possible to return to the understanding that was interrupted with
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the critiques of instrumental reason; and this will permit us to take up once again the since-
neglected tasks of a critical theory of society.63
This means, on the one hand, a change of paradigm within action theory: from goal-
directed to communicative action, and, on the other hand, a change of strategy in an effort
to reconstruct the modern concept of rationality… [t]hen we also have to reformulate the
naturalistic concept of self-preservation.64
Thus, Habermas went ahead to note, as a reconstruction of Weber’s view, that,
The rationalization of society would then no longer mean a diffusion of purposive-rational

action and a transformation of domains of communicative action into subsystems of
purposive rational action. The point of reference becomes instead the potential for
rationality found in the validity basis of speech… Inasmuch as social actions are
coordinated through reaching understanding, the format conditions of rationality-motivated
agreement specify how participant’s relations to one another can be rationalized. As a
general principle, they count as rational to the effect that the yes/no decisions that carry a
given consensus issue from the interpretive processes of the participants themselves.
Correspondingly, a lifeworld can be regarded as rationalized to the extent that it permits
interactions that are not guided by normatively ascribed agreement but –directly or
indirectly – by communicatively achieved understanding.65
With his reconceptualization/reconstruction, as redefinition, of the concept of rationality to
mean the provision of reasons/grounds for raised/thematized claims, Habermas’ new
paradigm which builds on this concept of rationality makes the idea of communicating to
reach understanding the basis of social actions. This idea of reaching understanding, based
on a rationality defined as providing the grounds for raised claims, implies argumentation
and critique. Thus by this new paradigm, Habermas argues for the ‘openness’ or
‘criticizability’ of validity claims, worldviews and lifeworlds. To these he connects also the
idea that worldviews and cultures are reproduced. This is what he meant by the
rationalization of lifeworld about which he wrote:
From the conceptual perspective action oriented to reaching understanding appears first as
a restructuring of the lifeworld, as a process that exerts an influence on everyday
communication by way of the differentiation of knowledge systems, and that thus affects
the forms of cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialization.66
As would be agreed, and as Habermas conceived, it is one’s understanding of the
world that determines the possibility or not of the rationalization of the lifeworld. Making
reference to “mythical worldviews” Habermas noted that their “concept of the world is
dogmatically invested with a specific content that is withdrawn from rational discussion
and thus from criticism”.67 This is what, borrowing from Karl Popper, he referred to as the
‘closedness’ of mythical worldviews which forms of life are tradition-bound. About such
worldviews he noted:
The more cultural traditions predecide which validity claims, when, where, for what, from
whom, and to whom must be accepted, the less the participants have the possibility of
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making explicit and examining the potential grounds on which their yes/no positions are
based. If we assess cultural systems of interpretation from this standpoint, we can see why
mythical worldviews represent an instructive limit case.68
Based on these, and optimistically projecting into the future for the possibility of changes,
Habermas submitted that if we can judge the rationality of worldviews in the formal-
pragmatically specified dimension of closeness/openness, we are reckoning with systematic
changes in worldviews that cannot be explained simply in psychological, economic, or
sociological terms – that is, by means of external factors – but can also be traced to an
internally reconstructible growth of knowledge.69
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ENDNOTES
1.
Geuss, Raymond. “Ideology: Descriptive, Pejorative, Positive views”, p. 6. Available online at
www.autodidactproject.org/other/ideo9a.html.
2.
Geuss, Raymond. “Ideology: Descriptive, Pejorative, Positive views”, p.20.
3.
Geuss, Raymond. “Ideology: Descriptive, Pejorative, Positive views”, p. 10.
4.
Geuss, Raymond. “Ideology: Descriptive, Pejorative, Positive views”, p.12.
5.
see Geuss, Raymond. “Ideology: Descriptive, Pejorative, Positive views”, pp. 13-15.
6.
Geuss, Raymond. “Ideology: Descriptive, Pejorative, Positive views”, pp. 22/23.
7.
Jürgen Habermas. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Trans. by Thomas Burger.
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), p. xi.
8.
Geuss, Raymond. “Ideology: Descriptive, Pejorative, Positive views”, p. 15.
9.
Jürgen Habermas. The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. I, Reason and Rationalization of
Society, Trans. by Thomas McCarthy. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), p. viii.
10.
He criticised this as destructive; see for instance Theory of Communicative Action, I, p. 388.
11.
Jürgen, Habermas. Knowledge and Human Interest, Trans. by Jeremy J. Shapiro. (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1998), p. 308.
12.
Jürgen Habermas. Theory of Communicative Action, I, p. 396.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
Jürgen Habermas. “Public sphere and political public sphere – the biographical roots of two
motifs in my thought”, Commemorative Lecture, Kyoto Nov. 11, 2004. Available online at
www.homepage.mac.com/gedavis/JH/Kyoto_lecture_Nov_2004.pdf, pp. 2/3. (Henceforth,
Commemorative Lecture, Kyoto)
18.
Commemorative Lecture, Kyoto, p. 4.
19.
Commemorative Lecture, Kyoto, p. 4/5.
20.
21.
Jean-Paul Sartre. Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. Trans. by
Hazel E. Barnes. (London: Routledge, 1996). p. xxxviii (Henceforth Being & Nothingness).
22.
Jean-Paul Sartre. Being & Nothingness, p. 521.
23.
Jean-Paul Sartre. Being & Nothingness , 264.
24.
25.
Jürgen Habermas. Theory of Communicative Action, I, pp. 69/70.
26.
27.
28.
29.
Jürgen Habermas. Theory of Communicative Action, I, pp. 87-94.
30.
31.
AJAH, A. C. (PG/MA/07/43119) Page 47

32.
33.
34.
35.
see also J.C.A. Agbakoba’s “Globalization, Religious Ideologies and Conflict: A Critical
Examination and exploration of alternatives”, in Contemporary Philosophy”, XXVII(1&2), Jan/Feb
& Mar/April 2006, pp. 24-25.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
Even though Kant used the term to mean simply the description of consciousness and experience
in abstraction from consideration of its intentional content; and Hegel used it instead as the historical
enquiry into the evolution of self-consciousness, developing from elementary sense experience to
fully rational, free, thought processes capable of yielding knowledge [see Blackburn, Simon (ed).
Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 284-5], and
therefore, relating to a peoples cultures, ideologies and mode of existence; in the 20th century, the
term is associated with the work and school of Husserl as he held, following Brentano, that
intentioanlity was the distinctive mark of consciousness.
44.
According to Austin Harrington, the term ‘Lifeworld’ entered the vocabulary of 20th century
philosophy and social theory with the publication of Edmund Husserl’s The Crisis of the European
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology in 1936. See Austin Harrington. “Lifeworld”. Theory,
Culture & Society, 23(2-3), 2006, p. 341. Available at: http://tcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/23/2-
3/341
45.
46.
47.
Jürgen Habermas. Knowledge and Human Interest, p. 365.
48.
49.
Jürgen Habermas. Theory and Practice, Trans. by John Viertel. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996),
p. 9.
50.
Jürgen Habermas. Theory and Practice, p. 9.
51.
Jürgen Habermas. Theory and Practice, pp. 8-9.
52.
53.
Jürgen Habermas.. Towards a Rational Society, Trans. by Jeremy J. Shapiro. (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1970), p. 73.
54.
55.
56.
Thomas Kuhn. “The nature and necessity of Scientific Revolution”, part of The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, in Stanley Rosen (ed), The Philosopher’s Handbook, Essential Readings
from Plato to Kant. (New York: Random House, 2000), p. 513. This is better understood as
necessary when we notice that paradigms play cognitive and normative functions. Their cognitive
functions extend to the framework they provide for the ontological conception of the world, and
AJAH, A. C. (PG/MA/07/43119) Page 48

building on it, their normative functions - as offering a description of a mode of relationship among
to human beings in general - depend on their presentation, for conceptualization, of the world.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
[see Horkheimer’s views in his 1939 “On the social function of philosophy”. About this
Konstantinos Kavoulakos in his “From Habermas to Horkheimer’s early work: Directions for a
materialist reconstruction of communicative theory” in On Habermas and Horkheimer, p. 40, also
noted that, “It is generally accepted that at the end of the thirties and beginning of the forties
Horkheimer turned away from his earlier program of ‘an interdisciplinary research into
contemporary society’ toward the historico-philosophical contemplations evident in Horkheimer,
Eclipse of Reason and Horkheimer & Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment”].
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
AJAH, A. C. (PG/MA/07/43119) Page 49

CHAPTER FOUR
HABERMAS ON SOCIAL CHANGE
4.1. Generalizations on social change as development
Social change is a general term which refers to: some transformations in social structure:
the nature, the social institutions, the social behaviour or the social relations of a society,
community of people, and so on. It is the transformation of some - and most times, very
gradually turns to all - of the different aspects or domains of the society.
Since human societies must bear the imperfect character of the human beings that
constitute them; and since also human beings are time-bound, then, “social arrangements”
can be said to involve “time, birth, transformation, and death”. Change therefore is bound
to be all about us: “we have variety of political shifts and conflicts that, in turn, have in a
complicated way, been associated with economic, social, and cultural repercussions. They
have also involved shifts in inner meanings and psychological dispositions”.1 These shifts
in inner meanings and psychological dispositions are the internal aspects of social changes.
They are also, most – if not all - the times, the source which determine the direction,
nature, duration, consistency or otherwise, of the external changes. For instance, a society
whose experiences make the members to be disenchanted and pessimistic would certainly
not have sufficient dynamo to move ahead with their normal life style. Such dispositions
due to loss of meaning may lead to the stagnation of the society, and therefore lead to the
state of ‘no positive development’. On the other hand, some of such anomies may lead to
the rise of revolutionists who, if they are consistent with their critique, can awaken the
society to consciousness and actions. But then, changes do result also, if not due to loss of
meaning, but as cumulative effects of gradual efforts and processes.
Based on these distinctions, it becomes necessary to make it clear that there are
different planes, modes, directionality, and patterns, of changes in the society.
Consequently, there are such terms as change and revolution, evolution and progress,
differentiation and continuity, tradition and discontinuity, which, according to Kaspar
Naegele, are “terms that seem to have a legitimate claim to be included in the analysis of
social change”. Studies about social change are attempts to know why there are shifts in
some patterns. And, when thinkers offer paradigms/theories of social integration and
progress in the society, it is also based on what they think will help improve on the
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prevailing pattern. About these, Naegele posed some questions which could be concerns of
studies on social change:
what domains (eg., economic, political, religious, technological, other spheres of distinct
activity or mutual relations) must one distinguish to account for change within a given
society, a given social organisation, or a particular web of social relations?2
What is meant by social causation?
How must the exploration of personalities and their motives be part of the study of social
change?3 What are the “real engines of change?4
Such questions and studies must at some point also “involve dissecting vested interests, and
separating the demand for change (in the name of an alternative order) from the dislike of
the status quo (in the service of a permanent desire to oppose any order). For this reason,
rebel, revolutionist, apostate, negativist, innovator, entrepreneur, discoverer, creative artist
– all represent, according to Naegele, modes of social action and relation which underlying
motives and contributions a theory of society can neither ignore nor leave unassessed.5 This
idea has no shallow connection with the fact that theoretically it is now known that
differences exist between the motives leading people to assert some propositions, the actual
assertions they make, and the possible consequences of the acceptance or rejection of their
assertions for a variety of persons, institutions, or other phenomena.6
4.2. On how ideologies specifically impact on the society
According to Naegele, “the study of social change becomes, in fact, very closely connected
with ideological commitments”.7 And, writing about traditional societies and their outlook
and approach to the physical world, Finkle and Gable noted:
In both the actual and the cognitive sense, man in traditional society is dominated by the
vicissitudes of nature and feels that he has little control over his environment. He lacks
confidence and a sense of power in his ability to manipulate either his physical or social
environment, an attitude reinforced by experience… His physical and mental horizon are
limited… His mental outlook is equally constricted as he remains isolated from new
ideas… With his limits, powers in these forces are beyond his control and his helplessness
breeds a sense of impotence; he finds it dangerous to experiment in the face of all these
odds.
This sense of impotence and of danger in the environment induces him to rely on other
people for decisions – the elders of the family, village leaders, landlords, and even others
in positions of authority. In turn, he expects the same submission and dependence from
those beneath him as he gives to his superiors… Impotence, dependence, and anxiety at
experimenting are bred into each successive generation. This style of life inhibits the
formation of a creative or innovative personality so that life goes on the same generation
after generation. The social and political structure remains hierarchical, if not authoritarian,
methods of production continue unchanged or are modified only slightly, and the level of
income and standard of living remains constant.8
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In this sample of the impact of ideologies on the society, one understands first of all
the social causal character of ideologies. One understands also, based on the first, the
interconnection between ontological, epistemological, and psychological/attitudinal
frameworks as parts of the ideology of any society. Primarily thus, it all begins with what
we conceive the world (that is, the physical and spiritual realms) which then determines our
relationship with it. The ontological framework also determines the epistemological
framework and the attitudinal orientations. Because of the limited mental and physical
horizon which constricts or allows, as the case may be, the possibilities of what can be
known and how it can be known, creativity and innovative potentials are also affected. In
the example of a traditional society given above, the style of life so explained, and based on
the ideology/worldview, stifles or inhibits these potentials.
Added to these, is the other idea of mode of validating and acquiring knowledge.
The ontological conception/presuppositions and epistemological outlook of any society
also determine which of the three sources of knowledge (senses, intuition, or reason) is
valued more than the others. They also determine whether or not certain information can be
disputed – and its grounds of validity sought and/or provided. Consequently, there may not
be improvements in the knowledge base of the society which validates propositional,
normative, and authenticity claims, not by the grounds provided for such claims, but simply
based on authority or tradition. But, what social development as improvement, is possible
in a constricted and limited horizon without room for improvement, creativity, and
innovations?
Thus, one better appreciates the views of J.C.A. Agbakoba when he noted9 that
more detailed than, but still based on, the triad of ontology, epistemology, and psychology,
the following are the more specific areas from angle of which the ideology of a society
determines the life-style and social condition of the people. They are:
(a) Epistemology: which centres on methods and sources of knowledge acquisition and
creation; extending to the educational institutions wherein the knowledge
acquisition and creation take place;
(b) Social Objective and aspirations of the members of the society;
(c) Interactive skills;
(d) Technical and artistic creativity; and
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(e) Entrepreneurship: which here gives attention to the question of the response of the
members of the society to risk-taking – whether encouraging or discouraging.
Agbakoba argued very incisively that these five elements are connected. Thus, the
readiness of the “knowledge creators”, which include researchers and students in tertiary
institutions, in a society to perform their duty affects the knowledge-base of their society
and thus their development. The availability and readiness of those who acquire the created
knowledge to learn, combined to the first group, depends on what and what are regarded as
the objectives and aspirations of the members of the society. The same social objectives
and aspirations influence to what extent the knowledge creators take seriously the question
of technical and artistic creativity. Likened to the above is the fact that the idea of
entrepreneurship of the members of any society, and related to this, the social response of
the society to risk-taking, depend on the readiness of the society to acquire and create
knowledge; to master and control their environment; and to encourage those who, aspiring
high, are ready to take risks, to be creative, and to move the society forward.
Lawrence Harrison corroborated this when he submitted
I believe that the creative capacity of human beings is at the heart of the development
process. What makes development happen is our ability to imagine, theorize,
conceptualize, experiment, invent, articulate, organize, manage, solve problems, and do a
hundred other things with our minds… Natural resources, climate, geography, history,
market size, governmental policies, and many other factors influence the direction and
place of progress. But the engine is human creative capacity.10
But then, all these are at the root related to the conception of the world by any society, that
is, the ontological presuppositions of her members about the nature of the world, of man,
and of man’s approach to the world. It is these presuppositions that ground what Finkle and
Gable meant by “physical and mental horizon”. And certainly Agbakoba would not
disagree to the primacy of the ontological presupposition of the members of any society, in
their ideological framework/worldview.
For this reason, Harrison noted that if a society’s worldview encourages the belief that
human beings have the capacity to know and understand the world around them, that the
universe operates according to a largely decipherable pattern of laws, and that the scientific
method can unlock the many secrets of the unknown, it is clearly imparting a set of
attitudes tightly linked to the ideas of progress and change in the society. If, on the other
hand, the worldviews of a particular society explains worldly phenomenon by supernatural
forces, often in the form of numerous capricious gods and goddess who demand obeisance
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from humans, there is little room for reason, education, planning, or progress. To establish
more explicitly the relationship among, encouragement of creative potentials and their
consequent effects/impacts on the changes in the society, Harrison submitted: “My own
belief is that the society that is most successful at helping its people – all its people –
realize their creative potentials, is the society that will progress the fastest”.11
To provide his own grounds for the conception of the world and man’s relation to it; to
provide the required “Interactive skill” among human beings, and with the world,
Habermas placed at the core of his social theory the theory of communicative action toward
reaching understanding. This central theory of his, is his point of departure: for accounting
in a historical manner, the social changes in the Western capitalised societies; and for his
arguments on the need for social change for all societies: the Western capitalized countries
and all other “mythical” (African) societies.
4.3.0. Habermas on Social Change
4.3.1. On the determining impact of worldviews on social change
There is a connection between the previous discussions in this chapter and the views
of Habermas. Referring to the paradigmatic nature of ideologies as social theories, and the
areas that ideologies specifically affect while having their impacts on the society,
Habermas wrote:
For…Social-scientific paradigms are internally connected with the social contexts in which
they emerge and become influential. In them is reflected the world- and self-understanding
of various collectives; mediately they serve the interpretation of social-interest situations,
horizons of aspiration and expectation.12
It is based on the internal connection which these paradigms/ideologies, like his, have
“with the social contexts in which they emerge and become influential”, as they become
the “reflexive mirror” for the expression of “the world- and self-understanding” – serving
also the interpretation of social situations, horizons of aspiration and expectation, as
Habermas conceives it – that one understands that in Habermas’ view, it is the worldview
of any society that determines the mode/pattern of change of/in the society. In this regard,
Habermas quoted Marx: “Very frequently the ‘world images’ created by ‘ideas’ have, like
switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of
interest”.13 Insofar as our explanations about social action make reference to legitimate
orders (conventions and legal norms), we are supposing:
(1). That the “dynamic of interests” is the motor force behind conduct;
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(2). That this dynamic usually takes effect, however, within the bounds of de facto valid
normative regulations;
(3). That the validity of normative regulations rests on the power to convince inherent in
the ideas that can be brought forward in their support; and
(4). That the de facto power of these ideas to convince also depends on the potential –
which is susceptible to objective appraisal, for grounding and justification that these ideas
afford a given context.14
Based on these, one is certainly not in the wrong to note that for Habermas, our
worldviews as (social) paradigms influence the social contexts in which they are used.
They provide the understanding of man and the world. And by interpreting the aspirations
and expectations of the society, worldviews create our interests, and the dynamo that
sustains them. This dynamo, keeping alive our interests, determines the tracks/paths of
action that we (choose) to take. Also, the ideas and values, imbedded in our interests and
aspirations, determine our normative regulations and the convictions we have in choosing
to act the way we do. These social actions jointly determine where the society at large is
heading to and at what pace. These actions also, as manifestations of some ideological
presuppositions, form the basis for any change in the society.
If there is any social theorist who tried to explain social changes from point of view
of the history of ideas, it is Habermas. He explained the changes in the European societies
to capitalist societies from point of view of the history of ideas. His critiques of capitalist
and (mythical) African societies are from this same angle. Against the pessimistic picture
presented by Weber, and later, Horkheimer, Adorno, Foucault, and others, he gave some
hope to possible changes in all modern societies based on the possibilities which he
believes exist in the reconstruction and enlargement of our worldviews.
Thus, the discussion of Habermas’ views on social change will take two looks: a look
at the past and the present (which is a critical look at what led to the situation in which
different societies find themselves today); and a look into the future with hope (which is a
prescriptive outlook by Habermas to the question of the situation of the world today –
based on a reconstruction and improvement on the ideas which he criticised in his first dual
(past and present) outlook.
4.3.2. A Critical look at the world: The past and the present
According to Holbach, “Man is unhappy because he has an erroneous view of nature”.15 If
man wants to be happy, he has to try to resolve the problem that leads to his unhappiness.
If, as Holbach noted, the source of his being unhappy lies in his ‘erroneous’ view of nature,
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then, there is the need to review and reconstruct his worldview. This reconstruction
requires a thorough critique of the status quo. And, this is exactly what Habermas aimed at
doing.
4.3.2.1. Fixated Modernity and the abandoned project: Advanced capitalist countries
In his introductory note to The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,
Thomas McCarthy wrote that the text is ‘a historical-sociological account of the
emergence, transformation, and disintegration of the bourgeois public sphere’.16 Habermas
argues that “for about a century the social foundations of (this) sphere have been caught up
in a process of decomposition”.17 Tracing the developments that led to the ‘decomposition’,
Habermas makes reference to ‘elements of early capitalist commercial relations’ which
include ‘the traffic in commodities and news’ and ‘the press’ (political journalists).18
Gradually, the public began to depend on the exchange of news for their private views.19
Very soon the press was systematically made to serve the interests of the state
administration. As late as March 1769 a press ordinance of the Vienna government
witnessed the style of this practice: “In order that the writer of the journal might know
what sort of domestic decrees, arrangements, and other matters are suitable for the public,
such are to be compiled weekly by the authorities and are to be forwarded to the editor of
the journal”.20
Implicit in this form of the press “systematically” serving the interests of the state
administration, is the gradual ‘culture’ of objectivating other human beings, the notorious
‘mass media deception’. It implies the manipulation, no longer of material objects alone,
but also of human beings as workers and consumers, in the process of production in
capitalist economies/states. The sphere that developed in the manipulated and administered
state destroyed the “critical public” that used their reason.21 It is what was destroyed that
differentiated the ‘state’ from the ‘society’.
The line between state and society, fundamental to our context, divided the public sphere
from the private realm. The public sphere was co-extensive with public authority, and we
consider the court part of it. Included in the private realm was the authentic “public
sphere”, for it was a public sphere constituted by private people… The private sphere
comprised civil society in the narrow sense… imbedded in it was the family with its
interior domain. The public sphere in the political realm evolved from the public sphere in
the world of letters; through the vehicle of public opinion it put the state in touch with the
needs of society22
But when the decomposition had begun, “Reason… itself needed to be protected from
becoming public because it was a threat to any and all relations of domination”.23 To
explain this decomposition, Habermas decisively was of the view that the dominance of
relations of domination in capitalist societies was the cause because reason could not
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protect itself neither was it protected. Instead, it became public. The consequence was a
consistently react against the negative transformation of the society. Reason in the social
theories that emerged could not freely ‘take-up, explain, criticise, and carry on the
intentions of earlier theory traditions’24 Such theories thus were not able to be on the guard
against the “danger that particular interests” were “being brought to bear unnoticed in its
own theoretical perspective. If the said protection of reason by itself was done, Habermas
seemed to argue, capitalist modernization could not have been, as it is, a process of one-
sided rationalization25 where “reason splits itself up into a plurality of value spheres and
destroys its own universality” as Weber conceived it.26 It could not have led into the
‘construction’ of Weber’s ‘iron cage’ neither would the modern society have turned into an
‘administered world’ as Adorno held.27
To salvage this reason, and thus, the society which values and worldviews it tries to
rationalize, Habermas argued that it requires a “critique of deformations inflicted, in two
ways, on the life forms of capitalistically modernized societies: through devaluation of
their traditional substance and through subjection to the imperatives of a one-sided
rationality limited to the cognitive-instrumental”.28 It was for lack of this critique, but
instead an institutionalization of this form of rationality that made Weber to write thus
about modern capitalism in the following words:
This cosmos today determines, with irresistible force, the lifestyles of all the individuals
who are born into this mechanism, not only of those directly concerned with economic
acquisition. Perhaps it will so determine them until the last ton of fossilized fuel is burnt…
fate has decreed that the cloak should become an iron cage… No one knows who will live
in this cage in the future, or whether at the end of this tremendous development entirely
new prophecies will arise… For then it might be said of the “last man” of this cultural
development: “specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart”; this nullity imagines
that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved.29
Weber argues for the thesis of “loss of meaning”30 due to “struggle among the gods of (the)
separate orders and values”.31 This interpretation was true both for Weber as for Habermas.
Like Weber also, Habermas sees this societal/mental change and disposition as the
cumulative effects of several changes in “world- and self-understanding”. According to
Habermas, it is traced to the philosophy of consciousness; to the exaggerated emphasis on
self-preservation – a self-defeating/self-destructive ego; a self-preservation conceived as an
absolute end32 – which is connected with the one-sided instrumental rationality that
conceives nothing other than the world of manipulable objects. It is traced also to the
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expanded conception of action that characterized Western worldviews before and within
the Marx-Weberian tradition, through Lukacs, Adorno, and Horkheimer.
Referring to the above noted tracing points as causes of the problem with the
modern society, Habermas noted that it “is not between types of action but between
principles of societal integration” which has disintegrative effect on the lifeworld.33 It is a
problem, a negative social change which is traced also to the point when money and power,
emerged as two elements of capitalist economies, and as two steering media that uncouple
action from processes of reaching understanding.
For Habermas, change is a necessity. Going by his link with the Hegelian dialectical
tradition, change is a character of the world-order and even the ideological frameworks that
structured the modern capitalist world as it is, according to Habermas, can be changed.
Following Hegel’s dialectical tradition therefore, Habermas is of the view that positive
social change is both necessary and possible. A primary element of this dialectical feature
in social change is well expressed in Habermas’ idea of communicative rationality as
already discussed above which requires that a claim (thesis) can be rejected (antithesis)
with the mental disposition (in an open or communicatively oriented society/ideology) that
a reconstructed view will emerge which is both an improvement of the previously rejected
claim and a response to the rejection as an anti-thesis. This is the optimism that serves as
the basic point of difference between Habermas and Weber (and the adherents of his
pessimistic “ironic cage” picture). Before we focus on how Habermas thinks that this
change is possible, it is necessary to consider his view of why the majority of the
African/underdeveloped countries are rather stagnant.
4.3.2.2. Mythical worldviews and the stagnant/underdeveloped countries
With a very clear view of the alternative paradigm, the ideology which he was about to
offer, Habermas’ study of some African societies was at the basis a critique of why these
societies are stagnant. From an ontological and epistemological perspective he wrote:
Myths do not permit a clear, basic, conceptual differentiation between things and persons,
between objects that can be manipulated and agents – subjects capable of speaking and
acting.34
In mythical thought, diverse validity claims, such as propostional truth, normative
rightness, and expressive sincerity are not yet differentiated35… [M]ythical worldviews
prevent us from categorically uncoupling nature and culture, not only through conceptually
mixing the objective and social world but also through reifying the linguistic worldview.
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As a result the concept of the world is withdrawn from rational discussion and thus from
criticism.36
These worldviews are closed – neither are the fundamental attitudes to the three worlds
differentiated, nor are the worldviews reflexive. They are not exposed to criticism neither
are they open to revision. The forms of life of the people living with such ideologies
therefore are tradition-bound. The consequence according to Robin Horton is that such
worldviews regulate our dealings with external reality with what can be perceived or
handled in the objective world, in such a way as to exclude alternatives.
The above level of interpreting the consequence of the closed African ideologies is
shallow according to Habermas. He presented his arguments thus:
In fact, however, the structures of worldviews determine a life-practice that is by no means

exhausted in cognitive-instrumental interaction with external reality. Rather, worldviews
are constitutive across the whole breath of processes of understanding and socialization, in
which participants relate as much to the experiences of their respective subjective world as
to happenings in the one objective world. If mythical thought does not permit a categorical
separation between cognitive-instrumental, moral-practical, and expressive relations to the
world, if the expressions of the Azande are for us full of ambiguities, this is a sign that the
“closedness” of their animistic worldview cannot be described solely in terms of attitudes
toward the objective world.37
This lack of categorical separation between different relations to the different worlds,
according to Habermas, requires the “decentration” of these worldviews if it is to be
resolved. One further understands the nature of the categorical tightness in African
worldviews if one links the idea of categorical unification with the fact that African
ideologies are at the core religious. In this regard, J.C.A. Agbakoba noted that “the
indigenous basic and secondary ideology in Africa, generally known as African Traditional
Religion and Thought (ATR/T), had and still has the strongest influence on African
personality in spite of the spread of the relatively new ideologies, particularly Christianity
and Islam.38 The closedness therefore of most African worldviews is traced to the
closedness of ATR/T. By implication therefore, the stagnancy of African societies,
Habermas would not disagree, is traced also to the features of ATR/T.
The concept of man in the African ideology places him in the context of community
with others. He is an individual who must adhere to the primary expectations, rules, norms,
and collective goals of his immediate community. This community is collectivistic in its
structure such that what one has to do is not derived from one’s ontological constitution as
an irreplaceable and incommunicable being but from the label placed on him as
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constituting part of a whole. By further implication then, there are no individual rights,
only socio-legal ones.39
Besides, there is the idea of ‘you-we-divide’ in the structure of African ideologies

that presents the persons outside one’s in-group as a type of rival, an enemy. The loyalty
from individuals is thus only reserved or meant for the in-group. The individual’s highest
goal is that of self-preservation – of the individual self and of the in-group. A case in point
is the Igbo society. For them, the goddess Ani is the being from whom the ethical
principles/commands issue. She is the source of normative standards and she punishes.
Each community has her own. In this regard, Agbakoba writes:
Ani is the ultimate lineage cult and its injunctions are based upon approval for those things
that would aid the preservation (material, physical preservation and continuation) of the
lineage (the family, extended family, clan, community)… Ani’s injunctions are not binding
on outsiders.40
On a general note, it is not an off-hand statement to say that traditional African social
constructs were largely codified mode of communication safe-guarding the interests of the
clever members of the group. Such ‘codified mode of communication’, Habermas referred
to as ‘distorted communication’. Consequently from the foregoing, the mechanism of
social change was controlled in these societies by such few, influential ones.41 And, besides
these influential members of the society, there is the conception of invisible forces that
have determining influences also on man in the African societies. This is at the core, the
result of a worldview that is simply mythical, having no distinction between the world of
spirits and the human realm. Thus, the daily life of the traditional African was such that
The common man had many taboos to observe, and many daily rituals to perform, either to
appease the community or the divinities. If he was not an indirect or unconscious slave of
the dominant conscious, he held perpetual allegiance to one divinity or another. If he was
‘free’ with men, he was not free with nature or his environment. Suppose community and
environment allow him to live his life with fewer burdens, he would still have to pay the
debts owned by his past ancestors42
This forms the background for African’s attribution of causal explanations either to the
gods or to the individuals who are able to influence them from the spiritual realm. There is
a very tenacious cling to the concept of invisible powers which can superimpose and
influence or ‘diminish one’s vital force’. One can be manipulated from anywhere and by
anyone who can, as an enemy, because he belongs to the out-group. Afigbo stretches the
implications of individual irresponsibility inherent in such worldview as he asks and
answers:
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Why is it that almost every major situation so far known in history appears to have placed
the black man at a disadvantage?... The explanation, it is suggested here, would seem to lie
in a certain reluctance on the part of the black man, his historians, sociologists, and other
cultural interpreters to invest him with responsibility for what happened to and around him.
The central peg on which many scholars, especially those motivated or inspired by
ideology, whether racial or economic, have hung the black man’s history is, in the words
of professor Chancellor Williams, the idea that the black man has always been “a race
under siege, it means he is under attack by hostile forces from outside himself or his
society. It means that things are happening to him instead of getting things done, it means
he is “effect” rather than cause, that he is an object on which things act rather than a
subject that acts on things.43
Such a not-decentered worldview evidently influences the African’s relation to the external
world as nature: nature is regarded as sacred, to be contemplated, mystified and neither
explored nor manipulated. Tradition and reference to ‘the spiritual’, rather than rational
grounding, as Habermas suggests, are basis for the causal explanations offered for
occurrences. There is no interest in theoretical understanding of nature so mystified and
contemplated; hence, it is not explored. Creative abilities are not developed. There is no
self-supersession. And, stagnation reigns supreme because, based on the above ontological
and epistemological presuppositions, our path to positive social change as development
from within is very far, very blink, and very rough. This is because, such a lifeworld as
horizon sets limits to one’s interpretation of reality, and for that reason requires the
enlargement of those limits through a fusion of horizons.44 But, how is such fusion possible
when the thoughts of traditional Africans are validated not by reason or grounds provided
after communication aimed at reaching understanding, but instead by authority and
intuition? How is improvement possible if (when) the individual prefers to follow the
uncritical way of his forefathers to spare himself the trouble of reasoning or evaluating the
situation so presented?45
According to Agbakoba, the solution to the problem is a reconstruction of African

worldviews, from their particularistic character to one with universalistic and objective
features. This is because, Agbakoba held, ‘A universalistic and objective ideology will tend
to encourage rationality by making people search for the essences and essential nature of
things, and by making people more concerned about theoretical understanding’.46 This
question of rationality forms the basis for Habermas’ critique of modern capitalist societies,
the mythical worldviews and the stagnancy/underdevelopment of African societies. The
same concept of rationality forms also the framework for his futuristic look, in expectation,
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toward a sustained positive social change in our ‘tightly’ globalizing world of the 21st
century.
4.3.3.0. Looking at the world into the future with hope: The new paradigm
According to Habermas,
If the rationality of worldviews can be judged in the formal-pragmatically specified

dimension of closedness/openness, we are reckoning with systematic changes in
worldviews that cannot be explained solely in psychological, economic, or sociological
terms – that is, by means of external factors – but that can also be traced to an internally
reconstructible growth of knowledge.47
The caesurae between the mythical, religious-metaphysical, and modern modes of thought
are characterized by changes in the system of basic concepts. With the transition to a new
stage the interpretation of the superseded stage are, no matter their content, categorically
devalued. It is not this or that reason, but the kind of reason, which is no longer
convincing.48
Thus for Habermas, the principles of modernity that resulted to the concept of “Modernity
as an abandoned project” need to be devalued, as much as the mythologically structured
principles/contents of African worldviews need to be decentered and devalued. He had
devalued them as no longer convincing in the critiques presented already. What follows is
his indication of the availability of another – a better – paradigm which he argues is more
convincing and pragmatic.
4.3.3.1. Healing modernity by means of communicative rationality
The “iron cage” picture of Weber is one of the clearest descriptions of the fact that
mankind – which developed his reason and control of nature, coming up in the modern era
with scientific advancements which are supposed to make human living more and more
humane and fulfilling – ended up being under siege at the ‘mercy’ of the products of his
instrumental reason. Hence, Herbert Marcuse’s critique was primarily from point of view
of the permanence and institutionalization of the structures of domination through
capitalism, sustained by technological advancements. One of the critical texts of George
Orwell, namely Nineteen eighty-four, was meant to uproot capitalism and its strongholds.
For Habermas, the problem was (is) with the predominant worldview: a
misconception of ideology; a one-world ontological presupposition that is simply object
structured; a one-sided rationality limited to the cognitive instrumental.49 He is of the view
that change is real. It is constant. It is possible. If, and since, modernity reached a
contradictory stage, it is no ground to abandon the project. Rather, it requires the
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reconceptualization of what this project itself aimed at and how it is going about it. This
reconceptualization as reconstruction was the objective of his two volumes Theory of
Communicative Action. The new paradigm he offered is communicative rationality which –
against the self-centred philosophy of the modern society, encumbered with one-world
teleological action, and language conceived solely as a means of representation –
“presupposes language as medium of uncurtailed communication”.50 It is a rationality and
communication which, instead of dehumanizing the agent, enables his coordinated actions
to “change something in the world”.51
The relevance of this paradigm of Habermas may be clearer if one recalls the
implications of the various interpretations both of Darwin’s evolutionary theory (one of
which was the self-preservation absolutised in the slogan, ‘survival of the fittest’) and
positivism, two of which formed the nineteenth century consensus, on the modern society.
These two themes resulted to “the growth of the impersonal elements within social
arrangement”.52 Because Habermas’ theory aims at social change, he had, in these critiques
of modernity, been “able to account for the genesis, the transformation, and the death of
social arrangement”.53
Thus, against the homogenization instituted by capitalism; a homogenization which

Marcuse very consistently argued against in his One-Dimensional Man, Habermas was of
the view that positive social change requires “the rationalization of the lifeworld” as a
“necessary condition for an emancipated society”54. Emancipation is what Habermas sees
as the goal of the social change needed to heal the fixated modernity. And, to realize and
sustain the change, this paradigm (communicative action toward reaching understanding) is
of grave necessity. It is the bedrock of the social change, as primarily a healthy modernity,
which Habermas foresees. This is because, when the members of a society relate with
themselves, not as objects to be manipulated, but as fellow rational subjects to be discussed
with, communicated with, understood, and reached agreement with, then the possibilities
available to coordinate their actions towards agreed goals will be evident. Consequently,
the claims of leaders for instance, can be evaluated, and their interests in suggesting one
mode of action against another cross-checked.
When the interests of the leaders of societies and groups are “shaken by critique”55
the question of ‘administered’ form of life will be a thing of the past. Thus, the loss of
meaning (due to “shifts in inner meanings and dispositions”56) and of freedom57 which
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formed the background to Weber’s pessimistic thesis about the world, would be resolved.
Through undistorted communication, points of view as validity claims will be made clear
for understanding (because of meaningful communication) and this form of communication
will be both an expression of the regain of freedom and an expression of freedom. This will
be the case, the change that Habermas anticipates, because: communicative action is the
type of interaction in which all participants harmonize their individual plans of action with
one another and thus pursue their aims without reservation58 bearing in mind that the
coordination which communicative action offers, devalues and supersedes the myriads of
competing interests which cluster and limit social integration and development.59
4.3.3.2. The less developed countries and the path to development as social change
If, as presented under the critique of African mythical worldviews, it is valid that most of
their ideologies are mythical, not rationally grounded, lacking some very necessary
categorical separations, that is, not decentered; closed from criticism; contemplating,
instead of understanding, mastering and exploring nature, then, the change which such
societies need, depends very highly on the reconstruction (as fusion for enlargement) of
their worldviews.
According to Habermas, any meaningful living in societies with closed mythical

worldviews requires that the members of societies
must thereby adopt a reflective attitude toward cultural patterns of interpretation that
ordinarily makes possible their interpretive accomplishments. This change in attitude
means that the validity of the thematized interpretive pattern is suspended and the
corresponding knowledge rendered problematic.60
This thematization and rendering problematic of validity claims and traditions should
become part of the process of rationalization of the traditional and stagnating African
worldviews. It takes place through, and as a, learning process.61 Such process is a necessity
since “Living in an unmanageably large and changing society permits neither perfect
mapping, nor perfect coordination of maps. This means that the members of the society are
constantly learning about it; both the society and its members are in a constant process of
self-discovery and self-making”.62 This is important because, the development of any
society depends on her knowledge-base. When the knowledge leads to self-discovery and
self-making, then the constitutive interest of the members of the society becomes gradually
emancipatory in character. It is this, and only this type of interest and/in knowledge that the
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less-developed countries need. Only such interest and knowledge can lead them to positive
social change.
The possibility of such changes in such societies, for Habermas, depends very much
on their model of communication. If they adopt communicative rationality and action, then,
they can make their worldviews to be open, criticisable and rationalizable. This is because
it is “evident that the rationalization of actions and forms of life, and the rationalization of
worldviews belong together”.63 Rationalization as critique is possible in a worldview which
paradigm is communicative rationality. It is a “critique with a restorative power”.64 It
salvages the self denatured under “a blind self-preservation”. The reason in communicative
action “does not simply encounter ready-made subjects and systems; rather it takes part in
structuring what is to be preserved”.65 It is a reason that encourages entrepreneurship and
hard work, creativity and innovation. It is a reason that encourages risk-taking for the good
of the society, instead of laziness that concentrates on what is already on ground – a
laziness which turns more than ninety percent of an entire continent into consumerists
without producing anything. Thus, it is this structuring and restructuring, aimed at
preservation and supersesion, which Habermas projects into the future for mythical
societies if, and only if, they will choose to fuse and enlarge their worldviews from the
reconstructive lenses of communicative rationality.
Above all, if the German poet, Schiller, was right in stating that hunger and love
perennially drive us along, then it could mean that this hunger is taken as ‘everybody’s’
problem which needs to be solved by coordinating the actions of the members of each
society. If these are correct, as it seems they are, then, the question is – what natural
disposition gives us the potential to coordinate our actions to enable us to ‘drive along’
taking care of these natural drive of hunger? Schiller would answer love – may be
understood as the act of caring for and thus being able to work in mutual understanding
with, others. If once again these suppositions are smoothly related and valid, then one finds
the social theory of Jürgen Habermas very ad rem to enable us, as a matter of principle and
paradigm, to drive along and live meaningfully – coordinating our actions (in love) to
jointly combat hunger (and any other threat to the society). And what are these if not the
bedrock for social change?
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ENDNOTES
1.
Naegele, Kaspar, D. in, Parsons, T., Edward S., Naegele, Kaspar D., & Pitts, Jesse, R. eds.
Theories of Society, Foundations of Modern Sociological Theory, Complete in one volume. (New
York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 1207.
2.
Because the different domains/spheres of the society are interdependent, “social change becomes,
more than other fields of study, an opportunity (and a necessity) to understand the relations between
the domains of society”, Naegele, Kaspar, D. in, Parsons, T., et al, Theories of Society, p. 1211.
3.
This is necessary because “social change bears a complex relation to the purposes” (what
Habermas prefers to call interests/motives) of men; Naegele, Kaspar, D. in, Parsons, T., et al,
Theories of Society, p. 1211.
4.
Naegele, Kaspar, D. in, Parsons, T., et al, Theories of Society, pp. 1208-1211.
5.
Naegele, Kaspar, D. in, Parsons, T., et al, Theories of Society, p. 1211.
6.
7.
8.
Finkle, Jason L. & Richard W. Gable (eds.). Political Development and Social Change. (New
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), pp. 119-220.
9.
Agbakoba, J.C.A. Article delivered at South Korea. Some of these views are similar to those of
Lawrence Harrison. According to Harrison, a society can create opportunities for change in seven
ways. These are: (1) Through creation of an environment in which people expect and receive fair
treatment. (2) Through an effective and accessible education system: one that provides basic
intellectual and vocational tools; nurtures inquisitiveness, critical faculties, dissent, and creativity;
and equips people to solve problems. (3) Through a health system that protects people from diseases
that debilitate and kill. (4) Through creation of an environment that encourages experimentation and
criticism (which is often at the root of experimentation). (5) Through creation of an environment that
helps people both discover their talents and interests and mesh them with the right jobs. (6) Through
a system of incentives that rewards merit and achievement (and conversely discourage nepotism and
“pull”). And, (7) Through creation of the stability and continuity that makes it possible to plan ahead
with confidence. Progress is made enormously more difficult by instability and discontinuity.
10.
See Harrison, Lawrence E., “What makes development happen?” from Underdevelopment is a
State of Mind. (1985). Available at: http://www.jdainternational.org/resources/What%20
development%20Happen.pdf
11.
See Harrison, Lawrence also.
12.
13.
14.
15.
in Jürgen Habermas. Theory and Practice, p. 258.
16.
Jürgen Habermas. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, p. xi.
17.
Jürgen Habermas. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, p. 4.
18.
Jürgen Habermas. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, pp.17-20.
19.
20.
21.
Jürgen Habermas. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, pp. 26/27.
22.
Jürgen Habermas. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, pp. 30/31.
23.
AJAH, A. C. (PG/MA/07/43119) Page 66

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
Marx Weber, in Jürgen Habermas. Theory of Communicative Action, I, pp. 247-248.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
Agbakoba, J.C.A. “Towards a Philosophy of Technology and Development for Africa”, in Africa:
Philosophy and Public Affairs, J.O. Oguejiofor, (ed.). (Enugu: Delta Publications Nig. Ltd., 1998),
p. 230.
39.
Njoku, F.O.C. Development and African Philosophy, A theoretical reconstruction of African
socio-political economy. (New York: iUniverse, 2004), p. 154.
40.
Agbakoba, J.C.A. “Globalization, Religious Ideologies and Conflict: A Critical Examination and
exploration of alternatives”, in Contemporary Philosophy”, XXVII(1&2), Jan/Feb &Mar/April
2006, pp. 24-25.
41.
Njoku, F.O.C. Development and African Philosophy, pp. 156-157.
42.
43.
Afigbo, A.E. in Agbakoba, J.C.A. “Towards a Philosophy of Technology and Development for
Africa”, pp. 232-233.
44.
see Onah, Godfrey. “A Concept of Man for a Developing Continent: A Search”, in Africa:
Philosophy and Public Affairs, J.O. Oguejiofor (ed.). (Enugu: Delta Publications Nig. Ltd., 1998), p.
23.
45.
see Njoku, F.O.C. Development and African Philosophy, p. 158.
46.
Agbakoba, J.C.A. “Towards a Philosophy of Technology and Development for Africa”, p.231.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
Naegele, Kaspar, D. in, Parsons, T., et al, Theories of Society, p. 1217. See also Robert Bellah’s
critique of the consequences of individualism in the U.S. in “Individualism and the Crisis of Civic
membership”, and “Is There a Common American Culture?” See bibliography for the location of the
texts.
53.
AJAH, A. C. (PG/MA/07/43119) Page 67

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
see Jürgen Habermas. Theory of Communicative Action, I, p. 398.
60.
61.
62.
I.C. Jarvie, in Jürgen Habermas. Theory of Communicative Action, I, pp. 79-80.
63.
64.
65.
AJAH, A. C. (PG/MA/07/43119) Page 68

CHAPTER FIVE
RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION AND APPLICATION OF HABERMAS’ VIEWS

ON IDEOLOGY AND SOCIAL CHANGE
5.1. Reappraisal
According to Kant, ‘our age is, in a special degree, the age of criticism, and to criticism
everything must submit’ - even Habermas’ concept of ideology and social change. This
holds even more valid in our age when there is deeper and mutual knowledge of, and
therefore better grounds for comparative evaluation among, cultures. We must submit to
reason, the grand tool, because through self-reflection, it makes possible the critique of
ideologies/worldviews and evaluation of motives and interests.
Because every speaker/writer is arguing from only a point of view, within the
limited horizon of his context; because also all about human beings is time-bound and
limited, no model of ideology and its impacts on social change can be accepted as faultless.
For this, Habermas held the thesis of redemption of validity claims, thanks to the
“hypothetical attitude”1 (which every thinker/theorist should always take), and
“criticizability and admitting of improvement”2 (which, as our social paradigm, should
characterise our views). To criticism therefore we must submit Habermas’ views. His
views have been accepted by some, and refuted by others. This section of our work will be
an attempt to balance the acceptance and rejection of the views of Habermas.
There is no doubt that Habermas’ concept of communicative rationality – as requiring

the provision of rational grounds for a claim raised – constitutes a problem that is rooted in
the question of: “are all men mentally capable on equal grounds?” And, Habermas seems to
have (intentionally) overlooked it as not very important though it evidently is.
But then, a good grasp of Habermas’ idea of undistorted communication based on a

conceived equality, emphasises on the one hand, equality more from point of view of
human nature than from point of view of an unrealisable expectation of equality in human
achievements and capabilities. On the other hand, such a grasp show that the same idea of
criticizability of validity claims and the provision of rational grounds for claims raised,
provides room for the answer to the problem of different capabilities/knowledge by
different men. Hence, even if there should be an ideal situation of the gathering of “all”
concerned to deliberate on issues, it is still evident that if those involved in the deliberation
AJAH, A. C. (PG/MA/07/43119) Page 69

are disposed to be refuted, then, the strength of the superior argument will always prevail.
And, for this reason, those who are not very knowledgeable or capable of discussing
reasonably on certain issues will, on their own, acknowledge the fact that they have not
sufficient knowledge to raise grounded claims or rational grounds in the discussion being
held. Should this be realized, then, the representative aspect of deliberative democracy
would have been very rationally and willingly given a choice of place against long and
fruitless deliberations among people of varied intellectual abilities.
Konstantinous Kavoulakos is a critic of some of Habermas’ views. In what he termed

“my necessarily – condensed critique of Habermas’ position”, Kavoulakos noted:
I do not find unfounded the opinion of a number of leftist intellectuals that Habermas “has
become an ideological spokesman of the status quo”, a fact which explains his by now
obvious inability to give a structural explanation of the global crisis and to think of
possible avenues for radical opposition.
Therefore, what we need today, on a theoretical level, is a determinate negation of the
Habermasian justification of the given, capable of retaining what truth there is in
communicative theory, but bringing it under a new theoretical synthesis. As a determinate
negation, such a critique cannot, of course, consist in a total (abstract) rejection of
communicative theory, but rather in its radicalization toward a more historical, materialist
and dialectical theory… since there seems to be a need once more for a critical theory that
is a critical theory of global capitalism, a perspective Habermas left behind (at the latest)
in the beginning of ’80s.3
But, one wonders how he who ‘justifies the given’, and is the ‘ideological spokesman of
the status quo’, will be the same person whose
attempts to overcome the aporias of Dialectic of Enlightenment and to reconstruct critical

theory (once he had accomplished a definitive turn away from the philosophy of the
subject toward a philosophy of intersubjectivity) rejuvenated critical thought, restored its
scientific credibility and provided it with new possibilities to contribute to the process of
social emancipation. For example, the emphasis on theory of communication created an
opening for productive dialogue with important currents in 20th century philosophy… (and
also) made possible the opening up of the theoretical perspective toward the post-war
phenomena of the construction of “democratic social states”.4
Any good reading and understanding of Habermas – especially his views on the two mental
dispositions of “hypothetical attitude” of a social scientist, and the criticizability of every
validity claim – would admit to the fact that Habermas is laying no claim to have
completed the course of history of ideas. And, based on the two mental dispositions stated,
it becomes surprising how Habermas could be mistakenly qualified as “an ideological
spokesman of the status quo” who is simply interested in “the given” as Kavoulakos
contends. This could also be due to some oversight on the part of Kavoulakos, of the
concluding words of Theory of Communicative Action I,5 wherein Habermas noted that reason
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in communicative action “does not simply encounter the ready-made subjects and system;
rather it takes part in structuring what is to be preserved”.
On another note, it is also very surprising to read from Kavoulakos that Habermas
was unable “to give a structural explanation of the global crisis and to think of possible
avenues for radical opposition”. It may be the case that Kavoulakos’ interest in ‘radical
opposition’ resulted to another oversight about which he noted that Habermas left behind
the critical theory of global capitalism. He solves the first problem (lack of explanation by
Habermas, for the global crisis) by stating later that Habermas, through his reconstruction
of critical theory “accomplished a definite turn away form the philosophy of the subject
toward a philosophy of intersubjectivity” which “rejuvenated critical thought, restored its
scientific credibility, and provided it with new possibilities to contribute to the process of
social emancipation”. What else do structural explanations of global crisis and the critical
theory of global capitalism aim at if not the same social (global) emancipation which he
said Habermas’ theory provided new possibilities for? And, it is also so surprising to read
from an author who gives impression that he has gotten a good grasp of Habermas’ views,
that “Habermas formulated a theory of modernity and modern democracy, focusing not so
much on the subversive potential of communicative reason as on the justification of
existent social structures as immutable and necessary”.6 Simply put, as a response to this,
one does not see the word ‘immutable’ in Habermas’ texts except, if at all, as an adjective
under critique. If, and since, Habermas’ theory of communicative action “created an
opening for productive dialogue” as Kavoulakos rightly agreed, then, there seems to be, for
now, no better paradigm to attend to our global crises of terrorism and “the waging of a
number of new imperialist wars under the guise of the “war against terrorism”’.7
Nayan Chanda’s presentation of the extent and inevitability of globalization comes

to mind here. In his text, Bound Together, based on detailed research in biomedical and
historical sciences, Chanda noted very correctly that the globe is encompassed “in an ever-
tightening web”.8 In his analysis, he refers to globalization as “the process of reconnecting
the dispersed human community that started more than 10,000 years ago”, and is stronger
now than ever. And, thanks to technology, “it is continuously accelerating, binding us ever
more tightly”, and, leading to “a shrunken world”.9 A world so closely linked, suffers then
the 1929 to 1933 Great Depression together; suffers together the spread of SARS from
China in 2003 within no long time-lag; suffers together the economic recession that began
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in the U.S. in 2008; and also suffers together the (impending) effects of swine flu which
worsened on 11th June, 2009. For all these connections, due to communications technology
revolution, there is consequently increase in social pressure. Due to communication,
“today, the have-nots know only too well how the haves live”.10
If this is the situation at hand - in a “hyperconnected world,”11 - wherein our

national boundaries and sovereignties are broken day-by-day12; where we encounter
ourselves more closely than ever: we come face to face to the raw fact of our cultural
differences: differences in our ontological presuppositions, and differences in our
normative regulations; how then can the pressure and tension be reduced if not a realization
of equality of all as Habermas suggests? How can terrorism be tamed if not still a
realization of this equality which makes possible free communication, acceptance of the
refutation of one’s points of view at the availability of a better option? And, how can one
agree that there is a better option if his ideology is closed from criticism that can arise from
others who, thanks to globalization, do not know very much about his culture but have to
live and work with him – and in the case of some international bodies like the United
Nations, sit together with him to talk about Millennium Development Goals, or Global
Peace, or Climate Change and Environmental Sustainability? What natural potential do we
have to co-exist peacefully if not our language, taken primarily as a medium for
communication? What else should be our primary objective if not to try to understand
ourselves, since as Chanda said, “Globalization is inevitable”13? And, how does one
understand the other well if not through communication? In this regard, Habermas
distinguishes in his 2003 article, “Intolerance and discrimination”,
between mere toleration of outsiders, who are nevertheless considered inferior, and
toleration based on mutual recognition and mutual acceptance of divergent worldviews.
This latter kind of tolerance allows religions and democracy to coexist in a pluralistic
environment and paves the way to reconciliation between multiculturalism and equality.14
To achieve this, Habermas’ theory of criticizability of interests and his concept of self-
reflection provide “a critique of prejudices and the combating of discrimination, in other
words, the fight for equal rights”.15 This is especially important for “Missionary doctrines
such as Christianity or Islam” which “are intrinsically intolerant to other beliefs”.16
The resultant question then is: How does a globalised world like ours tackle the
fundamentalism of a religion that preaches the ‘death of infidels’ if not by a consistent
critique of such a belief system both from the inside and the outside? And, should an
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adherent of such a belief system have some more tolerating reorientation, how can he try to
work for change in the system if not through communication – especially taking into
consideration the very wide “you-we divide”? The problem looms large because change
from outside, for such a fundamentalist belief system, will fail because it will require
pressure and force. But, psychologically, the adherents will take-up the defensive posture –
and added to the impenetrable nature of this defensive mechanism is the integration that
results from the pressure mounted on a group – and not be able to see the irrational content
of their system. Communication therefore still stands out as the 21st century paradigm. It is
communication and communication alone, understood as Habermas presented it, that can
create the possible diamond/human face of globalization. Such a face is possible if
globalization is understood to require inevitably (as it is itself inevitable) communication
and not control.
Finkle et al’s definition of a community aids to elucidate this. They wrote:
In a community, habits and preferences are transmitted by a system of communications.

Indeed, the processes of communication are the basis of the coherence of societies,
cultures, and even of the personalities of individuals. Thus, a community consists of people
who communicate with one another.17
This is then why “Habermas sees the outbreak of terror (sampled by the September 11
attack in North America) mainly as a failure of communications”.18 Even the massive
destruction of lives and property in the Israeli-Palestinian; Afghanistan, and Iraq wars, are
also “mainly as a failure of communications”, expressed in what Habermas termed “the
self-centred course of a callous superpower” (in his critique of the Bush administration).
Furthermore, “When… deliberate social change, even on a large scale, becomes

both the object of men’s consideration and the subject of sociological investigation”, it
becomes very necessary that there be “commitment to alternative ideals”, different from the
status quo.19 For some critiques, Habermas’ views are too idealistic. And it seems that
critics from such point of view are the ones who are not aware of the inevitability of
commitment to ideals for any social change. And, as Marcuse noted, for any social change
through social critical theory, the ideal must confront the real.
In line with this idea of ideals, the question of Lewis Mumford comes to mind here.
He asked and answered: “What are the possibilities of mankind’s acquiring a fresh grip on
reality and shading the compulsive fantasies that are pushing us to destruction?”20 If the
‘grip’ must be fresh, the shift must appear utopian as new paradigms do appear21 – after all
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in Plato’s allegory of the cave, it was those in the cave who thought that they were seeing
rightly. It would appear far away from being possible/realizable since the fantasies have
been compulsive. Then, the acceptance of an alternative would appear impossible. The
healing of modernity and the global capitalist crises require such “a fresh grip on reality
and shading” of “the compulsive fantasies that are pushing us to destruction”. Habermas’
communicative rationality which he qualifies as a “new paradigm” offers such a humane,
fresh grip and conception of reality and the world around us. If we can appropriate the
critical habit that he introduces us into, our fantasies and hidden motives would be laid
bare. We shall, from being pushed to destruction, move to emancipation and sustained
social development. The critical and rational habit will sustain a heterogeneity that
challenges a destructive homogeneity. However, a communication that aims at reaching
understanding will give room for a homogeneity that links a variegated/scattered but
productive heterogeneity.
5.2.1. Critique and reconstruction of ideologies: The philosophers’ role
Marx is known for the assertion that ‘[T]he philosophers have only interpreted the world,
in various ways; the point, however, is to change it’. This was his response to the need that
there be a unity between theoria and praxis. It seems very evident that social change is
possible only when interpretation as an act becomes a habit, inseparable from every day’s
action. Thus, the result of consistent (rational and interpretation-based) actions will
certainly be socio-economic and political changes – which are aspects of improvement in
the society.
Socrates, the icon in Plato’s dialogues, comes to mind here once again as a good
example of what the philosopher’s role should be. He bluntly informed the Athenians: “For
if you kill me you will not easily find a successor to me, who, if I may use such a ludicrous
figure of speech, am a sort of a gadfly, given to the state by God”. He criticized the society,
forcing her into reflection: as her psychoanalyst, he stirs her into life; and as a critic,
“arousing and persuading and reproaching her”.22 By these words, Socrates very rightly
noted that the place of the social philosopher cannot be occupied adequately by any other
person from whatever field of study. He, and he alone, as Horkheimer rightly stated in his
inaugural lecture, “On the Social Function of Social Philosophy”, approaches the social
facts around him with the tools of analysis and criticism. And, not stopping at that - when
he has come up with some knowledge of the root causes of the prevalent social ills – he
AJAH, A. C. (PG/MA/07/43119) Page 74

goes ahead to play his prescriptive role of suggesting alternatives as

corrections/antidotes/solutions to the problems so analyzed. His is the role of consistent
assessment and analysis of the society wherein he is. His also is the function to make some
very necessary (especially, ideological) reconstructions to enable the society to move ahead
better. But then, as Socrates is quoted, he does this by literally ‘forcing’ the society into
reflection: arousing, persuading, and reproaching her on what she should know. And when
she has known, then she can act, if she wants.
This role of forcing his fellows is a difficult one. Everyone in the society most of the
time claims to be sure of the correctness of what s/he is doing. Thus, it requires a lot of
consistency, and also several social philosophers, calling the society to order from several
angles of the society. This is the role of the philosophers. To this role, Habermas draws
their attention – namely, that they all, no matter where they regard their areas of
specialization to be, should give deserving attention to critical social theory to enable
humans to live rationally; to enable the good progress records from enlightenment and
modernity not to recoil and thereby place us in an ‘iron cage’ of no escape. By this,
Habermas, through his theme of rational reconstruction of ideologies and theories, suggests
the possibilities of, and actually the good in, the fusion and enlargement of ideologies.
5.2.2. Fusion and enlargement of horizons
According to Godfrey Onah, ‘Every philosophical questioning is done within a

cultural context which is termed horizon. This horizon, which is also historical, sets its
limits to one’s interpretation of reality, and at the same time offers the possibility of the
enlargement of those limits in a fusion of horizons’.23 This possibility of the fusion of
horizons – which enables both enlargement of different horizons and improvements
inherent in the resulting synthesis – is at the basis of Habermas’ concept of criticisable
validity claim in an open society wherein there is the freedom, and especially the
commitment of the social philosophers, to transcend/negate/criticise the ‘social given’.
If, as Habermas claims, the critique for enlargement of the ideologies of a society
leads to social change, then, it becomes self-evident that any society that wants to change
must consistently re-evaluate itself to improve on its vision of itself in/and the world. It
follows also that African societies can improve on their ideologies by widening their
horizons. One suggestion that this study makes is that such an enlargement can be done by
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fusing the predominant African ideologies with that of Habermas to get an improved
synthesis that can move the African societies higher and faster to better living.
5.2.3. Reconstruction for enlargement: Seeing the ideologies of some African societies
from Habermas’ conception of ideology
Every social change has a deep link with the ideological contents of the society
involved. This implies that every social change presupposes an (some) ideological
change(s). The ideologies of every society constitute a very great junk, if not simply the
core, of the non-material culture of the society. Thus, every social change results from
and/or leads to some changes in the ideologies of the society involved. There is something
circuitous about this relationship. Sometimes, some evident needs for social change
CANNOT (and may be, will not) be realized unless there are first of all some ideological
changes and transformations. Some other times, some very necessary changes may not be
so evident, and therefore not attended to until there is a critique of the predominant
ideologies. In situations like these therefore, social change cannot be conceived, nay
realized, because there is no consciousness of the need for change. Thus critical theories,
and particularly Habermas’ theories on the critique of ideologies as raising the attention of
individual and collective consciousness to problems and ideological pathologies, prove
very relevant.
We can thus enlarge our ideologies by giving attention to the following emerging
paths to lasting social change and development in Africa:
Committed efforts to actually control our environment rather than be controlled by

the environment. This requires a change from an ideology that contemplates nature
to an ideology that questions and explores natures.
One of the implications of this ‘need to control nature’ is that our educational
systems should form part of our priorities: proper teaching on the part of the
teachers as knowledge creators; committed learning on the part of the students as
the hope of the generation to come; and proper funding on the part of government
and policy makers.
We should try to make our society an open one. What this implies is that all the
structures that impede improvement in knowledge – for instance, the acceptance of
arguments by authority and not by reason; laziness on the part of students, which
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results to their preference of mediocrity to hard work; lack of commitment on the

part of teachers to their duty, and seeing their work as “Government work”, and not
a work as their contribution to national development – should be removed. Criticism
should be part of our conscious life. At worst, our philosophers should recognize
their roles in the society and live up to them.
Finally, as part of a committed effort to realize this last agenda which is of great
importance in creativity, innovation, exploration of nature, and then, social
development, there is the need to incorporate critical pedagogy in the curriculum of
studies of our younger generations. Several studies confirm the importance of this
toward uprooting dehumanizing structures, and then enhancing national
development.
It is not out of place to question whether some of Habermas’ views, ‘fused’ by this
work to enlarge the ideologies of some African societies like the Igbos in Nigeria are really
better or preferable. Yet, the results of this study, despite any form of critique rooted in
some Afrocentric dispositions, makes it very reasonable, beyond doubt, to accept that
nobody knows it all, and therefore, that an ideology that insists of the provision of rational
grounds/defence of a claim should be preferred to any form of argument based on authority
or mere tradition. This takes us back to the idea of self-reflection defined above as ‘deep-
seated and consistent criticism’. This is very necessary because, the consciousness of the
need to validate what is claimed leads to creativity and innovation. And, the freedom of the
young generation to reasonably question the claims of ‘authorities’ (a) enables the
authorities to consistently update their ideas; and (b) enables the younger generations to
freely look out for new ways of creating and solving problems. These are routes to social
development and of course, they are very likely to make life more fulfilling. And, it needs
to be noted that the consistency in the self-criticism and self-reflection is necessary because
what appears to be adequate today may need to be improved upon in a few years, and this
is not possible in a society where the emphasis is always on ‘this is how we do it’.
Conclusion
This work is concluded by reiterating the thesis of this study:
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(a) Firstly, that at the core of every social action and event which jointly result to
change and development in any society, there are ideologies which structure the
conceptual framework, motives, interests, and values of the members of the society.
(b) Secondly, that modernity’s project should not be abandoned. Instead, there is really
the need for some ideological and rational reconstructions as Habermas suggests.
(c) Thirdly, the ideologies of most African societies are closed and this has great and
determining impacts on the low level of development in most of such countries.
(d) Finally, Habermas’ theory of communicative action (and rationality), with its
conception of human beings and their use of language, can serve as a good
conceptual framework both for the necessary ideological reconstruction and for
progress in the social development of any society – especially in our globalizing
world of constant inter-cultural encounters with so many possibilities of
misunderstanding and clash of cultures (or “clash of civilizations”, as Samuel
Huntington preferred to put it).
AJAH, A. C. (PG/MA/07/43119) Page 78

ENDNOTES
1.
2.
3.
Kavoulakos, Konstantinos. “From Habermas to Horkheimer’s Early Work: Directions for a
Materialist Reconstruction of Communicative Theory”, Available online at: http://www.journal.
telospress.com/cgi/content/abstract/2005/130/39, p. 42.
4.
Kavoulakos, Konstantinos. “From Habermas to Horkheimer’s Early Work”, p. 53/54.
5.
6.
Kavoulakos, Konstantinos. “From Habermas to Horkheimer’s Early Work”, p. 54.
7.
Kavoulakos, Konstantinos. “From Habermas to Horkheimer’s Early Work”, p.42.
8.
Chanda, Nayan. Bound Together, How Traders, Preachers, Adventurers, and Warriors Shaped
Globalization. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), p. 29.
9.
Chanda, Nayan. Bound Together, p. 33.
10.
11.
12.
See Nef, Jorge. “Globalization and the crisis of sovereignty, legitimacy, and democracy”. Latin
American Perspectives, 2002; 29(6): 59-69. Available at: http://lap.sagepub.com/cgi/content
/refs/29/6/59. According to Nef: “The late-twentieth-century phenomenon often referred to as
globalization involved a drastic reshaping of the overall structure of world politics – a shift from
rigid bipolarity to diffuse unipolarism… It has increased the ongoing erosion of national
sovereignty”.
13.
14.
Jürgen Habermas. “Intolerance and Discrimination”, in I.CON, 1(1). (Oxford University Press and
New York University School of Law, 2003), pp.2-12. Available online at www.icon.oxford
journals.org/cgi/reprint/1/1/2, (retrieved on 28.01.09), p. 2.
15.
Jürgen Habermas. “Intolerance and Discrimination”, p.3).
16.
Jürgen Habermas. “Intolerance and Discrimination”, p.7).
17.
Finkle, Jason L. & Richard W. Gable (eds.). Political Development and Social Change, p. 120.
18.
Giovanna Borradori (ed.), Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and
Jacques Derrida, 2001. Available online at www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/066649.html,
(retrieved on 28.01.09).
19.
20.
in Njoku, F.O.C. Development and African Philosophy, p. 105.
21.
see Thomas Kuhn’s preceding elucidations in his work, “The nature and necessity of Scientific
Revolution”, part of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, in Stanley Rosen (ed), The
Philosopher’s Handbook, Essential Readings from Plato to Kant. (New York: Random House,
2000), p. 513.
22.
Socrates in Plato, Apology, in The Dialogues of Plato, Intro. by Erich Segal. (New York: Bentam,
House, Inc., 2006), p. 17-18.
23.
Godfrey Onah, ‘Á Concept of man for a Developing Continent: A Search’, in Africa: Philosophy
and Public Affairs, J.O. Oguejiofor (ed.). (Enugu: Delta Publications Nig. Ltd., 1998), pp. 177-178.
By Horizon Onah meant the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a
particular vantage point. This is also what Stephan Körner meant by stating that one’s immanent
metaphysics (the principles constituting his categorical framework in an intersubjective world) can
be constraining and as such requires enlargement. Such an enlargement is realizable by means of
critique of the status quo [see his Metaphysics: Its Structures and Functions, p. 125]. Habermas’
idea of rationalization of worldview and lifeworld offers opportunities also to fuse horizons.
AJAH, A. C. (PG/MA/07/43119) Page 79

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AJAH, A. C. (PG/MA/07/43119) Page 81

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Marx, Karl. Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, Trans. by Martin Mulligan, 2000.
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30/3/427
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Chiapello, Eve. “Reconciling the two principal meanings of the notion of ideology: The example
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Cook, Deborah. “Adorno, ideology and ideology critique”. Philosophy and Social Criticism,
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HABERMAS ON IDEOLOGY AND SOCIAL CHANGE

1.1. Background of the study

In addition to the above personal reasons for being attracted to Habermas, it is

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1.2. Purpose of the Study

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1.3. Statement of the problem

(b) Whether modernity’s project is really worth abandoning.

1.4. Thesis of the study

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1.5. Scope of the study

The scope of this study is Habermas’ concept of ‘communicative rationality’ as a

1.6. Significance of the study

Sustainable development is a necessity for every human society – all human

1.7. Research Methodology

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2.1. Review of related literatures

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Basically, Plato in The Republic, could dialectically, as already mentioned, negate

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On the very important place/role of interest in the realization of such transcendence

As an invitation to constant assessment through self-reflection of their lifeworld,

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objectified form’. In this objectification through practical activity of labour, thought is

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The social context of capitalist domination which led to Weber’s pessimistic

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As a contemporary and co-author of some texts, Theodore W. Adorno (1903-69),

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categorical frameworks, which he referred to as Immanent Metaphysics, can be regarded as

In relation to the possibility and dehumanizing implications of the said social

The acceptance or rejection of good ideas leads to the stagnation or development of

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To elucidate these themes, Agbakoba presented in the article (“Towards a

From his analysis in “Towards a Philosophy of Technology and Development for

Writing also as a critical social theorist, Francis O. C. Njoku in his book,

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3.0. Generalizations on the structure and components of ideologies

Writing on “Ideology: Descriptive, Pejorative and Positive Views”, Raymond

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3.1.0. Habermas’ conception of ideologies as worldviews

Based on the structures so presented, one can, following an aspect of Geuss’s

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Still on the pejorative sense of Habermas’ conception of ideology, one observes

With regard to this also, Habermas conceived the possibility of a ‘world-picture’

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3.1.1. The framework of Habermas’ conception of worldviews

(a) the concept of supreme being,

(b) the concept of human nature,

(c) the concept of the end/goal of man, and

A. Habermas on Supreme Being

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