You are on page 1of 5

Indya Flanagan 1

Happiness: Arguments of John Stuart Mill and Jean Kazez


In his work Utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill asserts that happiness is the ultimate goal of
every person. For Mill, the question of whether actions are right or wrong is determined by how
much happiness these actions produce. He concludes that happiness is the criterion for morality
() (Landau 25). In her work The Weight of Things, Jean Kazez accepts the importance of
happiness, but argues for the existence of other necessities. Kazez argues that happiness is
sometimes at odds with morality, and that there are necessary things for a good life besides
happiness and morality.
I.

Mill Explains Happiness

Mill argues that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, (17).
Mill aptly names his creed for the foundation of morals, (17) the Greatest-happiness
Principle (17), defining happiness as intended pleasure and the absence of pain, (17). Mill
argues that these are the only things desirable as ends, (18). Mill asserts that the only reason
people choose to act is for happiness, and that happiness is the backbone of morality.
Anticipating criticism, Mill elaborates on his idea of happiness, explaining that happiness is not
mere carnality: Human beings have faculties more elevated than animal appetites, (18).
Happiness is not just fulfilling physical needs, but encompasses the pleasures of the intellect, of
the feeling and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, (18). Mill deems human happiness to
be more complex than just the gratification of the senses. He argues that some kinds of pleasure
are more desirable and more valuable than others (19), explaining that the quality of the
pleasure anticipated holds more weight than the mere quantity of potential pleasures (19). Mill
argues that choosing high-quality pleasures results from a sense of dignity, which all human

Ethics & Society: Philosophy 1320

Kriewaldt

10/15/13

Indya Flanagan 2
beings possess, (20). Thus, Mill upholds the dignity of human beings as humans possessing
higher faculties, (19) which yearn for pleasures fulfilling their intellectual tastes, (21). By
arguing for a refined view of pleasure, Mill justifies his argument that happiness (pleasure and
the absence of pain) is the end of a persons action and the gauge of morality.
II.
Kazez Critiques the Greatest-happiness Principle
Kazez lays out things that are critical and necessary for a good life. The first necessary
thing Kazez explores is happiness. Kazez begins by siding with the Hedonistic Utilitarians:
Happiness is good, period, (51). Kazez argues that: Without at least some happiness, it does
not seem like we can reach the level of even minimally good lives, (51). Kazez sees happiness
as the basis for a good life, but unlike Mill, she argues that [h]appiness is critical, but its not the
only critical thing, (51). Kazez moves on to explain another necessary thing: morality. Kazez
argues that although happiness is a good starting place, she regard[s] moral virtue as central to
living our lives well, (56). This in itself does not necessarily contradict Mills position.
However, Kazez disavows that morality and happiness are equivocal: Its not always a matter of
morality making me happythough frequently it does, (56). Kazez argues that morality is
sometimes at odds with happiness, a position that Mill does not share. Kazez points to another
critic of hedonism: Aristotle. She argues that the Aristotelian virtues are sustainers of stability
and balance, (57) rather than Mills unequivocal quest for pleasure. Kazez argues that Morality
is good for us because it makes us less alone, (57). She argues that If you concern yourself not
at all with what you owe to others or with what they need from you, you live in profound
isolation, (57). Mills position of the Greatest-happiness Principle is a highly personal quest for
happiness, a system of morality that fails to take into account the effects of ones actions on
others. Kazez argues that happiness and morality are not equivocal; moral virtue can trump
happiness when one thinks of others rather than ones own personal pleasure.
Ethics & Society: Philosophy 1320

Kriewaldt

10/15/13

Indya Flanagan 3
III.
Mill Argues that Virtue is Part of Happiness
Mill makes his position clear: The utilitarian doctrine is, that happiness is desirable, and
the only thing desirable, as an end; all other things being only desirable as means to that end,
(22). Mill argues that because happiness is the ultimate end, it is consequently one of the criteria
for morality, (22). Mill moves on to demonstrate that happiness is not only one of the criteria
for morality, but in fact prove[s] itself to be the sole criterion, (22). Mill argues that: Virtue,
according to the utilitarian doctrine, is not naturally and originally part of the end, but it is
capable of becoming so; and in those who love it disinterestedly it has become so, and is desired
and cherished, not as a means to happiness, but as a part of their happiness, (23). Mill argues
that virtue is part of a persons happiness and not just a means to achieve happiness. Mill
expands upon his view of happiness, arguing that sometimes the means have become a part of
the end, (24). Holding that happiness is the ultimate end, he explains that certain means, like
virtue, are some of the elements of which the desire of happiness is made up. Happiness is not
an abstract idea, but a concrete whole; and these are some of its parts, (24). By uniting the idea
of virtue with the ultimate end of happiness Mill strengthens his position that happiness is the
criterion for morality. As for Kazez critique that the quest for personal happiness can be at odds
with the happiness of other people, a schism she solves by distinguishing morality from
happiness and choosing, in such circumstances, morality, Mill realigns happiness with morality
and the good of all people. He requires the cultivation of the love of virtue up to the greatest
strength possible, as being above all things important to the general happiness, (24). In the
context of his work the general happiness means the happiness of people, not only the
individual. Mill navigates Kazez critique of the Greatest-happiness Principle, arguing that virtue
is a component of happiness, the happiness not only of the individual but of the community. Mill
concludes that happiness is the sole end of human action, and the promotion of it the text by

Ethics & Society: Philosophy 1320

Kriewaldt

10/15/13

Indya Flanagan 4
which to judge of all human conduct, (25). Mill upholds his argument that happiness is the
ultimate end, strengthened by the inclusion of virtue and the moral judgment of other people.
IV.
Kazez Necessities Include More Than Happiness and Morality
Although Mill skillfully and subtly entwines moral virtue with happiness and the general
happiness of all people, Kazez argues that more necessities are required for a good life than
happiness and morality. Kazez gives the modern-day example of a blue collar worker, how the
worker loses control of her freedom and eventually her family. Kazez uses this example to
demonstrate that there is a level of autonomy beneath which we do not want to fall, (52).
Kazez claims that, like happiness, Autonomy is always, as such, good, (52). Kazez
acknowledges that autonomy is correlated with happiness, but argues that autonomy is distinct
from happiness: Lack of autonomy tends to be accompanied by unhappiness and greater
autonomy by greater happiness. Its difficult, therefore, to disentangle the desire to be more
autonomous from the desire to be happier. Still, [] the pursuit of autonomy is everywhere to
see, (53). Kazez gives the examples of slaves demanding freedom from their masters, workers
demanding control of wages, and women demanding the right to vote (53).
In addition to autonomy, Kazez argues that a sense of self is necessary for a good life.
Kazez notes that: A sense of identity tends to make us happy []. But self and happiness dont
always go hand in hand, (55). Kazez distinguishes the fundamental good of self from that of
happiness by giving an example of a depressed patient who underwent electro-convulsive
therapy, becoming happier but losing his sense of self by losing his memories (55). Kazez final
fundamental good is the improvement of our lives over time progress. Kazez gives the example
of a woman who is an excellent pianist, friend, and donor whose life remains consistently
pleasant from age 21 to her death at 81 (58). Although this person may be happy, this person is
missing out on the good of growth, positive change, progress, (58). As a final note critiquing
happiness as the ultimate end, Kazez observes: Happiness is good wherever it comes from, but

Ethics & Society: Philosophy 1320

Kriewaldt

10/15/13

Indya Flanagan 5
in addition to wanting happiness, we also want out happiness to come at least substantially from
things that have value, (60). This limitation on the importance of happiness contradicts Mills
notion of happiness as the ultimate end. Taken together, Kazez arguments of fundamental goods
besides happiness (and morality), i.e. autonomy, sense of self, and progress, as well as her
qualifications as to where happiness is gleaned, defeat Mills position that happiness is the only
thing humans desire. Kazez demonstrates consistently that these fundamental goods, necessary
for a good life, are not equivocal with happiness.
Mill argues that happiness is the ultimate end, the end which all humans seek. Kazez
argues that there 5 fundamental goods. Kazez asserts that morality and happiness are distinct,
because there are circumstances in which ones personal happiness contradicts the happiness of
other people. In such circumstances it can be good to choose the fundamental good of morality
over happiness. Mill skillfully entwines moral virtue with happiness by saying that moral virtue
is part of happiness. Moreover, he argues that pursuing happiness (which includes moral virtue)
leads to general happiness, or the happiness of all people, not just the individual. Kazez finalizes
her argument that happiness is not the ultimate end by listing the remaining 3 fundamental
goods: autonomy, sense of self, and progress, arguing through examples that these goods are
distinct from the good of happiness, compromising Mills position of happiness as ultimate end.
Reference: The Ethical Life by Russ Shafer-Landau

Ethics & Society: Philosophy 1320

Kriewaldt

10/15/13

You might also like