HWACHONGINSTITUTION(HIGHSCHOOLSECTION)

HUMANITIESRESEARCHPAPER2015
________________________________________________________________

Topic:Role of the USA in the Rise of Terror in the Middle East

Slant:History
TotalWordCount(excludingappendixes,footnotes&references):5454

Students(official)Name:AuWeiHoe
Class:4H1
NameofTeacherMentor:MsElizabethLee
Declaration
Ideclarethatthisassignmentismyownworkanddoesnotinvolveplagiarismorcollusion.Thesources
ofotherpeoplesworkhavebeenappropriatelyreferenced,failingwhichIamwillingtoacceptthe
necessarydisciplinaryaction(s)tobetakenagainstme.
StudentsSignature:
DateofSubmission:

Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1
General Background
1.2
Rationale
1.3
Research Questions
1.4
Thesis Statement
1.5
Methodology
1.6
Scope of Research
1.7
Significance of Research

04
04
04
05
05
05
06

1.8

06

Limitations

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1
Theoretical Framework

2.2.1
2.2.2

07

2.1.1 Political or Structural Approach

07

2.1.2 Rational or Organisational Approach

Case Study 1 Iraq War
Case Study 2 Afghanistan War

08
09
11

Chapter 3: Discussion
3.1

Approach

14

3.2

Iraq War

15

3.3

Afghanistan War

18

3.4

Slow Process of Resolution

21

3.4.1 Political Apathy

21

3.4.2 Perverse Incentives to not Eliminate ISIS

22

3.4.3 Falling Prey to Neo-Talibans Trap

23

Chapter 4: Conclusion
4.1 Conclusion

24

Bibliography

25

Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 General Background (Framework):
In the early years of the 21st Century, there has been a rise of terror concentrated within the
Middle East. Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan who rank the top 3 respectively on High Impact
of terrorism, all scoring above 9.3/10 on the scale have been in the centre of the political and
violent turmoil. (Global Terrorism Index 2014)

Similarly, the United States of America (USA) in recent years has spent a bulk of its foreign
policy focused on the Middle East. The USA has even dedicated an unprecedented amount of
6 trillion dollars in waging the Afghanistan and Iraq War. This sums up to around 75 thousand
dollars per household. (Shah, 2013)

1.2 Rationale:
With the rise of terror fuelling conflict within the Middle East, it is crucial to identify the
main causes, which led up to the current outbreak of violence. Due to the USAs timely focus
on foreign policy in the Middle East, as well as their general reputation of having created
many problems in the Middle East as a failed global policeman, it is also important to assess
how true these accusations are of their role in causing the rise of terrorism.

1.3 Research Questions:

1. How does terrorism manifest and proliferate and what are the factors that result in
terrorism?
2. How has terrorism in the Middle East evolved over the years and how has the USA
contributed to this?
3. Why has there been a lack of resolution over the rise of terrorism and how has the
USA contributed to the lack of success?

1.4 Thesis Statement:

The specific policies adopted in the by the USA in the war against terror were
counterproductive as they triggered the rise of terrorism in the Middle East.

1.5 Methodology:
This paper will look primarily on secondary sources such as journal articles written on the
motives and contributions of the USA to the rise of terror within the Middle East. Where
applicable, primary sources such as speeches and official government documents released
will be reviewed as well. To structure all the relevant content, two theoretical frameworks
will be utilised namely the Political or Structural Approach and Rational or Organisational
Approach. Analysis will also be conducted under case studies.

1.6 Scope of Research:

This paper will focus specifically on the United State of America, most notably during the
George Bush Junior Administration (2001 2008), when the war against terror was first
waged till present day (2015).

Admittedly, the effects of the rise of terror have spread outside of the Middle East, as
terrorism becomes increasingly an international problem. There are also many acts of terror
in different regions in the Middle East. However, this paper will focus on the effects that
occur specifically in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and Pakistan.

1.7 Significance of Research:

Currently, the USAs media bias has influenced the perspectives of many news agencies thus
this paper serves to consolidate all this information and sieve out the objective truths.
Crucially, there is a lack of analysis on the causal relationship in terrorism as expressed by
Andrew Silke, a professor at the University of East London, a review of recent research
work found that only 20% of published articles on terrorism are providing substantially new
knowledge on the subject. Any research paper on this topic tends to shy away from USAs
policies. This is symptomatic of the USAs foreign policy of playing a blame game focused
on the psychology of terrorists and neglecting their own contributions.

1.8 Limitations:
This paper understands that the rise of terrorism in the Middle East is multi-faceted and other
countries like the United Kingdom and Israel have a role to play. However, this paper does
not wish to engage in a blame game and instead, wishes to focus on how policies have
objectively resulted in a rise of terror via empirical analysis. As the USA is widely regarded
as the largest contributor, it is crucial to assess what their role is.

This paper understands that there are also many other instances of terror in the Middle East
such as the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Since, this paper is unable to conclusively
analyse every manifestation of terrorism, I have chosen to focus on Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria
and Pakistan as they have explicitly been targeted in the war against terror and would
therefore be crucial in proving the thesis.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Theoretical Framework:
While considering the causal relationship between USAs foreign policy in the Middle East
and the rise of terrorism, it is important to understand the causes of terrorism that are
applicable. This paper will adopt two theoretical frameworks to analyse the role of the USA
of America.

2.1.1 Political or Structural Approach:

The first is the Political or Structural Approach. This concept focuses on the external
environmental factors at a national or international arena that provide a conducive
environment for the proliferation of extremism (Hudson, 1999). Traditionally, circumstances
like poverty, oppression and inequality are used when explaining this concept. Such
arguments are rooted in economic and socio-psychological dimensions of human motivations
(Gupta, 2005).

The Theory of Relative Deprivation provides further nuance. (Gurr, 1970) It describes
feelings of economic, political and social deprivation as relative rather than absolute. It states
that the inability to obtain what is felt to be justified can lead to frustration or collective
discontent. Usually, this manifests itself in aggression and violence, which lends its
prominence in the explanation of terrorist activities.

This theory can be further streamlined into preconditions and precipitants (Crenshaw, 1981).
Preconditions are issues that set the background for terrorism to manifest. They can be
opportunities or events that directly inspire terrorist ideology. Precipitants are the
mechanisms, which activates any act of terrorism. The dichotomy is perhaps best represented

in the circumstance as pointed out by Dipak Gupta where [p]olitical violence takes place
when a leader gives voice to the frustration by formulating a well-defined social construction
of collective identity and paints in vivid colour the images of us and them. The
grievances experienced under this concept can remain as dormant root causes until a
triggering mechanism capitalizes upon them.

2.1.2 Rational or Organisational Approach:

The Rational and Organisational Approach is also adopted within this paper. This concept
functions on the premise that terrorists are organisations that function on collective rational
decisions for what achieves the best output for the organisation as a whole.

A few limitations have been raised with regards to this concept. Some claim that it is
speculative because not many have actually done psychological analysis on the thinking
process of terrorists and neither do experts have clear empirical data on the way terrorist
organisations functions. However, the Rational or Organisational Approach argues that
terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda and The Taliban have very clear structural systems
and levels of bureaucracy where work allocation is accorded very effectively (Hudson, 1999).
This points towards the likely fact that the power structures and institutions within terrorists
organisation function on a very high level like many other rational organisations would.

This theory further takes into consideration the existence of lone suicide bombers who
historically did come from such organisations but may have gone astray. These terrorists are
arguably still have a greater sense of collective rational good despite how warped those
notions of rationality are to them.

2.2.1 Case Study 1 Iraq War:

The premise of the Iraq War causing a rise of terrorism in Iraq starts from an analysis of
identity politics and who is to blame for it. The very first sign of institutionalised identity
politics was in 2003 where the Iraq Governing Council was set up. The appointment process
was blatantly based on sectarianism. There were 13 Shias and 6 Sunnis, numbers generated
from what was the arbitrarily perceived notion of the correct demographics of Iraq.

With the introduction of identity politics, Shia parties were a threat. The Sunni Arab
perspective believed that they were not just coincidentally Shia, they were politicians whose
Shia-centric, sectarian-centric view of things influenced their political outlook. (Beauchamp,
2014)

In response, massive crowds in largely Sunni based cities such as Ramadi, Mosul and Falluja
have staged protests. They accuse the Shia Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki of neglecting their
interests and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has constantly been accused of making the
military and security forces his personal fiefdom to forward his sectarian political goals.

Democracies are only as strong as peoples will to support it. Once democratic institutions no
longer represent the interest of its people, it no longer becomes viable. Clearly in the case of
Iraq, the state was accorded no legitimacy to function whatsoever, so much so that the
population saw volunteering in the armed services under the state as a sin. (Cole, 2013)

The remaining question therefore, is who caused identity politics? Experts can be divided into
two camps.

On one hand, some experts believe that the USA was at fault as they imposed a one-chamber
parliamentary system in Iraq which multiple political scientists have historically
demonstrated to create frustration and violence in societies with structural minorities. Shias
can now dominate the government due to the few de factor checks on power.

Crucially, the USA backed the de-baathification programme lead by Shiite politicians like
Ahmad Chalabi. It involved sacking over 100,000 Sunnis from government jobs, even lowskilled ones and replacing them with Shiite parties attempting to gain political influence.
Even till 2010, the commission tried to interfere in parliamentary elections, an attempt at
social engineering a government that bred sectarianism because it awarded material benefits
to those of superior ethnic and sectarian identity. (Cole, 2003)

On the other hand, other experts claim that there were other factors involved. They point
towards the historic record of a profound sense of Shiite victimhood under the Saddam
regime. (Haddad, 2013) In many instances, the Baath Party under Saddam would round up
Shias and non-Iraqis and forcefully bus them over to Iran. (Langtree, 2012) This suggests that
Shias were not considered true Iraqis even though many of them did hold Iraq citizenship.

The pre-existing Iraqi Salafi extremists compounded this problem. Fanar Haddad, an expert
on Iraqi sectarianism in the National University of Singapore quoted the example of Taha al
Dulaimi where he preached his unabashedly anti-Shiite doctrines during the 1990s in
Mahmoudiya one of the towns in the "Triangle of Death," an area that until recently was a
byword for anti-Shiite violence.

10

It did not get any better in the Iran-Iraq war as Saddam became even more desperate to
oppress the Shias. Many Shias in Iraq recognised Khomeini, Irans Shia leader, as their
natural religious leader who later used his influence to encourage Shias to take down the
secular Iraq regime. He was afraid that the Shia revolution in Iran would inspire a revolution
in Iraq to overthrow his regime. (Langtree, 2012)

However, it is important to note that Iraq at that time was a secular state and while oppression
of the Shias did occur, they remained as sentiments and sometimes-indirect policies. While
Saddam may have oppressed along sectarian lines, he was playing a balance between how to
supress the threat of Shias without being overly aggressive to instigate an entire civil war.
(Langtree, 2012) With Shias forming 60% of the population, it is unlikely that Saddam had
the outright intention of eliminating all Shias. The conclusion therefore is that identity
politics was intensified and institutionalised via the Iraq War, showing that the USA has a
large role to play in the outcomes of identity politics.

2.2.2 Case Study 2 Afghanistan War:

The strength of the Taliban now lies in the immense funding they receive. Again, experts are
divided when it comes to pin-pointing the reasons for the Talibans vast resources.

The USA is often blamed for creating of a Nacro-State as they allowed individuals already
accused of committing grave human rights abuses to come into power such as Mohammed
Qasim Fahim and Abdul Rab Rassoul Sayyaf who then became the countrys vice president
and leading member of parliament respectively.

11

This was because the USA felt that a corrupt government was less of a threat than the
Taliban. The military was only allowed 4 years to get 100 000 soldiers out of the nation and
in the process take down the Taliban while creating a sustainable army and police force to
self defend. As a state, the short-term focus on combat operations and logistics overshadowed
other long term problems relating to corruption, human rights exploitation and narcotics.
(Aikins, 2014)

At the same time, the USA invasion allowed warlords to run the entire opium trade. In 2002
spring, the harvest increased by 3400 tons due to USA backing. Opium farmers claim that
they were paying around $40 per acre in bribes to the local police, thereby allowing the
illegal activities to foster.

Under the Taliban, control over opium trade was surprisingly very effective. Within half a
year, the only region, which has significant opium harvests, was the north-eastern region
controlled by the Northern Alliance. As a whole, opium production fell from 3276 in 2000 to
185 tons in 2001. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell said that they welcomed the
Taliban leaders total ban on opium cultivation. Yet it was their very intervention that
reintroduced the trade and allowed it to prosper.

This peak in opium trade has made the Taliban extremely rich. The United Nations estimates
that the Taliban makes hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing opium trade. They charge a
10% tax on opium farmers and other small businesses in the trade. They also function as the
middleman in transferring bribe money to governmental officials, earning transactional costs
in between.

12

Due to the lucrative nature of the industry, it is not uncommon for to farmers to attack one
another to fight stiff competition. The Taliban exploits this by demanding protection money
to farmers desperate to keep their crops safe. The Taliban also looks over the refining of low
end opium to high end heroin which is later exported to the West at over a thousand times the
original price, thereby making huge profits in between. (Peters, 2009)

While the Nacro-state in undeniable, other experts blame Pakistan and their Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) for arming the Taliban. In fact, interviews with anonymous Taliban logistics
officer found that Pakistan provides up to 80% of the Talibans funding. If not, they would
not have been able to fund themselves in the Kandahar province alone.

Despite Pakistans claim to be supportive of the war against terror on paper, the ISI continues
to pretend to be businessmen, merchants and moneychangers to cross the border and
discreetly provide money, motorbikes and weapons to the Taliban. On multiple accounts,
Taliban leaders have invited ISI agents to Taliban meetings, showing their cordial symbiotic
relationship. (Moreau, 2014)

However, it would be important to note that the USA has provided unwarranted amounts of
funding to Pakistan too. Ever since the war against the Soviets, they have provided 4.08
billion dollars of war patronage for Pakistans help. Since 9/11, theyve provided over 20
billion dollars of military aid to Pakistan to help fight the war against terror. It would not be
unexpected if some of that money was siphoned off to fund the Taliban. So on both counts of
external funding and the creation of a Nacro-State, the USA has a role to play.

13

Chapter 3: Discussion
3.1 Approach:
Unlike what George Bush Junior had to say, the war against terror was not a success. The
following graphs taken from the Global Terrorism Index 2014 prove this point.

Terrorism has been increasing ever since 2003, which was the start of the Iraq War.

Terrorist attacks have become even more successful and the numbers of deaths from terrorism
have also been increasing.

14

The discussion is going to apply a revisionist approach to explain the rise of ISIS and the
Neo-Taliban, which seem to be new terrorist organisations but actually have their roots right
back at the beginning of the war against terror. Furthermore, this discussion will apply the
theoretical framework to prove a casual link between USA policies and the rise of terrorism.
Lastly, this discussion will explain why there has been a slow process of resolution over the
rise of terrorism.

3.2 Iraq War

It is well known that ISIS is a majority Sunni terrorist organisation. Many of their training
campsites and bases exist in majority Sunni populated villages as well. Recently in the start
of June this year, Sunni tribal Sheiks in Iraqs Anbar province pledged allegiance to ISIS, a
defection from the Iraqi government.

The earlier discussion of identity politics can already start to explain why there is such a
phenomenon in ISIS demographics. The implication of identity politics in the rise of
terrorism has generally occurred through three modes.

The first was the direct oppression experienced by the Sunnis. USA troops and Shiite Iraqi
government allies rounded up over 50,000 Sunni Arabs at the height of the conflict and were
in the labour camps at any one time. (Cole, 2013) Most were arbitrarily arrested for being
young adult males who just happened to be in the general vicinity of a bombing or other
guerrilla activity. Reported incidents include National Guard units laying down suppressive
fire whenever a bomb explodes in order to ensure that Iraqi pedestrians were killed after
market bombings. Soldiers stationed at checkpoints were known to shoot drivers who could
not speak English or did not understand commands to slow down.

15

Worst of all was that the fog of war aided USA troops in perpetuating such practices. Because
this was done in tandem with the newly instated Shia government, it resulted in a
disproportionate number of victims to be Sunnis.

The second is the widespread unemployment that plagued the entire nation. After the USA
removed the Baath Party, there was a severe brain drain of elite Iraqis who was the pillars of
the nation but happened to be part of the socialist party. Institutions started to breakdown as
the Baathist party was by far the only stable institution and their absence left Iraq to
crumble.

The USA further broke down institutions for security by dissolving the army. Unlike what the
White House had us believe, the army was not already gone. In fact, it was noted that many
ex-soldiers indicated that if they were offered money to show up at their barracks and report
to their sergeants, they would have. (Cole, 2013) The first proposed USA viceroy in Iraq, Jay
Garner suggests that the a Baathist army devoted to socialism along with a strong functional
state threatened the Bush Administrations intention of utilising Eastern European style
shock therapy. The elite units of the military were heavily concentrated with Sunni Arabs.
Instead of reintegrating them, they were fired and sent home, some even denied of pensions.
With a group of unemployed, angry, military trained men, many joined the guerrilla
resistance and it is undeniable that some of them would aid the growth of terrorist
organisations.

The USA also dissolved multiple state-owned companies by destroying the public sector due
to their links with the former Baath Party. It created massive unemployment in Iraq. Sunni

16

provinces such as al-Anbar were the worst hit, due to the Shia governments focus on
targeting Sunni companies, and they evolved to become the centre of violent resistance. It is
no wonder that these Sunnis would defect as reports of ISIS suggest that they pay higher
salaries for their militants than any other professional military in the region, at around $400
which is double what the Iraqi military provided. (Banco, 2014) Of course this could also be
because many of the only companies that could have survived under the Saddam regime were
the Sunni ones. Nevertheless, it was still perceived as targeting Sunni jobs and
unemployment seemed to affect the Sunnis disproportionately.

The third and final reason was the direct provision of weapons to Sunnis who ended up
becoming radicalised. The USA attempted to force fit the two factions together on a
superficial level. The Sons of Iraq programme in 2006 organised pro-American Sunni
militias to fight radical Sunnis. Local sheiks that were in charge were paid to develop and
maintain Sunni militias in order to function as peacekeepers. If a sheiks territory had
instances of violence, the USA military would threaten to use rival sheiks militias to
maintain peace or to cut off the money to the sheik. While the doctrine, Money as a
Weapon dramatically reduced violence in Iraq, it also meant that sheiks erred heavily on the
side of caution, making the militias extremely armed and trained and being very
indiscriminate about the risk of and cracking down upon violence.

It is no wonder that after that after the USA left, these well trained militias who in their time
felt like they had absolute power, were and should be the rightful wielders of power.
However, they were put in control of the Shia government which did not want those 100,000
Sunnis to be armed. Therefore, when the USA left, they declined them employment and even
prosecuted them for their guerrilla activities. They had thus been stripped of the very ability

17

to even self-defend against the reprisals of the radicals they had previously betrayed. Due to
this conflict, it left many moderate Sunnis desperate and vulnerable, needing to find
protection from their radical counterparts.

All of these are relevant to the Political or Structural Approach as the political legitimacy of
inequality resulted in greater ethno-sectarianism. It then became necessary for the Sunnis to
have a political response as strong as terrorism and the creation of an Islamic State.

3.3 Afghanistan War

We have already concluded that the Taliban gains most of its revenue whether directly or
indirectly from the USA. It is important to note that a key player in the power struggle in
Afghanistan is now the Neo-Taliban, a branch that has gained rapid traction recently. The
development of the Taliban and its evolution into the Neo-Taliban can generally be
categorised into 3 phases; its birth when Afghanistan was left destroyed after the war against
the Soviet Union, when it was thrown under international limelight immediately following
the events of 9/11 and its current state and form as an insurgency against the foreign forces
since the beginning of the Afghanistan War. Keeping that in mind, it can explain how USA
policies have strengthened the Neo-Taliban.

The very first characteristic we can observe is the change in demographics of Taliban
fighters. In the second and more prominent phase, most of those who enlisted were hundreds
of Arab and Central Asian fighters who were hiding out in FATA (Federally Administered
Tribal Areas) (Rashid, 2010)

18

Now as the Neo-Taliban expands, recruitment starts at the individual level based on
personal relations current militants have with the locals, as quoted from Mohammad
Osman Tariq Elias, who was a mujahid in the Afghan resistance. Locals who seek a settling
of scores with coalition forces are encouraged to join the movement. This allows the NeoTaliban to pride itself as a truly indigenous insurgency, no longer about forwarding an
international jihad but preserving Afghanistan pride and sovereignty that the USA infringed
upon.

With the invasion of the USA, it brought back an empire. Just like how the Taliban in phase 1
was created as a response to imperialism from the Soviet Union, the Neo-Taliban stands
firmly against the USA stepping foot on their soil. Anthropologist Robert Canfield
summarised the negative feelings Afghan civilians hold towards foreign forces that drives
them to join the Neo-Taliban using Benedict Andersons Imagined Communities:

These Muslims share a sense of Fraternity as Muslims, in fact in this case who desire a
more just world in which Muslims have more leverage, more dignity and more hope. They
share a common conception of power in that they grant leadership to individual who speak in
the name of God and can muster a force by which to actively confront the cultural juggernaut
of the West, some of them even supposing that their martyrdom for this cause would be
honourable and spiritually rewarded. They share a common sense of time in the sense of
cosmology and an eschatology that situates their present dilemmas in a trajectory of history

Because of the forceful entrance of the USA, it has provided the motivation for many
civilians to become personally involved in the resistance movement.

19

This relates to the second argument about the strategic ideological focus of the Neo-Taliban.
Evidence including quotes from journalists, speeches by Mullah Omar (Neo-Talibans leader)
and statements on their website supports the idea that the Neo-Taliban has moved away from
an international jihad. In August 2008, the Neo-Taliban stated on their website that they had
no plans of harming countries of the world our goal is the independence of the country and
building of an Islamic state. The British Department of International Development (DFID)
further conducted a study in 2008 on the radicalisation process of interviewed Taliban
members who made little common cause with Islamists movements outside of Afghanistan.

This of course is strategic, to alter their ideology to appeal to the general Afghan public
which in general had little interest for an international jihad, especially in rural areas.
Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid said that, when the Taliban did reappear, their major
slogan was that they would restore law and order.

Capitalising upon events like how a USA soldier went on a blind rampage killing 16 civilians
in March 2012, it is a common consensus amongst Afghans that the USA has only generated
violence and chaos. Within 2012 alone, there have been over 30 drone strikes conducted by
the USA in civilian villages; the number of casualties remains unknown. These events allow
the Neo-Taliban to portray themselves to disgruntled and insecure communities as the
saviours of Afghanistan. By painting the USA as a common enemy, it is very easy for the
Neo-Taliban to sell itself as the lesser of 2 evils. Thus, USA misconduct in Afghanistan has
provided the Neo-Taliban with the tools needed to gain more support on the ground.

In the wake of the sickening injustices and poorly done post-war reconstruction by the USA,
the Neo-Taliban thrives by promising a solution to this disarray. This is relevant to the

20

Rational or Organisational Approach as the Neo-Taliban functions to achieve 2 collective

rational goals 1) to oust the presence of the USA 2) to bring peace and order to the nation,
thereby increasing their insurgent strength.

3.4 Slow Process of Resolution

It is clear how USA policies have directly influenced the rise of terrorism in the Middle East.
Even if we were to assume that USA policies were not counterproductive, there are still many
obstacles that place the USA a mile away from resolving this new wave of terrorism. Exactly
what factors contributes to this slow process of resolution?
3.4.1

Political Apathy

The United States has creates massive political apathy, especially domestically, when it
comes to solving international terrorism. Public support for the war against terror has dipped
as Pew/USA Today polls show that there is less than 1/6 support for a Syrian War than there
ever was for the Iraq War as only 9% of Americans entertain the idea. It also found that in a 2
to 1 ratio, Americans feel that the Iraq War was stupid. Support for the Afghanistan War is at
all time low of 37% based on CNN Opinion Research Poll. Ramussen Reports shows that
67% of Americans feel that they should leave the Arab world alone. There is a massive
political fatigue, as taxpayers feel tired of engaging in a war that seems to never end.

On top of fatigue, the war against terror in the George Bush Junior Administration has created
fear internationally, a fear of a re-occurrence of what happened in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Whenever a proponent of intervention or a related suggestion is raised, pessimistic critics
who immediately point towards the Iraq and Afghanistan War as the be all and end all almost
always strike them down. Even if military technology, enforcement agencies and post-war

21

reconstruction strategies have improved, the shuddering fear of what happened in the wake of
those 2 devastating wars has created massive inertia to even the thought of intervention.

This is not to suggest that the war against terror as a whole is bad, but it was conducted
unsustainably. Even if the USA did fight the war intensively in those short 8 years, they are
unable to hold it over an extended period of time. Arguably, the latter is more important as
terrorism takes a lot of time to eliminate and short busts of aggression are insufficient.

3.4.2

Perverse Incentives to not Eliminate ISIS

The USA also has a perverse incentive to not take concrete actions to eliminate ISIS. It is
well known that Russia supports the Assad regime in Syria. The USA is obviously against
Assad and Russia and therefore they have funded Syrian rebels. Congress recently passed
legislature to spend $500 million in a covert CIA operation to train 5000 Syrian rebels.
However, the resistance movement in Syria has almost always been linked to ISIS as ISIS
uses the civil war as a training ground to provide experience to new militants. This can be
seen in the fluidity of A16 assault rifles brandished with the USA name originally given to
rebels in Syria but are not in the hands of ISIS militants. Does the USA know this? Probably?
Why does it still happen then? While the USA definitely does not support ISIS, whether it is
100% committed to eliminating ISIS is questionable.

There are 2 more, slightly speculative, perverse incentives. The first is to set up
circumstances that justify international terrorism. It is already clear with propaganda over
James Foley as USA media outlets sensationalise the threat of ISIS to American citizens. It
seems as though terrorism has become the next Red Scare in USA history, in order to
generate sentiments to combat the political apathy previously talked about. The second is to

22

set up circumstances for domestic surveillance. After Edward Snowden brought the activities
of the NSA and PRISM to media attention, the USA governments ability to freely carry out
domestic surveillance has been put in the hot seat. NSA Director, Keith Alexander, constantly
reasserts that domestic surveillance was necessary to thwart dozens of terrorist plots. He is
not alone in this as President Obama, Sentors and court judges have all used the same
justification. ISIS and terrorists as a whole has therefore become the convenient excuse for
the USA governments authoritarian plans.

3.4.3

Falling Prey to Neo-Talibans Traps

The USA has constantly fallen into the Neo-Talibans traps. The first can be seen in the overcomplacency of the USA. Analysts from the USA found that most of the time the local
commanders acted autonomously, based on their understanding of the strategic and political
aims articulated by the council. The USA claims that this shows ideological conflict and
strife within the Neo-Taliban. However, this is merely a more liberal system that gives more
autonomy down layers of bureaucracy. It is also a tactic of guerrilla warfare to be
unpredictable. The nave understanding that it is a weakness and not a tactic handicaps the
USA. This will severely affect their ability to plan strategies to contain the insurgencies,
especially as troops start to pull out of Afghanistan.

Furthermore, the USA has played directly into the Neo-Taliban rhetorical trap. As explained
earlier, the USA is widely hated for their indiscriminate killings of civilians in Afghanistan.
One of the Neo-Talibans most prominent characteristics is its heavy reliance on human
soldiers, adopting strategies such as human wave fronts and suicide bombers. Every single
time such an insurgency has occurred, the USA has effectively suppressed and protected their
territories. However, the Neo-Taliban continues to adopt this method, perhaps for another

23

reason. Whenever the USA mercilessly takes down an insurgence, massive numbers of
Afghanistan lives are eliminated. This provides the Neo-Taliban with the rhetoric to paint the
USA as a tyrant that kills your fellow citizens. That is also why we have seen recruitment
spikes every time the USA supresses an insurgence. In the eyes of the Neo-Taliban, the shortterm cost of human lives is marginal as compared to the long-term traction and grounding
they gain from such a tactic.

Chapter 4: Conclusion
4.1 Conclusion
In conclusion, ISIS and the Neo-Taliban have spawned and benefited from USA policies in
the Middle East. Socio-economic deprivation in Iraq resulting from USA policies has
motivated many ISIS militants. The presence of the USA and their misconduct in Afghanistan
allows the Neo-Taliban to gain more traction. Complications in this war against terror have
also made the USA incapable or reluctant to fully fight the war. Hence, the war against terror
has been counterproductive.

24

Bibliography:

(2006). US report says Iraq fuels terror, BBC News.

(2008). Concepts of Terrorism. Transnational Terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law,

c5(3).
(2010). Opinion Research Corporation. CNN.
(2014). Global Terrorism Index (2014), Measuring and Understanding the Impact of

Terrorism.
(2014). Taliban attack Kabul airport, US military base in Afghanistan in wave of

offensives. Dna.
Aikins, M. (2014). Afghanistan: The Making of a Narco State. Rolling Stone.
Al-Om, T. (2007). US & Middle East Relations.

Banco, E. (2014). Syrian Opposition Told US Senior Officials It Cannot Stop ISIS
Without More Weapons. International Business Times.

Beauchamp, Z. (2014, June 20). The real roots of Iraq's Sunni-Shia conflict. Vox.

Benedikter, R. (2015). Extremism and Ethnicity Part I - The ISIS lesson: Ethnicity Is
Key. Global Policy Journal.

Blog, W. (2014). Polls: Americans Are Sick of the War On Terror, War On Drugs
And All of the Other Failed U.S. Wars. Washingtons Blog.

Butler, D. (2015). Turkey, US Sign Deal To Train, Arm Syrian Rebels: US Embassy.
The Huffington Post. The World Post.

Chengu, G. (2014). Tells the Facts, the Names. How the US Helped Create Al Qaeda

and ISIS. CounterPunch.

Cockburn, P., & Sengupta, K. (2007). The War on Terror Is the Leading Cause of

Terrorism.
Cole, J. (2013). Thoughts on the Middle East, History and Religion. What we Did to

Iraq. Informed Comment.

Cottee, S. (2015). Why It's So Hard to Stop ISIS Propaganda. The Atlantic.
Crenshaw, M. (1981). The Causes of Terrorism. Comparative Politics, 13(4), 378-399.

25

DeAngelis, T. (2009). Understanding terrorism. Monitor on Psychology, 40(10), 6060

Durante, T., Stebner, B. (2012). 'Death to America!' Afghan protesters burn Obama
effigies as anger over U.S. soldier who killed 16 civilians rises. Associated
Newspapers Ltd. Daily Mail.

Elias, M.O.T. (2009). The Resurgence of the Taliban in Kabul, Logar and Wardak. In
Giustozzi, Antonio. Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field. Hurst
& Company.

Entous, A. (2015). Covert CIA Mission to Arm Syrian Rebels Goes Awry. Wall Street
Journal.

Gupta, D.K. (2004). Exploring Roots of Terrorism, San Diego State University
Haddad, F. (2013). Iraqis Sectarian Inheritance. Foreign Policy.

Hanasz, P. (n.d.). The Taliban: a split personality? NATO Review: The Mechanics of
Terrorism.

Hudson, R.A. (1999). The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a
Terrorist and Why? The Library of Congress,156..

Ibrahim, A. (2011). Why Would the Pakistani Intelligence Agency Support the
Taliban? The Huffington Post. The World Post.

Johnson, L. (2014). Report: U.S.-Provided Weapons To Afghans Have Gone Missing,

Sparking Insurgent Fears. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty.

Kaplan, R. (2001). The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War

at 123 (p. 123). Vintage; Reprint edition.

Langtree, S. (2012). Sunni-Shia Tensions in the Iran-Iraq War. E-International

Relations Students. University of Surrey.

Lee, M. (2013). The Afghan Taliban in 2013: Anti-Imperial Movement or Great Game
Pawns? Washington University International Review, 2(2), 8-26

26

Linschoten, A., Kuehn, F. (2012). An Enemy We Created The Myth of the Taliban /

Al-Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan, 1970-2010 (p. 273). C Hurst & Co.

Matthews, D. (2013). Twelve years after 9/11, we still have no idea how to fight

terrorism. The Washington Post.

Mazzetti, M. (2006). Spy Agencies Say Iraq War Worsens Terror Threat. New York

Times.
Moreau, R. (2010). How Pakistan Helps the Taliban. Newsweek

Nadem, A. (2012). Afghans urge U.S. exit after killings; US says timetable
unchanged. Reuters.

O'Brien, S.P. (1996). Foreign Policy Crises and the Resort to Terrorism: A TimeSeries Analysis of Conflict Linkages. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40(2),

320 - 335.
Peters, G. (2009). How Opium Profits the Taliban. United States Institute for Peace.

Library of Congress. Peaceworks, 62

Rashid, A. (2010). Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia.

Yale University Press; 2 edition.

Richardson, C. (2011). Relative Deprivation Theory in Terrorism: A Study of Higher

Education and Unemployment as Predictors of Terrorism, 16.

Ross, J.I. (1993). Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a

Causal Model. Journal of Peace Research, 30(3), 317-329.

Schwen, P. (2015, February 05). Anarchy, ISIS, and Democracy in the Middle East.
National Security Law Brief.

Shah, A. (2002). A Divided People; The West's Support For Dictators And Monarchies
Over Democracies. Global Issues Social, Political, Economic and Environmental
Issues That Affect Us All.

27

Shah, A. (2007). Iraq Crisis. Global Issues Social, Political, Economic and
Environmental Issues That Affect Us All.

Sheppard, B. (2014). The Taliban Is Making A Major Offensive As US Troops Pull

Out Of Afghanistan. Business Insider.

Sommerville, Q. (2012) Pakistan Helping Afghan Taliban NATO. BCC.

VC. (2014). ISIS : A CIA Creation to Justify War Abroad and Repression at
Home. Vigilant Citizen.

Wing, J. (2013). Musings on Iraq: Sunni Identity Politics In Iraq After 2003.
Zalman, A. (n.d.). Causes of Terrorism-Why are the Causes of Terrorism So Hard to
Identify? About News.

28

29