ANDREA M. MOSCOSO, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMINA

L. MORON, respondents
G.R. No. L-46439
April 24, 1984
FACTS:
Petitioner applied for land registration of a parcel of residential land which she
alleged among others that the property is her share in the estate of her late father
in the partition she entered with her five other siblings. The application was
opposed by three alleged children of applicants father in a common law union
prior to his marriage with applicants mother. After the presentation of evidence,
the trial court rendered decision finding that applicant is not the exclusive owner
of the property and directing the registration of the land in co-ownership with
applicant and the three oppositors. Applicant filed motion for reconsideration.
After hearing, the trial court modified its decision finding that of the three
oppositors, only one was able to prove her being an acknowledged natural child
of applicants father by competent proof, hence, the applicants share would be
13/14. CA affirmed the decision. Applicant contends that the trial court, acting as
a land registration court, has no jurisdiction to pass upon the issue whether
oppositor is the acknowledged natural child of his father.
ISSUE:
Does the court, acting in its limited jurisdiction as a land registration court,
competent to determine the right of the oppositor to inherit?
RULING:
Generally no. Exceptions: (1) Mutual consent of the parties to submit the issues
for the determination of the court; (2) Full opportunity was given to the parties in
the presentation of their respective sides of the issues and of the evidence in
support thereto; and (3) consideration by the court that the evidence already of
record is sufficient and adequate for rendering a decision upon the issues. In the
instant case, the exceptions exist. Besides, whether a particular matter should be
resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or
of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (Probate, Land Registration, etc.) is, in
reality, not a jurisdictional question. It is, in essence, a procedural question.