DIOCESE OF BACOLOD VS.

COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner Diocese of Bacolod is a Roman Catholic diocese and is represented in this
petition by its Bishop, the Most Rev. Vicente M. Navarra. Petitioner Bishop Navarra is also filing
this petition in his individual and personal capacity as the questioned orders are personally
directed at him and also as a concerned citizen, as the issues raised herein are matters of
paramount and transcendental importance to the public which must be settled early given the
far-reaching implications of the unconstitutional acts of the respondents.
Named as respondents are the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and its Election
Officer of Bacolod City Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon. On 21 February 2013, the petitioners have
caused to be placed on the front wall of the Bacolod Cathedral two sets of Tarpaulin, each sized
6x10 feet, with the message Conscience Vote (Team Buhay/Team Patay (Team Patay
Tarpaulin).
The Team Patay Tarpaulin contained the names of both Antiand Pro-Reproductive
Health Law senatorial candidates. In their special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioners sought the nullification of the 22 February 2013 order
issued by respondent Atty. Majarucon, which orders them to remove the supposed oversized
Team Patay Tarpaulin of the Diocese of Bacolod. They also sought to nullify the 27 February
2013 order issued by the COMELEC, through its Law Department, which orders the immediate
removal of the Team Patay Tarpaulin and threatening the petitioner Bishop of Bacolod with the
filing of an election offense if he fails to cause its immediate removal.
On March 5, 2013, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the respondents COMELEC and Atty. Majarucon from removing the Team Patay
Tarpaulin.

ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSIONS:
1.

2.

The assailed Orders/Directives to remove or cause the removal of the subject

Team Patay Tarpaulin are not electoral campaign materials and that the
mention of the candidates in the infringes on the petitioners right to freedom of
expression on their own private property: the subject Team Patay Tarpaulins
are not electoral campaign materials, stressing that the mentioning of
candidates name in the second tarpaulin was merely incidental to the
petitioners campaign against the RH Law, which they have firmly campaigned
against even when it was just a bill being deliberated in Congress;
The subject Team Patay Tarpaulins are covered by the broader constitutional
guaranty of freedom of expression and of conscience and not by the more
narrow and limited election laws, rules, and regulations;
Petitioners have the constitutional right to communicate their views and
beliefs by posting the subject Team Patay Tarpaulins on the Bacolod

Cathedral, a private property owned by the Diocese of Bacolod; the RH Law

and the candidates and party-lists running in the 2013 National Elections who
supported and who opposed its passage into a law are matters of public
concern and a legitimate subject of general interest and of discussion;
Citing the Supreme Courts jurisprudence in Chavez v. PCGG (G. R. No.
130716, December 9, 1998), the petitioners argued that that public concern
embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to
know citing the Supreme Courts jurisprudence in Adiong v. COMELEC ( G.
R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992), the petitioners further argued that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open. the content and
the message of the subject Team Patay Tarpaulin plainly relates to broad
issues of interest to the community especially to the members of the Catholic
community and that the subject tarpaulin simply conveys the position of the
petitioners on the RH bill and the public officials who supported or opposed it
as it gains relevance in the exercise of the peoples right of suffrage in the
advent of the 2013 polls, considering the petitioners message, through the
Team Patay Tarpaulin, was a matter of public concern, the message being
conveyed and the mode used for its communication and expression to the
public is entitled to protection under the Free Expression clause of the Bill of
Rights of the 1987 Constitution.
Not being candidates or political parties, the freedom of expression
curtailed by the questioned prohibition, using the logic of the Supreme Court in
Adiong v. COMELEC, is not so much that of the candidate or the political party.
There is no compelling and substantial State interest that is endangered
or which will be endangered by the posting of the subject Team Patay
Tarpaulin which would justify the infringement of the preferred right of freedom
of expression.
The assailed orders/directives to remove or cause the removal of the
subjectTeam Patay Tarpaulin are unconstitutional and void for violating the
principle of separation of Church and State enshrined in Section 6 of Article II
of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioners petition against the RH Law is not only a matter of exercise of
its freedom of expression and of conscience but is also a matter of Catholic
faith, morals, belief, and of duty.
The Diocese of Bacolod has taken on the issue of the RH Law as part of
her mission as part of its continued advocacy and obedience to the Catholic
Churchs teachings, in line with what they believe to be their duty in the faith,
the petitioners have declared the RH Law as being anti-life, antimorals, antifamily, anti-marriage, and contrary to the teachings of the Catholic Church.
Consequently, petitioners have called on its members and followers not to
support any candidate who is anti-life, and to support those who are pro-life; o
considering that the views and position of the petitioners on the RH Bill is
inextricably connected to its Catholic dogma, faith, and moral teachings, the
posting of the subject Team Patay Tarpaulin has already gone beyond mere
exercise of freedom of expression and of conscience, but also of the right and

privilege of the Church to propagate and spread its teachings which should be
insulated from any form of encroachment and intrusion on the part of the
State, and its agencies and officials.
ISSUES/GROUNDS:
1. Respondents orders directives to remove or cause the removal of the subject Team
Patay Tarpaulin are unconstitutional and void for infringing on petitioners right to freedom of
expression on their own private property.
2. Respondents orders/directives to remove or cause the removal of the subject Team
Patay Tarpaulin are unconstitutional and void for violating the principle of separation of Church
and State enshrined in Section 6 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
I.

COMELEC had no legal basis to regulate expressions made by private citizens

Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they
had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, all of these provisions pertain to candidates
and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party.
COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to
freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
In this case, the tarpaulin contains speech on a matter of public concern, that is, a
statement of either appreciation or criticism on votes made in the passing of the RH law. Thus,
petitioners invoke their right to freedom of expression.
II.

The violation of the constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression

Petitioners contend that the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violate
their fundamental right to freedom of expression.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the tarpaulin is an election propaganda subject to
their regulation pursuant to their mandate under Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution. Thus,
the assailed notice and letter ordering its removal for being oversized are valid and
constitutional.
Fundamental to the consideration of this issue is Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution:
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress
of grievances.132
No law. . .

While it is true that the present petition assails not a law but an opinion by the COMELEC Law
Department, this court has applied Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution even to governmental
acts.
In Primicias v. Fugoso, respondent Mayor applied by analogy Section 1119 of the Revised
Ordinances of 1927 of Manila for the public meeting and assembly organized by petitioner
Primicias. Section 1119 requires a Mayors permit for the use of streets and public places for
purposes such as athletic games, sports, or celebration of national holidays. What was
questioned was not a law but the Mayors refusal to issue a permit for the holding of petitioners
public meeting.1Nevertheless, this court recognized the constitutional right to freedom of
speech, to peaceful assembly and to petition for redress of grievances, albeit not absolute, 7 and
the petition for mandamus to compel respondent Mayor to issue the permit was granted.
In ABS-CBN v. COMELEC, what was assailed was not a law but COMELEC En Banc
Resolution No. 98-1419 where the COMELEC resolved to approve the issuance of a restraining
order to stop ABS-CBN from conducting exit surveys. The right to freedom of expression was
similarly upheld in this case and, consequently, the assailed resolution was nullified and set
aside.
. . . shall be passed abridging. . .
All regulations will have an impact directly or indirectly on expression. The prohibition against
the abridgment of speech should not mean an absolute prohibition against regulation. The
primary and incidental burden on speech must be weighed against a compelling state interest
clearly allowed in the Constitution. The test depends on the relevant theory of speech implicit in
the kind of society framed by our Constitution.
. . . of expression. . .
Our Constitution has also explicitly included the freedom of expression, separate and in addition
to the freedom of speech and of the press provided in the US Constitution.

III.

Size does matter (tarpaulin)

The form of expression is just as important as the information conveyed that it forms part of the
expression. The present case is in point.
It is easy to discern why size matters.
First, it enhances efficiency in communication. A larger tarpaulin allows larger fonts which make
it easier to view its messages from greater distances.

Second, the size of the tarpaulin may underscore the importance of the message to the reader.
From an ordinary persons perspective, those who post their messages in larger fonts care more
about their message than those who carry their messages in smaller media.
Third, larger spaces allow for more messages. Larger spaces, therefore, may translate to more
opportunities to amplify, explain, and argue points which the speakers might want to
communicate.
Large tarpaulins, therefore, are not analogous to time and place.They are fundamentally part of
expression protected under Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution.
IV.

This court has held free speech and other intellectual freedoms as "highly ranked in our scheme
of constitutional values."1These rights enjoy precedence and primacy. In Philippine Blooming
Mills, this court discussed the preferred position occupied by freedom of expression:
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If
human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless
attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the
tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs - political,
economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a
preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political
institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting
dubious intrusions.
V.

Content-based regulation

COMELEC contends that the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-neutral
regulation. The order was made simply because petitioners failed to comply with the maximum
size limitation for lawful election propaganda.
On the other hand, petitioners argue that the present size regulation is content-based as it
applies only to political speech and not to other forms of speech such as commercial speech.
A content-based regulation, however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is
measured against the clear and present danger rule. The latter will pass constitutional muster
only if justified by a compelling reason, and the restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor
vague.
Under this rule, "the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high."

"Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it
pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality."
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation.
There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin
as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to
minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The
size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone elses constitutional rights.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions "based on the subject matter
of the utterance or speech.
In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the
speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.
We reiterate that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is
not easily divorced from the size of its medium.
VI.Freedom of expression and equality
The guarantee of freedom of expression to individuals without any relationship to any
political candidate should not be held hostage by the possibility of abuse by those seeking to be
elected. It is true that there can be underhanded, covert, or illicit dealings so as to hide the
candidates real levels of expenditures. However, labelling all expressions of private parties that
tend to have an effect on the debate in the elections as election paraphernalia would be too
broad a remedy that can stifle genuine speech like in this case. Instead, to address this evil,
better and more effective enforcement will be the least restrictive means to the fundamental
freedom.
The message of petitioners in this case will certainly not be what candidates and political
parties will carry in their election posters or media ads. The message of petitioner, taken as a
whole, is an advocacy of a social issue that it deeply believes. Through rhetorical devices, it
communicates the desire of Diocese that the positions of those who run for a political position
on this social issue be determinative of how the public will vote. It primarily advocates a stand
on a social issue; only secondarily even almost incidentally will cause the election or nonelection of a candidate.

2.SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

Tarpaulin and its message are not religious speech

We proceed to the last issues pertaining to whether the COMELEC in issuing the questioned
notice and letter violated the right of petitioners to the free exercise of their religion.
At the outset, the Constitution mandates the separation of church and state. This takes many
forms. Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution, for instance provides:
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.
There are two aspects of this provision.
The first is the non establishment clause.
Second is the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship
Clearly, not all acts done by those who are priests, bishops, ustadz, imams, or any other
religious make such act immune from any secular regulation. 324 The religious also have a
secular existence. They exist within a society that is regulated by law.
The Bishop of Bacolod caused the posting of the tarpaulin. But not all acts of a bishop amounts
to religious expression. This notwithstanding petitioners claim that "the views and position of the
petitioners, the Bishop and the Diocese of Bacolod, on the RH Bill is inextricably connected to
its Catholic dogma, faith, and moral teachings.
Estrada v. Escritor,this court adopted a policy of benevolent neutrality:
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government
policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the governments favored form
of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their
purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a persons or
institutions religion. As Justice Brennan explained, the "government [may] take religion into
account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation
individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to
create without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may
flourish.
This court also discussed the Lemon test in that case, such that a regulation is constitutional
when: (1) it has a secular legislative purpose; (2) it neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3)
it does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.331
As aptly argued by COMELEC, however, the tarpaulin, on its face, "does not convey any
religious doctrine of the Catholic church." That the position of the Catholic church appears to

coincide with the message of the tarpaulin regarding the RH Law does not, by itself, bring the
expression within the ambit of religious speech. On the contrary, the tarpaulin clearly refers to
candidates classified under "Team Patay" and "Team Buhay" according to their respective votes
on the RH Law.
The same may be said of petitioners reliance on papal encyclicals to support their claim that the
expression onthe tarpaulin is an ecclesiastical matter. With all due respect to the Catholic
faithful, the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court. The
position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to
qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such
basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubtas to its
nature as speech with political consequences and not religious speech.
Furthermore, the definition of an "ecclesiastical affair" in Austria v. National Labor Relations
Commission cited by petitioners finds no application in the present case. The posting of the
tarpaulin does not fall within the category of matters that are beyond the jurisdiction of civil
courts as enumerated in the Austria case such as "proceedings for excommunication,
ordinations of religious ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities with attached
religious significance."
Embedded in the tarpaulin, however, are opinions expressed by petitioners. It is a specie of
expression protected by our fundamental law. It is an expression designed to invite attention,
cause debate, and hopefully, persuade. It may be motivated by the interpretation of petitioners
of their ecclesiastical duty, but their parishioners actions will have very real secular
consequences. Certainly, provocative messages do matter for the elections.
What is involved in this case is the most sacred of speech forms: expression by the electorate
that tends to rouse the public to debate contemporary issues. This is not speech by candidates
or political parties to entice votes. It is a portion of the electorate telling candidates the
conditions for their election. It is the substantive content of the right to suffrage.
This. is a form of speech hopeful of a quality of democracy that we should all deserve. It is
protected as a fundamental and primordial right by our Constitution. The expression in the
medium chosen by petitioners deserves our protection.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order previously
issued is hereby made permanent. The act of the COMELEC in issuing the assailed notice
dated February 22, 2013 and letter dated February 27, 2013 is declared unconstitutional.

BORJAL VS. CA
DOCTRINE OF FAIR COMMENT

Facts: A civil action for damages based on libel was filed before the court against Borjal and
Soliven for writing and publishing articles that are allegedly derogatory and offensive against
Francisco Wenceslao, attacking among others the solicitation letters he send to support a
conference to be launch concerning resolving matters on transportation crisis that is tainted with
anomalous activities. Wenceslao however was never named in any of the articles nor was the
conference he was organizing. The lower court orderedpetitioners to indemnify the private
respondent for damages which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. A petition for review was
filed before the SC contending that private respondent was not sufficiently identified to be the
subject of the published articles.
Issue: Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to constitute guilt of petitioners for libel.
HELD:
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious,
even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the
following cases:
1) A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any
legal, moral or social duty; and,
2) A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature,
or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other
act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
Respondent court explained that the writings in question did not fall under any of the
exceptions described in the above-quoted article since these were neither "private
communications" nor"fair and true report x x x without any comments or remarks." But this is
incorrect.
A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly
privileged. Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not actionable even if the
author has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art. VI, of the 1987 Constitution
which exempts a member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or
in any Committee thereof. Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged communications
containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without
good intention or justifiable motive. To this genre belong "private communications" and "fair and
true report without any comments or remarks."
Indisputably, petitioner Borjals questioned writings are not within the exceptions of Art. 354
of The Revised Penal Code for, as correctly observed by the appellate court, they are
neitherprivate communications nor fair and true report without any comments or
remarks. However this does not necessarily mean that they are not privileged. To be sure, the

enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications
since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. The rule on
privileged communications had its genesis not in the nation's penal code but in the Bill of Rights
of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press.
Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid
defense in an action for libel or slander.
The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation
publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is
judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not
necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be
actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is
immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred
from the facts.
CHAVEZ VS. GONZALES
FACTS
As a consequence of the public release of copies of the Hello Garci compact disc
audiotapes involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between then-President Gloria
Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales
warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its
contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons
possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by
anybody. Finally, he stated that he had ordered the National Bureau of Investigation to go after
media organizations found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the
contents of a tape.
Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned in a press release all radio stations and TV network
owners/operators that the conditions of the authorization and permits issued to them by
government like the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority explicitly provides that
they shall not use their stations for the broadcasting or telecasting of false information or willful
misrepresentation. The NTC stated that the continuous airing or broadcast of the Hello Garci
taped conversations by radio and TV stations is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping
Law and the conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority. It warned that
their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just
cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued
to the said media establishments.

Subsequently, a dialogue was held between the NTC and the Kapisanan ng mga
Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) which resulted in the issuance of a Joint Press Statement which
stated, among others, that the supposed wiretapped tapes should be treated with sensitivity and
handled responsibly.
Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary Gonzales
and the NTC directly with the Supreme Court.
II.

ISSUES

1. Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify

straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press?
2. Did the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC
constitute a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution?
III.

RULING

[The Court voted 10-5 (CJ Puno, joined by JJ. Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, SandovalGutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Reyes and Tinga in the majority,
as against JJ. Corona, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro and Velasco in the
minority) in granting the petition insofar as respondent Secretary Gonzalezs press statement
was concerned. Likewise, it voted 10-5 (CJ Puno, joined by JJ. Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Reyes and Velasco in
the majority, as against JJ. Corona, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro and Tinga in
the minority) in granting the same insofar as NTCs press statement was concerned.]
1. NO, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will NOT
justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press.
A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on
content is
given
the strictest
scrutiny, with
the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule
applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media.
Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of
speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. [T]he great
evil which government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of
the anti-wiretapping law. The records of the case at bar however are confused and confusing,
and respondents evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test. Firstly,
the various statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape

recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect. The Press
Secretary showed to the public two versions, one supposed to be a complete version and the
other, an altered version. Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the whos and the hows
of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially considering the tapes different versions. The
identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of its commission and other related and relevant proofs
are some of the invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it
is even arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.
We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of
freedom of speech and of the press. Our laws are of different kindsand doubtless, some of
them provide norms of conduct which[,] even if violated[,] have only an adverse effect on a
persons private comfort but does not endanger national security. There are laws of great
significance but their violation, by itself and without more, cannot support suppression of free
speech and free press. In fine, violation of law is just a factor, a vital one to be sure, which
should be weighed in adjudging whether to restrain freedom of speech and of the
press. The totality of the injurious effects of the violation to private and public interest must
be calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded by the Constitution and by related
international covenants protecting freedom of speech and of the press. In calling for a careful
and calibrated measurement of the circumference of all these factors to determine compliance
with the clear and present danger test, the Court should not be misinterpreted as
devaluing violations of law. By all means, violations of law should be vigorously
prosecuted by the State for they breed their own evil consequence. But to repeat, the need to
prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise of free speech and free press, a
preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils. For this failure of the respondents
alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to
uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation
of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State.
2. YES, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC
constituted a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the
Constitution.
[I]t is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not
reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press
statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official functions.
Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales made his statements as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC
issued its statement as the regulatory body of media. Any act done, such as a speech
uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule
on prior restraint. The concept of an act does not limit itself to acts already converted
to a formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an
official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior

restraint. The press statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as they constitute
impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and press.

IMBONG VS. OCHOA

A. On the constitutionality of RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law
1. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for
violating the right to life:
NO. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a
scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and
evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this
matter.
Ponentes view (Justice Mendoza): Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The State
recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from conception.
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of
conception according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at
fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) conception to refer to the moment of
fertilization and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not
intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the
fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male
sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be
deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child
was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court
cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits
abortion. By using the word or in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits
not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and

induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb. The RH Law recognizes that the
fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of
abortifacient by using the term primarily. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that
primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mothers womb (Sec. 3.01(a)
of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the
life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)),
which also uses the term primarily, must be struck down.
2. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for
violating the right to health
NO. Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law because it requires the
inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal,
non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies in the National Drug
Formulary and in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national
hospitals (Section 9 of the RH Law). They cite risks of getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral
contraceptive pills.
Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. Rather, they pray
that the status quo under RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained. These laws prohibit the sale and
distribution of contraceptives without the prescription of a duly-licensed physician.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the
Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are
made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH
must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: thecontraceptives it will procure shall be from
a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of
these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified
medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered mandatory
only after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the

FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are safe, legal, non-abortificient and
effective.
3. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for
violating the freedom of religion and right to free speech
The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support
of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according
to ones dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the
RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
a.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom since it mandates the
State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, which contravene the religious beliefs
of e.g. the petitioners
NO. The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the
policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other
groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This
would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state
religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even
if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
b.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by compelling medical
health practitioners, hospitals, and health care providers, under pain of penalty, to refer
patients to other institutions despite their conscientious objections
YES. Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or medical practitioner to
immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another
accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or
ethical beliefs. These provisions violate the religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector. They are contrary to Section 29(2), Article VI of the Constitution
or the Free Exercise Clause, whose basis is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience.
The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned
and operated by a religious group and health care service providers to refer patients to other

providers and penalizing them if they fail to do so (Sections 7 and 23(a)(3)) as well
as compelling them to disseminate information and perform RH procedures under pain of
penalty (Sections 23(a)(1) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24) also violate (and inhibit) the
freedom of religion. While penalties may be imposed by law to ensure compliance to
it,a constitutionally-protected right must prevail over the effective implementation of the
law.
Excluding public health officers from being conscientious objectors (under Sec. 5.24 of the IRR)
also violates the equal protection clause. There is no perceptible distinction between public
health officers and their private counterparts. In addition, the freedom to believe is intrinsic
in every individual and the protection of this freedom remains even if he/she is employed in the
government.
Using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state interest to limit the free
exercise of conscientious objectors. There is no immediate danger to the life or health of an
individual in the perceived scenario of the above-quoted provisions. In addition, the limits do not
pertain to life-threatening cases.
The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are least intrusive means to
achieve a legitimate state objective. The Legislature has already taken other secular steps to
ensure that the right to health is protected, such as RA 4729, RA 6365 (The Population Act of
the Philippines) and RA 9710 (The Magna Carta of Women).
c.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by requiring would-be
spouses, as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, to attend a seminar on
parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition
NO. Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to attend a seminar on
parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition as a condition for the issuance of
a marriage license, is a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. The law does
not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar. Those who
attend the seminar are free to accept or reject information they receive and they retain the
freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.
4. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for
violating the right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)

YES. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the
consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content),intrudes into
martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the
family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution
mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their
religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or
family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs
that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger
the institutions of marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article
II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character
shall receive the support of the Government. In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which
reads in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their
absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective
surgical procedures is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is
involved is non-surgical procedures.
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning
services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this
situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In
addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.
5. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for
violating the freedom of expression and academic freedom
NO. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which
mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health
Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH
education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet
formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.

Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children with the use of the term primary. The right of parents in
upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR
supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development
of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest
groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will
be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
6. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for
violating the due process clause
NO. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the
definitions of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of private health care service provider must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of
the RH Law which defines a public health service provider. The private health care institution
cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to private health care service provider.
The terms service and methods are also broad enough to include providing of information
and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are
exempted from rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by
Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1),
the terms incorrect and knowingly connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or
misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive
health.
7. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for
violating the equal protection clause

NO. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the governments RH program is
not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII
of the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to
provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the
RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and
desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a
couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children.
The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program
under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private
educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their
sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
8. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for
violating the prohibition against involuntary servitude
NO. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care
service providers to render 48 hours of pro bono RH services does not amount to involuntary
servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public
interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to
protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and nongovernment RH service providers to render pro bono service. Besides the PhilHealth
accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do
not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise (See Part 3b of this digest.)
B. WON the delegation of authority to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
determine WON a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid
NO. The delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply
or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid, as the FDA not only has the

power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods
(under RA 3720 as amended by RA 9711 or the FDA Act of 2009).
C. WON the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to Local Governments and the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
NO. The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local governments. Paragraph (c) of
Section 17 provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects,
facilities, programs and services. Unless a local government unit (LGU) is particularly
designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has
been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if
the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
In addition, LGUs are merely encouraged to provide RH services. Provision of these services
are not mandatory. Therefore, the RH Law does not amount to an undue encroachment by the
national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by LGUs.
Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM merely delineates
the powers that may be exercised by the regional government. These provisions cannot be
seen as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the
general welfare.