Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Oxygen and
Oxygen Systems:
Guidelines for Oxygen System Design,
IViaterials Selection, Operations,
Storage, and Transportation
Harold D. Beeson
Walter F. Stewart
Stephen S. Woods
Editors
ASTM Stock No.: MNL 36
m
jjl^
ASTM International
100 Barr Harbor Drive
INTERNATIONAL
PO BoX C700
Standards Worldwide
Copyright 2000 AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR TESTING AND MATERIALS, West Conshohocken, PA.
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The Society is not responsible, as a body, for the statements and opinions expressed in this
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Third Printing
Printed in Lancaster, PA
March 2005
Foreword
THIS MANUAL ON THE SAFE U S E OF OXYGEN AND OXYGEN SYSTEMS is sponsored by Com-
mittee G4 on Compatibility and Sensitivity of Materials in Oxygen-Enriched Atmospheres. The editorial work was coordinated by Harold D. Beeson, NASA Johnson
Space Center White Sands Test Facility, Las Cruces, New Mexico.
The original material was contained in the NASA Safety Standard for Oxygen and
Oxygen Systems, NSS 1740.15, which estabhshed a uniform NASA process for oxygen
system design, materials selection, operation, storage, and transportation. The NASA
document represented a wealth of information, knowledge, and experience gained by
NASA and its contractors. This information, knowledge, and experience should be extremely valuable t o industry, particularly the small or infrequent user of oxygen who
has little or no experience and staff to draw upon.
This manual contains minimum guidelines; users are encouraged to assess their individual programs and develop additional requirements, as needed.
"Shalls" and "wills" denote requirements that are mandated by other existing documents, which are referenced.
ui
Acknowledgments
NASA OXYGEN SAFETY HANDBOOK was originally prepared under NASA contract by
Paul M. Ordin, Consulting Engineer. The support of the NASA Hydrogen-Oxygen Safety
Standards Review Committee in providing technical monitoring of the original standard is recognized. The Committee included the following members:
THE
IV
CONTENTS
Lists of Tables and Figures
vi
Nomenclature
viii
Trademarks
xi
1
1
2
2
2
3
4
4
4
4
6
7
8
8
8
9
11
14
14
14
18
19
Chapter 5Cleaning
General
Cleaning Safety
Cleaning Procedures
Clean Assembly of Components and Systems
Record Keeping
24
24
25
25
28
29
vi
CONTENTS
Chapter 6Operating Procedures
General Guidelines
Personnel
Cooldown and Loading Procedures
Examinations
30
30
30
31
31
32
32
32
33
34
34
35
Chapter 8Transportation
General
Transport on Public Thoroughfares
Transport on Site Controlled Thoroughfares
Transportation Emergencies
43
43
43
44
45
46
46
47
47
References
48
Appendices
AChemical and Physical Properties
BMaterials Testing Methods and Test Data
CDesign Examples
DPressure VesselsTesting, Inspection, and Recertification
ECodes, Regulations, and Guidelines Listing
FScaling Laws, Explosions, Blasts, and Fragments
GOrganizational Policies and Procedures; Project Management;
Design, Safety, Operational, and Hazard Reviews
HGlossary
51
51
53
67
74
76
80
Subject Index
97
List of Tables
Table 1Some potential ignition sources of fuel-oxygen mixtures.
Table 2Typical maximum allowable particles for various cleaning
levels.
Table 3Typical nonvolatile residue (NVR) level specifications.
36
36
39
42
83
93
5
27
28
CONTENTS
Table 4Quantity-distance requirements for nonpropellant bulk oxygen
storage systems located outdoors.
37
Table 5Safe quantity-distance relationships for LOX storage (Hazard
Group II).
38
Table 6Liquid propellant explosive equivalents.
39
Table 7Separation distances for liquid hydrogen-LOX propellant
combination.
40
Table 8Factors for blast effects.
41
Table 9Intraline distances for liquid hydrogen-LOX propellant
combination.
41
List of Figures
Fig. 1Material safety logic.
vii
Nomenclature
AAR
AGA
AHJ
AIChE
AIHA
AIT
AI2O3
ANSI
API
ASHRAE
ASME
ASRDI
ASTM
BCL
BM
CDR
CFC
CFR
CGA
CHEMTREC
CPIA
CraOj
CTFE
DCR
DI
DOD
DODESB
DOE
DOT
ECTFE
EMU
EPR
ETFE
Poly(chlorotrifluoroethylene-co-ethylene)
Extravehicular Mobility Unit
Emergency Procedures Review
Poly(ethylene-co-tetrafluoroethylene)
FAA
FeO
FEP
FDR
FSA
FMEA
GOX
GN2
Gaseous Oxygen
Gaseous Nitrogen
vui
NOMENCLATURE
HAZMAT
HCFC
HMRB
Hazardous Materials
Hydrochlorofluorocarbon
Hazardous Materials Regulation Board
IEEE
IPA
JSC
KSC
LANL
LeRC
LOI
LOX
MAPTIS
MAWP
MCA
MCA
M&P
MSDS
MSEC
MSS
NASA
NBP
NBS
NTIS
NTSB
OHM
OPR
ORI
ORR
OSHA
OTR
PDR
PHA
PMMA
PSA
PTFE
QA
Quality Assurance
RP-1
S&A
SAR
NEMA
NFPA
NHB
NHS
NiO
NMI
NPSP
NSS
NSTS
NTP
ix
NOMENCLATURE
SAsR
Si02
SOP
SOW
SR
SRM
SRM&QA
SSA
SSA/SR
SSPP
STP
TNT
TRR
Trinitrotoluene
Test Readiness Review
USCG
US Coast Guard
WBS
WSTF
ZrOa
Zirconium Oxide
Trademarks
Trademark
Aclar*
Avimid*
Berv'lco""
Butaclor
Celcon
Celanese*
Chemigum
Chemraz
Colmonoy
Colorfast*
Daran
Delrin
Duradene
Ektar
Elgiloy
Epcar
Fomblin
Fortiflex
Fluorel*
Fluoiogold
Fluorogreen
Geon"
Halar
Hartex
Hastelloy*
Havnes
Hostaflon
Hostalen*
Hycar""
Hypalon
Inconer''
Invar
Kalrez
Kapton
Kel-F
Kiytox
Kynar
Lexan
Lucite
Lustran
Lustrex
Lycra
Makrolon
Marlex
Monel
Mylar
NeoBon
Nippol
Noryl
Paracril
Petrothene
Plexiglas
Plioflex
Polybon
Polystyrol
Profax
Rulon*
Company Name
AlliedSignal, Inc.
E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.
Cabot Coiporation
A. Schulman
Celanese
Celanese
Goodyear Tire and Rubber
Green, Tweed and Co.
Wall Colmonoy Corporation
GCC Technologies, Inc.
W. R. Grace
E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.
Firestone Synthetic
Rubber & Latex Co.
Eastman Chemical Co.
Elgiloy Company
B. F. Goodrich
Ausimont
Fortex Industries, Inc.
Dyneon LLC
Seismic Energy Products
United Fluoro Components
B. F. Goodrich
Ausimont
Haitin Paint & Filler Coip.
Haynes International, Inc.
Haynes International, Inc.
Celanese
Celanese
B. F. Goodrich
DuPont Dow Elastomers
Inco Alloys International, Inc.
Carpenter Steel Co.
DuPont Dow Elastomers
E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.
3M Company
E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.
San Diego Plastics, Inc.
G. E. Plastic
DuPont
Monsanto
Monsanto
DuPont
Miles Corp.
Phillips Chemical Co.
Inco Alloys International, Inc.
DuPont
Daikin
SBR (Zeon)
G, E. Plastics
Uniroyal
Quantum
Rohm and Haas
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
DuPont Tribon Composites, Inc,
BASF
Himont
Dixon Industries Corp.
XI
Company location
Morristown, New Jersey
Wilmington, Delaware
Boyertown, Pennsylvania
Akron, Ohio
Somerville, New Jersey
Somerville, New Jersey
Akron, Ohio
Kulpsville, Pennsylvania
Madison Heights, Michigan
Acton, Massachusetts
Boca Raton, Florida
Wilmington, Delaware
Akron, Ohio
Kingspoit, Tennessee
Elgin, Illinois
Jacksonville, Florida
Thorofare, New Jersey
Wilmington, North Carolina
Oakdale, Minnesota
Athens, Texas
Houston, Texas
Cleveland, Ohio
Thorofaie, New Jersey
Carlstadt, New Jersey
Kokomo, Indiana
Kokomo, Indiana
Somen'ille, New Jersey
Somerville, New Jersey
Cleveland, Ohio
Wilmington, Delaware
Huntington, West Virginia
Reading, Pennsylvania
Wilmington, Delaware
Wilmington, Delaware
St. Paul, Minnesota
Wilmington, Delaware
National City, California
Pittsfield, Massachusetts
Wilmington, Delaware
Saint Louis, Missouri
Saint Louis, Missouri
Wilmington, Delaware
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Pasadena, Texas
Huntington, West Virginia
Wilmington, Delaware
Belvidere, Illinois
Louisville, Kentucky
Pittsfield, Massachusetts
Middlebury, Connecticut
Cincinnati, Ohio
Philadelphia, Penn.sylvania
Akron, Ohio
Valley View, Ohio
Mt. Olive, New Jersey
Wilmington, Delaware
Bristol, Rhode Island
xii TRADEMARKS
Ryton
Saran
Sclair
Silastic
Stellite
Teflon
Tefeel*
Tenite
Torlon
Udel
Vespel
Victrex
Vistalon*
Viton
Zytel
Co.
Co.
Co.
Co.
Pasadena, Texas
Midland, Michigan
Mississuaga, Ontario, Canada
Midland, Michigan
Belleville, Ontario, Canada
Wilmington, Delaware
Wilmington, Delaware
Kingsport, Tennessee
Atlanta, Georgia
Alpharetta, Georgia
Wilmington, Delaware
Exton, Pennsylvania
Houston, Texas
Wilmington, Delaware
Wilmington, Delaware
N O T E : U s e of t h e s e t r a d e m a r k s is n o t a n e n d o r s e m e n t of t h e p r o d u c t .
MNL36-EB/Jan. 2000
Copyright'
2000 by A S I M International
PERSONNEL TRAINING
Personnel shall be properly trained for oxygen use and shall
be familiar with several .specific areas such as the following:
1. Personnel who handle and use oxygen or design equipment for oxygen systems must be familiar with its pertinent physical, chemical, and hazardous properties. The
www.astm.org
AND OXYGEN
SYSTEMS
4.
5.
6.
7.
SAFETY REVIEWS
As part of ensuring safe oxygen use, various safety reviews
such as the following shall be conducted regularly.
CHAPTER
1. A hazards analysis shall be performed both at a component and system level (Chapter 2) and at a facility level
(Chapter 7) to identify conditions that may cause injury,
death, or major property damage.
2. Operating procedures, instrumentation, and process controls shall be reviewed.
3. Emergency procedures shall be reviewed.
Safety reviews that are r e c o m m e n d e d are discussed in
Appendix G.
Note: Planning for personnel safety at or near the oxy-
1: BASIC
OXYGEN
SAFETY
GUIDELINES
gen facility must begin in the earliest stages of the design process, t o reduce the risk of injury or loss of life.
WAIVERS
This manual contains required safety provisions noted by
"shall" or "must" that must be followed to prevent loss of life,
injury, or property damage. Waivers to these safety provisions shall not be made except by approval of the AHJt.
MNL36-EB/Jan. 2000
PROPERTIES
Oxygen is a colorless, odorless, and tasteless gas at standard
temperature and pressure (STP). Earth's atmosphere, at STP,
consists of approximately 21 vol% oxygen. The normal boiling point (NBP) temperature of oxygen is 90.18 K (-297.3F).
High-purity LOX is light blue, odorless, and transparent.
Many pertinent properties of oxygen are given in Apjiendix A.
Two significant properties of oxygen are its ability to sustain life and its ability to support combustion. Although oxygen is nonflammable, it is a powerful oxidizer in both the
gaseous and liquid states. Some materials that will not b u m
in air will do so in a n oxygen-enriched atmosphere, materials
will burn at higher temperatures in an oxygen-enriched environment, and some materials will burn with a n almost explosivet reaction if ignited by a n u m b e r of ignition sources.
The specific gravity of GOX and LOX is 1.105 and 1.14, respectively. Thus, GOX is slightly denser than air, and LOX is
slightly denser than water. The significance of these properties is that oxygen is not buoyant and, thus, will tend to accumulate in low points or depressions. This should be considered in evaluating the dispersion of a gaseous leak or a
liquid spill.
HANDLING HAZARDS
GOX
The principal hazards associated with handling GOX are as
follows:
1. Fire. Most oxygen-related incidents are promoted by the
presence of contaminantsf or incompatible materials.
Fires in oxygen systems occur when a system material or a
contaminant in the presence of oxygen ignites and b u m s ,
and the resulting fire involves other system components in
a kindling chain process. In general, materials ignite at a
lower temperature in GOX than in air, b u m at a higher
flame temperature, and b u m more rapidly. Reaction speed
can vary from a slow combustion to an explosion. Oxygen
can saturate n o r m j j clothing and skin, rendering it extremely flammable.
2. Health. Oxygen toxicity must be considered for exposure
concentrations greater than 50% at 1 atm. Pure oxygen can
be breathed for limited periods of time: u p to 3 h at 1 atm
and 1 h at 3 atm of pressure. Adverse effects from breathing pure oxygen at sea-level pressure can be felt in 4 to 24
h [3-51
Copyright'
2000 by A S I M International
IGNITION MECHANISMS
General
In oxygen or oxygen-enriched atmospheres, ignition of fueloxygen mixtures will occur with lower energy inputs and at
lower temperatures than in air. For example, the m i n i m u m
spark energy required for the ignition of hydrogen in air is
0.019 m J (1.8 X 10^** Btu) at 1 atm [7], but the minimum spark
energy for the ignition of hydrogen in 1 atm of oxygen is only
0.0012 m J (1.1 X lO^^Btu) [S]. Some potential sources of thermal and electrical ignition of fuel-oxygen mixtures are listed
in Table 1.
www.astm.org
CHAPTER
TABLE 1Some potential ignition sources of fuel-oxygen
mixtures.
Adiabatic compression
Thermal ignition
Personnel smoking
Open flames
Shock waves from tank rupture
Fragments from bursting vessels
Heating of high-velocity jets
Welding
Explosive charges
Friction and galling
Resonance ignition (repeated shock waves in flow system)
Mechanical impact
Tensile rupture
Mechanical vibration
Exhaust from thermal combustion engine
Particle impact
Electrical ignition
Electrical short circuits, sparks, and arcs
Metal fiacture
Static electricity (two-phase flow)
Static electricity (solid particles)
Lightning
Generation of electrical charge by equipment operations
Ignition Conditions
The usual conditions for ignition follow a "3T" rule of t h u m b
[9]. The three T's stand for:
TemperatureMust be high enough to cause melting, vaporization, significant chemical reactions, or pyrolysistTimeMust be long enough to allow the heat input to be absorbed by the reactants so that a runaway thermochemical
process can occur.
TurbulenceMust be high enough to allow good mixing between the fuel and the oxidizer and heat can be transferred
from the reacted media to the unreacted media.
Ignition Factors
Factors affecting the ignition of solid materials include material composition and purity; size, shape, and condition of
the sample; characteristics of oxide layers; phase; testing apparatus; ignition source; gas pressure; and gas composition.
Ignition temperaturesf are provided in Ref 10 for several
solid materials in air and oxygen. The ignition process depends on the geometry and operating conditions; therefore,
caution must be taken in interpreting the results of any ignition experiment and in generalizing ignition data. Generally,
increasing the pressure reduces the ignition temperature for
most materials [11-14].
Care must be exercised in applying ignition temperature
data, especially for metals, to actual components. Ignition
temperature is not an inherent material property but is dependent upon the items listed above. When applying ignition
temperature data, it mu,st be ensured that the ignition temperature data were obtained in a manner similar to the enduse application. Failure to do this can result in erroneous decisions in the selection of materials. For example, the ignition
t e m p e r a t u r e of a l u m i n u m in oxygen varies from 953 K
(1255F), which is the melting point of aluminum, to 2020 K
(3176F), which is t h e melting point of a l u m i n u m oxide
2: PROPERTIES
AND HAZARDS
OF OXYGEN
AND OXYGEN
SYSTEMS
HAZARDS ANALYSIS
Although oxygen is not intrinsically dangerous, its use
involves a degree of risk that must never be overlooked. A
hazards analysisf should be performed on any component or
system intended for oxygen service. The hazards analysis
should include reviews of the system design, component design, operating procedures (emphasizing those that increase
the probability of personnel exposure), maintenance procedures, protective measures, in-service inspection requirements, and emergency procedures. The relationship of the
hazards analysis, other reviews, and the various project
phases is given in Appendix G. The hazards analysis should
identify static and operational hazards and provide information for developing safer and more reliable components and
systems.
The hazards analysis should be conducted according to the
following outline:
1. Determine the most severe operating conditions.
2. Evaluate tlammability of materials at the use conditions
(situational flammability).
3. Evaluate ignition sources.
4. Compare the above to existing data and perform configurational and component tests if required to determine and
demonstrate safety margins to ignition thresholds.
The hazards analysis shall consider the most severe operating conditions, and their effects upon the system. It shall
include the effect of operational anomalies and single-point
failuref modes, such as ignition, combustion, explosion, or
the effect of oxygen e n r i c h m e n t of a normally a m b i e n t
environment.
The following parameters define some of the operating
conditions relevant to the hazards of an oxygen system:
Temperature.
Pressure.
Oxygen concentration.
Flow velocity.
Rubbing parameters (load, speed).
Multiple duty cycles.
Components must be evaluated at the worst conditions
they would experience given a single-point failure in the sys-
DEFINE CDNFIGURATIDN
AND WDRST-CASE
OPERATING CDNDITIDNS
IS MATERIAL
'FLAMMABLE/EXPLDSIVE I N "
MINIMUM USE
THICKNESS 1^
YES
IES_
OXYGEN PURITY
JCES_
ND
REJECT CDMPDNENT
DESIGN /MATERIAL
SELECTION
MATERIAL/
CDNFIGURATIDN
ACCEPTABLE
FOR USE
tern. If it cannot be determined which condition is most severe or if the trends in material ignition and llammability (as
a function of the parameters Usted previously) are not understood, then the range of operating conditions must be
considered.
Oxygen is easily contaminated because many gases and liquids are soluble or completely miscible in it. Therefore, dissolving an odorless and colorless gas in oxygen can create an
invisible hazard. For example, inert gases such as argon and
nitrogen displace oxygen and can cause asphyxiation by reducing the oxygen level in breathing air or oxygen. A toxic gas
mixed in an oxygen or breathing air system can create a
health hazard. Explosions have resulted from inadvertent
mixing of flammable gases with oxygen.
Oxygen should be purchased to conform to Aviator's
Breathing Oxygen Purity Standard (ANSl/SAE AS 8010B) for
breathing and Oxygen, Liquid, Propellant Grade (ANSI/SAE
AMS 3012) for propellantf, or equivalent industrial standards that specify the oxygen purity and level to which contaminants are allowed appropriate to the intended application. The standards given here replace MIL-0-27210E [30]
and MIL-P-25508E [ 3 / ] , respectively.
The very low temperature of LOX may result in condensing
or solidifying (or both) many impurities, resulting in the concentration of contaminants in the system.
MNL36-EB/Jan. 2000
Materials Selection
GENERAL
While material selection cannot preclude system failures,
proper material selection coupled with good design practice
(see Chapter 4) can reduce the probability of system failures.
Materials evaluation and selection have been based on both
materials testing for ignition and combustion characteristics
and studies of LOX- and GOX-related failures.
A test that can produce either absolute ignition limits
or consistent relative ratings for all materials is not
available [32-35}. Materials have been evaluated by testing for
their ignition and burning characteristics by use of the established ignition and combustion tests described in Chapter 2.
Studies of oxygen-related incidents, fires, and failures have
shown that some materials and components used in oxygen
systems are vulnerable to ignition and may lead to catastrophic fires [36].
The ASTM Guide for Evaluating Nonmetallic Materials for
Oxygen Service (G 63) and ASTM Guide for Evaluating Metals for Oxygen Service (G 94) provide guidance in selecting
materials for use in oxygen service.
A large experience base and material test database for material selection exists for oxygen systems between 1 and 20.7
MPa (150 and 3000 psi); limited experience exists above 20.7
MPa (3000 psi). When selecting materials where little use experience exists, application-specific materials tests and configuration tests should be considered.
Information required to select materials and evaluate system safety includes material compositions and configurations, environmental and operational conditions (temperature, pressure, flow rate, or ignition mechanisms), and
ignition and combustion behavior of the materials in the
given environmental conditions. Ignition mechanisms to be
considered in selecting materials cu"e discussed in Chapter 2.
Materials in an oxygen environment below their autoignition temperature (AIT)t do not ignite without an ignition
source. The rate of energy input has to exceed the rate of heat
dissipation before ignition can occur. Ignition temperature is
dependent on the property of the material, the configuration,
the environment (temperature, pressure, oxygen concentration, and fuel characteristics), and the dynamic conditions
for flow systems.
The use of nonmetals in oxygen systems is often necessary
for purposes such as valve seats and seals; however, their
use should be limited and their quantity and exposure to oxygen should be minimized because nonmetals are more susceptible to ignition than metals (nearly all nonmetals are
flammable in oxygen at absolute pressures above 101.3 kPa
(14.7 psi)). In many instances, failures of metallic compo-
Copyright'
2000 by A S I M International
nents are caused by a polymer ignition, which provides sufficient energy for the metal to ignite. Nonmetals, such as polymers, generally ignite at lower temperatures and pressures
than metals; nonmetals may bum in oxygen at absolute pressures lower than 6.9 kPa (1 psi). The primary concern with
nonmetals in oxygen systems is that, if ignited, they may
cause damage to the oxygen system or user. Some damage
that might result includes propagation of the fire to metallic
components, loss of function arising from system leaks, and
toxic combustion products entering the oxygen system.
In general, metals are not easily ignited; however, metal particles may ignite easily. When ignited, however, burning metals can cause more damage than burning nonmetals because
of their higher flame temperatures and because they usually
produce liquid combustion products that spread fires readily.
Materials procured for use in oxygen systems require a material certificationt from the manufacturer. In addition, it is
good practice to confirm the manufacturer-supplied information.
The material requirements for LOX service include those
requirements for GOX, and, in addition, materials should
have satisfactory physiced properties, such as strength and
ductility, at low operating temperatures. One additional consideration is that vaporization of LOX occuis around heat
sources such as ball bearings. This increases ignition risks
and requires compensation for possible elevated pressure.
For summaries of material test data, see the ASTM Standard Guide for Evaluating Nonmetallic Materials for Oxygen
Service (G 63), Fire Hazards in Oxygen-Enriched Atmospheres (NFPA 53), and Refs 11, 15, 17, 18, 25. 28, 36-42.
Other data obtained from standard NASA materials tests are
stored in the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSEC)
Materials and Processes Test Information System (MAPTIS).
The data in this system are published periodically [/9] (see
Appendix B).
When selecting a material for oxygen systems, it is important to consider the material's ability to undergo specific
cleaning procedures (Chapter 5) to remove contaminants, particulatest, and combustible materials, without damage (see
ASTM Standard Practice for Cleaning Methods for Material
and Equipment Used in Oxygen-Enriched Environments (G
93), Cleaning Equipment for Oxygen Service (CGA G 4.1), and
Refs 43, 44).
MATERIALS CONTROL
ASTM standards related to determining the compatibility of
a material to GOX and LOX include the following:
www.astm.org
CHAPTER
3: MATERIALS
SELECTION
Standard Test Method for Measuring the Minimum Oxygen Concentration to Support Candle-Like Combustion of
Plastics (Oxygen Indexf) (ASTM D 2863),
Standard Test Method for Heat of Combustiont of Liquid
Hydrocarbon Fuels by Bomb Calorimeter (Intermediate
Precision Method) (ASTM D 4809),
Standard Guide for Evaluating Nonmetallic Materials for
Oxygen Service (ASTM G 63),
Standard Test Method for Autogenous Ignition Temperature of Liquids and Solids in a High-Pressure Oxygen-Enriched Environment (ASTM G 72),
Standard Test Method for Ignition Sensitivity of Materials
to Gaseous Fluid Impact (ASTM G 74),
Standard Test Method for Determining Ignition Sensitivity
of Materials to Mechanical Impact in Ambient Liquid Oxygen and Pressurized Liquid and Gaseous Oxygen Environments (ASTM G 86),
Standard Test Method for Determining the Combustion
Behavior of Metallic Materials in Oxygen-Enriched Atmospheres (ASTM G 124),
Standard Guide for Designing Systems for Oxygen Service
(ASTM G 88),
Standard Practice for Cleaning Methods for Material and
Equipment Used in Oxygen-Enriched Environments
(ASTM G 93), and
Standard Guide for Evaluating Metals for Oxygen Service
(ASTM G 94).
Through standards such as these, ASTM identifies test
methods and criteria by which the test results are evaluated
to determine the suitability of materials for use in an oxygen
environment.
For the use of a material in a given application, selection
criteria must be determined that may differ from the selection criteria of a standard because of the unique aspects of
the application. NASA uses ASTM standards for test methods, but applies different fail-pass criteria for determining
whether the material is suitable for use in an oxygen environment [45,461. NASA's acceptance criteria is based on both
the extreme environment conditions of pressure, temperature, and flow, and on the value of the assets involved. Materials that pass the required tests may be considered for use in
NASA's oxygen systems.
According to Sampling Procedures a n d Tables for Inspection by Attributes (ANSI/ASQC Z1.4), a batch is the
same as a lot, and is a collection of material that has been
m a d e u n d e r the same conditions and at the same time, using the same starting materials. Experience has shown that
some materials have such variability in manufacturing that
different batches of the same material are not always satisfactory for use. A batch or lot may have a sample drawn
from it and inspected to determine conformance with acceptability criteria. Batch lot testing was a NASA requirement {45} but the need for batch lot testing is now determ i n e d by the responsible NASA center materials
organization [46]. For example, NASA White Sands Test
Facility (WSTF) has a list of materials that do not require
batch lot testing if used at absolute pressures below 20.7
MPa (3000 psi). This list is based on history of successful
use in specific applications. Also, NASA Kennedy Space
Center (KSC) and Stennis Space Center (SSC) have LOX
a n d GOX materials selection lists t h a t differentiate be-
NONMETALLIC MATERIALS
This section contains guidelines that should be considered
when selecting nonmetals for oxygen systems. Appendix B
contains a discussion of the test methods and test data. The
ignition- and combustion-related properties of selected polymers are given in Table B-6.
Material Types
The nonmetals used in oxygen service are usually the polymers (including plastics and elastomers), thermosets, composites, and lubricants. Ceramics and glasses are not often
used in oxygen systems and are considered inert when used.
They are not discussed in this manual. Selection of nonmetals is based on the results of tests and use experience. Additional information relating to the selection of nonmetals
for oxygen service can be found in ASTM G 63.
Common elastomers used in oxygen systems are fluori-
10
AND OXYGEN
SYSTEMS
CHAPTER
B a t c h Lot Test Limitations
When tested by standard mechanical or pneumatic impact
tests, many nonmetals show a range of reaction pressures
when different batches or lots of material from the same
source are tested using identical methods. The variability
sometimes results from variations in the material composition
or processing and sometimes from the poor statistical base of
the tests. If variability results from changes in material composition or other material performance shortfalls, it is necessary to establish a minimum performance criterion and batch
testing procedure. However, when statistical variation limits
the sensitivity of an ignition or combustion test to batch variation, other tests can be substituted such as heat of combustion, melting points, density, or measurements for evaluating
the batch-to-batch consistency of a material. Unfortunately,
the current understanding of nonmetal ignition and flammabihty science rarely allows a direct correlation between these
physical, thermal, and chemical property measurements and
the important ignition and combustion characteristics.
Effects of Diluents
The effects of diluents and oxygen concentrations on the
flammability of some polymers have been investigated \49\
The data indicate that the selection of polymers for both air
and oxygen systems at absolute pressures above 20.7 MPa
(3000 psi) should be similar.
METALLIC MATERIALS
Metals are the most frequently used construction materials of
oxygen systems. Metals are generally less susceptible to ignition t h a n polymers. They are often ignited by a kindling
chain reaction from a polymer or hydrocarbon contaminant.
Selection of the proper metals in an oxygen system, coupled
with good design practice, can minimize the hazards of ignition and combustion of the metal. While selecting metals for
oxygen service situational or configurational flammability
must be evaluated.
In some cases, the resistance to ignition for metals is
caused by a protective oxide coating on the metal surface,
and the oxide coating should be considered when selecting
the metal. For alloys, the oxide or combination of oxides,
formed depends very much on the composition of the alloy
being oxidized and also the environment to which the alloy is
subjected. Nickel oxide (NiO) and iron oxide (FeO) are not
protective coatings mainly because they are not stoichiometric line compounds and, hence, diffusion through vacancies
and interstitials is high. However, chromium oxide (CraO;!),
silicone oxide (Si02), and aluminum oxide (Al20^) do not
have this problem because they are stoichiometric line compounds. The Pilhng and Bedworth ratiot, which establishes
whether or not an oxide is protective, indicates that nickel,
chromium, aluminum, and iron should form a protective oxide layer (ASTM Standard Guide for Evaluating Metals for
Oxygen Service [ASTM G 94]). However, this ratio does not
provide insight into the tenacity of the film or whether the oxide film grows conformably. Although Cr203 can form a passivating oxide film, it cannot be used for temperatures above
1072 K (1470F) because it volatilizes. SiOa is not a good ox-
3: MA TERIALS
SELECTION
11
alloys)
The ignition resistance of Inconel alloys varies with the specific alloy. Inconel 718 has been used extensively in highpressure oxygen systems in recent years, because it is a good
structural material and has been considered significantly less
ignitable than stainless steels. Some Inconel alloys have been
used successfully at absolute pressures as high as 69 MPa
(10 000 psi). However, recent studies' indicate that Inconel
718 is only marginally less ignitable than stainless steels (see
Table B-2, Appendix B). Inconel alloys appear to resist ignition by particle impact better than most stainless steels, but
are similar to stainless steel 440 C. Some Inconel alloys have
exceptional resistance to ignition by frictional heating, but
others (including Inconel 718) ignite at Pv products similar to
those of stainless steels. Inconel MA754, a mechanically alloyed material, has exceptional resistance to ignition by frictional heating and does not support self-sustained combustion (0.32-cm diameter rod (0.125-in.) burning upward) at
absolute pressures as high as 69 MPa (10 000 psi).
Nickel-Copper
alloys)
Nickel-copper alloys, such as Monel, are the least ignitable alloys commonly used as structural materials. Monel 400 and
K-500 have not ignited in particle impact tests (although
some surface melting and burning may be observed) and do
not burn upwards in upward flammability tests even in oxygen at absolute pressures as high as 69 MPa (10 000 psi).
' Data from tests conducted at NASA Johii.son Space Center White
Sands Test Facility; tbr additional information, contact White Sands
Test Facility.
12
AND OXYGEN
SYSTEMS
Alloys (such as
Hastelloy)
Some Hastelloys, such as C-22 and C-276, are much more ignition resistant than stainless steels and Inconel 718.
Stainless Steels
Stainless steels are far more ignition- and burn-resistant than
titanium and aluminum alloys and are used extensively in
high-pressure oxygen systems. The ignition and b u r n resistance is about the same for most stainless steels. Occasional
exceptions exist, such as stainless steel 440 C, which ignites
and propagates flame less easily t h a n other stainless steels.
Few problems are experienced with the use of stainless steel
storage tanks or lines, but ignitions have occurred in stainless
steel components such as valves used at high pressure, high
flow rates, or both. Although stainless steels particulate can
ignite materials, it is far less hazardous than aluminum particulate. Stainless steels have high heats of combustion and
are ignited quite easily by frictional heating, particle impact,
and promoterst.
Copper a n d Copper Alloys
Copper in bulk form is suitable for use in oxygen systems at
all pressures. It is particularly useful for resisting ignition by
particle impact and therefore can be used as impingement
plates (see Chapter 4).
Note: Copper and s o m e copper alloys in finely divided
configurations, such as wire mesh, are flammable i n
oxygen.
Copper is resistant to ignition and combustion, but it also
13
Iron Alloys
Iron alloys are not good candidates for oxygen systems because they ignite easily and offer little weight savings. However, iron alloys are used extensively in compressed gas cylinders. Iron alloys, like many other alloys, should not be used
unless the credible sources of ignition are identified and
removed.
Alloy steels (Fe-Ni) suitable for use in oxygen systems include 5% nickel (but not at t e m p e r a t u r e s below 129 K
[_227F] because of low-temperature embrittlement), 9%
nickel, and 36% nickel (Invar). The threshold pressure for
Invar 36 is similar to most stainless steels. In frictional heating tests a similar behavior is noted, where the Pv product
for ignition is comparable to that of stainless steels (Appendix B).
Restricted Alloys
In oxygen systems, the use of certain metals including titanium, cadmium, beiyllium, magnesium, and mercury must
be restricted.
Titanium alloys must be avoided because titanium is impact-sensitive in oxygen. A reaction of titanium and LOX or
GOX may propagate and completely c o n s u m e the metal
[39,56-58]. Various titanium alloys tested (a, a-P, P alloys)
showed very high sensitivity to mechanical impact in oxygen
[59]. Titanium must not be used with LOX at any pressure or
with GOX at an absolute pressure above 207 kPa (30 psi).
Tests have indicated that titanium, ot-titanium, and a2-titanium alloys can be ignited and sustain combustion in oxygen
at absolute pressures as low as 7 kPa (1 psi). Frictional heating tests conducted on titanium and titanium alloys
indicated that the Pv product for ignition is extremely low
(see Table B-2, Appendix B). Recent tests indicate that titanium and its alloys can also be ignited in air in frictional
heating tests.
Cadmium's toxicity and vapor pressure restrict its use. Syst e m s containing breathing oxygen m u s t not include cadmium if temperatures will exceed 322 K (120F) at any time.
Beryllium must not be used in oxygen systems or near oxygen systems where it could be consumed in a fire, because
beryllium metal, its oxides, and its salts are highly toxic.
Magnesium and its alloys are flammable in air and, therefore, should not be used in oxygen systems. In promoted
combustion tests in 100% oxygen, magnesium and its alloy
AZ-91 have shown the ability to sustain combustion even at
absolute pressures as low as 7 kPa (1 psi).
MNL36-EB/Jan. 2000
Design Principles
DESIGN APPROACH
The generally accepted steps in the design process, including
design and quality and acceptance testingt, are given below.
Specific design details are given in this chapter with examples given in Appendix C. ASTM Guide for Designing Systems
for Oxygen Service (ASTM G 88) provides guidance in
designing systems for use in oxygen service.
Risk Training
Before embarking on a new design task, it is important that
designers, customers, and operators understand the risks associated with oxygen systems. Experience with inert fluids,
such as nitrogen, does not qualify one to safely design and operate oxygen systems. This chapter addresses concerns specific to oxygen systems.
Design Specifications
Each new design project must begin with specifications for
the requested item. It is important to ensure that these specifications do not create an unnecessary risk for personnel or
equipment. Also, many materials are combustible in oxygenenriched environments, and reactivity is generally increased
with increasing temperature and pressure. Therefore, materials selection criteria are critical to achieving a successful final product. However, do not over-specify. Requesting higher
temperature and pressure ratings than are necessary requires
more expensive materials and heavier and bulkier parts and
may increase risks associated with testing and find use.
Design Reviews
Prior to the construction of components, equipment, systems, or facilities that involve the use of oxygen, the design of
such shall be reviewed in accordance with approved procedures of the AHJ. The design review shall address, among
other issues, safety and hazards involved in the component,
equipment, system, or facility, and compliance with applicable standards, codes and regulations. The design review ultimately needs to address all design aspects, down to the individual part level, because all parts may pose potential
hazards in oxygen service. The design review shall consist of
formal reviews at various stages of a project, beginning with
the conceptual stage and ending with the final review and approval to begin the fabrication and construction stage. A
summary of these reviews and their relationship with other
14
Copyright
2000 by A S I M International
www.astm.org
15
16
AND OXYGEN
SYSTEMS
CHAPTER
seats in rotating configurations. Ball valves are not recommended for some applications in oxygen systems because
of their tendency to generate particulate and their fast opening times, wfiich create rapid pressurization of systems.
17. Avoid thin walls. The walls between inner cavities or passageways and the outer surface of component housings
may become so thin that stress concentrations result
when pressure is introduced. Because geometries both
inside and outside can be complex, it may not be obvious
from drawings or even from direct inspection that such
thin, highly stressed areas exist. If such walls become too
thin, they may rupture under pressure loading. The energy released by the rupture can raise the temperature in
the rupture zone. The failed section can expose bare,
jagged metal that can oxidize rapidly a n d may heat
enough to ignite and burn.
18. Be cautious of single-barrier failures. A single-barrier
failure, such as a leak in which only the primary containment structure is breached, introduces oxygen into a region not normally exposed to oxygen. The materials or
configuration of parts in this region may not be compatible with oxygen.
Any situation in which a single barrier may fail should
be analyzed during the design phase. The single-barrier
failure analysis may consist of an engineering evaluation
of the configuration, including an analysis of the compatibility of materials exposed by the failure with the
high-pressure oxygen. The purpose of the analysis should
be to determine if a barrier failure is credible and if exposure of incompatible materials can create a hazard. If
the hazard cannot be assessed adequately by analysis, a
conflgurational test may be performed.
19. Be aware of seat shape and seal design. Designs in which
an O-ring seals against a seat in such a way that it may
cause increased wear, accelerated extrusion of the O-ring
material, or the generation of particulate contamination
should be avoided.
Although the design of sealing interfaces is a necessary
compromise, the design should use standard seat shapes
as much as possible. Past experience has shown that elastomeric O-rings are successful in static environments but
are usually poor choices in dynamic environments, and
should only be considered in designs where the exposure
to oxygen is minimized. In some instances, PTFE with Viton as a backup (which exposes the most compatible materials preferentially to oxygen) has been used for seals
where elastomers must be used and cannot be limited to
line exposure. Rigid plastics such as Vespel have been
used as seats in valves and regulators; however, the noncompliance of the material requires a small contact area
with a hard (metal or sapphire) mating surface to achieve
a seal. An alternative to rigid plastics is to use a coined
metal seat if the precautions to eliminate galling, discussed previously, have been taken.
20. Allow sufficient seal squeeze to avoid O-ring extrusion.
Standard manufacturers' dimensions and tolerances
should be incorporated into designs unless an unusual
overriding design constraint demands the change. Additionally, the dimensions of all parts in the valve assembly
should be carefully inspected.
4: DESIGN
PRINCIPLES
17
18
AND OXYGEN
SYSTEMS
19
The tank outlet should be clearly marked and should indicate whether the contents are gaseous or liquid. The hazard
potential of opening the system will differ significantly between pressurized gases and liquid. Emergency isolation
valves that function to stop liquid flow from the tank in case
of a line failure downstream should be provided as close to
the tank annulus as possible. The emergency valve should be
quick-acting and must be operable under conditions of maximum flow through a ruptured pipe. A label shall be provided
listing the content, capacity, operating pressuresf, direction
of flow, dates of proof testsf, and dates of in-service inspection and recertificationf.
Tank truck specifications for LOX are described in
Chapter 8 of this m a n u a l , CGA S t a n d a r d for Insulated
Cargo Tankf Specifications for Cryogenic Liquids (CGA
341X and 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 171-179
[63], and Ref 64. The vibration and sloshing of LOX should
be minimized by careful selection of r u n n i n g gear a n d
placement of inner tank baffles and supporting systems. Vibration can be reduced by controlling unwanted expansion
and contraction.
The tank pressure or liquid should not open the isolation
valves. The valves should fail closed on loss of power or loss
of control signal. The emergency isolating valve should be in
addition to any normal isolating valve required for operation.
Top-entry connections that extend into the liquid should also
be protected by emergency valves.
Piping Systems
20
AND OXYGEN
SYSTEMS
of heat into the line. A heat leak can cause the pressure to
increase significantly as trapped fluid w a r m s to a t m o spheric temperature. Therefore, each such section must be
equipped with protective devices for overpressuref control, particularly from overpressures caused by insulation
failures. The overpressure protection devices must be located in such a manner that all parts of the system are protected from overpressure.
4. Low points (traps) on liquid discharge piping are to be
avoided to prevent accumulating contaminants and trapping liquid. If traps are unavoidable, low-point drains
should be provided and designed so that all fluids drain on
oxygen-compatible surfaces. All tubing ends, fittings, and
other components used in oxygen systems should be protected against damage and contamination.
5. Where practical, avoid cavitation in LOX; where impractical, use the preferred materials listed in Ref 11.
GOX Piping SystemsThe following considerations are applicable to GOX piping systems:
1. The primary concern with high-velocity flow conditions is
the entrainment of particulates and their subsequent impingement on a surface, such as at bends in piping. The effects of extremes in flow velocity and pressure are also
concerns. Material erosion or ignition can be caused by entrained particulate impact and abrasion, erosive effects of
the fluid flow, or by both.
2. Until a more quantitative limit can be established, the following practices are recommended:
a. Where practical, avoid sonic velocity in gases; where impractical, use the preferred materials listed in Ref 11.
b. If possible, avoid the use of n o n m e t a l s at locations
within the system where sonic velocity can occur.
c. Maintain fluid system cleanliness to hmit entrained peirticulates, a n d perform blowdown with filtered, dry
gaseous nitrogen (GN2) at maximum anticipated pressure and flow before wetting the system with oxygen.
3. Piping systems should be designed to ensure the GOX in
the system does not exceed specified velocities. Places
where fluid velocities approach 30 m/s (100 ft/s) should be
reviewed for particle impact ignition sensitivity (refer to
Appendix B and CGA G-4.4).
4. Piping and fittings for use in oxygen service at gage
pressures above 4.83 MPa (700 psi) should be stainless
steel, nickel alloys, or copper alloys [56], because of ignition susceptibility. Monel is approved for tubing, fittings,
and component bodies [111. The choice of piping and fitting materials should take the external environment into
consideration.
Systems Connections and JointsThe following principles
and practices should be considered with regard to connections and joints in piping systems.
1. Welded, brazed, or silver-soldered joints are satisfactory
for oxygen systems. Such joints, however, if left in the asformed condition, may have slag or surfaces that can trap
contaminants. Welds shaU be specified as full penetration
so that the contracting surfaces are joined to limit particulate entrapment.
The use of fittings, such as socket fittings, that leave a
gap exposed to oxygen are permitted by standards such as
CHAPTER
S t a n d a r d for Bulk Oxygen Systems at Consumer Sites
(NFPA 50). However, the use of such fittings must be given
careful consideration. Factors that must be considered in
the use of this type of fitting include the potential for contaminant entrapment in the gap and the difficulty of removing cleaning fluids from the gap.
2. Exposed weld surfaces should be ground to a smooth finish for ease of cleaning. With brazed and soldered joints,
special care must be taken to ensure surface cleanliness,
close and uniform clearance, and full penetration of the
joint.
3. Materials used should be documented for compatibility
with the total environment of pressure, temperature, flow
rates, and exposure time profiles. Material for joints and
fittings should be similar to the piping metal to avoid developing electrical couples. When the use of different metals cannot be avoided, considerable care must be taken
when removing the fitting or connection so any grit or contaminant resulting from the electrical couple is not left in
the piping.
4. Piping should be assembled by welding, except at connections to valves, etc., where flanged joints are required.
Welding procedures, welder qualification tests, welding
operations, and weld testing should be in accordance with
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IV, "Qualification Standard for Welding and Brazing Procedures,
Welders, Brazers, and Welding and Brazing Operators"
and ASME B31.3. Backup rings should not be used because of the difficulty of recleaning the system.
5. Transition joints, such as a l u m i n u m to stainless steel,
should not be used in LOX transportation system piping.
Large temperature cycles and severe mechanical jolts have
frequently caused failure of such joints.
6. The connection of a LOX vessel to rigidly mounted facility
piping should use a flexible metal hose that is properly
supported and anchored, insulated for low-temperature
service, and rated for use at the MAWP of the fill line. Recommendations for flexible hoses include a maximum allowable slack of about 5% of the total length. For greater
safety, the hose restraints should be at least 50% stronger
than the calculated impact force on an open line moving
through the flexure distance of the restraint.
7. Fill connections for loading and transfer from transportation systems shall t e r m i n a t e in the fixed ends of hose
unions that use a unique design configuration (for example, keyed) to prevent filling oxygen tanks with other fluids. Standard cryogenic fluid transfer connections, such as
those described in CGA Standard Cryogenic Liquid Transfer Connections (CGA Pamphlet V-6) should be used
whenever possible to prevent cross connection of filling
systems for oxygen and other fluids.
8. The oxygen gas trailers and transfer connections must use
a unique design configuration to prevent or minimize connecting with incompatible gaseous fluids or similar fluids
at different pressure levels. The connectors and fittings to
be disconnected during operations should be provided
with tethered end plates, caps, plugs, or covers to protect
the system from contamination or damage when not in
use.
4: DESIGN
PRINCIPLES
21
ComponentsConsiderations
applicable to components of
oxygen piping systems include the following.
1. Isolation Valves
Isolation valves shall be used as needed to isolate
portions of a piping system for operating, maintenance,
and emergencies. All valves should be accessible for operation and maintenance and should be protected from
accidental damage by nearby activities, such as vehicle
movement.
Valves in GOX distribution sy.stems should be kept to a
minimum and should be of good quality because they have
mechanical joints that are susceptible to leaks. All valve
materials must be suitable for oxygen service, and material
selection must meet velocity criteria. Stems, packing
glands, and other parts vital to proper valve operation
should be of materials that will not readily corrode. The
stem packing should be an oxygen-compatible material as
Usted in approved sources, such as Ref 66.
Isolation valves should operate either fully open or fully
closed and never in a throttling or regulating mode. Where
required, a bypass valve should be provided around an isolation valve, especially one of large size. The bypass valve
must be of suitable materials because of the high velocity
involved. If a remotely operated bypass valve is used, the
valve should close in case of power loss, or from a system
emergency shutdown signal.
GOX tube trailers should be equipped with normally
closed safety shutoff valves that require power to remain
open, and automatically return to full closed when the
power is removed. These safety shutoff valves should never
be used for flow control. Manually operated main shut-off
valves should also be used to isolate the trailers and to control flow, if required.
Manual bypass valves should be provided around manual pipeline valves to equalize pressure in a controlled
manner for configurations or systems where it is necessary
to reduce adiabatic compression, pressure surge, or high
flow velocity across controlling elements.
Valves that, from a safety viewpoint, are suitable for
high-pressure GOX service may also be suitable for highpressure LOX service. The selection of a valve for liquid
service should include consideration of possible mechanical problems such as contraction strains, icing, and glass
transition temperatures of polymers. Extended-stem gate,
globe, or ball valves are satisfactory. Valves must be provided with venting features to prevent trapping cryogenic
liquid or cold gases. Valves, particularly ball valves and
gate valves, used in LOX service should be designed to
eliminate a trapped volume between the upstream and
downstream seats when in the closed position. Liquid
trapped between the seats of a valve will expand when
heated and can rupture the valve and piping system.
Valves should include an electrical ground connection
between the stem and body to prevent static electric
charge from accumulating on internal components from
the fluid flowing through the valve.
Vessels used as test facility components should have
remotely operated fail-safe shutoff valves located close
to the loading vessel. All large-capacity storage vessels
should have remotely operated fail-safe shutoff valves. A
22
AND OXYGEN
SYSTEMS
23
MNL36-EB/Jan. 2000
Cleaning
GENERAL
System cleanliness is critical in oxygen components and systems because contaminants may cause functioned anomalies
or ignition. Components used in oxygen systems should always be reasonably clean before initial assembly to ensure
c o n t a m i n a n t s do not d a m a g e the h a r d w a r e . After initial
mockup assembly, oxygen systems must be disassembled and
thoroughly cleaned, reassembled, leak tested, and purged
with clean, oil-free, filtered, dry, gaseous nitrogen or helium
before they are wetted with oxygen.
The ASTM Practice for Cleaning Methods for Material and
Equipment Used in Oxygen-Enriched Environments (G 93)
provides guidelines for industrial practices in cleaning for
use in oxygen service.
This chapter describes procedures for component disassembly, precleaningt, precision cleaningf, cleanliness verification, protection of cleaned c o m p o n e n t s a n d references
standards related to the development and selection of cleaning processes and agents.
Cleaning should ensure the removal of c o n t a m i n a n t s
which will potentially cause mechanical malfunctions, system failures, fires, or explosions. This specialized service
must be performed by properly trained and qualified individuals at approved facilities. In many cases a facility certification is required.
Effective cleaning will:
1. Remove particles, films, greases, oils, and other unwanted
matter.
2. Prevent loose scale, rust, dirt, mill scale, weld spatter, and
weld flux deposited on moving and stationary parts from
interfering with the component function and clogging flow
passages.
3. Reduce the concentration of finely divided contaminants,
which are more easily ignited than bulk material.
24
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2000 by A S I M International
www.astm.org
CHAPTER 5: CLEANING 25
of contaminants, and the desired cleanliness level. In addition, the item or component configuration (such as dead-end
ports) must be investigated so cleaning operations can be adequately performed.
Items that should be considered when establishing t h e
cleanliness level include as a minimum: flammability of the
materials of construction, system and component pressurization rates, flow velocities, use of filters, and effects of contaminants on downstream components. It has been reported
that as little as 10 mg of oil film may be ignited \_76] and as little as 10 mg of particulate has ignited components [6I\. The
threshold level of contamination that markedly increases the
ignition hazard has not been established. Therefore, good
practice is to be conservative by specifying a cleanliness level
equal to or better than that which experience has shown to be
acceptable for the application.
When a component is removed from an oxygen system, it
should be inspected to determine its degree of cleanliness.
This provides a n opportunity to determine the cleanliness of
the system and to establish cleaning intervals and levels. For
example, when a filter is removed it should be back-flushed,
and the trapped debris should be analyzed. Based on the results of the analysis, appropriate action can be taken.
The cleaned oxygen systems and components should be inspected in accordance with the guidelines established by the
AHJ.
Note: If solvents that react with liquid oxygen are used
in an oxygen system the solvent must be removed and
the removal verified prior t o wetting the system with
oxygen. The u s e of IPA in cleaning oxygen systems has
been reported t o have caused a fire in an oxygen system because the IPA w a s not thoroughly removed in
the cleaning process (OMB 0704-0188) [77]. Additionally, flammable cleaning solvents may be absorbed by
soft goods; the effects of this absorption must be assessed for oxygen systems.
CLEANING SAFETY
Cleaning Operations
An experienced responsible individual shall direct cleaning
operations. Operators shall be instructed in the safe use of
the cleaning agents and all applicable hazard communication
standard requirements such as Material Safety Data Sheets
(MSDSs). Operators shall also be given written standard operating procedures (SOPs) that identify safety considerations
wherever special safety considerations are involved.
The use of hazardous cleaning chemicals shall be kept to a
minimum. Appropriate spill response training and spill control equipment must be provided for the chemical types used.
Used cleaning solutions shall be disposed of in accordance
with appropriate federal, state a n d local hazardous waste
regulations.
Ventilation
All areas where cleaning compounds and solvents are used
shall be adequately ventilated to protect operators from hazardous airborne contaminants. Local exhaust ventilation, together with enclosures, should be used whenever feasible.
CLEANING PROCEDURES
No single cleaning procedure will meet all cleanliness requirements. Visual cleanliness is not a sufficient criterion
when dealing with oxygen systems because of the hazards associated with contaminants invisible to the naked eye. General oxygen-system cleaning procedures are discussed in
ASTM 0^93.
Items to be cleaned should be completely disassembled before cleaning when possible. Piping systems should be
cleaned and inspected before assembly. Components or parts
that could be damaged during cleaning should be cleaned
separately. Calibration-sensitive items should be processed
by qualified personnel.
Preparing components for oxygen sen'ice includes hydrostatic testing!, degreasing, disassembling and examining,
precleaning, inspection, precision cleaning, reassembly,
functional testing, and packaging. Special cleaning procedures may be required to remove heavy oils and greases, rust,
welding discoloration, and slag. Depending on the design of
the component or system, special procedures may also be required. Typical cleaning operations are as follows.
Degreasing
Degrease metal parts with a degreasing agent by immersing,
spraying, or vapor-rinsing the part until all surfaces have
26
AND OXYGEN
SYSTEMS
been thoroughly flushed or wetted. Assist the degreasing action with suitable brushes if necessary.
Note: This s t e p is required only for heavily oil- or
grease-contaminated items. Alkaline cleaners used t o
preclean metallic parts a n d detergents used to preclean both metallic and nonmetallic parts may effectively remove small amounts of grease and oil.
Disassembling and Examining
Components should be disassembled and their parts grouped
according to the method of cleaning. During disassembly, individual parts should be examined to assess their serviceability. If sealing surfaces are damaged or cracked, the component must be repaired or replaced. Special attention should
be directed to nonmetalsf since many solvents will reduce the
desired physical properties or destroy the nonmetals. On
used and long-stored components, remove and discard all
nonmetallic parts if possible, and replace them with new, like
parts. Materials used to fabricate replacement parts under
original specifications must have oxygen compatibility at
least as good as that of the original materials.
Hydrostatic Testing
Any required hydrostatic testing on hard lines, flexible hoses,
and pressure vessels should be completed before precleaning.
Precleaning
Various commercially available, cleaning solutions can be
used in conjunction with ultrasonics to remove firmly attached contaminants. Commonly used cleaning solutions include alkaline solutions, acid solutions, mild alkaline liquid
detergents, and rust and scale removers.
The cleaning solutions used depends on the material to be
cleaned. Stainless steels (300 series), Monel alloys, Inconel alloys, and Teflon are usually cleaned in an alkaline solution
and then in an acid solution. Carbon steel is cleaned by a rust
and scale remover, if required, and then in a n alkaline solution followed by a rust inhibitor. In severe cases of rust or corrosion, carbon steel may be glass-bead blasted. Copper and
brass are cleaned in alkaline solution, then acid pickled. Alum i n u m and nonmetals are cleaned in less caustic solutions.
Other specialized materials may require different cleaning
techniques; materials should not be cleaned in solutions with
which they react significantly. Assist chemical cleaning with
mechanical cleaning when necessary.
Visual inspection should be conducted by a highly trained
inspector with magnified otoscope, glass and/or horoscope
and continue precleaning until the inspector passes the component.
Chemical CleaningChemical cleaning may be a single-step
or multi-step process, depending upon the material involved.
These typical steps in the precleaning operation give insight
into the quality and thoroughness necessary for cleEining oxygen systems.
Note: Parts should be h a n d l e d only with approved,
clean gloves in the following steps.
Detergent CleaningLess caustic solutions are used to clean
both metallic and nonmetallic parts. Spray and immerse the
Inspecting
Visual inspection should be conducted by a highly trained inspector with magnified assistance of otoscope, glass or boro-
CHAPTER 5: CLEANING 27
scope and continue precleaning until the inspector passes
component for precision cleaning. The parts shall be visually
inspected u n d e r both a strong white and black light for
contaminants.
Note: Visual inspection with the naked eye will only detect particulate matter larger than 50 (jim as well as
moisture, oils, and greases.
Precision Cleaning
DegreasingAt ambient temperature, the parts are cooler
than the vapors in the vapor degreaser. As they are lowered
into the vapor, the vapor condenses on the parts. The condensate collecting on the parts helps remove greases, oils,
and particulate. When the temperature of the parts is equal
to that of the vapors, condensation ceases. The parts are then
lowered into the ultrasonic tankf for ultrasonic cleaning. After ultrasonic cleaning, slowly lift the parts into the vapor region. They are again cooler than the surrounding vapor, and
condensation occurs. When condensation ceases, slowly remove the parts to the final rinse area.
Final RinsingThoroughly
rinse the parts with distilled solvent from the distillate side of the vapor degreaser.
Cleanliness VerificationThis step is performed in conjunction with the final rinsing. Rinse the parts with enough dis-
tilled solvent to obtain a reasonably sized sample. Some considerations involved in the verification of cleanliness include
the following:
1. Typically, 0.1 m^ (1 ft^) of surface area is rinsed with 100
niL (0.026 gal) of solvent. Collect this solvent in a clean
sample beaker.
2. Filter the sample in the beaker through a 0.45-nm (1.77 x
10 "' in.) filter. Size and count the particulate.
3. For organic solvents the filtrate is evaporated in a clean,
preweighed tare dish to determine the a m o u n t of nonvolatile residue left in the tare dish. For verification of removal of hydrocarbon contaminants using aqueous processes alternative verification methods are available in
ASTMG 136 and G 144.
4. Typical NASA, ASTM, and CGA cleanliness specifications
are given in Tables 2 and 3. The maximum allowable nonvolatile residue on parts used for oxygen service is normally lOmg/m^ (2.05 x 10''lb/ft^). Particulate requirements for specific components and systems depend on the
application; levels 50, 100, and 300 are most common.
5. If parts fail to meet the required specifications, the precision cleaning must be repeated. Precleaning should only
be repeated when necessary.
DryingAfter the parts have been verified clean, they should
be dried with filtered, dry, compressed air or nitrogen.
Cleaning
Tcsl Level
1000
Me
<500
500 thru 750
> 7 5 0 t h r u 1000
>1000
<100
100 t h m 250
>250 thru 500
unlimited"
34
5
0
unlimited"
1075
27
>500
300
<100
100 thru 250
>250 thru 300
>300
unlimited"
93
3
0
200
<50
50 t h m 100
> 100 thru 200
>200
unlimited"
154
16
0
500
175
100
50
<25
25 thru 50
> 5 0 t h r u 100
>100
<10
15 t h m 25
>25 thru 50
>50
ASTM G 93 Speciiicalions
Si/e
No. ol Particles
Range,
Allowed per 0.1 m^,
ji,m/100mL
Ift^
X <100
100< X <175
175< X <300
300< X <500
X >500
fibers
X <100
100< X <17S
17S< X <300
X >300
fibers
no limit
100
20
5
0
100
no limit
20
5
0
25
X <50
50< X <100
100< X <175
X >175
fibers
20
5
1
0
5
unlimited"
68
11
0
unlimited"
17
8
0
" "Unlimited" means particulate in this size range is not counted; however, if the accumulation of this silt is sufficient to interfere with the
analysis, the sample shall be rejected.
'' CGA 1/07]
' Isolated fibers of lint shall be no longer than 2000 (im, and there shall be no accumulation of lint fibers.
28
SYSTEMS
Level
A
B
C
D
E
F
NASA
Specifications [106]
Maximum Quantity NVR
mg/m''Ib/ft^
10
20
30
40
2.05
4.10
6.14
8.19
X
X
X
X
10^
10 **
10^*
10 **
mg/m^
<11
<33
<66
<220
<550
ASTM G 93
Specifications
NVR Remaining
Ib/ft^
< 2 . 2 5 x 10 "^
<6.76 x 10 ^
<1.35 X 10 ^
<4.51 X 1 0 ^
<1.13 X 1 0 "
specified by user or supplier
500
1.02 X 1 0 "
Component Reassembly
When reassembling the system or components, only precision cleaned tools shall be used. The operator shall wear
clean, lint-free gloves and outer garments consistent with the
class of the reassembly area. Small components shall be assembled in a clean, dust-free environment. Keep all openings
and clean surfaces covered with FEP (Teflon) or CTFE
(Aclar) film until the system has been assembled.
Functional Testing
Leak-test the assembled component with oxygen-compatible
leak-check solution while component is being pressurized
with clean, dry air or nitrogen.
Apply final operational tests as required at rated pressure
and flow rate. (Nitrogen must be used for greater safety in the
operational tests.)
Packaging
Items cleaned for oxygen service are double-bagged as soon
as possible after cleanliness verification is obtained. The inner bag protects the cleanliness of the part. The outer bag is
used primarily as a vapor barrier and to protect the inner bag.
Inner Bag^After a part has been precision cleaned, it shall be
bagged in an oxygen-compatible film. The film used for bagging oxygen system parts must be as clean as the item being
packaged. FEP (Teflon) or CTFE (Aclar) film is normally
used for the inner packaging.
Outer BagThe outer bag is commonly polyethylene. It protects the inner bag and the part from abrasion, particles, and
moisture.
Label^A label should be affixed to the outer bag of each
bagged part to document the cleanliness level (see discussion
later in this chapter).
CHAPTER 5: CLEANING 29
native exists at the assembly stage, the assembly specifications should require additional cleaning after the O-ring and
threaded part have been assembled and before the components are installed in the next level of assembly. A light coating of compatible seal lubricant should be used to ease
assembly.
Threaded Assembly
Care should be taken when assembling threaded connections, because contaminants can be generated in oxygen systems as the threads are engaged and tightened (see Appendix
C, Fig. C-6).
Deformable Parts
Parts such as screw-locking devices, which are deformed by
other parts during assembly, may generate particulate. These
parts are usually nonmetallic inserts. Their use should be
limited as m u c h as possible, and their installation should be
sequenced so that they are driven in once only. Further assembly and disassembly increases the amount of particulate
created.
Press Fits
Press fits generate particulate during their assembly from the
relative motion of the two highly loaded surfaces. The particulate can be partially removed by cleaning the joined parts
immediately after pressing them together; this step should be
called out on the subassembly drawing. Assembly procedure
documents should ensure that the installation of press-fit,
push-fit, and threaded valve parts into housing bores is performed with the housing inverted (bore opening pointing
down), so contaminants generated during assembly fall away
from the component rather than into flow paths.
Components with press-fit parts are extremely difficult
to clean. These parts should never be submerged into a cleaning solution or bath, as the cleaning solution enters between
the two press-fit parts, leaches out later, and becomes a
contaminant.
RECORD KEEPING
Record keeping is especially critical for equipment in oxygen
service. At a minimum, labels must specify the cleanliness
level and what cleaning specification was used.
MNL36-EB/Jan. 2000
Operating Procedures
GENERAL GUIDELINES
Confined Space
Personnel shall not be permitted to enter a confined space
that may be subject to oxygen enrichment or oxygen depletion, or a confined space that contains a toxic material until
an assessment of that space is made and specific authorization is obtained. Entry must be done in accordance with
OSHA requirements, and only trained personnel should be
eJlowed to use monitoring equipment, evaluate entry, and do
actual entry. Free entrance is permissible only if the oxygen
concentration is between 19.5 and 23.5 vol%.
Instruments used for determining oxygen enrichment or
oxygen depletion must be calibrated in accordance with
specific requirements for the instrument.
PERSONNEL
Operator Certification
General
Before being certified to work with LOX or GOX, the operator shall demonstrate the following:
Boiowledge of the properties of LOX and GOX,
General knowledge of approved materials that are compatible with LOX and GOX under operating conditions,
Familiarity with manufacturers' manuals detailing equipment operations,
Proficiency in the use and care of protective equipment
and clothing and safety equipment,
Proficiency in maintaining a clean system and clean equipment in oxygen service,
Recognition of normal operations and symptoms that indicate deviations from such operations, and
Conscientious following of instructions and checklist requirements.
Copyright'
2000 by A S I M International
www.astm.org
Cryogenic Cold-shock
Cold-shocking a newly assembled LOX system by loading it
with clean liquid nitrogen following final assembly is highly
recommended. After the cryogenic cold-shock, the system
should be emptied of liquid nitrogen and warmed to ambient
temperature. Bolts and threaded connection must then be retorqued to prescribed values, and gas leak-checking procedures should follow.
Following cold-shock, the entire system should be inspected for evidence of cracking, distortion, or any other
anomaly, with special attention directed to welds. Then system cleanliness must be checked and verified.
Hydrostatic Testing
Where cleaning requirements preclude post-hydiostatic testing of a cold-shocked system, a thorough review of system integrity should be conducted. This includes cases where a
previously tested system is to be modified [80].
EXAMINATIONS
A visual safety examination of the oxygen systems should include verification of dimensions, joint preparations, alignment, welding or joining, supports, assembly, and erection.
Examples of conditions to be observed are:
Corrosion (especially under insulation),
Mechanical damage,
Cracking (especially at welds and areas of known stress
concentration),
Bulges or blisters,
Leakage,
Loose nuts, bolts, or other parts,
Excessive vibration,
Abnormal noise,
Overtemperature,
Discrepancies in gage readings,
Pipe hanger condition,
Flexible hose antiwhip devices,
Frost on vacuum-jacketed lines and on containers,
Obstruction in relief-valve vents, and
Evidence of contamination in system.
MNL36-EB/Jan. 2000
GENERAL
gen supplies. Consideration should be given for the installation of water spray systems.
2. Locate oxygen systems a safe distance from heat or thermal radiation sources.
3. Limit ignition sources and provide lightning protection in
the form of lightning rods, aerial cable, and suitably connected ground rods in all preparation, storage, and use
areas. All equipment in buildings should be interconnected and grounded to prevent inducing sparks between
equipment during lightning strikes (NFPA 70).
4. Provide a n isolation valve outside of a building that has
oxygen lines inside the building to close off the oxygen
supply.
5. Anticipate indirect oxygen exposure that may result from
system failures.
6. Avoid venting into confined spacesf.
7. Use the fewest possible n u m b e r of piping joints.
8. Locate instrumentation and controls so the system can be
inspected, serviced, and operated without presenting a
h a z a r d to personnel. Lighting should be provided for
equipment inspection and safe personnel movement.
9. Provide sufficient clearance for vehicles in structures
over roads, driveways, and accesses. Roads, curves, and
driveways should have sufficient width and radius to accommodate required vehicles. Access should be provided
for the operation and maintenance of safety and control
equipment. Also, two exit routes should be provided from
all buildings and test cells.
10. Consideration should be given to the effect of a n oxygen
system's particular location, use, size and criticaUty on
the cost of cleaning and inspection procedures. Commercial cleaning standards may be adequate for laboratory
facilities and smaller test facilities, and until lower cost
methods of cleaning and inspection are developed, the
risk of equipment loss or damage may in certain cases be
economically acceptable.
Planning for the protection and safety of personnel and equipment must start at the initial facility design stages because of
the hazards associated with oxygen and oxygen-enriched air.
An environmental review of LOX and GOX facilities should
include a n understanding of potential environmental effects
and how they can be effectively controlled. Situations during
transportation, storage, transfer, testing, and vaporization
where life, health, environment, and property may be exposed to substantial hazards should be considered. The probability of events occurring and causing spills, the nature of
the spill, and the risks of fires and explosions should be included in the evaluation.
Vapor cloud dispersion studies should be performed, taking into account evaporation rates, cold vapor stability, spill
sizes, and ground conditions. The studies should include the
effects of ignition under various stages of developing oxygenenriched air-fuel mixtures.
Various techniques and methods have been developed that
provide protection against fires and explosions:
1. Containers sufficiently strong to withstand explosions
(ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, and
Guide for Explosion Venting (NFPA 68)).
2. Venting methods to prevent vessel failures (NFPA 68 and
Ret 81).
3. Sufficient clearances and separations between oxygen
containers a n d incompatible materials, storage tanks,
plant equipment, buildings, and property lines that any incident or malfunction has a m i n i m u m effect on faciUty
personnel and pubUc safety. These may include protective
enclosures such as barricades or cell enclosures [82}.
4. Ignition and flame prevention techniques (NFPA Fire Protection Handbook).
Quantity-distance relationships are intended as a basic
guide in choosing sites and separation distances. Quantitydistance criteria for bulk oxygen storage facilities are intended to provide protection from external fire exposure.
Quantity-distance criteria for oxygen-fuel systems, however,
are intended to reduce the effects of fire, explosion, fragmentationf, and detonation by keeping the hazard source at a
safe distance from people and facilities. Blast effects and
fragmentation are discussed further in Appendix F.
Some general facility design guidelines for oxygen facilities
are as follows:
1. Design to m a n a g e fires. Provide a n automatic r e m o t e
shutoff to isolate critical comjxjnents from all bulk oxy-
32
Copyright'
2000 by A S I M International
www.astm.org
CHAPTER
tions will burn. Problems with centrifugal pumps have included sufficient friction between the rotating parts and the
casing to cause ignition, bearing failures, and fires. Lubrication also presents problems. Bearing friction tends to vaporize LOX with subsequent failures. Pumps with LOX-lubricated bearings must maintain liquid at the bearing to prevent
friction. Sufficient net positive suction pressure (NPSP)t
must be maintained to prevent cavitation. Consideration
should be given to the installation of a cavitation sensor or
downstream thermocouple with auto-shutdown capability to
enhance safety.
Shaft seals exposed to the atmosphere may condense water
and cause p u m p failures because of ice formation. Installing
a purged envelope around this area may prevent this damage
from occurring. Pumping systems must have suction screens
or filters to keep out particles and to maintain the required
cleanliness. The clearance between rotating and stationary
parts should be sufficient to eliminate catching of materials.
Suitable devices (strainers) for arresting c o n t a m i n a n t s
should be fitted in the intake and discharge lines. The mesh
gage of the strainer should be smaller than the smallest clearances between impeller and casing. The filter a n d screen
sizes in oxygen systems should be specified by the engineering or safety directorate. The pumps, bearings, seals, and
screens should be designed, engineered, and cleaned specifically for LOX service.
LOX and GOX System FailureRegulator,
valve, and mechanical device malfunctions can cause fires and explosions.
Piping and valving in vaporization systems may fail, causing
injury and low-temperature exposures. Combustion of the
materials in oxygen may occur, resulting in extensive damage
from fires and explosions.
Valves and high-pressure regulators may fail, usually from
improper operation or the presence of foreign material. Adiabatic compression may cause sufficiently high temperatures
to ignite soft goods or foreign materials.
Regulators should be placed in operation correctly, and all
fittings and connections should be cleaned for oxygen
service.
Components of oxygen systems should be tested for
safety and performance. The use of proper materials and
suitable filters and screens, cleanliness, avoidance of galling
in valves, and quality control will limit system failures. Piping manifolds should be sized to prevent excessive back pressure.
Thermal Insulation FailureThis causes overpressurization,
which is liirther explained in Chapter 9.
Test Cell EntryEntering an operating test cell must be considered dangerous. Authorized personnel should enter after
conditions within the cell have been determined to be safe.
Test cells and buildings in which combustible or explosive mixtures are present should not be entered under any
condition.
Personnel should be warned of the presence of oxygen-enriched areas that create combustible or explosivef mixtures
and high or low oxygen concentrations by using detectors,
sensors, and continuous sampling devices that operate both
an audible and visible alarm. These warning systems should
be designed and installed to allow for proper operation of the
test equipment, while at the same time providing adequate
7: FACILITY
PLANNING
AND IMPLEMENTATION
33
STORAGE SYSTEMS
As defined in Standard for Bulk Oxygen Systems at Consumer Sites (NFPA 50), a bulk oxygen system is an assembly
of equipment, such as oxygen storage containers, pressure
regulators, safety devices, vaporizers, manifolds, and interconnecting piping that has a storage capacity of more than
566 m"* (20 000 ft^) of oxygen at normal temperature and
pressure (NTP)t including unconnected reserves on hand at
the site. The bulk oxygen system terminates at the point
where oxygen at service pressure first enters the supply line.
The oxygen containers may be stationary or movable, and the
oxygen may be stored as gas or liquid.
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
(29 CFR 1910.104) [86] defines a bulk oxygen system similar
to the NFPA except for the storage capacity, which OSHA defines as a bulk oxygen system with more than 368 m"* (13 000
ft"*) of oxygen at NTP, connected in service or ready for service, or more than 708 m"* (25 000 ft') of oxygen (NTP), including unconnected reserves at the site [86].
The installation and location of nonpropellant bulk oxygen
(both GOX and LOX) systems should conform to the
requirements in 29 CFR 1910.104 [86] and NFPA 50.
Bulk oxygen storage systems should be located aboveground and outdoors or should be installed in a building of
fire-resistive, noncombustible, or limited-combustible construction as defined in Standard on Types of Building Construction (NFPA 220) that is adequately vented and used for
that purpose exclusively. Containers and associated equipment should not be located beneath, or exposed by the failure
of, electric power lines, piping containing any class
flammable! or combustible liquids!, or piping containing
flammable gases (NFPA 50).
34
AND OXYGEN
SYSTEMS
STORAGE VESSELS
At present, the minimum conventional vessel design criteria
including engineering design calculations and procedures,
fabrication, testing, and inspection for oxygen vessels are
those presented in the ASME Boiler Pressure Vessel Code.
This code also includes recommended formulas for calculating shell and head thicknesses to withstand the designed internal pressures and for determining thickness requirements
for vessel openings and reinforcements. It must be recognized that the code suggests minimum safe standards that
can be exceeded if they are found to be insufficient on the ba-
sis of specialized experiences. For example, Section VIII, Division 2 (Alternative Rules) of the ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code allows the use of higher design stresses than are
permitted under Section VIII, Division 1 (Pressure vessels),
but also requires greater attention to design analysis, loadings, fatigue evaluation, fabrication, and inspection. Section
VIII, Division 2 (Alternate Rules) requires more precise design procedures and prohibits a number of c o m m o n design
details. This reference specifically delineates fabrication procedures and requires more complete examination and testing. The guidelines presented in Section VIII, Division 2
should be reviewed, and many of the requirements should be
accepted as the m i n i m u m for LOX vessels.
In many instances where oxygen is used as a propellant,
LOX storage vessels for ground support equipment are designed to serve as both storage and run tanks; as r u n tanks
they provide the oxygen directly into the test or flight equipment without an intermediate vessel or liquid transfer operation. The design and construction requirements for such a
combined storage-run tank are more demanding since the
pressure and flow requirements are usually considerably
greater than those for a storage vessel alone.
Large industrial oxygen users commonly purchase liquidoxygen storage vessels from vendors who are familiar with
low-temperature equipment design, fabrication, and operation. The specifications should be sufficiently detailed for a
liquid-oxygen storage system that is safe for long-term use.
The design calculations must take into consideration the intended use of the vessel a n d its storage a n d heat leak
requirements.
See Chapter 8, Transportation, for information about tank
truck specifications.
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS FOR OXYGENENRICHED ENVIRONMENTS
NFPA 53 contains relevant data pertaining to fire extinguishing in oxygen-enrichedf atmospheres. Much of the information in this section summarizes portions of Chapter 7 of
NFPA 53.
General
Because the combustion rate of materials in oxygen-enriched
atmospheres is so greatly increased, response by professional
fire fighters may not be quick enough to preclude major damage to a facility. For this reason, operational personnel in
those oxygen-enriched environments must be fully trained
and instructed in the operation of the fire-fighting equipment
provided. However, operational personnel should not attempt to fight any major fires. Their mission should be to secure the system as best possible, notify the fire department,
and to advise and direct as needed qualified fire-fighting personnel. The heightened level of oxygen fire volatility further
should emphasize the utilization of highly trained fire-fighting professionals.
Extinguishing systems designed for the n o r m a l atmosphere may not be effective in an oxygen-enriched atmosphere.
Rigid specifications for the design of fire-extinguishing syst e m s for any planned or potential oxygen-enriched
CHAPTER
7: FACILITY
PLANNING
AND IMPLEMENTATION
35
Fire-Extinguishing Systems
BARRICADES
Pumps are usually required at oxygen storage and use facilities, and protection against overpressures from liquid flash
off and from p u m p failures yielding shrapnel should be provided [36,67,90-93]. Housings for high-rotational-speed test
rigs may be designed as the shrapnel shield between the rig
and the vessel. Personnel guards should be specified for exposed moving parts and for hot and cold surfaces.
See also a report on the design of barricades for hazardous
pressure systems \93^ and a paper [94] on options to consider
when designing to limit explosion damage.
When locating pressure vessels, consider the possibility of
tank rupture caused by impact from adjacent hardware.
'The requirements tor barricaded open storage modules are explained in Chapter 5 "Facilities Constniction and Siting" in Ret 89.
36
AND OXYGEN
SYSTEMS
Shrapnel-proof barriers may be used to prevent the propagation of an explosion from one tank to another and to protect
personnel and critical equipment.
Compatibility Groups
Department of Defense 6055.9 [89] establishes various compatibihty groups and identifies the types of liquid propellants
and the degree of hazard. LOX, for bulk storage conditions,
is considered a Group II (strong oxidizers that exhibit
properties such as vigorous oxidation or rapid combustion
in contact with materials such as organic matter)
propellant hazard with a Group A storage compatibility designation.
Quantity-Distance Tables
The recommended separations of bulk oxygen storage systems from inhabited buildings and public traffic routes are
shown in Table 5 [89]. The i n t r a g r o u p incompatible and
compatible Group 11 storage distances are also included in
this table.
Incompatible Storage
When liquid-oxygen storage and flow systems are part of the
range launch pad, static test stand, or test area, a greater possibility of reaction with the fuel (propellant) exists. Potential
reactions from leaks or pressure ruptures of propellant systems include normal combustion with the fuel or a detonation of t h e oxygen-fuel mixture. Therefore, with LOX in conjunction with a liquid fuel, as in engine static tests or launch
operations, the quantity-distance criteria are based on blast
hazards.
Explosive Equivalent
A given total quantity of LOX plus fuel accidentally released
and ignited can be expected to produce a blast-wave with farfield characteristics similar to some smaller amounts of high
explosives.
The total amount of propellants (fuel plus oxidizer) that are
involved in an incidental release can be related to an equivalent amount of TNT or similar high explosive that would produce the same blast-wave, far-field overpressure. Liquid-propellantt explosive equivalents [89] for a few propellant
combinations are given in Table 6. The equivalent amount of
explosive is determined by multiplying the explosive equivalent factor times the total weight in pounds of oxygen and
fuel present (see Appendix F) [82, J00,101].
The explosive equivalent factors are considered extremely
conservative. Results of theoretical studies and limited test
results show that the equivalent weight numbers presently
used for fuel-oxygen such as hydrogen-oxygen and RP-1 fueloxygen mixtures indicate that maximum pressures as high as
those that occur with TNT cire not developed. Tests involving
large-scale hydrogen-oxygen explosions have been conducted
at NASA Johnson Space Center WSTF to characterize such
explosions [102]. The r e c o m m e n d e d separation distances
should be considered conservative. The total quantity of propellant in a tank, drum, cylinder, or other container shall be
the net weight of the propellant contained therein. Where the
storage containers Eire not separated by the appropriate distance or are not so subdivided as to prevent possible accumulative involvement, the quantity shall be considered as the
total of all such storage containers. The distances can be re-
37
8.
9.
10.
11,
12.
13,
14,
It
Combustible structures
Fire resistive structures''
Openings in wall of fire resistive structures
Flammable liquid storage, above-ground:
a. 0 - 3 7 8 5 1 ( 0 - 1 0 0 0 gal) capacity
b. over 3785 L (1000 gal) capacity
Flammable liquid storage tank, below-ground:
a. 0-3785 L (0-1000 gal) capacity
b. over 3785 L (1000 gal) capacity
Fill, vent, or other opening in flammable liquid
storage tank below ground:
a. 0-3785 L (0-1000 gal) capacity
b. over 3785 L (1000 gal) capacity
Combustible liquid storage, above-ground:
a. 0-3785 L (0-1000 gal) capacity
b. over 3785 L (1000 gal) capacity
Combustible liquid storage tank, below-ground
Fill, vent, or other opening in combustible liquid
storage tank below-ground
Flammable gas storage:''
a. less than 141.6 m'' (5000 ft') capacity at NTP'
b. over 141.6 m'' (5000 ft') capacity at NTP'
Highly combustible materials'
Slow burning materials*
Confining walls:'
a. in one direction
b. in approximately 90 diiection
Congested areas'"
15.2''
7.6''
3.0/
15.2'27.4^'
SO'
25^.,/
90'
4.6''
9.1'
15''
30'
15.2''
15.2'
50''
50''
7.6'15.2''
4.6''
12.2'-
25'^
50'
15'-
40''
15.2'^
27.4'
15.2''
7.6'
50''
90<
50'
25'-
22.9
10.7
7.6
75
35
25
"Applies to storage capacity of more than 386 m ' (13 000 ft') of oxygen at NTP connected in
service or ready for service, or more than 708 m ' (25 000 ft') of oxygen at NTP including unconnected reserves on hand at the site. The oxygen containers may be statioiiaiy or movable,
and the oxygen may be stored as gas or liquid.
''Minimum distance measured in the most direct line except as indicated for exposure Types
5 and 8.
'Given distance does not apply where protective structures such as firewalls of adequate
height to safeguard the oxygen storage systems are located between the bulk oxygen storage installation and the exposure. In such cases, the bulk oxygen storage installation may be a minim u m distance of 0.3 m (1 ft) from the firewall.
''Structures with fire-resistive exterior walls or sprinklered buildings of other construction.
'Distance shall not be less than one-half the height of adjacent side wall of the structure.
'Distance shall be adequate to permit maintenance, but shall not be less than 0.3 m (1 ft).
'^Distance measured horizontally from an oxygen storage container to a Hammable or combustible liquid tank.
'includes compressed flammable gases, liquefied flammable gases, and flammable gases in
low pressure gas holders.
'NTP = n o r m a l temperature (293.15 K [68F]) and absolute pressure (101.3 kPa
[14.7 psi]).
'Includes solid materials that burn rapidly, such as excelsior or paper.
^Includes solid materials that burn slowly, such as coal and hea\'y timber.
'includes courtyards and similar confining areas, but does not include firewalls less than 6.1
m (20 ft) high, to provide adequate ventilation in such areas.
"'Includes areas such as offices, lunchrooms, locker rooms, time clock areas, and similar locations where people may congregate.
d u c e d w i t h t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n of effective i n t e r v e n i n g b a r r i e r s t o
l i m i t o r p r e v e n t m i x i n g . T h e d i s t a n c e will b e calciikited o n t h e
b a s i s of t h e e x p l o s i v e e q u i v a l e n t of t h e a m o u n t s , s u b j e c t t o
the mixing.
I n h a b i t e d B u i l d i n g s a n d P u b l i c Traffic R o u t e s
D i s t a n c e s t o i n h a b i t e d b u i l d i n g s a n d t o p u b l i c traffic r o u t e s
for v a r i o u s q u a n t i t i e s of e q u i v a l e n t p r o p e l l a n t m i x t u r e s [59]
a r e g i v e n i n T a b l e 7. T h e following f a c t o r s w e r e c o n s i d e r e d i n
700
800
900
1000
2 000
3 000
4 000
5 000
6 000
7 000
8 000
9 000
10 000
15 000
20 000
25 000
30 000
35 000
40 000
45 000
50 000
60 000
70 000
80 000
90 000
100 000
125 000
150 000
175 000
200 000
250 000
300 000
350 000
400 000
450 000
500 000
600 000
700 000
800 000
900 000
1 000 000
2 000 000'
3 000 000'
4 000 000'
5 000 000'
6 000 000'
7 000 000'
8 000 000'
9 000 000'
10 000 000/^
60
75
85
90
100
100
105
110
115
120
130
145
150
160
165
170
175
175
180
195
205
215
220
225
230
235
240
250
255
260
265
270
285
295
305
310
320
330
340
350
355
360
375
385
395
405
410
470
505
535
555
570
585
600
610
620
30
35
40
45
50
50
55
55
60
60
65
70
75
80
80
85
85
90
90
95
100
105
110
110
115
120
120
125
130
130
135
135
140
145
150
155
160
165
170
175
180
180
185
190
195
200
205
235
255
265
275
285
295
300
305
310
39
LOX/LH2 + LOX/RP-1
LOX/RP-1, LOX/NH, or
B5H9 + a fuel
60%
OXYGEN DETECTION
Galvanic.
Paramagnetic.
Electrochemical (Zr02 sensor, fuel cell, open-cathode oxygen cell, polarographic).
Gas chromatograph.
Mass spectrometer.
0 to 100 000
100 000 to 250 000
250 000 to 1 000 000
40 W '
2.42 W " " '
50 W'>
__
100
200
300
400
.500
600
700
800
900
1 000
1 500
2 000
3 000
4 000
5 000
6 000
7 000
8 000
9 000
10 000
15 000
20 000
25 000
30 000
35 000
40 000
45 000
50 000
55 000
60 000
65 000
70 000
75 000
80 000
8.S 000
90 000
95 000
100 000
125 000
150 000
175 000
200 000
225 000
2.S0 000
275 000
300 000
325 000
350 000
375 000
400 000
500 000'
600 000''
700 000'"
800 000"
900 000"
1000 000"
1500 000"
2 000 000"
2 500 000'^
3 000 000"
3.S00 000"
4 000 000"
5 000 000"
Distance, It
Barricaded', D = 9 W'''-
Unbarrieadcd', D = 18 W''>
__
40
50
60
65
70
75
80
85
85
90
105
115
130
145
155
165
170
180
185
195
225
245
265
280
295
310
320
330
340
350
360
370
380
390
395
405
410
420
450
480
.505
525
,545
.565
58.S
600
620
635
650
665
715
760
800
835
870
900
1030
1135
1220
1300
1365
1430
1540
80
100
120
1.30
140
150
160
170
175
180
210
230
260
290
310
.330
340
360
370
390
4.S0
490
530
560
590
620
640
660
680
700
720
740
760
780
790
810
820
840
900
960
1010
1055
1090
1135
1170
1200
1240
1270
1300
1330
1430
1520
1600
1670
1740
1800
2060
2270
2440
2600
27.30
2860
3080
"From Table 9-3 of Ref 89, in which the distances are given to the nearest foot.
''Liquid hydrogen-LOX weights must be converted (see Table 6) to TNT-equivalent weights before using this table.
'Requirements and specifications for barricaded facilities are given in Chapter 5 of Ref 89.
''For less than 23 kg (50 lb), shorter distances (determined by formulas for Columns 2 and 3) may be used when structures, blast mats, and
line can completely contain fragments and debris. This table is not appHcable when blast fragments and debris are completely confined as in
certain test firing barricades.
'Distances are based on blast effect of liquid hydrogen and LOX propellant combinations.
41
SYSTEMS
MNL36-EB/Jan. 2000
Transportation
GENERAL
TRANSPORT ON PUBLIC
THOROUGHFARES
General
Definitions
Emergency Response
During all phases of transport, emergency response information is required at facilities where hazardous materials are either loaded, stored, or handled (49 CFR 172.600) [63]. Advanced planning for a variety of potentially hazardous and
disastrous fires and explosions shall be undertaken with full
realization that the first priority is reduction of any risk to the
lives of emergency personnel and bystanders. Shipments of
oxygen may be monitored by CHEMTREC (the toll-free
emergency telephone number is 800-424-9300). Other emergency information sources include the Dow Chemical USA's
Distribution Emergency Response System (telephone number, 517-634-4400), and the Union Carbide Corporation's
Hazardous Emergency Leak Procedure (HELP), which provides infox'mation 24 hours a day (telephone n u m b e r is
304-744-3487).
Copyright'
www.astm.org
44
SYSTEMS
CHAPTER 8: TRANSPORTATION
45
keep people at least 152 m (500 ft) away for GOX or 800 m (V2
mile) away for LOX. Contact authorities and obtain help:
CHEMTREC (800-424-9300)
Emergency actions to combat leaks and fires involving oxygen tractor-trailers include pulling the vehicle into the least
hazardous area (see "Initial Actions" above) and turning the
ignition off. For fires originating near the engine, use a fire
extinguisher; for tire fires, use water or chemical fire extinguishers or both. Tires may reignite 20 to 30 min after the initial fire has been extinguished, so the driver should not leave
the scene until the tire temperature is lowered sufficiently.
Also, the driver should not leave the scene until the fire has
been completely extinguished and the b u r n i n g materials
cooled. Aid should be requested from the nearest fire or police department or both. On the highway, the environment in
which a fire and subsequent damage may occur is difficult to
control. An incident may occur at any time and at any place
along the route. A controlled release of oxygen from the
trailer through venting should take into account all possible
ignition sources, vapor dispersion, population exposure, and
general safe operations. Flares normally used for highway vehicular incident identification should not be used in close
proximity to upset or damage LOX tanks.
TRANSPORTATION EMERGENCIES
Initial Actions
The first concern in a transportation emergency shall be to
prevent death or injury. In an incident or emergency try to get
the vehicle off the road if possible, preferably to an open loca^
tion that is off an asphalt road or parking lot. Shut off the tractor-trailer electrical system. Post warning lights and signs and
Emergency Actions
MNL36-EB/Jan. 2000
Emergency Procedures
backpressures will not occur. Cryogenic liquid storage vessels are protected from overpressurization by a series of pressure relief devices. These reHef devices are designed to protect the inner vessel and the vacuum-insulated portion of the
tank from failures caused by inner and outer shell damage,
overfilling, and heat load from insulation damage or from a
fire.
In specific instances, such as when these vessels are involved in a fire which impinges upon the ullage area of the
tank, container failure could result. In these instances, water
should be directed onto the flame-impinged portion of the
tank to allow the tank to cool. Enough water should be directed onto this area to keep the tank wet. Water should not
be directed toward the relief devices, as the venting gas may
cause the water to freeze and seal off the relief device.
Frost appearing on the outer wall of an insulated cryogenic
vessel may be indicative of a thermal insulation loss. A thermal insulation loss could be the result of a n u m b e r of causes
such as a movement of the insulation in the annuleir area of
the tank, a loss of vacuum in the annular area, or a failure of
the inner vessel. The appearance of frost on the outer wall
could be an important signal that should not be ignored, especially if the outer wall material is subject to cold embrittlement. Assistance from knowledgeable and responsible pressure-systems personnel should be obtained.
Personnel should listen and watch for indication of pressure-relief device actuation. Constant relief actuation is an
indication that a major problem has occurred. Special care
should be taken if the sound of the relief device changes and
becomes higher pitched while operating.
Continued pressure rise while the relief device is actuated
indicates a major system malfunction. If constant relief device actuation is occurring, immediately evacuate the area
and physically rope off and control access to the area if this
can be performed safely. Venting the vessel is recommended,
if possible. Do not apply water, as this would only act as a
heat source to the much colder oxygen and aggravate the
boiloff.
TYPES OF EMERGENCIES
Leaks and Spills
Primary DangerThe primary danger from oxygen leaks and
spills is a fire or explosion caused by combustible materials
in the presence of a high concentration of oxygen. Oxygenenriched environments greatly increase the rate of combustion of flammable materials.
GOXGOX leaks can result in oxygen-enriched environments, especially in confined spaces. Impingement of GOX
onto an organic material such as grease can cause a fire.
When leaks are detected, the source of the oxygen should be
halted or disconnected. Any equipment inherently heat- or
spark-producing should be turned off or disconnected. Disassembly and repair of leaking lines should begin only after
the area has been properly ventilated.
LOXLOX spills and leaks cause oxygen enrichment of the
immediate vicinity as the liquid vaporizes. When a spill or
leak is detected, the source of the supply should be immediately halted or disconnected. Any equipment inherently heator spark-producing should be turned off or disconnected. Affected areas should be completely roped off or otherwise controlled to limit personnel movement. The equipment or piping should be thoroughly vented and warmed before repair of
the leak is attempted.
LOX spills on pavements such as asphalt have resulted in
impact-sensitive conditions that caused explosions from traffic or dropped items [J03]. The same condition can occur
from LOX leakage onto concrete that is contaminated with
oil, grease, or other organic materials. The affected areas
should be completely roped off or otherwise controlled to
limit vehicle and personnel movement. Electrical sources
should be turned off or disconnected. No attempt should be
made to hose off the affected area, and the area should not be
cleared for access until the oxygen-rich cold materials are adequately warmed and absorbed oxygen has evaporated.
Overpressuiization
Transportation Emergencies
Oxygen cannot be kept liquid if its temperature rises above
the critical temperature of 154.6 K (-181.4F). Consequently,
if LOX is trapped in a closed system and allowed to warm, extreme pressures can overpressurize the system. For example,
LOX trapped between valves can r u p t u r e the connecting
pipe. Pressure relief of some kind must be provided where
trapping might occur. Moreover, relief a n d vent systems
must be sized to accommodate the flow so that excessive
Copyright'
2000 by A S I M International
www.astm.org
CHAPTER
Consult the DOT Emergency Response Guidebook 1104}
and other references shown below for information regarding
the emergency action to take in the event of an incident involving LOX or GOX.
Additional information can be obtained 24 hours a day by
calling the Chemical Transportation Emergency Center
(CHEMTREC) at 800-424-9300.
Other emergency procedure information can be obtained
from the Association of American Railroads (AAR), Bureau
of Explosives, Emergency Handling of Hazardous Materials in
Surface Transportation [705], and the National Response
Center, US Coast Guard Headquarters, Room 2611, 2100
Second Street, SW, Washington, DC 20593-0001, telephone
8 0 0 - 4 2 4 - 8 8 0 2 or 202-267-2675.
First-Aid P r o c e d u r e s f o r C r y o g e n i c I n j u r i e s
Note: This information represents tlie most current understanding regarding cold injuries. It may change,
and anyone dealing with oxygen systems should k e e p
informed on the latest recommended procedures.
Direct physical contact with LOX, cold vapor, or cold
equipment can cause serious tissue damage. Momentary contact with a small amount of the liquid may not pose as great
a danger of a burn because a protective film may form. Danger of freezing occurs when large amounts are spilled and exposure is extensive. Cardiac malfunctions are likely when the
internal body temperature drops to 300 K (80.2F), and death
may result when the internal body temperature drops to 298
K (76.4F).
Guidelines for response to a cryogenic injury include the
following.
1. The injured person should be carefully removed from the
cold source and kept warm and at rest.
2. The injured area should be protected (covered) with a
loose, dry, sterile dressing that does not restrict blood
circulation.
3. Medical assistance should be obtained as soon as possible.
Treatment of truly frozen tissue requires medical supervision because improperly rendered first aid invariably aggravates the injury. In general, the recommended in-field
response to a cold injuryt is that non-medically trained
personnel do only what is absolutely necessary.
4. The injured person should be transported, as directed by
medical personnel, to a medical facility as soon as possible.
5. The affected part may be warmed to its normal temperature.
The injured part may be immersed in, or gently flushed
with, warm water, in other words at a temperature of
3 1 1 K t o 3 1 8 K ( 1 0 0 F t o 112F).
The affected part shall not be exposed to a temperature
greater than 318 K (112F). Exposure to a higher temperature may superimpose a burn, and gravely damage
already injured tissue.
Safety showers, eyewash fountains, or other sources of
water shall not be used because the water temperature
will almost certainly be therapeutically incorrect and aggravate the injury. Safety showers shall be tagged, "NOT
TO BE USED FOR TREATMENT OF CRYOGENIC
BURNS."
9: EMERGENCY
PROCED ORES
47
6. Frozen gloves, shoes, or clothing that could restrict circulation to the injured area may be removed, but only in a
slow, careful manner such that the skin is not pulled off
with the item being removed. An injured person, with any
unremoved clothing, may be put into a warm water bath at
the temperature specified above.
7. The affected part shall not be subjected to a rapid stream
of water; nor shall the affected part be massaged or rubbed
with snow or ice, or have any type of ointment applied to
it. These actions shall be taken neither before nor after
warming of the injured part.
8. Actions (such as smoking tobacco or drinking alcohol) that
result in decreasing the blood supply to the injured part
shall not be permitted.
9. The injured person should not be exposed to ignition
sources such as smoking, open flame, or electric sparks.
Education regarding the risk of cold injury as well as preventive and emergency care shall be incorporated into operations and emergency response training programs.
FIRE-FIGHTING TECHNIQUES
When fighting a fire involving oxygen-enriched atmospheres,
the first step should be to shut off the oxygen supply and, if
possible, to shut off and remove fuel sources. Combustible
materials must be cooled below their ignition temperatures
to stop the fire. Water has been shown to be an effective ex-
REFERENCES
[i] NASA, Safety Standard for Oxygen and Oxygen Systems, NSS
1740.15, NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, Washington, DC. January 1996.
[2] Bond, A. C, Pohl, H. O., Chaffee, N. H., Guy, W. W., Allton, C.
S., Johnston, R. L., and Castner, W. L., Design Guide for HighPressure Oxygen Systems, NASA RP-1113, NASA Scientific and
Technical Information Branch, 1983.
[3] Lipsett, M. J., Shusterman, D. J., and Beard, R. R., "Inorganic
Compounds of Carbon, Nitrogen, and Oxygen," Patty's Industrial Hygiene and Toxicology, Fourth ed.. Vol. H, Part F, G. D.
Clayton and F. E. Clayton, Eds., John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,
New York, 1994, pp. 4597-4604.
[4] Potts, A. M., "Toxic Responses of the Eye," Toxicology: The Basic Science of Poisons, Fourth Ed., M. O. Amdur, J. DouU, and
C. D. Klassen, Eds., Pergamon Press, New York, 1991.
[5] Kindwall, E. P., M.D., "Medical Aspects of Commercial Diving
and Compressed-Air Work," Occupational Medicine, Third ed.,
C. Zenz, M.D., B. O. Dickerson, M.D., and E. P. Horvath, Eds.,
1994, pp. 344-345.
[6] Bannister, W., Evaluation of LOX/MMH Mixing Special Test
Data Report. NASA White Sands Test Facility, Las Cruces, NM,
WSTF Nos. 93-27434 and 93-27435, March 1994.
[7] Lewis, B. and von Elbe, G., Combustion, Flames, and Explosions of Gases: Second Ed., New York, Academic Press, 1961.
[S] Kuchta, J, M., Cata, R. J., Martindill, G. H., and Spolan, I., Ignition and Fire Suppression in Aerospace Vehicles, Technical
Report AFAPL-TR-71-93, Air Force Propulsion Laboratory,
OH, 1971.
[9] Kuo, K. K., Principles of Combustion, John Wiley cind Sons,
Inc., New York, NY, 1986.
[10] Hilado, C. J., Flammability Handbook for Plastics, Third Ed.,
Technomic Publishing, 1982.
[11] Schmidt, H. W. and Forney, D. E., "Oxygen Systems Engineering Review," ASRDI Oxygen Technology Survey, Vol. 9,
NASA SP-3090, NASA, 1975.'
[12] Bryan, C. J. and Lowry, R,, "Comparative Results of Autogenous Ignition Temperature Measurements by ASTM G 72 and
Pressurized Scanning Calorimetry in Gaseous Oxygen,"
Flammability and Sensitivity of Materials in Oxygen-Enriched
Atmospheres: Second Volume, ASTM STP 910, M. A. Benning,
Ed., American Society for Testing and Materials, Philadelphia,
PA, 1986, pp. 108-117.
[27}
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42]
[43]
[44]
[45]
[46]
[47]
[48]
[49]
[50]
[51]
[52]
[53]
[54]
[55]
[77]
[78]
[79]
[80]
[81]
[82]
[83]
[84]
[85]
[86]
[87]
[88]
[89]
[90]
[91]
[92]
[93]
[94]
[95]
[96]
[97]
APPENDIX A
Chemical and Physical Properties
O x y g e n is a p o w e r f u l o x i d i z e r i n b o t h t h e g a s e o u s a n d l i q u i d
s t a t e s . T h e m o l e c u l a r w e i g h t of o x y g e n , O2 is 3 1 . 9 9 8 8 o n t h e
C'^ scale, a n d its a t o m i c w e i g h t is 15.9994 [AV]. O x y g e n w a s
t h e b a s e u s e d for c h e m i c a l a t o m i c w e i g h t s , b e i n g a s s i g n e d
t h e a t o m i c w e i g h t 16.000 u n t i l 1961 w h e n t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l
U n i o n of P u r e a n d A p p h e d C h e m i s t r y a d o p t e d c a r b o n 12 a s
t h e n e w b a s i s [A2,A3].
Oxygen has eight isotopes. There a r e three naturally occurr i n g s t a b l e i s o t o p e s of o x y g e n ; t h e s e h a v e a t o m i c m a s s n u m b e r s of 16, 17, a n d 18 [A2-A4]. T h e n a t u r a l l y o c c u r r i n g isot o p e s of o x y g e n a r e difficult t o s e p a r a t e ; t h e r e f o r e , p r o p e r t y
d a t a are generally obtained from naturally occurring oxygen,
w h i c h h a s a c o n c e n t r a t i o n in t h e r a t i o of 10 000:4:20 for t h e
t h r e e i s o t o p e s of a t o m i c m a s s n u m b e r s 16, 17, 18 [A2]. Also,
t h e d a t a a r e m o s t g e n e r a l l y g i v e n for d i a t o m i c , m o l e c u l a r
o x y g e n , O2 [.AI']. T h e m e t a s t a b l e m o l e c u l e , O^ ( o z o n e ) , is n o t
a d d r e s s e d in t h i s m a n u a l .
A s e l e c t i o n of t h e r m o p h y s i c a l p r o p e r t i e s of o x y g e n is given
i n T a b l e s A-1 t h r o u g h A-4. P r o p e r t i e s a t s t a n d a r d c o n d i t i o n s
Properties
Temperature, K {F)
Pressure (absolute), kPa (psi)
Density, kg/m' (lb,/ft')
Compressibility factor (PV/RT)
Heats of fusion and vaporization, J/g
(Btu/lb)
Specific Heat
At saturation (CJ, J/gK (Btu/lbmR)
At constant pressure (Cp), J/gK
(Btu/lbn,R)
At constant volume (Cv), J/gK
(Btu/lb,R)
Specific heat ratio (Cp/Cv)
Enthalpy, J/g (Btu/lb,)
Internal Energy, J/g (Btu/lb,,,)
Entropy, J/gK^Btu/lb^^R)
Velocity of sound, m/s (ft/s)
Viscosity, /xPa'S (Ib/ft-s)
Thermal conductivity, mW/m-K (Btu/fthF)
Dielectric constant
Surface tension, N/m (lb|/ft)
Equivalent volume/volume liquid at NBP
154.576 (-181.4)
5042.7(731.4)
436.1 (27.288)
0.2879
0
very large
very large
1.209" (0.2891)"
large
32.257 (13.878)"
20.70 (8.904)
4.2008(1.0040)
164(538)
31" (2.083 X 10 "^)"
unavailable
1.17082
0
2.2616
" Estimate.
STP
NTP
273.15(32)
101.325(14.696)
1.429(0.0892)
293.15(68)
101.325(14.696)
1.331 (0.0831)
0.9990
0.9992
0.9166(0.2191)
0.6550(0.1566)
1.40
248.06(106.72)
0.9188 (0.2196)
0.6575(0.1572)
1.40
266.41 (114.62)
177.16(76.216)
190.30(81.871)
6.325(1.512)
315(1034)
19.24 (0.01924)
6.391 (1.527)
326(1070)
20.36 (0.02036)
24.28(1.293 x 10 ^)
1.00053
798.4
25.75 (1.368 X 10 ^)
1.00049
857.1
51
52
AND OXYGEN
SYSTEMS
TABLE A-3Fixed point properties of oxygen at its normal boiling point [A/].
Properties
Temperature, K (F)
Pressure (absolute), kPa (psi)
Density, kg/m'' (lb/ft'')
Compressibility factor (PV/RT)
Heats of fusion and vaporization, J/g (Btu/lbm)
Specific Heat
At saturation (Cs), J/gK (Btu/lbn,R)
At constant pressure (Cp), J/gK (Btu/lbn,R)
At constant volume (Cv). J/gK (Btu/lbn,R)
Specific heat ratio (Cp/Cv)
Enthalpy, J/g (BtuAbm)
Internal Energy, J/g (Btu/lbm)
Entropy, J/gK(Btu/lb-R)
Velocity of sound, m/s (ft/s)
Viscosity, /tiPas (Ib/fts)
Thermal conductivity, mW/m-K (Btu/fthR)
Dielectric constant
Surface tension, N/m (lbf,ft)
Equivalent volume/volume liquid at NBP
Liquid
90.180 (-297.3)
101.325(14.696)
1140.7(71.215)
0.00379
212.89(91.589)
Vapor
90.180 (-297.3)
101.325(14.696)
4.477 (0.2795)
0.9662
212.89 (91.589)
1.692(0.4044)
1.696(0.4054)
0.9263 (0.2214)
1.832
-133.45 (-57.412)
-133.54 (-57.450)
2.943 (0.7034)
903 (2963)
195.8 (1.316 X 1 0 " )
151.5(0.08759)
1.4870
0.0132 (0.0009045)
1
-1.663 (-0.3974)
0.9616 (0.2298)
0.6650(0.1589)
1.446
79.439(34.176)
56.798 (24.436)
5.3027 (1.2674)
178(584)
6.85 (4.603 X 1 0 " )
8.544 (0.00494)
1.00166
Properties
Temperature, K (F)
Pressure (absolute), kPa (psi)
Density, kg/m' (lb/ft*)
Compressibility factor (PV/RT)
Heats of fusion and vaporization, J/g (Btu/lbm)
Specific Heat
At saturation (CJ, J/gK (Btu/lbR)
At constant pressure (Cp), J/gK (BtuAbR)
At constant volume (Cy), J/gK (Btu/lbn,R)
Specific heat ratio (Cp/Cv)
Enthalpy, J/g (Btu/lbm)
Internal Energy, J/g (Btu/lbm)
Entropy, J/g-K (Btu/lbmR)
Velocity of sound, m/s (ft/s)
Viscosity, fiPas (Ib/fts)
Thermal conductivity, mW/m-K (Btu/fth-R)
Dielectric constant
Surface tension, N/m (Ibp/ft)
Equivalent volume/volume liquid at NBP
54.351 (-361.8)
0.1517(0.0220)
1.359(84.82)
13.90(5.980)
1.440(0.3441)
207.33 (-89.197)
207.33 (-89,197)
1.841 (0.4401)
1.614"
0.8397
54.351 (-361.8)
0.1517(0.0220)
1.306(81.56)
0.0000082
242,55 (104.35)
1.666(0.3982)
1.665 (0.3979)
1.114(0.2663)
1.494
-193.43 (-83.217)
193.43 (-83.127)
2.097 (0.5013)
1.159(3.803)
619.4 (4,162 X 10 "')
192,9(0.1115)
1.5687
0.02265 (0.00155)
0.8732
254.9
Vapor
54.351 (-361.8)
0.1517(0.0220)
0.01075 (0.000671)
0.9986
-3.397 (-0.8119)
0.9103(0.2176)
0.6503(0.1554)
1.400
49.120(21.132)
35.000(15.058)
6.5484(1.565)
141 (463)
3.914 (2.630 X 10 '':
4.826 (0.00279)
1.000004
106 068
Solubility,
mol ppm
980
215
50
27
000
000
000
500
700
1 900
1000
860
135
20
5
2
0.6
1.5
12
15
REFERENCES
[AJ] NASA, ASRDI Oxygen Technology Survey, Vol. 1, Thermophysical Properties, NASA SP-3071, H. M. Roder and L. A. Weber,
Eds., National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington DC, 1972.
[42] Scott, R. B., Cryogenic Engineering, Met-Chem Research, Boulder, CO, 1988.
[A3'\ Timmerhaus, K. D. and Flynn, T. M., Cryogenic Process Engineering, Plenum Press, New York, 1989.
[A4] Zabetakis, M. G., Safety with Cryogenic Fluids, Plenum Press,
New York, 1967.
[A5] Roth, E. M., "Space-Cabin Atmospheres," in Oxygen Toxicity,
Pari I, NASA SP-47, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1964.
[A6] Mills, R. L. and Edeskuty, F. J., "Cryogens and Their Properties," in Liquid Cryogens, Vol. II, Properties and Applications, K.
D. Williamson, Jr. and F. J. Edeskuty, Eds., CRC Press, Boca
Raton, FL, 1983.
iA7'\ Edeskuty, F. J. and Stewart, W. F., Safety in Handling of Cryogenic Fluids, Plenum Press, New York, 1996.
APPENDIX B
INTRODUCTION
Many tests have been developed for evaluating materials for
oxygen systems, including studies of ignition and burning
characteristics and the causes of oxygen-related failures
[Bl-BS]. These tests provide a means to rank materials.
Experimental methods used for determining and evaluating the ignition and combustion of materials include ignition
tests and combustion tests as summarized below and described in detail in the next two sections.
Ignition Tests
Ignition tests involve the following tests:
Mechanical impact,
Pneumatic impact,
Autoignition,
Friction,
Particle impact, and
Resonance cavity.
Combustion Tests
Combustion tests involve the following tests:
Calorimeter,
Limiting oxygen index (LOI), and
Upward flammability of materials in gaseous oxygen
(GOX).
IGNITION TESTS
M e c h a n i c a l I m p a c t T e s t M e t h o d (ASTM G 8 6 ) ;
R e f e r e n c e [B4\
This test method is to determine the sensitivity of materials
to ignition by mechanical impact in liquid oxygen (LOX) or
GOX at absolute pressures from 0.1 to 68.9 MPa (14.7 to
lOOOOpsi).
The mechanical impact tester consists of a test chamber
with a striker pin and striker pin counterloader. It also includes the necessary test chamber purge, pressurization and
vent systems; a plummet, plummet guide tracks, plummet
hold-release mechanism and a plummet rebound limiter; and
controls and instrumentation necessary for performing the
test and monitoring the test chamber for evidence of reac-
SYSTEMS
tion. For GOX and LOX compatibility, the test system and
samples should be configured as described in Standard Test
Method for Determining Ignition Sensitivity of Materials
to Mechanical Impact in Ambient Liquid Oxygen and
Pressurized Liquid and Gaseous Oxygen Environments
(ASTM G 86).
Autoignition Temperature (AIT) Test Method
(ASTM G 72)
This test measures the minimum sample temperature at
which a material will spontaneously ignite when heated in an
oxygen or oxygen-enriched atmosphere. AITs of nonmetals
are commonly measured by methods such as in Standard
Test Method for Autogenous Ignition Temperature of Liquids
and Solids in a High-Pressure Oxygen-Enriched Environment (ASTM G 72). Metals autoignite at much higher temperatures than nonmetals. These temperatures are much
higher than those that normally would occur in actual oxygen
systems. The temperature at which a material will ignite
spontaneously varies with the system geometry and heating
rate.
The test system consists of a reaction vessel (bomb), a sample holding assembly, and a system whereby this reaction
vessel can be charged with oxygen and heated. Thermocouples and/or pressure transducers may be used to determine
the temperature at the time ignition occurs.
Pneumatic Impact Test Method (Reference [B4},
ASTM G 74)
Standard Test Method for Ignition Sensitivity of Materials
to Gaseous Fluid Impact (ASTM G 74) provides reaction sensitivity of materials to d5mamic pressure impacts by gases
such as oxygen, air, or gas blends containing oxygen.
The test system consists of a high-pressure accumulator
capable of being pressurized with oxygen or nitrogen to a
gage pressure of 69 MPa (10 000 psi), a quick-opening valve,
and a test chamber with a test sample.
Frictional Heating Test Method
This test method provides the susceptibility of materials to
ignition by friction in GOX and LOX, air, or blends of gases
containing oxygen. The ends of two hollow cylinders are
rubbed against one another in an oxygen-enriched atmosphere. Test variables include oxygen pressure, normal loads,
and rubbing velocity. At standard test conditions, a material
is ranked based on the Pv product at ignition (where P is load
divided by the initial cross-sectional area of the sample and v
is the relative surface velocity).
The GOX frictional heating apparatus described here is
also described in Ref B6. It consists of a high-pressure test
chamber, an electrical motor and transmission assembly,
and a pneumatic actuation cylinder. The high-pressure test
chamber, fabricated of Monel, consists of a cylindrical
chamber with a replaceable nickel sleeve inside. The chamber contains a rotating shaft that extends through the chamber by a series of bearings and seals. The shaft is connected
at one end to a drive motor/transmission assembly that is
capable of rotating the shaft up to 500 Hz (30 000 rpm). The
other end of the shaft is connected to a pneumatically actuated cylinder that allows axial movement of the shaft to apply up to 4450 N (1000 Ibf) normal load on the test specimens. The rotating test specimen is mounted on the shaft,
and the stationary test specimen is affixed to the test chamber.
The LOX frictional heating test system is similar to the
GOX frictional heating test system, except the LOX frictional
heating test system is configured in a vertical position and
has a fluid piping system for LOX.
Particle Impact Test Method
This test method provides the susceptibility of a material to
ignition by particle impact. A stream of oxygen with one or
more entrained particles is impinged on a metal target. The
particles may be capable of igniting themselves upon impact. Test variables include oxygen pressure, temperature,
and velocity, and particle number, size, quantity, and material.
Supersonic Particle Impact Test SystemThe supersonic particle impact test system is essentially the same as that described in Ref B7. It consists of a:
Gas inlet and flow straightener.
Particle injector and converging nozzle.
Diverging nozzle and test sample holder.
The particles, injected just upstream of the converging
nozzle, enter through the inlet section of the chamber and
are accelerated to a fraction of the supersonic gas velocity as
they pass through the converging and diverging nozzle. After
the diverging nozzle, the gas enters a short section with a
constant cross-sectional area to establish constant velocity
before impact. The particle impacts a target made of the test
material.
Subsonic Particle Impact Test SystemThe subsonic particle impact test system is essentially the same as the one described in Ref B8. It consists of a particle impact chamber,
in which up to 5 g (0.01 lb) of particles can be injected in
flowing oxygen upstream of a target specimen. The particles
entrained in the oxygen are carried through the test chamber where they impact the test material target. The oxygen
flows through holes on the periphery of the target and finally are vented to the atmosphere through the flow control
orifice.
Resonance Cavity Ignition Test Method
This test method was used to determine if resonance ignition
could occur \B9\ It was developed in 1975, but was not maintained after the early tests were completed. The test flow system consists of high-pressure gaseous nitrogen and oxygen
sources, stainless steel flow lines, pressure controllers, fire
valves, and an exit flow control valve. The controllers establish and maintain the constant pressure delivered to the resonance apparatus. The resonance test apparatus used is described in detail in Ref i?9; it consists of an inlet tube, an exit
tube, and a resonance tube, forming a tee. The temperatures
generated at the base of the resonance tube are in excess of
811 K (1000F) for both GOX and nitrogen.
are more suitable for the specific application of a metallic material may become available in the future. The relative ranking
of materials is partially dependent on the test inethod used.
Three tests commonly used by NASA are the promoted combustion test (upward flammabiiity test), the frictional heating
test, and the particle impact test. At present, the upward
flammabiUty test [B4] is used to obtain a basic ranking of a
metallic material's flammabiiity. Particle impact and frictional
heating tests ai-e valuable for assessing ignitability when particle impact or friction between moving parts can occur.
2210
448
1228 to 1233
823
593
1203
906
3518
347
1750 to 1760
1022
608
1706
1171
[B2/]
[B22]
W22]
[B22]
[822]
[B22]
\_B22]
775
813
774
866
734
1033
1773 to 1873
1173 to 1373
1500 to 1550
1622 to 1639
1503 to 1593
993
1511 to 1555
773
936
1004
934
1099
862
1400
2732 to 2912
1652 to 2012
2240 to 2330
2460 to 2490
2246 to 2408
1328
2260 to 2340
932
[B22]
IB22]
[B22]
[B22'\
[B22]
[B22]
[B21]
[B21]
[B22]
[B22]
[B2]]
[B22]
W22]
W22]
1855
1861
1844
1839
1516
2880 to 2960
2890 to 2940
2860 to 2910
2850 to 2920
2270 to 2350
608
IB22]
[B22]
[B22]
[B22]
[822]
[822]
to 1900
to 1889
to 1872
to 1878
to 1561
593
"LASER-ignited aluminum.
''At atmospheric pressure.
'In oxygen at 0.345 to 2.76 MPa (50 to 400 psi).
ignition are more easily ignited than those with high Pv products at ignition. Relative rankings of metallic materials for ignitability by frictional heating show some differences from
the relative rankings by promoted combustion tests. These
differences are significantly reduced if the friction coefficient, IX, of the metallic surface is considered and relative
rankings are based on the product fiPv [312].
Ignition of metallic materials by frictional heating can occur in LOX systems as well as in GOX. The ignitability of
metallic materials is lower in LOX than in GOX because of
the low initial temperatures. However, once ignition takes
Pv Product at Ignition
(Ibfyin.^ X ft/min X 10 *)
Stator
Rotor
(W/m^ X 10 ")
Inconel MA754
Haynes 214
Inconel MA758
Nickel 200
Tin Bronze
Hastelloy C-22
Inconel 600
Inconel MA6000
Glidcop Al-25
Hastelloy 230
NASA-Z
Copper Zirconium
Inconel 625
Hastelloy B-2
Waspaloy
Monel 400
Monel 400
Haynes 230
Monel K-500
13-4 PH
Hastelloy C-276
Incoloy 903
Inconel 718
17-4 P H ( H 900)
Yellow brass
Hastelloy X
Hastelloy G-30
14-5 PH
304 Stainless Steel
17-4 PH
Inconel 706
303 Stainless Steel
Stellite 6
316 Stainless Steel
Brass CDA 360
17-4 PH (Condition A)*Invar 36
Incoloy MA 956
316 Stainless Steel
440C Stainless Steel
Nitronic 60
Incoloy 909
Aluminum 6061-T6
Ti-6A1-4V
Inconel MA754
Haynes 214
Inconel MA758
Nickel 200
Tin Bronze
Hastelloy C-22
Inconel 600
Inconel MA6000
Glidcop Al-25
Hastelloy 230
NASA-Z
Copper Zirconium
Inconel 625
Hastelloy B-2
Waspaloy
Monel 400
Monel 400
Haynes 230
Monel K-500
13-4 PH
Hastelloy C-276
Incoloy 903
Inconel 718
17-4PH(H900)
Yellow Brass
Hastelloy X
Hastelloy G-30
14-5 PH
304 Stainless Steel
17-4 PH
Inconel 706
303 Stainless Steel
Stellite 6
316 Stainless Steel
Brass CDA 360
17-4 PH (Condition A)
Invar 36
Incoloy MA 956
316 Stainless Steel
440C Stainless Steel
Nitronic 60
Incoloy 909
Aluminum 6061-T6
Ti-6A1-4V
3.96to4.12'^
3.05 to 3.15
2.64 to 3.42
2.29 to 3.39^
2.15 to 2.29^
2.00 to 2.99^^
2.00 to 2.91''
1.99 to 2.66
1.95 to 3.59
1.79 to 2.19
1.77 to 2.63
1.68 to 3.19
1.62 to 1.73'
1.61 10 2.16^^
1.55 to 2.56
1.44 to 1.56''
1.42tol.55
1.40 to 1.82
1.37 to 1.64''
1.31 10 2.06"
1.21 to2.82'^
1.20 to 1.44
1.10tol.l9
1.00 to 1.21
0.97 to 1.22
0.93 to 1.05''
0.90 to 1,28'^
0.88 to 1.04
0.85 to 1.20
0.85 to 1.07
0.81 to 1.21
0.78 to 0.91
0.79 to 0.82
0.75 to 0.868
0.70 to 1.19"
0.61 to 1.05
0.60 to 0.94"
0.53 to 0.75
0.53 to 0.86"^
0.42 to 0.80
0.29 to 0.78
0.29 to 1.15
0.061"
0.0035"
11.30 to 11.75'^
8,73 to 8.98
7,53 to 9.76
6.54 to 9.66''
6.15 to 6.55"
5,72 to 8.52'
5.70 to 8.30''
5.68 to 7.59
5.56 to 10.2
5,10 to 6,24
5.05 to 7.52
4.81 to 9.11
4.65 to 4.94^
4,60 to 6.12'
4,45 to 7.31
4.12 to 4.46''
4.05 to 4.43
4,00 to 5.20
3.91 to 4.68''
3,74 to 5,88"
3,45 to 8.06^
3.41 to 4.11
3.13 to 3.37
2,87 to 3,45
2.77 to 3.49
2.66 to 3.02''
2.58 to 3.68/
2.51 to 2.96
2,43 to 3.41
2,42 to 3.05
2,33 to 3.45
2,25 to 2.60
2.25 to 2.35
2.14to2.46
1.98 to 3.41"
1,75 to 2.99
1.71 to 2.68"
1.51 to 2.14
1.50 to 2.46"
1,19 to 2,28
0,82 to 2,22
0,85 to 3.30
0.18"
0,01"
"2,5 cm (1 in,) diameter X 0,25 cm (0.1 in.) wall thickness x 2 cm (0.8 in.) high specimens rotated axially,
horizontally in stagnant 6.9 MPa (1000 psia), aviator's breathing grade oxygen. Tests were conducted by keeping V constant at 22.4 m/s (73.5 ft/s) and increasing P at a rate of 35 N/s until ignition.
Data are from frictional heating tests performed at NASA Johnson Space Center White Sands Test Facility
unless otherwise noted.
"This material did not ignite at these Pv products.
''ReiBd.
"ReiBlO.
fReiB23.
Ref B24.
''Solution annealed.
Rotor
Monel K-500
Monel K-500
Monel K-500
Ductile Cast Iron
Gray Cast Iron
Gray Cast Iron
Copper Beryllium
Ductile Cast iron
AtSl4140
Ductile Cast Iron
Monel 400
Inconel 718
Bronze
Tin Bronze
Monel K-500
17-4 PH Stainless Steel
Monel K-500
Inconel 718
17-4 PH Stainless Steel
Bronze
316 Stainless Steel
Inconel 718
Monel 400
17-4 PH Stainless Steel
Monel K-500
Ductile Cast Iron
Copper Zirconium
Ductile Cast Iron
Monel K-500
Bronze
304 Stainless Steel
Tin Bronze
316 Stainless Steel
Monel 400
Inconel 718
Monel K-500
304 Stainless Steel
316 Stainless Steel
Stellite 6
Monel 400
303 Stainless Steel
17-4 PH Stainless Steel
304 Stainless Steel
Monel 400
Ductile Cast Iron
Aluminum Bronze
Nitronic 60
Babbitt on Bronze
Babbitt on Bronze
Babbitt on Bronze
Hastelloy C-22
Hastelloy C-276
Hastelloy G-30
Monel 400
410 Stainless Steel
17-4 P H ( H 1150 M)
Monel 400
410 Stainless Steel
Monel K-500
17-4 P H ( H 1150 M)
Nitronic 60
17-4 PH Stainless Steel
Monel K-500
304 Stainless Steel
Inconel 625
Hastelloy C-22
304 Stainless Steel
304 Stainless Steel
Hastelloy C-276
17-4 P H ( H 1150M)
303 Stainless Steel
316 Stainless Steel
304 Stainless Steel
Hastelloy G-30
303 Stainless Steel
Stellite 6
316 Stainless Steel
Tin Bronze
17-4 PH Stainless Steel
410 Stainless Steel
303 Stainless Steel
Aluminum Bronze
17-4 PH Stainless Steel
303 Stainless Steel
303 Stainless Steel
316 Stainless Steel
17-4 PH Stainless Steel
304 Stainless Steel
Nitronic 60
17-4 PH Stainless Steel
17-4 PH Stainless Steel
Inconel 625
Copper Beryllium
316 Stainless Steel
Nitronic 60
C355 Aluminum
17-4 P H ( H 1150 M)
17-4 P H ( H 1150 M)
Monel K-500
410 Stainless Steel
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
3.72
2.70^
1.62
1.45'1.48'
1.66'
1.20
1.23'
1.35''
1.17'
1.69
1.06''
1.84'
1.25'
2.00
1.00
1.13'^
1.18''
1.10
1.02'
0.9a'
0.96''
0.94''
1.02
0.84 to i.oa'
0.84 to 1.16'
0.83 to 0.90
0.81 to 1.69'
o.sotoi.oa'
0.79
0.77
0.77
0.77
0.76
0.75
0.75
0.69
0.68
0.66
0.66
0.65
0.64
0.63
0.62
0.44
0.30
0.28
0.09
0.09
0.08
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
1.20'
0.79''
0.84
0.85''
0.93
0.87''
0.91''
1.09''
0.91''
0.77
1.53''
0.88
1.09
1.24
0.91''
0.75
0.32
0.61
0.21
0.19
0.09
4.51
4.00
3.81
3.65
3.39
3.35
3.14
3.12
3.10
3.00
2.93
2.91
2.82
2.78
2.67
2.65
2.63
2.58
2.55
2.55
2.53
2.44
2.43
2.41
2.41
2.39
2.39
2.32
2.27
2.25
2.21
2.20
2.18
2.17
2.14
2.10
1.97
1.93
1.90
1.89
1.86
1.83
1.81
1.75
1.25
0.85
0.80
0.25
0.25
0.24
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
10.61
7.70'
4.63
4.13'
4.24'4.75'
3.42
3.43'
3.85'
3.35'
4.78
3.03''
5.26'
3.56'
5.70
2.86
3.24''
3.37''
3.14
2.90'
2.57''
2.73''
2.69''
2.90
2.88''
3.3r
2.58
4.82'
2.39''
3.6^^
2.26''
2.38
2.41''
2.67
2.48''
2.61''
3.12''
2.60''
2.18
4.38''
2.51
3.11
3.54
2.59'
2.15
0.91
1.75
0.60
0.55
0.27
2.5 cm (1 in.) diameter x 0.25 cm (0.1 in.) wall thickness X 2 cm (0.8 in.) high specimens rotated axially,
horizontally in stagnant 6.9 MPa (1000 psia) aviator's breathing grade oxygen. Tests were conducted by keeping V constant at 22.4 m/s (73.5 ft/s) and increa.sing P at a rate of 35 N/s until ignition
Data are from frictional heating tests performed at NASA Johnson
Johnsc Space Center White Sands Test Facility
unless otherwise noted.
'RefB2-5.
''Reffi24.
400
200
T
600
800
r-
O NOMNIKM
A PAiniALBUm
mfnoN
MONEL
K500
(heat treated)
9a
MONEL
K500
(cmnealed)
P,
^^%'
PA A
AI^:
J'
MONEL
400
HAYNES 214
"M^ ^
INCOLOY
MA 754
'"% A l^i
TIN BRONZE
<^A4fo|ftA^
YELLOW BRASS
INCONEL 6 0 0
M ^^
AL BRONZE
INCONEL 6 2 5
100
200
JX
J_
300
400
500
SAMPLE TEMPERATURE. K
J_
600
700
FIG. B-1aIgnitability of metals In supersonic particle Impact test with 2000-)xm (0.0787in.) aluminum particles In 26.9-MPa (3900-psl) oxygen. Ignitability Increases from top right
to bottom left.
on the other end. The specimen is positioned in the chamber
to expose the face of the cylinder to the impacting particle.
Under these conditions, both particle velocity and the pressure at the target increased slowly with target temperature.
The absolute pressure at t h e target varied from approxi-
mately 3.6 to 4.0 MPa (520 to 580 psi) [B7], and the particle
velocity at the target varied from approximately 370 to 430
m/s (1200 to 1400 ft/s). The data provide a rough relative
ranking of the resistance of metallic materials to ignition by
particle impact; however, the test parameters are too arbi-
200
400
600
800
O NOMHmON
A PARIIALBJRN
MMIMN
440C SS
(onneQletD
INCONEL
718
(annealed)
j9^
^g^
^^Vt>
INCOLOY 800
< 6 4'^
-^
'
%tH^
INCOLOY
903
rs)
>A ' 0
NITRONIC 6 0
:t
INCOLOY
MA956
14
I la"' -^
SS 1 3 - 4
SS 1 4 - 5 PH
SS 316
*o>cr^^
SS 304
^v^ **
^ *
6061 AL
1.
100
200
300
400
500
600
SAMPLE TEMPERATURE. K
700
flammability increases with increasing pressure and decreases with increasing thickness (the standcird sample for the
test is a 0.32-cm (0.125-in.) diameter rod). The quantity of
promoter does not affect the flammability. Table B-5 shows
threshold pressures of some common metallic materials. It
should be noted that upward flame propagation is used for
this test because it provides more repeatable data and better
distinguishes the performance of different materials than
does downward propagation. However, metallic materials
bum downward more readily than upward and materials that
are self-extinguishing in upward propagation may bum completely in the downward configuration. Nevertheless, the test
severely evaluates metallic materials because the aluminum
promoter is a far more intense ignition source than typical ignition sources in real systems (such as burning polymeric materials). Details of this test are given in Refs B4, B12, and B14.
Relative rankings from promoted combustion and particle
impact tests appear to be similar, although the scarcity of
particle impact data makes this conclusion somewhat tentative. A rough correlation exists between heat of combustion
and ignitability and flammability in these two tests. Thus, the
materials that ignite least easily and propagate fire least readily are usually those with the lowest heats of combustion or
those containing elements with low heats of combustion.
Specific exceptions to this general rule do exist. For example,
aluminum bronzes containing 93% copper (low heat of combustion and relatively nonflammable) and only 7% aluminum (high heat of combustion and highly flammable) are
highly flammable in high-pressure oxygen.
kJ/g
66.38
31.07
24.69
19.71
10,88
7.95 to 8.37
7.74 to 7.95
7,74 to 8.16
7.38 to 7.53
7.385
5.439
4.60 to 5,86
5.314
4.895
4.10
3,64
3,45
3,31
2,89
2,74
2.45
1.05
0.146
Btu/lb
Source
28 557
13 365
10 620
8 478
4 680
3 420 to 3 600
3 330 to 3 420
3 330 to 3 510
3 177 to 3 2 4 0
3 177
2 340
1 980 to 2 520
2 286
2 106
1764
1 566
1485
1422
1242
1 179
1053
450
63
[B26]
[B26]
[8261
[8261
[B271
calculated
calculated
calculated
calculated
[B26]
calculated
calculated
[B27]
IB27]
[B271
calculated
calculated
calculated
calculated
calculated
\B26]
[B27]
[B2n
"Species given in parenthesis is the oxide assumed to be formed in the calculation of the heat of
combustion.
APPENDIX
B: MATERIALS
TABLE B-5Minimum oxygen pressure required to support selfsustained combustion oi approximately 15-cm (6-in.) long, 0.32-cm
(0.125-in.)-diameter rods ignited at the bottom.
Threshold
Absolute Pressure
Malcrial
MPa
psi
>68.9"
>68.9
>68.9
>68.9
>68.9
>68.9
>55.2
>55.2
>48.3
>48.3
>48.3
34.5
34.5
34.5
20.7
20.7
20.7
20,7
17.2
13.8
13.8
6.9
6.9
6.9
6.9
S6.9''
6.9
6.9
6.9
6.9
6.9
5.2*
4.1
3.5
<3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
2.1
1.4
1.4
1.4
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.2
0.2
0.17
0.17
0.07
0.007
0.007
> 10 000
> 10 000
> 10 000
> 10 000
>10 000
> 10 000
> 8 000
> 8 000
> 7 000
> 7 000
> 7 000
5 000
5 000
5 000
3 000
2 500
2 500
2 500
2 500
2 000
2 000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1 000
s i 000
1000
750
600
500
500
500
500
500
300
300
250
200
100
100
100
25
s35
s50
s25
sIO
l
l
Ne.xl Lower
Absolute
Pressure
Tested
psi
3 000
3 000
1000
1 000
1 000
1 000
1 000
1 000
1 500
1 500
500
500
750
500
none
500
500
500
none
500
none
500
100
none
none
none
none
250
200
100
100
none
none
50
20
none
none
none
none
none
none
"> indicates that this was the highest pressure tested and the material did not support self-sustained combustion. The threshold pressure, if it exists, is greater than the stated value.
'' indicates that no tests were conducted at lower pressures and
therefore the threshold pressure is less than or equal to the stated
value.
ical Impact for Materials in Variable Pressure GOX and LOX"
and Test 14 "Pressurized Gaseous Oxygen Pneumatic Impact
for Nonmetals" [B4]. In an operating high-pressure oxygen
system, the potential for pneumatic impact ignition is greater
than that for mechanical impact ignition [B15]. The standard
TESTING
METHODS
61
Ti
where
7) = final temperature (absolute),
Tj = initial temperature (absolute),
Pf - final pressure (absolute),
P, = initial pressure (absolute), and
n = ratio of specific heats (1.40 for oxygen).
Thus, for a final absolute pressure of 34.5 MPa (5000
psi) from an ambient temperature of 293 K (68F), and an
absolute pressure of 101.325 kPa (14.7 psi), the maximum
theoretical final t e m p e r a t u r e that oxygen can reach is
1550K(2330F).
Table B-6 shows polymer properties relating to ignition
and combustion. If the calculated temperature exceeds the
AIT of the polymer, then the potential for ignition exists.
Tables B-7 gives a description of the material designation
used in Table B-6.
Pressure,
in
Pressure,
in
GOX,'
MPa
Highest Passing
Pneumatic
Impact
Pressure,*
MPa
6.8 to 10.3
34.5"
3.45 to 41.4
(1/20)"
O.IOF
34 (29.4 to 49 J)
40.8
34.SP
3.45"
3.45"
Oxygen
Index*
Autoignition
Temp.'
"C
Heat of
Combusion
-AH^J/g
18 to 39.0^
243''
35 560"
100*
388''
6 170"
98"'
10.3""
ECTFE (Halar)
ETFE (Tefeel)
FEP (Teflon FEP)
so'**
77"
171"
243"
378'''
13 600"
16 880"
10 460"
98'"
34 (88.2 Jr
100*''
434"
6 380"
98''
34.0
485c,v
7 113
98"'
10.3
479AV
6 067"
98"'
10.3
27.2
(74.5 j r
13.6
ggm
34
34
268''
484av
14 770"
6 067
ggm
10.3
34 (29.4 to 49 J)'^
6.8
34 (39.2 to 68.6 J)
10.3"
>427'
222'''
5 335
21 700"
98
68.6 to 98^
178"
32 220"
49 to 58.8
34'
Material"
ABS
LOX,"^
MPa
FLUOROPOLYMERS
Fluorogold (glass-fiber
reinforced PTFE)
Fluorogreen E600 (glass fiber
reinforced PTFE)
TFE w/15% graphite fill
PVDF (Kynar)
Rulon A (glass-filled PTFE)
39'
22 to 28''
21 to 38''
Zytel 42
21.3 to 44''
PC
PE (unspecified density)
17.3 to 30.2''
PE, high density (HOPE)
17.5*
35""
PEEK
PES
22.7*
PET (Mylar) (unspecified grade)
Mylar A
Mylar D
PI (unspecified)
49
61/53^
Vespel SP21
(graphite-filled PI)
16.7 to 17.7'
PMMA
14.2 to 16.1'
POM [Polyacetal (Delrin)]
17 to 29.2''
PP
PPO
24 to 33''
PPS
43*
PS
17 to 25.2'
PSO
30 to 51''
PU (foam)
25 to 28*
PVC
31.5''
47*
60''
PVDC
192GV
286"
225>'-'^
176"
305"
373''
181"
36
30
46
46
32
31
22
960"
960"
668"
650"
500"
440"
180"
19.6"
9.8 to 58.8*
9.8'"
3.5 (1/20)"
6.9 (2/20)"
20.7"
20.7"
4.48"
10.3"
0.1 to 1.7
6.9 (68 J)
13.8''
6.89 (1/20)"
27.6"
3.5 (2/20)"
0.34"
6.89"
0.1 to 13.6
6.8"
20.7 to 62.1**
O.IOF
3.5"
3.5"
0.267"
19.6 to 58.8"
9.8 to 33.9"
562*-'^
343'''
26 109*
31 810"
178'''
174"
348''
285"
26
16
46
27
28
41
239"
568
950"
020"
650"
670"
422
21 771 to 27 214'
20 870"
98 "'''
10.3"'
13.7 to 41.2"
9.8"
20 900'
THERMOSETTING ELASTOMERS (RUBBERS)
CR (Neoprene rubber)
CSM (Hypalon rubber)
EPR copolymer
Fluoroelastomers
FFKM (Kalrez)
FKM Viton A
Viton PLV 501 OB
Fluorel
FluorelE2160
IIR (Butyl)
MQ (Silicone rubber)
26.3''
27*
25.5''
258"
159"
100*
355''
56 to 57.5'''' 268-322'''''
73.9 to 93.5''''
21 to 32*
25.8 to 39.2''
29 520"
28 470*
47 230"
6550"
15 060"
302"
11510"
208"
262"
45 100"
17 370"
O.IOF
3.45"
0.101(811)"
13.5'
98"
9gm
98'"
98"'
2.7
6.8
3.4"
3.4
0 . ^ 0 3.4"'
1.7
6.9''
41.4"
3.5"
13.8"
3.5"
B-6(Continued).
Highest Passing Meelianical mpacl
Material"
NBR (Buna-N)
Oxygon
Index''
Autoignition
Temp.'
"C
Heal of
Combusion
-AH,,J/g
22*
173"
41 430"
181"
143''
39 778"
21 7 6 0 t o 2 7 2 0 0 "
13 570''
NR
Polyurethane rubber
SBR
Energy, in
LOX at Amb.
Pressure/'
J
Pressure,
in
LOX,'
MPa
Pressure,
in
GOX,'
IVlPa
Highest Passing
Pneumatic
Impact
Pressure,''
MPa
10.3
(27.4 J ) " '
0.101"
0.101"
G R E A S E AND L U B R I C A N T S
10.3"
68.0"
3 768 to 4 187"
98"'
258KK
2i7fifi
TllERMOSETS
10 44(F-'
2 6 040^K
l(,,yR.i'i'
21,9eK''''
0.5 (7/9)
0.5
258'-'
ISS**
265K
2 9 6108
10 500K
2 7 650SK
21 Qsg.w.
22.2KR-'*
29.8Sfi-''''
0.5 (5/5)**:
0.5 (4/16)fi
0.5 (2/8)
312SS
340s
3 0 330^
2 3 ^KK./.*.
23.9Kft''''
0.5''
0.5 {A/lb'F
2 0 . isfi''''
0.5(1/16):
232KK
13.8"
MISCELLANEOUS
Carbon Black
35*
3 2 750*
"See Table B-7 for a description of the material designations used in this column.
Percentage concentration of oxygen in a mixture of oxygen and nitrogen that will maintain equilibrium burning conditions as prescribed in ASTM
D 2863.
^Lowest published value in 100% oxygen. There are several AIT test methods as described in Ref B28. Note that the AIT varies with pressure. AITs
from Kek B20 and B31 were conducted at 101.3 kPa in pure oxygen and should be used with caution. AITs determined with the DSC method are usually higher than those obtained by the ASTM G 72 method.
Maximum input energy for 0/20 reactions/tests, unless otherwi.se specified, in accordance with standard test method of ASTM D2512-82. Additional data for other materials and other conditions may be available. Contact NASA Johnson Space Center White Sands Test Facility for additional
information.
''Maximum absolute pressure at 98 J (72 ft-lb/), ambient temperature, and 0/20 reactions/tests, unless noted otherwise, that ASTM G 86-89 is
passed. Additional data for other materials and other conditions may be available. Contact WSTF for additional information.
'Maximum absolute pressure at ambient temperature, 98 J (72 ft-lb/) and 0/20 reactions/tests, unless otherwise specified, that ASTM G 86-89 is
passed. Additional data for other materials and other conditions may be available. Contact WSTF for additional infonnation.
''Maximum absolute pressure at 98 J (72 ft-lb/), ambient temperature, and 0/20 reactions/tests, unless noted otherwise, that ASTM G 74-82 is
passed. Additional data for other materials and other conditions may be available. Contact WSTF for additional information.
''[829]
'IBSOJ
'ASTM Guide for Evaluating Nonmetallic Materials for Oxygen Service (ASTM G 63, 1991).
*[53/]
'[B32]
"'[B16]
"Testing performed at WSTF. Contact WSTF for additional information.
"W33]
"[834]
"[Bi5]
^[820}
'[B36]
'[B37]
"[S,3S]
[Bi9]
'[B40\ AIT per G 63 in accordance with G72-82 at a starting pressure of 10.3 MPa.
'AIT determined by differential thermal analysis in GOX at 101.3 kPa,
""Information supplied by manufacturer.
''''Batch sensitive.
<^'[fi42]
''''[B43}
"Did not ignite (DNI) in 100% oxygen at 101.3 kPa (14.7 psia).
I\B44]
'^[B45']
''''Reaction impact energy at which a material has a 50% probability of reacting.
''[B46]
''The AIT depends on the carbon black content in rubbers.
Common Synonyms
Chemical Type
Tradenames"
THERMOPLASTICS
acetal
polyacetal
ABS
HDPE
acrylonitrile-butadiene-styrene
teipolymer
chlorotrifluoroethylene
homopolymer
poly(chlorotrifluoroethylene-coethylene)
poly(ethylene-co-tetrafluoroethylene)
fluorinated ethylene-propylene
copolymer
linear polyethylene; polyolefin
LDPE
PA
nylon
PC
poly(hexamethylene adipamide);
aliphatic polyamide
bisphenol A-based polycarbonate
PE''
PEEK
PES"
poly(ether sulfone)
PET
saturated polyester
PI
PL polyimide; polypyromellitimide
PMMA
polymethyl methacrylate
POM
polyoxymethlene
PP
PPG
PPS
polyphenylene oxide
polyphenylene sulfide
PS
polystyrene, rigid
PSO=
PTFE
polysulfone (amorphous)
polytetrafluoroethylene
PTFE,
reinforced
reinforced polytetrafluoroethylene
PU
PVC
PVDC
PVDF
PVF
polyvinylidene fluoride
polyvinyl fluoride
CR
poly(2-chloro-l,3-butadiene)
elastomer
chlorosulfonated polyethylene
poly(ethylene-co-propylene)
elastomer
ABS
CTFE
ECTFE
ETFE
FEF
PCTFE; CTFE;
polychlorotrifluoroethylene
PECTFE; ECTFE
Delrin (DuPont)
Celcon (Celanese)
ABS (J. Gibson)
Lustran (Monsanto)
Kel-F* (3M)
Neoflon CTFE (Daikin)
Halar (Asimont)
PETFE; ETFE
Teflon FEP; FEP
Tefzel (DuPont)
Teflon FEP (DuPont)
Fortiflex (Solvay)
Hostalen (Celanese)
Marlex (Phillips)
Petrothene (Quantum)
Petrothene (Quantum)
Sclair (DuPont Canada)
Tenite (Eastman)
Rilson (Atochem)
Zytel (DuPont)
Lexan (GE Plastics)
Makrolon (Miles)
(see HDPE and LDPE)
Victrex PEEK (LNP)
PC; polycarbonate
ELASTOMERS
CSM
EPR
Chemical Type
poly(tetrafluoroethylene-coperfluoromethylvinyl ether)
elastomer
poly(hexafliioropropylene-covinylidene fluoride) elastomer
poly(isobutadiene-co-isoprene)
elastomer
polydimethyl siloxane elastomer
NBR
poly(acrylonitrile-co-butadiene)
elastomer
NR
SBR
Common Synonyms
TFE-PMVE elastomer
perfluoroelastomer
PVDF-HFP; fluoroelastomer;
fluorocarbon elastomer
IIR; butyl rubber
Silicone rubber; MQ; MPQ
(low-temperature copolymer); MVQ (lowcompression set copolymer)
acrylonite rubber; acrylonitrile-butadiene
rubber; nitrile rubber; NBR; Buna N
NR; natural rubber; natural latex rubber
SBR; GRS, Buna S; styrene-butadiene
rubber
Tradenames"
Kalrez (DuPont)
Fluorel (Dyneon)
Viton (DuPont)
Exxon Butyl (Exxon)
Polysar Butyl (Polysar)
RTV (GE Silicones)
Silastic (Dow)
Chemigum (Goodyear)
Hycai' (B. F. Goodrich)
Paracril (Uniroyal)
Hartex (Firestone)
Duradcne (Firestone)
Nippol SBR (Zeon)
Plioflex (Goodyear)
"Trademarks given are for those materials for which data are provided in Table B-6, or are representative of products that are available. Some
of the tradenames may be obsolete (no longer available), but they are given because they are for the materials for which data are presented in
Table B-6.
'"Obsolete.
' F E P is not polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE).
''PE is a general classification and could refer to HDPE, LLDPE, LDPE, or UHMWPE.
'Examples of polyaiylsulfones.
REFERENCES
[Bl] Bryan, C. J. and Lowry, R., "Comparative Results of Autogenous Ignition Temperature Measurements by ASTM G 72 and
Pressurized Scanning Calorimetry in Gaseous Oxygen,"
Flammability and Sensitivity of Materials in Oxygen-Enriched
Atmospheres: Second Volume, ASTM STP 910, M. A. Benning,
Ed., American Society for Testing and Materials, Philadelphia,
PA, 1986.
APPENDIX
[B37] Moffett, G. E., Schmidt, N, E., Pedley, M. D., and Linley, L. J.
"An Evaluation of the Liquid Oxygen Mechanical Impact Test,"
Flammability and Sensitivity of Materials in Oxygen-Enriched
Atmospheres: Fourth Volume, ASTM STP 1040, J. M. Stohzfus,
F. J. Benz, and J. S. Stradling, Eds., American Society for Testing and Materials, Philadelphia, PA, 1989, pp. 11-12.
[B3S] Hirsch, D., Skarsgard, E., Beeson, H., and Btyan, C, "Predictability of Gaseous Impact Ignition Sensitivity from Autoignition Temperature Data," Flammahility and Sensitivity of
Materials in Oxygen-Enriched Atmospheres, Ninth Volume,
ASTM STP 1395, T. A. Steinberg, H. D. Beeson, and B. E. Newton, Eds., American Society for Testing and Mateiials, West
Conshohocken, PA, to be published.
[B39] Key, C. F., Compatibility of Materials in Liquid Oxygen-Volume
I, NASA Technical Memorandum NASA TM X-64711, Marshall Space Flight Center, AL, October 1972.
[B40] ASTM Standards Technology Training Course Handouts, Fire
Hazards in Oxygen Systems, Part 1 of 2 Addendum, Test Data,
American Society for Testing and Materials, Philadelphia, PA,
1997.
[647] Janoff, D., Pedley, M. D., and Bamford, L. J., "Ignition of Nonmetallic Materials by High Pressure Oxygen HI: New Method
Development," Flammahility and Sensitivity of Materials in
Oxygen-Enriched Atmospheres: Fifth Volume, ASTM STP 1111,
J. M. Stoltzfus and K. Mcllroy, Eds., American Society for
Testing and Materials, Philadelphia, PA, 1991, pp. 60-74.
[B42] Waller, J. M., Hornung, S. D., and Beeson, H. D., "Fuel Cell
Elastomeric Materials Oxygen Compatibility Testing; Effect of
450 and 6200 kPa Oxygen," Flammahility and Sensitivity of
Oxygen-Enriched Atmospheres, Eighth Volume, ASTM STP
1319, W. T. Royals, T. C. Chou, and T. A. Steinberg, Eds.,
ASTM, West Conshohocken, PA, 1977, pp. 385-402.
[B43] DTmperio, V. J. and Werley, B. L., "Oxygen Compatibility of
FKM Elastomers," Flammability and Sensitivity of Materials in
Oxygen-Enriched Atmospheres: Eighth Volume, ASTM STP
1319, W. T. Royals, T. C. Chou, and T. A. Steinberg, Eds.,
American Society for Testing and Materials, West Conshohocken, PA, 1997, pp. 350-357.
[B44] Fenimore, C. P. and Martin, F. J., Modern Plastics, Vol. 44, No.
3, November 1966, pp. 141-148.
[B45] Beeson, H. D., Hshieh, F., and Hirsch, D., "Ignitability of Advanced Composites in Liquid and Gaseous Oxygen," Flammability and Sensitivity of Materials in Oxygen-Enriched Atmospheres: Eighth Volume, ASTM STP 1319, W. T. Royals, T. C.
Chou, and T. A. Steinberg, Eds., American Society for Testing
and Materials, West Conshohocken, PA, 1997, pp. 421-431.
[B46] Hshieh, F. Stohzfus, J. M., and Beeson, H. D., "Note; Autoignition Temperature of Selected Polymers at Elevated Oxygen Pressure and Their Heat of Combustion," Fire and Materials, Vol. 20, 1996, pp. 301-303.
APPENDIX C
Design ExamplesOutline
Sample Material Applications
Metals
Polymers
Composites
Ceramics and Glass
General Design Requirements
Particle Impact
Pneumatic Impact
Mechanical Impact
Frictional Heating
Electrical Arcing
Eliminate Burrs and Sharp Edges
Minimize Use-Generated Particulate
C: DESIGN
EXAMPLES
67
68
AND OXYGEN
SYSTEMS
springs and high spring rates. Ignition resistance and hightemperature properties of these materials vary.
Inconel 625 is useful for very high-temperature applications where welded materials are required. In essence, it may
be used as a high-temperature replacement for Monel 400,
keeping in m i n d that material strength is reduced and
flammability and ignition susceptibility is increased.
Hastelloy C-22 and C-276 are Ni-Cr-Mo alloys t h a t can
withstand high-temperature oxidizing environments u p to
1090C (2000F). They are also resistant to mineral acids,
solvents, wet a n d dry chlorine, or hydrofluoric acids.
However, in high-pressure oxygen environments, these alloys
have flammable traits similar to Inconel 625. C-22 alloy, however, is known to be markedly less flammable than C-276.
Both of these alloys are available in cast, wrought, and forged
configurations.
A 300 series stainless steel is a very c o m m o n material for
valves, tubing, vessels, a n d fittings. If used in situations
where the ignition mechanisms are minimized or eUminated,
it provides a n effective a n d relatively low-cost material
choice.
Inconel 718 is useful for very high-temperature applications where high specific strengths are required and welding
is permitted. Because it can be heat-treated to enhance mechanical properties, Inconel 718 may replace Inconel 625;
however, flammability a n d ignition susceptibility are
increased.
Galling potential increases with materials of similar chemical composition and hardnesses. If an all-Monel valve is required, then screw threads should have one mating p a r t
made of annealed Monel 400 and the other of age-hardened
Monel K-500 to achieve a large difference in hardnesses and
some difference in chemical composition. Using an annealed
300 series stainless steel mated with age-hardened Monel K500 would further reduce galling potential because of the increased disparity in chemical compositions.
Note: A 303 stainless steel should not be used, especially for valve bodies and bolts, in a corrosive environment, such as a sea coast location, because it is subject to stress corrosion cracking.
Aluminum alloys are highly susceptible to ignition and
combustion in oxygen, but because of their light weight, designers are tempted to use aluminum in spite of the ignition
hazards. An anodizing surface preparation should be used
for aluminum parts subject to conditions that may generate
particulate or be subjected to particle impacts [C2]. Examples include bends or restrictions in aluminum flow lines,
valve bodies, and piston housings.
Polymers
In general, all polymers are flammable in 100% oxygen;
therefore, care must be taken to minimize or eliminate ignition sources. The materials listed below appear roughly in descending order of preference.
Teflon is the most compatible soft good in terms of ignition
resistance in oxygen-enriched environments. For this reason,
it is preferred for a wide variety of seals and miscellaneous
components. Teflon does not have any appreciable resilience,
which is a very desirable property for seal materials. Because
of this, the designer must ensure that "cold flow" of Teflon
can be tolerated for long-term mechanical loading, pressure-
induced loading, and thermal cycling. Additionally, the designer must avoid situations where extrusion creates fine
Teflon particles that can promote combustion of other components. The designer must also avoid seal leakage that could
create an oxygen-enriched environment around pressurized
components and/or high-velocity flow, which could create
particle impact ignition hazards. Teflon may also be used as
a solid lubricant coating on rubbing surfaces, but it will create contamination as the equipment is operated. Designers
should be aware that fillers may adversely affect ignition and
combustion effects of Teflon,
Kalrez/Chemraz may replace Viton when applications call
for an elastomer at lower and/or higher operating temperatures than Viton.
CTFE is a fluorinated material that may sometimes be substituted for Teflon because of its increased rigidity and a
slight resiliency. However, Vespels are usually preferred over
CTFE in applications where material strength is important.
Viton is the most recommended elastomer for oxygen usage. Unlike Teflon, it has "shape memory," which allows it to
withstand various loads and still return to its original shape.
Because of this property, Viton may be preferred over Teflon
for certain applications, even though it has reduced ignition
resistance.
Vespels, especially graphite-filled Vespels such as SP-21
and SP-22, are excellent choices for bearings, bushings, valve
seats, and seals. These materials have good ignition resistance, lubricity, machinability, and creep resistance.
Silicone is a common material for seals and diaphragms
when ductility and low hardness are required to provide excellent sealing ability at low operating t e m p e r a t u r e s (not
cryogenic) and moderate pressures. However, silicone is not
a material of choice for oxygen service because of its low ignition threshold in oxygen-enriched environments and its
moderate heat of combustion. Therefore, if silicone is used,
the designer must ensure that all ignition sources are eliminated. Fluorosilicone is not recommended in place of standard silicone, because the mechanical properties are not enhanced, ignition/flammability characteristics are similar to
silicone, and possible health risks from combustion byproducts are increased.
Adhesives and bonding agents should be avoided because
of their high reactivity with oxygen.
Composites
Polymeric composites may have increased mechanical or
physical properties over standard materials. A simple example of this is glass fiber-filled Teflon. The enhanced properties
are desirable, but the disadvantage is that the matrix material
and often the sizings are more flammable in oxygen. When
attempting to use any composite, complete ignition sensitivity testing must be performed.
Ceramics and Glass
Ceramics are not generally flammable in oxygen, so they can
serve as effective thermal and electrical insulators. However,
although they may not b u m , they may be severely degraded
by contact with molten metal slag, and their ability to act as
a fire stop or an insulator may be compromised. Care should
also be tciken in their use, because they are typically brittle
APPENDIX
C: DESIGN
EXAMPLES
69
and susceptible to fracture from manufacturing-induced defects and impact loading. High safety factors and compressive loading are design requirements.
Glasses may be used for many applications including pressure vessel windows and valve seals. Pressure vessel codes
generally require glass-retaining pressure differentials to
have safety factors of ten or greater. Special design features
must also be incorporated per ASME Safety Standard for
Pressure Vessels for H u m a n Occupancy (ASME PVHO-1).
Sapphire glass is often used for windows as well as for valve
ball seals where they mate against seats.
Pneumatic Impact
The key to successful designs is to integrate the concepts presented in Chapter 4. Several potential hazards can be reduced
or eliminated by judicious design. Additionally, it is wise to
spend time at the initial design stage to simplify designs. By
simplifying, potential failure points and ignition sources can
be eliminated, parts can often be made sturdier and more ignition-resistant, and flow paths can be made straighter.
Some examples of how to apply the concepts in Chapter 4
to real systems to avoid specific problems are given below.
Particle Impact
An ideal design to eliminate particle impact ignition sources
would limit fluid velocities, minimize contamination, reduce
the potential for particle impacts on blunt surfaces, and avoid
burrs and small parts susceptible to kindling chain ignition
and combustion. In a best-case example, flow would be approximately clean, low-velocity flow through a straight section of tubing. A worst-case example of how not to design for
particle impact ignitions may be found in Fig. C-1, which il-
Mechanical Impact
Any situation where mechanical components can impact
against each other should be avoided. Examples of situations
Valve Stem
Actuator Fitting
B a c k - U p Rings
mpact
Flow
Direction
Valve Seat
Outlet Fitting
FIG. C-2Design showing minimization of soft good exposure to pneumatic impact ignition. This configuration shows
the soft goods removed from the region of maximum pneumatic impact heating where the fluid momentum is stopped. All
soft goods have restricted flow paths from this region, greatly
reducing fluid heating of soft goods.
70
AND OXYGEN
SYSTEMS
Actuator Fitting
Actuator Spring
Housing
0-Ring
Stem Seal
Valve Seat
Outlet Fitting
Ten^perature Sensor
FIG. C-4Design minimizing electrical arcing. Ignitions caused by electrical malfunction can be prevented by using double-insulated heater wire with a differential current
sensor and a temperature sensor to monitor off-limit operating conditions.
APPENDIX
C: DESIGN
EXAMPLES
71
Feathered
edge
eliminated
by drilling
thraugh
Burr
(b)
(o)
Threading generates
contaminants
(b)
(a)
Flange mount
(c)
(d)
(e)
FIG. C-6Designs showing various fitting and particulate generation configurations. Figure C-6a shows how particulate can easily be generated during fitting assembly. The configuration will allow particles to be created while threading parts
together to be released into oxygen-wetted regions. A build-up of particles can
cause particle impact Ignitions. Figures C-6 (b) through (e) show configurations
that isolate assembly-generated contaminants from the oxygen.
72
AND OXYGEN
SYSTEMS
Rotating
stem
Ball-type
stem thrust
bearing
Nonrotating
stem
Valve packing
below stem
operator threads
Coined
body seat
Nonmetallic
Seat
(a)
(b)
FIG. C-7Designs illustrating rotating stem valve and particle generation configurations. Figure C-7a sliows a common valve configuration witii a rotating valve
stem. Manual valve actuation creates particulate in tlie tlireads and at ttie point of
contact with the seat. Particle contamination can Ise minimized as shown In Fig.
C-7b by placing stem seals t>elow the valve stem pacldng to isolate them from oxygen and by making the stem a nonrotation configuration. Axial stem movement
without rotation will minimize particulate generation, and the hazard of particle impact ignition Is reduced.
metallic seat can be used to achieve the desired slow actuation rate. In this case, the metal seat can be made of a m u c h
softer material and the seat can be formed by "coining" (pressure molding by the stem itself to create a perfect match).
Contaminants will not cause fragmentation of such a seat.
Galling cannot occur unless the nonrotating feature is compromised (therefore, care should be exercised when cleaning). The seat and body of such a valve can be fabricated from
many metals that are comparatively unreactive with oxygen.
Flow
Flow
(b)
APPENDIX
Prevent Rotation of Seals and Rotation Against
Seats
Sealed parts that require rotation at assembly (such as Orings on threaded shafts) can generate particles that may migrate into the flow stream (Fig. C-9a). Particulate generation
also occurs in ball valves where a ball is rotated on a nonmetallic seat.
A related phenomenon, which may be described as "feathering," occurs when valve stems are rotated against some
nonmetallic seats such as CTFE. Because of the mechanical
properties of some nonmetallic materials, a thin, feather-like
projection of material is extruded from the seat. The feathered feature is more ignitable than the seat itself.
Instead of rotating, the sealed part can be designed as a
push-in plug locked in place by a second part that is threaded
but not sealed, as shown in Fig. C-9b. Alternately, the sealed
threads can be replaced with a flanged and bolted connection. CTFE and other nonmetallic materials subject to feathering should not be used for seals and seats in rotating configurations. Ball valves are not recommended for oxygen
systems because of their tendency to generate particulate and
their quick opening times. The quick opening times lead to
rapid pressurization of downstream cavities, creating rapid
heating of soft goods and increasing the risk of polymer ignition and combustion.
C: DESIGN
Intersecting drill
Sharp edge
Thin wall
Seal
(Q)
Overdrill
Threads require
rotation of seal
at assembly
73
EXAMPLES
(b)
FIG. C-9Seal configuration reducing assembly-generated contaminants. Figure C-9a shows a configuration where particulate generated by the threads at assembly can enter the oxygen-wetted valve regions, because the seal is not engaged during the threading operation. Figure C-9d shows one of many
configurations that can be used to Isolate assembly-generated particles from the
contained oxygen and reduce wear and feathering of the seal or assembly.
74
AND OXYGEN
SYSTEMS
RISK OPTIMIZATION
In real design situations, the designer will often face risk optimization. Many times, task constraints dictate the use of
specific materials, hardware, or features. When these features introduce new ignition hazards, the hazards must remetin minimal. Often, the designer will be able to minimize
risks by adding filters, reducing pressurization rates, or ensuring that the best (and possibly more expensive) materials
are incorporated into the design. It is beyond the scope of this
document to describe all possible compromises for risk optimization; the designer must assess each situation separately.
REFERENCE
[Cl^ ASTM Committee G4.05, Fire Hazards in Oxygen Systems:
ASTM Standards Technology Training Coursebook, 2nd ed.,
B.L. Weriey, Ed., ASTM, Philadelphia, PA, 1991.
[C2] Bahk, S., Chavez, D., Emery, B., and Wilson, B., "Protecting
Aluminum Alloy From Particle-Impact Ignition with an AI2O3
Film," International Journal of Impact Engineering, November
1992.
APPENDIX D
P r e s s u r e Vessels^Testing, I n s p e c t i o n , a n d
RecertificationOutline
General
Testing
Qualification and Acceptance Testing
Pressure Testing
Performance Testing
Heat Leak Tests
Leakage Testing
Weld Testing
Testing Aerospace (Flight-Weight) Pressure Vessels
Inspection
In-Service Inspection and Recertification
Ground-based Pressure Vessels and Systems
Aerospace (Flight-Weight) Vessels
Test Records
GENERAL
Pressure vessels require testing, inspection, and qualification
when installed and periodic recertification while in service.
Refer to Chapter 4 for details on pressure vessel design for
oxygen service.
Several accepted definitions of pressure vessels are:
1. ASME Code pressure vessels.
2. NASA flight-weight pressure vessels. These do not meet
ASME code. They typically have safety factors between
1.10 and 1.35.
3. NASA medium-weight pressure vessels. These do not meet
ASME code, are nonflight, and have safety factors! between 1.35 and 4.00.
4. DOT, API vessels, etc. These typically have safety factors
between 1.5 and 4.0.
5. Compressed gas cylinders meeting the requirements of 49
CFR [Dll
Inspection and testing methods for establishing the suitability a n d safety of oxygen vessels, pressure vessels, piping,
and equipment are included in industrial guidelines:
Tentative S t a n d a r d Insulated Tank Truck Specification
(CGA 341); "Pressure Vessels," ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code (Section VIII) and "Quahfication Standard for
Welding and Brazing Procedures, Welders, Brazers, and
Welding and Brazing Operators," ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code (Section IX); and "Process Piping," (ANSI/ASME
B31.3).
The performance and design requirements of the system
and its components should be verified by testing and aneJysis. Testing within off-limit ranges should be considered for
evaluating limited design margins, single-point failures, and
any uncertainties in the design criteria. Such testing should
be performed per applicable codes. Before installation in a
system, pressure vessels, piping, valves, flexible hoses, and
p u m p i n g equipment should be pressure-qualification
(proof)-tested to ensure they can withstand internal test pressures higher t h a n design operating pressures.
If repairs or additions are made after the tests, the affected
piping or equipment must be retested. Equipment not to be
subjected to the pressure test should be either disconnected
from the piping or isolated by blinds or other means during
the test.
Cleanliness should be verified at system and component
operating levels. Initial testing may be performed with clean
inert fluids, and acceptance tests may be done with nitrogen.
Life tests, however, should be conducted with oxygen.
TESTING
Qualification and Acceptance Testing
Initial qualification tests to verify system integrity should not
exceed the system's Maximum Allowable Working Pressure
(MAWP)t. While the MAWP is held in the system, the test
should be monitored from a remote location. After testing is
completed, the components that have not previously been
qualified for oxygen service should be reevaluated for flow
and functional capabilities. They should be disassembled and
insjjected after testing.
APPENDIX
D: PRESSURE
VESSELS
75
Pressure Testing
Weld Testing
Unless the welded joints on the inner container of a LOX vessel are fully radiographed, all welds in or on the shell and
heads, both inside and outside, should be tested by the magnetic particle method, the fluorescent dye penetrant method,
or by the ultrasonic testing method (ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, also see "Inspection" in this
appendix). All cracks and other rejectable defects shall be repaired according to the repair procedures prescribed in the
code under which the tank was built. The welder and the
welding procedure should be qualified in accordance with
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX.
The AHJ is responsible for the welding done by personnel
within his/her jurisdiction and shall conduct the required
qualification tests of the welding procedures and the welders
or welding operators. Contractors are responsible for welding done by their personnel. A supplier shall not accept a performance qualification made by a welder or a welding operator for another supplier without the authorized inspector's
specific approval. If approval is given, acceptance is limited
to performance qualification on piping and the same or
equivalent procedures must be used, wherein the essential
variables are within the limits set forth in ASME Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX.
A performance qualification must be renewed as required
by the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX.
Performance Testing
Heat Leak TestsThe boiloff rate and heat leak establish the
maximum allowable hauling distance of a LOX transportation system. For calculation of one-way travel time, see Ref
DL The boiloff tests should be repeated after driving the
trailer for a minimum of 1600 km (1000 miles).
Leakage TestingLeak detection methods include soap tests
(bubble tests), which have a sensitivity of approximately 10 "*
cm^/s (6 X 10"'' in.''/s); and helium tests, which have a sensitivity of 10"^ cm^^/s (6 X 10~" in.''/s) or better. For vacuumjacketed systems, chemical analysis of a vacuum p u m p discharge will indicate leakage. The helium mass spectrometer
is the most sensitive leak detection instrument available for
industrial use. The presence of a leak is shown on a meter
that indicates how much helium is passing through the spectrometer tube. Helium leak testing should be performed before filling systems with oxygen.
The systems must be checked for leaks, initially under atmospheric temperature conditions and then when loaded
with fluids under the MAWP.
Pressure-rise tests of vacuum-jacketed equipment will indicate if a leak is present.
Before the oxygen vessel is completely assembled, the
inner vessel should be helium leak-tested with a mass
spectrometer. Leak tests should be conducted with the mass
spectrometer set at 1 x 10"^ std cm^'/s (6 x 10"" in.^/s) sensitivity. A no-leak indication for 15 min constitutes a successful test. Vacuum integrity and insulation stability tests
should be performed by pumping the vacuum space to an absolute pressure of at least 4000 Pa (0.58 psi) and sealing it.
Pressure in the vacuum space should not rise more than 667
Pa (0.01 psi) during 48 h. If the rise is more than 667 Pa (0.01
psi) it may be the result of a leak or H2O outgassing in the annulus.
Various leakage testing methods are described in Ref 7)3.
All vacuum leak detection and/or pumping must be done
using oxygen compatible vacuum p u m p oils in the event that
backstreaming conditions occur. Pump shutdown solenoid
valves should be in place to prevent oil migration during
power outages or p u m p failure modes.
INSPECTION
Comprehensive inspection and control are required of all materials and components to be used in LOX and GOX piping
installations. A quality control program should be established that will satisfy all requirements established by the
AHJ and construction code requirements for all piping, components, materials, and test equipment. Material identification and certification is required for all piping and components used in fabrication and assemblies subjected to LOX
and GOX operating conditions. No substitutions for the materials and components specified are permitted, except where
the substitution retains code compliance a n d has written
approval.
Required inspections of the piping, storage, and system
components should be made according to methods specified by the AHJ. Personnel performing inspections shall be
qualified.
76
AND OXYGEN
SYSTEMS
the proof test does not provide, by direct demonstration, assurance of satisfactory performance over the specified service life. The fracture control plan should include required
inspection intervals, periodic verification tests, and environmental conditioning for physical and corrosion protection
[DJ.DSl
Test Records
Test records should be kept on file for each system and piping installation. These records should include:
1. The test data and identification of the system, component,
and piping tested.
2. The test m e t h o d (for example, hydrostatic, pneumatic,
sensitive leak test).
3. The test fluid, the test pressure, the test temperature, and
the hold time at maximum test pressure.
4. The locations, types, and causes of failures and leaks in
components and welded joints; the types of repair; and
data on retest.
5. Written approval by AHJ-assigned safety/design engineer.
6. Nondestructive evaluation data.
Records should also be kept concerning the cleaning procedures used. Record Keeping in Chapter 5 gives a complete
description of the required information.
REFERENCES
[DI] CFR Title 49, Transportation, Code of Federal Regulations,
1986.
[D2] Roth, E. M Space-Cabin Atmospheres, Part I, NASA SP-47,
1964, p. 13.
[D3] Schmidt, H. W. and Forney, D. E., ASRDI Oxygen Technology
Survey, Vol. 9, NASA SP-3090, NASA, 1975.
[Z)4] NSS/HP-1740.1, NASA Aerospace Pressure Vessel Safety Standard, NASA Technical Memorandum, NASA TM-81074, NASA,
1974.
[D5] MIL-STD-1522, Standard General Requirements for Safe Design
and Operation of Pressurized Missile and Space Systems, Military
Standard, United States Air Force, Washington, DC, 1986.
\_D6\ NHB 8060. IB, Flammability, Odor, and Off gassing Requirements and Test Procedures for Materials in Environments That
Support Combustion, NASA TM-84066, NASA, Office of Safety
and Mission Quality, 1981.
[D7] McHenry, H, I., "Advances in Cryogenic Engineering," Fracture
Mechanics and Its Application to Cryogenic Structures, Vol. 22,
K. D. Timmerhaus, R. P. Reed, and A. F. Clark, Eds., Plenum
Press, New York, 1975, pp. 9-26.
[DS] Stuhrke, W. F. and Carpenter, J. L., Jr., Fracture Toughness
Testing DataA Technology Survey, OR-13432, Martin Marietta
Aerospace, NASA Contract NAS3-17640, NASA CR-134752,
1975.
APPENDIX E
C o d e s , R e g u l a t i o n s , zuid G u i d e l i n e s L i s t i n g Outline
American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
American Petroleum Institute (API)
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
77
PORTABLE TANKS
49 CFR 179
49 CFR 173.304, 173.314
49 CFR 178.337, 177.824
49 CFR 179.104, 179.105
49 CFR 179.200 to 179.400
CYLINDER DESIGN
49 CFR 178
49 CFR 173.301 173.302,
178.36, 178.37, 178.45
14 CFR 103
Tariff 6D
SYSTEMS
D 4809, Test Method for Heat of Combustion of Liquid Hydrocarbon Fuels by Bomb Calorimeter (Precision Method).
Compressed Gas Association (CGA)
Professional Societies
American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA)
American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE)
American Society of Heating, Refrigeration, and Air Conditioning Engineering (ASHRAE)
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineering (IEEE)
Instrument Society of America (ISA)
Society of Automotive Engineers
SAE AIR 17IC, Glossary of Technical and Physiological
Terms Related to Aerospace Oxygen Systems
SAE AIR 505, Oxygen Equipment, Provisioning and Use in
High Altitude (To 40,000 ft.) Commercial Transport Aircraft
SAE AIR 822A, Oxygen Systems for General Aviation
SAE AIR 825B, Oxygen Equipment for Aircraft
SAE AIR 847, Oxygen Equipment for Commercial Transport
Aircraft Which Fly Above 45,000 ft
SAE AIR 1059A, Transfilling and Maintenance of Oxygen
Cylinders
SAE AIR 1069, Crew Oxygen Requirements Up to a Maximum Altitude of 45,000 Feet
SAE AIR 1176A, Oxygen System and Component Cleaning
and Packaging
SAE AIR 1223, Installation of Liquid Oxygen Systems in
Civil Aircraft
SAE AIR 1389, FAA Regulations Covering the Use of Oxygen
in Aircraft
SAE AIR 1390, Convenient Location of Oxygen Masks for
Both the Crew and Passengers of Aircraft
79
80
AND OXYGEN
SYSTEMS
(for example), some controls are mandatory for NASA employees such as NHB 1700.1 [EH- In addition, each NASA
center has its own safety manuals, management instructions,
etc. NHS/IH 1845.2 [2] establishes NASA's requirements
necessary to ensure safe entry and work in confined spaces
and reviews the physical effects of varying oxygen levels and
partial pressures within NASA.
REFERENCES
Wn NHB 1700.1, Basic Safety Manual, Vol. VI-B, NASA TM-85234,
NASA, June 1993.
iE2] NHS/IH 1845.2, NASA Health Standard for Entry Into and Work
in Confined Spaces, NASA, 1983.
APPENDIX F
Scaling Laws, Explosions, Blasts, a n d
FragmentsOutline
Scaling Laws
Explosions
Explosions in Buildings
Tank Ruptures
Ground-Handling System Explosions
Blasts
Fragments
Scaling Laws
SCALING LAWS
A comprehensive review of accidental explosions has been
made [ f / ] . The review characterizes explosions by type, discusses the various scaling laws a n d summarizes nonideal
blast wave behavior a n d t h e m e c h a n i s m s by which blast
waves cause damage. Also see Refs F2-F4.
The classical experimental work on blast waves has mainly
used either high explosives or nuclear weapons to produce
the waves. The intermediate and far-field waves usually resemble those predicted from point-source theory quite
closely, so either high explosives or nuclear explosions can be
considered ideal.
A point-source blast wave is a blast wave conceptually produced by the instantaneous deposition of a fixed quantity of
energy at an infinitesimal point in a uniform atmosphere. Essentially, a point-source wave propagating away from its origin creates three regions of interest. The first is the near-field
wave in which pressures are so large that external pressure
(or counterpressure) can be neglected. This region is followed by a n intermediate region of extreme practical importance because the overpressure! and impulse are sufficiently
high to do significant damage. The intermediate region is followed in turn by a "far-field" region that yields to an analytic
approximation such that the positive overpressure portion of
the curve for large distances can be easily constructed from
the overpressure time curve at one far-field position.
Scaling the properties of point-source blast waves is comm o n practice and is subject to cube-root scaling (Sach's law)
\_F1,F3\ Theoretically, a given pressure will occur at a dis-
(F-1)
(F-2)
EXPLOSIONS
Explosions in Buildings
Explosions in buildings are of three main types. The severity
of damage increases from Type 1 to Type 3.
1. Type 1. Some combustible material spills, resulting in a
slow deflagration wave or flashback fire that causes a relatively slow pressure buildup in the building.
APPENDIX
F: SCALING
LAWS,
EXPLOSIONS,
BLASTS,
FRAGMENTS
81
To estimate blast wave properties, dimensionless parameters are used [F7]. Prediction curves for scaled values of these
parameters are given as functions of R, a dimensionless distance. The properties of interest a r e p , , side-on overpressure,
ta, time-of-arrival of side-on overpressure peak, T^ time-ofduration of the positive phase of the side-on overpressure,
and / , the positive phase impulse. The dimensionless parameters, designated with a bar on top, are defined as:
R=Rpa'yE'''
P = pJPa
*a ~ taAa r^
BLASTS
'E
fa = TaAaPa'^IE"'
E = [pi-paKri-niv,
(F-3)
where
E = blast yieldt (energy)
P\ = initial absolute pressure in the vessel
Pi, = absolute pressure of the outside atmosphere
/i = ratio of specific heats for the gas in the vessel
Vi = initial volume of the vessel
2. An estimate based on isentropic expansion from initial
burst pressure to atmospheric pressure
E = b7iV,/(y, - 1)] [ 1 - [pa/prf^' - ' V i
(F-4)
3. A lower limit on the energy released, for example by constant-pressure addition of energy to the explosion source
region at a release rate so slow that it does not produce a
blast wave
E=pAVf-Vt)
(F-5)
where
V/ = the final volume occupied by the gas that was originally in the vessel
The three equations [F3-F5^ are given in descending order
of total blast energy. The blast 5deld is considered to lie between Eqs F-4 a n d F-5. Equation F-3 gives slightly higher values than does Eq F-4, but both are considered very conservative [f 7].
The equations given for blast yields are based on the assumption that all the energy that can drive a blast wave does
so, depending only on the energy release rate. For real vessels, some energy must be absorbed by the vessel as it fractures, both in the fracturing process itself and in accelerating
the vessel fragments to their maximum velocity.
Methods for estimating the velocity and kinetic energy of
the vessel fragments are provided in Ref F7. Also, the characteristics of blast waves from liquid propeUant explosions and
spherical gas vessel bursts a n d their similarities to and differences from waves from condensed high explosives such as
TNT are reviewed in Ref F7.
T = IsAaPa"''E"'
where
Pa and E are as defined for E q F-3
R = radius of the blast wave (standoff distance)
Ps = side-on overpressure
ta = arrival time of side-on overpressure peak
Aa = ambient sound velocity
Tg = duration time of positive phase of side-on overpressure
F = positive-phase impulse of side-on overpressure
Scaling laws for nonideal explosions Eire not known exactly
now, but they can be easily developed once the physics of
such explosions are well known. They wiU likely be variants
on Sach's law [Fi,F3]. Theoretical work and some test results
suggest that at distances at which the absolute pressure levels are over approximately 103.4 kPa (15 psi) for LOX-liquid
hydrogen explosions, the TNT equivalence in terms of peak
pressure is approximately 0.07; for absolute pressure levels
from 101.4 to 0.69 kPa (14.7 to 0.1 psi), the TNT equivalence
is approximately 1; a n d below 0.69 kPa (0.1 psi) it is approximately 2.0. Interpreting these numbers means that at an absolute pressure of 101.4 kPa (14.7 psi) and above, it takes approximately 6.5 kg (14.3 lb) of LOX and liquid hydrogen to
generate t h e same pressure-distance relationship as does
0.45 kg (1 lb) of TNT; approximately 0.45 kg (1 lb) of LOX
and liquid hydrogen at an absolute pressure of between 101.4
to 0.69 kPa (14.7 psi t o 0.1 psi); and only 0.23 kg (0.5 lb) of
LOX and liquid hydrogen at an absolute pressure of less than
0.69 kPa (0.1 psi). If blast wave characteristics can be defined
for accidental explosions, correlation with damage effects on
buildings, vehicles, humans, etc., can be made from existing
methods and data in the literature [F3,F7,F9].
Fragmentation patterns from accidental explosions a n d
the damaging effects of these fragments are difficult to predict. The blast waves produced by the explosion of liquid propellants that are accidentally mixed are usually unreproducible and difficult to model adequately. Extensive studies
show that liquid-projjellant explosions differ from TNT explosions in a number of ways, so the concept of TNT equivalence is far from exact.
FRAGMENTS
The fragments generated by bursting oxygen high-pressure
gas or liquid vessels can vary widely in size and shape, depending on the total energy released, the release rate, and the
pressure vessel design. A vessel that bursts because of a seam
REFERENCES
[Fl] Strehlow, R, A. and Baker, W. E., The Characterization and
Evaluation of Accidental Explosions, UILU-ENG-75-0503, University of Illinois, NASA Grant NSG-3008, NASA CR-134779,
1975.
[F2] Stull, D. R., Fundamentals of Fire and Explosion, AlChE Monograph Series, Vol. 73, No. 10, 1977.
[Fi] Hannum, J. A. E., Ed., "Hazards of Chemical Rockets and Propellants," Safety, Health and the Environment, Vols. 1 and 2,
(AD-A16095l),CPIA-PUBL-394-VOL-1 and VOL-2, Chemical
Propulsion Information Agency, Johns Hopkins University,
MD, 1984.
\_F4] DOD 6055.9, DoD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards, United States Department of Defense, Wa.shington, DC,
1992, or latest revision.
[F5] Baker, W. E., Kulesz, J. J., Ricker, R. E., Bessey, R. I.., Westine, P. S., Parr, V. B., and Oldman, G. A., Workbook for Predicting Pressure Wave and Fragment Effects of Exploding Propellant Tanks and Gas Storage Vessels, NASA CR-134906,
Contract NAS3-19231, NASA, November 1975.
\F6\ Baker, W. E., Parr, V., Bessey, R., and Cox, D., Assembly and
Analysis of Fragmentation Data for Liquid Propellant Vessels,
74N1562, NASA CR-134538, NASA, 1974.
[FT] Baker, W. E., Kulesz, J. J., Ricker, R. E., Bessey, R. L., Westine, P. S., Pan-, V. B., and Oldman, G. A., Workbook for Estimating Effects of Accidental Explosions in Propellant Ground
Handling and Transport Systems, NASACR-3023, NASA, 1978.
[F8] Kinney, G. E. and Graham, K. J., Explosive Shocks in Air, Second Ed., New York, Springer-Verlag, 1985.
[F9] AMCP-706-180, Engineering Design Handbook, Principles of
Explosive Behavior, United States Army Material Command,
April 1972, or latest revision.
[FIO] Strehlow, R. A., Savage, L. D., and Vance, G. M., Measurement
of Energy Release Rates in Vapor Cloud Explosions, UILU-ENG72-0503, University of Illinois, IL, August 1972.
[FJl] Moore, C. V., "The Design of Banlcades for Hazardous Pressure Systems," Nuclear Engineering Design, Vol. 5, 1967, pp.
81-97.
[FJZ] Kuchta, J. M., Fire and Explosion Manual for Aircraft Accident
Investigators, AFAPL-TR-73-74, August 1973.
[F13] Farber, E. A., "Explosive Yield Limiting Self-Ignition Phenomena in LO2/LH2 and LO2/RP-I Mixtures," Minutes of the 15th
Explosives Safety Seminar, Vol. 2, NTIS, 1973, pp. 1287-1304.
APPENDIX G
Organizationzil Policies and Procedures; Project
Management; Design, Safety, Operational, and
Hazard ReviewsOutline
Introduction
Organizational Policies and Procedures
Designation/Assignment of Authority and Responsibility
Policies and Procedures for Oxygen Use
Personnel Training and Protection PoUcies and Procedures
Standard Operating Procedures
Emergency Plans and Procedures
Quality Control Policies and Procedures
Project Management
Project Plan
Project Periods and Phases
Definition Period
Phase 1: Identify Need
Phase 2: Develop Concept
Phase 3: Preliminary Design
Phase 4: Final Design
Implementation Period
Phase .5: Fabrication and Construction
Phase 6: Installation
Phase 7: Commissioning
Development Testing
Worst-Case Operating Condition Testing
Oxygen Compatibility Testing
Qualification Testing
Acceptance Testing
Operations Period
Phase 8: Operation
Termination Period
Phase 9: Remove from Service
Phase 10: Decommission and Disposal
Design, Safety, Operational, and Hazard Reviews
Design Reviews
Concept Design Review
Preliminaiy Design Review
Final Design Review
Design Certification Review
Safety Reviews
Safety Analysis
Safety Analysis Report
System Safety Program Plan
Safety Assessment Review
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
Material Compatibility Assessment
Operational Reviews
Operating Procedures Review
Operator Training Review
Test Readiness Review
Operational Readiness Inspection
Operational Readiness Review
Emergency Procedures Review
Hazard Reviews
84
AND OXYGEN
SYSTEMS
INTRODUCTION
An organization involved in the use of oxygen can considerably increase its ability to do so safely by adopting and instituting organizational practices and principles that have been
developed and used successfully by others. Likewise, confidence that a project will be successful is much greater if the
controls and checks that have been developed through many
years of experience are applied in the project management
function of the organization.
One purpose of this appendix is to provide an introduction
to the general safety related policies and procedures that are
necessary, and beneficial, for a n organization that is involved
in the use of oxygen so that it can safely accomplish its
mission.
A second purpose of this appendix is to provide guidance in
the safety-related aspects of project management. The policies and procedures and project management guidance given
in this appendix may be considered as a safety supplement to
the general policies and procedures of an organization and to
the general principles of project management, which are not
discussed herein except perhaps very briefly. Principles of
project m a n a g e m e n t are discussed in n u m e r o u s sources,
such as Refs G1-G3.
A third purpose of this appendix is to provide a summary
of the design, safety, operational, and hazard reviews that are
essentieJ for the safe use of oxygen. These reviews provide a n
assessment of the engineering and safety features of a system
design and the operational procedures involved in the use of
the system.
The term "system" is used loosely in this appendix. A "system" as used in this appendix could refer to a new site, a new
facility at a site, or a new installation at a facility. An exact definition of "system" depends upon the user, environment, and
ultimate goal. A general definition is: a group of elements, either people or equipment, that is organized and arranged in
such a way that the elements can act as a whole toward achieving some common goal, objective, or end. A system is one of
the principal functioning entities comprising the project hardware within a project or program. A "system" may be considered as the first major subdivision of a project work [G7].
"Programs" are commonly considered as the necessary
first-level elements of a system. A "program" may be defined
as a relative series of undertakings that continue over a period of time (normally years), and is designed to accomplish
a broad, scientific or technical goal in a long-range plan [Gl].
"Projects" are also time-phased efforts (much shorter t h a n
programs) and are the first level of breakdown of a program.
A "project" may be defined as an effort within a program as
an undertaking with a scheduled beginning and end, and
which normally involves some primary purpose [Gl].
For the purpose of this appendix, there is no basic difference between program m a n a g e m e n t and project management. Thus, the use of project management herein will apply
to either as appropriate.
APPENDIX
G: ORGANIZATIONAL
fice, or official responsible for "approving" equipment, an installation, or a procedure. The designation is used in a broad
manner because jurisdiction and "approval" agencies vary, as
do their responsibilities. Where public safety is primary, the
AHJ may be a federal, state, local, or other regional department or individual such as a fire chief, fire marshal, chief of
a fire prevention bureau, labor department, health department, building official, electrical inspector, or others having
statutory authority. For insurance purposes, the AHJ may be
an insurance inspection department, rating bureau, or other
insurance company representative. In many circumstances
the AHJ is the property owner or his designated agent. At government installations, the AHJ may be the commanding officer or a designated departmental official [G4}.
"Approved" as used in this document is defined as being
authorized by, or acceptable to, the AHJ. In determining the
acceptability of an installation, a procedure, equipment, or
materials, the AHJ may base acceptance or compliance with
applicable standards and government regulations. In the absence of such standards or government regulations the AHJ
may require evidence of proper installation, procedure, or
use. The AHJ may also refer to the listings or labeling practices of an organization that is concerned with product evaluations, and that is in a position to determine compliance
with appropriate standards and government regulations for
the current production of listed items [G4].
Policies a n d Procedures for Oxygen Use
An organization involved in the use of oxygen shall establish,
document, implement, and maintain a means of ensuring
that the organization's policies and procedures are adhered
to; this function is commonly referred to as quality
assurance, quality control, quality system, or other similar
terms.
An organization involved in the use of oxygen shall establish, document, implement, and maintain policies and procedures for the following purposes:
1. To govern and control all phases of a product or system
that involves the use of oxygen, from its concept to its removal from service and decommissioning. Important
functions involved in this process include appropriate reviews (such as design reviews) and approvals (such as for
the materials and processes used) for a product or system
that involves oxygen.
2. To ensure that the specifications and design of a product
or system for use with oxygen meet the intended purpose
of the product or system, and that the product or system is
safe to use with oxygen.
3. To define and establish a project cycle that is applicable for
a product or system that will be used in oxygen service.
The project cycle shall identify and ensure that pertinent
design, materials, and safety reviews are conducted at the
appropriate time in the project cycle.
4. To ensure that oxygen is used in a safe manner. Methods
that shall be used for evaluating the safety of a product or
system include a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
(FMEA) and a Hazards Analysis. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) shall be used to direct and control the use
of oxygen in a safe manner. All operations shall be conducted in accordance with written Operating Procedures
POLICIES
AND PROCEDURES
85
86
AND OXYGEN
SYSTEMS
PROJECT MANAGEMENT
Successful project management will involve the use effective
planning techniques. This begins with identification of the
quantitative and qucditative tools of project planning [ G / ] . A
fundamentcil tool in this process is the project plan, which involves the various phases of a project.
Project Plan
Regardless of the size of a project, it needs a plan that defines
clearly what is to be done, by whom, when, and for how
much. The essentials of a project plan include the following:
A description of the project,
A list of milestones,
A Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) that is sufficiently detailed to identify the tasks involved in the project,
An activity network that shows the sequence of the elements of the project and how they are related,
A budget and schedule breakdown for the elements of the
project,
A communication and reporting plan to keep everyone involved in the project informed,
A description of the review process defining who reviews
the project, when, and for what purpose, and
A list of key project personnel.
Milestones, check points, a n d reviews are the primary
means by which a project is controlled.
A detailed discussion of project management and planning is
beyond the scope of this appendix. Such is identified
as necessary, but the primary focus of this appendix is to
provide a review of those safety-related project management
and planning methods and techniques that are useful, or
required, in a project that involves the use of oxygen.
Additionally, some requirements that are unique, or especially
important, for the use of oxygen are described in this apjjendix.
Project Periods and Phases
DEFINITION PERIOD
PHASE 1
PHA'.F 9
PHASE 3
PHASE 4
IDENTIFY
NEED
DEVELOP
CONCEPT
PRELIMINARY
DESIGN
RNAL
DESIGN
ii
DESIGN
REVIEWS
CDR-
PDR,1
SSPP-^
SAFETY
REVIEWS
OPERATIONS
PERIOD
IMPLEMENTATION PERIOD
PHASF 6
PHASF 7
PHASF fl
INSTALLATION
COMMISSIONING
OPERATION
1,
FOR,,
PHASF S
FABRICATION
AND
CONSTRUCTION
PSA-
FSA-
FMEA-
FMEA-
DCR-
SAaR-
SAR-
SAsR"
'
MCA-
1
1
1
J
SOP-
FDR
FHA
FSA
FMEA
HA
MCA
OP
OPR
ORI
HAZARD
REVIEWS
PHA-
FHA-
1
1
ORR
OTP
POR
PHA
OPOPR-
OPERATIONAL
REVIEWS
OTR-
OPRORR-
OTR-
ORI-
EPR-
EPRWR-
TRR-
PHASF i n
DECOMMISSION
AND
1
DISPOSAL
LEGEND
1
1
PHASF 9
REMWE
FROM
SERVICE
CDR
OCR
EPR
FMEA -
TERMINATION
PERIOD
PSA
SAR
SAsR
SOP
SSPP
TRR
28 55
1.
2.
3.
4.
Definition Period,
Implementation Period,
Operations Period, and,
Termination Period.
These four project periods may be divided into various project phases, as shown in Fig. G-1, for better control and monitoring of a project. A brief description of some typical phases
of a project is given below. The various reviews mentioned in
these project phases are described in the next section of this
appendix.
Project phases should be established for every project and,
depending on the project, these may be simpler, or they may
be more detailed and complex, than the one described in this
appendix.
Definition Period
Phase 1: Identify Need
The project begins with the identification of a need and the
decision to address that need. An initial set of requirements
and specifications is developed to describe the need. The first
phase of a project includes the preliminary evaluation of an
idea, and determination of the existing needs, or potential deficiencies, of an existing system that might be available for
use in addressing the need.
Phase 2: Develop Concept
In Phase 2 a concept is developed to meet the need that was
identified in Phase 1. Tradeoffs for various concepts are evaluated. The requirements and specifications for the project
are expanded. Minimum safety requirements are defined. It
is essential that the requirements and specifications be as
88
AND OXYGEN
SYSTEMS
APPENDIX
G: ORGANIZATIONAL
POLICIES
AND PROCEDURES
89
90
AND OXYGEN
SYSTEMS
Safety Assessment Reviews (SAsR) should be made at periodic intervals during operation of the system to verify that
the system remains safe for operation. The SAsR may include
updating of other reviews and analyses, such as the Hazards
Analysis.
A TRR should be conducted for tests that involve test conditions or procedures that were not addressed in a previous
TRR.
Termination Period
Phase 9: Remove from Service
After the system has completed its mission it shall be removed from service and made safe. It may be maintained in
a state wherein it could be reactivated for a future need. An
approved plan should be followed in removing a system from
service and in any reactivation effort.
This phase of a project includes shutting down the system
and the reallocation of resources. The efforts on the total system are evaluated in this phase, and the results serve as input
to the Concept Phase for new projects and systems.
Some efforts involved in this phase of a project include the
following [Gl~\:
System phase-down,
Development of plans transferring responsibility to supporting organizations,
Divestment or transfer of resources to other systems,
Development of "lessons learned fi-om system" for inclusion in qualitative-quantitative data base to include:
^Assessment of performance,
Major problems encountered and their solution,
Technological advances,
Advancements in knowledge relative to the organization's strategic objectives,
New or improved management techniques,
Recommendations for future research and development,
Recommendations for the management of future programs, and
Other major lessons learned during the course of the
system.
Phase 10: Decommission and Disposal
Eventually the system will be deactivated, torn down, and
scraped or disposed of in an approved manner.
APPENDIX
G: ORGANIZA
Safety Reviews
At each phase in a system, specific safety tasks shall be accomplished to ensure safety during construction, operation,
maintenance, and final disposition of the system. These
safety tasks shall be tailored to include the appropiiate tasks
considering the size and complexity of the system and the associated safety risks and consequences of a mishap or failure.
The application of these requirements shall be considered for
the modification or reactivation of an existing system.
Safety AnalysisAll safety aspects, including oxygen hazards,
shall be reviewed to ensure the integrated design solution
does not present unacceptable risks to personnel and property in accordance with approved requirements of the AHJ.
A safety analysis shall be made for a system or facility
prior to its becoming operational for using oxygen. A system
shall be evaluated for potential risks to the operators, the
public, and the environment. The AHJ shall determine the
level of the safety analysis based on the facility functions and
potential accident risk. The Preliminary Safety Analysis
(PSA) shall be initiated during the Preliminary Design phase
and the results included in the PDR. The Final Safety Analysis (FSA) shall begin after completion of the Final Design
Phase, and shall be completed and approved prior to start of
operations. The safety analysis shall address items such as
the following:
Form, type, and amount of oxygen and other hazardous
materials to be stored, handled, or processed.
Principal design, construction, and operating features se-
TIONAL
POLICIES
91
lected for preventing accidents or reducing risks to acceptable levels, including the safety margins used.
Principal hazards and risks that can be encountered in system or facility operation, including potential accidents and
predicted consequences of events such as fire, explosion,
structural failure, wind, flood, lightning, earthquake, tornado, operating error, failure of essential operating equipment, and failure of safety systems.
Materials (both metallic and nonmetallic) used.
Cleaning levels.
Pressure relief protection.
Pressurization and flow rates.
The design basis accidents that were postulated and quantified, including the rationale for their selection. A design
basis accident is a postulated accident and resulting conditions for which the confinement structures, systems, and
components must meet their fvmctional goals.
92
AND OXYGEN
SYSTEMS
APPENDIX H: GLOSSARY
93
APPENDIX H
REFERENCES
[Gt] Kerzner, H., Project ManagementA Systems Approach to Planning, Scheduling, and Controlling, Second Edition, Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., New York, 1984.
\GZ] Cleland, D. I., Ed., Field Guide to Project Management, Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., New York, 1998.
[G3] Forsberg, K., Mooz, H., and Cotterman, H., Visualizing Project
Management, New York, Wiley, 1996.
[G4] Standard for Bulk Oxygen Systems at Consumer Sites, NFPA 50,
National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA, 1996.
Glossary
Acceptance testing, limited production testing that is designed to verify that products, which have been qualified to
meet design specifications, conform to specification requirements. Acceptance tests are generally less comprehensive
than Qualification tests and are nondestructive in nature.
Adiabatic, a process by which the system changes state
without thermal energy exchange between the system and
the surroundings.
Adiabatic compression, mechanical work transferred to a
system, where the energy goes into increasing the internal energy of the material for a static system or increasing the enthalpy for a dynamic system. If the process is also reversible
(in the thermodynamic definition), this change is also isentropic.
Ambient, may refer to the international standard atmospheric conditions at sea level [288 K (59F) temperature and
101.325 kPa (14.696 psi) absolute pressure] or it may refer to
the local temperature and pressure of a particular kjcation,
such as a city or a facility.
Approval, authorized by or acceptable to the AHJ. In determining the acceptability of an installation, a procedure,
equipment, or materials, the AHJ may base acceptance or
compliance with applicable standards and government regulations. In the absence of such standards or government regulations the AHJ may require evidence of proper installation,
procedure, or use. The AHJ may also refer to the listings or
labeling practices of an organization that is concerned with
product evaluations, and that is in a position to determine
comphance with appropriate standards and government regulations for the current production of listed items.
Authority having jurisdiction (AHJ), the AHJ is the organization, office, or individual responsible for "approving"
equipment, an installation, or a procedure. The designation
is used in a broad m a n n e r because jurisdiction and "approval" agencies vaiy as do their responsibilities. Where public safety is primary, the AHJ may be a federal, state, local, or
other regional department or individual such as a fire chief,
fire JTiarshal, chief of a fire prevention bureau, labor department, health department, building official, electrical inspector, or others having statutory authority. For insurance purposes, the AHJ may be an insurance inspection department,
rating bureau, or other insurance company representative. In
many circumstances the AHJ is the property owner or his
designated agent. At government installations, the AHJ may
be the commanding officer or a designated departmental
official.
94
AND OXYGEN
SYSTEMS
Flash point, the lowest temperature, corrected to an absolute pressure of 101.325 kPa (14.696 psi), at which an ignition source under specified conditions, causes the material
vapor to ignite momentarily.
Fragmentation, the breaking u p of the confining material
when an explosion takes place. Fragments may be complete
items, subassemblies, pieces of material, or pieces of equipment or buildings containing the flame.
Geysering, occurs in vertical systems with a tank and a long
feedline from the tank filled with cryogenic oxygen. Heat
transfer into the line causes gas bubbles to form and begin
rising in the line. As the bubbles rise, they coalesce to form
larger bubbles. In a line long with respect to its
diameter, the result is an expanding vapor bubble of sufficient size to expel the liquid above it into the tank with a force
large enough at times to rupture the tank or to damage internal tank components such as baffles, screens, or level sensors. When the Uquid subsequently reenters the line, it can
cause large water h a m m e r forces with accompanying system
damage.
Hazards analysis, a process that analyzes all possible ignition sources and the flammability of all materials present.
APPENDIX
Nonmetal, any material not containing metal, such as polymers. However, for the purposes of this document, "nonmetal" does not include ceramics, although they are classified as nonmetals.
Normal temperature and pressure (NTP), 293.15 K (68F)
and 101.325 kPa (14.696 psi).
Operating temperature, the temperature maintained in the
part under consideration during normal operation.
Operating pressure, the pressure of a vessel at which it normally operates. This pressure must not exceed the maximum
allowable working pressure.
Operational readiness inspection (ORI), a formal review
of facilities and systems undergoing initial activation or major modifications to ensure that proper standards of safety
and operational readiness are achieved prior to commitment
of the facility and to ensure that programs have been devised
and implemented that will systematically m a i n t a i n the
safety and operational posture of all anticipated future operations.
Overpressure, a blast wave above the ambient atmospheric
pressure resulting from an explosion or pressure in a component or system that exceeds the MAWP or other defined maximum pressure of the component or system.
Oxygen-enriched, several definitions of oxygen-enrichment
are found in the literature. Oxygen-enriched atmospheres
have been specified for oxygen concentrations greater than
21 vol% (NFPA 53), 23.5 vol% (29 CFR 1910.146), and 25
vol% or an absolute partial pressure of oxygen equal to or
greater t h a n 25.3 kPa (3.7 psi) u n d e r a m b i e n t pressure
(ASTM G 63-92). Oxygen-rich atmospheres expand the range
of flammability, lower the ignition energy, and cause combustible materials to burn violently when ignited.
Oxygen index, minimum concentration of oxygen in an ascending flow of oxygen and nitrogen at one atmosphere pressure that will just sustain combustion of a top-ignited, vertical test specimen (ASTM D 2863).
Particulate, a finely divided solid of organic or inorganic
matter, including metals. These solids are usually reported as
the amount of contaminant, by the number of a specific micrometer size present.
Pilling and Bedworth ratio, a criteria for establishing
whether an oxide is protective. It is based upon whether the
oxide that grows on a metal occupies a volume greater or less
than the volume of the metal that it replaces. The Pilling and
Bedworth ratio recommended by the ASTM Committee G-4
is: Pilling and Bedworth ratio = Wd/awD, where the metal, M,
forms the oxide, MaO/,; a and b are the oxide stoichiometiy
coefficients; W is the formula weight of the oxide; d is the
density of the metal; w is the formula weight of the metal; and
D is the density of the oxide.
Portable tanks, any tank or container as defined by the DOT,
designed primarily to be temporarily attached to a motor vehicle, other vehicle, railroad car other than tank car, or marine vessel, and equipped with skids, mountings, or accessories to facilitate mechanical handling of the container, in
which any compressed gas is to be transported in.
Precision cleaning, final or fine cleaning accomplished in a
controlled environment to achieve some cleanliness level.
Precision cleanliness, a degree of cleanliness that requires
H: GLOSSARY
95
special equipment and techniques for determination. Precision cleanliness levels normally include limits for particulate
size and quantities.
Precleaning, all cleaning activities and procedures required
to prepare items for precision cleaning.
Pressure vessel, any certified vessel used for the storage or
handling of gas or liquid under positive pressure.
Promoters, devices such as igniters, which by burning are
intended to cause ignition of an adjacent surface.
Proof test, a pressure test performed to establish the maxim u m allowable working pressure of a vessel, system, or component thereof: (1) when the strength cannot be computed
with satisfactory accuracy; (2) when the thickness cannot be
determined by means of the design rule of the applicable
code or standard; or (3) when the critical flaw size to cause
failure at the certified pressure cannot be identified by other
nondestructive test methods.
Propellant, fuels and oxidizers used in jet and rocket engines. When ignited in a combustion chamber, the propellants change into gases with a large increase in pressure, thus
providing the energy for thrust.
Pv product, a measure of the relative resistance to ignition
by friction. It is the product required for ignition (where P is
the normal load divided by the initial contact area and v is the
relative linear velocity between the samples). Determined by
a frictional heating test. Additional detail is provided in Appendix B.
Pyrolysis, the chemical decomposition of a material by thermal energy.
Qualification testing, comprehensive tests that are designed
to demonstrate that a product meets its specified requirements before it is released for production. Qualification tests
may include tests to destruction.
Radiant heat, heat that requires no m e d i u m to travel
through, unlike conduction (direct and contact) or convection (transport of heat by fluid movement).
Recertiflcation, the procedure by which a previously certified vessel or system, by appropriate tests, inspections, examinations, and documentation, is qualified to continue or
be returned to operations at the designed pressure.
Risk, the likelihood of occurrence of a specific consequence
or loss, caused by faults or failures, or external events. For example, the number of fatalities deriving from possible failures in a given hazardous activity is the risk. When qualified,
risk is often also used to mean the product of the likelihood,
expressed as a probability, and the magnitude of a given loss,
or the sum of such products over all possible losses, in other
words, the expected loss. Individual risk is the probability of
a given consequence (such as a fatality) occurring to any
member of the exposed population. Group or social risk is
the probability that a given number of individuals will suffer
a given consequence.
Safety factor, the ratio, allowed for in design, between the
ultimate breaking strength of a member, material, structure,
or equipment and the actual working stress or safe permissible load placed on it during ordinary use.
Set pressure, the pressure marked on a safety relief valve at
which system pressure relief begins.
Shock sensitivity, the ease with which a material may be ig-
SYSTEMS
MNL36-EB/Jan. 2000
Subject Index
Beryllium, 13
Beryllium-copper, 67
Blast effects, 41
Blasts, 82-83
Brazed joints, 29
Bronze, 67
Buildings
explosions in, 80-81
inhabited, distances to, 37, 39-41
Bulk liquid oxygen storage,
quantity-distance guidelines,
36-41
Bulk oxygen storage, quantity-distance
guidelines, 36-37
Burrs, removal, 29, 71
Cadmium, 13
Calorimeter test, 55, 60
Carbon dioxide, as fire-extinguishing
agent, 35
Ceramics, materials applications, 68-69
14 CFR-60-199, 78
14CFR-103, 77
29CFR-1910, 78
29CFR-1910.104, 33, 36
29CFR-1910.146, 95
46 CFR-140-149, 78
49CFR-101-179, 78
49CFR-171,8, 43
49 CFR-172, 19, 77
49 CFR-172.101,43-44
49 CFR-172.700, 43
49CFR-173.338, 43
49 CFR-172.600, 43
49CFR-173, 19,43-44,77
49CFR-173.1I5, 43
49CFR-173.301,77
49CFR-173.302, 44, 77
49 CFR-173.306, 44
49 CFR-173.31,44-45
49CFR-173.314, 77
49CFR-173.315, 44, 77
49CFR-173.316, 44
49CFR-173.318, 44
49 CFR-173.320, 44, 77
49 CFR-173.345, 43
49 CFR-174, 19, 77
49 CFR-175, 19,77
49 CFR-176, 19, 77
49CFR-177, 19,77
49 CFR-177.824, 77
49CFR-177.840, 44, 77
49CFR-177.848, 77
49CFR-177.859, 77
49 CFR-178, 19,77
49 CFR-178.245, 77
49 CFR-178.246, 77
49 CFR-178.247, 77
97
Copyright'
2000 by A S T M International
www.astm.org
49CFR-173.304, 77
49CFR-178.331,45
49CFR-178.337, 43-44, 77
49 CFR-178.338, 44-45
49 CFR-178.34, 44
49CFR-178.36, 44, 77
49CFR-178.37, 77
49 CFR-178.45, 77
49 CFR-179, 19,77
49 CFR-179.104, 77
49 CFR-179.105, 77
49CFR-179.200, 77
49CFR-179.300, 77
49 CFR-179.400, 77
49CFR-191,77
49 CFR-192, 77
49 CFR-193, 77
49 CFR-194, 77
49 CFR-195, 77
CGA341, 19,74,78
CGA C-7, 78
CGA G-4, 78
CGAG-4.0, 19
CGAG-4.1,8, 24, 78
CGA G-4.3, 78
CGA G-4.4, 16, 20, 78
CGA G-4.5, 78
CGA G-4.6, 78
CGA G-5.2, 78
CGA 02-DIR, 78
CGA P-1,78
CGA P-14, 78
CGAS-1.1,22, 78
CGAS-1.2, 22, 78
CGAS-1.3, 22, 78
CGAV-6, 21
Check valves, 22
Chemical cleaning, 26
Chemical pioperties, 51-53
CHEMTREC, 43, 45, 47
Chlorofluorocarbons, 24
Clean assembly, 28-29
Cleaning, 24-29
inspecting, 26-27
procedures, 25-28
safety, 25
Cleanliness, maintaining during
asseinbly, 28
Cold flow, 74
Cold-shocking, 31
Combustion tests, 55, 60-61
Components, 26, 28-29
Composites, materials applications, 68
Compressed gas cylinders, piping
systems, 22-23
Compressor, maliVmctions, 32-33
Confined space, operating procedures, 30
Connections, 20-21
Controls, 2
Galling, 6, 17,68
Gaseous oxygen
handling hazards, 4
leaks, 46
piping systems, 20
transport definitions, 43
transport requirements, 43-44
upward flammability of materials, 55
venting, 42
Gaseous oxygen system, failure, 33
Glass, materials applications, 68-69
Ground-handling system, explosions,
81-82
H
Handling hazards, 4
Hardware, design, cryogenic systems,
18-19
Hastelloy, 12, 68
Hazard reviews, 92-93
Hazards, 32-33
analysis, 6-7, 33
cryogenic, 18
handling, 4
Heat leak tests, 75
High-pressure and high-temperature
systems, design, 14-18
guidelines, 15-16
materials guidelines, 14-15
specific guidelines, 16-18
Hydrostatic testing, 26, 31
I
Ignition, 4-6, 10
Ignition temperature, metal test data, 55
Ignition tests, 53-54
meted test data, 55-60
Inconel alloys, 11, 67-68
Inspections, 26-27, 31, 75-76
Iron alloys, 13
Isolation valves, 21-22
Isotopes, 51
Joints, 20-21
Leakage tests, pressure vessels, 75
Leaks, 46
SUBJECT INDEX 99
o
OMB 0704-0188, 25
Operating conditions, nonmetallic
materials, 10
Operating procedures, 30-31
review, 92
Operational readiness inspection, 92
Operational readiness review, 92
Operational reviews, 92
Operator certification, 30
Operator training review, 92
Organizational policies and procedures,
1,83-86
Overpressurization, emergency
procedures, 46
Oxide coating, protective, 11-12
Oxygen compatibility testing, 89
Oxygen detection, 39, 42
Oxygen-enriched environments, fire
protection systems, 34-35
Oxygen purity, 7
Packaging, 28
Particle impact, 5
Particle impact ignition sources, 69
Particle impact test method, 54, 57-60
Particulates, minimize use-generated, 71
Passages, blind, eliminating, 72
Perfonnance testing, pressure vessels, 75
Personal protective clothing and
equipment
cleaning, 25
operating procedures, 30-31
oi"ganizational policies and procedures,
85-86
Personnel, operating procedures, 30-31
Personnel training, 1-2
organizational policies and procedures,
85-86
Physical properties, 10, 51-53
Piping systems, code requirements, 19-23
Pneumatic impact, 6
Pneumatic impact ignition sources, 69
Pneumatic impact test method, 54, 56,
60-61
Point-source blast wave, 80
Polymers, 61-63, 68
Post-ignition considerations, nonmetallic
materials, 10
Precision cleaning, 27-28
Precleaning, 26
Preliminary design review, 90-91
Press fits, 29
Pressure-relief devices, 22
Pressure testing, pressure vessels, 75
Pressure vessels, 74-76
Project management, 86-90
Project plan, 86
Promoted ignition, 6
Properties, 4
PTC-25.3, 78
Pump, malfunctions, 32-33
Q
Qualification testing, 74, 89
Quality control, organizational policies
and procedures, 86
Quantity-distance tables, 38
R
Record keeping, cleanliness, 29
Resonance, 6
Resonance cavity ignition test method, 54
Resonance cavity test method, metal test
data, 60
Respirator^' protection, 31
Restricted alloys, 13
Rinsing, 26
Risk optimization, 74
Risk training, 14
SAEAIR-171C, 79
SAE AIR-505, 79
SAE AIR-822A, 79
SAE AIR-825B, 79
SAE AIR-847, 79
SAE AIR-1059A, 79
SAE AIR-1069, 79
SAEAIR-1176A, 77, 79
SAEAlR-1223, 79
SAE AIR-1389, 79
SAE AIR-1390, 79
SAE AIR-1392, 79
SAEAMS-3012, 77
SAE ARP-433, 79
SAEARP-1109B, 79
SAE ARP-1320A, 79
SAE ARP-1398, 79
SAEARP-1532A, 79
SAE AS-861,79
SAEAS-916B, 79
SAE AS-1065, 79
SAEAS-1046B, 77, 79
SAEAS-1066A, 79
SAEAS-1214A, 79
SAEAS-1224B, 79
SAE AS-1225A, 79
SAE AS-1248A, 79
SAEAS-1303A, 79
SAEAS-1304A, 79
SAEAS-8010B, 77
SAEAS-8010C, 79
SAE AS-8025, 79
SAE AS-8026A, 79
SAE AS-8027, 79
SAE AS-8047, 79
Safety, cleaning, 25
Safety analysis, 91
Safety analysis report, 89, 91
Safety assessment review, 90-91
Safety clothing, 31
Safety guidelines, 1-3
Safety reviews, 2-3, 33, 91-92
Safe use, principles, 2
Scaling laws, 80
Seals
assembling, 28-29
extrusion, 74
preventing rotation, 73
Seats, preventing rotation against, 73
Silicone, 68
Soldered joints, 29
Solubility limit, 53
Specifications for Tank Cars, 78
Spills, 46
Stainless steels, 12, 68
Standard operating procedures, 86
Storage, incompatible, 36
Storage systems, 33-34
Storage vessels, 34
Subsonic particle impact test method, 54
Supersonic particle impact test method,
54
Systems, design, crj'ogenic systems,
18-19
System safety program plan, 91
Tank rrrptures, 81
Tariff 6D, 77
Teflon,68
Test cell, entry, 33
Test readiness review, 89, 92
Thin walls, eliminating, 73-74
Threaded assembly, 29
Thread tape, 29
Titanium alloys, 13
Training
organizational policies and procedures,
85-86
personnel, 1-2
transport, 43
Transfer, oxygen leak repair, 44
Transportation, 43-45
emergencies, 45, 45-47
1,1,1 -Trichloroethane, 24
U
Upward flammability of materials,
gaseous oxygen, 55, 60-61
Vacvrum dr^ying, 26
Valve stems, avoiding rotating, 71-72
Ventilation, cleaning, 25
Venting, 42, 45
Vespels, 68
W
Waivers, 3
Warning systems, 2
Water, as fire-extinguishing agent, 35
Welded joints, 29
Weld testing, pressirre vessels, 75
Worst-case operating condition testing,
89