Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Civil Code, of 1889 (which was the law in force when the subject firm was
organized in 1947), a universal partnership requires either that the object of
the association be all the present property of the partners, as contributed by
them to the common fund, or else "all that the partners may acquire by their
industry or work during the existence of the partnership". William J. Suter
"Morcoin" Co., Ltd. was not such a universal partnership, since the
contributions of the partners were fixed sums of money, P20,000.00 by
William Suter and P18,000.00 by Julia Spirig and neither one of them was an
industrial partner. It follows that William J. Suter "Morcoin" Co., Ltd. was
not a partnership that spouses were forbidden to enter by Article 1677
of the Civil Code of 1889.
The appellant's view, that by the marriage of both partners the company
became a single proprietorship, is equally erroneous. The capital
contributions of partners William J. Suter and Julia Spirig were separately
owned and contributed by them before their marriage; and after they were
joined in wedlock, such contributions remained their respective separate
property under the Spanish Civil Code (Article 1396). It being a basic tenet
of the Spanish and Philippine law that the partnership has a juridical
personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of its partners
(unlike American and English law that does not recognize such separate
juridical personality), the bypassing of the existence of the limited
partnership as a taxpayer can only be done by ignoring or disregarding clear
statutory mandates and basic principles of our law.
Other Ruling: Tax LAW
2. PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME
"SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO."
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE
USE OF THE FIRM NAME "OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA &
REYES."
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
FACTS
Two petitions were consolidated involving the partners of two law firms:
SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO and OZAETA,
ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES.
They based their petitions on Article 1840 which provides that the use by the
person or partneship continuing the business of the partnership name, or the
2
name of a deceased partner as part thereof, shall not itself make the
individual property of the deceased partner liable for any debts contracted
by such person or partnership. Also, In regulating other professions, such as
accountancy and engineering, the legislature has authorized the adoption of
firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of the
name of a deceased partner, at least where such firm name has acquired the
characteristics of a "trade name." They also based on the absence of
prohibition by local customs and the practice in American law.
The Supreme Court has ruled in the Deen case in Cebu as well as the
continued use of the name "Perkins & Ponce Enrile", that The Court believes
that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between
attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of
professional ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote
degree could give rise to the possibility of deception.
ISSUE
Whether or not it is proper to use the name of the deceased partner in the
firm's name.
RULING
No.
Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or
may not include the name of one or more of the partners. Those who, not
being members of the partnership, include their names in the firm name,
shall be subject to the liability, of a partner.
the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after
the death of their lawyer-predecessor.
Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to
protect rather than of a professional partnership, with no saleable
good will but whose reputation depends on the personal qualifications of its
individual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable goodwill can
exist only in a commercial partnership and cannot arise in a professional
partnership consisting of lawyers. As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a
commercial partnership the succeeding partners or parties have the right to
carry on the business under the old name, in the absence of a stipulation
forbidding it, since the name of a commercial partnership is a partnership
asset inseparable from the good will of the firm. On the other hand, a
professional partnership the reputation of which depends on the
individual skill of the members, such as partnerships of attorneys or
physicians, has no good will to be distributed as a firm asset on its
dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such skill and reputation may be,
especially where there is no provision in the partnership agreement
relating to good will as an asset.
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere
relationship or association for a particular purpose. ... It is not a partnership
formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or business or of holding
property. Profession as "a group of men pursuing a learned art as a common
calling in the spirit of public service, no less a public service because it
may incidentally be a means of livelihood."
FACTS
On November 29, 1947, plaintiff Woodhouse entered into a written
agreement with defendant Halili stating among others that: 1) that they
shall organize a partnership for the bottling and distribution of Mission soft
drinks, plaintiff to act as industrial partner or manager, and the defendant as
a capitalist, furnishing the capital necessary therefore; 2) that plaintiff was
to secure the Mission Soft Drinks franchise for and in behalf of the proposed
partnership and 3) that the plaintiff was to receive 30 per cent of the net
profits of the business.
Prior to entering into this agreement, plaintiff had informed the Mission Dry
Corporation of Los Angeles, California, that he had interested a prominent
financier (defendant herein) in the business, who was willing to invest half a
million dollars in the bottling and distribution of the said beverages, and
requested, in order that he may close the deal with him, that the right to
bottle and distribute be granted him for a limited time under the condition
that it will finally be transferred to the corporation. Pursuant to this request,
plaintiff was given a thirty days option on exclusive bottling and distribution
rights for the Philippines. The contract was finally signed by plaintiff on
December 3, 1947.
When the bottling plant was already in operation, plaintiff demanded of
defendant that the partnership papers be executed. Defendant Halili gave
excuses and would not execute said agreement, thus the complaint by the
plaintiff.
Plaintiff prays for the : 1.execution of the contract of partnership; 2)
accounting of profits and 3)share thereof of 30 percent with 4) damages in
the amount of P200,000. The Defendant on the other hand claims that: 1)
the defendants consent to the agreement, was secured by the
representation of plaintiff that he was the owner, or was about to become
owner of an exclusive bottling franchise, which representation was false, and
that plaintiff did not secure the franchise but was given to defendant himself
2) that defendant did not fail to carry out his undertakings, but that it was
plaintiff who failed and 3)that plaintiff agreed to contribute to the exclusive
franchise to the partnership, but plaintiff failed to do so with a 4)
counterclaim for P200,00 as damages.
The CFI ruling: 1) accounting of profits and to pay plaintiff 15 % of the
profits and that the 2) execution of contract cannot be enforced upon
parties. Lastly, the 3) fraud wasnt proved.
ISSUE 1
5
EXCHANGE
VITUG, J.:
FACTS
Ortega, then a senior partner in the law firm Bito, Misa, and Lozada
withdrew from the said firm. He filed with SEC a petition for dissolution and
liquidation of the partnership. The SEC en banc ruled that withdrawal of Misa
from the firm had dissolved the partnership. Since it is partnership at will,
the law firm could be dissolved by any partner at anytime, such as by
the partners, like any other contract, is binding among them and normally
takes precedence to the extent applicable over the Code's general
provisions.
5. MARJORIE TOCAO and WILLIAM T. BELO, petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and NENITA A. ANAY, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS
William Belo introduced Nenita Anay to his girlfriend, Marjorie Tocao. The
three agreed to form a joint venture for the sale of cooking wares. Belo was
to contribute P2.5 million; Tocao also contributed some cash and she shall
also act as president and general manager; and Anay shall be in charge of
marketing. Belo and Tocao specifically asked Anay because of her experience
and connections as a marketer. They agreed further that Anay shall receive
the following:
10% share of annual net profits
6% overriding commission for weekly sales
30% of sales Anay will make herself
2% share for her demo services
They operated under the name Geminesse Enterprise, this name was
however registered as a sole proprietorship with the Bureau of Domestic
Trade under Tocao. The joint venture agreement was not reduced to writing
because Anay trusted Belos assurances.
The venture succeeded under Anays marketing prowess.
But then the relationship between Anay and Tocao soured. One day, Tocao
advised one of the branch managers that Anay was no longer a part of the
company. Anay then demanded that the company be audited and her shares
be given to her.
ISSUE
Whether or not there is a partnership.
RULING
9
Yes, even though it was not reduced to writing, for a partnership can be
instituted in any form. The fact that it was registered as a sole
proprietorship is of no moment for such registration was only for the
companys trade name.
Anay was not even an employee because when they ventured into the
agreement, they explicitly agreed to profit sharing this is even though Anay
was receiving commissions because this is only incidental to her efforts as a
head marketer.
The Supreme Court also noted that a partner who is excluded wrongfully
from a partnership is an innocent partner. Hence, the guilty partner must
give him his due upon the dissolution of the partnership as well as damages
or share in the profits realized from the appropriation of the partnership
business and goodwill. An innocent partner thus possesses pecuniary
interest in every existing contract that was incomplete and in the trade name
of the co-partnership and assets at the time he was wrongfully expelled.
An unjustified dissolution by a partner can subject him to action for damages
because by the mutual agency that arises in a partnership, the doctrine of
delectus personae allows the partners to have the power, although not
necessarily the right to dissolve the partnership.
Tocaos unilateral exclusion of Anay from the partnership is shown by her
memo to the Cubao office plainly stating that Anay was, as of October 9,
1987, no longer the vice-president for sales of Geminesse Enterprise. By
that memo, petitioner Tocao effected her own withdrawal from the
partnership and considered herself as having ceased to be associated with
the partnership in the carrying on of the business. Nevertheless, the
partnership was not terminated thereby; it continues until the winding up of
the business.
6. MENDIOLA v. COURT OF APPEALS (2006)
DOCTRINE: In a partnership, the members become co-owners of
what is contributed to the firm capital and of all property that may
be acquired thereby and through the efforts of the members. The
property or stock of the partnership forms a community of goods, a
common fund, in which each party has a proprietary interest. In
fact, the New Civil Code regards a partner as a co-owner of specific
partnership property. Each partner possesses a joint interest in the
whole of partnership property. If the relation does not have this
feature, it is not one of partnership. This essential element, the
community of interest, or co-ownership of, or joint interest in
10
and conflict of interest; charged petitioner anew with serious misconduct for
the latter's alleged act of fraud and misrepresentation in authorizing the
release of an additional peso salary for himself, besides the dollar salary
agreed upon by the parties. Private respondent also accused petitioner of
disloyalty and representation of conflicting interests for having continued
using the Pacfor Phils.' office for operations of HEPI
CA: Affirmed holding that "the legal basis of the complaint is not
employment but perhaps partnership, co-ownership, or independent
contractorship." Hence, the Labor Code cannot apply.
Issues: Was there an employer-employee
partnership? Can both exist at the same time?
relationship
or
15
On March 8, 1983, the annual stockholders' meeting was held. - The ASI
group nominated three persons namely; Wolfgang Aurbach, John Griffin and
David P. Whittingham. The Philippine investors nominated six, namely;
Ernesto Lagdameo, Sr., Raul A. Boncan, Ernesto R. Lagdameo, Jr., George F.
Lee, and Baldwin Young. Mr. Eduardo R, Ceniza then nominated Mr. Luciano
E. Salazar, who in turn nominated Mr. Charles Chamsay. The chairman,
Baldwin Young ruled the last two nominations out of order on the basis of
section 5 (a) of the Agreement, the consistent practice of the parties during
the past annual stockholders' meetings to nominate only nine persons as
nominees for the nine-member board of directors, and the legal advice of
Saniwares' legal counsel. - There were protests against the action of the
Chairman and heated arguments ensued. An appeal was made by the ASI
representative to the body of stockholders present that a vote be taken on
the ruling of the Chairman. A series of events then ensued that culminated
in the eventual adjournment of the meeting and where the ASI Group,
Luciano E. Salazar and other stockholders, allegedly representing 53 or 54%
of the shares of Saniwares, decided to continue the meeting at the elevator
lobby of the American Standard Building. The continued meeting was
presided by Luciano E. Salazar, while Andres Gatmaitan acted as Secretary.
On the basis of the cumulative votes cast earlier in the meeting, the ASI
Group nominated its four nominees; Wolfgang Aurbach, John Griffin, David
Whittingham and Charles Chamsay. Luciano E. Salazar voted for himself,
thus the said five directors were certified as elected directors by the Acting
Secretary, Andres Gatmaitan, with the explanation that there was a tie
among the other six (6) nominees for the four (4) remaining positions of
directors and that the body decided not to break the tie. - These incidents
triggered off the filing of separate petitions by the parties with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC). The two petitions were consolidated and
tried jointly by a hearing officer who rendered a decision upholding the
election of the Lagdameo Group and dismissing the quo warranto petition of
Salazar and Chamsay. The ASI Group and Salazar appealed the decision to
the SEC en banc which affirmed the hearing officer's decision. - The SEC
decision led to the filing of two separate appeals with the Intermediate
Appellate Court by Wolfgang Aurbach, John Griffin, David Whittingham and
Charles Chamsay (docketed as AC-G.R. SP No. 05604) and by Luciano E.
Salazar (docketed as AC-G.R. SP No. 05617). The petitions were
consolidated and the appellate court in its decision ordered the remand of
the case to the Securities and Exchange Commission with the directive that
a new stockholders' meeting of Saniwares be ordered convoked as soon as
possible, under the supervision of the Commission.
ISSUES: The main issue hinges on who were the duly elected directors of
Saniwares for the year 1983 during its annual stockholders' meeting held on
March 8, 1983. To answer this question the following factors should be
16
stockholders. (pp. 4-5) - Section 5 (a) of the agreement uses the word
"designated" and not "nominated" or "elected" in the selection of the nine
directors on a six to three ratio. Each group is assured of a fixed number of
directors in the board. - Moreover, ASI in its communications referred to the
enterprise as joint venture. Baldwin Young also testified that Section 16(c) of
the Agreement that "Nothing herein contained shall be construed to
constitute any of the parties hereto partners or joint venturers in respect of
any transaction hereunder" was merely to obviate the possibility of the
enterprise being treated as partnership for tax purposes and liabilities to
third parties.
As correctly held by the SEC Hearing Officer: - It is said that participants in a
joint venture, in organizing the joint venture deviate from the traditional
pattern of corporation management. A noted authority has pointed out that
just as in close corporations, shareholders' agreements in joint venture
corporations often contain provisions which do one or more of the following:
(1) require greater than majority vote for shareholder and director action;
(2) give certain shareholders or groups of shareholders power to select a
specified number of directors; (3) give to the shareholders control over the
selection and retention of employees; and (4) set up a procedure for the
settlement of disputes by arbitration. - Thirdly paragraph 2 of Sec. 100 of
the Corporation Code does not necessarily imply that agreements regarding
the exercise of voting rights are allowed only in close corporations. As
Campos and Lopez-Campos explain: - Paragraph 2 refers to pooling and
voting agreements in particular. It is submitted that there is no reason for
denying stockholders of corporations other than close ones the right to enter
into not voting or pooling agreements to protect their interests, as long as
they do not intend to commit any wrong, or fraud on the other stockholders
not parties to the agreement. Of course, voting or pooling agreements are
perhaps more useful and more often resorted to in close corporations. But
they may also be found necessary even in widely held corporations.
Moreover, since the Code limits the legal meaning of close corporations to
those which comply with the requisites laid down by section 96, it is entirely
possible that a corporation which is in fact a close corporation will not come
within the definition. In such case, its stockholders should not be precluded
from entering into contracts like voting agreements if these are otherwise
valid. In short, even assuming that sec. 5(a) of the Agreement relating to
the designation or nomination of directors restricts the right of the
Agreement's signatories to vote for directors, such contractual provision, as
correctly held by the SEC, is valid and binding upon the signatories thereto,
which include appellants.
9. THE CITY OF MANILA, vs.FRANCISCO GAMBE, ET AL.,
18
19
the
and
her
the
the
21
22
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contended that because of the said stipulation
cancelling and superseding that previous Joint Affidavit, whatever
partnership agreement there was in said previous agreement had thereby
been abrogated.
Issue: Whether a partnership was established by and among the petitioner
and the private respondents as regards the ownership and/or operation of
the gasoline service station business?
Ruling: Yes.
We find no merit in this argument. Said cancelling provision was
necessary for the Joint Affidavit speaks of P15,000.00 advance rentals
starting May 25, 1966 while the latter agreement also refers to advance
rentals of the same amount starting May 24, 1966. There is, therefore, a
duplication of reference to the P15,000.00 hence the need to provide in the
subsequent document that it "cancels and supersedes" the previous one.
True it is that in the latter document, it is silent as to the statement in the
Joint Affidavit that the P15,000.00 represents the "capital investment" of the
parties in the gasoline station business and it speaks of petitioner as the sole
dealer, but this is as it should be for in the latter document SHELL was a
signatory and it would be against its policy if in the agreement it should be
stated that the business is a partnership with private respondents and not a
sole proprietorship of petitioner.
The Joint Affidavit of April 11, 1966 (Exhibit A), clearly stipulated by the
members of the same family that the P15,000.00 advance rental due to
them from SHELL shall augment their "capital investment" in the operation
of the gasoline station. Moreover other evidence in the record shows that
there was in fact such partnership agreement between the
parties. This is attested by the testimonies of private respondent Remedios
Estanislao and Atty. Angeles. Petitioner submitted to private respondents
periodic accounting of the business. Petitioner gave a written authority to
private respondent Remedios Estanislao, his sister, to examine and audit the
books of their "common business" (aming negosyo). Respondent Remedios
assisted in the running of the business. There is no doubt that the
parties hereto formed a partnership when they bound themselves to
contribute money to a common fund with the intention of dividing
the profits among themselves. The sole dealership by the petitioner and
24
the issuance of all government permits and licenses in the name of petitioner
was in compliance with the afore-stated policy of SHELL and the
understanding of the parties of having only one dealer of the SHELL
products.
v.
FRANCISCO
DE
LA
1695.)
We have found as a fact that money was furnished by the plaintiff and
received by the defendant with the understanding that it was to be used for
the purchase of the cascoes in question. This establishes the first element of
the contract, namely, mutual contribution to a common stock. The second
element, namely, the intention to share profits, appears to be an
unavoidable deduction from the fact of the purchase of the cascoes in
common, in the absence of any other explanation of the object of the parties
in making the purchase in that form, and, it may be added, in view of the
admitted fact that prior to the purchase of the first casco the formation of a
partnership had been a subject of negotiation between them.
The execution of a written agreement was not necessary in order to give
efficacy to the verbal contract of partnership as a civil contract, the
contributions of the partners not having been in the form of immovables or
rights in immovables. (Civil Code, art. 1667.) The special provision cited,
requiring the execution of a public writing in the single case mentioned and
dispensing with all formal requirements in other cases, renders inapplicable
to this species of contract the general provisions of article 1280 of the Civil
Code.
(2) Where the parties fail to agree upon articles of copartnership and
some of the contributions of one partner, less than all, are returned
to him and accepted with an express reservation of his rights as
partner, the partnership is not dissolved nor does he waive his right
to an accounting of the profits.
There was no intention on the part of the plaintiff in accepting the money to
relinguish his rights as a partner, nor is there any evidence that by anything
that he said or by anything that he omitted to say he gave the defendant
any ground whatever to believe that he intended to relinquish them. On the
contrary he notified the defendant that he waived none of his rights in the
partnership. Nor was the acceptance of the money an act which was in itself
inconsistent with the continuance of the partnership relation, as would have
been the case had the plaintiff withdrawn his entire interest in the
partnership. There is, therefore, nothing upon which a waiver, either express
or implied, can be predicated. The defendant might have himself terminated
the partnership relation at any time, if he had chosen to do so, by
27
recognizing the plaintiffs right in the partnership property and in the profits.
Having failed to do this he can not be permitted to force a dissolution upon
his copartner upon terms which the latter is unwilling to accept. We see
nothing in the case which can give the transaction in question any other
aspect than that of the withdrawal by one partner with the consent of the
other of a portion of the common capital.
28
defendant.
3. ID.; ID.; SERVICE OF PROCESS. The service of summons on such a
company is made in pursuance of paragraph 1, section. 396 of the Code of
Civil Procedure by delivering a copy thereof to the president or other head of
the corporation, secretary cashier, or managing agent thereof.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; RETURN OF SHERIFF AS EVIDENCE. The certificate of
service by the sheriff is prima facie evidence of the facts set out in such
certificate; and where such certificate shows that service of summons in an
action against a partnership duly organized and registered under the laws of
the Philippine Islands was made by serving a copy thereof on a person
therein named and described as the managing agent of the company, it is
prima facie evidence of the fact that the person on whom the summons was
served
was
in
fact
the
managing
agent
of
the
company.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. To overcome the presumption arising from the
sheriffs certificate the evidence must be clear and convincing.
6. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE; JUDGMENT; PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY.
A judgment rendered by a justices court is presumed to be a valid and
enforceable judgment where the record discloses that all of the steps
necessary to confer jurisdiction on the court have been taken and that the
court had jurisdiction of the subject matter.
16.) Ngo Tian Tek vs. Phil. Educate Co. G.R. No. L-48113, April 7,
1947.
Facts:
The case stemmed when Phil. Educate Co filed a complaint for
collection of money against the petitioner together with Vicente Tan alias
Chan Sy, wherein the CA affirmed the decision of the CFI holding that the
petitioners are jointly and severally liable to Phil. Educate Co. for the unpaid
cost of merchandise purchased by Lee Guan Box Factory from the plaintiff
and five other corporate entities. The CA found that Modern Box Factory was
at first owned by Ngo Hay, who later was joined by Ngo Tian Tek as a junior
partner. The modern Box Factory dealt in pare and similar merchandise and
purchased goods from the Phil Educate Co. and its assignors in the names of
the Modern Box Factory, Ngo Hay and Co., Go Hay Box Factory, or Go Hay.
When Lee Guan Box Factory was established a few meters from the Modern
31
Box Factory, under the management of Vicente Tan. Through Vicente Tan,
sought credit with the plaintiff and its assignors, Ngo Hay, in conversations
and interviews with their officers and employees, represented that he was
the principal owner of such factory, that the Lee Guan Box Factory and the
Modern Box Factory belonged to the same owner, and that the Lee Guan Box
Factory was a subsidiary of the Modern Box Factory. Moreover, Tan declared
that Lee Guan Box Factory was previously owned by the partnership of Ngo
Hay and Ngo Tian Tek.
Issue:
Whether or not the case should be dismissed because during its
pendency, Ngo Hay died?
Held: No. The case should not be dismissed because of the death of Ngo
Hay, it is sufficient to state that the petitioner Ngo Tian Tek and Ngo Hay is
sued as a partnership possessing a personality distinct from any of the
partners.
17.) Tai Tong Chuache and Co. vs. Insurance Commission, G.R. No. L55397 February 29, 1988.
Facts:
Azucena Palomo obtained a loan from Tai Tong Chuache Inc.
(P100,000.00). To secure the payment of the loan, a mortgage was executed
over the land and the building in favor of Tai Tong Chuache & Co. Arsenio
Chua, representative of Thai Tong Chuache & Co. insured the latter's interest
with Travellers Multi-Indemnity Corporation for P100,000.00 (P70,000.00 for
the building and P30,000.00 for the contents thereof).
Pedro Palomo secured a Fire Insurance Policy No. F- 02500, covering
the building for P50,000.00 with respondent Zenith Insurance Corporation.
Thereafter, another Fire Insurance Policy No. 8459 was procured from
respondent Philippine British Assurance Company, covering the same
building for P50,000.00 and the contents thereof for P70,000.00. On July 31,
1975, the building and the contents were totally razed by fire.
Based on the computation of the loss, including the Travellers MultiIndemnity, respondents, Zenith Insurance, Phil. British Assurance and S.S.S.
Accredited Group of Insurers, paid their corresponding shares of the loss.
Demand was made from respondent Travellers Multi-Indemnity for its share
in the loss but the same was refused. Hence, complainants demanded from
the other three (3) respondents the balance of each share in the loss based
32
and held, among others, that the transaction was an equitable mortgage
which is in the nature of pactum commissorium, hence invalid. Petitioner
now contends, among others, that he is not the real party in interest but
A.C. Aguila & Co., against which this case should have been brought.
Issue:
Held: No. Under Art. 1768 of the Civil Code, a partnership "has a juridical
personality separate and distinct from that of each of the partners." The
partners cannot be held liable for the obligations of the partnership unless it
is shown that the legal fiction of a different juridical personality is being used
for fraudulent, unfair, or illegal purposes. 10 In this case, private respondent
has not shown that A.C. Aguila & Sons, Co., as a separate juridical entity, is
being used for fraudulent, unfair, or illegal purposes. Moreover, the title to
the subject property is in the name of A.C. Aguila & Sons, Co. and the
Memorandum of Agreement was executed between private respondent, with
the consent of her late husband, and A.C. Aguila & Sons, Co., represented by
petitioner. Hence, it is the partnership, not its officers or agents, which
should be impleaded in any litigation involving property registered in its
name. A violation of this rule will result in the dismissal of the complaint.
19.) HEIRS OF TAN ENG KEE v. CA & BENGUET LUMBER COMPANY
(Pres. TAN ENG LAY), G.R. No. 126881, October 3, 2000.
Facts:
Heirs of Tan Eng Kee filed a suit against his brother Tan Eng Lay
and Benguet Lumber Company. The complaint alleged that that after the
second World War, Tan Eng Kee and Tan Eng Lay, pooling their resources and
industry together, entered into a partnership engaged in the business of
selling lumber and hardware and construction supplies. They named their
enterprise "Benguet Lumber" which they jointly managed until Tan Eng Kee's
death. The claimed that Tan Eng Lay and his children caused the conversion
of the partnership "Benguet Lumber" into a corporation called "Benguet
Lumber Company." The incorporation was purportedly a ruse to deprive Tan
Eng Kee and his heirs of their rightful participation in the profits of the
business. Petitioners prayed for accounting of the partnership assets, and
the dissolution, winding up and liquidation thereof, and the equal division of
the net assets of Benguet Lumber.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners and held that the partnership
is a joint venture. Hence, the respondent sought for recourse before the CA,
35
which reversed the decision of the RTC. They filed for a Motion for
Reconsideration but it was denied, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a partnership between Tan Eng Kee
and Tan Eng Lay in Benguet Lumber?
Held: Court held in the negative. In order to constitute a partnership, it must
be established that (1) two or more persons bound themselves to contribute
money, property, or industry to a common fund, and (2) they intend to
divide the profits among themselves. The agreement need not be in writing,
since the statute allows the oral constitution of a partnership, save in two
instances: (1) whe immovable property or real rights are contributed, and
(2) when the partnership has a capital of three thousand pesos or more. In
both cases, a public instrument is required. An inventory to be signed by the
parties and attached to the public instrument is also indispensable to the
validity of the partnership whenever immovable property is contributed to
the partnership.
The trial court determined that Tan Eng Kee and Tan Eng Lay had
entered into a joint venture, which it said is akin to a particular partnership.
A particular partnership is distinguished from a joint adventure, to wit: (a) a
joint venture is sort of informal partnership, with no firmame and no legal
personality. In a joint account, the participating merchants can transact
business under their own name, and can be individually liable therefor, (b)
usually, but not necessarily a joint adventure is limited to a SINGLE
TRANSACTION, although the business of pursuing to a successful
termination may continue for a number of years; a partnership generally
relates to a continuing business of various transactions of a certain kind.
A co-ownership or co-possession is not an indicium of the existence of
partnership. None of the petitioners witnesses could suitably account for the
beginnings of Benguet Lumber Company. Moreover, the essence of
partnership is that partners share profits and loses, and a demand for
periodic accounting is evidence of a partnership. Tan Eng Kee during his
lifetime appeared never to have made any demand or asked for the an
accounting from his brother Tan Eng Lay.
20.) MARIANO P. PASCUAL & RENATO P. DRAGON v. CIR & CTA, G.R.
No. 78133 October 18, 1988.
36
Facts:
Petitioners bought 5 parcels of lot and sold it thereafter. They
gained realized a net profit in the sale made in both transactions. The
corresponding capital gains taxes were paid by petitioners in 1973 and 1974
by availing of the tax amnesties granted in the said years. However, then
Acting BIR Commissioner Plana, assessed the petitioners and required them
to pay a total amount of the alleged deficiency corporate income taxes for
the years 1968 and 1970. Petitioners protested the said assessment
asserting that they had availed of tax amnesties way back in 1974.
Respondent Commissioner informed petitioners that in the years 1968
and 1970, petitioners as co-owners in the real estate transactions formed an
unregistered partnership or joint venture taxable as a corporation under
Section 20(b) and its income was subject to the taxes prescribed under
Section 24, both of the National Internal Revenue Code 1 that the
unregistered partnership was subject to corporate income tax as
distinguished from profits derived from the partnership by them which is
subject to individual income tax; and that the availment of tax amnesty
under P.D. No. 23, as amended, by petitioners relieved petitioners of their
individual income tax liabilities but did not relieve them from the tax liability
of the unregistered partnership. Hence, the petitioners were required to pay
the deficiency income tax assessed.
In the said case, petitioners borrowed a sum of money from their
father which together with their own personal funds they used in buying
several real properties. They appointed their brother to manage their
properties with full power to lease, collect, rent, issue receipts, etc. They had
the real properties rented or leased to various tenants for several years and
they gained net profits from the rental income. Thus, the Collector of
Internal Revenue demanded the payment of income tax on a corporation,
among others, from them.
Issue:
Whether or not there was an unregistered partnership which
made them liable for corporate income tax under the Tax Code?
Held: In order to constitute a partnership inter sese, there must be: (a) an
intent to form the same; (b) generally participating in both profits and
losses; and (c) such a community of interest, as far as third persons are
concerned as enables each party to make contract, manage the business,
and dispose of the whole property.
37
OF
INTRNAL
REVENUE
FACTS: Julia Bunales died on March 23, 1944 leaving as heirs her surviving
spouse Lorenzo T. Oa and her five children. A civil case was instituted in the
CFI of Manila for the settlement of her estate. Lorenzo was appointed
administrator of his wife-deceaseds estate. A project of partition shows that
the heirs have undivided interest in 10 parcels of land, 6 houses and an
undetermined amount to be collected from the War Damage Commission.
Although the court approved the project of partition, no attempt was made
to divide the properties listed therein. Instead, the properties remained
under the management of Lorenzo who used the said properties in business
by leasing or telling them and investing the income derived therefrom and
the proceeds from the sales thereof in real properties and securities. As a
result, petitioners properties and investment gradually increased from P
105,405.00 in 1949 to P 480,000. 20 in 1956.
38
39
FACTS: Petitioners Florencio and Angel Reyes, father and son, purchased a
lot and building for P 835,000.00. The amount of P 375,000.00 was paid.
The balance of P 460,000.00 was left, which represents the mortgage
obligation of the vendors with the China Banking Corporation, which
mortgage obligations were assumed by the vendees. The initial payment of P
375,000.00 was shared equally by the petitioners. At the time of the
purchase, the building was leased to various tenants, whose rights under the
lease contracts with the original owners, the purchaser, petitioners herein,
agreed to respect. Petitioners divided equally the income of operation and
40
41
RULING: YES.
Petitioners are subject to the income tax and residence tax for corporation.
As defined in section 84 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code, "the term
corporation includes partnerships, no matter how created or organized." This
qualifying expression clearly indicates that a joint venture need not be
undertaken in any of the standard forms, or in conformity with the usual
requirements of the law on partnerships, in order that one could be deemed
constituted for purposes of the tax on corporations. Partnership, as has been
defined in the civil code refers to two or more persons who bind themselves
to contribute money, properly, or industry to a common fund, with the
intention of dividing the profits among themselves. Thus, petitioners, being
engaged in the real estate transactions for monetary gain and dividing the
same among themselves constitute a partnership so far as the Code is
concerned and are subject to income tax for corporation.
Since Sec 2 of the Code in defining corporations also includes joint-stock
company, partnership, joint account, association or insurance company, no
matter how created or organized, it follows that petitioners, regardless of
how their partnership was created is also subject to the residence tax for
corporations.
FACTS: In 1907, Albert F. Kiel along with William Milfeil commenced to work
on certain public lands situated in the municipality of Parang, Province of
Cotabato, known as Parang Plantation Company. Kiel subsequently took over
the interest of Milfeil. In 1910, Kiel and P. S. Sabert entered into an
agreement to develop the Parang Plantation Company. Sabert was to furnish
the capital to run the plantation and Kiel was to manage it. They were to
share and share alike in the property. It seems that this partnership was
formed so that the land could be acquired in the name of Sabert, Kiel being
a German citizen and not deemed eligible to acquire public lands in the
Philippines.
By virtue of the agreement, from 1910 to 1917, Kiel worked upon and
developed the plantation. During the World War, he was deported from the
Philippines.
42
had
been
created
Partnership
RULING: YES.
No partnership agreement in writing was entered into by Kiel and Sabert.
The question consequently is whether or not the alleged verbal
copartnership formed by Kiel and Sabert has been proved, if we eliminate
the testimony of Kiel and only consider the relevant testimony of other
witnesses. In performing this task, we are not unaware of the rule of
partnership that the declarations of one partner, not made in the presence of
his copartner, are not competent to prove the existence of a partnership
between them as against such other partner, and that the existence of a
partnership cannot be established by general reputation, rumor, or hearsay.
(Mechem on Partnership, sec. 65; 20 R. C. L., sec. 53; Owensboro Wagon
Company vs. Bliss [1901], 132 Ala., 253.)
The testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses, together with the documentary
evidence, leaves the firm impression with us that Kiel and Sabert did enter
into a partnership, and that they were to share equally. Applying the tests as
to the existence of partnership, we feel that competent evidence exists
establishing the partnership. Even more primary than any of the rules of
partnership above announced, is the injunction to seek out the intention of
the parties, as gathered from the facts and as ascertained from their
43
language and conduct, and then to give this intention effect. (Giles vs. Vette
[1924], 263 U. S., 553.)
26. June 28, 1968
G.R.
No.
L-24193
MAURICIO
AGAD, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
SEVERINO MABATO and MABATO and AGAD COMPANY, defendantsappellees.
Facts: Alleging that Mauricio Agad and Severino Mabato are partners in a
fishpond business, to the capital of which Agad contributed P1,000, with the
right to receive 50% of the profits; Mabato who handled the partnership
funds, had yearly rendered accounts of the operations of the partnership;
despite repeated demands, Mabato failed and refused to render accounts for
the years 1957 to 1963, Agad prayed in his complaint against Mabato and
Mabato & Agad Company.
Mabato denied the existence of said partnership, upon the ground that the
contract had not been perfected, despite the execution because Agad had
allegedly failed to give his P1,000 contribution to the partnership capital.
Mabato prayed, therefore, that the complaint be dismissed; and the contract
be declared void ab initio. Subsequently, Mabato filed a motion to dismiss,
upon the ground that the complaint states no cause of action and that the
lower court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, because
it involves principally the determination of rights over public lands. The lower
court declared that the contract is null and void because the inventory of the
fish pond was not attached to the contract.
Issue: Whether "immovable property or real rights" have been contributed to
the partnership under consideration.
Held: The partnership was established "to operate a fishpond", not to
"engage in a fishpond business". Moreover, none of the partners contributed
either a fishpond or a real right to any fishpond. Their contributions were
limited to the sum of P1,000 each.
The operation of the fishpond mentioned in Annex "A" was the purpose of
the partnership. Neither said fishpond nor a real right thereto was
contributed to the partnership or became part of the capital thereof, even if
a fishpond or a real right thereto could become part of its assets.
44
while respondent would give, in addition to his industry, the amount needed
for general expenses and other costs. Furthermore, the income from the said
project would be divided according to the stipulated percentage. Clearly, the
contract manifested the intention of the parties to form a partnership. Under
Article 1767 of the Civil Code, a partner may contribute not only money or
property, but also industry.
Valid contract of partnership.
First, Article 1773 was intended primarily to protect third persons. Thus, the
eminent Arturo M. Tolentino states that under the aforecited provision which
is a complement of Article 1771, 12 "The execution of a public instrument
would be useless if there is no inventory of the property contributed,
because without its designation and description, they cannot be subject to
inscription in the Registry of Property, and their contribution cannot
prejudice third persons. This will result in fraud to those who contract with
the partnership in the belief [in] the efficacy of the guaranty in which the
immovables may consist. Thus, the contract is declared void by the law
when no such inventory is made." The case at bar does not involve third
parties who may be prejudiced.
Second, petitioners themselves invoke the allegedly void contract as basis
for their claim that respondent should pay them 60 percent of the value of
the property. 13 They cannot in one breath deny the contract and in another
recogn.ize it, depending on what momentarily suits their purpose. Parties
cannot adopt inconsistent positions in regard to a contract and courts will
not tolerate, much less approve, such practice.
In short, the alleged nullity of the partnership will not prevent courts from
considering the Joint Venture Agreement an ordinary contract from which
the parties' rights and obligations to each other may be inferred and
enforced
28. G.R. No. 148187
PHILEX
MINING
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
Facts:
Philex Mining Corporation (Philex Mining), entered into an
agreement4 with Baguio Gold Mining Company ("Baguio Gold") for the
former to manage and operate the latters mining claim, known as the Sto.
46
Nino mine, located in Atok and Tublay, Benguet Province. The parties
agreement was denominated as "Power of Attorney".
In the course of managing and operating the project, Philex Mining made
advances of cash and property in accordance with the agreement. However,
the mine suffered continuing losses over the years which resulted to
petitioners withdrawal as manager of the mine and the eventual cessation of
mine operations.
The parties executed a Compromise with Dation in Payment where the
parties determined the indebtedness of Baguio Gold. Further executed a
Amendment to Compromise with Dation in Payment assigning Baguios
tangible assets and transferring its equitable title in one of its segment.
Subsequently, petitioner wrote off in its 1982 books of account the
remaining outstanding indebtedness of Baguio Gold by charging
P112,136,000.00 to allowances and reserves that were set up in 1981 and
P2,860,768.00 to the 1982 operations.
In its 1982 annual income tax return, petitioner deducted from its gross
income the amount of P112,136,000.00 as "loss on settlement of receivables
from Baguio Gold against reserves and allowances." 9 However, the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) disallowed the amount as deduction for bad debt and
assessed petitioner a deficiency income tax of P62,811,161.39.
Petitioner protested before the BIR arguing that the deduction must be
allowed since all requisites for a bad debt deduction were satisfied, to wit:
(a) there was a valid and existing debt; (b) the debt was ascertained to be
worthless; and (c) it was charged off within the taxable year when it was
determined to be worthless.
BIR denied petitioners protest for lack of legal and factual basis. It held that
the alleged debt was not ascertained to be worthless since Baguio Gold
remained existing and had not filed a petition for bankruptcy; and that the
deduction did not consist of a valid and subsisting debt considering that,
under the management contract, petitioner was to be paid fifty percent
(50%) of the projects net profit. Petitioner appealed before the CTA.
However the Court denied for lack of merit and affirmed the lower court
decision.
47
50
Failure to comply with the requirement of the preceding paragraph shall not
affect the liability of the partnership and the members thereof to third
persons.
Art. 1773. A contract of partnership is void, whenever immovable property is
contributed thereto, if an inventory of said property is not made, signed by
the parties, and attached to the public instrument.
The partnership is void and legally nonexistent. The documentary evidence
presented by Aurelio, i.e. the letter from Eduardo and the Memorandum, did
not prove partnership.
The 1973 letter from Eduardo on its face, contains typewritten entries,
personal in tone, but is unsigned and undated. As an unsigned document,
there can be no quibbling that said letter does not meet the public
instrumentation requirements exacted under Article 1771 (how partnership
is constituted) of the Civil Code. Moreover, being unsigned and doubtless
referring to a partnership involving more than P3,000.00 in money or
property, said letter cannot be presented for notarization, let alone
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as called for
under the Article 1772 (capitalization of a partnership) of the Code. And
inasmuch as the inventory requirement under the succeeding Article 1773
goes into the matter of validity when immovable property is contributed to
the partnership, the next logical point of inquiry turns on the nature of
Aurelios contribution, if any, to the supposed partnership.
The Memorandum is also not a proof of the partnership for the same is not a
public instrument and again, no inventory was made of the immovable
property and no inventory was attached to the Memorandum. Article 1773 of
the Civil Code requires that if immovable property is contributed to the
partnership an inventory shall be had and attached to the contract.
Petitioner, in an obvious bid to evade the application of Article 1773, argues
that the immovables in question were not contributed, but were acquired
after the formation of the supposed partnership. Needless to stress, the
Court cannot accord cogency to this specious argument. For, as earlier
stated, petitioner himself admitted contributing his share in the supposed
shipping, movie theatres and realty development family businesses which
51
already owned
executed.
immovables
even
before
allegedly
52