Will 1

Isaac Will
Dr. Schaepdrijver
HIST 120U
15 December 2015

Welfare/Social Contract/Social Policy through Hobsbawm and Mazower

Both Eric Hobsbawm and Mark Mazower offer in-depth, thoughtful analyses of
Europes 19th and 20th centuries. The two examine the evolution of social policies,
regarding both rights and welfare throughout their works Age of Capital, Age of Empire,
and Dark Continent. Above all else, both make one aspect of the ever-changing
relationship between state and citizen abundantly clear: nothing occurred on a constant,
steady slope. Nations did not shift steadily from noninterventionist to interventionist, or
from leftist to rightist; but rather, the shift occurred in a more back and forth, unstable
fashion since 1848. Also, both make it explicitly clear that these changes, whether they be
in the social contract, rights, or welfare, were not strictly black and white either. There
were not only shifts from purely one ideology to purely another, but instead a
complicated mix of both. With this in mind, we shall follow the complex development of
the relation between states and their citizens from The Springtime of Peoples to the
modern era, according to Hobsbawms Age of Capital and Age of Empire, as well as
Mazowers Dark Continent.
Social rights, policies, and welfare have consistently evolved alongside the
changing relationship between state and man. This changing relationship the ever-

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shifting balance within the social contract has always brought about reform concerning
these social rights and welfare policies (whether positive, negative, or a mix of both).
Accordingly, it seems fit to begin analysis where Hobsbawm and Mazower begin theirs:
The Revolutions of 1848.
Before this Springtime of Peoples, Hobsbawm would contend that the European
social contract was tilted heavily in favor of the state. Most of them, he writes, were
ruled by what can be roughly called absolute monarchs or princes (Capital 11). Such
governments existed all across the continent, such as Hungary, Italy, Denmark, Poland,
etcetera. The social rights of individuals hung at the will of the monarchs or upper-class
bourgeoisie who governed the nation. Any welfare state at all scarcely existed; the state
often had small regard for its little people or its masses at all, as theyd originally been
considered irrelevant. However the numerical benefit sat, of course, in favor of the citizen
masses rather than the nation. Promptly, the lack of social rights and effective policy led
to mass uprisings for the sake of restoring balance in the social contract. The goal of
liberal change in favor of establishing democracies whether parliamentary,
representative, constitutional, or a combination of all three swept across the continent.
Hobsbawm notes that the desire for democratic and social republics was strongest
amongst the lower classes, which became the most active during insurrections. Uprisings
toppled every government in an area of Europe which is today occupied by all or part of
ten states (10). With absolutist governments nearly eradicated or demoted to impotence,
it seemed as if the social contract would be equalized and the people would finally
receive their sociopolitical dignity. But this would prove inaccurate.

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The (mainly) lower classes who had conducted the revolutions desired liberalism
and forms of democracy. Hobsbawm states that the radicals, for instance, desired a
unitary centralized democratic republic in Germany, Italy, Hungary, or wherever else the
uprising had taken place. Institutional changes were set to take placebut they would
not. A profounding lack of revolutionary consensus exposed itself amongst the people.
Just as the sweepingly ironic painting, Liberty Guiding the People, would come to
illustrate, the social contract did not only exist between two entities. It was not simply the
citizen and the state, for the citizens had divided themselves into a variety of
subcategories that we have come to know as classes.
As a result, whereas governments had been quick to eradicate the throne upon a
unified uprising (such as Metternich fleeing to London), they were now strong in
crushing the insurrection. All of the initial institutional changes in sync with political and
social rights for the people were soon erased by the reestablishment of governments.
Even Frances republic would only last another two and a half years (14). In addition to
this lack of revolutionary consensus among citizen classes, 1848 failed because it turned
out that the decisive confrontation was not that between the old regimes and the united
forces of progress, but between order and social revolution (17). The most
infamous example of this divided class consensus was the June Days in Paris, where a
solution to wane unemployment led to bloody disagreements. Conservative forces
regrouped. In areas such as the Bohemian lands, northern Italy, Danubian principalities,
and otherwise all across Europe, the original political order was restored. The social
contract seemed as if it would return to its original imbalance.

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And it would return to imbalance- the social contract would still vastly empower
the state. On the other hand, it would be incorrect to say progress hadnt been made for
social rights. Eric Hobsbawm makes it resoundingly clear that the Revolutions of 1848
had accomplished a vast amount of things: as one, it signified the end of traditional
monarchies believing citizens unwaveringly accepted monarchial rule and social
hierarchies (Capital 24). Second, it became evident that the middle classes, liberalism,
political democracy, nationalism, and even the working classes were now a factor in
politics (Capital 26). Third, it forecasted the next twenty-five years to be dominated by
anti-oppressive aspirations (Capital 83). And fourth, the revolutions had shown that
amassed citizens could now infiltrate the ruling elites sanctity and pressure
governments toward their will (Capital 99). By no means should we assume the social
contract was now in favor of the citizen. By no means should we assume citizens gained
absolute social rights. However, the major innovation brought about by the 1848
revolutions, according to Hobsbawm, was that The defenders of the social order had to
learn the politics of the people (Capital 25). Governments did not have to implement
social policy directly in the interest of citizens- but they could certainly no longer
implement social policies against them.
Proceeding the failure of these revolutions, one sees certain governments
sporadically begin to become more democratic, the most notable of which was France
where Napoleon III expanded male suffrage and implemented other social rights.
Ultimately, this provided a continent-wide anecdote: democracy of universal suffrage
was compatible with the maintenance of social order (Capital 26). Serfdom also began
vanishing, first from the Habsburg Empire, in what can be considered social rights

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progress although the true reason for its abolishment was more in terms of the economy
and maintenance of the free market (Capital 185). Above all, however, one sees radical
democracy expand: in France alone, polls counted 2 million as opposed to 3 million
conservatives (Capital 20). And their demands for social policy were largely unchanged
as they called for new elections and even the most basic forms of democracy. But
because the radical democrats were often impoverished laborers, they often lacked the
organization, the maturity, the leadershipthe historical conjecture (Capital 21).
Resultantly, despite strong beliefs and support, little more was instilled than government
fear. Come the Great Boom as described by Hobsbawm, radical democracy and the
passion for reform largely died down in the midst of high employment and occasional
(though temporary) wage increases. Politics went into hibernation, (Capital 31). Social
rights and the movements toward welfare were halted.
But when the economy crashed in 1857, the quest for social rights was
reinvigorated. Hobsbawm writes, Within a short space of time all the old questions of
liberal politics were once again on the agenda, some of which included constitutional
reform and civil liberties (Capital 32). In the 1860s, one sees relatively incredible
progress forward in terms of increasing social policies and rights. Hobsbawm notes that
the decade can be considered one of reform, political liberalization, increased
constitutions, and expanded electorates (Capital 71). This is in light of the demand for
social rights/representation in Germany, Italy, the Habsburg Empire, the Ottoman Empire,
and all the way to Russias border. The Scandinavian countries who already had
adopted constitutions expanded their electorate in the 1860s as well, while the British
Reform Act of 1867 put electoral power into the working classes. Amidst these reforms,

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The Habsburg monarchy in 1860 simply gave up trying to rule as though its subjects had
no political opinion (Capital 70,71). Of course, progression is infrequently steady or
black and white: there were obvious exemptions from such progress, like when
Frances urban population lost voting power. Its also important to note that although
Britain expanded its electorate again through the Second Reform Actvoters still
amounted to only 8% of the population. Voters in Italy would only amount to 1% (Capital
103). And while certain European labor organizations and strikes legalized, it was mainly
in hopes of their resulting political management (Capital 113). Nonetheless, there had
still been true progress toward social rights. The two parties of civilian and of state
were leveling with one another in the social contract. Only the two autocracies of Turkey
and Russia would maintain themselves in Europe. As aforementioned though, progression
didnt occur on a steady slope. Hobsbawm writes, In spite of conflicts, the era of liberal
triumph had been stable. It was no longer so after 1875 (81).
Following another economic crash, one sees social rights put on the backburners
of political agendas. Despite expanded electorates in France, Germany, Switzerland,
Denmark, Britain, etcetera, Hobsbawm doesnt point us to huge percentages of voters
anywhere. This political disregard for social policy was largely due to capitalism,
imperialism, and nationalism. Such inhibitors present themselves toward the beginning of
the 19th century, and therefore Hobsbawms Age of Empire as well.
Although democracy in politics seemed inevitable, a more active social policy for
rights and a welfare state did not. Strikes and labor organizations promptly took the
matter into their own hands. Notably, many arose in Spain, Russia, Germany, and France.
Two notable movements were Frances Commune and Germanys Society for Social

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Policy, amongst others (Capital 113). The socialist vote increased as well, especially in
Germany where it increased by the thousands (Capital 115). But when socialism was
outlawed, or labor unrest was bloodily put down as it was in the Paris Commune in 1871
or Belgium in 1886, it seems as if this democratic push slowed.
Another factor was imperialism, which was effective to diminish domestic
discontent by economic improvements or social reform in other ways. It also offered
glory for the citizen, rather than costly reforms (Empire 69, 70).
Nationalism, on the other hand, would increase state involvement with its citizens
(as discussed in the other paper). This was done to impose nationality uniformity. The
state would sponsor educational systems, employment, and conscription. The states
power over the citizen was growing, best exemplified as Europes schoolchildren
increased by 145% (Capital 95). Journalist A.V. Dicey would not that collectivism was
flattening individual liberties into the centralized tyranny of school meals, health
insurance, and old age pensions (Empire 102). But this is not to say good times followed
for the citizens. Many lived impoverished, barely enjoying the basic decencies of life, and
deprived of nearly all facets through this purely free-market, hands-off state policy
(Capital 218,219,229).
Democracy had been postponed out of fear it would meddle with the capitalism,
free-trade, and sound finance (Empire 96). Alongside generally hands-off governments
now came the goal of limiting the peoples power in the democracies; this was evident
through open ballots that remained until the 1900s in Denmark, Prussia, or Hungary
(Empire 87). This is in addition to elastic minimum voting ages, which fluctuated in
Denmark and Switzerland amongst others, as well as the buying of votes (Empire 97).

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Hobsbawm notes that these political breaking devices were visible all throughout the
continent. But even they couldnt stop democracys advance.
Hobsbawm writes that a new decade of political strategies began in 1890 as
socialist voters increased once again (Empire 99). As if the Popes Rerum Nevarum in
1891 signified a change for social policy, socialism would experience a mass political
mobilization. As the century turned, old age pensions, public labor exchanges, health
insurance, unemployment insurances, and even welfare schemes presented themselves
this no where more evident than in Germany (Empire 102). Hobsbawm writes,
Democratic optimism, a belief in historical inevitability, might make it look as though
its universal progress could not be halted (Empire 110). But as we knowMark
Mazowers Dark Continent would illustrate a vastly different picture.
Mazowers examination of the social contract relationship begins in 1918,
immediately after the end of the First World War. The post-war years were extremely
progressive in terms of delivering social rights to Europeans. Despite the obvious
exclusion of minorities who stunted nationalistic progress, the relation between state and
citizen was dominantly one of mutual respect with increasing authority given to the
people through constitutions. Mazower supports this, stating, With the victory of the
Entente forces and the U.S.A. in 1919, the demand for constitutional reform swept across
Central Eastern Europe. (6). In response to both the wars end and radical events of the
Russian Revolution, Germany, Austria, and Romania would begin discussing the social
rights of man within their constitutions. In Spain, the constitution declared itself a
democratic republic of all classes, with the possibility of land being acquired specifically
for social purposes, while the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes mentioned a

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need for social and economic legislation (9). The relation between man and nation
seemed as if the citizen had begun to accumulate inalienable rights, as if nations began to
realize their success entirely depended on the people.
The latter half of the statement would prove itself true for many European nations.
This realization (that states were largely dependent on their collected masses) would also
prove itself to be the reason for a large movement away from constitutionalized
parliamentary democracies, an unbalance in the relationship between the state and the
man, and ultimately the creation of a welfare state in both these authoritarian and
democratic nations, such as 1930s France. Very shortly after the postwar years effective
democracy began to weaken, largely due to the Lefts split between democrats and
communists, as well as through poor representation and little offered by the way of
accomplishing the peoples agenda. In addition, the primary goal of many states and their
people became national unity. The method of achieving this national unity, many
believed, was through more authoritarian forms of government. As numerous parliaments
and democracies failed Europeans, through stagnant, corrupt politics or ineffective
electoral systems, the belief rose that such a system might have to be sacrificed if the
nation was to survive (26). And while nations began developing identities and
nationalizing creating national uniformity through homogenous culture - many
Individual rights were overridden by the power bestowed upon the government to limit
them for the common good(30). Mazower also notes, What was new in 1919 was the
concern forcollective rights rather than individual liberties, (54). Consequently, the
social contract became increasingly lopsided with the introduction of fascism and
increased authoritarian governments in areas such as Italy, Germany, Greece, and

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etcetera. Even democracies, which were of course still prevalent in Europe, implemented
more active state systems. The social contract became lopsided in favor of the nation, and
less in favor of maintaining social rights and individual liberties- outlawing abortion in
just one instance, purely for the sake of the nations population. It would be almost a
decade before individuals would begin to reap the benefits of increased authority or a
focus on the collective wellbeing.
The 1929 Wall Street crash would likely be Mazowers culprit for increased state
involvement. Governments all throughout Europe viewed this as the coup de grce of the
laissez-faire economy, as Italys Mussolini would exemplify in proclaiming, We are now
burying economic liberalism (130). And, promptly, many individuals all throughout the
continent sought a more active state. Here, one sees this mix between the left-leaning and
right-leaning social policies begin to develop, as Mazower states, Capitalist nations took
over the idea of planning and state control from the Bolsheviks and watered it down: the
slump prompted state-led, national capitalism (126). Europeans would first see their
state begin to impede upon the economy to various extents- whether it be through
increased spending, or fixed exchange rates.
With Europes overcrowding, real hunger, declining physical/mental health, and
eight million unemployed in both Germany and Britain alone throughout the late 1920s30s, increased state involvement had optimal ground to increase social rights with more
social policies (104, 113, 114). Before actual politicians in actual governments, first came
organizations and movements backed by the people. These would support welfare and
seek to expand social policies with a more tightly binding social contract. In Britain, the
National Unemployment Workers Movement would advocate to give food to more

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mothers and children (114). In Germany, the German Labor Front would bolster factory
working conditions and begin to establish a welfare program, while Italys Dopolavoro
organization would also advocate for worker leisure, and welfare as well (132). In
Sweden, a welfare state would emerge in the 1930s, and so on (188). The trend would
continue across many parts of Europe. So with national goals to improve the health of the
collectivity, and these movements for increased social rights, individuals would
ultimately accumulate certain social entitlements as well; like a more active welfare state.
But make no mistake- many individuals were excluded from such rights, such as
minorities (Jews in many instances, as in Hungary, Romania, or notoriously Germany) or
cripples (the mentally or physically incapable, like through Eugenics in Britain and in the
USA). And these social rights were not everlasting; the balance of the social contract
would tilt largely in favor of many states during the beginning of WWII.
The erosion of a balanced social contract would climax in the inter-war years. For
authoritarian regimes, such as Stalins, Hitlers, or Mussolinis, the states ability to
intervene in private affairs would be vastly abused. In the nations best interest, social
rights of certain individuals could be discarded. At this point, put best by Mazower, The
state was meddling in the most intimate matters of private life (88). Social rights of
ethnicities were easily overlooked in these nations; notable genocides and purges would
occur (as in the Armenian genocide, or when Italy invaded Ethiopia). The physically or
mentally ill would be imprisoned, sterilized, or even killed. The relation between the
country and the individual declined for increasingly authoritarian governments, as they
began to believe, it was indeed possible to produce better human beings through the
right kinds of social policies (91). But these right kinds of social policies were

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actually morally atrocious- nations fighting for freedomor against Hitler in Europe
would promptly retaliate to such abuses by attempting to improve social rights, as well as
the relationship between citizens and government.
But nothing occurred in black and white. This saying especially held true within
the inter-war years, as not all of WWIIs impacts on social rights were exclusively
negative. The war displayed the governments ability to effectively manage both society
and the economy. This resultantly led many to the revelation away from black and white
thinking, so to speak, as select Europeans realized democracy was indeed compatible
with an interventionist state (185). The war against the Axis powers emphasized the
importance of both civil and human rights, Mazower stated. The war against Axis powers
was not just man against man, or individual against individual for territorybut rather, it
was a war of social policies, and quite often regarded as a war for social rights. And as
Churchill stated, the war was being fought to establish, on impregnable rocks, the
rights of an individual (193). So to win the war, the Allied countries naturally had to
first implement the very social policies they were fighting for and reassert themselves
in a world of enemies. When Mazower writes that Nazis invigorated the realization in
many people that if the individual was to be protected against the state, the traditional
doctrine of state sovereignty in domestic affairs would have to be reconsidered, he
means that the social contract, that had become unbalanced, would need to be reexamined
and corrected. Fear of returning to 1939 conditions of social, class, economic, and
spiritual difficulties also fueled and stimulated the reform process. In addition, William
Beveridge would put forth the idea that welfare and warfare were intimately connected,
as social policies were necessary for the improvement of the general population (103). All

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of this- the fighting for individual rights, the fear of a pre-1939 return, and the connection
between welfare and warfare allowed for a drastic change in social policy and social
rights- greatly beneficial for the individual, and ones relationship with the state through
the social contract.
All the while, welfare in Europe had vastly expanded from late 1930s onward. In
Britain alone, full-employment policies had come about, alongside reforms in education,
health, and town-planning. Mazower also points out that war introduced free school
meals and free milk, as well as social insurance reform (186,187). In Greece, the social
rights of an individual would expand too as standing governments veered leftward (189).
Sweden, as mentioned earlier, would participate from the 30s onward throughout the war
as well. Even in post-war Germany, studies from interwar years on improving the nation
were utilized to aid social rights and conditions, such as the creation of the National
Health Service, which committed to educational reform, nationalization, and full
employment. All the while, France, Britain, and Belgium led reforms in social security.
Even the Soviets, and Eastern countries under their influence, moved toward economic
planning and implemented a more effective social security system. With all of this
throughout the war and closely after, the social contract had begun to rebalance itself in
many forms of governments.
There should be no misconception, however, that all nations who had fought
against Hitler (or who had been victims of Hitler, like the German people) had fully
increased social rights with their welfare or full-employment policies. Joseph Stalins
iron-fisted communist regime aimed to industrialize and employ the nation. He did up to
39 million: but forced laborers -i.e. violated social rights- contributed to a large portion of

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this number (121, 123). Even if communist-influenced countries like Bulgaria adopted
universal health care, or Czechoslovakia nationalized the health sectorit was primarily
solely for the exploitation of labor and economic reasons (278). There should also be no
misconception that any sort of all-encompassing golden age of social rights between state
and government had been created. Civil rights still faltered, as the original relation
between the sexes returned and discrimination against races continued (208,209). But,
just as not all things are black and white, there was still a trend significant progression as
the 20th century moved onward.
Excluding such cases, many nations found a comfortably balanced social contract
as the Second World War drew to a close. Governments became very active with their
social policies. However, the more active state was now seldom detrimental, as social
rights and social justices were prioritized above almost everything else, except the
economy (257). And as the decade shifted into the 1950s, Across Europethe
repudiation of laissez-faire was complete. As a result, the idea of democracy was
resuscitated, fitfully and abortively in Eastern Europe, but with much greater success in
the West, (208). The social contract had really begun to rebalance itself. As Mazower
said best, Western Europe rediscovered democracy (286). Perhaps this is best
exemplified through France, Germany, and Italy rebuilding constitutional systems, or
through Greece reestablishing parliamentary rule, or through the extension of suffrage in
France, Yugoslavia, Greece, and many other nations (208, 286). Again, the social
contract had been rebalanced. The relation between state and citizen was improving.
These post-war years of planned prosperity would see welfare systems in their prime.

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A mix between black and white government policies, such as the combination of
domestic tatisme and foreign liberation, and a more interventionist government that
regulated the economy and social conditions but allowed for individualism, would set the
stage for a post-war economic boom. Mazower writes that this dual reform of capitalism
and democracy evolved over twenty-five years (327). This modified social contract
emplaced between governments and individuals would serve them both extremely well
from 1945-1970. By the 60s, welfare policies were now considered crucial to simply
maintaining the economy, so much so that reformist Karl Schiller was able to say that the
welfare state and dynamic market economy are mutually indispensible (298). This
revival of capitalism within a world of extended state power left the European economy
booming. Many nations saw welfare states with full employment, quick population
growth, and social conditions reaching their peak. This social contract allowed for
numerous individual opportunities- the rising tide could be said to have accordingly lifted
all boats. Even more authoritarian countries under Soviet influence had seen their social
contract level the socioeconomic playing field and essentially eradicate poverty (279).
Unfortunately, this social contracts benefits would not last eternally- and ergo, neither
would the type of contract itself.
Both the thriving economy and political stability came to an end in the 1970s
economic crash. Tensions between labor and capital, between citizen and government
would again arise. Despite its severity and the absolute worst fears of many Europeans,
however, Western democracies remained afloat. This was partly due to welfare systems
that cushioned societies against the worst effects of impoverishment and insecurity
(327). Nonetheless, however, the system was in shambles. 14% of the European Union

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lived in poverty (341). The welfare was helpingbut very minimally. Racism was again
surfacing while social rights began submerging, this time through high minority
imprisonment rates and exclusive immigration policies (345). In addition, the social and
welfare rights of these migrants/refugees slowly began to vanish (346). Just years after
the 1970s crash, the message was clear: the social contract, social policies, rights, and
welfare would all need rethinking.
Again demonstrating this unstable, inconsistent slope, Europeans now sought a
less involved, more hands-off social contract in retaliation to the crash and subsequent
political failure. Neoliberalism surfaced in Europe, desiring a more laissez-faire
governmental policy. Margaret Thatcher led a movement against intrusive, overstepping welfare policies. But again demonstrating the lack of black and white
simplicity, Europeans didnt want the state rolled back entirely. Mazower noted that
cutbacks in some areas of state-involvement occurred alongside state-involvement
increases elsewhere. Regarding welfare, its funding surprisingly remained about the
same, especially in Britain where many simply wanted the government to primarily
remain focus on the one indicator which held the key to economic success- the quantity
of money (331). So now as the popularity of monetarism grew, the immensity of
bureaucracy began to shrink. For a large portion of the 20th centurys last quarter, many
Europeans desired less government on the states end of the social contract, and its
exactly what many got: in 1990 Portugal created the National Day for
Debureaucratization, in 1987 Italian movements protesting bureaucratic policies arose,
while the British vastly cut civil-service employment and public spending, and so on
(336). Even in the East, the collapse of the previously intrusive Soviet Union allowed

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many states to scale back the presence of their government. The last quarter of the 20th
century seemed to tilt the social contracts balance in favor of the individual.
As racism visibly surfaced yet again from the 1970s onward, the governments
end of the social contract had the chance to prove itself in maintaining individual social
rights. National and domestic courts were now upholding the rights of minorities- they
were no longer ignored by a League of Nations. Exclusionist immigration policies were
no longer effective either; the International Human Rights Law was maintaining social
rights for migrants and curbing domestic restrictions (348). In general, it seemed as if
anti-racism was growing. In other countries, the social rights of women and gays were
now protected/increasing as well, exemplified through the West German Marriage Law of
1977 and legalized civil marriage in 1980s Greece. Also, women gained rights in
countries with previously government-favoring social contracts such as Spain and
Portugal.
Looking back into history through Mark Mazowers Dark Continent and
Hobsbawms works as well, the unstable evolution of the social contract, rights, and
welfare becomes as clear as such complexities can. We see that Europeans since the
middle of the 19th century have tried various forms of the social contract. Authoritarian
rule over the individual was too much, but the original parliamentary democratic rule was
too little. An inactive state hurt the population just as much as an overactive one- so as
time moved onward; it only seemed natural for individuals to adopt the complicated mix
of both. It only seemed natural to move away from any black and white terms of thinking.
And as the Soviet Union, the last major iron-fisted, authoritative state, collapsed, one
thing becomes clear in history. The rights of an individual have begun to reign supreme

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and the social contract has tilted in favor of the citizen. But if theres another thing that
both Hobsbawm and Mazower have made clear, its that no policy has remained stable.
No policy has lasted the test of time. So if Mark Mazower has stated that history doesnt
repeat itselfwere left to wonder whats next.