Manual de Vuelo Boeing B 52

T.O.
1B-52H-1
Flight Manual
USAF SERIES B-52H AIRCRAFT
THE BOEING COMPANY
F33657-79-C-0416
F34601-03-D-0066
This manual contains unverified procedures. Refer to the validation/verification status

page(s) prior to performing any operation or maintenance procedure.
THIS PUBLICATION INCORPORATES OPERATIONAL SUPPLEMENT -1S-19.

THIS PUBLICATION IS USED WITH T.O. 1B-52H-1-12 AND T.O. 1B-52H-1-13. SUPPLEMENTARY PUBLICATIONS ARE PROVIDED TO
SUPPLY OPERATIONAL COVERAGE IN NONSTANDARD CONFIGURATIONS. SEE T.O. 0-1-CD-1 FOR NUMERICAL INDEX OF
BOMBER TECHNICAL PUBLICATIONS.
SEE T.O. 0-1-CD-1 FOR CURRENT STATUS OF FLIGHT MANUALS, SAFETY SUPPLEMENTS, OPERATIONAL SUPPLEMENTS, AND
FLIGHT CREW CHECKLISTS.
COMMANDERS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR BRINGING THIS PUBLICATION TO THE ATTENTION OF ALL AIR FORCE PERSONNEL
CLEARED FOR OPERATION OF SUBJECT AIRCRAFT.
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT E Distribution authorized to the Department of Defense Components only, due to Direct Military Support, 29
October 1996. Other requests shall be referred to 327 BMSG/EN, Tinker AFB, OK 73145-3021.
WARNING This document contains technical data whose export is restricted by the Arms Export Control Act (Title 22, U.S.C., Sec 2751, et seq.)
or the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended, Title 50, U.S.C., App. 2401 et seq. Violations of these export laws are subject to severe
criminal penalties. Disseminate in accordance with provisions of DoD Directive 5230.25.
HANDLING AND DESTRUCTION NOTICE Comply with distribution statement and destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of
contents or reconstruction of the document. Demil code D.
PUBLISHED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
31 AUGUST 1996
CHANGE 22 1 JUNE 2006
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Technical orders are normally distributed promptly after printing. Date(s) shown on the title page (lower right corner) are for identification only. These
are not distribution dates. Processing time sometimes causes distribution to only appear to have been delayed.
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES
INSERT LATEST CHANGED PAGES. DESTROY SUPERSEDED PAGES.

NOTE:
The portion of the text affected by the changes is indicated by a

vertical line in the outer margins of the page. Changes to illustrations
are indicated by miniature pointing hands. Changes to wiring
diagrams are indicated by shaded areas.
Dates of issue for original and changed pages are:

Original
Change
Change
Change
Change
Change
0
1
2
3
4
5
31 Aug 96
1 Dec 97
15 Aug 98
30 Oct 98
30 Dec 98
1 Jun 99
Change
Change
Change
Change
Change
Change
6
7
8
9
10
11
30 Jul 99
1 Oct 99
30 Nov 99
15 Feb 00
1 Mar 00
1 Aug 00
Change
Change
Change
Change
Change
Change
12
13
14
15
16
17
30 Dec 00
30 Jun 01
30 Nov 01
1 Mar 02
1 Sep 02
1 Apr 03
Change
Change
Change
Change
Change
18
19
20
21
22
1 Dec 03
1 Apr 04
1 Dec 04
1 Jul 05
1 Jun 06
TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES IN THIS PUBLICATION IS 1422 CONSISTING OF THE FOLLOWING:

Page
No.
Change
No.
* Title . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
* A D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
E Blank Added . . . . . . . . . . 20
V/VS-1 V/VS-2 Added . . 21
* Flyleaf-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Flyleaf-2 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . 0
i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
* ii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
iii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
iv . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
v . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
vi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
* vii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
viii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
ix x Deleted . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1-1 1-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
* 1-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1-5 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-8 1-9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-10 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-12 1-14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1-15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1-17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-20 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-21 1-23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-24 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-27 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-28 1-31 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
Page
No.
Change
No.
1-32 1-35 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-36 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-37 1-39 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-40 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1-41 1-42 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-43 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1-44 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1-45 1-50 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-51 1-52 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1-53 1-56 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1-56A 1-56B Added . . . . 12
1-57 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1-58 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
* 1-58A Added . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
* 1-58B Blank Added . . . . . . 22
1-59 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-60 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1-60A 1-60B Added . . . . 12
1-61 1-63 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1-64 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-65 1-66 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1-66A 1-66B Added . . . . 12
1-67 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1-68 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-69 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-70 1-73 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-74 1-77 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1-78 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-79 1-80 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-81 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1-82 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
* 1-83 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1-84 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-84A Added . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-84B Blank Added . . . . . . 20
1-85 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-86 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Page
No.
Change
No.
1-87 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-88 1-89 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-90 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-91 1-94 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-95 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-96 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-97 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-98 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-99 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1-100 1-101 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-102 1-103 . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-104 1-107 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-108 1-109 . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1-110 1-113 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-114 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-115 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-116 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1-117 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1-118 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-119 1-121 . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1-122 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-123 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-124 1-127 . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1-128 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-129 1-133 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-134 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-135 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-136 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-136A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-136B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1-136C 1-136E . . . . . . . . 17
1-136F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1-136G 1-136H . . . . . . . . 17
1-136J . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-136K 1-136L . . . . . . . . . 17
1-136M Added . . . . . . . . . . 12
* 1-137 1-138 . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Page
No.
Change
No.
1-139 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1-140 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-141 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1-142 1-144 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
* 1-145 1-146 . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1-146A 1-146C . . . . . . . . 21
1-146D Blank Added . . . . . 20
1-147 1-149 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-150 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-151 1-164 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-165 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-166 1-167 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-168 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-169 1-174 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-175 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1-176 1-177 . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-178 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-179 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-180 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-181 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-182 1-183 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-184 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-185 1-186 . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1-187 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-188 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-189 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-190 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-191 1-192 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-193 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-194 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-195 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-196 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-196A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1-196B Blank Added . . . . . . 4
1-197 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-198 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1-199 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
CURRENT FLIGHT CREW CHECKLISTS

Pilots Abbreviated Checklist
Ground Crew Procedures
T.O. 1B-52H-1CL-1
T.O. 1B-52H-1CL-2
31 Aug 96
31 Aug 96
Change 14 - 1 Jun 06
Upon receipt of the second and subsequent changes to this technical order, personnel responsible for maintaining this publication in current
status will ascertain that all previous changes have been received and incorporated. Action should be taken promptly if the publication is
incomplete.
*The asterisk indicates pages changed, added, or deleted by the current change.
ADDITIONAL COPIES OF THIS PUBLICATION MAY BE OBTAINED BY USAF ACTIVITIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH T.O. 00-5-1.
Change 22
USAF
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES (continued)

Page
No.
Change
No.
1-200 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1-201 1-205 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-206 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1-207 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1-208 1-209 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-210 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1-211 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-212 1-219 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-220 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1-221 1-223 . . . . . . . . . 21
1-224 1-226 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-227 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1-228 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1-229 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-230 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1-230A 1-230B Added 21
1-231 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-232 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1-232A 1-232C Added 21
1-232D Blank Added . . . 21
1-233 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1-234 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1-234A Added . . . . . . . . . 21
1-234B Blank Added . . . 21
1-235 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1-236 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-237 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-238 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1-239 1-241 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-242 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-243 1-244 . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-244A 1-244C Added . 4
1-244D Blank Added . . . . 4
1-245 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-246 1-247 . . . . . . . . . . 1
1-248 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-249 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-250 1-251 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-252 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1-253 1-256 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-257 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1-258 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-259 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-260 1-262 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-263 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1-264 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-265 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1-266 1-267 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-268 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-269 1-279 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-280 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1-281 1-282 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-283 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-284 1-285 . . . . . . . . . . 0
* 1-286 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1-287 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-288 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-289 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-290 1-297 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-298 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-299 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-300 1-301 . . . . . . . . . 0
1-302 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1-303 1-307 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-308 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-309 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-310 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-311 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-312 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-313 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Page
No.
*
*
*
*
Change
No.
1-314 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-315 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-316 1-317 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-318 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-319 1-325 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-326 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1-327 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1-328 1-333 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-334 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1-335 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-336 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-337 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-338 1-339 . . . . . . . . . 10
1-340 1-342 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-343 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-344 1-347 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-348 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-349 1-353 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-354 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-355 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1-356 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-357 1-358 . . . . . . . . . 16
1-358A Added . . . . . . . . . 10
1-359 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-360 1-361 . . . . . . . . . 19
1-362 1-367 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-368 1-369 . . . . . . . . . 20
1-370 1-377 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-378 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-379 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-380 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1-381 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-382 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1-383 1-387 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-388 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-389 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1-390 1-393 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-394 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1-395 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-396 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1-397 1-399 . . . . . . . . . 18
1-400 1-401 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-402 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-403 1-405 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-406 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-407 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1-408 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1-409 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1-410 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-411 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1-412 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1-413 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-414 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-415 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1-416 1-417 . . . . . . . . . . 3
1-418 1-419 . . . . . . . . . 21
1-420 1-421 . . . . . . . . . . 3
1-422 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-423 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1-424 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-425 1-427 . . . . . . . . 21
1-428 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1-428A 1-428C . . . . . . 22
1-428D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1-428E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1-428F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1-428G 1-428H . . . . . 22
1-428J . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1-428K 1-428M Added . 3
Page
No.
Change
No.
1-428N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1-428P 1-428U . . . . . . 21
1-428V 1-428Y Added . 3
1-428Z Blank Added . . . . 3
1-429 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-430 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-431 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1-432 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-433 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-434 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-435 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1-436 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-437 1-438 . . . . . . . . . 19
1-439 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1-440 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-441 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1-442 1-443 . . . . . . . . . 0
1-444 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1-444A 1-444B
Deleted . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1-445 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1-446 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1-446A 1-446B
Deleted . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1-446C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1-446D 1-446E Added . 8
* 1-446F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1-446G 1-446N Added . 8
1-446P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1-446Q 1-446U Added . 8
1-446V Blank Added . . . . 8
1-447 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1-448 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-449 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1-450 1-452 . . . . . . . . . . 8
1-452A 1-452C Added . 8
1-452D Blank Added . . . . 8
1-453 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1-454 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1-455 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-456 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1-457 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-458 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-458A 1-458G . . . . . . 21
1-458H Blank . . . . . . . . . 21
1-459 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1-460 1-464 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-464A 1-464H Added . 8
1-464J 1-464N Added . 8
1-464P 1-464R Added . 8
1-465 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1-466 1-468 . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-469 1-470 Deleted . . . 4
1-471 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-472 1-477 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-478 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1-478A Added . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-478B Blank Added . . . . 4
1-479 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1-480 1-483 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-484 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1-485 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1-486 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1-486A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1-486B Blank Added . . . . 2
1-487 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1-488 1-492 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-493 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1-494 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-495 1-496 . . . . . . . . . . 2
Page
No.
Change
No.
1-497 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1-498 1-501 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-502 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1-503 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-504 1-505 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-506 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1-506A 1-506B Added . 2
1-507 1-508 . . . . . . . . . . 2
1-509 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-510 1-514 . . . . . . . . . . 2
1-514A Added . . . . . . . . . . 2
1-514B Blank Added . . . . 2
1-515 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-516 1-526 . . . . . . . . . . 2
1-526A 1-526C Added . 2
1-526D Blank Added . . . . 2
1-527 1-528 . . . . . . . . . 19
1-529 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-530 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1-531 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-532 1-533 . . . . . . . . . 19
1-534 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1-535 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1-536 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1-537 1-538 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-538A Added . . . . . . . . . 16
1-539 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1-540 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-541 1-542 . . . . . . . . . 21
1-543 1-545 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-546 1-547 . . . . . . . . . 20
1-548 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-549 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1-550 1-559 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-560 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1-561 1-567 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-568 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1-569 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-570 1-574 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-575 1-578 . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-579 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-580 1-585 . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-586 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-587 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1-588 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1-589 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1-590 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1-590A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1-591 1-593 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-594 1-596 . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-597 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1-598 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-599 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-600 1-601 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-602 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-603 1-606 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-607 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-608 1-610 . . . . . . . . . 17
1-610A 1-610B
Deleted . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1-611 1-612 . . . . . . . . . 11
1-612A 1-612B Added 11
1-613 1-615 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-616 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
* 1-617 1-618 . . . . . . . . . 22
* 1-618A 1-618B . . . . . . 22
* 1-619 1-621 . . . . . . . . . 22
Change 22
T.O. 1B-52H-1

Page
No.
Change
No.
1-622 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
* 1-623 1-624 . . . . . . . . . 22
1-625 1-626 . . . . . . . . . . 4
1-627 1-628 . . . . . . . . . . 21
1-628A Added . . . . . . . . . 21
1-629 1-630 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-631 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1-632 1-634 . . . . . . . . . . 0
1-635 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1-636 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2-2 2-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2-7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2-8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2-10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2-11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2-13 2-16 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2-18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2-19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2-21 2-23 . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2-24 2-25 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2-27 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2-28 2-29 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2-31 2-32 . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2-32A 2-32B Deleted . 17
2-33 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2-34 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-35 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2-36 2-37 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-38 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2-39 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2-40 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
* 2-41 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2-42 2-43 . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2-44 2-46 . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2-47 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-48 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2-49 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2-50 2-51 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-52 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2-52A Added . . . . . . . . . . 3
2-52B Blank Added . . . . . 3
2-53 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2-54 2-59 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-60 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2-61 2-62 . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2-63 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2-64 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2-65 2-66 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-67 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2-68 2-73 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-74 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2-75 2-78 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
Change 22
Page
No.
*
*
*
*
Change
No.
2-79 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2-80 2-84 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-84A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2-84B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2-84C 2-84H . . . . . . . . 16
2-84J Added . . . . . . . . . . 16
2-84K . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2-84L 2-84N Added . . 16
2-84P 2-84Q Added . . 16
2-84R 2-84T . . . . . . . . . 21
2-84U 2-84AB Added . 16
2-84AC 2-84AD . . . . . . 21
2-84AE 2-84AH Added 16
2-84AJ 2-84AN Added 16
2-84AP 2-84AV . . . . . . 16
2-84AW 2-84AX . . . . . 22
2-84AY 2-84BC . . . . . . 16
2-84BD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2-84BE 2-84BH . . . . . . 16
2-84BJ 2-84BN . . . . . . 18
2-84BP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2-85 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2-86 2-87 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-88 2-89 . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2-90 2-91 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-92 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2-93 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-94 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2-95 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2-96 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2-97 2-99 . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2-100 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-101 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2-102 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2-103 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-104 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2-105 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-106 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2-107 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-108 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2-109 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-110 2-112 . . . . . . . . . 21
2-113 2-115 . . . . . . . . . 17
2-116 2-135 . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-136 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2-137 2-144 . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-145 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2-146 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2-146A 2-146D Added 17
2-147 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2-148 2-150 . . . . . . . . . 12
2-151 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2-152 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2-152A 2-152B
Deleted . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2-153 2-155 . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-156 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-157 2-158 . . . . . . . . . 12
2-159 2-162 . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-163 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2-164 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-165 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
Page
No.
Change
No.
2-166 2-169 . . . . . . . . . . 4
2-170 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-171 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2-172 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-173 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2-174 2-177 . . . . . . . . . 17
2-178 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-179 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2-180 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2-181 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-182 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2-183 2-184 . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-185 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2-186 2-195 . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-196 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-197 2-201 . . . . . . . . . . 0
2-202 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-2 3-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3-7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3-8 3-10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3-12 3-13 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-14 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-15 3-21 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-22 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-23 3-25 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-26 3-27 . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
3-28 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3-29 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3-31 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-32 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3-33 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-34 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3-35 3-36 . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3-36A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3-36B Blank Added . . . . . 1
3-37 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
3-38 3-42 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-43 3-44 . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3-44A Added . . . . . . . . . . 12
3-44B Blank Added . . . . 12
3-45 3-46 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-47 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3-48 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-49 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3-50 3-51 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-52 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3-52A Added . . . . . . . . . . 13
3-52B Blank Added . . . . 13
3-53 3-58 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-59 3-60 . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3-61 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-62 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3-63 3-65 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-66 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-66A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3-66B 3-66H Added . . 16
3-66J 3-66K Added . . . 16
3-67 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Page
No.
Change
No.
3-68 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-69 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3-70 3-94 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
* 3-95 3-96 . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3-97 3-102 . . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-103 3-104 . . . . . . . . . 12
3-104A Added . . . . . . . . . 12
3-105 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3-106 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3-107 3-108 . . . . . . . . . 12
3-108A Added . . . . . . . . . 12
3-109 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3-110 3-113 . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-114 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3-115 3-116 . . . . . . . . . . 1
3-116A 3-116B Added . 1
3-117 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
3-118 3-119 . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-120 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3-120A Added . . . . . . . . . 12
3-121 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3-122 3-126 . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-127 3-128 . . . . . . . . . . 1
3-129 3-139 . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-140 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3-140A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3-140B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3-140C 3-140D . . . . . . . 8
3-140E 3-140G Added 21
3-140H Blank Added . . . 21
3-141 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3-142 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-143 3-144 . . . . . . . . . 12
3-145 3-149 . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-150 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3-151 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3-152 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3-153 3-155 . . . . . . . . . 21
3-156 3-163 . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-164 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3-164A Added . . . . . . . . . 12
3-165 3-167 . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-168 3-170 . . . . . . . . . . 4
3-171 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-172 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3-173 3-179 . . . . . . . . . 0
3-180 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3-181 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-182 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3-183 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-184 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3-185 3-186 . . . . . . . . . . 0
3-187 3-188 . . . . . . . . . 12
3-188A 3-188B Added 12
3-189 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3-190 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3-191 3-193 . . . . . . . . . 0
3-194 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
T.O. 1B-52H-1

Page
No.
Change
No.
4-1 4-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
4-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
4-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
* 4-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4-7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
4-8 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
5-1 5-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
5-7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5-8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
* 5-9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5-10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5-11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
5-12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5-12A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5-12B Blank Added . . . . 10
Page
No.
Change
No.
5-13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5-14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5-15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
5-16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5-17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5-18 5-24 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
5-25 5-28 . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5-29 5-30 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
5-31 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5-32 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5-33 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5-34 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
5-35 5-36 . . . . . . . . . . . 12
* 5-37 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5-38 5-42 Added . . . . . 12
6-1 6-15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
Page
No.
Change
No.
6-16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
6-16A Added . . . . . . . . . . . 1
6-16B Blank Added . . . . . 1
6-17 6-42 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
6-43 Added . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6-44 Blank Added . . . . . . 12
7-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7-2 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
7-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
7-4 7-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7-6 7-7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
7-8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7-9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
7-10 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
7-11 7-14 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
7-15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Page
No.
Change
No.
* 7-16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7-17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7-18 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
7-19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
7-20 Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
7-21 7-22 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
Glossary-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
* Glossary-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
* Index-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Index-2 Index-5 . . . . . . 21
Index-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Index-7 Index-8 . . . . . . 21
Index-9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
* Index-10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Index-11 Index-13 . . . . 21
Index-14 Blank . . . . . . . . . 0
Change 22
D/(E blank)
BLA
WARNING
This manual contains unverified procedures. Unverified procedures shall only be performed during verification, in accordance with TOs 00-5-1 and 00-5-3. Performance of unverified procedures may result in injury to personnel or damage to
equipment.
TECHNICAL ORDER VALIDATION/VERIFICATION STATUS PAGE

BASIC DATE
CHANGE NO. DATE
31 AUG 96
DATA ELEMENT
DATE
VALIDATED
CHANGE 21 1 JUL 05
VALIDATION
METHOD
T.O 1B-52H-1
(B)
(A)
TCTO Listings (P, PG vii)

Electrical Loads
(F: 1-69, Sheet 14/16, PG 1-221)
Electrical Loads
(F: 1-69, Sheet 15/16, PG 1-222)
Circuit Breaker Panels
(F: 1-70, Sheet 6A/15, PG 1-230)
(F: 1-70, Sheet 6B/15, PG 1-230A)
(F: 1-70, Sheet 8A/15, PG 1-232)
(F: 1-70, Sheet 8B/15, PG 1-232A)
(F: 1-70, Sheet 9A/15, PG 1-232C)
(F: 1-70, Sheet 12/15, PG 1-234A)
(F: 1-70, Sheet 12A/15, PG 1-235)
(F: 1-70, Sheet 15/15, PG 1-238)
MFD Control Panel (S, PG 1-428)
Mission Route Screen/Moving
Map Display (S, PG 1-428A)
Identifying Bullseyes on the
Mission Route Map (P, PG1-428B)
Chg Level of Declutter on Mission
Route Screen (P, PG 1-428C)
GPS IU/TACAN Emulation
Data Flow (F: 1-127A, PG 1-428D)
GPS IU/TACAN Emulation Mode
Data (F: 1-127B, PG 1-428E)
Msn Route Scrn/Mov Map Display
(F: 1-127D Sheet1/3, PG 1-428G)
Msn Route Scrn/Mov Map Display
(F: 1-127D Sheet2/3, PG 1-428H)
GPS IU/TACAN Annunciator
Messages (F: 1-127F, PG 1-428N)
GPS IU/TACAN Abnrm Ops/Faults
(F: 1-127G, Sheet 1/9,PG 1-428P)
12/01/04
9/01/02
6/01/03
9/01/02
12/01/04
6/01/03
12/01/04
12/01/04
9/01/02
9/01/02
9/01/02
9/01/02
6/01/03
6/01/03
6/01/03
9/01/02
9/01/02
12/01/04
12/01/04
9/01/02
9/01/02
DATE
VERIFIED
VERIFICATION
METHOD
T.O. NO.
PTO CHANGE NO. DATE
AMI
REMARKS
(B)
LEGEND:
(A) DATA ELEMENT:
(S) = SECTION, (PG) = PAGE, (P) = PARAGRAPH, (F) = FIGURE, (T) = TABLE
(B) VALIDATION OR VERIFICATION METHOD:
(P) = PERFORMANCE, (S) = SIMULATION, (A) = ANALYSIS (TABLE-TOP)
V/VS-1
WARNING
This manual contains unverified procedures. Unverified procedures shall only be performed during verification, in accordance with TOs 00-5-1 and 00-5-3. Performance of unverified procedures may result in injury to personnel or damage to
equipment.
TECHNICAL ORDER VALIDATION/VERIFICATION STATUS PAGE

BASIC DATE
CHANGE NO. DATE
31 AUG 96
DATA ELEMENT
DATE
VALIDATED
CHANGE 21 1 JUL 05
VALIDATION
METHOD
T.O 1B-52H-1
(B)
(A)

(F: 1-127G, Sheet 2/9,PG 1-428Q)
9/01/02
(F: 1-127G, Sheet 3/9,PG 1-428R)
9/01/02
(F: 1-127G, Sheet 4/9,PG 1-428S)
9/01/02
(F: 1-127G, Sheet 5/9,PG 1-428T)
9/01/02
(F: 1-127G, Sheet 6/9,PG 1-428U)
9/01/02
OAS Circuit Protection & Location
(F: 1-153, Sheet 1/6,PG 1-539)
9/01/02
OAS Circuit Protection & Location
(F: 1-153, Sheet 4/6,PG 1-542)
12/01/04
Pilots Station Bombing System Controls & Indicators
(F: 1-176, Sheet 1/2, PG 1-618)
12/01/04
Authorized Mixed External Weapon Loads
(F: 1-176A, PG 1-618B)
12/01/04
Authorized Weapons
(F: 1-177, Sheet 3/3,PG 1-621)
12/01/04
Navigators Compartment - Aft
(F: 1-181, Sheet 2/2, PG 1-628)
9/01/02
DATE
VERIFIED
VERIFICATION
METHOD
T.O. NO.
PTO CHANGE NO. DATE
AMI
REMARKS
(B)
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
LEGEND:
(A) DATA ELEMENT:
(S) = SECTION, (PG) = PAGE, (P) = PARAGRAPH, (F) = FIGURE, (T) = TABLE
(B) VALIDATION OR VERIFICATION METHOD:
V/VS-2
(P) = PERFORMANCE, (S) = SIMULATION, (A) = ANALYSIS (TABLE-TOP)
T.O. 1B-52H-1
STATUS OF SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL SUPPLEMENTS

This supplement status page is based on information available to the manual editor as of the date of
this publication. The information may not be current as it must be updated by any subsequent supplement status pages and by reference to T.O. 0-1-CD-1.
SUPPLEMENTS IN THIS CHANGE
Number
S-19
Date
Short Title
31 Mar 06
Section Affected
GBU-38
OUTSTANDING SUPPLEMENTS
Number
Date
Short Title
SS-18 (I)
03 Oct 05
Fuel Enrichment Valve

Equipped Aircraft Cold
Weather Operations
Change 22
Flyleaf-1/(Flyleaf-2 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Table of Contents
PAGE
SECTION I
Systems Description and Operation
1-1
SECTION II
Normal Procedures
2-1
SECTION III
Emergency Procedures
3-1
SECTION IV
Crew Duties
4-1
SECTION V
Operating Limitations
5-1
SECTION VI
Flight Characteristics
6-1
SECTION VII
All Weather Operation
7-1
Alphabetical Index
APPENDIX 1
Performance Data
Index 1
T.O. 1B-52H-1-1
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS - Titles included in alphabetical index
Change 15
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Before operating the B-52 aircraft

read the following pages carefully!
SCOPE. This manual provides the aircrew with a general knowledge of the aircraft, its characteristics, and
specific normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures. Your flying experience is recognized; therefore, basic flight principles are avoided. Instructions in this manual are for a crew inexperienced in the operation of this aircraft. This manual provides the best possible operating instructions under most circumstances, but it is a poor substitute for sound judgment. Multiple emergencies, adverse weather, terrain, etc
may require modification of the procedures.
COMPLEMENTARY MANUALS. This manual must be used with one or more of the following manuals to obtain
all the information necessary for safe and efficient operation of the B-52H aircraft. These manuals have been
separated from this manual for your convenience in handling information which may be classified, applicable
only to certain aircraft configurations, or used only by certain crewmembers.
T.O. 1B-52H-1-1
T.O. 1B-52H-1-12
T.O. 1B-52H-1-13
T.O. 1B-52H-5
T.O. 1B-52H-25-1
T.O. 1B-52H-25-2
T.O. 1B-52H-25-3
T.O. 1B-52H-30-1
T.O. 1B-52H-30-4
T.O. 1B-52H-34-2-1
T.O. 1B-52H-34-2-5
T.O. 1B-52H-34-2-6
T.O. 1B-52H-34-2-7
T.O. 1B-52H-34-2-8
T.O. 1B-52H-34-2-9
ii
Change 22
B-52H Flight Manual Appendix 1, Performance Data

B-52H Radar Navigators/Navigators Manual
B-52H Electronic Warfare Officers Manual
B-52H Basic Weight Checklist and Loading Data
B-52H Nuclear Bomb Delivery Technical Manual Basic Information
(SECRET RESTRICTED DATA) (Title Unclassified)
B-52H Nuclear Bomb Delivery Basic Information and Operating Procedures
B-52H Nuclear Bomb Mission Planning Manual
(SECRET RESTRICTED DATA) (Title Unclassified)
B-52H Aircrew Weapon Delivery Manual AGM-129
B-52H Aircrew Weapon Delivery Technical Manual AGM-86B
B-52H Aircrew Conventional Weapons Delivery Manual
B-52H Aircrew Weapon Delivery Manual (Nonnuclear) WCMD
B-52H Aircrew Weapon Delivery Manual (Nonnuclear) JDAM
B-52H Aircrew Weapon Delivery Manual (Nonnuclear) AGM-154 JSOW
B-52H Aircrew Weapon Delivery Manual (Nonnuclear) AGM-158 JASSM
B-52H Aircrew Weapon Delivery Manual (Nonnuclear) AGM-86C/D
T.O. 1B-52H-1
PERMISSIBLE OPERATIONS. The Flight Manual takes a positive approach and
normally states only what you can do. Unusual operations or configurations are
prohibited unless specifically covered herein. Clearance from the using command
must be obtained before any questionable operation, which is not specifically permitted in this manual, is attempted. Before granting the clearance, the using command may request coordination or engineering assistance/approval from Oklahoma
City ALC. Request should be made through the Flight Manual Manager.
HOW TO BE ASSURED OF HAVING LATEST DATA. Refer to T.O. 0-1-CD-1 for a listing of
all current flight manuals, safety, or operational supplements, and checklists. Also,
check the flight manual cover page, the title block of each safety and operational
supplement and all status pages attached to formal safety and operational supplements. Clear up all discrepancies before flight.
ARRANGEMENT. The manual is divided into seven fairly independent sections to simplify reading it straight through or using it as a reference manual.
SAFETY SUPPLEMENTS. Information involving safety will be promptly forwarded to
you in a safety supplement. Urgent information is published in interim safety supplements and transmitted by teletype. Formal supplements are mailed. The supplement title block and status page (published with formal supplement only) should be
checked to determine the supplements effect on the manual and other outstanding
supplements.
OPERATIONAL SUPPLEMENTS. Information involving changes to operating proce-
dures will be forwarded to you by operational supplements. The procedure for handling operational supplements is the same as for safety supplements.
CHECKLISTS. The flight manual contains itemized procedures with necessary ampli-
fications. The checklist contains itemized procedures without the amplification. Primary line items in the flight manual and checklist are identical. If a formal safety or
operational supplement affects your checklist, the affected checklist page will be attached to the supplement. Cut it out and insert it over the affected page but never
discard the checklist page in case the supplement is rescinded and the page is needed.
FLIGHT MANUAL BINDERS. Looseleaf binders and sectionalized tabs are available for
use with your manual. They are obtained through local purchase procedures and are
listed in the Federal Supply Schedule (FSC Group 75, Office Supplies, Part 1).
Check with your supply personnel for assistance in procuring these items.
Change 16
iii
T.O. 1B-52H-1
WARNINGS, CAUTIONS, AND NOTES. The following definitions apply to Warnings,
Cautions, and Notes found throughout the manual.
Operating procedures, techniques, etc, which could result in personal

injury or loss of life if not carefully followed.
Operating procedures, techniques, etc, which could result in damage to

equipment if not carefully followed.
NOTE
An operating procedure, technique, etc, which is considered essential to

emphasize.
SHALL, WILL, SHOULD, and MAY. The following definitions apply to the words:
SHALL or WILL
The instructions or procedures prefaced by shall or will

are mandatory.
SHOULD
Normally used to indicate a preferred but nonmandatory

method of accomplishment.
MAY
An acceptable or suggested means of accomplishment.
CHANGE SYMBOLS. Changes to existing material and addition of new material are
indicated by one of three types of symbols determined by the nature of the material
affected. Text material utilizes a vertical line in the margin adjacent to the affected
area. New illustrations (figures) utilize a vertical line in the outer margin of the
page. Photographs and line drawings use a miniature pointing hand to highlight the
affected area. Diagrams and schematics utilize a grey tone (screening) to highlight
the affected area. Change symbols are not used for blank space resulting from deletions, indexes, and tabular data where changes cannot be identified, relocation of
material, or correction of minor inaccuracies unless such correction changes the
meaning.
YOUR RESPONSIBILITY TO LET US KNOW. Every effort is made to keep the Flight
Manual current. Review conferences with operating personnel and a constant review
of accident and flight test reports assure inclusion of the latest data in the manual.
However, we cannot correct an error unless we know of its existence. In this regard,
it is essential that you do your part. Comments, corrections, and questions regarding
this manual, supplementary manuals, checklists, or any phase of the Flight Manual
program are welcomed. These should be submitted on an AF Form 847 through
channels established by major commands as directed by AFI 11-215 to 327 BMSG/
EN, Tinker AFB, Oklahoma 73145-3021.
FLYING SAFETY
Every effort has been made to provide flight crews with the safest possible procedures and techniques to be used during all phases of air refueling operations. These
procedures and techniques will be followed by all flight crews concerned. If occasions
or unusual situations arise which are not specifically covered in this manual, flying
safety will be the prime consideration in determining the action to be taken.
iv
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Aircraft Coding
The information contained in this manual covers all B-52H aircraft. USAF Serial numbers
are used to distinguish information related to one aircraft or group of aircraft from that
which is applicable to the other aircraft. When serial numbers appear by a paragraph or
illustration, the information applies only to the aircraft represented by the serial numbers.
Where no serial numbers appear on a paragraph or illustration, the information is applicable
to all B-52H aircraft.
Symbol means thru or on. Example:
60-001 60-015 Identifies B-52H AF60-001 thru AF60-015
Identifies B-52H AF61-016 and on
61-016
AIRCRAFT NO LONGER IN SERVICE
CS Aircraft modified by TCTO 1B-52H-756 (Integrated Conventional Stores

Management System)
# Aircraft not CSRL capable
USAF B-52H Serial No.
60-001
CS
60-022
CS
60-043
CS
61-001
60-002
60-023
CS
60-044
CS
61-002
60-003
CS
60-024
60-045
CS
60-004
CS
60-025
CS
60-046
CS
60-005
60-026
CS
60-047
60-006
60-007
CS
60-008
61-021
CS
CS
61-022
CS
61-003
CS
61-023
CS
61-004
CS
61-024
CS
61-005
61-025
60-027
60-048
61-006
CS
61-026
60-028
60-049
CS
61-007
CS
61-027
60-050
CS
61-008
CS
61-028
60-051
CS
61-009
CS
61-029
CS
61-010
CS
61-030
60-029
CS
CS
60-009
CS
60-030
60-010
CS
60-031
CS
60-052
60-011
CS
60-032
CS
60-053
61-011
CS
61-031
CS
60-012
60-033
CS
60-054
61-012
61-032
CS
60-013
CS
60-034
CS
60-055
61-013
CS
61-033
60-014
CS
60-035
CS
60-056
61-014
61-034
60-015
CS
60-036
60-016
CS
60-037
60-017
CS
60-038
60-018
CS
60-019
CS
60-057
CS
61-015
61-035
CS
60-058
CS
61-016
CS
61-036
CS
60-059
CS
61-017
CS
61-037
60-039
60-060
CS
61-018
61-038
CS
CS
60-040
60-061
CS
61-019
CS
61-039
CS
60-020
CS
60-041
60-062
CS
61-020
CS
61-040
60-021
60-042
CS
Change 10
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Personnel Coding
Where necessary to distinguish

crewmembers, the following
code letters will be used
(P)
(CP)
(N)
(G)
(RN)
(EW)
Pilot
Copilot
Navigator
Gunner
Radar Navigator
EW Officer
(IP)
(IN)
(DI)
(GC)
(10th)
Instructor Pilot
Instructor Navigator
Defense Instructor
Ground Crew
Tenth Crewmember
The amplified checklist describes in detail the steps to be completed. Each major
part of multi-crewmember checklists has been assigned to a crewmember to be read
by that crewmember, and to be accomplished by others in the crew. When necessary
to show which crewmember will accomplish certain steps, the normal crew coding is
used and the code letters will appear after the response to each step. Where a dash
(-) is used in crew coding, such as P-CP, P-CP-RN, or any combination of crewmembers, each crewmember will accomplish the step. Where a slash (/) is used, such as
P/CP, either crewmember will accomplish the step. A verbal response will be given
by the crewmember(s) performing the action. There are exceptions to the verbal response as some of the checklists are to be accomplished silently. When a single crewmember is responsible for a checklist and accomplishment of all items, no crew coding will appear. All duties and responsibilities of the aerial gunner are deleted. Any
crew member occupying the gunners ejection seat will continue to be referred to as
Gunner.
Software Coding
The information contained in this manual covers all the available versions of the B-52H OAS
software. The following coding applies:
vi
[CS]
Applies when Coventional Weapon (Integrated Convential Stores Management

System (ICSMS)) Software is loaded on the aircraft.
[NS]
Applies when Nuclear Weapon (Block II) Software is loaded on the aircraft.
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Retrofit Coding
The following code symbols along with the word Less are used to distinguish information
related to aircraft that have the described retrofit change incorporated from that which is
applicable to aircraft not yet retrofitted. This list contains only TCTOs currently active.
Those known to be completed are not included.
CODING EXAMPLE: DR T.O. 1B-52H-792, Installation of IU/TACAN Replacement on
B-52H aircraft. Information applicable to aircraft until they are modified in accordance with
T.O. 1B-52H-792 will be coded Less DR . Information applicable to aircraft modified in accordance with T.O. 1B-52H-792 will be coded DR .
SYMBOL
CS
T.O. NO.
1B-52H-753
1B-52H-756
TITLE
Installation of Global Positioning System (GPS) on B-52H
Aircraft (ECP 0109).
Installation of Integrated Conventional Stores Management System (ICSMS) on
B-52H Aircraft (ECP 0109).
CH
DJ
1B-52H-749
Installation of AN/ARC-210(V) V/UHF Radio on B-52H Aircraft.
CH
DL
1B-52-2422
Installation of Dual Modem II AFSATCOM Radio System on B-52H Aircraft.
CH
DQ
1B-52H-785
Installation AN/ARC-210 Retrofit.
CH
DT
1B-52H-798
Installation of Electronic Countermeasures Improvement on all B-52H Aircraft.
CH
DU
1B-52H-803
Installation of Demand Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA) System for the ARC-210
Radio and Advanced Narrowband Digital Voice Terminal (ANDTV) KY-100 System
Capability for the ARC 210/ARC-164 Radios on B-52H Aircraft.
[EV]
1B-52H-815
Installation of Engine Fuel Enrichment Valve on B-52H Aircraft.
CH
EA
1B-52H-823
Installation of Pilot EVS Monitor Input switch on B-52H Aircraft.
[AMI]
1B-52H-830
Replacement of Ballistics Computer Set AN/AYQ-10 and Inertial Navigation System

AN/ASN-136 on B-52H Aircraft. Baseline for [AMI] includes DJ .
[TP]
1B-52H-851
Installation of Targeting Pod on B-52H Aircraft.
Change 22
vii
T.O. 1B-52H-1
The B-52H Stratofortress
All data on pages ix and x deleted.
viii
Change 6
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Systems Description and Operation
table of contents
THE AIRCRAFT
section I
page
1-3
DOORS AND WINDOWS
1-21
OXYGEN SYSTEM
1-25
EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT
1-37
ESCAPE SYSTEMS
1-51
ENGINES
1-81
FUEL SUPPLY SYSTEM
1-99
CENTER OF GRAVITY/FUEL LEVEL ADVISORY SYSTEM
1-151
REFUELING SYSTEMS
1-163
ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEMS
1-185
LIGHTING EQUIPMENT
1-243
HYDRAULIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEMS
1-257
LANDING GEAR SYSTEM
1-277
STEERING AND CROSSWIND CRAB SYSTEMS
1-289
WHEEL BRAKE SYSTEM
1-299
DRAG CHUTE SYSTEM
1-307
BOMB DOOR SYSTEM
1-309
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS
1-319
AUTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS
1-337
PNEUMATIC SYSTEMS
1-355
1-1
T.O. 1B-52H-1
1-2
table of contents
page
ANTI-ICING SYSTEMS
1-379
INSTRUMENTS
1-389
FLIGHT DIRECTOR SYSTEM
1-407
NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT
1-423
COMMUNICATION AND ASSOCIATED ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
1-437
OFFENSIVE AVIONICS SYSTEM
1-537
DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS
1-545
TERRAIN AVOIDANCE SYSTEM
1-549
ELECTRO-OPTICAL VIEWING SYSTEM (EVS) (AN/ASQ-151)
1-587
BOMBING SYSTEM
1-617
MISSILE SYSTEM
1-623
MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT
1-625
T.O. 1B-52H-1
THE AIRCRAFT
DESCRIPTION
The Boeing B-52 Stratofortress aircraft is of the
land based heavy bombardment class designed for
long range flight at high speed and altitude. The
tactical mission is the destruction of surface objectives by bombs and missiles. The aircraft has provisions for ten crewmembers: a basic crew of five,
three instructors and two additional crewmembers.
The basic crew consists of pilot, copilot, radar navigator, navigator and electronic warfare officer. The
instructor crew includes an instructor pilot, instructor navigator and instructor electronic warfare officer. Finally, the gunner and tenth man positions are
also available for additional seating. A highly variable weapons load may be carried on external pylons in combination with internal cluster rack or
CSRL mounted weapons loads. Up to 12 cruise missiles may be carried externally.
NOTE
AGM-86C/D missiles will not be carried in

mixed loads with AGM-86B or AGM-129.
The CSRL can carry up to eight AGM-86B/86C/86D,
B-61, or B-83 weapons internally. These weapon
loads cannot be mixed on the CSRL.
The aircraft can suspend a variety of gravity weapons internally on cluster rack assemblies (three
cluster rack assemblies, up to 27 weapons total).
Externally, the B-52 can suspend weapons using an
AGM-28 pylon under each wing with standard rack
adapter beams attached to each pylon and two sets
of multiple ejector racks (MER) giving a total external carriage capability of 24 weapons. The heavy
stores adapter beam (HSAB) can be attached to a
stub pylon and up to nine MAU-12 bomb racks can
be attached to each HSAB for a total external carriage capability on the HSAB of up to 18 weapons.
SPECIAL FEATURES
The aircraft is characterized by swept wings and

empennage, four underslung nacelles housing eight
turbofan engines, a quadricycle main landing gear,
and a tip gear near each outboard engine nacelle.
Engine bleed air provides the air supply for air conditioning and anti-icing. Cartridge starters are installed to provide for engine starts without assistance from an auxiliary air cart or auxiliary electrical power cart. Primary electrical power is 205-volt
ac and is provided by four engine-driven generators. Hydraulic pressure is supplied by six enginedriven hydraulic pumps and two electric motordriven hydraulic pumps. Primary pitch and yaw
control is maintained by hydraulically actuated
rudder and elevators. Lateral control is maintained

by operation of hydraulically actuated spoilers. By
varying the method of control, these same spoilers
serve as airbrakes. The entire horizontal stabilizer
is moved by a hydraulic mechanism to provide pitch
trim. A steering and crosswind crab system provides steering of the forward main landing gear and
also properly positions both forward and rear main
landing gear for crosswind landings. A hydraulically driven revolver-type launcher installation in the
bomb bay provides umbilical and ejector rack connections for the weapons which may be launched/
released automatically or manually by the navigators. The weapon/missile equipment interfaces with
the AN/ASQ-176 offensive avionics system, AN/
APN-224 radar altimeter, and the aircraft electrical, bleed air, and body hydraulic systems. Weapon
selective jettison capability is available to the navigator and radar navigator. Either the Weapons
Control Panel (WCP) or backup MFD display and
the keyboard may be used for computer controlled
safe jettison of individual or multiple weapons. The
pilot is provided with an ejector unlock consent
switch and a prearm consent switch (cooperative
with the WCP on the navigators front panel), a
launcher hydraulic system selector switch, and a
bomb bay and missile jettison control which will jettison all weapons from the aircraft. The pilot is also
provided with pylon jettison switches and pylon jettison consent switches. The Radar Navigator is provided with a bomb bay and missile jettison switch,
which will jettison only conventional gravity weapons. This switch is inoperative for all CSRL gravity
weapons and all nuclear and conventional missiles.
For additional information with weapons installed refer to:
T.O. 1B-52H-25-2 Nuclear gravity weapons
T.O. 1B-52H-30-1 ACM (AGM-129)
T.O. 1B-52H-30-4 ALCM (AGM-86B)
T.O. 1B-52H-34-2-1 Conventional gravity weapons
T.O. 1B-52H-34-2-5 WCMD (CBU-103/104/105/107)
T.O. 1B-52H-34-2-6 JDAM (GBU-31/38)
T.O. 1B-52H-34-2-7 JSOW (AGM-154)
T.O. 1B-52H-34-2-8 JASSM (AGM-158)
T.O. 1B-52-H-34-2-9 CALCM (AGM-86C/D)
An electro-optical viewing system (EVS) is installed
to provide pilots and navigators with a visual presentation of the area ahead of the aircraft during
both day and night missions.
A GPS Navigation System which provides position
updates and emulated TACAN data to the crew and
a moving map display to the pilots has been added.
Change 22
1-3
T.O. 1B-52H-1
An Air Force Satellite Communications System
(AFSATCOM) terminal is installed and is a half-duplex UHF terminal providing communications in
both line-of-sight (LOS) and satellite modes. A dual
modem capability DL has been added to the
AFSATCOM. The Airborne Miniature Receive Terminal (MRT) AN/ARR-85(V) is installed to provide
reliable VLF/LF reception and printout of secure
and nonsecure messages at extended ranges in nuclear and/or jamming environments.
DIMENSIONS
Wing Span
Fuselage Length
Height
To top of fin
Fin folded
Tread
Centerline outboard
main tires
Centerline tip gear
to tip gear
185 feet
159 feet 4 inches
40 feet 8 inches
21 feet 6 inches
MOVEMENT OF FLIGHT PERSONNEL

11 feet 4 inches
148 feet 5 inches
For aircraft turning radius and minimum ground

clearance, see figure 2-2.
GROSS WEIGHT
The aircraft is in the 400,000 pound gross weight

class. For specific weight and loading information,
see WEIGHT LIMITATIONS, Section V.
INTERIOR ARRANGEMENT
All crewmembers perform their normal crew duties

in the crew compartment. This compartment is divided into upper and lower decks. The pilots stations (sheet 3, figure 1-1) are located at the forward
end of the upper deck while the EW officer and gun-
1-4
Change 19
ner are stationed in aft-facing seats at the aft end

of the upper deck. The radar navigators and navigators stations (sheet 4, figure 1-1), left and right
respectively, are on the lower deck forward of the
main entry door. In addition to the basic crew of
five, the following crewmembers are provided for:
an instructor pilot seated between and immediately
aft of the pilots, a defense instructor seated on the
right side of the upper deck ahead of the EW officer
facing aft, a tenth crewmember position located
next to the crew bunk facing aft utilizing the forward ditching hammock, and an instructor navigator seated at the aft end of the lower deck for takeoff and landing. The crew compartment extends
from a pressure bulkhead forward of the pilots stations to a pressure bulkhead aft of the EW officers
and gunners stations.
Movement of the crew between the upper and lower

deck is facilitated by a ladder forward of the main
entry door. Movement through the equipment deck,
forward wheel well, bomb bay, aft wheel well, and
aft equipment compartment is possible during
flight via a crawlway (figure 1-1) on the right side
of the fuselage which extends from the pressure
bulkhead door (9, sheet 4, figure 1-1) in the crew
compartment aft pressure bulkhead to the aft
equipment compartment. Windows are provided in
bulkhead doors along the crawlway to allow inspection of the equipment deck, forward wheel well,
bomb bay, and aft equipment compartment during
flight. Access to the unpressurized portion of the fuselage is not generally required for normal flight
operations and will be avoided, particularly at high
altitudes since the crew compartment must be depressurized. An inflight emergency may require
such movement.
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
General Arrangement Diagram (Typical)
Figure 1-1 (Sheet 1 of 4)
(1-5 blank)/1-6
T.O. 1B-52H-1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
CREW COMPARTMENT
AFT EQUIPMENT
COMPARTMENT
DRAG CHUTE
COMPARTMENT
FIRE CONTROL EQUIPMENT
COMPARTMENT
AFT ECM ANTENNA
COMPARTMENT
AFT WHEEL WELL
BOMB BAY
DOPPLER ANTENNA
COMPARTMENT
FORWARD WHEEL WELL
EQUIPMENT DECK
FORWARD ECM ANTENNA
COMPARTMENT
NOSE RADOME
COMPARTMENT
COPILOTS EJECTION
HATCH
PILOTS EJECTION HATCH
EW OFFICERS EJECTION
HATCH
GUNNERS EJECTION
HATCH
CHAFF DISPENSERS
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
VORTEX GENERATORS
MISSILE SAFEING PINS AND
STREAMERS STOWAGE
MISSILE GROUND SAFETY
PIN INSTALLATION AND
REMOVAL TOOL STOWAGE
AFT TRANSFORMERRECTIFIER UNITS (3)
AFT EQUIPMENT COMPARTMENT HATCH
DELETED
STARTER CARTRIDGE
STOWAGE
FORWARD TRANSFORMERRECTIFIER UNITS (5)
EXTERNAL POWER
RECEPTACLE (3)
AFT BATTERY
FORWARD BATTERY
MAIN ENTRY DOOR
RADAR NAVIGATORS
EJECTION HATCH
EVS STV TURRET
NAVIGATORS EJECTION
HATCH
FLIR TURRET
Change 4
1-7
T.O. 1B-52H-1
General Arrangement Diagram (Typical)(Cont)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
THERMAL CURTAIN
AISLE STAND
COPILOTS SIDE PANEL
EYEBROW INSTRUMENT PANEL
HOT CUP
FOOD AND DATA BOX
COPILOTS EJECTION SEAT
SIGNAL LIGHT
NIGHT FLYING CURTAIN
FOOD STORAGE CHEST
TOILET
FOOD WARMING OVEN
DEFENSE INSTRUCTORS SEAT
EW OFFICERS FOOD STOWAGE BOXES
OXYGEN BOTTLE
PERISCOPIC SEXTANT MOUNT
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
EW OFFICERS SIDE PANEL

DEFENSE STATION INSTRUMENT PANEL
MAIN REFUEL VALVE EMERGENCY CONTROL
LEVER
GUNNERS FOOD STOWAGE BOX
GUNNERS EJECTION SEAT
EW OFFICERS EJECTION SEAT
STANCHION
CREW BUNK
PILOTS EJECTION SEAT
PILOTS SIDE PANEL
INSTRUCTOR PILOTS SEAT
PERISCOPIC SEXTANT CARRYING CASE
PILOTS OVERHEAD PANEL
PILOTS INSTRUMENT PANEL
1-8
T.O. 1B-52H-1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT SHELF

NAVIGATORS INSTRUMENT PANEL
OXYGEN BOTTLE
NAVIGATORS SIDE PANEL
HOT CUP
DRINKING WATER CONTAINER
LADDER
RIGHT EQUIPMENT RACK
PRESSURE BULKHEAD DOOR
LEFT EQUIPMENT RACK
CENTRAL URINAL
INSTRUCTOR NAVIGATORS TAKEOFF AND
LANDING SEAT
POWER SUPPLY RACK
RADAR NAVIGATORS EJECTION SEAT
FOOD STOWAGE BOX
RADAR NAVIGATORS SIDE PANEL
NAVIGATORS EJECTION SEAT
1-9/(1-10 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Pilots Station
1
2
3
4
5
6
SLIDING WINDOW HANDLE

CHART HOLDER
OVERHEAD PANEL
EYEBROW INSTRUMENT PANEL
COPILOTS AERP BLOWER MOUNTING
BRACKET AND ELECTRICAL CONNECTOR
COPILOTS SIDE PANEL
7
8
9
10
11
12
CONTROL COLUMN DISCONNECT LEVER

AISLE STAND
PILOTS INSTRUMENT PANEL
ALTIMETER CORRECTION CARD AND HOLDER
PILOTS SIDE PANEL
PILOTS READINESS SWITCH ASSEMBLY
NOTE
Numbers in circles denote window numbers, windows 6L and 6R not anti-iced.
Figure 1-2
Change 20
1-11
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Pilots Side Panel (Typical)
1
2
3
4
5

PYLON JETTISON CONSENT PANEL DR
FACE PLATE DEFOG PANEL
PILOTS LIGHTING PANEL
MUNITIONS CONSENT PANEL
6
7
8
9
INTERPHONE POWER SWITCH

PILOTS CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL
IFF ANTENNA SWITCH PANEL
OXYGEN REGULATOR
1-12
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
10
11
12
13
14
15
ANTISKID SWITCH
MACH INDICATOR SWITCH
GYRO POWER SWITCH
HYDRAULIC CONTROL PANEL
IFF CONTROL PANEL
PILOTS MFD DISPLAY CONTROL PANEL
16
17
18
19
20
21
FLARE EJECTOR POWER

OXYGEN QUANTITY TEST SWITCH
OXYGEN QUANTITY GAGE
AIR OUTLET KNOB
INTERPHONE MIXER PANEL
INTERPHONE CONTROL PANEL
Change 21
1-13
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Copilots Side Panel (Typical)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

TEMPERATURE CONTROL SWITCH
AC CONTROL PANEL
VOLTMETER
FREQUENCY METER
MANIFOLD TEMPERATURE GAGE
FREQUENCY & VOLTMETER SELECTOR
SWITCH
FLUTTER ADVISORY PANEL
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
INTERPHONE MIXER PANEL

INTERPHONE CONTROL PANEL
FACE PLATE DEFOG PANEL
COPILOTS MFD DISPLAY CONTROL PANEL
CG/FLAS CONTROL PANEL
AHRS CONTROL PANEL
ANTISKID CONTROL PANEL
COPILOTS LIGHTING PANEL
AIR OUTLET KNOB
1-14
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
18
19
20
21
22
23
ENGINE OIL TEMPERATURE GAGE

OIL TEMPERATURE SELECTOR
GAM-72 FIRE WARNING PANEL
MANIFOLD VALVE SWITCH
[EV] FUEL ENRICHMENT VALVE SWITCH
Less [EV] BLANK
ENGINE START CONTROL PANEL
24
25
26
27
28
DU Z-AVH REMOTE CONTROL PANEL

Less DU Z-ANP REMOTE CONTROL PANEL
LIAISON RADIO CONTROL PANEL
COPILOTS CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL
OXYGEN REGULATOR
DC POWER SYSTEM CONTROL PANEL
Change 20
1-15
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Overhead Panel (Typical)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
OVERHEAD LIGHTING PANEL

GAM-72 (LAUNCH GEAR) JETTISON SWITCH
DJ AN/ARC-210(V) SWITCH PANEL
DJ V/UHF (ARC-210) RADIO CONTROL PANEL
UHF COMMAND RADIO CONTROL PANEL
TACAN RADIO CONTROL PANEL
VOR CONTROL PANEL
AIR REFUELING PANEL
REFUEL PANEL
PYLON JETTISON CONTROL PANEL
BOMB BAY & MISSILE JETTISON CONTROL
SWITCH
Less DJ UHF LINE-OF-SIGHT (LOS) RADIO
CONTROL PANEL
DQ NVIS LIGHT SWITCH
Figure 1-5
1-16
Change 16
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Aisle Stand
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
AIRBRAKE LEVER
STABILIZER TRIM CUTOUT SWITCH
STABILIZER TRIM WHEEL AND INDICATOR
THROTTLES
THROTTLE BRAKE LEVER
THRUST GATE
STEERING RATIO SELECTOR LEVER
PARKING BRAKE LEVER
AIR CONDITIONING PANEL
Figure 1-6
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
DRAG CHUTE LEVER

WARNING HORN SHUTOFF BUTTON (BEHIND)
AUTOPILOT TURN AND PITCH CONTROLLER
WING FLAP LEVER
NAVIGATION SYSTEM SELECT PANEL
TERRAIN DISPLAY CONTROL PANEL
EMERGENCY ALARM MONITOR LIGHT
EMERGENCY ALARM SWITCH
RUDDER TRIM KNOB AND INDICATOR
CROSSWIND CRAB CONTROL CENTERING
BUTTON
CROSSWIND CRAB CONTROL KNOB
LANDING LIGHTS PANEL
AUTOPILOT SWITCH PANEL
LATERAL TRIM CUTOUT SWITCH
1-17
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Pilots Instrument Panel (Typical)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
LOW OIL PRESSURE WARNING LIGHTS

AIR REFUELING LIGHTS
ACCELEROMETER
MAGNETIC STANDBY COMPASS CORRECTION
CARD
MAGNETIC STANDBY COMPASS
CABIN ALTIMETER
OIL PRESSURE GAGES
ANTI-ICE CONTROL PANEL
EVS CONTROL PANEL
CLOCK
FLIGHT COMMAND INDICATOR
ALTIMETER
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
INDICATED AIRSPEED INDICATOR

HORIZONTAL SITUATION INDICATOR
MARKER BEACON LIGHT
ATTITUDE-DIRECTOR INDICATOR
AHRS ATTITUDE SELECT SWITCH
MASTER CAUTION LIGHT
EVS MONITOR
VERTICAL VELOCITY INDICATOR
MACH INDICATOR
RADAR ALTIMETER
STANDBY ALTIMETER INDICATOR
RADAR ALTIMETER CAUTION LIGHT
ENGINE PRESSURE RATIO (EPR) GAGES
1-18
Change 4
T.O. 1B-52H-1
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
WING FLAP POSITION INDICATOR

LANDING GEAR POSITION INDICATORS PANEL
EXHAUST GAS TEMPERATURE (EGT) GAGES
FUEL FLOWMETERS
ENGINE FIRE SHUTOFF SWITCHES
TACHOMETERS
CENTER OF GRAVITY/FUEL LEVEL ADVISORY
SYSTEM (CG/FLAS) DISPLAY UNIT
FUEL SCAVENGE SYSTEM PANEL
FUEL SYSTEM MANAGEMENT PANEL
TOTAL FUEL FLOW INDICATOR
LANDING GEAR LEVER
CROSSWIND CRAB POSITION INDICATOR
TOTAL FUEL QUANTITY INDICATOR
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
SAS CONTROL PANEL

CENTRAL CAUTION PANEL
CENTRAL CAUTION PANEL RESET SWITCH
OUTSIDE AIR TEMPERATURE
BOMB DOORS SWITCH
LATERAL TRIM INDICATOR
AUTOPILOT TURN CONTROL SELECTOR
SWITCH
WINDSHIELD WIPER SWITCH
ENGINE FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM TEST
SWITCH
HEADING INDICATOR (GYRO)
TRUE AIRSPEED INDICATOR
LANDING GEAR CONTROL PANEL
1-19/(1-20 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DOORS AND WINDOWS

DESCRIPTION
MAIN ENTRY DOOR
One main entry door (figure 1-8) provides normal

crew access into the aircraft. The door is located on
the lower centerline of the fuselage ahead of the
forward landing gear wheel well. An entry light
switch is located directly forward of the door at the
head of the ladder. The entry light operates on direct battery power. An entry ladder is installed on
the inner side of the door. The door can be opened
and closed from both the inside and outside but can
be locked and unlocked from the inside only. The
locking handle is located inside the ladder structure
near the left front corner of the door (door closed)
and is moved to the left to lock and to the right to
unlock the door. The inside operating handle is located outside the ladder structure near the right
front corner of the door (door closed) and is moved
aft to unlatch and forward to latch the door. The
outside operating handle is flush with the surface of
the door and is rotated laterally to latch or unlatch
the door.
To prevent injury to ground crewmembers,

one of the pilots sliding windows will be
opened approximately 2 inches before the
main entry door is opened or closed.
A pressure bulkhead door (9, figure 1-1) at the aft

end of the lower deck is provided for inflight access
to the unpressurized portion of the fuselage. This
door can be opened from either side. The crew compartment will be depressurized before opening the
door. This door can be locked from the crew compartment side by disabling the door handle. To lock
the pressure bulkhead door, the door will be closed
and latched and the lockpin removed. This action
disconnects the door handle from the vertical latching bar. To unlock the pressure bulkhead door, the
handle is rotated until the hole in the door handle
extension lines up with the holes on the end of the
latching bar and the lockpin is inserted. Rotating
the door handle on either side of the door with the
pin in place lifts the latching bar to the unlatched
position and the door can be opened.
Entrance To Aircraft
Figure 1-8
1-21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
An aft equipment compartment hatch (22, figure

1-1) also serves as an escape hatch for bailout. See
ESCAPE HATCHES, this section, for description of
the door.
LOWER DECK FOLDING HATCH
A lower deck folding hatch (16, figure 1-181) is located over the main entry door and is used to prevent crewmembers from stepping on the main entry
door while moving about on the lower deck. The
hatch is held closed by a spring-loaded locking pin.
To open the hatch, the locking pin is withdrawn and
the door is folded up to its stowed position under
the instructor navigators seat where it is held in
place by a spring-loaded latch.
UPPER DECK SLIDING HATCH
An upper deck sliding hatch (10, figure 1-183) is

provided to cover the opening between the upper
and lower decks. The hatch is held closed by two
spring-loaded locking pins. To open the hatch, the
locking pins are withdrawn and the door is slid aft
along permanent tracks.
1-22
The upper deck sliding hatch will be opened

and locked prior to starting engines, takeoff, air refuelings, low level activity,
planned unusual maneuvers, penetration,
and landings.
PILOTS SLIDING WINDOWS
Pilots and copilots sliding windows (figure 1-9)

may be opened or closed (as required) while on the
ground. The sliding window assembly is made up of
an electrically heated window, tubular window
frame, latching mechanism, rubber seal, and an
electrical plug connector. Close the window by rolling it forward along the tracks to the forward stop
and rotating the latching handle upward until the
seal is pressed against its seat. A lockbolt within
the handle retains the window in the closed position. Open the window by releasing the handle lockbolt, rotate the handle downward and pull the window aft.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Pilots Sliding Windows
WINDOW IN
OPEN POSITION
1
3
WINDOW IN
CLOSED POSITION
A31629
4
NOTE
Pilots window shown copilots opposite
1
2
3
4
HANDLE LOCKBOLT
WINDOW HANDLE
FORWARD STOP
ELECTRICAL CONNECTOR
Figure 1-9
1-23/(1-24 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
OXYGEN SYSTEM
DESCRIPTION
The aircraft is equipped with a 300 psi liquid oxygen system. This system supplies all crew stations
and the portable oxygen bottle rechargers. See figure 1-11 for oxygen duration. An automatic pressure breathing diluter demand oxygen regulator,
figure 1-12, is provided at crew stations. Type
CRU-68/A, CRU-69/A, or CRU-73/A oxygen regulators are used at all crew stations. The instructor pilot, defense instructor, tenth crewmember, and
instructor navigator stations each have a panel
with a type CRU-68/A, CRU-69/A, or CRU-73/A regulator installed. Oxygen system circuit protection
and the location of the applicable circuit breakers is
contained in figure 1-16.
A pressure breathing portable oxygen bottle recharger (figure 1-10) is located near each of the six
regular crew stations. The oxygen system is supplied by three 25-liter 300 psi liquid oxygen converters (see SERVICING diagram, this section).
Converter No. 1 is located on the forward left side
of the aft equipment compartment. Converter No. 3
is located aft of converter No. 1 on the left side of
the aft equipment compartment directly opposite
converter No. 2. A supply line from each converter
connects with all oxygen regulators and portable
oxygen bottle rechargers. However, converter No. 1
normally supplies oxygen to all stations on the left
side of the aircraft while converter No. 2 supplies
those stations on the right side. Flow equalizer
check valves are provided in the interconnecting
lines between the two converter supply lines to balance the demand on each converter, thus creating
two separate systems. Check valves at each regulator isolate a ruptured line or converter to minimize
the amount of oxygen which will be lost. Converter
No. 3 is connected to the supply lines of converters

No. 1 and 2 to provide additional oxygen in accordance with mission requirements. Also, in the event
of malfunction in either or both systems, converter
No. 3 will provide oxygen to all stations connected
to either or both systems. When converter No. 3 is
not installed, a simulator is installed in the gaging
circuit to simulate zero liters of liquid oxygen at the
No. 3 position. An oxygen converter and/or its fittings may frost over under certain conditions. When
a converter is being filled, the body of the converter
and overboard vent line may be covered with frost
or moisture due to the converter being warm or
high moisture content in the air. This frost or moisture should dissipate after the converter has stabilized. If the converter is malfunctioning due to no
vacuum between the converter walls, the frost will
remain until all liquid oxygen is lost. After a converter has been filled and stabilized, the allowable
leakage due to evaporation loss is 2 liters per converter per 24-hour period. Frost should not appear
on the body of the converter but may appear on the
hose where the pressure, pressure vent, and supply
lines connect to the converter. This frost would appear due to liquid oxygen being supplied to the supply lines or oxygen being vented overboard due to
excessive pressure.
NOTE
Pressure indications as high as 420 psi may

be attained due to pressure buildup in the
heat exchanger line downstream of the liquid oxygen converter and check valve prior
to use of oxygen. A relief valve having a
high pressure setting of 395 (25) psi governs system pressure.
Change 4
1-25
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Oxygen Bottles and Recharger Points
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
RECHARGER HOSE
CARRYING SLING
ALTITUDE SELECTOR KNOB
OXYGEN MASK HOSE CONNECTION
OXYGEN PRESSURE GAGE
A-6 OXYGEN BOTTLE
PRESSURE DEMAND REGULATOR
OXYGEN BOTTLE FILLER PORT
Figure 1-10
1-26
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Oxygen Duration
CREW MEMBER OXYGEN DURATION HOURS
CREW: 6
CABIN
ALTITUDE
FEET
TOTALIZER GAGE QUANTITY LITERS
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
40,000
73.4
73.4
68.1
68.1
62.9
62.9
57.6
57.6
52.4
52.4
47.1
47.1
41.9
41.9
36.8
36.8
31.4
31.4
26.2
26.2
21.0
21.0
15.7
15.7
10.5
10.5
5.2
5.2
35,000
73.4
73.4
68.1
68.1
62.9
62.9
57.6
57.6
52.4
52.4
47.1
47.1
41.9
41.9
36.8
36.8
31.4
31.4
26.2
26.2
21.0
21.0
15.7
15.7
10.5
10.5
5.2
5.2
30,000
53.0
54.4
49.2
50.5
45.4
46.6
41.6
42.7
37.8
38.8
34.0
35.0
30.2
31.0
26.4
27.2
22.7
23.3
18.9
19.4
15.1
15.5
11.3
11.6
7.5
7.7
3.8
3.9
25,000
40.8
51.5
37.9
47.8
35.0
44.1
32.2
40.5
29.2
36.8
26.2
33.0
23.3
29.4
20.4
25.7
17.5
22.0
14.6
18.4
11.6
14.7
8.7
10.5
5.8
7.3
2.9
3.7
20,000
31.0
56.7
28.8
52.6
26.6
48.6
24.4
44.4
22.4
40.5
19.9
36.4
17.7
32.4
15.5
28.3
13.3
24.3
11.1
20.2
8.9
16.2
6.6
12.1
4.4
8.1
2.2
4.0
15,000
24.9
70.6
23.1
65.5
21.3
60.5
19.5
55.5
17.7
50.4
16.0
45.4
14.2
40.4
12.4
35.2
11.6
30.2
8.9
25.2
7.1
20.2
5.3
15.1
3.5
10.1
1.8
5.0
10,000
20.0
70.6
18.5
65.5
17.1
60.5
15.6
55.5
14.2
50.4
12.8
45.4
11.4
40.4
10.0
35.2
8.5
30.2
7.1
25.2
5.7
20.2
4.3
15.1
2.8
10.1
1.4
5.0
BELOW 5
EME
ERGE
ENCY DESC
D CEND
D
TO ALT
TITUDE NOT REQUIRIING O
OXYGEN
70
NOTE
Duration for crew of N crewmembers = 6 X duration for 6 crewmembers.

N
Table values in italics indicate diluter lever 100 oxygen.
Table values in bold print indicate diluter lever normal oxygen.
Three 25-liter liquid oxygen converters.
Figure 1-11
Change 4
1-27
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Oxygen System Controls and Indicators
1
2
3
4
OXYGEN FLOW INDICATOR

OXYGEN PRESSURE GAGE
OXYGEN SUPPLY SHUTOFF LEVER
REGULATOR DILUTER LEVER
NO.
5
6
7
OXYGEN EMERGENCY TOGGLE LEVER

OXYGEN QUANTITY GAGE PRESS-TO-TEST
SWITCH
LIQUID OXYGEN QUANTITY GAGE
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
Oxygen FLOW Indicator
A white blinker-type oxygen flow indicator which appears in the window

with each inhalation to indicate the flow of oxygen. If no oxygen flows the
white panel will not appear.
Oxygen Pressure Gage
Calibrated in psi and indicates oxygen system pressure available at the

regulator regardless of supply lever position.
1-28
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
3
CONTROLINDICATOR
Oxygen Supply Shutoff Lever
FUNCTION
With the lever in ON position, oxygen is supplied to the regulator. With the
lever in OFF position, the oxygen supply to the regulator is shut off to prevent any flow of oxygen from the regulator when not in use.
When the oxygen supply shutoff lever is positioned OFF, on the

CRU-73/A, the regulator diluter lever should automatically
move to 100% OXYGEN position or it may only move halfway
between the NORMAL and 100% OXYGEN positions. When
the supply shutoff lever is positioned OFF, do not force regulator
diluter lever to NORMAL as this will break the diluter lever.
NOTE
Due to the automatic pressure breathing feature of the oxygen
regulator, a continuous flow of oxygen will result if the oxygen
regulator is not being used and the oxygen supply shutoff lever
is left in ON position above 30,000 feet cabin altitude. This condition will cause a rapid loss of oxygen.
4
Regulator Diluter Lever
With the lever in NORMAL OXYGEN position, the regulator automatically

supplies the proper mixture of oxygen and air at all altitudes. With the lever in 100% OXYGEN position, the air intake port is closed and pure oxygen is supplied for emergencies regardless of the altitude. At cabin altitudes above 30,000 feet, the lever should be placed in 100% OXYGEN
position as a safety precaution. The lever should be left in 100% OXYGEN position at the end of a flight to prevent dust and lint from entering
the regulator. If a CRU-73/A regulator is installed, it will incorporate an interlock between the oxygen supply shutoff lever and the regulator diluter
valve. The interlock feature automatically places the diluter valve in the
100% OXYGEN position when the supply lever is positioned to OFF.
NOTE
For regulators other than the CRU-73/A, if the oxygen supply lever is off and the diluter lever is in normal, there is no restriction
to breathing, but the crewmember will be breathing cabin air
only and hypoxia will occur as cabin altitudes that require oxygen are reached. With the diluter lever in 100% (CRU-73/A regulator off) neither cabin air nor oxygen will be available at the
mask.
1-29
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Oxygen System Controls and Indicators (Cont)

NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
Oxygen Emergency Toggle Lever
Used to supply a positive oxygen pressure to the mask for emergency

use. The lever has EMERGENCY- -NORMAL - -TEST MASK positions.
TEST MASK position supplies positive oxygen pressure for checking the
oxygen mask. EMERGENCY position supplies oxygen at a continuous
positive pressure for emergency use. In NORMAL position, oxygen flow
is controlled automatically by the regulator. The emergency toggle lever
should remain in the NORMAL position at all times, unless an unscheduled pressure increase is required. When positive pressures are required, it is mandatory that the oxygen mask be well fitted to the face. Unless special precautions are taken to ensure no leakage, continued use
of positive pressure under these conditions will result in the rapid depletion of the oxygen supply. This condition could also result in extremely
cold oxygen flowing to the mask.
Oxygen Quantity Gage Press-To-Test

Switch
When switch is pressed and held, the quantity gage needle should move
to the 0 liter position; when switch is released, the quantity gage needle
should return to the initial position.
Oxygen Converter Quantity Gage
The gage indicates the total quantity of liquid oxygen in the converters.
The dial is graduated from 0 to 75 liters in increments of 5 liters. Capacitance probes in the converters are utilized in a manner similar to the capacitance probes in the fuel quantity gaging system. A capacitance simulator is installed in the system to provide an empty capacitance reading
from the No. 3 converter position when that converter is not installed in
the aircraft. AC power failure will render the gaging system inoperative.
1-30
T.O. 1B-52H-1
BUILDUP AND VENT VALVE HANDLE
A buildup and vent valve handle (figure 1-13) located in three places on the underside of the aft
equipment compartment controls a dual purpose
two-position three-port valve. Two types of valves
are optional on the aircraft. On one type valve, the
handle rotates in a horizontal plane (to the
centerline of the valve) through 120 from
SERVICE to FILL position. With this valve
installed, the exterior surface of the aircraft is
appropriately stenciled with SERVICE and FILL
positions. The other type valve is different in that
the handle rotates in a vertical plane (to the
centerline of the valve). The handle of this valve is
stamped with PULL TO VENT-PUSH TO BLD-UP.
When this handle is installed, exterior aircraft
markings are not required. Functionally however,
the valves are the same. With the appropriate valve
handle in either FILL or PULL TO VENT position,
the converter is vented to the atmosphere when being filled from the oxygen service cart. Any excess
oxygen introduced during filling or excess oxygen
pressure will escape through the vent. When the
handle is in SERVICE or PUSH TO BLD-UP position, the vent line is blocked, the converted gas and
liquid lines are connected, and system pressure
builds up to deliver oxygen to each of the crew station regulators. Both types of valves are springloaded in such a manner that as the handle is
moved over center, the handle will travel to stop in
the direction of travel.
NOTE
Oxygen system buildup requires approximately 30 minutes for system stabilization.

Servicing should be accomplished at least
30 minutes prior to engine start.
Buildup and Vent Valve Handles
Figure 1-13
1-31
T.O. 1B-52H-1
PORTABLE OXYGEN BOTTLES
A portable oxygen bottle and recharger are located

near each of the regular crew stations (figure 1-10).
The portable oxygen bottle assembly consists of a
low pressure cylinder (12, figure 1-10), cylinder carrying sling (8, figure 1-10), and a pressure demand
regulator (13, figure 1-10). The regulator consists of
an oxygen pressure gage (11, figure 1-10), altitude
selector knob (9, figure 1-10), and may have a clothing clip. The pressure gage is calibrated from 0 to
500 psi and is red-lined at 450 psi. The altitude selector knob has NORM- -30M- -42M- -EMER positions. The pressure demand regulator delivers
100% oxygen on all positions. The NORM position
is used on all cabin altitudes up to 30,000 feet and
delivers oxygen only on demand. The 30M position
is used at cabin altitudes from 30,000 to 42,000
feet. This position delivers oxygen under a slight
positive pressure which is intended to combat mask
leaks and possible altimeter lag. From 42,000 to
45,000 feet, the 42M position is used. This position
delivers oxygen under the higher pressure required
to sustain life at these altitudes. The EMER position further increases the pressure of the oxygen
and should be used any time the cabin altitude exceeds 45,000 feet. Regulator position, cabin altitude, and physical activity will affect the duration
of the oxygen supply. This time can vary from a
minimum of 4 minutes at a cabin pressure of SL to
12,000 feet, regulator position of NORM, to a maximum of 14 minutes at cabin pressure of 30,000 to
40,000 feet, regulator position of 30M all with
moderate physical activity. Passive physical activity
provides approximately twice this duration. Therefore, the pressure gage should be monitored continuously when the bottle is in use.
Oxygen will rapidly accelerate any ignition

source, such as a spark, into a flash fire.
Dirt, grease, and hand lotion all can act as
fuel to the fire. Therefore, when recharging
a portable oxygen bottle, crewmembers will
wear Nomex flight gloves and the helmet
with visor down. These gloves should be
free of oil and grease.
NOTE
If the oxygen bottle supply is depleted inflight, recharge the bottle above 50 psi prior
to landing if time/conditions permit.
1-32
Change 4
If the oxygen bottle supply is depleted inflight and not recharged, make an AFTO
Form 781 entry. The bottle must be recharged within 2 hours after landing or
purging will be necessary prior to recharging.
OXYGEN SYSTEM NORMAL OPERATION

Use the following procedure when the use of oxygen
is required during flight:
Crewmembers using upward ejection seats

will ensure that oxygen supply hose is
under seat armrest before hookup with the
mask hose.
NOTE
Requirements for use of oxygen while performing various activities will be in accordance with current directives. Use of 100%
oxygen will be as outlined in Sections II, III,
and IV. Pilot will ensure that oxygen is used
as required.
1. Check connection of oxygen mask hose to oxygen supply hose and bailout bottle hose.
2. Place oxygen supply shutoff lever in ON position.
3. Place oxygen regulator diluter lever in NORMAL or 100% OXYGEN as required.
NOTE
At cabin altitudes above 30,000 feet, the

lever should be placed in 100% OXYGEN
position as a safety precaution.
4.
Frequently check the oxygen flow indicator.

NOTE
During turbulent flight conditions, liquid

oxygen sloshes inside the converter. This
cools the gas and allows part of it to return
to the liquid state, resulting in a lowered
gas pressure. Lowering of the gas pressure
is not detrimental to crew consumption as
long as the pressure remains above 150 psi.
5. When flight is completed, position oxygen supply shutoff lever OFF and the regulator diluter
lever to 100% OXYGEN.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AIRCREW EYE/RESPIRATORY
PROTECTION (AERP) SYSTEM
BLOWER MOUNTING BRACKETS AND ELECTRICAL

CONNECTORS
The Aircrew Eye/Respiratory Protection (AERP)

equipment is designed to protect the aircrew member from toxic chemical exposure to the head, neck,
face, eyes, and respiratory tract. The equipment is
intended to provide protection without imposing operational or physiological burdens, degrading mission capability or combat effectiveness. The equipment is designed to be used with the existing aircrew chemical defense ensemble.
Pilot and Copilot Stations
The AERP equipment, (figure 1-14) consists of a

Protective Integrated Hood/ Mask (PIHM) assembly
which integrates a pressure-demand oxygen mask,
hood, oxygen regulator, chemical-biological filter
and pigtail adapter hose assembly, blower assembly,
and a ground intercommunication unit. Blower
mounting brackets and electrical connectors, (figure
1-15) have been installed at each crew position.
This allows the PIHM to be connected to the aircraft electrical, communication, and oxygen systems.
NOTE
The blower is to be used at all times when

crewmember is wearing the integrated
hood/mask subassembly.
The Intercommunication Unit (IU) is for
ground use only. The PIHM will be connected to the aircraft communication system as soon as practical after boarding the
aircraft.
When the blower is connected to the aircraft electrical source, it operates on 28 Vdc current.
The blower mounting bracket and electrical connector for the pilots system is located on the right side
of the pilots ejection seat fixed rail assembly, (14
figure 1-22). In addition, a strap assembly has been
added next to the mounting bracket and electrical
connector to hold the blower hose in place. The
PIHM electrical connector and blower mounting for
the copilots system is located on the copilots food
and data storage box (5, figure 1-2).
EW Officers Station
The electrical connector for the EW officers equipment is located on the lower edge of the diagonal
rack. The blower mounting bracket is located on the
floor below the electrical connector and near the
food storage box.
Navigator and Radar Navigator Stations
The blower mounting bracket and electrical connector for the navigators system is located on the shelf
just aft of the hot cup on the navigators side panel.
A blower mounting bracket, on the shelf on the
radar navigators side panel, and an electrical connector located on the lower side of the upper equipment rack just above the blower mounting bracket
and just aft of the conventional weapon panel, have
been installed for use by the radar navigator. A
hose modification kit has been added to the oxygen
hose system on the outboard side of the navigator
and radar navigators seats. In addition, a hanging
strap for the blower hose has been installed on the
overhead floor beam at each position.
Change 4
1-33
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Protective Integrated Hood/Mask (PIHM)

Assembly - Ground Configuration
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
HOOD/MASK SUBASSEMBLY
COMMUNICATION CORD
EXTERNAL DRINKING TUBE
BAYONET CONNECTOR
NECK DAM
OXYGEN HOSE
MANIFOLD SUBASSEMBLY
SELECTOR KNOB
INTERCOMMUNICATION UNIT(GROUND USE)
QUICK DISCONNECT TO BLOWER
CARRYING STRAP
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
Figure 1-14
1-34
Change 4
QUICK-DISCONNECT TO AIRCRAFT OXYGEN/

BLOWER
ARMORED QUICK DISCONNECT
C2 FILTER
EMERGENCY OXYGEN CONNECTOR
FILTER
BLOWER/MOUNT RELEASE LEVER
BLOWER ASSEMBLY
BLOWER ASSEMBLY BATTERY COMPARTMENT
BLOWER FAN SPEED CONTROL
ELECTRICAL CORD
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Blower Installation and Mounting Provisions
1
2
3
4
5
28 VDC CONNECTOR WITH DUST COVER

BLOWER ELECTRICAL PLUG
OXYGEN HOSE
BLOWER BATTERY COMPARTMENT LATCH
BLOWER BATTERY COMPARTMENT
6
7
8
BLOWER MOUNTING BRACKET AND SPRING

LOADED RELEASE
AIRCRAFT MOUNTING BRACKET
BLOWER FILTER
Figure 1-15
Change 4
1-35
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Oxygen System Circuit Protection and Location

CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
EQUIPMENT
Aircrew Eye/Respiratory Protection (AERP) System Blowers
Oxygen Quantity Indicator
11
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
CHEMICAL DEFENSE BLOWER

COPILOT
RLC/B21
Rt. ESS
EWO
RLC/B22
Rt. ESS
GUNNER
LLC/E8
Left ESS
NAVIGATOR
ABNS/B22
Rt. ESS
PILOT
LLC/E9
Left ESS
RADAR NAVIGATOR
ABNS/B23
Rt. ESS
PCBP/E14
AC Bus 3
OXY QTY IND
The definitions for the acronyms used to designate the circuit breaker panel names are as shown in the following list. The locator code
is the row and column location of the circuit breaker as marked on the circuit breaker panel depictions shown in the CIRCUIT BREAKER
PANELS figure, under the ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS subsection in Section I.
ABNS
LLC
AFT BNS CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL

LEFT LOAD CENTRAL CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL
PCBP
RLC
Figure 1-16
1-36
Change 20

RIGHT LOAD CENTRAL CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT
DESCRIPTION
ENGINE FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM
HAND FIRE EXTINGUISHERS
FIREFIGHTING GLOVE CONTAINERS
AXE
FIRST AID KITS
PARACHUTE STATIC LINE
ESCAPE ROPES
CENTRAL CAUTION SYSTEM
MASTER CAUTION LIGHTS
EMERGENCY ALARM SYSTEM
ESCAPE HATCHES
CRASH LANDING DITCHING STATIONS
DESCRIPTION
For location of emergency equipment, see figure
1-17. Emergency equipment circuit protection and
the location of the applicable circuit breakers is contained in figure 1-21.
ENGINE FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM
The aircraft is not equipped with an engine fire extinguishing system. The aircraft is equipped with
an electrically operated fire detection system. The
system consists of separate fire detection circuitry
for each engine and a test switch for simultaneous
test of all circuits. Each engine is protected by thermally actuated fire detectors wired in parallel,
which provide fire warning signals through a light
on the pilots instrument panel. The fire detector
system uses left essential dc power.
Engine Fire Warning Lights
Eight red engine fire warning lights (3, figure 1-33)

are an integral part of the fire shutoff switches on
the pilots instrument panel. A fire warning light
will illuminate when a fire detector unit on the affected engine is thermally actuated.
Engine Fire Detector System Test Switch
An engine fire detector system test switch (47, figure 1-7) is located on the left side of the pilots instrument panel. The switch is of the rotary type,
has two positions TEST- -NORMAL, and is used to
test continuity of the engine fire detection system.
In the spring-loaded TEST position, illumination of
the warning lights indicates that the warning light
circuits have continuity. Conversely, failure of the
lights to illuminate indicates that the warning light
circuits are broken provided the bulbs glow on
1-37
1-37
1-37
1-38
1-40
1-40
1-40
1-40
1-40
1-40
1-41
1-43
1-43
1-47
press-to-test. In NORMAL position, the circuits are

armed to fire warning.
Eight two-position pull-push fire shutoff switches

(3, figure 1-33) on the upper portion of the pilots instrument panel control engine fire shutdown. Each
of the T-shaped switches has a red press-to-test
engine fire warning light in the end of the handle.
Pulling a switch to FIRE SHUTOFF position closes
the engine firewall fuel shutoff valve for the corresponding engine regardless of throttle position. In
addition, when No. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7 switch is
pulled, the respective engine firewall hydraulic
shutoff valve is closed and, on engine 1, 3, 5, or 7,
the respective generator control relay is tripped,
deenergizing the generator. The generator circuit
breaker will open and, if the respective generator
bus tie circuit breaker is open, that bus tie circuit
breaker will be closed. Pushing a fire shutoff switch
in to the NORMAL position restores the engine firewall fuel shutoff valve to normal control by the
throttle. See THROTTLES under ENGINE FUEL
CONTROL SYSTEM, this section. Pushing in the
switch for engine No. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7 opens the engine firewall hydraulic shutoff valve but does not
restore generators on No. 1, 3, 5, or 7 to normal operation. It is necessary to restart the generator as
given in this section under GENERATOR OPERATION. The firewall fuel shutoff valves utilize essential dc power for operation. The outboard engines
use left essential dc power from the left essential
start bus and the inboard engines use right essential dc power from the right essential start bus.
When no other power is on the aircraft and one of
the batteries goes dead, the remaining battery automatically switches to supply power to all the fuel
shutoff valves. The engine firewall hydraulic shutoff valves use essential dc power for operation.
1-37
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Left wing engines use left essential dc power and
right wing engines use right essential dc power.
The generator control power is the same as for normal control; generators on engines 1 and 7 use left
essential dc power and generators on engines 3 and
5 use right essential dc power.
HAND FIRE EXTINGUISHERS
Two type HALON 1211 bromochlorodifloromethane

(BCF) fire extinguishers (14, figure 1-17) are installed in the crew compartment. One extinguisher
is located below the instrument console between the
EW officer and gunner; the other extinguisher is located on the left equipment rack immediately behind the radar navigator.
A trigger-type handle located on top of the extinguisher permits the extinguisher to be operated
with one hand. When serviced, the extinguishers
are effective within a 7 to 8 foot range in combating
all types of fires. The closer the extinguisher is to
the source of the fire, especially deep seated fires
(i.e. seat cushions, bags of clothing, large amounts
of plastic/rubber compounds) the greater its effectiveness. The supply of extinguishing agent will
last approximately 12-15 seconds of continuous use.
The pressure gage should be in the green zone, 125
(50) psi. The agent is colorless, faintly sweet smelling, leaves no residue, and is intended for use on
board all aircraft where clean, noncorrosive agents
are needed to prevent contamination. HALON 1211
has a low level of toxicity.
Procedures for the use and safety precautions are
indicated on the fire extinguishers. The Halon
bottles are 8 lbs in weight, when fully charged the
extinguisher holds 5 lbs of agent in liquid form because of pressurization. The agent turns to a gaseous state when exposed to air, which in turn displaces the oxygen where the gas is present. The fire
extinguishing agent is 3 to 4 times more effective
and less toxic than chlorobromomethane (CB) type
fire extinguisher agents; however the decomposed
by-products of the fire are no less toxic and should
be avoided when possible.
1-38
Although HALON 1211 has a low level of

toxicity, its decomposition products can be
hazardous. On decomposition, HALON 1211
has a characteristic sharp, acrid odor, even
in small concentrations.
Normal precautions should be taken to include the use of 100% OXYGEN immediately, with the emergency toggle lever on
the oxygen panel to the NORMAL position.
The portable oxygen bottle will be set at
30M or higher commensurate with aircraft
altitude when used.
NOTE
In the event the HALON 1211 extinguisher

starts to leak, 100% oxygen is recommended
until after the extinguisher is rendered
safe. Inverting the extinguisher and depressing the trigger will only expend the
extinguishing agent and deplete the bottle
of its contents. If the extinguisher leaks, it
is most likely due to overpressurization and
should stop leaking after normal pressure is
reached. Should the bottle be depleted due
to a leakage problem the extinguisher
should be replaced in its bracket and reported for replacement in the AFTO Form
781.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Emergency Equipment
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
COPILOTS ESCAPE HATCH

PILOTS ESCAPE HATCH
EW OFFICERS ESCAPE HATCH
GUNNERS ESCAPE HATCH
RADAR NAVIGATORS ESCAPE HATCH
NAVIGATORS ESCAPE HATCH
LIFERAFT DEFLATION TOOL (2 PLACES)
ESCAPE ROPES (4 PLACES)
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
FIREFIGHTING GLOVE CONTAINER (2 PLACES)

EMERGENCY ALARM LIGHT (3 PLACES)
FIRST AID KITS (3 KITS, 2 PLACES)
EMERGENCY KNIFE (PROVISIONS FOR)
HAND AXE
HALON 1211 FIRE EXTINGUISHER (2 PLACES)
PARACHUTE STATIC LINE CONTAINER (ON RH
RAIL)
Figure 1-17
1-39
T.O. 1B-52H-1
FIREFIGHTING GLOVE CONTAINERS
CENTRAL CAUTION SYSTEM
Two containers (9, figure 1-17) with asbestos gloves

for firefighting are installed in the crew compartment. One container is located on the copilots ejection seat fixed rail cross tube on the aft side of the
seat. The other container is located on the aft side
of the navigators seat.
The central caution system (figure 1-18) provides a

centrally located means for monitoring all caution
and warning indicators in the pilots compartment
except the engine low oil pressure warning lights.
The system is so designed that both pilots are
warned simultaneously and consists of two master
caution lights, a central caution lights panel having
word warning lights, and a series of controllers that
monitor various systems and control the various
lights. The systems monitored through the master
caution controllers with the exception of the flap
warning horn (which is a ground function only)
have caution lights on the central caution lights
panel and are as follows:
Autopilot Disengaged
Main Tank Low
Tip Protection Gear Position Warning
Bomb Doors Not Latched
Hatches Not Locked Warning
Engine Oil Overheat
SAS Pitch Axis
SAS Yaw Axis
Generator Drive Overheat (4 generator drives)
Hydraulic Low Pressure (8 airplane system
pumps and a rotary launcher pump)
Battery Not Charging (2 TR units)
AC Circuit Breaker Open (8 circuit breakers)
Bleed air overheat
AXE
A hand axe (13, figure 1-17) is provided for emergency escape by the crew and is stowed on the front
of the defense instructors seat. A chopout area is
marked with yellow-orange paint on the sidewall
outboard of the EW officers seat.
FIRST AID KITS
Three first aid kits (11, figure 1-17) are installed in

the aircraft, two are located on the sidewall outboard of the EW officers seat and one on the upper
right front corner of the right hand equipment rack
near the navigators seat.
PARACHUTE STATIC LINE
A parachute static line is stowed in a pouch installed on the aft side of the radar navigators (15,
figure 1-17) ejection seat rails. The line is used to
facilitate bailout of an injured crewmember through
the navigators hatch. At high altitudes (above
14,000 feet), the line should be connected to the automatic parachute arming lanyard. At lower altitudes, the line should be connected directly to the
ripcord T-handle of the parachute.
ESCAPE ROPES
An escape rope (8, figure 1-17) is located at each of

the upper deck escape hatches. Each rope is
approximately 22 feet long, 3/4 inches in diameter,
with approximately six inches of the free end
painted yellow. The ropes are provided to help personnel from the aircraft in any normal or crash attitude. The ropes are designed to be of sufficient
length to reach the ground when thrown through
escape hatches. The ropes at the pilots stations are
contained in canvas bags having zipper openings
and are installed below the outboard side of the escape hatch aft of the side windows. The ropes at the
EW officers and gunners stations are contained
within flaps of the lining which are snap-fastened
and are marked ESCAPE ROPE. The ropes are located on the sidewalls just below the hatches.
1-40
Change 12
A signal from any of these systems will cause both

the master caution lights and central caution panel
lights to illuminate. If the condition that caused the
signal is corrected, the master caution and central
caution lights will go out and the master caution
controllers will again monitor all of the systems. If
the condition that caused the signal is not corrected, the master caution and central caution
lights will continue to illuminate until the lights
are reset. The master caution lights are reset by
pressing the face of the lights; the master caution
controllers will then continue to monitor the remaining systems. The last four systems are also
monitored through four central caution controllers
which control four malfunction lights on the central
caution panel. A signal from one of the system circuits will cause the respective central caution lights
and the two master caution lights to illuminate. If
the reset switch adjacent to the central caution
panel is pushed, all the lights will go out and the
signal will be locked out until the cause for the signal is corrected. Both the master caution and central caution controllers will continue to monitor the
remaining circuits for that system. If the master
caution light only were reset, the light would continue to burn in the central caution panel. Reset-
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ting the controllers and resetting the lights in either the master caution or central caution panel
will not affect the indicators located on the individual control panels for these systems. One system,
the wing tank level warning system, is monitored
by a central caution controller which controls a
light on the central caution panel, but does not
cause the master caution lights to illuminate. A signal from either one of the wing tank level warning
lights will cause only the wing tanks caution light
to illuminate. Pushing the reset switch will cause
the wing tanks caution light to go out and the signal will be locked out until the cause for the signal
is corrected. The wing tanks caution light will continue to monitor the other wing tank level light.
There are 13 systems which have indicator lights
on the central caution panel that are not monitored
through any controller. Consequently, they cannot
be reset by either master caution or central caution.
A signal to one of these lights will cause the light to
illuminate until the cause for the signal is corrected. These systems are as follows:
Bomb Release
Bomb Doors Open
Aft Battery End of Life
Forward Battery End of Life
Fuel in Cabin Manifold
Fuel in Main Manifold
Starter Not Off (switch in START)
Stores Jettison
Time to Go = 0
IFF Mode 4
[EV] Fuel Enrichment Valve Open
MASTER CAUTION LIGHTS
Two rectangular amber indicator lights (18, figure

1-7) with an integral push-to-reset switch are
installed on the pilots instrument panel directly in
front of each pilot. The lights have a word warning panel which, when illuminated, shows black
letters MASTER CAUTION, PUSH TO RESET on
an amber background. The master caution lights
serve to warn that one of the systems which they
monitor (figure 1-18) has a malfunction. The master caution lights illuminate at the same time as
the indication in the malfunctioning system occurs
and remain on as long as the malfunction continues
unless it is reset. The master caution lights can be
reset by pressing the face of the lights, at which
time, they will go out and be ready for additional
indication of malfunction in the remaining monitored systems. The master caution lights will not
indicate malfunction on the reset channel until the
malfunction has been remedied. For further information on origination and cause of malfunction signal to these lights, refer to the respective system
descriptions. The master caution light bulbs may be
checked by pressing on the face of the lights.
Central Caution Panel
The central caution panel (figure 1-18) located in

the center of the pilots instrument panel provides a
visual indication to the pilots of a malfunction or a
certain condition in a particular system. The panel
contains 30 caution lights with each light being covered by lens denoting systems nomenclature. All
caution panel lights may be tested by pressing the
central caution test switch located to the left of the
central caution panel. The top four lights on the
panel are red, the four bottom lights are green, and
the remaining lights are amber in color. The red
lights have black lettering on a red translucent
background. The amber and green lights have
translucent colored lettering on a black background. The lights are designed to show no lettering when not illuminated. For further information
on the origination and cause of malfunction signal
to these lights, see the respective systems discussions.
Central Caution Panel Reset Switch
A central caution panel reset switch (41, figure 1-7)

adjacent to the central caution panel provides a
means of resetting the resettable lights on the central caution panel. The reset switch is a pushbutton
type and is spring-loaded to the release position.
Depressing the reset switch will send dc power to
the controllers, causing all resettable lights on the
caution panel and the master caution lights to go
out. The pilots should note the malfunctioning
lights since resetting the central caution panel will
cause all resettable lights to go out.
Central Caution Panel Test Switch
A central caution panel test switch below the central caution panel reset switch provides a means of
testing the central caution panel lights. The switch
is a pushbutton type and spring-loaded to the release position. Depressing the test switch causes all
lights on the central caution panel to illuminate except the battery end of life lights. The battery end
of life lights will illuminate provided the interphone
power switch is placed in ON position, supplying a
ground for the lights. Pressing the test switch also
causes the marker beacon indicator lights to illuminate.
Change 20
1-41
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Central Caution System

MASTER
CAUTION
PUSH TO RESET
MASTER
CAUTION
PUSH TO RESET
MASTER CAUTION
LIGHT CONTROLLER
MASTER CAUTION
LIGHT CONTROLLER
WING FLAP WARNING
TO RESET
CAUTION
CONTROLLERS
CENTRAL
CAUTION
LEGEND
LIGHT
RESET
TEST
NONFUNCTIONAL
SPARE
TEST ALL
LIGHTS
SAS YAW AXIS
AUTOPILOT SYSTEM
MAIN TANK QUANTITY
SYSTEM
TIP GEAR WARNING
BOMB DOOR SYSTEM
HATCH POSITION WARNING
STARTER SWITCHES
CABIN MANIFOLD
SCAVENGE SYSTEM
MAIN MANIFOLD
SCAVENGE SYSTEM
ENGING OIL TEMPERATURE
SELECTOR SWITCH
SPARE
SPARE
YAW SAS OFF
PITCH SAS OFF
AUTO PILOT
DISENGAGED
GENERATOR
OVERHEATRESET
MAIN TANK LOW

TPG NOT
IN TRAIL
BOMB DOORS
NOT LATCHED
HATCHES NOT
LOCKED
STARTER
NOT OFF
FUEL IN
CABIN MANIFOLD
FUEL IN
MAIN MANIFOLD
ENGINE OIL
OVERHEAT
SPARE
MISSILE AND SPECIAL

WEAPONS JETTISON SYSTEMS
STORES
JETTISON
TIME TO GO = 0
OAS
SPARE
WING TANKS
RESET
HYDRAULICS
RESET
BATTERY
RESET
HOT AIR
AC CIRCUIT
BKR OPENRESET
FWD BATTERY
END OF LIFE
AFT BATTERY
END OF LIFE
IFF
MODE 4
FEV
OPEN
BOMB
RELEASED
BOMB DOORS
OPEN
SAS PITCH AXIS
DRIVE OVERHEAT
GENERATOR DRIVE
CAUTION CONTROLLER DETECTOR (4 TOTAL)
WING TANK QUANTITY
SYSTEMS (2 TOTAL)
HYDRAULIC LOW
HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS
PRESSURE (8 PUMPS 7
ROTARY LAUNCHER
CAUTION CONTROLLER
PUMP)
BATTERY
BATTERY NOT CHARG
ING RELAYS (2 TOTAL)
CAUTION CONTROLLER
WING TANKS
CAUTION CONTROLLER
BLEED AIR OVERHEAT WARNING LIGHT

AC CIRCUIT BKR
AC CIRCUIT BREAKERS
(8 TOTAL)
CAUTION CONTROLLER
FORWARD BATTERY DETECTOR
AFT BATTERY DETECTOR
IFF TRANSPONDER
FUEL ENRICHMENT VALVE
BOMB RELEASE SYSTEM
[EV]
BOMB DOOR SYSTEM
RED LIGHTS
YELLOW LIGHTS
GREEN LIGHTS
B62843
Figure 1-18
1-42
Change 20
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EMERGENCY ALARM SYSTEM
NOTE
The interphone is considered the primary

means for crew warning; the emergency
alarm system is designed to warn personnel
while off interphone.
Red emergency alarm lights are located on the upper part of the forward instrument console at the
navigators station, on the upper part of the instrument console at the defense station, and on the upper part of the right electronic rack in the upper
deck walkway in the pressurized crew compartment. In addition, red alarm lights are located in
the forward part of the bomb bay, aft wheel well,
and aft equipment compartment. An emergency
alarm monitor light (figure 1-6) for the pilots is provided on the right side of the aisle stand. This light
will not press-to-test. The lights are controlled by a
guarded ALERT- -OFF- -ABANDON emergency
alarm switch (figure 1-6) on the right side of the
aisle stand. When the switch is in ALERT position,
a flasher mechanism flashes all alarm lights at a
frequency of approximately 30 to 60 times a minute. In ABANDON position, the lights glow continuously. The lights also glow continuously when either the pilots or copilots control column is stowed
during the ejection sequence. The light circuits in
the pressurized compartment are separate from
those in the unpressurized part of the aircraft. All
lights normally use power from the aft battery bus
and therefore operate regardless of battery switch
position. All lights use forward battery power when
the emergency battery switch is in EMERGENCY.
See EMERGENCY SIGNALS, in the pilots PREPARATION FOR FLIGHT checklist, Section II, for information concerning use of the lights.
ESCAPE HATCHES
lifters which are projected into the windstream as

the hatch is unlocked during the automatic ejection
sequence. The aerodynamic hatch lifters ensure
hatch jettisoning during automatic ejection sequence regardless of crewmember order of ejection.
NOTE
At airspeeds in excess of 300 knots IAS, the

aft upper escape hatch lifter(s) may extend
approximately 2 inches. This condition is
considered normal and does not constitute
a hazard to crewmembers. It does not affect
the functional reliability of the escape system.
EVS monitor optical light filters stowage provisions
are installed on the pilots and copilots escape
hatches. The navigators and radar navigators escape hatches have EVS sensor turret fairings attached to the lower side.
Footrests with mike switches are installed on the
inside of the lower deck hatches. The hatches are
part of the various seat ejection systems and will be
opened automatically by a gas-powered thruster
when the appropriate seat ejection mechanism is
actuated.
Removing a hatch without first disconnecting the arming link will fire the catapult
safety pin pull initiator and leave the ejection seat catapult in an armed condition.
The hatches may be released manually for use in
emergency exit or entrance. Hatch release handles,
painted yellow-orange, are provided on the inside of
all upper hatches and, when pulled away from the
hatch, will unlatch and open the respective hatch.
Crew Compartment Hatches
The escape hatches (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, figure 1-17)

in the aircraft are located at each crew station
equipped with ejection seats. The hatches (figure
1-19) are designed to facilitate pressurization of the
crew compartment, yet be jettisonable to allow the
ejection seat to be catapulted through the hatch
opening for emergency escape. The hatches are of
metal construction and have conventional lining;
only the pilots hatches have windows which provide side vision when the aircraft is in a banked attitude and provide better vision during air refueling. The aft upward escape hatches (3 and 4, figure
1-17) and the downward escape hatches (5 and 6,
figure 1-17) are equipped with aerodynamic hatch
Ground emergency egress handles have been installed at the EW officers and gunners stations.
Activation of the handle unlocks the escape hatch
above the respective crew positions without the
crew member rotating the arming lever thus exposing the catapult firing trigger to inadvertent activation (see figure 1-22).
NOTE
Use of the ground emergency egress handle

unlocks the escape hatch. It does not cause
the hatch to fall away from the aircraft at
speeds less than 90 knots.
Change 16
1-43
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Activation of the ground emergency egress system
to unlock the escape hatch is accomplished by removing safety pin No. 6, and pulling and rotating
the ground emergency egress handle clockwise (cw)
for the handle at the EW officers station and
counterclockwise (ccw) for the handle at the gunners station. Rotation of the handle will fire an initiator in the ground emergency egress handle assembly.
Gas expansion fires the hatch jettisoning initiator
(33, figure 1-24) and the hatch jettisoning thruster
(10, figure 1-24), thus unlocking the escape hatch.
The assembly is illuminated by red background/
edge lights that operate on essential dc power.
The battery will be depleted if the

GROUND EGRESS circuit breakers remain
IN for an extended period without aircraft
or external power.
The hatch release handles at the radar navigators
and navigators stations may be painted with yellow and black stripes or a solid gray color. The inside handles for the upper deck hatches are inside a
transparent flap of the lining. Flush-mounted external hatch release handles are provided for the
forward upper hatches. Release handles for the aft
upper hatches are flush-mounted to the side of the
lifters. These handles may be used for emergency
entrance by pulling away from the hatch (figure
3-1). Each hatch is provided with six rotary latch
hooks which engage latch arms on the fuselage.
When the latch hooks are in the latched position, a
pair of latch pins is driven into the throat of each
latch hook by rotation of torque tubes within the
hatch. The latch pins overlap the lip of the latch
hook approximately 1/8 inch when properly latched.
A spring-loaded lockpin retains the torque tube in
the latched position. A lockpin inspection window is
provided in each hatch to allow checking of the
lockpin. When in proper position, a paint stripe
shows on the lockpin adjacent to its spring cartridge. At all stations, actuation of any of the hatch
1-44
Change 12
release handles or the gas-powered thruster mechanism will perform the same function to unlock the
hatch; the lockpin will be disengaged from the
torque tube, the torque tube rotates to withdraw
the latch pin from the latch hooks, and the latch
hooks rotate as the hatch is forced away from the
fuselage. In addition, during actuation of the gaspowered thruster mechanism on those hatches provided with hatch lifters, pushrods on the torque
tubes force the hatch lifter into the windstream to
ensure positive jettisoning of the hatch.
Aft Equipment Compartment Hatch
The aft equipment compartment hatch (22, sheet 2

of figure 1-1) serves as an escape hatch for bailout.
The hatch door is hinged at the forward end and
serves as an access door for the aft equipment
compartment. A flush-mounted handle on the outside of the door is used for normal opening and closing of the door during ground operations. A hatch
jettison handle (figure 1-19) painted orange-yellow,
is installed near the aft right side of the hatch and,
when pulled upward, pulls the hinge pins and
forces the forward end of the hatch into the
airstream causing the hatch to jettison. A safety
lockpin is provided to securely retain the handle in
the stowed position.
Hatches Not Closed and Locked Light
An amber light on the central caution panel (figure

1-18) warns when any of the six escape hatches or
the main entrance door in the crew compartment or
the aft equipment compartment hatch is not closed
and locked. The light has a word warning panel
which, when illuminated, shows amber letters
HATCHES NOT CLOSED AND LOCKED on a
black background. When the light illuminates, a
signal is also sent to the master caution light controller causing the master caution light to illuminate. See CENTRAL CAUTION SYSTEM, or MASTER CAUTION LIGHT, as applicable, this section,
for additional information. The energizing circuit
for the flight loads data recorder uses the hatch
warning light circuit so that when the hatches not
closed and locked light is out (hatches all closed)
the recorder operates.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Escape Hatches
LATCH HOOK TYPICAL SIX PLACES
HATCH RELEASE HANDLE
HATCH LOCKPIN
INSPECTION WINDOW
THERMAL CURTAIN
EVS MONITOR
OPTICAL LIGHT
FILTER STORAGE
STRAPS
INBD
FWD
PILOTS HATCH
(Copilots Opposite)
SUNSHADE
IN
BD
LATCH HOOK TYPICAL SIX PLACES
FWD
HATCH LOCKPIN
INSPECTION
WINDOW
HATCH RELEASE HANDLE
EW OFFICERS HATCH
(Gunners Opposite)
A31636
1-45
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Escape Hatches (Cont)
HATCH JETTISON HANDLE
SAFETY LOCKPIN
WALKWAY
HATCH
FOOTREST
INTERPHONE
FOOT SWITCH
RADAR NAVIGATORS HATCH

(Navigators Opposite)
HATCH LOCKPIN
INSPECTION WINDOW
HATCH RELEASE
HANDLE
LATCH HOOK
TYPICAL SIX PLACES
LATCH PIN
TB
U
O
FW
LATCH HOOK
(LONG LIP)
D
LOCK ARM
LOCKPIN
LATCH PIN
PAINT
STRIPE
MINIMUM OVERLAP
1/8" BETWEEN
HOOK AND PIN
LATCH HOOK DETAIL

Typical All Hooks Shown Locked
LATCH ARM
LOCKPIN
SIGHTING
SHIELD
LOCKPIN DETAIL
Typical All Crew Compartment Hatches Shown Locked
A31637
1-46
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CRASH LANDING DITCHING STATIONS
All crew seats on the upper deck of the crew

compartment have been stressed for use as ditching
and crash landing stations. In addition, three crash
landing and ditching hammocks (figure 1-20) are
provided for use of lower deck crewmembers when
necessary. This gives provisions for nine
crewmembers. The three crash landing ditching
hammocks are normally stowed when not in use,
but may be installed in the upper deck walkway between the pilots station and the defense station for
crash landing or ditching. The forward and center
hammocks remain fastened at their upper ends at
all times and are stowed within the compartment
lining above the installation location. The forward
hammock is stowed within a flap of the lining,
marked FWD DITCHING STATION HAMMOCK
STOWAGE, snap-fastened on the aft edge of the
flap. The center hammock is stowed within a flap of
the lining adjacent to the air refueling receptacle
marked DITCHING STATION HAMMOCK STOWAGE, snap-fastened on the inboard edge of the flap.
The aft hammock is stowed separately in a box
marked DITCHING HAMMOCK STOWAGE next
to the defense instructors seat and will be fastened
at both upper and lower ends when installing. For
installation, the upper end of the aft hammock will
be hooked to a shackle mounted over the upper
deck access hatch marked DITCHING HAMMOCK
ATTACHMENT & HOIST FITTING. All three hammocks are of nylon webbing construction, having a
single attachment point at the top and two attachment points at the bottom. The fittings on the bottom of the hammock are studs which snap into
flush receptacles on the walkway floor. The hammocks are designed to withstand ultimate load factors of 8 gs forward and down and 4 gs up and aft
when properly installed.
NOTE
Care should be taken when inserting the

studs in the receptacles that the correct
installation is being made since once the fittings are inserted, it is necessary to use a
screwdriver in the screw aft of the fitting in
order to release the fitting.
The upper deck access hatch grating should
be closed to allow easy access to the receptacles for the aft hammock.
The hammocks are designed for the occupant to sit

on the aft side and are provided with a manual
safety belt to secure the occupant in position. To facilitate correct installation of the hammock, each is
marked AFT on the aft side and FWD on the forward side. In addition, the lower attachment fitting
on the hammock and the receptacle in which it fits
on the left side of the aircraft are both painted yellow-orange to aid in correct matching.
The crew bunk is not stressed for high g

loads and should not be occupied during
crash landing or ditching.
1-47
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Crash Landing Ditching Hammocks
1
2
3
4
5
FORWARD HAMMOCK STOWAGE

CRASH LANDING DITCHING HAMMOCKS
CENTER HAMMOCK STOWAGE
AFT HAMMOCK SUPPORT SHACKLE
AFT HAMMOCK STOWAGE BOX
6
7
8
9
10
Figure 1-20
1-48
SAFETY BELT (TYPICAL)

ATTACHMENT RECEPTACLE
RELEASE SCREW
HAMMOCK ATTACHMENT STUD
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Emergency Equipment Circuit

Protection and Location
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
EQUIPMENT
Master Caution Lights and
Controllers
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
MISCELLANEOUS
MA CAUTION LIGHT
CPCBP/E12
Rt. ESS
Caution Lights for AC Generator

Circuit Breakers, Generators,
Batteries, and Associated
Controllers
CENTRAL CAUTION PANEL ESS DC
CPCBP/E9
Rt. ESS
Caution Lights for Wing Tanks,

Hydraulics and Associated
Controllers
CENTRAL CAUTION PANEL TR DC
CPCBP/E11
Rt. TR
EMER ALARM SYS

BAILOUT WARN CONTR
PCBP/E24
Aft Batt (Fwd Batt

when emergency
battery switch is set
to EMERGENCY)
ENGINE
FIRE DET INBD ENG
FIRE DET OUTBD ENG
RLC/C13
LLC/D22
Rt. ESS
Left ESS
CPCBP/D1
CPCBP/D2
CPCBP/D3
CPCBP/D4
CPCBP/D5
CPCBP/D6
CPCBP/D7
CPCBP/D8
Left ESS Start Bus

Left ESS Start Bus
Rt. ESS Start Bus
Rt. ESS Start Bus
Rt. ESS Start Bus
Rt. ESS Start Bus
Left ESS Start Bus
Left ESS Start Bus
CPCBP/B7
CPCBP/B8
CPCBP/B9
CPCBP/B10
CPCBP/B11
CPCBP/B12
Left ESS
Left ESS
Left ESS
Rt. ESS
Rt. ESS
Rt. ESS
Emergency Alarm System
Engine Fire Detectors and Fire

Warning Lights
Engine Fire Shutoff Switches
and Firewall Shutoff Valves
Fuel Firewall Shutoff Valves
FIREWALL FUEL SHUTOFF VALVES

ENGINE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Hydraulic Firewall Shutoff

Valves
FIREWALL HYDRAULIC SHUTOFF

VALVES
ENGINE
1
3
4
5
6
7
1-49
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Emergency Equipment Circuit Protection

and Location (Cont)
EQUIPMENT
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
Ground Emergency Egress Handle Assembly Lights

EWO Position
DC GROUND EGRESS
RLC/E32
Rt. ESS
Gunner Position
LEFT ESSENTIAL DC POWER

GROUND EGRESS
LLC/E7
Left ESS
MISCELLANEOUS HATCH WARN
PCBP/E16
Left TR
Hatches Not Closed and Locked

Light
11
LLC
PCBP

RLC
1-50
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ESCAPE SYSTEMS
DESCRIPTION
UPW ARD EJECTION SEATS
DOWNW ARD EJECTION SEATS
INTEGRA TED HARNESS SYSTEM
AUTOMA TIC PARACHUTE
GLOBAL SURVIV AL KITS
LIFERAFT DEFLATION TOOL
SAFETY BELT
1-51
1-52
1-64
1-74
1-74
1-78
1-79
1-80
DESCRIPTION
The aircraft escape systems utilize ejection seats.
Use of these systems will greatly increase the
crewmembers chances of safe escape from the aircraft in time of emergency. Every crewmember who
might possibly be in a position to use an automatic
escape system should be familiar with the system
and have confidence in it. Although operation is
simple, if you do not know the system well enough
to operate it quickly and correctly or if distrust of
the automatic features causes you to manually
override them, you may lessen your chances in an
already dangerous situation. For step-by-step procedures and minimum altitudes for operating the
escape systems, see BAILOUT, Section III. A detailed description of the automatic opening parachute, which should be considered a part of each escape system, can be found under INTEGRATED
HARNESS in this section for both upward ejection
seats and downward ejection seats.
Ejection seat systems, with their automatic features, increase the airspeed and the high and low
extremes of altitude at which safe bailout can be accomplished. Automatic operation of a system includes stowing the control column, jettisoning the
hatch, ejecting the seat, deployment of a drogue
parachute, releasing the occupant from the seat,
and activating the automatic parachute opening device. The downward ejection seat systems and the
EW and gunner seats also provide automatic controlled man-seat separation. Release from the seat
and opening the parachute can be accomplished
manually by overriding the automatic system. However, fully automatic operation can greatly reduce
the time required for seat separation and chute deployment at low altitudes and make safe descent
from high altitudes possible even if loss of consciousness occurs.
The ejection seats are qualified for nude body
weights from 132 to 201 pounds (5th to 95th per-
centile male population -1950 Database). Certain

hazards are associated with ejections at or near the
extremes of the qualified weight range. These hazards are:
LIGHTWEIGHT
Increased injury risk as ejection speed increases.

Seat is less stable with lightweight crewmember.
Increased risk of spinal compression injury.
HEAVYWEIGHT
Increased injury risk at low altitude/adverse attitude conditions.

Increased injury risk at high speeds due to possible seat structural failure.
Increased injury risk from parachute landing fall.
For aircrew members with body weights below 132 pounds, ejection attempts above
340 KIAS can result in an increased injury
risk due to limb flail and drogue chute
opening shock. Also, spinal compression injury risk increases for all ejections with aircrew members weighing below 132 pounds.
These risks increase as body weight decreases below 132 pounds.
For aircrew members with body weights
above 201 pounds, ejection in excess of 400
KIAS increases the risk of injury from limb
flail and seat structural failure. Additionally, parachute landing fall injuries increase
for all ejections with aircrew members
weighing above 201 pounds. These risks increase as body weight increases above 201
pounds.
Change 13
1-51
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Figures 1-22, 1-23, and 1-25 show the configuration
of the seats and the component parts with which
the crewmember should be familiar in order to
properly check his seat. Figure 1-24 shows a schematic of the upward ejection seat system along with
a sequence of events relative to the ejection operation. Color coding makes it possible to correlate the
actuation of controls and mechanisms with the sequence of events. Figure 1-26 gives the same information for the downward seats. One sheet of each
illustration contains a detailed sequence of events
and is numbered; the numbers correspond to the
callouts on other sheets of the illustration.
Escape systems circuit protection and the location
of the applicable circuit breakers is contained in figure 1-29.
UPWARD EJECTION SEATS
NOTE
For description of downward ejection seats,

see DOWNWARD EJECTION SEATS, this
section.
The pilots positions in the crew compartment are
equipped with forward-facing bucket-type ejection
seats designed to provide a safe and effective means
of bailout from the aircraft. Provisions are made to
accommodate a survival kit and back-type automatic opening parachute and integrated harness.
Do not use any form of shock absorbing device other than the survival kit and/or seat
cushion designated as standard equipment
for the ejection seat. To do so would create
a definite possibility of serious injury during ejection and/or crash landing/ditching.
Utilizing the wrong seat cushions and/or survival
kit or too much cushioning material creates a definite injury hazard and may position the seat occupant where it is difficult to reach the controls.
Chance of vertebral injury is increased considerably
by the seat occupant sitting on too thick a compressible mass. When utilizing the ejection seat in
these circumstances, it will not exert a direct force
on the occupant until the seat has traveled 2 or 3
inches upward. After this amount of travel, the seat
has gathered such momentum that excessive impact is produced when the seat initially lifts the
seat occupant. Additional cushioning may also raise
the seat occupant to such a height that his arms
will not be held by the arm retainers on either armrest, thus exposing them to possible injury from
flailing in the windblast following ejection.
1-52
Change 13
Each seat is equipped with folding armrests which

may be folded by releasing the armrest catch (11,
figure 1-22). Arming levers, one in each armrest,
are used to prepare the seat for ejection. A series of
ballistic devices and mechanical linkages incorporated in the seat when initiated by either arming
lever will lock the inertia reel, stow the control column, jettison the hatch, unlatch the pilot and copilot seat drogue parachute arms, and arm the seat
for ejection. The alarm system is energized to signal
abandon when either the pilots or copilots control
column stows. A catapult is incorporated to eject
the seat from the aircraft and is fired by squeezing
either of the firing triggers located inside of each
arming lever. The seat is equipped with a drogue
parachute and deployment mechanism to positively
separate the seat from the seat occupant after the
seat leaves the rails. On the pilots and copilots
seat, the parachute is located in a container
mounted above the seat on spring-loaded swinging
arms. As the seat leaves the rails, the arms and
container swing aft of the seat and deploy the
drogue parachute, thus separating the seat from
the occupant. On the EW and gunners seat the
drogue parachute is attached to the bottom of the
seat and is deployed by a lanyard attached to the
intermediate rail which allows drogue parachute
deployment. The action is fully automatic and requires no action on the part of the crewmember.
Each seat can be positioned electrically up and
down, fore and aft, and tilted by seat positioning
switches. Electrical, oxygen, and ballistic lines are
equipped with disconnects to permit separation of
the lines when the seat is ejected. Each seat is
equipped with a headrest and an inertia reel which
assist the occupant in maintaining position during
ejection. An integrated harness release mechanism
provides a means for separating the safety belt and
parachute harness from the seat automatically after ejection. Manual operation of the integrated
harness release will disengage the safety belt and
parachute and, in addition, will disengage the parachute arming lanyard. A modified parachute and a
specially designed manual safety belt is installed in
the harness release fittings. See INTEGRATED
HARNESS, this section, for additional information.
For a detailed discussion of seat ejection sequences,
see figure 1-24.
The EW officer and gunner are provided with upward ejection seats. The seats are located at the aft
of the upper deck and face to the aft of the aircraft.
The seat controls are operated in the same manner
as the pilots and copilots seat controls. Sequence of
operation of the seat ejection system is the same as
the pilots with the exception of having no control
column stowage thruster and having a man-seat
separator.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Upward Ejection Seat

INBOARD
3
BLOWER
MOUNTING
BRACKET
ELECTRICAL
CONNECTOR
OXYGEN HOSE
RETAINER STRAP
DETAIL 1
14
SEE DETAIL 1
13
7
8
9
PILOT/COPILOT SEAT
1
5
2
6
INITIATOR
SAFETY PIN
12
11
A R M
I N I T I I N G
A T O R
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
10
ARMING INITIATOR (ACCOMMODATES

MAINTENANCE SAFETY PIN NO. 2)
INSPECTION DOOR AND WINDOW
DROGUE PARACHUTE CONTAINER ASSEMBLY
HEADREST
ARMRESTS
FLIGHT SAFETY PINS NO. 1 (ARMING LEVERS)
CATAPULT FIRING TRIGGER
ARMING LEVER RELEASE
ARMING LEVER
SEAT POSITIONING SWITCHES
ARMREST CATCH
A31640
SURVIVAL KIT RELEASE HANDLE
POUCH FOR NO. 1 FLIGHT SAFETY PINS
(INBOARD SIDE OF SEAT BUCKET)
AERP BLOWER MOUNTING BRACKET AND
ELECTRICAL CONNECTOR (INBOARD EJECTION
SEAT RAIL OF PILOTS SEAT ONLY)
Change 12
1-53
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Upward Ejection Seat (Cont)

3
15
PILOT/COPILOT SEAT
17
(TYPICAL)
16
20
15
16
17
18
19
20
PARACHUTE
INTEGRATED HARNESS RELEASE HANDLE
SURVIVAL KIT
CATAPULT INITIATOR SAFETY PIN
MANUAL INITIATOR CATAPULT SAFETY PIN-PULL LEVER
CATAPULT INITIATOR SAFETY PIN-PULL
CYLINDER
19
1-54
Change 12
18
A31641
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NOTE:
Both No. 1 Flight

Safety Pins not shown.
23
5
6
8
9
7
21
10
INITIATOR
SAFETY PIN
22
EW OFFICER/GUNNER SEAT
A R M
I N I T I I N G
A T O R
21
22
23
24
A31642
INERTIA REEL CONTROL HANDLE

DRAG PLATE
MAN-SEAT SEPARATOR STRAPS
INTEGRATED HARNESS RELEASE INITIATOR
(ACCOMMODATES MAINTENANCE SAFETY PIN
NO. 5)
Change 12
1-55
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NOTE:
Modified parachute and
survival kit not shown.
23
13
6
24
EW OFFICER/GUNNER SEAT
10
21
11
16 22
20
19
18
A31643
1-56
Change 12
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NOTE
Items not requiring description, or those described elsewhere are not included
in the following sheets.
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
Inspection door and window
Hinged door with a small round window, located on the inboard side of the
ejection seat immediately aft of the inboard armrest. Allows both visual
observation and installation/removal of the No. 2 (arming initiator) safety
pin.
Flight Safety Pins, No. 1

(Arming Levers)
Each upward ejection seat is provided with two flight safety pins, numbered 1, to be used by the flight crew member to prevent inadvertent initiation of the seat ejection sequence. The two pins (lockpins) are attached
to each end of a single red streamer and are inserted in the arming levers
through holes in the armrest structure. These two pins should be in place
in the arming levers during preflight and postflight on the ground and
whenever the crewmember leaves his seat in flight.
In addition, each upward ejection seat is provided with three safety pins
(numbered 2, 3, and 5) to be used for maintenance operations only. The
three pins are attached to a single red streamer and are stowed in the box
provided when the seat is on flight status.
Catapult Firing Trigger
The seat can be armed any time one of the two No. 1 safety
pins is removed. Rotation of the arming lever from which the
No. 1 pin has been removed arms the seat.
In the event either or both arming levers have been rotated,
the seat cannot be safetied until the arming levers have been
stowed. (The catapult safety pin-pull pin cannot be reinserted
into the catapult initiator in flight.) Lowering the armrests will
deactivate the firing triggers by adjusting a series of mechanical linkages. Installation of the safety pins with the arming
levers rotated to the up position will not prevent the seat from
firing if either trigger is squeezed. The seat can be considered completely safe only after the arming levers have been
stowed, No. 1 safety pins inserted, and the armrests lowered
(in this sequence). However, only qualified maintenance technicians should stow rotated arming levers unless combat or
emergency conditions require the crewmember to accomplish
this step, and an egress system technician is not available.
Attempting to stow the arming levers should be done only as
a last resort. Caution will be used to avoid inadvertent actuation of the catapult firing trigger. Actuation of the catapult firing trigger will result in an ejection of the seat.
A catapult firing trigger is installed in each arming lever and maintains a

25 lag as the arming lever is moved to the armed position. The firing
triggers are locked and cannot be actuated until the hatch is jettisoned.
When a trigger is pulled, the catapult is fired and the seat is ejected.
Change 12
1-56A
T.O. 1B-52H-1

CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
FUNCTION
Arming Lever Release
A mechanical latch incorporated in the arming lever. Squeezing the arming lever release unlocks the arming lever and enables it to be rotated
from the stowed position to the arming position.
Arming Lever
Levers installed in the armrests of each seat, used to prepare the seat for
ejection. The arming levers also provide a grip to help keep the occupants hands and arms in place during ejection. The arming levers are
stowed and latched beneath the armrests and will operate only when the
armrests are in the raised position. Each lever operates independently
and either lever can be used to arm the seat. The use of both levers is
recommended whenever possible since the levers provide a suitable
handgrip. When the arming lever release (8) is squeezed and the arming
lever is rotated from the stowed position toward the arming locked position, the arming initiator is fired and the inertia reel is locked. Firing the
arming initiator actuates the control column stowage thruster and the escape hatch thruster. The control column thruster stows the control column
and the hatch thruster unlocks the hatch and lifts the hatch lifter (aerodynamic flap) into the airstream which separates the hatch from the aircraft
and unlatches the pilot and copilot drogue parachute support arms. The
link connected to the hatch fires the catapult pin-pull initiator, thus arming
the seat. See figure 1-23 for arming lever sequence of operation.
To accomplish ejection, at least one armrest will be raised

from the stowed position and the arming lever on that armrest
will be rotated to the up position. Rotation of the arming lever
on a stowed armrest will not fire the arming initiator.
If the arming lever has been rotated on a stowed armrest,
raising the armrest will fire the arming initiator
Attempting to stow the arming levers should be done only as
a last resort. Caution will be used to avoid inadvertent actuation of the catapult firing trigger. Actuation of the catapult firing trigger will result in an ejection of the seat.
NOTE
If the arming levers have been rotated for any other reason than
ejection, lower the armrest by depressing the release tab on the
armrest support fitting. Lowering the armrests will deactivate the
ejection controls. If an armrest will not stow, the arming levers
may be stowed using a pointed instrument (such as a pencil).
To stow an arming lever, depress the forward lockpin (5, figure
1-23), visible through the inner armrest skin just below the arming lever pivot. Rotate the arming lever to the fully stowed position.
1-56B
Change 12
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
10
CONTROLINDICATOR
Seat Positioning Switches
FUNCTION
Three independently operated seat positioning switches are located on
the right front corner of the seat. The up and down switch is mounted vertically, the fore and aft switch is mounted horizontally, and the tilt switch is
mounted on a 45 slant. To obtain seat movement, the switch is pushed
in the direction movement is desired to electrically position the seat. The
electrical positioning actuators are 118 volt ac powered and contain limit
switches to stop motor operation at the extremes of travel.
Excessive operation of the positioning motors will shorten their

normal duty cycle. A full actuation in one direction should be followed by at least a 30-second rest. If another full actuation of that
positioning motor is required after the 30-second delay, a 5-minute rest must follow before another actuation of any degree.
Certain malfunctions of the seat actuators may cause the seat
to twist and misalign. Misalignment may cause the arming levers to contact other parts of the ejection seat, making it difficult
to raise or lower the armrests. In this condition, the armrests
should not be forcibly lowered, as this may cause the arming initiator to fire, thus jettisoning the hatch and arming the seat.
11
Armrest Catch
A small combination handle and mechanical catch, located at the base

of the telescoping portion of the armrest supports that serves both as a
latch and a release for the armrest. When the armrest is lifted up from its
lowered (stowed) position, the armrest catch engages and locks the armrest in the upright position. Depressing the armrest catch when the armrest is upright unlocks the armrest and allows the occupant to lower
(stow) the armrest. The armrest catches for the two side armrests work
independent of each other.
12
Survival Kit Release Handle
A handle located on the right side of the survival kit. It is operated by pulling up against the handle latch until the handle pulls free from the container. When the survival kit is in the seat, an arming plunger (12, figure 1-28)
located on the bottom of the kit is depressed. If the kit release handle is
pulled with the plunger depressed, the parachute strap adjuster will be
disconnected, thus severing the survival kit from the parachute harness.
The lid will not open and the dropline will remain attached to the kit. The
kit release handle may then be reset by replacing the handle in the socket,
reinstalling the parachute strap adjusters and while pushing firmly down,
the adjusters move the release handle to the locked position. Ensure the
survival kit is locked by pulling on the parachute strap adjusters.
13
Pouch for No. 1 Flight Safety Pins

(Inboard side of seat bucket)
NOTE
Do not allow the arming plunger to drop down before the release handle and parachute strap adjuster have been reset.
Do not use the survival kit release handle to lift or carry the
kit. To do so may cause the kit to open.
It is possible to install the survival kit in the ejection seat with
the arming plunger extended. Ensure that the plunger is fully
depressed into the seat before occupying an ejection seat.
A stowage pouch for the No. 1 flight safety pins. Located on the inboard
side of each upward ejection seat. The pouch on the opposite seat will be
utilized by each upward seat occupant for stowage of the No. 1 safety pins
from his seat. This permits stowage of the pins without unstrapping from
the seat.
Change 17
1-57
T.O. 1B-52H-1

NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
16
Integrated Harness Release Handle
FUNCTION
Located on the left side of each seat and painted yellow with black stripes.
This handle enables the seat occupant to manually detach the parachute
harness and the safety belt from the seat in lieu of automatic release. Pulling the release handle upward disengages the two safety belt fittings, the
parachute harness shoulder straps, and the parachute arming lanyard,
thus completely freeing the occupant from the seat. On the upward ejection seats, the release mechanism is reset by pushing the handle down.
Lock the inertia reel before actuating the integrated harness release handle to assure complete release of the integrated harness before leaving the seat.
NOTE
The integrated release handle should not be used to free the

occupant from the seat for normal inflight or postflight movement. If the release handle is pulled and the parachute and
survival kit are worn during such movement, the parachute
will have to be removed to reinstall the shoulder straps in the
inertia reel fitting without assistance.
The integrated harness release handle should be pulled directly upward since any fore, aft, or side loads can cause the
handle to bind resulting in excessive force required to pull the
handle.
19
Manual Initiator Catapult Safety Pin-Pull

Lever
A lever, provided to manually disengage the catapult pin-pull cylinder in

the event the catapult pin-pull initiator does not fire when the hatch is jettisoned from the aircraft. The pin is removed from the catapult initiator by
lifting the lever and manually withdrawing the catapult pin-pull cylinder.
The lever is held in the locked position when both arming levers are
stowed and can be pulled only after an arming lever is raised to the up
position.
21
Inertia Reel Control Handle
A handle, with LOCKED RELEASED positions, located on the left side

of each seat. A detent is provided for retaining the handle at either position of the quadrant. When the handle is in RELEASED position, the reel
harness strap will extend to allow the crewmember to lean forward; however, the reel harness strap will automatically lock when an impact force
of 2 to 3 gs is encountered. When the reel is locked in this manner, it will
remain locked until the handle is moved to LOCKED and then returned
to RELEASED position. When the handle is in LOCKED position, the reel
harness strap is manually locked so the crewmember is prevented from
bending forward. LOCKED position is used for ditching and crash landing. The arming lever used for seat ejection also locks the inertia reel.
LOCKED position may be used as an additional safety feature over the
automatic operation of the inertia reel system.
1-58
Change 12
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EWO OFFICER/GUNNER SEAT
Figure 1-22A
Change 22
1-58A/(1-58B blank)
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Upward Ejection Seat Arming Lever

and Trigger Sequence
(EITHER OR BOTH ARMING LEVERS)
2
2
3
2
3
1
Raise the armrest (1) to the locked position.
Squeeze the arming lever to release (2).
Rotate the arming lever (3) forward and upward to

the locked position. The firing trigger (4) rotates to
the firing position.
NOTE
Rotating the arming lever stows the control

column and jettisons the escape hatch.
The alarm system is energized to signal
ABANDON when either the pilots or copilots control column stows. Hatch jettisoning fires initiator, arming the seat.
It is necessary to partially release grip on

the arming lever to grasp the firing trigger.
Stow arming lever by depressing lockpins

(5) and (6) in order while rotating the arming lever forward and downward.
Squeeze the firing trigger (4) to fire the seat

catapult.
A31639
Figure 1-23
A31639
1-59
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Upward Ejection System
1-60
Change 12
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Upward Ejection System (Cont)

abcd
Change 12
1-60A
T.O. 1B-52H-1

NOTE
release initiator operates the DROGUE PARACHUTE SUPPORT

ARM RELEASE PIN-PULL CYLINDER. Withdrawing the pin allows
the drogue parachute support to pop up and lock into the pre-ejection position.
This is the key for sheets 5 and 6.
EJECTION SEQUENCE - P-CP SEATS

PRE-EJECTION PREPARATION
At least one of two FLIGHT SAFETY PINS 1 and three MAINTENANCE SAFETY PINS 2 , 3 , and 5 must be removed prior to accomplishing ejection sequence.
NOTE
The seat may be armed any time the maintenance pins
and either one of the No. 1 flight safety pins have been
removed by rotation of same arming lever from which No.
1 pin has been removed.
ARMING SEQUENCE
Raise armrests to the up position. Squeeze arming lever release
and rotate either, or both, ARMING LEVERS (4) forward and upward until locked. Rotation of the arming lever(s) locks the INERTIA
REEL (10), locks the shoulder straps (harness), and fires the ARMING INITIATOR (8). Gas expansion from the arming initiator fires
the CONTROL COLUMN STOWAGE THRUSTER, stowing the
control column. As this thruster extends, it closes the automatic
bailout switch, thus illuminating all the bailout warning lights and firing the HATCH JETTISON BOOSTER INITIATOR (14).
Gas expansion from the hatch jettison booster initiator fires the
HATCH JETTISON THRUSTER (17), which unlocks and opens the
hatch, thus jettisoning the hatch. A linkage attached to the hatch
and connected to the CATAPULT SAFETY PIN-PULL INITIATOR
(12) pulls the shear pin out of the initiator as the hatch departs the
aircraft, firing the catapult safety pin-pull initiator. Gas expansion
from the catapult safety pin-pull initiator operates the CATAPULT
SAFETY PIN-PULL CYLINDER (16), withdrawing the pin from the
CATAPULT INITIATOR (2) and thus arming the seat.
Gas expansion from the CATAPULT SAFETY PIN-PULL INITIATOR
will also fire the DROGUE PARACHUTE SUPPORT ARM RELEASE INITIATOR. Gas expansion from the drogue parachute arm
FIRING SEQUENCE
Squeezing either or both triggers will fire the CATAPULT INITIATOR
(2). Gas expansion from the catapult initiator fires the INTEGRATED HARNESS RELEASE (0.3 second delay) INITIATOR (11)
and the CATAPULT (13). Firing the catapult causes the seat, ejectable rails, and intermediate rails to move up the fixed rails. As the
ejectable rails move upward on the intermediate rails, the INTEGRATED HARNESS RELEASE ZERO DELAY INITIATOR (1) firing
lever contacts a STRIKER mounted on the fixed rail assembly firing
the integrated harness release zero delay initiator. Gas expansion
from the integrated harness release zero delay initiator, in tandem
with the integrated harness release (0.3 second) delay initiator, operates the INTEGRATED HARNESS RELEASE PIN-PULL CYLINDER. Repositioning the integrated harness release pin-pull cylinder releases the safety belt attachment points the upper harness attachment fittings.
As the ejection seat moves up the rails, the drogue parachute assembly will rotate aft. Aft rotation of the support assembly pulls the
drogue parachute safety pin, allowing deployment sprints to force
the drogue parachute out into the air stream. As the drogue parachute inflates, it will stabilize and decelerate the ejectable rail and
seat. Seat deceleration induces man-seat separation and automatic
personnel parachute activation, since the GOLD KEY is still attached to the seat.
MANUAL EMERGENCY OPERATION

If the catapult initiator fails to fire when trigger is squeezed, reach
under the armrest and lift the MANUAL CATAPULT INITIATOR
SAFETY PIN-PULL LEVER (15), and at the same time, pull the assembly forward to withdraw the pin from the catapult initiator. Reposition for ejection and squeeze trigger.
If the integrated harness release initiator fails to fire, pull the INTEGRATED HARNESS RELEASE HANDLE (6). Action of linkage unlocks the SAFETY BELT RELEASE FITTINGS (5), the SHOULDER
STRAP RELEASE FITTING (9), and the PARACHUTE ARMING
LANYARD (3), allowing the occupant to separate from the seat.
1-60B
Change 12
T.O. 1B-52H-1

EJECTION SEQUENCE - EW-G SEATS
PRE-EJECTION PREPARATION
At least one of two FLIGHT SAFETY PINS 1 and three MAINTENANCE SAFETY PINS 2 , 3 , and 5 must be removed prior to accomplishing ejection sequence.
NOTE
The seat may be armed any time the maintenance pins
and either one of the No. 1 flight safety pins have been
removed by rotation of same arming lever from which No.
1 pin has been removed.
ARMING SEQUENCE
Raise armrests to the up position. Squeeze arming lever release
and rotate either, or both, ARMING LEVERS (4) forward and upward until locked. Rotation of the arming lever(s) locks the INERTIA
REEL (10), locks the shoulder straps (harness), and fires the ARMING INITIATOR (8). Gas expansion from the arming initiator fires
the HATCH JETTISON BOOSTER INITIATOR (14).
Gas expansion from the hatch jettison booster initiator fires the
HATCH JETTISON THRUSTER (17). Initial movement of the hatch
jettison thruster forces the hatch lifter open, which aids in lifting the
hatch into the air stream. As the thruster continues to extend, it unlocks and opens the hatch, thus jettisoning the hatch. A linkage attached to the hatch and connected to the CATAPULT SAFETY PINPULL INITIATOR (12), fires the catapult safety pin-pull initiator by
pulling the shear pin out of the initiator as the hatch is jettisoned.
Gas expansion from the catapult safety pin-pull initiator operates
the CATAPULT SAFETY PIN-PULL CYLINDER (16), retracting the
pin from the initiator, thus arming the seat.
the sliding panel extends from the drag panel, and the drogue parachute bridle lines are pulled from their stowage containers. The drag
panel and sliding panel rotates downward until the restraint cables
become taut. As the seat and ejectable rails continue to move upward on the intermediate rails, the drogue parachute lanyard (attached to the intermediate rails) becomes taut. The lanyard then releases a latch, which attaches the drogue parachute pack to the
bottom of the seat. When the bridle lines become taut, the parachute lanyard pulls the parachute pack away from the drogue parachute, thus deploying the drogue parachute. As the seat and ejectable rails continue to move further up the intermediate rails, the INTEGRATED HARNESS RELEASE ZERO DELAY INITIATOR (1) is
fired by a STRIKER attached to the fixed rails. Gas expansion from
the integrated harness release zero delay initiator, in tandem with
and the integrated harness release (0.3 second delay) initiator, fires
the MAN-SEAT SEPARATION BOOSTER INITIATOR and operates
the INTEGRATED HARNESS RELEASE PIN-PULL CYLINDER.
Operation of the integrated harness release pin-pull cylinder releases both safety belt attachments and the upper harness attachment fitting, thus allowing the occupant to leave the seat. Gas expansion from the man-seat separation booster initiator fires the cartidge in the MAN-SEAT SEPARATION ACTUATOR, tightening the
separation harness and throwing the occupant from the seat.

If the catapult initiator fails to fire when trigger is squeezed, reach
under the armrest and lift the MANUAL CATAPULT INITIATOR
SAFETY PIN-PULL LEVER (15), and at the same time, pull the assembly forward to withdraw the pin from the catapult initiator. Reposition for ejection and squeeze trigger.
If the integrated harness release initiator fails to fire, pull the INTEGRATED HARNESS RELEASE HANDLE (6). Action of linkage unlocks the SAFETY BELT RELEASE FITTINGS (5), the SHOULDER
STRAP RELEASE FITTING (9), and the PARACHUTE ARMING
LANYARD (3), allowing the occupant to separate from the seat.
FIRING SEQUENCE
NOTE
Squeezing either or both firing triggers fires the CATAPULT INITIATOR (2). Gas expansion from the catapult initiator fires the INTEGRATED HARNESS RELEASE (0.3 second delay) INITIATOR (11),
and fires the CATAPULT (13). Firing the catapult causes the seat,
ejectable rails, and intermediate rails to move up the fixed rails. As
the seat moves upward, the hinged drag panel rotates downward,
Safety pin No. 6 for the ground emergency egress handle

at the gunners station can be installed either in the pin
receptacle on the front of the assembly, or in a pin receptacle on the right side of the assembly, if the pin interferes
with the crew seat at the gunners position.
PREFLIGHT STATUS AND LOCATION OF SAFETY PINS

PIN
NO.
LOCATION
No. 1
RH and LH Armrest (two)
No. 2
RH Ejectable Rail (Arming Initiator)
No. 3
Mounted on instrument panel upper mounting structure (Catapult Safety

Pin-Pull Initiator)
No. 5
On LH Ejectable Rail (Integrated Harness Release Initiator)
No. 6
EW and Gunners Ground Emergency Egress Handle Assembly
REMOVED BY
GROUND CREW
REMOVED BY
FLIGHTCREW
Change 12
1-61
T.O. 1B-52H-1

MAN SEAT SEPARATOR
EW AND GUNNER
11
10
9
4
5
6
7
ARMING LEVER SEQUENCE

HATCH JETTISON SEQUENCE
FIRING SEQUENCE
A88001
SAFETY PIN LOCATIONS
MECHANISM
(FORWARD VIEW)
1-62
Change 12
T.O. 1B-52H-1

12
3
A12633
TO MAN SEAT
SEPARATOR
EW AND GUNNER
DETAIL 2
1
17
11
10
13
16
15
14
4
6
SEE
DETAIL 2
A88002
MECHANISM
(AFT VIEW)
Change 12
1-63
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DOWNWARD EJECTION SEATS
The navigator and radar navigator are provided

with forward facing downward ejection seats (figure
1-25). Each seat is positioned over an escape hatch
and has fixed ejection rails. The ejection trigger
ring initiates the ejection cycle. One continuous pull
on the ejection trigger ring will sequence a series of
ballistic devices and mechanical linkages incorporated in the seat to rotate the leg guards, lock the
inertia reel, stow the writing table, jettison the
hatch, and fire the catapult to eject the seat from
the aircraft. The seat is equipped with a drogue
parachute and deployment mechanism to positively
separate the seat from the seat occupant after the
seat leaves the rails. The parachute is located in a
container mounted below the seat on spring-loaded
swinging arms. As the seat leaves the rails, the
arms and container swing aft of the seat and deploy
the drogue parachute, thus separating the seat
from the occupant. Restraint straps connected to
the arms to limit travel are interconnected with the
integrated harness mechanism to mechanically release the parachute and safety belt fittings as the
arms are deployed. These actions are fully automatic and require no action on the part of the
crewmember.
The seats can be positioned electrically up and
down, fore and aft, and tilted by seat positioning
switches during normal use. Electrical, oxygen, and
ballistic lines are provided with disconnects to permit separation of the lines when the seat is ejected.
The seat is equipped with a headrest and an inertia
reel which assist the occupant in maintaining position during ejection. The downward ejection seat
accommodates a survival kit and a back-type parachute.
Utilizing the wrong seat cushions and/or survival
kit or too much cushioning material creates a definite injury hazard and may position the seat occupant where it is difficult to reach the controls.
Chance of vertebral injury upon impact of crash
landing or ditching is increased considerably by sitting on too thick a compressible mass. The added
cushioning may also permit the seat occupant to
sink far enough down to loosen the shoulder straps,
allowing the seat occupant to slump forward, possibly incurring severe back injury. It may raise the
seat occupant to such a height that the leg re-
1-64
straints will not restrain his legs, thus exposing

them to possible injury from flailing in the windblast following ejection. An integrated harness release mechanism provides a means for separating
the safety belt and parachute harness from the seat
automatically after ejection of the seat. Manual operation of the integrated harness release will disengage the safety belt and parachute harness and, in
addition, will disengage the parachute arming lanyard. A modified parachute and a specially designed safety belt are installed in the harness release fittings. See INTEGRATED HARNESS SYSTEM, this section, for additional information.
Should a downward ejection hatch be inadvertently dropped, the ejection seat at that
station will be armed and can be fired.
Do not use any form of shock absorbing device other than the survival kit and/or seat
cushion designated as standard equipment
for the ejection seat. To do so would create
a definite possibility of serious injury during ejection and/or crash landing/ditching.
Man-Seat Separator
The seats are equipped with a man-seat separator

that ensures positive separation of crewmembers
occupying downward seats during ejection. Two nylon straps are installed in the seat under the survival kit and parachute. A reel-type ballistic actuator and jackshaft is installed on the back of the
seat. The nylon straps are attached to the jackshaft
driven by the reel-type ballistic actuator. The actuator is connected by ballistic hose to the integrated
harness ballistic actuation system. Simultaneously
with integrated harness release, the straps are
pulled tight, forming one side of a triangle, the other two sides of which form the seat back and bottom. As the straps are pulled tight, they provide
positive controlled separation of the seat occupant
from the seat. The man-seat separator separates
the man from the seat 0.3 seconds after ejection.
More time than this is needed to decelerate the
man to an acceptable parachute deployment velocity and is provided by the parachute timer.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Downward Ejection Seat
4
11
5
6
10
12
19
9
13
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
HEADREST
MODIFIED PARACHUTE
GLOBAL SURVIVAL KIT
EJECTION CONTROL TRIGGER RING
EJECTION CONTROL TRIGGER RING RELEASE
MECHANISM PIN
ANKLE RESTRAINTS
DROGUE PARACHUTE CONTAINER
SEAT POSITIONING SWITCHES
LEG GUARDS
INTEGRATED HARNESS RELEASE RESET
BUTTON (BEHIND)
PARACHUTE CONTAINER ARM RELEASE
INITIATOR (ACCOMMODATES MAINTENANCE
SAFETY PIN NO. 5)
RIPCORD T-HANDLE
PARACHUTE ARMING LANYARD
MANUAL CATAPULT INITIATOR SAFETY
PIN-PULL HANDLE
INTEGRATED HARNESS RELEASE HANDLE
INERTIA REEL CONTROL HANDLE
REMOVE BEFORE FLIGHT SAFETY PIN NO. 1
PARACHUTE SHOULDER STRAPS
14
10
18
15
17
16
A31647
Change 12
1-65
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Downward Ejection Seat (Cont)

NOTE
Items not requiring description, or those described elsewhere are not included
in the following sheets.
CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
4
Survival Kit Release Handle
FUNCTION
A handle located on the right side of the survival kit. It is operated by pulling up against the handle latch until the handle pulls free from the container. When the survival kit is in the seat, an arming plunger (12, figure 1-28)
located on the bottom of the kit is depressed. If the kit release handle is
pulled with the plunger depressed, the parachute strap adjuster will be
disconnected, thus severing the survival kit from the parachute harness.
The lid will not open and the dropline will remain attached to the kit. The
kit release handle may then be reset by replacing the handle in the socket,
reinstalling the parachute strap adjusters and while pushing firmly down,
the adjusters move the release handle to the locked position. Ensure the
survival kit is locked by pulling on the parachute strap adjusters.
NOTE
Ejection Control Trigger Ring
Do not allow the arming plunger to drop down before the release handle and parachute strap adjuster have been reset.
Do not use the survival kit release handle to lift or carry the
kit. To do so may cause the kit to open.
It is possible to install the survival kit in the ejection seat with
the arming plunger extended. Ensure that the plunger is fully
depressed into the seat before occupying an ejection seat.
Stowed on the front center of the seat. Prior to flight, the trigger ring is
safetied by the ejection control trigger ring release mechanism pin (6)
which in turn is safetied by the No. 1 REMOVE BEFORE FLIGHT safety
pin. In order to unstow the ejection control trigger ring, remove the No. 1
REMOVE BEFORE FLIGHT safety pin from the stowage clip on the ejection control trigger ring release mechanism pin, then pull upward on the
spring-loaded release mechanism pin. When the release mechanism pin
is lifted, the spring-loaded trigger ring will rotate 180 upward, thus
providing the seat occupant ready access to grasp the ring. A pull of
approximately 35 pounds is required to remove the trigger ring from its
retaining detent. After release from the detent, a pull of approximately 40
pounds and a cable travel of approximately 1 inch fires the arming
initiator, which locks the inertia reel, stows the writing table, rotates the
leg guards, and jettisons the escape hatch. Continued pull on the ejection
trigger ring (exerting approximately the same 40 pounds for
approximately 4 more inches of cable travel) fires the catapult initiator
which fires the catapult to eject the seat.
1-66
Change 12
T.O. 1B-52H-1

NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
Ejection Control Trigger Ring Release

Mechanism Pin
Installed on the front center of the seat. The release mechanism pin provides a means of stowing and unstowing the ejection control trigger ring
with the parachute and safety belt fastened. In addition, the release
mechanism pin provides a stowage clip for the No. 1 REMOVE BEFORE
FLIGHT safety pin. The release mechanism pin cannot be operated until
the No. 1 safety pin is removed. After removal of pin No. 1, pull upward
on the spring-loaded release mechanism pin to release the ejection control trigger ring from the stowed position. To restow the trigger ring, reverse the sequence.
Ankle Restraints
Spring-loaded restraints that keep the legs in position during ejection.

They may be kicked free any time after they are closed. In the event they
are accidentally triggered, they may be reset by pushing downward and
outward on either restraint until pivot arms and restraints are locked.
Ankle Restraint Triggers
A trigger is located on each side of the seat front. Pressing the triggers
causes the ankle restraints to rotate upward and inward to clasp the
ankles securely. Normally, the legs should be pressed against the triggers
prior to grasping the ejection trigger ring. The ankle restraints will then
hold the legs in position during ejection. The ankle restraint triggers are
cocked until triggered. If accidentally triggered, they may be reset by
pushing downward and outward on either ankle restraint until the pivot
arms and restraints are restowed and locked.
Three independently operated seat positioning switches are located on

the right front corner of the seat. The up and down switch is mounted vertically, the fore and aft switch is mounted horizontally, and the tilt switch is
mounted on a 45 slant. To obtain seat movement, the switch is pushed
in the direction movement is desired to electrically position the seat. The
electrical positioning actuators are 118 volt ac powered and contain limit
switches to stop motor operation at the extremes of travel.
Excessive operation of the positioning motors will shorten their

normal duty cycle. A full actuation in one direction should be followed by at least a 30-second rest. If another full actuation of
that positioning motor is required after the 30-second delay, a
5-minute rest must follow before another actuation of any degree.
Change 12
1-66A
T.O. 1B-52H-1

CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
10
FUNCTION
Leg Guards
The leg guards are positioned automatically during the ejection cycle.
Pulling the ejection control trigger ring triggers the arming initiator which
in turn fires the leg guard thruster which turns the leg guard torque tube
and rotates the leg guards into position to protect the legs during ejection.
Do not apply pressure to the leg guards during ground or air operations. A loss of dampening fluid could result, causing rapid
movement of the leg guards during ejection sequence. Upward
pressure on the leg guards may break the shear pin on the leg
guard thruster and render it unserviceable. Either circumstance
can cause serious injury to the seat occupant during ejection.
15
Manual Catapult Initiator Safety Pin-Pull

Handle
A handle located on the left side of the seat. When pulled, manually disengages the catapult pin-pull cylinder and thus pulls the safety pin from the
catapult initiator. The pin-pull handle should be straight and properly
seated parallel to and in close proximity below the left leg guard. No
movement of the straight handle up past the stowed leg guard should be
possible. If the seat will not fire after pulling the trigger ring, pulling upward
on the manual pin-pull handle will allow a spring to force the pin-pull cylinder outward, withdrawing the safety pin from the initiator.
16
Integrated Harness Release Handle
Located on the left side of each seat and painted yellow with black stripes.
This handle enables the seat occupant to manually detach the parachute
harness and the safety belt from the seat in lieu of automatic release. Pulling the release handle upward disengages the two safety belt fittings, the
parachute harness shoulder straps, and the parachute arming lanyard,
thus completely freeing the occupant from the seat. On the upward ejection seats, the release mechanism is reset by pushing the handle down.
Lock the inertia reel before actuating the integrated harness release handle to assure complete release of the integrated harness before leaving the seat.
NOTE
The integrated release handle should not be used to free the

occupant from the seat for normal inflight or postflight movement. If the release handle is pulled and the parachute and
survival kit are worn during such movement, the parachute
will have to be removed to reinstall the shoulder straps in the
inertia reel fitting without assistance.
The integrated harness release handle should be pulled directly upward since any fore, aft, or side loads can cause the
handle to bind resulting in excessive force required to pull the
handle.
1-66B
Change 12
T.O. 1B-52H-1

NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
17
Inertia Reel Control Handle
A handle, with LOCKED RELEASED positions, located on the left side

of each seat. A detent is provided for retaining the handle at either position of the quadrant. When the handle is in RELEASED position, the reel
harness strap will extend to allow the crewmember to lean forward; however, the reel harness strap will automatically lock when an impact force
of 2 to 3 gs is encountered. When the reel is locked in this manner, it will
remain locked until the handle is moved to LOCKED and then returned
to RELEASED position. When the handle is in LOCKED position, the reel
harness strap is manually locked so the crewmember is prevented from
bending forward. LOCKED position is used for ditching and crash landing. The arming lever used for seat ejection also locks the inertia reel.
LOCKED position may be used as an additional safety feature over the
automatic operation of the inertia reel system.
18
Seat Safety Pin No. 1
Each downward seat is provided with four safety pins. The No. 1 pin
marked REMOVE BEFORE FLIGHT is to be installed and removed by
the flight crewmember. This pin safeties the ejection control firing trigger
located at the front of the seat.
In addition, each downward ejection seat is provided with three safety
pins (numbered 3, 4, and 5 and marked USE DURING MAINTENANCE
ONLY) to be used during maintenance operations only. These maintenance pins are provided for the arming initiator, catapult pin-pull initiator,
and drogue parachute support arm release initiator, respectively. The
pins for the arming initiator and the drogue parachute support arm release
initiator are attached to each end of a single red streamer while the pin
for the catapult pin-pull initiator is attached to a separate streamer. The
two streamers are attached together with a snap fastener. When the seat
is in flight status, these pins are stowed in the box provided on the back
of the seat.
Change 12
1-67
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Downward Ejection System

6
7
10
8
9
5
34
12
11
33
12
13
14
13
15
32
16
31
28
27
30
29
26
17
1
18
19
25
3
20
24
SCHEMATIC
23
22
21
HATCH JETTISON SEQUENCE

ARMING AND FIRING SEQUENCE
SAFETY PIN LOCATION (PIN NO.)
A31649
1-68
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NOTE
causes the seat and ejectable rails to move downward on the fixed
rails. As the seat moves through the hatch opening, the DROGUE
PARACHUTE SUPPORT ARM RELEASE INITIATOR (11) is fired
by a INITIATOR TRIP (10) mounted on the fixed rails. Gas expansion from the DROGUE PARACHUTE SUPPORT ARM RELEASE
INITIATOR (11) causes the DROGUE PARACHUTE SUPPORT
ARM PIN-PULLER (22) to operate, allowing the drogue parachute
support to rotate from the seat pulling a lanyard, allowing drogue
parachute deployment.
This is the key for sheets 1, 3, and 4.
EJECTION SEQUENCE
PRE-EJECTION SEQUENCE
One FLIGHT SAFETY PIN 1 and three MAINTENANCE SAFETY
PINS 3 , 4 , and 5 must be removed, and the EJECTION CONTROL TRIGGER RING RELEASE MECHANISM PIN (36) must be
actuated to release the ejection control trigger ring from the stowed
position prior to accomplishing sequence.
Gas expansion from the integrated harness release initiator operates the INTEGRATED HARNESS RELEASE PIN-PULL CYLINDER (16). Action of the linkage unlocks the SAFETY BELT RELEASE FITTINGS (13) and SHOULDER STRAP RELEASE FITTING (35), releasing the SAFETY BELT (12) and PARACHUTE
HARNESS (34) thus allowing occupant to separate from seat.
ARMING AND FIRING SEQUENCE

Pull EJECTION CONTROL TRIGGER RING (26) upward. A cable
attached through a shock absorber to the ARMING INITIATOR (23)
fires the initiator. Gas expansion from the arming initiator fires the
LEG GUARD THRUSTER (25), HATCH JETTISON THRUSTER
(24) and TABLE STOWAGE INITIATOR (31). As the LEG GUARDS
(19) rotate, the INERTIA REEL (9) is locked.
Gas expansion from the INTEGRATED HARNESS RELEASE INITIATOR (6) also fires the INTEGRATED ROTARY ACTUATOR (7)
which operates to pull the nylon MAN-SEAT SEPARATION
STRAPS (8) tight and forcibly separate the seat occupant from the
seat immediately after release of SAFETY BELT RELEASE FITTINGS (13) and SHOULDER STRAP RELEASE FITTING (35).

Gas expansion from the table stowage initiator fires the TABLE
STOWAGE THRUSTER (27), thus moving TABLE (28) to stowed
position. As the ESCAPE HATCH (20) is jettisoned, CATAPULT
SAFETY PIN-PULL INITIATOR (17) is fired by means of catapult
safety pin-pull link attached to the escape hatch.
Gas expansion from the catapult safety pin-pull initiator operates
the CATAPULT SAFETY PIN-PULL CYLINDER (30) causing it to
retract pin which acts as a safety on the CATAPULT INITIATOR
(29). Continued pull on the TRIGGER RING (26) fires the CATAPULT INITIATOR (29).
Gas expansion from the CATAPULT INITIATOR (29) fires the INTEGRATED HARNESS RELEASE DELAY INITIATOR (0.3 SECOND
DELAY) (6) and fires the CATAPULT (14). Firing of the catapult
If the CATAPULT INITIATOR (29) fails to fire when trigger ring is

pulled, pull the MANUAL CATAPULT PIN-PULL RELEASE HANDLE (18) to withdraw the pin-pull cylinder and pin from the catapult
initiator. If the INTEGRATED HARNESS RELEASE INITIATOR (6)
fails to fire, pull the INTEGRATED HARNESS RELEASE HANDLE
(32). Action of the linkage unlocks the SAFETY BELT RELEASE
FITTINGS (13), SHOULDER STRAP RELEASE FITTING (35), and
PARACHUTE ARMING LANYARD RELEASE FITTING (15), allowing the occupant to separate from the seat.
If the integrated harness release handle has been pulled for some
reason other than bailout and it is desired to reset the mechanism,
push down on the INTEGRATED HARNESS RELEASE RESET
BUTTON (33).
PREFLIGHT STATUS AND LOCATION OF SAFETY PINS

PIN
NO.
LOCATION
No. 1
Front Center of Seat Bucket (Ejection Control Trigger Ring

Release Mechanism Pin)
No. 3
Front Center of Seat Bucket (Arming Initiator)
No. 4
Body Structure Just Aft Hatch (Catapult Pin-Pull Initiator)
No. 5
On Left Ejectable Rail (Drogue Parachute Support Arm Release

Initiator)
REMOVED BY
GROUNDCREW
REMOVED BY
FLIGHTCREW
Change 20
1-69
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Downward Ejection System (Cont)
1-70
T.O. 1B-52H-1
1-71
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Downward Ejection System (Cont)
1-72
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Drogue Parachute Arm Locking Lever and Spring
Figure 1-27
1-73
T.O. 1B-52H-1
INTEGRATED HARNESS SYSTEM
The integrated harness system provided in the aircraft consists of the integrated harness release
mechanism located on the seat, the safety belt, and
the automatic parachute (figure 1-28). The integrated harness release mechanism includes a trigger, an integrated harness release initiator with
necessary ballistic tubing, an integrated release
handle, and an inertia control handle. Firing the
ejection seat catapult triggers the integrated harness release initiator. The initiator fires after a
0.3-second delay to open the integrated harness release fittings on the seat and allow seat occupant,
parachute, and safety belt (along with survival kit)
to separate from the seat as an integral unit. An
additional integrated harness initiator is installed
and functions in the same manner to provide additional reliability. Also, a drogue parachute attached
to the seat positively separates the seat from the
seat occupant, parachute, and safety belt (along
with survival kit). (Separation from the seat arms
the automatic parachute since the parachute arming lanyard is anchored to the seat.) Pulling the integrated harness release handle on the seat provides for separation of man, parachute (and arming
lanyard), and safety belt from the seat.
NOTE
A zero delay lanyard is not provided on the

type BA-27A parachute.
A type BA-27A automatic parachute, developed specifically for use in B-52 aircraft upward and downward ejection seats, modified to utilize the integrated harness release mechanism in the seat is
provided in the ejection seats. The automatic parachute is equipped with a faster opening type C-9
canopy for improved low level escape capability.
Modifications include shoulder straps (5, figure
1-28) which are sewn into the parachute harness
for attachment to the inertia reel fitting.
A bailout oxygen bottle and gage is contained in the

parachute and may be inspected by opening the
flap located under the right side of the parachute
lining. Normal bailout bottle pressure is 1,800 psi
based on 70F. A reduction in temperature causes
reduction in cylinder pressure of 3.5 psi for each
degree of F. The bailout bottle is operated by
pulling the green bailout bottle release knob (3,
figure 1-28) on the right front of the harness. A
ripcord T-handle (8, figure 1-28) manually releases
the parachute when pulled. The ripcord T-handle
bypasses the automatic release device. An
automatic survival kit actuator has also been
provided in the parachute pack. This actuator
consists of a flexible housing and cable assembly.
The housing attaches to the inside of the parachute
pack and the CNU-129/P survival kit. The
actuation cable passes through the housing
attaching to both the survival kit automatic
actuation mechanism and one of the parachute
risers. When the personnel parachute deploys, the
force on the risers pulls the survival kit actuator
cable thus firing a delay cartridge in the
CNU-129/P survival kit actuation mechanism. Four
seconds after parachute deployment the cartridge
fires and automatically deploys the survival kit.
The parachute actuator is attached to the survival
kit when the parachute is installed in the seat. The
canopy quick-releases (6, figure 1-28) are located on
the upper left and right of the harness. Releasing
either of the quick-releases will spill the canopy.
Releasing both quick-releases will completely
separate the canopy from the harness.
The parachute contains the following features:
Universal Water Activated Release System (UWARS)
AUTOMATIC PARACHUTE
A pull-down vent line (PDVL) parachute canopy,

designated as a C-9P type, is utilized. The PDVL
improves the low speed inflation characteristics of
the parachute and improves the consistency of the
parachute opening timing.
An FXC model 11,000 ballistic automatic parachute opening release which incorporates a 0.75
second delay cartridge that automatically opens the
parachute pack 0.75 seconds after seat/man separation occurs. The model 11,000 release is activated
when the arming knob (10, figure 1-28) is pulled,
either manually or automatically by separation
from the seat.
1-74
Change 12
The UWARS consists of two parachute harness

sensing-release units (Figure 1-28 sheet 2), one
fitted to each parachute riser. The UWARS unit is
designed to operate within 2.5 seconds after being
immersed in sea water. The unit will remain inactive when exposed to humidity, rain, and salt spray.
The system consists of two independent self-contained activation devices which attach to the parachute risers and the left and right canopy releases.
Each activation device is equipped with a test circuit that permits a check of the battery which activates the release. The UWARS is functionally independent from the manual release system. It does
not affect the operation of the manual release, nor
does it depend on the manual release for proper operation.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Parachute Installation
The parachute is installed in the seat as follows:

1. The shoulder strap attaching hardware is inserted into the inertia reel fitting of the seat.
2. The survival kit attachment straps (19, figure
1-28) are connected to the survival kit strap adjustments. Thread these straps through the safety belt
loops (25, figure 1-28) in between the webbing of
the safety belt and attach to the parachute accessory rings with the quick-disconnect at the opposite
end.
3. Safety belt attachment fittings are inserted
into integrated harness release fittings on the seat.
4. The parachute arming lanyard anchor is inserted into the integrated harness release fitting at
the left rear corner of the seat.
NOTE
The automatic parachute, safety belt, and

survival kit should first be installed in the
seat, then buckled to the crewmember.
Since the parachute must be removed by the wearer in order to attach the shoulder straps to the inertia reel fittings unassisted, it is recommended that
the parachute and survival kit be left in the seat

when the crewmember desires to make routine
movements about in the aircraft. It is then only
necessary to buckle chest strap, leg straps, and
safety belt and to connect oxygen mask to prepare
for ejection in an emergency.
NOTE
Do not open safety belt to permit unrestrained hip movement. Since the parachute arming lanyard is anchored to the
seat, this could spill the parachute in the
seat.
Personal Locator Beacons
Most parachutes are equipped with personal locator

beacons. The beacon equipped parachutes may
have an AN/URT-21, AN/URT-27, or AN/URT-33
installed. Except for size and range, all three beacons are almost identical. Each beacon is designed
to begin transmitting automatically when a plastic
plug is pulled from the radio by a lanyard during
chute deployment. The beacons are accessible to the
crewmember after a parachute landing and have
complete metalcal instructions for manual operation attached to the unit.
Change 12
1-75
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Bailout Equipment
1-76
Change 12
T.O. 1B-52H-1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
PERSONAL LOCATOR BEACON LANYARD

SNAPPED (AUTOMATIC ACTUATION)
PERSONAL LOCATOR BEACON LANYARD UNSNAPPED (NONAUTOMATIC ACTUATION)
BAILOUT BOTTLE RELEASE KNOB
OXYGEN HOSE CONNECTOR MOUNTING PLATE
SHOULDER STRAP
QUICK-RELEASE
CHEST STRAP
RIPCORD T-HANDLE
ARMING LANYARD ANCHOR
ARMING KNOB
LEG STRAP
ARMING PLUNGER
KIT RELEASE HANDLE
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
MODE SELECTOR LEVER

FIRING PIN INDICATOR
MAIN COMPARTMENT
COMPRESSIBLE SPACER
SEAT CUSHION
SURVIVAL KIT QUICK-DISCONNECT FITTING
AND STRAPS
BAILOUT BOTTLE INSPECTION FLAP
PARACHUTE BACKPAD
BAILOUT OXYGEN HOSE
BAILOUT BOTTLE PRESSURE GAGE
UWARS FITTING
SAFETY BELT ATTACHMENT FITTINGS
EJECTION SEAT ATTACHMENT LOOPS
Change 12
1-77
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Personal Locator Beacon Lanyard
Parachutes equipped with a personal locator beacon

have a nylon cord lanyard with a tab and a female
snap fastener. The lanyard can accommodate all
three personal locator beacons. For automatic actuation of the beacon, the tab fastener is snapped to
a male snap fastener located below the right canopy
release. For nonautomatic (manual) operation, the
tab is left unsnapped. (See 1 and 2, figure 1-28.) For
peacetime operations, the personal locator beacon
lanyard must be configured for automatic operation. When mission requirements dictate the necessity to avoid detection and automatic actuation of
the beacon is not desired, the lanyard must be configured for nonautomatic (manual) operation.
NOTE
The sole purpose of the beacon lanyard is to

assure automatic operation (if desired) after
bailout in case the crewmember is injured
or incapacitated during the egress cycle. For
this reason, the beacon lanyard must be
configured to the desired operation (automatic or nonautomatic) during the interior
preflight and rechecked just prior to bailout.
GLOBAL SURVIVAL KITS
A global survival kit (figure 1-28) is provided for

each ejection seat. The type CNU-129/P survival kit
is located in the bottom of the seat and includes a
seat cushion. Provision for assorted items of survival equipment are contained in the kit. The kit is
made up of a compartment containing the liferaft
and survival equipment. A waterproof container,
equipped with straps for carrying as a backpack,
serves as an inner compartment containing various
items of survival equipment. The inner compartment is secured with straps in the bottom of the
main compartment and is passed through a slot in
the lid; the other end is attached to a detachable fitting which is part of the left parachute attachment
fitting. The liferaft is fastened to a loop which is located on the dropline about 10 feet from the survival kit. The dropline automatically triggers liferaft
inflation when fully extended, permitting the liferaft and kit to hang below the crewmember during
the parachute descent. The automatically deployed
survival kit is deployed by a sensor incorporated
into the type BA-27A parachute. The connection be-
1-78
Change 4
tween the sensor and actuator is automatically accomplished when the kit and parachute fittings are
connected. A selector lever, located on the right side
of the kit below the kit release handle, provides the
option of manual or automatic release of the kit.
With the lever in the AUTO (up) position, the kit is
automatically actuated 4 seconds after parachute
deployment. With the lever in the MANUAL (down)
position, the automatic deployment feature is deactivated and deployment of the kit is accomplished
by pulling the kit release handle.
NOTE
Incorporation of the automatic actuator in

the CNU-129/P survival kit does not affect
or prevent manual deployment by use of the
kit release handle.
Automatic or manual deployment of the survival kit
releases the parachute attachment fittings, allowing the kit to drop, the lid to open, and the liferaft
to inflate. The dropline remains attached to the
parachute harness and is attached to the liferaft
and survival kit. The liferaft will hang about 15 feet
below the descending airman and the kit about 25
feet below.
The kit is attached to the parachute by means of a
linkage assembly strap connected by quick-disconnect fittings to the parachute harness accessory
ring. When attached to the modified parachute, the
straps with quick-disconnects are passed through
loops in the safety belt. This interconnects parachute, safety belt, and survival kit. The kit is
installed in the aircraft merely by placing it in the
seat bucket. The straps are then passed through
the safety belt loops and connected to the parachute
accessory rings with the quick-disconnects. The
safety belt and parachute are then installed in the
integrated harness fittings on the seat. Normally
the survival kit is not detached from the parachute
except for emergency reasons such as a crash landing, or when accomplishing an alternate bailout.
Should a crewmember have occasion to leave the
seat without the survival kit but wearing the parachute, he may do so by pulling the survival kit release handle while firmly seated on the survival kit.
Pulling the release handle while seated on the kit
releases the strap adjusters and seat occupant from
the survival kit and lid will unlock, but will remain
connected in position by the hinge assembly
mounted on the front of the kit.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Global Survival Kit Controls
MODE SELECTOR LEVER

A mode selector lever (14, figure 1-28) is located on
the lower right-hand side of the front of the survival kit. The lever has two positions, AUTO- -MANUAL. In AUTO (up) position, the survival kit will be
automatically deployed 4 seconds after parachute
opening if connected to a type BA-21A or BA-27A
parachute. The deployment sensor in the parachute
initiates the deployment actuator in the survival
kit. In MANUAL (down) position, the kit will be
deployed only upon actuation of the survival kit release handle.
The survival kit release handle (13, figure 1-28) located on the right side of the survival kit is operated by pulling up against the handle latch until
the handle pulls free from the container. When the
survival kit is in the seat, an arming plunger (12,
figure 1-28) located on the bottom of the kit is depressed. If the kit release handle is pulled with the
plunger depressed, the parachute strap adjuster
will be disconnected, thus severing the survival kit
from the parachute harness. The lid will not open
and the dropline will remain attached to the kit.
The kit release handle may then be reset by replacing the handle in the socket, reinstalling the parachute strap adjusters and while pushing firmly
down, the adjusters move the release handle to the
locked position. Ensure the survival kit is locked by
pulling on the parachute strap adjusters.
NOTE
Do not allow the arming plunger to drop

down before the release handle and parachute strap adjuster have been reset.
Do not use the survival kit release handle
to lift or carry the kit. To do so may cause
the kit to open.
It is possible to install the survival kit in
the ejection seat with the arming plunger
extended. Ensure that the plunger is fully
depressed into the kit before occupying an
ejection seat.
When the survival kit is removed from the seat, the

compartment lid opening arming plunger will be
extended, arming the mechanism. If the kit release
handle is pulled with the arming plunger extended,
the lid will open, the dropline will remain attached
to the parachute harness, the parachute strap adjuster will be disconnected, and the raft will inflate
as the dropline is extended.
Do not pull the kit release handle while in

the aircraft with the kit not installed in the
seat. Pulling the handle with the kit suspended will cause the lid to open, leaving
the crewmember attached to the survival
kit. In an emergency, this could cause a fatal delay in escaping from the aircraft.
FIRING PIN INDICATOR
A cylindrical indicator (15, figure 1-28) having a red
ring around its body will protrude from the release
mechanism, with the red visible, to indicate that
the release initiator has fired.
LIFERAFT DEFLATION TOOL
Instances of inadvertent liferaft inflation

have occurred in flight resulting in full forward control column displacement. Pilots
will be alert to this possibility and be prepared to immediately puncture the liferaft
should inadvertent inflation occur.
A knife-like liferaft deflation tool (7, figure 1-17) located on the pilots and copilots glare shield above
their respective side panels is provided for liferaft
deflation. In the event the liferaft becomes inadvertently inflated at either pilots position, the pilot or
copilot will puncture the inflated raft with the
deflation tool and use a ripping action to make a
large opening for rapid deflation.
1-79
T.O. 1B-52H-1
SAFETY BELT
A safety belt with standard manual release and

lock lever fittings is provided with each ejection
seat. The belt is installed by inserting the attachment fittings (24, figure 1-28) in the integrated harness fittings on each side of the seat. The survival
kit is then secured to the parachute by threading
the parachute attachment fittings through the
straps on the safety belt and fastening them to the
kit. Thus, seat occupant, parachute, safety belt, and
survival kit are released from the seat as an integral unit whenever the integrated harness release
fittings are opening. For routine movement about in
the aircraft, it is recommended that the

crewmember unlock and open the safety belt, then
disconnect the parachute chest and leg straps, leaving the parachute with survival kit attached to the
seat.
Do not open the safety belt prior to ejection.

Severe injury may be incurred if ejection is
performed with any integrated harness attachment fitting disconnected.
Escape Systems Circuit Protection and Location

EQUIPMENT
Ejection Seat Position Actuators
EW Officer
Gunner
Copilot
Navigator
Pilot
Radar Navigator
11
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
MISCELLANEOUS
SEAT POSITION DECM
FCS SEAT POS
SEAT POSITION COPILOT
SEAT POSN R OPER
PILOTS SEAT POS
SEAT POSN L OPER
RLC/F17
RLC/E17
RLC/F16
ABNS/A14
LLC/C34
ABNS/A13
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
ABNS
LLC

RLC
Figure 1-29
1-80
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ENGINES
DESCRIPTION
ENGINE AIR BLEED
ENGINE FUEL CONTROL SYSTEM
ENGINE OIL SUPPLY SYSTEM
ENGINE STALL PREVENTION SYSTEM
ENGINE IGNITION AND STARTING SYSTEM
NORMAL OPERATION
OPERATION
MONITORING EGT DURING TAKEOFF
ENGINE LIFE
DESCRIPTION
Eight Pratt & Whitney Model TF33-P-3 turbofan
engines (figure 1-30) are installed on the aircraft.
The low pressure compressor on these engines consists of a compressor and fan assembly. The first
and second stage rotor blades are longer than those
of the remaining stages of the compressor and comprise the fan portion of the turbofan engine.
The engines are trimmed per flat rated engine
trim procedures. Takeoff rated thrust is obtained by
adjusting the throttles to a predetermined value of
engine pressure ration (EPR) as determined from a
takeoff rated thrust EPR curve for the prevailing
conditions of field barometric pressure and runway
temperature. At ambient temperatures below
100F, takeoff rated thrust will be obtained at
throttle settings below the full forward position.
The engines are mounted in pairs in four nacelles
suspended below the wings and are numbered in
the conventional manner from left to right 1 thru 8.
The nacelles are also numbered in this manner
with engines 1 and 2 in No. 1 nacelle, engines 3 and
4 in No. 2 nacelle, engines 5 and 6 in No. 3 nacelle,
and engines 7 and 8 in No. 4 nacelle. In each nacelle pod, diametrically shaped fin exhaust air
ducts are located outboard around each engine and
inboard between engines below the strut structure
from which the engines are suspended. The nacelle
pod cowling is attached to engine and strut structure and to mating cowling by a series of hooks,
pins, and quick-release latches to provide easy access to the engines. Cowling for each nacelle pod
consists of a nose cowl for each engine, a left and
right upper and lower wrap cowl, and a left and
right upper and lower afterbody cowl. The wrap
cowling covers the fan case and a portion of the turbofan exit ducts. The afterbody cowling covers the
engine accessories and the remainder of the engine
from the fan bypass duct exit to the aft end of the
tailpipe. Airflow from the engine fan exit ducts is
discharged axially over the afterbody cowling.
Openings are provided in the cowling for servicing
and to facilitate maintenance. The nose cowl, to-
1-81
1-83
1-83
1-86
1-87
1-87
1-95
1-95
1-95
1-95
gether with the nose dome, forms the engine air inlet. Eight auxiliary air inlet doors are provided in
the cowl to allow a sufficient volume of air to enter
the engine during ground operation and takeoff.
The doors, which are spring-loaded to the closed
position, are opened by differential pressure. Mach
number, engine thrust setting, and aircraft angleof-attack determine the differential pressure felt by
each door. During ground operation, the doors open
because of the pressure across them and assist in
producing a more uniform pressure at the engine
inlet. For usual flight operation, the doors close
during the initial portion of climb and remain
closed until landing pattern maneuvers.
The engines are identical with exception of the
installation of engine-mounted accessories. The accessories are driven from an engine accessories
gearbox by means of a shaft which is mechanically
geared directly to the main shaft connecting the
first stage turbine to the high pressure compressor.
A 120 KVA generator is installed in a lower center
position of engines 1, 3, 5, and 7. Generator rpm is
maintained by use of a constant speed hydraulic
drive installed on the same engines. A constant
speed drive air-oil cooler is located aft of the generator in the area of the turbofan exit duct where engine fan air used for cooling is exhausted overboard. Fan air is diverted into special ducts for cooling of 120 KVA generators and is exhausted overboard from under the afterbody cowl. An enginedriven variable delivery hydraulic pump is installed
on the lower right side of engines 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.
An electrically controlled air-drive starter is
installed on the lower side of each engine. All engines have cartridge start capability. The accessory
drive gearbox is also utilized for mounting the accessories necessary for engine control such as the
engine fuel pump, hydromechanical fuel control
unit, tachometer generator, and oil pressure transmitter. For engine thrust rating information, see
figure 1-30.
Engine circuit protection and the location of the applicable circuit breakers is contained in figure 1-34.
Change 16
1-81
T.O. 1B-52H-1
The Engine
1
2
NOSE DOME
EPR PROBE (INLET
PRESSURE
AUXILIARY AIR INLET
DOORS
INLET GUIDE VANES
LOW PRESSURE COMPRESSOR, FAN STAGES
FAN AIR EXIT VANES
LOW PRESSURE COMPRESSOR, BLADE STAGES
FAN AIR DUCT EXIT
FUEL STRAINER
OIL TANK, ENGINE
HIGH PRESSURE
COMPRESSOR
OIL TANK, CONSTANT
SPEED DRIVE
BLEED AIR DUCT
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
FIRE DETECTORS (ON

ENGINE FIREWALL)
FUEL MANIFOLD (DUAL)
COMBUSTION CHAMBER
COMBUSTION CHAMBER
CENTER TUBE
FIRST STAGE TURBINE
2ND, 3RD, AND 4TH STAGE
TURBINES
EXHAUST CONE
EGT PROBE
EPR PROBE(EXHAUST
PRESSURE)
FIRE SEAL
FUEL OIL COOLER
FUEL FLOWMETER
ENGINE IGNITER
PRESSURIZING AND DUMP
VALVE
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
STARTER
HYDRAULIC PUMP
TACHOMETER GENERATOR
SURGE BLEED VALVE ACTUATOR AND GOVERNOR
ACCESSORY DRIVE CASE
SURGE BLEED VALVE PORT
FUEL PUMP
CONSTANT SPEED DRIVE
FUEL CONTROL UNIT
GENERATOR COOLING AIR
OUTLET
CSD OIL COOLER AIR
OUTLET
AC GENERATOR
CSD OIL COOLER
GENERATOR COOL AIR
INLET
IGNITION UNIT
ENGINE DRIVEN ACCESSORIES

ENGINE NUMBER
HYDRAULIC PUMP
AC GENERATOR & CONSTANT

SPEED DRIVE
THRUST IN POUNDS AT SEA LEVEL ICAO STANDARD DAY

ENGINES
TF33-P3
TAKEOFF RATED THRUST
MILITARY RATED THRUST
NORMAL RATED
THRUST
MATERIAL
17,000
16,500
14,500
TITANIUM
Figure 1-30
1-82
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ENGINE AIR BLEED
Pneumatic power is provided for engine starting, control cabin air conditioning, anti-icing of the left wing
air conditioning ram airscoop, and pressurization of
the hydraulic systems reservoirs. For further information on the above uses of engine bleed air, see
PNEUMATICS, this section. In addition to the above
uses of high pressure compressor bleed air which is
taken directly from the main manifold of the pneumatic system, 16th stage engine bleed air is also used
for pressurization of the constant speed generator
drives and the oil tank for each drive. Operation of the
engine bleed valve actuators allows bleeding of the
9th stage low compressor pressure (for prevention of
hung starts and engine stall), and for anti-icing of engine nacelle cowls, inlet guide vanes, nose domes, and
inlet pitot tubes for the engine pressure ratio (EPR)
transducers. In addition to the utilization of engine
bleed air, turbofan discharge air is used for generator
cooling and constant speed drive oil cooling. Bleed air
obtained from the body manifold is regulated for pressurization of the missile environmental system air
ducts. Right body manifold bleed air is used for antiicing of the missile ram airscoop located in the leading
edge of the right wing.
ENGINE FUEL CONTROL SYSTEM
An engine fuel control system (figure 1-31) on each

engine automatically provides optimum engine performance for any throttle setting. This system makes
it unnecessary to make throttle adjustments to compensate for variations in inlet temperature, altitude,
or airspeed. Fuel from the tanks is routed through the
fuel supply system to fuel control units which meter
fuel to each engine. The throttle provides basic engine
thrust control and operates through the fuel control
unit to position a throttle valve. Engine fuel from the
fuel supply system is also controlled by an electrically
operated firewall fuel shutoff valve. Power to open
this valve is supplied by the fire shutoff switch when
the throttles are moved from CLOSED. This allows
fuel under boost pump pressure to reach a two-stage
engine-driven fuel pump. A bypass valve is provided
to allow fuel to bypass the first pump stage in the
event of failure. Output from the pump is delivered to
the fuel control unit.
Throttles
Eight throttles (12, figure 1-33) on the aisle stand control the firewall fuel shutoff valves and the throttle
valves. The throttle quadrant is marked CLOSED-IDLE- -OPEN. In CLOSED position, essential dc
power is supplied to close the firewall fuel shutoff
valves. Advancing the throttles out of CLOSED position provides power to open the firewall fuel shutoff
valves provided the fire shutoff switches have not
been pulled (figure 1-32). At the same time, provided
the engine starter switch is in START position, essential dc power is supplied to the engine ignition circuit.
(When in flight with the starter switch in CONT position, 115 volt ac power will be supplied.) See START-
ER SWITCH, this section. With the throttles advanced approximately 18 from CLOSED position,
the fuel control sequencing valves are positioned to
provide fuel pressure for closing the fuel dump valves;
metered fuel under pressure is then supplied to the
primary manifold of each engine. Advancing the
inboard nacelle engine throttles 3 and 5 or 4 and 6 to
approximately 75% rpm (approximately 45 throttle)
completes the flaps up warning circuit which sounds
the warning horn if the aircraft is on the ground and
the flaps are not fully extended. Retarding a throttle
near the IDLE position when the landing gear is not
down and locked completes a circuit providing TR
power to the landing gear warning horn. Except for
the two center throttles, each throttle has a different
height from the adjacent throttle and is separated
from the others by being slightly bent outboard for
selectivity and ease of operation of individual
engines. This facilitates ground handling of the
aircraft and thrust settings at the pilots discretion. A
mechanical stop is provided on the throttles which
prevents their being retarded to CLOSED unless
each throttle knob is raised approximately 1/4 inch.
An individual smaller throttle lever and knob is integrally connected to each large throttle to serve as a
one-hand multiple grip for operation of the eight engines simultaneously. These are located aft of the
large throttles and are spaced close together for convenience of use by the pilots.
[EV] Engine Fuel Enrichment System
The fuel enrichment system is used for ground

starting of cold soaked engines at low temperatures
(when the outside air temperature is at or below
zero degrees Celsius) and air starting engines above
15,000 feet when using JP-5, JP-8, or JET A/A1
fuels. The FEV may also be used for starts when
the temperature is 32 to 40F. This system is not
required with JP-4 fuel.
The system is made up of two major components, a
fuel enrichment valve (FEV) and an auxiliary
throttle valve (ATV). When the fuel enrichment
valve switch on the copilots side panel (19, figure
1-33) is set to OPEN, the system energizes the FEV.
The FEV then supplies fuel under pressure to the
ATV. The ATV is mechanically connected to the
throttle valve. When the throttle opens during engine start the mechanical connection opens the ATV
for additional fuel flow. As the engine RPM increases, the mechanical connection closes the ATV.
The additional fuel from the ATV is completely shut
off when the engine fuel flow reaches 1500 pph.
To prevent possible damage to the fuel enrichment valve solenoid, resulting from continuous operation, the fuel enrichment valve
switch should be set to the CLOSE position
after engine starting is completed.
Change 22
1-83
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Engine Fuel Control System

[EV]
FROM FUEL SUPPLY STSTEM
THROTTLES
ENGINE FIRE
SHUTOFF
SWITCH
OPEN
OP
NORMAL (IN)
CL
FIREWALL FUEL
SHUTOFF VALVE
FUEL
ENRICHMENT
VALVE SWITCH
CLOSED
FIRE
SHUTOFF
(OUT)
FILTER
PUMP
BYPASS
VALVE
TWO STAGE ENGINE

DRIVEN FUEL PUMP
DRAIN
PRESSURIZING
VALVE
FUEL CONTROL UNIT
PRESSURE
REGULATOR
AND
BYPASS
VALVE
FEV/
ATV
COARSE
FILTER
FINE
FILTER
FROM
FUEL
CONTROL
CASE
SERVO AND CONTROL PRESSURE
COMPRESSOR
INLET
PRESSURE
SERVO
THROTTLE
VALVE
FUEL
ENRICHMENT
VALVE
BURNER
PRESS
SERVO
MINIMUM PRESSURE
AND SHUTOFF VALVE
(Closed when throttle
is closed)
SPEED
SERVO
SPEED
GOVERNOR
SERVO
GOVERNOR
PILOT VALVE
(Operated by
throttle
movement
between
CLOSED
and IDLE)
FUEL CONTROL
CASE PRESSURE
RETURN TO ENGINE
PUMP INLET
DISCHARGE
MANIFOLDS
FLOWMETER
TRANSMITTER
PRIMARY
MAIN
ENGINE
INLET
TOTAL
FUEL FLOW
INDICATORS
FUEL
FLOW
METER
FUEL SUPPLY
METERED FUEL
BYPASS FUEL
TEMPERATURE OR PRESSURE
SENSING LINES
ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT
MECHANICAL ACTUATION
PRESSURIZING
VALVE
FUEL PRESSURIZING
VALVE (Closed
when throttle is open)
B62844
1-84
Change 20
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Less [EV]
FROM FUEL SUPPLY STSTEM
THROTTLES
ENGINE FIRE
SHUTOFF
SWITCH
OPEN
OP
FIREWALL FUEL
SHUTOFF VALVE
NORMAL (IN)
CL
CLOSED
FIRE
SHUTOFF
(OUT)
FILTER
PUMP
BYPASS
VALVE
TWO STAGE ENGINE

DRIVEN FUEL PUMP
DRAIN
PRESSURIZING
VALVE
FUEL CONTROL UNIT
PRESSURE
REGULATOR
AND
BYPASS
VALVE
COARSE
FILTER
THROTTLE
VALVE
FINE
FILTER
FROM
FUEL
CONTROL
CASE
SERVO AND CONTROL PRESSURE
COMPRESSOR
INLET
PRESSURE
SERVO
BURNER
PRESS
SERVO
SPEED
SERVO
SPEED
GOVERNOR
SERVO
GOVERNOR
MINIMUM PRESSURE
AND SHUTOFF VALVE
(Closed when throttle
is closed)
PILOT VALVE
(Operated by
throttle
movement
between
CLOSED
and IDLE)
FUEL CONTROL
CASE PRESSURE
RETURN TO ENGINE
PUMP INLET
DISCHARGE
MANIFOLDS
FLOWMETER
TRANSMITTER
PRIMARY
MAIN
ENGINE
INLET
TOTAL
FUEL FLOW
INDICATORS
FUEL
FLOW
METER
FUEL SUPPLY
METERED FUEL
BYPASS FUEL
TEMPERATURE OR PRESSURE
SENSING LINES
ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT
PRESSURIZING
VALVE
FUEL PRESSURIZING
VALVE (Closed
when throttle is open)
A31656
Change 20
1-84A/(1-84B blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Throttle Positions Chart

THROTTLES
POSITION
CLOSED
PERCENT
RPM
FIREWALL FUEL
SHUTOFF VALVE
POSITION
IGNITION
FUEL PRESSURIZING
AND DUMP VALVE
0%
CLOSED
Not Available
Open
Open unless engine

fire shutoff switch is
pulled
Available when
throttle is advanced from
CLOSED with
engine starter
switch in
START.
Advanced
18 approx
(Starting)
Closed.
Metered fuel under pressure is supplied to primary manifold.
IDLE
45 approx.
WARNING
HORN
Energized if
throttle is retarded when landing gear is not
down and locked.
75% approx.
Cruise
84 to 94%
OPEN
106.7% max.
Energized if aircraft is on the

ground and the
flaps are not fully
extended.
Figure 1-32
Fuel Control Unit
The fuel control unit (JFC 25-14) used on TF33-P-3

engines is of the hydromechanical type and provides a means of obtaining optimum engine performance at any thrust setting. The unit consists of a
metering and a computing system. The metering
system selects the rate of fuel flow to be applied to
the engine burners in accordance with the amount
of thrust demanded by the pilot but subject to engine operating limitations as scheduled by the computing system.
High pressure fuel from the engine-driven fuel

pump is supplied to the filtration system which is
incorporated within the fuel control inlet. The
filtration system consists of a coarse filter and a
fine filter. The fuel control unit contains speed,
burner pressure, and compressor inlet pressure (altitude sense) sensing servos, and a speed sensing
governor which acts in conjunction with the throttle
to position the throttle valve. Fuel pressure at the
throttle valve is maintained by a pressure regulating valve which bypasses the fuel in excess of that
directed to the throttle valve to the interstage area
1-85
T.O. 1B-52H-1
of the fuel pump. The throttle metering valve is
positioned by the computing section of the fuel control unit to permit selection of the proper fuel flow.
The amount of fuel metered to the engine by the
throttle valve is determined by a combination of
compressor inlet pressure, burner pressure, engine
rpm, and throttle position. A minimum pressure
and shutoff valve, which is the final fuel control
component to act upon metered flow prior to the
entry of fuel into the engine manifolds, is located
downstream from the throttle valve and is opened
by metered fuel pressure from the throttle valve.
This valve shuts off the flow of metered fuel to the
engine when the pilot moves the throttle to
CLOSED position. It also provides minimum operating pressure within the fuel control unit, ensuring that adequate pressure is available for operation of the servos and valves at minimum flow conditions.
The computing system of the fuel control unit positions the throttle valve to control steady state engine speed, acceleration, and deceleration. Positioning of the throttle valve is mechanically accomplished by using the ratio of metered fuel flow to
engine burner pressure to provide the required fuel
flow. Acceleration control is accomplished by placing a maximum stop on the ratio of metered fuel
flow to engine burner pressure, thereby limiting accelerations to avoid the overtemperature and surge
limits. When the throttle is closed, a sequencing
valve is opened which allows high pressure fuel to
close the minimum pressure and shutoff valve. Because of excessive pressure that would exist during
engine windmilling, the throttle controlled sequencing valve is designed to permit a windmill bypass
feature when the minimum pressure and shutoff
valve is closed, thereby allowing normal operation
of the pressure regulating valve and preventing
damage to the engine-driven fuel pump.
A flowmeter transmitter, flowmeter, and total fuel
flow indicator are also provided. Metered fuel under
pressure flows from the fuel control unit through
the flowmeter transmitter and fuel-oil cooler to the
primary manifold discharge nozzles and, when fuel
pressure is sufficient, a pressurizing valve is
opened which allows fuel to flow to the discharge
nozzles of the secondary fuel manifold.
The fuel pressurizing and dump valve is held closed
by fuel pressure, and is opened as fuel is shut off
when the throttle is moved to CLOSED position.
The opening of this valve as fuel pressure drops allows fuel to drain from both the primary and the
secondary engine fuel manifolds.
1-86
Change 13
ENGINE OIL SUPPLY SYSTEM
Each engine is provided with an integral oil system

which includes an oil tank with a minimum usable
capacity of 7.10 gallons and a total capacity of 10.23
gallons. Oil is supplied to a gear-type engine-driven
oil pressure pump from each engine oil tank. Above
engine idle rpm setting, the pump supplies a constant regulated 80 pounds of oil per minute at 45 to
50 psi pressure to the engine bearings and accessory drives in the various engine compartments.
Scavenge pumps remove oil from the engine compartments and returns it to the tank for reuse.
The fuel-oil cooler, which transfers heat from the oil
to the fuel, consists of a cylindrical oil chamber enclosed within an external jacket through which the
fuel passes without restriction of flow. Oil temperature is governed by a thermostatic control valve
which is an integral part of the fuel-oil cooler and
operates at temperatures between 40 and 120 C
(104 and 248 F). The valve permits bypassing of
the oil through the cooler at temperatures above
120 C.
The oil system incorporates a breather pressurizing
valve which is sensitive to altitude and which permits system pressurization up to 5 psi above atmospheric pressure. Pressurization improves the supply and scavenging system operation by compensating for the loss of gravitational forces on the oil at
altitude. When the oil supply is exhausted, approximately 1 to 1 1/2 gallons of oil remain trapped in
the lines and the oil cooler.
A selective type oil temperature indicating system
is provided for protection against engine damage or
failure and consists of a temperature gage and a selector switch located on the copilots side panel. To
obtain the indicated oil temperature of a particular
engine, the selector must be positioned to the desired engine by number. Each engine is equipped
with an oil temperature probe which will sense
temperatures in a range from 54 to 176C and automatically provide an electrical signal to the temperature gage. With the exception of the oil temperature selector which is used in checking the engines
separately for high or excessive oil temperatures,
no manual controls are provided for the engine oil
system. For oil servicing information, see figure
1-186.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ENGINE STALL PREVENTION SYSTEM
An engine stall prevention system is provided to

control the engine compressor surge bleed valves
for prevention of stalls which are caused by crosswinds during ground operation. During static engine operation, air entering the inlet around the
cowl lip separates and produces areas of low pressure across the face of the forward compressor. This
pressure distortion is aggravated further by wind
blowing across the inlet lip. Auxiliary air inlet takeoff doors are incorporated in the cowl to increase
the inlet area and minimize pressure distortion;
however, because of remaining inlet distortion combined with TF33-P-3 engine compressor characteristics, stalls will occur in crosswinds of 10 knots or
more. The stall prevention system permits stall-free
ground operation and enables takeoff since inlet
pressure distortion rapidly disappears with increase of airspeed during the takeoff roll and crosswinds are a negligible influence above an average
velocity of 50 knots. See ENGINE OPERATION,
this section, for additional information on engine
compressor stalls. Stall-free operation is accomplished by opening the compressor surge bleed
valves sufficiently to reduce the pressure rise across
the low speed forward compressor. A solenoid-operated valve in the bleed valve actuator air supply
line causes the bleed valve to open when energized.
The solenoid valves are controlled by a single engine stall prevention switch on each of the pilots
control wheels. The control circuit is deenergized by
the landing gear squat switches when the aircraft
is airborne.
A turbine-driven starter is provided on each engine.

The starter turbine may utilize either low pressure
bleed air obtained from a ground source or from an
operating engine through the air bleed system or
may utilize high pressure gas generated by burning
a solid propellant cartridge. Starter operation is basically the same for pneumatic or cartridge operation with the major difference being the temperature and pressure of the two gases. The bleed air
enters the starter turbine at a temperature of
500F or less, while the cartridge-produced gas
enters at a temperature in excess of 2100F. Each
starter unit consists of a turbine, gear train, and an
overrunning clutch. In addition, the cartridge
starter has a breech chamber with breech cap and
locking handle, a pressure modulating valve, and

the necessary electrical components for cartridge
ignition and starter control. The cartridge cannot
be ignited unless the breech is properly installed
and the lock handle is in the proper position. The
pressure modulating valve maintains proper
operating pressure and, in case of malfunction,
relieves pressure to safe limits. As engine rpm
exceeds starter rpm, the overrunning clutch
releases to prevent the starter turbine from being
driven to an overspeed condition. When starting
with compressed air, a centrifugal switch monitors
rpm at the starter mounting pad and, as a specified
rpm is reached, breaks the circuit to the starter
control valve solenoid, allowing the valve to close
and shut off the starter air supply. Each starter is
geared to the high pressure compressor of the
engine on which it is installed. Since the primary
purpose of the cartridge-pneumatic starter is to
provide for operation without need for auxiliary air
and electrical power supply, provision (24, sheet 2 of
figure 1-1) has been made to carry eight spare
cartridges in the aircraft. Since all eight engines
have cartridge-pneumatic starters, provisions are
made in the electrical supply system for cartridge
starting all engines simultaneously to accomplish a
quick start. These provisions also include the
capability to start all engines from a single battery
in the event of failure of one. The switching of the
start functions to the good battery is automatic and
cannot be controlled by the pilot.
A dual ignition system is installed, having an intermittent duty dc system for starting and a continuous duty ac system for prevention of flameout. Engine ignition is accomplished by spark ignitors located in the combustion chambers of each engine.
Ignition is under control of eight starter switches, a
start selector switch, and the throttles. These controls may be used to obtain starts on the ground in
any combination of engines from single to all, either
pneumatic or cartridge. In flight, these controls are
used for all combinations of air starts. Power for
starting ignition is essential dc power. Outboard engine ignition systems are supplied power from the
left essential dc start bus. Inboard engine ignition
systems are supplied power from the right essential
dc start bus. Under battery only operation, these
start buses will be automatically connected to the
good battery if one were to fail. AC power is used
for continuous ignition.
Change 4
1-87
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Engine Controls and Indicators
1
2
3
4
5
6
LOW OIL PRESSURE WARNING LIGHT (8)

OIL PRESSURE GAGE (8)
ENGINE FIRE SHUTOFF SWITCH (8)
EPR GAGE (8)
TACHOMETER (8)
EXHAUST GAS TEMPERATURE GAGE (8)
7
8
9
10
11
FUEL FLOW METER (8)

TOTAL FUEL FLOW METER
[EV] FEV OPEN CAUTION LIGHT
Less [EV] SPARE
STARTER NOT OFF CAUTION LIGHT
ENGINE OIL OVERHEAT CAUTION LIGHT
1-88
Change 20
T.O. 1B-52H-1
12
13
14
15
16
17
ENGINE STALL PREVENTION (ESP) SWITCH

THROTTLES (8)
THROTTLE BRAKE LEVER
THRUST GATE
OIL TEMPERATURE GAGE
OIL TEMPERATURE SELECTOR SWITCH
18
19
20
21

[EV] FUEL ENRICHMENT VALVE SWITCH
Less [EV] BLANK
ENGINE START SELECTOR SWITCH
ENGINE START SWITCH
Change 20
1-89
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Engine Controls and Indicators (Cont)

NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
NOTE
To more readily identify a malfunctioning engine, a yellow vertical stripe is painted between the left-hand and
right-hand bank of engine instruments (between engines 4 and 5).
1
Low Oil Pressure Warning Lights (8)
Low engine oil pressure is indicated by eight amber low oil pressure warning lights located over each oil pressure gage on the eyebrow instrument
panel. A pressure switch is installed on each engine that will cause the
light to come on when a decreasing oil pressure reaches 37 (2) psi and
turn the light off when an increasing oil pressure reaches 37 (2) psi.
These lights will complement the oil pressure indicating system to provide
a cross-check to establish if a malfunction is occurring in the oil pressure
indicating system or in the engine. All lights have a press-to-test feature
and have provisions for manually dimming or shading. The low oil pressure warning lights operate on TR power.
Oil Pressure Gages (8)
Indicates engine oil pressure in increments of 5 psi.

NOTE
If the oil pressure circuit breaker has popped out, oil pressure
indicators are inoperative.
Oil pressure will have a tendency to follow the throttle due
to the type of oil pressure relief valve installed. This condition
is normal provided the oil pressure stabilizes between the
minimum and maximum limits.
Engine Fire Shutoff Switches (8)
A fire shutoff switch is provided for shutoff of fuel to each engine. Each
switch closes a corresponding engine firewall fuel shutoff valve when
pulled out to the FIRE SHUTOFF position, regardless of throttle position.
A red fire warning light is an integral part of each switch. For other switch
functions, see ENGINE FIRE SHUTOFF SWITCHES, described under
EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT, this section.
Engine Pressure Ratio (EPR) Gages (8)
An engine pressure ratio (EPR) gage for each engine is located on the
pilots instrument panel. These gages indicate the ratio of engine inlet to
exhaust pressures which is used as a measure of engine thrust. The engine inlet and exhaust indications are compared by a computer-transmitter which electrically transmits an indication to the engine pressure ratio
gage.
Tachometers (8)
Speed of the high pressure compressor rotor in percent rpm is indicated

by eight tachometers on the pilots instrument panel. Engine driven
tachometer generators supply power to operate the indicators which are
independent of the aircraft electrical system. Each instrument has two
pointers. The larger pointer indication is read on a dial calibrated from 0%
to 100% rpm. The small pointer indication is read on a dial calibrated from
0% to 10% rpm.
1-90
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
Exhaust Gas Temperature Gages (8)
Exhaust gas temperature of each engine is indicated by eight gages on

the pilots instrument panel. These gages are calibrated in degrees centigrade and indicate the temperature of the exhaust gases of each engine.
Engine thermocouples supply power to operate the gages which are independent of the aircraft electrical power system.
Fuel Flowmeters (8)
Fuel flow to the engine is shown by eight fuel flowmeters on the pilots instrument panel. These indicators read in pounds per hour and operate on
TR power.
Total Fuel Flow Indicator
A total fuel flow indicator is located on the pilots instrument panel. This
instrument uses 115 volt ac power to electrically add the flow rates indicated on the eight individual fuel flowmeters. The totalizer indication is accurate within 3% when all engines are operating.
[EV] FEV OPEN Caution Light
The amber fuel enrichment valve (FEV) open caution light comes on any
time the FEV switch is in the OPEN position. It is a reminder to place the
FEV switch to CLOSE after engine start. This will prevent possible damage to the valve solenoid resulting from continuous operation. It should
be noted that the auxiliary throttle valve will close automatically when the
total fuel flow reaches 1500 pph, however, the fuel enrichment valve will
remain energized and open and the light will remain on until the FEV
switch is placed to the CLOSE position.
10
STARTER NOT OFF Caution Light
An amber starter-not-off caution light on the central caution panel is

marked STARTER NOT OFF. The light is illuminated by right essential
bus power when a starter switch is left in START position and, even
though the starter may be disengaged due to engine acceleration, the
light will indicate that power for ignition is available until shut off by the
starter switch.
11
ENGINE OIL OVERHEAT Caution Light
An amber engine oil overheat light on the central caution panel illuminates to read ENGINE OIL OVERHEAT when an oil temperature of 135
to 142C or higher occurs on any engine. The engine oil overheat light
may illuminate at temperatures of 10C and below if the oil temperature
selector switch (No. 16) is positioned in M or any of the eight engine positions; however, the light will immediately be extinguished when the engines are started. Due to extremely cold temperatures, an actuating cam
within the gage, as well as the pointer, may rotate counterclockwise until
the overheat light switch within the gage is contacted, causing the light
to illuminate. Placing the temperature selector switch in T position will
cause the actuating cam to move clockwise and extinguish the light as
the pointer moves beyond the comparative point of contact of the actuating cam. If the light is out for all temperatures in the 10 to +135C range,
operation is satisfactory.
12
Engine Stall Prevention (ESP) Switch
An engine stall prevention (ESP) switch is located on each of the pilots

control wheels and is used to prevent engine stall due to crosswind during
engine ground operation. These pushbuttons are also used as the
autopilot and air refueling boom release switches. When either engine
stall prevention switch is depressed, TR power is supplied to energize solenoid-operated valves which cause the compressor surge bleed valves
to open on all operating engines while on the ground. When the switch
is released, the surge bleed valves return to normal scheduled operation.
For additional functions of this switch, see AUTOPILOT and AIR REFUELING, this section.
FUNCTION
Change 20
1-91
T.O. 1B-52H-1

CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
13
Throttles (8)
FUNCTION
Eight throttles on the aisle stand control engine ignition. Advancing a
throttle out of CLOSED position will supply essential dc power for starting
ignition to that engine if the starter switch is in START or will supply ac
power for continuous ignition if the starter switch is in CONT. Returning
the throttle to closed cuts off ignition power.
NOTE
Because of forward throttle creep when the throttles are positioned above IDLE setting, a potential flight safety hazard exists
at any time a constant throttle setting is desired with the throttle
brake lever OFF. The condition exists because of induced
torque from the fuel control unit and results in making precise
thrust adjustments difficult as well as creating high throttle retarding forces.
14
Throttle Brake Lever
A throttle brake lever on the aisle stand to the right of the throttles is used
to adjust the amount of force necessary to move the throttles. When in
OFF (aft) position, the throttle brake is released. Moving the throttle brake
lever in the INCREASE (forward) direction increases throttle friction.
15
Thrust Gate
An adjustable thrust gate spans the throttle quadrant forward of the

throttles to provide a means of restricting forward travel of throttles during
operation requiring a limited amount of thrust. The gate, which is a rollermounted carriage, travels between guide rails located above the quadrant surface at each side of the aisle stand. The gate carriage acts as an
impediment when the throttles are advanced and it may be adjusted as
necessary to provide the desired thrust limit. A scissor-type lever located
on the copilots side of the thrust gate carriage provides for adjustment
of the thrust gate within a 70 arc at the forward end of the quadrant. The
aft edge of the carriage, which is painted white, is used as a positioning
indicator for both pilot and copilot. Lighting is provided on the copilots
side to facilitate adjustment and, on some aircraft, an index pointer is also
provided on the copilots side. The outboard side of each guide rail is
marked by a metalcal in 5 increments and numbered at 10 increments
from 40 thru 110. Adjustment of the thrust gate is usually accomplished
by the copilot; however, the adjustment lever is accessible to the pilot.
Detents are spaced 5 apart along the left guide rail for positioning of the
thrust gate which may be moved by squeezing the scissor-type lever to
release a roller-tipped spring-loaded plunger. The spring-loaded plunger
supplies the force to restrain the carriage in the selected detent position.
It is possible to overpower this force by applying approximately twice the
force required to normally operate all eight throttles simultaneously. For
operation not requiring use of the thrust gate, the carriage may be stowed
forward of full open throttle position.
1-92
Change 20
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
16
Oil Temperature Gage
A single engine oil temperature gage is located on the copilots side panel
and provides oil temperature readings for individual engine systems or
maximum temperature of all engine oil supply systems as selected by the
temperature selector switch. The temperature is indicated by a pointer
which rotates around a temperature scale on the indicating dial calibrated
from 0 to 180 C.
17
Oil Temperature Selector Switch
An oil temperature selector switch has 10 positions; one each for the eight
engine oil temperature probes (as designated by engine number), a T
(test) position, and an M (monitor) position. When the M position is selected, the indicating gage displays the temperature of the hottest of the
eight oil temperature probes but does not show which particular engine
has the high oil temperature. Due to a temperature tolerance of +5/0C,
a higher temperature may be indicated in M position of the selector switch
than at any other separate selection (1 thru 8 positions) of engine oil systems. Due to quick response to changes in temperature of the indicating
system, identification of an engine with excessively high oil temperature
is readily accomplished by selecting the engines separately. When the
selector switch is placed in T position, the pointer moves to the extreme
maximum temperature scale stop. This position of the selector provides
a method of testing for proper operation of the temperature gage and
overheat light. An edge lighted panel installed below the selector and the
temperature gage displays the following caution: LEAVE IN M POSITION
TO MONITOR ALL ENGINES. The oil temperature selector switch, which
has integral lighting, operates on 24 volt dc power on the same circuit with
the engine oil overheat caution light on the central caution panel.
18
MANIFOLD VALVE Switch
The OPEN- -CLOSE manifold valve switch, guarded to the CLOSE position, is located on the copilots side panel. OPEN position, used primarily
for engine starting, provides for airflow from any engine to any other
engine by supplying 118-volt single-phase ac to open the motor-driven
body crossover manifold and No. 3 strut bleed valves, and TR power to
open the normally closed solenoid-operated No. 1 and 4 strut bleed
valves. In OPEN position, air conditioning system control of the body
crossover manifold and No. 3 strut bleed valves is discontinued. This results in hot bleed air being interconnected between all engines through
the body crossover manifold. The guarded CLOSE position restores
118-volt single-phase ac to the air conditioning system controls for management of bleed air source selection, and removes TR power from the
solenoid-operated No. 1 and 4 strut bleed valves which resume their normally closed positions.
Change 20
1-93
T.O. 1B-52H-1

CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
19
[EV] FUEL ENRICHMENT VALVE

Switch
FUNCTION
The OPEN- -CLOSE fuel enrichment valve switch, guarded to the
CLOSE position, is located on the copilots side panel. When set to
OPEN, the switch opens the fuel enrichment valves to allow increased
fuel flow for engine starting in cold weather or high altitude with any alternate grade fuel. When set to CLOSE, the fuel enrichment valves are
closed.
NOTE
The auxiliary throttle valve is mechanically closed when the fuel
flow exceeds 1500 pph, however, the fuel enrichment valve will
remain open and energized until the fuel enrichment valve
switch is set to the CLOSE position.
20
START SELECTOR Switch
A start selector switch having CARTRIDGE- -FLIGHT- -PNEUMATIC

positions is located on the copilots side panel. The switch is locked in
center FLIGHT position and must be pulled out before moving to either
CARTRIDGE or PNEUMATIC positions. The position of this switch determines whether ignition only or both starter and ignition are provided when
the starter switch is operated. In momentary CARTRIDGE position, the
circuits are completed for firing of starter cartridges on engines selected
by the individual engine starter switches. If a starter switch is in START
position, positioning of this selector switch to CARTRIDGE position will
fire the cartridge for that selected engine. In FLIGHT position, only power
for engine starting ignition will be provided to the engine(s) for which the
starter switch is in START. The starters will be inoperable. In PNEUMATIC position, power is supplied to open the starter air valve on the engine
having the starter switch in START. Starting ignition power is also directed
to that engine.
21
Engine Start Switches (8)
Eight START- -OFF- -CONT starter switches are provided on the copilots side panel. These switches select the engine(s) for which a starting
or ignition function is desired. The desired functions are determined by
use of the start selector switch in accordance with the starting mode desired: pneumatic, cartridge, or inflight. When the starter switch is in
START, for pneumatic starting, the starter air valve is opened and ignition
power is directed to that engine. For cartridge starting, power is available
to fire the cartridge for that engine. For inflight starting, only ignition power
is directed to that engine. When the starter switch is in CONT, which represents continuous ignition, 115 volt ac ignition will be provided when
throttles are out of CLOSED position.
1-94
Change 20
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ENGINE NORMAL OPERATION

ENGINE IGNITION AND STARTING SYSTEM OPERATION
When the engine accelerates above starter cutout

speed, the starter relay becomes deenergized. This
prevents the starter from reengaging if the engine
speed drops below starter cutout speeds, even
though the starter switch remains in START position. If the starter switch is returned to OFF position, however, and the engine speed drops below
starter cutout speed, the starter relay will become
energized. Then if the starter switch is placed in
START position while the engine is still rotating,
starter coupling shaft failure may result. The starter will not engage when the starter switch is in
CONT position. CONT position of the starter switch
provides continuous duty ignition for prevention of
flameout during flight.
MONITORING EGT DURING TAKEOFF
The EGT of a normally operating engine will usually peak considerably sooner than the 2-minute engine acceleration time limit. It therefore is important that the pilot not physically making the takeoff monitor EGT during the takeoff roll and as soon
after unstick as possible. Throttles should be retarded to maintain the appropriate EGT limits.
Normally, a very small reduction in throttle setting
will return an EGT to within limits.
ENGINE LIFE
Time-Temperature-RPM
The Time-temperature-rpm relationship within

the engine is the main factor in engine life. The
most important of these is temperature. The
strengths of the materials used in the engine decrease as high internal temperatures approach the
melting points of the metals, even though the danger point may not be closely approached. There is a
tendency for any material to take a permanent set,
stretch, or bend; this tendency increases with both
the load and the temperature. The amount of permanent set increases with the length of time that
the load and/or temperature is applied. After a certain amount of permanent set is attained, the fibers
or grains of the material begin to pull apart. Under
inspection with a high powered microscope, the beginnings of fine cracks may be seen. With additional time, the material begins to elongate at faster
rates as the cracks become bigger and deeper. Finally, the material breaks. This process is so slow
that elongation is perceptible only with careful
measurement. The term creep has been applied to
the process because of the length of time required
for elongation to become significant. In a turbine
engine, high load and high temperature are usually
experienced at the same time. The loading on the
turbine and compressor blades is principally the
combined result of the centrifugal force, associated
with rpm, and some gas or air load, associated with
engine internal pressures. When the turbine discharge pressure, which is indicative of other internal pressures, is high, the EGT is also high. This
means that when the turbine blades are subjected
to their heaviest load, the material of which they
are constructed will be at its weakest. The compound effect of high rpm and high temperature results in an astounding increase in the rate of creep
at very high thrust settings when the centrifugal
load is the greatest. The ends of the compressor
blades and the rims of the turbine wheels tend to
travel outward. The rate of creep, which is measured in millionths of an inch per hour, increases
tremendously as the rpm and EGT approach maximum.
Engine Thrust vs Time
The length of time that an engine may be operated

at each of the various thrust ratings, such as takeoff or military, has been established in the interest
of conserving the life of the engine and making the
time between overhauls predictable. The periods of
5 minutes for takeoff and 30 minutes for military
(full thrust) has, by universal acceptance of the definitions for the various engine ratings, been deemed
adequate to take care of most situations. The real
purpose of limiting the time for engine operation at
takeoff or military rated thrust is not so much to
permit a cooling period between intervals of operation at high thrust (although such a cooling period
is very desirable) as it is to provide distribution of
the rate of creep and deterioration of hot section
parts throughout an engines normal life. There is
no hard and fast rule for reducing the throttle setting to normal rated, when operating at military for
any specific length of time before the higher thrust
rating may be used again. Whenever the situation
permits, it is good practice to operate an engine at
reduced thrust between periods of operation at military thrust for the same amount of time that the
engine has just operated at the higher thrust setting.
1-95
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Engine Cycle
NOTE
Engine compressor and turbine disks are subject to

low cycle fatigue and are replaced when cycle limits
are exceeded. An accurate record of cycles must be
maintained as specified in T.O. 00-20-5 by making the
appropriate entry on AFTO Form 781H of the number
of cycles which have occurred during each flight. A
cycle, created by certain thrust changes, results in
stresses that affect the low cycle fatigue life of rotating parts. For recording engine cycles in AFTO Form
781H an engine cycle is defined as follows:
Disk life limited to maximum accumulated

cycles: Definition of a cycle count will have
two categories, training and conventional.
1. A conventional takeoff and landing will be
counted as one cycle.
2. For training missions, a touch-and-go will
count as half cycle (0.5).
Engines Circuit Protection and Location

EQUIPMENT
Continuous Ignition
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
ENGINE CONTINUOUS AC
1&8
2&7
3&6
4&5
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
RLC/A20
RLC/A21
RLC/A22
RLC/A23
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
Engine Fire Detectors and Fire Warning Lights See EMERGENCY

EQUIPMENT CIRCUIT PROTECTION AND LOCATION, This Section
Engine Fire Shutoff Switches and Firewall Shutoff Valves See EMERGENCY
EQUIPMENT CIRCUIT PROTECTION AND LOCATION, This Section
Engine Stall Prevention and
Switch
AERIAL REFUELING
DISC & ENGINE STALL CONT
RLC/F4
Rt. TR
EPR Gages
ENGINE PRESSURE RATIO IND

POD 1
POD 2
POD 3
POD 4
RLC/B13
RLC/B14
RLC/B15
RLC/B16
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
FUEL MISCELLANEOUS
FLOW IND AC
FLOW IND DC
RLC/E1
RLC/E2
AC Bus 5
Rt. TR
[EV] Fuel Enrichment Valves
INBD FEV PWR

OUTBD FEV PWR
RLC/B24
LLC/D27
Rt. ESS Start Bus

Left ESS Start Bus
Ignition and Starting System
ENGINE IGNITION
1
2
DC3
DC4
DC5
DC6
7
8
LLC/F22
LLC/F23
RLC/A14
RLC/A15
RLC/A16
RLC/A17
LLC/F24
LLC/F25
Left ESS Start Bus

Left ESS Start Bus
Rt. ESS Start Bus
Rt. ESS Start Bus
Rt. ESS Start Bus
Rt. ESS Start Bus
Left ESS Start Bus
Left ESS Start Bus
Fuel Flow Gages
1-96
Change 20
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EQUIPMENT
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
Oil Pressure Gages
ENGINE OIL PRESS IND
RLC/C14
AC Bus 5
Oil Pressure Warning
ENGINE OIL PRESS WARNING
RLC/C18
Rt. TR
Oil Temperature Indicator
ENGINE OIL TEMP INDICATION
RLC/C16
AC Bus 5
Oil Temperature Warning
ENGINE OIL TEMP WARNING
RLC/C15
Rt. TR
Standby Starting Power
POWER FEEDERS DC
STBY START PWR INBD ENG
STBY START PWR OUTBD ENG
LLC/D9
RLC/D33
Aft Batt.
Fwd. Batt.
ENGINE ENGINE START

BUS SWITCHING
BUS SWITCHING
CONTROL AFT BUS
CONTROL FWD BUS
1&2
3&4
5&6
7&8
LLC/D24
RLC/B18
LLC/D23
RLC/B17
LLC/D25
RLC/B19
RLC/B20
LLC/D26
Left ESS
Rt. ESS
Left ESS
Rt. ESS
Left ESS
Rt. ESS
Rt. ESS
Left ESS
FUEL MISCELLANEOUS
FLOW IND AC
RLC/E1
AC Bus 5
Starting System Control
Total Fuel Flow Indicator
11
LLC
RLC
1-97/(1-98 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
FUEL SUPPLY SYSTEM

DESCRIPTION
FUEL TANK VENTING
FUEL CHECKOUT SYSTEM
FUEL SCAVENGE SYSTEM
FUEL SYSTEM CONTROLS AND INDICATORS
OPERATION
FUEL SYSTEM CHECKOUT
FUEL SYSTEM MANAGEMENT
DESCRIPTION
The fuel supply system (figure 1-35) is designed so
that the engines receive fuel from the nearest of
four main tanks or by pressure override from a
main manifold. The main manifold can be pressurized by any auxiliary tank or tanks. The main
tanks are integral wing tanks (wet wing); each
tank has four boost pumps and normally supplies
two engines. No. 1 main tank furnishes fuel for engines 1 and 2, No. 2 main for engines 3 and 4, No. 3
main for engines 5 and 6, and No. 4 main for engines 7 and 8. The auxiliary tanks include two outboard wing tanks which are integral wing tanks, an
integral center wing tank, three body tanks, and
two non-jettisonable external tanks. Normally, the
main manifold is used for directing auxiliary tank
fuel to the engines. The main manifold is separated
from the refuel manifold by the main refuel valve.
During a refueling operation, the main manifold is
used to direct fuel to the desired tanks. See REFUELING SYSTEM, this section. The main manifold may also be used to transfer fuel from auxiliary tanks to main tanks. A crossfeed manifold is provided which makes it possible to interconnect the
fuel feed systems of each nacelle. Auxiliary fuel
should be fed directly to the engines. While auxiliary fuel is being used, main tank boost pump
switches are ON. The boost pumps in the auxiliary
tanks are of higher capacity than the boost pumps
in the main tanks thus allowing a pressure override
condition to exist. When an auxiliary tank runs dry,
the main tank boost pumps take over fuel supply to
the engines with no interruption in fuel flow. The
fuel system panel (figure 1-38) is used to control
fuel flow for engine feed and air refueling operations. This panel indicates the flow of fuel obtained
by selecting different positions on the controls. The
majority of the fuel system controls are numbered
to simplify their identification (figure 1-38). The
control numbers that appear on the fuel system
panel correspond to the control identification num-
1-99
1-99
1-105
1-105
1-105
1-114
1-114
1-116
bers that appear in this manual. The main manifold is scavenged by utilizing a float switch, a solenoid-operated valve, and a scavenge pump which
directs scavenged fuel from the main manifold to
No. 3 main tank. For correct fuel specification
grade, see figure 1-186.
A schematic of the fuel system showing the detailed
mechanical configuration and function of the various fuel lines is given in figure 1-36. The fuel tank
quantities are listed in figure 1-37.
Fuel system circuit protection and the location of
the applicable circuit breakers is contained in figure 1-51.
FUEL TANK VENTING
Body fuel tanks are vented through three manifolds

to a surge tank aft of the aft body tank. The surge
tank opens to the atmosphere through a port located aft of the rear wheel well on the underside of
the fuselage and also routes fuel discharged
through the vents to the aft body tank. Body tank
cavities are vented through a manifold which opens
to the atmosphere through a port located aft of the
rear wheel well on the underside of the fuselage. Internal tanks in each wing are vented with a single
vent line for each tank. The three lines in each
wing drain to a wing surge tank located in each
wing tip. The surge tanks route fuel discharged
through the vents to No. 1 and No. 4 main tanks.
Each external tank is vented through a single line
which opens to the atmosphere through a port located on the aft outboard side of the tank strut. The
vent system is designed for JP-4 fuel only. See
RATE OF CLIMB LIMITATIONS WITH EMERGENCY FUEL (AVIATION GASOLINE), Section V,
for operating restrictions when using aviation gasoline.
Change 16
1-99
VENT
17
TO LEFT
WING SURGE
TANK
VENT
VENT
LEFT OUTBOARD
WING TANK
RIGHT OUTBOARD
WING TANK
RIGHT EXTERNAL
TO RIGHT
TANK
WING SURGE
TANK
T.O. 1B-52H-1
1-100
LEFT EXTERNAL
TANK
ENGINE
FEED
VENT
ENGINE
FEED
18
PYLONS
OFF
PYLONS
ON
FLUTTER
ADVISORY
SELECTOR
SWITCH
FUEL FLOW
INDICATOR SWITCH
(TYPICAL)
FUEL QUANTITY GAGE

(TYPICAL)
TO
NO. 1 AND NO. 2
MAIN TANK FUEL
QUANTITY GAGES
FROM
24
AFT SURGE TANK
ENGINE FEED
VENT
WING
TANKS
RESET
WING TANK
WARNING LIGHTS
(TYPICAL)
WING
TANKS
CAUTION
LIGHT
AFT BODY TANK
VENT
RETURN
DRAIN
VENT
TO REFUEL
SYSTEM
OVERBOARD
VENT
MAIN
REFUEL
VALVE
MID BODY TANK
FUEL FLOW
INDICATOR LIGHT
(TYPICAL)
CENTER WING TANK
FWD BODY TANK

FUEL PROBE
(TYPICAL)
MAIN MANIFOLD
INTERCONNECT VALVES
MAIN
MANIFOLD
29
28
A31658
ENGINE FEED
AUXILIARY TANK FUEL

FLOW CONTROL SWITCH
(TYPICAL FOR SWITCHES
NO. 17, 18, 23, 24, 25,
26 & 27)
29A
TO ALL OTHER
FUEL QUANTITY GAGES
29
OPEN
DEFUEL
VALVE
MAIN MANIFOLD
INTERCONNECT VALVES SWITCH
CLOSE
DEFUEL
VALVE
SWITCH
QUANTITY GAGES
PRESS TO TEST BUTTON
Fuel Supply System (Typical)
NO FUEL
FLOW FLASHER
MAIN
TANK LOW
TO MASTER
CAUTION LIGHTS
MAIN TANK LOW

CAUTION LIGHT
PUMP
PRESSURE
CHECK OUT
LIGHT
MAIN
MAINS
FROM LEFT
OUTBOARD
WING TANK
24 PSI
10 PSI
SCAVENGE
PUMP
PRESSURE
SWITCHES
NO. 1 MAIN TANK
AUXILIARY TANK
ENGINE FEED
CONTROL VALVE
SWITCH (TYPICAL)
OPEN
SOLENOID FLOAT
VALVE
SWITCH
NO. 3 MAIN TANK
NO. 2 MAIN TANK
ON
OFF
16
VENT
SURGE
TANK
DRAIN
MAIN TANK
BOOST PUMP
SWITCH NO. 4
(TYPICAL FOR
SWITCHES NO.
1, 2 & 3)
FUEL IN
MAIN MANIFOLD
FUEL IN
MAIN MANIFOLD
LIGHT
SOLENOID
VALVE
VENT
CABIN
AUX
PUMP PRESSURE
CHECKOUT
PRESS TO
RELIEVE
BUTTON
SCAVENGE
SYSTEM
SWITCH
OFF
OFF
FROM NO. 3 AND

NO. 4 MAIN TANK
FUEL QUANTITY
GAGES
LEFT WING
SURGE TANK
(TYPICAL FOR
RIGHT WING)
PUMP
PRESSURE
CHECK OUT
SWITCH
NO. 4 MAIN TANK
BOOST PUMP AND

CHECK VALVE (TYPICAL)
14
13
ENGINE CROSSFEED
MANIFOLD VALVE (TYPICAL)
CLOSED
EINGINE
FIREWALL
FUEL
SHUTOFF
VALVE
(TYPICAL)
15
CROSSFEED
AUXIILIARY TANK ENGINE FEED

CONTROL VALVE (TYPICAL)
MANIFOLD
10
11
PUMP PRESSURE
CHECKOUT LINES
ENGINE CROSSFEED
12
(TYPICAL)
12
CLOSED
THROTTLES
OPEN
MAIN TANK FUEL

LINES
16
OPEN
CROSSFEED FUEL
LINES
CLOSED
SCAVENGE LINES
ELECTRICAL
CLOSED
NACELLE NO. 2
TO ENGINE FUEL
CONTROL SYSTEM
FIRE SHUTOFF
(PULLED)
NORMAL
(IN)
ENGINE FIRE SHUTOFF
SWITCH (TYPICAL)
1-101
T.O. 1B-52H-1
A31659
NACELLE NO. 1
AUXILIARY TANK
FUEL LINES
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Fuel System Composite

PRESSURE SWITCH
MANUAL DRAIN VALVE
RELIEF VALVE
FUEL FLOW INDICATOR
CHECK VALVE PRESSURE LOADED
FUEL LEVEL CONTROL VALVE
CENTRIFUGAL PUMP
INLINE FLOAT SWITCH
FUEL PRESSURE DISCONNECT SWITCH
SOLENOID VALVE
SCAVENGE PUMP
OR
VALVE, SWING CHECK
A
AUXILIARY TANK ENGINE FEED CONTROL VALVE
C
I
D
11M 20
ENGINE CROSSFEED MANIFOLD VALVE

ENGINE FIREWALL FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE
MAIN MANIFOLD INTERCONNECT VALVE
DEFUEL VALVE
FLIGHT ESSENTIAL FUEL PUMPS
10M
9M
3
4
8M
14
A
10A
7M
10
FILTER (TYPICAL)
6M
C
1 2
5M
NO. 2
MAIN TANK
13
A
19
NO. 1 MAIN TANK
3A
17
LEFT EXTERNAL TANK
4M
1A
18A
MAIN TANK FUEL FLOW LINES

AUXILIARY TANK FUEL FLOW LINES
REFUEL MANIFOLD AND REFUEL LINES
2A
SCAVENGE LINES
VACUUM RELIEF LINES
18
CROSSFEED MANIFOLD
MAIN MANIFOLD
LEFT OUTBOARD
WING TANK
THERMAL RELIEF LINES

MANUAL DRAIN LINES
PRESSURE RELIEF LINES
A66327
1-102
Change 4
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AIR REFUELING RECEPTACLE
GATE VALVE, MOTOR OPERATED,

LINE MOUNTED
SINGLE POINT
REFUELING RECEPTACLE
25 23A
24A
FORWARD BODY TANK

CENTER WING TANK
26
25A
26A
NO. 3 MAIN TANK
21
12M
I 29
29A
30
13M
14M
15M
27A
15
A
11 C
27
28A
22A
16M
MID BODY TANK
17M
12 C
18M
29A
16
NO. 4 MAIN TANK
RIGHT
EXTERNAL
TANK
19M
22
30A
20A
24
22A
23A
28
21A
28A
31A
AFT BODY TANK
32A
23
RIGHT OUTBOARD WING TANK
A66328
Change 4
1-103
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Fuel Quantity Data

TANK CAPACITIES
USABLE FUEL (EACH)
TANKS
FULLY SERVICED (EACH)
NO.
POUNDS
GALLONS
POUNDS
NO. 1 AND 4 MAIN
31,843
4899
31,883
4905
NO. 2 AND 3 MAIN
44,259
6809
44,421
6834
MID BODY
46,410
7140
46,501
7154
FORWARD BODY
13,319
2049
13,345
2053
AFT BODY
55,192
8491
55,237
8498
OUTBOARD WING
7495
1153
7540
1160
CENTER WING
20,982
3228
21,060
3240
EXTERNAL
4550
700
4583
705
USABLE FUEL TOTALS

TANKS
POUNDS
NOTES
GALLONS
NO. 1, 2, 3, AND 4 MAIN
152,204
23,416
MAINS AND MID BODY
198,614
30,556
MAINS, MID BODY, FORWARD

BODY, AND AFT BODY
267,125
41,096
MAINS, ALL BODY, OUTBOARD

WING, AND CENTER WING
303,097
46,630
ALL TANKS
312,197
48,030
Figure 1-37
1-104
GALLONS
Fully serviced quantities include both

trapped and drainable fuel.
The tanks will have the quantities
shown under conditions of ICAO
standard day with fuel density of 6.5
pounds per gallon.
See data supplied in Section V,
OPERATING LIMITATIONS
to determine fuel loading.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
FUEL CHECKOUT SYSTEM
Fuel pressure gages and warning lights are not provided for each tank. To save weight, a fuel checkout
system is provided in the fuel system. This system
allows ground pressure checking of each boost
pump and each valve in the fuel system. To use the
fuel checkout system, fuel under pressure is routed
to a pressure switch by positioning various valves.
This switch is located in a fuel line between the
crossfeed manifold and the No. 2 main tank. The
pressure switches will close and supply power to illuminate a pressure checkout light, indicating proper system operation.
FUEL SCAVENGE SYSTEM
A separate scavenge system is provided for the

main fuel manifold and the refuel (cabin) manifold.
Each system has an ac powered pump, float switch,
and solenoid-operated valve, all under control of a
single scavenge switch. The main manifold fuel is
directed to the No. 3 main tank and the refuel (cabin) manifold fuel is directed to the No. 2 main tank.
The scavenge system controls and indicators are lo-
cated on the fuel scavenge system panel (figure

1-38) on the copilots instrument panel above the
fuel panels.
Continuous operation of a fuel scavenge

pump may cause damage. If the fuel-inmanifold light fails to go out after 20 minutes of operation, turn the scavenge system
switch OFF and annotate in the 781A.
FUEL SYSTEM CONTROLS AND INDICATORS
Fuel system controls and indicators located on the

copilots side of the main instrument panel are the
main fuel control panel, the flutter advisory selector, the scavenge system panel, and the system
checkout panel. The total fuel quantity gage, and
two caution lights on the central caution panel, are
located on the forward instrument panel below the
No. 1, 2, and 3 engine instruments. Figure 1-38 discusses the fuel system controls and indicators.
1-105
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Fuel System Controls and Indicators
1
2
3
4
5
MAIN TANK LOW CAUTION LIGHT

WING TANKS RESET CAUTION LIGHT
TOTAL FUEL QUANTITY GAGE
ENGINE CROSSFEED MANIFOLD VALVE
SWITCHES (SWITCHES 9 THRU 12)
MAIN TANK BOOST PUMP SWITCHES
(SWITCHES 1 THRU 4)
6
7
8
9
10
PUMP PRESSURE CHECKOUT LIGHT

FUEL QUANTITY GAGES (12 PLACES)
AUXILIARY TANK FUEL FLOW CONTROL
SWITCHES (SWITCHES 17, 18, 23 THRU 28)
MAIN TANK FUEL LEVEL CONTROL SWITCHES
(SWITCHES 19 THRU 22)
FUEL FLOW INDICATOR LIGHTS (12 PLACES)
1-106
T.O. 1B-52H-1
11
12
13
14
15
AUXILIARY TANK ENGINE FEED CONTROL

VALVE SWITCHES (SWITCHES 13 THRU 16)
FUEL FLOW CONTROL SWITCH LOCKS
WING TANK WARNING LIGHTS (2 PLACES)
QUANTITY GAGES PRESS-TO-TEST BUTTON
PUMP PRESSURE CHECKOUT PRESS-TO-RELIEVE BUTTON
16
17
18
19
20
21
PUMP PRESSURE CHECKOUT SWITCH

REFUEL LEVEL CHECKOUT SWITCH
FLUTTER ADVISORY SELECTOR SWITCH
DEFUEL VALVE SWITCH
SCAVENGE SYSTEM SWITCH
MAIN MANIFOLD INTERCONNECT VALVE
SWITCH (SWITCH 29)
1-107
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Fuel System Controls and Indicators (Cont)

NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
Main Tank Low Warning Light (amber)
An amber main tank low warning light is located on the central caution
panel . A 4000 pound or less indication of any main tank fuel quantity gage
completes a contact allowing right TR power to cause the main tank low
warning light to glow, indicating that the fuel quantity in one or more main
fuel tanks is below the 4000 pound level. A signal through the same circuit
is also sent to the pilots master caution lights and they will come on simultaneously with the main tank low warning light. The main tank low warning
light and the master caution lights will come on in the manner described
above except that a 10-second delay timer has been incorporated to prevent flashing of these lights due to fuel slosh and subsequent oscillation
of the main tank fuel quantity gages.
Wing Tanks Caution Light (amber)
A wing tanks caution light marked WING TANKS RESET located on the
central caution panel lights to warn the crew of improper fuel usage or fuel
configurations for which airspeed limitations may be required to avoid flutter. The pilots master caution lights will not come on when the WING
TANKS RESET light comes on. The wing tanks caution light comes on
simultaneously with the wing tank warning lights on the fuel system panel
and serves to warn the crew to check either or both wing tank fuel systems
for improper usage. The wing tanks caution light will go out when the reset
button beside the central caution panel is pushed. This allows the WINGS
TANKS RESET light to monitor the remaining circuits in its particular
system for any improper usage that may occur.
Total Fuel Quantity Gage
The total fuel quantity gage receives its indication by electronic addition
of indications of the individual fuel gages. A best flare speed indicator dial
is installed outside of total fuel quantity gage to allow determination of
gross weight and best flare speed directly from the quantity indication.
See Wing Flap System under FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM, this section,
for additional information on the best flare speed indicator.
FUNCTION
NOTE
Engine Crossfeed Manifold

Switches (Switches 9 thru 12)
Valve
If an individual fuel quantity gage malfunctions, the total fuel

quantity gage will be in error by the amount that the individual
quantity gage is in error. If the circuit breaker for the malfunctioning gage is pulled, the totalizer contribution from that gage
will be zero.
There is an allowable tolerance of 3400 pounds between the
total fuel quantity gage and the sum of all individual gage fuel
quantity gage readings.
Four engine crossfeed manifold valve switches on the fuel system panel
have unmarked OPEN- -CLOSED positions. These rotary switches are
numbered 9, 10, 11, and 12 and control operation of the engine crossfeed
manifold valves of corresponding numbers allowing interconnection of
the fuel systems of each nacelle. When the white stripe on a switch is
aligned with the flow line on the panel, the switch is OPEN and left essential dc power for valves 9 and 12 or right essential dc power for valves 10
and 11 is supplied to open the corresponding valves. CLOSED position
supplies power to close the valve. Engine crossfeed manifold valve
switches are numbered for ease of identification.
1-108
Change 16
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
5
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
Main Tank Boost Pump Switches

(Switches 1 thru 4)
Four main tank boost pump switches on the fuel system panel have
ON- -OFF positions and are guarded in the ON position. The switches are
numbered from 1 to 4 and each switch electrically controls the four boost
pumps in the corresponding main tank. Placing a switch in ON position
directs 205 volt three-phase ac power to the four boost pumps in the respective main tank. OFF position of a main tank boost pump switch deenergizes all the boost pumps in the respective main tank. Main tank boost
pumps are numbered for ease of identification.
Closure of the main tank switch guard may not actuate the boost
pump switch to the ON position. Apply firm pressure to the
toggle switch when placing it to the ON position and absolutely
ensure it is fully and completely ON before closing the guard.
6
Pump Pressure Checkout Light
When fuel pressure for the tanks selected by the pump pressure checkout switch (No. 16) reaches 10 psi for MAIN or 24 psi for AUX, the green
pump pressure checkout light illuminates.
Fuel Quantity Gages (12 Places)
The quantity of available (usable) fuel in each tank is indicated in pounds

by 12 fuel quantity gages on the fuel system panel. Fuel probes in each
tank sense the quantity of usable fuel. The fuel probe signals are relayed
to amplifiers in the gages. The fuel quantity gaging system may be in error
by as much as 1.5% of gage indication due to variation in fuel dielectric
constants. A full (by weight) indication of the fuel quantity gage breaks circuits causing the corresponding fuel level control valve to close if the
master refuel switch is ON. The main tanks, external tank, and outboard
wing tank fuel quantity gages for each wing have internal safe-level
switches which complete circuits to supply TR power to the MAIN TANK
LOW warning light (No. 1) or WING TANKS caution light (No. 2). See figure 5-1 for gage markings.
NOTE
For fuel densities greater than 6.5 lb/gal, the 6.5 LB/GAL fuel loading charts in T.O. 1B-52H-5 are applicable and should be used.
Auxiliary Tank Fuel Flow Control

Switches (Switches 17, 18, 23 thru 28)
Eight auxiliary tank fuel flow control switches on the fuel system panel
have unmarked REFUEL- -OFF- -ENGINE FEED positions. These
rotary switches are numbered 17, 18, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, and 28 and control of the flow of fuel to and from the auxiliary tanks. A white arrowhead
is painted on top of each switch and the direction the arrow is pointing determines the position of the switch. For ENGINE FEED position, the arrow
is pointed away from the tank, for REFUEL position, the arrow is pointed
toward the tank, and for OFF position, the arrow is perpendicular to the
flow line between tank and main manifold. ENGINE FEED position directs 205-volt three-phase ac power to the boost pumps in the respective
tank. REFUEL position causes TR power to energize the fuel level control
valves in the respective tank provided the master refuel switch is ON. See
REFUEL SYSTEM, this section. OFF position deenergizes the boost
pumps and the fuel level control valves in the respective tank. The
switches for the external and outboard tanks (switches 17, 18, 23, and 24
respectively) are equipped with fuel flow control switch locks (No.12).
Each lock is a pivoting bar with a detent that mates with an extension on
the corresponding switch. Auxiliary tank fuel flow control valves are numbered for ease of identification.
Change 16
1-109
T.O. 1B-52H-1

NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
Main Tank Fuel Level Control Valves

(Switches 19 thru 22)
Four main tank fuel level control valve switches on the fuel system panel
have unmarked REFUEL- -OFF positions. These rotary switches are
numbered 19, 20, 21, and 22 and control the flow of fuel to the main tanks.
When the white stripe on a switch is aligned with the flow line on the panel,
the switch is in REFUEL position and left and right TR power is supplied
to energize the fuel level control valves in the respective tank provided
the master refuel switch is ON. OFF position of a main tank fuel level control valve switch deenergizes the fuel level control valves in the respective
tank causing them to close. Fuel level control valves are numbered for
ease of identification.
10
Fuel Flow Indicator Lights (12 Places)
Twelve amber fuel flow indicator lights are located on the fuel system panel adjacent to the fuel quantity gages. Those indicator lights adjacent to
auxiliary tank gages perform a dual function:
1) indicating no fuel flow from the corresponding tank during fuel feed operations, and
2) indicating no fuel flow into the tank during refuel operations. Those indicator lights adjacent to the main tank gages perform only a single function, that of indicating no fuel flow into the tank during refuel operations.
With an auxiliary tank fuel flow control switch in ENGINE FEED position,
the boost pumps in the corresponding auxiliary tank supply fuel to the
main manifold. As soon as the auxiliary tank runs dry, a flow switch in the
line completes contacts allowing right TR power to cause the respective
fuel flow indicator light to flash, indicating no fuel flow from the tank. See
REFUEL SYSTEM, this section, for description of refuel function of the
lights.
NOTE
A fuel flow indicator light may flash intermittently when fuel

in an auxiliary tank is at a low level and the aircraft is being
maneuvered.
A fuel flow indicator light may not illuminate when an auxiliary
tank fuel flow control switch is in the ENGINE FEED position
and the auxiliary tank is empty. See FUEL SYSTEM MANAGEMENT, this section.
1-110
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
11
Auxiliary Tank Engine Feed Control

Valve Switches (Switches 13 thru 16)
Four auxiliary tank engine feed control valve switches on the fuel system
panel have unmarked OPEN- -CLOSED positions. These rotary
switches are numbered 13, 14, 15, and 16 and control operation of valves
of corresponding numbers to direct auxiliary tank fuel to the engines.
the switch is OPEN and left essential dc power for valves 14 and 15 and
right essential dc power for valves 13 and 16 is supplied to open the corresponding valves. CLOSED position closes the respective valve.
12
Fuel Flow Control Switch Locks
The switches for the left external, left outboard, right outboard, and right
external tanks (switches 17, 18, 23, and 24 respectively) are equipped
with fuel flow control switch locks. Each lock is a pivoting bar with a detent
that mates with an extension on the corresponding switch. The lock must
be pivoted away from the switch before the switch can be moved from
OFF position.
13
Wing Tank Warning Lights (2 Places)
Two amber wing tank warning lights on the fuel system panel are provided
to warn the crew of improper fuel usage or fuel tank configurations for
which airspeed limitations may be imposed to avoid flutter. The main, external, and outboard wing tank fuel quantity gages for each wing have internal safe level switches. If the fuel quantity indication of either main tank
in a wing is above the green band marking on the dial and the fuel quantity
indication of either the external or outboard wing tank for the same wing
is below safe level, the light will come on and remain on until the fuel quantity indications of both main tanks have reached the green band marking
area on the dial. The light will also come on if the fuel quantity indication
of either main tank in a wing is above the green band marking on the dial
and the respective outboard or external tank fuel flow control switch is in
the ENGINE FEED position.
If the flutter advisory selector switch is in the PYLONS ON position, the
wing tank warning light will come on any time an external tank is below
safe level or the fuel flow control switch for external tank is in the ENGINE
FEED position.
14
Quantity Gages Press-to-Test Button
The quantity gages press-to-test button on the fuel system panel is used
to test the circuit continuity. Pressing the button will cause clockwise rotation of all fuel quantity gage pointers and totalizer gage pointer up to 98%
(2%) scale. When the switch is released, all fuel quantity gage pointers
and totalizer gage pointer will return to their original position if the circuits
are functioning correctly.
15
Pump Pressure Checkout Press-to-Relieve Button
The pump pressure checkout press-to-relieve button on the fuel system

panel is utilized to relieve the fuel pressure built up by use of the pump
pressure checkout switch. Pushing this button causes left TR power to
energize and open a solenoid-operated valve to allow fuel pressure to
bleed off into No. 2 main tank.
1-111
T.O. 1B-52H-1

NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
16
Pump Pressure Checkout Switch
The pump pressure checkout switch on the fuel system panel is used for
ground checking of fuel pressure. The switch has MAINS--OFF--AUX
positions. MAINS position supplies left TR power to the low pressure side
of a pressure switch. When fuel pressure reaches 10 psi, the green pump
pressure checkout light (No. 6) on the fuel system panel glows. In AUX
position, left TR power is supplied to the high pressure switch. When fuel
pressure reaches 24 psi, the same pump pressure checkout light illuminates. OFF position completely deenergizes the pump pressure checkout circuits.
17
Refuel Level Checkout Switch
The refuel level checkout switch on the fuel system checkout panel on the
copilots side panel has PRIMARY- -OFF- -SECONDARY positions. This
switch is used to check the operation of the primary and secondary float
valves in the fuel level control valves. In order to check the valves in a
tank, an auxiliary tank fuel flow control switch or a main tank fuel level control switch must be placed in REFUEL position, the manifold to the tank
pressurized, and the master refuel switch on. PRIMARY position of the
refuel level checkout switch deenergizes the primary side of the fuel level
control valves (or valve) in the tank. This action permits fuel from the main
manifold to flood the primary float chamber in each fuel level control valve
in the tank, actuating the float valve to simulate a full-by-volume condition.
This causes the fuel level control valves to close. When the fuel level control valves (or valve) in a tank close, the fuel flow indicator light adjacent
to the appropriate fuel quantity gage glows steady. Moving the switch to
OFF position allows each primary float chamber to drain which allows the
fuel level control valves to open and the light to go out. SECONDARY
position performs the same function in the secondary float chamber. The
primary and secondary float chambers are the same level in any one
valve.
NOTE
The refuel level checkout switch can be used during air refueling to check operation of the fuel level control valves if absolutely necessary. However, their use in flight is not recommended. Use of these switches at such a time might cause a
pressure disconnect or might, as a remote possibility, result in
a fuel level control valve failing closed. It is recommended,
therefore, that fuel level control valve operation be checked before flight while fueling through the single point ground refueling
receptacle.
18
Flutter Advisory Selector Switch
The flutter advisory selector switch, a two position toggle switch, marked
PYLONS ON- -PYLONS OFF is located on the pilots instrument panel
and controls the wing tank warning light circuits. The PYLONS ON position will be used any time external pylons are installed and PYLONS OFF
will be used for a clean configuration.
1-112
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
19
Defuel Valve Switch
The defuel valve switch on the fuel scavenge system panel on the right
side of the pilots instrument panel in front of the copilot has OPEN- CLOSE positions and is guarded in CLOSE. This switch controls the defuel valve which separates the engine crossfeed manifold from the main
manifold. OPEN position supplies right TR power to the valve causing it
to open. CLOSE position causes the valve to close. This switch is normally used on the ground for defueling but may be used in flight. Care must
be exercised during inflight use because of high fuel flow rates.
20
Scavenge System Switch
The scavenge system switch on the fuel system panel has CABIN- -OFF- -MAIN positions, MAIN position directs right TR power to a
float switch in the scavenge line between the main manifold and No. 3
main tank. If there is fuel in the manifold, the float switch makes a contact
which causes the TR power to illuminate the fuel-in-main-manifold light,
open a solenoid shutoff valve, and energize a relay which directs 118-volt
single-phase ac power to the main manifold scavenge pump. The fuel in
the manifold is pumped into No. 3 main tank. As soon as the manifold is
scavenged, the float switch breaks contact causing the scavenge pump
to stop, the solenoid shutoff valve to close, and the fuel-in-main-manifold
light to go out. CABIN position actuates the scavenge operation in the refuel manifold. See AIR REFUELING SYSTEM, this section. OFF position
completely deenergizes the scavenge circuits in the main and refuel
manifolds.
21
Main Manifold Interconnect Valves

Switch (Switch 29)
A main manifold interconnect valves switch on the fuel system panel has
unmarked OPEN- -CLOSED positions. This rotary switch is numbered
29 and controls the operation of main manifold interconnect valves 29
and 29A. When the white stripe on the switch is aligned with the flow line
on the panel, the switch is OPEN and left TR power is supplied to open
valve 29 and right TR power is supplied to open valve 29A. Opening these
valves interconnects the right and left sides of the main manifold.
CLOSED position closes the two valves.
1-113
T.O. 1B-52H-1
FUEL SYSTEM OPERATION

A schematic of the fuel system showing the detailed
mechanical configuration and function of the various fuel lines is given in figure 1-36.
During ground operations, do not operate

the body or external tanks boost pumps
when these tanks are empty. With the aircraft in a level attitude, the tanks are considered empty when the applicable tank
gage reading is at or less than 300 pounds
in the forward body, 1000 pounds in the mid
body, 1200 pounds in the aft body, or 100
pounds in an external.
NOTE
The aircraft will not be flown with less than

two operational pumps in the mid and aft
body tanks. All external, outboard, forward,
and center wing boost pumps must be operational.
Fuel boost pump numbers 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15,
16, and 19 must be operational prior to
flight. No more than one of the remaining
two pumps in a single main tank may be
inoperative. This will preclude engine
flameout due to fuel starvation during
turns when any main fuel tank is in a low
fuel state.
FUEL SYSTEM CHECKOUT
A complete checkout of the fuel feed system for all

tanks may be accomplished as follows (figure 1-39):
NOTE
When pump pressure has caused the pump

pressure checkout light to glow, the pressure is trapped in the line and the light will
not go out immediately unless the pump
pressure checkout press-to-relieve button is
pressed. When it is stated in the following
steps that the light goes out after a valve
is closed or the pumps in a tank are turned
off, it is to be understood that after the described action has been accomplished, the
press-to-relieve button is pressed until the
light goes out.
Air trapped in the main manifold may
cause additional time to be required to relieve pressure in the main manifold when
1-114
Change 4
checking auxiliary tank boost pumps. This

additional time required can be substantially reduced by turning the master refuel
switch to ON, valve 29 to OPEN, and turning the tank switch of any tank that is less
than full to REFUEL prior to pressing the
press-to-relieve button.
1. Fuel Quantity Gage Press-to-Test Button
Pressed
Depress button to assure proper operation of fuel
gages.
2. Pump Pressure Checkout Switch MAINS,
light out
3. Fuel System Panel Switches 4 & 12 ON and
OPEN, light on
4. Switch No. 12 CLOSED, light out
5. Switch No. 4 OFF
6. Switches No. 3 & 11 ON and OPEN, light on
8. Switch No. 3 OFF
11. Switch No. 2 OFF
14. Switch No. 1 OFF
15. Pump Pressure Checkout Switch AUX
16. Switches No. 17, 13 & 9 ENGINE FEED,
OPEN, and OPEN, light on
17. Switch No. 17 OFF, light out
18. Switch No. 18 ENGINE FEED, light on
20. Switches No. 9 & 18 CLOSED and OFF
23. Switches No. 29 & 27 OPEN and ENGINE
FEED, light on
24. Switches No. 29 & 14 CLOSED, then OPEN
(in order), light out, then on (each time)
25. Switches No. 10, 14, 29 & 27 CLOSED,
CLOSED, CLOSED, and OFF, light out
30. Switches No. 11 & 25 CLOSED and OFF
31. Switches No. 12, 16 & 23 OPEN, OPEN, and
ENGINE FEED, light on
32. Switch No. 16 CLOSED, then OPEN, light
out, then on
35. Switches No. 12, 16 & 24 CLOSED, CLOSED,
and OFF, light out
36. Pump Pressure Checkout Switch OFF
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Fuel System Checkout
CHECKOUT OF LEFT EXTERNAL TANK SHOWN (TYPICAL)

QUANTITY GAGES
PRESS TO TEST
GREEN LIGHT ON
PUMP
PRESSURE
CHECKOUT
MSN
REFUEL
LEVEL
CHECKOUT
PRIMARY
OFF
3 ENG 4
5 ENG 6
1 ENG 2
FWD
BODY
10
9
25
AUX
12
11
CTR
WING
AFT
BODY
OFF
MAINS
NO.1NO.2
16
FUEL SYSTEM
CHECKOUT PANEL
ON
15
26
OFF
MAINS
NO.3NO.4
R OUTBD
R EXTERNAL
L OUTBD
WING
TANK
WARNING
MID
BODY
27
28
19
REFUEL
RECPT
L EXTERNAL
SECONDARY
PRESS TO
RELIEVE
PUMP
PRESSURE
CHECKOUT
14
ON
13
7 ENG 8
20
21
22
23
24
29
AMBER LIGHT ON
FUEL FLOW
STATIC
PUMP PRESSURE CHECK OF FUEL TANKS

PUMP PRESSURE
CHECKOUT
SWITCH POSITION
MAINS
OFF
AUX.
MAINS
OFF
AUX.
TANK
TO BE
CHECKED
MAIN TANKS
FUEL MANAGEMENT SWITCHES ON, OPEN

OR ENGINE FEED
(All other fuel management switches CLOSED or OFF)
NO. 4
NO. 3
NO. 2
NO. 1
4 and 12
3 and 11
2 and 10
1 and 9
AUX TANKS: LEFT EXTERNAL

LEFT OUTBOARD
AFT BODY
MID BODY
CENTER WING
FORWARD BODY
RIGHT OUTBOARD
RIGHT EXTERNAL
17, 13, and 9

18, 13, and 9
28, 14, and 10
27, 29, 14, and 10
26, 15, and 11
25, 15, and 11
23, 16, and 12
24, 16, and 12
A31664
Figure 1-39
1-115
T.O. 1B-52H-1
given in this section were designed to be
used in conjunction with proper fuel loading
procedures and, by following these sequences, maximum aircraft service life can
be realized.
During all auxiliary fuel transfer operations

below 25,000 feet MSL, an explosive condition exists due to the auto-ignition temperature of fuel vapors and the potential ignition source from a malfunctioning auxiliary
tank boost pump. Therefore, the auxiliary
tanks fuel control switches will be turned
off when the gage reads empty or the no
flow indicator light indicates a no flow condition. Auxiliary fuel flow control switches
will be turned off whenever fuel transfer is
to be stopped.
NOTE
Lateral fuel imbalance and engine flame

out due to fuel starvation may result if the
fuel balance is maintained without regard
to the reliability of the gages. Therefore,
prior to required fuel gage readings, the
fuel gages should be tested using the quantity gages press-to-test button. Also, when
transferring fuel, the expected increases
and decreases in fuel tank gage reading
should be confirmed.
The fuel supply system is designed so that the engines receive fuel from the nearest of the four main
tanks or from the main manifold. The main manifold is pressurized by the auxiliary tanks. When
auxiliary fuel is being used, main tank boost pump
switches are ON. The boost pumps in the auxiliary
tanks are of higher capacity than the boost pumps
in the main tanks thus allowing a pressure override
condition to exist. When an auxiliary tank runs dry,
the main tank boost pumps take over fuel supply to
the engines with no interruption in fuel flow. A
crossfeed manifold is provided which makes it possible to interconnect the fuel feed systems to each
nacelle. Proper management of the fuel supply system for any step in the fuel usage sequence is given
in figures 1-40, 1-42, 1-43, and 1-47. At any time an
unusual combination of engines is used, care should
be taken to manage fuel so as to maintain proper
center of gravity and fuel distribution. See Section
V for further information on fuel loading, cg location, and aircraft gross weight limitations. Also see
FUEL MANAGEMENT FOR LATERAL TRIM under CLIMB in Section II.
NOTE
The aircraft shall be loaded with fuel in accordance with procedures as outlined in
T.O. 1-1B-40, Handbook of Weight and Balance Data. Details of fuel loading are given
in T.O. 1B-52H-5. The fuel usage sequences
1-116
Change 17
Physical characteristics of JP-8 fuel cause

excessive smoke, torching, slow ignition,
and slow engine acceleration during engine
start when the ambient temperature is below 30 degrees F. To overcome the potentially adverse affects of JP-8 during alert start
at these temperatures, JP-4 fuel will be
loaded in the mid body and external fuel
tanks. The mid body and external tanks
will be serviced with JP-4 jet fuel to the required fuel load IAW T.O. 1B-52H-5. This
requirement applies when temperatures are
expected to remain below 30 degrees F.
When an auxiliary tank fuel flow control
switch is in the ENGINE FEED position
and the fuel flow indicator light fails to
flash when it is anticipated that the tank
should be empty, monitor the applicable
main tank quantity gage for an indication
of fuel use. A decrease in main tank fuel
quantity shows that the auxiliary tank is
not maintaining pressure (flow); therefore,
the next sequence step should be set.
If operations are planned above 488,000
pounds gross weight, refer to the applicable
appendix or the abbreviated checklist for
fuel sequences and air refueling distribution. The fuel distribution for SIOP increased gross weight operations is unique in
both initial fuel loading and subsequent
fuel usage for flight operations.
Fuel Tank Topcoat Peeling (FTTP) is the
blistering, peeling and flaking of the paint
on the internal surfaces of structural components (e.g. webs, stringers, skins, etc.)
within the integral fuel tanks. The paint
chips and flakes generated by FTTP have
the potential to contaminate and obstruct
fuel strainers and other fuel systems
screens at the fuel boost pump, engine fuel
pump, fuel control unit, and pressurization
and dump valve, possibly restricting fuel
flow to the engine. An Area of primary concern is the FTTP collecting at the main
tank boost pump screens and restricting
fuel flow to the engines. Along with maintenance procedures, analysis has shown
that if auxiliary fuel is used or the main
tank crossfeed valves are opened the risk of
engine fuel starvation during critical
phases of flight is further reduced.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Fuel Scavenging
When all auxiliary fuel has been used (to empty or

down to required ballast), the main manifold will be
scavenged as follows:
1. Mains to all engines
2. Scavenge system switch to MAIN
3. Main manifold interconnect valve switch No. 29
to OPEN
Turn scavenge system switch OFF and switch 29 to
CLOSED as soon as the fuel-in-manifold light goes
out.
NOTE
Fuel Usage Sequence (No Pylons)

Operating Weight (Basic Weight Plus Crew and Oil) CG
from 18.0% to 27.0% MAC
Closure of the main tank switch guard may

not actuate the boost pump switch to the ON
position. Apply firm pressure to the toggle
switch when placing it to the ON position and
absolutely ensure it is fully and completely
ON before closing the guard.
See figure 1-40 for abbreviated fuel sequences for
each of the following steps:
1. TAKEOFF. One of two fuel configurations is
used for takeoff, depending on the aircraft fuel
loading as described below:
For takeoff with mains 1 and 4 above green
band and center wing and aft body contain 2000
pounds or more each.
AFT BODY TO 1 AND 2
NO. 2 MAIN TO 3 AND 4
CENTER WING TO 7 AND 8
Turn fuel panel switches 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ON, 13
and 16 to OPEN, 26 and 28 to ENGINE FEED, all
other switches to OFF or CLOSED. Engines 3, 4, 5,
and 6 are being fed directly from the main tanks.
Engines 1, 2, 7, and 8 are being fed from the main
manifold by the pressure override condition.
For takeoff with either center wing or aft body
less than 2000 pounds.
MAINS TO ALL ENGINES (CROSSFEED
VALVES OPEN)
Turn fuel panel switches 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ON; 9, 10,
11, and 12 to OPEN; all other switches to OFF or
CLOSED. All engines are being fed directly from
the main tanks.
AFTER TAKEOFF. After takeoff, the remainder of
the fuel usage sequence, beginning with step 2, will
be employed except for step omissions where tanks
are empty or below specified quantities.
Immediately after initial climbout at high

power settings, energizing fuel pumps for
the center wing and body tanks may result
in a delay in fuel flow from these tanks.
This is a result of pump cavitation caused
by fuel air dissolution and is affected by
variables such as rate of climb, altitude,
fuel head, and fuel temperature. Immediate
flow may be obtained by reducing altitude.
However, if an altitude change is undesirable, some reduction in the cavitation period may be obtained by energizing the
pumps for approximately 3 minutes, deenergizing for approximately 2 minutes, energizing for approximately 3 minutes, and so
on until flow is established.
At initial level-off, main tanks may be replenished with fuel from body and center
wing tanks. Proper differential must be
maintained.
Fuel panel configurations for landing, transition, and low approaches are given following the normal fuel usage sequence steps.
These configurations can be entered from
any sequence step.
2. AFT BODY TO 1, 2, 3, AND 4

CENTER WING TO 5, 6, 7, AND 8 TO EMPTY
Fuel panel switches 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ON; 13, 14, 15,
and 16 to OPEN; 26 and 28 to ENGINE FEED; all
other switches to OFF or CLOSED. Depending on
the takeoff sequence used, some of the above panel
settings have been previously set. All engines are
being fed from the main manifold by the pressure
override condition.
3. AFT BODY TO 1, 2, 3, AND 4
FWD BODY TO 5, 6, 7, AND 8 TO EMPTY
Turn fuel system panel switch 25 to ENGINE
FEED and 26 to OFF. This panel configuration is
set as soon as the center wing tank runs dry and is
maintained until the forward body tank is empty.
All engines are being fed from the main manifold by
the pressure override condition.
4. MID BODY TO ALL ENGINES TO EMPTY
Turn fuel system panel switch 27 to ENGINE FEED
and 25 and 28 to OFF and 29 to OPEN. This panel
configuration is set as soon as the forward body tank
is empty and is maintained until the mid body tank
runs dry. All engines are being fed from the main
Change 19
1-117
T.O. 1B-52H-1
5. MAINS TO ALL ENGINES TO 20,000
POUNDS EACH IN MAINS 1 AND 4
Turn fuel panel switches 13, 14, 15, 16, and 29 to
CLOSED and 27 to OFF. This panel configuration
is maintained until mains 1 and 4 fuel quantity
gage pointers reach 20,000 pounds. All engines are
being fed directly from the main tanks.
6. AFT BODY TO ALL ENGINES TO EMPTY
OPEN and 28 to ENGINE FEED. This configuration is maintained until the aft body tank runs dry.
All engines are being fed from the main manifold by
the pressure override condition.
7. MAINS TO ALL ENGINES TO GREEN
BANDS FOR MAINS 1 AND 4
CLOSED and 28 to OFF. This configuration is
maintained until mains 1 and 4 fuel quantity gage
pointers indicate in the green band area. All engines are being fed directly from the main tanks.
NOTE
The following procedures may be used to

maintain desired main tank lateral balance
during cruise conditions:
1. Check auxiliary tank engine feed control
valve switches (13, 14, 15, and 16) closed.
2. Open crossfeed valve switches as required to feed the low tank engines from
the high tank.
3. Shut off boost pump switches in the low
tank. (Boost pumps should not be shut off
in more than one main tank at any time
except when specified in a fuel sequence.)
4. When the desired main tank balance is
attained, turn on all main tank boost pump
switches prior to closing the crossfeed
valves.
8. LEFT OUTBOARD TO 1 AND 2 TO EMPTY

RIGHT OUTBOARD TO 7 AND 8 TO EMPTY
Turn fuel system panel switches 13 and 16 to
OPEN, 18 and 23 to ENGINE FEED. This panel
configuration is set as soon as main tanks 1 and 4
are in the green band area and is maintained until
the outboard tanks run dry. Utilize outboard fuel as
necessary to obtain desired fuel distribution in
mains. Do not exceed upper limit of green band for
mains during transfer. Engines 3, 4, 5, and 6 are
being fed directly from the main tanks. Engines, 1,
2, 7, and 8 are being fed from the main manifold by
the pressure override condition. Glowing of a wing
tank warning light after this panel configuration is
set is an indication that one or both of the main
tank fuel quantity gages for the respective main
tanks have not reached the internal safe-level
switch that corresponds to the green band upper
limit. In this case, step 7 should be reset on the fuel
panel and maintained until the warning light goes
out. When the light goes out, step 8 should be reestablished.
9. LEFT EXTERNAL TO 1 AND 2 TO EMPTY
RIGHT EXTERNAL TO 7 AND 8 TO EMPTY
Turn fuel system panel switches 18 and 23 to OFF
and 17 and 24 to ENGINE FEED. This panel configuration is set as soon as the left and right outboard tanks run dry and is maintained until the
left and right externals are empty. Engines 3, 4, 5,
and 6 are being fed directly from the main tanks.
Engines 1, 2, 7, and 8 are being fed from the main
If the flutter advisory selector is in the PYLONS
ON position, the wing tank warning light will come
on any time the fuel flow control switch for external
is in the ENGINE FEED position.
1-118
T.O. 1B-52H-1
4 in green band area or when any main
tank is down to 5000 pounds can provide a
potential for engine flameout during a critical phase of flight.
10. MAINS TO ALL ENGINES (CROSSFEED

VALVES OPEN).
Turn fuel panel switches 13 and 16 to CLOSED.
Open all crossfeed valves (9, 10, 11, and 12 and 17
and 24 to OFF). All engines are being fed directly
from the main tanks.
ALL LANDING, TRANSITION, AND LOW
APPROACHES
These panel configurations are used at any time
when accomplishing landing, transition, and low
approaches.
MAINS TO ALL ENGINES
NOTE
Fuel system panel switches 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ON;

open all crossfeed valves (9, 10, 11, and 12). When
any main is down to 5000 pounds, open all crossfeed valves.
Failure to accomplish prescribed fuel panel

settings with fuel level in main tanks 1 or
During practice low approaches and landings, auxiliary fuel may be used as required
to keep fuel in main tanks 1 and 4 just below tops of green bands and balanced with
main tanks 2 and 3.
If auxiliary fuel usage is desired, it will be
transferred directly into main tanks
through the main manifold. See WING
FLUTTER AIRSPEED LIMITATIONS,
Section V, for speed restrictions associated
with use of auxiliary fuel in various aircraft
configurations. Auxiliary fuel will be used
in order of omitted steps.
For landings, transition and low approaches, open crossfeed valves,9,10,11 and
12 regardless of the green band.
Change 17
1-119
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Fuel System Operation with No Pylons

NOTE
OPERATING WEIGHT (BASIC WEIGHT PLUS CREW AND OIL) CG FROM
18.0% TO 27.0% MAC.
FUEL USAGE
STEP
1
(TAKEOFF)
REMARKS
AFT BODY TO 1 AND 2

MAIN 2 TO 3 AND 4
MAIN 3 TO 5 AND 6
FOR TAKEOFF WITH MAINS 1 AND 4 ABOVE GREEN

BAND AND CENTER WING AND AFT BODY CONTAIN
2000 POUNDS OR MORE EACH
OR
VALVES OPEN)
FOR TAKEOFF WITH EITHER CENTER WING OR AFT

BODY CONTAINING LESS THAN 2000 POUNDS, OPEN
ALL CROSSFEED VALVES (9, 10, 11 AND 12)
CLOSURE OF THE MAIN TANK SWITCH GUARD MAY NOT ACTUATE THE
BOOST PUMP SWITCH TO THE ON POSITION. APPLY FIRM PRESSURE TO THE
TOGGLE SWITCH WHEN PLACING IT TO THE ON POSITION AND ABSOLUTELY
ENSURE IT IS FULLY AND COMPLETELY ON BEFORE CLOSING THE GUARD.
2
AFT BODY TO 1, 2, 3 AND 4

CENTER WING TO 5, 6, 7 AND 8
CENTER WING TO EMPTY

FWD BODY TO 5, 6, 7 AND 8
FWD BODY TO EMPTY
MID BODY TO ALL ENGINES
MID BODY TO EMPTY
MAINS 1 AND 4 TO 20,000 POUNDS EACH
AFT BODY TO ALL ENGINES
AFT BODY TO EMPTY
MAINS 1 AND 4 TO GREEN BANDS

NOTE
OBSERVE WING FLUTTER LIMITATIONS IN SECTION V, IF REQUIRED.

8
LEFT OUTBOARD TO 1 AND 2

RIGHT OUTBOARD TO 7 AND 8
OUTBOARDS TO EMPTY
1-120
Change 17
T.O. 1B-52H-1
STEP
9
10
FUEL USAGE
REMARKS
LEFT EXTERNAL TO 1 AND 2

RIGHT EXTERNAL TO 7 AND 8
EXTERNALS TO EMPTY

VALVES OPEN)
OPEN ALL CROSSFEED VALVES (9, 10, 11 AND 12)
ALL LANDING, TRANSITION, AND LOW APPROACHES

VALVES OPEN)
OPEN ALL CROSSFEED VALVES (9, 10, 11, AND 12)

WITH ANY MAIN DOWN TO 5000 POUNDS, OPEN ALL
CROSSFEED VALVES (9,10,11 AND 12)
NOTE
FOR LANDINGS, TRANSITION AND LOW APPROACHES, OPEN CROSSFEED VALVES 9,10,11 AND 12
REGARDLESS OF THE GREEN BAND.
IF AUXILIARY FUEL USAGE IS DESIRED, IT WILL BE TRANSFERRED DIRECTLY INTO MAIN TANKS
THROUGH THE MAIN MANIFOLD. SEE WING FLUTTER AIRSPEED LIMITATIONS, SECTION V, FOR
SPEED RESTRICTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH USE OF AUXILIARY FUEL IN VARIOUS AIRCRAFT/MISSILE CONFIGURATIONS. AUXILIARY FUEL WILL BE IN ORDER OF OMITTED STEPS.
DURING PRACTICE LOW APPROACHES AND LANDINGS, AUXILIARY FUEL MAY BE USED AS REQUIRED TO KEEP FUEL IN MAIN TANKS 1 AND 4 JUST BELOW TOPS OF GREEN BANDS AND BALANCE WITH MAIN TANKS 2 AND 3.
Change 17
1-121
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Aft Body Fuel Adjustment Chart,

With No Pylons
NOTE
The aft body fuel adjustment chart may be used to set the CG to approximately 30% MAC for
takeoff. The use of this chart is optional for normal training missions.
INSTRUCTIONS:
DEDUCTIONS:
Enter chart with computed aircraft operating weight CG (% MAC).

Read left to right in a straight line until intersecting the diagonal line.
Read down in a straight line to the add aft body fuel line. The derived
aft body fuel is additional fuel to be added to the aft body fuel depicted
in the applicable fuel loading chart in T.O. 1B-52H-5.
Chaff
Flares
For conventional missions, with bombs in both the forward and aft
bomb bays, no corrections are required.
ADDITIONS:
Internal Bombs (Fwd Bomb Bay)
+210 Pounds/1000 Pounds
Figure 1-41
1-122
Change 4
500 Pounds
700 Pounds
NOTE
If the aircraft is already loaded with maximum fuel for
a 488,000 pound gross weight takeoff, additional aft
body (or mid body) fuel cannot be added. In this
case, move fuel from the mid body tank to the aft
body tank equal to the amount computed from the
chart. If the aft body becomes full before the entire
computed fuel figure can be moved from the mid
body, then move only that amount from the mid body
to fill the aft body.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Fuel System Operation With External AGM-86B Missiles
(Two Pylons-Symmetrical Loading)
Proper management of the fuel supply system when

carrying external AGM-86B missiles for SIOP/Positive Control Launch is accomplished by using the
sequence shown in figure 1-42 and for Training/
Tactical Ferry by using sequence in figure 1-47.
These sequences are usable for Operating Weight
cg from 18.0% to 27.0% MAC and will maintain the
aircraft cg within the safe operating limits shown in
figure 5-15.
Do not use SIOP/Positive Control Launch

fuel sequence for other than SIOP operations because aircraft structural life has not
been considered in the fuel sequence.
Fuel System Operation With External AGM-129 Missiles (Two Pylons-Symmetrical Loading)
Proper management of the fuel supply system when

carrying external AGM-129 missiles for SIOP/Positive Control Launch is accomplished by using the
sequence shown in figure 1-42 and for Training/
Tactical Ferry by using sequence in figure 1-47. The
operating weight cg for both SIOP/Positive Control
Launch and Training/Tactical is from 18.0% to
27.0%. This will maintain the aircraft cg within the
safe operating limits shown in figure 5-15.
Do not use SIOP/Positive Control Launch

fuel sequence for other than SIOP operations because aircraft structural life has not
been considered in the fuel sequence.
Fuel Sequence When Carrying External Conventional
Weapons
The fuel sequences in figure 1-42 or 1-47 will be

used for all missions which are to accomplish a
planned release. The fuel sequences are to be used
in conjunction with the aft body fuel adjustment
chart for carrying external conventional weapons,
figure 1-49.
NOTE
If external weapons are retained, continue

with this sequence and determine the
amount of external tank ballast fuel to be
retained from figure 1-50.
The fuel sequences and corresponding fuel
loads in T.O. 1B-52H-5 are based on fully
loaded two pylon configurations. Command
directives pertaining to nonstandard fuel
loads should be followed for partial stores
configurations.
1-123
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Fuel Sequence When Carrying External

Cruise Missiles - AGM-86B/C/D & AGM-129
SIOP/POSITIVE CONTROL LAUNCH
(TWO PYLONS SYMMETRICALLY LOADED OR ASYMMETRICALLY
LOADED 7, 9, OR 11 MISSILE CONFIGURATION) FOR OPERATING WEIGHT
CG FROM 18.0% TO 27.0% MAC.
DO NOT USE SIOP/POSITIVE CONTROL LAUNCH FUEL SEQUENCE FOR

OTHER THAN SIOP OPERATION BECAUSE AIRCRAFT STRUCTURAL LIFE
HAS NOT BEEN CONSIDERED IN THE FUEL SEQUENCE.
IN ORDER TO PREVENT EXCEEDING CG LIMITS, ACCOMPLISH THE FOLLOWING:
PRIOR TO LAUNCH/JETTISON OF EXTERNAL MISSILES AND PYLONS, FUEL
SPECIFIED IN FIGURE 1-45 SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE AFT
BODY TANK TO THE FORWARD BODY TANK.
NOTE
IF FUEL TRANSFER RESULTS IN A FUEL QUANTITY GREATER THAN THE

FORWARD BODY TANK CAPACITY, PUT THAT REMAINING FUEL IN THE
CENTER WING TANK.
IF TRANSFER OF FUEL FROM AFT BODY TANK TO FORWARD BODY TANK
WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND PLANNED LAUNCH/JETTISON WAS NOT ACCOMPLISHED, THE AIRCREW SHOULD RETURN THE FUEL TO THE AFT BODY
TANK AND RESUME THIS FUEL USAGE SEQUENCE.
IMMEDIATELY AFTER LAUNCH/JETTISON OF EXTERNAL MISSILE(S), CHECK
AIRCRAFT CG: IF CG IS AFT OF 30% MAC, REFER TO APPROPRIATE TRANSFER/GROSS WEIGHT CHART AND FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS.
FUEL USAGE
STEP
1
(TAKEOFF)
REMARKS

CROSSFEED VALVES OPEN (9,10,11 AND 12)
2
MID BODY TO EMPTY
AFT BODY TO 1, 2, 3, AND 4

CENTER WING TO 5, 6, 7, AND 8

MAINS 2 AND 3 UNTIL EQUAL TO MAINS 1 AND 4
1-124
Change 17
T.O. 1B-52H-1
STEP
FUEL USAGE
REMARKS
MAINS TO 5000 POUNDS EACH
AFT BODY TO BALLAST FUEL SHOWN IN FIGURE 1-46

NOTE
IF FUEL WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE FWD BODY AND CENTER WING

TANKS FOR WEAPON/PYLON LAUNCH/JETTISON, ACCOMPLISH STEP 7.
IF NO FUEL WAS TRANSFERRED, ACCOMPLISH STEP 7A.
7
7A
FWD BODY AND CENTER WING TO 3, 4, 5,

AND 6
FWD BODY AND CENTER WING TO EMPTY
OUTBOARDS TO 1, 2, 7, AND 8
OUTBOARDS TO BALLAST PER FIGURE 1-46
OUTBOARD TO ALL ENGINES
OUTBOARDS TO BALLAST
(RETAIN BALLAST FUEL SHOWN IN FIGURE 1-46 IF MISSILES ARE RETAINED FOR LANDING)
EXTERNALS TO ALL ENGINES
EXTERNALS TO BALLAST
(RETAIN BALLAST FUEL SHOWN IN FIGURE 1-46 IF MISSILES ARE RETAINED FOR LANDING)
SPEED RESTRICTED, SEE SECTION V FOR WING
FLUTTER AIRSPEED LIMITS

(CROSSFEED VALVES OPEN)


CROSSFEED VALVES (9, 10, 11, AND 12)
NOTE
FOR LANDINGS, TRANSITION AND LOW APPROACHES, OPEN CROSSFEED VALVES 9, 10, 11 AND 12 REGARDLESS OF THE GREEN BAND.
IF AUXILIARY FUEL USAGE IS DESIRED, IT WILL BE TRANSFERRED DIRECTLY INTO MAIN TANKS THROUGH THE MAIN MANIFOLD. SEE WING
FLUTTER AIRSPEED LIMITATIONS SECTION V FOR SPEED RESTRICTIONS
ASSOCIATED WITH USE OF AUXILIARY FUEL IN VARIOUS AIRCRAFT/MISSILE CONFIGURATIONS. AUXILIARY FUEL WILL BE IN ORDER OF OMITTED
STEPS.
Change 17
1-125
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Fuel Sequence When Carrying External

Cruise Missiles Asymmetrically Loaded
(One Pylon One Missile)
STEP
FUEL USAGE
1
(TAKEOFF)
REMARKS
USE 4000 POUNDS FROM EACH MAIN

CROSSFEED VALVES OPEN (9, 10, 11 AND 12)
2

FWD BODY TO 5, 6, 7, AND 8
FWD BODY TO EMPTY

MID BODY TO EMPTY

MAIN 2 TO 3 AND 4
MAIN 3 TO 5 AND 6
MAIN 2 EQUALS MAINS 1 AND 4 FOR LH PYLON
AFT BODY TO EMPTY
MAINS TO 9,000 POUNDS EACH (MAINTAIN DIFFEREN1

TIAL FUEL IN MAIN 2 OR 3)
OUTBOARDS TO ALL ENGINES
EXTERNALS TO BALLAST PER FIGURE 1-46
10
CROSSFEED VALVES OPEN
MAIN 3 EQUALS MAIN 1 AND 4 FOR RH PYLON
LATERAL DIFFERENTIAL:
AVERAGE PYLON: APPROXIMATELY 4200 POUNDS
AGM-86B/C/D: APPROXIMATELY 3600 POUNDS
AGM-129: APPROXIMATELY 4200 POUNDS
NOTE
FUEL TRANSFER (AFT BODY TANK TO FWD BODY TANK) IS NOT REQUIRED FOR MISSILE AND PYLON LAUNCH OR JETTISON.
1-126
Change 17
T.O. 1B-52H-1
(One Pylon Two Thru Six Missiles)

STEP
1
(TAKEOFF)
FUEL USAGE
REMARKS

CROSSFEED VALVES OPEN (9, 10, 11 AND 12)
2

FWD BODY TO EMPTY


MID BODY TO 3, 4, 5, AND 6
MAINS 1 AND 4 EQUALS MAIN 2 FOR LH PYLON
MID BODY TO EMPTY
AFT BODY TO LANDING BALLAST, FIGURE 1-46 (16,000

POUND MINIMUM IF PYLON AND WEAPONS ARE PRESENT)
MAINS TO 9,000 POUNDS EACH (MAINTAIN DIFFERENTIAL FUEL IN MAIN 2 OR 3 OPPOSITE EXTERNAL
AGM-86B OR AGM-129)
AFT BODY TO BALLAST PER FIGURE 1-46
MAINS 1 AND 4 EQUALS MAIN 3 FOR RH PYLON
NOTE
IF FUEL HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED TO THE FWD BODY TANK FOR WEAPON/PYLON LAUNCH/JETTISON, ACCOMPLISH STEP 9. IF NO FUEL WAS
TRANSFERRED TO FWD BODY TANK, ACCOMPLISH STEP 9A.
9

LH OUTBOARD TO 1 AND 2
RH OUTBOARD TO 7 AND 8
FWD BODY TO EMPTY
9A
10
EXTERNALS TO BALLAST PER FIGURE 1-46
11
CROSSFEED VALVES OPEN
NOTE
FUEL TRANSFER FOR LAUNCH/JETTISON OF EXTERNAL WEAPONS AND
PYLON (AFT BODY TANK TO FWD BODY TANK):
OPERATING WEIGHT CG OF 18.0% TO 22.0% MAC; NO FUEL TRANSFER
REQUIRED.
OPERATING WEIGHT CG OF 22.0% TO 27.0% MAC;
TWO FORWARD WEAPONS; NO FUEL TRANSFER REQUIRED
ADDITIONAL FORWARD WEAPON: 2,000 POUNDS
AFT WEAPONS: 600 POUNDS EACH
PYLON: 2,000 POUNDS
Change 17
1-127
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Aft Body Fuel Adjustment Chart for Carrying

External Cruise Missiles
AGM-86B/C/D MISSILES
NOTE
(TWO PYLONS SYMMETRICAL LOADED)
OPERATING WEIGHT CG, %MAC

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
EXTERNAL AGM86 MISSILES
27
PYLO
FWD
N MIS
SILE
POSI
TION
18 19
22
20
18
16
14
12
10
ADD AFT BODY FUEL 1000 LBS
DEDUCT AFT BODY FUEL

A31666
Additional Aft Body Fuel (Pounds)

(If full, add to mid body)
1-128
Change 20
T.O. 1B-52H-1
INSTRUCTIONS:
ADDITIONS:
Enter the chart with the number of forward pylon position missiles.
Read right to left in a straight line until intersecting the computed aircraft operating weight CG (%MAC) line. Read down in a straight line
to the aft body fuel line. This fuel will be additional fuel to be added to
aft body fuel depicted in the applicable fuel loading chart in T.O.
1B-52H-5. In some cases, fuel must be deducted from the aft body. If
fuel must be deducted from the aft body, move the computed amount
from the aft body to the mid body.
Aft Pylon Position Missiles +1000 Pounds/Missile

DEDUCTIONS:
Chaff
Flares
500 Pounds
700 Pounds
NOTE
If the aircraft is already loaded with maximum fuel for a 488,000 pound gross weight takeoff, additional aft body (or mid body) fuel cannot be added. In that case, move fuel from the mid body tank
to the aft body tank equal to the amount computed from the chart. If the aft body becomes full
before the entire computed fuel figure can be moved from the mid body, then move only that
amount from the mid body to fill the aft body.
1-129
T.O. 1B-52H-1

External Cruise Missiles (Cont)
AGM-129 MISSILES
NOTE
(TWO PYLONS SYMMETRICAL LOADING OR 7, 9, 11 MISSILE LOADING)
INSTRUCTIONS:
NOTE
Enter the chart with the number of forward pylon position missiles.
Read right to left in a straight line until intersecting the computed aircraft operating weight CG (% MAC) line. Read down in a straight line
to the aft body fuel line. This fuel will be additional fuel to be added to
the aft body fuel depicted in the applicable fuel loading chart in T.O.
1B-52H-5.
ADDITIONS:
Aft Pylon Position Missiles
+1200 Pounds/Missile
DEDUCTIONS:
Chaff
Flares
CSRL Weapons
Forward pylon positions are to be loaded first.

If total adjustment is positive, add to the aft body fuel
found on the primary fuel loading chart. If aft body
fuel tank is full, add remainder to mid-body fuel.
If total adjustment is negative, reduce aft body fuel by
that amount and add that fuel to mid-body fuel.
If the aircraft is already loaded with maximum fuel for
a 488,000 pound gross weight takeoff, additional aft
body (or mid body) fuel cannot be added. In that
case, move fuel from the mid body tank to the aft
body tank equal to the amount computed from the
chart. If the aft body becomes full before the entire
computed fuel figure can be moved from the mid
body, then move only that amount from the mid body
to fill the aft body.
500 Pounds
700 Pounds
50 Pounds/
1000 Pounds
1-130
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Forward Body Ballast Fuel Required for Launch/

Jettison of External Cruise Missiles
Gross Weight 200,000 to 340,000 Pounds
(SIOP/Positive Control Launch)
FUEL TRANSFER (AFT BODY TO FWD BODY) POUNDS
AIRCRAFT CG
% MAC
6 FWD MISSILES
35
13,400
9,000
4,400
2,800
34
13,000
8,400
4,200
2,600
33
12,800
8,100
4,100
2,300
32
11,600
7,800
4,000
2,000
31
10,400
6,600
2,800
800
30
9,200
5,400
1,600
29
8,100
4,200
600
28
7,000
3,000
27
5,800
1,900
26
4,600
800
25
3,500
24
2,400
23
1,200
22
21
4 FWD MISSILES
2 FWD MISSILES
1 FWD MISSILE
PYLON ONLY JETTISON

AIRCRAFT CG FWD OF 29% MAC; NO TRANSFER REQUIRED.
AIRCRAFT CG 29 TO 35% MAC; TRANSFER 2000 POUNDS/PYLON
1
TRANSFER OF FUEL FOR AFT LOADED MISSILES NOT REQUIRED.

NOTE
TRANSFER AN ADDITIONAL 500 POUNDS OF FUEL FOR EACH AFT LOADED MISSILE EXPENDED ALONG WITH A FORWARD MISSILE. FOR LAUNCH/JETTISON OF AFT MISSILES
ONLY, USE THE AFT MISSILE ONLY FUEL TRANSFER CHART.
TOTAL FUEL TRANSFERS OF LESS THAN 1000 POUNDS FOR A LAUNCH/JETTISON COMBINATION MAY BE OMITTED.
IF FUEL TRANSFER IS GREATER THAN FORWARD BODY TANK CAPACITY, TRANSFER
ADDITIONAL FUEL TO CENTER WING TANK.
FOR POST LAUNCH/JETTISON CGs OF 30% TO 35% MAC, AN AFT BODY TANK FUEL
BURN OF 3,000 POUNDS FOR EACH 1% AFT OF 30% IS REQUIRED BEFORE RESUMING
THE SIOP FUEL SEQUENCE.
1-131
T.O. 1B-52H-1

Jettison of External Cruise Missiles (Cont)
AIRCRAFT CG
% MAC
6 FWD MISSILES
35
13,600
9,200
4,800
2,800
34
13,000
8,400
4,400
2,400
33
12,300
8,100
4,200
2,200
32
11,600
7,800
4,000
2,000
31
9,600
6,300
2,500
400
30
8,600
4,800
1,000
29
7,100
3,200
28
5,600
1,600
27
4,100
26
2,600
25
1,200
24
23
4 FWD MISSILES
2 FWD MISSILES
400
NOTE
1-132
0
0
PYLON ONLY JETTISON

1
1 FWD MISSILE
T.O. 1B-52H-1

AIRCRAFT CG
% MAC
6 FWD MISSILES
35
14,000
9,200
5,600
3,200
34
13,000
8,400
5,000
2,800
33
12,000
8,100
4,500
2,400
32
11,000
7,800
4,000
2,000
31
9,000
6,100
2,200
400
30
7,000
4,200
400
29
5,200
2,300
28
3,400
400
27
1,700
26
0
0
25
4 FWD MISSILES
2 FWD MISSILES
1 FWD MISSILE
PYLON ONLY JETTISON

1

NOTE
1-133
T.O. 1B-52H-1

Jettison of External Cruise Missiles (Cont)
Aft Missiles Only
AIRCRAFT CG
% MAC
6 AFT MISSILES
4 AFT MISSILES
2 AFT MISSILES
35
5,200
4,000
2,400
1,600
34
4,800
3,600
2,000
1,200
33
4,600
3,400
1,800
1,000
32
4,400
3,200
1,600
31
3,000
1,500
30
1,500
29
NOTE
USE THE AFT MISSILES ONLY FUEL TRANSFER CHART WHEN AN AFT MISSILE IS EXPENDED, WHEN NO FORWARD MISSILES ARE EXPENDED, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER
THERE ARE FORWARD MISSILES REMAINING.
1-134
1 AFT MISSILE
Change 4
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Ballast Fuel for Landing With

AGM-86B/C/D
INSTRUCTIONS:
BALLAST ADDITIONS:
Enter the chart with the number of aft pylon

position missiles, then move up the diagonal line to
the number of fwd pylon position missiles. Read
left in a straight line from the number of fwd pylon
position missiles to the computed aircraft operating
weight CG (% MAC) line. Read down in a straight
line to the ballast fuel line. The computed ballast
fuel will be retained if landing with cruise missiles.

+210 Pounds/1000 pounds
EXAMPLE:
Chaff
Flares
CSRL Weapons
AGM-86 Pylons
+3000 Pounds/Pylon
BALLAST DEDUCTIONS:
Four forward AGM-86 missiles on a 20% MAC

operating weight requires full external tanks and
13,700 pounds (7700 + 3000/PYLON) in the
outboard wing tanks.
500 Pounds
700 Pounds
50 Pounds/
1000 Pounds
NOTE
For landing ballast with asymmetrical loaded missiles double the number of missiles to account for main 2 or 3 fuel retained for lateral balance.
Additional aft body fuel may be retained, if practical, in order to move the aircraft landing CG
(% MAC) further aft of the forward landing CG limit.
Chart and adjustments valid for operating weight CG 18.0% to 27.0% MAC.
For landing ballast fuel with asymmetrical pylon/weapon configurations, double the pylon/
weapon quantities of the heavy side configuration and enter the chart with these quantities.
Change 20
1-135
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Ballast Fuel for Landing With

AGM-129
INSTRUCTIONS:
BALLAST ADDITIONS:
Enter the chart with the number of aft pylon

position missiles, then move up the diagonal line to
the number of fwd pylon position missiles. Read
left in a straight line from the number of fwd pylon
position missiles to the computed aircraft operating
weight CG (% MAC) line. Read down in a straight
line to the ballast fuel line. The computed ballast
fuel will be retained if landing with cruise missiles.

AGM-129 Pylons
+3000 Pounds/Pylon
BALLAST DEDUCTIONS:
Chaff
Flares
CSRL Weapons
EXAMPLE:
Four forward AGM-129 missiles on a 20% MAC
operating weight requires full external tanks and
14,400 pounds (8400 + 3000/PYLON) in the
outboard wing tanks.
500 Pounds
700 Pounds
50 Pounds/
1000 Pounds
NOTE
Rotary launchers, bomb racks, and all other non-expendable useful load items are to be
included in the operating weight when installed.
Additional aft body fuel may be retained, if practical, in order to move the aircraft landing CG
(% MAC) further aft of the forward landing CG limit.
For landing ballast fuel with asymmetrical pylon/weapon configurations, double the pylon/
weapon quantities of the heavy side configuration and enter the chart with these quantities.
1-136
T.O. 1B-52H-1
SIOP INCREASED GROSS WEIGHT IN FLIGHT

NOTE
For AGM-86C/D missile carriage, use

AGM-86B missile data.
This section contains text and charts for use in SIOP
operations only. The information is specifically limited to air refueling and high altitude cruise flight operations with aircraft gross weight above 488,000
pounds. The flight test of the aircraft was limited to
these flight regimes. No fatigue analysis was accomplished for the increased gross weight operations, because the aircraft is not to be operated in this manner
(above 488,000 pounds) on a routine basis. In addition
to information concerning SIOP increased gross
weight, revised fuel loading charts and fuel usage sequences are provided to improve fuel economy on
SIOP missions. These Fuel Usage Sequences supplement parts of the B-52H Performance Data Appendix
(T.O. 1B-52H-1-1) for SIOP increased gross weight
operation. Reference is made to the basic non-SIOP
material when the revised SIOP increased gross
weight material is similar.
Revised procedures for management of fuel usage

and air refueling transfer are presented in this
part. Fuel usage sequences for various weapons
configurations are also included. An additional procedure for fuel transfer prior to launch/jettison of
external missiles has been added.
Fuel Usage Sequence (No External Missiles)
The fuel usage sequence in figure 1-46A provides

information to operate with an aft cg for fuel economy. It is intended for SIOP use on aircraft initially
loaded with a fuel configuration from ALERT
FUEL LOADING FOR CLEAN CONFIGURATIONS chart in T.O. 1B-52H-5. When operating the
aircraft with no external missiles, the attainable
SIOP increased gross weight will exceed 488,000
pounds and figure 1-46A will provide the desired
aircraft fuel management for SIOP increased gross
weight operations. The aircraft must have an operating weight (basic weight plus crew and oil), which
results in a center of gravity between 18.0% and
27.0% MAC in order to use these charts.
Fuel Usage Sequence (External AGM-86B Missiles)
The fuel usage sequences in figures 1-46B, 1-46C,

and 1-46D provide information to operate with an
aft cg for fuel economy with external AGM-86B
missiles installed. It is intended for SIOP use on
aircraft initially loaded with a fuel configuration
from ALERT FUEL LOADING FOR SYMMETRICALLY LOADED EXTERNAL AGM-86B MIS-
SILES CONFIGURATIONS (HEAVY GROSS

WEIGHT EXTENSION) chart in T.O. 1B-52H-5.
When operating the aircraft with external AGM86B missiles, the attainable SIOP increased gross
weight will be above 488,000 pounds and figures
1-46B, 1-46C, and 1-46D will provide the desired
aircraft fuel management for SIOP increased gross
weight operations. The aircraft must have an operating weight (basic weight plus crew and oil) which
results in a center of gravity between 18.0% and
27.0% MAC in order to use these charts.
Forward Body Ballast Fuel for Launch/Jettison of External Missiles
Prior to launch or jettison of an external missile, pilots shall take into consideration the aft cg shift
that will occur when the missile(s) separate from
the aircraft. For launch/jettison of all external missiles, the cg shift is significant. For single missile
launch/jettison, the effect on cg will not normally be
enough to exceed the aft limit. However, due to operation at SIOP increased gross weight with cg aft
for fuel economy, a single external missile launch/
jettison could exceed the aft cg limit during certain
phases of flight. Therefore, the aircrew will check cg
location at least 15 minutes prior to any external
missile launch/jettison to ascertain if the cg should
be adjusted forward. Fuel transfer from the aft
body to the forward body tank is the most suitable
method for attaining a forward cg shift. The procedures to be followed by the aircrew to determine if
aircraft cg location must be adjusted prior to
launch/jettison of external missiles are as follows:
1. Check Launch/Jettison CG Limit Range. Refer to
AGM-86 LAUNCH/JETTISON CENTER OF
GRAVITY LIMITS, Section V, for aircraft launch/
jettison aft cg limits.
2. Determine CG Location. Aircraft cg location may
be determined by use of the load adjuster.
3. Transfer Fuel (if required). Ballast fuel specified
in figure 1-45 should be transferred from the aft
body tank to the forward tank to prevent exceeding
cg limits due to launch/jettison of external
AGM-86B missiles. The procedure should be initiated at least 15 minutes prior to launch/jettison of
external missiles to allow time for fuel transfer
from the aft body to the forward body tank. If a series of single external missile releases in anticipated, with only a short time between each release,
the cumulative cg shift can easily exceed the aft
limit. Therefore, if rapid succession single launch/
jettison occurs, it should be treated as a multiple
launch/jettison.
Change 20
1-136A
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Summary of Launch/Jettison CG Factors
Although many combinations of weapons load and

fuel distribution are attainable on an SIOP sortie, it
is possible to make a useful summary of the data
pertaining to cg requirements for launch/jettison of
external missiles. The aircrew should be aware of
the following:
1. AGM-86B Missiles. While on the fuel sequence
provided in figures 1-46B, 1-46C, and 1-46D, for
any combination of launch/jettison of external
AGM-86B missiles, determine the amount of ballast
fuel to be transferred, utilizing figure 1-45 from the
aft body tank to the forward body tank. If this
transfer is not possible due to fuel distribution,
transfer as much fuel as possible (aft to forward)
while not exceeding the amount specified in figure
1-45. If fuel transfer is greater than forward body
tank capacity, transfer additional fuel to the center
1-136B
Change 12
wing tank. If this transfer is not possible due to aft

body burn, transfer as much fuel as possible from
the aft body tank to the forward body tank not to
exceed the amount specified in figure 1-45. This
will ensure a safe cg with this fuel configuration.
Immediately after launch/jettison of external missile(s), check aircraft cg. If cg is aft of 30% MAC, refer to the appropriate transfer/gross weight chart
(figure 1-45) and follow instructions. If fuel in the
aft body is insufficient due to prior aft body burn
and/or transfer, burn aft body to empty.
2. For conditions other than those listed in 1, the
load adjuster should be used to determine the aircraft cg. Figure 1-45 should be utilized in conjunction with AGM-86 LAUNCH/JETTISON CENTER
OF GRAVITY LIMITS, HEAVY GROSS WEIGHT
EXTENSION (Section V) and the actual aircraft cg
to determine if it is safe to launch/jettison external
missiles.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Fuel Sequence - Increased Gross Weight

No External Missiles
NOTE
DO NOT USE THIS FUEL SEQUENCE UNLESS THE AIRCRAFT OPERATING
WEIGHT (BASIC WEIGHT PLUS CREW AND OIL) RESULTS IN A CG BETWEEN 18.0% AND 27.0% MAC.
STEP
1
(TAKEOFF)
FUEL USAGE
REMARKS
AFT BODY TO 1 AND 2

MAIN 2 TO 3 AND 4
MAIN 3 TO 5 AND 6
FOR TAKEOFF WITH MAINS 1 AND 4 ABOVE GREEN

BAND AND CENTER WING AND AFT BODY CONTAIN
2000 POUNDS OR MORE EACH
OR
FOR TAKEOFF WITH AND EITHER CENTER WING OR

AFT BODY CONTAIN LESS THAN 2000 POUNDS OPEN
ALL CROSSFEED VALVES (9, 10, 11, AND 12)
2

CENTER WING TO 5, 6, 7 AND 8

FWD BODY TO EMPTY
MID BODY TO EMPTY
AFT BODY - USE 8000 POUNDS
MAINS 1 AND 4 TO 5000 POUNDS EACH
AFT BODY TO EMPTY, OPEN ALL CROSSFEED VALVES

(9, 10, 11, AND 12)
LEFT OUTBOARD TO 1 AND 2

RIGHT OUTBOARD TO 7 AND 8
OUTBOARDS TO EMPTY, OPEN ALL CROSSFEED

VALVES (9, 10, 11, AND 12)
Figure 1-46A (Sheet 1 of 2)
Change 17
1-136C
T.O. 1B-52H-1

No External Missiles (Cont)
STEP
FUEL USAGE
REMARKS
10
LEFT EXTERNAL TO 1 AND 2

RIGHT EXTERNAL TO 7 AND 8
EXTERNALS TO EMPTY, OPEN ALL CROSSFEED

VALVES (9, 10, 11, AND 12)
11


NOTE
FOR LANDING, TRANSITION AND LOW APPROACHES, OPEN CROSSFEED

VALVES 9,10,11 AND 12.
IF AUXILIARY FUEL USAGE IS DESIRED, IT WILL BE TRANSFERRED DIRECTLY INTO MAIN TANKS THROUGH THE MAIN MANIFOLD. SEE WING FLUTTER
AIRSPEED LIMITATIONS, SECTION V, FOR SPEED RESTRICTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH USE OF AUXILIARY FUEL IN VARIOUS AIRCRAFT/MISSILE CONFIGURATIONS. AUXILIARY FUEL WILL BE USED IN ORDER OF OMITTED
STEPS.
FUEL TRANSFER DURING AIR REFUELING

IF OUTBOARDS AND EXTERNALS ARE NOT FULL, REFUEL OUTBOARDS, EXTERNALS AND MAINS UNTIL
OUTBOARDS AND EXTERNALS ARE FULL. THEN REFUEL ALL TANKS SIMULTANEOUSLY UNTIL DESIRED
GROSS WEIGHT IS ACHIEVED.
NOTE
THE AIRCRAFT IS SPEED LIMITED UNTIL EXTERNALS ARE FULL, SEE WING FLUTTER AIRSPEED
LIMITATIONS CHART IN SECTION V OF THIS MANUAL.
WING TANKS MUST BE FULL AT GROSS WEIGHTS ABOVE 500,000 POUNDS.
1-136D
Change 17
T.O. 1B-52H-1

Symmetrical External Load of
Two and Four AGM-86B Missiles
(GROSS WEIGHT OVER 488,000 POUNDS - TWO PYLONS - SYMMETRICALLY LOADED WITH TWO OR FOUR AGM-86 MISSILES) FOR OPERATING
WEIGHT CG FROM 18.0% TO 27.0% MAC.)
DO NOT USE INCREASED GROSS WEIGHT SIOP/POSITIVE CONTROL LAUNCH

FUEL SEQUENCE FOR OTHER THAN SIOP OPERATION BECAUSE AIRCRAFT
STRUCTURAL LIFE HAS NOT BEEN CONSIDERED IN THE FUEL SEQUENCE.
SPECIFIED IN FIGURE 1-45 SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE AFT BODY
TANK TO THE FORWARD BODY TANK.
IF THIS TRANSFER IS NOT POSSIBLE DUE TO FUEL DISTRIBUTION, TRANSFER AS MUCH FUEL AS POSSIBLE FROM THE AFT BODY TANK TO THE FORWARD BODY TANK NOT TO EXCEED THE AMOUNT SPECIFIED IN FIGURE 1-45.
STEP
1
(TAKEOFF)
NOTE
IF FUEL TRANSFER IS GREATER THAN THE FORWARD BODY TANK CAPACITY, TRANSFER ADDITIONAL FUEL TO THE CENTER WING TANK.
IF MISSILES ARE TO BE LAUNCHED WITHIN AN HOUR AFTER REFUELING,
RETAIN THE FORWARD BODY BALLAST FUEL SPECIFIED IN FIGURE 1-45
DURING STEP 2 OF THIS FUEL USAGE SEQUENCE.
IF TRANSFER OF BALLAST FUEL FROM AFT BODY TANK TO FORWARD
BODY TANK WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND PLANNED LAUNCH/JETTISON WAS
NOT ACCOMPLISHED, THE AIRCREW SHOULD RETURN THE BALLAST FUEL
TO THE AFT BODY TANK AND RESUME THIS FUEL USAGE SEQUENCE.
AIRCRAFT CG: IF CG IS AFT OF 30% MAC, REFER TO APPROPRIATE TRANSFER/GROSS WEIGHT CHART (FIGURE 1-45) AND FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS.
FUEL USAGE
REMARKS

Figure 1-46B (Sheet 1 of 3)
Change 17
1-136E
T.O. 1B-52H-1

Two and Four AGM-86B Missiles (Cont)
STEP
FUEL USAGE
REMARKS
FWD BODY TO ALL ENGINES
FWD BODY TO EMPTY

MID BODY TO EMPTY

UNTIL MAINS 2 AND 3 EQUAL TO MAINS 1 AND 4
MAINS TO 15,000 POUNDS EACH
AFT BODY TO EMPTY
LEFT OUTBOARD 1, 2, 3, AND 4
OUTBOARDS TO BALLAST
(RETAIN BALLAST FUEL SHOWN IN FIGURE 1-46
IF MISSILES ARE RETAINED FOR LANDING)
RIGHT OUTBOARD TO 5, 6, 7, AND 8

10
FWD BODY (BALLAST) TO ALL

ENGINES
FWD BODY TO EMPTY

(FUEL WHICH WAS TRANSFERRED TO FWD BODY FOR
MISSILE LAUNCH)
11
EXTERNALS TO BALLAST
(RETAIN BALLAST FUEL SHOWN IN FIGURE 1-46
IF MISSILES ARE RETAINED FOR LANDING)
12
1-136F
Change 12
T.O. 1B-52H-1

Two and Four AGM-86B Missiles (Cont)
STEP
FUEL USAGE
REMARKS


NOTE

STEPS.

IF OUTBOARDS AND EXTERNALS ARE NOT FULL, REFUEL MAINS, OUTBOARDS, EXTERNALS AND AFT
BODY UNTIL OUTBOARDS AND EXTERNALS ARE FULL, THEN REFUEL ALL TANKS EXCEPT FORWARD
BODY UNTIL MAINS ARE FULL AND AFT BODY CONTAINS AT LEAST 36,000 POUNDS, THEN REFUEL ALL
TANKS SIMULTANEOUSLY UNTIL DESIRED GROSS WEIGHT IS ACHIEVED.
NOTE
MAINTAIN MAINS AS CLOSE TO 9000 POUNDS EACH AS POSSIBLE. AT NO TIME SHOULD MAINS
BE ALLOWED TO BE LESS THAN 5000 POUNDS.
THE AFT BODY SHOULD BE FULL AFTER REFUELING.
FOR AIRCRAFT WITH OPERATING WEIGHT CG FORWARD OF 22% MAC, LIMIT FORWARD BODY
FUEL TO 8000 POUNDS
Change 17
1-136G
T.O. 1B-52H-1

Six thru Twelve AGM-86B Missiles
(GROSS WEIGHT OVER 488,000 POUNDS - TWO PYLONS - SYMMETRICALLY LOADED IN WITH SIX TO TWELVE MISSILE CONFIGURATION) FOR
OPERATING WEIGHT CG FROM 18.0% TO 27.0% MAC.
DO NOT USE INCREASED GROSS WEIGHT SIOP/POSITIVE CONTROL LAUNCH

FUEL SEQUENCE FOR OTHER THAN SIOP OPERATION BECAUSE AIRCRAFT
STRUCTURAL LIFE HAS NOT BEEN CONSIDERED IN THE FUEL SEQUENCE.
SPECIFIED IN FIGURE 1-45 SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE AFT BODY
TANK TO THE FORWARD BODY TANK.
IF THIS TRANSFER IS NOT POSSIBLE DUE TO FUEL DISTRIBUTION, TRANSFER AS MUCH FUEL AS POSSIBLE FROM THE AFT BODY TANK TO THE FORWARD BODY TANK NOT TO EXCEED THE AMOUNT SPECIFIED IN FIGURE 1-45.
NOTE
IF FUEL TRANSFER IS GREATER THAN THE FORWARD BODY TANK CAPACITY, TRANSFER ADDITIONAL FUEL TO THE CENTER WING TANK.
IF MISSILES ARE TO BE LAUNCHED WITHIN AN HOUR AFTER REFUELING,
RETAIN THE FORWARD BODY BALLAST FUEL SPECIFIED IN FIGURE 1-45
DURING STEP 2 OF THIS FUEL USAGE SEQUENCE.
IF TRANSFER OF BALLAST FUEL FROM AFT BODY TANK TO FORWARD
BODY TANK WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND PLANNED LAUNCH/JETTISON WAS
NOT ACCOMPLISHED, THE AIRCREW SHOULD RETURN THE BALLAST FUEL
TO THE AFT BODY TANK AND RESUME THIS FUEL USAGE SEQUENCE.
AIRCRAFT CG: IF CG IS AFT OF 30% MAC, REFER TO APPROPRIATE TRANSFER/GROSS WEIGHT CHART (FIGURE 1-45) AND FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS.
FUEL USAGE
STEP
1
(TAKEOFF)
REMARKS

Figure 1-46C (Sheet 1 of 3)
1-136H
Change 17
T.O. 1B-52H-1

Six thru Twelve AGM-86B Missiles (Cont)
STEP
FUEL USAGE
REMARKS
FWD BODY TO EMPTY
CENTER WING TO ALL ENGINES
MID BODY TO 7000 POUNDS

MID BODY TO EMPTY

MAINS 2 AND 3 UNTIL EQUAL TO MAINS 1 AND 4
MAINS TO 5000 POUNDS EACH
AFT BODY TO EMPTY

10
LEFT OUTBOARD 1, 2, 3, AND 4

OUTBOARD TO BALLAST (RETAIN BALLAST FUEL

SHOWN IN FIGURE 1-46 IF MISSILES ARE RETAINED
FOR LANDING)
11
FWD BODY (BALLAST) TO ALL

ENGINES
FWD BODY TO EMPTY

(FUEL WHICH WAS TRANSFERRED TO FWD BODY FOR
MISSILE LAUNCH)
12
LEFT EXTERNAL TO 1, 2, 3, AND 4

RIGHT EXTERNAL TO 5, 6, 7, AND 8 (CROSSFEED VALVES OPEN)
EXTERNAL TO BALLAST (RETAIN BALLAST FUEL

SHOWN IN FIGURE 1-46 IF MISSILES ARE RETAINED
FOR LANDING)
13
Change 20
1-136J
T.O. 1B-52H-1

Six thru Twelve AGM-86B Missiles (Cont)
STEP
FUEL USAGE
REMARKS


WITH ANY MAIN DOWN TO 5,000 POUNDS, OPEN ALL
NOTE

STEPS.

IF OUTBOARDS AND EXTERNALS ARE NOT FULL, REFUEL MAINS, OUTBOARDS, EXTERNALS AND AFT
BODY UNTIL OUTBOARDS AND EXTERNALS ARE FULL, THEN REFUEL ALL TANKS EXCEPT FORWARD
BODY UNTIL MAINS ARE FULL AND AFT BODY CONTAINS AT LEAST 36,000 POUNDS, THEN REFUEL ALL
TANKS SIMULTANEOUSLY UNTIL DESIRED GROSS WEIGHT IS ACHIEVED.
NOTE
MAINTAIN MAINS AS CLOSE TO 9000 POUNDS EACH AS POSSIBLE. AT NO TIME SHOULD MAINS
BE ALLOWED TO BE LESS THAN 5000 POUNDS.
THE AFT BODY SHOULD BE FULL AFTER REFUELING.
FOR AIRCRAFT WITH OPERATING WEIGHT CG FORWARD OF 22% MAC, LIMIT FORWARD BODY
FUEL TO 8,000 POUNDS
1-136K
Change 17
T.O. 1B-52H-1

Asymmetrical External Load of
One thru Six AGM-86B Missiles on One Pylon
SIOP / POSITIVE CONTROL LAUNCH
(GROSS WEIGHT OVER 488,000 POUNDS - ONE PYLON ASYMMETRICALLY
LOADED - WITH ONE TO SIX MISSILES) FOR OPERATING WEIGHT CG FROM
18.0% TO 27.0% MAC.
STEP
1
(TAKEOFF)
FUEL USAGE
REMARKS

OR

FOR TAKEOFF, OPEN ALL CROSSFEED VALVES (9, 10,

11 AND 12)
2

FWD BODY TO EMPTY

UNTIL:
(LH PYLON): MAINS 1 AND 4 EQUAL TO MAIN 2
(RH PYLON): MAINS 1 AND 4 EQUAL TO MAIN 3
MID BODY TO EMPTY
AFT BODY TO 10,000 POUNDS

(MAINTAIN DIFFERENTIAL FUEL IN MAIN 2 OR 3
OPPOSITE EXTERNAL MISSILES)
AFT BODY TO BALLAST AS SHOWN IN FIGURE 1-46

(OPEN ALL CROSSFEED VALVES)
LEFT OUTBOARD TO 1, 2, 3, AND 4

OUTBOARDS TO BALLAST AS SHOWN IN FIGURE 1-46

LEFT EXTERNAL TO 1, 2, 3, AND 4

RIGHT EXTERNAL TO 5, 6, 7, AND 8
EXTERNALS TO BALLAST AS SHOWN IN FIGURE 1-46

10
OPEN ALL CROSSFEED VALVES

NOTE
MAINTAIN DIFFERENTIAL FUEL IN MAIN 2 OR 3 OPPOSITE EXTERNAL MISSILES, IF MISSILES ARE RETAINED FOR LANDING.
Figure 1-46D
Change 17
1-136L
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AIR REFUELING FUEL MANAGEMENT - SIOP

INCREASED GROSS WEIGHT IN FLIGHT OPERATIONS
FUEL DISTRIBUTION PRIOR TO AIR REFUELING
Fuel distribution for increased gross weight operations is unique in both initial fuel loading and subsequent fuel usage sequences for flight operations.
The fuel loading charts are contained in T.O.
1B-52H-5. The fuel sequences provided in FUEL
SYSTEM MANAGEMENT in this part reflect continual maintenance of an aft cg for increased range.
Utilization of the revised fuel management procedures prior to air refueling results in an aft cg. For
specific fuel usage sequences see the appropriate
procedure under FUEL SYSTEM MANAGEMENT
in this part.
Air Refueling Procedure - Internal Weapons (Increased
Gross Weight)
If outboards and externals are not full, refuel outboards, externals, and mains until outboards and
externals are full, then refuel all tanks simultaneously until desired onload is achieved.
Air Refueling Procedure - External AGM-86 & Internal

Weapons (Increased Gross Weight)
If outboards and externals are not full, refuel

mains, outboards, externals, and aft body until outboards and externals are full, then refuel all tanks
simultaneously until desired onload is achieved.
NOTE
The aircraft is speed limited until externals

are full. Refer to WING FLUTTER AND
SPEED LIMITATIONS chart in Section V
of T.O. 1B-52H-1.
The aft body should be full after refueling.
Forward body should not exceed 8000
pounds.
All wing tanks must be full at gross weights
above 488,000 pounds.
NOTE
Complete air refueling operations as

smoothly and expeditiously as possible.
Minimum time in air refueling reduces the
exposure to overstressing the aircraft at increased gross weight and improves fuel
economy.
The aircraft is speed limited until externals

are full. See WING FLUTTER AIRSPEED
LIMITATIONS chart in Section V of the basic flight manual.
At the completion of increased gross weight air refueling, resume the appropriate fuel usage sequence based on weapons configuration.
All wing tanks must be full at gross weights

above 500,000 pounds.
Complete air refueling operations as
smoothly and expeditiously as possible.
Minimum time in air refueling reduces the
exposure to overstressing the aircraft at increased gross weight and improves fuel
economy.
At the completion of increased gross weight air refueling, resume the appropriate revised fuel usage
sequence.
1-136M
Change 12
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Fuel Sequence With External Cruise Missile or

Conventional Pylons, With or Without Weapons
CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS/TRAINING/TACTICAL FERRY FUEL SEQUENCE
STEP
1
(TAKEOFF)
(TWO PYLONS SYMMETRICALLY CONVENTIONAL LOADED OR SYMMETRICALLY/ASYMMETRICALLY LOADED 7, 9, OR 11 CRUISE MISSILE CONFIGURATION) FOR OPERATING WEIGHT CG FROM 18.0% TO 27.0% MAC.
PRIOR TO EXTERNAL BOMB RELEASE, TRANSFER 300 POUNDS OF AFT
BODY FUEL TO THE FORWARD BODY FOR EACH 1000 POUNDS OF BOMBS/
MISSILES TO BE RELEASED. IF BOMB/MISSILE RELEASE OCCURS AFTER
STEP 8 OF THE FUEL USAGE SEQUENCE, THE AIRPLANE CG WILL BE FAR
ENOUGH FORWARD TO SAFELY EXPEND EXTERNAL STORES. FUEL
TRANSFERED TO THE FORWARD BODY TANK FOR LAUNCH/JETTISON OF
EXTERNAL WEAPONS SHALL BE ROUTED TO ALL ENGINES AFTER THE AFT
BODY FUEL TANK IS EMPTY OR PRIOR TO STEP 10, OUTBOARDS TO ALL
ENGINES.
IF THE TRANSFER OF BALLAST FUEL FROM THE AFT BODY TANK TO THE
FORWARD BODY TANK WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND THE PLANNED LAUNCH/
JETTISON WAS NOT ACCOMPLISHED, THE AIRCREW SHOULD RETURN THE
BALLAST FUEL TO THE AFT BODY TANK AND RESUME THIS FUEL USAGE
SEQUENCE.
FUEL USAGE
REMARKS


FOR TAKEOFF, OPEN ALL CROSSFEED VALVES (9, 10, 11,
AND 12)
2
MID BODY TO EMPTY


MAINS 2 AND 3 EQUAL TO MAINS 1 AND 4 (FOR ASYMMETRICAL LOADINGS, MAINTAIN DIFFERENTIAL FUEL IN MAIN
2 OR 3)
6
7

FWD BODY TO EMPTY

AFT BODY TO 12,000 POUNDS FOR AGM-86B/C/D
AFT BODY TO 20,000 POUNDS FOR AGM-129
AFT BODY TO EMPTY FOR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
MAINS TO 5000 POUNDS EACH (FOR ASYMMETRICAL

LOADINGS, MAINTAIN DIFFERENTIAL FUEL IN MAIN 2 OR 3)
AFT BODY TO BALLAST, FIGURE 1-46

FOR EXTERNAL CRUISE MISSILES
10
OUTBOARDS TO BALLAST, FIGURE 1-46

OR FIGURE 1-50 AS APPLICABLE
Change 22
1-137
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Fuel Sequence With External Cruise Missile or

Conventional Pylons, With or Without Weapons(Cont)
STEP
FUEL USAGE
REMARKS
11
EXTERNALS TO BALLAST, FIGURE 1-46

OR FIGURE 1-50 AS APPLICABLE
12
(CROSSFEED VALVES OPEN) (FOR ASYMMETRICAL

LOADINGS, MAINTAIN DIFFERENTIAL FUEL IN MAIN 2
OR 3)


NOTE

VALVES 9, 10, 11 AND 12 REGARDLESS OF THE GREEN BAND.
AIRSPEED LIMITATIONS, SECTION V, FOR SPEED RESTRICTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH USE OF AUXILIARY FUEL IN VARIOUS AIRCRAFT/MISSILE
CONFIGURATIONS. AUXILIARY FUEL WILL BE IN ORDER OF OMITTED
STEPS.
USE OF THIS SEQUENCE DURING CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DELIVERY
ALLOWS THE CREW TO JETTISON WEAPONS IMMEDIATELY AFTER TAKEOFF WITHOUT ADJUSTING FUEL, AND AT THE SAME TIME, MAINTAINING
AIRCRAFT CG WITHIN SAFE LIMITS.
1-138
Change 22
T.O. 1B-52H-1

AGM-86B/C/D MISSILES
OPERATIONAL MISSIONS/TRAINING MISSIONS/TACTICAL FERRY
NOTE
(TWO PYLONS SYMMETRICALLY LOADED)
OPERATING WEIGHT CG, % MAC

18
22
20
24
EXTERNAL AGM86B/C/D MISSILES
26
FWD
PYLO
N MIS
SILE
POSI
TION
22
20
18
16
14
12
10
ADD AFT BODY FUEL 1000 LBS
DEDUCT AFT BODY FUEL
A31671
Additional Aft Body Fuel (Pounds)

(If full, add to mid body)
Change 17
1-139
T.O. 1B-52H-1

INSTRUCTIONS:
ADDITIONS:
Enter the chart with the number of fwd pylon position missiles, then
read left in a straight line to the computed aircraft operating weight CG
(% MAC) line. Read down in a straight line to the additional aft body
fuel line. This fuel will be additional fuel to be added to the aft body fuel
depicted in the applicable fuel loading chart in T.O. 1B-52H-5.

DEDUCTIONS:
Chaff
Flares
500 Pounds
700 Pounds
NOTE
1-140
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AGM-129 MISSILES
OPERATIONAL MISSIONS/TRAINING MISSIONS/TACTICAL FERRY
NOTE
(TWO PYLONS SYMMETRICAL LOADING OR 7, 9, OR 11 MISSILE LOADING)
Change 17
1-141
T.O. 1B-52H-1

INSTRUCTIONS:
BALLAST ADDITIONS:
Enter the chart with the number of fwd pylon position missiles, then
read left in a straight line to the computed aircraft operating weight CG
(% MAC) line. Read down in a straight line to the additional aft body
fuel line. This fuel will be additional fuel to be added to the aft body fuel
depicted in the applicable fuel loading chart in T.O. 1B-52H-5.

Internal Bombs (FWD Bomb Bay)
BALLAST DEDUCTIONS:
Chaff
Flares
CSRL Weapons
500 Pounds
700 Pounds
50 Pounds/
1000 Pounds
NOTE
Forward pylon positions are to be loaded first.

If total adjustment is positive, add to the aft body fuel found on the primary fuel loading chart. If
aft body fuel tank is full, add remainder to mid-body fuel.
If total adjustment is negative, reduce aft body fuel by that amount and add that fuel to mid-body
fuel.
before the entire computed figure can be moved from the mid body, then move only that amount
from the mid body to fill the aft body.
1-142
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Aft Body Fuel Adjustment Chart For Carrying

External Conventional Weapons
ADDITIONS:
+210 Pounds/1000 Pounds)
OPERATING WEIGHT
(BASIC WEIGHT PLUS CREW,
PYLONS, AND OIL)
DEDUCTIONS:
Chaff 500 Pounds
Flares 700 Pounds
1-143
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Aft Body Fuel Adjustment Chart For Carrying

External Conventional Weapons (Cont)
INSTRUCTIONS:
ADDITIONS:
Enter the chart with the external conventional load. Read right to left
in a straight line until intersecting the computed aircraft operating
weight CG (%MAC) line. Read down in a straight line to the aft body
fuel line. This fuel will be additional fuel to be added to aft body fuel depicted in the applicable fuel loading chart in T.O. 1B-52H-5. In some
cases, fuel must be deducted from the aft body. If fuel must be deducted from the aft body, move the computed amount from the aft body
to the mid body.

DEDUCTIONS:
Chaff
Flares
500 Pounds
700 Pounds
NOTE
1-144
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Ballast Fuel for Landing With External Conventional

Weapons Configurations
500 Lb. Class Weapons
EXTERNAL QUANTITIES
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
6
4
2
OUTBOARD AUXILIARY
14 12 10
8
6 4 2
AFT BODY
0
BALLAST FUEL (1000 LBS)
0
8 6 4 2
EXTERNAL
WING
INSTRUCTIONS:
Enter the chart with the total number of aft pylon position weapons, then move up the diagonal line to the total number of fwd
pylon position weapons. Read left in a straight line from the
number of fwd pylon position weapons to the computed aircraft
operating weight CG (% MAC) line. Read down in a straight
line to the ballast fuel line. The computed ballast fuel will be retained if landing with external weapons.
FWD PYLON POSITIONS
18
AFT PYLON POSITIONS

B61080
BALLAST ADDITIONS:
Center Station Weapons
+300 Pounds/Weapon
BALLAST DEDUCTIONS:
Chaff
500 Pounds
Flares
700 Pounds
CSRL Weapons
50 Pounds/1000 Pounds
EXAMPLE:
Four forward weapons (two on each pylon) on a 20% MAC
operating weight requires 8000 pounds in the external wing
tanks.
NOTE
Rotary launchers, bomb racks, and all other non-expendable useful load items are to be included in the operating
weight, when installed.
Additional aft body fuel may be retained, if practical, in order to move the aircraft landing CG (% MAC) further aft of
the forward landing CG limit.
For landing ballast fuel with asymmetrical pylon/weapon configurations, double the pylon/weapon quantities of the
heavy side configuration and enter the chart with these quantities. For example, if there are only 3 aft position weapons
on the left pylon and 1 fwd and 3 aft position weapons on the right pylon, doubling the quantities on the heavy side
configuration (in this case, the right side pylon) would result in a total of 2 fwd and 6 aft position weapons. Enter the
chart with these values and obtain required ballast fuel in a manner similar to the previous example above.
Change 22
1-145
T.O. 1B-52H-1

Weapons Configurations (Cont)
EXTERNAL QUANTITIES
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
6
4
2
OUTBOARD AUXILIARY
14 12 10
8
6 4 2
AFT BODY
0
0
8 6 4 2
EXTERNAL
WING
INSTRUCTIONS:
FWD PYLON POSITIONS
18
AFT PYLON POSITIONS

B61079
BALLAST ADDITIONS:
+450 Pounds/Weapon
BALLAST DEDUCTIONS:
Chaff
500 Pounds
Flares
700 Pounds
CSRL Weapons
EXAMPLE:
operating weight requires 8500 pounds in the external wing
tanks.
NOTE
1-146
Change 22
T.O. 1B-52H-1

EXTERNAL QUANTITIES
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
6
4
2
OUTBOARD AUXILIARY
14 12 10
8
6 4 2
AFT BODY
0
0
8 6 4 2
EXTERNAL
WING
INSTRUCTIONS:
EXAMPLE:
operating weight requires full external tanks and 200
pounds in the outboard wing tanks.
FWD PYLON POSITIONS
18
AFT PYLON POSITIONS

B61083
BALLAST ADDITIONS:
+600 Pounds/Weapon
BALLAST DEDUCTIONS:
Chaff
500 Pounds
Flares
700 Pounds
CSRL Weapons
NOTE
Change 21
1-146A
T.O. 1B-52H-1

Weapons Configurations (Cont)
EXTERNAL QUANTITIES
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
18
OUTBOARD AUXILIARY
14 12 10
8
6 4 2
AFT BODY
0
2
8 6 4 2
EXTERNAL
WING
INSTRUCTIONS:
EXAMPLE:
operating weight requires full external tanks and 3000
pounds in the outboard wing tanks.
FWD PYLON POSITIONS
0
AFT PYLON POSITIONS
B61082
BALLAST ADDITIONS:
+1200 Pounds/Weapon
BALLAST DEDUCTIONS:
Chaff
500 Pounds
Flares
700 Pounds
CSRL Weapons
NOTE
1-146B
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
INSTRUCTIONS:
BALLAST ADDITIONS:

EXAMPLE:
BALLAST DEDUCTIONS:
Pylons
+3000 Pounds/Pylon

operating weight requires full external tanks and 13,700
pounds (7700 + 3000/PYLON) in the outboard wing tanks.
Chaff
Flares
CSRL Weapons
500 Pounds
700 Pounds
NOTE
ALCM/CALCM pylons (SUU-67) and ACM pylons (SUU-72) are considered expendable stores and are not included
in the operating weight.
Change 21
1-146C/(1-146D blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Fuel Supply System Circuit Protection and Location

EQUIPMENT
Auxiliary Tank Engine Feed Control Valve Switches
Aux Tank Fuel Flow Control &

Boost Pump Switches (In engine
feed position)
Engine Crossfeed Manifold Valve

Switches
Engine Fuel Shutoff Valves
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
FUEL FEED CONTROL
DIRECT FEED VALVE
13
14
15
16
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
RLC/C9
LLC/C15
LLC/C16
RLC/C10
Rt. ESS
Left ESS
Left ESS
Rt. ESS
LLC/C20
RLC/C5
LLC/C21
LLC/C18
RLC/C2
RLC/C1
LLC/C17
RLC/C3
RLC/C4
LLC/C19
Left TR
Rt. TR
Left TR
Left TR
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
Left TR
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
Left TR
RLC/B1
LLC/B12
RLC/B2
Rt. TR
Left TR
Rt. TR
RLC/B12
LLC/B21
RLC/B11
Rt. TR
Left TR
Rt. TR
FUEL FEED CONTROL

CROSS FEED VALVE
9
10
11
12
LLC/C13
RLC/C7
RLC/C8
LLC/C14
Left ESS
Rt. ESS
Rt. ESS
Left ESS
POWER FEEDERS DC
FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE INBD ENG
FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE OUTBD ENG
RLC/D34
LLC/D10
Rt. ESS
Left ESS
FUEL MISCELLANEOUS
FUEL MANAGE IND
RLC/E3
Rt. TR
FUEL MISCELLANEOUS MANIFOLD

FUEL SCAVENGE CONTROL
CABIN
MAIN
RLC/E8
RLC/E9
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
FUEL MISCELLANEOUS
FQIS DC
RLC/E10
Rt. TR
FUEL PUMP CONTROL

BODY TANKS
AFT 30
AFT 31
AFT 32
CTR 25
CTR WING 26
FWD 23
FWD 24
MID 27
MID 28
MID 29
LEFT WING TANKS
EXT 1
OUTBD 2
OUTBD 3
RIGHT WING TANKS
EXT 22
OUTBD 20
OUTBD 21
Firewall Fuel Shutoff Valves See EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT CIRCUIT

PROTECTION AND LOCATION, This Section.
Fuel Flow Indicator Lights
Fuel-In-Manifold Lights
Fuel Quantity Indicating System

Control Power
1-147
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Fuel Supply System Circuit Protection

and Location (Cont)
EQUIPMENT
Fuel Quantity Gages
Main Manifold Interconnect

Valves Switch
Main Tank Boost Pump Switches

(Boost pump control power)
Main Tank Low Warning Light
Pump Pressure Checkout Pressto-Relieve Button
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
FUEL QUANTITY INDICATORS
AFT BODY
CTR WING
FWD BODY
MID BODY
1
2
3
4
FUEL QTY IND
LEFT EXT
LEFT OUTBD
RIGHT EXT
RIGHT OUTBD
POWER
SOURCE
CPCBP/A7
CPCBP/A5
CPCBP/A4
CPCBP/A6
CPCBP/A1
CPCBP/A2
CPCBP/A8
CPCBP/A9
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
CPCBP/B1
CPCBP/B2
CPCBP/B5
CPCBP/B4
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
LLC/C12
RLC/C6
Left TR
Rt. TR
RLC/B3
RLC/B4
LLC/B13
LLC/B14
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
Left TR
Left TR
RLC/B5
RLC/B6
LLC/B15
LLC/B16
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
Left TR
Left TR
LLC/B17
LLC/B18
RLC/B7
RLC/B8
Left TR
Left TR
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
LLC/B19
LLC/B20
RLC/B9
RLC/B10
Left TR
Left TR
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
FUEL MISCELLANEOUS
LEVEL WARN
MAIN TANK LOW
RLC/E5
Rt. TR
FUEL SYSTEM GRD CHK OUT

REFUEL VALVE
LLC/A13
Left TR
FUEL FEED CONTROL

CROSS FEED VALVE
29
29A
FUEL PUMP CONTROL
LEFT WING TANKS NO. 1
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
RIGHT WING TANKS NO. 3
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
1-148
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EQUIPMENT
11
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
Pump Pressure Checkout Switch

and Light

PUMP PRESS
LLC/A12
Left TR
Scavenge System Switch (In

MAIN position; for CABIN position see REFUELING SYSTEM CIRCUIT PROTECTION
AND LOCATION, this section)
FUEL MISCELLANEOUS
MANIFOLD FUEL SCAVENGE
CONTROL
MAIN
RLC/E9
Rt. TR
Total Fuel Quantity Gage
FUEL QTY IND TOTAL
CPCBP/B3
AC Bus 5
Wing Tank Warning Light
FUEL MISCELLANEOUS
LEVEL WARN
OUTBD & EXT TANK
RLC/E4
Rt. TR
CPCBP
LLC

RLC
1-149/(1-150 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CENTER OF GRAVITY/FUEL LEVEL ADVISORY SYSTEM

play unit will display cg, fuel quantity, operating
weight and weapon load.
DESCRIPTION
The center of gravity fuel level advisory system
(CG/FLAS) automatically provides a continuous cg
indication during flight. It also indicates when the
cg approaches either forward or aft limit for normal
gross weights and heavy weight extension (BIGWIP) configuration, an asymmetrical fuel loading
condition, and when a fuel tank approaches a selected quantity. Weapons, flares, and chaff are manually input and fuel quantity is automatically input
by the FQIS or can be manually input. The CG/
FLAS controls and indicators (figure 1-53) consists
of a control panel located on the copilots side panel
and a display unit located on the pilots instrument
panel. CG/FLAS abbreviations are listed in figure
1-52.
CONTROLS AND INDICATORS
Control Panel
The CG/FLAS control panel consists of the power

switch, mode keys, and data entry keys. The dis-
See figure 1-53 for control and functional information on the CG/FLAS control panel.
Display Unit
See figure 1-53 for indicator and display arrangement.

POWER SOURCE
Single-phase 118 volt ac power to the CG/FLAS is

controlled by the CG/FLAS PWR switch. See figure
1-54 for CG/FLAS circuit protection and the location of applicable circuit breakers.
Power for the mode lights is provided through the
pilots warning dimming switch and 28 volt ac
power for the key lights and rocker switch is provided through the side panel rotary switch on the
copilots light control panel.
CG/FLAS ABBREVIATIONS
BS Body Station
BS-A Body Station Aft
BS-F Body Station Forward
BSLA Body Station Left Aft
BSLF Body Station Left Forward
BSRA Body Station Right Aft
BSRF Body Station Right Forward
CHAF Chaff
CHKN Check No
CHKY Check Yes
CONV Conventional
ERAS Erase
EXT External
FLAR Flares
GF Gage Fail
HARP Harpoon
INIT Initialization
INTR Interrupt
LT Left
NUC Nuclear
OPER Operational
OW Operating Weight
OWCG Operating Weight Center of Gravity
PWR Power
PYLN Pylon
RT Right
STRT Start
WB-A, WBA Weapons Bay Aft
WB-C, WBC Weapons Bay Center
WB-F, WBF Weapons Bay Forward
WPN Weapon
WT Weight
WTLA Weight Left Aft
WTLF Weight Left Forward
WTRA Weight Right Aft
WTRF Weight Right Forward
Figure 1-52
1-151
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CG/FLAS Controls and Indicators
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
CG/FLAS DISPLAY UNIT

POWER SWITCH
INITIALIZATION KEY
WEIGHT KEY
WEAPON KEY
SCROLL KEY
SHIFT KEY
8
9
10
11
12
13
TEST KEY
ENTER KEY
DISPLAY BRIGHTNESS KNOB
CHANGE KEY
FUEL KEY
MODE LIGHTS (3 PLACES)
1-152
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
FUNCTION
CG/FLAS DISPLAY UNIT
CG/FLAS Display Unit
See Sheets 3 thru 6 for CG/FLAS Displays.

CG/FLAS CONTROL PANEL
PWR (Power) Switch
A lighted rocker switch which alternately selects ON - - OFF. ON applies

power and starts self-test.
INT (Initialization) Key
Enters initialization when pressed. Allows entry of operating weight, operating weight CG, and weapons load in sequence. The three mode keys
(No. 4, 5, and 12) are inactive when initialization mode is active.
WT (Weight Status Mode) Key
Pressing the WT key activates the weight status mode and displays fuel
quantity, fuel gage failure, tank designations, cg, and burn-down-to-levels. The WT mode light comes on when the WT mode is active.
WPN (Weapon Status Mode) Key
Pressing the WPN key activates the weapon status mode and allows operator to monitor weapon status and to decrement weapons when a release or launch occur. The WPN mode light is on when the WPN status
mode is active.
SCROLL Key
The SCROLL key will allow the operator to sequence through the displays and select the actual aircraft loading configuration. When the CHG
key is pressed, the SCROLL key will sequence thru the data available for
the change function.
SHIFT Key
When pressed, sequences to the next digit on the display unit that data
can be manually input for the selected change function. When displaying
a sequence of displays (i.e., any weapon selection list or fuel and weight
modes) pressing SHIFT key allows reverse scroll capability.
TEST Key
Initiates self-test of the system.
ENTER Key
Enters displayed data into the CG/FLAS.
10
DISPLAY BRT Knob
Controls brightness of the display unit. Rotating the knob clockwise increases brightness and rotating the knob counterclockwise decreases
brightness.
11
CHG Key
Allows operator to change the selected data. Flashes the displayed data
to be changed.
12
FUEL (Fuel Status Mode) Key
The fuel level advisory mode is active and the FUEL mode light comes
on when the FUEL key is pressed. Burn-down-to-levels for selected
tanks, asymmetrical fuel loadings, and external missiles that can be released are displayed.
13
MODE Lights (3)
Come on when respective status modes are active.
1-153
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CG/FLAS Controls and Indicators (Cont)

In all modes, after WPN, CHKN entered,
displays the aircraft cg in % MAC.
Displays operating weight

(pounds), CSRL capabilities,
and cg in % MAC.
Weapons Load
NUC
CONV
ALCM
ACM
HARP
CB52
CB58
CB71
CB87
CB89
GB10
GB12
MK20
MK36
M40C
M40F
MK52
MK55
B53
B61
B83
NEW
NOTE
Display will flash when within 1%
MAC of either forward or aft CG
limit.
MK56
MK60
MK62
MK64
MK65
MK82
82AR
82SE
M117
117R
117A
MK84
NEW
operation
being
B-52
Aircraft
OW
Operating weight
OWCG Operating Weight
Center of Gravity
Internal Weapons Count First

window displays the forward
bay, the second window the
center bay and the third window the aft bay. The fourth window displays flares and/or
chaff loading.
Weapons Check Weapons

correction or check needed.
CHKY Check Yes
CHKN Check No
Airplane configuration Weapons location

EXT External weapons
WB Weapons Bay
F Forward
C Center
A Aft
Body stations and weights for
new weapons.
External Weapons Count
First two windows show left pylon forward and aft positions.
The next two windows show
the right pylon forward and aft
positions.
Weapons Check WPN will be
displayed.
Fuel Level Advisory Mode First two display windows show the number of external missiles that
can be launched without exceeding the aft cg. The
3rd window shows asymmetric fuel load and tank
designation where the difference occurred. The
4th window displays pounds from selected burn
down in thousands of pounds.
Fuel Level Advisory Mode Displays tank designation and burn-down-to level.
Weight Status Mode Displays the FQIS or operator input. Displays GF on gage failure, and
pounds from selected burn down in thousands of
pounds.
Weight Status Mode Displays selected tank(s)

and fuel weight in hundreds of pounds. With gage
failure, tank designation and last accurate tank
reading displayed.
DISPLAY UNIT
1-154
Displays
loaded:
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TANK SELECTION
SCROLL 14 Main Tanks 1 and 4
MB Mid Body Tank
23 Main Tanks 2 and 3
MN Main Tanks 1, 2, 3, and 4
FB Forward Body Tank
AB Aft Body Tank
OW Outboard Wing Tanks, Left and
Right
EX External Tanks, Left and Right
CW Center Wing Tank
1 No. 1 Main Tank
4 No. 4 Main Tank
2 No. 2 Main Tank
3 No. 3 Main Tank
LO Left Outboard Tank
RO Right Outboard Tank
LE Left External Tank
RE Right External Tank
Current Aircraft CG % MAC
SHIFT
Next scroll returns to tank selection

14
Number of External Weapons That Can Be

Released Without Exceeding Aft CG Limit
With an ALCM/ACM pylon selected during initialization, a P is displayed if all external missiles are released and both pylons can be jettisoned without exceeding
the aft cg limit.
NOTE
The numbers are displayed on
right half of LED and letters are
displayed on full LED.
Quantity (4, 3, 2, 1, *) From Burn-Down-To

Level (LB x 1000) Flashing * indicates
tank level less than selected burn-down-to
level.
ASYMMETRICAL FUEL LOADING CONDITION

E
0
1
4
2
3
=
=
=
=
=
=
Between External Tanks ( > 1000 pounds)

Between Outboard Wing Tanks ( > 1000 pounds)
Between Main Tanks 1 and 4, No. 1 Main is Low
Tank
Tank
Tank
Tank
(>
(>
(>
(>
2000
2000
2000
2000
pounds)
pounds)
pounds)
pounds)
FUEL LEVEL ADVISORY MODE
1-155
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CG/FLAS Controls and Indicators (Cont)
External Load
Left Pylon Number of weapons FWD
and AFT. Example one weapon forward
and three aft.
Right Pylon Number of weapons FWD
and AFT. Example two weapons forward
and one aft.
FLARES CHAFF
F Flares Remaining
C Chaff Remaining
B Both Remaining
Blank Neither Remaining
P Displayed in AFT locations to indicate

an empty pylon when all ALCMs/ACMs
on the applicable pylon are expended.
Internal Load
Number of weapons in FWD, CTR, and
AFT bomb bay locations. CSRL weapons
indicated in CTR and AFT locations only.
WEAPON STATUS MODE

1-156
T.O. 1B-52H-1
FQIS Gage Failure Detected on

Selected Tank Fuel level input
status must be manually changed
to manual (M) or opposite (O) before system will return to normal
operation.
Quantity (4, 3, 2, 1, *) From BurnDown-To Level (LB x 1000)

Flashing * indicates tank level less
than selected burn-down-to level.
Selected Tank Fuel Level (LB x

100) (May Have Two Digits, Depending on Tank Designation)
Manually changeable only in manual (M).
Fuel Level Input Status For Selected Tank. F FQIS, O Opposite Paired Tank, and M Manual.
TANK SELECTION
SCROLL 1 No. 1 Main Tank
4 No. 4 Main Tank
2 No. 2 Main Tank
3 No. 3 Main Tank
F Forward Body
M Mid Body
A Aft Body
C Center Wing
LO Left Outboard
RO Right Outboard
LE Left External
RE Right External
SHIFT
Next scroll returns to

tank selection 1
NOTE
Scroll sequence is altered if a gage failure (GF) occurs or if the fuel input status is manually changed
from F. Order of preference is GF (if not corrected),
M, O, and F for SCROLL key and F, O, M, and GF
for SHIFT key.
WEIGHT STATUS MODE

1-157
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NORMAL OPERATION
The CG/FLAS has a self-test function, initialization
process, fuel level advisory, weapon status, and
weight status modes. The self-test function automatically checks the internal circuitry of the CG/
FLAS. The initialization process allows the operator to enter the operating weight, operating weight
cg, and weapon, flare, and chaff data. The fuel level
mode allows fuel management monitoring, shows
an asymmetrical fuel loading, and the number of
external weapons that can be released and remain
forward of the aft cg. The weapon status mode allows the operator manually to update weapon status as weapons are released, and in the weight status mode, fuel quantity can be displayed or manually changed for each tank and failed gage information is displayed.
SELF-TEST
Self-test can be accomplished any time except during initialization and the change process by pressing the TEST key and is automatically entered
when power is initially applied to the CG/FLAS. All
lights on the keyboard and the decimal point on the
top row of the display come on at initial power
application. As self-test begins, the display unit
goes blank. The internal circuitry is checked, and
when complete, the three mode lights come on. All
the elements of the display segments on the display
unit will come on one row at a time, starting on the
top row, then the middle and the bottom row.
After self-test is completed, a number will be displayed to the right of the decimal point indicating
the latest software revision and the mode lights will
go off.
If self-test was entered automatically at power
application, the TEST and ENTER keys are the
only active keys, otherwise the mode keys, TEST,
and ENTER are the only active keys.
INITIALIZATION
When PWR INTR is displayed, press ENTER to display the aircraft OW. The system is programmed to
initially indicate 1770 operating weight on the display unit. Obtain the OW from the aircraft DD
Form 365-4 (Form F) and input the OW in
hundreds of pounds. Input the OW by pressing the
CHG key. The first digit of the display to be input
will flash. Use the SCROLL key to increment the
numbers from 0 to 9. When the appropriate number
is displayed, press the SHIFT key. The second digit
to be input will flash. Use the same procedure to input the second number. Repeat the procedure until
the OW input is complete. Press ENTER to display
the operating weight cg (OWCG). The system will
initially display 16.0 (OWCG). Input the OWCG in
percent MAC using the same procedure as for OW.
NOTE
NOTE
Pressing a key during self-test may cause a

keyboard error detection.
When self-test is complete, PWR INTR or TEST
PASS will be displayed if self-test passes. PWR
INTR will be displayed if self-test was entered automatically at power application and TEST PASS will
be displayed if self-test was entered with the TEST
key. TEST FAIL will be displayed if the system fails
self-test. DATA FAIL is displayed if the initialization data is corrupted. If the system fails self-test,
the numbers 1 thru 5 may be displayed in the upper left corner of the display unit. The numbers
represent a fault and are as follows:
NUMBER
FAILURE
1
2
3
4
5
Micro-processor
Program Read Only Memory (PROM)
Random Access Memory (RAM)
Keyboard
Analog to Digital Circuitry
1-158
Use the SCROLL key to obtain the next display. Use the SHIFT key to obtain the previous display. The previous display cannot
be obtained if the ENTER key is pressed.
Use the CHG/SCROLL/SHIFT keys to input
all numerical data. The keys are used as
previously discussed.
A C may be displayed under the digits on
some displays. This indicates that the value
can be modified with the CHG process.
Press ENTER to display STRT, INIT. If initialization data is stored in memory, the OPER MODE
and DATA ERAS displays are selected by using the
SCROLL/SHIFT key. If initialization data is not
stored in memory, pressing the SCROLL/SHIFT
keys do not change the display from STRT INIT as
the OPER MODE, DATA ERAS, and ERAS DONE
displays are not applicable.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
If the initialization data stored in memory (flares,
chaff, weapon load) is identical to the current mission, scroll to OPER MODE; then, press ENTER.
The system displays weapon load immediately and
is ready for the weapon check question. Further initialization is not required. If the initialization data
stored in memory is different from the current mission and a data erase is desired, scroll to DATA
ERAS; then press ENTER. When the data is
erased, ERAS DONE is displayed. After a data
erase, a complete initialization is necessary. Press
ENTER to select the STRT INIT display. Pressing
ENTER with the STRT INIT display selected allows the operator to choose from three B-52 weapon
configurations. The first display is B-52 NONE.
Press the SCROLL/SHIFT key to select B-52 NUC
or B-52 CONV.
With B-52 NONE display selected, press ENTER to
display FLAR NONE. If no flares are aboard, press
ENTER to display CHAF NONE. If flares are
aboard, scroll to FLAR YES; then, press ENTER to
display CHAF NONE. If no chaff is aboard, press
ENTER to show the weapon load display. If chaff is
aboard, scroll to CHAF YES; then, press ENTER to
show the weapon load display. The weapon load display will be blank if it was initialized with no weapons on board.
NOTE
The weapon count display will also go blank

when the weapons are decremented to zero.
Zeros will be displayed only when using the
CHG process to change the weapon count.
Press ENTER to command the weapon check options. WPN CHKN, ENTER completes initialization, and WPN CHKY, ENTER reverts back to the
B-52 NONE display.
With the B-52 NUC display selected, pressing ENTER allows the operator to choose from four external weapon configurations. The first configuration
is EXT NONE. Press the SCROLL/SHIFT key to select EXT ACM, EXT ALCM, or EXT NEW. EXT
ACM and EXT ALCM displays are used for symmetrical weapon loads. Pressing ENTER with any
of the first three external weapon display choices
(EXT NONE, EXT ACM, or EXT ALCM) completes
the external weapon load and selects the internal
weapon load configurations. The EXT NEW display
allows loading of new weapons not currently listed
in the CG/FLAS program and also makes provisions for asymmetric pylon loading and ALCM/
ACM pylon loading. With EXT NEW displayed,

pressing ENTER selects the EXT SAME, YES display. If all weapons on the pylons are the same,
press ENTER to select ACM PYLON YES. If the
pylons are ACM pylons, press ENTER to obtain the
EXT WT display. Input the weapon weight using
the CHG/SCROLL/SHIFT keys. The weapon body
station locations for the ACM pylons are already
programmed. If the pylons are not ACM pylons,
scroll to ACM PYLN, NO; press ENTER to display
EXT, BS-F. Input body station forward (moment
arm location) data using the CHG/SCROLL/SHIFT
keys (this data is available in T.O. 1B-52H-5), then
scroll to EXT, BS-A and use the CHG/SCROLL/
SHIFT keys to input body station aft moment arm
location. Scroll to EXT WT and use the CHG/
SCROLL/SHIFT keys to input the weapon weight.
The external weapon loading is now complete; press
ENTER to select internal weapon load configurations.
If weapons on the pylons are different and/or at
least one of the pylons is not an ACM pylon, scroll
to the EXT SAME, NO display and press ENTER.
System questioning determines whether a left or
right ACM pylon is installed. First, ACM PYLN, LT
Y is displayed. With an ACM pylon installed on the
left wing, press ENTER to display EXT WTLF and
input the individual weight of the new weapons located on the left forward pylon positions by using
the CHG/SCROLL/SHIFT keys; then, scroll to EXT
WTLA and use the CHG/SCROLL/SHIFT keys to
input the individual weight of the new weapon
weight located on the left aft pylon positions. The
weapon body station locations for the ACM pylons
are already programmed.
Press ENTER to display ACM PYLON, RT Y. With
an ACM pylon installed on the right wing, press
ENTER to display EXT, WTRF and follow the same
weight input procedures for the right forward and
right aft pylon positions as used for the left pylon.
With ACM pylons installed, the external loading is
complete; press ENTER to select the internal loading configurations. If the left pylon is not an ACM
PYLON with ACM PYLN, LT Y displayed, scroll to
the ACM PYLN, LT N display and press ENTER.
With EXT BSLF displayed, use the CHG/SCROLL/
SHIFT keys to input body station left forward data;
then, scroll to the EXT BSLA display and use the
CHG/SCROLL/SHIFT keys to input body station
left aft data. Next, scroll to EXT WTLF and use the
CHG/SCROLL/SHIFT keys to input the weapon
weight on the left forward position of the pylon.
1-159
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Scroll to the EXT WTLA display and use the CHG/
SCROLL/SHIFT keys to input the weapon weight
for the left aft position of the pylon. Press ENTER
to display ACM PYLN, RT Y. If the right pylon is
an ACM pylon, use the CHG/SCROLL/SHIFT keys
to input weight data for the forward and aft positions of the pylon. If the right pylon is not an ACM
pylon, scroll to ACM PYLN, RT N and use the
CHG/SCROLL/SHIFT keys to input body station
and weight data using the same procedures as used
for the left pylon. The external loading is complete;
press ENTER to select the internal loading configurations.
the SCROLL/SHIFT keys to display the different

types of weapons listed. Press ENTER to input appropriate weapon data. New weapon data can be input by selecting EXT NEW, pressing ENTER, and
inputting weapon location and weight data into the
applicable displays. Internal conventional weapon
data is loaded in the same sequence as nuclear
weapon data: forward, center, and then, aft. Select
the proper display, then ENTER. After the internal
weapon data is loaded, input the flare and chaff
data; then, complete initialization.
The first internal load display is WB-F NONE.

Other forward bay weapon options can be selected
by using the SCROLL/SHIFT keys. Select the proper weapon and ENTER. If the weapon loaded in the
forward bay is not shown, select WB-F NEW and
ENTER. Weapon location data (body station moment arm location available in T.O. 1B-52H-5) is input and entered and then the weapon weight is input and entered. Center bay weapon data is loaded
next. WB-C NONE is displayed. Use the SCROLL/
SHIFT keys to select the remaining center bay
weapons. Select the proper weapon and press ENTER. Except for ALCM, both the center and aft bay
CSRL weapons display an L prior to the weapon
designation. New weapon data is input using the
same procedures as the procedures for the forward
bay. With the center bay loaded, press ENTER to
display WB-A NONE. Use the SCROLL/SHIFT
keys as necessary for the aft weapons and press
ENTER when appropriate. New weapon data is
loaded as previously described. When internal loading is complete, press ENTER to display FLAR
NONE. Use previously discussed procedures for
loading flare and chaff data. If the actual weapon
load is different from the system weapon load,
when the weapon count display appears after loading flares and chaff, use the CHG/SCROLL/SHIFT
keys to correct CG/FLAS weapon load to actual
weapon load. Then, complete initialization for nuclear weapon operations.
The fuel level advisory mode will be displayed when

the FUEL key is pressed and the FUEL level advisory mode light will come on and remain on while
the fuel level mode is active. When the fuel level
advisory mode is active, aircraft cg is displayed on
the top line, selected tank and burn-down-to level
on the second line, and number of external missiles
that can be released and asymmetrical fuel load
condition on the third line. The first two digits on
the third line indicate the number of external missiles that may be launched without exceeding the
aft cg limit. With an ALCM/ACM pylon selected
during initialization, a P is displayed if all external
missiles are released and both pylons can be jettisoned without exceeding the aft cg limit. The last
digit on the third line displays the burn-down-to
level difference. The cue that the actual fuel level is
approaching the selected burn-down-to level appears when the level is within 4000 pounds. The
display at this location is blank until the 4 appears.
It continues down 3000 pounds, 2000 pounds, 1000
pounds. When the actual fuel level equals the selected fuel level or less, an asterisk * will appear
and begin flashing.
Conventional weapon initialization procedures parallel the procedures for no weapons and nuclear
weapons; therefore, detailed conventional initialization procedures are not provided. With B-52 CONV
selected, press ENTER to display EXT NONE. Use
1-160
FUEL LEVEL ADVISORY MODE
NOTE
Due to differences in tolerances between

CG/FLAS and the aircraft fuel quantity indicating system, CG/FLAS may not indicate
empty at the same time as the fuel quantity
indicating system. If a fuel gage reads
empty or a fuel flow indicator light comes
on, disregard CG/FLAS and follow FUEL
SYSTEM MANAGEMENT procedures this
section.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Fuel Input
The fuel level advisory mode is used to monitor fuel

management. In the fuel level advisory mode, only
the burn-down-to quantity can be manually input.
Press the SCROLL or SHIFT key until the desired
tank to be monitored is displayed in the first two
windows of the second row. Then press CHG and
the third digit in the second row will flash. Use the
SCROLL key until the desired number is displayed.
Press the SHIFT key and the next digit will flash
and the preceding digit goes steady. Use the
SCROLL key to display the desired value. Now, the
desired burn-down-to level is displayed in thousands of pounds. Press ENTER to load system.
Remaining External Weapons
The number of external weapons that can be released is a function of aft cg. As the cg moves aft,
the number of external weapons will decrease. If
more missile launches are scheduled than number
of missiles displayed, the fuel sequence should be
altered to move the cg forward.
Asymmetrical Fuel Load
If an asymmetrical fuel load condition develops, the

CG/FLAS will alert the crew by indicating which
pair of tanks are involved, and which is the low one.
If a main tank differential becomes greater than
2000 pounds relative to its opposite tank, the low
tank number will be displayed. If a differential of
1000 pounds develops in the external tanks, an E
will appear. If the same differential of 1000 pounds
appears in the outboard tanks, an O will be displayed.
WEAPON STATUS MODE
The weapon status mode is used to change weapon

status after a gravity release or missile launch.
Weapon status is displayed and the weapon status
mode is active when the WPN key is pressed. The
weapon status mode light comes on and remains on
while the weapon status mode is active. The current aircraft cg is displayed on the top row, external
weapon load on the center row, and internal weapon load on the bottom. Weapon status change process is initiated by pressing the CHG key. Then use
SCROLL, SHIFT process as described earlier, until
the desired weapon status is displayed, then ENTER. The weapon status is changed from left to
right starting on the center row and sequencing
thru the bottom row. When ALCMs/ACMs are present and a pylon is empty, a P will be displayed and
is accounted for in the same manner as a weapon.
WEIGHT STATUS MODE
The weight status mode is used to monitor fuel

quantity and update status, if required. The weight
status mode data will be displayed when the WT
key is pressed. The weight status mode light comes
on and remains on while the weight status mode is
active. The correct aircraft cg is displayed on the
top row, gross weight (in 100s of pounds) on the second row, and total fuel weight (in 100s of pounds)
on the third row. Pressing the SCROLL or SHIFT
key will cause the second row to display tank input
status in the first digit, and burn-down-to-level difference in the last digit, and the third row to display selected tank and weight. The burn-down to
level can be cancelled by selecting 99. The weight
status mode uses FQIS inputs normally, but a fuel
weight can be manually input. Also, the opposite
tank weight can be used if an opposite tank exists,
such as MAIN 1 and MAIN 4. To change from one
input selection to another, use the SCROLL or
SHIFT key to access the desired tank(s), then the
CHG, SCROLL process and then ENTER. The selections are F (FQIS), M (manual), and O displays
opposite paired tank weight. When M is selected,
the operator uses CHG, SCROLL, SHIFT, SCROLL
until the desired weight is displayed, then ENTER.
The aircraft cg calculations will be based on the
manual fuel weight inputs. When the CHG key is
pressed, the first digit on the center row will flash
and will move from left to right and then across the
bottom row as the SHIFT key is pressed. The O input can be used when a gage failure occurs, and an
approximate reading can be monitored from the opposite paired tank.
1-161
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CG/FLAS Circuit Protection and Location

EQUIPMENT
CG/FLAS
Control Power
Main Power
11
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
FUEL SYSTEM
CG/FLAS DC PWR
CG/FLAS AC PWR
RLC/D9
RLC/D10
Rt. TR
AC Bus 5
Key Light and Rocker Switch

Power
INTERIOR LIGHTING COPILOT INST
RLC/A29
AC Bus 5
Mode Lights Power
LIGHTING INTERIOR
DIM CONTROL PILOT & COPILOT
LLC/E12
Left TR
LLC
RLC
Figure 1-54
1-162
T.O. 1B-52H-1
REFUELING SYSTEMS
SINGLE POINT GROUND REFUELING SYSTEM
AIR REFUELING SYSTEM
AIR REFUELING HYDRAULIC PRESSURE
AIR REFUELING FUEL FLOW
AIR REFUELING SCAVENGE SYSTEM
AIR REFUELING SYSTEM CONTROLS AND INDICATORS
AIR REFUELING SYSTEM NORMAL OPERATION
AIR REFUELING SYSTEM CHECK
AIR REFUELING FUEL MANAGEMENT
SINGLE POINT GROUND REFUELING

SYSTEM
A single point ground refueling receptacle (figure
1-186) is provided to allow filling of all aircraft fuel
tanks from a single point. Single point servicing of
the fuel system reduces the time and amount of
equipment required during fuel servicing of the aircraft. The receptacle is located forward of the left
forward wheel well and is accessible through a filler
cap. The nozzle adapter of the receptacle contains a
spring-loaded poppet which is opened by the fuel
1-163
1-164
1-164
1-165
1-165
1-165
1-176
1-176
1-177
nozzle and seals the filler opening when the nozzle

is withdrawn. The single point refueling receptacle
is connected directly to the refuel manifold and fuel
flows in the same manner as in air refueling (figure
1-55). The fuel system panel (figure 1-38) or the refuel panel (figure 1-56) includes the controls necessary for operation of the refuel system valves.
Single point ground refueling system circuit protection and the location of the applicable circuit breakers is contained in figure 1-60.
1-163
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AIR REFUELING SYSTEM

An air refueling system makes it possible to refuel
the aircraft in flight from a boom-type tanker aircraft. An air refueling slipway and receptacle,
which can be covered by hydraulically operated
slipway doors when not in use, is located on top of
the fuselage slightly aft of the pilots stations. A refuel system (figure 1-55) makes it possible to fill all
the aircraft fuel tanks from the air refueling receptacle or a single point ground refueling receptacle.
The refuel system is an extension of the fuel supply
system using the same panel to control flow of fuel
through the same manifold. A separate refuel panel
(figure 1-56) is installed on the overhead panel adjacent to the air refueling panel and contains the
master refuel switch, the refuel valve switch, and
refuel valve position indicator. See FUEL SUPPLY
SYSTEM, this section. A main refuel valve downstream from the air refuel receptacle and the single
point ground refuel receptacle connects the refuel
manifold to the main manifold. The main manifold
distributes fuel to each tank through the fuel level
control valves which are controlled from the fuel
system panel (figure 1-38) located in front of the copilot on the pilots instrument panel. An air refueling panel (figure 1-56) located on the pilots overhead panel contains the controls necessary to operate the air refueling hydraulic system and to con-
1-164
trol a signal amplifier system. The signal amplifier

serves to control the refueling sequence and to indicate the sequence conditions of the amplifier to the
pilot and copilot.
Air refueling system circuit protection and the location of the applicable circuit breakers is contained
in figure 1-60.
AIR REFUELING HYDRAULIC PRESSURE
Hydraulic pressure used to operate the slipway

door system is normally supplied by the left body
hydraulic system. The right body hydraulic system
serves as an alternate source of pressure for this
purpose. This pressure is controlled by normal and
alternate slipway door control valves which are
electrically controlled by slipway door switches. A
dual shuttle valve, positioned by the pressure
source, allows hydraulic pressure to operate the
slipway doors actuator and to position the toggle actuator to unlock the toggles. Pressure is also supplied to two electrically operated toggle latching
valves. One valve is controlled automatically by the
signal amplifier and the other valve is controlled by
a manual toggle latching switch. Opening a toggle
actuator valve allows hydraulic pressure to lock the
latching toggles which hold the air refueling boom
in the receptacle.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AIR REFUELING FUEL FLOW
When the air refueling boom nozzle is seated in the

air refueling receptacle and held by hydraulically
operated latching toggles, fuel is pumped from the
tanker to the receiver refuel manifold. Rate of flow
is controlled by the tanker crew and number of receiver tanks open. In the receiver, fuel flows from
the refuel manifold into the main manifold and into
fuel tanks as directed by fuel level control valves
which are operated by switches on the fuel system
panel (figure 1-38). When a fuel tank is full by
weight, the full-by-weight switch, which is an integral part of the fuel quantity indicator, will close
the primary and secondary valves in the fuel level
control valves in the tank. When a fuel tank is full
by volume, float valves will close the primary and
secondary valves in the fuel level control valve.
(The primary and secondary valves in each fuel level control valve are at the same level.) When fuel
level control valves for all tanks are closed, pressure builds up in the main manifold and refuel
manifold and a disconnect is effected when the

pressure exceeds a disconnect pressure switch setting of 69 (3) psi. A disconnect is also caused by
the boom exceeding its envelope limits. A voluntary
disconnect may be initiated by either pilot pressing
the disconnect switch on his control wheel or by a
disconnect signal by the boom operator.
AIR REFUELING SCAVENGE SYSTEM
A fuel scavenge system is provided for the refuel

manifold and consists of an ac powered pump, float
switch, and shutoff valve, all under control of the
scavenge system switch on the fuel scavenge system panel.
REFUELING SYSTEM CONTROLS AND

INDICATORS
A description of the refueling system controls and
indicators is contained in figure 1-56.
Change 4
1-165
READY
LIGHT
(Doors Open)
T.O. 1B-52H-1
1-166
SLIPWAY
SLIPWAY DOOR
CLOSED AND
LOCKED LIGHT
AIR
REFUEL
RECEPTACLE
SLIPWAY DOOR
ACTUATOR
(TYPICAL)
CONTACT
LIGHT
TOGGLE
ACTUATOR
TO MAIN MANIFOLD
SCAVENGE SYSTEM
INDUCTION
COIL
PLUNGER
LIMIT
SWITCH
MANUAL
TOGGLE
CONTROL
VALVE
THROUGH CABIN
POSITION OF
SCAVENGE
SYSTEM SWITCH
SINGLE
POINT
REFUEL
RECEPTACLE
PRESSURE
DISCONNECT
SWITCH
FLOAT
SWITCH
SOLENOID
VALVE
FUEL IN
CABIN MANIFOLD
SCAVENGE
PUMP
TO NO. 2
MAIN TANK
DUAL
SHUTTLE
VALVE
FROM
LEFT BODY
SYSTEM
A31680
NORMAL
OPEN
NORMAL SLIPWAY DOOR
CONTROL VALVE
PILOTS
ALTERNATE
CLOSED
FROM
RIGHT BODY
SYSTEM
ALTERNATE
OPEN
ALTERNATE SLIPWAY DOOR CONTROL VALVE
COPILOTS
DISCONNECT SWITCHES
FROM SIGNAL
AMPLIFIER POWER SWITCH
SIGNAL
AMPLIFIER
REFUEL MANIFOLD
NORMAL
CLOSED
MANUAL
TOGGLE
LATCHING
SWITCH
SIGNAL
AMPLIFIER
RESET
BUTTON
DISCONNECT
LIGHT
Refueling System
NORMAL
TOGGLE
CONTROL
VALVE
MAIN
OFF
CABIN
SCAVENGE
SYSTEM
SWITCH
NORMAL SLIPWAY
DOOR CONTROL
SWITCH
MAIN REFUEL VALVE

(Normally Motor Driven)
OPEN
OPEN
ALTERNATE
SLIPWAY DOOR
CONTROL SWITCH
CLOSE
OPEN
MAIN
REFUEL
VALVE
SWITCH
ON
OFF
TO SIGNAL AMPLIFIER RESET

BUTTON THROUGH OPEN POSITION
OF EITHER SLIPWAY DOOR CONTROL SWITCH
AUXILIARY TANK
FUEL FLOW CONTROL
SWITCH (TYPICAL)
MANUAL
POWER
LIGHT
FUEL FLOW
INDICATOR
LIGHT
(TYPICAL)
FUEL QUANTITY
GAGE (TYPICAL)
FUEL FLOW
MANIFOLD
SCAVENGE LINES
HYDRULIC SYSTEM
PRESSURE
NORMAL DOOR AND
TOGGLE OPEN PRESSURE
CLOSE
MASTER
REFUEL
SWITCH
REFUEL
REFUEL
MAIN MANIFOLD
SIGNAL AMPLIFIER
POWER SWITCH
CENTER
MAIN REFUEL
REFUEL VALVE
VALVE EMERGENCY
POSITION
CONTROL LEVER
INDICATOR
MAIN TANK
FUEL LEVEL
CONTROL VALVE
SWITCH
(TYPICAL)
REFUEL
LEVEL
CHECKOUT
SWITCH
PRIMARY
OFF
SECONDARY
THROUGH
REFUEL
POSITION
OF FUEL
LEVEL
CONTROL
VALVE
SWITCH
THROUGH
REFUEL
POSITION
OF FUEL
FLOW
CONTROL
SWITCH
NORMAL TOGGLE
LATCHING LINES
FUEL LEVEL
CONTROL VALVE
(TYPICAL)
FUEL FLOW
INDICATOR
LIGHT
(TYPICAL)
FUEL LEVEL
CONTROL VALVE
(TYPICAL)
RETURN LINES
A31681
1-167
ELECTRICAL
MECHANICAL
AUXILIARY TANK
(TYPICAL)
TO OTHER
TANKS
MAIN TANK
(TYPICAL)
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ALTERNATE OPEN LINES

AND MANUAL TOGGLE
LATCHING LINES
NORMAL CLOSE LINES
ALTERNATE CLOSE LINES
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Air Refueling System Controls and Indicators
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
NORMAL SLIPWAY DOOR SWITCH

SLIPWAY DOOR CLOSED AND LOCKED LIGHT
ALTERNATE SLIPWAY DOOR SWITCH
MANUAL TOGGLE LATCH SWITCH
SIGNAL AMPLIFIER RESET BUTTON
MANUAL POWER LIGHT
SIGNAL AMPLIFIER POWER SWITCH
REFUEL VALVE POSITION INDICATOR
REFUEL VALVE SWITCH
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
MASTER REFUEL SWITCH

READY FOR CONTACT LIGHT (BLUE)
CONTACT-MADE LIGHT (GREEN)
DISCONNECT LIGHT (AMBER)
FUEL IN CABIN MANIFOLD LIGHT
FUEL IN MAIN MANIFOLD LIGHT
AUTOPILOT AND AIR REFUELING (IFR) BOOM
RELEASE BUTTONS
1-168
Change 20
T.O. 1B-52H-1
17
18
19
20
21
DEFUEL VALVE SWITCH

FUEL SCAVENGE SYSTEM SWITCH
REFUEL LEVEL CHECKOUT SWITCH
AUXILIARY TANK FUEL FLOW CONTROL
SWITCHES (8 PLACES)
FUEL FLOW INDICATOR LIGHTS
22
23
24
MAIN TANK FUEL LEVEL CONTROL VALVE

SWITCHES (4 PLACES)
MAIN MANIFOLD INTERCONNECT VALVES
SWITCH
MAIN REFUEL VALVE EMERGENCY CONTROL
LEVER
1-169
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Air Refueling System Controls and Indicators (Cont)

NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
NORMAL SLIPWAY DOORS Switch
Normal slipway door switch with OPEN and CLOSED positions are provided on the air refueling panel. Power is supplied to this switch when the
master refuel switch is in ON position. When the normal slipway door
switch is in OPEN position, right TR power is supplied to the normal slipway door control valve which allows hydraulic pressure from the left body
hydraulic system to open the doors. OPEN position also directs right TR
power to the signal amplifier power switch. When the normal slipway door
switch is placed in CLOSED position, power is supplied to the normal slipway door control valve to close the doors.
SLIPWAY DOOR CLOSED &

LOCKED Light (amber)
An amber slipway door closed-and-locked light is located on the air refueling panel. This light is supplied right TR power when the slipway doors
are closed and locked, provided the master refuel switch is ON and the
light is off when either door is not closed and locked.
ALTERNATE SLIPWAY DOORS Switch
The alternate slipway door switch functions similarly except that the right
body hydraulic system and the alternate slipway door control valve are
utilized.
FUNCTION
NOTE
The alternate slipway door switch must be in CLOSED position
for the normal slipway door switch to operate the doors properly.
4
MANUAL TOGGLE LATCH Switch
A manual toggle latch switch located on the air refueling panel has RELEASE- -HOLD positions. This switch is supplied with right TR power
only when the signal amplifier power switch is in the MANUAL position,
and controls the latching toggles (normally controlled by the signal amplifier). In the HOLD position, power is supplied to the manual toggle latching valve allowing the latching toggles to hold the boom in the air refueling
receptacle. HOLD position also supplies power to slipway door limit
switches, induction coil, and to the disconnect light. In RELEASE position, the toggles are released and allow the air refueling boom nozzle to
be withdrawn from the receptacle. The latching toggles may also be released by pressing the air refueling release button on the pilots control
wheel or copilots control wheel, by high fuel pressure, or by brute force
pullouts.
1-170
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
5
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
Signal Amplifier Reset Button
A push-to-reset signal amplifier reset button is located on the air refueling

panel. When pressed after a disconnect has been accomplished, this button resets the automatic control circuit of the signal amplifier. After resetting, the air refueling system is ready for another contact.
NOTE
Upon occasion, the signal amplifier reset button will either fall
out of or be pushed inside the air refueling panel when attempting to reset after a disconnect has occurred. Placing the master
refuel switch to OFF, then back to ON will accomplish the same
thing as pressing the reset button and the signal power amplifier
will be in the ready for contact position.
MANUAL/POWER ON Light (amber)
A right TR powered manual power light is on the air refueling panel. This
light is illuminated when the signal amplifier power switch is in MANUAL
position provided the air refueling system master switch is ON. The
manual power light is out when the signal amplifier power switch is in
NORMAL.
SIGNAL AMP POWER Switch
A signal amplifier power switch located on the air refueling panel has
MANUAL- - NORMAL positions. MANUAL position directs right TR power to the manual toggle latch switch, the manual power light, and the
plunger limit switch. NORMAL position directs right TR power to the
plunger limit switch, the slipway door limit switches, and the signal amplifier.
REFUEL VALVE Position Indicator
A tab-window type refuel valve position indicator on the refuel panel has
three markings to register position of the main refuel valve and switch.
When the refuel valve switch is placed in OPEN position, right TR power
is supplied to open the valve. When the valve is open, a limit switch stops
the motor and energizes the refuel valve position indicator to show the
OPEN marking. When the refuel valve switch is moved to CLOSE position, the position indicator is deenergized, showing the slanting stripes
marking. The indicator remains deenergized until the valve closes and a
limit switch stops the motor and energizes the indicator to show the
CLOSED marking.
REFUEL VALVE Switch
A refuel valve switch on the refuel panel has OPEN- -CLOSE positions.
This switch controls the main refuel valve located downstream from the
air refuel receptacle and the single point refuel receptacle. The valve separates the refuel manifold from the main manifold. In CLOSE position,
right TR power is supplied to close the main refuel valve and energize the
refuel valve position indicator. In OPEN position, power is supplied to
open the main refuel valve and energize the refuel valve position indicator.
1-171
T.O. 1B-52H-1

NO.
10
CONTROLINDICATOR
MASTER REFUEL Switch
FUNCTION
A master refuel switch on the refuel panel has ON- -OFF positions. ON
position supplies right TR power to the normal and alternate slipway door
control switches. In OFF position, no power is supplied to these units. The
master refuel switch also supplies power to the fuel level control valve circuits. OFF position of the master refuel switch removes power from the
fuel level control valve circuits; the valves will close and refueling through
the valves is impossible.
During low level or traffic pattern fuel panel operations, the master refuel switch will not be used by itself to control auxiliary tank
fuel transfer operations. Whenever engine feed is selected with
the auxiliary tank fuel flow control switch and the master refuel
switch is off, the auxiliary tank boost pumps will continue to run
with a no flow condition. Therefore, both the master refuel
switch and all auxiliary fuel control switches will be turned off
whenever fuel transfer is to be stopped. This is necessary since
below 25,000 feet MSL, an explosive condition exists due to the
auto-ignition temperature of fuel vapors and the potential ignition source from a malfunctioning auxiliary boost pump.
11
Ready-for-Contact Light (blue)
A blue ready-for-contact light is the upper light of the three air refueling
lights on the eyebrow instrument panel. The word READY can be read
on the light. The light receives right TR power through the fully open positions of the slipway door limit switches.
12
Contact-Made Light (green)
A green contact-made light is the center light of the three air refueling
lights on the eyebrow instrument panel. The word CONTACT can be read
on the light. The light receives right TR power through the plunger limit
switch in the air refuel receptacle.
13
Disconnect Light (amber)
An amber disconnect light is the lower light of the three air refueling lights
on the eyebrow instrument panel. The word DISCONNECT can be read
on the light. The light receives right TR power from the signal amplifier or
from the HOLD position of the manual toggle latch switch.
14
FUEL IN CABIN MANIFOLD Light
The fuel-in-manifold light marked FUEL IN CABIN MANIFOLD is located

on the central caution panel and indicates when fuel is in the refuel manifolds. The FUEL IN CABIN MANIFOLD light will glow if fuel is in the refuel
manifold and the master-refuel switch is placed to OFF or when the scavenge system switch (No. 18) is placed in CABIN position. The light will go
out as soon as the manifold is scavenged.
1-172
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
15
FUEL IN MAIN MANIFOLD Light

(amber)
The fuel-in-manifold light marked FUEL IN MAIN MANIFOLD is located

on the central caution panel and indicates when fuel is in the main manifold. When the scavenge system switch (No. 18) is placed in MAIN position, the FUEL IN MAIN MANIFOLD light will glow if fuel is in the main
manifold. The light will go out as soon as the manifold is scavenged or the
scavenge system switch is turned OFF.
16
Autopilot and Air Refueling (IFR) Boom

Release Button (2 places)
An autopilot and air refueling (IFR) boom release button is located on the
pilots control wheels. Pressing this button during air refueling operations
utilizes right TR power to deenergize the toggle latching valve releasing
the latching toggles. Additional functions of this switch are covered under
AUTOPILOT, this section.
17
DEFUEL VALVE Switch
A defuel valve switch on the fuel scavenge system panel on the right side
of the pilots instrument panel in front of the copilot has OPEN- - CLOSE
positions and is guarded in CLOSE. This switch controls the defuel valve
which separates the engine crossfeed manifold from the main manifold.
OPEN position supplies right TR power to the valve causing it to open.
CLOSE position causes the valve to close. This switch is normally used
on the ground for defueling but may be used in flight. Care must be exercised during inflight use because of high fuel flow rates.
18
FUEL SCAVENGE SYSTEM Switch
A scavenge system switch on the fuel system panel has CABIN- -OFF- -MAIN positions. If fuel is in the refuel manifold (as determined
by a float switch), CABIN position causes right TR power to open a solenoid shutoff valve and energizes a relay which directs 118-volt singlephase ac power to the refuel manifold scavenge pump. The fuel in the
manifold is pumped into No. 2 main tank. As soon as the manifold is scavenged, the float switch breaks contact causing the scavenge pump to
stop and the solenoid shutoff valve to close. MAIN position actuates the
scavenge operation in the main manifold. See FUEL SUPPLY SYSTEM,
this section. OFF position deenergizes the scavenge circuits in the main
and refuel manifolds.
1-173
T.O. 1B-52H-1

NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
19
REFUEL LEVEL CHECKOUT Switch
FUNCTION
A refuel level checkout switch on the fuel system checkout panel on the
copilots side panel has PRIMARY- -OFF- -SECONDARY positions. This
switch is used to check the operation of the primary and secondary float
valves in the fuel level control valves. In order to check the valves in a
tank, an auxiliary tank fuel flow control switch or a main tank fuel level control switch must be placed in REFUEL position, the manifold to the tank
pressurized, and the master refuel switch on. PRIMARY position of the
refuel level checkout switch deenergizes the primary side of the fuel level
control valves (or valve) in the tank. This action permits fuel from the main
manifold to flood the primary float chamber in each fuel level control valve
in the tank, actuating the float valve to simulate a full-by-volume condition.
This causes the fuel level control valves to close. When the fuel level control valves (or valve) in a tank close, the fuel flow indicator light adjacent
to the appropriate fuel quantity gage glows steady. Moving the switch to
OFF position allows each primary float chamber to drain which allows the
fuel level control valves to open and the light to go out. SECONDARY
position performs the same function in the secondary float chamber. The
primary and secondary float chambers are the same level in any one
valve.
NOTE
The refuel level checkout switch can be used during air refueling
to check operation of the fuel level control valves if absolutely
necessary. However, their use in flight is not recommended.
Use of these switches at such a time might cause a pressure
disconnect or might, as a remote possibility, result in a fuel level
control valve failing closed. It is recommended, therefore, that
fuel level control valve operation be checked before flight while
fueling through the single point ground refueling receptacle.
20
Auxiliary Tank Fuel

Switches (8 places)
Flow
Control
Eight auxiliary tank fuel flow control switches on the fuel system panel
have unmarked REFUEL- -OFF- -ENGINE FEED positions. These
rotary switches are numbered 17, 18, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, and 28 and control the flow of fuel to and from the auxiliary tanks. A white arrowhead is
painted on top of each switch and the direction the arrow is pointing determines the position of the switch. For ENGINE FEED position, the arrow
is pointed away from the tank; for REFUEL position, the arrow is pointed
toward the tank; and for OFF position, the arrow is pointed perpendicular
to the flow line between the tank and the main manifold. REFUEL position
causes left and right TR power to energize the fuel level control valves
in the respective tank provided the master refuel switch is ON. ENGINE
FEED position of an auxiliary tank fuel flow control switch directs 205-volt
three-phase ac power to the boost pumps in the respective tank. See
FUEL SUPPLY SYSTEM, this section. OFF position deenergizes the fuel
level control valves in the respective tank causing them to close. Fuel level control valves are numbered for ease of identification
1-174
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
21
Fuel Flow Indicator Lights (amber)

(12 places)
Twelve amber fuel flow indicator lights are located on the fuel system panel adjacent to the fuel quantity gages. When a main tank fuel level control
valve switch or an auxiliary tank fuel flow control switch is placed in REFUEL position, the fuel level control valves in the corresponding tank are
opened provided the master refuel switch is ON. When the valves close
due to a full tank, either by weight or by volume, contacts are completed
allowing right TR power to cause the respective fuel flow indicator light
to glow steady, indicating the valves are closed. See FUEL SUPPLY
SYSTEM, this section, for additional information on these lights.
22
Main Tank Fuel Level Control Valve

Switches (4 places)
Four main tank fuel level control valve switches on the fuel system panel
have unmarked REFUEL- -OFF positions. These rotary switches are
numbered 19, 20, 21, and 22 and control the flow of fuel to the main tanks.
the switch is in REFUEL position and left and right TR power is supplied
to energize the fuel level control valves in the respective tank provided
the master refuel switch is ON. OFF position of a main tank fuel level control valve switch deenergizes the fuel level control valves in the respective
tank causing them to close. Fuel level control valves are numbered for
ease of identification (figure 1-36 or 1-38).
23
Main Manifold Interconnect Valves

Switch
A main manifold interconnect valves switch on the fuel system panel has
unmarked OPEN- -CLOSED positions. This rotary switch is numbered
29 and controls the operation of main manifold interconnect valves No.
29 and 29A. When the white stripe on the switch is aligned with the flow
line on the panel, the switch is OPEN and left TR power is supplied to
open valve 29 and right TR power is supplied to open valve 29A. Opening
these valves interconnects the right and left sides of the main manifold.
CLOSED position closes the two valves.
24
Main Refuel Valve Emergency Control

Lever
A main refuel valve emergency control lever located between the EW officers and gunners stations has OPEN (UP) - -CENTER- -CLOSE
(DOWN) positions. This lever provides manual control of the main refuel
valve which is normally controlled by the refuel valve switch. Moving the
lever to OPEN (UP) position operates cables to open the valve. Moving
the lever to CLOSE (DOWN) position operates cables to close the valve.
In CENTER position, no cable tension is applied to the valve. A detent at
the CENTER position makes it necessary to pull out on the handle before
moving it to either extreme position.
The main refuel valve emergency control lever should be in the

CENTER position before the main refuel valve is actuated electrically since OPEN and CLOSE positions of the lever apply
cable tension to the valve.
Change 10
1-175
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AIR REFUELING SYSTEM NORMAL

OPERATION
AIR REFUELING SYSTEM CHECK (PILOT READS)
Interior Check
This check may be performed after maintenance on

a reported malfunction has occurred, time and conditions permitting, and at the discretion of the
flightcrew. The following preflight will be accomplished after external power is connected to the aircraft and the left body hydraulic system standby
pump is turned on. No external air is required.
1. Master Refuel Switch ON (CP)
2. Refuel Valve Switch OPEN, refuel valve
position indicator OPEN (CP)
3. Signal Amplifier Power Switch NORMAL
(CP)
4. Normal Slipway Door Switch OPEN, readyfor-contact light on (CP)
When slipway doors are open, the closed-and-locked
light will be out and the blue ready light will illuminate when the slipway doors are fully open.
NOTE
The pilot must wait 30 seconds after the

blue ready light is illuminated to allow sufficient warmup time for the signal amplifier
before proceeding with the next steps.
5. Plunger Limit Switch Actuator Pressed,
toggles engaged (EW)
The Electronic Warfare Officer presses the plunger
limit switch actuator on pilots request and observes
toggle actuator operation. Blue ready light will go
out and the green contact-made light will illuminate indicating contact made and toggles engaged.
NOTE
When operating the plunger limit switch actuator, the Electronic Warfare Officer
should check the actuator and spring for operation by pulling down on the actuator
arm. For the remaining checks, the Electronic Warfare Officer need only push the
limit switch.
6. Plunger Limit Switch Actuator Released,
toggles disengaged (EW)
Electronic Warfare Officer releases signal switch
plunger and toggle actuator will return to the release position. Amber disconnect light will illuminate and the green contact-made light will go out.
1-176
Change 4
7. Signal Amplifier Reset Button Pressed (CP)

Push and release signal amplifier reset button and
check ready light illuminated.
8. Plunger Limit Switch Pressed, toggles engaged (EW)
Electronic Warfare Officer holds the plunger limit
switch in the pressed position and observes toggles
actuator operation; blue ready light will go out and
the green contact-made light will illuminate indicating contact made and toggles engaged.
9. Pilots Boom Release Button Pressed (P),
NOTE
Cycling of the toggle latches will occur

when the boom release buttons on the pilots or copilots control wheels are depressed while the Electronic Warfare Officer holds the plunger limit switch in the
contact-made position.
Pilot presses boom release button on control wheel.
The amber disconnect light will illuminate and the
green contact-made light will go out, indicating the
toggles are in the release position. Electronic Warfare Officer checks toggle release action and continues to hold the plunger limit switch depressed.
10. Signal Amplifier Reset Button Pressed (CP),
Copilot presses and then releases the signal amplifier reset button. The blue ready light will blink on,
then will go out and the green contact-made light
will illuminate, indicating contact made and toggles
engaged. Electronic Warfare Officer observes toggle
actuator operation.
NOTE
The toggles will engage as soon as the copilot releases the signal amplifier reset button because the Electronic Warfare Officer
is still holding the plunger limit switch depressed.
11. Copilots Boom Release Button Pressed
(CP), toggles disengaged (EW)
Copilot presses boom release button on control
wheel. The amber disconnect light will illuminate
and the green contact-made light will go out, indicating the toggles are in the released position. Electronic Warfare Officer checks toggle release action.
NOTE
Cycling of the toggle latches will occur

when the boom release buttons on the pilots or copilots control wheels are depressed while the Electronic Warfare Officer holds the plunger limit switch in the
contact-made position.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
12. Plunger Limit Switch Actuator Released
(EW)
13. Signal Amplifier Power Switch MANUAL
(CP)
The amber manual power light will illuminate and
the blue ready light will illuminate when the toggle
latching switch is in the release position.
14. Manual Toggle Latch Switch HOLD (CP),
The blue ready light will go out. Electronic Warfare
Officer checks toggle engage action.
15. Pilots Boom Release Button Pressed (P),
Pilot presses boom release button on control wheel;
amber disconnect light will illuminate. Electronic
Warfare Officer checks toggle release action.
NOTE
If the pilots and copilots boom release buttons function properly when the signal amplifier switch is in NORMAL, it is unnecessary to check the copilots boom release button with the signal amplifier switch in
MANUAL.
16. Manual Toggle Latch Switch RELEASE
(CP)
17. Signal Amplifier Power Switch NORMAL
(CP)
18. Normal Slipway Door Switch CLOSED,
closed-and-locked light on (CP)
Amber slipway door closed-and-locked light will illuminate when doors are fully closed.
19. Refuel Valve Switch CLOSE; position indicator CLOSE (CP)
20. Master Refuel Switch OFF (CP)
If the master refuel switch is turned OFF

before the slipway doors closed-and-locked
light illuminates, the doors will remain in
an unlocked or intermediate position.
21. Air Refueling Accumulator Preload 1000
(200) psi (EW)
Electronic Warfare Officer checks air refueling accumulator located to the right and aft of the air refueling receptacle.
22. Hydraulic Leaks Checked (EW)
Electronic Warfare Officer checks for possible hydraulic leaks aft of slipway area. Report to pilot.
Before Taxiing Check
The following alternate slipway door switch check

will be made after the engines are started. This
check could not be made during the POWER-ON
INTERIOR CHECK because hydraulic standby
pump pressure is not available to the alternate slipway door control valve with the controllable hydraulic check valves CLOSED. This check will normally be made only after maintenance or reported
malfunction has occurred.
1. Master Refuel Switch ON (CP)
2. Alternate Slipway Door Switch OPEN,
ready- for-contact light on (CP)
Amber door-locked light will go out and blue readyfor-contact light will illuminate when the doors are
fully open.
3. Alternate Slipway Door Switch CLOSED,
slipway door closed-and-locked light on (CP)
The amber slipway door closed-and-locked light will
illuminate when the doors are fully closed.
4. Master Refuel Switch OFF (CP)
AIR REFUELING FUEL MANAGEMENT
Fuel Distribution Prior to Air Refueling
With the exception of ground operation and takeoff,

fuel will generally be used first from the center
wing and body tanks. Consequently, mains, outboard and external wing tanks will be full for takeoff and additional fuel required will be distributed
between the center wing and body tanks in accordance with loading data in T.O. 1B-52H-5. This results in a desirable distribution of fuel for air refueling since the three body tanks and the center
wing tank are capable of taking fuel simultaneously
as fast as the tanker can supply it and their combined capacity will normally satisfy any outbound
or inbound refueling requirements. As the four
tanks fill simultaneously, the cg moves aft remaining well within the flight limit.
Refuel Valves Operating Technique
A typical panel configuration for refueling is shown

in figure 1-57.
The tanks in each step will be refueled simultaneously to the prescribed quantities prior to commencing the next step. Where a tank is refueled in
successive steps, it may be practical to leave the appropriate valve open at the end of the initial step.
Be careful to maintain the proper differential between tanks.
Change 4
1-177
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Air Refueling Fuel Management

REFUEL VALVE
OPEN
MASTER REFUEL
ON
OPEN
OFF
CLOSE
REFUEL PANEL
3 ENG 4
5 ENG 6
1 ENG 2
FWD
BODY
10
9
12
11
16
PUMP
PRESSURE
CHECKOUT
14
ON
CTR
WING
AFT
BODY
OFF
MAINS
NO.1NO.2
13
7 ENG 8
25
ON
15
26
OFF
MAINS
NO.3NO.4
R OUTBD
WING
TANK
WARNING
MID
BODY
27
28
17
R EXTERNAL
L OUTBD
18
19
REFUEL
RECPT
L EXTERNAL
20
WING
TANK
WARN
21
22
23
24
29
BLINKING AMBER LIGHT INDICATES "NO FLOW" CONDITIONS
STEADY AMBER LIGHT INDICATES SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSED
MAIN FUEL FLOW
REFUEL FLOW
STATIC
A31683
Figure 1-57
1-178
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Whenever a main tank is full, its respective refuel
valve should be left open during the remainder of
the refueling operation in order to replenish fuel
used from the main tank for engine feed. Main
tank(s) differential fuel load is maintained by opening and closing appropriate refuel valves as required.
Whenever a token off-load has been received and
considerable fuel has been used out of the main
tanks for pilot air refueling proficiency purposes,
the main tanks should be replenished with fuel
from the body tanks in normal fuel usage sequence
down to ballast requirements. The proper distribution between mains 1 & 2, and 3 & 4 should be
maintained.
Air Refueling Procedure No Pylons
1. If outboards and externals are not full, refuel

outboards, externals and mains until outboards and
externals are full.
NOTE
The aircraft is speed restricted until the external wing tanks are full. See Section V for
WING FLUTTER AIRSPEED LIMITATIONS.
2. Continue filling all tanks simultaneously until
desired gross weight is achieved.
NOTE
If refueling for SIOP-increased gross

weight, all wing tanks must be full at gross
weights above 500,000 pounds.
Refueling at Heavy Gross Weights
NOTE
Pilot fatigue and aircraft loads are substantially reduced by using the aerial refuel
mode of the automatic flight control system.
For additional information, see AUTOPILOT, this section.
The most skill required of the pilot for operation at

maximum weight will be air refueling. Refueling
should be done smoothly because, at the airspeeds
flown, it is possible for the pilot to exceed the g limit of the aircraft. In general, if the refueling is done
at normal altitudes (that is, above 27,000 feet), the
aircraft cannot aerodynamically exceed the 1.8 g
limit load. If refueling is done at lower altitudes
where it is possible aerodynamically to reach limit
load, refueling will be smoother because of improved performance and stability characteristics. At
maximum weight, the receiver may not have the
normal amount of power for maneuvering if refueling at optimum cruise altitude, causing difficulty in
maintaining optimum refueling position with the
tanker. In this case, the tanker may have to start a
slow descent during the last part of the refueling.
Although the aft cg flight limit at 488,000 pounds is
35%, the aircraft is easier to handle at high gross
weight during a refueling if the cg is maintained
forward of 30%. Refueling with an aft cg causes
considerable pitching of the receiver which induces
pitching of the tanker and the two soon become incompatible. If pitching commences during a refueling hookup, it is recommended that the receiver
disconnect, drop back and stabilize, then move in
for a new hookup. The cg at maximum gross weight
is not always a constant figure. Fuel density, bomb
load, chaff load, etc, are variables which can affect
the cg location. By following prescribed air refueling procedures in this section, the cg will be maintained forward of 30% as maximum gross weight is
approached.
NOTE
For further air refueling operation and

checklists, refer to T.O. 1-1C-1 and T.O.
1-1C-1-15.
Air Refueling Procedure With External Cruise Missiles
or Conventional Weapons
The air refueling sequence for SIOP positive control

launch is shown in figure 1-58 and for Conventional
Operations/Training/Tactical Ferry in figure 1-59.
Change 4
1-179
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Air Refueling Procedure With External

Cruise Missiles or Conventional Weapons
NOTE
TWO PYLONS SYMMETRICAL LOADING.
THE FOLLOWING TANK REFUELING SEQUENCE IS FOR AIRCRAFT CARRYING EXTERNAL CRUISE MISSILES IN A
SYMMETRICAL LOADING. REFUEL THE TANKS SPECIFIED IN EACH STEP (FORWARD BODY AND CENTER WING
TANKS ARE NOT REFUELED):
IF OUTBOARD AND EXTERNALS ARE NOT FULL:
1. MAINS, OUTBOARDS, EXTERNALS, AND AFT BODY TO THE FOLLOWING QUANTITIES:
AFT BODY TO 30,000 POUNDS.
MAINS TO 9000 POUNDS EACH.
OUTBOARDS AND EXTERNALS TO FULL.
NOTE
MAINTAIN MAINS AS CLOSE TO 9000 POUNDS EACH AS POSSIBLE. AT NO

TIME SHOULD MAINS BE ALLOWED TO BE LESS THAN 5000 POUNDS EACH.
AIRCRAFT IS SPEED RESTRICTED UNTIL EXTERNALS ARE FULL. SEE WING
FLUTTER AIRSPEED LIMITATIONS CHART, SECTION V.
AS SOON AS OUTBOARDS AND EXTERNALS ARE FULL, USE THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES:
IF OUTBOARDS AND EXTERNALS ARE FULL:

1. MAINS AND AFT BODY TO THE FOLLOWING QUANTITIES:
MAINS TO 18,000 POUNDS EACH.
2. MAINS AND AFT BODY TO THE FOLLOWING QUANTITIES:
MAINS 1 AND 4 TO 20,000 POUNDS EACH.
AFT BODY TO FULL.
3. MAINS AND MID BODY:
MAINS TO FULL.
MID BODY TO DESIRED GROSS WEIGHT.
Figure 1-58
1-180
Change 20
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Air Refueling Procedure With External

Cruise Missiles or Conventional Weapons
CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS/TRAINING/TACTICAL FERRY
NOTE
TWO PYLONS SYMMETRICAL LOADING.
THE FOLLOWING TANK REFUELING SEQUENCE IS FOR AIRCRAFT CARRYING EXTERNAL CRUISE MISSILES IN A
SYMMETRICAL LOADING. REFUEL THE TANKS SPECIFIED IN EACH STEP (FORWARD BODY AND CENTER WING
TANKS ARE NOT REFUELED):
1. AFT BODY, MAINS, AND OUTBOARDS TO THE FOLLOWING QUANTITIES:
AFT BODY TO 9000 POUNDS.
OUTBOARDS TO FULL.
2. AFT BODY AND MAINS TO THE FOLLOWING QUANTITIES:
3. AFT BODY AND MAINS TO THE FOLLOWING QUANTITIES:
MAINS 1 AND 4 TO FULL.
4. AFT BODY, MID BODY, AND MAINS TO THE FOLLOWING QUANTITIES:
AFT BODY TO INITIAL LOADING (MISSILES NOT LAUNCHED).
MAINS 2 AND 3 TO FULL.
MID BODY TO DESIRED GROSS WEIGHT.
Figure 1-59
Change 4
1-181
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Refueling System Circuit Protection and Location

EQUIPMENT
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
Autopilot and Air Refueling (IFR)

Boom Release Buttons
AERIAL REFUELING
Auxiliary Tank Fuel Flow Control

Switches (In refuel position)
(Master Refuel switch must be
ON to allow power to reach the
refuel valves)
FUEL LEVEL CONTROL REFUEL

VALVES
BODY TANKS
AFT 28
AFT 28A
CTR WING 26
FWD 25
MID 27
LEFT WING TANKS
EXT 17
OUTBD 18 & 18A
RIGHT WING TANKS
EXT 24
OUTBD 23 & 23A
Defuel Valve Switch

Disconnect Light
Fuel Flow Indicator Lights

Main Manifold Interconnect

Valves Switch
Main Tank Fuel Flow Control

Switches (In refuel position)
(Master Refuel switch must be
ON to allow power to reach the
refuel valves)
Manual Power Light
POWER
SOURCE
RLC/F4
Rt. TR
RLC/D8
LLC/A20
RLC/D6
LLC/A19
RLC/D7
Rt. TR
Left TR
Rt. TR
Left TR
Rt. TR
LLC/A15
LLC/A16
Left TR
Left TR
RLC/D5
RLC/D4
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
FUEL MISCELLANEOUS
DEFUEL VALVE
RLC/E7
Rt. TR
AERIAL REFUELING
SIGNAL AMPL
RLC/F4
RLC/F5
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
FUEL MISCELLANEOUS
FUEL MANAGE IND
RLC/E3
Rt. TR

CABIN
MAIN
RLC/E8
RLC/E9
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
FUEL FEED CONTROL CROSS FEED

VALVE
29
29A
LLC/C12
RLC/C6
Left TR
Rt. TR
LLC/A17
LLC/A18
Left TR
Left TR
RLC/D2
RLC/D3
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
RLC/F3
Rt. TR
FUEL LEVEL CONTROL REFUEL

VALVES
LEFT WING TANKS
NO. 1 19 & 19A
NO. 2 20
RIGHT WING TANKS
3 21
4 22 & 22A
AERIAL REFUELING
MANUAL CONTROL
1-182
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Refueling System Circuit Protection

and Location (Cont)
EQUIPMENT
Manual Toggle Latch Switch
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
AERIAL REFUELING
SIGNAL AMPL
POWER
SOURCE
RLC/F5
Rt. TR
RLC/F5
RLC/F2
RLC/F1
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
LLC/A14
RLC/D1
Left TR
Rt. TR
Master Refuel Switch (ON position supplies control power to refuel valve circuits thru the LEFT
MASTER and RIGHT MASTER
circuit breakers on the LLC and
RLC circuit breaker panels, respectively)
AERIAL REFUELING
SIGNAL AMPL
SLIPWAY DOOR ALT
SLIPWAY DOOR NORMAL
FUEL LEVEL CONTROL
LEFT MASTER
RIGHT MASTER
Refuel Level Checkout Switch

REFUEL VALVE
LLC/A13
Left TR
FUEL MISCELLANEOUS
REFUEL VALVE
RLC/E6
Rt. TR
RLC/E8
Rt. TR
Refuel Valve Switch and Position

Indicator
Scavenge System Switch (In
CABIN position; for MAIN position see FUEL SUPPLY SYSTEM CIRCUIT PROTECTION
AND LOCATION, this section)

CABIN
Signal Amplifier, Signal Amplifier Power Switch, Reset Button,

Contact Made Light, and Ready
For Contact Light
AERIAL REFUELING
MANUAL CONTROL
SIGNAL AMPL
RLC/F3
RLC/F5
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
Slipway Doors Switches
AERIAL REFUELING
SLIPWAY DOOR ALT
SLIPWAY DOOR NORMAL
RLC/F2
RLC/F1
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
11
LLC
PANELS figure, in the ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS subsection in Section I.
RLC
1-183/(1-184 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEMS

DESCRIPTION
AC POWER SYSTEM
DIRECT CURRENT SYSTEM
EXTERNAL ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS
NORMAL OPERATION
CONTROL CIRCUITS
INSTRUMENT INDICATIONS
DC SYSTEM
EXTERNAL POWER
GENERATOR OPERATION
ELECTRICAL LOADS
CIRCUIT BREAKER PANELS
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM CIRCUIT PROTECTION
AND LOCATION
DESCRIPTION
Primary and secondary distribution buses supply
power to the aircraft. Primary power is supplied by
four engine-driven generators. This 205/118-volt
three-phase ac power is used for most heavy loads
such as fuel boost pumps, and wing flap motors.
Single-phase 118-volt ac power is generally used for
small motors, actuators, and is used for some electronic equipment. Transformers reduce singlephase ac power to 28 volts for most lighting. Secondary power is 28-volt nominal unregulated dc
supplied by transformer-rectifier (TR) units fed
from the 205-volt three-phase ac power of the primary system. This TR power is used for control circuits, instruments, small motors, and electronic
equipment. Two nickel-cadmium batteries provide
an auxiliary source of 24-volt dc power which is
supplied to essential equipment in case the ac or
TR system fails to function. The batteries also provide power directly to emergency equipment
through the forward and aft battery buses. Both ac
and dc power are distributed throughout the aircraft by buses located in junction boxes and panels.
Circuit breakers and fuses are installed to protect
aircraft wiring. AC and dc power may be obtained
for ground operation through external power receptacles. Missile ac power requirements are provided
from the aircraft through circuit breakers in the engine No. 1, 3, 5, and 7 generator power boxes.
The ac input power is redistributed within the missile system through circuit breakers located in a
missile power distribution box installed in the forward wheel well. Missile dc control power and other
miscellaneous requirements are supplied from the
aircraft non-interruptible dc (NDC) bus. The dc
1-185
1-185
1-196
1-202
1-206
1-206
1-206
1-206
1-206
1-207
1-207
1-224
1-239
power requirements for missiles are provided from

one TR unit to provide dc power for the rotary
launcher hydraulic pump and three paralleled NDC
power supplies to provide power to missile electronics and EED power, with circuit breaker protection
in the power distribution box.
Electrical power supply systems circuit protection
For additional information regarding the AGM-86B
electrical system, refer to T.O. 1B-52H-30-4, or T.O.
1B-52H-34-2-9 for the AGM-86C/D electrical system. For AGM-129, refer to T.O. 1B-52H-30-1.
AC POWER SYSTEM
The ac power system (figures 1-61 and 1-62)

consists of four engine-driven generators, a flight
gyro emergency power inverter, power distribution
boxes, a central bus tie, bus tie and generator circuit breakers, power load boxes, and circuit breaker
panels. An ac control panel (figure 1-64) at the copilots station provides all the controls and indicators
for operation of the system. The gyro power switch
on the pilots side panel controls the flight gyro
emergency power inverter.
Generators
The primary ac power supply is provided through

four engine-driven 120 kva generators located underneath the engines on the accessory pads of engines 1, 3, 5, and 7. Each generator is capable of
carrying 120 kva at a reasonable power factor.
Change 16
1-185
T.O. 1B-52H-1
GENERATOR DRIVES
PROTECTIVE FEATURES
Since certain electronic equipment requires

constant frequency, a drive is needed to drive the
generator at a constant speed throughout the range
of various engine speeds. The drive used consists of
a hydraulic transmission controlled by an electromechanical governor. The transmission receives its
input drive power directly from the engine. By use
of the basic governor through the wobble pump, the
drive adds to or subtracts from the variable input
speed of the engine and provides a constant ac output from the generator of 400 (1) Hz. The
frequency reference unit provides a constant ac
output from the generator at 400 (+0.1) Hz. The
generators are driven at a constant speed of 8000
rpm. The minimum generator cut-in speed is
approximately 5670 engine rpm. Movement of the
governor flyweights controls the action by directing
oil pressure to vary the pitch of the wobble plate.
The frequency is controlled automatically by the
frequency and load controller through the magnetic
trim head of the basic speed governor if the generator field is energized. If the generator field is not
energized, the basic governor controls the frequency. See ELECTRICAL SYSTEM OPERATION, this
section, for additional information on generator frequencies.
Generator protective features are incorporated in

the generator and generator drive systems. Each
protective feature may accomplish one or more of
the following actions:
An electro-mechanical decoupling device is contained in the drive and provides a means of manually decoupling the drive input shaft from the engine shaft. The drive shaft and engine shaft cannot
be recoupled during flight. When the temperature
of a drive reaches 250 (10) F, the drive overheat
light, master caution lights, and central caution
light will come on and the drive should be
decoupled. If the drive fails to disconnect, the lights
will again come on when the drive temperature
reaches 350 (15) F. See figure 1-63 for a generator drive decoupler control schematic.
GENERATOR DRIVE OIL SYSTEM
Each generator drive is provided a separate oil system which includes an oil tank having a usable capacity of 6.75 quarts and a total capacity of 9
quarts. Oil is routed through the generator drive,
through an oil cooler, and returned to the tank.
Cooling air for the oil cooler is provided by engine
fan air. Oil temperature is controlled by a thermostatic valve which allows bypassing of the cooler.
No manual controls are provided for this system.
For generator drive oil servicing, see figure 1-186.
1-186
Change 16
1. Isolate the generator by tripping the respective

bus tie circuit breaker.
2. Disconnect the generator from its main bus by
tripping the respective generator circuit breaker.
3. Throw the drive in full underspeed operation
so it will turn at the slowest rate possible for the
speed at which the engine is operating.
4. Provisions have been made for manually decoupling of the generator drive from the engine.
NOTE
A bus tie circuit breaker will close automatically, if not already closed, when its generator shuts down.
Speed Protection
An under-overspeed switch controlled by a limit

governor provides protection from excessively low
or high generator speeds. If the speed of the generator drops to a point where the ac output frequency
is below 295 Hz (possibly due to a faulty governor
or engine shutdown), the switch will energize the
under-overspeed relay, tripping the generator control relay and generator circuit breaker. This will
take the generator off the line and thus protect
electronic equipment which might be damaged by
operation at a low frequency. When the drive overspeeds, the under-overspeed switch is drained of oil
by the limit governor and reacts in the same manner as an underspeed condition. The limit governor
also causes the transmission to be hydraulically
locked in full underdrive (slowest output speed)
position. When this happens, the generator cannot
be put back on the line for the duration of the
flight.
Generator Overheat Protection
When a generator reaches a temperature of 240C

or above, its respective bus tie circuit breaker will
automatically trip open and will remain open until
it is closed by actuation of the generator switch.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AC Power Routing
Figure 1-61
1-187
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AC Power System
TO GEN NO. 1
CONTROL
PANEL BUS
TIE TRIP
AMPERES
AMPERES
350oF
250oF
ENG 1 GEN
RIGHT
ESS. DC
10
10
ENG NO. 3
GEN
EXT PWR
& BUS TIE
ISOLATE
F
N
PHASE
SEQUENCE
RELAY
TO GEN
NO. 3
CLOSE
EXT PWR
TRIPOUT
RELAY
ON
EXT PWR
CONTROL
RELAY
BATTERY
OVERRIDE
SWITCH
OFF
MAIN EXT
PWR SWITCH
CLOSE
TRIP
TRIP
EXT PWR
CKT BKR
TRIP
CLOSE
EXT PWR
LOCKOUT
RELAY
EXT PWR
CKT BKR POSI
TION INDICATOR
GEN
NO. 3
BUS
GEN
NO. 1
BUS
MAIN
EXTERNAL
POWER
RECEPTACLE
ON
OFF
GENERATOR SWITCHES
TO
MASTER
CAUTION
LIGHT
C
N
OFF
ON
GEN
CIRCUIT
BKR
(TYPICAL)
ENG 3 GEN
CONSTANT
SPEED
DRIVE
GENERATOR
NO. 1
DIFF
FAULT
DETECT
MASTER ISOLATE SWITCH

GENERATOR
OVERHEAT
RESET
CLOSE
MASTER
ISOLATE
RELAY
BUS TIE CKT

BKR (TYPICAL)
GEN DRIVE
DECOUPLE
O
V
E
R
H
E
A
T
TRIP
CLOSE
TRIP
RT. TR
BUS
R. ESS
DC
L. ESS
DC
CENTRAL
TIE BUS
DECPL
MON
NORM
OVER
HEAT
ENG 3
GEN
ENG NO. 1
GEN
L. ESS
DC
DECPL
MON
NORM
OVER
HEAT
O
V
E
R
H
E
A
T
ENG 1
GEN
ENG 5
GEN
ENG 7
GEN
VOLTS & CYCLES

SELECT
A31685
1-188
Change 4
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CONDITION:
AMPERES
ENG 5 GEN
CONSTANT
SPEED
DRIVE
AMPERES
Generators 1, 5, and 7 on, and all

bus tie breakers closed. External
power plugged in but not selected.
NORMAL (IN)
ENG 7 GEN
ENG NO. 7
GEN
LEFT
ESS. DC
205 volts ac control

28 volts dc control
power
IN
PULLED
OUT
10
GENERATOR
NO. 5
205 volts ac (3)
FIRE
SHUTOFF
SWITCH
205 volts ac monitor
1 Closes in correct
ON
phase if all
generator breakers
are open.
OFF
2 Supplies left
FREQUENCY
AND LOAD
CONTROLLER
essential power to
External Power
Tripout relay
through the open
side of generator
circuit breakers. As
long as generator
breakers are open,
External Power
Tripout relay
remains open.
When a generator is
placed on, the
External Power
Tripout relay applies
right essential
power to trip the
external power
circuit breaker.
ON
VOLTAGE
REGULATOR
OFF
GENERATOR SWITCHES
BUS TIE TRIP
TRIP
GEN BKR TRIP
TO
GEN 7
B
CLOSE
CLOSE
3 Decouple solenoid.
TRIP
GEN
NO. 7
BUS
GEN
NO. 5
BUS
GENERATOR
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
POSITION
INDICATOR
(TYPICAL)
AC
GENERATOR
CONTROL
PANEL
GEN BKR CLOSE

BUS TIE CLOSE
TRIP
CLOSE
BUS TIE
CKT BKR
POSITION
IND INBD
BUS TIE
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
POSITION
INDICATOR
(TYPICAL)
TRIP
FREQUENCY
METER
BUS TIE CKT BKR

POSITION IND OUTBD
CLOSE
LEFT
ESS. DC
RT ESS. DC
CYCLES
VOLTMETER
O
V
E
R
H
E
A
T
OVER
HEAT
DECPL
MON
NORM
DECPL
MON
NORM
OVER
HEAT
O
V
E
R
H
E
A
T
VOLTS AC
A31686
1-189
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Generator Drive Decoupler System (Typical)
Figure 1-63
1-190
Change 4
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Flight Gyro Emergency Power Inverter
An emergency flight instrument inverter is provided to supply 115-volt three-phase ac power to

primary flight instruments in the event of a complete failure of the ac system. The inverter supplies
power to the pilots attitude indicator and pilots
heading indicator (gyro). The inverter also supplies
single-phase power for instrument lighting of the
pilots attitude indicator. The inverter is automatically turned on when the complete ac power source
fails, provided the gyro power switch on the pilots
side panel is in ON position. The inverter is deenergized when the gyro power switch is in OFF position. The inverter utilizes emergency battery power.
AC Power Distribution Boxes, Panels, Fuses, and Circuit Breakers
Primary 205 volt ac power is fed to separate buses

within the four generator power boxes, which in
turn feed power to separate buses within the five
power distribution boxes and panels. These power
distribution boxes and panels provide power
throughout the aircraft (figure 1-70). See figure
1-61 for ac power routing. If any generator becomes
inoperative, the other generators act as an alternate source to provide power to the faulty generator
power distribution box. This is accomplished
through automatic features of the generator system. The boxes and panels are supplied power
through multiwire feeders of three or more wires
for each phase. The buses in these boxes and panels
supply all of the 205-volt three-phase and 118-volt
single-phase loads and, in addition, furnish 118-volt
single-phase power to auto-transformers for reduction to 28 volt ac. Distribution circuits for the circuit breaker panels in the crew compartment except
the EVS circuit breaker panel are protected by circuit breakers located on the POWER FEEDER portion of the left and right load central circuit breaker
panels. Fuses and additional circuit breakers on the
circuit breaker panels within the crew compartment are used to protect wiring to individual pieces
of equipment.
20, 30, 40, 50, and 60 amperes are used. Some limiters have an indicator element that protrudes out
of the limiter body when the limiter has blown; others show discoloration inside the glass barrel when
blown.
INDICATING FUSES
Indicating fuses are used for protection of some
lightly loaded three phase ac transformers. These
fuses protect transformer windings as well as the
aircraft wiring. A neon light in the end of the fuseholder will glow when its respective fuse is blown.
CIRCUIT BREAKERS
Standard circuit breakers, ranging in size from 2.5
to 50 amperes, are used to provide protection for
aircraft wiring. Although applied specifically for
wire protection, they provide some protection for
components. These circuit breakers are of the tripfree pushbutton type. Wiring to three-phase loads is
protected by three individual circuit breakers, one
for each phase. Special circuit breakers are used in
conjunction with the offensive avionics system to
provide both wire and component protection. These
circuit breakers are toggle type and are used in
fractional ampere ratings. Three-phase circuit
breakers of this type are used for some OAS components requiring three-phase power. The three-phase
breakers will open all three power circuits simultaneously in the event that a short occurs in any one
circuit.
NOTE
The circuit breakers located on the pilot and

copilot side panels are the trip-free
pushbutton type. The circuit breaker side
panels should not be used as a storage area
for checklists or other equipment. Keep the
pilot and copilot circuit breaker side panels
free of equipment to allow proper functioning and crew monitoring of the circuit
breakers.
CURRENT LIMITERS (FUSES)

One basic type of fast blow fuse is used throughout
the aircraft for fault protection. Six ratings of 10,
1-191
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AC Power System Controls and Indicators
1-192
T.O. 1B-52H-1
1
2
3
AC AMMETERS (4 PLACES)
GENERATOR SWITCHES (4 PLACES)
GENERATOR CIRCUIT BREAKER POSITION INDICATORS (4 PLACES)
BUS TIE CIRCUIT BREAKER POSITION INDICATORS (4 PLACES)
GENERATOR DRIVE OVERHEAT LIGHTS (4
PLACES)
GENERATOR DRIVE DECOUPLER SWITCHES
EXTERNAL POWER CIRCUIT BREAKER POSITION INDICATOR
4
5
6
7
NO.
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
MASTER ISOLATE SWITCH

MAIN EXTERNAL POWER SWITCH
FREQUENCY METER
VOLTMETER AND FREQUENCY SELECTOR
SWITCH
VOLTMETER
GENERATOR DRIVE OVERHEAT CAUTION
LIGHT
AC CIRCUIT BREAKER CAUTION LIGHT
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
AC Ammeters (4 places)
Four ac ammeters provide an indication of output in amperes supplied by

each individual generator. The ammeters indicate in the range from 0 to
500 amperes. See figure 5-1 for ammeter markings.
Generator Switches (4 places)
Four three-position generator switches are marked ON and OFF at the

extreme positions respectively and are spring-loaded to the unmarked
neutral position. When the switch is held momentarily in ON position, 24
volt nominal dc essential power closes the generator control relay and the
generator circuit breaker and energizes the generator field. When the
switch is held in OFF position, the same power trips both the generator
control relay and the generator circuit breaker and closes the bus tie circuit breaker.
Change 20
1-193
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AC Power System Controls and Indicators (Cont)

CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
FUNCTION
Generator Circuit Breaker Position Indicators (4 places)
Four three-position tab indicators, one for each generator circuit breaker
provide a means of indicating the position of the respective circuit breakers. Two positions of the tab indicator are bars and the other is OFF. The
bars are white and run vertically and horizontally through the center of the
black indicator. OFF position is black and has OFF marked in white
across the center of the indicator. When the bar is aligned with the reference line on the ac control panel, the circuit breaker is closed. When the
bar is at a right angle to the reference line, the circuit breaker is open. OFF
position indicates the tab indicator is not receiving control power.
Bus Tie Circuit Breaker Position Indicators (4 places)
Four three-position tab indicators, one for each bus tie circuit breaker provide a means of indicating the position of the respective circuit breakers.
The bus tie circuit breaker position indicators function in the same manner
as the generator circuit breaker position indicators (No. 3).
Generator Drive OVERHEAT Lights

(4 places)
Four amber generator drive overheat lights, one for each generator are
marked OVERHEAT. The lights will illuminate when a generator drive
temperature exceeds 250 (10) F, provided the decoupler switch is in
NORM position. The lights will also illuminate when the drive temperature
reaches 350 (15) F regardless of decoupler switch position.
Generator Drive Decoupler Switches

(4 places)
Four generator drive decoupler switches, one for each generator are on
the ac control panel. The switches are marked NORM and DECPL at the
extreme positions and MON at the center position. The switch latches in
NORM position and is spring-loaded to MON position after being placed
in DECPL position.
NOTE
If a generator drive is decoupled during flight, it can only be recoupled while the aircraft is on the ground with the generator
drive removed.
External Power Circuit Breaker Position

Indicator
A single three-position tab indicators provides a means of indicating the

position of the main external power circuit breaker relay. See External
Power system Controls and Indicators this section.
Master Isolate Switch
A master isolate switch on the copilots control panel is marked PUSH TO

ISOLATE CENTRAL TIE BUS. Pressing the switch energizes the master
isolate relay, which in turn trips the bus tie circuit breakers, isolating all
generators from the central bus tie. Holding the generator switches in ON
position until the bus tie circuit breakers close will repower the central bus
tie.
Main External Power Switch
A three-position switch controls application of main external power. See

External Power system Controls and Indicators this section.
10
Frequency Meter
A frequency meter adjacent to the ac control panel provides a means of

reading individual frequencies of the generators and central bus tie.
Some frequency meters are calibrated from 350 to 450 Hz and some from
380 to 420 Hz. For typical frequency meter instrument markings, see figure 5-1.
1-194
Change 4
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
FUNCTION
11
Voltmeter and Frequency Selector

Switch
A five-position frequency and voltage selector switch located adjacent to

the ac control panel has ENG 1 GEN- -ENG 3 GEN- -CENTRAL TIE
BUS- -ENG 5 GEN- -ENG 7 GEN positions. The switch provides a
means of selecting and reading frequency and voltage of the central bus
tie and of each generator. In ENG 1 GEN position, the frequency and voltage of the No. 1 generator may be read on the frequency meter and voltmeter provided the generators are isolated. The remaining positions will
perform the previous operation for their respective generators as marked.
When the generators are in parallel, all generator switch positions will be
read the same as the CENTRAL TIE BUS position.
12
Voltmeter
A voltmeter adjacent to the ac control panel provides a means of reading

individual voltages of the generators and central bus tie. The voltmeter
is calibrated from 0 to 250 volts. For voltmeter markings, see figure 5-1.
13
Generator Drive Overheat Caution Light

(Amber)
A generator drive overheat caution light marked GENERATOR OVERHEAT RESET on the central caution lights panel indicates that one or
more of the generator drives are in an overheat condition and the drive
should be decoupled by the copilot. The copilot must monitor the generator drive overheat lights on the ac control panel in order to determine
which generator drive has the overheat condition. The generator drive
overheat light signal is also received by the master caution lights causing
them to light simultaneously. In event the generator drive overheat caution light comes on, it should be reset by pressing the reset switch adjacent to the central caution panel so the remaining generator drives may
be monitored.
14
AC CIRCUIT BKR Caution Light

(Amber)
The light, when illuminated, shows amber letters AC CIRCUIT BKR

OPEN, RESET on a black background. The ac circuit breaker light serves
to caution that one of the generator or bus tie circuit breakers has tripped
open. The light will come on at the same time any of the generator or bus
tie circuit breakers open and will remain on as long as the circuit breaker
is open unless it is reset. The light may be reset by pressing the reset
switch adjacent to the central caution panel, at which time, it will go out
and be ready for additional indication of any circuit breaker which may
open. The indication given on the ac circuit breaker light is also indicated
on the master caution lights located on the pilots instrument panel.
NOTE
60-001 thru 60-062
Faults on the left essential bus or the associated circuit breaker
being open may cause the generator drive overheat light and
generator drive overheat caution light to come on dimly. This is
caused by a feedback voltage from the right essential bus. With
a system malfunction, the lights will illuminate with normal brilliance.
1-195
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DIRECT CURRENT SYSTEM
Direct current (dc) power is normally provided

through transformer-rectifier (TR) units which are
supplied ac power by the generators. Two 24-volt 35
ampere-hour maintenance-free batteries are used
as an auxiliary source of dc power. DC power is
supplied to the various equipment from one of the
following buses:
Aft Battery Bus and Forward Battery Bus
Emergency Battery Power Bus and Emergency
Instrument Power Bus
Right Essential Bus and Left Essential Bus
Right TR Bus, Left TR Bus, and Aft TR Bus
The equipment will receive power from one of the
buses according to the importance of the equipment
(figure 1-65). The two forward TR buses are interconnected and will supply dc power as long as ac
power is available. In the event of an ac power failure, dc power would not be supplied to the TR
buses. The left essential and right essential buses
normally receive TR power but in the event of an ac
system failure, these buses automatically transfer
to battery power provided the battery switch is ON.
These buses supply battery power to essential dc
operated equipment which normally receive TR dc
power. The aft battery bus and forward battery bus
can supply direct battery power to emergency
equipment. DC power is distributed and protected
through boxes and panels located throughout the
aircraft (figure 1-70).
Batteries
An auxiliary source of dc power is provided by two

24-volt 35 ampere-hour maintenance-free batteries
(27 and 28, sheet 1 of figure 1-1) designated as the
aft and forward batteries located in the forward
wheel well. The batteries have heaters and are capable of satisfactory operation at 40F (40C). The
aft battery supplies power directly through fuses
and circuit breakers to battery buses located in the
aft battery power box, left load central fuse installation, left load central circuit breaker panel, pilots
circuit breaker panel, and right forward BNS overhead circuit breaker panel. The forward battery
supplies power directly through fuses and circuit
breakers to battery buses located in the right forward dc power box, right load central fuse installation, right load central circuit breaker panel, pilots
circuit breaker panel, and aft BNS overhead panel.
Essential battery buses are supplied battery power
through the left and right essential dc battery relays when the battery switch is ON and TR power
is not available. When TR power is available, the
right and left dc TR relays are energized. Should the
1-196
Change 20
ac or TR power fail, essential battery bus loads are

assured a source of power from the batteries for
short periods. Loads such as emergency landing
gear control, entry light, and jettison power are connected directly to the battery buses. Loads such as
bailout warning and airbrake control are connected
so that they may receive power from either the forward or aft battery, depending on position of emergency dc power switch (figure 3-21). The batteries
are charged from individual static transformer-rectifiers. The transformer-rectifier unit for the forward battery receives ac power from engine No. 3
generator bus and that for the aft battery receives
ac power from engine No. 5 generator bus. The TR
units will supply charging power for their batteries
as long as ac power is on the respective generator
buses.
Battery power duration is dependent on the load
conditions. Fully charged batteries are capable of
performing a simultaneous eight engine cartridge
start with no ground support equipment, and with
only the minimum flight essential equipment powered can supply enough power to fly the aircraft for
up to four hours in an emergency situation.
Battery Chargers
During normal operating conditions, the batteries

are maintained in a fully charged condition by a
two separate 37 amp charging TR units (battery
chargers), one for the forward battery and one for
the aft battery are located in the left forward wheel
well. Both the forward and aft batteries and chargers are identical. The battery chargers (figure
1-66) provide charger fault, battery fault and battery charge status for the respective circuits.
The battery charger front panel contains a CHARGER FAULT indicator, BATTERY FAULT indicator,
BATTERY READY LED, and a LAMP TEST pressto-test button. A mission ready status is defined as
the BATTERY READY indicator ON and both fault
latches in the no fault (totally black face) mode.
This indicates that the battery is charged and the
system is operational. The time from application of
charger input power until the battery is charged is
dependent on battery initial state of charge, load,
and temperature. The total time for the base, topping, and constant potential charging cycle will not
exceed four hours.
A CHARGER FAULT indicates that the charger
was inoperable at some period of time. BATTERY
FAULT conditions include the battery being excessively hot, temperature sensor failure, and cell imbalance.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
The BATTERY READY is a green LED that indicates the charger is operational and the battery is
charged to at least 85% of capacity. The LAMP
TEST is a press-to-test button used to verify the
operation of the BATTERY READY lamp.
BATTERY CHARGING
There are four charge modes. The base charge mode
is an approximately 37 amp constant current output until battery reaches a temperature derived
voltage. This is the 85% of capacity point when the
BATTERY READY indication comes ON. If the
charger is in the basecharge less than approximately 20 minutes at the 85% transition point it
will go into the tricklecharge mode. For basecharges greater than 20 minutes, the charger will transition to overcharge mode. Overcharge mode is a
fixed two hour period with a variable ON/OFF duty
cycle based on battery temperature. The ON pulse
is typically 25 amps. The OFF current can be up to
25 amps depending on battery bus loads. Loads
above 25 amps will be supplied by the battery.
Tricklecharge mode after basecharge or overcharge
maintains the battery charge at a duty cycle of 3
seconds ON and 73 seconds OFF. The ON pulse is
typically 25 amps. The OFF current can be up to 25
amps depending on battery bus loads. Loads above
25 amps will be supplied by the battery. The
constant voltage mode is in operation when the battery temperature is between 40F (40C) and
32F (0C) at that point it transitions to basecharge. There is a watchdog timer that shuts down
the charger if it hasnt reached 85% in approximately 70 minutes. Occasionally a deep discharged
battery (<18 volts) with high capacity (i.e. a new
battery greater than 40 amp hours) may take more

than one basecharge cycle to reach 85% (BATTERY
READY). If the charger shuts down and the BATTERY READY indication is off, check the battery
for excessive temperature (>72C or 162F). If the
temperature is not excessive, reset latches and
cycle AC power to the charger. No latches should
set and the BATTERY READY indicator should
come on within approximately 20 minutes. If not,
take corrective action.
Transformer
Breakers
Rectifier
Units,
Buses,
and
Circuit
Direct current power for normal operation is

supplied from 28-volt output transformer-rectifier
(TR) units (25, sheet 1 of figure 1-1) which operate
directly from the ac power boxes and are supplied
three-phase 205-volt ac power from the generators.
TR bus voltage is between 23 and 30 volts depending upon load and condition of TR units. Five TR
units are located in the aft portion of the forward
wheel well area. The three remaining TR units are
located in the aft equipment compartment. The forward TR units are bussed together as are the aft
TR units so that partial TR unit failure will not result in a loss of power to any dc operated equipment. The output of the forward units is distributed
to the left and right forward dc power boxes
through the load centrals to the individual crewmembers circuit breaker panels. The output of the
aft units is distributed to the aft dc power box. In
the event of complete failure of a TR bus, certain ac
loads such as flaps, fuel, stabilizer trim, etc, may be
inoperative because they are controlled by TR
power.
Change 17
1-196A/(1-196B blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DC Power System
AC POWER
FROM FROM
GEN
GEN
NO. 1 NO. 7
AC POWER
FROM
FROM
GEN
GEN
NO. 3
NO. 5
FORWARD
TR UNITS
FORWARD
TR UNITS
AC POWER
FROM
GEN
NO. 1
AFT TR
UNITS
FUSES
RIGHT
TR BUS
LEFT
TR BUS
COPILOTS
LEFT
ESSENTIAL
BUS
LEFT
ESSENTIAL
BUS
NORMAL
EMERGENCY
DC POWER
SWITCH
AFT
TR BUS
COPILOTS
RIGHT
ESSENTIAL
BUS
RIGHT
ESSENTIAL
BUS
BATTERY
SWITCH
OFF
ON
EMERGENCY
INSTRUMENT
BUS
AC POWER
TR POWER
TR OR BATTERY POWER
BATTERY POWER
EMERGENCY
BATTERY
BUS
NOTE
EMER.
AFT
BATTERY
BUS
BATTERY
CHARGING
TR UNIT
AFT
BATTERY
FORWARD
BATTERY
BUS
FORWARD
BATTERY
See figure 3 21 for

battery and essential
bus loads and figure 3 22
for TR bus loads.
BATTERY
CHARGING
TR UNIT
FROM GEN NO. 3
FROM GEN NO. 5
A31689
Figure 1-65
1-197
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Battery Charger
CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
FUNCTION
BATTERY FAULT Indicator
The BATTERY FAULT indicator is a magnetic latching indicator and

shows battery fault status. When the indicator is black, the respective circuit is good and when the indicator shows alternately black and white, a
fault is indicated After a fault is indicated the indicators can be reset mechanically by rotating the indicator 60 degrees clockwise.
BATTERY READY Light
A green BATTERY READY light shows the charge condition of the battery. This light is on if the battery capacity is 85% or more, and is off at less
than 85% capacity.
LAMP TEST Switch
The LAMP TEST switch checks the BATTERY READY light. When the
LAMP TEST switch is pressed, the BATTERY READY light comes on. If
the light does not come on, the BATTERY LIGHT is inoperable. If the BATTERY READY light is on, the lamp test is not required.
CHARGER FAULT Indicator
The CHARGER FAULT indicator is a magnetic latching indicator and

shows charger fault status. When the indicator is black, the respective circuit is good and when the indicator shows alternately black and white, a
fault is indicated. After a fault is indicated the indicators can be reset mechanically by rotating the indicator 60 degrees clockwise.
Figure 1-66
1-198
Change 6
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DC Power System Controls and Indicators
1
2
3
4
5
BATTERY SWITCH
EMERGENCY DC POWER SWITCH
AFT BATTERY DISCHARGING LIGHT
BATTERY CHARGE TEST SWITCH
FORWARD BATTERY DISCHARGING LIGHT
6
7
8
9
BATTERY CAUTION LIGHT

FORWARD BATTERY END OF LIFE LIGHT
AFT BATTERY END OF LIFE LIGHT
Change 20
1-199
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DC Power System Controls and Indicators (Cont)

CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
FUNCTION
Battery Switch
An ON- -OFF battery switch routes battery power to the essential battery
buses. When the battery switch is placed in ON position, battery power
is directed to the essential buses through the essential dc battery relays
and, when TR power is available, relays are energized to transfer essential buses to TR power. In the copilots circuit breaker panel only, the right
and left essential dc buses are normally powered from their respective
battery any time the battery switch is ON. If the battery switch is OFF and
TR power is available, they will be powered from the TR buses. When the
battery switch is in OFF position, no battery power is available to the essential battery buses. Battery power is supplied directly from each battery
to individual (direct) battery buses at all times, regardless of the position
of the battery switch.
Emergency DC Power Switch
An emergency dc power switch marked NORMAL- -EMER located on the

copilots side panel controls which source of power is connected to the
emergency battery power bus and the emergency instrument power bus.
When the switch is in NORMAL position, aft battery power is supplied to
the emergency battery power bus, and left essential power is supplied to
the emergency instrument power bus. When the switch is placed in
EMER position, forward battery power is supplied to both buses. For detail loads in each switch position, see figure 3-21.
Aft Battery Discharging Light (amber)
Two amber lights, one for each battery, provide visual indication that the
battery is discharging. With the BATT CHARGE TEST switch in TEST
FWD AND AFT and the batteries greater than 85% of full charge, the battery DISCHARGING lights will flash on and off indicating the pulsing
action of the charger, provided battery bus loads between 0.25 to 1.0 and
5 amps exist. At loads above 5 amps, charging action will be steady and
the battery DISCHARGING lights will not come on. A battery discharging
rate of 0.25 to 1.0 amp with no charging TR power present is indicated
by steady lights. A press-to-test feature of the battery DISCHARGING
lights allows the copilot to check the light bulbs and ground circuits. A
warning light on the central caution panel marked BATTERY RESET indicates when battery charging power is not present. Reference to the two
DISCHARGING lights on the copilot side panel will indicate which charger is not operating. For proper operation of the press-to-test feature, the
INTERPHONE POWER switch must be ON. However, the forward battery DISCHARGING light may come on while the INTERPHONE
POWER switch is OFF and no TR power is available. This condition
exists due to feedback through the battery detection circuit and main TR
bus loads to ground if the press-to-test feature is operated.
Battery Charge Test Switch
The BATT CHARGE TEST switch may be used to test the state of charge
of both the forward and aft batteries. A DISCHARGING light No. 3) for
each battery is located next to the test switch. With the switch in TEST
FWD AND AFT, flashing of the light indicates the battery is greater than
85% charged.A battery bus load of at least 1.0 amp shall exist to assure
operation of battery DISCHARGING light during battery testing with the
BATT CHARGE TEST switch. No light will be present if the battery is
below 85% of full charge.
1-200
Change 6
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
Forward Battery Discharging Light

(amber)
The forward battery discharging light functions in the same manner as the
aft battery discharging light (No. 3). The forward battery discharging light
will press to test with the interphone switch OFF if a feedback voltage
exists through the battery detector system.
Battery Caution Light (amber)
An battery caution light marked BATTERY-RESET indicates that one or

both of the battery charging TR units are not supplying charging power
to their respective battery buses. The copilot must monitor the battery discharging lights on his side panel in order to determine which battery is not
receiving charging power; however, the battery discharging lights will not
be on unless sufficient loads are on the buses. The battery caution light
signal is also received by the master caution lights causing them to light
simultaneously. The light may be reset by pressing the reset switch adjacent to the central caution panel. In the event the battery caution light
comes on, the light should be reset so the remaining battery may be monitored
FWD BATTERY END OF LIFE Light

(amber)
The forward battery end of life light indicates the approach to and the end
of useful battery output. When battery voltage decreases to 22.2 (0.1)
volts, the respective light will flash at a rate of 45 (+20/-15) cycles per minute (a cycle being one complete on and off operation). The light will continue to flash until voltage decreases to 18 (+0.5) volts at which time the
lights will remain on. At this time, the battery is discharged beyond a usable condition. The lights will remain off when voltage is 22.3 or above.
With a maximum emergency load of 15 amperes on the battery buses,
there is a minimum time of 6 minutes and a maximum of 14 minutes from
the time the end of life lights flash on and off until they have a steady illumination.
AFT BATTERY END OF LIFE Light

(amber)
The aft battery end of life light functions in the same manner as the forward battery end of life light (No. 7).
An ON- -OFF interphone power switch on the pilots side panel, in addition to its normal functions (see INTERPHONE SYSTEM, this section),
controls operation of both battery detectors. ON position energizes both
battery detectors and allows the battery discharging lights to function.
OFF position deenergizes the battery detectors and battery discharging
light circuits.
1-201
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EXTERNAL ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS
Three external power receptacles are provided for

energizing aircraft equipment from an external
source: a main receptacle, a bombing navigational
system receptacle, and a gunnery system receptacle.
Main External Power
The main external power (ac) is routed to the central bus tie by means of an external power receptacle (26, sheet 1 of figure 1-1) located on the right
side of the fuselage adjacent to the forward wheel
well. This receptacle has six pins. Three pins take
205-volt three-phase ac power, two pins are for
ground, and one is for 24-volt dc external power to
energize the external power control relay through
the phase sequence relay. The external power circuit breaker relay connects the ac power to the aircraft bus and is closed through actuation of the external power switch on the copilots ac control panel. The external power circuit breaker is closed
through the open side of the generator circuit
breakers. The main external power circuit breaker
relay may be tripped by placing the external power
switch to OFF position, shutting off the external
power cart, pulling the plug, or energizing any aircraft generator.
Offensive Avionics System External Power
External power for the offensive avionics system

(OAS) is routed to the BNS circuit breaker panels
by means of two receptacles (26, sheet 1 of figure
1-1) located on the right side of the fuselage adjacent to the forward wheel well just aft of the main
external power receptacle. One receptacle is for ac
power and has six pins. Three pins take 205 volt
three-phase ac power, one for ground, one for 24
volt dc control power to energize the connecting relays through the phase sequence relay, and the remaining pin is not used. AC power is connected to
the BNS circuit breaker panels through the actuation of the OAS external power switch. The other
receptacle has three pins, one pin for ground and
two to take 24 volt dc external power for control
and power to the BNS circuit breaker panels. If external power is applied to the OAS receptacle while
power is applied to the main external receptacle,
the OAS external electrical power will automatically isolate the OAS from the aircraft power system.
The control circuits are interlocked such that dc
power cannot be supplied unless ac power is also
available. The main external power receptacle is
used to furnish OAS equipment power for normal
preflight operation which may include inertial navi-
1-202
gation system ground alignment. In order to eliminate momentary power interruption during ground
power-to-aircraft power transfer, an autoparalleling
circuit is incorporated. This circuit maintains noninterruptible electrical power to the aircraft
installed equipment during transfer from the
ground power unit to aircraft power. However, during transfer from aircraft power to ground power,
there is momentary interruption of electrical power
which will cause damage to OAS equipment. Therefore, OAS equipment, particularly the INS, will be
completely shut down before aircraft power can be
turned off. For additional information concerning
OAS system power turn on and turnoff operations,
refer to T.O. 1B-52H-1-12.
The OAS, radar, and all EVS subsystems

should be OFF to prevent surge damage
when switching from aircraft power to external power or if aircraft power is interrupted.
NOTE
In order to accommodate the ground-to-aircraft power transfer, the external power frequency will be within 3 Hz of the aircraft
power frequency as read on the aircraft frequency meter. It may be necessary to adjust
external power supply frequency to accomplish the power transfer.
Fire Control System External Power
External power for the fire control system (FCS) is

routed to the aft ac power box by means of a double
receptacle located aft and adjacent to the right rear
wheel well. One receptacle is for ac power and has
six pins. Three pins take 205-volt three-phase ac
power, one is for ground, one is for 24-volt dc external power to energize the connecting relay, and the
remaining pin is not used. The other receptacle is
for dc power and has three pins, two take 24-volt dc
for power and control and one is for ground. Power
is supplied to the FCS circuit breaker panel
through the actuation of the external power switch.
If FCS external power is applied to the FCS receptacle, all FCS equipment will automatically be isolated from aircraft power. In addition to the gunner
equipment, the domelight, spotlights, and interphone are supplied external power. Control circuits
are interlocked such that both ac and dc must be
applied simultaneously.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Battery Override Switch
An ON- -OFF spring-loaded momentary switch is

located in the forward wheel well on the bottom forward end of the left dc power box. The switch is provided as an emergency means of connecting external power to the aircraft bus when aircraft battery
power is unavailable. When placed to the ON position, power is supplied to the switch from pin E of
the power cart to close the external power circuit
breaker through the interlock circuits. In OFF position, the external power control circuitry is returned to the normal configuration. The external
power switch on the copilots ac control panel
should be used to trip the external power circuit
breaker to disconnect external power.
This switch is not to be used for normal

training missions.
Make certain the EXT PWR & BUS TIE
ISOLATE circuit breaker on the copilots
circuit breaker panel is in when external
power is connected to the aircraft bus. This
will assure protective circuitry in the event
of a circuit fault.
EXTERNAL ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM CONTROLS

AND INDICATORS
The controls and indicators associated with external power are described in figure 1-68.
1-203
T.O. 1B-52H-1
External Power System Controls and Indicators
1
2
MAIN EXTERNAL POWER SWITCH

MAIN EXTERNAL POWER SYSTEM INDICATOR
OFFENSIVE AVIONICS SYSTEM EXTERNAL

POWER SWITCH
1-204
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
Main External Power System Switch
FUNCTION
A three-position main external power switch on the ac control panel is
marked ON and OFF at extreme positions respectively and is springloaded to the unmarked neutral position. The switch is provided for controlling the main external power system. When placed in ON position momentarily, the external power circuit breaker relay is closed and latched,
feeding external power to the aircraft distribution system provided phase
sequence is correct, generator circuit breakers are open, and the battery
switch is ON. When placed in OFF position momentarily, the external
power circuit breaker relay is tripped open and external power is removed
from the bus.
In order to turn off external power, the EXT PWR & BUS TIE
ISOLATE circuit breaker on the copilots circuit breaker panel
will be in.
2
Main External Power System Indicator
A three-position tab indicator located on the ac control panel provides a

means of indication that the main external power circuit breaker relay is
closed and main external power is on the bus. Two positions of the tab
indicator are bars and the other is OFF. The bars are white and run vertically and horizontally through the center of a black indicator. The OFF indicator is black and has OFF marked in white across the center of the indicator. When the bar is lined up with the reference line on the ac control
panel, the external power circuit breaker is closed and power is on the aircraft bus. When the bar is at a right angle to the reference line on the ac
control panel, the external power circuit breaker relay is open and external power is not on the aircraft bus. OFF position indicates the tab indicator is not receiving control power.
Offensive Avionics System External

Power Switch
A two-position ON- -OFF switch marked BNS EXTERNAL POWER located on the BNS ground cooling control panel at the radar navigators
station is provided for controlling the offensive avionics system external
power system. In ON position, the BNS control relay and BNS external
power relays are energized feeding power to the OAS equipment provided phase sequence is correct. In OFF position, the system is deenergized and OAS external power is removed from the bus. The switch receives control power from the OAS external power receptacle.
1-205
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM NORMAL OPERATION
DC SYSTEM
CONTROL CIRCUITS
Battery Charge Test
A complete understanding of the dc relays which

control the primary electrical system is a valuable
aid in the efficient operation of the electrical systems. All controls that affect the starting and routing of electrical power use 24-volt dc essential battery power. This use of essential battery power assures that with the battery switch in the ON position, there will always be power available to start,
control, and route power throughout the aircraft.
Control power for the main external power relays is
also furnished by essential power while control
power for the BNS and FCS external power relays
is furnished by the respective power cart.
The battery charge test switch can be used to determine if the forward and aft batteries are 85% to
100% charged. When the test switch is placed in
FWD AND AFT position, the forward and aft battery discharging lights will blink on and off at a
slow rate if the batteries are 70% or more charged.
However, excessive loads on the battery bus will
prevent the battery charging TR unit from pulsing
and the battery discharging lights will not blink on
and off. If the battery discharging lights do not
blink, retract airbrakes (if extended). If one or both
of the discharging lights do not blink, it is an indication that the battery charging system is not operating properly.
INSTRUMENT INDICATIONS
EXTERNAL POWER
Information which can be obtained from the electrical system instruments can be correctly interpreted
only if the significance of the readings is understood. A brief explanation of the meaning of the instrument readings is given in the following paragraphs.
Voltage
Voltage is the electrical potential supplied by the

batteries, TR units, or generators. It is the force
which pushes current through the lines. The ac
voltmeter measures the effective voltage rather
than the instantaneous voltage at the peak of the
cycle. The only indication of battery voltage is
through the battery end of life lights which flash on
and off when voltage decreases to 22.2 (+0.1) volts
or below. There are no means of measurement for
TR voltage.
Frequency
The ac frequency meter indicates the number of

voltage (and current) cycles that occur in each second. One complete cycle is considered 360 electrical
degrees and each phase reaches a voltage and a
current peak in both directions once during each
cycle. Since this is a balanced three-phase system,
the voltage peaks of the three phases are separated
by one-third of a cycle or 120.
Load
Four ac ammeters (figure 1-64) located on the ac

control panel are provided to measure B phase ac
current and to enable the copilot to compare the
four indicated load values. Current in amperes is
the rate of flow of electricity.
1-206
Change 12
To connect external power, several preliminary

steps will first be accomplished. The battery switch
should be turned ON and a check made of the battery discharging lights. These lights should illuminate since TR power for battery charging is not
available. The generator circuit breakers should be
open since the control circuit for external power is
routed through the open side of these circuit breakers. A check of the four circuit breaker position indicators would be sufficient to determine the correct
position of the generator circuit breakers since
these indicators use essential battery power. If the
indicators show the circuit breakers are closed, actuate the generator switches to OFF position and
circuit breakers will open. When external power is
plugged into the external receptacle and the external power switch is placed in ON position, essential
dc power will close the external power circuit breaker sending power to the central bus tie. It is necessary that the bus tie circuit breakers be closed
manually, if open, by placing generator switches to
OFF in order to power all units on the aircraft.
Placing any operating generator switch to ON, placing the external power switch to OFF, placing the
power cart switch to OFF, or removing the external
cord plug will remove external power from the aircraft system.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
GENERATOR OPERATION
ELECTRICAL LOADS
Starting
The generators are designed to carry 120 kva at a

reasonable power factor. All generators have an
overload capacity that allows them to operate at
240 kva for 5 seconds or at 180 kva for 5 minutes.
Load indication is only shown on the ammeters.
Under normal operating conditions, the load should
never exceed the limitation on the ammeters.
Each generator can be energized and placed on its

main bus after its engine is started. Normally, it is
best to actuate the generator switch after all engines are started. The latter procedure allows external power to carry the entire electrical load until all
engines are operating and the flightcrew is ready to
operate on aircraft power and for ground crew to
disconnect external power. In addition, less copilot
attention is required during engine starting. It is
not necessary to trip the generator switch to OFF
prior to engine starting as the generator control
relay is tripped automatically on engine shutdown
and bus tie circuit breakers are closed. Holding of
the generator switch to ON is required only during
paralleling through the bus tie circuit breaker. Paralleling through the generator circuit breaker requires momentary actuation only of the generator
switch to ON. The latter is by far the more common
occurrence. Joggling of the engine speed is required
if the generators do not parallel. After the generators are on their respective bus, loss of aircraft dc
voltage does not affect the ac generation system except that the copilot has no generator switch control. However, the ac system protects itself if faults
or abnormal operation are experienced.
Shutdown
The generator may be completely shut down by use

of the constant speed drive (CSD) decoupler switch
without shutting down the engine. Re-coupling of
the drive can only be accomplished when the aircraft is on the ground with engines shut down and
the CSD removed. During normal shutdown, the
under-over speed switch will trip the generator circuit breaker and de-excite the field.
Parallel Operation
During parallel operation, all electrical loads are divided among the four generators. Should any generator or drive fail, the load would be automatically
redistributed among the remaining three generators. Two or more generators operating in parallel
will have the same frequency (speed ) and voltage.
Frequency Control
One frequency and load controller for each generator automatically controls the frequency through
the magnetic trim head of the basic speed governor.
The frequency and load controller has two basic circuits; a frequency circuit for controlling the generator frequency and a load division circuit for maintaining real load balance between paralleled generators. Power for frequency and load controller sensing is supplied from the generator output. One frequency reference unit is provided in the electrical
system and operates in conjunction with the four
frequency and load controllers. The unit is supplied
400 Hz power from the central tie and in turn supplies 115-volt ac at 400 (0.1) Hz to each frequency
and load controller. The unit will not operate unless
power is on the central tie.
Isolated Operation
For information on generator isolation, see MASTER ISOLATE SWITCH, this section.
Change 5
1-207
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Equipment Power Source and

Electrical Loads Chart
POWER SOURCE
EQUIPMENT/
CIRCUIT BREAKER
TITLE
AC
BUS
DC
BUS
UNIT
LOAD
(AMPS)
CONTROL
SOURCE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
11
CODE
ANTI-ICING SYSTEMS
Engine and Nacelle Anti-Icing
ANTI-ICE POD CONTROL
NO. 1
NO. 2
ENGINE ANTI-ICE CONTROL
POD 3
POD 4
3
3
0.3
0.3
Left TR
Left TR
LLC/D32
LLC/D33
5
5
0.2
0.2
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
RLC/C22
RLC/C23
7.6
3
3
2.8
3.2
PCBP/C12
PCBP/C13
2.5
PCBP/D6
6.0
CPCBP/E4
Q-Spring Airscoop Anti-Ice
2.4
Stabilizer Screw Heat (2)
1.7
5
5
5
4.7
2.7
2.7
EVS/E2
EVS/F3
EVS/J3
2.6
LLC/D29
2.6
RLC/B24
3
3
3
3
2.4
22.5
26.0
19.5
PCBP/E5
PCBP/E1
PCBP/E2
PCBP/E3
5
5
5
2.4
26.0
19.5
CPCBP/D12
CPCBP/D10
CPCBP/D11
FLIR Window Heater

Pitot & Q-Inlet System Anti-Ice
ALTITUDE COMPUTER PITOT HEAT
LH
RH
FLIGHT INDICATORS
LEFT PITOT & FAIR HTR
MISCELLANEOUS
RH PITOT & FAIR HTR
STV Window Heater

115 AC-PHASE A STV WINDOW HTR
115 AC-PHASE B STV WINDOW HTR
115 AC-PHASE C STV WINDOW HTR
Window Anti-Ice
ANTI-ICE LEFT
WINDOW CONT UNITS
ANTI-ICE RIGHT
WINDOW CONTR UNITS
MISCELLANEOUS WINDOW
HEAT POWER
AUX WINDOWS LEFT
1
2 LEFT
3 & 4 LEFT
WINDOW HEAT POWER
AUX WINDOWS RIGHT
2 RIGHT
3 & 4 RIGHT
1-208
T.O. 1B-52H-1
POWER SOURCE
EQUIPMENT/
CIRCUIT BREAKER
TITLE
AC
BUS
DC
BUS
UNIT
LOAD
(AMPS)
CONTROL
SOURCE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
11
CODE

Autopilot Power and Control
AUTOPILOT AC POWER
Stability Augmentation System
FLIGHT CONTROLS PITCH SAS

AC 1
AC 2
AC 3
FLIGHT CONTROLS YAW SAS
AC 1
AC 2
AC 3
5.6
Fwd. TR
LLC/F29
5.8
3
3
3
0.7
0.7
0.7
LLC/D17
LLC/D18
LLC/D19
3
3
3
0.7
0.7
0.7
LLC/D14
LLC/D15
LLC/D16
Fwd Batt.
2.5
28.0
ABNS/A26
ABNS/A25
Fwd Batt.
2.5
28.0
ABNS/B26
ABNS/B25
0.8
RLC/A29
BOMBING SYSTEM
Aft Weapon
BOMB SYSTEM AFT ALT WEAPON
IFC
T-249 TESTER PANEL LIGHTS
Forward Weapon
BOMB SYSTEM FWD ALT WEAPON
IFC
3
CG/FLAS
Key Lights and Rocker Switch Power

COMMUNICATION AND ASSOCIATED ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT

AFSATCOM System
MISCELLANEOUS
AFSATCOM R-T A
AFSATCOM R-T B
AFSATCOM R-T C
10.0
5
5
5
1.8
1.8
1.8
RLC/D24
RLC/D25
RLC/D26
9.4
PCBP/E21
Interphone System Main Power

MISCELLANEOUS MAIN INPH PWR
Liaison Radio (AN/ARC-190(V))
Emer Batt.
1
21.1
1-209
T.O. 1B-52H-1

Electrical Loads Chart (Cont)
POWER SOURCE
EQUIPMENT/
CIRCUIT BREAKER
TITLE
AC
BUS
DC
BUS
UNIT
LOAD
(AMPS)
CONTROL
SOURCE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
11
CODE
COMMUNICATION AND ASSOCIATED ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT (Cont)

Miniature Receive Terminal (AN/ARR-85(V)
MINITR REC TERM CONT DC
MINITR REC TERM PTR AC
MINITR REC TERM
RCVR A
RCVR B
RCVR C
2.4
3
0.5
0.4
Left TR
AUXBNS/D8
AUXBNS/D9
3
3
3
0.5
0.5
0.5
AUXBNS/D10
AUXBNS/D11
AUXBNS/D12
V/UHF Radio (AN/ARC-210(V)

MISCELLANEOUS ARC-210
HPA
POWER
Left TR
Left TR
25
7.5
LLC/C27
LLC/C26
DAMA DU
Left TR
5.0
LLC/C28
KY-100 DU
Right TR
7.5
RLC/E33
DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS
Blanking System
System 15 Heater
15.3
Rt. TR
System 16 Heater
15.3
Rt. TR
ECM Systems Miscellaneous

CLOCK
System 15 Pressure Pump
Left TR
0.2
ECM/P2
1.8
Aft TR
15.4
Chaff Dispensers (No. 1,2,3, & 4) (4)
3.0
Left TR
Chaff Dispensers (No. 5,6,7, & 8) (4)
3.0
Rt. TR
FLARE EJECTOR POWER
2.2
ECM Test Receptacles

MISCELLANEOUS
NOSE ECM TEST RECP AC
LLC/C32
Expendable Countermeasures Systems
1-210
Change 17
ECM/O2
T.O. 1B-52H-1
POWER SOURCE
EQUIPMENT/
CIRCUIT BREAKER
TITLE
AC
BUS
DC
BUS
UNIT
LOAD
(AMPS)
CONTROL
SOURCE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
11
CODE
DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS (Cont)

Receiver Systems
AN/ALR-20A Search Receiver
AN/ALR-20 AC A
AN/ALR-20 AC B
AN/ALR-20 AC C
5
5
5
4.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
ECM/P1
ECM/Q1
ECM/R1
Sensor Integration Systems

SI DISPLAY AC
1.0
ECM/I2
Radar Warning Receiver (RWR)

WARNING RCVR AC
3.3
ECM/G2
12.0
ECM/S2
Receiver-Transmitter Systems
CH ALQ-172(V) CDU
DT
Left TR
CM Set (AN/ALQ-153(V))
16.6
MISCELLANEOUS ECM PMS A

MISCELLANEOUS ECM PMS B
MISCELLANEOUS ECM PMS C
5
5
5
1.2
1.2
1.2
System 1 & 2 (AN/ALQ-155(V)) (2)
51.3
Left TR
System 3 & 5 (AN/ALQ-155(V)) (2)
51.3
Left TR
System 4 & 6 (AN/ALQ-155(V)) (2)
51.3
Rt. TR
System 7 & 8 (AN/ALQ-155(V)) (2)
51.3
Left TR
System 9 (AN/ALQ-122/AN/ALT-16A)
27.4
Aft TR
System 11 & 12 (AN/ALT-32) (2)
42.8
Aft TR
System 13 & 14 (AN/ALQ-155(V)) (2)
51.3
Aft TR
System 15 (AN/ALQ-172)
26.0
System 16 (AN/ALQ-172)
26.0
System 20 (AN/ALT-32L)
20.9
Rt. TR
System 21 (AN/ALQ-122/AN/ALT-16A)
27.4
Aft TR
RLC/D20
RLC/E20
RLC/F20
Change 20
1-211
T.O. 1B-52H-1

POWER SOURCE
EQUIPMENT/
CIRCUIT BREAKER
TITLE
AC
BUS
DC
BUS
UNIT
LOAD
(AMPS)
CONTROL
SOURCE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
11
CODE
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM

Battery Chargers
Aft Battery Charger
7.2
Forward Battery Charger
6.9
Flight Gyro Emergency Inverter

FLIGHT INDICATORS FLIGHT GYROS
EMER INVTR
Emer. Inst.
5.5
PCBP/D9
Power Feeders
POWER FEEDERS PHASE A
RH 28V TRANS
0.7
RLC/A32
POWER FEEDERS PHASE B

PILOT 28V AC PWR
1.2
LLC/B7
5
5
5
5
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
RLC/B13
RLC/B14
RLC/B15
RLC/B16
0.8
RLC/E1
0.1
RLC/C16
ENGINES
EPR Gages
ENGINE PRESSURE RATIO IND
POD 1
POD 2
POD 3
POD 4
Fuel Flow Indicators
FUEL MISCELLANEOUS FLOW IND AC
Oil Temperature Indicator
ENGINE OIL TEMP INDICATION
EVS
EVS Complete System Load
35.9
EVS Monitor and Display Systems

Monitor Power
115V AC-PHASE A
MONITOR COPILOT
MONITOR PILOT
115V AC-PHASE C
MONITOR NAV
MONITOR RADAR NAV
3
5
0.2
0.2
EVS/A4
EVS/E3
5
3
0.9
0.9
EVS/K3
EVS/N2
1-212
T.O. 1B-52H-1
POWER SOURCE
EQUIPMENT/
CIRCUIT BREAKER
TITLE
AC
BUS
DC
BUS
UNIT
LOAD
(AMPS)
CONTROL
SOURCE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
11
CODE
EVS (Cont)
EVS Monitor and Display Systems (Cont)
SCU Power
115V AC-PHASE A
SCU COPILOT/FLIR
SCU PILOT/STV
115V AC-PHASE C
SCU-FLIR
SCU-STV
3
3
0.2
0.4
EVS/B3
EVS/D3
3
3
0.2
0.2
EVS/O1
EVS/N3
3
3
3
0.8
0.3
0.3
EVS/A1
EVS/F1
EVS/J1
3
5
0.1
0.1
EVS/A3
EVS/D3
5
3
0.2
0.2
EVS/M3
EVS/N1
4.5
EVS/B2
1.3
EVS/G2
1.3
EVS/K2
19.2
EVS/A2
7.4
EVS/F2
7.4
EVS/J2
Symbol Generator
115V AC-PHASE A SYMBOL GEN
115V AC-PHASE B SYMBOL GEN
115V AC-PHASE C SYMBOL GEN
VDU Power
115V AC-PHASE A
VDU COPILOT/TA/SSG
VDU PILOT/STV
115V AC-PHASE C
VDU NAV/PRI SYNC
VDU R NAV/ALT SYNC/FLIR
EVS Turret Window Wash System
Pump Power
115V AC-PHASE A
WINDOW WASH PUMP
115V AC-PHASE B
WINDOW WASH PUMP
115V AC-PHASE C
WINDOW WASH PUMP
Tank Heater Power
115V AC-PHASE A
WINDOW WASH TANK HTR
115V AC-PHASE B
115V AC-PHASE C
1-213
T.O. 1B-52H-1

POWER SOURCE
EQUIPMENT/
CIRCUIT BREAKER
TITLE
AC
BUS
DC
BUS
UNIT
LOAD
(AMPS)
CONTROL
SOURCE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
11
CODE
EVS (Cont)
Forward Looking Infrared System
Control and Main Power
115V AC-PHASE A FLIR
115V AC-PHASE B FLIR
115V AC-PHASE C FLIR
3
3
3
9
5.2
5.2
EVS/B1
EVS/G1
EVS/K1
3
3
3
17.8
8.2
8.2
EVS/C1
EVS/H1
EVS/L1
3
3
3
6.9
4.0
4.0
EVS/D1
EVS/I1
EVS/M1
7.6
Environmental Heater Power

115V AC-PHASE A FLIR ENV HTR
115V AC-PHASE B FLIR ENV HTR
115V AC-PHASE C FLIR ENV HTR
Fan Power
115V AC-PHASE A FLIR ENV FAN
115V AC-PHASE B FLIR ENV FAN
115V AC-PHASE C FLIR ENV FAN
Window Heater Power
Steerable TV System
115V AC-PHASE C STV
DC POWER POWER STV
1.4
0.8
EVS/L3
EVS/S2
5
5
5
5.9
3.4
3.4
EVS/C2
EVS/H2
EVS/L2
5
5
5
1.5
1.0
1.0
EVS/D2
EVS/I2
EVS/M2
5
5
5
4.7
2.7
2.7
EVS/E2
EVS/F3
EVS/J3
Left TR
Environmental Heater Power

115V AC-PHASE A STV ENV HTR
115V AC-PHASE B STV ENV HTR
115V AC-PHASE C STV ENV HTR
Fan Power
115V AC-PHASE A STV ENV FAN
115V AC-PHASE B STV ENV FAN
115V AC-PHASE C STV ENV FAN
Window Heater Power
115V AC-PHASE A STV WINDOW HTR
115V AC-PHASE B STV WINDOW HTR
115V AC-PHASE C STV WINDOW HTR
1-214
T.O. 1B-52H-1
POWER SOURCE
EQUIPMENT/
CIRCUIT BREAKER
TITLE
AC
BUS
DC
BUS
UNIT
LOAD
(AMPS)
CONTROL
SOURCE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
11
CODE
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM

Airbrakes Control
MISCELLANEOUS AIR BRAKE CONTR
INBD
OUTBD
2.2
2.2
Emer. Batt.
Emer. Batt.
PCBP/E12
PCBP/E13
1
7
53.0
53.0
Left TR
Rt. TR
PCBP/E6
PCBP/E7
1.5
Flap Position Control

MISCELLANEOUS WING FLAPS
CONTROL LEFT
CONTROL RIGHT
Lateral Trim Actuator
MISCELLANEOUS
LATERAL TRIM ACTUATOR
Stabilizer Trim
Fwd. TR
PCBP/E9
1.9

Pilots Emergency Attitude Data Source
(MD-1) Power
EMER INV
Emer. Inst.
5.5
PCBP/D9
3
3
3
0.2
0.2
0.2
AUXBNS/D1
AUXBNS/D2
AUXBNS/D3
0.7
PCBP/D8
0.2
PCBP/D3
Pilots Normal Source (AHRS) Attitude Data

Source Power
OAS NAV AHRS
A
B
C
Horizontal Situation Indicators (HSI)
FLIGHT INDICATORS RADIO NAV IND AC
Pilots Rate of Turn Gyro
FLIGHT INDICATORS RATE OF TURN
Emer. Inst.
1-215
T.O. 1B-52H-1

POWER SOURCE
EQUIPMENT/
CIRCUIT BREAKER
TITLE
AC
BUS
DC
BUS
UNIT
LOAD
(AMPS)
CONTROL
SOURCE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
11
CODE
FUEL SUPPLY SYSTEM

Aux Tank Fuel Flow Control & Boost Pumps
(16)
FUEL PUMP CONTROL
BODY TANKS
AFT 30
AFT 31
AFT 32
CTR 25
CTR WING 26
FWD 23
FWD 24
MID 27
MID 28
MID 29
FUEL PUMP CONTROL
LEFT WING TANKS
EXT 1
OUTBD 2
OUTBD 3
RIGHT WING TANKS
EXT 22
OUTBD 20
OUTBD 21
14.1
3
7
1
1
7
3
5
5
7
1
8.2
8.2
8.2
8.2
8.2
8.2
8.2
8.2
Left TR
Rt. TR
Left TR
Left TR
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
Left TR
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
Left TR
LLC/C20
RLC/C5
LLC/C21
LLC/C18
RLC/C2
RLC/C1
LLC/C17
RLC/C3
RLC/C4
LLC/C19
RLC/B1
LLC/B12
RLC/B2
1
3
1
8.2
8.2
Rt. TR
Left TR
Rt. TR
7
7
5
8.2
8.2
8.2
Rt. TR
Left TR
Rt. TR
RLC/B12
LLC/B21
RLC/B11
5
1
1.6
1.6
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
RLC/E8
RLC/E9
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
CPCBP/A7
CPCBP/A5
CPCBP/A4
CPCBP/A6
CPCBP/A1
CPCBP/A2
CPCBP/A8
CPCBP/A9
5
5
5
5
5
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
CPCBP/B1
CPCBP/B2
CPCBP/B5
CPCBP/B4
CPCBP/B3
CABIN
MAIN
Fuel Quantity Gages
FUEL QUANTITY INDICATORS
AFT BODY
CTR WING
FWD BODY
MID BODY
1
2
3
4
FUEL QTY IND
LEFT EXT
LEFT OUTBD
RIGHT EXT
RIGHT OUTBD
TOTAL
1-216
T.O. 1B-52H-1
POWER SOURCE
EQUIPMENT/
CIRCUIT BREAKER
TITLE
AC
BUS
DC
BUS
UNIT
LOAD
(AMPS)
CONTROL
SOURCE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
11
CODE
FUEL SUPPLY SYSTEM (Cont)

Main Tank Boost Pumps (16)
6.0
FUEL PUMP CONTROL

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
Left TR
Left TR
RLC/B3
RLC/B4
LLC/B13
LLC/B14
4.2
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
Left TR
Left TR
RLC/B5
RLC/B6
LLC/B15
LLC/B16
3
5
1
7
4.2
3.9
3.9
Left TR
Left TR
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
LLC/B17
LLC/B18
RLC/B7
RLC/B8
3
5
1
7
4.2
3.9
3.9
Left TR
Left TR
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
LLC/B19
LLC/B20
RLC/B9
RLC/B10
Left TR
Rt.TR
PCBP/C8
PCBP/C9
Left TR
Left TR
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
PCBP/C5
PCBP/C4
PCBP/C6
PCBP/C7
1
7
3
5
3.9
4.2
3.9
1
7
3
5
HYDRAULIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

Hydraulic Ground Cooler
28.3
Rudder/Elevator Hydraulic Pumps

RUDDER/ELEVATOR HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
PUMP CONTROL
NO.1
NO. 2
.
82.2
82.2
1
7
Standby Hydraulic Pumps (Starting Load)
21.0
Standby Hydraulic Pumps

HYDRAULIC PACKAGE STANDBY
PUMP CONTROL
LH BODY
LH OUTBD
RH BODY
RH OUTBD
.
3
1
1
7
12.2
12.2
12.2
12.2
1-217
T.O. 1B-52H-1

POWER SOURCE
EQUIPMENT/
CIRCUIT BREAKER
TITLE
AC
BUS
DC
BUS
UNIT
LOAD
(AMPS)
CONTROL
SOURCE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
11
CODE
INSTRUMENTS
Attitude Heading Reference System
OAS NAV AHRS
A
B
C
3
3
3
0.2
0.2
0.2
AUXBNS/D1
AUXBNS/D2
AUXBNS/D3
0.3
LLC/C31
Emer. Inst.
1.1
PCBP/D10
Emer. Inst.
5.5
PCBP/D9
0.4
AUXBNS/D5
0.4
PCBP/D5
Altitude Computer and Pilots Altimeters in

Servo Mode
MISCELLANEOUS ALT CMPTR
C-2A Heading Indicator (Emergency Power)
DIR IND C-2
EMER INV
Radar Altimeter
OAS NAV RDR ALTM
Standby Attitude Indicator

FLIGHT INDICATORS STANDBY ATTITUDE
Emer. Inst.
LANDING GEAR SYSTEM

Antiskid Control
1.5
LIGHTING EQUIPMENT
Exterior Lighting
Air Refueling Slipway Doors and Wing Illumination Lights
AERIAL REFUELING EXT LIGHT
1.5
Rt. TR
RLC/F7
1.9
Left TR
LLC/F16
1&7
10.1
2.4
Crosswind Landing and Taxi Light Control

LIGHTING EXTERIOR
TAXI & CROSS WIND CONTROL
Landing Lights
Navigation Lights
LIGHTING EXTERIOR NAV PWR
1-218
LLC/F12
T.O. 1B-52H-1
POWER SOURCE
EQUIPMENT/
CIRCUIT BREAKER
TITLE
AC
BUS
DC
BUS
UNIT
LOAD
(AMPS)
CONTROL
SOURCE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
11
CODE
LIGHTING EQUIPMENT (Cont)

Exterior Lighting (Cont)
Terrain Clearance Light Operation
LIGHTING EXTERIOR
TERRAIN CLEARANCE CONTROL
Wing Taxi Light
2.0
2.5
Interior Lighting (Total Load)
LLC/F15
31.0
Dome Lights (EWO, DI, and Gunner)

DECM LTS DOME
FCS LTS DOME
5
5
0.3
0.3
ECM/B1
ECM/B3
0.8
ABNS/A5
1.2
RLC/A27
0.3
LLC/E20
5
5
0.5
0.4
ECM/A1
ECM/A3
0.2
ABNS/A8
5
3
0.4
0.3
RLC/A25
LLC/E19
5
3
0.8
1.6
RLC/A29
LLC/E17
Dome Lights (Nav Station)

MISCELLANEOUS OAS
COMPARTMENT LIGHTS DOME OAS
Dome Lights (Pilots Station)
INTERIOR LIGHTING PILOT & COPILOT
DOME
Essential Flt Inst. Lights (With complete AC
power failure) Pilots ADI Lights
LIGHTING INTERIOR EMER INSTR
LTS CONT
Flood Lights (EWO, DI, and Gunner)
DECM LTS FLOOD
FCS LTS FLOOD
Flood Lights (Nav Station)
MISCELLANEOUS OAS
COMPARTMENT LIGHTS OAS FLOOD
Flood Lights (Pilots Station)
INTERIOR LIGHTING
COPILOTS FLOOD
PILOT FLOOD
Instrument Lights (Pilots Station) (Including
Standby Compass Light)
LIGHTING INTERIOR PILOT INST
1-219
T.O. 1B-52H-1

POWER SOURCE
EQUIPMENT/
CIRCUIT BREAKER
TITLE
AC
BUS
DC
BUS
UNIT
LOAD
(AMPS)
CONTROL
SOURCE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
11
CODE
LIGHTING EQUIPMENT (Cont)

Interior Lighting (Cont)
Panel Lights (DI and Gunner)
FCS LTS PNL
0.4
ECM/C3
2.0
ECM/C1
5
3
0.9
1.3
RLC/A28
LLC/E18
0.2
CPCBP/E2
5.7
RLC/E19
5
5
3
5.2
5.7
5.9
RLC/D16
RLC/F15
ABNS/B6
Panel Lights (EWO)

DECM LTS PNL
Panel Lights (Pilots Station)
INTERIOR LIGHTING COPILOT PANEL
LIGHTING INTERIOR PILOT PANEL
Electronic Clocks
CLOCK
Left TR
Food Warming Oven

MISCELLANEOUS FOOD WARMING OVEN
Hot Cups
MISCELLANEOUS
HOT CUP ECM & FCS
HOT CUP PILOT & COPILOT
HOT CUP
Vertical (Strike) Camera
3.8
Camera Blower
2.0
CAMERA DOOR CONTR
1.5
Camera Heaters (8)
1.4
MISSILE SYSTEM
AGM-86B (Load per Missile)
23.8
Missile Interface Unit

Bay (Without Missile)
1.2
Left or Right Pylon (Without Missile)
1.2
1-220
Change 18
Rt. TR
ABNS/B2
T.O. 1B-52H-1
POWER SOURCE
EQUIPMENT/
CIRCUIT BREAKER
TITLE
AC
BUS
DC
BUS
UNIT
LOAD
(AMPS)
CONTROL
SOURCE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
11
CODE
TACAN Receiver (AN/ARN-118(V))
MISCELLANEOUS AN/ARN-118(V) DC
2.2
Left TR
LLC/B32
OFFENSIVE AVIONICS SYSTEM (OAS)

Computational Subsystem
Less [AMI] Processor Power (Combined total
load for all 3 processors)
[AMI] Processor Power (Combined total load
for both processors)
OAS COMPUTATIONAL
PROCESSOR NO. 1
ALT PWR A
ALT PWR B
ALT PWR C
NORM PWR A
NORM PWR B
NORM PWR C
7.0
1.5
5
5
5
3
3
3
2.3/[AMI].5
2.3/[AMI].5
2.3/[AMI].5
2.3/[AMI].5
2.3/[AMI].5
2.3/[AMI].5
AUXBNS/E8
AUXBNS/F8
AUXBNS/G8
AUXBNS/E7
AUXBNS/F7
AUXBNS/G7
PROCESSOR NO. 2
ALT PWR A
ALT PWR B
ALT PWR C
NORM PWR A
NORM PWR B
NORM PWR C
3
3
3
5
5
5
2.3/[AMI].5
2.3/[AMI].5
2.3/[AMI].5
2.3/[AMI].5
2.3/[AMI].5
2.3/[AMI].5
AUXBNS/E10
AUXBNS/F10
AUXBNS/G10
AUXBNS/E9
AUXBNS/F9
AUXBNS/G9
Less [AMI] PROCESSOR NO. 3

ALT PWR A
ALT PWR B
ALT PWR C
NORM PWR A
NORM PWR B
NORM PWR C
5
5
5
3
3
3
2.3
2.3
2.3
2.3
2.3
2.3
AUXBNS/E12
AUXBNS/F12
AUXBNS/G12
AUXBNS/E11
AUXBNS/F11
AUXBNS/G11
1.3
LFBNS/A17
3&5
64.9
3.7
AUXBNS/E1
1.2
AUXBNS/G4
1.2
AUXBNS/E2
1.2
AUXBNS/E3
Controls and Displays Subsystem

Display Electronics Unit
CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS
DEU AC NO. 1
OAS Master Power Switch (AC)
Radar Scan Converter
OAS NAV RDR SCAN CONV
Interface Subsystem
Armament Interface Unit (AIU)
OAS INTERFACE ARMT IU ALT AC
EVS Interface Unit (EIU)
OAS INTERFACE EVS IU AC
Radar Interface Unit (RIU)
OAS INTERFACE RDR IU AC
Change 21
1-221
T.O. 1B-52H-1

POWER SOURCE
EQUIPMENT/
CIRCUIT BREAKER
TITLE
AC
BUS
DC
BUS
UNIT
LOAD
(AMPS)
CONTROL
SOURCE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
11
CODE
OFFENSIVE AVIONICS SYSTEM (OAS) (Cont)

Navigational Subsystem
Doppler Radar
OAS NAV DOPPLER RDR
1.5
3
1.5
Global Positioning System
1.5
Less [AMI] INS Sets (2) (Total Load)
16.7
AUXBNS/D4
INS No. 1
NO. 1 INS
AC PWR A
AC PWR B
AC PWR C
FAN A
FAN B
FAN C
HEATER A
HEATER B
HEATER C
COOL
DC ALT PWR
AFT BATTERY POWER
RSPA PWR 24V IEU 1
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
1.7
1.7
1.7
4.1
4.1
4.1
16.0
13.0
3.8
LFBNS/A1
LFBNS/A2
LFBNS/A3
LFBNS/A7
LFBNS/A8
LFBNS/A9
LFBNS/A4
LFBNS/A5
LFBNS/A6
LFBNS/A10
RTSV/A1
LLC/F6
1.7
1.7
1.7
4.1
4.1
4.1
16.0
13.0
3.8
LFBNS/B1
LFBNS/B2
LFBNS/B3
LFBNS/B7
LFBNS/B8
LFBNS/B9
LFBNS/B4
LFBNS/B5
LFBNS/B6
LFBNS/B10
RTSV/H2
RLC/F29
Right TR
Right TR
Aft Batt
INS No. 2
NO. 2 INS
AC PWR A
AC PWR B
AC PWR C
FAN A
FAN B
FAN C
HEATER A
HEATER B
HEATER C
COOL
DC ALT PWR
FWD BATTERY POWER
RSPA PWR 24V IEU 2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
Right TR
Right TR
Fwd Batt
[AMI] INS Sets (2) (Total Load)
1.4
INS No. 1
NO.1 INS AC PWR
NO.1 INS DC B/U POWER
3
Fwd Batt
0.7
2.5
LFBNS/A1
RLC/F29
Aft Batt
0.7
2.5
LFBNS/B4
LLC/F6
0.4
AUXBNS/D5
INS No. 2
NO.2 INS AC PWR
NO.2 INS DC B/U POWER
Radar Altimeter
OAS NAV RDR ALTM
1-222
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
POWER SOURCE
EQUIPMENT/
CIRCUIT BREAKER
TITLE
AC
BUS
DC
BUS
UNIT
LOAD
(AMPS)
CONTROL
SOURCE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
11
CODE
OFFENSIVE AVIONICS SYSTEM (OAS) (Cont)

Strategic Radar Subsystem
11.6
Cooling Blowers
RADOME GROUND COOL
BLOWER A
BLOWER B
BLOWER C
3
3
3
4.8
4.8
4.8
AUXBNS/C1
AUXBNS/C2
AUXBNS/C3
6.5
AUXBNS/C7
Radar Pressurization
RDR PRESS AC
Radar Transponder (AN/APN-69)
5.6
OXYGEN SYSTEM
Oxygen Quantity Indicator

OXY QTY IND
0.1
PCBP/E14
6.0
RLC/C27
PNEUMATICS
Air Bleed System
CABIN AIR CONDITIONING BLEED
VALVES STRUT NO. 3 & BODY XOVER
5
REFUELING SYSTEM
CABIN
MAIN
1.6
1.6
5
1
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
RLC/E8
RLC/E9
WHEEL BRAKE SYSTEM

Antiskid Control
11
1.5
ABNS
AUXBNS
CPCBP
ECM
EVS
LFBNS

AUXILIARY BNS CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL
ECM CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL
EVS CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL
LEFT FORWARD BNS CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL
LLC
PCBP
RFBNS
RLC
RTSV

RIGHT FORWARD BNS CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL
RIGHT S/V FILTER BOX
NOTE
The following points are emphasized to enable the crewmember to better use this chart.
All items in capital letters are actual labels on circuit breaker panels in the pressurized crew compartment.
Load analysis data is presented as a consolidated grouping when relation to an individual circuit breaker is not practical.
Consider the immediate mission priorities when reducing loads in an emergency situation. The figures (amps) listed in
the load column are to be used as a relative guide in determining high load items. The actual drop on generator ammeter
gages will not necessarily be the amperage shown in this figure, since multiple generators share loads and ammeters
reflect phase B load only.
Figure 1-69 (Sheet 16 of 16 )
Change 21
1-223
T.O. 1B-52H-1
1-224
T.O. 1B-52H-1
PILOTS CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL (PCBP)
COPILOTS CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL (CPCBP)
RIGHT LOAD CENTRAL (RLC) CIRCUIT

BREAKER PANEL
LEFT LOAD CENTRAL (LLC) CIRCUIT

BREAKER PANEL
RIGHT FORWARD BNS (RFBNS) CIRCUIT

BREAKER PANEL
LEFT FORWARD BNS (LFBNS) CIRCUIT

BREAKER PANEL
EVS CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL (EVS)
AFT BNS CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL (ABNS)
LEFT LOAD CENTRAL FUSE INSTALLATION
10
AUXILIARY BNS CIRCUIT BREAKER

PANEL (AUXBNS)
11
ECM CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL (ECM)
12
ENG NO. 3 GENERATOR POWER BOX
13
14
15
STATION 694 POWER PANEL
16
AFT AC POWER BOX
17
SECTION 47 OR AFT DC POWER BOX
18
FCS POWER BOX
19
AFT ECM POWER BOX
20
21
AGM-69A BATTERY POWER BOX
22
MISSILE POWER DISTRIBUTION BOX
23
AFT BATTERY POWER BOX
24
LEFT FORWARD DC POWER BOX
25
RIGHT FORWARD DC POWER BOX
26
RIGHT SV FILTER BOX CIRCUIT BREAKER

PANEL (RTSV)
DENOTES READILY ACCESSIBLE PANELS
1-225
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Circuit Breaker Panels (Cont)
Locator code system is for reference only; aircraft does not have these markings.
1 PILOTS CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL (PCBP) (TYPICAL)

1-226
T.O. 1B-52H-1
2 COPILOTS CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL (CPCBP) (TYPICAL)

Change 18
1-227
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Power for flight loads data recorder (some airplanes).
3 Less [AMI] RIGHT LOAD CENTRAL CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL (RLC) (TYPICAL)
1-228
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Change 20
1-229
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Power for flight loads data recorder (some airplanes).
3 [AMI] RIGHT LOAD CENTRAL CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL (RLC) (TYPICAL)

Figure 1-70 (Sheet 6A of 15)
1-230
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Figure 1-70 (Sheet 6B of 15)
Change 21
1-230A
T.O. 1B-52H-1
4 Less [AMI] LEFT LOAD CENTRAL CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL (LLC) (TYPICAL)
1-230B
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Change 20
1-231
T.O. 1B-52H-1
4 [AMI] LEFT LOAD CENTRAL CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL (LLC) (TYPICAL)

1-232
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Change 21
1-232A
T.O. 1B-52H-1
5 RIGHT FORWARD BNS CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL (RFBNS) (TYPICAL)
6 Less [AMI] LEFT FORWARD BNS CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL (LFBNS) (TYPICAL)
1-232B
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
5 RIGHT FORWARD BNS CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL (RFBNS) (TYPICAL)
6 [AMI] LEFT FORWARD BNS CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL (LFBNS) (TYPICAL)
Change 21
1-232C/(1-232D blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
7 EVS CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL (EVS) (TYPICAL)

Change 21
1-233
T.O. 1B-52H-1
8 AFT BNS CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL (ABNS) (TYPICAL)

1-234
Change 10
T.O. 1B-52H-1
10 Less [AMI] AUXILIARY BNS CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL (AUXBNS) (TYPICAL)

Change 21
1-234A/(1-234B blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
10 [AMI] AUXILIARY BNS CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL (AUXBNS) (TYPICAL)

Change 21
1-235
T.O. 1B-52H-1
These circuit breakers have been deactivated.
11 ECM CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL (ECM) (TYPICAL)

1-236
T.O. 1B-52H-1
11 ECM CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL (ECM) (TYPICAL) (Cont)

Change 20
1-237
T.O. 1B-52H-1

Less [AMI]
[AMI]
Locator code system is for reference only; aircraft

does not have these markings.
Locator code system is for reference only; aircraft

does not have these markings.
26 RIGHT S/V FILTER BOX CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL (RTSV) (TYPICAL)

1-238
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Electrical Power System Circuit

EQUIPMENT
Battery Discharge Indicator Light
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
POWER FEEDERS DC
RIGHT ESSENTIAL DC POWER
BATT DISCHG IND LIGHT
RLC/E27
Fwd Batt
AC GENERATOR CONTROL
BUS TIE CKT BKR POSITION IND
INBD
OUTBD
CPCBP/C4
CPCBP/C5
CP Rt. ESS
CP Left ESS
Bus Tie Master Isolate Switch,

Main External Power Switch and
Control Circuits, and Main External Power System Indicator
EXT PWR & BUS TIE ISOLATE
CPCBP/C6
CP Rt. ESS
Emergency Battery Power and

Control and Emergency DC
Power Switch
POWER FEEDERS
FWD BATTERY POWER
EMER BUS CONT
EMER INSTR BUS CONT
R EMER INSTR PWR
R EMER PWR
RLC/F25
RLC/F34
RLC/F33
RLC/F32
Fwd Batt
Fwd Batt
Fwd Batt
Fwd Batt
POWER FEEDERS
LEFT EMER INSTR PWR
LLC/E6
Left ESS
Flight Gyro Emergency Power

Inverter

EMER INVTR
PCBP/D9
Emer. Inst. Bus
Generator Controls and

Switches, Generator Breaker
Position Indicators, and Generator Drive Overheat Lights
ENG NO. 1 GEN
ENG NO. 3 GEN
ENG NO. 5 GEN
ENG NO. 7 GEN
GEN TRIP IND BOX
CPCBP/C1
CPCBP/C2
CPCBP/C7
CPCBP/C8
CPCBP/C11
CP Left ESS
CP Rt. ESS
CP Rt. ESS
CP Left ESS
CP Rt. ESS
Generator Drive Decoupler

Switches
ENGINE GEN DRIVE DECOUPLE
RLC/C19
Rt. TR
POWER FEEDERS PHASE A

COPILOT
DEFENSE
LEFT 28V TRANS
PILOT
RH 28V TRANS
RLC/A34
RLC/A33
LLC/A6
LLC/A3
RLC/A32
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 5
Bus Tie Breaker Position

Indicators
Power Feeders AC
Phase A
1-239
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Electrical Power System Circuit

Protection and Location (Cont)
EQUIPMENT
Power Feeders AC
Phase B
Power Feeders AC
Phase C
Power Feeders DC
Aft Battery
Power Feeders DC
Forward Battery
Power Feeders DC
Left Essential DC Power
Power Feeders DC
Left TR Power
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
POWER
SOURCE
POWER FEEDERS PHASE B

AHRS SYNC
BNS 28V AC PWR
COPILOT
DEFENSE
PILOT 28V AC PWR
PILOT
LLC/B2
LLC/B6
RLC/B34
RLC/B33
LLC/B7
LLC/B3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
POWER FEEDERS PHASE C

DEFENSE
PILOT
RLC/C33
LLC/C3
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 3
POWER FEEDERS
AFT BATTERY POWER
BNS
EMER
L ESS DC BATT CONT
L ESS DC BATT PWR
PILOT
LLC/F1
LLC/F3
LLC/F4
LLC/F5
LLC/F2
Aft Batt
Aft Batt
Aft Batt
Aft Batt
Aft Batt
POWER FEEDERS
FWD BATTERY POWER
BNS
PILOT
R ESS CONTR
R ESS PWR
RLC/F28
RLC/F31
RLC/F26
RLC/F27
Fwd Batt
Fwd Batt
Fwd Batt
Fwd Batt
POWER FEEDERS
BNS
PILOT
TR
LLC/E3
LLC/E2
LLC/E1
Left ESS
Left ESS
Left ESS
POWER FEEDERS DC
LEFT TR POWER
BNS
BNS STA
PILOT
LLC/D3
LLC/D4
LLC/D5
Left TR
Left TR
Left TR
1-240
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EQUIPMENT
Power Feeders DC
Right Essential DC Power
Power Feeders DC
Right TR Power
11
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
POWER FEEDERS DC
R ESS BNS
R ESS PILOT
RLC/E28
RLC/E29
Rt. ESS
Rt. ESS
POWER FEEDERS DC
RIGHT TR POWER
BNS
COPILOT
DECM
PILOT
R ESS BUS
RLC/D30
RLC/D28
RLC/D31
RLC/D29
RLC/D32
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
CPCBP
LLC

PCBP
RLC

1-241/(1-242 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LIGHTING EQUIPMENT
DESCRIPTION
EXTERIOR LIGHTING
INTERIOR LIGHTING
1-243
1-243
1-244B
DESCRIPTION
Lighting equipment circuit protection and the location of the applicable circuit breakers is contained
in figure 1-75.
EXTERIOR LIGHTING
Exterior lighting (figure 1-71A) consists of landing

lights, navigation lights, terrain clearance light,
taxi lights, air refueling lights, crosswind landing
light, anticollision lights, and a signal light. The
lights utilize 28 volt ac power reduced from 118
volts ac by autotransformers. Exterior lighting controls are described in figure 1-72.
Landing Lights
A fixed landing light is installed in each forward

landing gear door (5, 20 figure 1-71A) for use during approach and landing. The landing lights will
not illuminate after the landing gear has been retracted.
Navigational Lights
The navigational lights consist of a red light on the

left wingtip (16 figure 1-71A), a green light on the
right wingtip (7 figure 1-71A), two white lights on
each tip of the horizontal stabilizer (12, 13 figure
1-71A), and three white lights, one on top of the fuselage (9 figure 1-71A) and one on each side above
the bomb bay doors (8, 10 figure 1-71A).
Anticollision Lights
Three rotating anticollision lights, two on top of

the fuselage (11, 14 figure 1-71A) and one on the
bottom just forward of the empennage (15 figure
1-71A), are used to safeguard against midair collision.
Crosswind Landing Light
A crosswind landing light (4, figure 1-71A) is installed on the right forward landing gear to provide
lighting on the landing area during crosswind landings. It will not illuminate unless the landing gear
lever is in DOWN position.
Terrain Clearance Light
A retractable terrain clearance light (19 figure

1-71A) installed on the forward bottom fuselage will
provide illumination during a night crash landing.
In addition, the light may also be used for night
takeoff and landings.
Taxi Lights
Three taxi lights and the crosswind landing light

provide lighting for taxi operation. One light is
installed on the leading edge of each wing just outboard of the outboard pods (6, 17 figure 1-71A). A
crosswind taxi light (18 figure 1-71A) is installed on
the right forward landing gear.
Air Refueling Lights
Air refueling lights consist of five white lights, one

installed in the receptacle (3 figure 1-71A) and two
in each slipway door (1, 2 figure 1-71A). The lights
illuminate the receptacle, slipway, and wing areas
during night air refueling operations. In addition,
the lights aid the tanker boom operator in checking
the receiver aircraft. The lights in the slipway doors
may be used for scanning the wing leading edges,
nacelles, struts, and spoilers.
Change 4
1-243
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Exterior Lighting Locations
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
LEFT AND RIGHT SLIPWAY DOOR LIGHTS

LEFT AND RIGHT WING ILLUMINATION LIGHTS
IFR RECEPTACLE LIGHT
CROSWIND LANDING LIGHT
RIGHT LANDING LIGHT
RIGHT TAXI LIGHT
RIGHT WING TIP LIGHT
RIGHT BODY NAVIGATION LIGHT
TOP BODY NAVIGATION LIGHT
LEFT BODY NAVIGATION LIGHT
RIGHT UPPER ANTICOLLISION LIGHT
RIGHT LOWER AND UPPER TAILLIGHTS
LEFT LOWER AND UPPER TAILLIGHTS
LEFT UPPER ANTICOLLISION LIGHT
LOWER ANTICOLLISION LIGHT
LEFT WING TIP LIGHT
LEFT TAXI LIGHT
CROSSWIND TAXI LIGHT
TERRAIN CLEARANCE LIGHT
LEFT LANDING LIGHT
1-244
Change 4
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Change 4
1-244A
T.O. 1B-52H-1
A 28 volt ac powered signal light (8, sheet 3 of figure 1-1) stowed aft of the copilot may be used as a
means of communication between aircraft in flight
or an aid in identification. A power receptacle is located adjacent to the light for plugging in the power
cord leading from the light.
dull light conditions and during thunderstorms to

lessen the blinding effect of lightning flashes. All
lights utilize 28 volt ac power reduced from 118
volts ac by autotransformers except the entry lights
and, in an emergency, the essential instrument
lights which use 24 volt dc battery power. Interior
lighting is described in figure 1-73. Entry and walkway lights are described in figure 1-74.
INTERIOR LIGHTING
Spotlights
Interior lighting is provided by red and white

lights. Red lights are used during night flights since
red color does not adversely affect night vision.
White lights are used for daytime flights during
Spotlights are located at the pilots, EW officers,

gunners, radar navigators, and navigators stations. The lights are controlled by a rheostat switch
on the individual light.
Signal Light
1-244B
Change 4
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Exterior Light Controls and Indicators
1
2
3
4
NAVIGATION LIGHT STEADY-OFF-FLASH

SWITCH
NAVIGATION LIGHT BRIGHT-DIM SWITCH
ANTI-COLLISION LIGHTS SWITCH
AIR REFUELING AIRPLANE LIGHTS SWITCH
5
6
7
8
9
AIR REFUELING SLIPWAY LIGHTS SWITCH

LANDING LIGHT SWITCH
TERRAIN CLEARANCE LIGHT SWITCH
TAXI LIGHTS SWITCH
CROSSWIND LANDING LIGHTS SWITCH
Change 4
1-244C/(1-244D blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
Navigation Light STEADY-OFF-FLASH

Switch
The toggle switch on the pilots overhead panel controls the navigation
lights. The STEADY position selects steady illumination of all lights.
FLASH position selects a flashing of the wing and tail lights with steady
illumination of the fuselage lights, while OFF position turns the lights out.
Navigation Light BRIGHT-DIM Switch
The intensity of the lights are controlled by a toggle switch on the pilots
overhead panel. The BRIGHT- -DIM switch selects bright or dim illumination of all navigational lights.
ANTI-COLLISION Lights Switch
The lights are controlled by an ON- -OFF switch on the pilots overhead
panel.
Air Refueling
Switch
LIGHTS
The left and right wing illuminating lights are controlled by a rotary switch.
The air refueling lights will not illuminate unless the master refuel switch
is ON and either the slipway door normal or alternate switch is in OPEN
position.
Air Refueling SLIPWAY LIGHTS Switch
The receptacle light and slipway lights are controlled by a rotary switch.
The air refueling lights will not illuminate unless the master refuel switch
is ON and either the slipway door normal or alternate switch is in OPEN
position.
LANDING Lights Switch
The landing lights are controlled by an ON- -OFF switch on the aisle stand
and will not illuminate when the landing gear is up and locked.
TERRAIN CLEARANCE Lights Switch
The light is controlled by an open guarded three-position switch on the

aisle stand. The switch has EXT- -OFF- -RET positions. In EXT position,
118 volts ac power is supplied to a motor which extends the light out of
the fuselage. OFF position stops the motor and allows the light to remain
at any degree of travel during extension or retraction. RET position supplies power to the motor to retract the light into the fuselage. Limit
switches automatically stop the motor at either extreme of travel. Light illumination is independent of the switch and is controlled by position of the
light. The light will be illuminated at any time the light is extended more
than 10.
TAXI Lights Switch
The lights are controlled by an ON- -OFF switch on the aisle stand.
CROSSWIND LANDING Lights Switch
The light is controlled by an ON- -OFF switch marked CROSSWIND

LANDING on the aisle stand. Also, the light may be controlled by a switch
marked TAXI on the aisle stand. The crosswind landing light will not illuminate unless the landing gear lever is in DOWN position.
AIRPLANE
1-245
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Interior Light Controls and Indicators
1
2
3
4
5
PANEL LIGHT SWITCH (7 PLACES)

WARNING LIGHT DIMMING CONTROL
EYEBROW PANEL LIGHT SWITCH
FLIGHT INSTRUMENT LIGHT SWITCH (2
PLACES)
FLOOD LIGHT SWITCH (2 PLACES)
6
7
8
9
9A
DOME LIGHT RED/WHITE SWITCH

DOME LIGHT INTENSITY CONTROL SWITCH
THUNDERSTORM LIGHTS
BUNK COMPARTMENT DOME LIGHTS
NVIS LIGHT SWITCH DQ
1-246
Change 1
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
PILOTS STATION LIGHTING
PANEL Lights
(Pilots SIDE PANEL and FORWARD
PANEL, OVERHEAD PANEL, CTR
INSTRUMENTS CTR CONSOLE, and
Copilots FWD PANEL and SIDE
PANEL)
Lights within edge-lighted panels, which illuminate indirectly from the underside, are red. The lights are the primary source of instrument lighting
and are controlled by OFF- -BRIGHT rotary switches on the pilots side
panel, copilots side panel, and pilots overhead panel.
WARNING LIGHT Dimming Control

Switch
A warning light dimming switch on the pilots side panel controls the
brightness of all indicator and warning lights at the pilots and copilots station with the exception of the fire warning lights and the landing gear
lights. The switch has DIM- -BRIGHT at the extreme positions respectively and is spring-loaded to the NEUTRAL position. When the switch is
placed to BRIGHT position, all indicator lights are at their brightest illumination. Momentarily moving the switch to DIM position will energize the
dimming control relay to dim all lights with the exception of the fire warning, landing gear lights. The rotary flight instruments switch on the pilots
side panel provides for additional dimming control. The rotary control
switch is mechanically linked to the dimming circuit, and the warning
lights are automatically reset to bright whenever flight instruments lights
have been turned to OFF position. The thunderstorm light control switch
cuts out the dimming control circuit when positioned ON. Energizing the
thunderstorm lights resets all indicator and warning lights to bright.
EYEBROW PANEL Lights
The eyebrow panel lights and the standby compass light are controlled
by an OFF- -BRIGHT rotary switch on the pilots side panel.
FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS Lights

(Pilot and Copilot)
Red lights in the instrument hoods provide illumination for individual instruments. The lights are controlled by OFF- -BRIGHT rotary switches on
the pilots side panel and copilots side panel.
PILOTS and COPILOTS

FLOODS (Floodlights)
Floodlights are a secondary source of instrument lighting and are

mounted in a manner so as to provide illumination on a group of instruments located in the same area. The pilots station floodlights are controlled by OFF- -BRIGHT rotary switches on the pilots side panel and copilots side panel.
DOME LIGHT WHITE/RED Switch
One red and one white domelight are located by the pilots and copilots
escape hatches. The light color is selected by a RED- -WHITE toggle
switch.
DOME Light Intensity Control Switch
The intensity of the domelights is controlled by an OFF- -BRIGHT rotary

switch.
THUNDERSTORM Lights
Two white thunderstorm lights in the pilots compartment provide illumination during thunderstorms to lessen the blinding effect of lightning flashes.
The lights are controlled by an ON - - OFF switch.
Bunk Compartment Domelights
One white and one red domelight located at the crew comfort station are
controlled by a RED- -OFF- -WHITE switch adjacent to the oxygen regulator and interphone panel.
NVIS Light Switch
The three position switch controls the light intensity of the AN/ARC-210
(V) Switch panel.
9A
Change 1
1-247
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Interior Light Controls and Indicators (Cont)
10
11
12
13
EW OFFICERS MAIN CONSOLE PANEL LIGHT

SWITCH
ECM INDICATOR LIGHTS SWITCH
DOME LIGHT RED/WHITE SWITCH (2 PLACES)
FLOOD LIGHT SWITCH (2 PLACES)
14
15
16
DOME LIGHT INTENSITY CONTROL SWITCH (2

PLACES)
EW OFFICERS PANEL LIGHTS SWITCH
DI, BUNK, AND GUNNERS PANEL LIGHTS
SWITCH
1-248
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
EW OFFICERS, DI, AND GUNNERS LIGHTS
10
EW Officers MAIN CONSOLE Panel

Lights Switch
Lights within all of the edge-lighted panels on the front (main) console of
the EW officers station are controlled by an OFF - - BRIGHT rotary switch
on the main console light control panel.
11
ECM IND Lights Switch
Dimming of indicator lights on the master expendables panel and the

ALT-28 antenna selector panel is controlled by an ECM indicator light
control switch adjacent to the light control panel on the left sidewall of the
EW officers station. The switch has BRIGHT - - DIM positions springloaded to a center neutral position. The bright or dim light level of the indicator lights is obtained by actuating the switch to the desired position.
12
DOME WHITE/RED Switch
Two red and two white domelight are located by the EW officers and gunners stations. The light color is selected by a RED - - WHITE toggle
switch. One toggle switch is located on the EW officers light control panel
and another toggle switch is located on the gunners light control panel.
13
EW Officers, DI, and Gunners FLOOD

Lights Switches
Red floodlights in the EW officers and gunners stations are controlled

by OFF - - BRIGHT rotary switches on the EW officers light control panel
and the gunners light control panel.
14
EW Officers, DI, and Gunners DOMELIGHTS Switch
Two red and two white domelights are located at the EW officers and gunners stations and are controlled by OFF - - BRIGHT rotary switches and
light color is selected by a RED - - WHITE toggle switch. One rotary
switch is located on the EW officers light control panel and another rotary
switch is located on the gunners light control panel.
15
EW Officers Panel Lights Switch
Lights within the edge-lighted panels on the side walls at the EW officers
station are controlled by an OFF - - BRIGHT rotary switch on the ECM
light control panel.
16
DI, Bunk and Gunners Panel Lights

Switch
Lights within all edge-lighted panels at the defense instructors, bunk ,

and gunners stations except the AFSATCOM printer and keyboard are
controlled by an OFF - - BRIGHT rotary switch on the gunners light control panel. The lights on the two AFSATCOM panels are controlled by the
illumination switch on the printer
Change 4
1-249
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Interior Light Controls and Indicators (Cont)
17
18
19
20
NAV STATION PANEL LIGHTS SWITCH (3

PLACES)
RED FLOOD LIGHTS SWITCH
DOME LIGHT RED/WHITE SWITCH
DOME LIGHT INTENSITY CONTROL SWITCH
21
22
23
24
BNS FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS SWITCH

OAS TABLE LIGHT SWITCH
EVS INDICATOR LIGHTS SWITCH
SERVICE DOME LIGHT SWITCH
1-250
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
NAV STATION LIGHTING
17
NAV Station Panel Lights (LH SIDE,

BNS FRONT PANEL, and RH SIDE
PANEL)
Lights within all of the edge-lighted panels are controlled by the respective OFF- -BRIGHT rotary switch.
18
NAV Station RED FLOOD Lights
Floodlights for the entire compartment are controlled by an

OFF- -BRIGHT rotary switch on the OAS light control panel.
19
DOME WHITE/RED Switch
One red and one white domelight are located above each navigators
seat. The light color is selected by a RED- -WHITE toggle switch.
20
NAV Station DOME Lights
Two domelights, one red and one white, are located above each navigators seat. The light intensity is controlled by an OFF- -BRIGHT rotary
switch.
21
BNS FLIGHT INST Lights
Red lights in the instrument hoods provide illumination for individual instruments. The lights are controlled by an OFF- -BRIGHT rotary switch.
22
OAS TABLE Lights
Two white table lights over the navigators table are controlled by an
OFF- -BRIGHT rotary switch on the right BNS observers pressure suit
control panel.
23
EVS IND Lights
The EVS indicator lights are controlled by a BRIGHT- -DIM toggle switch
on the navigators table light control panel.
ELECTRONIC RACK LIGHTING
24
SERVICE DOME Lights
Lighting for the electronic racks is supplied by service domelights and

spotlights. The domelights are controlled by an ON- -OFF switch on the
overhead panel above instructor navigators seat, while the spotlights
have an individual rotary switch on each light.
1-251
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Entry Light Controls and Indicators
1
2
3
ENTRY LIGHT SWITCH (MAIN ENTRY DOOR)

COPILOTS ENTRY LIGHT SWITCH (PILOTS
COMPARTMENT)
WALKWAY LIGHT SWITCH
4
5
6
AISLE LIGHTS SWITCH

BNS LIGHTING CONTROL PANEL WALKWAY
LIGHT SWITCH
AISLE LIGHTS SWITCH
1-252
Change 12
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
Main Entry Door Entry Light Switch
This switch by the main entry door works with the switch at the copilots
station (No. 1) to control the entry lights.
Copilots Entry Light Switch
This switch works with the switch at the main entry door (No. 2) to control
the entry lights. The entry lights are white lights located on the copilots
glare shield, pilots overhead panel, in deck above entry ladder, and in
deck above entry door.
WALKWAY LIGHTS Switch
This switch above the crawlway entrance works with the switch on the
BNS light control panel (No. 5) to control the walkway lights. The walkway
lights are white lights located along the walkway and crawlway through
the equipment deck, wheel wells, bomb bay, and aft equipment compartment.
AISLE LIGHTS Switch
Two white aisle lights, one located right of entry ladder in the lower crew
compartment and one in ceiling of upper crew compartment, are controlled by this switch and a switch (No. 6) in the upper crew compartment.
BNS Light Control Panel WALKWAY

LIGHTS Switch
This switch on the OAS light control panel works with the switch above
the crawlway entrance (No. 3) to control the walkway lights.
AISLE LIGHT Switch
This switch works with the switch above the crawlway entrance (No. 4)
to control the aisle lights.
OAS PANEL INDICATOR LIGHTS
The OAS panel indicator lights are controlled by

two dimmer controls, one located on the RN station
and the other located on the navigators station.
The dimmer control on the radar navigators sta-
tion controls the intensity of the RN keyboard,

RNMP, and RN radar presentation panel. The dimmer control on the NAV station controls the intensity of the indicators on the NAV keyboard, OAS power panel, computer control panel, WCP, and NAV
radar presentation panel.
1-253
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Lighting Equipment Circuit Protection and Location

EQUIPMENT
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
Exterior Lighting
Air Refueling Slipway Doors
and Wing Illumination Lights
AERIAL REFUELING EXT LIGHT
RLC/F7
Rt. TR
Anti-Collision Lights
LIGHTING EXTERIOR
ANTI-COLLISION LOWER
ANTI-COLLISION UPPER
LLC/F14
LLC/F13
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
LIGHTING EXTERIOR TAXI &

CROSS WIND CONTROL
LLC/F16
Left TR
LLC/C23
Left ESS
RLC/F10
Rt. ESS
LIGHTING EXTERIOR
NAV PWR
LLC/F12
AC Bus 3
MISCELLANEOUS
SIGNAL LIGHT RECP
RLC/E14
AC Bus 5
LLC/F15
AC Bus 3
LIGHTING INTERIOR
AISLE AND SPOT
LLC/E16
AC Bus 3
MISCELLANEOUS DOME LIGHT

BUNK COMPARTMENT
RLC/E15
AC Bus 5
EWO, DI, and Gunner
DECM LTS DOME

FCS LTS DOME
ECM/B1
ECM/B3
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
Nav Station
MISCELLANEOUS OAS COMPARTMENT LIGHTS DOME OAS
ABNS/A5
AC Bus 3
INTERIOR LIGHTING
PILOT & COPILOT DOME
RLC/A27
AC Bus 5
ECM Indicator Lights
ECM IND DIMMING
ECM/X2
Left TR
Electronic Rack Lights
MISCELLANEOUS OAS
COMPARTMENT LIGHTS
DOME MISC
LIGHTING INTERIOR
AISLE AND SPOT
ABNS/A6
AC Bus 3
LLC/E16
AC Bus 3
Crosswind Landing and

Taxi Light Control
Landing Light Control
Left
Right
Navigation Lights
Signal Light
Extension and Retraction
Motor Control Power
LANDING GEAR NORMAL CONTROL

L FWD
LDG. GEAR NORMAL CONTROL
R FWD
LIGHTING EXTERIOR
TERRAIN CLEARANCE CONTROL
Interior Lighting
Aisle Lights and Spot Lights
(EWO, DI, Gunner, Nav and
Pilots Station)
Dome Lights
Bunk Compartment
Pilots Station
1-254
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EQUIPMENT
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE

Entry Lights
RFBNS/B27
Aft Batt.
LLC/E20
AC Bus 3
PCBP/E18
AC Bus 3
DC POWER
EVS INDICATOR DIMMING
EVS/R3
Left TR
DECM LTS FLOOD

FCS LTS FLOOD
ECM/A1
ECM/A3
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
MISCELLANEOUS OAS COMPARTMENT LIGHTS OAS FLOOD
ABNS/A8
AC Bus 3
LIGHTING INTERIOR
COPILOTS FLOOD
PILOT FLOOD
REMOTE FLOOD
RLC/A25
LLC/E19
LLC/E15
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
MISCELLANEOUS OAS COMPARTMENT LIGHTS INST
ABNS/A10
AC Bus 3

RLC/A29
LLC/E17
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 3
OAS Compartment Remote

Panel Lights
MISCELLANEOUS OAS COMPARTMENT LIGHTS REMOTE PANEL
ABNS/A7
AC Bus 3
OAS Panel Indicator Lights
MISCELLANEOUS
NAV IND LTS
RDR NAV LTS
ABNS/B13
ABNS/B14
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
MISCELLANEOUS OAS COMPARTMENT LIGHTS TABLE
ABNS/A9
AC Bus 3
Essential Flt Inst. Lights (With

complete AC power failure)
Pilots ADI Lights
Pilots Instrument Lights
EVS Indicator Lights
Flood Lights
EWO, DI, and Gunner
Nav Station
Pilots Station
Instrument Lights
Nav Station
Pilots Station
OAS Table Lights
ENTRY LIGHTS
LIGHTING INTERIOR
EMER INSTR LTS CONT
MISCELLANEOUS
EMER FLIGHT INSTR LIGHTS
1-255
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Lighting Equipment Circuit Protection

and Location (Cont)
EQUIPMENT
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE

Panel Lights
DI and Gunner
FCS LTS PNL
ECM/C3
AC Bus 5
EWO
DECM LTS PNL
ECM/C1
AC Bus 5
Nav Station
MISCELLANEOUS OAS COMPARTMENT LIGHTS PANEL

FRONT
LH OPER
RH OPER
ABNS/A2
ABNS/A3
ABNS/A4
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
INTERIOR LIGHTING COPILOT PANEL

LIGHTING INTERIOR PILOT PANEL
RLC/A28
LLC/E18
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 3
LIGHTING INTERIOR
PRESS-TO-TEST
LLC/E13
Left TR
Standby Compass Light
LLC/E17
AC Bus 3
Thunderstorm Lights
MISCELLANEOUS
THUNDER STORM LIGHT
RLC/E16
AC Bus 5
MISCELLANEOUS WALKWAY
LIGHTS
AFT CONTR
FWD PWR
ABNS/A12
ABNS/A11
Left TR
AC Bus 3
LIGHTING INTERIOR
DIM CONTROL PILOT & COPILOT
LLC/E12
Left TR
Pilots Station
Press-to-Test Lights Power
Walkway, Crawlway, and

Bomb Bay Lights
Warning Light Dimming

Control Switch
11
ABNS
ECM
EVS
LLC

PCBP
RFBNS
RLC

1-256
T.O. 1B-52H-1
HYDRAULIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEMS

DESCRIPTION
ENGINE-DRIVEN HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS
HYDRAULIC PUMP CAPACITIES
RUDDER/ELEVATOR HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS
ROTARY LAUNCHER HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM CONTROLS AND INDICATORS
NORMAL OPERATION
PRESSURE FLUCTUATIONS
POWERED RUDDER/ELEVATOR SYSTEM
NORMAL OPERATION
ROTARY LAUNCHER HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
NORMAL OPERATION
DESCRIPTION
NOTE
Reference to engine-driven pumps/left or

right body hydraulic systems providing
standby pressure to the rudder/elevator hydraulic systems should not be misunderstood. Hydraulic pressure provided by the
body systems provides a source of power for
the auxiliary hydraulic pumps; however, the
hydraulic fluid in the body systems is completely separated from that in the rudder/
elevator systems. Therefore, if a complete
loss of hydraulic fluid occurs in the rudder/
elevator systems resulting in the illumination of all four indicator lights, normal body
systems pressure will not provide any pressure within the rudder/elevator system and
these flight control systems will be inoperative. See RUDDER/ELEVATOR HYDRAULIC MALFUNCTIONS, Section III.
The hydraulic systems of this aircraft differ from a
conventional system in decentralization. Instead of
the usual single main system, there are six independent engine-driven systems (figure 1-76) consisting of inboard and outboard, right and left wing
hydraulic systems, and right and left body hydraulic systems (figure 1-77). In addition, there are two
electric motor-driven primary hydraulic systems
consisting of main No. 1 and 2 rudder/elevator hydraulic systems (figure 1-78).
Engine-driven pumps, which supply normal pressure to the wing and body systems, are mounted on
the right side of engines 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. Electric
motor-driven pumps, which supply normal pressure
1-257
1-259
1-264
1-264
1-265
1-267
1-273
1-274
1-274
1-275
to the No. 1 and 2 main rudder/elevator hydraulic

systems, are mounted on the right aft side of the fuselage in the 47 section of the aircraft. Electric motor-driven standby pumps, available for use in all
systems except the inboard wing systems, are
installed at the left and right wing trailing edge
locations and left and right body locations.
The right body system standby pump supplies
standby pressure to the No. 2 rudder/elevator hydraulic system. Engine-driven pumps 1 and 7 supply normal pressure to the outboard spoilers and tip
protection gear. The outboard left and right wing
location electric motor-driven pumps supply standby pressure to the outboard spoilers and tip protection gear.
The engine-driven pumps on engines 3 and 6 supply normal pressure to the inboard spoilers and
provide emergency pressure for extension of the tip
protection gear. The engine-driven pumps installed
on engines 4 and 5 supply normal pressure to the
body systems and standby pressure to the rudder/
elevator systems (RUD/ELEV AUX 1 and 2, figure
1-78). The left and right body electric motor-driven
pumps provide standby pressure for the essential
body systems normally serviced by engines 4 and 5,
respectively.
The left body system supplies normal pressure to
the air refueling system, left forward landing gear,
brakes, steering and crosswind crab, left aft landing
gear, brakes, and the stabilizer nut. It also supplies
emergency pressure to the right forward landing
gear, forward bomb door, and right aft landing gear;
and it supplies standby pressure to the rudder and
elevator.
Change 16
1-257
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Hydraulic System Locations (Typical)
Figure 1-76
1-258
T.O. 1B-52H-1
The right body system supplies normal pressure to
the right forward landing gear, brakes, steering and
crosswind crab, forward and aft bomb doors, right
aft landing gear, brakes, and the stabilizer screw. It
also supplies emergency pressure to the air refueling system, left forward, and left aft landing gear;
and it supplies standby pressure to the rudder and
elevator. Due to a one-way check valve in each body
system, the left body standby pump is able to supply standby pressure only to the air refueling system, left forward landing gear, brakes, steering and
crosswind crab, and right forward landing gear. The
right body standby pump, in a similar manner, is
able to supply standby pressure only to the right aft
landing gear, brakes, crosswind crab, stabilizer
screw, and left aft landing gear. See HYDRAULIC
SYSTEM OPERATION, this section. Pressure can
be furnished from either of two engine-driven
pumps or a standby pump for operation of the stabilizer, brakes, landing gear, air refueling toggle actuator, and air refueling doors. Pressure can be furnished from either No. 4 or 5 engine-driven pumps
for operation of the rudder and elevator in event of
failure of the No. 1 and 2 main rudder/elevator system pumps. No standby pump pressure is available
to the bomb doors.
Reliability of the aircraft hydraulic systems is assured by alternate sources of pressure, providing
increased life to vital equipment during either combat or routine missions. Launcher rotational drive
is accomplished through the use of two similar but
independent launcher hydraulic systems. See
Rotary Launcher Hydraulic Systems, this section,
for additional information.
Hydraulic power systems circuit protection and the
location of the applicable circuit breakers is contained in figure 1-80.
ENGINE-DRIVEN HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS
A variable delivery engine-driven pump supplies

normal pressure to each wing and body hydraulic
system (figure 1-77) and supplies standby pressure
to the rudder/elevator hydraulic systems (figure
1-78). Each pump has a rated flow of 12 gallons per
minute at an output pressure of 2800 psi, with cutout pressure of 3000 (50) psi and provides both
variable flow and pressure. At cutout pressure, the

pumps continue to operate but discontinue delivery;
the fluid is bypassed to return. With exception of
the inboard spoilers and the aft bomb door actuator,
each separate hydraulic power supply system
(brakes, steering, landing gear, etc) has either or
both emergency and standby alternate sources of
pressure.
Each electric motor-driven standby pump has a
rated flow of 3 gallons per minute at 1300 psi
output pressure. The variable delivery standby
pumps, which discontinue delivery at a cutout
pressure of 3000 (50) psi, are controlled by individual switches on the pilots side panel. According to
system demand, a standby pump may run continuously for several hours under emergency conditions.
Due to accumulative tolerance buildup in pressure
transmitters and pressure gages, engine-driven and
standby pump cutout pressures will indicate 3000
(250) psi on the hydraulic system pressure gages.
A pressure switch is incorporated in each system to
control the respective pressure low warning light
for that system.
The lights which indicate main pump pressure only
are located on the pilots side panel. A pressure
transmitter in each system, located downstream of
the system one-way check valve, registers system
pressure at the hydraulic pressure gage on the pilots side panel.
Oil-air type accumulators which have attached air
gages are incorporated to provide air preload pressure for accelerating the operation of outboard wing
system components and certain body system components.
In the brake pressure lines, restrictor valves are located downstream from the accumulators to prevent a momentary drop in pressure. Direct application of pressure is provided to the stabilizer hydraulic motors and the bomb door, landing gear, and air
refueling toggle actuators. Where the restrictor
valves are located downstream from the accumulator in the brake pressure lines, a thermal relief
valve with an opening pressure of 3750 (100) psi is
located at each accumulator to relieve excess
pressure caused from continuous use of the brakes.
Change 4
1-259
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Hydraulic Power Supply Systems

ENGINE DRIVEN
PUMP
ENGINE DRIVEN
PUMP
FROM
AIR BLEED
SYSTEM
FROM
AIR BLEED
SYSTEM
FIRE SHUTOFF
SWITCH
FILTER AND
FLOW CONTROL
ORIFICE
QUICK
DISCONNECTS
CHECK
VALVE
TO MASTER
CAUTION LIGHT
TO CENTRAL
CAUTION LIGHTS
STANDBY
PUMP
SWITCH
PRESSURE
SWITCH
FILTER AND
FLOW CONTROL
ORIFICE
QUICK
DISCONNECTS
CHECK
VALVE
PRESSURE
REGULATING
RELIEF VALVE
FIRE SHUTOFF
SWITCH
VENT
RELIEF
OP
CL
HYDRAULIC
PUMP OUT LIGHT
HYDRAULIC
PUMP OUT LIGHT
STBY
OFF
MOTOR
DRIVEN
STANDBY
PUMP
PRESSURE
REGULATING
RELIEF VALVE
VENT
RELIEF
AIR
PRESSURE
TO BODY
SYSTEM
TO MASTER
CAUTION LIGHT
PRESSURE
SWITCH
3.5 GALLON
RESERVOIR
TO CENTRAL
CAUTION
LIGHTS
GROUND
SERVICE
(TEST)
PUMP
HYDRAULIC PRESSURE
GAGE
ON
3.5 GALLON
RESERVOIR
PRESSURE TRANSMITTER
SPRING LOADED
GROUND SERVICE
(TEST) PUMP SWITCH
ACCUMULATOR
OFF
HYDRAULIC PRESSURE
GAGE
PRESSURE TRANSMITTER
TO OUTBOARD SPOILERS
TO INBOARD SPOILERS
TO OUTBOARD AIRBRAKE
CONTROL ACTUATOR
TO INBOARD AIRBRAKE
CONTROL ACTUATOR
EMERGENCY PRESSURE
FOR TIP GEAR SYSTEM
TO TIP GEAR SYSTEM
OUTBOARD WING SYSTEM (TYPICAL)
INBOARD WING SYSTEM (TYPICAL)

A31701
Figure 1 77 (Sheet 1 of 3)
1-260
T.O. 1B-52H-1
MAIN PRESSURE
EMERGENCY PRESSURE
STANDBY PRESSURE
GROUND SERVICE
(TEST) PRESSUE
SUPPLY
RETURN
AIR PRESSURE
ELECTRICAL CIRCUITS
ENGINE DRIVEN
PUMP
FIRE SHUTOFF
SWITCH
QUICK
DISCONNECTS
OP
PRESSURE
SWITCH
STANDBY PUMP
SWITCH
CL
STBY
OFF
FROM LT. INBOARD

SPOILER
RESERVOIR AIR
PRESS SYSTEM
HYDRAULIC
PUMP OUT
LIGHT
TO MASTER
CAUTION LIGHT
STANDBY
PUMP
TO CENTRAL
CAUTION LIGHTS
EMERGENCY PRESSURE
TO FWD BOMB DOOR
ACTUATOR
MANUALLY OPERATED GROUND
SERVICE VALVE
6.7 GALLON
RESERVOIR
TO LEFT FWD GEAR

STEERING
1.0 GALLON
STANDBY PUMP
RESERVOIR
TO AIR REFUELING DOORS

AND TOGGLE ACTUATOR
TO LEFT FWD LANDING
GEAR ACTUATOR
QUICK
DISCONNECTS
TO
ROTARY
LAUNCHER
TO LEFT FWD GEAR

BRAKES
LAUNCHER
HYDRAULIC
CONTROL
SWITCH
EMERGENCY PRESSURE
TO RIGHT FWD LANDING
GEAR ACTUATOR
TO LEFT REAR GEAR
STEERING
OP
TO LEFT REAR LANDING

GEAR ACTUATOR
EMERGENCY PRESSURE TO
RIGHT REAR LANDING
GEAR ACTUATOR
TO LEFT REAR GEAR

BRAKES
TO RUD/ELEV SYS NO. 1
HYD DRIVEN AUX PUMP
TO STABILIZER
TRIM SYSTEM
CL
LEFT BODY SYSTEM

ROTARY
LAUNCHER
POWER PUMP
LOW PRESS
LIGHT
CONNECTIONS
FOR CSRL
A31702
1-261
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Hydraulic Power Supply Systems

ENGINE DRIVEN
PUMP
MAIN PRESSURE
EMERGENCY PRESSURE
STANDBY PRESSURE
GROUND SERVICE
(TEST) PRESSURE
SUPPLY
RETURN
AIR PRESSURE
ELECTRICAL CIRCUITS
6.7 GALLON
RESERVOIR
FIRE SHUTOFF
SWITCH
(IN) NORMAL
(OUT) FIRE SHUTOFF
FROM RT. INBOARD

SPOILER RESERVOIR
AIR PRESSURIZATION
SYSTEM
CL
TO MASTER
CAUTION LIGHT
STANDBY
PUMP
SWITCH
QUICK
DISCONNECTS
OP
PRESSURE
SWITCH
HYDRAULIC
PUMP OUT
LIGHT
TO CENTRAL
CAUTION LIGHT
TO FWD BOMB
DOOR ACTUATOR
STBY
OFF
TO RIGHT FWD
GEAR STEERING
AIR REFUELING DOORS AND
TOGGLE ACTUATOR
TO RIGHT FWD
GEAR BRAKES
STANDBY
PUMP
TO RIGHT FWD LANDING

GEAR ACTUATOR
LEFT FWD GEAR ACTUATOR
1.0 GALLON
STANDBY PUMP
RESERVOIR
TO AFT BOMB
DOOR ACTUATOR
HYDRAULIC PRESSURE
GAGE
PRESSURE
TRANSMITTER
TO RUD/ELEV SYS NO. 2

HYD DRIVEN AUX PUMP
TO STABILIZER
TRIM SYSTEM
CONNECTONS
FOR CSRL
TO RIGHT REAR
STEERING
TO RIGHT REAR LANDING
GEAR ACTUATOR
TO LAUNCHER
HYDRAULIC
CONTROL
SWITCH
EMERGENCY PRESSURE
TO LEFT REAR LANDING
GEAR ACTUATOR
RIGHT BODY SYSTEM

1-262
MANUALLY
OPERATED
GROUND
SERVICE
VALVE
TO RIGHT REAR
GEAR BRAKES
A31703
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Hydraulic Fuses
Reservoir
Hydraulic fuses of two types, which are installed as

a safety feature in certain systems, will
automatically close when a break in a downstream
line allows more flow than the calibrated rate of a
fuse, thus preventing the loss of an excessive
quantity of hydraulic fluid. The fuse types consist of
Type I and Type II which are similar in
performance and differ only in the manner in which
they are reset after closing. Type I fuses require the
pressures on each side of the fuse be equalized and
Type II fuses require reverse flow for resetting. The
wheel brake system incorporates two 60 cubic inch
Type I fuses in the slave control lines and eight 120
cubic inch Type II fuses in the wheel brake pressure
lines. Two 120 cubic inch Type I fuses are installed
upstream of the emergency extension control valves
of the tip protection gear. Two 120 cubic inch Type I
fuses are used in the air refueling pressure actuating lines.
Each wing hydraulic system includes a 3.5 gallon

capacity reservoir which is located in the wing trailing edge. The outboard wing reservoirs supply hydraulic fluid for the electric motor-driven standby
pumps as well as the main engine-driven pumps.
Main reservoirs for the body system have a capacity
of 6.7 gallons and are located in the trailing edge of
the inboard wings. All main system reservoirs are
pressurized from the air system at 25 to 30 psi operating pressure. Each reservoir is equipped with
an internal 100 cubic inch capacity negative g tank
which will keep a supply available to the pump
with fluid held to the top of the tank due to negative g flight attitude. Each reservoir also incorporates a filler neck, strainer, cap, and a window-type
sight gage calibrated to show full and refill levels.
Hydraulic Shutoff Valve
A motor-operated hydraulic shutoff valve is

installed in the supply line of each system for control of fluid from the reservoir to the engine-driven
pump. The shutoff valves are open and provide a
continuous flow of hydraulic fluid when the engine
fire shutoff switches on the pilots instrument panel
are pushed in to the normal position.
Hydraulic Pump (Engine-Driven)
Each engine-driven hydraulic pump is a complete

packaged unit with engine mounting provisions.
The pumps are of variable delivery design and are
driven by the engines at a ratio speed of 0.342 of
engine rpm. The pumps operate continuously with
engine operation, are self-regulating, and react to
either continuous or intermittent demands of power, supplying variable flow and pressure accordingly. Each pump has a rated flow of 12 gallons per
minute with an output pressure of 2800 psi with
pump rpm at 3100. Pump cutout pressure is 3000
(50) psi. Due to being controlled by operation of
the engines, there are no manual-type controls for
energizing the engine-driven hydraulic pumps.
Cavitation of the pump is prevented by keeping a
head of fluid available to the pump by air
pressurization of the supply portion of the system.
The pumps utilize hydraulic fluid from the supply
for cooling and lubrication. Shutoff of the supply
will result in damage to the pump while the engine
is windmilling.
NOTE
Fluctuations of the reservoir fluid level near

the full mark are normal and may be expected due to pressure and temperature
variations in the system air and oil which
cause expansion and contraction.
A 1.0-gallon reservoir is installed in the return line
of each body system to provide a supply of fluid to
the standby pump of the right and left body hydraulic systems. The outboard wing hydraulic system has no standby reservoir; however, the supply
lines to the standby pumps hold 0.5 gallon of fluid.
In the event of a complete hydraulic failure on one
wing, the supply should be enough to extend the tip
protection gear. Standby pump reservoirs are
equipped with inlet and outlet attach fittings only
and are installed at respective left forward and
right aft bulkhead locations of the bomb bay.
Standby Pump
The standby pump in each of four hydraulic systems (body and outboard wing) supplies sufficient
pressure to operate the system should the enginedriven hydraulic pump fail. The standby pump consists of a 205-volt 400 Hz ac constant speed continuous duty electric motor coupled with a variable delivery hydraulic pump which has a rated flow of 3
gallons per minute at 1300 psi, decreasing to 1.2
gallons per minute at 2800 psi. The pump and motor are packaged as a complete assembly which is
self-cooled and electrically controlled. Cutout pressure of each standby pump is 3000 (50) psi. Each
standby pump is controlled by a manually operated
switch and, when energized, will regulate from zero
flow to full flow within 0.05 second, decreasing to
zero flow at 3000 psi. The circuit breakers for the
standby pumps are in the standby pump switch
circuits which are controlled by TR power.
Change 13
1-263
T.O. 1B-52H-1
HYDRAULIC PUMP CAPACITIES
Hydraulic Pump (Engine-Driven)
Rated capacity is affected by change of altitude and

rpm as indicated for the following conditions and is:
the event of electric motor-driven supply failure.

The auxiliary hydraulic pumps are prevented from
continuous operation by a shutoff valves that are
controlled by hydraulic pressure from the primary
system. The left and right body hydraulic systems
each supply power to one transformer.
13.2 gpm at sea level takeoff
Main Hydraulic Pump (AC Motor-Driven)
8.7 gpm at sea level idle
A hydraulic power supply is incorporated in each

rudder/elevator system as the main (primary)
source of hydraulic power. Each main hydraulic
power supply consists of an electric motor-driven
pump, an airless self-pressurizing reservoir, and a
manifold. The motor pump assembly consists of a
variable delivery, axial piston, 4 gpm hydraulic
pump, and a three-phase 118/205-volt ac induction
motor. The assembly is rated for continuous duty at
2 gallons per minute to an altitude of 55,000 feet.
Rated pump speed is 5625 rpm. Return fluid from
each system is routed through an air/oil cooler in
each system.
11.6 gpm at high altitude cruise

10.1 gpm at high altitude idle.
Standby Pump (Electric-Driven)
Each standby pump produces 3 gpm flow within

0.05 second at 1300 psi and will reduce to 0 gpm
flow at 3000 psi. They are installed for emergency
or ground check operation when for some reason
the engine-driven pump is not functioning. They
are capable of continuous operation.
Rudder/Elevator Auxiliary Hydraulic Pumps

Ground Service (Test) Pumps
Two ground service (test) pumps, one in each inboard wing hydraulic system, provide a means of
pressurizing the respective system during maintenance operations. Each pump is controlled by a
toggle switch having ON- -OFF (spring-loaded
OFF) positions. They are located in the left lower
longeron in the left forward wheel well. Each pump
produces 0.45 gpm flow at 3000 psi.
To prevent pump overheating, the ground

service (test) pumps are limited to 5 minutes continuous operation.
RUDDER/ELEVATOR HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS
The rudder and elevator flight controls are powered

by two independent hydraulic systems (figure 1-78).
Each hydraulic system has its own fluid power generation, fluid transmission, supply components, and
actuation subsystem. The systems are redundant,
in that either is adequate for mission accomplishment in event of failure of the other. Normal hydraulic power is generated by variable displacement hydraulic pumps driven by ac electric motors.
An auxiliary hydraulic pump (hydraulic transformer) is installed in each of the hydraulic systems to
provide standby power capable of supplying adequate hydraulic pressure for system operation in
1-264
Change 20
An auxiliary hydraulic pump is incorporated in

each rudder/elevator hydraulic system to provide a
standby source of hydraulic power for rudder and
elevator actuation. The auxiliary rudder/elevator
pump is a transformer type unit consisting of a
fixed displacement hydraulic motor with a flow regulator in the inlet port and a fixed displacement hydraulic pump (driven by the hydraulic motor) with
a check valve in the outlet port. The auxiliary rudder/elevator hydraulic pumps utilize power from
the aircraft left and right body hydraulic systems,
but maintain fluid isolation between the body hydraulic systems and the rudder/elevator hydraulic
system. Each auxiliary rudder/elevator hydraulic
pump has a normal output of 2 gallons per minute
at a discharge pressure of 2200 (50) psi. Each auxiliary pump delivers zero flow at pump differential
pressures above 2800 psi and delivers flow at pressure differentials below 2600 (+50/130) psi. A flow
regulator is installed in the pressure port of the
auxiliary hydraulic pump to limit flow to 3 (+0/0.3)
gpm.
NOTE
A shutoff valve is installed forward of each

auxiliary pump to prevent continuous operation of the pumps from body hydraulic
system pressure. These valves will open to
allow auxiliary pump operation when the
associated main pump is switched off or
upon failure of a main pump.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Reservoir
Two reservoirs of approximately 2.4 gallon capacity

each are installed for use in the powered rudder/
elevator main No. 1 and 2 hydraulic systems. These
are bootstrap type reservoirs with a reservoir piston loaded to approximately 8 psi by means of a helical spring. With 3000 psi applied to the pressurizing piston, the reservoir outlet pressure will be 38
(5) psi.
Ground Cooling Blower
A ground cooling blower is also incorporated to supply cooling air for the oil coolers and hydraulic supply electric motors during ground operation. Exhaust air from the oil coolers and electric motors is
ducted overboard. The 205-volt ac blower is activated when either main hydraulic system switch 1
or 2 is in ON. The blower is deactivated during
flight through a landing gear safety switch and
cooling air is then supplied to the hydraulic systems
from a ram air scoop located in the leading edge of
the vertical stabilizer.
Each source of hydraulic pressure is electrically

controlled by a three position (ON PRIMARY- -OFF- -ON RH BODY) toggle switch on the pilots hydraulic control panel.
NOTE
On CSRL configured aircraft, when the

launcher pump fails to supply the required
pressure, switch to the RH body hydraulic
system and command rotation of the CSRL.
To change back to the launcher hydraulic
system, switch back to ON PRIMARY.
Each launcher hydraulic system contains a pressure, return, and bypass line with quick-disconnect
fittings located on the right and left lower longeron
for mating with the launcher hydraulic lines (figure
1-77 sheet 2).
NOTE
The CSRL will not rotate while the landing

gear is in transit as the landing gear hydraulic system has priority over the rotary
launcher.
Launcher Power Pump
Maximum time that rudder/elevator hydraulic systems can be operated without

ground blower in operation is 4 minutes.
ROTARY LAUNCHER HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS
The rotary launcher hydraulic pressure supply system provides hydraulic power for operation of the
rotary launcher when the launcher is installed in
the bomb bay. The system consists of two similar
but independent hydraulic systems. An electric
motor-driven hydraulic pump connected to the left
body system provides primary hydraulic pressure
for normal launcher rotation. Secondary hydraulic
pressure for emergency rotation is provided by the
engine No. 5 hydraulic pump through a control
valve connected to the right body system.
The rotary launcher power pump is the primary

source of hydraulic pressure to rotate the launcher
and is mounted on the left lower longeron midway
in the bomb bay. The launcher power pump receives
its fluid supply from the left body hydraulic system
return line. The launcher power pump consists of a
variable delivery piston type pump powered by a
115/200-volt ac, three-phase, 400 Hz electric motor.
The pump is controlled by activating the rotary
launcher switch located on the pilots hydraulic control panel. Placing the switch in the ON PRIMARY
position supplies 28 volt dc power from the left TR
BUS to energize the hydraulic pump control relay.
When energized, this relay closes the three-phase
ac circuit from the engine No. 1 generator power
box to drive the launcher power pump. The ac circuit breakers for the launcher power pump are not
accessible in flight.
Change 13
1-265
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Rudder/Elevator Hydraulic Power Systems

FROM LH BODY
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
STAB TRIM
BYPASS
LINE
PRESSURE
HYDRAULIC TRANSFORMER
RETURN
SHUTOFF VALVE
SUPPLY
STANDBY PRESSURE
FLOW REGULATOR
HYDRAULIC
MOTOR
ELECTRICAL CIRCUITS
RUD/ELEV
AUX 1
AUX
PRESSURE
SWITCH
RUD/ELEV
AUX 1 PUMP
MECHANICAL
ACTUATION
SYSTEM NO. 1 SHOWN

SYSTEM NO. 2 IDENTICAL
CHECK
VALVE
ON
OFF
TO CENTRAL
CAUTION
PANEL
RUD/ELEV
MAIN 1
RUD/ELEV
MAIN 1 PUMP
MAIN
PRESSURE
SWITCH
SAS
PRESSURE
SWITCH
CHECK
VALVE
TO
SAS
AIR/OIL
COOLER
RETURN
LINE
FILTER
PRESSURE
LINE FILTER
2.4 GALLON
RESERVOIR
ACCUMULATOR
TO
HYDRAULIC
SYSTEM NO. 2
ELEVATOR
ACTUATOR
SINGLE ELEVATOR
(TYPICAL)
1-266
TO
HYDRAULIC
SYSTEM NO. 2
ELECTROHYDRAULIC
CONTROL VALVES
RUDDER
ACTUATOR
RUDDER
Figure 1-78
A31705
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Secondary Hydraulic Power Supply
A secondary source of hydraulic power to rotate the

launcher is provided by a solenoid operated, threeway hydraulic control valve which routes pressure
from the right body hydraulic system pressure line
to the launcher manifold. Selecting ON RH BODY
on the launcher switch located on the pilots hydraulic control panel supplies 28 volt dc power from
the left TR BUS to operate the hydraulic control
valve. Secondary pressure will be interrupted during operation of either the stabilizer trim system or
the bomb door system. During secondary system operation, the ENG 5 (right body) hydraulic pressure
gage will indicate available supply pressure.
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM CONTROLS AND INDICATORS
The hydraulic system controls are arranged on the

hydraulic control panel (figure 1-79) which is located on the forward vertical part of the pilots side
panel. The six individual hydraulic systems are represented on the control panel by six pressure gages
and six pump-out indicating lights which are
grouped by location according to the aircraft systems arrangement. Four standby pump control
switches are located on the control panel according
to positions which correspond with the arrangement of the aircraft hydraulic systems. Two
switches and four lights are also located on the lower part of the panel to control and monitor the rudder/elevator hydraulic systems. The edge-lighted
control panel has an outline of the hydraulic systems shown with designated power supply components of each system.
Power Drive Unit Control (PDUC) Power Switch
The PDUC power switch, a two-position switch

marked ON- -OFF, located on the RH equipment
rack in the lower compartment, provides power to
the rotary launcher PDU. The PDUC circuit breaker is also on the switch panel.
Engine Fire Shutoff Switches
Eight pull-type engine fire shutoff switches (figure

1-33), each corresponding to a respective engine,
are installed horizontally across the upper edge of
the pilots instrument panel for inflight emergency
use. In addition to providing shutoff control of other
systems, six of the switches will shut off the hydraulic fluid supply to engines 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 on
which the hydraulic pumps are installed. Each of
the six switches, corresponding to the above engines, will close the motor-operated engine firewall
hydraulic shutoff valve which controls the flow of
fluid from the system reservoir to the engine-driven
pump. Each hydraulic shutoff valve unit consists of
a dc motor and a gate-type valve which will open or
close within 1 second regardless of temperature.
See EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT, this section, for
additional information on engine fire shutoff
switches.
1-267
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Hydraulic System Controls and Indicators
1
2
3
4
HYDRAULIC PRESSURE GAGES (6 PLACES)

STANDBY PUMP SWITCHES (4 PLACES)
ENGINE-DRIVEN HYDRAULIC PUMP OUT
LIGHTS (6 PLACES)
SWITCHES (2 PLACES)
5
6
7
8

INDICATOR LIGHTS (4 PLACES)
ROTARY LAUNCHER HYDRAULIC SELECTOR
SWITCH
ROTARY LAUNCHER POWER PUMP LOW PRESSURE LIGHT
HYDRAULICS RESET CAUTION LIGHT
1-268
Change 20
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
HYDRAULICS CONTROL PANEL
Hydraulic Pressure Gages (6 places)
Six gages indicate pressure of the hydraulic systems. The gages are calibrated from 0 to 4000 psi. The location of each gage on the control panel
corresponds to the respective hydraulic system which it serves and which
is shown by outline on the control panel. Due to accumulative tolerance
buildup in pressure transmitters and pressure gages, engine-driven and
standby pump cutout pressures will indicate 3000 (250) psi on the hydraulic system pressure gages. In the event an engine-driven pump fails
on the left or right body system, the pressure gage will then indicate only
pressure trapped in that portion of the system downstream of the oneway check valve. This pressure should dissipate either through normal
internal leakage or by operation of a system component located downstream of this one-way check valve. When the standby pump is energized, the gage will then indicate only the pressure supplied to this isolated portion of the system. See figure 5-1 for gage markings.
Standby Pump Switches (4 places)
Four two position (OFF - STBY) hydraulic standby pump switches control
the starting and stopping of individual system pumps. When placed in
STBY position, the separate switches energize respective standby
pumps to provide hydraulic system pressure.
Engine-Driven Hydraulic
Lights (amber) (6 places)
Each of the six individual hydraulic systems has an amber pump-out indicating light. Since the lights indicate engine-driven pump pressure only,
a light will remain on after failure of a main pump even though (for those
systems which have a standby pump) system pressure is restored to normal by the standby pump. Only a return of the affected main pump to proper operation will extinguish the light. Each light is illuminated when system
pressure drops to 350 (150) psi and goes out when system pressure
increases to 700 psi maximum as controlled by pressure switches in the
systems.
Pump-Out
Whenever a pressure switch senses low pressure, a signal is sent simultaneously to a pump-out light on the hydraulic control panel, to the hydraulics caution light (No. 8) on the central caution light panel, and to the
master caution lights on the pilots forward instrument panel, illuminating
the lights.
NOTE
During ground operation, the pump-out lights may illuminate
momentarily when a demand is placed on a hydraulic system
and the engine driving the pump for that system is at or near idle.
1-269
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Hydraulic System Controls and Indicators (Cont)

NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
Rudder/Elevator Main 1 and 2 System

Switches
Two rudder/elevator hydraulic system switches have ON- -OFF positions

and in the ON position they energize ac motor-driven pumps located in
the 47 section that operate the rudder/elevator main No. 1 and 2 hydraulic
systems. ON position of either hydraulic system switch 1 or 2 also activates the ground cooling blower. In the OFF position, power is removed
from the hydraulic pumps. The switches are spring-loaded toggle-type
switches and are held in both the ON, OFF positions by detents. Moving
the switches from one position to another requires pulling them out of one
detent and placing them in the other detent.
Rudder/Elevator Main Hydraulic

System Indicator Lights
Four amber push-to-test indicator lights are available for monitoring the
main and auxiliary rudder/elevator hydraulic systems. The lights are
marked RUD/ELEV MAIN 1 (or 2) and RUD/ELEV AUX 1 (or 2) for main
rudder/elevator hydraulic systems 1 and 2 and auxiliary rudder/elevator
hydraulic systems 1 and 2 respectively. When main hydraulic system
switches 1 and 2 are on and the hydraulic system pumps are operating
normally, the rud/elev main 1 and 2 lights and the rud/elev aux 1 and 2
lights will be out. If main rudder/elevator hydraulic system pumps 1 and/or
2 fail, their respective lights will illuminate. The aux rudder/ elevator lights
1 and/or 2 will remain out indicating that hydraulic pressure is being supplied to systems 1 and/or 2 from the right and/or left body hydraulic systems. If one or the other aux rudder/elevator lights illuminate, that specific
pump has failed. Whenever a pressure switch senses low pressure, a signal is sent to the light on the hydraulic control panel and, for main hydraulic systems 1 and 2, simultaneously to the master caution light on the pilots forward instrument panel, illuminating the lights.
NOTE
The RUD/ELEV AUX 1 and 2 lights receive signals from the
same pressure switches as the RUD/ELEV MAIN 1 and 2 lights.
When the main pump switches are placed ON and pumps are
operating normally, all four lights will go out. When main pump
switches are OFF, or pumps have failed, the RUD/ELEV AUX
lights receive signals from the auxiliary hydraulic system for
proper RUD/ELEV AUX light indications. Should a main pump
fail, the corresponding aux light may come on momentarily, then
go out indicating auxiliary system pressure is available.
1-270
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
6
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
Launcher Hydraulic Selector Switch
A single toggle switch provides for selection of the launcher power pump
or right-hand body hydraulic system pressure to power the rotary launcher. The switch has positions marked ON PRIMARY- -OFF- -ON RH
BODY. With the switch positioned to ON PRIMARY, the rotary launcher
power pump is powered, and the launcher is operated by this pump. With
the switch positioned to ON RH BODY, the power pump is turned off and
the launcher operates from the aircraft right-hand body hydraulic system.
To preclude interruption of the stabilizer trim system or bomb door operation while operating the launcher on the right-hand body system, the secondary launcher control valve is automatically turned off whenever the
electrical stabilizer trim buttons are used or an electrical signal is
introduced to operate the bomb doors.
Do not place the launcher hydraulic control switch to ON PRIMARY unless a rotary launcher is installed and will be rotated,
as damage may result to the rotary launcher hydraulic pump.
7
Launcher Power Pump Low Pressure

Light (Amber)
An amber launcher low pressure light indicates that a low pressure condition exists in the launcher primary hydraulic system and that hydraulic
pressure is not adequate for launcher rotation. This light and the master
caution light will come on when the launcher power pump output pressure
drops below 1300 (100) psi. The light will come on for a low pressure
condition in the primary system only when the launcher hydraulic control
switch is in the ON PRIMARY position. The light will go out when pressure
increases to 1500 (50) psi or when ON RH BODY or OFF position is selected.

8
Hydraulics Caution Light
An amber caution light marked HYDRAULICS RESET and the master

caution lights illuminate whenever a pressure low signal is sent from any
one of the six engine-driven hydraulic pumps and the two main rudder/
elevator system hydraulic pumps. The hydraulic control panel must be
monitored to determine which particular hydraulic pump has a pump-out
light illuminated. The hydraulics caution light circuit may be reset for use
as an indicator of other malfunctions by pressing the central caution reset
button which extinguishes both the central and master caution lights.
1-271
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Hydraulic System Controls and Indicators (Cont)
PDUC POWER SWITCH
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
PDUC POWER PANEL
PDUC Power Switch
The PDUC power switch, a two-position switch marked ON- -OFF provides power to the rotary launcher PDU. The PDUC circuit breaker is also
on the switch panel. In the ON position, the PDUC allows rotation of the
CSRL on either the launcher hydraulic system or the RH BODY hydraulic
system, as applicable. In the OFF position, the CSRL will not rotate.
NOTE
With a CSRL configured for gravity weapons, turning the PDUC
power switch to OFF will also turn off the NUC SLU and bomb
monitor power. NUC SLU and bomb monitor power must be
reapplied after turning the PDUC power switch back on.
1-272
T.O. 1B-52H-1
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM NORMAL OPERATION
Hydraulic pressure is provided by six separate hydraulic systems consisting of inboard and outboard
right and left wing hydraulic systems and right and
left body hydraulic systems. Six engine-driven
pumps and four electric motor-driven standby
pumps provide normal and standby pressure for the
six separate hydraulic systems. Except for the inboard wing hydraulic systems, which are provided
with engine-driven pump pressure only, each system has both an engine-driven pump and an electric motor-driven standby pump to provide reliability of continued system operation. Standby pump
pressure for the inboard wing hydraulic systems is
not considered essential to continuous aircraft maneuverability since the aircraft can be flown without assistance of the inboard spoilers.
Each hydraulic system supplies hydraulic fluid under pressure to hydraulically operated components.
With exception of the inboard spoilers and the aft
bomb door actuator, each hydraulically operated
component has either or both emergency or alternate sources of pressure. The front bomb door actuator receives normal and emergency pressure but
it cannot be actuated by standby pump pressure
while in flight. Due to accumulative tolerance
buildup in pressure transmitters and pressure
gages, engine-driven and standby pump cutout
pressures will indicate 3000 (250) psi on the
hydraulic system pressure gages.
Each pump has a rated flow of 12 gallons per
minute at an output pressure of 2800 psi and
provides variable flow and pressure in accordance
with the system demands. Hydraulic system
pressure is independent of the engine pump speed.
However, the hydraulic oil flow rate is directly
proportional to the engine speed; at 10% (windmill)
rpm, there will be 1 1/2 gallons of oil flow per
minute available for system operation.
Each electric motor-driven standby pump has a
rated flow of 3 gallons per minute at 1300 psi
output pressure. The variable delivery standby
pumps are controlled by individual switches.
Standby pump pressure is used in case of failure of
either an engine or an engine-driven pump.
Emergency or alternate pressure is provided for
certain hydraulically operated components by
interconnecting pressure sources from both enginedriven and standby pumps of another system.
However, with exception of emergency tip gear

extension, hydraulic fluid does not pass from one
system into another. The actuator components of
the front landing gear, including brakes and
steering on the left gear only, and the air refueling
toggle actuator receive standby pump pressure
from the left body system.
Similarly, the aft landing gear components,
including brakes and steering on the right gear
only and the hydraulic jackscrew for the horizontal
stabilizer, receive an alternate source of pressure
from the standby pump installed in the right body
hydraulic system. Horizontal stabilizer control is
accomplished through a hydraulic pressure-driven
jackscrew and nut assembly. Normal pressure for
movement of the nut is furnished by the left body
system. Standby pressure is not available to the
nut; consequently, in case of normal pressure
failure, travel speed of the assembly is reduced onehalf which affects control of the horizontal
stabilizer by reducing movement to one-half speed.
A motor-operated hydraulic shutoff valve is
installed in the supply line of each system for
control of fluid from the reservoir to the enginedriven pump. The shutoff valves, which have a
rated flow of 25 gallons per minute with a working
pressure of 100 psi, are open and provide
continuous flow of hydraulic fluid when the fire
shutoff switches on the pilots instrument panel are
pushed in to the normal position. As a safety
feature in the event of a ruptured line, hydraulic
fuses are installed to seal off the lines which
provide normal and emergency slave pressure for
actuation of the brakes, normal pressure for brake
application, emergency pressure for tip gear
extension, and both normal and emergency
pressure for opening of the air refueling toggles and
closing or opening of the air refueling doors. A
pressure relief valve is incorporated in each system
to limit maximum pressure at 3850 psi with a rated
flow of 16 gallons per minute.
A pressure transmitter in each system registers
system pressure at the respective hydraulic system
pressure gage. Each hydraulic system has an
amber pump-out warning light which indicates
main pump pressure only. When pressure in any
system falls below 350 (150) psi, a warning light
illuminates. The light may go out at any pressure
above this value and will positively go out when
pressure reaches 700 psi maximum.
1-273
T.O. 1B-52H-1
The functional components of each system are designed to operate throughout an ambient temperature range from 65 to 160F with variations of
pressure altitude from sea level to 60,000 feet. Under cold temperature takeoff conditions down to
55F, half speed or better spoiler operation will
provide adequate lateral control to allow takeoff
without exercising the hydraulic system. A takeoff
from cold soak conditions below 55F will require
preliminary controls exercise to obtain at least half
speed operation. At 65F, this will require 3 to 4
minutes of continuous spoiler cycling.
PRESSURE FLUCTUATIONS
During normal operation of the stabilizer trim,

right rear landing gear, brakes, or crosswind crab, a
drop in pressure may be noted on the right body hydraulic system pressure gage. Sustained operation
of any of these systems may cause the pressure to
drop to 1000 psi. Also, normal operation of any of
these systems simultaneously or with any of the
other systems connected to the right body hydraulic
system may cause the pressure to drop to 1000 psi.
Due to the locations of the pressure transmitter
(figure 1-77), normal bomb door operation, right forward gear actuation, and braking or steering may
not show a drop in pressure but will show a pressure surge above 3000 psi when the operation cycle
has been completed. This surge will be noted whenever any of the systems are operated. Similarly, in
the left body system, normal operation of the forward landing gear, brakes or steering, and air refueling doors will cause a drop in pressure indicated on the left body system pressure gage. Operation of the stabilizer, left rear gear, and brakes may
not show a pressure drop on the left body system
pressure gage due to the location of the pressure
transmitter. This pressure drop in either system
with the resulting surge is normal, provided engine
No. 4 and No. 5 are operating at 82% rpm or above.
In particular, if the left and right body systems are
working properly, the stabilizer trim should move 6
units every 10 seconds and the bomb doors should
close in 3 to 5 seconds. Normal pressure fluctuations of approximately 1500 psi will be experienced
in the right body hydraulic system at initiation of
rotary launcher drive in the secondary mode.
1-274
POWERED RUDDER/ELEVATOR SYSTEM NORMAL OPERATION
In addition to the systems described above, two independent 3000 psi hydraulic pump and reservoir
assemblies are installed to supply hydraulic power
for the rudder and elevator actuators. Each electric
motor-driven pump has nominal fluid flow of 4 gallons per minute at 2700 psi and is rated for continuous duty at 2 gallons per minute to an altitude of
55,000 feet. The two systems are redundant in the
sense that either system has the capability of supplying sufficient hydraulic pressure to operate each
elevator and rudder actuator for mission accomplishment following the failure of the other. Backup
or standby pressure is supplied to each system by
the installation of two hydraulic transformers (hydraulic motor and pump) which derive power from
the left and right hand body hydraulic systems.
The transformers are designed to maintain fluid
isolation between the body systems and rudder/elevator hydraulic systems. Fluid flow limitation is obtained by a flow regulator installed in the pressure
port of the hydraulic motor (to limit flow to 3 (0.3)
gallons per minute). The transformers have a zero
flow delivery at pump differentials above 2800 psi
and a flow delivery at differential pressures below
2470 psi. Each transformer has a normal output of
2 gallons per minute. Four lights located on the
hydraulic control panel serve as a means for
monitoring the main rudder/elevator pumps and
the auxiliary (transformer) hydraulic pumps. These
lights are controlled by a pressure switch connected
to the sensing port of each hydraulic transformer
pump and each power supply pump. Each pressure
switch is so located and isolated with a check valve
so that it will detect pressure only from the
respective transformer output or the main pump
output. The switch contacts are normally closed.
Contact points open at 700 psi maximum during
increasing pressure and close at 350 (50) psi on
decreasing pressure, thus controlling the respective
warning lights on the pilots side panel. In addition
to the four pressure switches used for pump failure
monitor lights, two additional pressure switches are
installed in the hydraulics. These two switches
function in conjunction with the SAS electronics
only.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ROTARY LAUNCHER HYDRAULIC SYSTEM NORMAL
OPERATION
Two separate and independent hydraulic systems

are permanently installed in the aircraft to power
the rotary launcher. Each system contains a pressure, return, and case drain line connected to quickdisconnect fittings on the left and right lower longerons for mating with the launcher hydraulic
lines. The primary system consists of an electric
motor-driven launcher power pump which takes hydraulic fluid from the left body hydraulic system return line and supplies pressure to the launcher
manifold quick-disconnect point. The pump is a
variable delivery piston type. A relief valve is
installed in a line connecting the pump output pressure and left body hydraulic return lines, and provides pressure relief at 3750 (25) psi if the
launcher pump malfunctions. When the launcher is
installed, the pump is controlled by a three position
switch on the pilots hydraulic control panel.
Selecting ON PRIMARY with the control switch
supplies 28 volt dc power from the left TR BUS to
energize the hydraulic pump control relay. When
energized, the relay supplies three-phase ac current
from the engine No. 1 generator power box to drive
the launcher power pump. A pressure sensor is
installed in the primary launcher hydraulic system
to provide a warning of inadequate pressure to operate the launcher by illuminating the launcher low
pressure warning light. The light will come on
when pressure decreases to 1300 (100) psi and will
go out when pressure increases to 1500 (50) psi or
when the launcher control switch is moved to the
OFF or ON RH BODY position. The launcher power
pump should not be operated unless a rotary
launcher is installed in the aircraft as damage to
the pump may occur. Failure of the launcher power
pump to shut down when the control switch is
placed in the OFF position will not damage the
pump. In the event of left body hydraulic system
fluid depletion, the launcher power pump should
not be operated as overheating and pump failure
results. A hydraulic line failure downstream of the
launcher power pump results in depletion of the left

body hydraulic system fluid if operation of the
launcher power pump is continued. Failure of the
left body engine driven pump does not affect operation of the launcher power pump as long as bleed
air is available from either the No. 3 or No. 4 engine to pressurize the left body system hydraulic
reservoir.
Secondary hydraulic pressure for emergency operation of the rotary launcher is provided by the engine No. 5 hydraulic pump through a solenoid operated, three-way hydraulic control valve in the right
body hydraulic system, to the launcher manifold.
The control valve is energized by 28 volt dc power
from the left TR BUS when the launcher control
switch is placed to the ON RH BODY position.
When energized, the control valve routes pressure
from the right body main pressure line to the
launcher quick-disconnect point. The engine No. 5
(right body) hydraulic pressure gage will indicate
the available supply when operating the secondary
launcher hydraulic system. Operation of the
launcher is interrupted during operation of either
the stabilizer trim system or the bomb door system.
In the event of hydraulic line failure downstream of
the solenoid operated control valve, the control
switch must be returned to the OFF position to prevent depletion of the right body system hydraulic
fluid. Loss of the right body engine-driven pump or
depletion of the right body system hydraulic will result in the secondary launcher hydraulic system being inoperative.
NOTE
The CSRL will not rotate while the landing

gear is in transit as the landing gear hydraulic system has priority over the rotary
launcher.
The CSRL will not rotate while bomb doors
are not fully opened or closed.
1-275
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Hydraulic Power Supply System Circuit

CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
EQUIPMENT
Engine-Driven Hydraulic
Pump-Out Lights
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
HYDRAULIC PACKAGE
PRESSURE WARN LT
PCBP/C2
Left TR
HYDRAULIC PACKAGE
PRESSURE IND
PCBP/C1
AC Bus 3
AGM 69A HYD CONTROL
LLC/E27
Left TR
Power Pump Low Pressure

Light
HYDRAULIC PACKAGE
PRESSURE WARN LT
PCBP/C2
Left TR
PDUC Power Switch
CSRL PDUC
Navigators
Side Panel
Left TR
RUDDER/ELEVATOR HYDRAULIC SYSTEM PUMP CONTROL

NO.1
NO. 2
PCBP/C8
PCBP/C9
Left TR
Rt. TR
Rudder/Elevator Hydraulic System Ground Cooling Control
POWER FEEDERS DC RUD/ELEV

HYD GRD COOLING CONTROL
LLC/D11
Left TR
Rudder/Elevator Hydraulic System Indicator Lights
RUDDER/ELEVATOR HYDRAULIC SYSTEM PRESSURE WARNING LIGHT
PCBP/C10
Left TR
Standby Hydraulic Pumps
HYDRAULIC PACKAGE STANDBY

PUMP CONTROL
LH BODY
LH OUTBD
RH BODY
RH OUTBD
PCBP/C5
PCBP/C4
PCBP/C6
PCBP/C7
Left TR
Left TR
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
Engine Firewall Hydraulic Shutoff

Valves See EMERGENCY
EQUIPMENT CIRCUIT
PROTECTION AND LOCATION,
This Section.
Hydraulic Pressure Gages
Rotary Launcher Hydraulics
Hydraulic Selector Switch
Rudder/Elevator Hydraulic
Pumps Control
11
LLC
PCBP
Figure 1-80
1-276
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LANDING GEAR SYSTEM

DESCRIPTION
LANDING GEAR GROUND LOCKS
The landing gear system is a composite of the main

landing gear system and the tip gear system. All
landing gear are hydraulically actuated through
electrically operated valves.
Three pairs of landing gear ground locks (figure

1-81) prevent retraction of the landing gear on the
ground. Each ground lock is a pin-type lock with a
red warning streamer attached. The tip gear locks
are the smallest of the two types. The front main
gear locks have the ground lockpin on one end of
the streamer and a two-pin steering valve bypass
key on the other end. Most rear main gear also
have bypass key facilities for use by maintenance
when towing from the rear is required. The ground
lockpins are inserted in each main landing gear
drag strut and each tip gear side brace. The locks
are stowed in containers (14, figure 1-181) which
are located beneath the left equipment rack in the
aft end of the navigators compartment.
The dual wheel main landing gear are in a quadricycle arrangement with two side by side forward
and two side by side rear. The left forward and left
rear gear retract forward into fuselage wheel wells
while the right forward and right rear gear retract
aft into fuselage wheel wells. The main landing
gear doors are mechanically linked to the main
landing gear and follow the cycle of operation selected by the normal landing gear lever or the landing gear emergency switches.
The tip gear are located between the outboard engine strut and the external tank strut and retract
inboard and slightly forward into each wing. The
function of the tip gear is to prevent damage to the
wingtips during abnormal ground maneuvers and/
or high gross weight conditions. Normally, the tip
gear tires contact the ground only under maximum
weight conditions. The tip gear doors are in two sections. The strut section is connected to the tip gear
and follows the cycle of operation for the gear. The
wheel well section is hydraulically actuated and is
controlled for proper sequence operation by mechanical linkage in the tip gear system.
Retraction and extension of each landing gear is accomplished by its hydraulic actuator with pressure
supplied from the right and left body hydraulic systems. The landing gear is fully retracted in 10 to 15
seconds or extended in 15 to 20 seconds. A single
mechanical lock on the main landing gear drag
strut locks the main landing gear in either the extended or the retracted position. Oleo safety
switches prevent inadvertent gear retraction on the
ground. There are no provisions for overriding
these switches in an emergency.
For cold weather retraction time, see COLD
WEATHER OPERATION, Section VII.
Landing gear system circuit protection and the
For information on landing gear brakes, see
WHEEL BRAKE SYSTEM, this section. For information on landing gear steering and crosswind crab
operation, see STEERING AND CROSSWIND
CRAB SYSTEM, this section.
MAIN LANDING GEAR SYSTEM
The main landing gear system (figure 1-82) utilizes

power for operation from the left and right body hydraulic systems which receive main pump pressure
from the engine-driven pumps installed on engine
No. 4 and No. 5 respectively. Pressure for actuation
of front and aft landing gear which are located on
one side of the aircraft is normally supplied from
the body system on that same side of the aircraft.
Normal extension or retraction of the main landing
gear is accomplished by positioning of the landing
gear control lever. An emergency source of pressure
is provided which allows separate control of the
landing gear by individual switches.
Emergency pressure is provided by connecting the
pressure sources of the body systems to solenoid-operated control valves which are installed on the opposite side of the aircraft.
Each main landing gear may be actuated by either
of two solenoid-operated control valves, one of
which is supplied with normal system pressure and
the other with emergency system pressure. Although separate switches are used for emergency
actuation, the emergency system pressure sources
of the left front and aft landing gear are the same
as the normal system pressure sources of the right
front and aft landing gear. Similarly, the emergency
system pressure sources of the right front and aft
landing gear are the same as the normal system
pressure sources of the left front and aft landing
gear.
1-277
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Landing Gear Ground Locks
Figure 1-81
1-278
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Main Landing Gear System

GEAR
UP
GEAR UP LOCK SWITCH

(Opens when gear is locked up)
LANDING GEAR LEVER

AND WARNING LIGHT
GEAR
DOWN
NORMAL PRESSURE
EMERGENCY PRESSURE
RETURN
ELECTRICAL CIRCUITS
TO CROSSWIND CRAB
CENTERING MOTER
EMERGENCY
CONTROL
RELAYS
RETRACT
LANDING GEAR
EMERGENCY SWITCH
(Typical Left)
OLEO SAFETY SWITCH

(Open on ground)
TO OTHER
SET OF GEAR
(Not shown)
RETRACT
OFF
LANDING GEAR
EMERGENCY SWITCH
(Typical Right)
OFF
CENTERING SWITCHES
EXTEND
EXTEND
EMERGENCY CONTROL
RELAYS
EMERGENCY OLEO SAFETY
SWITCHES (Open on ground)
POSITION SWITCH RELAY

(Deenergized when gear
is locked down)
FROM LEFT BODY

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
POSITION SWITCH RELAY

(Deenergized when gear
is locked down)
DOWN
DOWN
RIGHT GEAR
EMERGENCY
CONTROL VALVE
LEFT GEAR
EMERGENCY
CONTROL VALVE
UP
UP
UP LEFT GEAR NORMAL

CONTROL VALVE
DOWN
RIGHT GEAR NORMAL UP

CONTROL VALVE
SHUTTLE
VALVE
TO
RETRACTION
LOCKOUT
VALVE
SHUTTLE
VALVE
LANDING GEAR
ACTUATORS
LEFT
DOWN
TO
RETRACTION
LOCKOUT
VALVE
RIGHT
LANDING GEAR
POSITION
INDICATORS
WARNING
HORN
LEFT
THROTTLES
FROM RIGHT BODY

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
TYPICAL LANDING GEAR

SYSTEM SHOWN OTHER
LANDING GEAR SYSTEM
IS IDENTICAL
RIGHT
MAIN
LANDING GEAR
A31707
Figure 1-82
1-279
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Each of the body systems is equipped with an electric standby pump which is energized by a separate
standby pump switch. Standby pump pressure may
be supplied as an alternate source of normal system
pressure when the engine-driven pumps are not operating or not providing sufficient normal pressure.
Standby pump pressure may be used for actuating
the front or aft pair of landing gears separately
from the other pair when the engine-driven pumps
are not operating. Due to the location of a check
valve, pressure from the left body system standby
pump is not supplied to the aft landing gear. Similarly, pressure is not supplied to the forward gear
from the right body system standby pump. When
the landing gear control lever is positioned, pressure from the left body system standby pump will
actuate the forward landing gear through the left
normal pressure control valve and the right emergency pressure control valve; pressure from the
right body system standby pump will actuate the
rear landing gear through the right normal pressure control valve and the left emergency pressure
control valve.
The normal gear up circuit supplies power to the
crosswind crab centering motor through centering
switches to ensure centering of the main landing
gear prior to retraction. This circuit also includes
oleo safety switches which prevent inadvertent retraction when either the left front or right rear
main landing gear is on the ground and the oleo
strut is compressed more than 0.75 inch. A gear up
lock switch de-energizes the circuits when the gear
is up and locked. After being unlocked by hydraulic
pressure, the landing gear will free fall almost to
the down and locked position; therefore, a position
switch is included in the circuit. This switch keeps
the circuit energized until the landing gear reaches
the full down and locked position.
The emergency gear up circuits include oleo safety
switches to prevent retraction when either the right
front or left rear main landing gear are on the
ground. Actuation of the emergency landing gear
switches does not automatically center the landing
gear. Each landing gear emergency retract or extend circuit remains energized until the individual
emergency switches are placed in OFF position.
LANDING GEAR OLEO SAFETY SWITCHES
When the aircraft is on the ground, the landing

gear struts are compressed actuating the oleo safety switches. The oleo safety switches are also actu-
1-280
Change 12
ated in flight when the gear is extended and

crabbed to an angle equal to or exceeding 14
through any combination of crosswind crab setting
and rudder pedal movement. The following systems
are affected by actuation of the landing gear oleo
safety switches:
The anti-ice airscoop heater for the rudder and
elevator Q-spring inlet and the air conditioning
scoop lip anti-ice shutoff valve will not be energized, causing ice to form on the lip under icing conditions.
The AN/ALE-20 flare ejection circuit will become
de-armed, preventing flares from being ejected.
The rudder/elevator hydraulic system ground
cooling blower will operate.
The OAS ground cooling system blowers will
operate.
The OAS overheat system automatic shutdown
thermal switch will become armed.
Cabin pressure will dump.
The engine stall prevention system becomes
armed.
The flap warning horn will sound and the master
caution light will illuminate if the throttles are at
or beyond approximately 45 of travel and the flaps
are not fully extended.
The ground interphone panels become operative.
The landing gear cannot be retracted by either
the normal or emergency controls.
The strike camera heater control system becomes
inoperative.
The EVS FLIR window anti-icing system becomes inoperative.
The ECM heater system becomes inoperative.
The antiskid valves will be deenergized and
application of brakes prior to landing will result in
locked brakes. Normal braking may be applied during the landing roll.
The flight loads data recorder will not record.
NOTE
When the landing gear oleos are extended

after takeoff, the operation of the above systems will be reversed.
If the safety switches have been cycled by a takeoff and landing, Mode 4 codes will zeroize if the
Mode 4 code switch is not placed in HOLD position
prior to turning the IFF off.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TIP GEAR SYSTEM
The tip gear system (figure 1-83) for each gear receives normal hydraulic pressure from the outboard
wing hydraulic system. Normal system pressure to
the left and right outboard wing hydraulic systems
is supplied by engine-driven pumps installed on engine No. 1 and No. 7, respectively. Each outboard
wing hydraulic system includes an electric standby
pump which provides an alternate source of normal
system pressure when energized by an individual
switch. Emergency pressure for tip gear extension
is provided by the inboard wing hydraulic systems
which receive pressure from engine-driven pumps
installed on engine No. 3 and No. 6. Emergency tip
gear extension is accomplished by actuating individual switches which are grouped with the emergency switches for the main landing gear. There are
no provisions for emergency retraction. The tip gear
system operates in an indirect manner. In gear
down operation, the normal landing gear lever actuates switches which energize the down circuit.
When the solenoid in the normal control valve is
energized, hydraulic pressure is directed to the
wheel well door actuator and to the normal sequence valve. When the wheel well door opens, mechanical linkage opens the normal sequence valve
permitting hydraulic pressure to enter the tip gear
actuator thus extending the tip gear. A reverse sequence ensures proper door and gear timing during
the retraction cycle. The tip gear circuits pass
through the main landing gear oleo safety switches
to prevent inadvertent retraction on the ground.
LANDING GEAR SYSTEM CONTROLS
Landing Gear Controls and Indicators are shown in

figure 1-84.
During retraction or extension of the landing gear by either the normal or emergency
system, do not change the position of the
control handle or the emergency switch
while the gear is in motion since this procedure may rupture a hydraulic line.
During retraction or extension of the landing gear by one system, do not actuate the
other system while the gear is in motion
since this procedure may rupture a hydraulic line.
Landing Gear Warning Horn and Shutoff Button

The landing gear warning horn is flush-mounted on
the upper aisle domelight mounting plate. The horn
sounds a warning when any throttle is retarded below a position 2.25 to 7.5 above IDLE position
while any one landing gear is not down and locked.
A warning horn shutoff button (11, figure 1-6),
which is used to silence the horn, is located on the
copilots side of the aisle stand. Provided a gear has
not locked, the horn, which operates on TR power,
will sound again when another throttle is retarded.
NOTE
When all throttles have been retarded and

the shutoff button has been used to silence
the warning horn, a throttle must be advanced to reactivate the warning horn system. This is necessary to ensure proper
warning horn operation for an unsafe gear
condition.
1-281
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Tip Gear System
NORMAL
CONTROL
VALVE
FROM OUTBOARD WING

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
DOWN
UP
FROM INBOARD WING

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
EMERGENCY EXTEND
CONTROL VALVE
GEAR DOWN LOCK

(Opens when gear is
locked down)
HYDRAULIC
FUSE
SHUTTLE
VALVE
GEAR UP LOCK
(Opens when gear
is locked up)
MAIN GEAR
OLEO SWITCH
(Opens on ground)
CHECK
VALVE
OFF
NORMAL
SEQUENCE
VALVE
(Lock
control)
GEAR UP
LANDING GEAR
LEVER AND
WARNING
LIGHT
EXTEND
TIP GEAR
EMERGENCY
SWITCH
GEAR DOWN
TPG NOT
IN TRAIL
TIP GEAR
CAUTION
LIGHT
SEQUENCE
VALVE
TIP GEAR
ACTUATOR
WHEEL WELL
DOOR ACTUATOR
TO MASTER
CAUTION
LIGHTS
WHEEL WELL DOOR

(Gear retracts be
fore door closes)
TIP GEAR
MAIN PRESSURE
EMERGENCY PRESSURE
RETURN
ELECTRICAL CIRCUITS
TIP GEAR EXTENDED
A31708
Figure 1-83
1-282
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Landing Gear Controls and Indicators
1
2
3
LANDING GEAR EMERGENCY SWITCHES

(6 PLACES)
LANDING GEAR POSITION INDICATORS
(6 PLACES)
LANDING GEAR WARNING LIGHT TEST
BUTTON
4
5
6
LANDING GEAR LEVER

LANDING GEAR WARNING LIGHT
TIP PROTECTION GEAR NOT IN TRAIL
CAUTION LIGHT
Change 20
1-283
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Landing Gear Controls and Indicators (Cont)

NO.
1
CONTROLINDICATOR
Landing Gear Emergency Switches
(6 places)
FUNCTION
Guarded switches used for emergency actuation of the landing gear.
Four switches, one for each main landing gear, have
EXTEND- -OFF- -RETRACT positions.
The other two switches, one for each tip gear, have only EXTEND- -OFF
positions since there are no emergency retraction provisions for the tip
gear.
The switch guards are spring-loaded and are designed to return the
switches from other positions to the OFF position when the guards are
closed. The emergency switches control forward direct battery power for
the left forward and right aft main landing gear and aft direct battery power
for the right forward and left aft main landing gear.
Each switch operates an emergency control valve to direct pressure from
an alternate hydraulic system for gear actuation.
Each separate landing gear may be actuated independently of the others
by use of the individual emergency switches.
Operation of the main landing gear control lever does not affect the position of the landing gear when the emergency switches are placed in either
RETRACT or EXTEND position.
The electrical emergency extend (all gear) and retract (main gear only)
circuits are independent of the normal circuits. However, the normal main
gear circuits are interrupted by the emergency main gear circuits. When
the emergency circuit is energized, the normal control valve is deenergized allowing the normal control valve to position itself so that trapped
hydraulic fluid is returned to the reservoir. With normal pressure relieved,
the emergency pressure will reposition the shuttle valve allowing emergency pressure to actuate the main gears. Actuation of the emergency
landing gear switches does not automatically center the landing gear.
The tip gear emergency extend system will override the normal system
hydraulically, provided a normal system retract signal is not present.
The normal landing gear retract and extend circuits are deenergized by
a lock switch when the landing gears are actuated to either extreme position.
Emergency retract and extend circuits are energized until the emergency
switches are returned to OFF position. Due to actuation of the main landing gear oleo strut switches by the weight of the aircraft, either the normal
or the emergency retract circuits cannot be energized for retraction when
the aircraft is on the ground. Landing gear actuation is provided by individual emergency switches when certain gear have failed to actuate after
placing the main landing gear control lever in the desired position.
1-284
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
Landing Gear Position Indicators

(6 places)
Tab-window type landing gear position indicators display landing gear

position. Each tab indicator has three visual indicators to register landing
gear position. When the landing gear is up and locked, the word UP appears in the tab window. A gear in an intermediate position or when there
is no dc power on the aircraft is indicated by slanting alternate black and
ivory stripes. The appearance of a wheel symbol indicates a gear down
and locked.
Landing Gear Warning Light Test Button
When pressed, causes landing gear warning light (No. 5) to illuminate.
Landing Gear Lever
The lever handle is in the shape of a miniature landing gear wheel to facilitate recognition. Positions of the lever are GEAR UP- -GEAR DOWN.
The landing gear lever is held by a spring-loaded pawl and a detent on
the inside end of the lever making it necessary to pull out on the handle
approximately 1/4 inch to move the lever from one position to the other.
In changing positions of the landing gear lever, the pawl travels the lever
quadrant surface which has detents at each end for engaging the pawl
in the GEAR UP or GEAR DOWN position. The quadrant has a safety
stop at a midpoint position between the detents. The safety stop provides
a positive GEAR DOWN latched position if the pawl on the landing gear
control lever fails to remain in the GEAR DOWN position detent. The lever
quadrant with visible detents at each end is located on the face of the instrument panel and in addition, the landing gear control lever, which must
be pulled out approximately 1/2 inch in changing positions, is held in
GEAR UP and GEAR DOWN positions by an overcenter spring.
Landing gear lever movement actuates a group of switches which control
the solenoids of the control valves and the first motion of the landing gear
hydraulic actuator will unlock the locks for gear actuation in either the up
or down position. The landing gear lever is mechanically linked to a steering ratio selector unit which prevents movement to GEAR UP until the
steering ratio selector lever is in TAKEOFF LAND position. This mechanical linkage also adjusts the steering ratio selector unit to zero ratio, when
the landing gear lever is moved to GEAR UP. The GEAR DOWN position
of the landing gear lever energizes the landing light and crosswind landing light circuits. The landing gear lever controls TR power for all warning
and indicator systems and essential power for normal landing gear control including the tip gears.
NOTE
The effort required to operate the landing gear lever is increased
if the rudder pedals are not in neutral. This increase in operating
effort is caused by the requirement to displace the steering system.
1-285
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Landing Gear Controls and Indicators (Cont)

CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
5
FUNCTION
Landing Gear Warning Light

(Red)
A red landing gear warning light in the end of the landing gear lever warns
of incorrect landing gear position. When gear actuation is taking place
and the landing gear position does not agree with the landing gear lever
position or the landing gear warning horn is blowing, or when the landing
gear lever is not in the detent, the red light in the landing gear lever illuminates. As soon as the landing gear is locked in the selected position, the
red light goes out provided the warning horn is not blowing. The warning
light circuit is deenergized to allow the warning light to go out when the
landing gear lever pawl, which is retracted by a control lever spring, is fully
seated in the lever quadrant detents.
NOTE
Flight at high indicated airspeeds and Mach numbers may produce enough wing twist to cause the tip protection gear doors
to gap open. This will cause the landing gear warning light to go
on and cause an intermediate tip gear signal to appear. Reduction of airspeed will correct this situation. However, flight may be
continued under these conditions without affecting normal operation of the aircraft.
Tip Protection Gear Not In Trail Caution

Light (Amber)
Light is marked TPG NOT IN TRAIL and illuminates when a reversal of

the tip protection gear is detected. This light and the master caution lights
illuminate if a tip gear casters more than 120 either side of trail. While the
master caution lights may be extinguished by pushing to reset, the central
caution panel light will remain on until the tip gear casters to a trail aft
position.
When the tip gear is reversed, the strut resides on the inboard
side of the wheel and may cause damage if retraction is attempted.
1-286
Change 22
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Landing Gear System Circuit

EQUIPMENT
Emergency Gear Control
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
LANDING GEAR EMERGENCY

CONTROL
LEFT AFT
LEFT FWD
LEFT TIP
RIGHT AFT
RIGHT FWD
RIGHT TIP
PCBP/A4
PCBP/A3
PCBP/A2
PCBP/A6
PCBP/A5
PCBP/A7
Aft Batt.
Fwd Batt.
Rt. ESS
Fwd Batt.
Aft Batt.
Left ESS
Gear Position Indicators
LANDING GEAR POS IND
PCBP/B2
Rt. ESS
Gear Warning Horn and Shutoff

Button
LANDING GEAR
POS & FLAPS WARN HORN
PCBP/A1
Rt. TR
Gear Warning Light
LANDING GEAR SW & POS WARN
PCBP/B3
Rt. ESS
Normal Gear Control
MISCELLANEOUS LANDING GEAR

NORMAL CONTROL
L FWD
L TIP
RT AFT
LDG. GEAR NORMAL CONTROL
LEFT AFT
RIGHT FWD
RIGHT TIP
LLC/C23
LLC/C22
LLC/C24
Left ESS
Left ESS
Left ESS
RLC/F9
RLC/F10
RLC/F11
Rt. ESS
Rt. ESS
Rt. ESS
LANDING GEAR SQUAT SWITCH

CONTR
LEFT AFT
LEFT FWD
RIGHT AFT
RIGHT FWD
PCBP/B7
PCBP/B6
PCBP/B9
PCBP/B8
Rt. ESS
Left ESS
Left ESS
Rt. ESS
MISCELLANEOUS
CENTRAL CAUTION PANEL ESS DC
CPCBP/E9
Rt. ESS
Oleo (Squat) Safety Switches

Control
Tip Gear Caution Light
11
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
CPCBP
LLC

PCBP
RLC

Figure 1-85
1-287/(1-288 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
STEERING AND CROSSWIND CRAB SYSTEMS

DESCRIPTION
A means of steering the aircraft on the ground and
of presetting the crab angle of the landing gear during crosswind landings and takeoffs is furnished by
two separate yet integrated systems known as the
steering and the crosswind crab system (figure
1-86). The steering system and crosswind crab system are integrated through mechanical and cable
linkage to a differential coordinating unit. Cable
and mechanical linkage from this unit operate
steering metering valves on both forward and rear
main gear. The steering metering valves meter hydraulic pressure to the actuating cylinders which
position each forward gear for steering or all four
gear for crosswind crab.
NOTE
Actuation of the crosswind crab system sets

up a new neutral position for steering
which does not affect the turning angle
available with the takeoff and landing
steering ratio but limits the turning angle
available with the taxi steering ratio. With
crosswind crab set and the steering ratio selector in TAXI, the available turning angle
of the forward gear relative to the new neutral is 55 in the direction of the crab
setting and 55 minus the crab setting in
the direction opposite the crab setting. See
figure 1-87.
Steering and crosswind crab system circuit protection and the location of the applicable circuit breakers is contained in figure 1-89.
STEERING SYSTEM
The forward main landing gear are steered by hydraulic pressure controlled by movement of the rudder pedals. The left forward gear uses pressure
from the left body hydraulic system and the right
forward gear uses pressure from the right body hydraulic system. Emergency source of hydraulic
pressure is not available for steering; however, under certain conditions, standby pressure can be
used. See LANDING WITH ONE FORWARD
GEAR STEERING FAILURE, Section III. In the
event of steering failure on one front gear, it will
trail the other front gear which has steering avail-
able. Steering is accomplished when the rudder

pedals move mechanical and cable linkage through
a ratio selector unit and a differential coordinating
unit to the metering valves which hydraulically
position the forward main gear. The steering ratio
selector unit mechanically limits steering angles for
two conditions. A taxi ratio allows the forward gear
to be turned to a maximum angle of 55 right or left
of a center position with full rudder pedal travel.
The second ratio is used for takeoff and landing and
restricts the turning angle to approximately 12
right or left of center. The differential coordinating
unit has three main components, a forward drum, a
jackscrew, and a rear drum. All three are
interconnected. Rudder pedal movement for
steering mechanically moves the forward drum in
an amount determined by the ratio selector.
Movement of the forward drum moves the rear
drum through linkage to mechanically operate the
steering metering valves on each of the forward
main gear. These valves meter hydraulic pressure
to the actuating cylinders to position the gear as
desired. During forward towing operations, a valve
between the steering actuating cylinders on each
forward gear must be opened by a steering bypass
key (figure 1-81) to bleed pressure. This is to
prevent damage caused by hydraulic locking of the
pistons in the actuating cylinders. This valve was
also incorporated on the rear gear so that towing
from the rear could be accomplished. The bypass
keys for the forward gears are attached to the
ground lock streamers. When the key is inserted
into the steering metering valve receptacle, one pin
secures the key in place and the other moves the
bypass valve to bleed pressure. Centering springs
are provided near each steering valve which only
assist in returning the gear and rudder pedals to
neutral whenever pressure on the rudder pedals is
removed.
NOTE
For maximum steering and rudder control,

no rudder trim should be used. The maximum steering angle is reduced when rudder
trim in the opposite direction is used. For
example, steering to the left is reduced
when nose right trim is introduced. The
steering angle is reduced proportionally to
the amount of trim used to displace the rudder pedals.
Change 4
1-289
RUDDER PEDALS
FROM RIGHT BODY

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
LANDING
GEAR LEVER
GEAR
UP
TAKEOFF
LAND
TRUNNION SWIVEL
SHUTOFF VALVE
GEAR
DOWN
TAXI
STEERING RATIO
SELECTOR LEVER
STEERING METERING
VALVE
STEERING METERING
VALVE
STEERING RATIO
SELECTOR UNIT
STEERING
COMPENSATOR
VALVE
MANUAL
STEERING
BYPASS
VALVE
(TOWING)
OVERTRAVEL UNIT
METERING VALVE
ACTUATOR AND
CENTERING SPRINGS
OVERTRAVEL
UNIT
REAR
DRUM
FORWARD
DRUM
MANUAL
STEERING
BYPASS
VALVE
(TOWING)
JACKSCREW
CROSSWIND CRAB
CENTERING MOTOR
STEERING
ACTUATORS
DIFFERENTIAL
COORDINATING
UNIT
STEERING
ACTUATORS
CROSSWIND CRAB
CENTERING BUTTON
CROSSWIND
CRAB POSITION
TRANSMITTER
PUSH TO
CENTER GEAR
A31709
LEFT FORWARD
LANDING GEAR
Steering and Crosswind Crab System
TRUNNION SWIVEL
SHUTOFF VALVE
T.O. 1B-52H-1
1-290
FROM LEFT BODY

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
CROSSWIND CRAB
CONTROL KNOB
RIGHT FORWARD
LANDING GEAR
STEERING
COMPENSATOR
VALVE
FROM LEFT BODY

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
FROM RIGHT BODY

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
TRUNNION
SWIVEL
SHUTOFF
VALVE
TRUNNION SWIVEL
SHUTOFF VALVE
CROSSWIND
CENTERING
SWITCHES
STEERING METERING
VALVE
STEERING METERING
VALVE
TO LANDING
GEAR LEVER
STEERING
COMPENSATION
VALVE
STEERING
COMPENSATOR
VALVE
OVERTRAVEL
UNIT
OVERTRAVEL
UNIT
TO EVS
CROSSWIND CRAB
POSITION
INDICATOR
(Left main
landing gear
only)
STEERING
ACTUATORS
STEERING
ACTUATORS
CROSSWIND
CRAB POSITION
TRANSMITTER
1-291
A31710
STATIC
LEFT REAR
LANDING GEAR
ELECTRICAL CIRCUITS
MECHANICAL
ACTUATION
RIGHT REAR
LANDING GEAR
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NORMAL PRESSURE
RETURN
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Turning Angles Available With Maximum

Crosswind Crab Setting
Figure 1-87
1-292
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CROSSWIND CRAB SYSTEM
A crosswind crab system is provided on this aircraft

to facilitate making crosswind takeoffs and landings and to reduce the hazards of crosswind conditions. The crosswind crab system provides a means
of turning all four main gear to align with the runway while the aircraft is flown in a wings-level attitude compensating for drift. This system utilizes
the steering actuators on the front main gear and a
similar set on the rear main gear. The landing gear
can be preset and turned up to 20 left or right of
center during the approach. The maximum of 20
crab will accommodate landings in crosswinds up to
and including 43 knots blowing 90 to the runway
at a landing weight of 270,000 pounds. The
direction of the landing gear is preset by a
crosswind crab control knob which mechanically
operates the steering metering valves on each main

gear. These valves meter hydraulic pressure to the
actuating cylinders to position the gear as desired.
The crosswind crab system is automatically
centered when the landing gear lever is moved to
the GEAR UP position. On the ground after
landing, the gear is quickly centered by a pilot-operated centering button or by turning the crosswind
crab control knob to center. Crab position of the aft
gear is fed to the EVS for positioning the STV and
FLIR sensors.
STEERING AND CROSSWIND CRAB SYSTEM CONTROLS AND INDICATORS
A discussion of steering and crosswind crab system

controls and indicators is contained in figure 1-88.
1-293
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Steering and Crosswind Crab

Controls and Indicators
1
2
CROSSWIND CRAB POSITION INDICATOR

CROSSWIND CRAB CONTROL KNOB AND
INDICATOR
3
4
CROSSWIND CRAB CONTROL CENTERING

BUTTON
STEERING RATIO SELECTOR LEVER
1-294
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
1
CONTROLINDICATOR
Crosswind Crab Position Indicator
FUNCTION
The crosswind crab position indicator shows in a relative plan view presentation the amount in degrees that the landing gear is turned to compensate for aircraft crab during crosswind conditions. The indicator is an
electrically operated instrument and receives power from the TR bus
which is carried through two position transmitters, one on the left forward
gear and one on the left rear gear. The indicator has a diagram marked
with a miniature runway and a scale calibrated from 0 to 20 both right
and left. Two movable pointers, mounted one above the other, indicate
the degree of turn. The lower pointer, a simple needle, indicates the
forward gear, and the upper pointer, in the form of a miniature aircraft,
indicates the rear gear. Since the gear position is in the opposite direction
from that indicated by the pointers, it is always considered that the aircraft
is being turned into the wind at an angle to the runway. When the aircraft
is steered, the lower pointer will move in a direction opposite that of the
turn and the upper pointer will remain in the position of the crab angle.
NOTE
Crosswind Crab Control Knob
After crosswind crab has been set, both pointers of the crosswind crab indicator should match crab angle within 2.
The control knob can be turned while the aircraft is on the
ground with responding control knob indicator movement
without hydraulic pressure or electrical power. Therefore, if an
unobserved crab setting exists, upon aircraft taxiing, the gear
will immediately actuate to a left or right crab position resulting in the aircraft rapidly departing centerline.
The crosswind crab control knob and indicator is recessed in the rudder
trim control knob on the aft end of the aisle stand. The control has an indicator in the form of a miniature aircraft which points to a degree scale to
indicate the amount of nose left or right crab selected. To move the control, it is necessary to lift up before turning. When the crosswind crab control knob is turned for crab, cable linkage moves the jackscrew at the differential coordinating unit. The jackscrew positions the rear drum of the
coordinating unit to move cable and mechanical linkage to operate the
forward gear steering metering valves. The jackscrew also moves cable
and mechanical linkage to operate the rear gear steering metering
valves. It is to be noted that the rear main gear can be steered only
through movement of the jackscrew of the coordinating unit while the forward main gear are steered by movement of the rear drum of the coordinating unit. The rear drum can be moved both by the jackscrew for crosswind crab and by the forward drum of the coordinating unit for steering by
the rudder pedals. This action allows steering of the forward gear even
when the forward gear are preset for crosswind crab.
NOTE
When the main landing gear are extended and crabbed in flight
to an angle equal to or exceeding 14 through any combination
of crosswind crab setting and rudder pedal movement, the
landing gear safety switch will be actuated causing certain
aircraft systems to start operating or to shut down. For further
information, see LANDING GEAR OLEO SAFETY SWITCHES,
this section.
1-295
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Steering and Crosswind Crab Controls and

Indicators (Cont)
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
Crosswind Crab Control Centering

Button
Used to center all four main landing gear from a turned position to neutral.
The crosswind crab centering button controls an electric motor which
turns the jackscrew in the coordinating unit in the desired direction to center all four gear. When the left rear gear is centered, power to the motor
is interrupted causing all centering action to stop. The centering button,
a push-type switch that is spring-loaded to OFF position, is supplied TR
power. It is covered with a moisture and dust-proof rubber cap which must
be pressed to actuate the centering button. The direction of the motor is
governed by two cam-actuated centering switches on the left rear main
landing gear. When either of these switches are actuated by the cam and
the centering button is pushed, the circuit is energized to operate the centering motor.
Steering Ratio Selector Lever
Used to select one of two steering ratios. The two ratios are TAXI- -TAKEOFF LAND which allow steering of up to 55 and approximately 12 respectively. To move the lever from either one of these positions, a knob
on the lever must be pulled up to free the lever from a detent position.
When the lever is moved from one position to the other, it mechanically
adjusts the steering ratio selector unit to limit the angle of turn available.
The ratio selector lever is mechanically linked to the landing gear lever.
This is done to prevent moving the landing gear lever up unless the ratio
selector lever is in TAKEOFF LAND and to prevent moving the ratio selector lever while the landing gear are retracted. When the landing gear lever
is moved to GEAR UP, the linkage will adjust the steering ratio selector
unit to a zero steering ratio. This prevents any actuation of the steering
metering valves by rudder pedal movement and returns the steering control system to center. Since normally the landing gear lever will be positioned before using the emergency landing gear switches, the ratio selector will usually be adjusted accordingly. Centering cams in each gear
maintain the gear at centered position as soon as oleos are fully extended. A trunnion swivel shutoff valve is on each main gear and shuts
off hydraulic pressure to the steering valves when the landing gear have
retracted 38 to 60. This prevents steering action before the gear has
cleared the wheel well during landing gear extension.
NOTE
With the steering ratio selector lever in either the TAXI or TAKEOFF LAND position, the landing gear will follow the rudder pedal
displacement by a predetermined amount. Moving the selector
lever from one to the other position will be met by increasing resistance as the rudder displacement is increased from the neutral position. This is the result of attempting to steer the landing
gear to the new position as required by the steering ratio selector unit through use of the selector lever. This condition can be
avoided by placing the rudder pedals in the neutral position before moving the steering ratio selector lever.
1-296
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Steering and Crosswind Crab Systems

Circuit Protection and Location
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
EQUIPMENT
11
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
Crosswind Crab Control

Centering Button
LANDING GEAR CENTERING CONTR
PCBP/B1
Rt. TR
Crosswind Crab Position

Indicator
LANDING GEAR
CROSSWIND CRAB IND
PCBP/B5
Left TR
PCBP
Figure 1-89
1-297/(1-298 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
WHEEL BRAKE SYSTEM
DESCRIPTION
Each wheel of the main landing gear has hydraulic
brakes. The brakes are of the segmented rotor multiple-disc type utilizing cerametallic brake linings.
Braking is accomplished by toe pressure on any or
all of the rudder pedals. No differential braking is
provided. An antiskid system to automatically detect and correct a skid condition is on each wheel of
the main landing gear. Parking brakes are also provided.
Wheel brake system circuit protection and the location of the applicable circuit breakers is contained
in figure 1-92.
WHEEL BRAKE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
Each main landing gear has an individual brake

system as shown in figure 1-90. Brake pressure for
the front and rear gear on the right side is supplied
by the right body system and pressure for the front
and rear gear on the left side is supplied by the left
body system. There is an accumulator for each
main gear brake system, one located in each wheel
well. There is a pressure gage on each accumulator
which gives brake system pressure or air preload if
the brake system is bled down. The two forward
main gear brakes are actuated simultaneously and
the two rear main gear brakes are slaved to the forward brake systems. This provides equal braking
pressure on all four main gear. Brake application
pressure is supplied to each aft main landing gear
by individual slave pressure-operated metering
valves. Both aft brake slave metering valves are
normally supplied with slave pressure from the left
body hydraulic system; however, an alternate
source of slave pressure is supplied to both valves
from the right body hydraulic system. Slave pressure from either body system will open the slave
metering valves of both aft gear to permit brake

application from pressure supplied by the body system which corresponds with the side on which the
gear is located. Toe pressure on the rudder pedals is
transmitted to two main metering valves through
mechanical linkages and a spring system of feel and
return springs. The feel springs absorb linkage
travel and hold spring tension on the metering
valves. The return springs return and hold the metering valves in the off position. A retraction lockout cylinder is connected to each spring cartridge
assembly, which contains a retraction lockout
spring and a return spring, to limit the amount of
brake pressure that can be applied to stop wheel rotation during gear retraction. This reduced braking
pressure, which amounts to approximately onefourth normal braking pressure, is for the purpose
of preventing undue stresses on the retraction
mechanism by a sudden braking of the wheels. Hydraulic pressure from the main metering valves is
used for two purposes; one is brake actuation on
each wheel of the forward main gear and the other
is hydraulic actuation of the two slave metering
valves, one for each rear main gear. Pressure is
supplied to the two slave metering valves through
the normal slave line or the alternate slave line.
Differential pressure in the normal slave line holds
a control valve in the alternate slave line closed.
The alternate slave line control valve will open if
the pressure in the normal slave line becomes appreciably less than the pressure in the alternate
slave line. Either slave line pressure can enter the
two slave metering valves through a shuttle valve
on each metering valve. The shuttle valve positions
according to pressure differential. Hydraulic pressure to the brakes is further controlled by an antiskid system. An antiskid indicator panel is installed
on the copilots side panel for testing antiskid electrical circuits.
Change 4
1-299
T.O. 1B-52H-1
1-300
RUDDER
PEDALS
NORMAL PRESSURE
BRAKE PRESSURE
NORMAL SLAVE
PRESSURE
ALTERNATE SLAVE
PRESSURE
RETURN
FROM LEFT BODY

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
FROM RIGHT BODY

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
SUPPLY
LINE
CHECK
VALVE
RETRACTION
LOCKOUT
VALVE
AIR PRESSURE
ELECTRICAL CIRCUITS
HYDRAULIC PRESSURE
FROM RETRACTION
PORT ONE TO EACH
FORWARD NORMAL
LANDING GEAR
CONTROL VALVE
PARKING BRAKE
HAND PUMP AND
HANDLE (Ground
use only)
PARKING BRAKE
PRESSURE GAGE
CHECK
VALVE
ACCUMULATOR
MAIN
METERING
VALVE
MAIN
METERING
VALVE
DUAL
ANTISKID
VALVE
DUAL
ANTISKID
VALVE
ALTERNATE SLAVE
CONTROL VALVE
ANTISKID
SWITCH
ON
OFF
HYDRAULIC
FUSES
ANTISKID
CONTROL
UNIT
RESTRICTORS
Wheel Brake System
ACCUMULATOR
HYDRAULIC
FUSES
RESTRICTORS
SKID
DETECTOR
A31711
PRESSURE RELIEF
VALVE
PRESSURE RELIEF
VALVE
LEFT FORWARD
MAIN LANDING
GEAR
RIGHT FORWARD
MAIN LANDING
GEAR
FROM RIGHT BODY

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
FROM LEFT BODY

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
HYDRAULIC
FUSES
CHECK
VALVE
CHECK
VALVE
ACCUMULATOR
ACCUMULATOR
SLAVE
METERING
VALVE
SHUTTLE
VALVE
SLAVE
METERING
VALVE
SHUTTLE
VALVE
DUAL
ANTI SKID
VALVE
DUAL
ANTI SKID
VALVE
HYDRAULIC
FUSES
HYDRAULIC
FUSES
RESTRICTORS
RESTRICTORS
PRESSURE RELIEF
VALVE
LEFT REAR
MAIN LANDING
GEAR
RIGHT REAR
MAIN LANDING
GEAR
T.O. 1B-52H-1
A31712
1-301
PRESSURE RELIEF
VALVE
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Wheel Brake System Controls and Indicators
1
2
PARKING BRAKE LEVER

ANTISKID SWITCH
3
4
ANTISKID INDICATOR LIGHTS

ANTISKID TEST SWITCH
1-302
Change 17
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
CONTROL/INDICATOR
FUNCTION
Parking Brake Lever
Moving the parking brake lever aft while depressing the brake pedals sets the parking brakes. A mechanical linkage from the parking
brake lever locks the brake pedals in a brakes-applied position. As
long as hydraulic pressure is available, the brakes will remain on.
The parking brake may be released by merely depressing the
brake pedals until the parking brake lever releases; then release
the brake pedals.
Antiskid Switch
Switch has two positions, ON- -OFF, and is guarded to the ON position. When the switch is ON, the antiskid system is in operation.
Antiskid Indicator Lights

(green) One for each of the 8
main wheel brakes
When illuminated with antiskid test switch in GND position, indicates the antiskid shields have power; when illuminated with
antiskid test switch in FLT position, indicates the individual brake
has released.
Antiskid TEST Switch

FLT
OFF
GND
Is used to test the antiskid system before taxiing and before landing. The switch has FLT- -OFF- -GND positions and is springloaded to OFF. With the aircraft on the ground and the antiskid test
switch in the GND position, all eight indicator lights should illuminate. Illumination indicates that the antiskid shield for the corresponding wheel brake is receiving power. With the aircraft in flight
and the antiskid test switch in FLT position, all eight lights should
be illuminated. Illumination indicates that the antiskid system has
released for that particular wheel brake.
1-303
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Rudder Pedals
Toe pressure on any one of the four rudder pedals

will actuate the wheel brakes.
Parking Brake Hydraulic Hand Pump
The parking brake hydraulic hand pump is used to

charge the left front gear accumulator pressure
during towing operations. Approximately 70 double
strokes are required on the hand pump to charge
the accumulator for one or two brake applications
with the antiskid switch OFF. The hand pump and
handle are located on the right side of the forward
wheel well.
ANTISKID SYSTEM
The antiskid system consists of a skid detector on

each main gear wheel, a dual antiskid valve for
each gear, a relay unit for each main gear, and an
antiskid switch. The antiskid system is supplied
with essential dc power from each main gear antiskid shield. The dual antiskid valve is electrically
actuated through relays from a skid detector unit
on each wheel. This valve is spring-loaded to the
open position to allow pressure to reach the brakes.
When any wheel is in a skid condition, a signal is
transmitted by the skid detector unit through the
1-304
relay unit to actuate the valve. The dual antiskid

valve is then positioned to shut off pressure to the
brake and opens a port to the return line releasing
the brake pressure on that wheel. At the end of the
skid signal, following a very short time delay, brake
pressure is again restored to the wheel. If the skid
continues until wheel rotation stops, a locked wheel
signal is transmitted through an additional relay to
release brake pressure from that wheel. Upon
brake pressure release, the wheel is free to rotate
and again starts to accelerate. After a short time
delay to permit the wheel to reach nonskid speed,
the brake pressure is again restored to the wheel.
For further information, see LANDING GEAR
OLEO SAFETY SWITCHES, this section.
NOTE
A skid or locked wheel condition on any one

wheel does not affect braking on any other
wheel.
ANTISKID INDICATOR PANEL
The antiskid indicator panel (figure 1-91), located

on the copilots side panel, is used to perform a
cross check of the antiskid system. The antiskid indicator is supplied with essential dc power from
each main gear antiskid shield.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
WHEEL BRAKE NORMAL OPERATION

Brakes, themselves, merely stop the wheels from
turning, but stopping the aircraft is dependent on
the friction of the tires on the runway. This frictional force, in turn, is dependent on the load imposed
on the wheel. Therefore, optimum braking action on
landings cannot be expected until the tires are carrying heavy loads. Although the antiskid system allows for immediate braking after touchdown, lift
should also be decreased as much as possible by extension of the airbrakes. The tendency for the tires
to skid decreases considerably when the full weight
of the aircraft is on the wheels. Optimum braking
occurs with approximately a 15% to 20% rolling
skid; that is, the wheel continues to rotate but has
approximately 15% to 20% slippage on the surface
so that the rotational speed is 80% to 85% of the
speed which the wheel would have were it in a free
roll. As the amount of skid increases beyond this
amount, the coefficient of friction decreases rapidly
so that with a 75% skid, the friction is approximately 60% of the optimum, and with a full skid becomes even lower. There are two reasons for this
loss in braking effectiveness with skidding. First,
the immediate action is to scuff the rubber, tearing
off little pieces which act almost like rollers under
the tire. Second, the heat generated starts to melt
the rubber and the molten rubber acts as a lubricant between the tire and the ground surface.
BRAKE DESIGN
Aerodynamic braking should be utilized in an attempt to keep wheel brake usage to a minimum. To
provide minimum brake weight, consistent with
safe operation, the military specification to which
the brakes are designed requires that they provide
for only one maximum refused takeoff stop. Under
such a condition, it is advisable to taxi clear of the
runway using minimum braking before coming to a
complete stop and not to apply the parking brake.
It is possible that the overheated brakes may seize,
resulting in considerable delay on runway operations. For brake energy limits, see figure 5-14. Cold
brakes on this aircraft may result from landing in a
moderate headwind at light weight, on a long runway when little or no braking was done, or when
there is a definite malfunction or failure of a brake.
Usually some heat will be felt when approaching
wheel brake rotor or housing with the hand. The
amount of heat radiating from the brake depends

on these variables: amount of braking needed to
stop the aircraft, amount of hydraulic pressure delivered to the brakes, location of the wheel well
doors affecting the airflow around the wheels, differential wheel loadings due to turns and crosswinds, and difference in rpm settings of the antiskid systems. Any heat at all radiating from a
brake indicates that it has been operating satisfactorily even though no two brakes will be at the
same temperature.
ANTISKID OPERATION
The antiskid system is intended to prevent skids at

high speed under light wheel loads and to provide
optimum braking resulting in shorter stopping distances regardless of the surface conditions. Therefore, the antiskid switch should be ON during takeoff and landing. However, it should not be used to
its maximum potential to purposely make all landing rolls as short as possible since this causes undue wear of the tires and brakes. While taxiing on a
slippery surface with the antiskid switch ON, it is
possible to lose up to 50% of the effective braking
due to locked wheel conditions; the remaining braking action with antiskid protection is more effective
than full braking without antiskid.
NOTE
Improper servicing of the shock struts or a

malfunctioning landing gear safety switch
may prevent transfer of the antiskid system
from the airborne mode to the ground
mode. If this occurs, the antiskid system automatically releases brakes on the affected
gear (possibly all gear) when the aircraft is
moving at a slow rate of speed, as during
taxiing. When loss of braking due to this
condition is experienced, turning the antiskid switch OFF restores braking action
without antiskid protection. When the antiskid switch is OFF, braking action depends
entirely on the pressure applied to the
brake pedals.
WHEEL BRAKE LIMITATIONS
See WHEEL BRAKE LIMITATIONS and TIRE

LIMITATIONS, Section V.
1-305
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Wheel Brake System Circuit Protection and Location

CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
EQUIPMENT
Antiskid Control Circuits and
Panel Indicators
11
LANDING GEAR ANTI-SKID

CONTROL
LEFT AFT
LEFT FWD
RIGHT AFT
RIGHT FWD
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
PCBP/B12
PCBP/B10
PCBP/B14
PCBP/B13
POWER
SOURCE
Rt. ESS
Left ESS
Rt. ESS
Left ESS
PCBP
Figure 1-92
1-306
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DRAG CHUTE SYSTEM

DESCRIPTION
A 44-foot ribbon-type drag chute is provided for deceleration during the landing roll. The parachute is
installed in a compartment (3, sheet 1 of figure 1-1)
aft of the rudder in the top of the tail section of the
fuselage. When the compartment door is opened,
the drag chute is deployed. The opening door pulls
the ripcord and releases the spring-loaded pilot
chute into the slipstream. The pilot chute then
pulls out the main drag chute. The risers of the
main chute are attached to the aircraft through a
terminal held by the jettison mechanism. For operating limits of the drag chute, see AIRSPEED LIMITATIONS, Section V.
NOTE
If the door opens accidentally, thus deploying the drag chute, the chute will be jettisoned automatically by the drag chute
mechanism.
DRAG CHUTE LEVER
A drag chute lever (10, figure 1-6) is located on the

copilots side of the aisle stand. Positions of the lever are DEPLOY- -LOCKED- -JETTISON. This le-
ver manually operates the drag chute release and

jettison mechanisms through a cable system. Normally, the lever must be moved to DEPLOY before
it can be moved to JETTISON position. A hinged
stop prevents movement of the control lever from
LOCKED to DEPLOY position without lifting the
stop in order to prevent inadvertent deployment.
LOCKED position holds the spring-loaded drag
chute compartment door securely closed. JETTISON position causes release of the jettison mechanism and allows the chute to pull free of the aircraft.
NOTE
A locking device on the control system operated by the drag chute compartment door
prevents actuation of the jettison mechanism when the door is closed.
PERSONNEL SAFETY ROD
To protect parachute loading personnel against inadvertent drag chute door opening, a steel safety
rod is provided to install through the aircraft skin
and engage the door hinge arms. This rod must be
removed before flight.
1-307/(1-308 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
BOMB DOOR SYSTEM

DESCRIPTION
BOMB-DOOR-CLOSE TIMER
NORMAL OPERATION
OAS AUTOMATIC BOMB DOOR OPERATION
OAS MANUAL BOMB DOOR OPERATION
BOMB DOOR OPERATION WITH RADAR NAVIGATORS
BOMB DOOR SWITCH
BOMB DOOR OPERATION WITH PILOTS BOMB DOOR
SWITCH
DESCRIPTION
The bomb door system (figure 1-93) comprises
doors, latches, and the systems which control them.
Six double-panel doors cover the bomb bay opening.
All actuation by the bomb door system affects the
lower panels only. The upper panels are hinged to
provide a larger opening for ground service. The
doors are latched at the forward and aft bulkheads
of the bomb bay. To secure simultaneous action of
all doors, the center doors are mechanically linked
to the forward and aft doors. The doors can be operated with the bomb door switch on either the pilots
or radar navigators control panel. The OAS can operate the doors automatically. The bomb or missile
jettison systems will open the doors but will not
close them. During ground operation, with no power on the aircraft, the bomb doors may be unlatched
by manually pulling the bomb door latch release
cable in the aft wheel well. The bomb doors are held
closed by mechanical latches and held open by hydraulic pressure. The right body hydraulic system
supplies normal pressure to operate the forward
and aft bomb door actuators through the forward
and aft main control valves. The left body hydraulic
system supplies alternate pressure automatically to
the forward bomb door actuator through the forward emergency control valve whenever the normal
pressure is low or fails. The forward bomb door
latch actuator is supplied normal pressure by the
left body hydraulic system through the forward
emergency control valve. The aft bomb door latch
actuator is supplied normal pressure by the right
body hydraulic system through the aft main control
valve. Neither the forward or aft bomb door latch
actuator has an alternate source of hydraulic pressure. Both bomb door latch actuators are bused together by cable so that when hydraulic pressure is
1-309
1-309
1-312
1-315
1-315
1-315
1-316
1-316
available to either or both of the bomb door latch

actuators, the forward and aft latches will be released.
A forward special weapon manual release handle is
connected to the latch actuator cable to provide an
emergency means of unlatching the bomb doors.
Airloads will then position the bomb doors to some
position between closed and full open depending on
indicated airspeed. Bomb door operation (open/close
cycle) (open only for normal jettison) (figure 1-93) is
computer controlled for launch or normal jettison of
bomb bay missiles. During the computer controlled
bomb door open phase, the bomb door safety relay
is energized and disables all bomb-door-close circuits (OAS, manual, etc).
Bomb door system circuit protection and the location of the applicable circuit breakers is contained
in figure 1-95.
BOMB-DOOR-CLOSE TIMER
A bomb-door-close timer is provided to supply a

bomb door close signal when the OAS is operating
the bomb doors during a conventional gravity release. The OAS does not actually supply a bomb
door close signal following bomb release, however,
the OAS does supply power to close the bomb doors
when operating in the bomb mode (and the bombing system switch is in AUTO) provided a bombdoor-open signal is not present at the preset time to
go. The bomb-door-close timer starts to work upon
receiving the first bomb release pulse from the
bomb release interval control and, approximately 3
seconds after receiving the last bomb release pulse,
it causes a continuous door close signal to be sent.
Change 20
1-309
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Bomb Door System
1-310
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Change 4
1-311
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Bomb Door Controls and Indicators
1
2
3
4
5
PILOTS BOMB BAY & MISSILE JETTISON

SWITCH
PILOTS BOMB DOOR SWITCH
RADAR NAVIGATORS BOMB BAY JETTISON
CONTROL SWITCH
PILOTS BOMB DOORS NOT LATCHED LIGHT
PILOTS BOMB DOORS OPEN LIGHT
6
7
8
9
10
11
BOMB DOOR CONTROL VALVE LIGHTS (2)

BOMBING SYSTEM SWITCH
BOMB DOOR NOT LATCHED LIGHT
BOMB DOOR OPEN LIGHT
RADAR NAVIGATORS BOMB DOOR CONTROL
SWITCH
MASTER BOMB CONTROL (POWER) SWITCH
1-312
Change 20
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
Pilots BOMB BAY & MISSILE

JETTISON CONTROL Switch
Button type switch; recessed in the panel to discourage inadvertent actuation. Momentarily pressing the switch energizes the jettison circuits
using aft battery power. When the jettison circuits are energized, the
bomb door open circuits are energized and all the weapons (internal and
external) will be released in a safe configuration. The bomb doors are
held open while the jettison circuits are energized.
Pilots BOMB DOORS Switch
Used to control operation of the bomb doors. The switch has

OPEN- -OFF- -CLOSED positions and is spring-loaded to OFF position.
Actuating this switch to OPEN or CLOSED position energizes the bombdoors-open circuit or the bomb-doors-close circuit which positions the
bomb door control valves to direct hydraulic pressure to the bomb door
actuators. Actuating this switch to CLOSED position de-energizes the jettison circuits if the jettison circuit is energized and will close the bomb
doors.
Radar Navigators BOMB BAY

The radar navigators switch opens the bomb doors in the same manner
as the pilots jettison switch (1). Activation will jettison only conventional
gravity weapons. This switch is inoperative for all CSRL gravity weapons
and all nuclear and conventional missiles.
Pilots BOMB DOORS NOT LATCHED

Caution Light (Amber)
Illuminates, along with the MASTER CAUTION light, when the forward
bomb door latch is unlatched. The light remains on until the bomb doors
are closed and the forward bomb door is latched.
Pilots BOMB DOORS OPEN Light

(Green)
When illuminated, indicates the bomb doors are fully open; the bomb
doors will be held open until the bomb-doors-close circuit is energized;
and the bomb door safety switches are positioned so bomb release may
be made by either the normal or jettison system. The light remains illuminated as long as the bomb doors are fully open. The bomb-doors-open
light receives TR power through the limit switch actuated by the forward
bomb door radius rod on aircraft.
FWD and AFT BOMB DOOR

CONTROL VALVE Lights (Amber) (2)
The bomb door control valve lights, when illuminated, indicate hydraulic
pressure exists in the respective bomb door close line and that the bomb
doors may be damaged if the bomb door open circuit is energized. Each
light will illuminate when the hydraulic pressure in the line is above 1500
(50) psi and go out when the hydraulic pressure in the line is below 1300
(100) psi.
Do not attempt to free a bomb door control (four-way) valve by

opening the bomb doors as this procedure may damage the
bomb door system.
Change 12
1-313
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Bomb Door Controls and Indicators (Cont)

NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
MASTER BOMB CONTROL PANEL
BOMBING SYSTEM CONTROL Switch
Used to transfer control of the bomb doors from the OAS to the radar navigators bomb door switch. The switch has AUTO--MANUAL positions.
AUTO position allows the OAS control of the bomb doors. MANUAL position transfers control of the bomb doors to the radar navigators bomb
door switch. In either position, the OAS is prevented from dropping
bombs if the bomb doors are not full open. Not applicable to CSRL releases.
NOTE
The bomb doors cannot be operated with the OAS (bombing
system switch in AUTO) when the special weapons select
switch is in any position other than FWD RACK or AFT RACK.
BOMB DOOR NOT LATCHED Light

(Amber)
Illuminates when the forward bomb door latch is unlatched. The light will
remain on until the bomb doors are closed and the forward bomb door is
latched.
BOMB DOOR OPEN Light
When illuminated, indicates bomb doors are fully open; the bomb doors
will be held open until the bomb-doors-close circuit is energized, and the
bomb door safety switches are positioned so bomb release may be made
by either the normal or jettison system. The light remains illuminated as
long as the bomb doors are fully open. The bomb-doors-open light receives TR power through the limit switch actuated by the forward bomb
door radius rod on aircraft.
10
BOMB DOOR CONTROL Switch
Used to control operation of the bomb doors. The switch has

OPEN- -OFF- -CLOSE positions and is spring-loaded to the unmarked
OFF position. When actuated to OPEN with the bombing system switch
in MANUAL and the master bomb control switch in ON position, energizes the bomb doors open circuit. When actuated to CLOSE with the
bombing system switch in MANUAL and the master bomb control switch
in ON position, energizes the bomb doors close circuit. Power is supplied
to this switch through relay contacts when the bomb doors are open and
the bombing system switch is in MANUAL position.
11
MASTER BOMB CONTROL POWER

Switch
The switch has ON--OFF positions. An open-type guard discourages inadvertent actuation. When positioned to ON, TR power from the bomb indicator lights switch is supplied to the power-on indicator light and the
bomb release circuits, including bomb door control.
1-314
T.O. 1B-52H-1
BOMB DOOR SYSTEM NORMAL OPERATION

The OAS and bomb door switches at the pilots and
radar navigators stations are used for normal operation of the bomb doors. Hydraulic pressure is
available for bomb door operation when either
engine 5 or 4 is in operation. The No. 5 engine hydraulic pump supplies normal bomb-door-open and
close hydraulic pressure. The No. 4 and 5 lights on
the pilots hydraulic control panel will illuminate
when the respective system pressure is low. The
bomb door control valve lights on the radar navigators front panel will illuminate if there is pressure
in the bomb-door-close lines. The bomb-doors-notlatched lights will illuminate when the forward
bomb door latch is unlatched and they remain illuminated until the forward bomb door latch is
latched again. When illuminated, the bomb-doorsopen lights indicate the bomb doors are fully open
and the bomb door system will now hold the bomb
doors open until closing action is initiated.
OAS AUTOMATIC BOMB DOOR OPERATION
The OAS will automatically open the bomb doors at

a predetermined time for gravity weapons releases
from cluster racks or the CSRL and for missile
launches from the CSRL. For gravity releases from
cluster racks, the open signal is routed through the
RIU and the bomb-door-close-timer provides the
bomb door close signal. For gravity releases from
the CSRL and all missile launches, the open and
close signal is routed through the AIU.
NOTE
For SMOs that use the Armament Interface

Unit (AIU) to open the bomb bay doors (all,
except the GWD SMO) the OAS display is
the only indication of the bomb door status
that is used by the OAS to approve an automatic release. The OAS monitors a separate
safety switch than the circuit which provides the bomb-door-open light indication at
the pilots and radar navigators stations.
For these SMOs (all, except GWD SMO),
the OAS display must indicate an open
bomb door condition in order to allow a release. However, in simulation mode a bomb
door fault will not prohibit a simulated
gravity release (non-CSRL simulation only).
The door opening time for all gravity releases is

modifiable via FRMT 8 from 0 to 15 seconds and
initializes at 3 seconds. Door opening for all missile
launches is set at 3 seconds and non-modifiable.
Door closure is accomplished 3 seconds after any release/launch. To accomplish automatic OAS bomb
door operation proceed as follows:
CLUSTER RACK
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Command OAS to FLY TO a gravity target.

Engine 5 or 4 in operation.
Master Bomb Control Switch ON
Bomb Indicator Light Switch ON
Bombing System Switch AUTO
Release Circuits Disconnect Connected
DBRIC Set
ROTARY LAUNCHER
1. Command OAS to FLY TO a gravity target.
2. Engine 5 or 4 in operation.
3. Weapons Control Panel Missile Launch Mode
Switch AUTO
OAS MANUAL BOMB DOOR OPERATION
The OAS can be used to manually open or close the

bomb doors regardless of switch settings on the
master bomb control panel. Bomb doors can be
opened and closed both inflight and during ground
operations by use of the CF-59 command. Using either the pilots or radar navigators manual bomb
door switch will always result in a master fault for
bomb doors. This will not necessarily preclude release in any mode as long as CF-5 or the program
display indicates a bomb door open status. Monitoring the CF-5 display during use of CF-59 will allow
the operator to reference bomb door status (OPEN,
CLSD, or UNLTCHD). However, if CF-59 is used to
close bomb doors after a gravity weapon delivery,
the master bomb control switch must be cycled to
ensure the proper weapon release sequence is retained.
Exercise caution during ground operation of

bomb doors with CF-59. Ensure ground personnel are clear of bomb doors before entering the CF-59 command.
Change 20
1-315
T.O. 1B-52H-1
BOMB DOOR OPERATION WITH RADAR NAVIGATORS
BOMB DOOR SWITCH
BOMB DOOR OPERATION WITH PILOTS BOMB DOOR

SWITCH
To open the bomb doors with the radar navigators

bomb door switch:
To open the bomb doors with the pilots bomb door

switch:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Engine 5 or 4 in operation.
Master Bomb Control Switch ON
Bombing System Switch MANUAL
Radar Navigators Bomb Door Switch
OPEN
Hold the switch in OPEN position until the bombdoor-open lights are illuminated, then release. The
bomb doors will remain open. Loss of hydraulic
pressure will allow the bomb doors to be positioned
by the airstream loads to some intermediate position between full open and closed, depending on indicated airspeed.
2. Pilots Bomb Door Switch OPEN
Hold the switch in OPEN position until the bombdoor-open lights illuminate, then release. The bomb
doors will remain open. Loss of hydraulic pressure
will allow the bomb doors to be positioned by the
airstream loads to some intermediate position between full open and closed depending on indicated
airspeed.
To close the bomb doors with the radar navigators

bomb door switch:
Do not attempt to open the bomb doors with

the pilots bomb door switch when the
bombing system switch is in AUTO position
and the OAS is operating in the bomb
mode, as the bomb doors will keep cycling
(opening partly and then slamming closed)
until either the pilots bomb door switch is
positioned to OFF or the bombing system
switch is positioned to MANUAL.
2. Master Bomb Control Switch ON
3. Bombing System Switch MANUAL
4. Radar Navigators Bomb Door Switch
CLOSE
Hold the switch in CLOSE position until the bombdoor-not-latched lights are out, then release. The
bomb doors will remain closed.
To close the bomb doors with the pilots bomb door

switch:
2. Pilots Bomb Door Switch CLOSED
Hold the switch in CLOSED position until the
bomb-door-not-latched lights are out, then release.
The bomb doors will remain closed.
1-316
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Bomb Door System Circuit Protection and Location

CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
EQUIPMENT
Bomb Door Close Timer
POWER
SOURCE
BOMB SYSTEM BOMB DOOR

CONTROL
BNS TIMER DOOR CLOSE
ABNS/A17
Left TR

CONTROL
VALVE CHECK
ABNS/A18
Left TR
Bomb Door Control Valves and

Switches
BOMB SYSTEM DOOR CONTROL

AFT MAIN VALVE
FWD EMER VALVE
FWD MAIN VALVE
RELAYS
RFBNS/B24
RFBNS/B22
RFBNS/B23
RFBNS/B25
Rt. ESS
Left ESS
Rt. ESS
Rt. ESS
Bomb Door Emergency Opening

During Jettison Sequence
BOMB SYSTEM JETTISON

CONTR
PWR
RFBNS/B18
RFBNS/B19
Aft Batt.
Aft Batt.
Bomb Door Limit Safety

Switches for Jettison Sequence
MISCELLANEOUS
GAM-72 GEAR JETTISON
& AGM-69A
PCBP/E23
Aft Batt.

CONTROL POS IND
ABNS/A20
Left TR

CONTROL HOLD OPEN
ABNS/A19
Left TR
Bomb Door Control Valve Lights
Bomb Door System Indicators

Bomb Doors Not Latched
Light
Bomb Doors Open Light
11
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
ABNS
PCBP

RFBNS
Figure 1-95
1-317/(1-318 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS

DESCRIPTION
POWERED
RUDDER/ELEVATOR SYSTEM
STABILIZER TRIM SYSTEM
LA TERAL CONTROL SYSTEM
LA TERAL TRIM SYSTEM
AIRBRAKE ACTUATION
WING FLAP SYSTEM
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM CONTROLS AND INDICATORS
DESCRIPTION
Primary flight control of the aircraft is accomplished by three basic systems: the elevator, rudder,
and lateral control systems. The elevators and rudder are moved by hydraulically powered systems.
See POWERED RUDDER/ELEVATOR SYSTEM,
this section. Lateral control is accomplished by
spoilers which are part of a spoiler and airbrake
control system. Ailerons are not installed on the
aircraft.
1-319
1-319
1-322
1-325
1-327
1-327
1-329
1-331
movement due to SAS inputs). The maximum elevator deflection is 19 for mechanical control inputs and approximately 5 for SAS inputs. For further information on component parts of the powered rudder/elevator system, see HYDRAULIC
POWER SUPPLY SYSTEMS, this section. For further information on the electronic portion of the
powered rudder/elevator system, see Stability Augmentation System (SAS), in AUTOMATIC FLIGHT
CONTROL SYSTEMS, this section.
RUDDER AND ELEVATOR ACTUATORS
Flight control systems circuit protection and the

POWERED RUDDER/ELEVATOR SYSTEM

A hydraulically powered rudder/elevator system
(figure 1-96) is installed in the aircraft in conjunction with a yaw and pitch stability augmentation
system (SAS) which provides dutch roll damping,
reduced structural loads, and controllability in turbulence. For further information on the SAS, see
Stability Augmentation System (SAS), in AUTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS, this section. SAS commands applied to the rudder hydraulic actuator are applied in series with pilot inputs
(i.e., the rudder pedals do not reflect rudder movement due to SAS inputs). The maximum rudder
deflection is limited to 19 for mechanical control
inputs and 10 for SAS inputs. Two elevator actuators are incorporated in the pitch axis control system to provide an irreversible actuation system.
The elevator actuators position the elevators in response to mechanical control inputs transmitted to
each actuator from the control column or autopilot
pitch axis and by electrical signals transmitted to
each actuator from the SAS. Autopilot commands
are applied to the actuators in parallel with pilot
inputs (i.e., the control column is displaced when
the elevators are displaced). SAS commands are applied to the actuators in series with pilot inputs
(i.e., the control column does not reflect elevator
The rudder is powered by a single actuator while

the elevator is powered by two actuators, one each
for the right and left surfaces, operating independently of one another (figure 1-96). The rudder and
elevator actuators are dual tandem type units with
each of the two cylinders utilizing power from one
of the two rudder/elevator hydraulic systems. The
actuators position the rudder and elevators in response to pilot and/or electrical input commands.
Each of the actuators also incorporate two load
limit devices, one per piston and cylinder assembly,
to permit control surface blow down to preclude
inadvertent structural damage due to the added
power of the system. It should be noted that the
stability augmentation system and mechanical
command ability is fully operational in the event of
one complete hydraulic system failure. The only
degradation in performance noted is a lower blow
down speed, which decreases authority in some
flight conditions. This is due to the fact that only
half power is available. Snubbing is provided in the
last three degrees of rudder and elevator travel.
Each actuator package consists of two shutoff
valves, four filters, and two position transducers.
Each rudder and elevator actuator also employs
two electrohydraulic control valves. These electrohydraulic flow control valves are controlled by electrical inputs. Each unit meters hydraulic fluid flow
to an auxiliary servo actuator in response to an
electrical signal. For further information, see STABILITY AUGMENTATION SYSTEM, this section.
1-319
T.O. 1B-52H-1
RUDDER PEDALS
The rudder pedals are conventional and are adjustable fore and aft by levers on the inboard side of
each pedal. A vertical hinge incorporated into each
pedal allows the pedals to be individually folded aft
to provide additional leg room.
RUDDER ARTIFICIAL FEEL
Rudder feel and centering is provided by a rudder

Q-spring in the cable system. This device consists of
two bellows chambers attached to fuselage structure. Ram air from the leading edge of the fin enters the two chambers and exerts a pressure directly proportional to indicated airspeed; this pressure
exerts a force on a cable which is attached to a Qspring arm on the rudder torque tube. Tension in
the cable tends to keep the Q-spring arm centered,
thereby also centering the rudder control system. It
also adds a resistance to pilot control force, thus
simulating airloads on a conventional rudder system.
RUDDER TRIM
A ball bearing screw actuator, which is extended or

retracted by a cable system attached to the rudder
trim knob, moves the rudder torque tube to a new
position relative to the Q-spring lever and provides
rudder trim. The Q-spring tends to maintain the
torque tube in the neutral position as set by adjustment of the trim knob. Movement of the rudder
pedals in flight rotates the torque tube causing displacement of the Q-spring lever; however, when use
of rudder is discontinued, Q-spring force returns
the torque tube to the neutral position. Use of rudder trim will displace the entire rudder control system including the rudder pedals. This displacement
moves the rudder by mechanical command input to
the rudder actuator.
cranks and the forward elevator control quadrants.

These switches, although having no effect on the
elevator system, provide the pilots with a means of
quickly terminating any unscheduled stabilizer
trim movements that may result from stabilizer or
autopilot system malfunction (except stabilizer trim
reversal). For further information on force switch
operation, see FORCE SWITCHES under STABILIZER TRIM SYSTEM, this section. Either or both
control columns may be manually disconnected
from the cable system and stowed forward against
the instrument panel. A connection is provided between the disconnect linkage and the seat ejection
system so that the column will be automatically disconnected and stowed during the seat ejection cycle.
Disconnect Levers
The pilots and copilots control columns can be

manually disconnected from the elevator system by
pushing forward and downward on control column
disconnect levers. These levers are located near
each pilots outboard armrest and below their respective side panels. When disconnecting a control
column, grasp the control wheel, push down on the
disconnect lever, and assist the control column into
its stowed position. The columns will remain in
position when manually disconnected. Reconnection
of control columns after depressing disconnect lever
is dependent on column being cycled through
stowed detent or disconnect lever being pulled up
before being reconnected.
Rudder Trim Knob and Indicator
The rudder trim knob and indicator on the aisle

stand is the only control provided for rudder trim.
Rotation of the knob actuates the trim screw and
repositions the rudder torque tube to a new neutral
trim which is maintained by the Q-spring.
CONTROL COLUMNS
The control columns transmit control movements

through separate control column disconnect mechanisms to the respective right and left forward control cable quadrant, where a pair of cables joins
them into a single system. A force switch assembly
is contained in each of the control rods located between the control column transverse shaft bell-
1-320
Whenever either control column is disengaged and subsequently reengaged in flight,

positive engagement will be confirmed by
holding the other column rigid near neutral
while applying a push/pull force to the column being engaged. This may be accomplished with the autopilot operating provided care is taken not to displace either
column sufficiently to cause autopilot disengagement.
When the column has been reengaged after
ejection sequence has been initiated, the
column will be manually stowed for subsequent ejection.
NOTE
After ejection sequence has been initiated,

control column can be reengaged by pulling
disengage lever up as far as possible and
holding it until the control column is pulled
aft and engagement occurs.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Powered Rudder/Elevator System
Figure 1-96
1-321
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ELEVATOR ARTIFICIAL FEEL
Elevator feel and centering is provided by an elevator Q-spring in the cable system. The Q-spring consists of a single bellows chamber attached to the
structure operating in conjunction with a preloaded
mechanical spring to provide control centering force
in the low speed range. Operation of the elevator
control system in either direction from neutral is
immediately opposed by the resistance of the
Q-spring and the mechanical spring. The mechanical spring provides supplemental artificial feel and
a positive control column neutral position. Pilot effort required to maneuver the aircraft is increased
at low airspeeds (providing trim stimulus) and decreased at high airspeeds (providing improved maneuvering capabilities) with positive centering at
all airspeeds (increasing trim stability). In the
event that Q-spring pressure is lost, this additional
spring tension on the elevator system will provide
partial feel. Conventional elevator trim is not provided; pitch trim is accomplished by hydraulically
moving the entire stabilizer.
STABILIZER TRIM SYSTEM
Pitch trim of the aircraft is provided by the stabilizer trim system (figure 1-97). The leading edge of the
stabilizer is raised and lowered by a jackscrew driven by two hydraulic motors. One of the motors
drives the screw and the other drives the nut. The
motor driving the screw is supplied with pressure
from the right body hydraulic system while the left
body hydraulic system supplies the motor driving
the nut. The hydraulic pressure to the motors is
metered by valves which are controlled by the cable
system or a parallel electric trim control system
through a followup system. The mechanical followup system automatically returns the metering
valves to the closed position when the stabilizer
reaches the position called for by the cable system,
the electric trim control system, or the autopilot.
When engaged, the autopilot provides stabilizer
trim through the followup system. An alternate
source of hydraulic pressure for the upper hydraulic
motor (which drives the screw) is furnished by the
right body standby pump. No standby pump is provided for the lower hydraulic motor (which drives
the nut). Stabilizer speed is approximately four
units every 10 seconds with both left and right body
hydraulic systems operating and engines at idle
and six units every 10 seconds with engines operating at 82% rpm and above. When operated only on
standby pressure, this speed is reduced to approximately one unit every 10 seconds. Trim position
creeping, due to airloads on the stabilizer when the
hydraulic system is unpressurized, is prevented by
a hydraulically released brake on each hydraulic
1-322
motor drive. This brake is completely released

when hydraulic pressure is above 1000 psi. The
electrical input into the followup system is equivalent to approximately seven units every 10 seconds
of stabilizer travel. Pitch trim is not automatically
adjusted when the wing flaps are raised and lowered. An automatically operated heating element is
installed in each followup screw to prevent icing of
the screw threads. Missile rotary launcher operation in the secondary mode places a high demand
on the right body hydraulics system. To ensure a
continuous hydraulic supply for bomb door operation and/or for stabilizer trim screw operation, trim
change electrical inputs in both the noseup and
nosedown directions are paralleled to rotary
launcher hydraulic interrupt relays. Operation of
either interrupt relay will result in interruption of
the launcher hydraulic drive for the duration of the
trim change and/or bomb door operation.
NOTE
If heater elements are not installed or are

inoperative, the stabilizer trim system may
become inoperative under certain conditions
of temperature and humidity. This inoperative condition could be caused by frost or ice
buildup on the followup screws which may
jam the screws and prevent stabilizer operation either manually or electrically until
the frost or ice is melted. Operation without
heaters after cold soak at altitude may result in a reduced operation rate electrically
and sponginess in the operation of the
manual trim wheel.
Stabilizer Trim Wheels and Indicators
Manual control of the stabilizer trim metering

valve is provided by rotation of the stabilizer trim
wheels on the aisle stand. The pilots trim wheel is
attached to the throttle shaft and operates through
a chain sprocket linkage to move a trim indicator
located forward and inboard of the wheel. The copilots trim wheel and trim indicator are located opposite to the pilots trim indicator. The indicators are
calibrated in units of stabilizer leading edge movement from nine units AIRPLANE NOSE DN to four
units AIRPLANE NOSE UP, with one unit equalling 1 of stabilizer travel. Any trim accomplished
using the electric trim control system will feed back
through the cable system rotating the manual trim
wheels and indicators. The manual trim wheels can
be used to override the electric trim control system
or autopilot trim system. The trim wheel face and
periphery is painted in alternate black and white
segments as a visual aid and reminder when the
electric trim control system is being used.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Stabilizer and Lateral Trim Buttons
Stabilizer and lateral trim buttons are located on

the outboard grips of the pilots control wheels.
Guards are provided on the wheels at the stabilizer
trim switch housings to prevent inadvertent actuation of the trim switches. To initiate electrical actuation of the stabilizer trim, either the NOSE UP
or NOSE DN position is used. The buttons are
spring loaded to an unmarked center OFF position.
NOTE
The spring-loaded feature of the stabilizer

trim switch should not be relied on to return the switch to neutral. The pilot should
manually return the switch to neutral with
a positive thumb movement each time it is
used. To aid in recognizing a malfunctioning
electrical trim system before reaching an
extreme out-of-trim condition, the trim
switch will be actuated in short intermittent bursts when used during flight. Due to
the possibility of the switch sticking, care
should also be taken to avoid inadvertent
actuation of the switch when flying on
autopilot. A runaway trim condition would
result if a trim switch was stuck and the
autopilot was disengaged.
Actuation of the stabilizer trim button should produce the following visible results:
1) Nose up trim moves the trim indicator aft toward
AIRPLANE NOSE UP, the manual trim wheel rotates aft, and the stabilizer leading edge moves
down; and conversely;
2) Nose down trim moves the trim indicator forward toward AIRPLANE NOSE DN, the manual
trim wheel rotates forward, and the stabilizer leading edge moves up.
Moving a button to either trim position closes a circuit to supply left TR power to one of two power relays. These relays will switch 205-volt three-phase
ac power to operate the trim control motor. Positioning a button to a trim position will also supply
TR power to the respective nose up or nose down
clutch solenoid in the trim actuator. The stabilizer
trim function of the stabilizer and lateral trim buttons is inoperative when the autopilot PITCH ENGAGE switch is ON. This is accomplished by electrically disconnecting the control circuits between
the trim buttons and the actuator clutches and
power relays. For operating limitations of the stabilizer trim system, see SYSTEMS LIMITATIONS,
Section V.
Stabilizer Trim Cutout Switch
A guarded stabilizer trim cutout switch on the aisle

stand is provided to disconnect the dc control circuits between the trim buttons and the stabilizer
trim control relay coil. Manual control of stabilizer
trim is not affected by the cutout switch.
Force Switches
Force switches are installed within the control column linkage to provide the pilots with an effective
means of immediate interruption of unscheduled
stabilizer trim movement (except stabilizer trim reversal as noted below). A pilots reaction in responding to an aircraft pitch movement is an opposing
control column force. When such an opposing force
on either control column reaches 24 to 36 pounds,
two microswitches are actuated to open. One switch
disengages the autopilot and the other deactivates
the stabilizer trim in the unscheduled direction
only. Electrically controlled trim opposing the unscheduled trim movement continues to be available
by means of trim buttons unless deactivated by the
trim cutout switch or circuit breakers. Note that as
control column force is reduced below the 24 to 36
pounds required to actuate the microswitches, the
switches close and restore any unscheduled stabilizer trim not originally caused by the autopilot
which will not reengage.
1-323
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Stabilizer Trim System

TO AUTOPILOT
DISCONNECT
CIRCUIT
CONTROL COLUMNS
FORWARD
METERING
VALVE
FROM RIGHT BODY
HYDRAULIC
SYSTEM
HYDRAULICALLY
RELEASED
BRAKE
PILOTS CIRCUIT
BREAKER PANEL
TRIM CONTR
PILOTS
FORCE
SWITCH
JACKSCREW
COPILOTS
FORCE
SWITCH
UPPER
HYDRAULIC
MOTOR
STABILIZER
AND LATERAL
TRIM BUTTON
CONTROL COLUMNS
AFT
NOSE
DOWN
CUTOUT
FOLLOWUP
LINKAGE
LOWER
HYDRAULIC
MOTOR
JACKSCREW NUT
NOSE
UP
STABILIZER
TRIM
CUTOUT
SWITCH
STABILIZER
NORMAL
HYDRAULIC
RELEASED
BRAKE
AFT AC
POWER
BOX
TRIM
INDICATORS
STABILIZER TRIM
ACTUATOR CIRCUIT
BREAKER 3 AC
CLUTCH
NOSE
UP
AFT AC
POWER BOX
3
AC
TRIM
CONTROL
MOTOR
NOSE
DN
STABILIZER
TRIM WHEELS
ON
OFF
PITCH
ENGAGE
SWITCH
AUTO
PILOT
STAB
TRIM
SERVO
PRESSURE
RETURN
FROM LEFT BODY
HYDRAULIC
SYSTEM
ELECTRICAL CIRCUITS
METERING
VALVE
TO ROTARY LAUNCHER
HYDRAULICS STABILIZER TRIM
INTERRUPT RELAYS
Figure 1-97
1-324
A31722
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LATERAL CONTROL SYSTEM

Lateral control and airbrake action are provided by
a spoiler and airbrake system (figure 1-98). Each
wing is provided with seven spoilers which perform
a dual function. Rotation of the control wheels actuates hydraulically operated spoilers located on the
upper surface of each wing just aft of the rear spar.
Rising the spoilers interrupts the flow of air over
the wing, causing a reduction in lift and an increase
in drag.
When the control wheel is rotated, the spoilers are
actuated to provide lateral control. In addition,
when the airbrake lever is actuated, the spoilers
are raised symmetrically to act as airbrakes. The
spoilers are numbered from left to right No. 1 thru
7 being on the left wing and 8 thru 14 on the right
wing. Each of the 14 spoilers has a separate hydraulic actuator. On each wing, the four outboard
spoilers are mechanically linked to operate as a
unit and are called group A. The three inboard
spoilers are also mechanically linked to operate as a
unit and are called group B. Group A spoilers are
powered by the outboard wing hydraulic system
(hydraulic pumps on engines 1 and 7); group B
spoilers are powered by the inboard wing hydraulic
system (hydraulic pumps on engines 3 and 6). Hydraulic pressure is metered by four metering
valves, one for each group of spoilers. The four metering valves are controlled through four differential mechanisms, one for each valve, which allow
the metering valves to be operated by either airbrake control, lateral control (including lateral
trim), or both simultaneously. When lateral control
and airbrake control mechanisms are used simultaneously, the differential mechanisms in one wing
will be moved the total amount called for by both
control systems and the spoilers will respond to the
total control signal. At the same time, the differential mechanisms in the opposite wing will receive
control movements in the opposite direction. The
net result is that the output movement of the differentials is the difference between opposing input signals; the spoilers respond to the difference in the
two. This will result in cancellation of airbrake action in cases where the spoiler signal equals or is
greater than the airbrake signal, permitting the
lateral control system to override the airbrake system.
Spoiler action for lateral control is initiated by control wheel rotation which mechanically opens hydraulic metering valves to supply pressure to the
spoiler actuators. A mechanical followup system automatically returns the metering valves to the
closed position when the spoilers reach the position
called for by the control wheels or by the autopilot,
if engaged. The spoilers are full up (60) at
approximately 80 of wheel rotation. Rotation of the
control wheels will cause both metering valves in
both wings to be displaced. All spoilers will rise on
the wing toward which the control wheel is turned
and, at the same time, the metering valves in the
opposite wing will be displaced in the opposite
direction to lower spoilers. This will have no effect
on the spoilers on this wing if they are already in
the down position. The metering valves permit this
control movement without bottoming. Two
overtravel spring cartridges located in each wing
allow continued operation of the remainder of the
system should a metering valve, followup system,
differential mechanism, or trim mechanism be
jammed.
NOTE
At airspeeds above 250 knots, the spoiler

actuators do not have sufficient force to
raise the spoilers full up. Adequate roll control is still available under these conditions.
Because of this force limitation, the roll response with wheel position is not the same
with airbrakes up as with zero airbrakes. In
the area of spoiler blowdown, a dead area
exists, but when the control wheel is rotated beyond this area, spoiler control will
be regained and roll control will still be obtained.
CONTROL WHEELS
Dual control wheels (2, figure 1-101) are provided

for the pilots. Each wheel has, on its outboard
handgrip, a stabilizer and lateral trim button, an
autopilot and air refueling (IFR) boom release button, and an interphone-mike trigger switch. Each
wheel has, on its inboard handgrip, an EVS NFOV
(narrow field of view) select switch.
NOTE
The control wheels are not disconnected

from the lateral controls when the control
columns are disconnected.
1-325
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Spoiler and Airbrake System

NOTE
Left wing system shown
right wing system similar.
NO. 5
SPOILER
METERING WING
FOLLOWUP
LINKAGE
FROM INBOARD WING

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
SPOILER NO. 5
ACTUATOR
CHECK
VALVE
TO SPOILER
ACTUATOR
NO. 6 & 7
AIRBRAKE
CONTROL
ACTUATOR
(FOR GROUP
"B" SPOILERS)
AIRBRAKE
LEVER
AUTO PILOT
LATERAL CONTROL SERVO
DIFFERENTIAL
UNIT (FOR GROUP)
"B" SPOILERS)
TO RIGHT
WING
SYSTEM
AIRBRAKE
SWITCH BOX
CONTROL
WHEEL
AIRBRAKE
CONTROL
ACTUATOR
(FOR GROUP
"A" SPOILERS)
DIFFERENTIAL
UNIT (FOR GROUP
"A" SPOILERS)
PRESSURE
RETURN
FROM OUTBOARD
WING HYDRAULIC
SYSTEM
FROM LATERAL
TRIM SYSTEM
NO. 1
SPOILER
ELECTRICAL
CIRCUITS
MECHANICAL
ACTUATION
CHECK
VALVE
TO RIGHT
WING SYSTEM
FOLLOWUP
LINKAGE
METERING VALVE
SPOILER
NO. 1
ACTUATOR
TO SPOILER
ACTUATOR
NO. 2, 3 & 4
A31724
Figure 1-98
1-326
Change 17
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LATERAL TRIM SYSTEM
An electrically controlled lateral trim system (figure 1-99) provides a means of obtaining lateral trim
(lateral control neutral position). Lateral trim buttons on the control wheels control a single centrally
located electrical trim actuator which is cable-connected to an actuator drum on the spoiler centering
mechanism in each wing. Rotation of the actuator
drum relocates the neutral position for each centering mechanism which in turn tends to hold the entire lateral control system in a new position. Maximum displacement of the neutral position is equivalent to approximately 20 of rotation to left and
right of the zero control wheel position. Limit
switches are incorporated within the electrical trim
actuator to prevent the actuator from exceeding its
maximum allowable travel. The effect of lateral
trim will be modified as airbrakes are applied,
making readjustment of lateral trim necessary.
Lateral Trim Cutout Switch
The 118-volt single-phase ac circuit for the lateral

trim actuator can be disconnected by actuating the
lateral trim cutout switch (9, figure 1-101).
degrees of spoiler position from 0 to 15 spoiler up

with a separate scale for left and right spoilers. The
indicator pointer is a single needle pointed at both
ends and will indicate on either scale. The pointer
is electrically connected to a position transmitter of
the lateral trim actuator shaft.
Stabilizer and Lateral Trim Buttons
Lateral trim control is provided by a stabilizer and

lateral trim button (1, figure 1-101) on the outboard
handgrip of each control wheel.
AIRBRAKE ACTUATION
Use of the spoilers as airbrakes is controlled by an

airbrake lever which electrically controls solenoid
valves in airbrake control actuators at each spoiler
differential unit. The airbrake control actuators reset the spoiler differential units to open the spoiler
metering valves. The metering valves are opened in
pairs so that the outboard spoilers move as a unit
and the inboard spoilers move as a unit, providing
symmetrical airbrake action. Control for the airbrakes is available on emergency battery power.
Airbrake Lever
Lateral Trim Indicator
A single lateral trim indicator (6, figure 1-101) provides an indication of trim input which is comparative with spoiler position. Spoiler position does not
necessarily correspond to indicated trim which is
electrically positioned by the lateral trim actuator
shaft. As much as 3 of trim indication may be
necessary to compensate for tolerances in the
lateral control system. The indicator is calibrated in
The airbrake lever (12, figure 1-101) has an OFF

position and six positions. Detents are provided at
OFF position, positions 1, 2, 4, and 6. Position 1,
marked AR, used primarily for air refueling, gives
increased roll rate authority. When the airbrake lever is progressively moved through its full range
(with the control wheel in neutral), the outboard
spoiler and the inboard spoilers operate alternately
as described in figure 1-101, sheet 4, item 12.
Change 12
1-327
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Lateral Trim System
Figure 1-99
1-328
T.O. 1B-52H-1
WING FLAP SYSTEM
WING FLAP LEVER
The wing flap system includes four separate wing

flap sections. The flaps are of the Fowler type with
high lift-drag ratio resulting in shortened takeoffs
and reduced landing speeds. All four flap sections
are simultaneously driven by a single power unit located in the fuselage aft of the center section gear
spar (figure 1-100). The power unit consists of two
205-volt three-phase ac motors joined by differential gearing. Each motor is provided with an electrically released brake which will be released only
when the motor is energized and putting out
torque. A flap torque tube driven by the power unit
extends out each wing on the aft side of the rear
spar. This torque tube drives two jackscrews in
each flap section to extend or retract flaps. During
the first 37 1/2% of extension, the flaps rotate
downward 35 with little rearward movement. For
the remainder of the extension, the flaps move
rearward only. Most of the drag increase occurs
during the first 20% of the flap motion. This initial
20% rotates the flaps down 29 in approximately 12
seconds, leaving only 6 of rotation in the
remaining 80% of flap extension. The flaps are
electronically controlled by a single flap lever. No
emergency control system is provided for the flaps;
however, should one of the two motors in the power
unit be rendered inoperative, the remaining motor
will extend or retract the flaps in approximately
120 seconds. An overspeed brake mechanism
located at the outboard end of each flap torque tube
functions automatically to modulate rate of flap
movement in case of excessive rpm of the flap drive.
Such excessive rpm would be induced by the
slipstream acting to drive a flap section or
sections which had been rendered free because of
a broken torque tube. The overspeed brake limits
the movement to a rate that will not cause damage
to the free section or sections. For information on
the aerodynamic characteristics of the wing flaps,
see Section VI.
Control of the wing flaps is accomplished by moving

a lever with an airfoil-type knob (7, figure 1-101) on
a detent quadrant located on the right side of the
aisle stand.
A dual wing flap position indicator (5, figure 1-101)

reads from 0% to 100% of wing flap travel. The indicator transmitters, which are controlled by TR
power, are located in the overspeed brakes on the
outboard ends of each torque tube. The dual indicating system is provided to show any difference in
position of the left and right wing flap sections such
as would result from a broken flap torque tube. The
top needle in the indicator, has a hole in it, is
marked R and indicates the position of the right
wing flaps. The bottom needle is marked L and indicates the position of the left flaps.
WING FLAPS UP WARNING SIGNAL
The wing flaps up warning signal is sounded by the

landing gear warning horn. The signal will sound
only when the aircraft is on the ground, throttles
for engines 3 and 5 or 4 and 6 are beyond approximately 45 of travel (as indicated on the thrust gate
guide rail) and flaps are not fully extended.
The horn is activated by a series circuit energized
by TR power through the horn, throttles for engines
3 and 5 or 4 and 6, a landing gear squat switch, and
through the flap warning horn switch. Engines 1, 2,
7, and 8 are not included in this circuit. When the
flaps warning horn is energized, a signal is also
sent to the master caution light to cause it to illuminate.
1-329
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Wing Flap System
Figure 1-100
1-330
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Flight Control System Controls and Indicators
1
2
3
4
5
6
STABILIZER AND LATERAL TRIM BUTTON

CONTROL WHEEL
CONTROL COLUMN
LATERAL TRIM INDICATOR
7
8
9
10
11
12
WING FLAP LEVER

RUDDER TRIM KNOB AND INDICATOR
LATERAL TRIM CUTOUT SWITCH
STABILIZER TRIM WHEELS AND INDICATORS
STABILIZER TRIM CUTOUT SWITCH
AIRBRAKE LEVER
1-331
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Flight Control System Controls and Indicators (Cont)

NO.
1
CONTROLINDICATOR
Stabilizer and Lateral Trim Button
FUNCTION
Stabilizer and lateral trim buttons are located on the outboard grips of the
pilots control wheels. Guards are provided on the wheels at the stabilizer
trim switch housings to prevent inadvertent actuation of the trim switches.
These buttons have L WING DN- -R WING DN- -NOSE DOWN- -NOSE
UP- -OFF positions and are spring loaded to OFF. Only the first two positions and the center OFF position affect the lateral trim. When moved
sideways to the L WING DN or R WING DN positions, the buttons close
contacts to supply TR power to one of two lateral trim relays.
This relay, when energized, will close contacts to supply 118-volt single
phase ac power to the lateral trim actuator. The dc control circuit to each
trim relay is closed only when the other relay is deenergized; thus when
one pilot is trimming the lateral control system, the other pilots trim circuit
is disconnected. The trim buttons energize either the stabilizer or lateral
trim circuits but not both at the same time.
NOTE
Use of a trim button does not position the control wheels. Lateral
trim is accomplished by coordination of trim button actuation
with control wheel movement. As lateral trim is accomplished,
centering spring loads are relieved when a neutral position is established for the lateral control centering mechanism of each
wing. The neutral trim position, as provided by rotation of the lateral trim actuator drum, will allow the aircraft lateral attitude to
remain as positioned by the control wheels after a stable
trimmed condition has been established.
Control Wheel
Dual control wheels are provided for the pilots. Each wheel has, on its outboard handgrip, a stabilizer and lateral trim button, an autopilot and air
refueling (IFR) boom release button, and an interphone-mike trigger
switch. Each wheel has, on its inboard handgrip, an EVS NFOV (narrow
field of view) select switch.
Control Column
The dual control columns transmit control movements.
Control Column Disconnect Lever
Used to manually disconnect the pilots and copilots control columns

from the elevator system by pushing forward and downward on control
column disconnect levers. When disconnecting a control column, grasp
the control wheel, push down on the disconnect lever, and assist the control column.
Wing Flap Position Indicator
A dual wing flap position indicator is provided which reads from 0% to

100% of wing flap travel. The dual indicating system is provided to show
any difference in position of the left and right wing flap sections such as
would result from a broken flap torque tube. The top needle in the indicator, has a hole in it, is marked R and indicates the position of the right wing
flaps. The bottom needle is marked L and indicates the position of the left
flaps.
1-332
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
A single lateral trim indicator provides an indication of trim input which is

comparative with spoiler position. Spoiler position does not necessarily
correspond to indicated trim which is electrically positioned by the lateral
trim actuator shaft. As much as 3 of trim indication may be necessary to
compensate for tolerances in the lateral control system. The indicator is
calibrated in degrees of spoiler position from 0 to 15 spoiler up with a
separate scale for left and right spoilers. The indicator pointer is a single
needle pointed at both ends and will indicate on either scale.
Wing Flap Lever
The wing flap lever provides UP- -OFF- -DN positions with detents at UP
and DN positions. This lever must be pulled up out of the detent before
it can be moved from either the UP or DN position. An OFF position is located on either side of a spring-loaded latch-type stop which is in the
middle of the detent quadrant. Depressing the latch toward the flap lever
allows the flap lever to be moved from OFF position on either side of the
latch to the opposite detent. When the lever is placed in the UP or DN
position, a circuit is closed to supply TR power to left and right flap extend
or retract relays. Limit switches provide protection for both extension and
retraction operations. When the lever is in OFF position, the circuits are
deenergized and the wing flaps are held in their last position.
Rudder Trim Knob and Indicator
The rudder trim knob and indicator is the only control provided for rudder
trim. Rotation of the knob actuates the trim screw and repositions the rudder torque tube to a new neutral trim which is maintained by the Q-spring.
The indicator is a mechanical indicator calibrated in units of trim up to a
maximum of 12 units nose left and 12 nose right.
Lateral Trim Cutout Switch
The 118-volt single-phase ac circuit for the lateral trim actuator can be disconnected by actuating a CUTOUT- -NORMAL guarded switch on the left
side of the aisle stand. When the switch is in CUTOUT (guard up) position, the circuit is broken and lateral trim is inoperative. This switch must
be in NORMAL (guard down) position before lateral trim can be accomplished.
10
Stabilizer Trim Wheels and Indicators
Manual control of the stabilizer trim metering valve is provided by rotation

of the stabilizer trim wheels on the aisle stand. The pilots trim wheel is
attached to the throttle shaft and operates through a chain sprocket linkage to move a trim indicator located forward and inboard of the wheel.
The copilots trim wheel and trim indicator are located opposite to the pilots trim indicator. The indicators are calibrated in units of stabilizer leading edge movement from nine units AIRPLANE NOSE DN to four units
AIRPLANE NOSE UP, with one unit equalling 1 of stabilizer travel. Any
trim accomplished using the electric trim control system will feed back
through the cable system rotating the manual trim wheels and indicators.
The manual trim wheels can be used to override the electric trim control
system or autopilot trim system. The trim wheel face and periphery is
painted in alternate black and white segments as a visual aid and reminder when the electric trim control system is being used.
1-333
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Flight Control System Controls and Indicators (Cont)

CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
FUNCTION
11
Stabilizer Trim Cutout Switch
A guarded CUTOUT- -NORMAL stabilizer trim cutout switch is used to

disconnect the dc control circuits between the trim buttons and the stabilizer trim control relay coil. When this switch is in CUTOUT (guard up) position, the circuits are broken and the stabilizer trim cannot be operated
electrically. For normal electrical control of stabilizer trim, this switch must
be in NORMAL (guard down) position. Manual control of stabilizer trim is
not affected by the cutout switch in either CUTOUT or NORMAL position.
12
Airbrake Lever
The airbrake lever operates six contacts in the airbrake switch box supplying emergency battery power to the solenoid valves at the hydraulic
control units. These units mechanically open the metering valves which
direct hydraulic pressure to actuate the spoilers. The lever has an OFF
position and six operating positions marked 1- -2- -3- -4- -5- -6. Detents
are provided at OFF positions 1, 2, 4, and 6. Position 1, marked AR, is
used primarily for air refueling and gives increased roll rate authority. OFF
position of the airbrake lever deenergizes the airbrake control circuits and
permits the spoilers to provide lateral control only. When the airbrake lever is progressively moved through its full range (with the control wheel
in neutral), the outboard spoiler and the inboard spoilers will be operated
alternately as follows:
LEVER
POSITION
OFF
1
2
3
4
5
6
OUTBOARD
SPOILERS
0
10
10
40
40
50
50
INBOARD
SPOILERS
0
0
20
20
40
40
60
NOTE
The spoilers move rapidly from one position to another as new
positions are selected by the airbrake lever. Gradually moving
the airbrake lever from one position to another will not result in
a reduced rate of spoiler movement nor can they be stopped in
any intermediate position.
1-334
Change 12
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Flight Control Systems Circuit

CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
EQUIPMENT
Airbrakes Control
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
MISCELLANEOUS AIR BRAKE CONTR

INBD
OUTBD
PCBP/E12
PCBP/E13
Emer Batt.
Emer Batt.
MISCELLANEOUS WING FLAPS

CONTROL LEFT
CONTROL RIGHT
PCBP/E6
PCBP/E7
Left TR
Rt. TR
Flaps Position Indicator
FLIGHT INDICATORS FLAP POS
PCBP/D1
Left TR
Flaps Up Warning Signal
LANDING GEAR
POS & FLAPS WARN HORN
PCBP/A1
Rt. TR
MISCELLANEOUS
LATERAL TRIM ACTUATOR
PCBP/E9
AC Bus 3
FLIGHT INDICATORS LATERAL TRIM
PCBP/D2
Left TR
MISCELLANEOUS TRIM CONTR
PCBP/E8
Left TR
Flap Position Control Relays
Lateral Trim Actuator

Rudder/Elevator Hydraulic System See HYDRAULIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM CIRCUIT
PROTECTION AND LOCATION,
This Section
Stabilizer and Lateral Trim
Control
11
PCBP
Figure 1-102
1-335/(1-336 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1

AUTOPILOT SYSTEM
AUTOPILOT NONSTEERING MODES
AUTOPILOT PITCH AND ROLL STEERING MODES
AUTOPILOT SAFETY FEATURES
PITCH AND ROLL STEERING FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS
STABILITY AUGMENTATION SYSTEM
AUTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROLS AND INDICATORS
AUTOPILOT NORMAL OPERATION
PREFLIGHT OF THE AUTOPILOT
PILOTS OPERATION OF THE AUTOPILOT
RADAR NAVIGATORS OPERATION OF THE AUTOPILOT
AUTOPILOT DISENGAGEMENT
AUTOPILOT
AUTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM
The word autopilot, as used in this manual, consists of the entire digital automatic Flight Control
System (FCS). The autopilot provides automatic
flight control with nonsteering and pitch and roll
steering modes. The bomb mode, another autopilot
auxiliary control mode, allows the autopilot to be
integrated with the OAS. A synchronization mode,
also called a followup system, is provided with the
autopilot and operates anytime the autopilot is on
but disengaged. The followup system of the
autopilot, allows the roll servo and pitch servo to
align (i.e., synchronize) to existing flight attitude
and heading of the aircraft for smooth engagement
of autopilot control modes. An interlock system is
provided as protection against improper operation
of the autopilot and to ensure the pilot of primary
flight control at all times. The autopilot operates on
TR power and 118 volt single-phase ac power.
The autopilot will be used with caution

during any critical phase of flight (i.e., low
level, air refueling, or combat breakaway
maneuvers). The trim condition of the aircraft should be closely monitored at all
times when using the autopilot, but particularly so during the critical flight phases
mentioned above. In the event of automatic
trim system failure, large amounts of stabilizer trim can be compensated for by the
autopilot. This can result in severe pitch
down/up when either a change in attitude
or power setting causes an automatic disconnect or when a manual disconnect is accomplished. To minimize the effect of an automatic trim system failure, the fore and aft
position of the control column should be
monitored closely. If several units of nosedown stabilizer trim and aft position of the
1-337
1-337
1-338
1-338
1-339
1-342
1-342
1-348
1-348
1-350
1-351
1-352
control column are detected while flying

with autopilot altitude hold engaged, be
aware that autopilot disengagement by any
means will cause abrupt pitchdown unless
proper preventive steps are taken. Disengaging the autopilot, retrimming, and reengaging at frequent intervals, is recommended.
NOTE
If dc or ac power to the AHRS is lost, the

autopilot will disengage immediately.
Automatic flight control systems circuit protection
AUTOPILOT NONSTEERING MODES
Autopilot stabilization and altitude hold are referred to as autopilot nonsteering modes because
control column inputs are not used to command
pitch and roll to the autopilot. Autopilot stabilization is provided anytime ROLL ENGAGE and/or
PITCH ENGAGE switches on the control panel are
set to the ON position. The autopilot can be operated with only roll stabilization or only pitch stabilization if desired. The autopilot stabilization mode
is used to hold the aircraft in straight and level
flight on a constant heading using pitch, roll, and
heading signals provided by the AHRS. Aircraft attitudes and heading changes are made by a
crewmember using the autopilot flight controller or
by the OAS. The autopilot stabilization mode is always selected first before other autopilot control
modes can be engaged. The altitude hold mode is
used to maintain the aircraft at a constant barometric pressure altitude. Altitude hold cannot be
engaged unless the pitch flight stabilization mode is
engaged. Pressure signals from the Air Data Sensor
Unit are processed by the FCS Processor to control
elevator and stabilizer trim as required to maintain
the aircraft at the pressure altitude existing at the
time of selection.
1-337
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AUTOPILOT PITCH AND ROLL STEERING MODES
Aerial refuel and low level modes of the autopilot

are referred to as steering modes and are designed
to substantially reduce the loads imposed during
aerial refueling and to reduce pilot fatigue during
low level mode of flight. When using the aerial refuel and low level modes, the pilot flies the aircraft
through the autopilot by control column inputs in
the same manner that he flies without the autopilot
except that control column forces are considerably
reduced. Inputs by the pilot through the column
generate electrical signals proportional to the force
applied through force transducers in and below the
control columns. These signals to the autopilot are
used to command the aircraft in pitch and roll in
lieu of signals from the autopilot pitch, turn, and
roll knobs. Turn, roll trim, and pitch trim knobs are
disabled in the steering modes. The maximum bank
angle in aerial refuel mode is 40 degrees and 45 degrees in low level mode. Lateral control force stiffens when angle limits are approached.
Attempts to increase the bank angle beyond these
limits will result in an autopilot disconnect. Aerial
refuel and low level modes differ in that during aerial refuel mode, the autopilot will maintain a
constant attitude and will resist attempts to change
that attitude. The autopilot will return the aircraft
to its original attitude unless the pilot holds a particular change to pitch or bank angle for a sufficient
period of time to allow the autopilot to adjust. Once
the autopilot adjusts, it will aid the pilot in maintaining the new attitude. The pilot will feel very
little resistance in the lateral controls for bank
angles up to 8 degrees. Any bank angle between 8
degrees and 45 degrees established by the pilot will
be held by the autopilot regardless of changes to
power or airspeed. Changes in pitch attitude will
also be maintained by the autopilot in low level
mode regardless of changes in thrust or airspeed. A
reduction of manual rudder requirements is realized through use of the yaw axis of the stability
augmentation system and the hydraulically powered rudder system. The pilot trims the aircraft laterally but need not apply any stabilizer trim. The
autopilot will automatically trim the aircraft to assist the pilot in maintaining a pitch attitude and
will trim to compensate for any gross weight or cg
change. See PITCH AND ROLL STEERING
FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS, this section.
AUTOPILOT SAFETY FEATURES
Force Override
The autopilot can be disconnected with manual

force applied to the pilot or copilot control column
or wheel. A column or wheel force exceeding
approximately 30 pounds in flight stabilization
1-338
Change 10
mode or 40 pounds in steering modes will disengage

the autopilot.
Pitch Protection
The autopilot monitors for excessive pitch attitude,

pitch rate, and control column forces. The autopilot
limits the pitch rate command to 6.5 degrees per
second for all modes. An accelerometer located in
the digital amplifier unit detects changes in Gforces relative to autopilot pitch commands to provide g limiting in autopilot steering modes.
NOTE
When the PITCH ENGAGE switch is ON,

the stabilizer trim portion of the stabilizer
and lateral trim button will be inoperative.
Roll Protection
The autopilot monitors and limits roll attitude, roll

rate, and control column roll forces in nonsteering
and steering modes. Additional roll protection will
disengage the autopilot if either pilot exerts a wheel
force exceeding 30 pounds in flight stabilization or
40 pounds in steering modes. The flight controller
turn knob, when rotated to the first detent, will
limit bank angle to approximately 39 degrees for
nonsteering modes; roll rate command is limited to
10 degrees per second. Further rotation of the turn
knob to the full mechanical stop will command
approximately 50 degrees of bank to facilitate a
breakaway.
See
COMBAT
BREAKAWAY
MANEUVERS, Section VI, for maximum recommended bank angles applicable to existing gross weight, altitude, and Mach number.
NOTE
When the ROLL ENGAGE switch is ON,

the stabilizer and lateral trim button will
continue to operate normally for trim of the
spoilers and the stabilizer.
In aerial refuel and low level modes, turns commanded with the control wheel are limited in bank
angle to 40 and 45 degrees, respectively. In the
autopilot bomb mode, turn control is transferred to
the OAS. With BOMB position of OAS selected,
turns are limited in bank angle to 38 degrees by the
autopilot. If autopilot bomb and low level modes are
selected together, turns commanded by the OAS are
limited in bank angle to 15 degrees. Roll rate com-
T.O. 1B-52H-1
mand is limited to 10 degrees per second with the
autopilot bomb mode engaged. The flight controller
roll trim knob is effective only in the autopilot bomb
mode and provides approximately 20 degrees maximum roll command to correct FCI standoff error.
craft loads. When the pilot relaxes wheel or column

force following momentary corrections, the
autopilot will restore the aircraft to the attitude existing prior to the correction.
NOTE
G Limiter
Autopilot steering modes will reduce control column

force requirements considerably with the additional
assistance provided by the elevator servo. Consequently, it would be possible for the pilot to inadvertently exceed the load limits of the aircraft in a
pull-up, pushover, rapid turn, or combination of
pull-up and turn. To prevent exceeding the physical
limits of the aircraft, a G limiter function has been
incorporated in the autopilot. The G limiter function is set to limit acceleration from a minimum of
0.2 g to a maximum of 1.8 g. As the pilot maneuvers
the aircraft through any longitudinal attitude
change, the autopilot accelerometer will sense the
amount of acceleration and reduce the autopilot elevator command. As a result of less elevator command, the pilot will observe more force is required
on the control column to command the aircraft in
pitch. Any attempt by the pilot or copilot to increase
applied control column force beyond 40 pounds will
disengage the autopilot.
PITCH AND ROLL STEERING FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS
Aerial Refuel Mode
The aerial refuel mode of the autopilot was designed primarily to substantially reduce the loads
imposed on the aircraft during air refueling and
will be utilized for all air refueling operations with
tanker aircraft, when the equipment is operative,
unless specific directives dictate otherwise.
NOTE
The aerial refuel mode is not recommended

for formation flying other than that required for air refueling operations.
The pilot will find that using the aerial refuel mode
will improve manual proficiency. This mode provides stability in pitch and roll which will resist attitude changes due to tanker downwash or turbulence. The aircraft responses in the aerial refuel
mode differ from the low level mode in that more
rapid aircraft responses are obtained when wheel or
column force is applied. This characteristic allows
smoother control inputs to maneuver the aircraft in
the small envelope behind the tanker and also allows use of more of the envelope, thus reducing air-
The characteristics of the following pitch

and roll maneuvers while in aerial refuel
mode may be observed by the pilot without
the aid of a tanker.
PITCH MANEUVERS
The attitude hold and pitch attitude reference
change features of the autopilot while in aerial refuel mode may be demonstrated by the following
maneuvers. Momentarily pitch the aircraft up or
down approximately 2 degrees and immediately relax force on the control column. When force is relaxed, the aircraft will return to the original flight
attitude. A change to the pitch attitude reference
may be accomplished by maintaining column force
for some period of time. As an example, with the
PITCH ENGAGE and ROLL ENGAGE switches
ON, establish an approximate 2 degree noseup
pitch attitude by rotating the pitch knob. Place AERIAL REFUEL switch ON and push the control column forward until the aircraft rotates to level
flight. Relax column force and observe that the aircraft starts recovery to the original 2 degrees noseup attitude. Maintain level fight and observe that
the restraining force necessary to maintain level
flight gradually decreases until column force is
zero. When column force reaches zero, the aircraft
attitude reference will have changed from 2 degrees
noseup to level flight. Thus, a change in pitch attitude reference is accomplished automatically by the
autopilot when column force is maintained for a
specific period of time. The amount of reference
change is dependent on the length of time column
force is maintained. Automatic stabilizer trimming
occurs during autopilot aerial refueling operation
whenever a continuous column force is applied.
ROLL MANEUVERS
The attitude hold and roll attitude reference change
features of the autopilot when in aerial refuel mode
may be demonstrated by the following maneuvers.
Momentarily roll the aircraft left or right, establishing a shallow bank angle and immediately relax
force on the control wheel. When force is relaxed,
the aircraft will return to the original flight attitude. Reestablish the bank angle, restrain the
wheel, and note that the wheel force will gradually
decrease until the aircraft roll attitude is maintained at the new reference with zero wheel force.
Change 10
1-339
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Turns are accomplished by changing the roll attitude reference but the roll characteristics of the aerial refuel mode require a special technique. The
change in roll reference from wings level to a 30 degree bank angle, for example, may require maintaining a wheel force as long as 30 seconds. However, the time required to change the roll reference
may be shortened by slight overcontrolling. That is,
after the desired bank angle is established, a slight
increase in wheel force (through the use of cross
control) will increase the roll reference rate of
change. Returning to wings level after turning requires a similar procedure.
RECEIVER-TANKER CONTACT TECHNIQUES
The aerial refuel mode of the autopilot is designed
to be compatible with refueling altitude, airspeed,
and downwash characteristics of the tanker aircraft. Generally, each pilot must perform several
contacts with the tanker before the optimum air refueling technique is developed and full confidence
in this mode of the autopilot is realized.
NOTE
The pilot should be prepared to initiate a

switch or force disconnect prior to engaging
the AERIAL REFUEL switch since some
autopilot failures may result in a hardover
pitch and/or roll servo action. Force disconnects during this condition are easily initiated by resisting column or wheel movement until applied force exceeds the disconnect value.
Low Level Mode
The low level mode of the autopilot was designed to

aid the pilot in flying the aircraft at low altitudes
and to reduce pilot fatigue during this type of flying.
NOTE
The low level mode is not recommended for

penetrations, takeoffs, formation flying,
holding patterns, instrument approach procedures, landing, or flight at any altitude
other than that required for low level or low
level missions.
The pilot should be prepared to initiate a
force disconnect prior to engaging the LOW
LEVEL switch since some autopilot failures
may result in a hard-over pitch and/or roll
servo action. Force disconnects during this
condition are easily initiated by resisting
1-340
the column or wheel until applied force exceeds the disconnect value.
PITCH MANEUVERS
After engaging the low level mode, pitch maneuvers
are commanded through the autopilot by applying
force to the control column. Pitch characteristics
may be observed by gradually increasing control
column force. As force is increased, the column
starts to move with a corresponding change in aircraft pitch attitude. Allow the aircraft attitude to
change a few degrees by applying column force. The
column will return approximately to neutral as stabilizer trim occurs and the aircraft will be maintained in the new attitude. This attitude will be
maintained by the autopilot. Automatic trimming
may be observed during changes in aircraft speed
due to climbing or descending flight or by advancing or retarding the throttles. Apply a column force
and observe that trimming occurs.
ROLL MANEUVERS
Bank the aircraft left or right to a bank angle of 8
degrees or less. When wheel force is relaxed, the
autopilot will return the aircraft to wings level.
Bank the aircraft left or right to a bank angle
greater than 8 degrees. When wheel force is relaxed, the autopilot will maintain the aircraft in the
new bank angle. Continue the bank angle to approximately 30 degrees and note that wheel force
must be increased in order to keep the wheel displaced at this bank angle. The increase in wheel
force is called wheel stiffening and autopilot disconnect will occur at approximately 45 degrees of bank
angle or when approximately 40 pounds of wheel
force is reached. This roll force disconnect feature is
available in all modes.
OUT-OF-TRIM EFFECTS
Effects of an out-of-trim aircraft may be noted by
disengaging the autopilot, slightly reducing power
on engines 7 and 8, and reengaging the autopilot
low level mode. The same observation can be made
with the autopilot stabilization mode engaged. This
exaggerated out-of-trim condition illustrates the necessity of trimming the aircraft before engaging the
autopilot. Wheel displacement may be decreased by
advancing throttles for engines 7 and 8. Note the
aircraft heading is maintained constant. Heading
hold in autopilot stabilization is accomplished by
the lateral control servo operating the spoiler surfaces. If heading is drifting after autopilot stabilization is selected, the autopilot roll axis will compensate for drift and command the lateral control servo
to displace and rotate the wheel.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
OAS TIE-IN
The OAS tie-in (second station) mode may be selected while in autopilot stabilization, altitude hold,
or low level modes by positioning the autopilot
TURN CONTROL selector switch to BOMB. The
pilot retains autopilot pitch and manual rudder
control but autopilot roll and heading control is
transferred to the OAS. The autopilot limits bank
angle to 15 degrees (3 degrees) below 18,000 feet
and to 38 degrees (4 degrees) at or above 18,000
feet in NAV mode of the OAS. In BOMB mode of
OAS with autopilot stabilization or altitude hold
modes selected, bank angle is limited to 38 degrees
(4 degrees). However, if the BOMB mode of OAS
and low level are selected, bank angle is limited to
15 degrees (3 degrees). With the low level mode

engaged, pilot initiated pitch steering through the
control column simultaneously with OAS second
station roll steering may appear awkward at first,
requiring coordination between the pilot and radar
navigator. The autopilot will disconnect if the pilot
restrains wheel movement that accompanies second
station roll steering commands. Manual control of
the aircraft can be regained by overpowering the
autopilot aircraft in pitch or roll with sufficient column/wheel force or by pressing the autopilot release button. Second station control can also be disengaged, with roll steering return to the pilot, by
rotating the flight controller turn knob out of detent
or setting the autopilot TURN CONTROL selector
switch to PILOT.
1-341
T.O. 1B-52H-1
STABILITY AUGMENTATION SYSTEM (SAS)

A Stability Augmentation System (SAS) has been
installed in the aircraft to substantially reduce
structural fatigue damage rates and peak loads, to
provide improved dutch roll damping, and to improve controllability of the aircraft under turbulent
flight conditions. The SAS is an electrohydraulic
two-axis (pitch and yaw) system. The system utilizes three hydraulic actuators; one for the rudder
and two for the elevators. Each actuator responds
to mechanical and electrical input commands. The
mechanical commands come from the pilot or
autopilot. Electrical input signals come from the
SAS electronic control units. Each actuator has
dual electrohydraulic flow control valves. The electrohydraulic flow control valve is the point where
electrical signals become proportional hydraulic signals. Each servo unit provides its related control
valve. The flow control valve is an electrohydraulic
unit which receives SAS generated electrical signals. Electrical commands from the SAS transmitted to the electromechanical flow control valve
are in series with the mechanical commands. For
this reason, electrically commanded surface displacement of the rudder and elevators is not reflected by movement of the rudder pedals or control
column. Mechanical inputs to the rudder and elevators is limited to 19. Electrical commands are
limited 10 authority in yaw and 5 authority in
pitch. For information concerning SAS flight
characteristics, see FLIGHT CONTROLS, Section
VI. For additional information on associated
hydraulic and mechanical changes to the aircraft,
see HYDRAULIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEMS and
POWERED RUDDER/ELEVATOR SYSTEM, this
section.
NORMAL OPERATION OF SAS
Pilot operation of the electronic portion of the SAS

consists essentially of engaging or disengaging the
yaw and pitch SAS switches. The yaw and pitch
SAS switches should not be engaged when transitioning from ground power to aircraft power. This is
necessary to avoid giving erroneous information to
the maintenance crew since the power changeover
with the switches engaged trips the maintenance
warning indicators on the electronic units in the 47
1-342
section. If the yaw channel fail light comes on during flight, the operation of the system is not impaired, but the failure of one rate channel is indicated. If it is a nuisance failure, it is often possible
to return the questionable channel to operation by
disengaging the yaw SAS switch and then returning it to the ENGAGE position.
AUTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROLS AND

INDICATORS
AUTO PILOT
Autopilot Flight Controller
The autopilot flight controller (figure 1-103) is located on the aisle stand. When the autopilot is engaged, the flight controller provides a means for
maneuvering the aircraft from the pilots or copilots
position through the TURN, PITCH, and ROLL
TRIM knobs.
Control Panel
The autopilot control panel is located on the aisle

stand (figure 1-103). Switches located on the control
panel are identified as POWER, ROLL ENGAGE,
PITCH ENGAGE, AERIAL REFUEL, LOW LEVEL, and ALT HOLD. A test switch is provided to
initiate preflight testing of the autopilot. A reset
switch, identified as VALID/INVAL, is provided to
indicate valid or invalid preflight test results.
BNS Steering (Autopilot) Light
A green BNS steering (autopilot) light on the radar

navigators panel (20, figure 1-103), will illuminate
when the autopilot turn control selector switch is
placed in BOMB position.
STABILITY AUGMENTATION SYSTEM
SAS Control Panel
The SAS control pane is located on the pilots forward instrument panel. The panel contains two
switches (figure 1-103) labeled YAW SAS and
PITCH SAS respectively, and a CHANNEL FAIL
light.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Automatic Flight Controls and Indicators
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
AUTOPILOT AND IFR BOOM RELEASE BUTTON

AUTOPILOT TURN CONTROL SELECTOR
SWITCH
YAW SAS SWITCH
YAW CHANNEL FAIL LIGHT
PITCH SAS SWITCH
PITCH KNOBS (2)
TURN KNOB
ROLL TRIM KNOB
ROLL ENGAGE SWITCH
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
PITCH ENGAGE SWITCH

ALT HOLD SWITCH
VALID/INVAL RESET SWITCH/INDICATOR
TEST SWITCH
FCS POWER SWITCH
LOW LEVEL SWITCH
AERIAL REFUEL SWITCH
PITCH SAS OFF LIGHT
AUTOPILOT DISENGAGE LIGHT
YAW SAS OFF LIGHT
Change 20
1-343
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Automatic Flight Controls and Indicators (Cont)
20
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
BNS STEERING LIGHT
FUNCTION
Autopilot and Air Refueling (IFR) Boom

Release Button (2 places)
Autopilot release buttons, also referred to as inflight refuel (IFR) boom release buttons, are used to disengage autopilot control. Anytime either release button is pressed, both roll and pitch axes of the autopilot will be
disengaged, and MASTER CAUTION light and AUTOPILOT DISENGAGED light (No. 18) will come on. Pressing either IFR button a second
time will cause the lights to extinguish. The autopilot will disengage from
any nonsteering or steering mode and return to the synchronization
mode. The autopilot will remain disengaged and align all autopilot servos
to existing aircraft attitudes.
Autopilot TURN CONTROL Selector

Switch
The autopilot turn control selector switch is of the solenoid locking type
and has PILOT--BOMB positions for selecting either the autopilot flight
controller (PILOT) or the OAS (BOMB), respectively, for turn command
of the autopilot. Interlocks will return the turn control selector switch from
BOMB to PILOT position without disengaging the autopilot when the pilots turn knob is rotated out of center detent.
SAS CONTROL PANEL
YAW SAS Switch
The YAW SAS switch has two positions, ENGAGE- -DISENGAGE. The
ENGAGE position of the switch supplies power to the engage valves in
the hydraulic actuators and places the system in operation. It also supplies a reset pulse to the comparators when placed in the ENGAGE position. The DISENGAGE position removes power from the hydraulic actuator engage valves. The switch is a solenoid locking type switch and is held
in the ENGAGE position by dual coil electromagnets. If the logic circuitry
determines that the switch contacts should be broken, the electromagnets are released allowing the spring-loaded switches to return to the
DISENGAGE position.
Yaw CHANNEL FAIL Light (Amber)
A push-to-test yaw channel fail light serves to warn the pilot that a single
rate channel of the SAS yaw axis has failed.
1-344
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
5
PITCH SAS Switch
FUNCTION
The PITCH SAS switch has two positions, ENGAGE- -DISENGAGE.
The ENGAGE position of the switch supplies power to the engage valves
in the hydraulic actuators and places the system in operation. It also supplies a reset pulse to the comparators when placed in the ENGAGE position. The DISENGAGE position removes power from the hydraulic actuator engage valves. The switch is a solenoid locking type switch and is held
in the ENGAGE position by dual coil electromagnets. If the logic circuitry
determines that the switch contacts should be broken, the electromagnets are released allowing the spring-loaded switches to return to the
DISENGAGE position.
AUTOPILOT FLIGHT CONTROLLER
PITCH Knobs (2 places)
Interconnected pitch knobs labeled PITCH, are provided for adjustment

of the reference pitch attitude that will be maintained by the autopilot. Adjustment of the pitch knobs will command the elevator for climb or descent
for autopilot stabilization mode. The pitch knob is mechanically stiffened
in the autopilot altitude hold mode; forced rotation of the pitch knobs will
disengage the altitude hold mode and allow the pilot to adjust pitch as required for changing altitude. The pitch knob is disabled for autopilot steering modes. Forward rotation (GLIDE) of the pitch knobs results in aircraft
descent; aft rotation (CLIMB) will command the aircraft to climb.
TURN Knob
The turn knob, labeled TURN, provides coordinated turns in autopilot

nonsteering modes. Rotating the turn knob results in an aircraft turn in the
same direction as the knob is rotated. The rate of turn is proportional to
the speed of the aircraft and amount of bank commanded with the turn
knob. Moving the turn knob out of center detent puts turn control back to
the pilot regardless of the setting of the autopilot turn control selector
switch. Additional detents are located at points in the turn knob rotation
corresponding with approximately 10 degrees less than the maximum
bank capability of 50 degrees. The turn knob is disabled for autopilot
steering modes.
NOTE
When the turn knob is not in use, it should be in the detent at center position of total knob rotation. The autopilot will not engage
with either turn or trim knobs out of detent.
ROLL TRIM Knob
The roll trim knob is used principally to correct FCI standoff error when
the autopilot turn selector switch is in BOMB position. The roll trim knob
can only operate with autopilot stabilization, altitude hold, or low level
modes. The roll trim knob is disabled during aerial refuel mode of operation or whenever the turn control selector switch is set to the pilot position.
Use of the roll trim knob for lateral trim will deflect a spoiler and increase
drag causing the aircraft to roll. Lateral trim should normally be accomplished by fuel management.
1-345
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Automatic Flight Controls and Indicators (Cont)

NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
AUTOPILOT CONTROL PANEL
ROLL ENGAGE Switch
The ROLL ENGAGE switch has ON--OFF positions. ON position engages the lateral control servos. OFF position disengages the servos.
10
PITCH ENGAGE Switch
The PITCH ENGAGE switch has ON--OFF positions. ON position engages the elevator and stabilizer trim servos. OFF position disengages
the servos.
11
ALT (Altitude) HOLD Switch
The ALT HOLD switch has ON--OFF positions. In the ON position, the
autopilot will maintain the aircraft at a constant barometric pressure altitude. Barometric pressure signals from the air data sensor unit are processed to operate the elevator and stabilizer pitch trim servos as required
to maintain the pressure altitude existing at the time that the ALT HOLD
switch was set to ON.
12
VALID/INVAL Indicator/Reset Switch
When the TEST switch (No. 13) is pressed, the autopilot status will be
indicated as VALID or INVAL on the indicator.
13
TEST Switch
The TEST switch actuates a built-in-test (BIT) system to determine the

operational status of the autopilot. The system is wired through the aircraft squat switches and is therefore usable on the ground only.
14
FCS POWER Switch
The FCS POWER switch has ON--OFF positions. When the POWER
switch is set to the ON position, electrical power is applied and the synchronization mode of the autopilot is operational.
NOTE
In the event of any indicated malfunction of autopilot disengagement, place the POWER switch to the OFF position, thus assuring positive autopilot disengagement.
15
LOW LEVEL Switch
The LOW LEVEL switch has ON--OFF positions. In the ON position, signals are supplied from the force transducers which allow the pilot to control the aircraft through the autopilot. The turn knob and pitch knobs are
disabled when the low level mode is engaged. In the OFF position, power
is removed from the low level portion of the autopilot. The LOW LEVEL
switch will automatically return to OFF when the autopilot is disengaged
for any reason.
16
AERIAL REFUEL Switch
An AERIAL REFUEL switch has ON--OFF positions. In the ON position,

signals are supplied from the force transducers which allow the pilot to
control the aircraft through the autopilot. Turn, pitch, and roll trim knobs
are disabled when the aerial refuel mode is engaged. In the OFF position,
power is removed from the aerial refuel portion of the autopilot. The AERIAL REFUEL switch will automatically return to OFF when the autopilot
is disengaged for any reason.
1-346
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
17
PITCH SAS OFF Light (Amber)
Push-to-test light marked PITCH SAS OFF warns the pilots that two associated channel failures of the pitch SAS have occurred and that the
holding coils for the ENGAGE switch have been released returning the
switch to the DISENGAGE position. Simultaneously with the illumination
of the PITCH SAS OFF light, the master caution light on the pilots panel
will illuminate.
18
AUTO PILOT DISENGAGED Light

(Amber)
Illumination of the AUTO PILOT DISENGAGED light (amber master caution lights also come on) alerts the pilot and copilot that ROLL ENGAGE
or PITCH ENGAGE switches have been returned from ON to the OFF
position. The warning lights operate with any autopilot mode selected.
The warning lights can be turned off by resetting the ROLL ENGAGE and/
or PITCH ENGAGE switches to ON, by momentarily placing the POWER
switch OFF then ON, or by pressing either autopilot release button.
19
YAW SAS OFF Light (Amber)
Push-to-test light marked YAW SAS OFF warns the pilots that two associated channel failures of the yaw SAS have occurred and that the holding
coils for the ENGAGE switch have been released returning the switch to
the DISENGAGE position. Simultaneously with the illumination of the
YAW SAS OFF light, the master caution light on the pilots panel will illuminate.
BNS STEERING PANEL
20
BNS Steering (Autopilot) Light (Green)
BNS steering (autopilot) light on the radar navigators panel, illuminates

when the autopilot turn control selector switch is placed in BOMB position.
1-347
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AUTOPILOT NORMAL OPERATION

PREFLIGHT OF THE AUTOPILOT
During the following checks, do not allow

the stabilizer trim to drive more than 1/2
unit at a time when operating on standby
pumps. Hydraulic power is necessary at the
stabilizer jackscrew to allow the mechanism
to operate without slipping of the autopilot
stabilizer trim servo override clutch.
NOTE
This check may be performed after a reported malfunction has occurred, time and
conditions permitting, and at the discretion
of the flight crew.
1. Place body standby pump switches to STBY.
2. Place TURN knob and ROLL TRIM knob in
detent.
3. Place POWER switch ON.
4. Place ROLL ENGAGE and PITCH ENGAGE
switches on and check autopilot BIT.
NOTE
Do not apply pressure to the control column

when engaging the pitch and roll modes. A
small force (approximately 4 1/2 pounds)
will prevent autopilot engagement. In the
event the autopilot does not engage, reposition the control column to the neutral position and recycle the autopilot pitch and roll
switches.
a. Press TEST switch on control panel; control
columns move forward and aft, control wheels rotate right and left. After approximately 30 seconds,
ROLL ENGAGE and PITCH ENGAGE switches release to OFF and AUTOPILOT DISENGAGED
warning light flashes momentarily. VALID light
comes on.
b. Press VALID/INVAL reset switch; VALID
light goes out.
switches ON.
6. Check autopilot disengage functions:
a. Disengage autopilot by pressing pilots
autopilot release button; reengage autopilot and
check by pressing copilots autopilot release button.
b. Apply approximately 40 pounds lateral
force on the pilots control wheel to the right;
1-348
Change 4
autopilot should disengage. Reengage autopilot and

repeat to the left. Reengage autopilot and repeat
lateral force disconnect both right and left for copilots control wheel.
c. Place PITCH ENGAGE and ROLL ENGAGE switches ON. Push forward on the pilots
control column until the ROLL ENGAGE and
PITCH ENGAGE switches disengage. Reengage the
autopilot and pull back on the control column until
the ROLL ENGAGE and PITCH ENGAGE
switches disengage, and again reengage the
autopilot. Repeat control column force disconnect
both fore and aft for the copilots control column.
7. With the autopilot disengaged, operate pilots
or copilots stabilizer trim button to NOSE UP and
NOSE DOWN; the manual trim wheels should rotate in the direction of the commanded trim.
8. Place PITCH ENGAGE and ROLL ENGAGE
switches ON. Operate the pilots or copilots stabilizer trim button to NOSE UP and NOSE DOWN; the
manual trim wheels should not rotate.
9. Place the ALT HOLD switch ON. Rotate the
pitch knob; ALT HOLD switch should return to
OFF. ROLL ENGAGE and PITCH ENGAGE
switches should remain ON.
NOTE
It should be considered normal, when engaging the ALT HOLD switch on the
ground, for the engage error of the altitude control to originate a signal to which
the aircraft at rest on the ground cannot respond, causing the elevator and stabilizer
trim to be driven to their limits.
10. Rotate the TURN knob clockwise; the pilots
control wheels should rotate clockwise. Repeat for
the counterclockwise direction, then return the
TURN knob to detent.
11. Rotate the PITCH knobs in the CLIMB direction; the control columns should move aft and the
manual trim wheel should rotate for noseup trim.
Rotate the PITCH knobs in the GLIDE direction;
the control columns should move forward and the
manual trim wheel should rotate for nosedown
trim.
12. Place the autopilot TURN CONTROL selector
switch in BOMB. The OAS steering indicator
should indicate ON provided the OAS power switch
is ON and the OAS is in NAV or bomb mode.
13. Command a right turn with the OAS; the pilots control wheels should rotate clockwise. Command a left turn with the OAS; the pilots control
wheels should move counterclockwise.
14. Return the autopilot TURN CONTROL selector switch to PILOT.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
15. Place LOW LEVEL switch to ON.
a. Disengage autopilot by pressing pilots release button; reengage autopilot and check by
pressing copilots release button.
repeat to the left. Reengage the autopilot and repeat lateral force disconnect both right and left for
copilots control wheel.
NOTE
It may be necessary to move the control

wheel to the stops to apply sufficient force
to disconnect the autopilot.
c. Apply a sharp push-pull force to pilots control column; autopilot should disconnect. Reengage
and repeat using a sharp pull-push force. Repeat
using copilots control column.
d. With LOW LEVEL switch ON, move control
column forward. Control column should move easily
and remain where displaced by the pilot. The stabilizer trim should move while force is being applied
to the control column and should drive in the nosedown direction, possibly driving to the limit. Limit
stabilizer trim movement to 1/2 unit of displacement. While stabilizer trim is moving, apply a
5-pound force to control column in the opposite direction of trim movement and note that the stabilizer trim follows the force change.
e. Repeat step d using an aft control column
displacement.
f. Displace control wheel right using varying
amounts of displacement up to full travel. Note that
control wheel does return to neutral when force is
released. Repeat using left control wheel displacement.
g. Place autopilot TURN CONTROL selector
switch to BOMB.
h. Command a right turn with the OAS; pilots
control wheels should rotate clockwise. Command a
left turn with the OAS; pilots control wheels should
rotate counterclockwise. During bomb mode of operation, the pilot will have the force override feature on lateral control to disconnect the autopilot.
The pilot will have pitch control through the control
column. Switching between PILOT and BOMB
modes of operation should not disconnect the
autopilot.
NOTE
The ROLL TRIM knob may be used to reduce standoff error as observed on the FCI
when the autopilot TURN CONTROL selector switch is in BOMB position.

i. Return autopilot TURN CONTROL selector
switch to PILOT. Return LOW LEVEL switch to
OFF.
16. Place MASTER REFUEL switch ON.
17. Place NORMAL SLIPWAY DOOR switch to
OPEN.
18. Place AERIAL REFUEL switch to on.
a. Disengage autopilot by pressing pilots
autopilot release button; reengage autopilot and
check by pressing copilots autopilot release button.
repeat to the left. Reengage autopilot and repeat
lateral force disconnect both right and left for copilots control wheel.
NOTE
It may be necessary to move the control

wheel to the stops to apply sufficient force
to disconnect the autopilot.
c. Apply a sharp push-pull force to pilots control column; autopilot should disconnect. Reengage
and repeat using a sharp pull-push force. Repeat
using copilots control column.
d. Move pilots control column forward and release; column should return to neutral. Move control column aft and release; column should return
to neutral. Repeat using copilots control column.
e. Move pilots control column forward and
hold in displaced position for 20 to 30 seconds. The
control column should remain in displaced position.
Repeat procedures by moving control column aft.
Repeat using copilots control column.
NOTE
If stabilizer trim drives, limit movement to

1/2 unit by using approximately 5 pounds
of force in the opposite direction of trim
movement.
Control column forces may appear higher
when using aerial refueling mode than
when using low level mode.
f. Rotate pilots control wheel right and release; wheel should return to neutral. Rotate wheel
left; wheel should return to neutral. Rotate control
wheel right and hold in displaced position for 20 to
30 seconds; wheel should remain in displaced position when released. Repeat using copilots wheel.
1-349
T.O. 1B-52H-1
19. Place the NORMAL SLIPWAY
switch to OFF.
20. Return the POWER switch to OFF.
DOOR
PILOTS OPERATION OF THE AUTOPILOT
5. Place ALT HOLD switch to ON if constant altitude control is desired. The aircraft is now under
autopilot control on the roll and pitch axes.
Pilots inflight operation of the autopilot may be accomplished by the following procedure:
Check POWER switch ON.
Check aircraft wings level and ball centered.
a. The aircraft should be trimmed by fuel
management and thrust adjustments as much as
possible since manual trim will deflect the spoilers
and create drag. See FUEL MANAGEMENT FOR
LATERAL TRIM under CRUISE, Section II.
b. Use rudder trim, as required, to obtain
straight and level flight. Observe RUDDER TRIM
3. Check autopilot flight controller for:
a. TURN knob in detent.
b. ROLL knob in detent.
switches ON.
NOTE
The aircraft should, with no more than two

overshoots, stabilize out on a reference altitude within the following stated tolerances from engage altitude during
straight and level flight.
1.
2.
The pilot should be prepared to immediately disengage the autopilot in the event of a
hardover indication following engagement.
NOTE
Upon engagement, there should be no engage transient exceeding 1/2 degree of pitch
or yaw and 1 degree of roll.
Autopilot stabilization may be engaged in a
normal climb or descent and the aircraft
will continue to fly that attitude until the
pilot moves his pitch knob.
If the autopilot is engaged when the aircraft
is banked for a turn, it will automatically
roll the aircraft to a near wings-level attitude.
The autopilot will not completely compensate for all lateral mistrim. If the aircraft
is not properly trimmed before autopilot engagement or becomes out of trim after engagement, the aircraft may fly slightly wing
low until the aircraft is retrimmed by fuel
management and thrust adjustments.
If the AHRS fails, the autopilot will disengage.
1-350
Yaw SAS is required to provide dutch roll

damping.
Below 30,000 feet

pressure altitude
() 30 feet
Above 30,000 feet

pressure altitude
() 0.1% engage
reference altitude.
During turns, deviation from the engaged reference

altitude should not exceed () 60 feet (for roll angles
less than 30). ALT HOLD will be disengaged if the
flight controller pitch knob is rotated out of detent,
or when AERIAL REFUEL or LOW LEVEL mode is
selected.
6. Standard maneuvers may be executed with the
PITCH and TURN knobs. Climbs and descents may
be accomplished with the PITCH knob; turns may
be made with the TURN knob. A climbing or descending turn may be made with a combination of
the two knobs.
7. Steady displacement of the control wheel indicates asymmetrical fuel load or engine thrust requiring appropriate fuel management and/or thrust
adjustment to center the control wheel. See FUEL
MANAGEMENT FOR LATERAL TRIM under
CLIMB, Section II.
NOTE
During operation on autopilot, airbrake operation should be performed with caution to

avoid excessive longitudinal out-of-trim condition and to prevent possible automatic pilot disengagement.
During autopilot control with ALT HOLD
engaged, operation of the wing flaps is permissible. While operating flaps, a large but
not dangerous indicated altitude change
will result due to a change in airflow across
the static source. Lowering flaps results in
a gain in altitude; raising flaps will result
in a loss of altitude.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
8. The low level mode should be engaged after
stabilizing at an altitude consistent with the start
of low level flight with the aircraft trimmed. The
low level mode is engaged as follows:
POWER switch ON
PITCH ENGAGE switch ON
ROLL ENGAGE switch ON
NORMAL and ALTERNATE SLIPWAY DOOR

switches are CLOSED
ROLL TRIM and TURN knob in detent

NOTE
The LOW LEVEL switch should be placed

ON immediately after placing the PITCH
ENGAGE and ROLL ENGAGE switches
ON to avoid low level flight in an autopilot
nonsteering mode.
In the event of a malfunction of the slipway
door system, the LOW LEVEL switch may
be engaged if the MASTER REFUEL
SWITCH is OFF or is cycled from ON to
OFF after the slipway door switches are in
the CLOSED position.
When engaging either the LOW LEVEL or
AERIAL REFUEL switches, the pilot and
copilot should not be exerting any force on
the control column. If either pilot is exerting a force on the controls when the LOW
LEVEL or AERIAL REFUEL switch is engaged, an engage transient will occur. The
action will be observed as a short pulse action on the control columns but will not
drive the control limit.
9. The air refueling system must be configured

for air refueling in order to engage the aerial refuel
mode. The aerial refuel mode is placed in operation
while approaching the precontact position (at
approximately 10 knots above refueling airspeed)
and will be engaged as follows:
POWER switch ON
AERIAL REFUEL switch ON

No other autopilot mode engaged
NOTE
LOW LEVEL switch ON

No other autopilot mode is engaged (if ALT HOLD
is on, it will drop out)
ROLL ENGAGE switch ON
Engaging the PITCH ENGAGE, ROLL ENGAGE, and AERIAL REFUEL switches (in
this order) should be accomplished as rapidly as possible to minimize the time the
autopilot is in a nonsteering mode.
When engaging the AERIAL REFUEL
switch, if the signal amplifier cycles from
ready to disconnect, push the reset button
and return air refueling system to ready
condition.
During aerial refueling, boom disconnects
caused by excessive pressure, exceeding the
boom envelope limits, or boom operator initiated disconnects, will not disengage the
autopilot.
RADAR NAVIGATORS OPERATION OF THE

AUTOPILOT
The offensive avionics system has no pitch control

over the aircraft. Turn control of the autopilot is
transferred to the OAS when the autopilot turn
control selector switch is placed in BOMB position.
When the autopilot is controlled by OAS, steering
commands are generated to the current destination.
The destination can be modified and steering commands generated to a selected destination with a
FLY TO NN ENTER command. The crosshair can
be placed over a point and a FLY TO + command
generates steering commands to the crosshair. If
the crosshair are moved, another FLY TO + command must be initiated for the aircraft to fly to the
new position. Moving the crosshair on the display
will not change direction of the aircraft without a
FLY TO + COMMAND.
NOTE
The radar navigator/navigator will inform

the pilots before inserting a FLY TO +, FLY
TO NN, or CF 73 command when OAS tiein (second station) is engaged.
PITCH ENGAGE switch ON
1-351
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AUTOPILOT DISENGAGEMENT
Check elevator and rudder systems for artificial feel after autopilot disengagement if
flying in or leaving an icing condition. Icing
of the Q-spring ram air duct may result in
loss of artificial feel. If abnormally light
rudder or elevator control forces are encountered, abrupt control displacements
should be avoided to prevent overstressing
the aircraft. See ELEVATOR AND RUDDER CONTROL MALFUNCTION, this section.
If a constant large displacement of the control column indicates failure of the automatic trim system during flight on
autopilot, maintain column position manually after autopilot disengagement and retrim.
Disengagement for Out-of-Trim Condition
If large amounts of stabilizer out-of-trim and displaced control columns are observed when flying
with autopilot altitude hold engaged, disengagement should be accomplished using the following
procedure:
1. To prevent an abrupt pitchdown (up) upon disengagement, restrain control column movement by
attempting to maintain column in position observed.
2. Disengage autopilot by pressing release button. Expect sudden and possible heavy elevator
forces to be encountered to keep the control column
from snapping to neutral or hands-off position.
3. Immediately apply stabilizer trim.
4. Use air brakes, if required.
NOTE
If elevator authority is insufficient to control a nosedown mistrim, airbrake extension should be used as a backup to the elevator for additional pitch authority.
1-352
Individual Servo Disengagement
Single axis control of the aircraft with the autopilot

is possible for some control modes if both autopilot
amplifier processors are operating properly. Separate ROLL ENGAGE and PITCH ENGAGE
switches on the mode selector allow engagement of
autopilot roll (spoiler or lateral control) and pitch
(elevator) servomotors, respectively. A list of possible single axis control modes include:
Autopilot stabilization with only the roll axis engaged

Autopilot stabilization with only the pitch axis engaged
Altitude hold with only the pitch axis engaged
Both roll and pitch axes of the autopilot must be engaged to operate steering and OAS modes. Single
axis control with autopilot is accomplished by the
following procedure:
1. Disengage the autopilot using the autopilot release button on the pilots or copilots control wheel.
2. Set the appropriate ROLL ENGAGE or PITCH
ENGAGE switch either ON or OFF as desired.
3. Select the desired autopilot control mode. The
autopilot mode control logic will prevent engagement of incompatible modes. Attempts to engage
any noncompatible autopilot modes will result in
the appropriate mode select switch dropping to the
OFF position.
Complete Disengagement
Complete disengagement may be accomplished at

any time by pressing the pilots or copilots autopilot
release button on the respective control wheel, placing the ROLL ENGAGE and PITCH ENGAGE
switches to OFF, or placing the autopilot POWER
switch to the OFF position. The pilot or copilot may
also disengage the autopilot by applying sufficient
force to the control column. In nonsteering modes, a
column or wheel force exceeding 30 pounds will disengage the autopilot. In steering modes, a column
or wheel force exceeding 40 pounds will disengage
the autopilot.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Automatic Flight Control Systems

EQUIPMENT
Autopilot Power And Control
Autopilot Safety Disconnect

Switches
Pitch SAS
Yaw SAS
11
LLC
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
AUTOPILOT
AC POWER
DAFCS POWER
INTERLOCK
OFF LIGHT
SERVO POWER
LLC/F29
LLC/F33
LLC/F34
LLC/F30
LLC/F32
AC Bus 3
Left TR
Left TR
Left TR
Left TR
AERIAL REFUELING
RLC/F4
Rt. TR
LLC/D17
LLC/D18
LLC/D19
LLC/D20
LLC/D21
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
Left TR
Left TR
LLC/D14
LLC/D15
LLC/D16
LLC/D12
LLC/D13
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
Left TR
Left TR
FLIGHT CONTROLS PITCH SAS

AC 1
AC 2
AC 3
DC 1
DC 2
FLIGHT CONTROLS YAW SAS
AC 1
AC 2
AC 3
DC 1
DC 2
RLC
Figure 1-104
1-353/(1-354 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
PNEUMATIC SYSTEMS
DESCRIPTION
AIR BLEED SYSTEM
MISSILE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM
AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM
AIR SUPPLY REGULATION
AIR CONDITIONING PACK
AIR DISTRIBUTION
PRESSURE REGULATION
CONTROL POWER SUPPLY
AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM CONTROLS AND INDICATORS
NORMAL OPERATION
SYSTEM TURN-ON
ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT COOLING AT
HIGH ALTITUDE
SYSTEM SHUTDOWN
SYSTEM GROUND OPERATION
DESCRIPTION
The pneumatic systems include the air bleed system and the air conditioning and pressurization
system. Pneumatic system circuit protection and
the location of the applicable circuit breakers is contained in figure 1-112.
AIR BLEED SYSTEM

The air bleed system (figure 1-105) incorporates a
wing leading edge manifold and controls for collecting and routing high pressure hot air. This air may
be obtained either from the final stage compressor
of each operating engine or from an auxiliary air
source applied to a ground start connection on the
underside of each nacelle. The air bleed system is
the power source for engine starting and the air
source for heating, cooling, and pressurizing the
crew compartment. The system is designed so that
normal airflow is from the No. 2 nacelle through a
ram air heat exchanger (precooler) in the No. 2
strut into the distribution ducting in the wing leading edge and fuselage. On the ground, the landing
gear squat switch functions to fully open the cooling
air ejector valve at all times to allow maximum precooler operation. In flight, duct temperatures not to
exceed 190C result from regulation of ram air
passing through the heat exchanger in the precooler. A bleed air overheat light comes on if the duct
1-355
1-355
1-357
1-357
1-358
1-358
1-358A
1-359
1-359
1-364
1-367
1-374
1-374
1-375
1-376
1-376
temperature exceeds approximately 210C. In the

event of failure of the bleed air supply from No. 2
nacelle, either through duct failure or shutdown of
engines 3 and 4, emergency airflow may be obtained from No. 3 nacelle by placing the bleed selector switch (6, figure 1-110) on the aisle stand, in the
EMERG RH INBD position. This air does not pass
through a strut mounted precooler and therefore
may directly subject the distribution ducting and
the air conditioning system to bleed air temperatures of 232 to 399C, depending on engine thrust
settings and OAT. The distribution ducting and the
routing it follows, particularly along the wing leading edge, are not designed for safe operation at temperatures above 246C when the aircraft is below
25,000 feet.
Above 25,000 feet with low OAT conditions, adequate cabin heating may not be available with the
bleed selector switch in the NORMAL LH IN BD
position. This is caused by over-cooling of the bleed
air by the precooler, with the result that the bleed
air temperature may not be high enough to permit
adequate cabin heating. In order to minimize this
problem, the following instructions apply:
1. At altitudes below 25,000 feet, place the bleed
selector switch in NORMAL LH INBD position.
2. At altitudes of 25,000 feet or above, place the
bleed selector switch in EMERG RH INBD position.
Change 16
1-355
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Air Bleed System

ENGINE
NO. 1
ENGINE
NO. 2
ENGINE
NO. 3
ENGINE
NO. 5
ENGINE
NO. 4
TO NO. 2
NACELLE
ANTIICING
TO NO. 1
NACELLE
ANTIICING
ENGINE
NO. 6
ENGINE
NO. 8
ENGINE
NO. 7
TO NO. 3
NACELLE
ANTIICING
TO NO. 4
NACELLE
ANTIICING
STARTER STARTER
SELECTOR SWITCH
SWITCH (TYPICAL)
CARTRIDGE START
FLIGHT
PNEUMATIC
TO HYDRAULIC
RESERVOIR
PRESSURIZATION
NO. 2 STRUT HEAT

EXCHANGER COOLING
AIR EXHAUST
OFF
TO HYDRAULIC
RESERVOIR
PRESSURIZATION
MANIFOLD
TEMPERATURE
GAGE
NO. 1
STRUT
BLEED
VALVE
NO. 4
STRUT
BLEED
VALVE
NO. 3 STRUT
BLEED
VALVE
BODY
CROSSOVER
MANIFOLD
VALVE
TO ANTIICE MISSILE
ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTROL UNIT RAM
AIRSCOOP
MA
NI
F
VA OLD
LV
E
O
EN PEN
GI
F
NE OR
O STA
CA PE RT
N
CL UT
OS ION
E
ST AFTE
AR
R
T
TO ANTIICE AIR
CONDITIONING PACK
HEAT EXCHANGER
RAM AIR SCOOP
TO AIR
CONDITIONING
SYSTEM
FOR MISSILE
ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTROL DUCTING
PRESSURIZATION
CL
OS
MANIFOLD VALVE
SWITCH
Controlled by Master Switch and
Bleed Selector Switch of Air Condi
tioning System to allow one valve
(not both) to be open while Mani
fold Valve Switch is CLOSED. All
valves open when Manifold Valve
Switch is OPEN.
GROUND START CONNECTION

SHUTOFF VALVE
TEMPERATURE SENSOR
CHECK VALVE
BLEED AIR
RAM AIR
ENGINE STARTER
NORMAL PRECOOLED AIR FLOW

ELECTRICAL CIRCUITS
Figure 1-105
1-356
A31728
T.O. 1B-52H-1
When EMERG RH INBD is selected below

25,000 feet, an explosive condition may exist in the wing if fuel vapors have accumulated near the hot air ducting and the duct
temperature exceeds 246C. Therefore, the
bleed air overheat light, and the manifold
temperature gage will be closely monitored
to prevent exceeding 246C below 25,000
feet, since bleed air is not precooled in
EMERG RH INBD. The explosive danger
no longer exists above 25,000 feet, due to
the high auto-ignition temperature of fuel
vapor above this altitude.
Hazardous conditions exist at all altitudes
when combustible materials are stored on
hot air ducts or close to hot air duct outlets.
The manifold valve switch is used primarily for

engine starting and provides for airflow from any
engine to any other engine. For operation of the
manifold valve switch see 3, figure 1-110.
MISSILE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL

SYSTEM
The missile environmental control system receives
engine bleed air (figure 1-105) from the body manifold for regulated pressurization of the environmental air distribution ducting. Right manifold
bleed air is supplied to a valve for anti-icing control
of the missile ram airscoop in the right wing leading edge.
The missile environmental control system supplies
conditioned air to the missiles and Missile Interface
Units (MIUs) or Weapon Interface Units (WIUs) on
both external pylons and the CSRL through the
Missile Conditioning Subsystem (MCS), This ensures MIU/WIU and missile temperature is maintained within a normal operating range. The system will operate when Missile/Weapons Interface
Unit (MIU) power is applied and the cabin air conditioning system is on.
The system is composed of two distinct circuits, a
temperature control circuit and a missile air circuit.
The temperature control circuit consists of a heat
exchanger, hot and cold air modulating valves, temperature controller, missile circuit temperature sen-
sor, and ram air inlet temperature sensor. The missile air circuit consists of a fan, fan differential
pressure switch, pressure regulator, missile overtemperature switch, two wing leading edge bypass
valves, and four pylon breakaway valves. Both circuits contain ducting for routing air and wiring required for operation and control of the system.
The missile circuit fan circulates conditioned air
through a closed loop to the cruise pylon and CSRL
missiles. The air is cooled or heated to the desired
temperature as it flows through the heat exchanger
core. The missile circuit air temperature is monitored by a sensor installed in the heat exchanger
outlet duct. Ambient temperature is sensed by the
ram air inlet temperature sensor. These signals allow the controller to determine the three modes of
operation for the MCS system: warmup mode, normal heating mode, and normal cooling mode. The
MCS controller adjusts airflow through the hot or
cold air modulating valves to provide the required
missile supply air temperatures.
The right wing ram airscoop provides cooling air to
the missile dc power supplies installed in a rack immediately aft of the heat exchanger. The missile dc
power supplies are powered anytime an MIU is
powered on. The power supplies require cooling air
when powered on.
On the ground, the missile dc power supplies

can be operated for a maximum of two minutes without cooling air being suppled to the
right wing root ram air scoop. If necessary to
reapply MIU power without cooling air, a
minimum cooling period of 20 minutes between power applications is required
Conditioned air is supplied to both cruise missile
pylons and ICSMS stub pylons. In addition conditioned air is supplied to the weapon stations on the
cruise missile pylons. The HSAB on the ICSMS pylon and HSAB mounted weapons do not receive
conditioned air.
Self-sealing valves at the pylon interface assure
conditioned air is not lost into the atmosphere after
the pylon is jettisoned or when no pylon is installed.
After pylon separation or when no pylons are installed, the leading edge bypass valves open allowing supply air to return to complete the cooling
loop.
Change 16
1-357
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Proper operation of the missile environmental control system is continuously monitored. Improper operation of the system is indicated when a reverse
video ECU (Environmental Control Unit) appears
on the MFD. Fan failure, as sensed by the fan differential pressure switch, missile circuit air temperature above 140F or below 46F, missile circuit
temperature sensor failure, or ram air inlet temperature sensor failure will generate this display. Also,
an overheat condition, as sensed by the missile circuit overtemperature switch, will cause the fan to
shut down and result in a fault indication on the
MFD. The ECS/MCS controller incorporates a builtin-test (BIT) feature which allows isolation of defective components. The system requires 28 volt dc for
control and 118/205 volt ac 400 Hz power for major
component operation.
For further information on missile environmental
control system and anti-icing, refer to the appropriate weapon manual.
AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM

The air conditioning system (figures 1-106 and
1-107) provides crew compartment ventilation with
filtered temperature controlled air, piped cooling to
electronic equipment, pressurization, and emergency ram air ventilation. High pressure hot air from
the air bleed system (figure 1-105) provides the energy to air condition and pressurize the crew compartment. The bleed air ducting contains a thermal
switch which is connected to an amber press-to-test
warning light on the pilots instrument panel to
warn of bleed air overheat. Additionally the master
caution light will come on when the bleed air overheat light comes on. The bleed air overheat light
comes on at 210C. In case of bleed air overheat
another thermal switch is located in the air conditioning pack (ACP) compressor discharge duct
which will shut the ACP down if the temperature
exceeds 224C. Bleed air, which has been partially
cooled by a temperature controlled precooler in the
No. 2 strut, is admitted to the system by the air
conditioning system pressure regulator and shutoff
valve, which is operated electrically by the cabin
pressure (air conditioning) master switch on the
aisle stand. From the air conditioning shutoff valve,
bleed air passes through a catalytic filter then divides. Part of the hot air passes through a flow control valve and is cooled by the ACP. A water separator downstream of the ACP removes moisture from
the cooler air. The remaining uncooled bleed air
1-358
Change 16
passes through a pressure regulator valve and is

mixed with the cooled air and ducted to the crew
station lower outlets to maintain the desired cabin
temperature. The remainder of the air cooled by the
ACP is ducted into the pressurized compartment
where it supplies cooling to electronic equipment
and crew station overhead outlets. Cabin pressurization is provided by regulating the discharge of
cabin air through combination cabin pressure safety and outflow valves. Ram air ventilation of the
crew compartment and some cooling of electronic
equipment may be obtained by positioning the air
conditioning master switch in RAM to shut off conditioned air, open the emergency ram airscoop, and
open the outflow valves. For ground operations, the
OFF position is used when the ground cooling cart
is connected to the ground cooling connection in the
forward wheel well to cool electronic equipment and
ventilate the compartment. Also, cooling air can be
obtained by selecting 7.45 when bleed air is available through an air cart connected to No. 2 nacelle
or from an engine run.
AIR SUPPLY REGULATION
The bleed air supply is normally taken from engines 3 and 4 and precooled in a ram air heat exchanger in the No. 2 strut before delivery to the air
conditioning system. An emergency (not precooled)
bleed air supply from engines 5 and 6 is available
when selected with the bleed selector switch on the
aisle stand. Bleed air passes through two pressure
regulator valves and a flow control valve, which
control the airflow through the air conditioning system. The airflow divides downstream of the catalytic filter, one stream going through the ACP to be
cooled, and the other stream is used for cabin heating.
A mixture of heated and cooled air from the pack
goes to the foot outlet ducts and can be varied hot
to cold. A portion of the total bleed airflow, depending on the position of the temperature modulating
valves, bypasses the ACP in maintaining a selected
cabin temperature. The temperature modulating
valves are electrically controlled from a combination switch-rheostat (temperature selector) on the
copilots side panel for the upper zone and on the
radar navigators front panel for the lower zone.
This provides the cabin with two zone automatic
temperature regulation. Control of the quantity of
air to each crew station is provided by controls at
the crew stations.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Extreme caution must be exercised by all

crewmembers when stowing and securing
gear aboard the aircraft. Care will be taken
to ensure that gear is safely secured and is
not stowed on or near heating ducts, outlets, electrical wiring, and electronic equipment. Periodically during flight, each crewmember should check ducts, outlets, electrical wiring, and electronic equipment in his
immediate area to see that they are free of
combustible materials. For location of
mixed air ducts and outlets, see figure
1-108.
NOTE
Ensure that the sensors (51 and 52, figure

1-106) are free from any coverings or obstructions for proper operation.
AIR CONDITIONING PACK
The ACP located in the left forward wheel well

cools the hot bleed air by means of an air-to-air
heat exchanger and an air cycle machine. The heat
exchanger uses ram air as the coolant which is obtained through a duct from the anti-iced airscoop in
the leading edge of the left inboard wing panel. The
air cycle machine consists of a compressor wheel,
an expansion turbine, and an axial blower directly
coupled together. The bleed air is partially cooled
with the first pass through the primary side of the
heat exchanger. It is then compressed to a higher
pressure by a pass through the compressor. This is
followed by another pass through the secondary
side of the heat exchanger. The air is then subjected
to a decrease in pressure and temperature in passing through the expansion turbine. The cold air output must be warmed above freezing to prevent ice
blockage of the water separator and to prevent extremely cold air from entering the cabin. An electronic controller automatically maintains an above
freezing temperature in the cold air output by oper-
ating a modulating anti-icing valve to bypass bleed

air from upstream of the first stage of the heat exchanger into the output of the air cycle machine.
The amber press-to-test warning light, located on
the pilots center instrument panel, is connected to
a thermal switch in the bleed air duct to warn of
overheat. The bleed air overheat light and the master caution light come on when bleed air temperature exceeds 210C. If the bleed air overheat light
comes on, see FAILURE OF BLEED AIR PRECOOLER under PNEUMATIC SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS, in Section III.
NOTE
210C should not be construed as a limiting

temperature for ACP operation. Illumination of the bleed air overheat light is an indication of higher than normal temperatures in the bleed air supply manifold for
the air conditioning system following a precooler malfunction. Due to the location of
the overheat temperature sensor, the overheat light may also illuminate if EMERG
RH INBD is selected following loss of normal bleed air supply. Operation of the ACP
with manifold temperature above 210C is
permissible so long as the temperature does
not exceed 246C. For more information see
AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM, this section.
The ACP is equipped with a thermal switch in the
compressor discharge duct which is set at 224C.
This switch is wired to the ACP flow control valve
and the cabin temperature control system (CTCS)
shutoff valve. These valves will close when the temperature at the switch reaches 224C. This shuts off
bleed air to the ACP and cabin distribution system.
Closure of the overspeed pressure switch or water
separator overtemp switch will also shut the system
down. The system will not automatically reset
when bleed air temperature decreases. The system
can manually be reset by placing the air conditioning master switch to RAM or OFF and then back to
a pressurization position.
Change 10
1-358A/(1-358B blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Water Separator
The water separator removes part of the moisture

precipitated by refrigeration of engine bleed air to
minimize fogging and snow conditions in the cabin.
The separator is installed with an automatically
controlled bypass just downstream of the air cycle
machine. Water collected is drained overboard. The
water separator bypass valve opens at any altitude
as a fail-safe feature if a malfunction or a freeze-up
restricts airflow.
AIR DISTRIBUTION
Cabin air is distributed by separate mixed air foot

outlet spray tubes at all crewmembers feet, by auxiliary cold air overhead outlets at all stations, and
by piped forced air cooling to electronic equipment.
The foot outlets are intended to provide the normal
air distribution for the crew, while head outlets provide an auxiliary source of cold air for cooling. The
cold air supply is divided between crew and equipment cooling so the crew will receive a major portion of the cold air output with all outlets open. The
crew has positive shutoff capability of each air outlet at their station. Closure of crew outlets may result in increased noise level. Quantity of air output
from pilots and defense station foot outlets is variable by means of push-pull knobs which simultaneously operate the butterfly valves in mixed air
supply ducts. The system is equipped with a cooling
effects detector (CED) in the cold air branch to the
electronics which provides automatic flow output
modulation of the ACP. The ACP will thus increase
air flow delivery when the crew outlets are opened
and decrease when they are closed. A ram air temperature switch will cut out the operation of the
CED above 32C ram air conditions to allow maximum cooling capability to the cabin. The piped cooling to the electronic equipment is supplemented by
circulation of cabin air through the electronic compartments to the controlled outflow valve(s) located
at the left side of the upper deck and the right side
of the lower deck. Pressurized cabin air is used for
environmental control of the EVS turrets. For further information, see EVS ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTROL AND TURRET WINDOW WASH SYSTEMS under ELECTRO-OPTICAL VIEWING SYSTEM (EVS), this section. For control of airflow at
individual air outlets, see AIR CONDITIONING
SYSTEM NORMAL OPERATION, this section.
PRESSURE REGULATION
Cabin pressure is regulated by controlling the outflow of air from the cabin. The cabin pressurization
equipment includes one automatic pressure regulator, a pneumatic relay, and two outflow valves
which also function as safety valves. A repressurization rate control is incorporated in the regulator
to limit the rate of cabin pressure increase to not
more than 1 psi per minute.
NOTE
A three-position test valve handle on the

regulator is marked TEST ONLY-DIFF
OFF- -TEST ONLY-ALL OFF- -FLIGHT.
The handle may be used during ground
maintenance testing, but at all other times,
it should be safety wired to FLIGHT. If the
handle is not in FLIGHT, the cabin will
pressurize ahead of the selected schedule
until the handle is returned to FLIGHT position. Access to regulator for purpose of
checking the handle position is only gained
by crawling forward of the navigators station on the floor under the navigators table.
The lower deck outflow valve is located on
the right side of the aircraft about 4 feet up
from the floor. The pressure regulator is located slightly above, inboard and aft of the
outflow valve near the top of the compartment.
Change 4
1-359
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Air Conditioning Pressurization and Pneumatic

System
AIR DUCT COLOR CODE
VALVES POSITIONED FOR NORMAL USE
ENGINE BLEED AIR
24
RAM COOLING
PACK OUTLET AIR
ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT COOLING AIR
RECIRCULATED CABIN COOLING AIR FOR INS
22
MIXED AIR
23
21
PNEUMATIC
13
15
14
1718
16
19
20
12
11
10
5
4
39
3
2
40
43
41
42
44
46
45
47
48
49
53
52
51
50
1
2
3
4
5
PILOTS STATION LOWER OUTLETS

UPPER ZONE TEMPERATURE SELECTOR
PILOTS STATION AIR OUTLET CONTROL
PILOTS STATION UPPER OUTLETS
SPRAY BAR
A31729
1-360
Change 19
T.O. 1B-52H-1
25
27
26
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
38
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
37
CTCS CONTROLLER
OUTFLOW VALVE AND EXHAUST
PRESSURE CONTROL REGULATOR
NAVIGATORS STATION UPPER OUTLETS
VENTS
PNEUMATIC RELAY
COOLING FAN RH REMOTE RACK
RECIRCULATED AIR INLET SCREENS
ORIFICE
LOW AIRFLOW DETECTOR
DEFENSE STATION LOWER OUTLETS
DEPRESSURIZATION DUMP CONTROL VALVE
DUCT TEMPERATURE SENSING ELEMENT
DEFENSE STATION AIR OUTLET CONTROLS
DEFENSE STATION UPPER OUTLETS
CATALYTIC FILTER
FLOW CONTROL SENSOR
FLOW CONTROL SHUTOFF VALVE
RIGHT WING RAM AIRSCOOP
MCS HOT AIR MODULATING VALVE
ORIFICE
PRESSURE REGULATOR (41 PSIG) AND
SHUTOFF VALVE
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
BODY CROSSOVER MANIFOLD VALVE

ACS/MCS CONTROLLER
ORIFICE
MCS COLD AIR MODULATING VALVE
PACK RAM AIRSCOOP
RAM AIRSCOOP ANTI-ICING SHUTOFF VALVE
SUCK-IN DOOR
AIR CONDITIONING PACKAGE
OVERSPEED PRESSURE SWITCH
PRESSURE REGULATOR VALVE (PSIG)
HOT AIR MODULATING VALVES
WATER SEPARATOR
GROUND COOLING AIR INLET DUCT
COLD AIR MODULATING VALVES
ORIFICE
WATER SEPARATOR OVERTEMPERATURE
SWITCH
44 CABIN EMERGENCY RETRACTABLE RAM
AIRSCOOP
45 PACK ANTI-ICE TEMPERATURE SENSOR
46 COOLING EFFECT DETECTOR
47 SUPPLY AIR TEMPERATURE SENSORS
48 ORIFICE
49 LOWER ZONE TEMPERATURE SELECTOR
50 NAVIGATORS STATION AIR OUTLET
CONTROLS
51 LOWER ZONE TEMPERATURE SENSOR
52 UPPER ZONE TEMPERATURE SENSOR
53 WINDOW WASH AIR PRESSURE REGULATOR
A31730
Change 19
1-361
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Air Conditioning System

(TR)
(118V AC)
BLEED VALVES
STRUT
STRUT NO. 3
MA
NI
V FOL
O AL D
EN PEN VE
GI
NE FOR
ST
AR
CL CAU OPE T
OS TI N
O
ST E AF N
AR
TE
T
R
CL
OS
E
(118V AC)
CTCS
PWR
(LTR)
CABIN EMER
RAM AIR CONT
5
AC POWER
AC SYSTEM
POWER
(TR)
CONTROL
NO. 4
1&4
AND BODY
CROSSOVER
MANIFOLD
VALVE
SWITCH
OP
7.45 PSI
COMBAT
4.50
OFF
PSI
ALT
PNEU
START
CONT
CL
CABIN
TEMPERATURE
CONTROL RELAY
EMERG
RH
INBD
BLEED
SELECTOR SWITCH
FROM
NO. 2 STRUT
(NORMAL
SOURCE)
OP
7.45 PSI
TO PRESSURE
REGULATOR
4.50 PSI
SOLENOID
RESET
EMERG
NORMAL
LH
INBD
NORMAL
CABIN PRESSURE
MASTER SWITCH
COMBAT
4.50 PSI
RAM
OFF
RAM
INBD ENG
START RELAY
AUTO
NORMAL
DUMP
CL
TO
MOD
VALVES
CABIN
TEMPERATURE
CONTROLLER
CL
NO. 3
STRUT
BLEED
VALVE
NO. 1 STRUT BODY

BLEED VALVE CROSSOVER
MANIFOLD
VALVE
OP
CLOSE
NO. 4 STRUT
BLEED VALVE
FILTER
FROM
RAM AIR
SCOOP IN WING
(PACK COOLANT)
ANTIICE
COOLING
VALVE
EFFECT
DETECTOR
AIR
CONDITIONING
PACK
HEAT
EXCHANGER
CTCS
SHUT OFF
AND PRES. REG
VALVE
COOL
WARM
COOL OFF WARM

AUTO
NORMAL
MANUAL
COOL
WARM
PILOTS
TEMPERATURE
CONTROL
THRU LANDING
GEAR SQUAT
SWITCH
TO PRESSURE
RELEASE SOLENOID
CONTROL
VALVE
RELAYS
CABIN EMERGENCY
RAM AIR SCOOP
MOTOR
AIR CONDITIONING
SHUTOFF VALVE
BLEED
CONTROLLER
AIR
OVERHEAT
ACS/MCS
WARNING
LIGHT
CABIN
PRESSURE
RELEASE
SWITCH
COOL
WARM
OFF
MANUAL
NAVIGATORS
TEMPERATURE
CONTROL
CLOSE
OPEN
CABIN EMERGENCY
RAM AIR SCOOP
(SHOWN RETRACTED)
TURBINE
CABIN EMER RAM

AIR SCOOP
(115 V AC)
COOLANT
EXHAUST
FLOW
CONTROL
VALVE
COOL AIR
TO PRESSURIZED
COMPARTMENT
HOT AIR
TO PRSSURIZED
COMPARTMENT
A31731
1-362
T.O. 1B-52H-1
(OUTSIDE
HANDLE)
STATIC
PORT
LOWER
ZONE
HOT VALVE
UPPER
ZONE
COLD
VALVE
UPPER
ZONE
HOT VALVE
LOWER ZONE
COLD VALVE
STATIC PORT
SE
D
GROUND
AIR
CONNECTION
(FWD WHEEL
WELL)
TO
ACS/MCS
CONTROLLER
COOLING EFFECT
DETECTOR
PIPED COOLING
TO ELECTRONIC
EQUIPMENT
P
U
UPPER L
L
HEAD
OUTLETS
OUT
FLOW
VALVE
RADAR NAV
NAVIGATOR
UPPER
(LH)
PRES
SURE
REGU
LATOR
FROM
COMBAT
4.50 PSI
POSTION
OF MASTER
SWITCH
C
LO
EMERGENCY
CABIN PRESSURE
RELEASE HANDLES
STATIC
PORT
PRESSURE
RELEASE
SOLENOID
VALVE
(NORMALLY
CLOSED)
FROM
ACP
HOT BLEED AIR
D
U
M
FROM PRESSURE
RELEASE (DUMP)
SWITCH RAM POSITION
OF MASTER SWITCH AND
LANDING GEAR SQUAT
SWITCH
T
O
NAVIGATORS
STATION
LOWER
FOOT OUTLETS
O
P
E
N
LOWER AFT
HEAD
OUTLETS
PNEU
MATIC
RELAY
P
U
UPPER L
L
EW OFFICER
DEFENSE STATION
OUT
FLOW
VALVE
T
O
O
LOWER P
E
N
FOOT OUTLETS
LOWER
RH
CHECK VALVE
CITCUIT BREAKER
TYPICAL
HEAD OUTLET
PILOT AND COPILOT
PILOTS
STATION
HEAD
OUTLETS
MOTOR OPERATED
SHUT OFF VALVE
SOLENOID CONTROLLED AIR
ACTUATED SHUT OFF VALVE
(NORMALLY & FAILSAFE
CLOSED)
ROTATE
90 TO OPEN
OR CLOSE
(TYPICAL PILOT
AND COPILOT)
COPILOT
AIR OUTLET VALVE
PILOT
AT LOWER OUTBOARD
CORNERS OF INSTRUMENT PANEL
FOOT
OUTLETS
ENGINE BLEED AIR (HOT)

PRECOOLED BLEED AIR
PARTIALLY COOLED AIR
COOLED AIR
RAM AIR
ELECTRICAL CIRCUITS
PRESSURIZED COMPARTMENT
RIGHT
SIDE
(PILOTS)
(COPILOTS)
LEFT
SIDE
A31732
MIXED AIR
1-363
T.O. 1B-52H-1
The control of cabin pressure is entirely automatic
and normally involves the following operational
ranges:
Unpressurized operation from ground level to
8000 feet in which cabin pressure is maintained
substantially at ambient pressures.
Isobaric operation in which the cabin pressure is
maintained at essentially an 8000-foot pressure
level. Isobaric operation will be maintained until
the pressure differential from cabin to ambient
equals 4.50 or 7.45 psi (figure 1-109) depending on
the schedule selected with the master switch.
NOTE
When changing the cabin pressure differential from 7.45 to 4.50 psi, an overshoot of
cabin altitude may occur. This momentary
overshoot of up to 3000 feet higher than expected should be considered normal. Figure
1-109 depicts cabin altitude versus aircraft
altitude for the two pressurization schedules.
Both outflow valves (left side upper deck and right
side lower deck) serve the following functions:
Relieve overpressure by allowing air to flow overboard to prevent cabin pressure from exceeding a
differential of 8.0 psi with respect to ambient pressure.
Relieve negative pressure by allowing ambient
air to flow into cabin to prevent cabin pressure from
becoming less than 0.37 psi lower than ambient
pressure.
Regulate normal outflow of air in response to the
automatic signals supplied by the regulator.
Dump cabin pressure when a dump signal is initiated by turning the master switch to RAM, by
turning the emergency cabin pressure release handles to DUMP, or by selecting DUMP with the cabin
pressure release switch.
1-364
The crew compartment cannot be pressurized when

the cabin pressure release solenoid valve is open.
This valve will be open under any one of the following conditions:
Pressure Release Switch in DUMP (electrically)
Air Conditioning Master Switch in RAM (electrically)
Emergency Cabin Pressure Release Handle in
DUMP (mechanically)
Aircraft weight on wheels actuates landing gear
squat switch relays (electrically)
Main landing gear extended and crabbed in flight
to an angle of 14 or more through any combination
of crosswind crab setting and rudder motion actuates landing gear squat switch relays (electrically).
Up to 8000 feet, this is not critical since cabin pressure is regulated to approximately 0.25 psi (1/2 inch
Hg) above atmospheric or substantially ambient
pressure.
CONTROL POWER SUPPLY
The body crossover manifold valve and the No. 3

strut bleed valve are operated by 118-volt singlephase ac motors. Strut No. 1 and 4 bleed valves are
operated by solenoids which are supplied TR power.
TR power is supplied to operate the following:
Cabin pressure release solenoid value
Pressure regulator 4.50 psi solenoid
Air conditioning system pressure regulator and
shutoff valve
Cabin temperature control relay which connects
118-volt ac power to the electronic cabin temperature control system controller for automatic operation of the cabin temperature modulation valves.
The emergency cabin ram airscoop is operated by a
118-volt single-phase ac motor.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Hot/Mixed Air Duct Locations and Outlets

EW AND GUNNERS STATION
PILOTS STATION
NOTE
Although this air is
mixed. It is possible for
duct temperatures to in
crease to a dangerous
level.
NAVIGATORS STATION
RADAR NAVIGATORS STATION
A31733
Figure 1-108
1-365
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Cabin Pressure Schedule
Figure 1-109
1-366
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM CONTROLS

AND INDICATORS
System controls and indicators are described in figure 1-110.
AIR OUTLET CONTROLS
Air Outlet Knobs
Two knobs at pilots station and defense station, and

three at navigators station marked AIR OUTLET
(figure 1-107) remotely control shutoff and quantity
of airflow from outlets at that station and may affect the overall distribution as described under AIR
DISTRIBUTION. The knobs on the radar navigators left sidewall, those between the EW officer and
gunner, and those at the lower part of each end of
the pilots instrument panel are placarded PULL
TO OPEN for increased airflow. By an arrow-indicated turn-clockwise-to-lock feature, the knobs may
be set at a desired intermediate point between all
the way in and out. The air outlet knobs at the de-
fense stations are grouped in a cluster with the

auxiliary heat knob. The air outlet knob at the top
of the cluster associated with the placard UPPER
controls head outlets airflow at that station. For operation of defense station auxiliary heat knob, see
AUXILIARY HEAT KNOB, this section.
Head Outlets
The pilots head outlets (figure 1-107) do not have

remote control knobs but are regulated directly by
the outlets themselves. Each pilots movable head
outlet, ball-mounted at the forward end of the spray
tube, may be opened or closed by 90 rotation of the
cylindrical portion of the outlet. Each head outlet
other than the pilots has, in addition to remote control of shutoff and quantity at the station, a separate built-in control of the direction and amount of
air flowing from the particular outlet. For control of
airflow at individual air outlets, see AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM NORMAL OPERATION, this
section.
1-367
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Pneumatic Systems Controls and Indicators
1
2
3
4
5
CABIN ALTIMETER
MANIFOLD TEMPERATURE GAGE
TEMPERATURE CONTROL SELECTOR (2
PLACES)
CABIN PRESSURE (AIR CONDITIONING)
MASTER SWITCH
6
7
8
9
10
BLEED SELECTOR SWITCH

PRESSURE RELEASE SWITCH
HOT AIR CAUTION LIGHT
CABIN AIRFLOW LOW WARNING LIGHT
EMERGENCY CABIN PRESSURE RELEASE
(DUMP) HANDLE
1-368
Change 20
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Change 20
1-369
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Pneumatic Systems Controls and Indicators (Cont)

NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
Cabin Altimeter
The single pointer Type MA-2 cabin altimeter marked CABIN PRESSURE ALT on the eyebrow instrument panel is graduated to indicate cabin pressure altitude in 1000-foot increments to 50,000 feet, then in
5000-foot increments from 50,000 to 80,000 feet. The instrument is a selfcontained unit requiring no external power source.
Manifold Temperature Gage
The manifold temperature gage indicates the temperature from 0 to

300C in the air bleed manifold. The gage is electrically operated by TR
power through a temperature sensor bulb in the manifold at the air conditioning duct lead-off. See figure 5-1 for gage markings.
MANIFOLD VALVE Switch
The OPEN- -CLOSE manifold valve switch is guarded to the CLOSE

position. The OPEN position, used primarily for engine starting, provides
for airflow from any engine to any other engine by supplying 118-volt single-phase ac to open the motor-driven body crossover manifold and No.
3 strut bleed valves, and TR power to open the normally closed solenoidoperated No. 1 and 4 strut bleed valves.
In OPEN position, air conditioning system control of the body crossover
manifold and No. 3 strut bleed valves is discontinued. This results in hot
bleed air being interconnected between all engines through the body
crossover manifold.
The guarded CLOSE position restores 118-volt single-phase ac to the air
conditioning system controls for management of bleed air source selection, and removes TR power from the solenoid-operated No. 1 and 4 strut
bleed valves which resume their normally closed positions.
TEMPERATURE CONTROL Selector

(2 places)
Two rotary temperature control selectors, one at the copilots station and
one at the radar navigators station, are a combination switch-rheostat.
Marking of AUTOMATIC RANGE with graduations marked
COOL- -NORMAL- -WARM and MANUAL TEMPERATURE CONTROL
with COOL- -OFF- -WARM positions indicate two modes of controlling
cabin temperature, automatic and manual, with separate means of regulation. The temperature selector has a range marked AUTO COOL to
AUTO WARM which selects temperatures from 54 to 96F.
NOTE
The cabin pressure (air conditioning) master switch must be

in 7.45 PSI or COMBAT 4.50 PSI position for cabin temperature control circuits to be energized.
Allow 15 to 20 minutes for the cabin temperature to stabilize
at the selected setting when the temperature control selector
is in AUTOMATIC.
1-370
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
4
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
TEMPERATURE CONTROL
Selector (Cont)
When the knob is positioned on the AUTOMATIC RANGE, ac power is

switched to the electronic automatic cabin temperature regulator for cycling the modulating valves in the respective zone, hot and cold air ducts
as required, to drive the valve toward open or toward closed in maintaining the temperature selected. Rotating the knob to OFF position removes
the power from the cabin temperature modulating valves which then remain stopped at the last position to which cycled, causing a constant ratio
of hot to cold air to be delivered to the cabin regardless of temperature.
Moving the spring-loaded knob from OFF to the WARM or COOL position
allows for manual adjustment of the air temperature by setting up a new
ratio of hot to cold air. Holding the knob in the WARM position further
opens the cabin temperature hot air modulating valve providing a warmer
air mixture, while holding the knob in the COOL position further opens the
cold air modulating valve providing cooler flow.
NOTE
Care should be taken when adjusting the temperature manually
to preclude going beyond the desired detent.
CABIN PRESSURE (Air Conditioning)

MASTER SWITCH
Four-position RAM- -OFF- -7.45 PSI- -COMBAT 4.50 PSI cabin pressure
(air conditioning) master switch is grouped with the pressure release and
bleed selector switches, and is accessible to both pilots.
Either RAM or OFF position shuts off the hot air supply to the air conditioning system by supplying 118-volt single-phase ac to close the air conditioning shutoff valve and, when the manifold valve switch is in CLOSE and
the bleed selector switch is in NORMAL LH INBD position, to close the
body manifold crossover valve while maintaining the No. 3 strut bleed
valve closed. Also, RAM or OFF position removes TR control power and
118-volt single-phase ac from temperature control circuits preventing the
205-volt three-phase ac operating power from reaching temperature
modulating valve motors.
To provide adequate external air for pneumatic engine start without external power a circuit breaker marked ALT PNEU START CONT is installed
to supply battery power to energize the air conditioning shutoff and flow
control valves. Once energized, airflow will close the valves, provided the
cabin pressure (air conditioning) master switch is in either RAM or OFF
position.
The emergency cabin ram airscoop is driven closed by 118-volt
single-phase ac in every position of the switch except RAM position,
which is used to open the ram airscoop. RAM position also dumps cabin
pressure by supplying TR power to open the cabin pressure release solenoid valve. OFF position does not dump cabin pressure which, however,
will bleed down by normal leakage.
1-371
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Pneumatic Systems Controls and Indicators (Cont)

NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
CABIN PRESSURE (Air Conditioning)

MASTER SWITCH (Continued)
Both 7.45 PSI and COMBAT 4.50 PSI positions close the emergency ram
airscoop while at the same time opening the air conditioning shutoff valve
to admit bleed air to the air conditioning system from the air bleed system
according to positions of the manifold valve switch and the bleed selector
switch. Also, 7.45 PSI and COMBAT 4.50 PSI positions energize the temperature control circuits for either manual or automatic operation and remove power from the cabin pressure release solenoid valve which then
closes to permit cabin pressurization according to the selected schedule.
COMBAT 4.50 PSI position provides a low differential pressurization
schedule by connecting TR power to the 4.50 psi solenoid in the pressure
regulator to shift the regulator from high (7.45 psi) to low pressure differential operation.
BLEED SELECTOR Switch
Guarded NORMAL LH INBD--EMERG RH INBD bleed selector switch

is grouped with the cabin pressure master switch and the pressure release switch and is accessible to both pilots.
NOTE
The manifold valve switch must be in the guarded CLOSE position and the cabin pressure (air conditioning) master switch
must be in either 7.45 PSI or COMBAT 4.50 PSI position for the
bleed selector switch to be energized.
With the bleed selector switch energized, the guarded NORMAL LH
INBD position connects 118-volt single-phase ac power so as to simultaneously close the No. 3 strut bleed valve and open the body crossover
manifold valve thus providing the normal precooled bleed air supply from
the No. 2 strut to the air conditioning system. Lifting the guard and moving
the switch to EMERG RH INBD position reverses the electrical connections thus closing the body manifold crossover valve while the No. 3 strut
bleed valve opens to provide an emergency hot (not precooled) bleed air
supply to the air conditioning system.
PRESSURE RELEASE Switch
A guarded RESET- -DUMP pressure release switch is grouped with the

cabin pressure master switch and the bleed selector switch and is accessible to both pilots. During pressurized operation, the switch will be in the
guarded RESET position and will be energized by TR power through the
cabin pressure master switch. Raising the guard and actuating the switch
to DUMP position energizes the cabin pressure release solenoid valve
to the open position causing the connected outflow valves to open and
dump cabin pressure.
HOT AIR (Bleed Air Overheat) Warning

Light (Amber)
The HOT AIR light on the central caution panel comes on when the bleed
air in the manifold duct exceeds 210C. The master caution light also
comes on.
CABIN AIRFLOW LOW Caution Light

(Amber)
The CABIN AIRFLOW LOW press-to-test caution light at the radar navigators station comes on when the flow of air in the duct delivering piped
cooling to electronic equipment becomes insufficient to safely cool the
equipment.
1-372
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
10
CONTROLINDICATOR
EMERGENCY CABIN PRESSURE
RELEASE (DUMP) Handle
FUNCTION
An emergency cabin pressure release (dump) handle with
DUMP- -CLOSED positions is provided just above each side of the pressure bulkhead door. Moving the handle to DUMP position mechanically
actuates the cabin pressure release solenoid valve to the open position
causing the connected outflow valves to open and dump cabin pressure.
CLOSED position of the handle permits the cabin pressure release solenoid valve to return to the normal spring-loaded closed position allowing
the outflow valves to resume the selected pressurization schedule.
NOTE
The emergency cabin pressure release handle is lockwired

to CLOSED position to prevent inadvertent opening of the
valve by partial actuation of either the outside or the connected inside handle. The lockwiring is designed to break
when either handle is actuated intentionally. The handle on
the pressurized side of the door is lockwired.
A guard is installed around the handle on the pressurized
side of the door to prevent inadvertent depressurization
caused by clothing or equipment catching on the handle during movement of a crewmember.
1-373
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM NORMAL

OPERATION
When EVS window washing action is initiated during RAM operation, the lines and
pump will remain full of water until the
cabin is pressurized. Line freeze should be
expected if the aircraft is exposed to a low
temperature environment prior to cabin
pressurization.
Do not run the ACP with the heat exchanger ram air duct plugs in place in the wing.
Such operation will overspeed the ACP to
destruction.
To prevent possibility of damage to electronic or other equipment from water in the
form of rain which is not removed from
bleed air during takeoff, and to prevent
windshield and instrument fogging, such
takeoffs should be made with the air conditioning system on RAM. The system must
then be returned to 7.45 PSI within 10 minutes after the cabin airflow low warning
light illuminates to prevent overheat damage to the OAS equipment.
NOTE
SYSTEM TURN-ON
For normal pressurized operation, the air conditioning system should be used from the ground up (except that ram air is used during takeoff) and is
placed in operation as follows:
1. Emergency Cabin Pressure Dump Handle
CLOSED
For the cabin to be pressurized, the emergency cabin pressure release handle will be
set positively to CLOSED. If the release
handle is cocked slightly from the shallow
CLOSED position detent, to which position
it has been lockwired, the lockwire may be
stretched or broken and cabin pressure may
be inadvertently dumped.
2. Cabin Pressure Release Switch RESET
3. Manifold Valve Switch CLOSE
4. Bleed Selector Switch NORMAL LH INBD
5. Cabin Pressure (Air Conditioning) Master
Switch 7.45 PSI (or COMBAT 4.50 PSI may be selected, according to operational requirements)
1-374
Valves in the bleed air temperature control

system have a tendency to stick when the
environmental control system (ECS) is first
turned on after takeoff causing the bleed air
overheat light to come on. Should this occur,
monitor the manifold temperature gage. If
the temperature reaches the red line,
throttle back engines 3 and 4 to approximately 0.04 EPR below the highest EPR of
remaining engines until the bleed air overheat light goes out. At this time the bleed
air temperature should have returned to
normal operating range. Advance throttles
back to desired setting.
Heating or cooling, according to cabin temperature selector switch settings and availability of pneumatic system hot air, is provided with the air conditioning master
switch in 7.45 PSI (or COMBAT 4.50 PSI)
whether the cabin is pressurized or not.
During extended periods of unpressurized
operation, move cabin pressure release
switch to DUMP position in order to provide
additional airflow for cooling of electronic
equipment.
If excessive noise tends to blank out interphone and radio communications, the air
conditioning master switch may be positioned to RAM during low altitude operation at power settings which cause difficulty
in communications. On climbout, return
master switch to 7.45 PSI before reaching
10,000 feet.
Use of RAM setting during low level operation for extended periods of time may result
in OAS equipment and/or pressurization
compartment overheating.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
6. Cabin Temperature Selectors AUTO
7. Air Outlet Knobs Set
To obtain maximum comfort for all crewmembers,
the optimum position for each control knob is
shown in figure 1-111. Depending upon changes in
altitude and differences experienced at the individual stations, the controls may be further adjusted
with slight variations as necessary. With increased
changes in control knob settings, air distribution
may become unsatisfactory and it will then be necessary to return the control knobs to positions as
specified in figure 1-111 before satisfactory control
may be established. The pilots head outlets should
be fully closed at all times except during ground or
low altitude operation. While operating at altitudes
above 40,000 feet, it may be necessary to refer to
the procedure outlined under ELECTRONIC
EQUIPMENT COOLING AT HIGH ALTITUDES,
this section, to keep the cabin airflow low warning
light extinguished.
ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT COOLING AT HIGH ALTITUDE
Altitude has a direct bearing on operation of the air

conditioning pack. With the aircraft at high altitudes (above 40,000 feet), it may be necessary to accomplish a check of the following items in order to
keep the cabin airflow low warning light extinguished. The check may also be used to determine
that a system malfunction does not exist when erratic temperature control is experienced.
1. Throttle setting for engines 3 and 4:
If possible, sufficient thrust to provide adequate
airflow for electronic equipment cooling should be
maintained (depending on the flight condition) on
these engines.
2. Position of the cabin temperature selectors:
If it is necessary to maintain low thrust settings on
engines 3 and 4, it will also be necessary to maintain a low cabin temperature setting.
Air Outlet Knob Positions

NORMAL OPERATION
LOCATION
OUTLET
POSITION
Pilot/Copilot
Stations
Lower
Upper
Knob Full Out

Directional Nozzles and Spray
Bars As Desired
EW Officer/Gunner
Stations
Lower
Upper
Knob Full Out

Knob As Desired
Navigator/Radar
Navigator
Stations
Lower Aft
Lower Forward
Upper
Knob Full Out

Knob Full Out
Knob As Desired
NOTE
These knob positions should provide adequate crew comfort without further adjustment for changes in flight conditions.
Any time inadequate equipment cooling is indicated by the OAS low flow light, crew
outlets, upper and/or lower, may be closed to the extent acceptable for crew comfort to increase equipment airflow.
During RAM operation the Missile Conditioning Subsystem (MCS) should not be
operating.
Figure 1-111
1-375
T.O. 1B-52H-1
3. Position of air outlet controls:
The air outlets will not need to be completely
closed, but any reduction of airflow for crew outlets
will tend to build up back pressure and furnish
more air for electronic equipment cooling.
NOTE
All of the previously mentioned items

should be checked before determining that
an actual malfunction of the system exists.
SYSTEM SHUTDOWN
The system is normally shut down by opening a pilots side window approximately 2 inches and placing cabin pressure master switch in RAM position
to relieve the small residual cabin pressure built up
during ground operation of the air conditioning system. The residual pressure is due to the need to
maintain the outflow valve preloaded to the closed
position by a slight spring pressure when the cabin
is depressurized. With the crew compartment closed
and the air conditioning system operating, a residual cabin pressure must build up to balance the
spring pressure before the outflow valve will open
to permit the necessary airflow for ventilation. An
unusually high residual cabin pressure, as noted by
means of the cabin altimeter, can be relieved by
turning the air conditioning master switch to RAM
and then opening the side window. The air conditioning master switch should then be returned to
the 7.45 PSI position to ensure cooling of electronic
equipment, if operating. Prior to ground operations,
1-376
opening a pilots side window before closing the

entry door will prevent buildup of residual pressure.
To prevent injury to ground crewmen, one

of the pilots side windows will be opened
approximately 2 inches before the main
entry door is opened or closed. Otherwise,
a small residual cabin pressure will build
up during ground operation of the air conditioning system. This pressure may impose
sufficient load on the door to cause injury
to anyone in its path when it is unlatched.
SYSTEM GROUND OPERATION
To obtain air conditioning for ground operation

from a connected external air conditioning unit,
place cabin pressure (air conditioning) master
switch in OFF position. To obtain air conditioning
for ground operation from an external air supply attached to the ground start connection at No. 2 nacelle, operate the air conditioning by following the
procedures for SYSTEM TURN-ON. Ground air
conditioning may also be obtained by the ground
operation of an engine in No. 2 nacelle and system
operation per steps 3 thru 7, or by attaching an external air supply to the ground start connection at
No. 3 nacelle, placing the bleed selector switch to
EMERG RH INBD position and further operate per
steps 5 thru 7 of SYSTEM TURN-ON.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Pneumatic Systems Circuit Protection and Location

CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
EQUIPMENT
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
Air Bleed System

Bleed Valves
CABIN AIR CONDITIONING BLEED

VALVES
STRUT NO. 1 & 4
STRUT NO. 3 & BODY XOVER
RLC/C26
RLC/C27
Rt. TR
AC Bus 5
Controls and Bleed Air

Overheat Light
MISCELLANEOUS
BLEED AIR SYSTEM
RLC/E23
Rt. TR
Manifold Air Temperature
MISCELLANEOUS
MANIFOLD AIR TEMP
RLC/E23
Rt. TR
Cabin Temperature
Modulation Valves Power
CTCS PWR
ECM/D1
Ac Bus 5
Controls and Air Flow Low

Warning Light
CABIN AIR CONDITIONING CONTROL
RLC/C25
Rt. TR
Emergency Cabin Ram Air

Scoop
MISCELLANEOUS
CAB EMER RAM AIR CONTR
ABNS/A1
Left TR
Air Conditioning System
11
ABNS
ECM

RLC
Figure 1-112
1-377/(1-378 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ANTI-ICING SYSTEMS
DESCRIPTION
ENGINE, NACELLE, AND SCOOPS ANTI-ICING SYSTEM
NORMAL OPERATION
PITOT ANTI-ICING
PITOT ANTI-ICING NORMAL OPERATION
WINDSHIELD ANTI-ICING AND WINDOW DEFOGGING
NORMAL OPERATION
EVS TURRET WINDOW ANTI-ICING
1-379
1-379
1-383
1-384
1-384
1-384
1-385
1-385
DESCRIPTION
Anti-icing is provided for the engines, nacelles,
scoops, windshield, windows, and pitot heads, with
all controls, except for EVS windows, being located
on the anti-ice control panel located on the left side
of the pilots instrument panel. Controls for anti-icing of EVS windows are at the radar navigators
station. An engine, nacelle, and scoops anti-icing
switch provides control for the use of engine bleed
air for anti-icing of the engine inlet components, nacelles, and air conditioning pack heat exchanger
ram airscoop (figure 1-113).
61-015
Two additional switches operate electrical heaters

for all pitot tubes. In addition, the left pitot heat
switch controls the Q-spring ram air inlet heaters.
A rotary switch is provided for the selection of a
normal or high rate of heat for windshield anti-icing and defogging. The engine, nacelle, and scoops
anti-icing switch provides inflight relay control of
power used to open a solenoid valve which connects
anti-icing bleed air to the missile environmental
system ram airscoop located in the right wing leading edge (figure 1-113).
NOTE
To prevent engine damage caused by formation of ice which enters the inboard engine
inlet area of the nacelles, the nose cowl cap
covers between the engines are equipped for
bleed air anti-icing.
Anti-icing systems controls and indicators are described in figure 1-114, while systems circuit protec-
tion and the location of the applicable circuit breakers is contained in figure 1-116.
ENGINE, NACELLE, AND SCOOPS ANTI-ICING
SYSTEM
Engine, nacelle, and scoops anti-icing (figure 1-113)

is accomplished thermally by hot air bled from the
engine high pressure compressors except for the Qspring ram air inlet and cabin emergency ram airscoop which are heated electrically.
Engine inlet guide vanes and nose domes receive
hot compressor bleed air independently, as an individual system on each engine, by means of a duct
on each side of each engine; each duct has a thermal restrictor and a TR powered relay-controlled
motor-driven shutoff valve.
Nacelle anti-icing uses hot air from the air bleed
system through a shutoff valve in each nacelle to
prevent ice formation on the leading edges of the
nose cowls. For anti-icing each engine nose cowl,
hot air from the shutoff valve is directed through a
modulating valve at each engine. The modulating
valve provides sufficient volume at safe temperatures and pressures for anti-icing the engine nose
cowl. The modulating valve incorporates two overheat controller temperature sensing elements to
maintain an 85F anti-icing temperature and two
overheat thermoswitches to shut off bleed air
should nacelle temperature exceed 120F. The
nacelle anti-icing shutoff valves are air actuated,
fail-safe-to-closed, and solenoid-operated to open
when the air bleed system is pressurized and the
solenoid is energized by TR power.
1-379
T.O. 1B-52H-1
The ram airscoop in the left wing, which supplies
the ram air coolant to the air conditioning pack
heat exchanger, and the right wing ram airscoop,
receives anti-icing air from the air bleed system
through a shutoff valve which is air actuated, failsafe-to-closed, and solenoid-operated to open when
the air bleed system is pressurized and the solenoid
energized by TR power. The Q-spring ram air inlet
is electrically anti-iced by 118-volt single-phase ac
and relay controlled by TR power. The cabin
emergency ram airscoop is electrically anti-iced by
118-volt single-phase ac and relay controlled by TR
power.
TR power to turn on both bleed air and electrical
anti-icing of scoops is supplied through the landing
gear squat switch relay, when aircraft weight is off
the wheels, for inflight use only.
The missile airscoop anti-ice valve receives relaycontrolled TR power through the control panel
1-380
Change 10
switch (3, figure 1-114) and the landing gear squat

switch relay. The missile airscoop anti-ice valve
receives relay controlled TR power from the RH
AIRSCOOP ANTI-ICE circuit breaker located on
the RH forward dc power panel.
No provisions are made for emergency operation of
the engine, nacelle, and scoops anti-icing system.
On all aircraft except 60-0017, the emergency ram
airscoop is electrically heated and will also cycle
approximately 1 minute open and 15 seconds closed
to prevent ice formation when the engine, nacelle,
and scoops anti-icing switch is ON and the air conditioning master switch is in RAM.
61-015
The engine, nacelle, and scoops anti-icing switch

also controls the electric heaters for the cabin emergency ram airscoop and anti-icing of the movable
external guide vanes for the angle of attack computer.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Engine, Nacelle, and Scoops Anti-Icing System
Figure 1-113
1-381
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Anti-Ice System Controls and Indicators
CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
FUNCTION
RIGHT PITOT HEAT Switch
The ON position of the switch energizes the pitot tube heaters on the right
side of the aircraft to prevent pitot tube stoppage by icing. OFF position
removes power from the heaters.
LEFT PITOT & Q-SPRING HEAT

Switch
The ON position of the switch energizes the pitot tube heaters on the left
side of the aircraft to prevent pitot tube stoppage by icing. The left pitot
heat switch also controls the Q-spring ram air inlet heater. OFF position
removes power from the heaters.
ENGINE NACELLE AND SCOOPS

Switch
The ON- -OFF engine, nacelle, and scoops anti-icing switch controls
anti-icing of engine inlet components, nacelle leading edge areas, the
ram airscoop lip in the left wing, and the cabin emergency ram airscoop.
ON position makes the connections to supply TR power to energize the
various solenoids and relays which cause the anti-icing air valves to open
and turn on the electrical heater power. OFF position deenergizes the solenoids and relays, causing engine, nacelle, and scoop anti-icing to be
shut off.
61-015
This switch also controls the electric heaters for the cabin emergency ram
airscoop.
WINDSHIELD ANTI-ICE AND

DEFOGGING Switch
The three-position OFF- -NORMAL- -HIGH rotary selector windshield

anti-ice and defogging switch electrically controls application of power to
autotransformers supplying the respective window heater voltages as required.
In OFF position, no power reaches the autotransformers and ac power
is removed from the main windshield window electronic temperature control units so windows will not be heated.
NORMAL position causes the main windshield window power transformers to be energized to produce the lower of two output voltages for anti-icing the main windows with the necessary ac power supplied to operate
the electronic temperature control units. NORMAL position also causes
the auxiliary window power autotransformers to be energized to heat the
auxiliary windows for defogging.
HIGH position switches connections to the main windshield window power transformers so they produce the higher output voltage required for
anti-icing the main windows (1 thru 4L & R) under the most severe icing
conditions.
Figure 1-114
1-382
Change 12
T.O. 1B-52H-1
inlet guide vanes. Anti-icing should be used
only as necessary in prevention of icing and
not for prolonged periods in dry air. When
the possibility of encountering icing conditions no longer exists, engine, and nacelle
anti-icing should be turned off.

NORMAL OPERATION
Normal operation of engine, nacelle, and scoops

anti-icing consists of turning the control switch ON
before entering suspected icing conditions and turning the switch OFF as soon as there is no further
need for anti-icing. Proper operation of the anti-icing system is indicated when a noticeable EPR drop
on all engines is noted upon actuating the anti-icing
control switch to ON. Engine, nacelle, and scoops
anti-icing should remain ON at all times during icing conditions. This includes static ground operation, taxiing, and takeoff. The engine and nacelle
anti-icing system was designed to prevent the accumulation of ice in the inlet section of the engine, not
to remove it. Thus it is essential that icing conditions be anticipated. During night flights an inadvertent encounter of icing conditions or unobserved
ice buildup is more likely to occur. Therefore, whenever there is any indication or suspicion that icing
conditions may exist, the engine, nacelle, and
scoops anti-icing switch will be turned ON during
night flights below 20,000 feet when the OAT gage
reading is below 10C. If ice should form, the
engine will be operated at or above a minimum
EPR that will provide adequate anti-icing. To attain
proper anti-icing for the engine, nacelle, and scoops,
the following minimum EPR values must be
maintained:
ALTITUDE - FEET
EPR
Below 5000
1.07
5000 to 10,000
1.09
10,000 to 15,000
1.12
15,000 and above
1.18
To prevent loss of thrust and possible engine damage due to ice ingestion, engine,
nacelle, and scoops anti-icing will be turned
ON prior to encountering ice.
Indiscriminate or prolonged use of engine
and nacelle anti-icing may cause cracking of
No EPR drop noted on one or more engines

upon actuating the engine and nacelle antiicing control switch would indicate possible
malfunction of the anti-icing system and
known or suspected icing conditions should
be avoided.
If ice is inadvertently allowed to build up on
the engine inlet, throttle setting should be
reduced (if flight conditions permit) before
anti-ice is activated to prevent or reduce engine damage. Throttle settings should be
consistent with minimum EPRs for use of
anti-ice heat and ignition should be turned
on until engine stabilizes.
NOTE
When descending under possible inlet icing

conditions, starter switches should be
placed in CONT and remain in CONT until
sufficient thrust for anti-ice heat has been
reestablished and stable engine operation
obtained. If the descent is being made for a
landing and inlet icing conditions are anticipated, starter switches should be placed to
CONT prior to final thrust reduction. Starter switches may be placed to CONT prior to
descent for low level operations or landing
and left in CONT until climb out of low level or after final landing.
Possible icing conditions are indicated by either of the following speed, temperature,
and moisture combinations:
1. Ground operation and at speeds below
250 knots IAS if the OAT true is 47F (8C)
or below and the dewpoint is within 4F
(2.3C) of the OAT with or without visible
moisture.
2. Flight above 250 knots IAS if the OAT
true is below 32F (0C) and with visible
moisture present. Visible moisture is
defined as rain, wet snow, or fog with
visibility 1 mile or less.
1-383
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Icing conditions which lead to use of the engine, nacelle, and scoops anti-icing system at altitudes
above approximately 25,000 feet should, to the
maximum extent possible, be avoided. Engine compressor stalls which are characterized by a recurring bang at the rate of about one per second may
occur from 1 to 5 minutes after anti-icing is turned
on. Such stalls, if experienced for only a short duration, may not produce harmful effects; however, to
prevent possible engine damage, prolonged operation with the stall condition should be avoided. To
avoid stall conditions or reduce the intensity, see
ENGINE COMPRESSOR STALL under ENGINE
MALFUNCTIONS, Section III. If anti-icing is required and compressor stall is experienced, the following procedure will be observed:
1. Increase engine thrust (not to exceed NRT) to
approximately 99% RPM. Airbrakes may be required to maintain the desired speed schedule. If
engine continues to stall at high thrust settings,
turning the anti-icing off momentarily may eliminate the stall.
NOTE
To reduce engine compressor stalls, anti-icing should be turned off when making engine deceleration above 15,000 feet. Anti-icing can then be turned on after the engines
have stabilized at the reduced throttle settings.
2. If the stall condition is not eliminated by increasing thrust, reduce throttle setting to IDLE.
3. If due to the amount of thrust adjustment required, difficulty is experienced in maintaining
proper airspeed, descend to an altitude at which the
engine stall will no longer occur. Return to normal
thrust settings until such time as anti-icing is no
longer required. If a prolonged stall (more than 1
minute) has been encountered, the information will
be recorded on Form 781 to facilitate maintenance
inspection.
PITOT ANTI-ICING
Left and right pitot heat is powered by 28-volt ac

power. The left and right pitot tubes provide input
to the parameter scheduling unit of the stability
augmentation system (SAS). Altitude computer
pitot heaters are supplied 118-volt ac power. There
is no emergency provision for pitot anti-icing.
1-384
PITOT ANTI-ICING NORMAL OPERATION
Pitot heat switches should be ON prior to takeoff or

in flight whenever icing conditions are anticipated
to prevent ice formation and loss of airspeed indication. Switches should be turned OFF after landing.
The main windshield windows and all auxiliary

windows except the panes at each side of the upper
center window are heated for anti-icing or defogging by means of transparent electrically conductive film between the glass laminations. The main
windshield windows are numbered (figure 1-115)
left and right from the center, which is No. 1 thru
4L & R, and are anti-iced by having the conductive
film next to the outer pane. Inner surfaces of the
main windows are defogged by part of the anti-icing
heat being conducted through the laminated glass.
The auxiliary windows include those numbered 5L
& R, 6L & R, and the pilots and copilots escape
hatch windows. The auxiliary windows, except 6L
and R which are unheated, have the conductive
film next to the inner pane with the primary purpose of defogging the inner glass surface. AC power
at the necessary voltages for heating the respective
conductive films to the required operating temperature for each heated window is supplied by 118-volt
ac autotransformers.
Heater power to the auxiliary windows is interrupted by individual thermal snap switches on the
inner surface of each window as protection from
overheating. The main windshield windows may be
heated at either of two heating rates while only a
single heating rate is provided for the auxiliary
windows, as selected by the windshield anti-ice and
defogging switch. Main windshield windows 3L & R
are the pilots and copilots sliding windows. When
either sliding window is opened, a limit switch also
opens removing power from the autotransformer
supplying both 3L (or R) and 4L (or R) so main
windshield windows 3 and 4 will not be anti-iced
while the sliding window on that side is open.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NORMAL OPERATION
NORMAL position of the windshield anti-ice and

defogging switch will give the longest main windshield service life and will provide satisfactory antiicing and defogging under normal flight conditions.
The following procedure is recommended:
1. Turn windshield anti-ice and defogging switch
to NORMAL prior to takeoff. Leave the switch in
this position as long as satisfactory anti-icing and
defogging is obtained.
To prevent damage to the heated windows,

operate on NORMAL 15 minutes before
turning switch to HIGH position.
2. The switch should be set to HIGH at any time
the NORMAL setting does not provide satisfactory
anti-icing or defogging of main windshield windows.
3. Turn the switch to OFF after landing.
EVS TURRET WINDOW ANTI-ICING
Anti-icing and defogging of the FLIR and STV turret windows is provided when the FLIR and STV
turret air switches on the EVS environmental power control panel are placed on. The FLIR window is
made out of germanium and contains a sensor
which is connected to a temperature controller to
maintain a temperature range from 86F to 98F.
This germanium window is used as an electrical
semiconductor; therefore, when the FLIR window
heat system is energized, lethal voltage is present
on the window surface. The temperature controller
is connected through a squat switch relay to
prevent inadvertent FLIR window heat operation
while the aircraft is on the ground. Heating power
is 118-volt ac.
The STV window is heated by means of transparent
electrically conductive film between the glass
laminations. This window contains a sensor which
is connected to a temperature controller to
maintain a temperature range from 86F to 98F.
The STV window heat system is not connected to
the squat switch and may be operated safely while
the aircraft is on the ground. Heating power is
118-volt ac.
For additional control information, see EVS
ENVIRONMENTAL POWER CONTROL PANEL
under ELECTRO-OPTICAL VIEWING SYSTEM
(EVS), this section.
1-385
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Windshield and Window Numbering
Figure 1-115
1-386
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Anti-Icing Systems Circuit Protection and Location

EQUIPMENT
Engine and Nacelle Anti-Icing
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
ANTI-ICE POD CONTROL

NO. 1
NO. 2
ENGINE ANTI-ICE CONTROL
POD 3
POD 4
POWER
SOURCE
LLC/D32
LLC/D33
Left TR
Left TR
RLC/C22
RLC/C23
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
EVS/Q2
EVS/R2
Rt. TR
Left TR
PCBP/C12
PCBP/C13
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
PCBP/D6
AC Bus 3
CPCBP/E4
AC Bus 5
ANTI-ICE
AIR SCOOP SHUTOFF VALVE
LLC/D34
Left TR
STV Window Anti-Ice Power
115 AC-PHASE A STV WINDOW HTR

115 AC-PHASE B STV WINDOW HTR
115 AC-PHASE C STV WINDOW HTR
EVS/E2
EVS/F3
EVS/J3
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
Window Anti-Ice
ANTI-ICE LEFT
AUX WINDOW RELAYS
WINDOW CONT UNITS
WINDOW RELAYS
ANTI-ICE RIGHT
AUX WINDOW RELAYS
WINDOW CONTR UNITS
WINDOW RELAYS
MISCELLANEOUS WINDOW
HEAT POWER
AUX WINDOWS LEFT
1
2 LEFT
3 & 4 LEFT
WINDOW HEAT POWER
AUX WINDOWS RIGHT
2 RIGHT
3 & 4 RIGHT
LLC/D31
LLC/D29
LLC/D30
Left TR
AC Bus 3
Left TR
RLC/B26
RLC/B24
RLC/B25
Rt. TR
AC Bus 5
Rt. TR
PCBP/E5
PCBP/E1
PCBP/E2
PCBP/E3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
CPCBP/D12
CPCBP/D10
CPCBP/D11
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
EVS Window Anti-Ice Control
DC POWER CONTROL FLIR ENV

DC POWER CONTROL STV ENV
Pitot & Q-Inlet System Anti-Ice
ALTITUDE COMPUTER PITOT HEAT

LH
RH
FLIGHT INDICATORS
LEFT PITOT & FAIR HTR
MISCELLANEOUS
RH PITOT & FAIR HTR
Ram Air Scoops Anti-Ice
11
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
CPCBP
EVS
LLC

PCBP
RLC

Figure 1-116
1-387/(1-388 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
INSTRUMENTS
DESCRIPTION
PITOT-STATIC SYSTEM
TRUE AIRSPEED COMPUTER
ALTITUDE COMPUTER
PITOT-STATIC INSTRUMENTS
MISCELLANEOUS ELECTRICAL INSTRUMENTS
MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUMENTS
ATTITUDE HEADING REFERENCE SYSTEM (AHRS)
1-389
1-389
1-389
1-391
1-391
1-397
1-399
1-402
DESCRIPTION
The instruments in this subsection include pitotstatic operated instruments, electrically operated
instruments, radar altimeter, and miscellaneous instruments. The Attitude Heading Reference System
(AHRS) is also included in this subsection. The Attitude-Director Indicator (ADI) and the Horizontal
Situation Indicator (HSI) are covered under
FLIGHT DIRECTOR SYSTEM, this section.
Instruments circuit protection and the location of
the applicable circuit breakers is contained in figure 1-122.
PITOT-STATIC SYSTEM
NOTE
Due to the location of static ports relative

to airflow under different conditions of
flight, instruments depending on a static
source may vary in accuracy. See the POSITION CORRECTION charts in Part 1 of
T.O. 1B-52H-1-1 for the correction desired
under a particular condition.
Four pitot tubes, two pitot-static tubes, and six
static ports (figure 1-117) provide impact and static
pressures to operate the pitot-static instruments.
Two pitot tubes are located aft of the forward radome on the lower left and lower right of the control
cabin. The left forward pitot tube supplies impact
pressure to the pilots airspeed indicator, the EVS
IAS transducer, and the OAS equipment. The right
forward pitot tube supplies impact pressure to the
copilots airspeed indicator, autopilot equipment,
the true airspeed computer, and flight loads recorder. Two pitot tubes are located just below and just
aft of the pitot tubes described above. These pitot
tubes supply impact pressure through a manifold
valve to the parameter scheduling unit. The param-
eter scheduling unit provides gain signals to the

yaw electronic control unit of the stability augmentation system (SAS).
Two pitot-static tubes are located forward of the
wing leading edge on the upper left and upper right
of the aft control cabin. The aft pitot-static tubes
provide impact and static pressure to the AIMS altitude computer. The static lines from both tubes
are connected together and supply static pressure
to the altitude computer. The right aft tube provides impact pressure to the altitude computer. The
impact pressure line from the left aft tube is capped
and not used.
Three static ports are located on each side of the
control cabin. Each port is interconnected with the
corresponding port on the opposite side of the aircraft. The bottom ports provide static pressure for
the true airspeed computer, the autopilot equipment, and flight loads recorder. The center ports
provide static pressure for the copilots airspeed, altimeter, and vertical velocity indicators, the navigators altimeter, the OAS equipment, and the SAS
parameter scheduling unit. Static pressure for the
pilots altimeter, airspeed, vertical velocity indicator, and the EVS IAS transducer is supplied by the
top ports.
TRUE AIRSPEED COMPUTER
The aircraft is equipped with a true airspeed computer which uses static pressure, pitot pressure,
and temperature to compute true airspeed. True
airspeed information is supplied to the true airspeed indicator on the radar navigators front panel
and on the pilots instrument panel. Mach information is computed from pitot and static pressure and
is supplied to the Mach indicator on the pilots instrument panel.
Change 16
1-389
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Pitot-Static System
Figure 1-117
1-390
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ALTITUDE COMPUTER (CPU-66)
PITOT-STATIC INSTRUMENTS
The CPU-66 altitude computer provides the same

inputs to both the AAU-19/A altimeter and the AN/
APX-64 IFF. The operating mode of the AAU-19/A
altimeter (RESET or STBY) has no effect on the
CPU-66 computer inputs to the IFF transponder.
The computer measures pressure altitude referenced to standard sea level pressure of 29.92 and
corrects for position error. For IFF functions this
corrected altitude is encoded to the nearest 100-foot
level and is furnished to the IFF transponder,
which in turn automatically relays the corrected altitude as a pulse train to the Ground Control Center, upon interrogation, provided the mode C enabling switch on the control panel is in the ON position.
The pitot-static instruments include:
For altimeter functions, this corrected altitude is

used to drive the altimeter display when the altimeter is in servo mode. With an altimeter setting of
29.92, the altimeter altitude displayed will correspond to the computer altitude. Altimeter settings
other than 29.92 introduce a corresponding difference between the altimeter altitude displayed and
the computer altitude. If either the pilots, copilots
or both altimeters fail (STBY flag showing) the
computer may still operate properly and transmit
correct altitude data to the transponder. With both
altimeter flags showing simultaneously it may be
determined if the altimeters or computer failed by
using the IFF self test feature for mode C. With
both flags showing, and the system does not self
test in mode C, the computer may be assumed to
have failed. If both altimeter flags are showing and
the system self tests in mode C properly, the two altimeters have failed in the servo mode or have been
placed in STBY. In this case, a subsequent failure of
the computer would not be indicated to the pilots
since the same AAU-19/A STBY flag is used to indicate a failure in the altimeter or the computer. Periodic mode C checks while cruising and a check prior
to a change of altitude should be made to assure
correct computer operation. The mode C self test
check will not detect blockage of static lines to the
computer, only a failure within the computer.
The pilots and copilots indicated airspeed

indicators
The pilots and copilots vertical velocity indicators
The Mach indicator
The pilots and navigators true airspeed
indicators
Navigators altimeter
The pilots and copilots AAU-19A altimeters (when
in the STBY mode)
When the AAU-19A altimeters are in the RESET

mode, they use information supplied by the altitude
computer.
Indicated Airspeed Indicators
A Type L-7A indicated airspeed indicator (B, figure

1-118) is located at both the left and right sides of
the pilots instrument panel. By the use of two
pointers, the pilots can observe the airspeed indication and the maximum allowable airspeed indication at the same time. The airspeed dial is graduated from 50 to 650 in 10-knot increments. A rotating
drum, visible through a window in the dial, is graduated from 0 to 100 in 2-knot increments for sensitive indications. Stops limit the maximum speed
pointer travel in the range from 200 to 600 knots.
Mach number indications from 0.6 to 1.0 are also
provided in this range as a reference for the Mach
number index adjustment. A triangular index at
the edge of the dial is set to the aircraft maximum
allowable Mach number by an adjustment made at
the rear of the instrument case. This adjustment
governs the rate of change of the maximum airspeed pointer to indicate the Mach airspeed of the
aircraft for any flight altitude or airspeed. In operation, the maximum airspeed pointer moves down
the scale from the upper limits with lowering pressure altitude, and the indicated airspeed pointer
moves up the scale with increasing airspeed. When
the pointers coincide, the maximum Mach/airspeed
for the existing flight condition has been reached.
Vertical Velocity Indicators
An MS28049 vertical velocity indicator (C, figure

1-118) is located at both the right and left sides of
the pilots instrument panel.
1-391
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Mach Indicator
True Airspeed Indicator
A Type ME-5 Mach indicator (D, figure 1-118) located on the left side of the pilots instrument panel
indicates the ratio of aircraft speed to the speed
of sound at the particular pressure altitude at any
time during flight. The instrument has a range of
0.5 to 1.0 which is indicated on a stationary dial
by a rotating pointer. A rotating subdial is also
provided which reads in hundredths and is graduated from 1 to 10. The ME-5 is a servo-type indicator, receiving power from the true airspeed computer through a Mach indicator switch on the pilots
side panel (9, figure 1-118). Movable indices are
located on the face of the instrument, one on the
main dial and one on the subdial which rotates
with the subdial scale. These indices can be moved
by the pilot to any value of Mach number desired
as a reference without affecting the reading or adjustment of the instrument. Rotating the knob in
the lower right corner of the instrument while in
its normal (out) position will move the index on
the main dial. Depressing and rotating the knob
will allow adjustment of the index on the subdial.
However, if there is no power on the instrument,
movement of the subdial index may cause movement of the subdial and the main dial pointer. This
rotation of pointer and subdial scale will not affect
indicator reading. A red power-off flag will appear
when power to the Mach indicator is off and will
remain in view for approximately 40 seconds after
Mach indicator switch is turned ON when power
is available. When power is turned ON and the
true airspeed computer is warmed up sufficiently,
the needle and the subdial will indicate the appropriate Mach reading.
A true airspeed indicator (E, figure 1-118) located

on the pilots instrument panel and on the radar
navigators front panel (G, figure 1-118) is a remote
indicating unit. A main dial and subdial in the true
airspeed indicator repeat airspeed information
transmitted from the true airspeed computer. A cutout and reference mark on the main dial permit
reading of the subdial. The power to operate this indicator is supplied by the true airspeed computer.
NOTE
The Mach indicator ideally would give a

true Mach reading; however, there are two
sources of error in the system. One is the
position error inherent in the pitot-static
system and the other is the instrument error inherent in the mechanism of the instrument itself. The magnitude of the position error is shown on the POSITION ERROR chart in Part 1 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1.
Since no calibration is available, the magnitude of the instrument error is not known
to the pilot but will be within the maximum
allowable tolerance of 0.03. Refer to Part
1 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1 for a further discussion of these errors and a method of inflight
determination of the Mach number. All
Mach numbers given in this flight manual
are indicated Mach unless otherwise noted.
1-392
Altimeter (Navigators)
A Type AAU-8/A altimeter (F, figure 1-118) is located on the navigators instrument panel. Three
concentrically mounted pointers indicate hundreds,
thousands, and ten thousands of feet with reference
to a single dial scale uniformly graduated from 1 to
10. The long pointer indicates 1000 feet in one revolution, the intermediate pointer 10,000 feet in one
revolution, and the small pointer 10,000 feet for
each major graduation on the dial up to the maximum possible altitude reading of 80,000 feet. The
small 10,000-foot pointer is part of a black disc next
to the main dial with a 60 low altitude warning
symbol segment cut out of the side opposite the
pointer. At zero altitude indication (and below), the
60 low altitude warning symbol in the disc is filled
with alternate diagonal fluorescent and black
stripes. With increasing altitude, the diagonal
stripes are progressively covered until, at 16,000
feet, no stripes are showing. This provides a conspicuous warning of approaching lower altitudes
when descending from operational altitudes. The
cutout filled with the diagonal stripes is also used
as an indication of a correctly zeroed altimeter
during the preflight check. The zero setting knob on
the front of the instrument sets the pointers to read
from any ground pressure altitude between 28.1
and 31.0 inches of mercury as displayed in the
Kollsman window located between the 2 and 3 on
the main dial. Positive stops are provided at or near
the extremes of the barometric scale so that the
scale cannot be misset by excessive rotation.
NOTE
A Type MA-1 altimeter may be installed in

the aircraft although it is not recommended.
The MA-1 is identical and performs in the
same manner as the AAU-8/A altimeter except that positive stops are not provided on
the barometric scale to preclude missetting
the scale by excessive rotation.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Altimeter (Pilot and Copilot)
A Type AAU-19/A altimeter (A, figure 1-118) is on

the pilots and copilots instrument panels. The altimeter has a counter-drum-pointer display. The
counters and drum provide a direct digital readout
in thousands and hundreds of feet. The single
pointer repeats the 100-foot indications of the
drum, serving both as a vernier for the drum and as
a quick indication of the rate and direction of altitude change. The altimeter can be operated in either the servo (computer controlled) mode or the
standby (static pressure) mode as selected by the
RESET-STBY lever. The RESET-STBY lever is
spring loaded to an unmarked neutral position between RESET and STBY positions. When in the
standby mode, a STBY flag will be in sight on the
instrument face. A barometric pressure set knob
and barometric scale are provided for adjusting the
altimeter setting. A field elevation check should be
made in both modes using 75 feet as the maximum
altimeter error allowable in either case. In addition,
readings between the two modes should correspond
within 75 feet.
altitude (standby mode) by as much as 4500 feet

without the altimeter monitor inadvertently
switching the altimeter to the standby mode. This
is to compensate for large altitude position errors in
some airplanes. Since a single CPU-66 computer
drives both altimeters in the servo mode, no means
of comparison between AAU-19/A altimeters is
available if both are in RESET. This condition can
be circumvented by operating the pilots altimeter
in RESET and the copilots altimeter in STBY. Both
altimeters will then display data derived from
separate sources and provide a means of
comparison and independent backup.
If the altimeter reverts to standby mode automatically, attempt should be made to reset to the servo
mode. If the malfunction was transient, the altimeter will reset. If the fault remains, the altimeter
will not reset but will operate normally in the
standby mode.
SERVO MODE
Servo mode is designed to be the primary mode of
operation and should be used unless failure prohibits. In the servo mode, the basic pressure altitude
indication of the instrument is servo-corrected for
position error by the CPU-66 altitude computer.
Inflight, the allowable difference between servo
mode readings of two altimeters is 75 feet at all altitudes and speeds. The altimeter is placed in servo
mode by momentarily positioning the reset-stby lever to RESET. The STBY flag will disappear. A failure monitor circuit will automatically return the
system to standby mode and the STBY flag will appear for any of the following malfunctions:
Primary power failure

Servo amplifier or motor failure
Switch failure
The CPU-66 computer error sensing system senses

error in a servo loop that takes its input from a
pneumatic sensor within the computer. All error
sensing is downstream of the sensor and as a result
there is no monitor function applied to the sensor
itself. The AAU-19/A altimeter also has a means of
monitoring internal failures which will revert the
altimeter to STBY. In addition, it is designed to be
capable of accepting electrical signals from the computer which differ from the uncorrected pneumatic
If it is determined that the altitude computer (CPU-66) has failed or is delivering erroneous data, placed the mode C enabling
switch to the OUT position and advise the
ARTC center.
NOTE
Relay failure
Monitor failure
If the computer pneumatic sensor were to

fail or become locked in a particular position, or system failures - such as pitot or
static source icing, ice or water blockage in
static lines, leaks, or pitot head damage - were to occur, the computer could deliver erroneous data to the altimeters. The
aircraft could experience a large change in
altitude before the AAU-19/A error detection circuit would react and switch the system to standby. Erroneous data would also
be delivered to the transponder and
relayed, on interrogation, to the ground radar agency.
If the altimeter cannot be switched to STBY

manually due to a switch malfunction, the
STBY mode can be acquired by momentarily opening the ALT CMPTR circuit breaker
(for approximately 3 seconds). The altimeter will revert to standby and operate as a
pneumatic altimeter.
The altimeter correction card is not used in
the servo mode.
1-393
T.O. 1B-52H-1
STANDBY MODE
In the standby mode, the altimeter operates solely
from the static pressure system. A black-on-red
STBY flag will be in view, indicating that the instrument is providing a normal static pressure
reading and that displayed altitude is not corrected
for position error. The instrument will be in standby mode when aircraft power is first applied and
will remain in standby mode until the RESETSTBY lever is momentarily placed to RESET. The
altimeter may be shifted from servo to standby
mode by holding the RESET-STBY lever in the
STBY position until the STBY flag appears. Normally 1 to 3 seconds are required for this to happen
due to the time delay built into the instrument to
prevent nuisance trip-offs. When the altimeter is in
the standby mode, an internal vibrator will operate
continuously. The vibrator minimizes mechanical
friction, enabling the instrument to provide a
smoother display during altitude changes. Should
vibrator failure occur, the altimeter will continue to
function but a less smooth movement of the instrument display will be evident with changes in altitude.
When the altimeter is operating in standby

mode, the appropriate altimeter correction
card for the current aircraft configuration
will be used to fly corrected altitude for traffic separation.
If the altimeters internal vibrator is inoperative, the 100-foot pointer may momentarily hang up when passing through 0 or
12 oclock position. The pointer hangup can
be minimized by tapping the altimeter case.
Pilots should be especially watchful for this
failure when their minimum approach altitude lies within the 800 to 1000 foot part of
1-394
Change 18
the scale, such as 1800 to 2000 feet or 2800

to 3000 feet, and should use any appropriate altitude backup information available.
During normal use of the barometric setting

system, momentary locking of the barocounters may be experienced. If this occurs,
do not force the setting. Application of force
may cause internal gear disengagement and
result in excessive altitude errors in both
standby (STBY) and servo (RESET) modes.
If locking occurs, the required setting may
sometimes be established by rotating the
knob a full turn in the opposite direction
and approaching the setting carefully.
Altimeter Correction Card
An altimeter correction card and holder are located

on the pilots glare shield. The altimeter correction
card is for a clean configuration and serves as a
baseline correction. The card reflects position error
only and is based on an average gross weight of
325,000 pounds and a standard day temperature.
When configured with external weapons, altitude
corrections can be computed by applying the applicable chart correction, from Part 1 of the performance manual, to the clean configuration altimeter
card. For further information concerning the use of
the altimeter correction card, refer to Part 1 of T.O.
1B-52H-1-1.
When the altimeter is operating in standby

mode, the appropriate altimeter correction
card for the current aircraft configuration
will be used to fly corrected altitude for traffic separation.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Pitot Static Indicators
1
2
3
4
STANDBY FLAG
100-FOOT POINTER
BAROMETRIC SCALE
RESET STBY LEVER
5
6
7
8
100-FOOT DRUM
BAROMETRIC PRESSURE SET KNOB
1000-FOOT COUNTER
10,000-FOOT COUNTER
1-395
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Pitot Static Indicators (Cont)
MACH INDICATOR SWITCH
1-396
Change 17
T.O. 1B-52H-1
MISCELLANEOUS ELECTRICAL INSTRUMENTS
Horizontal Situation Indicator
See FLIGHT DIRECTOR SYSTEM, this section.

C-2A Heading Indicator (Gyro)
A Type C-2A heading indicator (gyro) (A, figure 1-119)

is located on the left side of the pilots instrument
panel. This instrument receives 115 volt three-phase
ac power as controlled by the gyro power switch on the
pilots side panel. The heading indicator (gyro) is an
unslaved-type gyro which provides auxiliary headings for navigational purposes and is also used to provide headings in the event of failure of the main compass system. A calibrated compass card (1, figure
1-119) located on the upper portion of the instrument
is read against a lubber line fixed on the instrument
mask. The mask has a cutout in the lower portion (2,
figure 1-119) which shows reciprocal heading. A
spring-loaded push-to-set type synchronizing knob
(3, figure 1-119) is located on the lower left portion of
the indicator and is used to realign or calibrate the
dial to known references. Emergency dc power is
supplied to the heading indicator clutch at all times.
NOTE
The heading indicator (gyro) should be

monitored throughout the flight for correct
magnetic or grid heading and reset as necessary. The heading indicator (gyro) may be
the first or only indication of a heading system malfunction.
The allowable drift rate is 8 degrees per
hour minus the earths rate; therefore, the
instrument should be periodically reset to
correct for drift beyond the capabilities of
the leveling system.
Gyro Power Switch
A gyro power switch (4, figure 1-119) located on the

left side of the pilots instrument panel has
ON- -OFF positions. In the ON position, power is
supplied to the pilots and copilots attitude indicating systems, and the C-2A heading indicator (gyro).
The gyro system operates on 205-volt three-phase
ac aircraft power from the No. 3 generator bus
routed to the flight gyro transformer. The flight
gyro transformer reduces the ac power to 115-volt
ac which is supplied to the pilots and copilots attitude indicating systems and C-2A heading indicator
(gyro). In the event of ac electrical power failure on
the No. 3 generator bus, an emergency flight gyro
inverter will supply 115-volt three-phase ac power
to the pilots attitude indicator and C-2A heading
indicator (gyro). In addition, the inverter supplies
lighting power for the pilots attitude indicator. The
inverter utilizes emergency dc power and is auto-
matically controlled by a gyro power switching

relay when the gyro power switch is in ON position.
When the gyro power switch is in OFF position,
power is cut off to the instruments and the inverter.
See Instrument Operation under COMPLETE AC
POWER FAILURE, Section III, for further information concerning the emergency flight gyro inverter.
NOTE
When one of the flight gyro power circuit

breakers trip, the gyro system will continue
to function. If two circuit breakers trip, the
system will not function properly.
If any of the three flight gyro circuit breakers
trip and cannot be reset, do not pull the remaining circuit breakers unless the AHRS
has also failed, resulting in an inflight emergency. The emergency instrument inverter is
designed to function during aircraft power
failures and not during a single instrument
failure. The condition which caused the circuit breaker to trip could damage the emergency inverter. However, with flight gyro circuit breaker(s) tripped and AHRS failure,
this is an acceptable risk.
The ATT warning flag indicates the attitude
information displayed on the pilots and/or
copilots attitude director indicator may be
erroneous and the standby attitude indicator should be checked to determine proper
attitude references.
Attitude-Director Indicator
See FLIGHT DIRECTOR SYSTEM, this section.

A standby attitude indicator (D, figure 1-119), Type

ARU-30/A3, located on the pilots instrument panel,
provides a continuously operating source of attitude
reference in case of primary attitude indicator malfunction. The standby attitude indicator receives dc
power from the emergency instrument bus. Normally, the emergency instrument bus receives
power from the forward TR bus through the left essential bus. If TR power is lost, the indicator receives dc power from the forward/aft battery. See
BATTERY LOADS, Section III.
An OFF flag (10, figure 1-119) appears upon loss of
all power to the indicator. A pitch trim and caging
knob (7, figure 1-119) permits zeroing the horizon
line with reference to the miniature aircraft (6, figure 1-119) and, when pulled, cages the attitude
sphere (5, figure 1-119) and causes the OFF flag to
appear. The pitch trim and caging knob is springloaded. Do not allow the knob to spring back when
released or damage to the indicator may result.
Change 18
1-397
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Radar Altimeter AN/APN-224
RADAR ALTIMETER TIE-IN
A Type AN/APN-224 radar altimeter (B, figure 1-119)

is located on each side of the pilots forward instrument panel. The instrument provides for measuring
the absolute altitude from 0 to 5000 feet. An altitude
indicator needle (15, figure 1-119) indicates altitude
from 0 to 400 feet in 20 foot increments, 400 to 1000
feet in 50 foot increments, and 1000 to 5000 feet in 500
foot increments. If the altitude indicator needle has
disappeared behind the mask (16, figure 1-119) and
the absolute altitude is less than 5000 feet, the receiver-transmitter has failed or is unreliable. The radar
altimeter control knob (17, figure 1-119) is a detented,
push-to-test, rotary switch used to control power to
the indicator and receiver-transmitter, to set the low
altitude limit index cursor (14, figure 1-119), and to
test the lights and the radar altimeter system. When
the control knob on either indicator is rotated clockwise, out of the detent, power is supplied to the indicator and the receiver-transmitter. The other indicator
remains off unless it is turned on. The OFF flag (12,
figure 1-119), when visible, indicates an off condition
or system power failure.
The radar altimeter provides absolute altitude inputs to the OAS for altitude calibration and weapon
delivery functions. The radar altimeter also provides absolute altitude inputs to the EVS which are
displayed on the EVS monitors. For additional information, see EVS MONITOR under ELECTROOPTICAL VIEWING SYSTEM (EVS), this section.
The radar altimeter OFF flag does not indicate all failures of this system.
During normal system operation the flag is withdrawn and a black background appears in the window. If the aircraft absolute altitude is below 5000
feet and the indicator is on, the indicator needle will
point to the aircraft absolute altitude. If the aircraft
absolute altitude is above 5000 feet, the indicator
needle will be behind the mask and the OFF flag will
be visible. An adjustable low altitude limit index cursor (14, figure 1-119) is provided on the circumference
of the indicator dial. The cursor can be manually set
to any altitude between 0 and 5000 feet by rotating
the radar altimeter control knob. If the needle indicates an absolute altitude less than the altitude set by
the cursor, the amber low altitude caution light on the
indicators and the amber RDR ALT LOW lights (11,
figure 1-119) on the pilots instrument panel will come
on. The caution light will be out any time the needle
indicates an absolute altitude greater than the altitude set by the cursor. Momentarily pressing the control knob (17, figure 1-119) tests the low altitude caution light (13, figure 1-119), the RDR ALT LOW light
(11, figure 1-119), the green system test light (18, figure 1-119), and the radar altimeter system. If the indicator does not display a reading of 1000 (100) feet
when the system test light is ON, the indicator is
defective. A defective receiver-transmitter is
indicated by the system test light being out during
system test. The radar altimeter operates on 115 volt
ac power from generator bus No. 3. The radar altimeter low caution light operates on right TR power.
1-398
Change 18
RADAR ALTIMETER LOW CAUTION LIGHT

An amber press-to-test radar altimeter low caution
light (11, figure 1-119) is located adjacent to each pilots radar altimeter. Each caution light illuminates
when its associated radar altimeter indicated altitude is below the altitude at which its cursor is set.
Radar Altimeter Normal Operation
The radar altimeter is to be used in conjunction

with the terrain avoidance system and will be included in the pilots normal instrument scanning
pattern for a continuous cross-check with other terrain clearance information. The radar altimeter will
indicate only the highest terrain detected within its
90 degree conical shaped pattern. The system will
function without degrade up to 45 of pitch and roll
and 2200 fps of climb or descent. Predicted error
tolerance is 3 feet or 4% of indicated altitude,
whichever is greater. The following procedure is
used to place the radar altimeter in operation and
may be accomplished in one continuous action.
NOTE
The control knob on either the pilot or copilot radar altimeter indicator will turn on
the system and the respective radar altimeter indicator, and set the respective index
cursor to the desired altitude.
1. Rotate the radar altimeter control knob clockwise out of the detent enough to move the index
cursor to any indication between 0 and 5000 feet.
This will turn on the system and remove the OFF
flap from view.
2. After a warmup of approximately 1 minute, if
the aircraft is flying at an absolute altitude less
than 5000 feet, the indicator needle will appear
from behind the mask and rotate in a counterclockwise direction to indicate the aircraft absolute altitude.
3. System test is accomplished by setting the index cursor to 1500 feet and pressing the control
knob. The indicator needle should point to 1000
(100) feet, the system test light, the indicator low
altitude caution light, and the RDR ALT LOW light
should come on.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
4. Reset the index cursor to the desired absolute
altitude.
5. To turn the system off, rotate the radar altimeter control knob on both the pilot and copilot indicators counterclockwise into the detent. The OFF flap
will appear and the indicator needle will rotate
clockwise until it disappears behind the mask.
MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUMENTS
Accelerometer
An accelerometer (A, figure 1-120) is located on the

pilots eyebrow panel. The accelerometer is a selfcontained unit requiring no external connections.
The dial is calibrated in g units from 2 to +4 gs.
The instrument contains three pointers, the main
pointer giving continuous indications. Two auxiliary pointers indicate and maintain maximum plus
and minus accelerations until they are reset, using
the reset knob on the front of the instrument.
Magnetic Standby Compass
TIME SET SEQUENCE
Press
Press
Press
Press
Press
Press
Press
and hold SEL Hours digits will flash

CTRL Hour digits will increment
SEL Minute digits will flash
CTRL Minute digits will increment
SEL Second digits will flash
CTRL Second digits will increment
SEL Returns to normal clock mode
SELECTING ELAPSED TIME (ET) OR CLOCK (C)

MODE
Press SEL Clock changes to Elapsed Time mode

Press SEL Clock changes to Clock mode
ELAPSED TIME OPERATION

Pressing CTRL in the ET mode:
1st Starts elapse timer
2nd Stops elapse timer
3rd Resets elapse timer
4th Repeats cycle (starts timer)
A pilots magnetic standby compass (B, figure

1-120) is located on the eyebrow instrument panel
between the oil pressure gages.
Electronic Clock
60
Spring-Wound Clocks (If Installed)
A Type A-13A clock (C, figure 1-120) is provided on

the left and right sides of the pilots instrument
panel. They are spring-wound 8-day clocks and
have a winding knob on the lower left corner. A
sweep second hand and minute totalizer, both controlled
by
successive
depressions
of
a
START- -STOP- -RESET knob on the upper right
corner, are provided.
55
50
10
15
45
ETC
40
20
Electronic Clocks (If Installed)
Electronic clocks (figure 1-118A) are installed at the

left and right sides of the pilots instrument panel and
at the electronic warfare station. Usually powered by
aircraft 28 VDC power, a self-contained 3.2V battery
provides backup power, except for back lighting for
the clock face, when aircraft power is not available.
35
25
30
CTRL
SEL
A85919
Figure 1-118A
Outside Air Temperature Gage
The electronic clock indicates hours, minutes and

seconds for Clock (C) and Elapsed Time (ET) modes.
The display has six digits for a twenty-four hour indication and a sweep second indication. Setting
time and switching between the clock and elapsed
time modes are accomplished by using the SEL and
CTRL pushbuttons.
SELF-TEST
The clock has a self-test feature that illuminates all
segments, during the first 5 seconds of operation on
aircraft power.
A Type G-10 outside air temperature gage (D, figure

1-120) is located on the left side of the pilots instrument panel and near the center of the instrument
panel at the navigators station. The air temperature
gage is operated by an electrical resistance thermometer bulb located flush with the body skin on the lower
left side of the forward pressurized section of the radar navigators escape hatch. The temperature range
of the gage is 70 to +50C. The pointer should rest
off the scale with power off, and should register outside air temperature with power on.
Change 18
1-399
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Miscellaneous Electrical Instrument Controls and

Indicators
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
COMPASS CARD
RECIPROCAL HEADING WINDOW
SYNCHRONIZING KNOB
GYRO POWER SWITCH
ATTITUDE SPHERE
MINIATURE AIRCRAFT
PITCH TRIM AND CAGING KNOB
BANK SCALE
BANK POINTER
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
Figure 1-119
1-400
OFF FLAG
RDR ALT LOW CAUTION LIGHT
OFF FLAG
LOW ALTITUDE CAUTION LIGHT
LOW ALTITUDE LIMIT INDEX CURSOR
ALTITUDE INDICATOR NEEDLE
MASK
RADAR ALTIMETER CONTROL KNOB
SYSTEM TEST LIGHT
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Miscellaneous Instruments
Figure 1-120
1-401
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ATTITUDE HEADING REFERENCE SYSTEM (AHRS)
MANUAL FAST SLAVE
The AHRS consists of an AN/ASN-134 Attitude

Heading Reference Set, a pilots and a copilots attitude select switch located on the forward instrument panel, a magnetic detector, and an attitude
switching relay box. The attitude heading reference
set consists of an AHRS control panel (figure 1-121)
located on the copilots side panel, a gyro reference
unit (GRU), an electronic control amplifier (ECA),
and a compass compensation unit (CCU). The
AHRS uses 115 volt three-phase ac power.
The AHRS control panel provides a manually actuated HEADING SYNC/SLEW knob for fast slaving
of the heading indicator to the MAD heading when
in slaved mode. Pressing the knob will synchronize
the heading to the MAD output at a rate of 30 per
second. Manual fast slave activation overrides the
acceleration cutoffs, therefore if PUSH TO SYNC is
used in other than straight and level flight, errors
can be introduced into the system.
AHRS Operation
TURN-ON
The AHRS system becomes fully operational 1 minute after turn-on with accuracies of 1 vertical for
altitude and 0.5 of the magnetic azimuth detector
(MAD) heading output for heading in the slaved
mode. The AHRS also provides a heading output
through the OAS to the navigators MFD with accuracies of 1.1 in the slaved mode and 1.6 in the
COMP mode. These accuracies are degraded if the
aircraft is moved during the 1 minute turn-on, erection/slaving cycle. The first 20 seconds of the cycle
are used for caging and gyro spinup. During 20 to
40 seconds the system is leveling, and 40 to 60 seconds the heading is being slaved and synchronized
to the MAD. To prevent errors from entering the
system during accelerations, three cutoffs are incorporated for inputs to the AHRS directional gyro.
Pitch erection cutoff is applied when longitudinal
acceleration exceeds 0.055 g (0.01 g). Roll erection cutoff is applied when turn rate exceeds 8 per
minute. Heading slaving cutoff is applied when longitudinal acceleration is in excess of 0.055 g (0.01
g) and/or turn rates exceed 8 per minute. If the aircraft is moved during the first 40 seconds after power on, the cutoffs will be applied. Errors in the system will result because the cutoffs interrupt the
normal erection/slaving of the AHRS. If the aircraft
has to be moved prior to the 1-minute cycle completion, such as during alert, the heading sync/slew
knob should be pressed at least 40 seconds after
AHRS power on. The AHRS heading will then slave
to the MAD heading at a rate of 30 per second and
the aircraft can be moved (43 seconds after AHRS
power application minimum) with minimum degradation of the AHRS attitude and heading.
MANUAL FAST ERECTION
The normal vertical erection rate for AHRS following completion of the 1-minute start cycle is approximately 1 per minute. Pushing and holding the fast
erect switch (6, figure 1-121) increases the erection
rate to 25 per minute if a vertical error greater
than 0.5 is present.
1-402
Change 4
INFLIGHT OPERATION
Slaved Mode Operation
The SLV (slaved) mode is the normal operating
mode. In this mode, gyro stabilized magnetic heading data is supplied to the OAS.
1. Position mode select switch to SLV.
2. Set latitude dial for each two degree change in
aircraft latitude.
3. Set magnetic variation as applicable.
4. Set hemisphere selection as applicable.
DG Mode Operation
The DG (directional gyro) mode can be used when
the slaved magnetic heading data is considered unreliable or undesirable (e.g., grid navigation). In
this mode, earth rate corrected directional gyro
heading data is supplied to the OAS. The AHRS
must be operated in the DG mode during an alternate true heading calibration in order to update the
heading in the alternate navigation mode. Accomplishment of an alternate true heading calibration
or emergency setting true or magnetic heading using FRMT 8 will not automatically update the
heading in the AHRS. Corrected heading information for the AHRS must be manually set using the
Heading Sync knob (1, figure 1-121).
1. Position mode select switch to DG.
2. Set heading using the heading sync knob.
aircraft latitude.
COMP Mode Operation
The COMP (compass) mode is the least accurate
mode and should only be used if gyro stabilization
is unreliable. In this operating mode, non-gyro stabilized magnetic heading is provided to the pilots
indicators only. The OAS does not accept this heading data.
1. Position mode select switch to COMP.
aircraft latitude.
3. Set magnetic variation as applicable.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AHRS Controls and Indicators
1
2
3
4
HEADING SYNC/SLEW KNOB

SYNCHRONIZATION INDICATOR
LATITUDE DIAL
HEMISPHERE SELECTION SWITCH
NO.
1
5
6
7
MAGNETIC VARIATION SWITCH

FAST ERECT SWITCH
MODE SELECT SWITCH
CONTROLINDICATOR
HEADING SYNC/SLEW KNOB
FUNCTION
The heading SYNC/SLEW knob marked PUSH TO SYNC HDG, when
pushed in the SLV mode, initiates the automatic synchronization function
of the ECA. This function occurs automatically when the AHRS is turned
on in SLV mode. This automatic synchronization function bypasses the
synchronization limits within the system and slaves the HSI display to the
magnetic azimuth detector. Pushing and turning the knob in the DG mode
provides a heading drive rate signal to the ECA proportional to knob rotation and direction.
NOTE
When in slaved mode the heading SYNC/ SLEW knob should
be used only in straight and level flight. Use in other than straight
and level flight can induce large heading errors in the system.
Two metal guards are located adjacent to the AHRS control
panel to preclude inadvertent actuation of the heading SYNC/
SLEW knob.
1-403
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AHRS Controls and Indicators (Cont)

NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
SYNCHRONIZATION INDICATOR
The synchronization indicator indicates the relative error between the

AHRS magnetic heading and the magnetic heading input to AHRS from
the Magnetic Azimuth Detector (MAD) and displays magnetic system
alignment within 02.5 degrees. Because of the positioning of the MAD
in the wing, full scale oscillations of the synchronization indicator during
low level flight or turbulence should be considered normal. The synchronization indicator is operative only in the slaved mode.
LATITUDE DIAL
The latitude dial when set to the appropriate latitude, provides inputs for
earth rate and magnetic coriolis corrections in both SLV and DG modes.
The dial should be updated in flight for each 2 of latitude change in aircraft position regardless of operating mode.
HEMISPHERE SELECTION SWITCH
A two-position toggle switch having N--S positions is used to select either

the Northern or Southern hemisphere for proper earths rate correction.
MAGNETIC VARIATION SWITCH
A three-position toggle switch having 15, 0, +15 positions provides magnetic variation approximation to the heading processor for computing true
heading used for earth rate correction of the vertical gyro. For magnetic
variation greater than 8 East, set 15, between 8 East and 8 West set
0, and greater than 8 West set +15.
FAST ERECT SWITCH
The switch when pushed and held, commands the vertical gyro to fast
erect if the respective pitch or roll errors are greater than 0.5. Roll fast
erection will not engage if the aircraft turn rate is greater than 8 per minute. Fast erection in both pitch and roll occurs at 25 (5) per minute.
MODE SELECT SWITCH
A four position rotary mode select switch has OFF- -SLV- -DG- -COMP
positions and selects the mode of operation of the AHRS. The switch has
a positive detent which prevents rotation to or from the OFF position without pulling out on the knob. When moved out of the OFF position, a relay
in the ECA is actuated providing three-phase power for AHRS operation.
The SLV (slaved) mode of the AHRS provides a gyro stabilized magnetic
heading output. The DG (directional gyro) mode provides an earth rate
corrected directional gyro heading output with a drift rate of approximately
1 per hour. The COMP (compass) mode provides a non-gyro stabilized
magnetic heading output.
NOTE
Placing mode select switch in COMP records a malfunction on
the mission data recording tape.
1-404
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Instruments Circuit Protection and Location

EQUIPMENT
Attitude Heading Reference System
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
OAS NAV AHRS

A
B
C
AUXBNS/D1
AUXBNS/D2
AUXBNS/D3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
MISCELLANEOUS ALT CMPTR
LLC/C31
AC Bus 3
PCBP/D11
PCBP/D13
PCBP/D14
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
PCBP/D10
Emer Inst. Bus
PCBP/D9
Emer Inst. Bus
MISCELLANEOUS
FREE AIR TEMP IND
LLC/B26
Left TR
Radar Altimeter
OAS NAV RDR ALTM
AUXBNS/D5
AC Bus 3
Radar Altitude Low Lights
MISCELLANEOUS LOW ALT

WARNING LT PWR
RLC/E24
Rt. TR
FLIGHT INDICATORS
STANDBY ATTITUDE
PCBP/D5
Emer Inst. Bus
MISCELLANEOUS TAS IND
LLC/B30
AC Bus 3
Altitude Computer and Pilots

Altimeters in Servo Mode
C-2A Heading Indicator
Normal Power
Emergency Power

True Airspeed Computer, TAS and
Mach Indicators
11
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE

A
B
C
DIR IND C-2
EMER INV
AUXBNS
LLC

PCBP
RLC

Figure 1-122
1-405/(1-406 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1

DESCRIPTION
ATTITUDE-DIRECTOR INDICATOR (ADI)
ATTITUDE SELECT SWITCH
HORIZONTAL SITUATION INDICATOR (HSI)
FLIGHT DIRECTOR SYSTEM CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS
NORMAL OPERATION
1-407
1-407
1-409
1-409
1-409
1-410
1-419
DESCRIPTION
NOTE
Some of these instruments have red warning flags which may be difficult to see at
night.
The flight director system provides the pilot and copilot with a display of airplane attitude, heading,
and position. The system also provides a visual display of steering commands which the pilot follows
to attain and hold any desired attitude, altitude,
heading, and course in all phases of instrument
flight. The flight director system consists of the following primary equipment: attitude director indicator, horizontal situation indicator, nav system select
panel switches, flight director controls, CPU-4A
flight director computer, and a turn rate gyro (pilots ADI). The copilots turn rate is supplied by the
AHRS. The mode select switch on the nav system
select panel selects TACAN, VOR, ILS, ILS APP or
GPS for display. Inputs from systems external to
the flight director system are provided from the
TACAN, ILS/VOR, glide slope receiver and GPS IU
systems. Pitch and roll is supplied by either the
AHRS or MD-1 gyro. Figure 1-123 illustrates the
flight director system data flow.
Flight director system circuit protection and the
powered by the flight gyro emergency inverter and

automatically supplies attitude and rate of turn information. The copilots ADI will lose all functions,
including attitude, pitch, roll, and rate of turn,
therefore, the dc-powered standby attitude indicator must be used by the copilot under complete ac
power failure conditions. During power failure on
No. 3 generator bus, the pitch and bank steering
bars will be in view, but are inoperative. The pilots
and copilots attitude director indicators are interconnected to provide an attitude comparator warning system. A description of the various components
of the attitude director indicator is given below.
NOTE
An error in the pitch indication of the attitude indicators is generated during accelerations or decelerations. The error is indicated in a nose-high direction during and
after a forward acceleration and in a nosedown direction during and after deceleration. The longer the duration of acceleration
(or deceleration), the greater the indicated
error and the longer it persists when acceleration (or deceleration) ceases. The erection system reduces the error at about the
same rate it was generated. Pitch error may
reach one bar width during a high gross
weight takeoff.
ATTITUDE-DIRECTOR INDICATORS (ADI)
Pitch and Roll Attitudes
The ARU-49/A attitude director indicators (figure

1-124), display the aircraft pitch and roll attitude,
rate of turn, and yaw coordination information.
Glide slope information can be obtained from the
raw data glide slope indicator or the pitch steering
bar. In addition, the localizer information is presented by the bank steering bar/course deviation indicator provided the proper navigation mode is selected. If power failure occurs on the No. 3 generator bus, the pilots attitude director indicator is
Pitch and roll attitudes are displayed in the standard manner with the pitch scale located on the attitude sphere and the bank pointer and imprinted
bank scale located on the lower half of the instrument. The pilots and copilots attitude indicators
receive pitch and roll signals from the MD-1 or the
AHRS gyro systems, as determined by attitude select switches. The MD-1 and AHRS both receive
power from the No. 3 generator bus.
Change 21
1-407
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Flight Director System Data Flow
Figure 1-123
1-408
Change 3
T.O. 1B-52H-1
GPS IU/TACAN Emulation HSI Operation
The attitude select switch (35, figure 1-124) is an

alternate action pushbutton switch located above
the ADI at the pilots and copilots station. It has a
green NORM light at the top of the pushbutton,
and an amber ALT light at the bottom. It is used to
select the pitch/roll data source for the respective
station ADI, and is independent of the source selected at the other station. The NORM light at the
pilots station indicates selection of AHRS pitch/roll
data for the pilots ADI and for the pitch and roll
bars on the pilots EVS monitor. The NORM light at
the copilots station indicates selection of MD-1
pitch/roll data for the copilots ADI and EVS monitor. The ALT light at the pilots station indicates selection of the MD-1 pitch/roll data for the pilots
ADI and EVS monitor. The ALT light at the copilots station indicates selection of AHRS pitch/roll
data for the copilots ADI and EVS monitor. See figure 1-123 for data flow.
The IUS (IU Software) will provide the HSI with

range and bearing to the selected Navaid along
with steering indications when the GPS is selected
on the Navigation System Select Panel MODE SELECT switch. When the IU is unable to determine
the selected TACAN station, either the station is
not within 200 nm, or the Navaid database contains
more than one Navaid with the same TACAN channel within 200 nm of the aircraft current position,
the Range Indicator Warning Flag will be displayed
and the TACAN bearing pointer will rotate.
NOTE
During IU/TACAN emulation operation,

with the MODE SELECT switch in GPS, a
TACAN station identifier is not generated
by the IU and therefore is not supplied to
the Interphone system. The absence of the
audio identifier has no effect on IU/ TACAN
emulation.
When the pilots or copilots attitude select

switch (but not both) is in the alternate position both ADIs are using the same attitude source. The attitude comparator warning system cannot detect a failure of a
single attitude source. Under this condition,
failure detection is limited to the indicators.
Therefore, periodic manual comparison of
the ADIs with the standby attitude indicator is required when either attitude select
switch is in the alternate position.
HORIZONTAL SITUATION INDICATOR (HSI)
A Type AQU-2/A horizontal situation indicator (figure 1-124) is located on both the pilots and copilots
instrument panel. It is an electrically operated instrument and replaces the bearing distance indicator, the radio course indicator, and the directional
indicator (heading system). In the event of loss of
all ac power, no information will be available from
either the pilots or copilots HSI.
The navigation system select panel (figure 1-124),

on the aisle stand contains the navigation MODE
SELECT switch, the HDG SELECT switch, and the
INST CONTROL switch. The MODE SELECT allows selection of GPS, TACAN, VOR, ILS, or ILS
APP for display on the flight director indicators.
The HDG SELECT switch has MAN and NOR positions and controls the input source for signals to
the bank steering bar on the attitude-director indicator. The INST CONTROL switch has PILOT- -COPLT positions and selects whether the pilot or copilot has control of the course and heading
set knobs on the HSI.
Change 21
1-409
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Flight Director System Controls and Indicators
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
GLIDE SLOPE INDICATOR (OUT OF VIEW)

ATTITUDE SPHERE
COURSE WARNING FLAG
PITCH STEERING BAR
BANK STEERING BAR SHIELD
BANK STEERING BAR/COURSE DEVIATION
INDICATOR
BANK SCALE
PITCH TRIM KNOB
ATT WARNING FLAG
BANK POINTER
TURN AND SLIP INDICATOR
OFF FLAG
ATT TEST PUSHBUTTON
MINIATURE AIRCRAFT
GLIDE SLOPE WARNING FLAG
GLIDE SLOPE INDICATOR
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
GLIDE SLOPE DEVIATION SCALE

RANGE INDICATOR
RANGE INDICATOR WARNING FLAG
BEARING POINTER (HEAD)
HEADING MARKER
LUBBER LINE
COMPASS CARD
COURSE SELECTOR WINDOW
COURSE ARROW (HEAD)
TO-FROM INDICATOR (TO SHOWN)
COURSE DEVIATION INDICATOR
COURSE SET KNOB
BEARING POINTER (TAIL)
HEADING SET KNOB
COURSE ARROW (TAIL) (SOME HSIS)
AIRCRAFT SYMBOL
COURSE DEVIATION SCALE
1-410
T.O. 1B-52H-1
34
35
36
LAMP TEST BUTTON

INSTRUMENT CONTROL SWITCH
NO.
37
38
HEADING SELECT SWITCH

NAV MODE SWITCH
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
A
ATTITUDE-DIRECTOR INDICATOR
Glide Slope Indicator (out of view)
Location of stowed glide slope indicator.
Attitude Sphere
The attitude sphere is a sphere marked with the artificial horizon and the
pitch reference scale, and moves to display pitch and roll.
Course Warning Flag
A course warning flag comes into view when any course signal selected
by the pilots nav mode select switch fails or becomes unreliable.
The course warning flag will come into view in GPS IU/TACAN Emulation
mode when the IU determines the TACAN emulation data is unreliable.
Pitch Steering Bar
A pitch steering bar indicates whether the aircraft has the proper pitch to
intercept the glide slope correctly. The bar operates in ILS APP mode
only. When not in operation and normal power is available, the pitch steering bar is out of view.
Change 21
1-411
T.O. 1B-52H-1

(Cont)
CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
FUNCTION
A
ATTITUDE-DIRECTOR INDICATOR (Cont)
Bank Steering Bar Shield
The bank steering bar shield covers the bank steering bar when normal
power is available and the nav mode select switch is not in an ILS mode
(ILS or ILS APP).
Bank Steering Bar/Course Deviation

Indicator
A bank steering bar indicates whether the aircraft has the correct bank
angle and rate of turn to intercept the localizer beam on course if the
AN/ARN-14 is tuned to an ILS frequency. It performs the same function
with respect to an omni-range beam if the AN/ARN-14 is tuned to an
omni-range station and the nav mode select switch is in ILS. In addition,
the bank steering bar operates when the heading select switch (located
adjacent to the navigation system select panel on the pilots aisle stand)
is in MAN position. The bar will then operate in conjunction with the heading set by the heading set knob and will indicate the correct bank angle
and rate of turn to intercept the desired heading on course. When the
nav mode select switch is in GPS, TACAN or VOR and normal power is
available, the bank steering bar is out of view behind the bank steering
bar shield (No. 5).
If the CPU-4A computer is calibrated properly and when centering the bank steering bar, an initial bank angle of 30 (+0/5)
will be indicated. Cross-check the bank steering bar with the
bank pointer on the attitude-director indicator to preclude the
possibility of exceeding a bank angle of 30 .
NOTE
When in TACAN, VOR, ILS, or ILS APP mode of operation, the
course warning flag will appear when the ARN-21 or ARN-14
fails or signals from the URN-3 beacon or the VOR or ILS stations are lost or become unreliable. Continued display of this
warning flag after the heading select switch has been positioned
to MAN does not indicate faulty operation of the bank steering
bar.
7
Bank Scale
Used with Bank Pointer (No. 10) to indicate aircraft bank.
Pitch Trim Knob
Turning the pitch trim knob zeroizes the horizon line with reference to the
miniature aircraft.
1-412
Change 3
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
9
ATT Warning Flag
FUNCTION
An ATT warning flag comes into view, in the pilots and copilots attitude
director indicators, under the following conditions:
(1) When the power is off to one or both indicators or is lost to the
comparator circuits.
(2) When the attitude sphere position between the pilots and copilots indicators differs in roll by more than 6 (1) for more than 1 second, and
when compensated for, pitch trim positions differ by more than 6 (1)
in pitch for more than 1 second.
(3) When the comparator and related circuits fails.
(4) When the ATT TEST pushbutton (No. 13) on the pilots or copilots ADI
is pressed and held for at least 2 seconds.
NOTE
The ATT warning flag indicates the attitude information displayed on the pilots and/or copilots attitude director indicator
may be erroneous and the standby attitude indicator should be
checked to determine proper attitude references.
10
Bank Pointer
Indicates aircraft bank (roll) on the bank scale (No. 7).
11
Turn and Slip Indicator
Indications of aircraft rate of turn and slip are provided by the needle and
ball arrangement at the bottom center of the instrument. Turn rate information is provided by the rate of turn gyro for the pilots needle and by the
AHRS for the copilots needle.
12
OFF Flag
The OFF flag appears upon interruption of power to the attitude indicating
system. Interruption of any two phases of ac power to the flight gyro transformer causes the copilots OFF flag (normal mode) to appear. When the
gyro power switch is OFF, the pilot and copilot OFF flags are in view.
When the gyro power switch is turned ON, both OFF flags should disappear in approximately 60 seconds.
The OFF flag does not appear during every attitude indication
failure. Therefore, it is possible that a malfunction of the attitude
indicator portion of the attitude-director indicator might be determined only by cross-checking it with the turn and slip indicator
and the other remaining flight instruments.
1-413
T.O. 1B-52H-1

(Cont)
CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
FUNCTION
A
ATTITUDE-DIRECTOR INDICATOR (Cont)
13
ATT TEST Pushbutton
An ATT TEST pushbutton is provided for checking the operation of the

attitude comparator warning system. When the pilots ATT TEST pushbutton is pressed, the pilots attitude sphere rotates 10 (1) in both the
roll and pitch axes and the pilots and copilots ATT warning flags appear.
When the copilots ATT TEST pushbutton is pressed, the copilots attitude
sphere rotates 10 (1) in both the roll and pitch axes and the pilots and
copilots ATT warning flags appear. The pilots and copilots attitude
sphere will always give a right roll and pitch up indication. This checkout
indicates that the attitude comparator warning system is functioning properly.
14
Miniature Aircraft
The miniature aircraft is a fixed symbol representing the aircraft and is

used as the attitude reference against the movable sphere (No. 2).
15
Glide Slope Warning Flag
A glide slope warning flag comes into view during ILS or ILS APP mode
of operation when the glide slope equipment fails or a glide slope signal
of dependable strength is not being received.
16
Glide Slope Indicator
The glide slope indicator indicates on a glide slope deviation scale (No.
17) whether the aircraft is above or below the glide slope. The indicator
operates when the nav mode select switch (No. 38) is in either ILS or ILS
APP position and the ARN-14 is tuned to an ILS frequency. When not in
operation, the glide slope indicator is stowed out of view in the upper left
corner of the indicator.
17
Glide Slope Deviation Scale
Used with glide slope indicator (No. 16) to indicate aircraft vertical position (above or below) relative to the glide slope.
HORIZONTAL SITUATION INDICATOR
18
Range Indicator
A range indicator will give a digital display of the line-of-sight distance (up
to 300 nautical miles, 200 nautical miles in GPS mode) to a URN-3 surface beacon.
19
Range Indicator Warning Flag
The range indicator display (No. 18) will be covered by the range indicator
warning flag if the TACAN radio system is not tuned to a surface beacon
that is within 300 nautical miles of the aircraft and will also be covered if
the TACAN station is not transmitting a signal of dependable strength.
In GPS IU/TACAN Emulation mode the warning flag will be visible when
either the selected TACAN station is not within 200 nautical miles of the
aircraft, or the Navaid database contains more than one Navaid with the
same channel as the selected TACAN within 200 nautical miles of the aircraft.
1-414
Change 20
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
20
Bearing Pointer (Head)
FUNCTION
A bearing pointer (head) that indicates the bearing heading to an Emulated TACAN, a URN-3 surface beacon, or to an omni-range station.
The bearing pointer indicates the bearing to a GPS emulated TACAN
station when the Nav mode switch is in the GPS position and the
TACAN radio system is tuned to the proper channel which must be within 200 nautical miles of the aircraft.
The bearing pointer indicates bearing to a URN-3 surface beacon when
the nav mode select switch (NO. 38) is in TACAN position. The TACAN
radio system must be tuned to the surface beacon and the surface beacon must be within 300 nautical miles of the aircraft.
The bearing pointer indicates bearing to an omni-range station when the
nav mode select switch is in VOR position and then only if the omni-range
radio (ARN-14) is tuned to that station.
The bearing pointer is inoperative when the omni-range receiver
(ARN-14) is tuned to an ILS station.
21
Heading Marker
A heading marker that indicates a desired heading. The heading marker

rotates with the compass card after the desired heading is selected by the
heading set knob (No. 30).
22
Lubber Line
The fixed reference line representing the nose of the aircraft used to read
compass card and heading marker headings.
23
Compass Card
The rotating compass card provides an indication of aircraft heading

when referenced to the lubber line (No. 22).
NOTE
Aircraft headings indicated by the compass card will be related
to magnetic north or gyro north depending on whether the
AHRS compass system is in slaved or gyro operation. Bearings
indicated by the bearing pointer will always be magnetic.
24
Course Select Window
The course selector window gives a digital display of the desired course
selected by the course set knob.
NOTE
The digital display in the course selector window should be
checked and, if necessary, reset with the course set knob when
changing the instrument control switch position from the pilots
or copilots setting.
25
Course Arrow (Head)
A course arrow (head) that indicates the desired course selected by the
course set knob during ILS, ILS APP, VOR, TACAN, and GPS modes.
The course arrow will rotate (in step) with the compass card.
26
To-From Indicator
A TO-FROM indicator that indicates whether the selected course, if intercepted and flown, will take the aircraft to the selected facility, or vice versa. The pointer references the surface beacon if the nav mode select
switch is in TACAN or GPS. For all other positions of the nav mode select
switch, the pointer references the omni-range station; however, if the
ARN-14 is tuned to an ILS frequency, the pointer is not visible.
Change 21
1-415
T.O. 1B-52H-1

(Cont)
CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
FUNCTION
HORIZONTAL SITUATION INDICATOR (Cont)
27
Course Deviation Indicator
A course deviation indicator referenced to the course arrow that indicates

whether the aircraft is left or right of the desired course or localizer beam.
When the course deviation indicator is aligned with the head (No. 25) and
the tail (No. 31) of the course arrow, the HSI is indicating the aircraft is on
course. The deviation indicator provides information relative to the
localizer beam when the nav mode select switch is in ILS or ILS APP and
the ARN-14 is on and tuned to an ILS frequency. In GPS mode the CDI
provides information relative to the emulated TACAN station. For all other
conditions, the course deviation indicator provides information relative to
the desired course provided TACAN radio or ARN-14 is tuned to the
respective surface beacon or omni-range station.
28
COURSE SET Knob
The course set knob used to set the course arrow and the digital display
in the course selector window to the desired course. When the nav mode
select switch is in VOR position and the ARN-14 tuned to an ILS frequency, the course set knob has no functional effect on the course deviation
indicator; however, the course deviation indicator rotates in conjunction
with the course set knob.
The course set knob is also used to provide the course setting to the IU
for GPS/TACAN Emulation.
NOTE
To prevent course counter malfunctions, the course set knob

should not be moved or spun in a rapid, jerky motion.
The course set knob will be quite warm to the touch when
the system is operated for extended periods of time in moderately high ambient temperatures.
29
Bearing Pointer (Tail)
The tail indicates the reciprocal heading of the bearing pointer ( No. 20).
30
HEADING SET Knob
A heading set knob is used to set the heading marker to the desired heading.
NOTE
The heading set knob will be quite warm to the touch when the
system is operated for extended periods of time in moderately
high ambient temperatures.
31
Course Arrow (Tail)
The tail, on some HSIs, indicates the reciprocal heading of the Course
Arrow ( No. 25).
32
Aircraft Symbol
An aircraft symbol is fixed on the face of the HSI and oriented to the nose
of the aircraft.
33
Course Deviation Scale
The course deviation scale is made up of equally spaced dots that are
perpendicular to the course arrow (No. 25). Each dot represents 5 of
deviation from course or 1/4 of the localizer width.
1-416
Change 3
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
C
34
LAMP TEST BUTTON
The lamp test button is located adjacent to the attitude select switch on
both the pilots and copilots forward instrument panel and is used to test
the bulbs in the respective attitude select switch. Pressing the button will
light the respective green NORM and amber ALT lights.
35
ATTITUDE SELECT Switch
The attitude select switch is an alternate action pushbutton switch located

above the ADI at the pilots and copilots station. It has a green NORM
light at the top of the pushbutton, and an amber ALT light at the bottom.
It is used to select the pitch/roll data source for the respective station ADI,
and is independent of the source selected at the other station. The NORM
light at the pilots station indicates selection of AHRS pitch/roll data for the
pilots ADI and for the pitch and roll bars on the pilots EVS monitor. The
NORM light at the copilots station indicates selection of MD-1 pitch/roll
data for the copilots ADI and EVS monitor. The ALT light at the pilots station indicates selection of the MD-1 pitch/roll data for the pilots ADI and
EVS monitor. The ALT light at the copilots station indicates selection of
AHRS pitch/roll data for the copilots ADI and EVS monitor. See figure
1-123 for data flow.
When the pilots or copilots attitude select switch (but not both)
is in the alternate position both ADIs are using the same attitude
source. The attitude comparator warning system cannot detect
a failure of a single attitude source. Under this condition, failure
detection is limited to the indicators. Therefore, periodic manual
comparison of the ADIs with the standby attitude indicator is required when either attitude select switch is in the alternate position.
36
INST CONTROL SWITCH
An instrument control switch located on the navigation system select panel on the aisle stand has PILOT- -COPLT positions and selects whether
the pilot or copilot has control of the course and heading set knobs on the
HSI. When the switch is in PILOT position and the pilot rotates his course
and heading set knobs, the corresponding information will be displayed
on the copilots HSI and the copilot will not be able to change these settings. The reverse of the above condition will be true when the instrument
control switch is in COPLT position. Both pilots and copilots horizontal
situation indicators and attitude indicators are fully operative regardless
of the position of the instrument control switch.
Change 3
1-417
T.O. 1B-52H-1

(Cont)
CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
FUNCTION
NAVIGATION SYSTEM SELECT PANEL (Cont)
37
HDG SELECT Switch
A heading select switch located on the navigation system select panel on

the aisle stand is marked HDG SELECT. The switch has MAN- -NOR
positions and controls the input source for signals to the bank steering bar
on the attitude-director indicator. In NOR (normal) position, the information displayed on the flight director indicator is determined by the position
of the mode select switch. In MAN (manual) position, the flight director
system operates the same as when the switch is in NOR position with the
exception of the bank steering bar. The bank steering bar comes into view
and responds to the heading set by the heading set knob on the horizontal
situation indicator. The bar indicates zero deflection when the aircraft has
the correct bank angle to arrive at the selected heading. The heading can
be maintained by keeping the bank steering bar at zero deflection.
NOTE
38
Nav MODE SELECT Switch
With any of the course navigation modes selected on the pilots

nav mode select switch, if any of the navigation receivers fails
or the signal is lost or unreliable, the course warning flag (No.
3) will appear. Continued display of the course warning flag after
the heading select switch has been positioned to MAN does not
indicate faulty operation of the bank steering bar.
If the heading select switch is in MAN position, the selected
heading rather than the selected course is commanded by the
bank steering bar. To fly a specific course rather than heading,
check that the heading select switch is in NOR position.
The rotary switch has GPS- -TACAN- -VOR- -ILS- -ILS APP positions. In
the GPS position the GPS emulated TACAN provides the currently selected NAVAID three letter identifier and channel, and the range and bearing from the NAVAID to the aircraft. In TACAN position, the TACAN system may be placed in operation in the normal manner as outlined under
NORMAL OPERATION OF TACAN RADIO. In VOR position, the omnirange radio navigation system is selected and may be placed in operation
as noted under OMNI-RANGE RADIO AN/ARN-14, this section. In ILS
position, the instrument landing system mode of navigation is selected;
for further information, see INSTRUMENT LANDING SYSTEM (ILS)
EQUIPMENT, this section. In ILS APP position, the instrument landing
system-approach mode of navigation is selected; for further information,
see AUTOMATIC APPROACH EQUIPMENT, this section. The autopilot
localizer and glide slope can be energized only when the nav mode select
switch is in ILS or ILS APP position respectively and the omni-range radio
system is on and tuned to an ILS frequency.
1-418
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
FLIGHT DIRECTOR SYSTEM NORMAL

OPERATION
TURNS TO AND MAINTAINING HEADING
To select and fly a particular magnetic heading using the bank steering bar or heading marker, proceed as follows:
1. Place nav mode select switch to VOR or
TACAN.
2. Place heading mode select switch to NOR or
MAN, as desired.
3. Rotate heading set knob to align heading
marker with desired magnetic heading on compass
card.
4. Turn aircraft to desired heading.
a. If heading select switch is in NOR, turn aircraft to center heading marker under lubber line,
rolling out of turn as heading marker centers under
lubber line.
b. If heading select switch is in MAN, bank
aircraft to center bank steering bar. Reduce bank
angle as necessary to keep bank steering bar centered. Rollout will be complete when desired heading is reached. Maintain heading by keeping bank
steering bar centered.
NOTE
In this submode of operation, the indications given in step 4.a. also will occur.
TACAN OR VOR NAVIGATION
To fly a selected TACAN or VOR course, proceed as

follows:
1. Select desired frequency on TACAN or VOR receiver.
2. Place nav mode select switch to TACAN or
VOR.
3. Place heading select switch to NOR.
4. Set course set knob. Rotate course set knob until head of course arrow aligned with desired course
on compass card. The course window should indicate the same course, and the CDI should show the
aircraft deviation from the selected course.
5. Establish intercept heading. The intercept

heading to be flown should be determined on the
basis of prescribed instrument flying techniques.
6. Monitor course deviation indicator. Check
movement toward aircraft symbol. As CDI approaches aircraft symbol, turn aircraft to heading of
selected course.
7. Check position of course deviation indicator. If
CDI is offset, indicating overshoot or undershoot,
steer aircraft toward CDI to center it.
NOTE
If desired, the bank steering bar may be

used to maintain aircraft heading after
wind drift correction has been established.
GPS IU/TACAN NAVIGATION
To fly a selected GPS/TACAN emulation course,

with the IUS and the DDLC loaded, proceed as follows:
1. Select desired channel on the TACAN receiver.
2. Place nav mode select switch to GPS.
4. Set course set knob. Rotate course set knob until head of course arrow aligned with desired course
on compass card. The course window should indicate the same course, and the CDI should show the
aircraft deviation from the selected course.
5. Establish intercept heading. The intercept
heading to be flown should be determined on the
basis of prescribed instrument flying techniques.
6. Monitor course deviation indicator. Check
movement toward aircraft symbol. As CDI approaches aircraft symbol, turn aircraft to heading of
selected course.
7. Check position of course deviation indicator. If
CDI is offset, indicating overshoot or undershoot,
steer aircraft toward CDI to center it.
NOTE
If desired, the bank steering bar may be

used to maintain aircraft heading after
wind drift correction has been established.
Change 21
1-419
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ILS APPROACH
NOTE
The following operating procedure shows the normal method of using the flight director system to
intercept a localizer course and glide slope in conjunction with an ILS approach. Specific instrument
flight procedures, which vary from base to base, are
not considered.
1. Select localizer frequency on VOR/ILS receiver

and identify station.
NOTE
Failure to place the heading select switch to

NOR causes the bank steering bar to command headings toward the selected heading
rather than the ILS approach course.
3. Set course set knob. Rotate the course set knob
to set localizer front approach course in the course
selector window. The head of the course arrow
should point to the same course on the compass
card.
NOTE
The published front approach course must

be set in the course selector window for all
ILS approaches to obtain accurate directional indications on the HSI course deviation indicator.
4. Place nav mode select switch to ILS to obtain
steering information from bank steering bar.
5. Center bank steering bar. When the aircraft
heading is within 90 of the published front
approach course, steer aircraft as necessary to keep
bank steering bar centered. The steering bar should
provide an intercept angle to the localizer course of
up to 45 and, when the course is approached,
command a turn inbound to place the aircraft on
the localizer course.
The flight director commands up to a 45

angle of intercept to the localizer course
without regard to the location of the outer
marker and/or glide slope intercept point.
Therefore, the pilot is responsible for
properly positioning the aircraft by use of
the other nav aids or radar before following
the bank steering bar commands to the
localizer course.
1-420
Change 3
If the published front course is not set in

the course selector window, the bank steering bar is unreliable.
In the ILS mode of operation, the flight director computer does not compensate for
wind which may cause localizer standoff.
Therefore, it might be necessary to complete
the intercept without using the bank steering bar in strong crosswinds.
6. Check course deviation indicator. When rollout

on localizer front approach course is complete,
check that CDI is centered under aircraft symbol,
indicating aircraft is on localizer course.
7. Place nav mode select switch to ILS APP.
When the nav mode select switch is moved from
ILS to ILS APP, the maximum bank angle required
to center the bank steering bar is reduced from 30
to 15. This bank angle limit automatically restricts
corrective maneuvering which may be required to
keep the aircraft on the localizer approach course.
The aircraft should be on course and nearly aligned
with the inbound heading before using the bank
steering bar in the ILS APP mode. This should
prevent bracketing and apparently large intercept
angles during the ILS approach. If bracketing
occurs, disregard the bank steering bar and use the
CDI as reference to align the aircraft on the
localizer. Then use the bank steering bar to
complete the approach.
NOTE
In ILS APP mode, wind drift corrections are

accomplished automatically. Consequently,
centering the bank steering bar results in
an aircraft flight path along the center line
of the localizer approach course.
The pitch steering bar comes into view
when switching to ILS APP. However, pitch
steering corrections should not be made at
this time.
8. When flying aircraft on localizer approach

course, monitor glide slope indicator. When indicator approaches center, proceed to step 9. (The position of the glide slope indicator when pitch steering
is initiated depends primarily on the pilot technique.)
T.O. 1B-52H-1
9. Adjust aircraft pitch attitude to center pitch
steering bar.
10. Keep pitch and bank steering bars centered.
The pitch and bank steering bars command attitude correction directly proportional to glide slope
and localizer deviations to correct to or maintain
the ILS flight path.
NOTE
The pitch and bank steering bars do not indicate direct ILS localizer nor glide slope information. Cross-check as necessary the
glide slope indicator and CDI to ensure the
aircraft is on course and glide slope.
Flight Director System Circuit

CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
EQUIPMENT
Attitude Director Indicators
Copilot Attitude Data Source
Power

A
B
C
EMER INV
POWER
SOURCE
PCBP/D11
PCBP/D13
PCBP/D14
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
PCBP/D9
Emer Inst. Bus
OAS NAV AHRS

A
B
C
AUXBNS/D1
AUXBNS/D2
AUXBNS/D3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
Attitude Source Select
SELECT CONTR
PCBP/C11
Rt. TR
Horizontal Situation Indicators (HSI)
FLIGHT INDICATORS
RADIO NAV IND AC
RADIO NAV IND DC
PCBP/D8
PCBP/D7
AC Bus 3
Rt. TR
FLIGHT INDICATORS RATE OF TURN
PCBP/D3
Emer Inst. Bus
Pilots Emergency Attitude

Data Source (MD-1) Power
Pilots Normal Source (AHRS)
Attitude Data Source Power
Pilots Rate of Turn Gyro
11
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
AUXBNS
PCBP
Figure 1-125
Change 3
1-421/(1-422 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DESCRIPTION
TACAN RADIO AN/ARN-118(V)
TACAN RADIO CONTROLS AND INDICATORS
TACAN RADIO NORMAL OPERATION
GPS IU/TACAN EMULATION
OMNI-RANGE RADIO AN/ARN-14
INSTRUMENT LANDING SYSTEM (ILS)
GLIDE SLOPE EQUIPMENT AN/ARN-31 or AN/ARN-67
MARKER BEACON RECEIVER AN/ARN-32
INSTRUMENT LANDING SYSTEM INDICATORS
OMNI-RANGE RADIO/ILS CONTROLS AND INDICATORS
IFF TRANSPONDER SET AN/APX-64 (AIMS)
AN/APX-64 IFF CONTROLS AND INDICATORS
AN/APX-64 IFF NORMAL OPERATION
1-423
1-423
1-425
1-427
1-428
1-428Y
1-428Y
1-428Y
1-428Y
1-428Y
1-429
1-430
1-431
1-434
DESCRIPTION
The navigation equipment (figure 1-126) includes a
TACAN radio, GPS IU/TACAN Emulation, omnirange radio, glide slope equipment, marker beacon
receiver, radar altimeter, rendezvous radar, IFF radar, radar warning receiver, fire control radar,
Doppler radar, attitude heading gyroscope set
(AHRS), OAS, and EVS. For antenna locations, see
figure 1-132.
pointer may slew to 270 for 2 to 4 seconds prior to

slewing to the 180 test position. The test may be
terminated at any point by changing the TACAN
channel or changing the mode selector.
Navigation equipment circuit protection and the

The receiver-transmitter of the TACAN radio

initiates the interrogation process by radiating
pulse signals. These signals, known as distance
interrogation pulses, are detected at the particular
surface beacon installation or cooperating aircraft
to which the TACAN radio is tuned, causing the
station to respond with its own transmitted pulses.
These response pulses are received by the receiver
portion of the TACAN radio and are converted into
a range indication which is displayed on the range
indication of the HSI. In addition, the station
transmits a reference signal which can be received
by the TACAN radio anytime the receiver portion is
in operation. This reference signal is displayed as a
bearing indication on the HSI. Bearing information
may be received even though interrogation pulses
are not being transmitted by the TACAN radio.
Each station may be identified by a tone
identification signal in International Morse Code.
Placing the TACAN-ODR (VHF omnidirectional
range) marker mixer switch to ON position
provides the tone identification signal in the
crewmembers headset.
TACAN RADIO AN/ARN-118(V)
The AN/ARN-118 TACAN(V) (Tactical Air Navigation) radio is provided to operate in conjunction
with surface navigation beacons and suitably
equipped aircraft. The TACAN radio and surface
beacons form a radio navigation system which enables the aircraft to obtain continuous indications
of its range and bearing to any selected surface beacon located within line-of-sight distance from the
aircraft up to 300 nautical miles, depending on aircraft altitude. The B-52 TACAN installation is not
designed for air-to-air operation; however, the aircraft can obtain range and bearing indications from
other air-to-air equipped aircraft when they are at
altitudes lower than the B-52. The ARN-118 only
provides range to other aircraft when interrogated.
The TACAN performs an automatic self-test whenever signals become lost or unreliable, or if an internal malfunction occurs. If the TEST light comes
on at the end of the test, a malfunction may have
occurred and the test should be repeated manually
by pressing the TEST switch. The test takes approximately 20 seconds and is indicated by a distance reading of zero miles, a relative bearing
pointer indication of 180 (+3), course deviation
bar centered (provided 180 is set in course
window), and TO-FROM arrow indicating TO. At
the beginning of the test, the relative bearing
Bearing and range information is displayed on the

horizontal situation indicator (HSI) (figure 1-124)
located on the pilots instrument panel.
The nav mode select switch is used to select TACAN

for display of the flight director system.
The TACAN control panel (figure 1-127) is located
on the pilots overhead panel. Three rotary knobs,
located on the TACAN control panel, provide a
means by which a desired TACAN channel may be
selected. Channels are equally divided between X
and Y channels and are spaced at 1 megahertz to
provide a total of 252 operating channels available.
Change 21
1-423
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Navigation Equipment
TYPE
DESIGNATION
FUNCTION
OPERATOR
HORIZONTAL
RANGE
LOCATION OF
CONTROLS
ATTITUDEHEADING
GYROSCOPE
SET
AN/ASN-134
Provides attitude
and heading
reference
Copilot
Copilots side
panel
DOPPLER
RADAR *
AN/APN-218
Groundspeed
and wind drift
Navigator
Navigators front
panel
ELECTROOPTICAL
VIEWING
SYSTEM
AN-ASQ-151
Low level flight

assist
Pilot, Copilot,
Radar Navigator,
and Navigator
Line-of-Sight
Pilot, copilot,
radar navigator,
and navigators
stations
GLIDE SLOPE
AN/ARN-31
60-001 Thru
60-062
AN/ARN-67
61-0001 thru
61-040
Indicates glide
angle for landing
Pilot and Copilot
15 miles
Operates through
omni-range radio
GLOBAL
POSITIONING
SYSTEM *
AN/ARN-151(V)
GPS navigation
Navigator
IFF
AN/APX-64
MARKER
BEACON
AN/ARC-32
OAS RADAR *
Aircraft
recognition
IFF Mode 4
Navigators
station
Pilot
Line-of-Sight
Pilots side panel
Receives location
marker signals on
navigation beam
Pilot and Copilot
Low altitude
Operates through
omni-range radio
AN/APQ-166
Provides bombing, navigation,

and low level
flight assist
Pilot, Copilot, and

Radar Navigator
Pilot, copilot, and

radar navigators
station
OFFENSIVE
AVIONICS
SYSTEM *
AN/ASQ-176
Navigation and
Weapon Delivery
Navigators
Navigators
station
OMNI-RANGE
RADIO
AN/ARN-14
Indicates lateral
alignment with
runway and used
for VHF navigation
Pilot and Copilot
RADAR
ALTIMETER
AN/APN-224
Measures terrain
clearance
Pilot and Copilot
RENDEZVOUS
RADAR *
AN/APN-69
Aerial
rendezvous
Navigator
150 to 200 miles
Navigators side
panel
TACAN
AN/ARN-118
UHF navigation
Pilot and Copilot
300 miles
Pilots overhead
panel
Line-of-Sight
Pilots instrument
panel
NOTE
* Description of this equipment can be found in T.O. 1B-52H-1-12.
Figure 1-126
1-424
Change 20
Pilots overhead
panel
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TACAN Radio Controls and Indicators
1
2
3
4
CHANNEL INDICATOR WINDOW

VOLUME CONTROL KNOB
FUNCTION SELECTOR KNOB
UNITS CHANNEL SWITCH
NO.
5
6
7
8
X-Y CHANNEL SELECTOR KNOB

TEST SWITCH
TEST LIGHT
TENS CHANNEL SELECTOR KNOB
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
CHANNEL Indicator Window
Displays the TACAN channel set by the tens (No. 8), units (No. 4), and
(No. 5) X-Y channel selector knobs.
VOL Control Knob
The volume control knob is used to adjust the volume of the audio identification signal received from the beacon/aircraft through the headset.
Function Selector Switch
A five-position function selector switch has OFF- -REC- -T/R- -A/A

REC- -A/A T/R positions.
In the OFF position, the system is deenergized.
In the REC position, bearing information from a selected surface beacon
is received. This fundamental bearing is the angle to surface beacon referenced to magnetic north.
In the T/R position, relative bearing is calculated and slant range distance
to the surface beacon is measured.
In the A/A REC position, a suitably equipped, cooperating aircraft must
be contacted to establish proper operating channel spacing (to simulate
a surface beacon signal) before bearing information can be obtained.
In the A/A T/R position, both distance and bearing information can be received from a suitably equipped aircraft after proper operating channels
have been established.
NOTE
GPS IU/TACAN emulation is not possible when the TACAN
function selector switch is set to OFF or to an Air-to-Air mode
(A/A REC or A/A T/R).
Change 21
1-425
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TACAN Radio Controls and Indicators (Cont)

CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
4
Units Channel Selector Knob
FUNCTION
The units channel selector knob is used to set the third digit (ones digit) of
the channel and displays the digit in the channel selector window (No. 1).
The selector knob is also used to select the channel for GPS IU/TACAN
emulation.
The channel selector knobs used on these control heads contain built-in mechanical stops to prevent rotation past the nine
(9) position on the units (ones) digit channel setting. Do not attempt to override this mechanical stop. Direction of knob rotation must be reversed when the stop is reached.
NOTE
During IU/TACAN emulation operation, with the MODE SELECT switch in GPS, a TACAN station identifier is not generated
by the IU and therefore is not supplied to the Interphone system.
The absence of the audio identifier has no effect on IU/TACAN
emulation.
5
X-Y Channel Selector Knob
The X-Y channel selector knob is used to set the X or Y function on the
channel and displays X or Y in the channel selector window (No. 1).
TEST Switch
A momentary TEST switch located on the TACAN radio control panel is

used to initiate a confidence test to determine if an internal fault has occurred in the TACAN units. Pressing the switch in the T/R (transmit) mode
initiates a test of the TACAN units. A malfunction is indicated by the TEST
light (No. 7) being on. If the light is on after 2 seconds (end of the test
cycle), a malfunction is indicated and all range and bearing information
should be disregarded. If the test is repeated in the REC (receive) mode
and the TEST light goes out, bearing information is valid.
TEST Light
A red TEST light comes on to indicate a malfunction in the TACAN units.

When the light comes on, press the TEST switch (No. 6) to initiate a test
of the TACAN units. If the light goes out at the end of 20 seconds, all bearing and distance information is valid. The light flashes at the beginning of
each test cycle to indicate the bulb is operational.
Tens Channel Selector Knob
The Tens channel selector knob is used to set the first two digits
(hundreds and tens) of the channel and displays the digits in the channel
selector window (No 1).
The channel selector knobs used on these control heads contain built-in mechanical stops to prevent rotation past the twelve
(12) position on the hundredth/tenth digit channel settings. Do
not attempt to override this mechanical stop. Direction of knob
rotation must be reversed when the stop is reached.
The selector knob is also used to select the channel for GPS IU/TACAN
emulation .
1-426
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TEST indicator light coming on are available
indications of loss of TACAN.
TACAN RADIO Normal Operation
The following procedure is used to place the

TACAN system in operation:
1. Place NAV mode select switch to TACAN position.
2. Set channel selector knobs to desired channel.
3. Set function selector switch to desired mode of
operation.
4. Pull NAV AIDS interphone mixer switch out to
identify selected beacon. Adjust volume of audio
signal with the volume control knob on TACAN control panel.
5. To turn the TACAN system off, place the function selector switch to OFF position.
INTEGRATED TACAN OMNI-RANGE OPERATION
1.
Nav mode select switch in TACAN position:

a. With TACAN function selector switch in T/R
and omni-range power switch in OFF position, bearing and range to the selected TACAN beacon is indicated on the HSI, and the course deviation indicator
(CDI) on the HSI indicates deviation from the selected course to the TACAN beacon. (If the TACAN
system goes into search, the CDI goes to the null or
zero position and remains until TACAN once again
locks onto the station.)
b. With function selector switch in T/R, the
omni-range power switch in ON position, and the AN/
ARN-14 set tuned to an ILS frequency, the HSI indicates bearing and range to the TACAN beacon and
deviation from the selected course to the TACAN beacon (except for zero position during TACAN search).
If TACAN is being used for an approach and

the range indicator warning flag comes into
view or the TACAN TEST light comes on,
abandon the approach and change to a reliable instrument approach system.
NOTE
In TACAN mode of operation, the TACAN radio AN/ARN-118 28-volt dc circuit breaker
also provides power for relay switching of the
course deviation indicator warning flag and
course warning flag functions. If this circuit
breaker pops out, control of the warning flags
reverts to VOR regardless of the position of
the nav mode select switch. In TACAN mode,
when the TACAN radio is inoperative due to
this circuit breaker being out, the warning
flags will remain out of sight if the VOR is receiving a reliable signal. However, the appearance of the TACAN range indicator
warning flag, loss of TACAN aural signal, and
If TACAN indicators readouts appear unreliable during flight, perform SELF TEST of
TACAN system by pressing SELF TEST
button on control unit and note readouts for
proper indications.
2.
Nav mode select switch in VOR position:

a. With function selector switch in T/R and
omni-range power switch in OFF position, the HSI
provides range to the TACAN beacon only.
b. With function selector switch in T/R and
omni-range power switch in ON position, the HSI
indicates omni bearing and TACAN range. The CDI
of the HSI responds to the omni station except
when an ILS station is selected, then the CDI provides localizer information.
TACAN AIR-TO-AIR OPERATION
NOTE
Due to antenna configuration, air-to-air operation may be impaired or inoperative unless the cooperating aircraft is at lower altitudes.
GPS IU/TACAN emulation is not possible
when an air-to-air mode is selected on the
TACAN control panel.
1. Contact cooperating aircraft to establish operating channels.
NOTE
The channel of the receiving aircraft must

be either 63 channels above or 63 channels
below the cooperating aircraft channel and
within the 1 thru 126 X- or Y- channel
range.
To prevent possible interference from IFF or
transponder signals, channels 1 thru 11, 58
thru 74, and 121 thru 126 should not be used.
The use of Y channels is recommended to
reduce the possibility of DME interference
(if cooperating aircraft is equipped with Ychannel capabilities).
2. Set function selector switch to A/A REC position

(for bearing information) or A/A T/R position (for
range and bearing information if cooperating aircraft
has bearing-transmit capabilities).
3. Read bearing and/or range display on HSI after 5 seconds.
NOTE
If HSI bearing pointer rotates continuously

clockwise, check if TEST light is on. If light is
on, momentarily depress TEST switch to initiate a test cycle. If light goes out after 20 seconds, distance-bearing information is valid.
Change 21
1-427
T.O. 1B-52H-1
GPS IU/TACAN EMULATION
As part of the aircraft Global Positioning System

(GPS), the GPS Interface Unit (IU) provides GPS
navigation and TACAN emulation to the pilots
monitors. Figure 1-127A shows GPS IU/TACAN
Emulation Data Flow. OAS data is also supplied
and displayed to the pilots, along with GPS data, on
two video situational displays available on the EVS
monitor. GPS derived emulation of TACAN information is also available on the HSIs. The IU control
panel and the Digital Data Loader (DDL) for the IU
are both located at the Navigators Station. The IU
Software (IUS) is loaded from the DDL into the IU
by commands entered on the Programmable Keyboard (PKB) also located at the Navigators Station.
For additional information on the IU, DDL, and the
PKB refer to GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM, in
Section I of T.O. 1B-52H-1-12.
There are two modes of operation of the IUS. The
first mode occurs when the OAS is operating with a
full Flight Management System (FMS) load. The
second, less capable mode occurs when the OAS has
failed or is operating with Block II (Nuclear) software. When FMS is communicating with the IU the
system operates in Normal Mode. When the FMS is
not communicating with the IU (Block II Software)
the system is in the Stand-Alone Mode. The system
also has a limited operating capability with no OAS
data available. GPS Navigation, TACAN Emulation, and Pilots displays are affected by the operational mode. Figure 1-127B lists the data available
in the different modes of operation.
Pilots Controls and Displays
The GPS system interfaces with the pilots through

two displays. These displays are available using the
EVS monitors when the MFD is selected on the
MFD Control Panel (figure 1-127C). The two displays are the Mission Route Screen/Moving Map
Display (figure 1-127D), and the Destination Screen
(figure 1-127E). The GPS position on the NAV
MODE switch on the Navigation System Select
Panel also provides GPS navigation and TACAN
emulation to the pilots HSIs.
TACAN CONTROL PANEL
The TACAN control panel is used with GPS IU/TACAN Emulation to select the TACAN channel for
emulation. When the channel is set on the control
panel, the data associated with the set channel is
obtained from the Navaid data base stored on the
DDLC. TACAN Emulation will not function when
the TACAN is OFF or in an Air-to-Air mode (A/A
REC or A/A T/R).
1-428
Change 22
The GPS receiver is not certified for instrument procedures. Do not accomplish a TACAN penetration and/or approach with the
navigation mode selector in the GPS position.
NOTE
During IU/TACAN emulation operation, with

the MODE SELECT switch in GPS, a TACAN
station identifier is not generated by the IU
and therefore is not supplied to the Interphone system. The absence of the audio identifier has no effect on IU/ TACAN emulation.
MFD CONTROL PANEL
The MFD Control Panels toggle switch (figure
1-127C) must be set to the MFD position before either IU/TACAN display may be viewed. The switch
is used to select the video source for the EVS display. If both the pilots and copilots MFD Controls
are set to the MFD position, then changing MFD
screens on one monitor will change the display on
the other monitor as well. However, setting one control to the MFD position and one to the EVS position will allow one monitor to display MFD screens
and the other monitor to display screens associated
with the EVS mode, respectively.
To change screens on the MFD press the crown on
the display mode control switch to the left or to the
right. If the currently displayed screen is the Mission Route Screen, make sure that the Declutter
Mode is not active. Declutter Mode can be identified
by the presence of the Declutter Menu (figure
1-127D). If Declutter Mode is active, reset the operational mode to Normal Mode by pressing down
on the center of the crown before changing screens.
When the Mission Route Screen is displayed on the
MFD, the MFD Control operates in two different
modes of operation. When in Normal Mode, the MFD
screen will not display the Declutter Menu (figure
1-127D). The normal mode is used for switching to the
Destination Data Screen and for changing the scale
of the map. When in Declutter Mode, the MFD screen
will display the Declutter Menu. Declutter mode of
operation is used for setting the Declutter Level on
the map and for setting the number of lookahead
flight legs in the mission route.
NOTE
When the Declutter Menu is displayed, the

Bullseye(s) range and bearing will be hidden until the Declutter Menu is removed.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Mission Route Screen/Moving Map Display
The Mission Route Screen provides situational

awareness to the pilots. Depending on the mode of
operation (figure 1-127B), the display may include
the following items when they occur within the selected range:
All NAVAIDS contained in the GPS IU software

All OAS destinations
The active destination
Associated NAVAIDS
Selected NAVAID
Fly-To destination
Bullseye 1 and 2
Range and bearing from the associated NAVAID
to the Current Destination
Range and bearing from the selected NAVAID to
the aircraft when in GPS mode
Range and bearing from each Bullseye to the aircraft
Current Declutter Level
Selected number of look-ahead flight legs
True Air Speed (TAS) in Knots
Ground Speed (GS) in Knots
Wind Direction and Speed
Time-To-Go to destination Less [AMI] in seconds
when within 200 seconds of the destination, [AMI]
in hours, minutes, and seconds
Magnetic Heading (HDG M)
Heading Error
Ground Track
Viewing Range
Error Messages
Less [AMI] Launch Acceptability Region (LAR)
for JDAM, WCMD and JASSM SMOs.
The map is oriented magnetic heading up as indicated by the M beside the heading. The heading is
displayed in a box at the top of the compass rose. As
the heading changes, the compass rose rotates in
one degree increments matching the heading. The
track indicator is used to display the ground track
and moves along the compass rose as needed to accurately depict the ground track.
The map can be displayed in 200, 100, 50, 25, and
12.5 nautical mile ranges. A number indicating the
range in nautical miles (NM) of the moving map is
displayed in the upper left corner of the map box. A
small triangle above and/or below the range value
indicates larger or smaller selectable range is available. While in Declutter Mode (Declutter Menu displayed) the range cannot be changed and the arrows are not displayed.
The scale is measured from the center of the aircraft

symbol (aircraft present position) to the top of the
compass rose. There is also a midrange arc drawn on
the map that represents half the distance of the scale.
As an example, if the map range displayed in the upper left corner of the map box is 100 NM, midrange
arc represents the 50 NM range from the center of the
aircraft.
The map also displays destinations, Bullseyes, and
Navaids that are found to be within the selected
map scale. Destinations in the route are connected
by straight lines and are not intended to depict the
actual flight path of the aircraft. Figure 1-127D
lists the destination symbols.
The Time-To-Go to the destination is displayed at the
top or the map display. Less [AMI] It will remain as
200 seconds until the actual time to go is less than 200
seconds. [AMI] It will be displayed as h:mm:ss up to
9:59:59.
IDENTIFYING DESTINATIONS ON THE
MISSION ROUTE MAP
The center of each destination symbol represents the
latitude and longitude of that destination.
Destination points are identified by their numeric
Destination ID. When flying to a cross hair, the Destination ID XH is used. If a destination has a dash ()
in front of it, this indicates that the destination has
been identified as a turn short destination. Otherwise, the destination is treated as an overfly destination. If the destination has an asterisk (*) behind it,
this indicates that this destination is in a stack of destinations located at this position. This condition occurs when there are two or more consecutive destinations with the same Lat/Long.
When a Fly-To destination is defined, a filled in destination will be used to represent the Fly-To Destination Point. All Fly-To crosshair destination points will
be represented as navigation points and thus will be
drawn as a filled in circle. A dash - dot line will be
drawn from the aircraft position at the time that the
Fly-To command was issued to the Fly-To Destination
Point. The dash - dot line will not change with the aircraft position. The original dash - dot line will remain
on the MFD screen until a new Fly-To Destination
Point is defined, the mission is reloaded, or a different
mission is loaded. To return to the route, define the
Fly-To Destination Point as one of the destination
points on the route. Fly-To destinations are identified
by flying to destinations out of sequence or by flying
to crosshair points.
When flying to a Fly-To Destination Point that is not
on the route, the radial and DME at the bottom of the
map will be replaced by FLY TO X-HAIR.
Change 22
1-428A
T.O. 1B-52H-1
IDENTIFYING NAVAIDS ON THE MISSION
ROUTE MAP
The center of each Navaid symbol (figure 1-127D) represents the latitude and longitude of that Nav-aid.
The Navaid symbol outline is filled in when that Navaid is the selected Navaid. To the left of each Navaid
will be its three letter identifier and channel. Valid
Navaids are VORTAC, VOR/DME and TACAN stations.
IDENTIFYING BULLSEYES ON THE MISSION
ROUTE MAP
The center of the Bullseye symbol represents the
point at which the latitude and longitude for that
Bullseye is defined. Bullseyes are identified by a
symbol on the display.
Less [AMI] To the right of each Bullseye symbol is
the Bullseye identifier, BE1 or BE2. In addition to
displaying the indicators on the moving map, the
range and bearing from each Bullseye to the aircraft will be displayed on the left side of the screen
below the wind speed and direction (see figure
1127D). M or T follows the bearing of each Bullseye indicating if the bearing is true or magnetic.
Each Bullseye bearing true or magnetic selection is
determined by the Bullseye bearing true or magnetic selection. The range and bearing will be updated
dynamically as the aircraft location changes. An asterisk precedes the BE that represents the IUS selected Bullseye. Bullseyes are displayed until IU
power has been cycled.
[AMI] To the right of each Bullseye symbol is the
Bullseye identifier, BE1 or BE2. In addition to displaying the indicators on the moving map, the range
and bearing from each Bullseye to the aircraft will be
displayed on the left side of the screen below the wind
speed and direction (see figure 1127D. An M or T following the bearing indicates magnetic or true and is
determined by the FMS Bullseye Bearing Reference.
An asterisk preceding the BE represents the FMS selected bullseye.
NOTE
[AMI] Bullseye data is calculated independently by the GPS IU/TACAN displayed at

the pilots MFD and Prime Mission Data displayed at the navigators station. Small variations in bearing and range between the two
1-428B
Change 22
systems should be expected. Resolution at the

pilot station is 0.05 NM while the navigator
station is 0.5NM leading to inherent rounding differences.
Less [AMI] IDENTIFYING LAR ON THE MISSION
ROUTE MAP
The outline of a Launch Acceptability Region (LAR)
for JDAM, WCMD and JASSM will be displayed on
the moving map when provided by OAS (see figure
1-127D).
TYPES OF LINES DISPLAYED ON THE MISSION ROUTE MAP
There are three types of lines that are displayed on
the Mission Route Map. They are:
1. Solid Identifies the planned route. Connects
sequential destinations in the route.
2. Dashed Connects the Current Destination to
the Current Destinations Associated Navaid.
3. Dash - Dot Fly-To line. Drawn from the current A/C position at the time that the Fly-To is defined to the Fly-To point. Will remain on the map
until a new Fly-To is detected, the mission is reloaded, or a different mission is loaded.
Mission Route Screen/Moving Map Display Operation
The MFD Mode of Operation only applies when the

displayed screen is the Mission Route Screen. There
are two modes for the MFD, Normal and Declutter.
The MFD Mode is determined by the presence or absence of the Declutter Menu Pressing down the center
of the crown on the display mode control switch
toggles between Normal and Declutter modes.
CHANGING THE MISSION ROUTE MAP SCALE
In order to change the viewing range on the Mission Route Screen, the MFD must be in Normal
Mode. While in Normal Mode, small triangles will
appear above and/or below the viewing range if
there are larger and/or smaller scale factors available for selection. The viewing range can be
changed by pressing the crown of the display mode
control switch forward to increase the viewing
range and aft to decrease the viewing range.
Changing the range on the pilots display will
change the copilots display and vice versa.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CHANGING THE LEVEL OF DECLUTTER ON
THE MISSION ROUTE SCREEN
In order to change the Level of Declutter on the
Mission Route Screen, the MFD must be in Declutter Mode (identified by the presence of the Declutter Menu). The pilot/copilot can change the declutter modes on the Mission Route Screen by pushing
the crown of the display mode control switch either
to the left or to the right. The declutter list is cyclic.
Therefore continued selection will return the operator to the original declutter mode. The Level of Declutter is indicated by the Declutter Level Indicator
as shown below.
The number of viewable flight legs can also be

scrolled by holding the crown forward or aft. The
number of viewable flight legs is cyclic. Therefore,
when the maximum number of destinations in the
mission is reached, the number of viewable flight
legs is reset to one. Decreasing the number of viewable flight legs past one will have a similar effect
except the value will be set to the maximum number of destinations in the mission.
Changing the number of viewable flight legs does not
change the planned mission, it only changes what is
displayed on the MFD screen. The default number of
viewable flight legs is 5. One history leg will always
be shown as long as the mission route is visible.
All four blocks highlighted - Destination Map and

all viewable Navaids displayed.
SEL, DP (xx), and ASSOC highlighted; ALL is
not highlighted - Destination Map, associated Navaids, and the selected Navaid are displayed.
SEL and DP (xx) are highlighted; ASSOC and
ALL are not highlighted - Destination Map and the
selected Navaid are displayed.
SEL is highlighted; DP (xx), ASSOC and ALL are
not highlighted - Selected Navaid only is displayed.
The Time-To-Go field at the top-center of the screen

displays Less [AMI] the value 200 when the actual
time to go is greater than 200 seconds, [AMI]
h:mm:ss up to 9:59:59. The time to go data is the
same as that displayed in EVS display modes.
While in Stand Alone Mode (FMS not communicating), only the following declutter modes are available:
The FCI (Flight Command Indicator) will be displayed on the Mission Route Map only when one of
the following sets of conditions is met:
Selected Navaid only

All viewable Navaids
IDENTIFYING THE TIME-TO-GO AND FCI
With NO OAS DATA, the Time-To-Go will not be

displayed.
NOTE
Bullseyes and Less [AMI] LARs are displayed in all Declutter levels.
CHANGING THE NUMBER OF VIEWABLE
FLIGHT LEGS MISSION ROUTE SCREEN
In order to change the Number of viewable flight
legs on the Mission Route Screen, the MFD must be
in Declutter Mode. The pilot/copilot can change the
number of viewable flight legs on the Mission Route
Screen by pushing the crown of the display mode
control switch either forward to increase the number of legs or aft to decrease number of legs. The
current number of viewable flight legs is indicated
by the number in the center of the Declutter Menu
(13, figure 1-127C). The number of viewable flight
legs is also displayed on the Declutter Level Indicator in parentheses following DP.
FMS
1. Nav Mode Select switch is in the GPS,
TACAN, or VOR mode
2. There is valid course deviation information
from FMS
3. OAS is on
4. Heading select switch is in the NOR position
ILS
1. Nav Mode Select switch is in the ILS or ILS
APP mode
2. There is valid bank steering from the Flight
Director
3. Heading select switch is in the NOR position
HSI
1. Heading select switch is in the MAN position
2. There is valid bank steering from the Flight
Director
The FCI is the same as that displayed in EVS display modes.
Change 22
1-428C
T.O. 1B-52H-1
GPS IU/TACAN Emulation Data Flow
Figure 1-127A
1-428D
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
GPS IU/TACAN Emulation Mode Data

WITH FMS
[AMI]
[CS]
WITH OAS Less [AMI]

BLOCK II
NO OAS
[NS]
DATA
MISSION ROUTE SCREEN/MOVING MAP DISPLAY SCREEN

ANNUNCIATORS
ASSOCIATED NAVAID TO THE CURRENT DESTINATION

(ID, CHANNEL, BEARING, AND DISTANCE)
BANK STEERING COMMAND
BULLSEYE(S)
COMPASS ROSE
CURRENT DESTINATION
DESTINATIONS (NUMBER AND TYPE)
DRIFT
FILED NAVIGATION REFERENCE POINT (ID AND CHANNEL)
GROUND SPEED
GROUND TRACK
HEADING ERROR
Less [AMI] JDAM/WCMD/JASSM LAUNCH ACCEPTABILITY

REGION (LAR)
MAGNETIC HEADING
NAV REFERENCE POINTS FROM DAFIF
SELECTED NAVAID TO THE AIRCRAFT

TIME-TO-GO
TRUE AIR SPEED
WIND DIRECTION AND SPEED
[AMI]
NO OAS
DATA
X
X
DESTINATION DISPLAY SCREEN

ANNUNCIATORS
CURRENT DESTINATION
DESTINATIONS (NUMBER AND TYPE)
DRIFT
FILED NAVIGATION REFERENCE POINT

(ID, CHANNEL, BEARING AND DISTANCE)
GROUND SPEED
GROUND TRACK
INDICATION OF NAVIGATOR MODIFIED DESTINATIONS (MOD)
MAGNETIC HEADING
SELECTED NAVAID TO THE AIRCRAFT

TRUE AIR SPEED
WIND DIRECTION AND SPEED
MOVING MAP DISPLAY WILL DISPLAY NO OAS DATA WHEN NO SUPPORTING DATA IS AVAILABLE.
AVAILABLE ONLY WITH DDLC INSERTED.
Figure 1-127B
Change 22
1-428E
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Pilots MFD Control Panel Controls and Indicators
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
EVS Monitor Source Select Switch

(MFD - EVS)
The switch is used to select the video source for the EVS display. MFD
position selects IU/TACAN displays and the EVS position selects EVS
displays. If both the pilots and copilots MFD Controls are set to the MFD
position, then changing MFD screens on one monitor will change the display on the other monitor as well. Setting one control to the MFD position
and one to the EVS position will allow one monitor to display MFD screens
and the other monitor to display screens associated with the EVS mode,
respectively.
Display Mode Control Switch

(P/DECLUTTER)
The switch is used with both the Mission Route Screen and the Destination Data Display.
On the Digital Data Display pressing the switch forward and aft scrolls
through the destination list. Pressing the switch left or right toggles the
display to the Mission Route Screen.
On the Mission Route Screen/Moving Map Display the switch toggles between Normal and Declutter modes of operation by pressing the switch
crown down.
In Normal mode pressing the switch forward and aft changes the
viewing range selection. Pressing the switch left or right changes the
display to the Destination Data Display.
In Declutter mode pressing the switch forward and aft changes the
number of viewable flight legs. Pressing the switch left or right
changes the declutter level.
Figure 1-127C
1-428F
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Mission Route Screen/Moving Map Display
1.
Heading Error Indicator
6.
Bullseye Indicator. Asterisk indicates selected Bullseye.
2.
Less [AMI] Time-To-Go to destination in seconds.

(Displays 0 to 200 seconds).
[AMI] Time-To-Go to destination, displayed as h:mm:ss.
7.
3.
Display Range in nautical miles (12.5, 25, 50, 100, or

200) as selected by the Display Mode Control switch
when in the Normal mode.
The triangles above and below indicate there are
selectable ranges available which are greater or less
than the displayed range.
The triangles are displayed only when the Display
Mode Control switch is in the Normal mode.
NAVAID Symbol - Filled in when the NAVAID is the

selected NAVAID. For the current destination, a dotted
line indicates the radial from the selected NAVAID to
the current destination.
8.
Current Destination
9.
Present Position
4.
Magnetic Heading
5.
Track Indicator
10. NAVAID ID with Range and Bearing from the selected

NAVAID to the current destination.
11. PREV NEXT Scroll Arrows - Displayed when the
Display Mode Control switch is in the Normal mode.
12. Advisory Message Field
Figure 1-127D (Sheet 1 of 3)
Change 22
1-428G
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Mission Route Screen/Moving Map Display (Cont)

13. Declutter Level Indicator - The bar under the label is
solid when the option is selected using the Display
Mode Control switch when in the Declutter mode.
SEL
(Selected) Only the selected NAVAID is
displayed.
DP (X) Selected Destination Point X Map and
Selected NAVAID are displayed.
ASSOC (Associated) The Destination Map,
Associated NAVAIDS, and the Selected
NAVAID are displayed.
ALL
The Destination Map and all viewable
NAVAIDs are displayed.
14. Declutter Menu Displayed when the Display Mode

Control switch is in the Declutter mode.
Rocking the Display Mode Control switch forward or
aft scrolls the selected DP number displayed in the
center box. Rocking the Display Mode Control switch
left or right changes the declutter level.
15. Bullseye(s) range and bearing display
16. Current Flight Conditions
17. GPS Emulated TACAN Data of currently selected
NAVAID including Station Information and Radial/DME.
NOTE
In Normal Mode, the Bullseye(s) range and bearing are displayed. When the Declutter
Menu is displayed, the Bullseye(s) range and bearing is hidden.
Bullseyes and Less [AMI] LARs are displayed in all Declutter levels.
DESTINATION SYMBOLS
SMO Gravity Weapon Target
SMO Initial Points or Navigation Points (IP, NAV, TCIP, TCCP, TCEX )
Air Refueling Points (ARIP, ARCP, AREX)
SMO Launch Points (Cruise Missile, Direct Attack, JSOW/JASSM etc.)
The destination symbol is filled in when it is the Current Destination or a Fly-To destination.
ABBREVIATION
DESCRIPTION
SYMBOL
NAV
Navigation Destination
ARIP
Air Refuel Initial Point
ARCP
Air Refuel Control Point
AREX
Air Refuel Exit Point
TCIP
Terrain Correlation Initial Point
TCCP
Terrain Correlation Control Point
TCEX
Terrain Correlation Exit Point
SMO DESTINATIONS
Gravity Weapon Initial Point
Gravity Weapon Target
LP
JDAM/WCMD Launch Point
LP
JSOW Launch Point
LP
Cruise Missile Launch Point
SEVT
JASSM Launch Point
SEVT
All Other SMO Destinations
IP
TGT
1-428H
Change 22
T.O. 1B-52H-1
JDAM/WCMD LAR
JASSM LAR
Change 21
1-428J
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Destination Screen
The Destination Data Screen (figure 1-127E) is

used to provide information regarding destinations
and their associated Navaids. The Destination Data
Screen also provides information about the current
heading. The Destination Data Screen is capable of
displaying the following:
All Destinations (with any indications of active

and/or modified)
Destination Types
Associated Navaids (includes three letter identifier, channel number, and range and bearing from
the Navaid to its associated destination)
Selected Navaid
Range and Bearing from the Selected Navaid to
the Aircraft, when in GPS mode
True Air Speed (TAS) in Knots
Ground Speed (GS) in Knots
Wind Direction and Velocity
Magnetic Heading (HDG)
Ground Track (TRK)
Drift
Error Annunciators (if any)
During certain modes of operation, some of these
capabilities may not be available. See figure 1-127B
for data availability.
Destination Screen Operation
IDENTIFYING ITEMS IN THE DESTINATION

LIST
The Destination List is displayed in the middle of
the Destination Data Screen. The list displays up to
7 destinations in the route at a time. Each row in
the list shows the destination number, destination
type, and the destinations associated Navaid. Abbreviations for each destination type are defined in
the Table on sheet 2 of figure 1-127D.
1-428K
Change 3
Each destinations associated Navaid is depicted by

its three letter identifier, channel, and distance and
bearing from the Navaid to the destination. The
bearing displayed is relative to magnetic North. If
the destination has not been modified, then the
range and bearing displayed will be the distance
and bearing filed with the flight plan. This information is read in from the Digital Data Loader at the
Navigators Station. If a destination has been modified, then the range and bearing will be calculated
by the IU Software. If a destination is moved more
than 200 NM from its associated Navaid, then the
distance will be replaced by the CHANNEL annunciator.
The Current Destination is identified by an outline
surrounding the destination number, type, and associated Navaid.
MODIFIED DESTINATIONS
A destination is considered modified anytime the
destinations Lat/Long is changed from the original
flight plan through FMS or the original associated
Navaid is changed through the PKB. When a destination is modified, the MOD indication will be displayed to the right of the destination type in the
Destination List (7, figure 1-127E). The MOD indication cannot be removed until a new mission is
loaded.
SCROLLING THROUGH THE DESTINATION
LIST
The pilot/copilot can scroll through the list of destinations on the Destination Data Screen by pressing the crown of the display mode control switch
forward or aft respectively. Small triangles on the
right side of the MFD (next to the assigned Navaids) will appear when there are more destinations in the list. When the top of the destination list
is reached, the triangle pointing up will disappear.
Similarly, the triangle pointing down will disappear
when the bottom of the destination list is reached.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Destination Data Screen
1.
Computed Flight Parameters
4.
Active Destination
2.
Destination Data
5.
GPS Emulated TACAN Data
3.
Destination List Scroll Arrows - Displayed when the

destination list may be scrolled up or down
respectively.
6.
Annunciator Message Field.
7.
Modified Destination Indicator.
Figure 1-127E
Change 3
1-428L
T.O. 1B-52H-1
GPS Emulated TACAN Display
The GPS Emulated TACAN provides the currently

selected Navaids three letter identifier and channel, and the slant range and bearing from the Navaid to the aircraft. This data is only available
while the Nav MODE SELECT switch on the Navigation System Select Panel is set to GPS mode.
When not in GPS navigation mode, NOT IN GPS
MODE will be displayed in place of the Selected
Navaids range and bearing. 15, figure 1-127D
shows GPS Emulated TACAN data on the Mission
Route Screen, and 5, figure 1-127E shows GPS
Emulated TACAN data on the Destination Data
Screen.
The selected Navaid symbol will also be filled in on
the Mission Route Map if the Navaid is within the
viewable range. Some conditions prevent the selected Navaid from being displayed. When such a
condition occurs, one of the following annunciator
messages listed in figure 1-127F will be displayed
in place of the selected Navaid data displayed on
the GPS Emulated TACAN line.
Associated Navaid Range and Bearing
The associated Navaid field provides the associated

Navaids three letter identifier and channel, and
the distance and bearing from the Navaid to the
destination. If the destination has not been modified, then the distance and bearing will reflect the
data filed with the associated flight plan. Otherwise, the distance and bearing displayed will be
that which was calculated by the IUS.
Each destination (except a Fly-To Crosshair point)
may have one associated Navaid. On the Destination Data Screen, the associated Navaid is displayed in the Destination List with the destination
number and type (figure 1-127E). On the Mission
Route Screen, the associated Navaid is displayed
below the Mission Route Map along with the Current Destination Number (9 on figure 1-127D).
1-428M
Change 3
On the Mission Route Map, the Current Destination is connected to its associated Navaid by a
dashed line. This is done only for the Current Destination. Some conditions prevent the associated
Navaid for the Current Destination from being displayed. When such a condition occurs, one of the
annunciators messages listed in figure 1-127F will
be displayed below the map on the Mission Route
Screen in place of the associated Navaid data.
Computed Flight Parameters Displayed on the MFD
Computed flight parameters are displayed on both

the Destination Data Screen and the Mission Route
Screen. The computed flight parameters are comprised of the following items:
True Air Speed (TAS)

Ground Speed (GS)
Wind Velocity and Direction relative to magnetic
North
Ground Track relative to magnetic North
Heading relative to magnetic North
Drift
On the Destination Data Screen (1, figure 1-127E),
the computed flight parameters are displayed at
the top of the screen. On the Mission Route Screen
(14, figure 1-127D), the TAS, GS, and winds are displayed on the left side of the screen while the heading, ground track, and drift are displayed on the
Mission Route Map. The heading is displayed in a
box at the top of the compass rose while ground
track is displayed using a floating track marker.
The drift is determined by the difference between
the heading and track bug.
Annunciators Displayed in the Annunciator Field
There is currently only one annunciator that is displayed in the designated annunciator field on the
MFD. NAVAID DATE will appear in the annunciator field when the current date is past the last effective date for the Navaid database.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
GPS IU/TACAN Annunciator Messages

ANNUNCIATOR MESSAGE
CHANNEL
CAUSE
GPS Emulated TACAN Display Box:
The selected Navaid is either more than 200 NM away from the aircraft, or there is a
communication problem with the TACAN Control Panel.
Associated Navaid Message Display Box:
The Current Destination has been moved more than 200 NM away from the associated Navaid.
CONFLICT
More than one Navaid with the tuned channel is within 200 NM of the current aircraft
position.
FLY TO X-HAIR
The Current Destination is a Fly-To crosshair. A crosshair point does not have an
associated Navaid.
GPS DATA
GPS data is not good enough (FOM of 6 or higher) to provide an accurate position.
NAVAID DATA
The Navaid database in invalid.
NO MISSION DATA
The Mission Data has not been:

Less [AMI] loaded from the DDLC.
[AMI] received from the ACU.
NO NAVAID ASSIGNED
There is currently no Navaid associated with the Current Destination.
NOT IN GPS MODE
The Nav MODE SELECT switch on the Navigation Select Panel is not in the GPS
position.
Figure 1-127F
GPS IU/TACAN EMULATION ABNORMAL OPERATION
Malfunctions and abnormal operations of GPS IU/

TACAN Emulation are indicated at the Pilots station on the HSI/ADI and the EVS monitor when in
MFD mode. Most errors and failures also have associated fault messages which are displayed on the
Programmable Keyboard (PKB) at the Navigators
station. Since many of the conditions share MFD
messages, the pilots GPS IU/TACAN Abnormal Op-
erations/Fault table (figure 1-127G) will first define

the condition, describe the indications which appear
to the pilots, the corrective action, the probable
cause, and the capabilities lost. The Navigators IU/
TACAN faults indicated by PKB messages appear
in Section III of T.O. 1B-52H-1-12 and are presented in the normal fault Indication - Corrective Action - Possible Cause - Capability Lost table format.
Change 21
1-428N
T.O. 1B-52H-1
GPS IU/TACAN Abnormal Operations/Fault Table

ABNORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS
CONDITION
HSI/ADI
INDICATION
MFD
INDICATION
CORRECTIVE
ACTION
PROBABLE
CAUSE
CAPABILITY
LOST/
LIMITATIONS
No DDLC
(Digital Data
Loader Cartridge)
In GPS Mode Nav

Invalid Flag on
ADI, Range Flag
on HSI, Course
Deviation to zero,
To/From flag set
To and Bearing
Pointer Rotating.
No impact if additional data is not

required from the
DDLC. If data is
required from the
DDLC then, Destination Data
Screen:Blanks
where associated
Navaids would be,
NAVAID DATA in
GPS Emulated
TACAN field.
Mission Route
Screen: NAVAID
DATA in GPS
Emulated TACAN
field, Less [AMI]
NO MISSION
DATA, [AMI]
NO NAVAID
ASSIGNED, in
associated Navaid
field, No Navaids
or route displayed.
Verify DDL Cartridge is properly

loaded.
DDL Cartridge not

installed or improperly installed.
Unable to support
GPS HSI parameters, situational
awareness
screens, and reloading IUS. Also
the IU will not be
able to provide Almanac data to the
GPS Receiver. IU
should get Almanac data from
DTUC.
DDLC Data
Corrupted or
Unable to
access DDLC
Navaid
Information
In GPS Mode Nav

Invalid Flag on
ADI, Range Flag
on HSI.
Destination Data
Screen: Blanks
where associated
Navaids would be,
NAVAID DATA in
GPS Emulated
TACAN field
Mission Route
Screen: NAVAID
DATA in GPS
Emulated TACAN
field, Less [AMI]
NO MISSION
DATA, [AMI]
NO NAVAID
ASSIGNED, in
associated Navaid
field, No Navaids
or route displayed.
The Navigator
should verify that
proper cartridge is
installed. IU
should try to request the same
block of data several times before
declaring a failure.
Data block requested from

DDLC did not
pass the checksum test, Navaid
file not found, Almanac Data Corrupted on DDLC,
Cartridge Table of
Contents Corrupted, or Partition
Directory File Corrupted.
Data cannot be
used to support
GPS HSI parameters, situational
awareness
screens, and reloading IUS.
Figure 1-127G (Sheet 1 of 9)
1-428P
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ABNORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS (Cont)

CONDITION
HSI/ADI
INDICATION
MFD
INDICATION
CORRECTIVE
ACTION
PROBABLE
CAUSE
CAPABILITY
LOST/
LIMITATIONS
Less [AMI]
DTUC, [AMI]
DTC, Data
Corrupted or
unable to access mission
data from
Less [AMI]
DTUC, [AMI]
DTC
No Impact.
Destination Data
Screen: Blanks
where associated
Navaids would be
Mission Route
Screen: NO MISSION DATA in associated Navaid
field, No route displayed.
IU should try to request the same

block of data several times before
declaring a failure.
Data record requested from

Less [AMI]
DTUC, [AMI]
DTC, did not pass
the checksum test.
Crypto Key, B-52

Mission Data may
not be available.
Invalid Crypto
Variable
No indication unless data accuracies degraded.

See GPS Errors
Excessive.

See GPS Errors
Excessive.
Check the Crypto

Key source and
re-start GPS.
Available Crypto
Keys were not validated by the
GPS.
Required GPS accuracy jeopardized. Weapon

launches may require overrides
and/or operate in
degraded mode.
No Crypto
Variable

See GPS Errors
Excessive.

See GPS Errors
Excessive.
Check the Crypto

Key source and
reload/re-enter
Crypto keys.
No Key entered on
PKB, no Crypto
data load received
from the fill port, or
DTUC. FMS will
indicate DTUC fail
if crypto key is corrupted on the
DTUC.
Required GPS accuracy jeopardized. Weapon

launches may require overrides
and/or operate in
degraded mode.
Less [AMI]
HSI & ADI Operates normally.
Destination Data
Screen:Blanks
where associated
Navaids would be.
Mission Route
Verify proper
DDLC/DTUC cartridges are
installed.
DDLC and DTUC

data are not correlated.
No associated
Navaids unless
manually assigned/entered on
PKB.
HSI & ADI Operates normally.
Destination Data
Screen: NAVAID
DATE in the annunciator field
Mission Route
Screen: NAVAID
DATE in the annunciator field.
Load up to date
data.
Data stored on
DDLC or [AMI]
DTC was derived
from DAFIF version that is out of
date.
Navaids recognized by FAA may

not agree with
those in the system (added or deleted) or Navaid
data does not
agree (Lat, Long,
Mag Var, etc.).
Mission on
DDLC does
not match
DTUC Mission or DDLC
Mission Data
is Corrupted
DAFIF is Out
of Date
Change 21
1-428Q
T.O. 1B-52H-1

(Cont)
CONDITION
HSI/ADI
INDICATION
MFD
INDICATION
CORRECTIVE
ACTION
PROBABLE
CAUSE
CAPABILITY
LOST/
LIMITATIONS
GPS Receiver
Acquiring
Satellites
In GPS Mode Nav

Invalid Flag on
ADI, Range Flag
on HSI, Course
Deviation to zero,
TO/FROM flag indicates TO and
Bearing Pointer
Rotating.
When less than 4

satellites are available...Destination
Data Screen: GPS
DATA in the GPS
Emulated TACAN
field Mission
Route Screen:
GPS DATA in the
GPS Emulated
TACAN field.
Continue operation until satellites

acquired.
Normal operation.
If IU could not provide the Almanac
data to the receiver acquisition time
will be extended.
The GPS receiver
will continue to acquire satellites.
TACAN Emulation
mode is not functional.
GPS Air to
Air Modes
ADI Nav Invalid

Flag set, HSI distance flag set,
Course Deviation
set to 0, TO/
FROM flag indicates TO, Bearing
Pointer rotating.
Destination Data
Screen: CHANNEL in the GPS
Emulated TACAN
field Mission
Route Screen:
CHANNEL in the
GPS Emulated
TACAN field, No
selected TACAN
identified on map.
Turn the TACAN

Control Mode
switch to either
REC or T/R position.
The NAV Select

Mode is set to
GPS and the TACAN Control
Mode switch is set
to either A/A REC
or A/A T/R mode.
Unable to support
GPS HSI parameters. Selected
Navaid data cannot be obtained.
Some situational
awareness data
will not be available.
IU Reading
Data from
DDLC

required from the
DDLC. In GPS
mode Nav Invalid
Flag on ADI,
Range Flag on
HSI, Course Deviation to zero and
Bearing Pointer
Rotating.

required from the
DDLC. If data is
required from the
DDLC then, Destination Data
Screen: Blanks
where associated
Navaids would be,
NAVAID DATA in
GPS Emulated
TACAN field Mission Route
Screen: NAVAID
DATA in GPS
Emulated TACAN
field, Less [AMI]
NO MISSION
DATA, [AMI]
NO NAVAID
ASSIGNED, in
associated Navaid
field, No Navaids
or route displayed.
If the PKB indicates DDL BUSY

for more than 2
minutes, Navigator
should perform
IBIT test on the
DDL if on the
ground. Otherwise, remove the
DDLC from its receptacle for
approximately 1
minute then reinstall the cartridge
back in the receptacle.
May be normal operation or could indicate interface

problem.
System unable to
support HSI and
Situational Displays.
1-428R
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1

CONDITION
HSI/ADI
INDICATION
MFD
INDICATION
CORRECTIVE
ACTION
PROBABLE
CAUSE
TACAN Channel Out of

Range (Greater than 200
NM)
In GPS Mode Nav

Invalid Flag on
ADI, Range Flag
on HSI, Course
Deviation to zero,
Bearing Pointer
Rotating.
Destination Data
Emulated TACAN
field
Mission Route
Emulated TACAN
field, No selected
TACAN identified
on map.
Select a Navaid
that is within range
or wait until selected Navaid is in
range.
In GPS mode and

the selected
(tuned) TACAN
channel is out of
range or the A/C
flies out of range
(greater than 200
NM).
System will not

compute range/
bearing to selected station.
Selected
channel has
Multiple Navaids in the
data base
with the same
channel and
both are within 200 NM of
the A/C current position
In GPS Mode Nav

Invalid Flag on
ADI, Range Flag
on HSI, Course
Deviation to zero,
Bearing Pointer
Rotating.
Destination Data
Screen: CONFLICT in the GPS
Emulated TACAN
field Mission
Route Screen:
CONFLICT in the
GPS Emulated
TACAN field, No
selected TACAN
identified on map.
Select a different
Navaid.
Data base contains Navaids with

the same channel
that are close to
each other (within
400 NM).
IUS is unable to
determine which
Navaid is selected.
Less [AMI]
HSI/ADI displays
not affected.
Destination Data
Screen: NO MISSION DATA
where Destination
List would be Mission Route
None - Normal
operation for Block
II Software Load.
Block II operational software

loaded.
Information on the
Situational Awareness screens is
limited to Navaids
only. HSI GPS
display parameters unaffected.
If the SDC is not

faulted and in
GPS mode Nav
Invalid Flag on
ADI, Range Flag
on HSI, Course
Deviation to zero
and TO/FROM
flag indicates TO
and Bearing Pointer Rotating.
No Impact.
Ensure TACAN
Control Panel is
turned on.
HSI fault, synchro/

Digital conversion
fault, wiring.
No valid tofrom
or course Deviation on HSI.
Nuclear Mission Load
No Selected
Course
CAPABILITY
LOST/
LIMITATIONS
Change 21
1-428S
T.O. 1B-52H-1

(Cont)
CONDITION
HSI/ADI
INDICATION
MFD
INDICATION
CORRECTIVE
ACTION
PROBABLE
CAUSE
CAPABILITY
LOST/
LIMITATIONS
TACAN Navigation Mode
Operates
normally.
Destination Data
Screen: NOT IN
GPS MODE in the
GPS Emulated
Screen: NOT IN
GPS MODE in the
GPS Emulated
TACAN field, no
selected TACAN
identified on map.
Turn the NAV Select Mode switch

to GPS position.
The NAV Select

Mode is set to TACAN and the TACAN Control
Mode switch is set
to either REC or
T/R mode.
The MFD will not

provide GPS emulated Range and
Bearing data.
TACAN Air to
Air Modes
Operates
normally.
Destination Data
Screen: NOT IN
GPS MODE in the
GPS Emulated
Screen: NOT IN
GPS MODE in the
GPS Emulated
TACAN field, no
selected TACAN
identified on map.

to GPS position
and change the
TACAN Control
Mode switch to either REC or T/R
position.
The NAV Select

Mode switch is set
to either A/A REC
or A/A T/R mode.
The MFD will not

provide GPS emulated Range and
Bearing data and
selected Navaid
will not be displayed on map
window.
TACAN Control Panel is

off when in
ADI Nav Invalid

Course Deviation
set to 0, TO/
FROM flag indicates TO.
Destination Data
Screen: NOT IN
GPS MODE in the
GPS Emulated
Screen: NOT IN
GPS MODE in the
GPS Emulated
TACAN field, no
selected TACAN
identified on map.

to GPS position
and change the
TACAN Control
position.
The NAV Select

Mode switch is set
to OFF.
Unable to support
GPS HSI parameters. Some situational awareness
data will not be
available.
TACAN Control Panel is

off when in
GPS Navigation Mode
ADI Nav Invalid

Course Deviation
set to 0, TO/
Destination Data
Emulated TACAN
field Mission
Route Screen:
CHANNEL in the
GPS Emulated
TACAN field,
No selected TACAN identified on
map.
Turn the TACAN

Control Mode
switch to either
REC or T/R position.
The NAV Select

Mode is set to
GPS and the TACAN Control
Mode switch is set
to OFF.
Unable to support
data will not be
available.
1-428T
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1

CONDITION
HSI/ADI
INDICATION
MFD
INDICATION
CORRECTIVE
ACTION
PROBABLE
CAUSE
CAPABILITY
LOST/
LIMITATIONS
Not in GPS or
No Impact.
Destination Data
Screen: NOT IN
GPS MODE in the
GPS Emulated
Screen: NOT IN
GPS MODE in the
GPS Emulated
TACAN field, No
selected TACAN
identified on map.

to GPS position
and change the
TACAN Control
position.
The NAV Select

Mode is NOT set
to GPS or TACAN
mode.
Unable to support
data will not be
available.
GPS Errors
Excessive
Nav Invalid Flag

set when FOM
and Errors exceed
allowed limit.
Destination Data
Screen: GPS
DATA in the GPS
Emulated TACAN
field Mission
Route Screen:
GPS DATA in the
GPS Emulated
TACAN field.
Navigator should
attempt to re-acquire the GPS
constellation.
FOM is greater
than 6 and GPS
error estimates for
degraded GPS
Data.
Degraded GPS.
Cone of
Confusion
In GPS modes
NAV invalid flag
set. Course deviation should go to
zero and TO/
FROM flag indicates TO and
Bearing Pointer
Rotating.
No Impact.
None - Normal
operation.
Distance to Navaid less than

0.236 NM.
Bearing errors exceed required limits.
Change 21
1-428U
T.O. 1B-52H-1

(Cont)
SYSTEM FAULT CONDITIONS
CONDITION
HSI/ADI
INDICATION
MFD
INDICATION
IU Fail BIT
fault(s)
In GPS modes if
TACAN Emulation
function affected
NAV invalid flag
and distance flag
zero and TO/
FROM flag indicates TO. Otherwise normal if not
affected by failure.
Display normal unless affected by

failure.
IU Fail CPU
failure
In GPS modes if
TACAN Emulation
function affected
NAV invalid flag
and distance flag
zero and TO/
NOT AVAILABLE.
IU Fail No
IUS
In GPS modes if
TACAN Emulation
function affected
NAV invalid flag
and distance flag
zero and TO/
SDC Fail
GPS Receiver
Fail
CORRECTIVE
ACTION
CAPABILITY
LOST/
LIMITATIONS
IU BIT FAULT.
Dependent on
function affected.
Navigator should
cycle IU power.
IU wont come up
due to hardware
failure or no power. May or may not
get an FMS failure
indication depending on whether or
not the IU is capable of informing
FMS of the failure.
No IU function is
supported.
NOT AVAILABLE.
Navigator should
reload IUS.
Bad Software load

and no DDLC is
available. Degraded 1553 communication with
FMS.
No IU function is
supported.
In GPS modes
NAV invalid flag
and distance flag
zero and TO/
FROM flag indicates TO if the
SDC is capable.
No Impact.
Cycle TACAN
power.
The SDC BIT detected a fail and

set the fail discrete
to IU.
TACAN and TACAN Emulation

functions are
questionable.
In GPS modes
NAV invalid flag
and distance flag
zero and TO/
Destination Data
Screen: GPS
DATA in the GPS
Emulated TACAN
field. Mission
Route Screen:
GPS DATA in the
GPS Emulated
TACAN field.
GPS receiver set

fail bit in 1553
message to IU.
GPS data is unreliable.
1-428V
PROBABLE
CAUSE
Change 3
T.O. 1B-52H-1
COMMUNICATION FAILURE SYSTEM FAULT CONDITIONS

CONDITION
HSI/ADI
INDICATION
MFD
INDICATION
No ACU Communication
HSI & ADI should

be functional.
DDLR or
DDLC Fail or
no communication with
DDL
No Communication with
GPS Receiver
CORRECTIVE
ACTION
PROBABLE
CAUSE
CAPABILITY
LOST/
LIMITATIONS
Destination Data
Screen: NO OAS
DATA in the
middle of screen,
TAS: N/A,
WIND: N/A ,
DRIFT: N/A,
HDG: N/A.
Mission Route
Screen: NO OAS
DATA in the
middle of map display TAS: N/A,
WIND: N/A,
FCI: Blank,
Heading: Blank,
No Time-To-Go,
NO MISSION
DATA, no declutter status.
No Communication with the OAS.
Cannot monitor
changes initiated
by the navigator
on the IKB. Cannot pick up TAS,
Heading, Winds,
Current Destination, or FCI Data.
In GPS modes if
data not available
to support calculations NAV invalid
flag and distance
flag set. Course
deviation should
go to zero and TO/
FROM flag indicates TO. Otherwise normal if not
affected by failure.

required from the
DDLC. If data is
required from the
DDLC then,
Destination Data
Screen:
Blanks where associated Navaids
would be, NAVAID DATA in
GPS Emulated
Screen: NAVAID
DATA in GPS
Emulated TACAN
field, NO MISSION DATA in associated Navaid
field, No Navaids
or route displayed.
No Communication with the

DDLC.
Unable to access
DDLC data or
data is unreliable.
HSI and Navaid
information on situational screens
cannot be supported.
In GPS modes
NAV invalid flag
and distance flag
zero and TO/
Bearing Pointer
Rotating.
Destination Data
Screen: GPS
DATA in the GPS
Emulated TACAN
field. Mission
Route Screen:
GPS DATA in the
GPS Emulated
TACAN field.
No communication
with the GPS Receiver.
GPS data is not

available.
Change 3
1-428W
T.O. 1B-52H-1

(Cont)
COMMUNICATION FAILURE SYSTEM FAULT CONDITIONS (Cont)
CONDITION
HSI/ADI
INDICATION
MFD
INDICATION
CORRECTIVE
ACTION
PROBABLE
CAUSE
CAPABILITY
LOST/
LIMITATIONS
SDC
In GPS modes
NAV invalid flag
and distance flag
zero and TO/
Bearing Pointer
Rotating.
Not Impacted.
No Communication with the

Signal Data
Converter.
HSI/ADI displays
cannot be supported in GPS
Mode.
TACAN Control Panel
In GPS modes
NAV invalid flag
and distance flag
zero and TO/
Bearing Pointer
Rotating.
Destination Data
Emulated TACAN
field. Mission
Route Screen:
CHANNEL in the
GPS Emulated
TACAN field, No
selected TACAN
identified on map.
No communication
with the TACAN
Control Panel.
Unable to select
Navaid for TACAN
or GPS modes.
CORRECTIVE
ACTION
PROBABLE
CAUSE
CAPABILITY
LOST/
LIMITATIONS
OPERATOR INITIATED SELF TEST CONDITIONS

CONDITION
HSI/ADI
INDICATION
MFD
INDICATION
Operator Initiated Self Test

on TACAN
control
Deviation bar
moves left and
right 1 dot, range
indicator switches
between invalid
and 234 NM,
Bearing Pointer
rotates from 45
degrees to 180
degrees (relative
to the compass
rose).
No Impact.
N.A. Normal Operation, Wait until

Self Test Complete (approx 30
sec).
Operator Initiated
Self Test via TACAN control Head.
HSI bearing pointer will rotate,

range indication is
fixed to invalid or
234, and flags are
set.
Operator Initiated Self Test

on SDC from
the PKB
Deviation bar
moves left and
right 1 dot, range
indicator switches
between invalid
and 234 NM,
Bearing Pointer
rotates from 45
degrees to 180
degrees (relative
to the compass
rose).
No Impact.
N. A. Normal Operation, Wait until

Self Test Complete (approx 20
minutes or until
disabled).
Operator Initiated
Self Test via SDC
switch, when TACAN Control IBIT
has been selected
or requested by
the IU via the SDC
ARINC bus.
HSI bearing pointer will rotate,

range indication is
fixed to invalid or
234, and flags are
set.
Limited to Ground
operation only.
1-428X
Change 3
T.O. 1B-52H-1
OMNI-RANGE RADIO AN/ARN-14
The omni-range radio provides a very high frequency receiver for navigation over land and for runway
localizer instrument approaches. The omni-range
radio includes a receiver, a control panel on the pilots overhead panel, and shares an HSI with the
TACAN system. The horizontal situation indicators
(figure 1-124) are located on the pilots instrument
panel. To start the omni-range radio, position the
power switch to ON. To turn off the omni-range radio, position the switch to OFF.
INSTRUMENT LANDING SYSTEM (ILS)
EQUIPMENT
The instrument landing system (ILS) provides the

pilots with a straight line glide slope and a localizer
or on-course guidance. The ILS system is used both
as a means of navigation and as an aid to assist the
pilots when landing in inclement weather. The ILS
consists of the glide slope equipment (AN/ARN-31
60-001
60-062 or AN/ARN-67 61-001
), omnirange radio (AN/ARN-14), the pilots control panel,
and the marker beacon receiver (AN/ARN-32). For
further information on this equipment, see FLIGHT
DIRECTOR SYSTEM, this section.
Glide Slope Equipment AN/ARN-31 60-001

AN/ARN-67 61-001
60-062 or
This equipment indicates glide angle of the aircraft

with relation to the runway for instrument approach. The control and indicators are common to
the omni-range radio. A glide slope indicator (16,
figure 1-124) on the attitude-director indicator indicates aircraft position relative to a glide slope
beam. A warning flag on the left side of the indicator moves out of sight when a glide slope signal is
received. To start the glide slope equipment, position the omni-range radio power switch to ON. To
stop the equipment, position the power switch to
OFF.
Marker Beacon Receiver AN/ARN-32
This receiver is used both as a navigational and

landing aid. When flying over a beacon, a signal is
heard on the interphone and observed as a light (4,
figure 1-128) illumination just above each AQU-2/A.
Instrument Landing System Indicators
Course, bearing, and range indicators are integrated in the AQU-2/A horizontal situation indicator. See FLIGHT DIRECTOR SYSTEM, this section.
Change 3
1-428Y/(1-428Z blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Omni-Range Radio/ILS Controls and Indicators
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
Frequency Selector Switch
The frequency selector switch is used to select the desired frequency.

Tuning the receiver to the proper localizer channel automatically tunes
the glide slope receiver to the proper glide slope channel frequency. The
selector is calibrated from 108.0 to 135.9 MHz.
Power Switch
ON position provides operation of the signal comparison glide path and

omni-range operation. OFF position turns off the equipment.
Volume Knob
The volume knob is used to adjust the receiver audio to the interphone
system.
MARKER BEACON Indicator Light

(green)
The marker beacon indicator light is used as a navigational and landing

aid. The light is green with translucent-colored lettering MARKER BEACON on a black background and is located just above the respective pilots horizontal situation indicator. These lights are tested by pushing the
central caution panel test switch .
Figure 1-128
1-429
T.O. 1B-52H-1
IFF TRANSPONDER SET AN/APX-64 (AIMS)
MODE 3/A
Any one of 4096 possible codes, as set on

IFF panel
MODE C
Standard ATC code

for altitude reporting
MODE 4
As determined by
mode 4 transponder
computer
NOTE
AIMS includes the features of and is derived from:
A Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System

I
Identification Friend or Foe
M Mark XII Identification

S System
CODE SELECTIONS
The transponder set AN/APX-64 (AIMS) provides

for Mark X IFF with selective identification feature
(SIF), automatic altitude reporting, and Mark XII
(Mode 4) encrypted IFF. The transponder set is the
airborne portion of a two-way link between the aircraft and ground radar installations. The ground
radar station sends an interrogation signal which is
received by the aircraft; the aircraft transponder
(reply system) then replies with coded signals
which are received on the ground and displayed on
the radar scope as unique identification and altitude signals. The ground station may interrogate in
more than one mode. However, the transponder
only replies in those modes that are enabled. In
addition to the normal replies listed above, the
transponder contains provisions for a special emergency mode of operation (EMER position of the
master switch), and for transmission of an identification of position (IDENT) signal. The transponder
receives coded altitude information from the
CPU-66 altitude computer (see INSTRUMENTS
this Section). Modes 1, 2, 3/A, and C have a self-test
capability with either internally generated test interrogations or ground station interrogations. Mode
4 operation requires that the mode 4 transponder
computer be physically installed in the aircraft and,
when installed, operation is continuously monitored
by a caution light.
The interrogation and reply modes are as follows:
INTERROGATION
REPLY
MODE 1
Any one of 32 possible

codes, as set on IFF
panel
MODE 2
Any one of 4096 possible codes, as set on

APX-64 transponder
1-430
Change 4
Mode 1 code selectors are eight-position thumbwheel type selectors with integral indicators. The
first digit selector is numbered from 0 thru 7, and
the second digit selector is numbered from 0 thru 3.
A total of 32 mode 1 code combinations is available.
Mode 2 codes are manually inserted at the
transponder located under the bunk.
Mode 3/A code selectors are thumbwheel type selectors with integral indicators numbered from 0 thru
7. The mode 3/A selectors allow selection of any
base eight code from 0000 to 7777, for a total of
4,096 different codes.
Mode 4 codes are preset using a crypto keying device.
Mode 4 Operation
Mode 4 operation requires the mode 4 transponder

computer (KIT-1C), be physically installed in the
aircraft and, when installed, operation is continuously monitored by the IFF MODE 4 caution light
(#13 figure 1-129), located on the pilots main caution panel. The mode 4 computer (figure 1-129A) is
located on the fourth shelf, aft portion of the upper
compartment left equipment rack. For proper response to interrogation, the mode 4 computer must
have the correct and proper codes loaded. KIT-1A
codes are loaded using the KIK-18 (paddle) loading
device. The KIT-1C is loaded using either the
KYK-13 (preferred method), or the KOI-18 key
loading device (figure 1-129A). The KOI-18 is also
used to insert cryptographic codes into the memory
buffer of the KYK-13 (normally accomplished by
Comm.). Figure 1-129A illustrates the interface required between the KOI-18 and the KYK-13 to load
codes into the buffer of the KYK-13.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AN/APX-64 IFF Controls and Indicators
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
MODE 4 CODE SWITCH

MODE 4 REPLY LIGHT
TEST LIGHT
MASTER SWITCH
TEST MODE ENABLING SWITCHES (4)
RAD TEST/MON SWITCH
IDENT/MIC SWITCH
8
9
10
11
12
13
MODE 3/A CODE SELECTORS

MODE 1 CODE SELECTORS
MODE 4 ON/OUT SWITCH
MODE 4 AUDIO/LIGHT SWITCH
IFF ANTENNA SWITCH
IFF MODE 4 CAUTION LIGHT
Change 12
1-431
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AN/APX-64 IFF Controls and Indicators (Cont)

CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
1
Mode 4 CODE Switch
FUNCTION
Four position rotary switch has ZERO--B--A--HOLD positions.
Positions A and B select the preset code for the present and succeeding code
period. When pulled out and rotated cw to ZERO zeroizes both A and B code
settings anytime airplane power is on and the master switch is in any position
other than OFF. When rotated ccw and held in HOLD for 15 seconds with
transponder power on, overrides zeroing function and causes transponder
computer to retain mode 4 code setting when airplane is on the ground.
When released, returns to position A.
NOTE
Once the mode 4 HOLD has been activated on the ground, airplane
power loss or IFF master switch OFF does not cause loss of the code.
If the mode 4 HOLD switch is activated, zeroize the code upon flight
termination or alert uncocking.
Mode 4 REPLY Light (Green)
Press-to-test light. Rotate lens cw to dim. When mode 4 AUDIO/LIGHT

switch (No. 11) is in either AUDIO or LIGHT position, REPLY light comes on
whenever mode 4 replies to an interrogation.
TEST Light (Green)
Press-to-test light. Rotate lens clockwise to dim. Comes on when transponder indicates proper response to self-test of modes 1, 2, 3/A, or C or to external
interrogation. Source of interrogations is controlled by the mode enabling
switch (No. 5) TEST POSITIONS or RAD TEST/MON switch (No. 6).
MASTER Switch
Five position rotary switch, has OFF--STBY--LOW--NORM--EMER positions. When set to OFF, all power is removed from the transponder and transponder computer. When set to STBY, provides power to transponder receiver and computer for warmup. Warmup time requires approximately 3 minutes. When set to LOW, transponder operates with reduced receiver sensitivity. When set to NORM, transponder operates at normal receiver sensitivity. When set to EMER, causes automatic transmission of emergency reply
signals to mode 1, 2, or 3/A, regardless of code settings. Switch must be
pulled out to turn to OFF or EMER.
NOTE
The master switch must be in the NORM position for self-test with
mode enabling switches.
TEST (Mode Enabling Switches)

(4 Places)
Four toggle switches marked M-1, M-2, M-3/A, and M-C have positions of
OUT--ON--TEST. The TEST position of each switch is spring-loaded to return to ON position. When set to OUT, prevents the transponder from replying
to interrogation signals in that mode. When set to ON, enables transponder
to reply to selected mode interrogations. When held in TEST (up), causes
built-in-test feature to interrogate transponder and evaluate the characteristics of reply signal and causes TEST light (3) to come on when reply is satisfactory.
RAD TEST/MON Switch
Three position toggle switch. Has RAD TEST--OUT--MON positions and is

spring-loaded from RAD TEST to OUT. MON position enables the TEST light
(No. 3) to come on anytime transponder replies to mode 1, 2, 3/A, or C interrogations. The OUT position is used when using the mode enabling switch
(No. 5) TEST position. RAD TEST position is not normally used by the flightcrew.
1-432
Change 4
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
7
CONTROLINDICATOR
IDENT/MIC Switch
FUNCTION
Three position toggle switch with IDENT--OUT--MIC positions and springloaded from IDENT to OUT. When momentarily positioned to IDENT, initiates
an identification response used by an air traffic controller. When placed to the
MIC position, identification response is initiated whenever the pilots or copilots microphone trigger switch is pressed provided the command radio is on
and the interphone selector is in the respective COMM position. Response
continues for 30 seconds after IDENT/MIC switch or trigger switch is actuated.
NOTE
The proper mode enabling switch must be turned on (to match the interrogation mode) to allow identification operation.
MODE 3/A Code Selectors (Four

Thumbwheels)
Eight position thumbwheel type selector. When set to a numbered position,

selects mode 3/A codes. Thumbwheels are continuously rotatable with no
stops and are numbered 0 thru 7 consecutively.
MODE 1 Code Selectors (Two

Thumbwheels)
When set to a numbered position, selects mode 1 codes. Thumbwheels are

continuously rotatable with no stops. Left wheel has eight positions numbered 0 thru 7 consecutively. Right wheel is numbered 0 thru 3.
10
MODE 4 ON/OUT Switch
Two position lever lock toggle switch. Has ON--OUT positions. With transponder on, setting switch to ON causes transponder to reply to mode 4 interrogations. When set to OUT, turns off mode 4 computer. Operator must pull
out on the toggle switch before it can be moved to the OUT position.
11
MODE 4 AUDIO/LIGHT Switch
The mode 4 audio/light switch has three positions marked AUDIO- -OUT- -LIGHT. In the LIGHT position, the mode 4 reply light illuminates
when mode 4 replies are transmitted. In the AUDIO position, an audio signal
in the pilots headset indicates interrogations are being received and illumination of the mode 4 reply light indicates when replies are transmitted. The
audio signal is controlled by a separate mixer switch channel on the pilots
interphone panel. In the OUT position, both light and audio indications are
inoperative.
12
IFF ANTENNA Switch
A three-position IFF antenna switch on the pilots side panel allows selection
of UPPER, BOTH, or LOWER IFF antennas. When the IFF antenna switch
is positioned to BOTH, the transponder alternates between antennas.
13
IFF MODE 4 Caution Light
The IFF MODE 4 light on the central caution system is located on the pilots
flight instrument panel. The caution light illuminates whenever an inoperative
mode 4 capability is detected, provided that
(1) the mode 4 transponder computer is installed,
(2) aircraft power is on, and
(3) the master switch is not OFF.
Specific discrepancies monitored by the caution light are:
Mode 4 codes zeroized.
Transponder failure to reply to proper interrogation.
Automatic self-test function of the computer reveals a faulty computer.
To attempt correction when the caution light is illuminated, reposition the
master switch to NORM (if in STBY or LOW), check that the mode 4 on/out
switch is ON, and check that the proper A or B code has been selected.
NOTE
Since power for the caution light is routed through the mode 4 transponder computer, this unit must be physically installed in the aircraft
to render the caution light inoperative.
1-433
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AN/APX-64 IFF Normal Operation
Normal operation is as follows:

1. Position master switch to STBY for warmup.
Warmup requires about 3 minutes.
2. Set mode 1 and mode 3/A code selectors as
briefed.
3. Position IFF antenna switch to BOTH.
4. Position IDENT/MIC switch to OUT.
5. For system self-test:
a. Position master switch to NORM.
b. Position RAD TEST/MON switch to OUT.
c. Momentarily hold each mode enabling
switch to TEST, then return to OUT. Illumination
of test light for each mode indicates satisfactory operation.
NOTE
If test light does not come on when switch

is held in TEST position, a malfunction is
indicated. The TEST light may blink when
the switch is released. This is a maintenance trouble shooting indication.
6. Position master switch to LOW or NORM as
desired.
7. Position mode enabling switches to ON as
briefed.
1-434
Change 4
8. Position RAD TEST/MON switch to OUT or

MON as desired.
9. Perform mode 4 operations as briefed.
10. To turn off equipment, place the mode 4 code
switch momentarily to ZERO then position the
master switch to OFF.
NOTE
To retain the mode 4 code after mission termination, momentarily place the mode 4
code switch to the HOLD position after the
aircraft has landed. Aircraft electrical
power must be left on for 15 seconds to lock
the code in.
AN/APX-64 IFF Operation During an Emergency
For emergency use, pull outward on the master

switch and rotate to the EMER position. Modes 1,
2, and 3/A are automatically enabled. The set responds to modes 1 or 2 interrogations with the reply code determined by the mode 1 and mode 2 code
selectors followed by three sets of pulse pairs. Mode
3/A reply code is 7700, regardless of the position of
the mode 3/A code selectors, and is followed by
three sets of pulse pairs.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Transponder Loading Devices
1
2
3
4
5
6
BATTERY COVER
FILL CONNECTOR PORT WITH DUST COVER
ZEROIZE SWITCH
FUSES (3)
FILL LIGHT
CONNECTOR (OUTPUT)
7
8
9
10
11
12
MODE SELECTOR SWITCH

PARITY LIGHT
INITIATE PUSHBUTTON
ADDRESS SELECT SWITCH
CONNECTOR (INPUT)
FILL CABLE
Figure 1-129A
Change 17
1-435
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Navigation Equipment Circuit

CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
EQUIPMENT
POWER
SOURCE
Glideslope Receiver
MISCELLANEOUS GLIDE SLOPE
RLC/D17
AC Bus 5
IFF Transponder
MISCELLANEOUS IFF
AC
DC
IFF MODE 4
IFF TEST SET
LLC/B28
LLC/B27
LLC/C29
LLC/C30
AC Bus 3
Left TR
Left TR
Left TR
Marker Beacon Receiver

TACAN Receiver
VOR/ILS Receiver
11
12
12
MISCELLANEOUS AN/ARN-118(V)
AC
DC
12
LLC/B31
LLC/B32
12
Aft TR
AC Bus 3
Left TR
Aft TR
LLC
12
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
RLC
The circuit protection for these components is not accessible to the flight crew inflight.
Figure 1-130
1-436
Change 4
T.O. 1B-52H-1
COMMUNICATION AND ASSOCIATED

ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
DESCRIPTION
INTERPHONE SYSTEM AN/AIC-18
INTERPHONE SYSTEM NORMAL OPERATION
DU KY-100 SECURE VOICE SYSTEM
DJ DU V/UHF RADIO AN/ARC-210(V)
DU DAMA MODEM
V/UHF RADIO AN/ARC-210(V) NORMAL OPERATION
UHF COMMAND RADIO AN/ARC-164(V)
(HAVE QUICK II)
UHF COMMAND RADIO AN/ARC-164(V) (HAVE
QUICK II) NORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES
UHF LINE-OF-SIGHT (LOS) RADIO AN/ARC-171(V)
LOS RADIO NORMAL OPERATION
LIAISON RADIO AN/ARC-190(V)
ARC-190(V) LIAISON RADIO NORMAL OPERATION
SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS TERMINAL AN/ASC-19
AFSATCOM NORMAL OPERATION
DL AFSATCOM DUAL MODEM OPERATING MODES
MINIATURE RECEIVE TERMINAL (MRT) AN/ARR-85(V)
MRT MODES OF OPERATION
1-437
1-440
1-443
1-444
1-447
1-452
1-459
1-465
1-471
1-478
1-479
1-480
1-483
1-485
1-506
1-507
1-527
1-534
DESCRIPTION
The communication and associated electronic
equipment (figure 1-131) includes an interphone
system, UHF command radio or UHF/VHF dual
command radio , Line-of-Sight (LOS) radio
set, DU KY-100 Secure Voice System, and DJ V/
UHF radio system or a DU V/UHF radio system
with DAMA Modem, Air Force Satellite Communications System (AFSATCOM) terminal, and Miniature Receive Terminal (MRT). DL A Dual Modem
II Communications System has been added to the

AFSATCOM terminal. For antenna locations, see
figure 1-132.
Communication and associated electronic equipment circuit protection and the location of the applicable circuit breakers is contained in figure
1-151.
Change 19
1-437
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Communication Equipment
TYPE
INTERPHONE
DESIGNATION
FUNCTION
OPERATOR
HORIZONTAL
RANGE
LOCATION OF
CONTROLS
AN/AIC-18
Intercrew
communication
Any Crewmember
HAVE QUICK II
COMMAND
AN/ARC-164(V)
Short range two-way

anti-jam voice
communication
Pilot and Copilot
75 to 270 miles
Pilots overhead
panel
UHF LINE-OFSIGHT (LOS)

RADIO
AN/ARC-171(V)
Short range two-way

voice communications
Pilot and Copilot

Less DJ
Navigator DJ
Line-of-sight.
Range varies with
altitude
Pilots overhead
panel Less DJ
Navigators
instrument panel
DJ
V/UHF RADIO DJ
AN/ARC-210(V)
Short and long range,

two-way anti-jam,
encrypted voice
communication
Pilot and Copilot
Line-of-sight.
Range varies with
altitude.
Line-ofsight via satellite
Pilots overhead
panel
V/UHF RADIO DU
WITH DAMA
AN/ARC-210(V)
& MD-1333/a
Short and long range,

two-way anti-jam,
encrypted voice
communication
Pilot and Copilot
Line-of-sight.
Range varies with
altitude.
Line-of-sight via
satellite
ARC-210 Radio on
Pilots overhead
panel
KY-100
Encryption and
decryption of voice
communication
Navigator or
Copilot
AIR FORCE
SATELLITE
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
TERMINAL
Less DL
AN/ASC-19
Communications using
satellite as relay
Navigator
Line-of-sight via
satellite
Navigators station
AIR FORCE SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM TERMINAL

WITH DUAL
MODEM II DL
AN/ASC-19
Communications using
satellite as relay
Navigator
Line-of-sight via
satellite
Navigators station
LIAISON RADIO
AN/ARC-190(V)
Long range, two-way

voice and code
communication
Copilot
800 to 1500 miles
Copilots
side panel
MINIATURE
RECEIVE
TERMINAL (MRT)
AN/ARR-85(V)
Long range receive

only data
communications
Navigator
Depends on
operating
frequency and
atmospheric
conditions
Navigators
instrument panel
KY-100 SECURE
VOICE DU
Figure 1-131
1-438
Change 19
Each crew station
DAMA RCU on
Navigators instrument panel
Navigators
instrument panel
and Copilots right
hand console
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Antenna Locations (Except ECM)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
GLIDE SLOPE ARN-31/ARN-67

UHF LINE-OF-SIGHT (LOS) RADIO ARC-171
IFF (UPPER) APX-64
AFSATCOM ASC-19
GPS CONTROLLED RECEPTION PATTERN
ANTENNA
MRT ARR-85 TM ANTENNA
DJ V/UHF RADIO ARC-210 SATCOM ANTENNA
OR DU V/UHF RADIO ARC-210 WITH DAMA MODEM
OMNI-RANGE RADIO ARN-14
RENDEZVOUS RADAR BEACON APN-69
LIAISON RADIO ARC-58/ARC-190(V)
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
RADAR ALTIMETER APN-224

MRT ARR-85 TE ANTENNA (LEFT SHOWN,
RIGHT OPPOSITE)
DJ V/UHF RADIO ARC-210 LINE OF SIGHT
ANTENNA OR DU V/UHF RADIO ARC-210 WITH
DAMA MODEM
MARKER BEACON ARN-32
NO. 1 UHF COMMAND RADIO ARC-164
DOPPLER RADAR APN-218
TACAN ARN-118
IFF (LOWER) FLUSH APX-64
STRATEGIC RADAR APQ-166
FOR ECM ANTENNA LOCATIONS REFER TO T.O. 1B-52H-1-13
Figure 1-132
Change 21
1-439
T.O. 1B-52H-1
INTERPHONE SYSTEM AN/AIC-18
INTERPHONE VOLUME CONTROL KNOB
A transistorized interphone system provides intercommunication between the crew stations, transmission and reception on UHF command, V/UHF
DJ and liaison radio sets, and reception of audio
signals from specialized receivers. Control panels
(figure 1-133) vary according to station requirements. The pilots, copilots, instructor pilots, radar
navigators, navigators, instructor navigators, gunners, EW officers, bunk, and defense instructors
stations each have a control panel containing a selector switch, volume control knob, hot mic talk
switch, call button, and seven mixer switches. In
addition, each of the previously named stations except the bunk has an auxiliary interphone panel
containing eight mixer switches. Two interphone
panels located in the left forward wheel well contain a call button and volume control knob and provide interphone and call functions only. This
interphone system has separate microphone and
headset amplifiers which provide uninterrupted
communication at all times. Communication interference caused by unwanted signals received at the
headset from a mixer switch facility not selected by
the mixer switch or interphone selector switch is a
characteristic of the AN/AIC-18 interphone system.
These unwanted signals are known as crosstalk.
Only direct battery power is used to power the system, all stations being in parallel. Normal power is
from the aft battery bus and emergency power from
the forward battery bus.
An interphone volume control knob (11, figure

1-133) on each interphone panel is used in conjunction with the mixer switches to regulate the volume
level received at that station.
Interphone System Controls
INTERPHONE SELECTOR SWITCH

An interphone selector switch (10, figure 1-133) on
each crewmembers
interphone
panel
has
INT- -UHF-1- - HF- -UHF-2- -PVT INT and V/UHF
DJ
positions. INT position provides normal
interphone communication between crewmembers.
UHF-1, HF, UHF-2, and V/UHF DJ positions permit corresponding transmission and reception via
UHF command, liaison, and line-of-sight (LOS),
and V/UHF DJ radios. PVT INT position provides
another interphone channel identical in function to
the normal channel and can be used at the same
time for private or extended communication between two or more crewmembers.
NOTE
For a crewmember to talk on the hot mic

facility, the selector switch must be positioned to UHF-1, HF, UHF-2, PVT INT, or
V/UHF DJ .
1-440
HOT MIC TALK SWITCH

A hot mic talk switch (7, figure 1-133) on each crewmembers interphone panel provides communication between two or more crewmembers without actuating microphone switches. To speak on the hot
mic facility, a crewmember must position the
interphone selector switch to one of the following
positions, UHF-1, HF, UHF-2, PVT INT, or V/UHF
DJ , and pull out the hot mic talk switch. To monitor the hot mic facility, the crewmember must pull
out the hot mic mixer switch.
MIXER SWITCHES
The mixer switches (1-6, 8, and 12-15, figure 1-133)
on the pilots, copilots, radar navigators, navigators, EW officers, gunners, instructor pilots,
instructor navigators, defense instructors, and
bunk station panels allow the crewmembers to
monitor the channels essential to individual crew
positions. In addition, an individual volume control
is incorporated as an integral part of each mixer
switch, providing a simple and adequate method of
adjusting all signals to a level desired by the
crewmember. Pulling one or more mixer switches
out provides listening to the corresponding channel(s) simultaneously with transmission or reception on any other channel selected by the interphone selector switch. The mixer switches allow listening to the interphone system, command radio,
liaison radio, LOS radio, hot mic, V/UHF DJ radio,
and private interphone (pilot, copilot, navigator, radar navigator, EW officer, gunner, instructor pilot,
instructor navigator, defense instructor, and bunk
station), APN-69 (pilot, copilot, navigator, radar
navigator, instructor pilot, and instructor navigator), TACAN or omni-range radio and marker beacon (pilot, copilot, and instructor pilot), ALR-20A
(EW officer and defense instructor) and IFF mode 4
(pilot), warning receiver (ALR-46, SI, and ALQ-153)
(gunner, EW officer, and defense instructor).
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Interphone System Controls
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
INTERPHONE MIXER SWITCH

PRIVATE INTERPHONE MIXER SWITCH
UHF-1 MIXER SWITCH
HF MIXER SWITCH
UHF-2 MIXER SWITCH
HOT MIC MIXER SWITCH
HOT MIC TALK SWITCH
V/UHF MIXER SWITCH DJ
CALL BUTTON
INTERPHONE SELECTOR SWITCH
INTERPHONE VOLUME CONTROL KNOB
NAV-AIDS MIXER SWITCH (PILOT, COPILOT,
INSTRUCTOR PILOT) APN-69 MIXER SWITCH
(NAVIGATOR, RADAR NAVIGATOR, INSTRUCTOR
NAVIGATOR) SI MIXER SWITCH (GUNNER,
EW OFFICER, DEFENSE INSTRUCTOR)
APN-69 MIXER SWITCH (PILOT, COPILOT,
INSTRUCTOR PILOT) ALR-20A MIXER SWITCH
(EW OFFICER, DEFENSE INSTRUCTOR)
WARNING RCVR MIXER SWITCH (GUNNER,
EW OFFICER, DEFENSE INSTRUCTOR)
IFF MODE 4 MIXER SWITCH (PILOT)
ALQ-153 MIXER SWITCH (GUNNER, EW
OFFICER, DEFENSE INSTRUCTOR)
Figure 1-133
Change 8
1-441
T.O. 1B-52H-1
An ON- -OFF interphone power switch (figure
1-133) is located on the pilots side panel. ON position provides direct battery power to the pilots, copilots, instructor pilots, radar navigators, navigators, instructor navigators, EW officers, bunk,
gunners, and defense instructors interphone facilities. In addition, when positioned to ON, direct battery power is supplied to the two interphone facilities in the left forward wheel well provided the battery switch is ON. OFF position turns off power to
the interphone system. In addition, the interphone
power switch controls operation of the battery detector systems. See DC SYSTEM under ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEMS, this section.
Use the call channel only in emergencies or

to direct someone to another facility.
TRIGGER SWITCH
A trigger switch (figure 1-133) on the pilots and copilots control wheels has three positions, INTER- OFF- -MIKE, and is spring-loaded to OFF position.
When the switch is held in MIKE position, the
crewmember may speak through the facility selected with the interphone selector switch. When
the switch is held in INTER position, the
crewmember can speak on the interphone channel
only. The purpose of the trigger switches is to provide the pilots with a microphone switch and a
quick method for speaking on the interphone without changing the selector switch.
NOTE
FOOT SWITCH
This switch provides a direct connection of
a portion of the interphone system to the
batteries, independent of the battery
switch. To conserve batteries, this switch
should be placed in OFF position whenever
ac power is lost or removed from the aircraft and the interphone system is not to be
operated.
HAND SWITCH
CALL BUTTON
A call button (9, figure 1-133) on each interphone
panel, when pressed, is used to call other stations
on the call channel. The call buttons on the
interphone panels located in the left forward wheel
well each have a cover which must be removed before the button can be pressed.
NOTE
The call channel has a call override feature which permits continued communications on all other facilities.
1-442
A foot switch (figure 1-133) on the floor at the EW

officers, radar navigators, navigators, and gunners stations is the microphone switch for the respective crewmember. When the switch is pressed,
the crewmember may speak through the facility selected with the interphone selector switch.
The instructor pilots, instructor navigators, bunk,

and defense instructors interphone stations are
equipped with a microphone hand switch (figure
1-133). When the switch is pressed, the
crewmember may speak through the facility selected with the interphone selector switch.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
INTERPHONE SYSTEM NORMAL OPERATION
Except when specifically cleared by the aircraft commander, all crewmembers must be
on interphone at all times as the interphone
is considered the primary means for crew
warning.
To transmit or receive over any interphone facility,
observe the following procedure:
NOTE
When an adjustment to a facility having

controls located at another station is
required, call the crewmember at that station through the interphone and request the
necessary adjustment be made.
1. Pilot places interphone power switch to ON position.
2. Push all mixer switches in.
3. Rotate interphone volume control to 12
oclock position.
4. Rotate mixer switches necessary to monitor
the desired facilities to 12 oclock position. Rotate
all other mixer switches to full counterclockwise position.
5. Position interphone selector switch to desired
facility (e.g., UHF-1).
6. Adjust the receiver volume control of the selected facility to the lowest volume level consistent
with satisfactory operation.
NOTE
When crosstalk interference is excessive,

the receiver volume control of the facility
causing the crosstalk should be adjusted
to the lowest volume level consistent with
satisfactory operation.
7. Further adjustments of the volume level
should be made using the mixer switches.
NOTE
When ambient noise levels (engines, etc)

necessitate increasing the volume level
above that which may be achieved with the
mixer switches, make additional volume
level increases with the interphone volume
control.
8. Close mic switch to talk (when using any facility except hot mic or call).
9. Pull out mixer switches to monitor the desired
facilities.
10. Pull out hot mic talk switch (only when using
hot mic facility).
NOTE
The interphone selector switch must be positioned to UHF-1, HF, UHF-2, PVT INT, or
V/UHF DJ when speaking through the hot
mic facility.
11. Press call button (only when using call facility).
1-443
T.O. 1B-52H-1
KY-100 SECURE VOICE SYSTEM DU
The KY-100 secure voice system provides narrowband and wideband encrypted air-to-air and air-to
ground/sea digital voice communication. The secure
voice system is used with command radio (UHF-1)
or V/UHF radios. The system contains Z-AVH Remote Control Panel ( A , figure 1-134A), TSEC/
KY-100 Main Terminal Unit (MTU) ( B , figure
1-134A), a COMSEC Remote Control Panel ( C , figure 1-134A) and a KY/RAD Switch Unit. The secure
voice system is addressed through the AN/AIC-18
interphone system. The command radio is the Have
Quick II modified AN/ARC-164(V) radio. The V/
UHF radio is the AN/ARC-210(V) radio DU . Either
radio can be selected on the AN/ARC-210 Mode
Control panel. When the secure voice mode is selected on the Z-AVH Remote Control panel, both the
receiver and transmit functions of the selected radio will be placed in the secure voice configuration.
The KY-100 system contains a mode control panel
to permit selection of HF (Advanced narrow band
digital voice terminal [ANDVT]), LOS (VINSON),
diphase, or baseband operation, delayed or direct
push-to-talk. The navigator or pilot can control the
system.
NOTE
A bypass jumper is used to enable plain text

communication when the KY-100 MTU is
removed from the aircraft.
The KY-100 MTU is mounted in the Navigators instrument panel. The COMSEC Mode Control panel,
also mounted in the Navigators instrument panel,
is located above the to the right of the processor.
The Z-AVH Remote Control panel is installed in the
Copilots side console.
The KY-100 MTU converts analog voice (plain text)
into or from digitally encrypted (cipher text) for RF
transmissions over either the AN/ARC-164(V) or
AN/ARC-210(V) radio sets, as selected by the COMSEC Mode Control.
All data on pages 1-444A and 1-444B (Deleted)

1-444 Change 17
Audio encryption/decryption occurs within the

MTU. The various operating parameters may be selected by the controls on the front of the MTU or,
when selected to remote operation, by controls on
the Z-AVH RCU. Operational and Preset selections
are made via menu screen selections, cursor arrow
keys, and entry keys on either the MTU or RCU.
The KY-100 may be programmed with up to six (6)
Presets. These Presets may be selected to operate
as wideband or as narrowband channels. When a
wideband Preset is selected for either LOS or nonDAMA SATCOM operation, VINSON Traffic Encryption Keys (TEK) may be loaded in up to six (6)
keyfill locations within the Preset. When a narrowband Preset is selected for SATCOM DAMA operation, Advanced Narrowband Digital Voice Terminal
(ANDVT) TEKs may be loaded in up to six (6) keyfill locations within the Preset. Loading of the TEKs
may be accomplished using either the KYK-13 or
the preferred CYZ-10.
The majority of the parameters used may be manually programmed into the Presets using the off line
Preset mode. These parameters include radio interface, transfer rates, Base Band/Diphase, volume,
and impedance to name a few. See T.O.
1B-52H-1-12, Section II for configuration/set up
procedures.
The MTU battery retains these Presets, as well as
the TEKs. The TEKs may be zeroized individually
or en mass with the Z ALL capability.
NOTE
Removal of aircraft power and MTU battery

power for over twelve (12) seconds will zeroize the TEKs and will return the Presets
to the factory defaults.
Off line testing is available. Upon power up, the
system initiates power on test and also indicates
whether TEKs have been retained or whether a
Cold Start is required to reload the TEKs.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Z-AVH REMOTE CONTROL DU
The Z-AVH Remote Control Panel ( A , figure

1-134A) is mounted on the Copilots side console.
The PRESET switch is the a master power switch
for the system. It must be turned to the MAN
(Manual) position to allow operating positions to be
selected using the on-line and off-line menu system.
The preset mode storage registers are numbered 1,
2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. The switch knob points to the code
presently selected for use. The Mode switch selects
Plain Text (PT), Emergency Backup (EB), Cipher
Text (CT), Remote Keying (RK), Off Line (OFFLINE), or Zeroize All (Z ALL (PULL)). The PRESET switch selects Manual (MAN) or the selected
presets (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6). Pulling out the MODE
switch and rotating the switch to the Z-ALL position will zeroize all codes presently loaded in the
KY-100 MTU, except EB mode.
TSEC/KY-100 MTU DU
The TSEC/KY-100 MTU ( B , figure 1-134A) contains

equipment to encode and decode the transmitted
and received audio signals. An integral control panel contains operator controls for local control of the
Unit. Plain Text (PT), Emergency Backup (EB), Cypher Text (CT), Remote Keying (RK), and Off Line
(OFFLINE) are used with Net Control Device and
can be selected using the MODE switch. The
MODE switch (Z ALL (PULL)) is also used to zeroize all stored encryption keys except EB. The PRESET switch is used to select each storage position in
turn when the storage register is filled with codes

using the AN/CYZ-10 Data Transfer Device (DTD).
Codes are loaded into the MTU by mating the AN/
CYZ-10 DTD to the FILL connector. Power to the
MTU is controlled by the PRESET control by selecting the manual (MAN) or remote (REM) positions.
It functions only after system power is turned on at
the Z-AVH RCU. The battery cover panel for the
MTUs self-contained battery has eight (8) small
writing surfaces for entering key fill information
and battery change date.
COMSEC MODE CONTROL PANEL DU
The COMSEC MODE Control Panel ( C , figure

1-134A) allows the Navigator to select whether the
command or V/UHF radio will be used in COMSEC
mode by using the KY/RAD SELECT switch. The
DIPHASE/BASEBAND guarded switch is used by
the AN/ARC-210 only. Set the PTT SELECT switch
to DELAY to use the delayed push-to-talk mode
(AN/ARC-164(V) only). This mode is used with the
HAVE QUICK radio transmission. Set the PTT SELECT switch to DIRECT to transmit plain text.
Mounted inside the panel are the KY-GUARD, CTO
(cipher text only) relays, which enable the selected
level of transmission (cypher, guard, or plain) over
the selected radio. An indication of the selected radio set is duplicated on the AN/ARC-210(V) Switch
panel, (figure 1-136), in the Pilots overhead panel.
All data on pages 1-446 through 1-446B (Deleted)

Change 17
1-445/(1-446 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
KY-100 Secure Voice System Controls and

Indicators DU
Change 12
1-446C
T.O. 1B-52H-1

Indicators DU (Cont)
CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
FUNCTION
A
Z-AVH REMOTE CONTROL
INIT (Initiate) Key
Offline activates the displayed menu mode and provides entry to submenus.
Online activates the selected mode (CT, RK, EB, PT).
Display, LCD
Backlighted Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) indicates KY-100 operational status, operator prompts and messages. (See figure 1-134B and figure 1-134C
for LCD Message descriptions. For error messages see COMMUNICATION
EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTIONS in SECTION III of this manual.)
(Right Arrow) Key
Offline scrolls through menus in reverse order. Online selects the display
fields to be changed.
(Up Arrow) Key
Offline scrolls through menus in forward direction.Online scrolls through

available options for the display field being changed.
FILL Port
Inoperative.
PRESET Switch
Controls unit operating power and manual or preset operation.
PWR OFF
Turns off power to KY-100.
MAN
Allows operating modes to be selected using menu system.
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Selects one of six previously preset modes.
PNL/OFF BRT Switch
Two-function rotary switch that controls the on/off status and backlight brightness for overall front panel. Clockwise rotation increases backlight brightness. Full counterclock-wise rotation to the OFF position turns off panel
backlighting.
DSPL/OFF BRT Switch
Two-function rotary switch that controls the on/off status and backlight brightness for LCD display. Clockwise rotation increases backlight brightness. Full
counter-clockwise rotation to the OFF position turns off display backlighting.
MODE Switch
Selects the following modes
PT
Selects plain text operating mode.
EB
Selects voice privacy operations.
CT
Selects cipher text operating mode.
RK
Selects rekey operations.
OFFLINE
Selects off line operations.
Z ALL
Zeroizes all stored encryption keys.
1-446D
Change 8
T.O. 1B-52H-1

CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
FUNCTION
B
KY-100 MTU
10
INIT (Initiate) Key
Offline activates the displayed menu mode and provides entry to submenus.
Online activates the selected mode (CT, RK, EB, PT).
11
Display, LCD
Backlighted Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) indicates KY-100 operational status, operator prompts and messages. (See figure 1-134B and figure 1-134C
for LCD Message descriptions. For error messages see COMMUNICATION
EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTIONS in SECTION III of this manual.)
12
(Right Arrow) Key
Offline scrolls through menus in reverse order. Online selects the display
fields to be changed.
13
(Up Arrow) Key
Offline scrolls through menus in forward direction.Online scrolls through

available options for the display field being changed.
14
DSPL/OFF BRT Switch
Two-function rotary switch that controls the on/off status and backlight brightness for LCD display. Clockwise rotation increases backlight brightness. Full
counter-clockwise rotation to the OFF position turns off display backlighting.
15
PNL/OFF BRT Switch
Two-function rotary switch that controls the on/off status and backlight brightness for overall front panel. Clockwise rotation increases backlight brightness. Full counterclock-wise rotation to the OFF position turns off panel
backlighting.
16
PRESET Switch
Applies power and selects manual, preset, or remote operation.
17
18
PWR OFF
Turns off power to KY-100.
MAN
Allows operating modes to be selected using menu system.
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Selects one of six previously preset modes.
REM
Allows KY-100 to be controlled by Z-AVH remote control.
MODE Switch
Selects the following modes
PT
Selects plain text operating mode.
EB
Selects voice privacy operations.
CT
Selects cipher text operating mode.
RK
Selects rekey operations.
OFFLINE
Selects off line operations.
Z ALL
Zeroizes all stored encryption keys.
FILL Connector
Receptacle mates with the KYK-13, KOI-18, KYX-15A, or AN/CYZ-10 when

codes are loaded.
Change 8
1-446E
T.O. 1B-52H-1

CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
FUNCTION
C
19
20
21
MODE CONTROL
DIPHASE/BASEBAND Switch
DIPHASE
(Not used)
BASEBAND
Used when operating the AN/ARC-210.
PTT SELECT Switch

DIRECT
When selected, allows transmissions in plain text (AN/ARC-164 only).
DELAY
Used in the delay push-to-talk mode and with the cipher text transmission
(AN/ARC-164 only).
KY-RAD SELECT Switch
Selects the radio to be used for secure voice communications.
AN/ARC-164(V)
Selects the AN/ARC-164(V) command radio set.
AN/ARC-210(V)
Selects the AN/ARC-210(V) V/UHF radio set.
1-446F
Change 22
T.O. 1B-52H-1
KY-100 LCD Display Annunciators and

Display Fields DU
NO.
ANNUNCIATOR OR
DISPLAY FIELD
FUNCTION
TX Annunciator
Displayed when KY-100 is transmitting.
RX Annunciator
Displayed when KY-100 is receiving.
WB Annunciator
Displayed when KY-100 is in the Wideband (VINSON) configuration.
NB Annunciator
Displayed when KY-100 is in the Narrowband (ANDVT) configuration.
EB Annunciator
When selected, allows transmissions in plain text (AN/ARC-164 only).
Alphanumeric Display
8 Character, 14 segment display provides prompts, messages, and mode indications.
PT Annunciator
Displayed when KY-100 is processing plaintext voice.
Key Symbol
Not presently used. Key symbol will appear only during power turn-on and
User test when all display segments are on.
D Annunciator
Displayed when KY-100 is in Data mode.
10
V Annunciator
Displayed when KY-100 is in Voice mode.
11
Rate Display
3 Character, 7 segment display indicates voice or data rate.
Change 8
1-446G
T.O. 1B-52H-1
KY-100 LCD Display Annunciators And

Display Fields DU (Cont)
NOTE
Press the up arrow < > key to scroll menu in forward direction (top
- down) Press the right arrow < > key to scroll menu in reverse
direction (bottom - top) Menu will wrap around
Selection of a parameter value is accomplished by pressing the <INT>
key. The current parameter value will begin to flash. Press the < >
key until desired parameter value is displayed. Once the desired parameter value is displayed, press the <INT> key to lock in the value.
ON-LINE MENU
(Receiver Volume Adjust and CT/PT Mode Enable)
MENU ITEM
PLAIN TEXT NAME
PARAMETER VALUES
MODE
Mode Selection
PT
CT
RK
EB
RXCTV n
Receiver Ciphertext Volume
n = volume levels 0 through 9
CT or CT ONLY
Ciphertext and Plain Text or Ciphertext Only
CT or CT ONLY
RXPTV n
Receiver Plaintext Volume
n = volume levels 0 through 9
NARROWBAND DISPLAY
Figure 1-134B (Sheet of 8)
1-446H
Change 8
T.O. 1B-52H-1
WIDEBAND DISPLAY
OFF-LINE MAIN MENU

NOTE
Selecting the OFFLINE position with the MODE switch enters the
OFF-LINE Menu.
MENU ITEM
PLAIN TEXT NAME
PARAMETER VALUES
TEST
Test Selection
AUTO
USER
VERSION
OPS
Key Operations
LOAD KEY
UPDATE
ALM CHK
ZERO
LOAD Eb
PRESET
Preset Mode Selections
NRW-BAND
WIDEBAND
INFC
Interface
AUDIO
RADIO
SET dEF
Set Defaults
INFC
PRESET
MENU LK
Menu Lock/Unlock
Change 8
1-446J
T.O. 1B-52H-1

TEST MENU
1. When Off-Line Menu is displayed, press the <INT> key to access TEST sub-menus.
2. Press the up arrow < > key or the right arrow < > key until the desired sub-menu option is
displayed.
AUTO (Automatic) Test
With AUTO displayed, press <INT> key to start the test.
Display will blink while tests are being performed. At the conclusion of test, the test results
will be displayed.
If TEST is successful, PASS will be displayed and a pass (happy) tone will be heard. Next,
the display will indicate USER, which is the next sub-menu.
To exit TEST Mode, rotate the MODE switch out of the OFFLINE position.
If a failure is detected during the automatic tests, a FAIL message will be displayed.
KEY OPS MENU
SUB-MENU ITEM
PLAIN TEXT NAME
PARAMETER VALUES
LOAd KEY
Load Encryption Keys
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6
U
UPdATE
Update Keys
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6
ALM CHK
Alarm Check Keys
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6
U
ZERO
Zeroize Specific Keys
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6
U
Eb
LOAd Eb
Load Emergency Backup Key

(Eb)
PRESET MENU
SUB-MENU ITEM
PLAIN TEXT NAME
PRESET
WIdEbANd (Wideband)
NRW-bANd (Narrowband)
1-446K
Change 8
PARAMETER VALUES
T.O. 1B-52H-1
WIdEbANd
(WIDEBAND)
SUB-MENU ITEM
PLAIN TEXT NAME
MODEM SELECT
PARAMETER VALUES
Bb (Baseband)
DP (Di-Phase)
RATE n
Rate Select
n = 16 KbPS
12KbPS
TEK n
Key Select
n = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6
TD
Time Delay
Td On
Td OFF
NRW-bANd
(NARROWBAND)
SUB-MENU ITEM
PLAIN TEXT NAME
MODEM SELECT
PARAMETER VALUES
HF, LOS
bd (Black Digital)
bdL (Enhanced Black Digital)
RATE n
Rate Select
n = 75
150
300
600
12K (1200)
24K (2400) bps
TEK n
Key Select
n = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6
MODE SELECT
HF VC NT (HF Voice Net)

HF VC PP (HF Voice PTP)
INFC
(INTERFACE AUDIO DATA MENU)
SUB-MENU ITEM
PLAIN TEXT NAME
INFC
Interface
AUd-dATA
Audio-Data
SET dEF
Set Audio-Data Defaults
PARAMETER VALUES
See SET DEFAULTS SUB MENU
Change 8
1-446L
T.O. 1B-52H-1

SET dEF
(SET DEFAULTS SUB MENU)
SUB-MENU ITEM
GUARd
PLAIN TEXT NAME

Guard Audio
PARAMETER VALUES
GRd ON (Guard Audio ON) **
GRd OFF (Guard Audio OFF) *
MIC
Microphone
MIC bAL (Microphone Balanced)

MIC UnbL (Microphone Unbalanced) *
bALANCE
Balance
Rx bAL (Receiver Balanced)

RX UnbAL (Receiver Unbalanced) *
IMPEd
Impedance
600 OHMS *
300 OHMS
150 OHMS
dAT SENS
Data Sense (Polarity)
MARK + *
MARK
RX COUP
Receiver Coupling
RXAC (Receiver AC Coupled)*

RXdC (Receiver DC Coupled)
TX COUP
Transmitter Coupling
TXAC (Transmitter AC Coupled) *

TXdC (Transmitter DC Coupled)
TX CLKS
Transmitter Clocks
J2-U*
* Default Setting
** GUARD Audio must be set to GRd ON.
INFC
(INTERFACE NARROWBAND MENU)
SUB-MENU ITEM
PLAIN TEXT NAME
INFC
Interface
AUd-dATA
Audio-Data
See Audio Data Menu
RadIO
Radio
NRW-bANd, (Narrowband)
WIdEbANd (Wideband)
SET dEF
Set Narrowband Defaults
See SET NRW BAND DEFAULTS

SUB MENU
SET WIDEBAND DEFAULTS
SUB MENU
1-446M
PARAMETER VALUES
Change 8
T.O. 1B-52H-1
SET dEF
(SET NRW BAND DEFAULTS SUB MENU)
SUB-MENU ITEM
PLAIN TEXT NAME
PARAMETER VALUES
TX CLKS
Transmit Clocks
INT CLK (Internal Clock) * **

EXT CLK (External Clock) **
TRN SEQ
Training Sequence
6*
9
12
15
30
60 frames
TX dELAY
Transmission
onds)
PREAM
Preamble
STANd (Standard) *
ENHAN (Enhanced)
dAT SENS
Data Sense (Polarity)
MARK +
MARK *
CTS
Clear-To-Send Bd (Black Digital),

HF/PT , LOS, bdL (Enhanced
Black Digital),
OFF *
188
SW GNd
delay
(millisec-
MILSTAR
135 *
295
600
895
1200ms
ON
OFF *
TX LVL
Transmit Level (dBm)
21
18
15
12
9
6
3
0 dBm *
IMPEd
Impedance (ohms)
150
300
600 ohms *
RTS/PTT
Request-To-Send/Push-To-Talk
(bd,/dbL, HF, LOS, PT)
RTS+PTT *
PTT
RTS
* Default Setting
** This parameter must be set to EXTERNAL for SATCOM DAMA operation and reset to INTERNAL for
LOS operation by either radio
Change 8
1-446N
T.O. 1B-52H-1

SET dEF
(SET WIDEBAND DEFAULTS SUB MENU)
SUB-MENU ITEM
PLAIN TEXT NAME
PARAMETER VALUES
IMPEd
Impedance (OHMS)
150
300
600 ohms *
PHASING
Phasing (milliseconds)
48 *
98 **
148
198
248
298
348 MS
CTS
Clear-To-Send
CTS - Baseband OFF

CTS - Diphase OFF
* Default Setting
** PHASING must be set to 98MS.
NOTE
To exit SET dEF menus, press the up arrow < > key and right arrow < > key simultaneously or rotate the MODE switch out of the
OFFLINE position.
1-446P
Change 12
T.O. 1B-52H-1
KY-100 LCD Display Operator Prompts And

Messages DU
DISPLAY
MESSAGE
MEANING
OPERATOR RESPONSE
ALM CKn (n= Key

location (1 through 6
and U)
Alarm Check Key

Location n
Test integrity of security

circuits and key stored in
selected location.
Select and test appropriate

key location(s) as required.
bb
Baseband Modem Format
Indicates present selection for Wideband (WB)

Modem format. Display
occurs during off-line
PRESET mode and
on-line Wideband (WB)
operation.
If this is not the desired modem format refer to ;

(PRESET) or
(NB Operation).
bd
Black Digital
Indicates present selection for Narrowband

(NB) Modem format.
Display occurs during
off-line PRESET mode
and on-line Narrowband
(NB) operation.

(PRESET) or
(NB Operation).
bdL
Enhanced Black Digital

(NB) Modem format.
Display occurs during
off-line PRESET mode
and on-line Narrowband
(NB) operation.

(PRESET) or
(NB Operation).
CLd STRT
Cold Start
Indicates that the

KY-100 does not contain
any valid traffic encryption keys (TEKs).
Perform cold start turn on

procedures.
CMA ####
(#### = the
hexadecimal
number)
COMSEC A PWA
Software Version
Number
Indicates software version number (hexadecimal) of the COMSEC A

PWA currently installed
in the KY-100.
Ensure the displayed software version is correct for

the KY-100 installation.
CMB ####
(#### = the
hexadecimal
number)
COMSEC B PWA
Software Version
Number
Indicates software version number (hexadecimal) of the COMSEC B

in the KY-100.

CT or
CT ONLY
Ciphertext or
Ciphertext Only
On-line menu option

used to configure the
KY-100 for ciphertext/
plaintext or ciphertext
only operation.
If the desired selection is not

displayed, press the INIT
pushbutton to enter the
menu. press the (up arrow)
or (right arrow) pushbutton to toggle display.
Change 8
1-446Q
T.O. 1B-52H-1

Messages DU (Cont)
DISPLAY
MESSAGE
MEANING
dP
Diphase Modem Format
Indicates present selection for Wideband (WB)

Modem format. Display
occurs during off-line
PRESET mode and
on-line Wideband (WB)
operation.
If this is not the desired modem format. refer to (PRESET or (WB Operation).
EXT CLK
External Clock
Current transmit (TX)

clock selection for Narrowband Black Digital
modes.
If this is not the desired TX

clock selection, press the
(up arrow) or (right arrow)
pushbutton to toggle display
and select the Internal Clock
(INT CLK).
FP ####
(#### = the
hexadecimal
number)
Front Panel Display

Interface PWA
Software Version
Number
Indicates software version number (hexadecimal) of the Front Panel

Display Interface PWA
currently installed in the
KY-100.

HF VC NT
HF VC PP
HF Voice Net
HF Voice PTP
Off-line PRESET menu

item indicates current
mode selector for Narrowband HF voice mode
being PRESET.
If the desired mode selection

is not displayed, press the
pushbutton to toggle display.
INT CLK
Internal Clock
Current transmit (TX)

clock selection for Narrowband Black Digital
modes.
If this is not the desired TX

clock selection, press the
pushbutton to toggle display
and select the External
Clock (EXT CLK).
KEY n
(n = Location 1
through 6 or U)
Key position n is loaded
Confirmation that the encryption key has been

successfully loaded in
location n.
None.
KEY 1 01 or
KEY n xx
(n = Location 1
through 6 or U)
(xx = Update Count
01 through 99)
Key position n is loaded

and update count
Current key location and

update count. When
each encryption key is
initially loaded, the update count is set to 01.
None. Continue normal operation or update key if required.
LISTEN
Listen
Displayed during off-line

USER Test. Listen to
looped-back CT speech
in handset or headset.
If failure occurs, notify maintenance.
1-446R
Change 8
OPERATOR RESPONSE
T.O. 1B-52H-1
MESSAGE
DISPLAY
MEANING
OPERATOR RESPONSE
LOAd n
(n = Location 1
through 6 or U)
Load key location n
Indicates current key

location selected for
loading.
If the desired key location is

not displayed, press the
pushbutton to select the desired location.
LOCKEd
Menu locked
Confirm that the KY-100

menu successfully
locked.
None.
LS
Line-of-Sight Modem

(NB) Modem option. Display occurs during offline PRESET mode and
on-line Narrowband (NB)
operation.

(PRESET).
LVL n
(n = 0 to 21)
Transmit level (dBm)
Off-line INFC RADIO

menu option indicating
presently selected transmit level (0 to 21 dBm
increments).
If the desired level is not displayed, repeatedly press the

(up arrow) or (right arrow) pushbutton to change
level.
MA ####
(#### = the
hexadecimal
number)
Modem Processor PWA

Software Version
Number
Indicates software version number (hexadecimal) of the Modem Processor PWA currently
installed in the KY-100.

MARK +
MARK
Mark plus
Mark minus
Off-line INFC menu option indicates the current

data sense polarity for
MARK. This menu option is used in both the
INFC AUDIO and INFC
RADIO menus.
If the desired polarity is not

displayed, press the (up
arrow) or (right arrow)
pushbutton to toggle the
display.
MENU LK
Menu lock
Off-line main menu item

for locking the KY-100
menu.
To enter lock mode, press

INIT pushbutton.
MIC bAL
MIC UNbL
Microphone balanced
Microphone unbalanced
Off-line INFC AUDIO

menu selection indicates
the current selection for
microphone interface at
AUDIO/DATA connector.

display.
PANEL
KY-100 is in front panel

test mode.
Off-line user front panel

test is being performed.
Wait for, and follow, display

prompts.
PASS
Pass
KY-100 passed the test
None. Continue normal operation.
Change 8
1-446S
T.O. 1B-52H-1

Messages DU (Cont)
DISPLAY
MESSAGE
MEANING
OPERATOR RESPONSE
PHASING
Phasing Sequence
length (milliseconds)
Off-line INFC RADIO

submenu item allows
selection of Wideband
phasing sequence
length from 48 ms to 348
ms in 50 ms increments.
Press INIT pushbutton to enter PHASING submenu. If

the desired phasing sequence length is not displayed, press the (up arrow) or (right arrow) pushbutton to change value.
PT LOOP
Plaintext Loopback
Off-line USER plaintext

loopback test is being
performed.
Perform loopback operation

when prompted.
RCU ####
(#### = the
hexadecimal
number)
RCU Front Panel

Display Interface PWA
Software Version
Number
Indicates software version number (hexadecimal) of the RCU Front

Panel Display Interface
in the KY-100.

the RCU installation.
REKEY
ReKey
Rekey operation has

completed.
None. Continue normal operation.
RK
ReKey
Off-line USER front panel switch test is being

performed. Request for
operator to set the
MODE control switch to
the RK position.
Set MODE control switch to

RK position.
RX bAL
RX UNbAL
Receiver Balanced
Receiver Unbalanced
Off-line INFC AUDIO

the current setting for receiver BALANCE option.

display.
RX AC
RX dC
Receiver AC Coupled
Receiver DC Coupled
Off-line INFC AUDIO

the current setting for
RX COUP option.

display.
TALK
Talk
Off-line USER voice

loopback test is being
performed. Request for
operator to talk into
handset or headset microphone.
With PTT switch pressed,

talk into handset/headset microphone.
1-446T
Change 8
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DISPLAY
MESSAGE
MEANING
OPERATOR RESPONSE
TRN SEQ
Training Sequence
Off-line INFC RADIO

menu option selects
Narrowband Black Digital training sequence (6,
9, 12, 15, 30, 60
frames).
Press INIT pushbutton to enter TRN SEQ menu.
TX AC
TX dC
Transmitter AC Coupled
Transmitter DC Coupled
Off-line INFC AUDIO

the current setting for TX
COUP option.

display.
UdT n xx
(n = 1 through 6 or
U)
(xx = 00 through 99)
Update Key location n,

update count xx
Indicates current update

count of key stored at
location n.
If update is required, press

INIT pushbutton.
VERSION
Check software version

of PWAs
Off-line TEST menu item Press INIT pushbutton to enter

used to check software
VERSION menu.
version of COMSEC A,
COMSEC B, Modem
Processor, Voice Processor, Front Panel, and
RCU PWAs.
USER
User test
Off-line TEST menu item

for user tests.
Press INIT pushbutton to

perform user tests.
VP ####
(#### = the
hexadecimal
number)
Voice Processor PWA

Software Version
Number
Indicates software version number (hexadecimal) of the Voice Processor PWA currently
installed in the KY-100.

Change 8
1-446U/(1-446V blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
V/UHF RADIO AN/ARC-210 DJ
The AN/ARC-210(V) V/UHF Radio system (referred

to in this section as the V/UHF radio) provides airto-air or air-to-ground (LOS and SATCOM) communication. The set uses a tuneable LOS antenna (13,
figure 1-132) and a SATCOM antenna (7, figure
1-132), a control panel (figure 1-136), a switching
panel (figure 1-136) and a receiver-transmitter. The
V/UHF radio transceiver has selectable commercial,
HAVE QUICK I (HQ I) and HAVE QUICK II (HQ
II) anti-jamming (AJ), single channel ground-air radio system (SINCGARS) modes, demand assigned
multiple access (DAMA) operation and manual
maritime. It has automatic maritime offset and direction finding modes which are not currently operable. It is also capable of data transmission under
manual or MIL-STD-1553B control with a data rate
up to 32,000 bits/second. The data transmission feature is not currently operable. Frequency range of
the V/UHF radio is 30 to 399.9875 MHz tunable at
5 kHz intervals. Channel spacing is 25 kHz in all
bands. The V/UHF radio is capable of the following
specific operations:
Freq Range
in MHZ
Band
30 88
FM
Clear/Secure Voice/Data
150 Hz Squelch Tone
SINCGARS Voice ECCM
108 136
AM
121.5 MHz Guard
108-118 MHz Receive
Only
136 156
NOTE
DU
Freq
Operation
121.5 MHz Guard
156 174
FM
Maritime
225 400
AM/FM Clear/Secure Voice/Data

HQ I/HQ II ECCM
SATCOM
Use of frequencies 136.000 to 151.975 MHz

for air-to-air/air-to-ground communications
are subject to FAA/FCC/host country approval.
243 MHz Guard is monitored in all bands
except 108 to 156 MHz.
Anti-jamming (AJ) Capability
The AJ mode uses the instant tuning capability of

the V/UHF radio system, synchronized precision
clocks and programmable frequency switching patterns to make jamming of the radio more difficult.
The word-of-day (WOD), time-of-day (TOD), and
net number are used to establish communications
in the AJ mode. The V/UHF radio will periodically
scan for communication activity. Scanning ensures
that communication can be accomplished by others
who may not be transmitting on the same frequency as the operator has selected. It also has interface
provisions for use with a TSEC/KY-100 DU to provide cryptographic security of transmissions in AM,
FM, normal or AJ modes.
HAVE QUICK Operation
The V/UHF radio uses selectable HAVE QUICK AJ

operation in the UHF frequency spectrum. HAVE
QUICK is an algorithm controlled ECCM voice/data
communications technique which can be performed
using HQ I or HQ II mode in UHF AM or FM frequency bands. HAVE QUICK synchronization reference (algorithm) information is stored in the applique as channels consisting of Time-of-Day (TOD),
Word-of-Day (WOD) or multiple words of the day
(MWOD) and NET ID number. This information
may be programmed into the applique manually or
utilizing an AN/CYZ-10 data transfer device (DTD).
NOTE
The DTD does not program TOD information into the transceiver, therefore one of
the following TOD loading procedures must
be used.
Time-Of-Day (TOD) Transmission
VHF AM transmissions from 108 to 118

MHz using the V/UHF radio will be avoided
during normal peacetime operation. Such
transmissions may jam navigation signals,
causing safety of flight hazards.
The TOD entry is normally entered before flight,

but it is possible to enter it in flight. A mode time
transmission allows a time update if one radio has
drifted out of synchronization. It is possible to
transmit and receive timing information in normal
and AJ modes utilizing a UHF RF link. The operator may send TOD using the ancillary mode and
pointer push-button switches to select SND on the
Change 17
1-447
T.O. 1B-52H-1
function indicators. The operator sending the TOD
then has 60-seconds to push the LOAD/OFST pushbutton to initiate the TOD transfer. The entire TOD
is passed (including time tick) if the transfer is
done in manual or preset modes. If the transfer is
done in AJ or AJ/M modes only the updating time
tick is transferred.
Time-Of-Day (TOD) Reception
Reception is possible in both normal and AJ modes.

The radio automatically accepts only the first TOD
message received after the radio is turned on. Subsequent messages are ignored unless the operator
desires to reset the TOD. The operator may receive
TOD using the ancillary mode and pointer pushbutton switches to select RCV on the function indicators and pushing the LOAD/OFST switch. The
operator receiving the TOD then has 60-seconds in
which to receive the TOD transfer. The entire time
is passed if the TOD is received in manual or preset
modes. If the TOD is received in AJ or AJ/M modes
only the updating time tick is received.
NOTE
TOD will be retained for a minimum of 7

seconds during a power loss. If power loss
exceeds this limit TOD must be reloaded.
Time-Of-Day (TOD) Emergency Start
The TOD emergency start allows the operator to

initialize the receiver-transmitters master (internal) clock for use as a TOD reference should it become necessary during flight. Any frequency may
be selected while in the normal or preset mode. The
frequency selection is not band dependent, however,
AJ or AJ/M modes may not be used. The operator
may reset the HQ master clock to zero and restart
it to provide a timing reference. This is accomplished by using the ancillary mode and pointer
push-button switches to select both SND and RCV
on the function indicators and pushing the LOAD/
OFST switch.
Word-Of-Day (WOD)
The WOD entry is normally entered before flight,

but it is possible to enter it in flight. Each WOD is
tagged with a unique operational date code. When
the current operational date is updated, the code
generator is automatically reinitialized with a new
WOD having the same date. WOD elements are entered into memory locations accessed by using the
CHAN/FREQ CRSR switch until the one of the six
desired channel numbers is selected (channels 20
through 15). Channel 14 is used to enter the date
code necessary for the implementation of the WOD.
For a new WOD frequency entry, start at channel
1-448
20 and use the same method as in entering preset

frequencies in the normal mode. The WOD frequency is set with the frequency mode selector switch,
CHAN/FREQ CRSR push-button switch, and
LOAD/OFST switch. After a brief pause, a single
beep or double beep tone sounds in the headset indicating that channel 20 is entered into preset
memory. Channels 19 through 15 are selected in decreasing order for preset frequency entry. After
each entry, a single beep sounds until after channel
15 entry, a 14 0 0 is displayed indicating that the
radio has accepted all six WOD entries. Once the
WOD information has been entered, the operational
date must be entered in channel 1.
WOD Transfer
If the radio is turned off, the WOD data is not lost.

It remains stored in non-volatile memory, and must
be transferred into resident memory in the applique. After the radio is turned back on, select the
preset mode and starting with preset channel 20,
rotate and push the CHAN/FREQ CRSR switch until 220.025 is displayed. Push the LOAD/OFST
push-button switch. It will cause 20 00.000 to be
displayed and a single beep will be heard indicating
that entry of WOD is not complete, but has been
transferred and accepted. After the beep sounds,
preset remaining channels (19-15) in the same
manner until 14 0 0 is displayed and transfer is
complete. Once the WOD information has been entered, the operational date must be entered in
channel 1.
Multiple Word-Of-Day (MWOD)
MWOD allows for up to six WODs to be loaded at

one time and each WOD is tagged with a unique operational date code. WOD elements are entered into
memory locations accessed by using the CHAN/
FREQ CRSR switch until the desired channel number is selected (channels 20 through 15). Channel
14 is used to enter the date code necessary for the
implementation of the WOD. After the first complete WOD is entered, the corresponding date codes
are entered by selecting channel 14 using the
CHAN/FREQ CRSR switch (14 0 0 will be displayed). Enter the two-digit day-of-month
(DOM)(00-31) for the day that the WOD is to be
used and push the LOAD/OFST switch. The applique will acknowledge by producing a double beep to
be heard and the radio set control display to cycle
back to the initial WOD/MWOD display (20
220.025). The radio will retain the six most recently
entered WODs. Once the WOD information has
been entered, the operational date must be entered
in channel 1.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Operational Date
HAVE QUICK modes are defined as follows:
The operational date is the current (GMT) date.

The date is required to uniquely identify the appropriate WOD when reinitializing the code generator at midnight transitions. Channel 1 is used for
entering the current operational date. If the aircraft is powered down after the WODs/MWODs are
loaded, the WODs/ MWODs will not be lost, but the
operational date will. When the current operational
date is updated, the code generator is automatically
reinitialized with a new WOD having the same
date. If TOD is being received from a HQ II source,
there is no need to enter the current date in channel 1 since the radio will receive the operational
date (day and year) as part of the TOD message.
XX.X00
XX.X25
XX.X50
XX.X75
HQ I
HQ II (NATO)
HQ II (non-NATO)
RESERVED (for later use)
Crypto Security DU
The V/UHF radio has interface provisions for use

with the KY-100. The KY-100 may be utilized by the
V/UHF radio in AM or FM modes for normal or AJ
(HAVE QUICK or SINCGARS) modes and FM
mode for UHF SATCOM operation. Refer to KY-100
Secure Voice System section for additional information.
Erase MWOD
Conference Capability
The MWOD segments can be erased by automatically setting all segments to zero. Set the frequency
mode selector switch to PRST, select channel 20 using the FREQ/CHAN and set the operational mode
switch to CHNG/PRST. Change the displayed frequency to 220.050 and push the LOAD/OFST
switch. The MWOD segments can be reloaded following the procedure described above.
In AJ mode, the radio set can receive and process

two simultaneous transmissions on the same operating net (conferencing) without the beat frequency
interference that normally results. Three simultaneous transmissions can result in a garbled reception. This is accomplished by automatically offsetting the second transmitter frequency to the next
lower channel (-25 kHz) when it monitors a transmission on the primary frequency. Reception is possible due to the wideband characteristics of the radio set receiver. In the HQ II radio set, this conferencing feature is enabled or disabled by the last two
digits of the WOD element loaded in memory location 19. If the WOD element ends with 00 or 50,
conferencing is enabled. If the WOD element ends
with 25 or 75, conferencing is disabled.
Verify WOD/MWOD
The operator can verify whether there is a WOD/

MWOD loaded for a particular day of the month by
setting the frequency mode selector switch to PRST,
selecting channel 20 using the FREQ/CHAN and
setting the operational mode switch to CHNG/
PRST. The displayed frequency must be changed to
220.000 and the LOAD/OFST switch pushed. The
display will read 20 0 0. Enter the day of the month
that is to be verified (00-31) and push the LOAD/
OFST switch. A double beep will be heard indicating that a WOD has been loaded for that day.
NOTE
HAVE QUICK Net Numbers
After TOD and WOD have been entered, any valid

AJ net number can be selected by using the manual
frequency knobs. A net number is used to identify a
specific communications network. It is used by the
HAVE QUICK algorithm in conjunction with the
WOD to set up a unique frequency hopping scheme.
Net numbers allow various networks to operate in
the same proximity without interference. The net
number also identifies the type of net and may be
re-defined by the operator using the CHAN/FREQ
CRSR switch with the operational mode switch set
to CHNG/PRST. The first three digits of a net number identify the net, the last two digits identify the
HAVE QUICK mode (XXX.XYY). A net number of
00.X00 is for HQ I training which allows for up to
five non-interfering nets, and 0X.X25 is for HQ II
training which allows up to 16 non-interfering nets.
When operating in secure voice mode, conferencing is automatically disabled.

When operating in AJ mode on a single element WOD (channel 20 only), conferencing
is enabled by default.
For HQ I and HQ II training and/or maintenance mode operation, conferencing is always enabled.
Guard Operation
Guard receiver operation is not affected while operating in the AJ mode. The guard frequency may be
monitored regardless of what mode the radio is set
in as long as the frequency selector switch has been
rotated to the desired guard frequency (121 or 243)
and pulled out. This will tune the radio to the
guard frequency and will disable the preset and
manual frequency controls. To discontinue guard
frequency monitoring rotate the frequency selector
switch to the desired mode.
Change 17
1-449
T.O. 1B-52H-1
SCAN Operation
SCAN mode allows the operator to scan preset

channels 22 through 25. Preset channel 22 is the
command channel and preset channels 23 through
25 are secondary scanned channels. During scan
operation the channel and frequency will be displayed when a signal is detected on a scanned channel. Transmission will occur on the active channel if
the radio is keyed within 3 seconds of when the
scanned frequency is displayed. The radio stores
the last 3 frequencies used prior to receipt of a
scanned signal. Each time the LOAD/OFST button
is pushed, the radio is reset to the last previously
active channel. Pushing the LOAD/OFST button a

fourth time returns the radio to SCAN mode.
Maritime Operation
Maritime mode is selected by placing the frequency

mode selector switch to MAR position. The operator
may select any one of 57 permanently stored preset
maritime channels (channels 1 through 28 and 60
through 88) listed below. Maritime channel and
transmit frequency are displayed. Alternately pushing the LOAD/OFST push-button switch while in
maritime mode changes transmit frequency and
station operation from shore to ship station and
back.
Maritime Channel Assignment Transmit

Frequencies (MHZ)
CHANNEL
SHIP STATION
COAST STATION
CHANNEL
SHIP STATION
COAST STATION
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
156.050
156.100
156.150
156.200
156.250
156.300
156.350
156.400
156.450
156.500
156.550
156.600
156.650
156.700
156.750
156.800
156.850
156.900
156.950
157.000
157.050
157.100
157.150
157.200
157.250
157.300
157.350
157.400
160.650
160.700
160.750
160.800
160.850
156.300
160.950
156.400
156.450
156.500
156.550
156.600
156.650
156.700
156.750
156.800
156.850
161.500
161.550
161.600
161.650
161.700
161.750
161.800
161.850
161.900
161.950
162.000
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
156.025
156.075
156.125
156.175
156.225
156.275
156.325
156.375
156.425
156.475
156.525
156.575
156.625
156.675
156.725
156.775
156.825
156.875
156.925
156.975
157.025
157.075
157.125
157.175
157.225
157.275
157.325
157.375
157.425
160.625
160.675
160.725
160.775
160.825
160.875
160.925
156.375
156.425
156.475
156.525
156.575
156.625
156.675
156.725
156.775
156.825
156.875
161.525
161.575
161.625
161.675
161.725
161.775
161.825
161.875
161.925
161.975
162.025
Figure 1-135
1-450
Change 8
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Sync Time
This is the time in which a receiver/transmitters

hopping sequence is referenced. The sync time is
used to maintain synchronization between net radios. The net control station (master radio) is the
timekeeper of the net receiver/transmitter clocks
and update the receiver-transmitters sync time
with each transmission. Sync time should not be
confused with universal coordinated time (UTC) or
time-of-day (TOD). The applique does not store the
complete time for each SINCGARS net. Instead, the
sync time is stored as a time offset from UTC or the
time is being used as the receiver-transmitter master time reference. Sync time may be viewed by the
operator when a SINCGARS is selected. The time is
viewed in the form of days, hours, and minutes (DD
HH:MM). The operator may change the sync time
manually. Whenever sync time is loaded manually,
all SINCGARS channels are reset to the ECCM
master clock when the sync time has been altered
by the operator. All channels will then contain the
same time. Updating just one of the channels may
be accomplished through ECCM remote fill.
Cold Start Net
This is a cooperative method that may be used to

initially open a net. The radio must have a compatible transmission security (TRANSEC) variables
loaded. The V/UHF radio has reserved AJ preset
channel 30 as the COLD START channel. The
COLD START preset channel is loaded with a predetermined low VHF-FM frequency (30 88 MHz).
With the preset channel selected in the AJ or AJ/M
frequency mode, the SINCGARS algorithm will
cause the receiver-transmitter to hop on that single
frequency. This allows the radio to transmit/receive
an ECCM remote fill.
rithms to determine which frequencies will be used

during frequency hop operations.
Lockout Set
A lockout set is a method of encoding data which

prevents transmission and reception on particular
frequencies during frequency hop operations. The
lockout set is stored in the applique and applies to
all SINCGARS net activities.
TRANSEC Variable
A TRANSEC (transmission security) variable is

electronic control data used in conjunction with the
SINCGARS or HAVE QUICK algorithms and hopset to determine which frequencies will be used
during frequency hop operations.
Late Entry
Late entry is a method by which a non-net

SINCGARS or HAVE QUICK radio may enter an
active net without precise time synchronization.
The effect of late entry is to open the radios clock
boundaries so that a non-net radio may join the net.
After joining the net, the radios clock is synchronized by the others in the net and late entry mode
is exited.
Cue
A cue is used to contact a SINCGARS or HAVE

QUICK radio net when the radio is not an active
member of that net. The cue takes the form of a
predetermined contact frequency that, if programmed into a SINCGARS radio, will be periodically scanned for activity during SINCGARS frequency hop operations. In the V/UHF radio, the cue
frequency is loaded into AJ preset channel 31.
ECCM Remote Fill

Master Radio
ECCM remote fill is a technique in which a receiver/transmitter is loaded with SINCGARS frequency
hop data transmitted by a master radio. This may
be accomplished during COLD START openings
and for SINCGARS data updating. ECCM remote
fill RF data can include channel hopset, lockout set,
sync data, and additional TRANSEC variables. A
different variable may be allocated for each
SINCGARS channel.
Hopset
A hopset is a method of encoding the frequencies on

which a net will hop. Data is used in conjunction
with the TRANSEC variable, and SINCGARS algo-
A radio in the SINCGARS net is designated as the

net control station. A V/UHF radio designated as
the master radio must be operating in the AJ/M
mode.
SINCGARS Net ID Number
The net ID number is used to identify a specific

SINCGARS communication network. The net ID is
associated with a specific hopset, lockout set, sync
time, and TRANSEC variable. The net ID along
with the frequency hop data will be loaded into an
AJ preset channel. In the V/UHF radio, the net ID
may not be altered by the operator.
Change 8
1-451
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Operation
DAMA Operating Modes DU
The radio set supports limited wide-band (25 kHz

band width) operations in an essentially closed system configuration. In other words, specific channels
are reserved for specific users and when a specific
channel is not in use, other users are still not allowed to use it. Communication in this system is restricted by AFSATCOM to pre-established network
links for which it is designated.
Five basic modes of operation are available on the

Modem. These modes of operation are:
DAMA MODEM DU
The DAMA (Demand Assigned Multiple Access)

modem, mounted in the 47 section, is used for SATCOM communication 5kHz and 25kHz DAMA or
Dedicated Non-DAMA channel modes. The modem
has an embedded Communication Security, Transmission Security Integrated Circuit (CTIC) for encrypted operation.
The modem provides SATCOM users the ability to
select either 5-kHz and 25-kHz DAMA channel
modes or dedicated non-DAMA 5-kHz and 25-kHz
channel modes for satellite communications. The
modem is intended to be used in conjunction with
and provide control of the AN/ARC-210(V) radio to
provide simple half-duplex, unencrypted voice or
data transmission.
The DAMA modem receives +28 vdc aircraft power
from the DAMA MODEM power circuit breaker located on the Left Load Central (LCC) circuit breaker panel.
DAMA Remote Control (RCU) DU
The DAMA Remote Control Unit (RCU) is mounted

at the Navigators station. A liquid crystal display
(LCD) is used to indicate menus concerning operation of the DAMA Modem. The front panel of the
RCU contains a keypad entry unit, ZEROIZE/
NORM/BATT SAVE function switch, and a Fill port
connection.
The RCU provides the control functions necessary
for remote operation of the modem. It also provides
configuration, zeroizing, loading/filing, and other
operational controlling functions for the modem.
1-452
Change 8
Power-Up
Off-line
Dedicated (5 kHz and 25 kHz Non-DAMA) Channel Mode
25 kHz TDMA/DAMA Channel Mode
5 kHz DAMA Channel Mode
POWER-UP MODE
The Power-Up mode or start-up mode begins when
power is applied to the Modem. During power-up,
the Modem initiates power-up BIT tests within the
various Modem assemblies as well as begins status
polling of the external devices (i.e., the radio and
the RCU) attached to the Modem. This sequence involves software hand shaking and acknowledgments between the devices and takes approximately 30 seconds. See T.O. 1B-52H-1-12, Section II for
Power-On procedures, operations and indications.
OFF-LINE MODE
The Off-line mode occurs whenever the Modem is
NOT using a normal channel operating mode (i.e.,
Dedicated non-DAMA mode, 25 kHz DAMA mode,
or the 5 kHz DAMA mode) and is operating off-line.
The off-line mode allows the operator to run off-line
BIT or other tests on the Modem or RCU without
interrupting an operating mode.
DEDICATED CHANNEL MODE
The Dedicated non-DAMA 5 kHz or 25 kHz channel
mode allows a satellite communications (SATCOM)
terminal to operate over dedicated 5 kHz and 25
kHz Ultra-High Frequency (UHF) SATCOM channels. The 5 kHz bandwidth channels are referred to
as narrowband (NB) and the 25 kHz bandwidth
channels are referred to as wideband (WB).
T.O. 1B-52H-1
To use Dedicated mode, set up and configure a
single baseband port. Then, to start the mode uses
the procedures described in T.O. 1B-52H-1-12, Section II to set up the radio and initiate the mode.
The satellite terminal (i.e., the Modem and associated equipment can acquire a signal on the downlink and if desired, the operator can transmit after
the receive message is complete. If there is no signal present on the downlink, communication can be
initiated by keying the baseband device being used
to generate the uplink signal. When transmission is
complete or another mode is required, the currently
selected mode must be deactivated.
25 KHZ DAMA MODE
The waveform for the 25 kHz TDMA/DAMA channel mode allows multiple users to use a single, nonregenerative satellite transponder channel. The waveform also allows a network controller (NC) to
have pre-assigned or real-time control of the channel depending upon the submode selected. The waveform can accommodate multiple I/O bit rates and
RF burst rates, as well a dynamic assignment of users between channels. Operation in 25 kHz channel
mode is typically transparent to the user baseband
equipment, except for Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) frame-time delays.
The method of user access to the communications
slots within the waveform frame structure depends
on whether the waveform is operated in the Automatic Control (AC) or Distributed Control (DC)
mode. For the AC Mode, terminal access to slots is
assigned by the network controller (NC). A satellite
terminal requests access to another satellite terminal within the network by sending a message to the
NC. In this mode, the waveform frame format is unknown to the satellite terminals operator, since the
format is dynamically controlled by the NC to reflect the changing demands and priorities of the
network. However, in DC Mode, access to slots is
pre-arranged and known by the satellite terminals
operator. Communication slots are uniquely numbered and pre-assigned for specific purposes. The
satellite terminal operator interface is used to establish a connection between the data port(s) of the
terminal and a communication slot(s).
When the 25 kHz mode is to be activated, the operator must set up the COMSEC/TRANSEC switches
and then load the encryption keys via the fill device. If external encryption for the baseband port
(or ports) is desired, the operator attaches and initializes an external encryption device to load the
crypto keys. Next, the operator sets up and configures the baseband port (or ports). To set up and activate the 25 kHz mode (TDMA), use the various
procedures to configure the radio, and set up the
desired parameters within the desired DC or AC
submode operation. See T.O. 1B-52H-1-12, Section
II for configuration/set up procedures.
Once the TDMA mode is activated, the satellite terminal (i.e., the Modem and associated equipment)
attempts to acquire a downlink channel form a satellite, and upon success, the operator receives an
event message indicating successful acquisition.
Ranging is then accomplished via the transmission
of a ranging burst when active ranging is selected
in the configuration. Passive ranging does not require an uplink signal to be transmitted. Passive
ranging uses an operator-entered passive ranging
delay value. The operator may then attempt to send
a uplink transmission by accessing a slot within the
configured frame format.
If the desired submode is DC, the operator configures the access slot with the DC mode parameters.
If the slot is available, the operator receives an
event message indicating that slot connection was
successful and that data can now be received and
transmitted via the selected I/O port. Otherwise,
the operator receives an event message indicating
the slot connect (uplink) was not successful. The operator must determine the cause of the slot-connect
failure and take corrective action, if necessary.
However, if the desired submode was AC, the satellite terminal is assigned a slot from the satellite
and the operator receives an event message indicating that the frame/slot connect (uplink) was successful. Otherwise, the operator receives an event
message that the frame/slot connect was not successful. The operator must determine the cause of
the failure and take corrective action, if necessary.
NOTE
To start any other operating mode, the operator must first stop the current mode of operation.
Change 8
1-452A
T.O. 1B-52H-1
5 KHZ DAMA MODE
The 5 kHz DAMA channel mode allows for dynamic
sharing of one or more non-processed UHF SATCOM DAMA channels among numerous users. 5
kHz DAMA also provides efficient handling of short
command and control (C 2) messages as well as effective resources sharing between voice and data
communications. The 5 kHz DAMA network is controlled by a Primary Channel Controller (PCC)
within a Network Control Station (NCS) that provides real-time control of the channel. The PCC receives and processes service requests and broadcasts assignments to the various satellite terminals
within the network. The service requests are sent
to the PCC. The PCC responds with allocations of
channel resources. The NCS also provides a relay
function for multiple-hop (global) communications
between satellite terminals. The NCS is located in
areas where the satellite footprints overlap allowing simultaneous access to one or more channels on
the two adjacent satellites. A satellite terminal
within one satellites footprint can use the NCS
relay to communicate with a satellite terminal
within another satellite footprint.
When the 5 kHz mode is to be activated, the operator must set up the COMSEC/TRANSEC switches
and then load the encryption keys. If external encryption for the baseband port (or ports) is desired,
the operator attaches and initializes an external encryption device and loads the crypto keys. The operator then sets up and configures the baseband port
(or ports). To set up and activate the 5 kHz DAMA
mode, the operator sets up and configures the various parameters required for a data circuit, a voice
circuit, or a message circuit. See T.O. 1B-52H-1-12,
Section II for configuration/set up procedures.
Once the 5 kHz DAMA mode is activated, the satellite terminal (i.e., the Modem and associated equipment) attempts to acquire a downlink satellite
channel, and upon success, the operator receives an
event message indicating a successful downlink acquisition. Ranging is then accomplished via the
transmission of a ranging burst when active ranging is selected in the configuration. Passive ranging
does not require an uplink signal to be transmitted
to the satellite and uses an operator-entered passive-ranging delay value. The operator may then
initiate a login request. After the login transmission is successfully received by the NCS, the opera-
1-452B
Change 8
tor can then request a service (data, voice, or message circuit). Otherwise, the operator receives an
event message indicating that the login was not
successful and the operator must determine the
cause of the login failure and take corrective action,
if necessary. If successful, the satellite terminal is
now online within the network and utilizing the requested service.
NOTE
To start any other operating mode, the operator must first stop the current mode of operation.
DAMA Modem Operation Remote Control Unit (RCU)
Interface DU
The Remote Control Unit (RCU) (Figure 1-136A)

controls the Modem. Modem operations are performed through a series of menus displayed on the
RCU.
RCU DISPLAY. The RCU display is a 14-character
x 4-line display. On each line, the first 11-characters provide the menu options, parameters, etc. associated with the current menu, while the last 3
characters provide the menu name and the current
page of the menu displayed. A menu option that is
not preceded by a number indicates that the option
is not currently selectable. At the bottom of the display is the > which designates the cursor for operator entry. To move from page to page within a
menu, use the UP () and Down () arrow keys (6
and 7, Figure 1-136A).
OPERATOR INPUT. Menu selections and data entered in response to prompts are made using the
RCU keypad.
OPERATOR ENTRY ERRORS. Attempts to enter
data outside the allowed parameter range will result in an error message displayed on the RCU. Error messages must be acknowledged by pressing
the [ACK] key (3, Figure 1-136A) on the RCU. The
incorrect data can then be erased one character at a
time by pressing the [DEL] key (12, Figure 1-136A).
The entire entry can be erased by using the [ESC]
key (15, Figure 1-136A), which re-displays the current prompt and allows the operator to re-enter the
correct data.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
MAIN (TOP) MENU. The TOP menu is accessed on
the RCU by pressing the [MAIN] key (4, Figure
1-136A).
EVENT MESSAGES. The top two lines within the
RCU display may also show any event messages
pertaining to operation of the Modem. These messages overwrite the existing top two lines of information within the RCU display. In most cases, the
event message consists of only one line; therefore,
only the top line of the display is overwritten by the
event message. These messages do not necessarily
indicate a failure, but rather, the status of the Modem operation. The types of messages can be: power-up BIT messages, on-line BIT messages, critical
event messages, mode-related messages, etc. To
clear an event message, simply press the [ACK] key
once or twice, depending upon the type of message
displayed.
HELP PAGE. The HELP page provides information
about the current menu or menu items. The information typically consists of a list of all selections
and their associated numerical values. The HELP
page is accessed by selecting an option with a visible menu-selection number and then pressing the
[SHIFT] key (2, Figure 1-136A) and then the
[HELP] key (4, Figure 1-136A). The data entry
prompt remains visible while the HELP page(s) is
accessed. Page-Up () and Page Down () keys page
through the current display. The operator may either enter the desired selection while on the HELP
menu page or press the [ESC] key once to re-display the previous menu and enter the selection at
that time. Upon entering data while the HELP display is present, the HELP page is automatically replaced with the menu page containing the current
data entry menu item.
STATUS PAGE. The Status page provides the parameter status for a selected communications mode.
The Status page is accessed by pressing the
[SHIFT] key and then the [STAT] key (16, Figure
1-136A), while in that mode. When not operating in
a mode, the MODEM displays the current software
versions within the MODEM. To leave the Status
page, press the [ESC] key.
Change 8
1-452C/(1-452D blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Single Channel Ground-Air Radio System (SINCGARS)
Operation
The V/UHF radio employs SINCGARS, an algorithm controlled ECCM voice/data technique operating in the low VHF-FM (30 88 MHz) frequency
range. A small s symbol will be displayed in the
upper right hand corner of the display when
SINCGARS mode is selected. The SINCGARS algorithm data stored in the applique (Net ID, Hopset,
and TRANSEC variable) requires SINCGARS base
time and SINCGARS net time offset to synchronize
the frequency hopping operations. Using the AN/
CYZ-10 DTD to transfer SINCGARS operational
data will normally negate the need to access most
ancillary functions, with the exception of
SINCGARS base time which is not part of the DTD
transfer function.
SINCGARS Base Time
This is the time to which a receiver/transmitters

hopping sequence is reference. SINCGARS base
time may be viewed by the operator when
SINCGARS COLD START is selected, or when any
SINCGARS channel is selected as long as there are
no NET TIME offsets. Time is viewed in the form of
days, hours, and minutes (DD HH:MM). It may be
set from 00 00:00 to 99 23:59 and 59.5 seconds in
increments of 0.05 seconds. SINCGARS base time
(including the mission day) may be loaded by overthe-air RF transfer from another radio, or EMERGENCY TIME start. If EMERGENCY TIME start
is used, the SINCGARS base time and the
SINCGARS mission day will be equal to zero. Subsequent updates of the SINCGARS base time is accomplished by manual remote control entry. Any
subsequent RF over-the-air time receipts or EMERGENCY TIME receipts after initial loading of the
SINCGARS base time, will not effect the
SINCGARS base time. If the operator loads a new
SINCGARS BASE TIME manually, referred to as
wrist watch time, all net time offsets will be zero.
SINCGARS Net Time
Each net operates on its own SINCGARS net time

and its associated SINCGARS net time offset. The
net offset ranges from 60 minutes in 0.5 second

increments. The net offset is added to the
SINCGARS base time to obtain SINCGARS net
time. SINCGARS net time may be altered by using
late entry or ECCM remote fill. In most cases the
net offset will be 0, which allows all nets to operate
on the SINCGARS base time.
V/UHF RADIO CONTROLS AND INDICATORS
AN/ARC-210(V) Radio Control Panel
The AN/ARC-210(V) radio set controls are located

on the front panel of the C-11898/ARC (figure
1-136) located on the pilots overhead panel aft of
the UHF command radio. The V/UHF radio control
panel includes: a volume/squelch control; a CHAN
FREQ/NET/TIME display module which contains
two channel indicators, six frequency indicators,
two ECCM mode indicators, a fault indicator, and
10 function indicators (GPS is not enabled in the
B-52); a CHAN/FREQ CRSR push-button rotary
switch, a LOAD/OFST push-button switch, a frequency mode selector switch, a pointer push-button
switch, an ancillary mode push-button switch and
an operational mode selector switch. The following
paragraphs explain the function of each of these
controls and how they are used in conjunction with
each other to operate the radio. See figure 1-136 for
functions of the radio controls.
AN/ARC-210(V) Switch Panel
The AN/ARC-210(V) switch panel (figure 1-136), located on the pilots overhead panel, enables the operator to load key variables in the V/UHF radio,
and select the desired radio and antenna for communication.
NVIS Light Switch
DQ
A three position NVIS Light Switch (figure 1-136) is

located on the pilots overhead panel to the left of
the AN/ARC-210(V) Switch Panel. This switch enables the pilots to control the intensity of the lights
on the AN/ARC-210(V) switch panel for daylight,
night, and night vision goggles operations.
Change 8
1-453
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AN/ARC-210(V) Radio Control and Indicators DJ
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
VOLUME/SQUELCH SWITCH
CHANNEL/FREQUENCY/NETWORK/TIME
DISPLAY MODULE
CHANNEL/FREQUENCY CURSOR SWITCH
LOAD/OFFSET SWITCH
FREQUENCY MODE SELECTOR SWITCH
POINTER SWITCH
ANCILLARY MODE SWITCH
OPERATIONAL MODE SELECTOR SWITCH
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
FILL PORT
ANTENNA MODE SELECT SWITCH
HPA DISABLE SWITCH
KY-RAD SELECTOR RADIO ANNUNCIATOR
LAMP TEST SWITCH
HPA FAULT LIGHT
ANTENNA ELEMENT SELECT SWITCH
NVIS LIGHT SWITCH DQ
1-454
Change 1
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
FUNCTION
A
AN/ARC-210(V) RADIO CONTROL PANEL
Volume/Squelch Off Control
The switch is a potentiometer/push-pull switch. The potentiometer adjusts

the audio output level. The SQ OFF push-pull switch disables main receiver
squelch in the out position and enables squelch in the in position.
Display Module
The liquid crystal display module displays selected channels, frequencies,

nets, mode or built-in-test (BIT) results. The function indicators indicate
selection of time (TIME), global positioning satellite (GPS)(not enabled), AM,
FM, hopsets (H), lockout (L), send (SND)/receive (RCV) ECCM remote fill,
late entry (LE) or frequency (OFST).
CHAN/FREQ CRSR SWITCH
Each time the CHAN/FREQ CRSR push-button rotary switch control is

pushed, the cursor position changes. Rotating the switch changes channel
or frequency value depending upon the mode selected and cursor position.
LOAD/OFST Switch
Pushing the switch enables the loading of various data depending on the
mode selected.
NOTE
Pushing this switch within two seconds after the operational mode
selector switch has been placed in TEST will cause the system to
perform a single-step self-test rather than end-to-end self test.
Frequency Mode Selector Switch
The frequency mode selector push-pull rotary switch selects the AJ, AJ master net, MAR (Maritime), preset, manual frequency select, 243 UHF, and 121
VHF guard modes.
AJ/M (AJ Master)
Pulling out and rotating the switch to AJ/M, selects the anti-jam/master net
mode which provides the same AJ capabilities described below plus functions associated with a master net controller.
AJ
Rotating the switch to AJ mode enables the operator to select up to 25 AJ

preset networks. The networks can be HQ I, HQ II, or SINCGARS ECCM,
if all 25 channels are loaded with fill information, or the SINCGARS CUE
channel in addition to cold start. A HQ preset channel is represented by the
symbols HQ I or HQ II and SINCGARS is represented by the symbol S in the
upper right hand corner of the display(2). The channel and preset net number
are displayed for AJ presets and CS is displayed when the cold start channel
is selected. Following operator selection, the applique supplies all frequency
and control data for operation of the receiver/transmitter and antenna. The
operator may define or redefine a channel as HQ and change the WOD and
HQ type. When HQ is selected, the SND/RCV time ancillary mode, SND/
RCV ECCM remote fill, hopsets, lockout and late entry modes are available.
When SINCGARS SND/RCV ECCM remote fill is selected, hopsets, lockout
and late entry modes are available and SINCGARS CUE channel is monitored.
MAR
MAR the operator may select any one of 57 preset maritime channels (channels 1 through 28 and 60 through 88).
(Continued)
1-455
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AN/ARC-210(V) Radio Controls and Indicators DJ

(Cont)
CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
FUNCTION
AN/ARC-210(V) RADIO CONTROL PANEL (Cont)
Frequency Mode Selector Switch

(Cont)
PRST (Preset)
Rotating the switch to PRST, allows the operator to select up to 25 channels

(1 through 25) preset operating frequencies for simplex operation or channels 26 through 30 with dual frequencies for half-duplex operation. The selected channel, frequency and modulation type (AM or FM) is displayed. The
operator may also select SINCGARS CU (CUE) channel 31. When selected,
CU and the frequency are displayed. SCAN mode is enabled when SCAN
is displayed and preset channels 22-25 are scanned. Preset channel 22 becomes the command channel and preset channels 23 through 25 are secondary scanned channels. When a signal is detected on a scanned channel,
the channel number and frequency is displayed. Pushing LOAD/OFST(No.
4) during scan mode will select the last active second and/or third channels.
Pushing the switch a fourth time will resume scanning operation. The same
ancillary modes described for manual (MAN) mode are also available in preset mode.
MAN
Rotating the switch to MAN enables manual selection of operating frequencies when used in conjunction with the pointer mode switch (No. 6) and ancillary mode switch (No. 7). The following are available in manual mode:
AM/FM
Identifies modulation to be used in the VHF band (136 155.985 MHz) or
UHF band (225 399.985 MHz).
SND/RCV
Used for over-the-air transfers between radios on the same frequency when
LOAD/OFST is pushed. HQ TOD may be transferred with the radio operating
frequency in the UHF range. SINCGARS ECCM remote fill may be transferred when the radio is operating in the low VHF range. This is also used for
TOD emergency start.
OFST
Enable selection of any frequency in the valid operating bands from 30 to 400
MHz in 5 kHz steps. Offsets of 0 kHz, 5 kHz and 10 kHz can be selected
after the pointer is placed in front of the OFST menu selection on the display,
and pushing the LOAD/OFST push-button switch to increment in 5 kHz
steps.
243
Rotating the switch to 243 UHF guard tunes the transmitter and main receiver
to 243.000 MHz(AM).
121
Pulling out and rotating the switch to 121 selects VHF guard tunes the transmitter and main receiver to 121.500 MHz (AM).
NOTE
Selecting 121 or 243 modes, will cause the manual frequency selector controls to become inoperative.
1-456
Change 10
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
FUNCTION
POINTER SWITCH
The pointer push-button switch is used to toggle on or off an arrow shaped

pointer, adjacent to the function indicator on the display module to select or
deselect an ancillary mode selected by the ancillary mode push-button
switch.
ANCILLARY MODE SWITCH
The ancillary mode push-button switch moves the cursor under the various
ancillary modes displayed on the function indicators. It is used with the pointer push-button switch to select and deselect ancillary modes.
Operational Mode Selector Switch
The operational mode switch is a rotary push-pull switch which selects zeroize (ZRO), power off (OFF), BIT (TEST), transmitter-receiver plus guard
(TR+G) mode, transmitter-receiver (TR) mode, automatic direction finding
(ADF)(not enabled), and change preset (CHNG/PRST) mode.
ZRO (zeroize)
Pulling out and rotating the switch to ZRO will completely erase (zeroize) the
ECCM constants and key variable from memory. The display (No. 2) will read
ZRO.
OFF
Rotating the switch to OFF turns off the radio power.
TEST
Rotating the switch to TEST initiates BIT of the control unit, receiver-transmitter, applique, logic converter and LOS antenna. A decimal will appear on
the display while the test is in progress. Any faults detected are displayed
(Section III COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTIONS, figure
3-19). If no faults are detected, the display will read 888.888 and all function
indicators on the front panel will be illuminated. The test routine is continuous
from start to finish; however, the operator may step through each test step
and display each step by pushing the LOAD/OFST push-button switch within
two seconds of selecting test mode. A three-digit failed assembly repair code
will appear in the frequency position of the display. The code will facilitate repair of a failed line repairable unit (LRU).
NOTE
Test mode takes precedence over all operations except 243 MHz
guard. It does not test the RF coaxial switch, high power amplifier
(HPA), the diplexer preamplifier, or the SATCOM antenna.
TR+G
Rotating the switch to TR+G selects main transmitter-receiver mode plus

guard mode. The main transmitter, receiver, and guard receiver are on and
able to perform all functions.
TR
Rotating the switch to TR selects main transmitter-receiver mode. The main

communications transmitter and receiver and are on and able to perform all
functions. The guard receiver is off.
(Continued)
1-457
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AN/ARC-210(V) Radio Controls and Indicators DJ

(Cont)
CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
FUNCTION
AN/ARC-210(V) RADIO CONTROL PANEL (Cont)
Operational Mode Selector Switch

(Cont)
ADF
The ADF mode is not enabled.
CHNG/PRST
Rotating the switch to CHNG/PRST enables the operator to load preset

channels, including COLD START and CUE, and their corresponding operating frequencies and modulation, into the receiver-transmitter memory. It also
loads the HQ ECCM net codes into the ECCM controller memory. Presets
may be loaded by the operator via the control unit using a AN/CYZ-10 data
transfer device (DTD).
NOTE
Although the V/UHF radio system in not configured for data, the AN/
ARC-210(V) is capable receiving preset channels using a MILSTD-1553B bus.
B
AN/ARC-210(V) RADIO SWITCH PANEL
FILL PORT
The key fill port loads ECCM fill into the CD-17/ARC-210(V) applique using
support equipment such as the DTD.
10
ANT Mode SEL Switch

(SATCOM LOS)
Used to select either SATCOM or LOS antenna modes.
11
HPA Disable Switch

(AUTO OFF)
The high power amplifier (HPA) is activated when the SATCOM antenna has
been selected. The operator can select to enable or disable the HPA using
the HPA push-button switch.
12
KY-RAD Select Radio

Lights
Light indicates the position of the KY/RAD switching unit as a result of either
the ARC-164 or the ARC-210 radio being selected on the COMSEC mode
panel at the Navigators station.
13
LAMP TEST Switch
A lamp test push-button indicator illuminates all the switches/annunciators

on the panel to ensure they are operating properly.
14
HPA Fault Light
The FAULT indicator will illuminate if the HPA has been enabled and there
is no aircraft power to the HPA, or when there is a HPA fault.
15
Antenna Select Switch

(UPPER LOWER)
Used to select either the low or high antenna elements.Selection is based

upon azimuth angle (elevation) from the aircraft to the satellite. Upper should
be selected from 90 (directly underneath the satellite) to 35 5 to 0 (extreme edges of the satellite footprints).
16
NVIS Panel Light Intensity Switch

(BRT, DIM, NVG) DQ
The three position switch controls panel light intensity of the AN/ARC-210 (V)
Radio Switch Panel. The BRT position is used in normal daylight, DIM is used
at night, and NVG is used when the pilots are wearing night vision goggles.
1-458
Change 4
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DAMA Remote Control Unit Controls and Indicators

DU
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
DISPLAY
SHIFT KEY
XFR/ACK KEY
HELP/MAIN KEY
ZEROIZE/NORM/BATT SAVE SWITCH
UP ARROW
DOWN ARROW
BRT/NVG KEY
FILL CONNECTOR
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
ENTR KEY
9 KEY
. DEL KEY
TEST 0 KEY
VIEW 8 KEY
ESC KEY
STAT 7 KEY
A THRU F/1 THRU 6 KEYS (6)
Change 21
1-458A
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DAMA Remote Control Unit Controls and Indicators

DU (Cont)
CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
1
Display
FUNCTION
Displays menu and operational information. First 11 characters in each row indicate menu
and option pages remaining 3 characters provide status information.
The Display includes the following six fixed annunciator lights:
ALRM
COMSEC subsystem Alarm
BYP
Orderwire Bypass, operating in plaintext mode
ZERO
COMSEC/TRANSEC subsystem has been zeroized
OTAR
Over-the-air-rekey has occurred
BIT
Built-In-Test (BIT) within the Modem has detected a fault.
BATT
The 9V battery within the Modem needs to be replaced
SHIFT Key
Accesses upper function of subsequent specified key.
XFR
XFR Transfers modem control to remote tenninal device (not available). Upper function.
ACK Key
ACK Acknowledges critical ALERT and ALARM messages. Press once to clear non-critical message, press twice to clear critical message.
HELP
HELP Displays HELP page for current menu or menu item selected. Upper function.
MAIN Key
MAIN Displays Main (Top) menu.
ZEROIZE/NORM/
BATT SAVE Switch
Provides the following functions:
4
5
ZEROIZE Zeroizes all COMSECTTRANSEC cryptokey variables

NORM Normal key retention of remote control unit and modem
BATT SAVE Deletes key variables and allows operation in battery-save mode
Up Arrow
Moves up one item at a time on a menu, up one page at a time on a multiple page menu.
Down Arrow
Moves down one item at a time on a menu. down one page at a time on a multiple page menu.
BRT
BRT Turns on/of unfiltered LCD backlighting with bright NVG keyboard lighting.
NVG Key
NVG Alters display for night vision goggles (NVG) by allowing operator to choose from
three different backlight levels.
FILL Connector
Allows connection to compatible COMSEC fill device such as AN/CYZ-10, KYK-I3,

KYX-15A, or KOI-181.
10
ENTR Key
Starts/selects desired operational mode or confirms/enters the menu selection displayed.
11
9 Key
9 Enters number 9 for numerical input.
. Enters a decimal point for numerical entry. Upper function.
DEL Key
DEL Moves cursor back one space.
TEST
TEST Allows self-test on RCU. Upper function.
0 Key
0 Allows entry of number 0 for numencal input.
VIEW
VIEW Adjusts the viewing angle through three increments covering sixty degrees. Upper
function.
8 Key
15
ESC Key
Returns to previous menu or exits a menu selection without saving entry.
16
STAT
STAT Displays current operating mode status. Upper function.
7 Key
AF
A F. Use hex characters to enter hexadecimal information. Upper function.
1 6 Keys (6)
1 6. Use numbered keys to enter numerical information.
12
13
14
17
Enters minus for input. Upper function.
1-458B
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DAMA Remote Control Unit Menus DU
Change 21
1-458C
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DAMA Remote Control Unit Menus DU (Cont)

DEDICATED MENU
1-458D
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
5k DAMA MENU (PARMS MENU)
Change 21
1-458E
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DAMA Remote Control Unit Menus DU (Cont)

5k DAMA MENU (OPS MENU)
1-458F
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
25k DAMA MENU

All data on page 1-458H (Deleted)
Change 21
1-458G/(1-458H blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
V/UHF RADIO NORMAL OPERATION
HAVE QUICK Operating Procedures
To put the set in operation:
To operate in anti-jamming (AJ) mode:
1. Operational Mode Selector OFF

2. Frequency Mode Selector MAN
3. Operational Mode Selector TEST
Display is blank except for decimal point while BIT
is in progress. Within 20 seconds, 888.888 and all
functions of the display are illuminated to indicate
that the system has successfully passed BIT. If the
display does not appear as described, BIT has isolated faults. Refer to V/UHF radio abnormal operation in section III.
4. Operational Mode Selector TR
5. Frequency Mode Selector Set to desired
frequency
6. VOL/SQ OFF IN and adjusted as desired

2. WOD Enter
WOD can be loaded manually using MWOD loading
or by the single WOD loading method. WOD can also be loaded using a DTD.
NOTE
On initial power-up, radio set automatically

accepts first TOD message received. Subsequent TOD transmissions are ignored.
The radio set is now ready to transmit and

receive.
To select preset channel:
2. Frequency Mode Selector PRST
3. CHAN/FREQ CRSR Set to desired channel
Frequency display shows correct preset frequency
for the desired channel.
NOTE
Channel 20 is reserved for loading single

WODs and MWOD mode operating data.
To select frequency manually:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Operational Mode Selector TR

Frequency Mode Selector MAN
CHAN/FREQ CRSR Set to desired frequency
LOAD/OFST Push
NOTE
To verify that correct frequencies are loaded

for each channel rotate CHAN/FREQ CRSR
switch clockwise from channel 1 through
30. The correct frequency should be displayed for each channel selected.
NOTE
To load MWOD using AN/CYZ-10 data

transfer device (DTD) follow the appropriate DTD loading procedures for DTDs with
limited or full keypads.
3.
TOD Enter
NOTE
a. Request TOD from another station in the

network
b. Frequency Mode Selector MAN or PRST
c. CHAN/FREQ CRSR Select predesignated
frequency for TOD transfer
d. Ancillary Mode/Pointer Switches RCV
e. LOAD/OFST Switch Push
NOTE
4.
If time is being automatically beaconed, the

first TOD message received within one minute of pushing LOAD/OFST switch will be
accepted.
If TOD is not available from a coordinated
timing source or from any other source
within your network, perform a TOD emergency clock start.
Net Number Enter
a. Frequency Mode Selector AJ
b. CHAN/FREQ/CRSR Enter Net
To transmit and receive on the guard frequency:

1. Operational Mode Selector TR+G
2. Frequency Mode Selector Set to 121
(VHF guard) or 243 (UHF guard)
All control panel controls except VOL should be disabled.
Change 10
1-459
T.O. 1B-52H-1
To receive time-of-day (TOD):
NOTE
On initial power-up, the radio automatically

accepts the first TOD message received.
Subsequent TOD transmissions are ignored.
1. Request TOD from another station in the
network
2. Frequency Mode Selector MAN
3. CHAN/FREQ CRSR Select predesignated
4. Ancillary Mode/Pointer Switches RCV
5. LOAD/OFST Switch Push
3.
Ancillary/Pointer Switches Select both SND
and RCV
This resets the HQ master clock to zero and restarts it to provide a timing reference.
NOTE
This new TOD is arbitrary and will not be

synchronized to coordinate time (UTC). The
radio set will not communicate with any
other ECCM-equipped radio sets in AJ
mode unless this new TOD is transmitted
to other radio sets.
MWOD FUNCTIONS AND DISPLAYS
Code Number
Function
220.000
Verify code/
Operate using code
MWOD Load
MWOD Erase
Training MWOD Load
NOTE

first TOD message received within one minute of pushing LOAD/OFST switch will be
accepted.
To update Time-Of-Day (TOD):
NOTE
Slightly garbled but otherwise acceptable

communications during AJ operations is an
indication of drift in TOD synchronization.
A TOD update to resynchronize radio set
can be performed while in AJ mode. (Only
time tick will be transferred.)
1. Request TOD from another station in the
network
2. Frequency Mode Selector AJ
3. CHAN/FREQ CRSR Select predesignated
4. Ancillary Mode/Pointer Switches RCV
Time-of-Day Emergency Start:
NOTE
To use the V/UHF radio as a TOD reference,

the receiver/transmitters internal clock
must be initialized.
220.025
220.050
220.075
To load MWOD using manual method:

1. Operational Mode Selector CHNG/PRST
3. CHAN/FREQ CRSR Set to channel 20,
frequency 220.025
The display will read 20 00.000
5. CHAN/FREQ CRSR Enter first MWOD
segment
NOTE
A MWOD is complete whenever a 2 is

loaded in the hundred MHz position, i.e.
2XX.XXX. The last two digits of element 20
determine the hop rate (00 for the slowest
rate, 75 for the fastest).
A beep will be heard and the display will decrement
to the next element to be loaded. The display will
read: 1900.000
7. Repeat steps 3 through 5 for the second element of WOD.
NOTE
1. Frequency Mode Selector Select MAN or

PRST
NOTE
AJ or AJ/M modes may not be used.

2. CHAN/FREQ CRSR Select frequency while
in manual or preset mode
1-460
In multiple element (MWOD) load, element

19 designates whether the WOD will be in
the CONFERENCE mode. For CONFERENCE mode selection, enter 00 or 50 in the
last two digits of the segment, i.e. XXX-X00.
For non-CONFERENCE selection enter 25
or 75 as the last two digits.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
A beep will be heard and the display will decrement
to the next element to be loaded. The display will
read: 1800.000
9. Repeat steps 3 through 5 for the remaining
segments of WOD until channels 20 through 15
have been loaded.
The display will read: 14 0 0
10. CHAN/FREQ CRSR Enter two-digit DOM
A double beep will be heard when DOM has been
loaded and the display will cycle back to the initial
MWOD display. The display will read: 20 220.025
12. Repeat steps 10 and 11 for remaining MWODs.
NOTE
Up to six MWODs may be stored for HQ II.

NOTE
The erase mode is used to clear the memory

of all MWOD segments by automatically
setting them to zero.
Frequency Mode Selector PRST
CHAN/FREQ CRSR Select channel 20
Operational Mode Selector CHNG/PRST
LOAD/OFST Switch Push
NOTE
MWOD is now erased.

6.
To load single WOD:

During transition from single to multiple WOD operation, the single WOD loading method is still
available. Using this method, WOD elements are
entered into preset channels 20 through 15. The
WOD may vary in length and may require from one
to six of these channels, starting with channel 20
and digressing to 15.
3. CHAN/FREQ CRSR Set to channel 20, frequency 220.025
5. CHAN/FREQ CRSR Enter WOD segment
NOTE
To erase MWOD:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
beep will be heard if a MWOD has not been loaded

for the selected date.
To verify MWOD date code:

3. CHAN/FREQ CRSR Select channel 20.
5. CHAN/FREQ CRSR Select frequency of
220.00
The display will read 20 0 0.
7. CHAN/FREQ CRSR Enter two-digit DOM to
be verified
A double beep will be heard to indicate that a
MWOD has been loaded for the selected date. No
A WOD is complete when a 3 is loaded in

the hundred MHz position, i.e. 3XX.XXX.
The last two digits of element 20, determine
the hop rate (00 for the slowest rate, 75 for
the fastest).
A beep will sound and the display will decrement to
the next element to be loaded.
7. Repeat steps 3 through 5 for the remaining
segments of WOD, or until channels 20 through 15
have been loaded.
The display will read: 14 0 0 .
To load current operating date for HQ WOD/
MWOD:
This is used to initialize the HQ WOD/MWOD associated with that day of month.
2. CHAN/FREQ CRSR Set to preset channel 20
4. CHAN/FREQ CRSR Set frequency to 220.125
5. LOAD/OFST Switch Push 1
The display will read 20 0 0 .
6. CHAN/FREQ CRSR Enter 2-digit day of
month
00 represents WOD mode, 01 through 31 represents
the date in which each WOD is valid for MWOD
mode operation.
1-461
T.O. 1B-52H-1
To load HQ I Training Net:
The HQ I training net can be used for maintenance
or training. The HQ I training net consists of a oneelement WOD and five operating frequencies. A HQ
I training net is always in the conferencing mode,
therefore, an operating frequency of 225 MHz shall
not be used. An offset (-25 MHz) would put the operating frequency out of the V/UHF radio operating
band.
frequency 220.025
7. CHAN/FREQ CRSR Enter first operating
frequency
9. Repeat steps 7 through 8 until all 5 operating
frequencies are loaded.
A double beep will sound.
To load HQ II Training Net:

9. Repeat steps 7 through 8 until all 16 operating
frequencies are loaded.
A double beep will sound.
WOD SEGMENTS FOR TRAINING/MAINTENANCE
For training and/or maintenance, use WOD assigned by the operating command. If unassigned,
use the following WOD segments with the corresponding memory locations. The WOD may be
loaded using either the single or MWOD loading
method.
MWOD FUNCTIONS AND DISPLAYS
Channel
20
19
18
17
16
15
14
WOD Element
300.500
376.000
359.100
314.300
297.600
297.400
Date Code (MWOD only)
DTD Loading Procedures (With Full Keypad)

NOTE
Should an alarm occur or an error message

be displayed, return the device to the issuing authority.
The HQ II training net can be used for maintenance or training. The HQ II training net consists
of a MWOD and 16 operating frequencies. A HQ II
training net is always in the CONFERENCE mode,
therefore, an operating frequency of 225 MHz shall
not be used. An offset (-25 MHz) would put the operating frequency out of the V/UHF radio operating
band.
1. Operational Mode Selector ZRO

Radios set is zeroized.
3. DTD ON/OFF key Push
Main menu will be displayed after up to 30 seconds
start-up time.

frequency 220.075
7. CHAN/FREQ CRSR Enter first operating
frequency
NOTE
1-462
If the Consolidated Single Channel Radio

ECCM Package (CSEP) application is not
set as default application, push C. If the
CSEP application is set as the default application and the CSEP master menu is displayed, proceed to the next step.
4. Main Menu Push ENTR key
Selects APPL.
5. C Key Push
Selects CSEP.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
6. Down Arrow Key Push
This acknowledges that the maximum classification
of keys, WODs, MWODs in the CSEP data base is
displayed in the lower right corner of the screen.
7. CSEP Menu Push ENTR
Selects SEND load option.
8. CSEP Menu Push A
Selects ARC-210 radio. ARC-210 fill files will be
displayed.
9. CSEP Master Menu Use [PUP] or [PDN]
keys to select the desired fill record and push ENTR
Display will read: Connect to device and press SND.
10. Connect DTD to the AN/ARC-210(V) switch
panel fill port Push SEND
The following three prompts will be displayed in sequence: Attempting to connect radio number 30,
Transfer to radio 30 in progress, and ARC-210 Data
Transfer to Radio 30 Successful. No action is necessary until the last prompt is displayed.
NOTE
It the prompt displayed reads: Radio 30

Failed, check to make sure that the address
was correct, the V/UHF radio set is powered
up and repeat steps 7 through 10.
11. ABORT Key Push
CSEP master menu will be exited.
12. ON/OFF Key Push
13. Disconnect DTD From the AN/ARC-210(V)
Switch Panel Fill Port.
SATCOM Operating Procedures
Preset channels 26 through 30 have been designated for UHF SATCOM operation. Those channels
must be programmed with separate UHF FM transmit and receive frequencies.
NOTE
Refer to loading preset channel procedures

(manual or with DTD) to program preset
channels 26 through 30 with SATCOM frequencies.
SINCGARS Operating Procedures
To view the SINCGARS net time and if desired alter the SINCGARS base time manually:
1. Operational Mode Selector TR, TR+G or ADF
2. Frequency Mode Selector AJ or AJ/M
3. CHAN/FREQ CRSR Select a SINCGARS
channel
4. Ancillary Mode and Pointer Switches Select
TIME
The SINCGARS net time for the channel is displayed in days, hours, and minutes (DD HH:MM)
NOTE
The time displayed during COLD START

mode is the SINCGARS base time. If
SINCGARS base time is not intended to be
altered, do not push the LOAD/OFST pushbutton. If the LOAD/OFST button is accidently pushed, the SINCGARS base time
will be corrupted. Deselect the time display
by pushing the pointer push-button.
5. CHAN/FREQ CRSR Enter new time as
DD HH:MM
To enter SINCGARS net using late entry:
All variables such as hopset, lockout set and
TRANSEC
variables
must
be
pre-loaded.
SINCGARS base time must be manually loaded using the previous procedure and be within one minute of net SINCGARS time to work.
LE
SINCGARS base time will be updated by the next
transmission of a net synchronized radio. Late entry mode will exit automatically when the radio is
synchronized and normal SINCGARS communication is now possible on that SINCGARS channel or
net.
1. Operational Mode Selector TR or TR+G

3. CHAN/FREQ CRSR Switch Select desired
SATCOM preset channel
4. Key Transmitter
Establish two-way communication with a station.
1-463
T.O. 1B-52H-1
To send/receive SINCGARS ERF:
SINCGARS ERF data may be transferred over a
SINCGARS channel (including the cold start channel) in AJ or AJ/M modes.
NOTE
Both the transmitting and receiving radios

must be set for compatible communication
conditions and have a common TRANSEC
variable and SINCGARS net time.
SND to transmit or RCV to receive
A 01 in the channel position (represents the set
number) and prevent hopset and lockout set menu
options are displayed.
2. CHAN/FREQ CRSR Switch Select the
desired set number to be transferred if other
than 01
3. LOAD/OFST Switch (Receiving Radio) Push
The receiving radios display returns to, and operates in, the state it was in prior to ERF and accepts
ERF as it arrives. Data tones are heard in the
headset when ERF is received. A beep sounds in
the headset if ERF was received without errors and
successfully stored in the applique.
4. LOAD/OFST Switch (Transmitting Radio) Push
Data tones are heard in the headset when ERF is
transmitted.
5. LOAD/OFST Switch (Receiving Radio) Push
The transmitting radios display returns to and operates in the state it was in prior to ERF transmission.
To send/receive SINCGARS ERF over the cold start

channel:
2. CHAN/FREQ CRSR Switch CS displayed
3. Operational Mode Selector Select CHNG
PRST
4. CHAN/FREQ CRSR Switch Select valid cold
start operating frequency
5. Operational Mode Selector TR or TR+G
Establish two-way communications with a similarly
equipped SINCGARS radio to request ERF parameters. The radio is now ready for ERF.
To enter a SINCGARS radio net for which you are
not an active member using SINCGARS cue:
1. Frequency Mode Selector PRST or AJ
2. CHAN/FREQ CRSR Switch CU displayed
3. CHAN/FREQ CRSR Switch Select valid
SINCGARS cue frequency
A short tone sounds in the headset and a c is displayed when signal is received on the SINCGARS
cue frequency.
NOTE
To communicate with the station transmitting the cue, rotate the CHAN/FREQ CRSR
switch until CU is displayed.
To operate in SINCGARS mode:
1. Ensure that SINCGARS data has been loaded
by DTD or ERF
2. Frequency Mode Selector AJ or AJ/M
3. CHAN/FREQ CRSR Switch Select authorized
SINCGARS channel
Two way communication can now be established
with another station on the selected net.
NOTE
Test mode takes precedence over all operations except 243 MHz guard.
1-464
T.O. 1B-52H-1
To check V/UHF radio using Built in TEST Mode:
1.
2.
Operational Mode Selector Switch Set OFF

Operational Mode Selector Switch Set TR+G,
then TEST
Display is blank except for decimal point while
BIT is in progress. Within 20 seconds, 888.888
and all functions of the display are illuminated
to indicate that the system has successfully
passed BIT. If the display does not appear as
described, BIT has isolated faults. Refer to V/
UHF radio abnormal operation in Section III.
3.
4.
3.
Frequency Mode Selector Switch Set MAN

CHAN/FREQ CRSR Switch Press until
cursor is below desired frequency digit
CHAN/FREQ CRSR Switch Rotate until
desired value is obtained.
Repeat for each digit until desired operating
frequency is selected
4.
For channels 26 through 30 SATCOM (Half

Duplex) the operator must use the ancillary
mode cursor and pointer to select SND for the
transmit frequency (UPLINK) and RCV for
the receive frequency (DOWNLINK). As each
is selected. LOAD/OFST Switch Press to
program the frequency into the corresponding
channel.
NOTE

Operational Mode Selector Switch Set TR
To put the set in normal operation, on a preset frequency:
1.
2.
9.
VOL/SQ OFF Switch Set IN and adjusted as

desired
Radio is now ready to transmit and receive.
To verify that correct frequencies are loaded

for each channel, rotate CHAN/FREQ
CRSR switch clockwise from 1 thru 30. The
correct frequency should be displayed for
each channel selected.
Channels 22 through 25 are used in SCAN
operations, but may be used as regular
presets.
Channels 26 through 30 are reserved for
NONDAMA Voice SATCOM operating frequencies.
Channel 31 is reserved for the SINCGARS
CUE Channel.
Channel 32 selects the SCAN mode.
Channels 36 through 40 are reserved for
DAMA Voice SATCOM operating channels.
To select preset channels:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Operational Mode Selector Switch Set CHNG

PRST
Frequency Mode Selector Switch Set PRST
CHAN/FREQ CRSR Switch Rotate to obtain
desired channel indication on CHAN display
CHAN/FREQ CRSR Switch Press until
cursor is below desired frequency digit
frequency is selected
6.
7.
If necessary, use the ancillary mode cursor and

pointer to select the type of modulation
LOAD/OFST Switch Press
1.
2.
3.

CHAN/FREQ CRSR Switch Set desired
frequency.

1.
2.
Operational Mode Selector Switch Set TR+G

or TR
Frequency Mode Selector Switch Set 243
(UHF GUARD) or by pulling and rotating the
Mode Select Switch for 121 (VHF GUARD)
All control panel controls except VOL should
be disabled.
Press after desired frequency and desired

modulation is obtained,
Frequency display shows correct preset
frequency for the desired channel.
8.
Repeat for each preset channel to be loaded.
Change 8
1-464A
T.O. 1B-52H-1
HAVE QUICK Operating Procedures
1. The following procedures will allow the operator to access many of the HAVE QUICK ancillary
functions as well as operate the radio in the HAVE
QUICK mode.
2. A HAVE QUICK preset channel is represented
by the symbols HQ I or HQ II in the upper right
hand corner of the V/UHF control display. The radio
can store up to 25 HAVE QUICK preset channels.
One WOD or SIX MWODs can be stored in the radio. Depending on whether the radio is in WOD or
MWOD mode the current WOD or MWOD is global.
This means that all HAVE QUICK channels (HQ I
or HQ II) will go active on the currently selected
WOD or MWOD. In the case of the MWOD mode
the MWOD is selected by the operational day. For
WOD mode the WOD is always selected and is not
dependent on the operational day.
3. The radio selection of WOD or MWOD mode is
determined by one of the following:
a. Loading operational day.
(1) Loading a day of 1 to 31, then the radio
is in MWOD mode.
(2) Loading a day of 0, the radio is in WOD
mode.
b. Loading a WOD (date tag = 0), the radio is
in WOD mode.
c. Loading a MWOD (date tag = 1 to 31), the
radio is in MWOD mode.
4. For HAVE QUICK communications to take
place the TOD. WOD. and NET NUMBER
must be identical in all radios. If HAVE
QUICK II training nets are used then the FMT
frequencies must be identical.
To operate in antijamming (AJ) HAVE QUICK
mode:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Initialize time by one of the following methods.

a. Emergency Time start
b. Receive Time over the air
Load operational day if operation is in MWOD
mode.
If RADIO has been loaded via AN/CYZ10 go
to step 7.
Load WOD or MWODS. One or up to 6
MWODS can be loaded.
For HAVE QUICK II training nets Load HAVE
QUICK II FMT frequencies.
Load HAVE QUICK net ID numbers. For
combat nets, net numbers AOO.OXX to
A99.9XX (XX equal to 00,25 or 50) are allowed.
For training nets, net numbers 000.100 to
A00.400 for HAVE QUICK I and A00.025 to
AO1.525 for HAVE QUICK II are allowed.
1-464B
Change 8
7.
Make sure to take operational mode Selector

Switch out of CHNG PRST position after
loading the net number.
Operational Mode Selector Switch Select AJ,
the radio should go active and communicate in
HAVE QUICK at this time. If at this time
HAVE QUICK communication is not possible,
examine the radio set control and take
appropriate action.
Proper HAVE QUICK net display with no communication could be caused by wrong TOD,
WOD or MWOD.
no day indicates the operational date was not
loaded or wrong day was received via over the
air transfer.
no fill can indicate one of the following: WOD
or MWOD not loaded, invalid HAVE QUICK
net ID loaded( combat net ID loaded with
training WOD or MWOD), or No HAVE
QUICK II FMT frequencies.
no fill with > TIME indicates time has not
been initialized.
indicates the ECCM channel not filled (no
net definition).
LOADING TIME-OF-DAY (TOD) OPERATION

NOTE
On initial powerup, radio set automatically

accepts first TOD message received. Subsequent TOD transmissions are ignored unless TOD update procedures are used.
To use the V/UHF radio as a TOD reference,
the radios internal clock must be initialized.
To transfer TOD over the air:
1.
2.
3.
First establish a communication link between

two radios. If the transfer is done in manual or
preset modes, the entire time is passed (Day,
Hour, Seconds, and Fractions of Seconds). If
the transfer is done in AJ or AJ/M modes only
the fractional portion of the time is
transferred.
To send TOD, the operator will use the
ancillary mode and pointer switches to
select SND.
To receive TOD, the operator will use the
ancillary mode and pointer switches to
select RCV
T.O. 1B-52H-1
4.
5.
The operator receiving TOD Presses the

LOAD/OFST switch
The operator sending TOD then has 60 seconds
to press the LOAD/OFST switch to initiate
the TOD transfer.
NOTE
If a DTD is being used to load ECCM data,

Anti-Jam presets may already be loaded,
making manual assignment unnecessary.
To update Time-Of-Day (TOD):
To enter a NET NUMBER:

1.
2.
3.
To load WOD/MWOD using manual method:

WOD/MWOD FUNCTIONS AND DISPLAYS
CODE NUMBER
NOTE

A TOD update to resynchronize the radio
can be performed while in AJ mode (Only
the Fractional portion of the time tick will
be transferred).
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Request TOD from another station in the

network
Frequency Mode Selector Switch Set AJ
CHAN/FREQ CRSR Switch Select
predesignated frequency for TOD transfer
Ancillary Mode Cursor Switch Press until
cursor is under RCV
Pointer switch Press until RCV is selected
A short tone is heard when TOD reception is
successful.
220.000
220.025
220.050
220.075
220. 125
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
2.
3.
On the radio set control select any frequency

while in the normal or preset mode. The
frequency selection is not band dependent (AJ
or AJ/M modes may not be used).
Using the ancillary mode and pointer switches,
select both SND and RCV functions.
This HAVE QUICK master clock is reset to
zero and restarted to provide a timing reference.
9.
FUNCTION
Verify code/Operate using code
HQWOD/MWODLOAD
WOD/MWOD Erase
HQ II FMTLOAD
Operational Date Load
Operational Mode Selector Switch Set TR or

TR+G
CHAN/FREQ CRSR Switch Set Channel 20
PRST
CHAN/FREQ CRSR Switch Set Frequency of
220.025
CHAN/FREQ/NET/TIME display should
display the following:
CHAN
20
TOD Emergency Start:
1.

PRST
CHAN/FREQ CRSR Switch Enter NET
NUMBER.
FREQ/NET/TIME
200.000
Enter the first segment of WOD. The segment

consists of six digits. Select digit by pressing
CHAN/FREQ CRSR switch until cursor is
below desired digit. Rotate CHAN/FREQ
CRSR switch until desiredvalue is obtained.
Repeat for each digit until desired WOD
segment is selected. The last two digits of
segment 20 determine the hop rate (00 for the
slowest, 75 for the fastest).
LOAD/OFST Switch Press when entry is
complete.
A short tone should be heard in the headset.
10. CHAN FREQ/NET/TIME display should dislay

the following:
CHAN
19
FREQ/NET/TIME
300.000
Change 8
1-464C
T.O. 1B-52H-1
11. Enter the second segment of WOD using the
CHAN/FREQ CRSR switch in the same
manner as the first segment. In a multiple
segment load, segment 19 designates if the
WOD is in conference mode. For conference
mode selection, enter 00 or 50 in the last two
digits of the segment.
12. LOAD/OFST Switch Press when entry is
complete.
13. CHAN FREQ/NET/TIME display should dislay
the following:
CHAN
18
FREQ/NET/TIME
00
17. For HAVE QUICK II MWOD, rotate CHAN/

FREQ switch to select two digit day of the
month (01 through 31). For HAVE QUICK
WOD. display remains at 00.
18. LOAD/OFST Switch Press
A double tone should be heard in the headset.
19. CHAN FREQ/NET/TIME display should
CHAN
20
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
FREQ/NET/TIME
300.000
14. Remaining Segments (channels 18

through 15) Enter in same manner
15. LOAD/OFST Switch Press when entry is
complete.
16. The CHAN FREQ/NET/TIME display should
display two digits (00 through 31) as follows:
CHAN
14
To erase MWOD:
FREQ/NET/TIME
220.025

frequency is selected.
7.
For HAVE QUICK II, Repeat steps 6

through 15 for the remaining five MWOD.
For HAVE QUICK the WOD load is complete.
20. Operational Mode Selector Switch Set TR or

TR+G
NOTE

of all MWOD segments by automatically
setting them to zero.
1-464D
Change 8

MWOD has been erased.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

TR+G
CHAN/FREQ CRSR Switch Select channel
20
PRST
220.000
CHAN FREQ/NET/TIME display should
CHAN
20
8.
NOTE

TR+G
20
PRST
220.050
9.
FREQ/NET/TIME
00
Enter day of month to be verified (00 for HQ,

01 through 31 for HQ II) by rotating the
CHAN/FREQ CRSR switch
A double tone indicates MWOD loaded for that
day. No tone indicates no MWOD loaded.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
4.
To load single WOD:

NOTE
During transition from single to multiple

WOD operation, the single WOD loading
method is still available. Using this method,
WOD elements are entered into preset
channels 20 thru 15. The WOD may vary in
length and may require from one to six of
these channels, starting with channel 20
and digressing to 15.
1.
2.
3.
4.

PRST
20 select frequency 220.025.
5.
6.
7.

PRST
CHAN/FREQ CRSR Switch Set operating
frequency of 220.125
CHAN FREQ/NET/TIME display should
CHAN
20
8.
9.
CHAN/FREQ CRSR Switch Rotate to select

two digit day of month (01 through 31)
10. Date is loaded

To load HQ I Training Net:
20 00.000 is displayed.
5.
NOTE

desired value is obtained. Repeat for each digit
until desired operating frequency is selected.
The HQ I training net can be used for maintenance or training. The HQ I training net
consists of a one element WOD and five operating frequencies. A HQ I training net is
always in the conferencing mode; therefore,
an operating frequency of 225 MHz shall
not be used. An offset ( 25 MHz) would put
the operating frequency out of the V/UHF
radio operating band.
NOTE
A WOD is complete whenever a 3 is loaded

in the hundred MHz position; i.e.,
3XX.XXX. The last two digits of element 20,
determine the hop rate (00 for the slowest
rate, 75 for the fastest).
1.
A beep will sound and the display will

decrement to the next element to be loaded.
2.
3.
7. Repeat steps 3 thru 5 for the remaining segments

of WOD. or until channels 20 thru 15 have
been loaded.
4.
14 0 0 is displayed.
8.
To load current operational date for HQ WOD/MWOD:
1.
2.
3.

TR+G
20
FREQ/NET/TIME
00
5.
6.
7.

TR+G
20
PRST
CHAN
20
8.
FREQ/NET/TIME
200.000
Digit To Be Changed Select by pressing

CHAN/FREQ CRSR switch until cursor is
below desired digit.
Change 8
1-464E
T.O. 1B-52H-1
10. CHAN/FREQ CRSR Switch Rotate until
desired value is obtained. Repeat for each digit
until 300.0XX (where XX is the hopping rate,
00 for the slowest, 75 for the fastest) is
entered.
A short tone is heard in headset. And
CHAN
19
A short tone should be heard in the headset

and the display channel should decrement to
the next channel.
14. Remaining Four Frequencies Enter in the
same manner as first operating frequency
15. LOAD/OFST Press when each entry is
completed.
A short tone will be heard each time.
16. CHAN/FREQ/NET/TIME display should
display two digits (00 through 31) as follows:
FREQ/NET/TIME
00
16. For HQ II MWOD, enter two digit day of

month. For HQ WOD, display remains at 00.
A double tone will be produced indicating
completion of the load.
To load HQ II FMT Training Net:
NOTE
HQ II training net consists of 16 operating

frequencies. A HQ II training net is always
in conference mode; therefore an operating
frequency of 225.000 MHz cannot be used.
The 25KHz offset would be out of the operating band.
1.

TR+G
1-464F
Change 8
4.
5.
6.

20
PRST
FREQ/NET/TIME
300.000
12. First Operating Frequency Enter using

CHAN
14
2.
3.
CHAN
20
7.
8.
FREQ/NET/TIME
300.000
First Operating Frequency Enter using the

A short tone will be heard in the headset and
the display should decrement to the next channel.
9.
Remaining 15 Frequencies Enter in the

same manner as first operating frequency
10. LOAD/OFST Press when each entry is
completed.
A short tone will be heard each time until the
last frequency entry, when no tone will be
produced.
WOD SEGMENTS FOR TRAINING/MAINTENANCE.
For training and/or maintenance, use WOD assigned by the operating command. If unassigned,
use the following WOD segments with the corresponding memory locations. The WOD may be
loaded using either the single or MWOD loading
method.
CHANNEL
20
19
18
17
16
15
14
WOD ELEMENT
300.050
376.000
359.100
314.300
297.600
287.400
DATE CODE(MWOD ONLY)
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DTD LOADING PROCEDURES (WITH FULL
KEYPAD)
1.
Operational Mode Selector Switch Set ZRO

Radio is zeroized.
2.
3.

TR+G
DTD Power Switch ON
12. SEND Press

The following three prompts will be displayed
in sequence: Attempting to connect radio
number 30. Transfer to radio 30 in progress
and ARC-210 Data Transfer to radio 30
Successful. No action is necessary until
the last prompt is displayed.
NOTE
Main menu will be displayed after approximately 30 seconds startup time.
If the prompt displayed reads: Radio 30

failed, check to make sure that the address
was correct, the V/UHF radio set is powered up and check to make sure fill cable is
properly connected then repeat steps 7 thru
12.
NOTE
If the Consolidated Single Channel Radio

ECCM Package (CSEP) application is not
set as default application, Press C. If the
CSEP application is set as the default and
the CSEP master menu is displayed, proceed to step. 6.
4.
ENTR Key Press

Selects APPL.
5.
DOWN Arrow Key Press

This acknowledges that the maximum classification of keys, WODs. MWODs in the CSEP
data base is displayed in the lower right corner
of the screen.
7.
CSEP Master menu will be exited.

14. DTD ON/OFF Key Press
15. DTD Disconnect from the AN/ARC-210(V)
switch panel fill port.
NON DAMA SATCOM OPERATING PROCEDURES.
C Key Press
Selects CSEP.
6.
13. ABORT Key Press
ENTR On CSEP Menu Press
NOTE
Selects send mode.

8.
A On CSEP Menu Press

Selects ARC-210 radio. ARC-210 fill files will
be displayed.
9.
CSEP MASTER MENU use (PUP) or (P DN)

keys to select the desired fill record
10. ENTR Key Press
11. DTD Connect to the AN/ARC-210(V) switch
panel fill port
1.
2.
3.
4.
Preset channels 26 thru 30 have been

designated for UHF SATCOM operation.
Those channels must be programmed with
separate UHF FM transmit and receive frequencies.
Refer to loading preset channel procedures
(manual or with DTD) to program preset
channels 26 thru 30 with SATCOM
frequencies.
TR+G
CHAN/FREQ CRSR Switch Set desired
SATCOM preset channel
Key transmitter and establish two-way
communications.
Change 8
1-464G
T.O. 1B-52H-1
SINCGARS OPERATING PROCEDURES
NOTE
5.
To view the SINCGARS net time and, if

desired, alter the SINCGARS base time
manually.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
CHAN
01

TR+G
Frequency Mode Selector Switch Set AJ or
AJ/M
SINCGARS channel (indicated by a small s
displayed in the upper right corner of the
display) Select using the CHAN/FREQ CRSR
switch
TIME Select using ancillary mode cursor and
pointer switches
CHAN FREQ/NET/TIME display will display
days, hours, and minutes (DD HH:MM) as
follows.
6.
CHAN
01
7.
FREQ/NET/TIME
07:00
CHAN FREQ/NET/TIME display will display

days, hours, and minutes (DD HH:MM) as
follows.
FREQ/NET/TIME
07:00
NOTE
In the case of cold start operation, the time

displayed is the SINCGARS BASE TIME.
If the SINCGARS BASE TIME is not intended to be altered, do not LOAD/OFST
Switch Press If the LOAD/OFST is unintentionally depressed, the SINCGARS
BASE TIME will be corrupted. Deselect the
time display by depressing the pointer
switch.
CHAN/FREQ CRSR Switch Enter new time
in days, hours, and minutes.
To enter SINCGARS net using late entry:

NOTE
6.
7.
NOTE
In the case of cold start operation, the time

displayed is the SINCGARS BASE TIME.
The following procedure allows the operator

to enter into a SINCGARS net without prior
precise time synchronization. This procedure assumes that SINCGARS data such as
HOPSET, LOCKOUT SET, and TRANSEC
VARIABLE has previously been loaded.
SINCGARS base time must be manually
loaded using the previous procedure and be
within 1 minute of net SINCGARS time to
work.
If the SINCGARS BASE TIME is not intended to be altered, do not LOAD/OFST

Switch Press If the LOAD/OFST is unintentionally depressed, the SINCGARS
BASE TIME will be corrupted. Deselect the
time display by depressing the pointer
switch.
CHAN/FREQ CRSR Switch Enter new time
in days, hours. and minutes
1.
To view the SINCGARS net time and, if desired, alter the

SINCGARS base time manually.
1.
2.
3.
4.

TR+G
Frequency Mode Selector Switch Set AJ or
AJ/M
SINCGARS channel (indicated by a small s
displayed in the upper right corner of the
display) Select using the CHAN/FREQ CRSR
switch
TIME Select using ancillary mode cursor and
pointer switches.
1-464H
Change 8
2.
With the SINCGARS Mode selected, use the

preceding procedure to manually load the
SINCGARS Base Time . The SINCGARS Base
Time must be within one minute of net
SINCGARS Time.
Using the ancillary mode and pointer Press
buttons, select late entry LE mode and Press
the LOAD/OFST switch. SINCGARS Base
Time will be updated by the next transmission
of a net synchronized radio. Late entry mode
will exit automatically when the radio is
synchronized and normal SINCGARS commu
nication is now possible on that SINCGARS
channel or net.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
To send/receive SINCGARS ERF:
NOTE
1.
SINCGARS ERF data may be transferred

over SINCGARS channel (including the
cold start channel) in AJ or AJ/M modes.
To send/receive SINCGARS ERF over cold start channel:
1.
2.
3.
Both the transmitting and receiving radios

must be set for compatible communication
conditions and have a common TRANSEC
variable and SINCGARS net time.
4.
Ancillary Mode & Pointer Switches Set to

SND or RCV
6.
5.
A 01 in the channel position (represents the set

number) and prevent hopset and lockout set
menu options are displayed.
2.
3.
CHAN/FREQ CRSR Switch Select the

desired set number to be transferred if other
than 01.
On Receiving Radio LOAD/OFST Switch
Press
The receiving radios display returns to, and
operates in, the state it was prior to ERF and
accepts ERF as it arrives. Data tones sound in
the headset if ERF is received. A beep sounds
in the headset if ERF was received without errors and successfully stored in the radio.
4.
On Transmitting Radio LOAD/OFST Switch

Press
The radio is now ready for ERF.

To enter a SINCGARS radio net, for which you are
not an active member, using SINCGARS cue:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
CHAN/FREQ CRSR Switch Rotate to select a

valid SINCGARS CUE frequency
When signal is received on the SINCGARS
CUE frequency, a short tone will be heard in
the headset and a c (small c) will be displayed on the CHAN/FREQ/NET/TIME display.
On Receiving Radio LOAD/OFST Switch

Press
The transmitting radios display returns to and
operates in the state it was in prior to ERF
transmission.
Frequency Mode Selector Switch Set to PRST

or AJ
CHAN/FREQ CRSR Switch Rotate to
Channel 31
CU is displayed.
Data tones sound in the headset when ERF is

transmitted.
5.
Frequency Mode Selector Switch Set to AJ.

30 with CS displayed.
PRST
Valid Cold Start Operating Frequency Set
using the CHAN/FREQ CRSR switch.
TR+G
Establish two-way communications with a
similarly equipped SINCGARS radio to request
ERF parameters.
6.
To communicate with station transmitting the

CUE go to channel 31
DAMA SATCOM OPERATING PROCEDURES DU
Refer to T.O. 1B-52H-1-12 Section II for detailed

DAMA SATCOM Operations.
Change 8
1-464J
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NOTE
KY-100 NORMAL TURN-ON DU
This is the abbreviated procedure only. The complete procedure with all its amplifications can be
found in T.O. 1B-52H-1-12, Section II.
Keep personnel clear of the antenna during

operation. Do not key transmitter during
fueling operation or when oxygen is being
serviced. Personnel injury or aircraft damage could result.
If at least one valid key is stored in the

KY-100, the display will blank while the
power-on tests are being performed. Upon
successful completion, PASS will be displayed and a pass tone will be heard. If a
FAIL message appears in the display, notify
maintenance.
If no valid keys are stored in the KY-100,
Cld STRT will be momentarily displayed
followed by a flashing PSH INIT display.
KY-100 SECURE VOICE SYSTEM COLD START DU

NOTE
The KY-100 and the Z-AVH RCU PRESET

switches must be in MAIN to enable operation of the AN/ARC-210 and AN/ARC-164
radios. Additionally, the KY-100 MODE
switch and the Z-AVH MODE switch must
be in PT (depending on which unit has control) for plain text radio operation.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
KY-100 PRESET Switch MAN

Reveiver Volume Adjusted
KY-100 DSPL & PNL Switches Adjusted
KY-100 MODE Switch OFFLINE
Fill Device Turned on and key to be loaded
selected
Fill Device (KYK-13 or CYZ-10) Connected to
the KY-100 fill connector
INIT Key Pressed
NOTE
Keep personnel clear of antenna during operation. Do not key transmitter during fueling operation or when oxygen is being serviced. Personnel injury or aircraft damage
could result.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
NOTE
If a fill device is not connected to the

KY-100 when the INIT Key is pressed, a
DEV ERR message will be displayed. If this
occurs, only PT communications will be
available until a traffic key is loaded.
8.
If a fill device is not connected to the

KY-100 when the INIT Key is pressed, a
DEV ERR message will be displayed. If this
occurs, only PT communications will be
available until a traffic key is loaded.
Fill Device Turned off and disconnected

7.
8.
1-464K
Change 8

Fill Device ON
Key To Be Loaded Selected
Fill Device (KYK-13 or CYZ-10) Connected to
the KY-100 fill connector
KY-100 INIT Key Pressed
Fill Device Off

Fill Device & Cable Disconnected
T.O. 1B-52H-1
KY-100 KEY LOAD PROCEDURES DU
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

KEY OPS Selected
LOAD Key Selected
LOAD n Selected (with n flashing)
Fill Device ON
Key Location Select, as required
Fill Device Connect to KY-100 fill connector
Load n Flashing Selected
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
NOTE
Data rates of 75 bps and 150 bps can only

be used when operating in the Enhanced
Black Digital (bdL) mode.
6.
7.
NOTE
To load additional keys, repeat steps 3.

through 10. until all desired key locations
have been loaded.
11. Fill Device OFF position
12. Fill Device and Cable Disconnected
If LOS, bd, or bdL modem type was selected, no further operator action is required. If HF was selected proceed as follows:
8.
9.
NOTE
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

PRESET Menu Selected using Up or Right
arrow
KY-100 PRESET Switch Set as desired
(MAN, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)
Wide Band Selected
Baseband/Di-Phase Selected, as desired
Data Rate Selected
Traffic Encryption Key (TEK) Selected
Td ON/Td OFF Selected
KY-100 MODE Switch As desired (out of
OFFLINE)
This procedure permits the user to select

Red audio and data interface parameters
for the KY-100. These include defaults,
transmit/receive coupling, transmit clock
selection, microphone/receiver balance
selection, and data polarity sensing. The
ARC-164 (V) and the ARC-210 (V) both use
the INFC default settings (only).
1.
2.
3.
4.

INFC Audio-Data Menu Selected
AudioData Defaults (SET dEF) Set
NOTE
The default setting for Guard audio is OFF

(GRd OFF). Guard audio must be set to ON
(GRd ON) plaintext guard audio to be received even during ciphertext (CT) operation.
Narrow Band PRESET Configuration
HF Mode Selected
KY-100 MODE switch As desired (out of
OFFLINE)
Interface (INFC) Audio Data Procedures
Wideband (Vinson) PRESET Configuration
1.
2.
Data Rate Selected

NOTE
If a fill device is not connected to the KY-100 when

the INIT key is pressed, a DEV ERR will be displayed. If this occurs, only PT communications will
be available until a traffic key is loaded
10. KY-100 INIT Key Pressed

PRESET Menu Selected (using Up or Right
arrow)
KY-100 PRESET Switch Set as desired
(MAN, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)
Narrow Band Selected
Narrowband Modem Selected (As briefed)
5.
6.
Guard Audio Set to GRd ON

KY-100 MODE Switch As desired (Out of
OFFLINE)
Change 8
1-464L
T.O. 1B-52H-1
KY-100 INTERFACE (INFC) RADIO NARROWBAND
(NRW-BAND) PROCEDURES DU
This procedure permits the user to select interface
parameters for the Black RADIO port of the KY-100
when operating in the Narrowband configuration.
These include defaults, radio transmission levels,
impedance matching and Black Digital interface
parameters. The ARC-210 (V) uses the default settings except for the TX CLKS setting in DAMA operation.
1.
2.
3.
4.

INFC Radio Narrow Band Menu Selected
Narrowband Radio Defaults (SET dEF) Set
NOTE
INT CLK must be set to EXTERNAL for

SATCOM DAMA operation.
5.
6.
Transmit Clock Source Selector (TX CLKS)

Set to EXT CLK
KY-100 Mode switch As desired (out of
OFFLINE)
KY-100 INTERFACE (INFC) RADIO WIDEBAND (WIDEBAND) PROCEDURES DU
This procedure permits the user to select interface
parameters for the Black RADIO port of the KY-100
when operating in the Wideband configuration.
These include defaults, impedance matching, wideband phasing and clear-to-send (CTS) functions.
1.
2.
3.
4.

INFC Radio Wide Band Menu Selected
Wideband Radio Defaults (SET dEF) Set
NOTE
Phasing must be set to 98MS for use with

both the ARC-164(V) and ARC-210(V) Radio Sets.
1-464M
Change 8
5.
6.
The phasing sequence length menu choices

(48, 98, 148, 198, 248, 298, or 348 MS) do
not wrap around. A wrong key tone will be
heard if the operator attempts to set a phasing sequence length past either extreme.
If the desired phasing sequence length is
not displayed, press the Up arrow to increase the length or the Right arrow to decrease the length. As the phasing sequence
length is changed, the level indicator aural
tone is heard at a rising or a falling pitch
to indicate an increment of decrement level
change.
Wideband Phasing Selector Set to 98MS
KY-100 MODE Switch As desired (out of
OFFLINE)
KY-100 RECEIVER VOLUME ADJUSTMENT DU
This procedure permits the user to adjust the plaintext audio volume (RXPTV) and ciphertext audio
volume (RXCTV) for comfortable listening levels.
NOTE
1.
2.
3.
The receiver plaintext and ciphertext volume can be adjusted when the KY-100 is in
the idle state or when receiving audio communication.
The receiver volume choices do not wrap
around. A wrong Key tone will be heard if
the operator attempts to set a value past
either extreme.
Allowable volume settings are from 0 (off)
to 9 (maximum). Side tone volume settings
are from 0 (Off) to 4 (maximum).
KY-100 MODE Switch PT, EB, CT, or RK
position
Volume Level Adjust
KY-100 MODE Switch Set (as desired)
T.O. 1B-52H-1
KY-100 CIPHERTEXT AND PLAINTEXT MODE ENABLE
PROCEDURES DU
This procedure is used to configure the KY-100 for
ciphertext operation only (CT ONLY) or for both ciphertext and plaintext (CT) operation. When enabled, the plaintext mode can only be used for voice
communication. When this menu item is set to CT,
plaintext voice can be received when the KY-100 is
in the idle state or the KY-100 MODE switch is set
to PT. When set to CT ONLY, and the user sets the
KY-100 MODE switch to PT, the display will indicate INVALId.
1.
2.
KY-100 MODE Switch PT, EB, CT, or RK

CT/CT ONLY Set (as desired)
KY-100 NARROWBAND CIPHERTEXT OPERATION HF

MODEM (SATCOM ADVANCED NARROWBAND DIGITAL
VOICE TERMINAL [ANDVT]) DU
found in T.O. 1B-52H-1-12.
The HF modem (ANDVT) supports the following
Narrowband CT modes: Net Voice (NT), Point-ToPoint (PP) Voice, and Net Data at 2400, 1200, 600,
and 300 bps.
NOTE
1.
2.
3.
4.
The data rate field setting does not affect

the quality of ciphertext voice transmission
and reception. Ciphertext voice is always
processed at 2400bps regardless of the setting shown on the data rate field.
5.
6.
7.
HF ANDVT Modem Selected

NOTE
To transmit voice, press the interphone

switch. Listen for full-transmitted
preamble, then transmit voice to the remote
station. Observe that the TX and V annunciators are displayed.
To receive voice, release the interphone
switch and listen for full received preamble
from the remote station, followed by the receive voice message. Observe that the RX
and V annunciators are displayed during
voice reception.
KY-100 WIDEBAND CIPHERTEXT OPERATION

LINE-OFSIGHT (LOS) DU
The Wideband VINSON configuration supports the
ciphertext (CT) Voice, Analog Data and Digital
Data modes at 16,000 and 12,000 bps.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
KY-100 MODE Switch CT

Wideband (WB) Mode Selected
Time Delay Selected
Modem Selected
Data Rate Selectee
NOTE
The KY-100 system must be selected to

ANDVT preset prior to DAMA PTT operation. Pressing the PTT button while in any
DAMA mode of operation without the
KY-100 being selected to a preset, containing the proper parameter setup and
ANDVT keys, will result in a lock-up of the
DAMA Modem operation. If this occurs, the
ARC-210 and DAMA Modem must be powered down for 20 seconds, then powered up
and DAMA operation reinitiated.
KY-100 MODE Switch CT
Narrowband (NB) Mode Selected
Net Voice (NT) Mode Selected

switch. If operating with no time delay inserted (NTd), listen for a short tone. If operating with time delay inserted (Td), listen
for a longer warbling tone. After the appropriate tone is heard, transmit voice to
the remote station. Observe that the TX
and V annunciators are displayed.
switch and listen for voice message from the
remote station. Observe that the RX and V
annunciators are displayed during voice reception.
Change 8
1-464N
T.O. 1B-52H-1
KY-100 PLAINTEXT VOICE OPERATION DU
2.
3.
NOTE
1.
2.
4.
Up Arrow ( ) & Right Arrow ( ) Press

(until key location to be zeroized appears in the
display)
KY-100 INIT Key Pressed, flashing ZERO n
is displayed
NOTE
If the KY-100 is configured for CT ONLY

operation, selecting the PT mode will cause
INVALId to be displayed.
Plaintext voice operation is available when
the KY-100 is configured for either ciphertext or plaintext operation. Plaintext voice
operation can be enabled in the Wideband
(VINSON) voice modes and Narrowband
(ANDVT) voice modes.
KY-100 MODE Switch PT
KY-100 PRESET Switch Set
To zeroize additional key locations, wait until the display indicates ZERO n (with n
flashing), then repeat steps 2 through 4.
5.
KY-100 MODE switch As desired (out of

OFL)
ZEROIZE ALL (Z ALL) KEYS
found in T.O. 1B-52H-1-12, Section II, SPECIAL
PROCEDURES Subsection.
NOTE
NOTE

switch, then transmit voice to the remote
station. Observe that the TX and V annunciators are displayed during voice transmission.
switch and listen for the received voice message. Observe that the RX and V annunciator is displayed during voice reception.
The Z ALL (Zeroize ALL) MODE control

switch position is active even when primary
power is removed from the KY-100. Setting
the switch to Z ALL will erase all keys
stored in the KY-100. Once zeroized, only
plaintext (PT) operation is permitted.
1.
KY-100 MODE control switch Z ALL (Pull

out)
KY-100 SHUT DOWN PROCEDURES DU

KY-100 ZEROIZE (ZERO) SPECIFIC KEY LOCATIONS
DU
1.
KY-100 INIT Key Press, ZERO displayed.
1-464P
Change 8
1.
2.
KY-100 PRESET switch OFF

DSPL and PNL switches OFF
T.O. 1B-52H-1
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Port 0 Configured
Port 1 Configured
Data Rate 2400 Bps
Frequency Configuration Accomplish
(a) Uplink (Transmit) Frequency
Set
(b) Downlink (Receive) Frequency
Set
(8) FrqSwt Set
(9) TxInhib Set
(10) Ranging Set
(11) SILENT Set
(12) LogMode Set
(13) Bypas Set
(14) Guard List Set
c. 25k, if required:
(1) 25K Mode Selected
(2) Terminal ID Selected
(3) Frequency Configuration
Accomplished
(a) Uplink (Transmit) Frequency
Set
(b) Downlink (Receive) Frequency
Set
(4) Configuration Code (CC) Set
(5) Port 1 Select
(6) AcRate 2400 Bps
(7) CnstKey Set
(8) Code Set
(9) Ranging Set
(10) Bypass Set
DAMA POWER-ON PROCEDURES DU
1.
ARC-210(V) Radio ON (CP)

NOTE
The MD-1333/A DAMA Modem system is a

subset of the ARC-210(V) Multimode Radio
Set. The ARC-210 must be functional for
the DAMA modem to work with the UHF
SATCOM system.
2.
3.
4.
5.
DAMA RCU On
Menu Viewing Angle Adjusted
Lighting Level Adjusted (N)
DAMA Modem Setup Accomplish (if
required) (N)
NOTE
Accomplish DAMA Modem setup with new

modem installation, a modem returned
from repair, or a modem with unknown configuration.
6.
7.
a. ARC-210 Radio Configuration Accomplish

(N)
b. Port Configuration As Required (N)
DAMA Key Fill Loading Accomplish (As
required) (N)
DAMA Configuration:
a. Dedicated:
(1) Dedicated Mode Selected
(2) Frequency Configuration
Accomplished
(a) Transmit Frequency Set
(b) Receive Frequency Set
b. 5k, if required:
(1) 5k DAMA Mode Selected
(2) 5K Parameters Menu Selected
(3) Terminal ID Entered
NOTE
The following step only applies to 25K AC

operation
8.
(11) Guardlist Set

Configuration Presets Save
Change 8
1-464Q
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NOTE
DAMA OPERATION DU
AC or DC availability is a function of the

25k DAMA net controller and will lock out
the nonavailable mode selection automatically; however, the available selection must
be made by the operator.
1.
Dedicated Mode:
NOTE
(1) DC Mode Activation:

(a) Slot Set
(b) Request Sent
(2) AC Mode Activation
(a) Prec Set
(b) Port 0 Set
(c) Terminal IDs Entered
(d) Units Set
(e) Length Set
(f) Request Sent
If Dedicated mode has already been configured and power has not been removed, proceed to step b. If a preset configuration is
to be retrieved, proceed as follows:
2.
a. Preset Select
b. Dedicated Mode Select
c. EMCON Select (As applicable)
5k DAMA:
NOTE
If 5k DAMA mode has already been configured and power has not been removed, proceed to step b. If a preset configuration is
3.
a. Preset Selected
b. 5K DAMA Mode Selected
25k DAMA:
NOTE
DAMA DEACTIVATION DU
1.
2.
For DAMA operation, the ARC-210 must be

set to preset channels 36 - 40 and SATCOM
UPPER or SATCOM LOWER antenna positions. Additionally, the TSEC/KY-100 COMSEC device must be loaded with an ANDVT
key and selected to the ARC-210 position.
If 25k DAMA mode has already been configured and power has not been removed, proceed to step b. If a preset configuration is
Dedicated Mode
a, Dedicated Mode Selected
b. StopMode Selected
5k DAMA Mode (if required)
a 5K Ops Selected
b StopMode Selected
NOTE
A message will appear :LOGOUT :OperReqst, press the <ACK> key twice to clear.
Wait approximately 30 seconds. Press the
<MAIN> key to return to the TOP menu.
3.
a. Preset Selected
b. 25K DAMA Selected
c. AC/DC Operation As Available from the
Net Controller
25k DAMA Mode (if required)

a. 25K Ops Selected
b. DC or AC Ops Selected (As applicable)
c. StopMode Selected
NOTE
A message will appear :25k EXIT :SltsDisCon, press the <ACK> key twice to clear.
Wait approximately 30 seconds. Press the
<MAIN> key to return to the TOP menu.
4.
1-464R
Change 8
Zeroized
T.O. 1B-52H-1
UHF COMMAND RADIO AN/ARC-164(V)
(HAVE QUICK II)
NOTE
One AN/ARC-164 radio is installed in the

command UHF radio position.
The UHF command radio is a short range set which
provides air-to-air and air-to-ground voice communications. There are two modes of operation: normal
AM voice and antijamming (AJ) mode communications. The set includes one antenna, a transmitter,
two receivers (guard and main), and a control panel
(figure 1-137) on the overhead panel. The frequency
range is from 225.0 to 399.75 MHz. There are 7000
frequencies available in steps of 0.025 MHz. The
guard receiver is set to a predetermined frequency
(normally 243.000 MHz) and cannot be changed in
flight. The 28 volt dc power supply for command radio No. 1 is through a circuit breaker marked COMMAND RADIO located on the right load central circuit breaker panel.
In the normal mode, 14 frequencies can be preset in
any order within the operating range of the equipment. Rotating the preset channel selector switch
to a channel number gives the desired frequency.
Selection of any one of the 7000 frequencies is possible by using the manual function of the set. The
transmitter and receiver both tune to the same operating frequency.
In AJ mode, the frequency is changed many times
per second using frequency hopping techniques.
Frequency hopping is a technique where the frequency being used for communication on a given
link is rapidly changed many times per second. Frequencies are changed in a random manner making
jamming more difficult. The particular frequency is
dependent on the particular time-of-day (TOD),
word-of-day (WOD), and net number.
NOTE
When all UHF radios are operated, more efficient operation may result if radios are
tuned at least 1/2 MHz apart.
The following values of range for various aircraft

altitudes are typical for the UHF command radio:
ALTITUDE
(1000 FEET)
AVERAGE RANGE
(NAUTICAL MILES)
50
270
40
240
30
210
20
170
10
120
The HAVE QUICK II radio set provides additional

AJ improvements and features from the original
HAVE QUICK radio set as follows:
1. Two new frequency tables (NATO/Europe and
non-NATO/Europe) and reserved memory space for
a fourth frequency table in addition to the original
A-net and B-net frequency table.
2. Multiple Word-of-Day (MWOD) loading capability which allows entry of up to six WODs for six
days use.
3. Provides a connector to interface an electronic
fill device for automatic MWOD loading.
4. MWOD erase capability.
5. Provides an expanded training net (frequency
management training net or FMT-net) in addition
to the present T-net. FMT-net operation permits all
users to share a common training WOD yet also
provides the capability for regional allocation of the
FMT-net frequency hopset (16 frequencies).
6. Addition of operational date information as
part of time-of-day (TOD) message. This allows the
radio set to initialize with the proper WOD.
7. Front panel liquid-crystal (LCD) displays for
the preset channel indicator and frequency/status
(f/s) indicator as well as other operator prompts.
8. Provides ANVIS green-A compatible front panel lighting for use with night vision goggle (NVG)
equipment.
Change 17
1-465
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ANTI-JAMMING (AJ) CAPABILITY
The AJ mode of operation provides jam-resistant

capability by taking advantage of the rapid tuning
ability of the radio set. Automatically changing the
frequency many times per second is a technique
called frequency-hopping. To permit frequency-hopping, three special entries are required. These entries are word-of-day (WOD), time-of-day (TOD)
and net number.
Word-of-Day (WOD)
This programs the frequency-hopping rate and frequency-hopping pattern. The radio cannot function
in the AJ mode without a valid WOD. In the HAVE
QUICK II radio set, the WOD data is now stored in
nonvolatile memory located in the receiver-transmitter SYNTHESIZER/ECCM assembly. Preset
channels previously reserved for WOD storage (19
to 15) can now be used for normal preset operation,
since the WOD does not take up preset memory.
The WOD memory is still accessed through preset
channel locations 20 through 14. WOD length may
vary and may require anywhere from one to six
channel locations (20 to 15). The seventh memory
location (accessed by channel 14) stores day-ofmonth information. This date code works in conjunction with TOD and specifies which day the
WOD is to be used. At midnight (UTC) transitions,
the radio set automatically generates a new frequency-hop pattern based on the new days WOD.
Up to six WODs may be entered at one time, allowing for multi-day use of the radio set without installing another WOD. This procedure of storing
multiple WODs is called multiple word-of-day
(MWOD) loading. The radio set retains the six most
recently entered WODS. If a WOD is entered which
has a duplicate date as one which was previously
entered, the new entry takes precedence and is
identified as being the most recent entry. The radio
set also has the capability to erase all stored
MWODs.
WOD Transfer
TOD synchronization is necessary for communicating in the AJ mode to allow frequency-hopping at

the same instant in time. The radio set automatically accepts the first TOD signal received after
power-up. The first TOD reception must occur in
normal mode. Any subsequent updates can be per-
1-466
Change 4
formed in the AJ mode or normal mode. Subsequent

transmission of TOD are ignored unless the operator enables the radio to receive a new TOD. The operator may also send TOD contained in a radio to
other radios similarly equipped. In the HAVE
QUICK II radio set, operational date information is
part of the TOD message. This information is necessary for the radio set to select the WOD with the
same date. TOD obtained from universal coordinated time (UTC) which is available from the Transit Satellite System, can be transferred by use of a
time signal which keeps time in sync by means of a
rubidium oscillator. UTC is a worldwide standard
and is available from a variety of sources. The time
signal set maintains and disseminates UTC as
TOD. Once all radio sets are operating on UTC,
uninterrupted voice communications are ensured in
a communications-jamming environment. The time
signal set allows all users to receive TOD at the
start of every mission. In the original HAVE
QUICK time signal set, TOD can be transferred via
UHF RF link from another HAVE QUICK modified
radio which has correct time, or in some installations, via hardwire link from an external HAVE
QUICK timing source.
Net Numbers
The net number is used in AJ mode in the same

fashion as a non-AJ mode frequency. The net number enables multiple station pairs to operate simultaneously on a non-interfering basis in AJ mode
while sharing a common WOD and TOD. The net
number begins with an A and is followed by three
digits 000 to 999. The last two digits of the display
(00, 25, 50, 75) designate the frequency table being
used. This permits 1000 possible net numbers for
each frequency table. Net numbers ending in 25 select NATO/Europe frequency table and net numbers
ending in 50 select non-NATO/Europe frequency
table. Net numbers ending in 75 are reserved for
future use at this time and will generate an invalid
net alarm (pulsating warning tone). TRAINING
MODE net numbers are designated as listed below.
Selecting any other net number while operating on
a TRAINING MODE WOD also generates the invalid net alarm.
A00000 through A00400 Five original T-net
numbers
A00025 through A01525 Sixteen new FMTnet numbers
T.O. 1B-52H-1
UHF Command Radio Controls ARC-164 (V)
TONE BUTTON
OFF-MAIN-BOTH-ADF-SWITCH
The tone button (12, figure 1-137) located on the

UHF command radio control panel energizes an oscillator and turns on the transmitter when depressed and held. A continuous tone is transmitted
until the button is released. Pressing the tone button with the channel selector in T position starts
emergency startup of TOD clock.
The rotary selector switch (13, figure 1-137) has

four positions: OFF- -MAIN- -BOTH- -ADF. With
the switch in the OFF position, the command radio
is deenergized. In the MAIN position, the set transmits and receives on the selected frequency but the
separate receiver for the guard frequency is not
heard. BOTH indicates simultaneous reception
from both the main and guard receivers. ADF function is not operable.
MANUAL-PRESET-GUARD SWITCH
Frequencies on the UHF command radio can be selected by three methods. A rotary switch marked
MNL- -PRESET- -GRD (9, figure 1-137) provides
the three methods. In the MNL position, the frequency selector knobs (8, figure 1-137) are used to
quickly select an operating frequency without disturbing the preset frequencies. The manually selected frequency appears in the windows across the
panel. Rotating the selector to PRESET shifts control of the frequency control to the preset channel
selector (5, figure 1-137). In the GRD position, the
transmitter and main receiver operate on a fixed
frequency and the guard receiver is heard. The
fixed frequency cannot be changed in flight.
PRESET CHANNEL SELECTOR SWITCH
The preset channel selector switch (5, figure 1-137)
is operative when the manual-preset-guard switch
(9, figure 1-137) is in the PRESET position. To select one of the 20 preset frequencies, refer to the
frequency chart at the upper left corner of the panel
for the corresponding channel number, then rotate
the selector knob until the channel number appears
in the channel indicator (6, figure 1-137) adjacent
to the selector.
MANUAL FREQUENCY SELECTOR KNOBS
Four knobs (8, figure 1-137) across the control panel are for selection of any frequency within the operating range of the equipment. The knobs are used
to manually select frequencies when the manualpreset-guard switch is in MNL, and to preset frequencies into memory when used in conjunction
with the channel load pushbutton (3, figure 1-137)
with the manual-preset-guard switch in PRESET.
SQUELCH SWITCH
A squelch switch (10, figure 1-137) controls the
squelch circuits in both main and guard receivers.
In the ON position, the squelch circuits operate normally. In the OFF position, the squelch disable is
actuated in the main receiver allowing receiver
noise to be heard in the absence of a signal.
CHANNEL LOAD PUSHBUTTON
The channel load pushbutton (3, figure 1-137) is located under the presetting cover and frequency
chart (4, figure 1-137) and is used to set preset
channel frequencies. A preset frequency can be
changed by setting the OFF- -MAIN- -BOTH- -ADF
switch (10, figure 1-137) to MAIN and the manualpreset-guard switch (6, figure 1-137) to PRESET.
Turn the preset channel selector switch (5, figure
1-137) to the desired channel number. Set the desired frequency on the manual frequency windows
with the frequency selector knobs (8, figure 1-137).
Lift the frequency chart cover and press the channel load pushbutton (3, figure 1-137). Record new
preset frequency on the frequency chart adjacent to
appropriate channel number.
MODE SELECTOR
The mode selector (14, figure 1-137) has four positions: A- -3- -2. Positions 2 and 3 determine the
most significant digit in the display when entering
frequencies. Position A signifies anti-jam mode
(AJ).
UHF Command Radio Indicators ARC-164
FREQUENCY/STATUS INDICATOR
The frequency/status indicator (16, figure 1-137) on
the UHF radio control panel consists of an LCD indicator which indicates the manual operating frequency set by the manual frequency selector knobs.
VOLUME CONTROL KNOB
PRESET CHANNEL INDICATOR
A volume control knob (11, figure 1-137) on the

UHF radio control panel is used to adjust the volume of both main and guard receivers. However, receiver output cannot be reduced below a fixed audible level.
A preset channel indicator LCD (6, figure 1-137) indicates the channel to which the preset channel selector switch is set. The dial numbers correspond to
frequency numbers on the frequency chart (4, figure 1-137).
Change 4
1-467
T.O. 1B-52H-1
UHF Command Radio Controls ARC-164
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
ZERO SWITCH
FILL CONNECTOR
CHANNEL LOAD PUSHBUTTON
PRESETTING COVER AND
FREQUENCY CHART
STATUS PUSHBUTTON
MANUAL FREQUENCY SELECTOR KNOBS (4)
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Figure 1-137
All data on pages 1-469 and 1-470 (Deleted).
1-468
Change 4
SQUELCH SWITCH
VOLUME CONTROL KNOB
T-TONE SWITCH
OFF-MAIN-BOTH-ADF SWITCH
MODE SELECTOR
TEST DISPLAY PUSHBUTTON
FREQUENCY/STATUS (F/S) INDICATOR (LCD)
T.O. 1B-52H-1
UHF COMMAND RADIO AN/ARC-164(V) (HAVE QUICK
II) NORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES
NOTE
The radio set is now in verify/operate mode.

To put the set in operation, proceed as follows:
1. OFF-MAIN-BOTH-ADF Switch MAIN
All segments of both LCD displays will light up momentarily on power-up and a series of beeps may be
heard. After power-up, if frequency/status (f/s) indicator displays a frequency, proceed to step 2. If MLOAD, FMT.CHG or ERASE is displayed, proceed
as follows:
a. Channel Selector Switch Set to channel
20
b. Frequency Set
Rotate frequency selector knobs so that the frequency 220.000 is displayed on f/s indicator.
c. Manual-Preset-Guard Switch PRESET
d. Channel LOAD Pushbutton Press LOAD
The load pushbutton is located behind the hinged
presetting cover and frequency chart (3, figure
1-137).
e. Manual-Preset-Guard Switch MNL (manual)

2. SQUELCH Switch OFF
A rushing noise will be heard. Adjust VOL (volume)
control for desired listening level.
3. SQUELCH Switch ON
Rushing noise stops.
NOTE
The radio set is now ready to transmit and

receive.
1. Manual-Preset-Guard Switch MNL (manual)
2. Manual Frequency Selector Knobs Set to
desired frequency
Elements of the frequency selected will be displayed in the f/s indicator.
Change 4
1-471
T.O. 1B-52H-1
To select preset channel:
3.
1. Manual-Preset-Guard Switch PRESET

2. Preset Channel Selector Switch Set to
desired channel
Verify desired channel number is displayed in preset channel indicator.
NOTE
Channel 20 is reserved for loading single

WODs and MWOD mode operating data. To
view the frequency loaded in selected channel, press STATUS switch. The f/s indicator
will display the frequency for 5 seconds.
NOTE

accepts first TOD message received. Subsequent TOD transmissions are ignored.
a. Manual Frequency Set Knobs or Preset
Channel Selector Switch Set to predesignated frequency for TOD transmission
b. T-TONE Switch T
Momentarily select T position then release switch.
c. Request TOD from another station in the
network.
NOTE
To load present channel:

2. Manual Frequency Selector Knobs Set to
desired frequency
3. Preset Channel Selector Switch Rotate to
desired channel from channel 1 to 19.
4. Presetting Cover & Frequency Chart Raise
5. Channel LOAD Pushbutton Press and
release
NOTE
Repeat steps 2 thru 5 to load additional preset channels.

6. Presetting Cover & Frequency Chart Close
after desired preset channels are loaded.
1. OFF-MAIN-BOTH-ADF Switch BOTH
2. Manual-Preset-Guard Switch GRD (guard)
1-472
If TOD is not available from a coordinated

timing source or from any other source
within your network, perform a TOD emergency clock start.
Net Number Enter

a. Manual-Preset-Guard Switch Set as
desired
If MNL is set, desired frequency must be selected with the manual frequency selector knobs.
If PRESET is set, rotate preset channel selector
switch so that desired channel number is displayed
in channel indicator.
NOTE
To verify the frequency of selected channel

when operating with Manual-Preset-Guard
switch set to PRESET, press the STATUS
switch to view digits in f/s indicator.
b.
Mode Selector Set to A
Set is now ready to operate in AJ mode.

NOTE
To operate in the anti-jamming (AJ) mode:

1. Radio Set On
2. WOD Enter
Word-of-day can be loaded manually using MWOD
loading or by the single WOD loading method.
WOD can also be loaded using the KYK-13 fill device.

first TOD message received within 1 minute
of selecting T position will be accepted.
4.
To transmit an ADF tone:

1. Desired Frequency or Channel Selected
2. T-TONE Switch TONE
Hold switch in TONE for approximately 2 seconds
until a 1020 Hz tone is heard. Release T-TONE
switch to stop transmitting tone.
TOD Enter
A steady warning tone will be heard in

headphone when AJ mode is selected and
TOD or a valid WOD has not been entered.
A pulsating warning tone is heard when an
invalid operating net is selected.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
The A cannot be stored in preset channel

memory. If loading of a net number
(AXX.XXX) into a preset channel is attempted, the A is accepted as a three. A preset channel frequency can be used as an AJ
mode net number if the five digits after the
hundreds position are the same as the desired net number.
To receive time-of-day (TOD):
Time-of-Day Emergency Clock Start:

NOTE
If the WOD intended for use was loaded using single WOD method (presets 20 to 15),
it is not necessary to load an operational
date; proceed to step 2.
1.
Operational Date Load

NOTE
NOTE

accepts first TOD message it receives. Subsequent TOD transmissions are ignored.
1. Manual-Preset-Guard Switch Set as desired
Set predesignated frequency for TOD transmission
by selecting MNL and turning frequency using frequency selector knobs or by selecting PRESET and
tuning frequency using channel selector switch.
2. T-TONE SWITCH T
Momentarily select T position and then release
switch.
3. TOD Request
NOTE

first TOD message received within 1 minute
of selecting T position will be accepted.
To update time-of-day (TOD):
NOTE

A TOD update to resynchronize radio set
can be performed while in AJ mode.
1. T-TONE Switch T
Hold switch to T position for 1 second then release.
2. TOD Request
To send time-of-day (TOD):
1. Frequency (normal mode) or Net Number (AJ
mode) Set
Frequency can be set either manually with frequency selector knobs or by using preset channel switch.
Place switch to TONE momentarily.
The operational date is the current (UTC)

day-of-month and must be entered so the
radio set can select one of the MWODs for
code generator initialization.
a. MWOD Loading Mode Enter
Four operating modes are used within the radio set
to initiate various MWOD programming functions.
The following data lists the four modes and the displays applicable to each mode.
MWOD Functions and Displays
Code Number
220.000
220.025
220.050
220.075
Display
VER/OP
M-LOAD
ERASE
FMT. CHG
Function
Verify/Operate
MWOD Load
MWOD Erase
Frequency
Management
Training Change
After radio set has been turned on, the following

procedures may be used to enter any of these
modes.
(1) Channel Selector Switch Channel 20
(2) Manual-Preset-Guard Switch PRESET
(3) Desired Operating Mode Set
Set applicable code number (220.0XX) for desired
operating mode from the above list.
(4) Channel Load Pushbutton Press and
release
The radio set is now in selected operating mode.
NOTE
For MWOD load, MWOD erase, or

FMT.CHG modes, the operating mode is
displayed on the f/s indicator. For verify/operate mode, press STATUS pushbutton and
observe that VER/OP is displayed on f/s indicator for 5 seconds.
1-473
T.O. 1B-52H-1
(5) Manual-Preset-Guard Switch Set
channel 1
b. Operational Date Set
Using frequency selector knobs, select operational
date in the format XAB.XXX where AB equals the
day-of-month (01-31) and X equals dont care.
c. T-TONE Switch TONE
Place T-TONE switch to TONE position and release. Note an audible tone. Operational data is
now entered.
d. Verify/Operate Mode Enter
2. T-TONE Switch T
Set T-TONE switch to T while simultaneously
pressing test display switch, then release.
NOTE
All remaining WOD elements may be

loaded in memory locations 19 thru 15 by
repeating steps 2 thru 5.
6.
Channel Selector Switch Set to channel 14

NOTE
If two or more WODs loaded have the same

date code, the radio recognizes only the last
date code entered.
7. Date Code Enter
Enter the applicable date code using frequency selector knobs.
NOTE
NOTE
This new TOD is arbitrary and will not be

synchronized to coordinate time (UTC). The
radio set will not communicate with any
other ECCM-equipped radio sets in AJ
mode unless this new TOD is transmitted
to other radio sets.
Date Code entry for the WOD is represented by the format XAB.XXX, where AB
equals the day-of-month (01-31) and X
equals dont care.
To load MWOD using manual method:

NOTE

Set switch to TONE position and release. Note a
double beep. One complete WOD is now entered. To
load more WODs, position the channel selector
switch to channel 20 and repeat steps 2 thru 8.
NOTE
In the following steps, if the frequency selector knobs are not used within 5 seconds,
the f/s indicator reverts to the M-LOAD display. To review the frequency settings, press
STATUS switch.
1. M-Load Mode Enter
Ensure Manual-Preset-Guard switch is set to MNL.
2. Channel Selector Switch Set channel
(memory location) 20
3. WOD Enter frequency
Using the frequency selector knobs, set elements of
first WOD.
Set switch to TONE position and release. Note an
audible tone. The first WOD element is entered.
5. Channel Selector Switch Select next lower
memory location
1-474
If the radio set is switched off or power is

lost after entry of MWODs, the data is not
lost. All MWOD data remains in force until
erased.
To load MWOD using KYK-13 fill device:
1.
2.
3.
Radio On
KYK-13 Mode Switch OFF/CHECK
KYK-13 Fill Device Connect to FILL port
NOTE
The fill cable for the KYK-13 may be used

while loading MWOD data into the RT, but
is not required.
4. KYK-13 MODE Switch ON
Observe that the f/s indicator displays FILL.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
5. KYK-13 ADDRESS Switch Set to applicable
channel (1 to 6)
release
Note a series of beeps are heard and the f/s indicator displays WOD OK.
NOTE
The channel indicator steps down from

memory location 20 to 14, then displays
memory location one while KYK-13 is connected and turned on. This allows entry of
operational date information, if required.
The operational date must match date code
of one of the WODs being loaded with the
KYK-13 fill device.
To erase MWODs:
NOTE

of all MWOD elements.
1. Channel Selector Switch Channel 20
3. Erase Code Number Enter
Using the frequency selector knobs, enter 220.050.
release
5. F/S Indicator Displays ERASE
Radio set is now in selected mode.
Set switch to TONE and release.
If f/s indicator displays BAD, KYK-13 must

be reloaded and steps 3 thru 7 repeated.
7. KYK-13 ADDRESS Switch Set to next

applicable channel
8. Channel LOAD Pushbutton Press and release
Observe the WOD OK is displayed on f/s indicator
after each WOD is loaded.
9. Operational Date Load (if desired/required)
a. Status Pushbutton Press
b. Date Code Enter
Enter the applicable date code using frequency selector knobs and using the format XAB.XXX where
AB equals day-of-month (01-31) and X equals dont
care.
c. T-TONE Switch TONE
Momentarily set T-TONE switch to TONE position
and release.
10. KYK-13 MODE Switch OFF/CHECK
11. KYK-13 Fill Device Disconnect from FILL
port
Note that the radio set returns to its previous mode
and both LCD displays return to previous settings.
NOTE
All MWODs are now erased.

7.
Verify/Operate Enter
To erase MWOD using alternate method:

1. Presetting Cover & Frequency Chart Raised
2. Zero Switch Press down then release
Note that ERASE is displayed on the f/s indicator.
NOTE
All MWODs are now erased.

The verify/operate mode serves a dual function. It is
used to enter normal or AJ operate modes, and is
also used to verify date codes of WODs loaded in radio set. To verify MWOD date codes, proceed as follows:
1. Verify/Operate Mode Enter
Enter verify/operate mode using the procedures
listed in step 1.a. of paragraph titled Time-Of-Day
(TOD) Emergency Clock Start.
2. MWOD Date Set
Using frequency selector knobs, set MWOD date to
be verified.
3. Channel Selector Switch Set memory
location (channel) 20, then memory location (channel) 19, and then back to memory location 20.
Listen for a single beep in headphone. A single beep
verifies a MWOD with a matching date code is
stored in memory. If single beep is not heard, date
code selected is not stored in memory.
NOTE
Repeat steps 2 and 3 until all desired date

codes have been verified.
1-475
T.O. 1B-52H-1
To load single WOD:
During transition from single to multiple WOD operation, the single WOD loading method is still
available. Using this method, WOD elements are
entered into preset channels 20 thru 15. The WOD
may vary in length and may require anywhere from
one to six of these channels, starting with channel
20 and working backward to 15. To load single
WOD, proceed as follows:
2. Channel Selector Switch Channel 20
3. WOD Element Set
Use frequency selector knobs to set WOD element.
4. Channel Load Pushbutton Press
5. Channel Selector Switch Set to next lower
channel
NOTE
Repeat steps 3 thru 5 until all WOD elements are loaded.

6. Radio Set Initialize
Initialize radio set by selecting channel 20 with
channel selector switch; listen for a single beep in
headphone. Progressively select next lower channel
with channel selector switch until a double beep is
heard. This double beep indicates all WOD elements are transferred from switching unit memory
to non-volatile synthesizer/ECCM memory of the
RT.
2. Appropriate Memory Location (20 to 5) Set

With channel selector switch, set appropriate
memory location (20 to 5).
3. First Frequency to Change Select
With frequency selector knobs, select first frequency to be changed.
NOTE
If frequency selector knobs are not used

within 5 seconds, f/s indicator reverts display of current operating mode FMT.CHG.
Set to TONE position then release. Note that an audible tone is heard.
NOTE
Repeat steps 2 thru 4 until all frequency

changes are loaded.
5. Verify/Operate Mode Enter
Enter verify/operate mode in accordance with step
1.a. of the paragraph titled time-of-day (TOD)
emergency clock start.
WOD Elements for Training/Maintenance:
For training and/or maintenance, use WOD assigned by operating command. If unassigned, use
the following WOD elements with the corresponding memory locations. The WOD may be loaded using either the single or MWOD loading method.
NOTE
The radio is initialized automatically after

power-up if a WOD is loaded using single
WOD loading method.
7.
Manual-Preset-Guard Switch MNL
Frequency Management Training Change (FMTCHG) Mode:

To change any or all 16 frequency management
training net frequencies, proceed as follows:
1. FMT-CHG Mode Enter
Enter FMT-CHG mode using the procedures listed
in step 1.a. of the paragraph titled Time-Of-Day
(TOD) Emergency Clock Start.
1-476
Location
WOD Element
20
19
18
17
16
15
14
300.050
376.000
359.100
314.300
297.600
287.400
Date Code (MWOD method only)
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Conference Capability:
In AJ mode, the radio set can receive and process
two simultaneous transmissions on the same operating net (conferencing) without the beat frequency
interference that normally results. Three simultaneous transmissions result in garbled reception.
This is accomplished by automatically offsetting the
second transmitter frequency to the next lower
channel (25 kHz) when it monitors a transmission
on the primary frequency. Reception is possible due
to the wideband characteristics of the radio set receiver. In the Have Quick II radio set, this conferencing feature is enabled or disabled by the last two
digits of the WOD element loaded in memory location 19. If the WOD element ends with 00 or 50,
conferencing is enabled. If the WOD element ends
with 25 or 75, conferencing is disabled.
NOTE
numbers ending in 50 select the new non-NATO/

Europe frequency table. Net numbers ending in 75
are reserved for future use, and if selected will generate an invalid net alarm(pulsating warning tone).
Training Net Numbers:
The valid T-Net and FMT-Net training mode net
numbers are listed below. Selecting another net
number while operating on a training mode WOD
causes the invalid net alarm to sound. As shown below, a net number ending with 00 selects the T-Net
training mode. In this mode, the radio set hops between the five frequencies loaded in with the WOD
(locations 19 to 15). A net number ending in 25 selects the FMT-Net training mode. In this mode, the
radio set hops between the 16 FMT-Net training
frequencies. To change any or all of the 16 FMT-Net
frequencies, see the paragraph titled Frequency
Management Training Change (FMT-CHG) mode.
When operating in secure voice mode, conferencing is automatically disabled.
T-Net
Numbers
If operating in AJ mode on a single element

WOD (memory location 20 only), conferencing is enabled by default.
A00000
A00100
A00200
A00300
A00400
For FMT-net training mode operation, conferencing is always enabled.
Net Numbers:
The net number programs the entry point in the AJ
mode frequency hopping pattern. This enables multiple radio pairs to operate simultaneously on a
non-interfering basis using a common WOD and
TOD. The A position on the mode selector switch
overrides the hundreds digit in both the manual
and preset modes, puts the radio set in the AJ
mode, and programs the radio set to use the net
number inserted following the A.
Full-Up Net Numbers:
Net numbers are in the format AXXXXX. The A is
followed by the digits 000 to 999. The last two digits
of the display (00, 25, 50, 75) designate the frequency table being used. This permits 1000 possible net
numbers for each frequency table. Net numbers
ending in 00 select the original A-Net and B-Net
frequency tables. Net numbers ending in 25 select
the new NATO/Europe frequency table and net
FMT-Net Numbers
A00025
A00125
A00225
A00325
A00425
A00525
A00625
A00725
A00825
A00925
A01025
A01125
A01225
A01325
A01425
A01525
Guard Operation:
Guard receiver operation is not affected while operating in the AJ mode. The guard frequency may be
monitored regardless of what mode the radio set is
in as long as the OFF-MAIN-BOTH-ADF switch is
in the BOTH position. Selecting GRD (guard) on
the Manual-Preset-Guard switch disables the AJ
mode, tunes the main receiver/transmitter to the
guard frequency (243.000 MHz), and disables the
guard receiver.
Jamming Conditions When in AJ Mode:
The only situation where jamming may occur in AJ
mode is when operating the radio set with the OFFMAIN-BOTH-ADF switch in BOTH (jamming on
guard frequency with guard receiver enabled). To
counter this condition, select MAIN on the OFFMAIN-BOTH-ADF switch.
1-477
T.O. 1B-52H-1
UHF LINE-OF-SIGHT (LOS) RADIO AN/ARC-171(V)
The AN/ARC-171(V) (line-of-sight) radio (figure

1-137A) provides voice and modulated code communication from aircraft to aircraft and aircraft to
ground. There are 7000 frequencies available in
steps of 0.025 MHz within the frequency range of
225.0 to 399.975 MHz. Any 20 frequencies may be
preset in any order at the control panel. If it is desired to tune to a frequency other than one which
has been preset, that frequency may be set manually without disturbing any of the preset channels.
Receiver and transmitter tuning is automatically
completed after a channel or frequency change.
Both a main receiver and a preset guard receiver
are provided to permit a selected frequency and the
guard frequency to be received simultaneously. The
AN/ARC-171(V) radio control panel is installed aft
of the UHF command radio or UHF/VHF dual command radio control panel on the pilots overhead
panel (figure 1-137A) Less DJ , or in the navigators
station RH side console DJ . The AN/ARC-171(V)
radio set has its own antenna (2, figure 1-132) and
is located as shown on the top of the fuselage just
forward of the wing.
A MANUAL- -PRESET- -GUARD switch (7, figure

1-137A) controls the mode of frequency selection:
manual frequency when in MANUAL position, preset frequency when in PRESET position, and guard
frequency when in GUARD position.
Line-of-Sight Radio Controls and Indicators
FUNCTION SELECTOR SWITCH

The function selector switch (11, figure 1-137A) selects the desired function and has OFF- -MAIN- BOTH- -ADF- -SATL positions. OFF position removes power from the radio set or transfers control
to the satellite terminal. MAIN position turns the
main receiver-transmitter on in the receive mode.
BOTH position energizes both the main and guard
frequencies. SATL position transfers control to the
satellite terminal at the navigators station. ADF
position is not used on this aircraft. However, the
ADF position preempts the satellite terminal.
NOTE
When the function selector switch is in

MAIN, BOTH, or ADF position, the LOS radio preempts the satellite terminal.
MANUAL FREQUENCY SELECTOR KNOBS

The four manual frequency selector knobs (8, figure
1-137A) are used for selection of any one of 7000
frequency channels other than those already available on the preset channels. They have the capability of selecting any 0.025 MHz increment frequency
from 225 thru 399.975 MHz.
MANUAL FREQUENCY INDICATORS
The manual frequency indicators (10, figure
1-137A) located on the LOS UHF radio control
panel consist of a six digit display which indicates
manual operating frequency set by the manual frequency selector knobs.
A preset channel selector switch (6, figure 1-137A)
is used to select any one of 20 preset channel frequencies.
A preset channel indicator (4, figure 1-137A) indicates the channel to which the preset channel selector switch is set.
PRESET-STORE BUTTON
The PRESET-STORE button (9, figure 1-137A)
stores the selected frequency and channel into the
control unit when pressed. A preset frequency write-on chart (5, figure 1-137A) for recording the 20
preset channels is provided on the front panel.
SQUELCH SWITCHES
The MAIN and GUARD squelch switches (3, figure
1-137A) having ON- -OFF positions disable the
main or guard receiver squelch circuits when desired. When the squelch switches are ON, the
squelch circuits are enabled. When they are OFF,
the squelch circuits are disabled.
1-478
Change 19
T.O. 1B-52H-1
UHF Line-Of-Sight (LOS) Radio AN/ARC-171(V)

Controls
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
VOLUME CONTROL KNOB

TEST FAULT LIGHT
SQUELCH SWITCH
PRESET FREQUENCY WRITE-ON CHART
8
9
10
11
12
13
MANUAL FREQUENCY SELECTOR KNOB

PRESET-STORE BUTTON
MANUAL FREQUENCY INDICATORS
FUNCTION SELECTOR SWITCH
TEST INITIATE SELECTOR SWITCH
TONE BUTTON
Figure 1-137A
Change 4
1-478A/(1-478B blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
VOLUME CONTROL KNOB
LOS RADIO NORMAL OPERATION
A volume control knob (1, figure 1-137A) located on

the radio control panel is used to adjust the volume
of both main and guard receivers.
To put the set in operation on a preset command

frequency and the fixed guard frequency, proceed as
follows:
TONE BUTTON
The tone button (13, figure 1-137A) AM tone modulates the UHF transmitter when depressed and
held. A continuous tone is transmitted until the
button is released.
TEST INITIATE SELECTOR SWITCH
The test initiate selector switch (12, figure 1-137A)
has OPR--LAMP--CONT--RCVR--XMTR--ANT positions and tests the fault light, control, receiver, transmitter, and antenna when the corresponding position
is selected. In OPR position, the system is in normal
operation selected by the function selector.
TEST FAULT LIGHT
1. Position function selector switch to BOTH.

The LOS PMT light on the AFSATCOM control at
the navigators station will illuminate if the mode
selector is ON.
2. Test initiate selector switch to OPR.
3. MAIN and GUARD SQUELCH switches to
ON.
4. MANUAL-PRESET-GUARD selector switch to
PRESET.
5. Set PRESET channel selector switch to desired
channel.
6. Adjust VOL control knob to desired level.
For satellite operation:
1. Position function selector switch to OFF or
SATL.
NOTE
An orange test fault light (2, figure 1-137A) is provided to indicate an equipment fault when in OPR
mode, or a fault in an area selected for test by the
test initiate selector switch when in CONT, RCVR,
XMTR, or ANT positions.
When the function selector switch is in

MAIN, BOTH, or ADF position, the LOS
radio preempts the satellite terminal.
To turn the set off:
1.
Position function selector switch to OFF.
To select frequencies manually:

1. Position function selector switch to MAIN or
BOTH.
2. MANUAL-PRESET-GUARD switch to
MANUAL.
3. Set manual frequency selector knobs to desired
frequency.
To transmit and receive on guard frequency:
1. Position function selector switch to MAIN or
BOTH
2. MANUAL-PRESET-GUARD switch to GUARD
Change 19
1-479
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LIAISON RADIO AN/ARC-190(V)
This liaison radio provides long range voice communications in the high frequency range. The radio operates over a frequency range of 2.0000 to 29.9999
MHz in 100 Hz steps, giving 280,000 available frequencies. The radio operates in the USB, LSB, AM,
and CW modes. It uses 115-volt, three-phase ac
power for operation. The radio controls are located
on the copilots side panel (figure 1-138).
Liaison Radio Controls and Indicators
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
CHANNEL INDICATOR SWITCHES (2)

MODE INDICATOR SWITCH
FREQUENCY INDICATOR SWITCHES (6)
POWER ON INDICATOR
TAKE COMMAND-OFF SWITCH
TAKE COMMAND INDICATOR
LOAD SWITCH
NO.
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
TEST SWITCH
SQUELCH CONTROL
COUPLER FAULT INDICATOR
SQUELCH DISABLE SWITCH
RECEIVER/TRANSMITTER FAULT INDICATOR
VOLUME CONTROL
CONTROL FAULT INDICATOR
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
CHANNEL Indicator Switches (2)
The two thumbwheel CHAN switches select preset channels 00 thru 29.
The CHAN switches are enabled only when the MODE switch (No 2) is
in P position. Both frequency and mode of operation are preassigned to
each preset channel.
MODE Indicator Switch
The MODE thumbwheel switch selects the following modes of operation:

UV -Upper sideband voice
LV -Lower sideband voice
AM -Amplitude modulation
P
-Preset channel
UD -Upper sideband data (not used)
LD -Lower sideband data (not used)
CW -Continuous wave (not used)
A
-Unassigned (not used)
1-480
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
FUNCTION
FREQ Indicator Switches (6)
The six thumbwheel FREQ switches select operating frequencies from

2.0000 to 29.9999 MHz in 100 Hz steps. A frequency higher than 29.9999
cannot be selected. If a frequency lower than 2.0000 is selected, the
CONTL FAULT indicator (No. 14) will light. Any time a new frequency is
selected, a receiver tune cycle is initiated. The next time the microphone
switch is pressed, a transmit tune cycle is initiated.
Power ON Indicator
The power ON indicator lights whenever the liaison radio is energized.
TAKE CMD-OFF Switch
The TAKE CMD-OFF switch is a three-position, spring-return to center

switch. When momentarily operated to TAKE CMD (up) position, primary
power is applied to the liaison radio, the control is enabled, and the TAKE
CMD (No. 6) and ON (No. 4) indicators light. When momentarily operated
to OFF (down) position, primary power is removed from the liaison radio
and the TAKE CMD and ON indicators go off.
TAKE CMD Indicator
The TAKE CMD indicator lights whenever the control has command of the
liaison radio. It is intended for systems that have more than one control
location. Since the installation has only one control, the TAKE CMD indicator will light whenever the ON indicator lights. Failure of the light to be
lit to do indicates a malfunction.
LOAD Switch
The momentary action, pushbutton LOAD switch causes mode and frequency data to be stored in the receiver-transmitter preset channel
memory. Data is stored in the memory location indicated by the preset
CHAN switches. Mode and frequency data is obtained from MODE and
FREQ switches.
Test Switch
The momentary action, pushbutton TEST switch initiates a receive selftest cycle. When TEST switch is pressed, all FAULT indicators light, and,
when released, all FAULT indicators go out. If the receive test fails, one
of the FAULT indicators lights. After pressing the TEST pushbutton, the
next time the microphone switch is pressed, a transmit self-test is initiated. The transmit self-test is performed on upper sideband with 1000 Hz
cw tone. If the test fails, one of the FAULT indicators will light.
Do not initiate a transmit self-test unless ground transmissions

restrictions are observed.
9
SQL (Squelch) Control
The SQL control is a four-position switch that selects the squelch level.
In the fully ccw position, the squelch is disabled.
10
CPLR (Coupler) FAULT indicator
The CPLR FAULT indicator lights when a fault occurs in the antenna coupler.
1-481
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Liaison Radio Controls and Indicators (Cont)

NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
11
Squelch DSBL (Disable) Switch
The SQL DSBL switch is an alternate-action pushbutton switch. When

out, the squelch level is selected by the SQL control. When in, the squelch
is disabled.
12
R/T (Receiver/Transmitter) FAULT

Indicator
The R/T FAULT indicator lights when a fault occurs in the receiver-transmitter.
NOTE
If the omni-range (AN/ARN-14) is operating at the same time as
the ARC-190 liaison radio, a false R/T fault indicator may light.
Cycling the ARC-190 should correct this indication.
13
VOL Control
The VOL control is an eight-position switch that adjusts the receiver audio output level.
14
CONTL (Control) FAULT Indicator
The CONTL FAULT indicator lights when a fault occurs in the radio set
control, the FREQ switches are set below 2 MHz, the CHAN switches are
set to an unloaded preset channel with the MODE switch set to P, or the
MODE switch is set to A.
1-482
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ARC-190(V) LIAISON RADIO NORMAL OPERATION
Operation Modes
POWER TURN ON
The liaison radio is energized by momentarily operating the TAKE CMD-OFF switch to TAKE CMD.
The ON and TAKE CMD indicators will light. If the
MODE switch is set to P and the CHAN switch is
set to an unloaded channel, frequency is set below 2
MHz or the MODE switch is set to A, the CONTL
FAULT indicator will light.
POWER TURN OFF
The liaison radio is deenergized by momentarily operating the TAKE CMD-OFF switch to OFF. The
TAKE CMD and ON indicators will go off.
MODE AND FREQUENCY PRESETTING
The AN/ARC-190(V) liaison radio has 30 preset
channels. These channels are numbered 00 thru 29.
Mode and frequency information for each preset
channel is stored in a nonvolatile memory located
in the receiver-transmitter. Presetting is accomplished on the master control panel with the equipment turned on. Presetting is normally done before
flight but may be done in flight, if necessary, and is
accomplished as follows:
1. Momentarily operate TAKE CMD-OFF switch
to TAKE CMD.
2. Set MODE switch to desired mode.
3. Set FREQ switches to desired frequency in the

range of 2.0000 thru 29.9999 MHz. If frequency is
set below 2.0000 MHz, the CONTL FAULT indicator will light.
4. Set CHAN switch to desired channel. Channels
are numbered from 00 thru 29.
5. Press LOAD pushbutton. This causes the mode
and frequency information to be loaded into the receiver-transmitter nonvolatile memory.
6. Repeat steps 2 thru 5 for each preset channel
required.
MODE SELECTION
The AN/ARC-190(V) liaison radio can operate in the
upper sideband voice (UV), lower sideband voice
(LV), amplitude modulation (AM), or preset (P)
modes. The UD, LD, CW, and A positions of the
MODE switch are not used. When the MODE
switch is set to UV, LV, or AM, the mode and frequency of the liaison radio is determined by the
MODE and FREQ switches. When the MODE
switch is set to P, the mode and frequency of the
liaison radio is determined by the preset CHAN
switch. If an unloaded preset channel is selected,
the CONTL FAULT indicator will light.
FREQUENCY SELECTION
When the MODE switch is set to P, the frequency is
selected by the CHAN switches. In all other MODE
switch positions, the frequency is selected by the
FREQ switches. If a frequency below 2.0000 is selected, the CONTL FAULT indicator will light.
1-483
T.O. 1B-52H-1
VOICE COMMUNICATION
Liaison radio voice communication is accomplished
as follows:
1. On interphone control panel, set interphone selector switch to HF.
2. On radio set control, momentarily operate
TAKE CMD-OFF switch to TAKE CMD. TAKE
CMD and ON indicators will light.
3. Set CHAN, MODE, and FREQ switches as authorized.
4. Adjust VOL and SQL controls as desired.
Ground transmissions of the AN/ARC-190

liaison radio are prohibited on aircraft within 200 feet of any of the following:
Unloaded nuclear weapons or warheads.
Aircraft with external weapons with nuclear warheads installed.
Nuclear weapons loaded in an aircraft
(transmitting or adjacent) with its bomb
bay doors open.
Hazardous RF voltages can exist between
the aircraft skin and ground when transmissions are being made with the liaison
radio.
Do not transmit on the HF radio when in
contact with or when in close proximity to
1-484
Change 12
the KC-10 air refueling boom. Transmitting

on the HF radio under these conditions may
cause uncommanded movement of the
KC-10 refueling boom, endangering the
tanker or receiver aircraft and crews.
NOTE
This does not prohibit AN/ARC-190 receiver

operation on the ground.
5. Momentarily press mic switch to initiate transmit tune cycle. The first time a preset channel is
tuned, the antenna coupler tunes on an RF signal
from the receiver-transmitter. A 1000 Hz audio tone
will be heard on the headset when the RF signal is
present. After tuning is complete, the antenna coupler tuning information is stored in the preset nonvolatile memory of the receiver-transmitter, thereafter, each time the preset channel is selected, the
antenna coupler is prepositioned to the preset channel frequency. The first-time tuning cycle requires
approximately 1 second. The pretuned tuning cycle
requires 35 ms. Completion of the transmit tune
cycle is indicated by return of receive audio or receiver background noise.
6. The liaison radio is now ready for operation. To
transmit, press mic switch and speak into mic. The
transmit audio sidetone will be heard in the headset. To receive, release mic switch.
7. Turn the liaison radio off by momentarily operating TAKE CMD-OFF switch to OFF. TAKE CMD
and ON indicators will go off.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS TERMINAL
AN/ASC-19
The AN/ASC-19 Air Force satellite communications

system (AFSATCOM) terminal is a half-duplex
(HDX) UHF single integrated operational plan
(SIOP) communications terminal providing line-ofsight (LOS) and satellite communications. See figures 1-139, 1-142, and 1-143 for general arrangement of AFSATCOM panels and equipment at the
navigators station. Satellite communications are
controlled by the navigator and permit teletype satellite communication of UHF frequencies utilizing
narrow band FSK (frequency-shiftkeyed) capability
on certain selected preset satellite frequency plans
or by alternate frequency selections. Frequency
range of the system is 225 to 399.975 MHz selectable in 0.025 MHz increments. The satellite communications system utilizes the AN/ARC-171(V) receiver-transmitter with an FM output power of 100
watts delivered to a subsonic antenna (4, figure
1-132). This antenna has a nominal 0 db gain with
a maximum 1 db loss near the zenith and a maximum loss of 1 db near the horizon, thus providing
nearly uniform upper hemispherical coverage without requiring operator selection of zenith or horizontal elements. The Automatic Send Receive
(ASR) equipment consists of a keyboard unit, printer, and logic/power supply. The keyboard unit consists of the character and control keys, indicators,
and displays necessary for the operator to prepare
messages and select operating modes. The printer
is capable of printing 100 words per minute with 20
characters per line. The logic/power supply unit
contains the microprocessor, character memory and
control logic to provide and accept data and control
information for the printer and keyboard.
AFSATCOM Operating Modes Less DL
Six modes of operations are available with

communications available on two of the modes.
Communications with either AFSATCOM when
OPR 1 is selected or the Lincoln Laboratory
experimental satellite (LES) mode when OPR 3 is
selected at the Mode selector (10, figure 1-139). An
OPR 2 mode is selectable at the mode selector;
however, this mode functions the same as OPR 1
mode except that TDM becomes available on
channels 8, 9, and 10. In addition a BIT mode, KEY
mode, and LOAD mode is available. See paragraph
MODE SELECTOR, this subsection, for additional
explanation of functions.
AFSATCOM Operating Modes DL
AFSAT I, AFSAT IIM, and MILSTAR UHF IIR. The

control-indicator (CI) allows the operator to direct
and monitor modem operation through a small
display and keypad.
The Dual Modem equipment provides the following
operating modes.
Idle
AFSAT I
AFSAT IIM
MILSTAR
Time Transfer
Built-In-Test (BIT)
AFSATCOM Control Panel Less DL
The AFSATCOM Control Panel (Control-Indicator

C-10357(V)1/A) provides full control of the Dual
Modem (MD-1035/A) for single channel, half duplex
operation over both the Lincoln Laboratory experimental satellite (LES) and AFSATCOM satellite.
See figure 1-139 for description of control panel operation.
AFSATCOM Control Panel DL
The AFSATCOM Control Panel (Control Indicator

C11637(V)1/A), (figure 1-140), provides control of
the MD-1035B/A modem for single channel, halfduplex (HDX) operations over three different satellite communications systems AFSAT I, AFSAT
IIM, and MILSTAR UHF IIR. The control-indicator
(CI) allows the operator to direct and monitor modem operations through a small screen display and
keypad.
The CI keypad allows the operator to select and access the parameters displayed with each menu via
the arrow keys. The keypad also allows the operator to change and store new configurations using
[SEL], [SHFT], and [ENTR] keys.
The CI display is a 10-line by 24-character display.
The top line of the display is reserved for the menu
title. The display can show up to nine lines of menu
options and parameters at a time. To scroll up or
down through the displayed menu parameters, use
the [ ] or [ ] or scroll keys. The arrow symbol
(or in some cases) furthest to the left on CI display indicates that there are additional parameters
(not displayed) that can be accessed by using one of
the scroll keys. The > symbol is the cursor, which
always points to the active parameter.
The Dual Modem system is able to operate over

three different satellite communications systems
Change 19
1-485
T.O. 1B-52H-1
The operator has the ability to correct errors in
mode menus. Prior to mode entry, and when entering parameters, the operator may correct entries by
using the CI keypad to re-select the parameter and
enter the correct parameter value. Once the mode is
entered and the operator realizes any parameters
are incorrect, the operator must re-enter the active
mode menu to correct the data by doing the following:
Time Standard Module (TSM) DL
A Time Standard Module (TSM) (figure 1-141) may

be installed under a cover on the front of the CI.
When installed, the TSM will enhance performance
during hopped modes by providing values for parameter data bases, accurate TOD values, and oscillator references.
1. Ensure that the TOP MENU REVIEW parameter is ACTIVE, then press the [SHFT] then
[ENTR] keys to access the active (current) modes
parameter.
2. Use the keypad to enter the correct parameters.
The TSM is an electrostatic discharge

(ESD) sensitive device. To avoid equipment
damage, be sure to follow all ESD (i.e., not
touching the connector pins, etc.) procedures when handling, installing, or removing the TSM.
NOTE
Some MILSTAR Mode parameters can only

be changed after a complete re-start of the
mode. Refer to MILSTAR Mode parameters,
figure 1-147.
NOTE
3. When all parameters are correct, press the

[SHFT] then [ENTR] keys to re-enter the active
mode.
An asterisk (*) symbol is displayed on the CI display screen under two conditions. The first condition is as a [SHFT] key flag. An asterisk (*) symbol
displayed in the upper-right corner of the CI display indicates that the [SHFT] key has been
pressed. The asterisk symbol is cleared when the
next key is pressed or when the [SHFT] key is
pressed again. The second condition when the asterisk symbol is displayed is when it represents the
mode parameter change flag. When a parameter is
changed after starting an operating mode, the asterisk symbol is displayed in the upper left corner
of the CI display to indicate a change has been detected for the current mode of operation. The symbol is subsequently cleared when either the mode is
entered (pressing the [SHFT] and [ENTR] key in
sequence), which activates the mode changes or
when the mode is exited without activating the
mode changes and the operation returns to the Top
Menu.
The CI contains a Non-Volatile Random Access
Memory. This memory stores operating parameters
during power outages of 3 seconds or less duration.
This allows the modem to return to the previous operating mode without going through the power-up
(cold start) process when power to the system is interrupted or during power transients.
1-486
Change 2
When transporting the TSM, use the container provided. To avoid equipment damage, do not touch the connector pins on the
rear of the module when handling, installing or removing. Use the ring on the front
of the module when installing and/or removing the TSM.
Be sure to follow all precautions and procedures for using the TSM or else the information within the TSM may be destroyed.
The TSM is not required for operation in
any mode. However, the TSM is typically
used in AFSAT IIM and MILSTAR modes.
The TSM provides more accurate time
(UTC), Word-of-the-day (WOD) and Future
WOD (FWOD) key variables as well a Timeof-Day (TOD) information for use in maintaining hopping time and frequency synchronization during operation of AFSAT
IIM and MILSTAR modes.
The term Word-of-Day (WOD) is used synonymously with the terminology Word-ofMonth or WOM. Both terms indicate the required key variables used to operate within
the AFSAT IIM or MILSTAR Modes.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TSM WODS VS. WOMS
AFSATCOM Keyboard
To operate within the AFSAT IIM or MILSTAR

modes, the equipment requires certain Transmission Security (TRANSEC) key variables. These key
variables are valid for a specified 24 hour period;
hence, the term Word-of-Day (WOD). The effective
period of the MILSTAR WOD has been changed to
expire after specified 30 day period; thus, a new
term Word-of-Month (WOM).
The C-10080/A keyboard is used during satellite operating mode of the terminal to prepare and send
messages. The keyboard is located at the right side
of the navigators station. A handrest is provided below the panel at either location. The keyboard power
and panel lighting is controlled by the printer. See
figure 1-142 for keyboard controls and indicators.
AFSATCOM Printer
NOTE
In this manual, the terms Word-of-Day

(WOD) or Future WOD (FWOD) are used
synonymously with the new terms Word-ofMonth (WOM) and Future Word-of-Month
(FWOM). This usage is also in keeping with
the terminology of WOD and FWOD as
shown on the AFSAT IIM or MILSTAR
mode configuration screens.
The operator should verify that TRANSEC
key variables are available to cover the
duration of the mission.
The TT-712/A printer is a high speed page printer

that prints one character at a time on full page format. The printer is controlled by the microprocessor
located in the logic/power supply and provides a
hard copy of received, composed, or transmitted
messages as determined by the selected operating
mode. The printer receives data automatically in
the receive mode which has priority over all other
operating modes. The printer may also be programmed to recognize certain incoming messages,
interrupt current operations, and print the message. The printer controls power to the keyboard.
See figure 1-143 for printer controls and indicators.
Change 19
1-486A/(1-486B blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AFSATCOM Control Panel Less DL
Change 19
1-487
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AFSATCOM Control Panel (Cont) Less DL

NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
SLOT Annunciator (Green)
The SLOT annunciator comes on when the mode selector switch (No.
10) is set to OPR 1 and indicates that the time slot number is being displayed in the two leftmost digits directly under the SLOT annunciator.
The time slot can be set with the control indicator button (No. 11) located directly below the corresponding display.
FRAME Annunciator (Green)
The FRAME annunciator comes on when the mode selector switch

(No. 10) is set to OPR 1 and the dual modem is in the timed state. It
indicates that the digits displayed below the FRAME annunciator are
the frame number.
Key Mode Annunciators (3) (Green)
The green key mode annunciators are comprised of the KEY 1-6, the
KEY 7-11, and FREQ annunciators. The KEY 1-6 annunciator illuminates when the KEY mode is first entered and indicates that the first
six digits of the key are being shown in the display. The values of the
first six digits may be modified by pressing the buttons under the corresponding display when the KEY 1-6 annunciator is illuminated. Successively pressing the DISPLAY CONTROL button when in KEY
mode causes KEY 1-6, KEY 7-11, and FREQ annunciators to illuminate in turn. Pressing the DISPLAY CONTROL button again will cause
the KEY 1-6 and FREQ annunciators to illuminate at the same time
displaying Channel 1.5 parameters. Every fourth depression of the
DISPLAY CONTROL button causes the KEY 1-6 annunciator to illuminate. The KEY 7-11 annunciator indicates that the last 5 digits of the
key are being shown. These digits may be modified by pressing the
buttons under the corresponding display. The FREQ annunciator illuminates when the display is showing the ALT frequency. The digits
may be modified by pressing the buttons under the corresponding digits. When the FREQ and KEY 1-6 are illuminated at the same time, the
current value of Channel 1.5 parameters will be displayed. Enter the
desired parameter from the following list using the display button under the corresponding digit:
PARAMETER
TIME Annunciator (Green)
Automatically acquire the Channel 1.5

downlink signal even if it should start
occurring while other operations are in
progress
Channel 1.5 operation inactive
Channel 1.5 operation only
The TIME annunciator comes on when the mode selector switch (No.
10) is set to either OPR 3 or LOAD positions and indicates that the digital display is showing real time. These digits may be modified by pressing the button (No. 11) under the corresponding display (No. 12).
1-488
MODEM OPERATION
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
5
CONTROLINDICATOR
DISPLAY CONTROL Button
FUNCTION
Pressing the DISPLAY CONTROL button causes the display to
change in different ways according to the mode selector switch (No.
10) position as follows:
Status Annunciators (7) (Amber)
BIT When a fault is detected, execution of tests is stopped

and the appropriate number is displayed on the digital display.
When the DISPLAY CONTROL button is pressed, the display is
blanked and the execution of tests is resumed. However, there
are certain failures that are too serious to permit testing to be
resumed, in which case the number remains on the display.
KEY Successively pressing the DISPLAY CONTROL button
causes the display to indicate KEY 1-6, KEY 7-11, and FREQ
in turn.
OPR 1 The DISPLAY CONTROL button is used to alternately
blank and illuminate the SLOT and FRAME numbers.
OPR 2 The OPR 2 position is not used.
OPR 3 Pressing the DISPLAY CONTROL button causes the
displayed time to be alternately displayed and blanked. The EAM
light (an EAM alarm) can be reset by pressing the DISPLAY
CONTROL button.
LOAD The DISPLAY CONTROL button is used to start and
stop the real-time clock. Real-time is entered by first stopping the
clock using the DISPLAY CONTROL button, then setting a time
somewhat in advance of the reference time by pressing the three
display buttons as needed. As reference time reaches display
time, press the DISPLAY CONTROL button to start the clock.
The status annunciators come on to indicate the following:
LOS PMT When control of the radio is preempted by the LOS

control, the LOS PMT annunciator comes on. In LOS PMT, a
new request to transmit from the ASR equipment is ignored except when the mode selector switch (No. 10) is in the LOAD
position.
RCV BSY When in the OPR 1 mode, the RCV BSY annunciator comes on upon recognition of an acceptable preamble and
remains on until the message is terminated.
SYN ERR The SYN ERR annunciator comes on in an AFSAT
timed state when a sync message is missed in slot 60. In the
OPR 3 mode, the SYN ERR annunciator will be on until acquisition is accomplished.
(Continued)
1-489
T.O. 1B-52H-1

NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
Status Annunciators (7) (Amber) (Cont)
RCV FLT A fault affecting the receive mode detected during

any of the modes causes the RCV FLT annunciator to come on.
The annunciator is cleared by changing the SATL plan thumbwheel switch (No. 9), or by pressing the DISPLAY CONTROL
button (which also stops the clock when in LOAD mode). If the
fault remains, the annunciator comes on again.
XMT FLT A fault affecting the transmit mode detected during
any of the modes causes the XMT FLT annunciator to come on.
The annunciator is cleared by changing mode, changing SATL
plan thumbwheel switch (No. 9), or by pressing the DISPLAY
CONTROL button (which also stops the clock when in LOAD
mode). If the fault remains, the annunciator comes on again.
I/O FLT A fault affecting the I/O device (automatic send receive equipment), the memory unit, or the low power RAM detected during any operating mode causes the I/O FLT annunciator to come on. The annunciator is cleared by changing the SATL
plan thumbwheel switch (No. 9) or by pressing the DISPLAY
CONTROL button (which also stops the clock when in LOAD
mode). If the fault remains, the annunciator comes on again.
EAM The EAM annunciator flashes approximately twice a
second when an emergency action message (EAM) is recognized. Pressing the DISPLAY CONTROL button clears the annunciator.
LAMP TEST Button
Pressing the LAMP TEST button causes all displays, lights, and indicators on the SATCOM control to come on, including all segments of the
six digit display, even if the SATCOM control is connected to a faulty dual
modem.
DIM/BRT (Brightness) Control
The DIM/BRT control provides a continuously variable brightness control from full off to full on of the seven segment digital displays and the
annunciators: FRAME, SLOT, FREQ, TIME, KEY 1-6, and KEY 7-11.
CHANNEL SELECT Thumbwheel

Switches (3)
The three CHANNEL SELECT thumbwheel switches select from left to

right the satellite plan, transmit channel, and receive channel when the
mode selector switch is in OPR 1 position. The left thumbwheel switch
(satellite plan) is set to a letter A thru M (excluding I) while the right two
thumbwheels are set to numbers 1 thru 12. The middle thumbwheel
specifies transmit frequencies and the right thumbwheel specifies receive frequencies. Satellite plans F, G, H, J, and K use the same receive
frequency as satellite plans A, B, C, D, and E, respectively, but use the
alternate transmit frequency entered when the mode switch is in the
KEY mode. In the mode selector OPR 3 position, a satellite plan is selected by the satellite thumbwheel and a transmit channel is selected by
use of the remaining two thumbwheels.
1-490
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
10
CONTROLINDICATOR
Mode Selector
FUNCTION
The mode selector switch, a seven-position rotary switch selects modes
of AFSATCOM control operation. In OFF position, normal power to the
dual modem, AFSATCOM control panel and receiver-transmitter are
turned off. The BIT position is provided for localizing faults. It can be
used for checking for a GO condition and fault localization. In the KEY
position, the AFSAT sync code, alternate frequency plan, and channel
1.5 parameter selection can be displayed and modified, via the six digit
display and the three control indicator buttons, which control three twodigit groups and the DISPLAY CONTROL button. In the OPR 1 position,
AFSAT communication is in operation. OPR 2 position provides an extended TDM1 and TDM2 capability, i.e., TDM1 and TDM2 operation becomes available on channels 8, 9, and 10 for certain frequency plans
of AFSAT mode. All other functions are identical to AFSAT mode. In
OPR 3 position, LES mode is selected. In OPR 3/LOAD position, the six
digit display is used as a real-time clock. In the LOAD position the LES
sync code is loaded and verified via the keyboard by: entering COMP
EDIT, selecting a buffer, typing in the sync code and pressing AUTO
XMT and the buffer that the sync code is in. Real time is set in LOAD
and must be within 1 second of GMT to synchronize your terminal with
the satellite in OPR-3.
NOTE
When in channel 1.5 monitor mode, if the slot number is

not incremented when the display button has been
pressed, repeat operation until the desired slot number appears under the SLOT annunciator. If the fast increment
mode is entered by holding the pushbutton down for a prolonged period of time, slot incrementing may halt for a period of 3 seconds, then continue incrementing. This is considered normal operation and not a malfunction.
If the mode selector is turned OFF or aircraft power is interrupted, the sync code, alternate frequency, and channel
1.5 parameters may have to be reinserted and must be
verified as correct after power is reapplied and prior to using equipment.
When both the I/O FLT and XMT FLT annunciators are
illuminated, real time cannot be altered in LOAD and the
sync code or alternate frequency cannot be altered in KEY.
If both FREQ and TIME annunciators illuminate at the
same time, message processing is being performed on
Channel 1.5.
If both KEY 1-6 and KEY 7-11 annunciators illuminate at
the same time, Channel 1.5 is locked out. To exit lockout
mode, rotate the mode switch to another position and
back.
1-491
T.O. 1B-52H-1

CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
FUNCTION
11
Control Indicator Buttons (3)
The control indicator buttons, in conjunction with the DISPLAY CONTROL button (No. 5), enter data displayed on the six digit display in KEY
OPR 1 and LOAD modes. Each button is associated with a two digit segment of the display.
12
Digital Display
The digital display is a red six digit display which displays fault indications, thumbwheel CHANNEL SELECT data, AFSAT sync code, alternate transmit frequency, time slot, frame number, time, and channel 1.5
parameter.
1-492
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AFSATCOM DMU Control Panel DL
Change 19
1-493
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AFSATCOM DMU Control Panel DL (Cont)

CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
1
FUNCTION
Display
The display has 240 alphanumeric character locations arranged as 10

lines of 24 characters each. This available space, in some cases, is insufficient to display all parameters concerning an operating mode (i.e. the
terminal data base) to the operator at once.
To reach all the data, a one-dimensional spread sheet format is used. This
is a window that opens onto nine lines of data in the data base. The top
line stays constant, describing the data base being used. Each line contains only one parameter entry. The operator uses the keypad arrow keys
to scroll the cursor to a desired parameter and modify it. To display parameters not currently seen in the display window, the operator scrolls the
window up and down to the desired parameter.
BRT Control
Varies the display brightness from full off to full on.
ON/OFF Switch
The ON/OFF toggle switch is a guarded (pull-to-throw) switch that applies

power to the control-indicator and telegraph modem. To turn power off the
switch must be pulled out and pushed to the down position. The adjoining
green annunciator indicates when power is present.
HHM IN Annunciator
Proper seating of the TSM into the connector causes the green HHM IN
annunciator to illuminate.
Time Standard Module (TSM) Housing
The optional Time Standard Module attaches to the connector inside this
housing. When the TSM is installed in the housing, the telegraph modem
receives TOD, frequency initialization data, and system initialization data
from the TSM. When the TSM is not installed, the telegraph modem uses
internally stored default values. The housing is opened to receive the
TSM in the following manner: using both hands, press on the cover with
both thumbs while simultaneously pulling the levers on either side of the
housing down. Once the TSM is installed, push both levers up to close
the cover.
HHM RDY Annunciator
The green HHM RDY annunciator illuminates when the TSM within the
TSM housing is ready to perform a full mission.
SHFT Key
Pressing [SHFT] enables the secondary key functions (those showing at

the top of the key).
1-494
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
8
CONTROLINDICATOR
[DFLT] and [SEL] Key
FUNCTION
Pressing [SHFT] then [DFLT] return all parameter values for the current
mode back to their defaults, (i.e., those parameters last sent to the modem). In the modem, the default parameters are stored in the low power
RAM (LRAM). If the values in the RAM are not usable, the defaults are
obtained from the Memory Unit on the front of the modem, or from the
TSM. The cursor is also homed back to the initial starting point for the
menu.
Pressing [SEL] performs one of the following, depending upon the current
display:
a. Scrolls through the possible options for a specific parameter within the
database. For example, if the parameter were MILSTAR, NO. GRP ID(s),
the display would scroll through the numbers 0-5 as the operator repeatedly pressed this key.
b. Changes the available menu options when starting at the Top Menu.
[L DFT] and [ ] Key
Pressing [SHFT] then [L DFT] causes the last value from the modem to
be restored. This value is not necessarily the same value every time; it
is just the last value transmitted from the modem. For example, the
[SHFT] and [L DFT] sequence is used when the operator realizes that he
has mistakenly changed a parameter within a database.
Pressing [ ] moves the cursor to the left along a single line.
10
[ENTER] and [ ] Key
[SHFT] then [ENTR] are pressed sequentially when all parameters for a
specific mode have been entered and the operator wants the modem to
transition from the setup state to the operational state or from an old operational state to one with setup parameters.
Pressing [ ] moves the cursor to the right along a single line.
11
[TOP M] and [ ] Key
Pressing [SHFT] then [TOP M] returns the control indicator to the Top
Menu without terminating any operational state previously entered.
Pressing [ ] moves the cursor up to a new line on the display in order
to select a different parameter to enter.
12
[CLR] and [ ] Key
Pressing [SHFT] then [CLR] permits the operator to clear alarms and fault
conditions.
Pressing [ ] moves the cursor down to a new line on the display in order
to select a different parameter to enter.
Change 2
1-495
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AFSATCOM DMU Control Panel DL (Cont)

CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
13
[LT] Key (LAMP TEST)
FUNCTION
When the [LT] key is pressed and held, the following actions occur:
a. The HHM IN and HHM RDY LEDs flash until the lamp-test cycle is
complete. At that time, depending on the state of the TSM, the LEDs may
go out.
b. A vertical bar sweeps horizontally (left to right) across the 10 line by 24
character display. The bar is created by illuminating all pixels corresponding to a character location (5x7 dot matrix = 35 pixels) in every character
row. The resulting bar sweeps across the display area at the rate of one
sweep in 2.4 seconds, dwelling in every character column for 0.1 second
each. If [LT] is still pressed at the completion of the first and subsequent
sweeps, the vertical bar repeats the sweep across the display area, but
at a rate of 9.6 seconds per sweep, dwelling for 0.4 seconds at every character column. Upon release of [LT], the display pixel test is terminated at
the completion of the current sweep.
Time Standard Module DL
Figure 1-141
1-496
Change 2
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AFSATCOM Keyboard
Change 19
1-497
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AFSATCOM Keyboard (Cont)

NO.
1
CONTROLINDICATOR
MEM (Memory) Indicator Display
FUNCTION
The MEM indicator is a one character display capable of displaying the
following characters: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 0, F, E, C, a small zero (o),
and a dash (). The small zero indicates a power-on condition. Any time
the MEM indicator is not being used to display status information, it displays a dash () providing the printer power is on. The MEM indicator
is also used for the following functions:
1. To display the numeric identifier associated with the selected
composition buffer and the status of the selected buffer. The
memory indicator on the keyboard control is cycled between
display of the selected memory status at a 1 1/3 cycle per
second rate. Definitions of the memory select readouts are
as follows:
READOUT
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
(small o)
F
E
C
dash ()
DEFINITION
Message length selected for
Composition buffer No. 1
Read only memory buffer No.
Initial power-on condition
Selected buffer full
Selected buffer overflow
Selected memory clear
No memory selected
6
7
8
9
2. To indicate a memory full condition and is enabled when the

last input character has filled the selected character
memory, or upon detection of ETX after the remainder of the
selected memory format length has been filled with ASCII
SYN characters. The memory full indication is provided by
displaying F on the keyboard memory indicator. Display of
the full status alternates with display of the currently selected buffer numeric identifier.
3. To indicate a memory overflow condition and is enabled
when the last input character has exceeded the selected
message format length, or when the last input character has
exceeded the maximum buffer capacity. The indicator remains on until the keyboard is backspaced, memory is
cleared, or a new memory is selected. If data entry is continued, it is stored until the upper boundary of the selected
memory is reached. Continuation of additional characters
does not alter the contents of the existing message. The
memory overflow indication is provided by displaying E on
the keyboard memory indicator.
1-498
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
AUTO XMT(Automatic Transmit) Indicator
The AUTO XMT (automatic transmit) light indicates when equipment

is in AUTO XMT mode.
POLL XMT(Polling Transmit) Indicator
The POLL XMT (polling transmit) light indicates when equipment is in

POLL XMT mode.
MNL XMT(Manual Transmit) Indicator
The MNL XMT (manual transmit) light indicates when equipment is in

MNL XMT mode.
TEXT (Text) Indicator Display
The TEXT display is a five character alphanumeric display used as an

aid by the operator during compose and edit operations. The display
provides the operator with a readout of the five most recently entered
keyboard characters. The characters displayed can be backspaced or
forward spaced under control of the edit keys on the keyboard. The most
recent character entered from the keyboard appears in the rightmost
character location of the display.
Keyboard
The alphanumeric keyboard can be used to generate a 49 ASCII character set as follows:
FUNCTION
26 letters (A thru Z)
10 numerals (0 thru 9)
ETX (end of text)
ACK (acknowledge)
CAN (cancel)
NAK (negative acknowledge)
SOH (start of heading)
/ (slash)
. (period)
, (comma)
?
#
SPACE
CR (carriage return)
LF (line feed)
Twelve keys are dual function with the upper character available when
the control key (No. 11) has been pressed and the control indicator light
(No. 10) is on. The remaining alphanumeric keys operate only when the
control light is off. All other keyboard keys are independent of the control
key and light. The affected keys are the numeric keys, the # ? key, and
the CAN SOH key.
7
AUTO XMT (Automatic Transmit) Key
The AUTO XMT key enables a message from the selected memory for
subsequent transmission as controlled by the external bit clock. At the
end of message transmission, the ASR equipment goes to a message
hold status; the AUTO XMT light (No. 2) is then disabled. Keyboard inputs to memory are disabled in the auto transmit mode and during message hold status. The AUTO XMT light is turned on by the logic/power
supply when the auto transmit mode is in effect. At the end of message
transmission, the AUTO XMT light is turned off.
RCV PRT (Receive Print) Key
The RCV PRT key permits the operator to control page printer operation
from the keyboard. When enabled, the printer prints only received messages or messages from memory for verification during compose and
edit. When the control is not enabled, the printer prints messages being
composed, verified, or received, and prints transmitted messages at the
time of actual transmission. The RCV PRT light (No. 18) is enabled in
this mode.
1-499
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AFSATCOM Keyboard (Cont)

CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
9
FUNCTION
VRFY (Verify) Key
Operation of the VRFY Key causes the selected memory contents (to
ETX) to be printed on the printer. Keyboard inputs to memory are disabled during verification. Printing occurs regardless of the setting of the
receive print only. The verify key is operative only in the compose and
edit mode.
10
Control Indicator
The control light indicates when the keyboard is in the control mode.
11
CONT (Control) Key
The CONT key permits the operator to utilize the uppercase symbols or
control codes on the keyboard. The CONT key/light is enabled when the
keyboard unit is in the control mode. The control mode is entered by
pressing the CONT key on the keyboard. The CONT key must be
pressed a second time to remove the control mode.
12
FWD SP (Forward Space) Key
The FWD SP key provides forward spacing within the character

memory for character correction.
13
BACK SP (Back Space) Key
The BACK SP key provides backspacing within the character memory

for character correction.
14
RESET Key
The RESET key permits the operator to halt any operation of the ASR
equipment and causes it to be placed in the receive mode. Pressing this
key also initiates a lamp test of all indicators on the keyboard. Pressing
this key also turns off the printer ready light.
15
COMP EDIT (Compose and Edit) Key
When pressed, the COMP EDIT key places the ASR equipment in the
compose edit mode. The COMP EDIT light (No. 2) is enabled in this
mode.
16
MNL XMT (Manual Transmit) Key
Permits direct on-line message transmission at the manual typing rate.

This mode is enabled from the keyboard. In this mode, the memory is
bypassed so that no change or loss of any stored character occurs. The
MNL XMT light (No. 4) is enabled in this mode. The indicator is turned
on upon receipt of the transmit bit clock from the external system.
17
POLL XMT (Polling Transmit) Key
The POLL XMT key enables a message from the selected memory for
subsequent transmission in response to a polling inquiry. Keyboard inputs to memory are disabled in this mode. The ASR equipment remains
in the poll transmit mode until another operating mode is selected by the
operator. The POLL XMT light (No. 3) is turned on by the logic/power
supply when the poll transmit mode is in effect.
18
RCV PRT(Receive Print) Indicator
The RCV PRT (receive print) light indicates when equipment is in receive print mode.
1-500
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
19
CLR MEM (Clear Memory) Key
The CLR MEM key is used to remove any stored message from the selected character memory. This control is operative only when the device
is in the compose and edit mode and when a character memory has
been selected. The CLR MEM key is interlocked with the keyboard
CONT key.
20
RCVR BUSY(Receiver Busy) Indicator
The RCVR BUSY (receiver busy) light will come on when a message
is being received. A sync message in time slot 60 will also turn on the
light, although no other indications will be observed by the operator if the
system was previously placed in the timed access mode (framed).
21
COMP EDIT (Compose and Edit) Indicator
The COMP EDIT (compose and edit) light indicates when equipment is
in compose edit mode.
22
MSG SENT(Message Sent) Indicator
The MSG SENT(message sent) light is enabled by the logic/power supply at the conclusion of automatic transmit and polling transmit. In automatic transmit, the indicator is turned off when the next operating mode
of the device is selected. In polling transmit, the indicator is turned off
10 seconds after message transmission.
1-501
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AFSATCOM Printer
1-502
Change 19
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
Viewing Window
The viewing window permits the operator to view the printed copy. Low
paper is indicated by a mark (red border) on the paper.
PWR-ON/OFF (Power) Switch
The PWR-ON/OFF switch applies power to all of the ASR units. When
the switch is in the ON position, the green PWR light is on.
To prevent receiver-transmitter lock-up, turn printer power on

prior to SATCOM control turn-on.
3
Power Light (Green)
The power light is on when the power switch is in the ON

position.
ILLUM BRT/OFF/DIM (Illumination)

Switch
The ILLUM BRT/OFF/DIM switch provides illumination control for the

paper, Power Light (No. 3), and Printer Ready Light (No. 5) on the printer. This switch also controls the light level of the MEM indicator (No. 1),
TEXT display (No. 3), Keyboard Indicator Lights (No. 2) and Control
Light (No. 11) on the keyboard.
PRT RDY (Printer Ready) Light (Green)
The PRT RDY light comes on when the printer is ready for
operation.
ENBL-DSBL (Address Enable-Disable)

Switch
The ENBL-DSBL switch disables the address function when

desired.
LINE FEED Switch
The LINE FEED switch is a momentary pushbutton switch that advances paper on the printer when pressed.
ADDRESS (Address Select)

Switches (3)
The ADDRESS switches provide selection of a unique hexidecimal

number for the ASR units address.
Change 4
1-503
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Automatic Send Receive Modes Of Operation
RESET
RECEIVE
Pressing the RESET button on the keyboard cancels the previously selected mode of operation and
returns the ASR equipment to the normal receive
only mode. Pressing the RESET button also initiates a lamp test of all indicators and displays on
the keyboard. As long as the button is held pressed,
all indicators and displays are lit and the printer
ready light is out.
This is the normal operating mode of the automatic

send receive (ASR) equipment. The equipment
monitors all incoming signals. Upon recognition of a
valid address, the printer module prints the incoming message, including the message header. Receive
mode operation has priority usage of the printer
over all other operating modes. If the printer is operating in another mode, a received message preempts the operation. The printer executes a carriage return and two line feeds, prints the received
message, executes another carriage return and two
line feeds, and returns to the previous operating
mode.
ADDRESS RECOGNITION
The ASR equipment is capable of address recognition in conjunction with receive mode operation. If
the equipment recognizes the address of an incoming message, the printer prints that message. If the
equipment does not recognize the address, the message is not printed. Messages without an address
are considered to be addressed to all receivers, and
are printed.
RECEIVE PRINT ONLY
The RCV PRT (receive print only) button on the
keyboard gives the operator an option for use of the
printer. Pressing the button enables the receive
print only mode. When this mode is enabled, the
printer prints only incoming messages or messages
from memory for verification during compose and
edit mode operation. Receive print only mode is terminated by pressing the RESET key on the keyboard. When the receive print only mode is not enabled, the printer prints received messages, messages from memory for verification, messages from
keyboard input during compose and edit mode operation, and transmitted messages at the time of actual transmission. Received messages have priority
usage of the printer.
1-504
COMPOSE AND EDIT

The compose and edit mode permits off-line composition and editing of messages for later transmission. This mode is selected by pressing the COMP
EDIT switch on the keyboard. Composition is accomplished as the message is typed into memory.
Editing is accomplished by forward spacing or backspacing, character correction, and continuation of
message composition. Compose and edit mode inputs from the keyboard are displayed on the fivecharacter TEXT display on the keyboard. The message is also printed on the printer if the receive
print only option is not enabled, and if the printer
is not preempted by an incoming message. In compose and edit mode operation, the keyboard inputs
are entered into the selected memory, regardless of
the state of the receive print only option.
VERIFY
The memory readout, or verify function, allows the
operator to view an entire message on the printer
at any time between composition and memory clear,
provided printer operation has not been preempted
by an incoming message. The function is enabled by
pressing the CONT (control) button on the keyboard, pressing the key that corresponds with the
numeric identifier of the desired memory, then
pressing the VRFY button on the keyboard.
CANNED MESSAGES
The ASR equipment has read-only memory (ROM)
storage facilities for four predefined (canned) messages of 40 characters each. Any one of the messages can be read from memory for verification,
editing, or transmission, as selected by the operator. Selection of the canned message buffer is accomplished by pressing the CONT (control) button,
then pressing the key that corresponds with the numeric identifier of the desired message (numbers 6
thru 9).
T.O. 1B-52H-1
PRECOMPOSED MESSAGES
The ASR equipment has provisions for composing
and storing five messages (four of 40 characters
each and one of up to 160 characters in increments
of 20 characters). Any one of the messages can be
composed, edited, verified, or transmitted, as selected by the operator. Selection of one of the
40-character buffers is accomplished by pressing
the CONT (control) button, then pressing the key
that corresponds with the numeric identifier of the
desired message (numbers 2 thru 5). Selection of
the 160-character message buffer is accomplished
by pressing the CONT button and the (number) 1
key. If no message has been entered into the
memory, the MEM (selected memory) display alternately flashes the number 1 and a C. The message
can be loaded by selecting the compose and edit
mode, setting the message length, then typing the
message on the keyboard. Message length is set by
selecting buffer No. 0 and inserting the desired
message length. Message length can be set from 20
to 160 characters, in increments of 20, the selected
message length is displayed in the first three positions of the five (5)-character TEXT indicator.
CONTROL
Pressing the CONT (control) button on the keyboard allows the operator to use the upper case
characters and special function keys. Once the control function has been activated, the CONT key
must be pressed again to release the function.
the operator presses the AUTO XMT button again.

Automatic Transmit Mode can be effectively used
in: random access (satellite operation with no timed
access control), TDM-1 (timed access mode), or
TDM-2 (timed access mode, frequency shifting).
Maximum message length is 160 characters in random access and 40 characters in TDM-1 or TDM-2.
MANUAL TRANSMIT
The manual transmit mode permits direct on-line
transmission via manual keyboard entry. Operation
in this mode is activated by pressing the MNL XMT
(manual transmit) button on the keyboard. When
the mode is activated, synchronous idle (SYN) characters are continuously generated to maintain bit
and character synchronization. Each keyboard input character replaces the next SYN character and
is sent to the external data line at the manual typing rate. The receive print only and receive message
preempt features are applicable. To ensure against
unrecognized character loss, the printer does not
print a character until it is sent to the external data
interface. Transmission can be terminated by an
end-of-text (ETX) character keyboard input. If a
time interval of approximately 10 seconds lapses
between keyboard inputs, the ASR equipment
transmits four ETX characters. When the ETX
characters have been sent, the transmit keyline is
deactivated and transmission ceases. Manual
transmission cannot be continued or repeated unless the operator presses the MNL XMT button
again. Manual transmit can be effectively used only
in random access.
AUTOMATIC TRANSMIT
POLL TRANSMIT
The automatic transmit mode, when enabled,
permits the ASR equipment to automatically read a
message from a selected memory location, and to
transmit the message at a fixed rate of 75 bits per
second. Operation in this mode is accomplished by
pressing the AUTO XMT (automatic transmit) key
on the keyboard, then selecting the canned or precomposed message for transmission. When the
mode is activated, message transmission is initiated upon receipt of the external bit clock signal. If
the receive print only function is not activated, and
if page printer usage is not preempted by an incoming message, the message is printed on the printer
simultaneously with transmission. Upon completion of transmission, the MSG SENT (message-sent) indicator lights, and remains lit until a
new mode is selected. The message is not destroyed
by transmission, but cannot be sent again unless
Polling mode operation provides automatic reply

transmission in response to an incoming polling inquiry message. Poll transmit mode operation is initiated by pressing the POLL XMT button on the
keyboard. Each valid poll inquiry message initiates
an automatic reply transmission. The MSG SENT
(message sent) indicator is turned on for 10 seconds
following each reply transmission. The ASR
equipment remains in poll transmit mode, with the
POLL XMT indicator lit, until the operator selects a
new mode. Poll Mode can be effectively used only
when a valid address is inserted and enabled. This
must be accomplished in order to receive and respond to a poll inquiry. Maximum message length
for Poll XMT is 160 characters in random access
and 40 characters in TDM-1 or TDM-2. Normally,
Polling mode will be done in random access.
1-505
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AFSATCOM NORMAL OPERATION
To turn the AFSATCOM on:

1. Set power switch on printer to ON. Power light
comes on.
der this circumstance, the modem automatically restarts the downlink acquisition process using the
oven-controlled oscillator, and if the oscillator is
within limits, successful downlink acquisition occurs.
NOTE
To prevent receiver-transmitter lock-up,

turn printer on prior to AFSATCOM control
turn-on.
2. Set mode selector switch on the AFSATCOM
control panel to OPR 1. Less DL
2. Set control indicator power switch to ON. DL
Warm-up:
The ARC-171A Radio Transceiver (RT) requires an
initial 15-minute warm-up period. After the
15-minute warm-up, the RT switches from a crystal
oscillator to an oven-controlled oscillator. Because
each oscillator operates independently, there can be
significant differences between output signals.
When the output difference is large enough (>3Hz),
a loss-of-signal may be observed during AFSAT IIM
or MILSTAR downlink acquisition due to strict satellite timing requirements.
If the DMU starts an AFSTAT IIM or MILSTAR
downlink acquisition immediately after RT power
has been applied, and the crystal oscillator output
is within acceptable accuracy limits, successful
downlink acquisition will occur. However, after the
RTs 15-minute warm-up period and subsequent
switchover to the oven-controlled oscillator, a loss of
the downlink signal could occur due to a difference
between output of the oscillators.
Loss of the downlink signal will cause several preempt messages such as LOSS OF SLOT SYNC,
LOSS OF SIGNAL, or BAD CTRL CHAN to be displayed on the CI. If the downlink signal is lost un-
1-506
Change 2
Oscillator output differences have no effect

on AFSAT I operations.
To turn the AFSATCOM off:
1. Set mode selector switch on the AFSATCOM
control panel to OFF. Less DL
1. Set control indicator power switch to OFF. DL
2. Set power switch on printer to OFF.
To transmit in manual transmit mode using ASR
equipment:
1. Position function selector switch on the LOS
control panel to OFF or SATL.
2. Press MNL XMT key on keyboard, MNL XMT
indicator will come on.
3. Type message. Message is transmitted as it is
typed.
To set message length for buffer number 1 using
ASR equipment.
1. Set message length as follows:
a. Press COMP EDIT key on keyboard. COMP
EDIT indicator will come on. MEM indicator will
display a dash (-).
b. Press CONT KEY. Control indicator should
be on.
c. Press 0 key. MEM indicator will display 0
and TEXT indicator will display 040 (or previous
message length).
d. Type message length required for message
(20 to 160 in increments of 20). TEXT indicators
will display number typed.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
To transmit in the compose and edit mode using
ASR equipment:
1. Press CONT KEY, COMP EDIT, and desired
buffer number. CONT indicator and COMP EDIT
indicator will be on and MEM indicator will alternate the selected buffer number (1 thru 9) and C.
2. Type message. Last five (5) characters typed
will appear in TEXT display as the message is
typed.
3. Press VRFY key. Message will be printed out
on the printer for verification.
4. Position function selector switch on the LOS
control panel to OFF or SATL.
5. Press CONT KEY and AUTO XMT key. AUTO
XMT indicator will come on.
6. Press selected buffer number. At end of transmission, AUTO XMT light will go out and MSG
SENT light should come on.
NOTE
Use of RCV PRT is not recommended during AUTO XMT. This method of operation
insures the correct message has been transmitted. It will also provide a copy of the actual message transmitted.
AFSATCOM DUAL MODEM OPERATING MODES DL
Each mode of operations, described briefly in the

following paragraphs, has its own menu which is
accessed via the Top Menu.
The Top Menu is in the main menu and is always
available to the operator by pressing the [SHFT]
then [TOP M] keys on the Control Indicator (CI)
figure 1-140. After entering one of the six modes of
operation, the CI returns to the Top Menu display,
but also provides other operational data to the operator on the status lines of is the CI display. Top
Menu options, parameters and default values are in
figure 1-144.
Reviewing and Changing Active AFSAT I, AFSAT IIM, or

MILSTAR Parameters
NOTE
Some MILSTAR Mode parameters cannot

be changed after mode entry. If an attempt
is made to change a parameter not designated, the operator must re-enter the
MILSTAR Mode menu from the TOP
MENU to change the parameters. See figure 1-147 for allowable parameters marked
with an asterisk (*).
To change the active AFSTAT I, AFSAT IIM, or
MILSTAR parameters after starting the mode, the
operator accomplishes the following:
1. On the CI TOP MENU display, position the
cursor (>) at REVIEW, press the [SEL] key until
the ACTIVE option is shown.
2. Press the [SHFT] then {ENTR] keys to review
parameters of the ACTIVE mode, (AFSTAT I, AFSAT IIM, or MILSTAR).
3. Move the cursor (>) to the desired parameter
using the scroll keys [ ] or [ ].
4. Review and change the parameter (as required
using the [SEL] key) until the desired option is
shown.
5. Press the [SHFT] then [ENTR] keys to return
to the active configuration (AFSTAT I, AFSAT IIM,
or MILSTAR).
6. If ACTIVE mode was either AFSAT IIM or
MILSTAR and the parameter changes affects WOD/
WOM and/or WOD-entry method, the WOD entry
menu/parameters are displayed to the operator
prior to mode entry.
IDLE Mode
When the equipment has completed power-up BIT

it is automatically in the IDLE Mode, the default
mode at power up. During operation, the idle mode
also allows the operator to place the equipment in a
standby state where the modem is not operating
within a communication mode. See figure 1-144 for
Idle Mode Menu.
Change 2
1-506A
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AFSAT I Mode
The AFSAT I mode of operation provides all modem

and force element (FE) terminal synchronization
functions on both regenerative and non-regenerative channels. The parameters of operation (i.e., frequency plan, transmit and receive channels, etc.)
are based on the AFSAT I configuration entered by
the operator. See figure 1-145 for AFSAT I Mode
Parameters and Mode Status Parameters. This
mode also allows for Emergency Action Message
(EAM) and Force Direction Message (FDM) reception on primary channel as well as channel 1.5 for
certain frequency plans.
To change the active AFSTAT I EAM mode parameter after starting the AFSTAT I Mode, do the following:
1. On the CI TOP MENU display, with the cursor
(>) at REVIEW, press the [SEL] key until the ACTIVE option is shown.
2. Move the cursor (>) down to the EAM mode parameter using the [ ] Key.
3. Review and change the EAM mode parameter
by pressing the [SEL] key until the desired option
is shown.
1-506B
Change 2
4. Press the [SHFT] then [ENTR] keys twice to

return to the active AFSTAT I configuration.
To change the active AFSTAT I CH 1.5 LOCKOUT
parameter after starting the AFSTAT I mode, do
the following:
1. On the CI TOP MENU display, with the cursor
(>) at REVIEW, press the [SEL] key until the ACTIVE option is shown.
2. Using the [ ] Key, move the cursor (>) down to
the CH 1.5 LOCKOUT parameter.
3. Review and change the CH 1.5 LOCKOUT
parameter by pressing the [SEL] key until the desired option is shown.
4. Press the [SHFT] then [ENTR] keys twice to
either reset the CH 1.5 LOCKOUT parameter (depending upon selection), and return to the active
AFSTAT I configuration.
5. If the Channel 1.5 Lockout is reset, the
AFSTAT I mode status display for the CH 1.5 parameter changes from LCKOT to SRCH.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
After entering AFSAT I mode, the following operational events should occur:
1. The RX parameter (in CI display) should show
ACQ (acquired) within 10 seconds.
NOTE
When operating on a regenerative (always

toggling i.e., where there is always satellite
energy present) channel, the satellite is designed to provide a two-tone signal. At
times, a satellite may provide only one tone
or not have any tone present on the regenerative channel.
When operating on a known TDM 1 or TDM 2 AFSAT I regenerative channel, wait at least 6 minutes
for a valid frame sync message to be received by the
modem. When a valid sync message is received, the
RX status changes to ACQ.
2. During operation, the FRAME status and the
current active slot number (AS [current active slot
number] field for SLOT parameter) are different for
each TDM submode. Depending upon the TDM
submode supported by the modem, the following
may occur:
RNDM submode: both the FRAME and AS fields
are blank.
TDM1 submode: the FRAME field remains fixed at
000 while the AS field increments continuously.
TDM2 submode: the FRAME and AS fields increment continuously.
3. When either an EAM or FDM is received on
the primary channel, the RX status parameter displays MSG. The EAM display is shown on the CI,
the EAM alarm sounds, and the message is printed
to the teletype. In the case of a FDM, there is no
alarm and the message is printed on the teletype.
EAM alarm handling and clearing within AFSAT I

mode is based upon selection of either NORMAL or
LCC. If NORMAL has been selected, the operator
must manually clear and silence the alarm by
pressing [SHFT] then [CLR] keys. the LCC option
provides automatic alarm clearing (and silencing)
approximately 15 seconds after the last message
character (for the last repeat) of the current EAM
received. regardless or the EAM mode selected, the
EAM for the AFSAT I mode is printed as follows:
UUUXX<CR><LF>
EIGHT EIGHT <CR><LF>
EIGHT ECHO <CR><LF>
ALFA MIKE <CR><LF>
NOVEMBER NOVEMBER <CR><LF>
ZERO ZERO <CR><LF>
ZERO ALFA <CR><LF>
ALFA ALFA <CR><LF>
ECHO ALFA <CR><LF>
MIKE EIGHT <CR><LF>
NNNN <CR><LF>
<ETX>
4. If it is applicable to the current mission and
there is energy/signal detected on channel 1.5 (other than noise), the RX status changes to show 1.5
DET and the 1.5 MSG. Message reception indications for EAM and FDM are the same as in 3 above.
5. If there is noise or a non-valid signal present
on channel 1.5 and the CHAN 1.5 SUBMODE
SRCH parameter (AFSAT I menu) and the CH 1.5
LOCKOUT parameter (Top menu) are both enabled, the modem locks out channel 1.5. Refer to
AFSATCOM Abnormal Procedures in Section III of
T.O. 1B-52H-1-12 for AFSAT I mode preempt messages and corrective actions.
Change 2
1-507
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Idle Mode Menu And Top Menu Parameters DL

NOTE
There are two types of operational parameters, INDEPENDENT and DEPENDENT.
INDEPENDENT parameters do not depend on any other operation parameter
selections; do not depend on the current configuration of the Dual Modem; and
are always displayed as part of the Top Menu. DEPENDENT parameters are called
so because their use (and whether they are displayed as an option to the operation
or not) is dependent upon the mode of operation selected. Additional information
on independent and dependent parameters is located in the parameter figures
associated with desired mode of operation.
PARAMETER
DEFINITION
RANGE OF VALUES
DEFAULT
ACTIVE, ALTERNATE
ACTIVE
IDLE MODE MENU

USE
Disposition of parameter list being reviewed

TOP MENU PARAMETERS
REVIEW
Independent Selects modem operating mode for

review.
AF1, AF2M, TIME XFER,

BIT, IDLE, ACTIVE,
ALTERNATE, MILSTAR
AF1
EAM MODE
Independent Selects EAM alarm handling and

EAM Message text formatting.
NORMAL, LCC
NORMAL
0001 thru 1021
0001
NOTE
Use of the LCC Option should be avoided.
TERMINAL ID
Dependent Defines the terminal identification

number assigned for operation within the MILSTAR network.
NOTE
Terminal ID numbers
896 1021 are typically
reserved for Command
Post Terminals.
NET ID
Dependent Network identification number (for

MILSTAR mode only).
01 thru 31
01
SAT ID
Dependent Satellite identification number (for

MILSTAR mode only).
01 thru 10
01
CH 1.5
LOCKOUT
NOTE
ENBL, RESET, DSBL
This parameter is displayed whenever

the REVIEW parameter is ACTIVE or
AF1. The modem ignores this parameter
in all modes except AFSAT I.
Dependent Allows use of and reset of channel
1.5 for lockout (channel 1.5 is applicable to
AFSAT I mode only). The Dual Modem
automatically starts up with lockout enabled,
unless otherwise configured at startup.
Figure 1-144
1-508
Change 2
ENBL
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AFSAT I Mode Parameters DL

PARAMETER
DEFINITION
RANGE OF VALUES
DEFAULT
ACTIVE
USE
Independent Shows the current disposition of

menu and parameters being reviewed. If ACTIVE,
the AFSAT I mode becomes the primary operating
mode for the Dual modem after the operator enters all parameters and presses the [SHFT] and
[ENTR] keys. If ALTERNATE, it indicates the AFSAT I mode has been designated as the alternate
operating mode for the Dual modem.
ACTIVE, ALTERNATE
FREQ PLAN
Independent Defines the frequency plan to be

used during operation. The frequencies assigned
to each plan are provided to the operator within
the communications plan or mission parameters
information.
A thru H, J thru Q
TDM SUBMODE
Independent Determines the control of Time Division Multiplexing (TDM) modes on transmit
channel 8. 9. and 10 only. This applies to all frequency plans except for plans N, O, P, and Q. The
NORMAL option allows Random TDM mode only
while the EXTEND (extended) option allows the
Random, TDM1, or TDM2 modes.
NORMAL or EXTEND
TX CHAN
Independent Defines the Uplink (UL) transmit

channel.
01 thru 39
07
RX CHAN
Independent Defines the primary Downlink (DL)

receive channel.
01 thru 39
01
TDM SLOT
Independent Defines the TDM transmission slot

number.
01 thru 59
21
KEY [C]
Independent An 11-digit octal value that defines

the confidential hopping-control variable for
TDM2. The default variable is stored in memory
unit locations 160-171.
O1 thru O11
Stored in
Memory Unit
ALT TX FREQ
Independent Defines the alternate transmit frequency in 5 KHz increments for frequency plans F,
G, H, J, or K only. The default value for the alternate frequency is stored in memory unit locations
172-177.
220.000 MHz thru

399.995 MHz
Stored in
Memory Unit
CHAN 1.5
SUBMODE
Independent Defines the channel 1.5 monitoring

activity for specific AFSAT I frequency plans on
specific Downlink receive channels. The choices
are SRCH (where the Modem searches for energy
on channel 1.5 and when energy is detected, it
preempts the primary channel), CONT (continuous) (where the Modem processes channel 1.5 as
the primary channel), or DSBL (where the Modem
does not monitor channel 1.5).
CONT, SRCH, DSBL
SRCH
RX
Downlink receive status during operation. Status

is either NO ACQ (No Acquisition), ACQ (Acquisition has occurred), MSG (message received), 1.5
DET (energy is detected on channel 1.5) or 1.5
MSG (message received on channel 1.5).
NO ACQ, ACQ, MSG,

1.5 DET, or 1.5 MSG
NONE
NORMAL
1-509
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AFSAT I Mode Parameters DL (Cont)

PARAMETER
DEFINITION
RANGE OF VALUES
DEFAULT
CH
Displays the Frequency plan, Transmit channel,

and Receive channel parameters (separated by
space) as selected by the operator.
Frequency plan:
A thru H, J thru Q
Transmit channel:
01 thru 39
Receive channel:
01 thru 39
NONE
CH 1.5
Channel 1.5 monitoring status. Status is either

SRCH (where the Modem is searching for energy
on channel 1.5 and when energy is detected, it
preempts the primary channel), CONT (where the
Modem is processing channel 1.5 as the primary
channel), DSBL (where the Modem is not monitoring channel 1.5 activity), or LCKOT (where the
Modem has locked out all channel 1.5 activity due
to a non-valid signal being received. The CH 1.5
LOCKOUT preempt message is displayed as
well.).
SRCH, CONT, DSBL, or

LCKOT
NONE
MODE
The current TDM submode supported by the modem.
RNDM, TDM1, TDM2, or

EXTD
NONE
FRAME
The current TDM frame number used. This parameter is blank in RNDM mode, shown as 000 in
TDM1 mode, and shown as an incrementing number in TDM2 mode.
000 thru 999
NONE
SLOT
The TDM slot number assigned as well as the slot

number currently being used. Where, the parameter display uses the following format:
SS: 01 thru 59
AS: blank or 01 thru 60
NONE
SS/AS definitions:
SS = Assigned slot number
AS = Current active slot number.
NOTE
This parameter is also blank in RNDM
mode.
1-510
Change 2
T.O. 1B-52H-1
quisition occurs provided below is nominal,
given an accurate TSM.
AFSAT IIM Mode
The AFSAT IIM mode is a receive-only mode in

which the modem receives AFSAT IIM processed
and modulated data. The parameters of operation
(i.e., TRANSEC information on hopping bandwidth)
are based on the AFSAT IIM configuration entered
by the operator. (See figure 1-146 for AFSAT IIM
Mode Parameters and Mode Status Parameters.)
This mode continuously monitors the receive channel for the presence of a signal, while rapidly
changing (hopping) the received frequency over one
of the two operator-selectable bandwidths. This
mode of operation typically uses the Time Standard
Module (TSM) (figure 1-141) to provide Word-ofthe-Day (WOD) and the Future WOD (FWOD), key
variables as well as Time-of-Day (TOD) information
for use in maintaining hopping time and frequency
synchronization during operation.
2. Once the signal is acquired, the RX parameter

changes to ACQ (acquired).
3. See subsequent paragraphs for EAM and FDM
reception displays, actions and activities.
During set up of AFSAT IIM mode of operation, if
the KBD (keyboard) option for WOD LOAD VIA parameter was selected, the following events should
happen:
1. The CLSG WOD prompt is printed on the I/O
device (AFSATCOM printer). At the prompt, type
the current WOD on the AFSATCOM keyboard and
press the [AUTOXMIT] key after all characters
have been typed. WOD should then print out on
printer.
NOTE

modes, the equipment requires certain TRANSEC
key variables. These key variables, traditionally
were for a 24 hour period; hence, the term Word-ofDay (WOD). The effective period of the WOD has
been changed to expire after 30 days. This resulted
in the new term Word-of-Month (WOM). The terms
Word-of-Day (WOD) or Future WOD (FWOD) are
used synonymously with the new terms Word-ofMonth (WOM) and Future Word-of-Month
(FWOM). This usage is also in keeping with the terminology of WOD and FWOD as shown on the AFSAT IIM or MILSTAR mode configuration screens.
NOTE
Ascertain that the TRANSEC code for

WOD/WOM are current and correct, and
that they cover the duration of flight plus
time if flight duration is longer than expected. Non current or incorrect TRANSEC
codes will inhibit the equipment in its functions.
After entering AFSAT IIM mode, the following operational events should occur:
1. The RX (receive) Mode Status Parameter (line
8 on CI display) shows NO ACQ for approximately
60 seconds while the Dual Modem (and terminal
equipment) are attempting to acquire the satellite
downlink signal.
NOTE
Actual AFSAT IIM acquisition time depends on the accuracy of time supplied by
the TSM or as a last resort, the time supplied by the operator. The time until ac-
When entering WOD via the keyboard, only

the last five characters entered will be visible in the text indicator display. After all
characters of WOD are entered, use the
BACK SP (backspace) and/or FWD SP (forward space) keys to review WOD prior to
pressing the [AUTOXMIT] key..
2. If either the FUTURE or BOTH parameter
was selected for the KBD, the I/O device prompts
for the FLSG. At the prompt, type the future WOD
and depress the [AUTOXMIT] key after verifying
entered characters are correct using the BACK SP
and/or the FWD SP keys.
3. The I/O then prompts for the FLSG rollovertime. The first parameter is the year (format=YY).
Type in the required year and then press the [AUTOXMIT] key.
NOTE
All rollover-time entries for FLSG and

FILSG WOD must be 2 digit values, therefore. leading zeros are required.
4. The I/O device prompts individually for the remaining rollover-time parameters:
Month (format=MM)
Day (format=DD)
Hour (format=HH)
Minutes (format=mm)
Seconds (format=ss)
5. After each parameter is entered, press the
[AUTOXMIT] key.
Refer to AFSATCOM Abnormal Procedures in Section III of T.O. 1B-52H-1-12 for AFSAT IIM Mode
Preempt messages and corrective action.
Change 2
1-511
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AFSAT IIM Mode Parameters DL

PARAMETER
DEFINITION
RANGE OF VALUES
DEFAULT
ACTIVE
USE

menu and parameters being reviewed. lf ACTIVE,
the AFSAT IIM mode becomes the primary operating mode for the Dual modem after the operator
enters all parameters and presses the [SHFT] and
[ENTR] keys. lf ALTERNATE, it indicates the AFSAT IIM mode has been designated as the alternate operating mode for the Dual Modem.
ACTIVE, ALTERNATE
HOP BAND
Independent Defines the frequency hopping

range. The choices are NARROW (where hopping
takes place over a narrow frequency bandwidth)
or WIDE (where hopping takes place over a wider
frequency bandwidth).
NARROW or WIDE
WOD LOAD VIA
NOTE
NARROW
NONE, Cl, KBD, or TSM
Cl
CURRENT, FUTURE, or
BOTH
BOTH
Be sure to check with the COMSEC custodian before using the KBD option to enter the TRANSEC WODs.
Once the WODs have been loaded (and
the mode is entered), any attempt to redisplay the active mode parameters
shows this parameter as NONE.
Independent Defines the source for external

loading of current or future (optional) TRANSEC
Words-of-Day (WODs). The choices are NONE
(where the default WODs stored in front panel
ROM are used), Cl (where the operator uses the
CI key pad to load the WODs), KBD (where the
operator uses a teletype (TTY) to load the WODs),
or TSM (where the TSM is used to load the
WODs).
LSG WOD SEL
Dependent Defines the LSG WODs to be loaded

and reviewed The choices are CURRENT (which
applies to current WODs only), FUTURE (which
applies to future WODs), or BOTH (where both
current and future WODs are to be loaded).
NOTE
If the FUTURE option is selected, a rollover time is needed. Note that this parameter is not shown if WODLOAD VIA
TSM is selected.
C LSG
Dependent Defines the current LSG WOD to be

used. This parameter is a 32-digit hexadecimal
value. The default WOD values are stored in
Memory Unit locations 128-159 on the front-panel
ROM.
NOTE
This parameter is not displayed if WOD
LOAD VIA TSM or KBD is selected.
1-512
Change 2
W1 thru W32
Stored in
Memory Unit
T.O. 1B-52H-1
PARAMETER
F LSG
DEFINITION
Dependent - Defines the future LSG WOD to be
Memory Unit locations 128-159 within the frontpanel ROM.
RANGE OF VALUES
W1 thru W32
DEFAULT
Stored in
Memory Unit
NOTE
RX
TRM
When the future LSG WODs are used, the operator must enter the ROLLOVER TIME information
in the following format:
YEAR (values 00 to 79 = years 2000 to 2079)
(values 80 to 99 = 1980 to 1999)
MONTH
DAY
HOUR
MINUTE
SECOND
is either NO ACQ (No Acquisition), or ACQ (Acquisition has occurred).
Since this mode of operation may require a TSM
for operation, the Control Indicator provides the
TSM status. The status may show ABSNT (where
the TSM is not present within the CI housing), INOPR (where the TSM is not present within the CI
housing), INOPR (where the CI has determined
the TSM to be non-functional), CHGNG (where
the TSM is operational for the mission and charging within the CI housing), or READY (where the
TSM is present within the CI and operational for
the mission).
00 thru 99
00
01 thru 12
01 thru 31
00 thru 23
00 thru 59
00 thru 59
NO ACQ or ACQ
01
01
00
00
00
NONE
ABSNT, INOPR,
CHGNG, or READY
NONE
Change 2
1-513
T.O. 1B-52H-1
that they cover the duration of flight plus
time if flight duration is longer than expected. Non current or incorrect TRANSEC
codes will inhibit the equipment in its functions.
MILSTAR Mode
The MILSTAR mode allows the terminal to become

a Force Element (FE) terminal net member within
the MILSTAR UHF network. The modem performs
halfduplex (HDX) (receive on one frequency and
transmit on another, but not simultaneously) transmit and receive signal processing, modulation/demodulation, and frequency hopping/dehopping control of the radio. The parameters of operation (i.e.,
satellite ID, network ID, frequency plan, control
channels, report back channels, WOD and FWOD
key variables, rollover time, etc.) are based on the
MILSTAR configuration typically loaded from a
TSM. (See figure 1-147 for MILSTAR Mode Parameters and Mode Status Parameters.) The MILSTAR
network allows four Frequency Division Multiplexed (FDM) uplink channels available to transmit
and four Time Division Multiplexed (TDM)
downlink channels on which to receive.
After entering MILSTAR mode, the following operational events (and operator interactions) should occur:
1. The RX (receive) Mode Status Parameter (line
8 on CI display) shows NO ACQ while attempting
to acquire the downlink signal. When acquisition
has occurred, the status changes to NO SYNC until
the modem obtains slot and frame synchronization.
When the slot and frame are acquired, the status
automatically changes to OK.
NOTE
NOTE
The term Word-of-Day (WOD) is used synonymously with the terminology Word-ofMonth (WOM). Both terms indicate the required key variables used to operate within
the AFSAT IIM or MILSTAR Modes.
Use of the MILSTAR Mode network parameters and WODs/WOMs obtained from the
TSM is the preferred method for entering
MILSTAR Mode.

modes, the equipment requires certain TRANSEC
key variables. These key variables, traditionally
were for a 24 hour period; hence, the term Word-ofDay (WOD). The effective period of the WOD has
been changed to expire after 30 days. This resulted
in the new term Word-of-Month (WOM). The terms
Word-of-Day (WOD) or Future WOD (FWOD) are
used synonymously with the new terms Word-ofMonth (WOM) and Future Word-of-Month
(FWOM). This usage is also in keeping with the terminology of WOD and FWOD as shown on the AFSAT IIM or MILSTAR mode configuration screens.
NOTE
Ascertain that the TRANSEC code for

WOD/WOM are current and correct, and
1-514
Change 2
Actual MILSTAR acquisition time depends

on the accuracy of time supplied by either
the TSM or, as a last resort, the operator.
The time until acquisition occurs provided
below is nominal given an accurate TSM.
Under normal conditions, the receiver (RX)
acquisition process nominally takes one (1)
minute, but may take up to 15 minutes.
Once the RX status is shown as OK (downlink acquisition completed), messages can
be received by the modem, and uplink acquisition begins.
The modem does not attempt uplink acquisition until downlink acquisition and
frame synchronization are complete.
MILSTAR uplink acquisition nominally
takes two (2) to three (3) minutes, but may
take longer due to network activity.
After mode entry, if the operator wishes to
alter any of the allowable mode setup/control functions (such as for network logout,
reportback cancellation, etc.), the operator
must re-enter the ACTIVE mode menu.
Failure to do so could result in an undesirable mode change and/or inaccurate terminal status information.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
2. The TX (transmission) Mode Status Parameter
(line 8 on CI display) shows NO ACQ throughout
the downlink acquisition process and until the
uplink acquisition process succeeds.
NOTE
During the transmit signal process (uplink

acquisition) the transfer-to-bypass relays,
within the terminal equipment start clicking. This is normal for the MILSTAR uplink
acquisition process.
When uplink acquisition has occurred, the TX status changes to NO LOG until the modem successfully logs into the MILSTAR network. When login is
complete, the status automatically changes to LOG
and the preempt message LOGIN OK appears on
the CI display. Refer to AFSATCOM Abnormal Procedures in Section III of T.O. 1B-52H-1-12 for
MILSTAR Mode preempt messages and corrective
actions.
NOTE
If the TX parameter shows DENIED, the

Network Controller (NC) has denied the
terminals log-in request and no reportback
transmissions are allowed. The operator
needs to re-start the MILSTAR Mode (and
log-in process) through the TOP MENU.
If the terminal has not fully logged in (i.e.,
TX:LOG status is not shown), then the terminal cannot transmit reportback messages
or message acknowledgements to the NC.
Any reportback messages attempted at this
time will be queued in the status until LOGIN is completed (TX:LOG status is
shown).
3. Once the preempt message LOGIN OK appears on the CI display, the terminal is logged into
the network, acknowledged by the Network Controller (NC), and is ready for further operation.
4. Once logged into the network, the Network

Controller (NC) can send FDM (or EAM) requiring
an acknowledgment (ACK) by the terminal. The CI
display (and teletype) shows an ACK REQ preempt
for either the EAM or FDM. See paragraphs Receiving an EAM in MILSTAR and Receiving a FDM in
MILSTAR for information on receiving and acknowledging either an EAM or FDM.
NOTE
If a message acknowledgment is not

required, the ACK EAM REQ or ACK FDM
REQ: xxx preempt is not displayed on the
CI and the message itself is only printed to
the teletype.
During set up of MILSTAR mode of operation, if the
KBD (keyboard) option for WOD LOAD VIA parameter was selected, the following events should happen:
1. The CLSG WOD prompt is printed on the I/O
the current WOD on the AFSATCOM keyboard and
have been typed. WOD should then print out on
printer.
NOTE

pressing the [AUTOXMIT] key.
for the FLSG. At the prompt, type the future WOD
Change 2
1-514A/(1-514B blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
3. The I/O then prompts for the FLSG rollovertime. The first parameter is the year (format=YY).
Type in the required year and then press the
[AUTOXMIT] key.

pressing the [AUTOXMIT] key.
NOTE

for the FILSG. At the prompt, type the future WOD
8. The I/O then prompts for the FILSG rollovertime. The first parameter is the year (format=YY).
Type in the required year and then press the [AUTOXMIT] key.

FILSG must be 2 digit values, therefore,
leading zeros are required.
Month (format=MM)
Day (format=DD)
Hour (format=HH)
Minutes (format=mm)
Seconds (format=ss)
[AUTOXMIT] key.
6. The CILSG WOD prompt is printed in the I/O
the CILSG WOD on the AFSATCOM keyboard and
have been typed. CILSG Word-of-Day should then
printout on the printer.
NOTE

NOTE

FILSG must be 2 digit values, therefore,
leading zeros are required.
Month (format=MM)
Day (format=DD)
Hour (format=HH)
Minutes (format=mm)
Seconds (format=ss)
[AUTOXMIT] key.
1-515
T.O. 1B-52H-1
MILSTAR Mode Parameters DL

NOTE
Within the following parameters:
T = Information provided by the TSM for IOT&E and normal MILSTAR operation.
This information is based on the NET ID and SAT ID parameter settings.
OPER - Information the OPERATOR must provide for proper IOT&E and normal
MILSTAR operation.
DEF = The Default setting for this parameter is typically used for IOT&E and/or
normal MILSTAR operation.
*= Parameter that can be changed after starting MILSTAR mode.
**= Parameter that may be remotely modified by the MILSTAR Network Controller
(NC).
PARAMETER
DEFINITION
USE *

the MILSTAR mode becomes the primary operating mode for the Dual Modem after the operator
enters all parameters and presses the [SHFT] and
[ENTR] keys. lf ALTERNATE, it indicates the
MILSTAR mode has been designated as the alternate operating mode for the Dual Modem.
DEF
CONFIG**
T
TERMINAL ID
OPER
NET ID
OPER
SAT ID
OPER
FREQ PLAN**
T
CONTROL CHAN**
T
RB CH1**
T
Change 2
ACTIVE or ALTERNATE
DEFAULT
ACTIVE
Independent The Network Controller (NC) assigns a configuration number that defines the current network configuration parameters. This number can be changed over the air by the NC during operation, which can affect the configuration
parameters previously entered by the operator.
00 thru 31
Independent - Defines the terminal identification

number assigned for operation within the
MILSTAR network.
0001 thru 1021
Independent Defines the MILSTAR network

identification number. Used by the modem to access the appropriate network on the satellite.
01 thru 31
01
Independent Defines the satellite identification

number for use with a specific MILSTAR network.
01 thru 10
01
Independent Defines the frequency plan used.

When a TSM configuration database is available
to the modem, the database information replaces
the defaults based upon NET ID and SAT ID correspondence.
0 thru 7
Independent Defines the Downlink control channel. When a TSM configuration database is available to the modem, the database information replaces the defaults based upon NET ID and SAT
ID correspondence.
0,1, 2, or 3
Independent Defines the Primary Reportback

(RB) channel. When a TSM configuration database is available to the modem, the database information replaces the defaults based upon NET
ID and SAT ID correspondence.
0,1, 2, 3, or NOT USED
1-516
RANGE OF VALUES
00
0001
T.O. 1B-52H-1
PARAMETER
RB CH2**
T
RB CH3**
T
U/L LOCAL CHAN**

T
D/L LOCAL CHAN**

T
NO GRP IDS *
OPER
WOD LOAD VIA*
OPER
DEFINITION
RANGE OF VALUES
DEFAULT
Independent Defines the Secondary Reportback

0, 1, 2, 3, or NOT USED
Independent Defines the Tertiary Reportback

0, 1, 2, 3, or NOT USED
Independent Defines the Uplink local channel.

When a TSM configuration database is available
to the modem, the database information replaces
the defaults based upon NET ID and SAT ID correspondence.
0, 1, 2, or 3
Independent Defines the Downlink local channel. When a TSM configuration database is available to the modem, the database information replaces the defaults based upon NET ID and SAT
ID correspondence.
0, 1, 2, or 3
Independent Defines the number of group IDs

associated with this terminal.
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5
NONE, Cl, KBD, or TSM
CI
NOTE
The MILSTAR TRANSEC WODs are
now unclassified; therefore, the KBD option does not require clearance from a
COMSEC custodian.
Independent Defines the source for external
loading of future (optional) TRANSEC Words-ofDay (WODs). The choices are NONE (where the
default WODs stored in front-panel ROM are
used), Cl (where the operator uses the CI keypad
to load the WODs), KBD (where the operator uses
a teletype (TTY) to load the WODs), or TSM
(where the TSM is used to load the WODs).
RB MODE *
DEF
DUTY CYCLE *
OPER
Independent Defines the type of reportback

message mode. The choices are FIXED (where
the operator can send a one-time message of up
to 160 characters in length) or NARR (narrative)
(where there is a constant connection to the Network Controller that allows the operator to send an
overall message of any length, but can only transmit 40 characters at a time).
FIXED or NARR
Independent Defines the reportback duty cycle.

Where the number defines the number of frames
between transmissions of a NARR reportback
message (where 1 = every cycle, 2 = every other
cycle, 3 = every third cycle, etc).
01 thru 15
FIXED
15
Change 2
1-517
T.O. 1B-52H-1
MILSTAR Mode Parameters DL (Cont)

PARAMETER
DEFINITION
RADIO SILENCE*
Independent Allows the operator to inhibit message transmission. The DSBL option means that
RADIO SILENCE is disabled and the radio is
transmitting. The ENBL option means that the radio is silent and not transmitting. Due to automatic
transmissions and acknowledgments occurring in
MILSTAR mode, this is the only way to inhibit radio transmissions while in MILSTAR mode.
DSBL or ENBL
DSBL
Independent Controls message acknowledgment handling for the modem. When enabled and
a message is received, the operator presses the
[SHFT] and [CLR] keys to send a message acknowledgment. lf disabled, the operator can still
press the [SHFT] and [CLR] keys, but instead, the
message acknowledgment is queued and not sent
until this parameter is enabled.
DSBL or ENBL
ENBL
Independent Controls action on reportback message. The CANCEL ACK option cancels all pending acknowledgments, the CANCEL RB option
cancels all active Reportback message protocols,
and CANCEL ALL cancels all message acknowledgments and Reportback message protocols.
OK, CANCEL ACK, CANCEL RB, or CANCEL ALL
Independent Controls terminals membership in

a MILSTAR network. lf the operator elects to logout of the network, the modem immediately logs
out of the network. lf the operator wishes to re-establish communications on the network, the MILSTAR mode must be re-entered from the Top Menu
and the terminal must re-acquire/log back into network.
DSBL or ENBL
Dependent Defines the LSG WODs to be loaded

and reviewed if the WOD LOAD VIA parameter
selection was Cl, KBD, or NONE. The choices are
NONE (where no WODs are used), CURREN
(Current) (which applies to current WODs), FUTURE (which applies to future WODs), or BOTH
(where both current and future WODs are to be
loaded).
NONE, CURREN,
FUTURE, or BOTH
CURREN
NONE, CURREN,
FUTURE, or BOTH
CURREN
DEF
MSG ACK *
DEF
RB STATUS *
DEF
NETWORK
LGOUT *
DEF
LSG WOD SEL

DEF
RANGE OF VALUES
DEFAULT
OK
DSBL
NOTE
If the FUTURE option is selected, a rollover time is needed.
ILSG WOD SEL
DEF
Dependent Defines the I LSG WODs to be

loaded and reviewed if the WOD LOAD VIA parameter selection was Cl, KBD, or NONE. The
choices are NONE (where no WODs are used),
CURREN (which applies to current WODs), FUTURE (which applies to future WODs), or BOTH
(where both current and future WODs are to be
loaded).
NOTE
If the FUTURE option is selected, a rollover time is needed.
1-518
Change 2
T.O. 1B-52H-1
PARAMETER
DEFINITION
GROUP ID*
Dependent Defines the terminal group ID dependent upon the selection made in the NO GRP
IDS parameter.
0001 thru 1021
Dependent Defines the current LSG WOD to be

ROM.
W1 thru W32
Stored in
Memory Unit
W1 thru W32
Stored in
Memory Unit
OPER
C LSG
T
RANGE OF VALUES
DEFAULT
0001
NOTE
FLSG
T
Dependent Defines the future LSG WOD to be

NOTE
C ILSG
T
When the future LSG WODs are used, the operator must enter the ROLLOVER TIME information
(values 80 to 99 = years 1980 to 1999)
MONTH
DAY
HOUR
MINUTE
SECOND
Dependent Defines the current ILSG WOD to be
ROM.
00 thru 99
79
01 thru 12
01 thru 31
00 thru 23
00 thru 59
00 thru 59
W1 thru W32
01
01
00
00
00
Stored in
Memory Unit
W1 thru W32
Stored in
Memory Unit
NOTE
F ILSG
T
Dependent Defines the future ILSG WOD to be

NOTE
Change 2
1-519
T.O. 1B-52H-1
MILSTAR Mode Parameters DL (Cont)

PARAMETER
DEFINITION
F ILSG (cont)
When the future LSGWODs are used, the operator must enter the ROLLOVER TIME information
RX

(values 80 to 99 = years 1980 to 1999)
MONTH
DAY
HOUR
MINUTE
SECOND
is either NO ACQ (no acquisition), NO SYNC (no
receive synchronization), BAD CTL (bad control
channel), or OK (receive acquisition is complete),
or BADNETID (indicating the NET ID being used
is not valid).
RANGE OF VALUES
00 thru 99
DEFAULT
79
01 thru 12
01 thru 31
00 thru 23
00 thru 59
00 thru 59
NO ACQ, NO SYNC,
BAD CTL, OK, or BADNETID
01
01
00
00
00
NONE
TX
Uplink transmit status during operation. Status is

either NO ACQ (no acquisition), NO LOG (acquisition complete and awaiting response from network
controller), LOG (login okay), SILENT (radio silence invoked), or DENIED (message or request
denied by network controller).
NO ACQ, NO LOG, LOG

SILENT, or DENIED
NONE
RB MSG
Reportback message status. Status is either

NONE (no reportback messages), PEND (reportback message is pending), ACT (reportback message assignment received), or INPRG (reportback
message is currently being sent). A typical transmission sequence should show this parameter
changing from NONE to PEND to ACT to INPRG
and back to NONE when an RB message is being
sent.
NONE, PEND, ACT, or

INPRG
NONE
NOTE
The status toggles between ACT and INPROG during a lengthy message transmission and there can only be one RB
message protocol active at a time.
RB ACK
Message acknowledgment status. Status is either

NONE (no message acknowledgment) or PEND
(message acknowledgment pending).
NONE or PEND
NONE
TSM

the TSM is not present within the CI housing), INOPR (where the TSM is not present within the CI
housing), INOPR (where the CI has determined
the TSM to be non-functional), CHGNG (where
the TSM is operational for the mission and charging within the CI housing), or READY (where the
TSM is present within the CI and operational for
the mission).
ABSNT, INOPR,
CHGNG. or READY
NONE
1-520
Change 2
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Time Transfer Mode
The time transfer mode allows the operator to

transfer the Time-of-Day (TOD) value either from
the TSM to Modem; the Modem to the TSM; or to
manually input to Modem. See figure 1-148 for
Time Transfer Mode Parameters and Mode Status
Parameters.
Time transfer mode (TIME XFER) is entered from
the Top Menu.
1. Operator selects USE parameter.
2. At the prompt TIME XFER FROM: use the
[SEL] key to select the source of time, either TSM,
MDM, or OPER.
NOTE
Due to the critical nature of time to system

synchronization it is not recommended to
use the OPER option for time transfer unless absolutely necessary. The optimum
method of time transfer is using the TSM.
After entering the Time Transfer Mode, the following operational events and operator interactions
should occur. Refer to AFSATCOM Abnormal Procedures in Section III of T.O. 1B-52H-1-12 for Time
Transfer Mode Preempt messages and corrective actions.
1. The CI now displays/flashes the CLEAR FOR
TIME XFER message. When the set time equals
the current time, press the [SHFT] then [CLR] keys
to transfer time.
2. The status (line 8 of CI display) shows TIME
INPRG while time is being transferred and TIME
CMPLT when transfer is complete.
3. The status may also show the TSM:CHGNG
(Time Standard Module: Charging). This is the indication that the CI may be charging the TSM during operation.
NOTE
Selecting MDM resets the TSM time to modem time.

if the OPER option was selected, enter the
required time (approximately 1 minute
ahead to allow additional set-up time for
the operator) by pressing the [ ] and the
[SEL] keys for each time parameter and
press the [ ] key to move the cursor (>) to
the next time parameter.
3. When all parameters are defined, press the

[SHFT] then [ENTR] keys to transfer the time.
4. When the mode is entered, the lower half of
the CI display shows the TIME TRANSFER status.
The most accurate method of transferring

time of operation, in either the AFSAT IIM
mode or MILSTAR mode is to use the TSM.
Because of the critical time requirements,
manual or operator entry of time should
only be attempted as a last resort.
When TSM is installed, extra care must be
taken when using the TIME TRANSFER
Mode to avoid corrupting the TSM time.
This is especially critical in MILSTAR mode
because the modem establishes a time base
from the satellite and transfers this more
accurate time to the TSM during operation.
The TIME TRANSFER Mode should never
be used once the modem is operating/ACTIVE in either AFSAT IIM or MILSTAR
modes.
Time Transfer Mode Parameters DL

PARAMETER
DEFINITION
RANGE OF VALUES
DEFAULT
USE

the TIME TRANSFER mode becomes the primary
operating mode for the Dual Modem after the
operator enters all parameters and presses the
[SHFT] and [ENTR] keys. lf ALTERNATE, it
indicates the TIME TRANSFER mode has been
designated as the alternate operating mode for
the Dual Modem.
ACTIVE, ALTERNATE
ACTIVE
Figure1-148 (Sheet 1 of 2)
Change 2
1-521
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Time Transfer Mode Parameters DL (Cont)

PARAMETER
TIME XFER FROM
DEFINITION
NOTE
RANGE OF VALUES
DEFAULT
TSM, MDM, or OPER
TSM
It is NOT recommended to use the

OPER option for time transfer unless it is
ABSOLUTELY necessary. The optimum
method of time transfer is using the TSM.
Independent Defines the source of time
information. The choices are TSM (where time is
provided by the TSM within the CI housing). MDM
(where the time is provided by the modem to the
TSM based on the modems current time), or
OPER (where the operator loads the time
information into the Modem using the CI keypad).
For accuracy and reliability, the time should be
loaded from the TSM whenever possible.
TIME ENTRY
TIME
TSM
Dependent Sets the date and time to be

transferred. This parameter is displayed only if the
OPER option is selected from the TIME XFER
FROM parameter. The time is entered in the following format:
YEAR (values 00 to 79 = years 2000 to 2079, values 80 to 99 = years 1980 to 1999)
MONTH
DAY
HOUR
MINUTE
SECOND
The following parameters define the LEAP
SECOND:
DIRECTION NEXT
MONTH NEXT
YEAR NEXT (value entered is not used and
therefore ignored by the modem)
PRESENT COUNT
Time transfer process status. The status may
show either INPRG (where the time transfer is in
progress), CMPLT (where the time transfer is
complete), or ERROR (where there was an error
detected during the time transfer process).
00 thru 99
79
01 thru 12
01 thru 31
00 thru 23
00 thru 59
00 thru 59
01
01
00
00
00

the TSM is not present within the CI housing),
INOPR (where the CI has determined the TSM to
be non-functional), CHGNG (where the TSM is
operational for the mission and charging within the
CI housing), or READY (where the TSM is present
within the CI and operational for the mission).
ABSNT, INOPR,
CHGNG, or READY
Figure1-148 (Sheet 2 of 2)
1-522
Change 2
+, NONE, or
01 thru 12
00 thru 99
NONE
01
00
00 thru 79
INPRG, CMPLT, or
00
NONE
ERROR
NONE
T.O. 1B-52H-1
BIT Mode
NOTE
The BIT mode of operation allows the operator to

verify the performance of the Dual Modem and the
interfacing equipment (i.e., the RT, the TSM, the
ROM, the CI, etc.). This off-line BIT mode is operator selected from the Top Menu and inhibits the reception or transmission of messages during BIT
mode. Refer to AFSATCOM Abnormal Procedures
in Section III of T.O. 1B-52H-1-12 for BIT Mode and
Mode Status Parameters.
The operator uses BIT when the operation and
functionality of the Dual Modem (and interfacing
equipment) may be in question. If, during operation, the operator is notified with a preempt message from on-line-BIT (On-line-BIT is always running in the background) of a possible problem, the
operator has the option of taking the equipment offline and selecting BIT to isolate the problem and if
possible, perform the recommended corrective actions to regain full functionality of the equipment.
Refer to AFSATCOM Abnormal Procedures in Section III of T.O. 1B-52H-1-12 for Power-Up BIT, OnLine BIT, and Off-Line BIT messages.
Do not remove the TSM during time transfer mode, BIT mode, or when the blinking
mode indication has stopped blinking for a
2-3 second interval during any mode of operation.
If the TSM is removed/replaced while in
MILSTAR or AFSAT IIM mode, the mode
must be restored to ensure correct modem
operation.
6. When the BIT mode is entered, the lower-half

of the CI display shows the BIT status.
After entering operator initiated BIT mode, the following events should occur:
1. The BIT status (line 8 of display) shows the
number of REPS (repetitions) and the TSTC (test
configuration). TSTC should indicate NORMAL
when BIT mode is initiated on aircraft.
2. As the BIT runs, it follows a prescribed sequence of events/tests.
NOTE
There are corrective actions that the operator, onboard the aircraft, cannot accomplish.
Therefore, the operator must make every effort to enter all failed tests during PowerUp BIT and all fault messages displayed
during On-Line BIT and Off-Line BIT testing into the AFTO Form 781.
To use the BIT mode, do the following:
NOTE
When running BIT, all network activity and

messages are not received.
1. If not already displayed, access the Top Menu.
2. With the cursor (>) pointing at the REVIEW
parameter, press [SEL] key until the BIT mode of
operation is shown in the display.
3. Select the BIT mode menu by pressing [SHFT]
and then [ENTR].
4. The cursor (>) is now pointing at the USE parameter, which flashes the ACTIVE value.
NOTE
To run BIT mode, the USE parameter value

must be active.
5. When ready to enter the BIT mode, press the
[SHFT] then [ENTR] keys to start BIT.
Some of the BIT tests cause the receiver/

transmitter (RT) to transmit. To prevent
hazards, remain at least 10 feet from the
SATCOM antenna.
3. When the BIT tests the automatic send receive
(ASR) I/O device interface, the preempt message
I/O INPUT CHAR FOR TEST is printed to the
AFSATCOM printer. The operator has 30 seconds
to accomplish the following:
Type a string of characters on AFSATCOM

keyboard.
Press the [AUTOXMIT] key on the
AFSATCOM keyboard to send the characters to the modem.
4. If the test is successful, the modem echoes back

every other character typed. For example, when the
input is ABCD, the modem echoes back AA CC EE,
etc. However, depending upon the I/O device setup,
these characters may not be printed for the operator.
5. If an error/fault is encountered, the fault/preempt message will be displayed on the CI display
and BIT halts. To continue the BIT, note the message and then press the [SHFT] then [CLR] keys.
Refer to AFSATCOM Abnormal Procedures in Section III of T.O. 1B-52H-1-12 for BIT failure messages and associated corrective action.
Change 2
1-523
T.O. 1B-52H-1
6. When the BIT gets to the keypad test, the operator will be prompted to press requested keys on the
keypad beginning with the [LT] key. If the requested key is pressed and there is nothing wrong
with the keypad, the CI shows the status PASS
next to the requested key display i.e., HIT LT KEY:
PASS.
7. When the first repetition of the BIT is complete
(approximately 2.5 minutes minimum), the status
(line 8) shows REPS: 001 TSTC NORMAL. The
REPS value number increases by one with each
repetition of the BIT.
8. To stop the BIT, press [SHFT] then [TOP M] keys
before the next repetition begins.
NOTE
When stopping the BIT, the operator must

wait until a full repetition is complete,
otherwise, the BIT continues to the next
repetition of the test and the operator will
be unable to stop the test.
Upon stopping, the operator must put the
modem into a random mode of operation.
For these procedures, AFSAT I mode will be
the most convenient mode of operation to
enter since it is the default value when TOP
M is selected.
9. To ensure BIT has stopped completely, accomplish the following:

Press the [SHFT] then [ENTR] keys to access the
AFSAT I mode menu.
Press the [SHFT] then [ENTR] keys again to
start the AFSAT I mode using the existing AFSAFT
I configuration.
If applicable, return to the Top Menu.
The Dual Modem may now be configured for the
current mission.
NOTE
During performance of Off-Line BIT, reception or transmissions of messages is inhibited until Off-Line BIT mode is terminated.
Prior to initiating Off-Line BIT as the active mode, evaluate the situation and the
consequences of not receiving/transmitting
message traffic.
1-524
Change 2
Active vs Alternate Mode
The two review parameter modes of ACTIVE and

ALTERNATE are not true operating modes such as
Al-SAT I, MILSTAR, BIT, etc., they provide a history of operation or possibly an alternate standby
mode for the operator to enter. ACTIVE is the current active operating mode. ALTERNATE is either
the previous active operating mode or a pre-set
standby mode.
When reactivating a MILSTAR mode from the ALTERNATE mode, check the NETWORK LOGOUT
and RADIO SILENCE parameters within the
MILSTAR mode menu to ensure desired values set.
Also, if WODs/WOMs were loaded previously, the
WOD LOAD VIA parameter within the MILSTAR
mode menu shows WOD LOAD VIA; NONE since
the WODs/WOMs are already loaded.
Other than initial power up, IDLE mode is only valid as an ALTERNATE mode when using the ACTIVE/ALTERNATE screens to switch between
IDLE and an operating mode. The IDLE mode is
not a valid ALTERNATE mode when using the TOP
MENU to switch between modes.
MESSAGE PROCESSING DL
Receiving an EAM in AFSAT I or AFSAT IIM
When an EAM is received in either AFSAT I or AFSAT IIM mode, the operator does the following:
1. Observe CI for the EAM alarm display.
2. If NORMAL EAM handling was selected at the
Top Menu, manually silence the EAM alarm and
acknowledge receipt of the EAM by pressing the
[SHFT] then [CLR] keys on the CI keypad.
3. If LCC option was selected at the Top Menu,
the alarm is automatically silenced (and cleared) 15
seconds after message termination.
4. Observe that the EAM is printed to the teletype.
5. Follow normal EAM handling procedures.
NOTE
In AFSAT I mode, when a message (EAM

or FDM) is received on the primary channel, the RX status parameter displays MSG.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AFSAT IIM and MILSTAR EAM Handling
EAM alarm handling/clearing and printing formats

are based upon the selection of either NORMAL or
LCC EAM mode, where:
NOTE
In the MILSTAR mode, clearing an EAM

alarm does not send an EAM acknowledgment. The operator must take specific actions to acknowledge an EAM (See Receiving an EAM in MILSTAR this section).
NORMAL us the default mode at power on.
NORMAL is the preferred mode of operation. The operator should refrain from selecting/utilizing the LCC mode.
1. NORMAL Option. For alarm handling and

clearing, the NORMAL option requires the operator
to manually clear and silence the alarm by pressing
the [SHFT] then [CLR] keys. The NORMAL option
also means that the EAM message will be printed
on the I/O Teletype device without blank lines within the message text as shown below:
UUUXX<CR><LF>
EIGHT ECHO <CR><LF>
ALFA MIKE <CR><LF>
ZERO ZERO <CR><LF>
ZERO ALFA <CR><LF>
ALFA ALFA <CR><LF>
ECHO ALFA <CR><LF>
MIKE EIGHT <CR><LF>
NNNN <CR><LF>
<ETX>
NOTE
When the I/O device pauses during printing, the EAM message text is continuous on
the printed page.
2. LCC Option. The Launch Control Center
(LCC) option provides automatic alarm clearing
(and silencing) approximately 15 seconds after the

last message character (for the last repeat) of the
current EAM received. Additionally, the LCC option
indicates that the EAM message text is sent to the
I/O printer without any special formatting. The actual EAM message text printout depends upon the
I/O device and printer used.
NOTE
When the I/O printer device on the aircraft

pauses during printing, a blank line is inserted within the EAM message text.
Receiving an EAM in MILSTAR
When an EAM is received in MILSTAR mode, the

operator does the following:
1. Observe CI for the EAM alarm display.
2. If NORMAL EAM handling was selected at the
Top Menu, manually silence the EAM alarm by
pressing [SHFT] then [CLR] key on CI keypad.
3. If LCC option was selected at the Top Menu,
the alarm is automatically silenced (and cleared) 15
seconds after message termination.
4. If an acknowledgment is required, observe the
CI display for the preempt message ACK EAM
REQ:xxx. The EAM should also be printed to the
teletype.
5. If the MSG ACK parameter was enabled, the
EAM is acknowledged by pressing the [SHFT] then
[CLR] key on the CI keypad. This clears the preempt and acknowledges the message.
NOTE
Observe the RB ACK status on CI display

changes from NONE to PEND and back to
NONE as the acknowledgment is sent.
6. If the MSG ACK parameter was not enabled.
the EAM acknowledgment (pressing the [SHFT]
then [CLR] keys) is queued, but is not sent until the
parameter is enabled.
NOTE

Change 2
1-525
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Receiving a FDM in AFSAT I or AFSAT IIM
When receiving a FDM in AFSAT I or AFSAT IIM

mode, the operator does the following:
1.
2.
NOTE
Observe the teletype for the FDM printout.

Follow the normal FDM handling procedures.
NOTE
In AFSAT I mode, when a message (EAM

or FDM) is received on the primary channel, the RX status parameter displays MSG.
Receiving a FDM in MILSTAR
When a FDM is received in MILSTAR mode, the operator does the following:
1. If a FDM acknowledgment is required, observe

the CI display for the preempt message ACK FDM
REQ:xxx. The FDM should also be printed to the
teletype.
2. If the MSG ACK parameter was enabled, the
FDM is acknowledged by pressing the [SHFT] then
[CLR] key on the CI keypad. This clears the preempt and acknowledges the message.
NOTE

3. If the MSG ACK parameter was not enabled,
the FDM acknowledgment (pressing the [SHFT]
then [CLR] keys) is queued, but is not sent until the
parameter is enabled.
Sending a FIXED Reportback (RB) Message

NOTE
A FIXED reportback message makes efficient use of network resources and is the
recommended reportback message type.
To send a FIXED Reportback (RB) Message, do the
following:
1. Type the message on the AFSATCOM keyboard using the format below.
1-526
Change 2
Do not transmit until instructed to do so.

If the terminal is not fully logged in (i.e.,
TX:LOG status not shown), then the terminal cannot transmit reportback message or
message acknowledgments to the NC. Any
reportback message attempted at this time,
will be queued in the system until LOGIN
is completed (TX:LOG status is shown).
2. Verify the FIXED Reportback (RB) Mode is selected.

3. When the message is formatted, typed, and
ready to transmit from the teletype, press the [AUTOXMIT] key. The message is now queued for
transmission by the modem. Actual transmission
occurs according to MILSTAR network protocol.
NOTE
NOTE

A FIXED message cannot exceed 160 characters and is sent all at once to the Net
Controller (NC) using four consecutive
frames of 40 characters (4 frames X 40
characters = 160 characters total). If the operator attempts to send a message with
more than 160 characters, and I/O FLT preempt is displayed on the CI as the excess
characters are being sent from the teletype
to the modem. The excess characters are
not transmitted by the terminal.
Only two reportback messages can be

queued within the system. The first attempted message transmission is clocked
into the modem and held for transmission.
The last message transmission attempt is
held in the TTY until the first message is
transmitted by the modem.
Attempting to queue more than two messages (i.e., 5 messages) yields message
number 1 clocked into the modem and held,
and number 5 held in the TTY, while messages 2 through 4 are overwritten as each
subsequent message is queued by pressing
the [AUTOXMIT] key at the TTY.
4. After pressing the [AUTOXMIT] key on the

TTY, observe that the RB MSG status (line 8 on CI)
displays PEND until transmit slots have been assigned by the NC. Once assigned, the RB MSG status alternates between ACT and IN PRG, indicating that the reportback message is being transmitted per network protocol. At the conclusion of
the message transmission, the RB MSG status returns to NONE.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
To send a FIXED Reportback (RB) Message, use the
following mandatory format:
1.
Message format: PXXXA4 . . . . . . . A160

P=mandatory precedence level, ranging
from 1 (lowest priority) to 7 (highest priority).
NOTE
Precedence level 7 is considered an EMERGENCY REPORTBACK priority. When a

priority level 7 message is detected by the
modem, the modem automatically terminates all other ongoing modem RB message
protocols and immediately sends the message to the NC.
XXX=three-character classification header

to be entered in accordance with mission directives, where: uuu=unclassified, ccc=confidential, and sss=secret.
A4 . . . . . . . . . . A160=156 character message
text composed from the following set of allowed MILSTAR message characters:
NOTE
Use of message text characters other than

those shown above results in the transmission of an asterisk (*) in place of the unacceptable character.
2. The precedence level must be entered or else
the DMU automatically uses the first character
from the AFSATCOM keyboard after pressing the
[AUTOXMIT] key to develop a default precedence
level of 3.
3. The three character classification header
should be entered as a part of the message format.
If it is not entered as noted above, the classification
is printed as ??? when received by the NC.
Sending a Narrative (NARR) Reportback (RB) Message
A NARRative reportback (for RB MODE parameter) indicates the operator needs a permanent
connection to NC to send many reportback messages. Once the operator has finished transmitting
the desired message(s), the assigned reportback
service should be released by selecting the CANCEL RB value of the RB STATUS parameter in the
active MILSTAR Mode menu.
SP
NOTE
SOH
ETX
The NARRative reportback message makes

less efficient use of the network resources
compared to FIXED reportback message(s).
NAK
ACK
CAN
HT
LF
NUL
<
CR
>
SYN
Change 2
1-526A
T.O. 1B-52H-1
To send a Narrative (NARR) Reportback (RB) Message, do the following:
1. Type the message on the AFSATCOM keyboard using the format below.
NOTE
A NARR message can be as long as needed

to send the required information to the NC;
however, it can only be entered in blocks of
up to 160 characters and sent in four
frames of 40 characters each.
If the operator attempts to send a message
block with more than 160 characters, an I/O
FLT preempt is displayed on the CI as the
excess characters are not transmitted by
the terminal.
4. After pressing the [AUTOXMIT] key, observe

the RB MSG status (line 8 of display) change from
NONE, to PEND (pending) to ACT (assignment received), to INPRG (in progress) and ACT (as each
40-character message is sent), and finally back to
NONE when message transmission is complete.
NOTE
A NARR Reportback Message is considered

a permanent connection to the Net Controller. This kind of message locks up network
assets (i.e., channel and frame slots) and
limits access to other network users. If it
becomes necessary to release network assets, use procedures described in Cancelling
and Acknowledgment of Reportback Message.
The actual frame assignment and when the

message is transmitted is controlled by the
DUTY CYCLE parameter.
If the terminal is not fully logged in (i.e.,
TX:LOG status is not shown), then the terminal cannot transmit reportback messages
or message acknowledgements to the NC.
Any reportback message attempted at this
time will be queued in the system until LOGIN is completed (TX:LOG status is
shown).
To send a NARR Reportback (RB) message, use the

following mandatory format:
1.
The operator must select a teletype buffer

size to accommodate the length of the message being transmitted.
1-526B
Change 2
P=mandatory precedence level, ranging

from 1 (lowest priority) to 7 (highest priority).
Precedence level 7 is considered an EMERGENCY REPORTBACK priority. When a

priority level 7 message is detected by the
modem, the modem automatically terminates all other ongoing modem RB message
protocols, changes the RB mode from NARR
to FIXED for the duration of the level 7
message, and immediately sends the message to the NC in the FIXED mode.
NOTE
Only two reportback messages can be

queued within the system. The first attempted message transmission is clocked
into the modem and held for transmission.
The last message transmission attempt is
held in the TTY until the first message is
transmitted by the modem.
Message format: PXXXA4 . . . . . . . A160
NOTE
2. Verify the NARR RB MODE selected.

3. When the message is formatted, typed, and
ready to transmit from the teletype, press the [AUTOXMIT] key. The message is now queued for
transmission by the modem. Actual transmission
occurs according to MILSTAR network protocol.
Attempting to queue more than two messages (i.e., 5 messages) yields message
number 1 clocked into the modem and held,
and number 5 held in the TTY, while messages 2 through 4 are overwritten as each
subsequent message is queued by pressing
the [AUTOXMIT] key at the TTY.
XXX=mandatory three-character classification header to be entered in accordance

with mission directives, where uuu=unclassified, sss=secret, and ccc=confidential.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
A4 . . . . . . . . . . A160=156 character message

text composed from the following set of allowed MILSTAR message characters:
SYN
SP
SOH
ETX
NAK
ACK
CAN
HT
LF
NUL
<
CR
>
NOTE
Use of text characters other than those

shown above results in the transmission of
an asterisk (*) in place of the unacceptable
character.
2. The precedence level must be entered or else the
DMU automatically uses the first character from
the AFSATCOM keyboard after pressing the [AUTOXMIT] key to develop a default precedence level
of 3.
3. The three character classification header
should be entered as a part of the message format.
If it is not entered as noted above, the classification
is printed as ??? when received by the NC.
Cancelling an Acknowledgement or Reportback Message
To cancel any (or all) acknowledgment or reportback message protocols (or both), use the following
procedures.
1. On the Top Menu display, with the cursor at
REVIEW, press [SEL] key until ACTIVE option is
shown.
2. Press [SHFT] then [ENTR] keys to review
MILSTAR parameters.
3. Move the cursor down to RB STATUS parameter.
4. Using the [SEL] key, change the RB STATUS
parameter to one of the following desired options
(CANCEL RB, CANCEL ACK, or CANCEL ALL).
NOTE
The operator can select the CANCEL ALL

option for the RB STATUS parameter. This
cancels any reportback messages as well as
any message receipt acknowledgements
that are pending. Selecting the CANCEL
ACK option only cancels pending message
receipt acknowledgements and does not affect reportback message processing.
5. Press [SHFT] then [ENTR] keys to implement
cancellation. Observe that the RB MSG status
changes to NONE to indicate that the modem has
completed the RB cancellation.
6. Observe CI display for preempt message: RB
CANCELLED. To clear the preempt, press the
[SHFT] then [CLR] keys.
NOTE
After clearing the RB CANCELLED preempt, normal operations can continue and
other reportback messages may be sent as
required.
Change 2
1-526C/(1-526D blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
MINIATURE RECEIVE TERMINAL AN/ARR-85(V)
The Miniature Receive Terminal (MRT) AN/

ARR-85(V) provides a VLF/LF receive capability for
the aircraft. The MRT is controlled by the navigator
and is designed to automatically receive, process
and printout secure and nonsecure messages at extended ranges in nuclear and/or jamming environments over the frequency band of 14 to 60 KHz, in
10 Hz increments.
The MRT consists of R-2348/ARR-85(V) receiver,
KGV-61/TSEC transfer module, C-11784(V)/ ARR85(V) remote control unit (RCU), RP-346/ARR85(V) automatic data processing printer and an antenna subsystem which contains two AS-3857/
ARR-85(V) transverse electric (TE) antennas and
one AS-3858/ARR-85(V) transverse magnetic (TM)
antenna.
In order for the MRT to become operational, the
KGV-61/TSEC transfer module must be installed in
the MRT receiver. The transfer module is a programmable, battery powered, removable crypto
unit. It is the transfer device between mission planning activities and the operational aircraft MRT.
Operation of the MRT requires Transfer Module
Service Set (TMSS) programming of the transfer
module with cryptographic and mission profiles before being installed in the receiver. Each mission
profile consist of transmitter frequencies and their
transmitter numbers. The number of cryptographic
variables used during the mission depends on frequency scanning and mission requirements. A maximum of five transmitters for each of the five mission profiles are scanned by the receiver. Once programmed, the transfer module can retain mission
profiles for 96 hours using self-contained batteries.
While installed in the receiver, the transfer module
is powered by the demodulator and has its batteries
recharged during the mission. The transfer module
includes a provision to zeroize all stored cryptographic variables. Removal of the transfer module
from the receiver, actuation of the ZEROIZE switch
on the transfer module or remote control unit, or
disconnection of the remote control unit cable to the
receiver will zeroize the cryptographic variables
only. The transfer module retains the classified mission data until cleared by the TMSS. Once zeroized,
the transfer module must be reprogrammed by the
TMSS before operation of the MRT can be resumed.
Messages are received through the two transverse

electric (TE) antennas and one transverse magnetic
(TM) receive antenna. The receive signals are processed in the MRT receiver and intelligent data is
output to the printer.
The MRT has two receive operational modes, ALL
and AJ. In the ALL mode, all received messages are
processed and printed. While in the AJ mode, only
special encrypted messages will be processed and
printed.
MRT Remote Control Unit
The MRT remote control unit (RCU) (C-11784(V)/

ARR-85(V)) is the master control for the MRT. The
RCU controls the MRT receiver and system operations with the following functions: MRT power-up,
initiates mission configuration, receives indications
of incoming messages and system operational status, zeroizes the system cryptographic variables,
overrides transmitter search programs, starts BIT
and requests a hard copy printout of system BIT
faults. See figure 1-149 for MRT RCU controls and
indicators.
MRT Printer
The MRT printer (RP-346/ARR-85(V)) is the MRT

output device for all received messages and system
status information. The printer operates automatically and provides hard copy of all messages received and processed by the receiver. The hard copy
is produced on a 2.4 inch wide roll of thermal paper
at 26 characters per line. The last 25 feet of the paper roll is striped to alert the operator when the paper supply is low. When the paper supply is nearing
depletion, the STATUS FAULT light will come on to
alert the operator. A feature of the printer will prevent the loss of any message while changing the paper roll. After the paper is changed, printing will
resume. The print head is ready to print at the end
of the power-on BIT, which takes less than 10 seconds. There is a window (12, figure 1-149) on the
front of the printer which allows the operator to
view seven lines of text at once. See figure 1-149 for
MRT printer controls and indicators.
Change 19
1-527
T.O. 1B-52H-1
MRT Controls and Indicators
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
TEST SYSTEM/OFF/LAMP SWITCH

TEST FAULT/PRINT SWITCH INDICATOR
TEST GO INDICATOR
MESSAGE/RESET SWITCH INDICATOR
PASS SWITCH INDICATOR
PRINTER ALL CALL/TEXT SWITCH
ZEROIZE SWITCH
MODE ALL/AJ SWITCH
COMMUNICATIONS PLAN THUMBWHEEL
COMMUNICATIONS PLAN DISPLAY
POWER ON/STBY SWITCH
12
13
14
15
16
VIEWING WINDOW
POWER ON INDICATOR
PAPER ADVANCE SWITCH
STATUS FAULT INDICATOR
SELF TEST SWITCH INDICATOR
1-528
Change 19
T.O. 1B-52H-1
MRT Controls and Indicators (Cont)

NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
A
MRT REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
TEST SYS/OFF/LAMP Switch
The TEST SYS/OFF/LAMP switch is a three position switch, spring

loaded to the OFF position. The SYS position initiates system off-line
diagnostic testing of the entire system. The RCU testing includes
checks of the serial communication interface and RCU indicators. The
receiver commands all RCU indicators to light and verifies the indicator
status. The LAMP position initiates the lamp self-test of all RCU indicators. The OFF position terminates the selected function, system off-line
or lamp testing.
TEST FAULT/PRINT Switch
The TEST FAULT/PRINT switch indicator is a pushbutton switch indicator. When pressed, the FAULT/PRINT switch generates a request for
the printer to produce a hard-copy printout of the BIT diagnostic message. When the indicator (red) lights, a system BIT fault has been detected from either on-line monitoring function or off-line diagnostics.
TEST GO Indicator
The TEST GO indicator lights (green) to indicate successful completion

of off-line diagnostics either at power-up or when initiated by the TEST
SYS/LAMP switch (no faults detected by on-line monitors). Both the
FAULT/PRINT and GO indicators are lit while the BIT is in progress.
MSG(Message)/RESET Switch Indicator
The MSG/RESET switch indicator lights (white) to indicate incoming

messages. When pressed at the completion of a message, the MSG/
RESET indicator is turned off and reset awaiting the next message.
PASS Switch Indicator
When the PASS switch indicator is pressed, the receiver breaks off
lock-on of a station transmitting a long message and activates circuits
to skip over this station for a communications plan that scans two or
more stations. The PASS indicator lights (amber) to indicate the PASS
function is activated.
PTR (Printer) ALL CALL/TEST Switch
The PTR ALL CALL/TEST switch is a two position switch. The ALL CALL
position selects printout of valid formatted messages only. The TEST
position tests receiver lock-on by printing all characters received, including received idle pattern transmissions.
ZEROIZE Switch
The ZEROIZE switch is a momentary switch that will zero all the crypto
variables in the transfer module located in the receiver. The transfer
module indicator turns white when cryptographic variables are zeroized.
MODE ALL/AJ Switch
The MODE ALL/AJ switch is a two position switch that is used to select
which type of incoming messages will be received and processed. In the
ALL position, the receiver will receive and process all incoming messages. In the AJ position, only special encryption mode messages will
be received and processed.
1-529
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
9
FUNCTION
COMM (Communications) PLAN

Thumbwheel
The COMM PLAN thumbwheel switch selects preset communications

plans that have been programmed into the transfer module. By using
the DECR/lNCR function of the switch, the operator may select the numbered plan (1 thru 5) required for the mission profile. Moving the switch
will also reset the PASS function.
10
COMM (Communications) PLAN Display
Displays the COMM PLAN number (1 thru 5) as selected by the thumbwheel switch (No. 9).
11
Pwr (POWER) ON/STBY Switch
The POWER ON/STBY switch is a two position switch with overcenter,

pull out and up from STBY to PWR ON. The PWR ON position supplies
+28 volts dc to the receiver which powers up the system and starts
bit-test.
B
MRT PRINTER
12
Viewing Window
The printer paper can be seen through the viewing window.
13
PWR ON Indicator
The PWR ON indicator lights (green) when power and power control
from the receiver is applied to the printer.
14
PPR (Paper) ADV (Advance) Switch
The PPR ADV switch indicator will advance the printer paper and resets
the printer status faults when pressed. When the system PWR ON/
STBY switch is set ON, the PPR ADV (white) light comes on and remains on.
15
STATUS FAULT Indicator
The STATUS FAULT indicator lights (red) when power is initially applied
and when a printer fault has been detected from either the on-line monitoring functions or off-line diagnostics.
NOTE
A printer STATUS FAULT normally indicates a low paper condition. If the light is on, check the paper supply. If adequate
paper is available or the paper is changed, and the light remains on, it is a hardware fault. Follow the corrective actions
found in T.O. 1B-52H-1-12, Section III.
16
SELF TEST Switch Indicator
The SELF TEST switch indicator initiates the printer on-line BIT diagnostic test and test message print out. The SELF TEST indicator lights
(white) when the self-test function is activated.
1-530
Change 10
T.O. 1B-52H-1
MRT Receiver
MRT Transfer Module
The MRT receiver (R-2348/ARR-85(V)) (figure

1-150) accepts and processes incoming RF signals
from the antennas. It consists of two functional sections: the RF section and the demodulator section.
The RF section accepts inputs from the antennas,
provides frequency conversion, band limiting and
signal conditioning for processing in the demodulator section. The demodulator also contains an interface for the transfer module. The receiver contains
an integral circuit for fault detection and isolation.
This BIT function operates in two modes: off-line
fault diagnostics and on-line performance monitoring.
The MRT transfer module (KGV-61/TSEC) (figure

1-150) is a programmable, battery-powered, removable crypts plug-in unit that contains all the
COMSEC equipment and firmware. It is the transfer device between mission planning activities and
the operational aircraft. The transfer module is
plugged into a receptacle on the front of the receiver and the operational modes and plans are selected
from the MRT RCU. When the transfer module is
removed, a closeout panel is installed to maintain
the proper cooling air flow.
The RF section provides non-linear signal processing to reduce the effects of atmospheric noise. It has
three identical signal channels with four inputs
from the TE and TM antennas. The two TE antenna signals are combined to drive one of the channels. The two remaining channels are driven by two
inputs from the TM antenna.
The antenna system consists of two TE antennas

and one TM antenna. They function as the receiver
front-end. Test loop windings are wound over the
main receive loop windings of each antenna. This
provides a means for the receiver to perform BIT
analysis of each antenna. See ANTENNA LOCATIONS, this Section for location of the MRT antennas.
The demodulator section accepts the stabilized output of the RF section and demodulates it. It combines the TE and TM signals to improve message
accuracy and increase jammer rejection.
Off-line BIT is started at power on or when the test
switch on the RCU is placed in the SYS position.
The test performs a front to back functional test of
the receiver analog, TE/TM antennas and receiver
signal processing circuits. The BIT test also checks
and verifies the operational status of the RCU and
printer. The BIT test results in an interruption of
normal system operation until the completion of the
test.
On-line BIT is performed in a background mode
and runs a series of tests to check the system operation. If any of the tests fail, a full BIT diagnostic
routine is automatically performed during the next
idle period of operation and any faulty circuits are
identified to the operator.
Antennas
TE ANTENNAS
The TE antennas (AS-3857/ARR-85(V)) are ferrite
core, rectangular loop antennas. They have integral
band pass filters, low noise preamplifiers and EMP
protection circuits. Both TE antennas receive low
level signals with the frequency range of 14 to 60
KHz in the transverse electric mode.
TM ANTENNA
The TM antenna (AS-3858/ARR-85(V)) is a dual
axis, crossed ferrite core antenna. It has dual band
pass filters, dual low noise preamplifiers and EMP
protection circuits integrated into a single antenna
assembly. It operates in the transverse magnetic
mode within the same frequency range as the TE
antennas.
1-531
T.O. 1B-52H-1
MRT Receiver With Transfer Module
1
2
3
FILL CONNECTOR
CLR ZEROIZE INDICATOR
ZEROIZE SWITCH
1-532
Change 19
T.O. 1B-52H-1
MRT Receiver With Transfer Module (Cont)
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
FILL Connector
The fill connector is used at the TMSS to load the cryptographic key variables, real time, mission profiles and other system initialization data.
CLR ZEROIZE Indicator
The CLR ZEROIZE indicator is black when the cryptographic variables

are loaded. The CLR ZEROIZE indicator is white when the cryptographic
variables have been erased either by using the ZEROIZE switch on the
MRT RCU or the transfer module, by removing the control indicator interconnect cable to the receiver or by removing the transfer module from the
receiver.
ZEROIZE Switch
When pressed, the ZEROIZE switch zeroizes the cryptographic variables in the transfer module. The transfer module indicator turns white
when cryptographic variables are zeroized.
Change 19
1-533
T.O. 1B-52H-1
MRT MODES OF OPERATION
The MRT is a receive only system that has two

modes of receive operation. When the mode switch
is set to the ALL position, every message that is received by the receiver is printed out as hard copy.
When the mode switch is set to the AJ position,
only those messages with special encryption parameters are printed out as hard copy. The encryption
parameters for this mode are programmed into the
transfer module at the TMSS during the normal
mission operations loading of the module.
Normal Operation of the MRT
1.
9. Set COMM PLAN thumbwheel on RCU to required communication plan.

NOTE
Install the transfer module in the receiver.
If the TEST GO indicator fails to light and

the TEST FAULT indicator or the printer
STATUS FAULT indicator is lit, press the
TEST FAULT/PRINT switch indicator to
printout the diagnostic results. After printer has completed the hard copy printout,
shut down the MRT.
Power down of the MRT will not erase the
cryptographic variables contained in the
transfer module.
10. If required, power down the MRT by placing

the PWR ON/STBY switch to STBY (off).
The MRT will only be operated with aircraft
cooling air available to the MRT receiver.
Operation of the receiver without cooling
air will burn up the receiver unit.
2. Set the RCU PWR switch to ON. The PWR ON
indicator on the printer will light and the system
BIT test is started.
NOTE
MRT Printer Paper Reload
1. Loosen the captive screw on the printer door.

2. Open the printer door by sliding the latch to
the left (located at the bottom of the door)
3. Slide the paper drawer assembly forward to
gain access to the paper spool.
4. Remove the paper spool and place a new roll of
thermal paper on the spindle.
NOTE
BNS FRONT PANEL light rheostat must be

rotated to full BRIGHT (fully clockwise) to
provide power to all RCU lights. Failure to
rotate the rheostat fully clockwise could result in a BIT failure.
3. TEST FAULT/PRINT and GO indicators light.
Printer STATUS FAULT indicator lights.
4. After approximately 2 minutes, TEST FAULT/
PRINT light goes out and GO light remains on.
TEST GO indicator remains on to indicate system
is ready. Printer STATUS FAULT indicator goes
out.
5. The printer prints hard copy of system BIT
status.
6. Momentarily set the TEST SYS/LAMP switch
on the RCU to LAMP. All indicators on RCU and
printer light.
7. Set PTR ALL CALL/TEST switch on RCU to
ALL CALL or TEST, as required.
8. Set the MODE switch on RCU to ALL or AJ as
required.
1-534
Change 10
Install thermal paper with the slick side to

the inside.
5.
Reinstall the paper spindle.

NOTE
The pin should be on the right side of the

spindle.
6. Route the paper under the roller and through
the slot in the front of the drawer assembly as per
the schematic on the printer door.
7. Slide paper drawer assembly back into the
printer.
8. Close and latch the printer door.
9. Tighten the captive screw on the printer door.
10. Check the status of the printer by pressing the
FAULT/TEST pushbutton on the MRT RCU.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Communication And Associated Electronic

Equipment Circuit Protection and Location
EQUIPMENT
AFSATCOM System (AN/ASC-19)
Control Panels
Printer
UHF Line of Sight (LOS) Radio
(AN/ARC-171(V)
Interphone System Main Power

Interphone System Panels
Copilot, Radar Nav, EWO
IP, IN, and DI
Main Ext Pwr & Fwd Wheel Well
Pilot, Nav, and Gunner
KY-100 System DU
Liaison Radio (AN/ARC-190(V))
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
MISCELLANEOUS
AFSATCOM DC NO. 1
AFSATCOM DC NO. 2
DC CONTR PS & MODEM
MISCELLANEOUS
AFSATCOM R-T A
AFSATCOM R-T B
AFSATCOM R-T C
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
RLC/E25
RLC/E26
RLC/D27
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
RLC/D24
RLC/D25
RLC/D26
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
MISCELLANEOUS
MAIN INPH PWR 12
PCBP/E21
Emer Batt.
INPH PWR
INPH PWR INST
INPH PWR GRD
INPH PWR
CPCBP/E8
ECM/A2
ECM/B2
RFBNS/B26
Emer Batt.
Emer Batt.
Emer Batt.
Emer Batt.

SECURE VOICE KY-100
RLC/E33
Rt. ESS
13
13
AC Bus 1
Change 17
1-535
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Communication And Associated Electronic

Equipment Circuit Protection and Location (Cont)
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
EQUIPMENT
Miniature Receive Terminal
(AN/ARR-85(V)
Control Panel
Control Panel Lighting
Printer
Receiver
11
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
MINITR REC TERM CONT DC

MRT PNL LTS
MINITR REC TERM PTR AC
MINITR REC TERM
RCVR A
RCVR B
RCVR C
POWER
SOURCE
AUXBNS/D8
AUXBNS/G3
AUXBNS/D9
Left TR
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AUXBNS/D10
AUXBNS/D11
AUXBNS/D12
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
UHF Command Radio

(AN/ARC-164(V)

R ESS DC PWR COMM RADIO
RLC/E31
Rt. ESS
V/UHF Radio (AN/ARC-210(V)
MISCELLANEOUS ARC-210
HPA
POWER
LLC/C27
LLC/C26
Left TR
Left TR
AUXBNS
CPCBP
ECM

LLC
PCBP
RLC

12
This circuit breaker supplies power to all crew position interphone panel circuit breakers.
13
The circuit protection for these components is not accessible to the flight crew inflight.
1-536
Change 12
T.O. 1B-52H-1
OFFENSIVE AVIONICS SYSTEM

DESCRIPTION
Although the offensive avionics system of the aircraft provides complete electronic navigation equipment, other equipment is provided, which is used
separately or can be used separately, to aid in navigating. These items are the attitude and heading
reference set, periscopic sextant, rendezvous radar
beacon, Doppler radar, true airspeed computer, altimeter, outside air temperature gage, and clock.
For additional information on the offensive avionics
systems not described here, see INSTRUMENTS,
this section, or refer to T.O. 1B-52H-1-12.
The circuit protection, circuit breaker location, and
power source for offensive avionics system equipment is contained in figure 1-153.
OFFENSIVE AVIONICS SYSTEM (AN/ASQ-176)
The aircraft is equipped with a Type AN/ASQ-176

Offensive Avionics System (OAS). On this aircraft,
the system is composed of the following auxiliary
systems:
Attitude-Heading Reference Set AN/ASN-134

(AHRS)
Electronic Altimeter Set AN/APN-224 (Radar
Altimeter)
Inertial Navigation Set AN/ASN-136 (2) (INS)
Control-Display Set AN/ASQ-175 (CDS)
Doppler Radar AN/APN-218 (Doppler)
Radar Set Group OY-73/ASQ-176 (MACR)
Digital Data Set AN/AYK-17 (Interface
Equipment)
Control-Monitor Set AN/AWQ-3 (Weapon
Control)
Ballistics Computer Set AN/AYQ-10
(Computational)
ry systems. For information on OAS and its operation, refer to T.O. 1B-52H-1-12.
Flight Command Indicator (FCI)
The AN/ASQ-176 OAS flight command indicator

(FCI) (figure 1-152) located on the pilots side of the
pilots instrument panel provides time-to-go and
heading error reference information for bomb runs
and destination point homing. The same information displayed on the FCI is also displayed on the
EVS monitors. For additional information, see EVS
MONITOR under ELECTRO-OPTICAL VIEWING
SYSTEM (EVS), this section.
FCI Normal Operation
The zero heading error mark represents the current

value of true heading. The heading error pointer
displacement thus indicates the direction and magnitude of turn required to bring aircraft and desired
heading into coincidence. A white band rotates beneath the heading error pointer on the time-to-go
drum. This moving band narrows as time to go approaches zero to assist in judging turn correction
rates. The error pointer should be maintained within the white area at all times to avoid the necessity
for excessive turn rates as time to go nears 0 second. With the automatic pilot turn control selector
switch in BOMB position, OAS heading error is furnished the autopilot as well as the FCI. This automatic steering removes heading errors as they are
generated, thus maintaining the FCI error pointer
at 0. The FCI display is readily adapted for precise
control of complex time-track problems during
airborne radar approach, penetrations, holding
patterns, or special flight patterns where other
reference aids are not usable. The OAS computers
and radar sighting furnish continuously updated
steering and timing information to a selected radar
or geographical coordinate reference point.
The OAS is designed to be highly automatic in

operation by interconnection of the various auxilia-
1-537
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Flight Command Indicator
1
2
3
TIME-TO-GO INDICATOR
HEADING ERROR INDICATOR
WHITE BAND
CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
FUNCTION
Time-To-Go Indicator
The time-to-go indicator displays the remaining time-to-go in seconds before the OAS provides a bomb release pulse, or time-to-go to the crosshair geographical position. The time-to-go readings are displayed on a
drum which rotates past the fixed index pointer.
Heading Error Indicator
The heading error indicator displays the angular difference between the
current aircraft heading and the heading necessary to make good the true
course to the bomb release point (OAS in bomb mode), the heading to
the crosshair position, or the heading to a preset destination. The heading
error sensitivity is increased at low values by use of a logarithmic pointer
displacement and error scale markings.
White Band
The white band rotates beneath the heading error pointer on the time-togo drum. This moving band narrows as time to go approaches zero to assist in judging turn correction rates.
Figure 1-152
1-538
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EA Pilots EVS Monitor Input Switch
A guarded two position switch at the Radar Navigators station selects input source for the EVS monitor on the Pilots instrument panel. The two positions of the switch are NORMAL PILOT DATA and
guarded RN RH MFD DATA. The switch allows the
Pilot to observe on his EVS monitor any display capable of being selected for the Radar Navigators
Right Hand MFD. These displays include OAS, Radar, and EVS data. When the guard is lifted and
the switch is placed to the RN RH MFD DATA posi-
tion, normal EVS display data to the Pilots EVS

monitor is interrupted. With the switch in the RN
RH MFD DATA position, the display data being
sent to the Radar Navigators right hand MFD is
also sent to the Pilots EVS monitor. Placing the
switch back to the NORMAL PILOT DATA position
restores normal functions of the EVS data displays.
For a detailed discussion of the displays available
refer to T.O. 1B-52H-1-12 or the applicable aircrew
weapons delivery manual (-25 series, -30 series, or
-34-2 series).
EA Pilots EVS Monitor Input Switch
NO.
1
CONTROLINDICATOR
Pilot EVS Monitor Input Switch
(NORMAL PILOT DATA RN RH MFD DATA)
FUNCTION
The Guarded two position switch is used to select the EVS video source
for the Pilots EVS Monitor. IU/TACAN data displays are still available in
either position.
NORMAL PILOT DATA position allows the EVS Monitor to display EVS
data as selected by the pilot.
RN RH MFD DATA (Guarded Position) disconnects the pilots EVS monitor from the EVS display data and displays whatever the Radar Navigator
has selected for display on the RN right hand MFD. The Radar Navigators
displays include OAS, Radar and EVS data.
Figure 1-152A
Change 16
1-538A/(1-538B blank)
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Offensive Avionics System (OAS) Circuit

EQUIPMENT
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
Computational Subsystem
Bus Control
Control Power Source for
DTUs and Processors
Control Power Distribution for

DTUs and Processors
DTU Main Power
Processor Main Power
OAS BUS CONTR
RFBNS/B31
Left TR
OAS COMPUTATIONAL
CONTR PNL DC ALT
CONTR PNL DC NORM
AUXBNS/G6
AUXBNS/G5
Left TR
Rt. TR
ACU NO. 1
ACU NO. 2
Less [AMI] ACU NO. 3
DTU NO. 1
DTU NO. 2
RTSV/T2
RTSV/D1
RTSV/I2
RTSV/A2
RTSV/J1
Left TR
Rt. TR
Left TR
Left TR
Rt. TR
OAS COMPUTATIONAL
DTU PWR NO. 1
DTU PWR NO. 2
AUXBNS/E5
AUXBNS/E6
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 5
AUXBNS/E8
AUXBNS/F8
AUXBNS/G8
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
AUXBNS/E7
AUXBNS/F7
AUXBNS/G7
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
PROCESSOR NO. 2
ALT PWR A
ALT PWR B
ALT PWR C
AUXBNS/E10
AUXBNS/F10
AUXBNS/G10
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
PROCESSOR NO. 2
NORM PWR A
NORM PWR B
NORM PWR C
AUXBNS/E9
AUXBNS/F9
AUXBNS/G9
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5

ALT PWR A
ALT PWR B
ALT PWR C
AUXBNS/E12
AUXBNS/F12
AUXBNS/G12
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5

NORM PWR A
NORM PWR B
NORM PWR C
AUXBNS/E11
AUXBNS/F11
AUXBNS/G11
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
OAS COMPUTATIONAL
PROCESSOR NO. 1
ALT PWR A
ALT PWR B
ALT PWR C
PROCESSOR NO. 1
NORM PWR A
NORM PWR B
NORM PWR C
Change 21
1-539
T.O. 1B-52H-1

EQUIPMENT
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
Controls and Displays Subsystem

Airborne Video Tape Recorder
115V AC-PHASE B AVTR
EVS/G3
AC Bus 5
Display Electronics Unit

DEU AC NO. 1
DEU AC NO. 2
DEU 1
DEU 2
LFBNS/A17
LFBNS/B17
RTSV/C2
RTSV/I1
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
Left TR
Rt. TR

MF DISPLAY
NAV AC
NAV DC
R-N AC
R-N DC
N MFD
R/N MFD
LFBNS/A13
LFBNS/A15
LFBNS/A14
LFBNS/A16
RTSV/D2
RTSV/E2
AC Bus 3
Rt. TR
AC Bus 3
Rt. TR
Left TR
Left TR
POWER
NO. 1 OAS
NO. 2 MSTR
RFBNS/B32
RFBNS/B33
Left TR
Rt. TR
Radar Presentation Panel
NAV PRES PANEL

RDR/NAV PRES PNL
RTSV/E1
RTSV/F1
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
Radar Scan Converter
OAS NAV RDR SCAN CONV

RSC
AUXBNS/E1
RTSV/G2
AC Bus 3
Left TR
RN Management Panel

RDR MGT PNL
RDR MGT
LFBNS/B16
RTSV/H1
Rt. TR
Rt. TR

V RCDR
AC
DC
VID RCDR
LFBNS/A12
LFBNS/A11
RTSV/K2
AC Bus 3
Rt .TR
Left Tr

WPN CONT PNL
WCP
LFBNS/B15
RTSV/G1
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
Multifunction Displays
OAS Power Control
Video Recorder
Weapon Control Panel
1-540
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
EQUIPMENT
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
Interface Subsystem
Armament Interface Unit (AIU)
OAS INTERFACE ARMT IU

ALT AC
DC
NORM AC
AIU
AUXBNS/G4
AUXBNS/F4
AUXBNS/E4
RTSV/B1
AC Bus 3
Rt. TR
AC Bus 3
Rt. TR
BNS Interface
BNS PRESS XDCR

BNS TIME TO GO
RFBNS/A19
RFBNS/A18
Left TR
Left TR
Controls and Displays

IU ALT AC
IU NORM AC
CDIU
LFBNS/B13
LFBNS/B12
RTSV/F2
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
Left TR
OAS INTERFACE EVS IU

AC
DC
EIU
AUXBNS/E2
AUXBNS/F2
RTSV/C1
AC Bus 3
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
OAS INTERFACE RDR IU

AC
DC
RIU
AUXBNS/E3
AUXBNS/F3
RTSV/B2
AC Bus 3
Rt. TR
Left TR
OAS NAV
DOPPLER RDR
AUXBNS/D4
AC Bus 3
EVS/C4
EVS/B4
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 1
EVS/G4
EVS/F4
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 1
EVS/K4
EVS/J4
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 1
EVS/T4
EVS/U4
Left TR
Left TR
115V AC-PHASE C
GPS RCVR
EVS/L4
AC Bus 1
DC POWER
RDR NAV PRGM KYBD
EVS/R4
Left TR
DC POWER
DDL PWR
EVS/S4
Left TR
EVS Interface Unit (EIU)
Radar Interface Unit (RIU)
Navigational Subsystem
Doppler Radar
Global Positioning System
GPS Interface Unit Power
GPS Receiver Power

Programmable Keyboard
Digital Data Loader
115V AC-PHASE A
GPS INTFC UNIT FILL-IN
GPS INTFC UNIT PRIME
115V AC-PHASE B
115V AC-PHASE C
DC POWER
INTFC UNIT
INTFC UNIT CONT PNL
Change 21
1-541
T.O. 1B-52H-1

CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
EQUIPMENT
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
Navigational Subsystem (Cont)

Less [AMI] INU No. 1
Main Power
Power for Cooling Fan

Power for Heater
NO. 1 INS AC PWR A

AC PWR B
AC PWR C
DC ALT PWR
FAN A
FAN B
FAN C
HEATER A
HEATER B
HEATER C
LFBNS/A1
LFBNS/A2
LFBNS/A3
LFBNS/A10
LFBNS/A7
LFBNS/A8
LFBNS/A9
LFBNS/A4
LFBNS/A5
LFBNS/A6
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
Rt. TR
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
INS No. 1 Backup DC

Power
AFT BATTERY POWER

RSPA PWR 24 V IEU 1
LLC/F6
Aft Batt.
INS No. 1 Cooling Control

Power
NO. 1 INS COOL
RTSV/A1
Rt. TR
LFBNS/B1
LFBNS/B2
LFBNS/B3
LFBNS/B10
LFBNS/B7
LFBNS/B8
LFBNS/B9
LFBNS/B4
LFBNS/B5
LFBNS/B6
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
Rt. TR
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
Less [AMI] INU No. 2

Power
Power for Cooling Fan

Power for Heater
NO. 2 INS AC PWR A

AC PWR B
AC PWR C
DC ALT PWR
FAN A
FAN B
FAN C
HEATER A
HEATER B
HEATER C
INS No. 2 Backup DC

Power
FWD BATTERY POWER

RSPA PWR 24 V IEU 2
RLC/F29
Fwd Batt.
INS No. 2 Cooling Control

Power
NO. 2 INS COOL
RTSV/H2
Left TR
Main Power
NO. 1 INS AC PWR
LFBNS/A2
AC Bus 3
INS No. 1 Backup DC

Power
NO. 1 INS DC B/U POWER
RLC/F29
Fwd Batt.
Main Power
NO. 2 INS AC PWR
LFBNS/B4
AC Bus 5
INS No. 2 Backup DC

Power
NO. 2 INS DC B/U POWER
LLC/F6
Aft Batt.
OAS NAV RDR ALTM
AUXBNS/D5
AC Bus 3
[AMI] INU No. 1
[AMI] INU No. 2
Radar Altimeter
1-542
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EQUIPMENT
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
Strategic Radar Subsystem

Antenna
PROGRAMMER ANT. POSITION

PWR ON DC
ANT
ANT ELEX UNIT
STRATEGIC RADAR
ACR ANT
ANT ELEX UNIT
ANT ELEX UNIT A
ANT ELEX UNIT B
ANT ELEX UNIT C
RADAR ANT A
RADAR ANT B
RADAR ANT C
RTSV/K1
Rt. TR
AUXBNS/B6
AUXBNS/B5
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AUXBNS/B13
AUXBNS/B14
AUXBNS/A7
AUXBNS/A8
AUXBNS/A9
AUXBNS/A1
AUXBNS/A2
AUXBNS/A3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
BLANKING AMPL
PWR ON DC
DISP GEN
RADAR PROC
RADAR TIME DELAY
RADAR CONTL PNL
RADAR PROC A, B, C
STRATEGIC RADAR
DISPLAY GEN A, B, C
RADAR CONTROL
AUXBNS/C9
AC Bus 3
AUXBNS/B2
AUXBNS/B3
AUXBNS/B1
AUXBNS/C8
AUXBNS/C11
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AUXBNS/A5
AUXBNS/B12
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
OVERHEAT CONTR
RADOME GROUND COOL
BLOWER A
BLOWER B
BLOWER C
CONTR
AUXBNS/C5
Left TR
AUXBNS/C1
AUXBNS/C2
AUXBNS/C3
AUXBNS/C4
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
Left TR
Radar Presurization
RDR PRESS AC
RDR PRESS DC
AUXBNS/C7
AUXBNS/C6
AC Bus 3
Left TR
Radar Transponder
(AN/APN-69)
OAS NAV AN/APN-69 PRESS CONTR
AUXBNS/D6
Left TR
R-T Unit
PWR ON DC
R-T MOD
STRATEGIC RADAR
R-T MOD
R-T MODULATOR A, B, C
AUXBNS/B4
AC Bus 3
AUXBNS/B10
AUXBNS/A11
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
Controls and Displays

Processor
Cooling (Low Airflow Lights

and Blowers)
1-543
T.O. 1B-52H-1

EQUIPMENT
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
Test Receptacles
OAS
IFF
11
TEST RECEPTACLES
AFT OAS AC
AFT OAS DC
FWD OAS AC
FWD OAS DC
ABNS/B8
ABNS/B7
ABNS/B10
ABNS/B9
AC Bus 3
Left TR
AC Bus 3
Left TR
TEST RECEPTACLES
IFF AC
IFF DC
ABNS/B12
ABNS/B11
AC Bus 3
Left TR
ABNS
AUXBNS
EVS
LFBNS

LEFT FORWARD BNS CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL
LLC
RLC
RTSV

RIGHT S/V FILTER BOX
1-544
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS
DESCRIPTION
FLARE EJECTOR SET POWER SWITCH
The unclassified discussion of the defensive systems

is contained in T.O. 1B-52H-1-13, and the classified
aircrew data is contained in T.O. 1B-52H-1-13-1.
The circuit protection, circuit breaker location, and
power source for defensive equipment is contained
in figure 1-155.
This switch is an added safety device located on the

pilot side panel (figures 1-154) and allows the pilot
to control application of power to the system.
Pilots ALE-20 Flare Ejector Panel
NO.
1
CONTROLINDICATOR
Flare Ejector Set Power Switch
FUNCTION
Used to provide the pilot a means of assuring that flares will not be ejected
during critical periods of flight. The switch must be in ON position to provide dc operating power. Three position ON-OFF-ON switch is used. The
switch locks in the center or OFF position and must be pulled out before
it can be moved up to ON position. The lower ON position is disconnected
and serves no function.
Figure 1-154
1-545
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Defensive Systems Circuit Protection and Location

EQUIPMENT
Blanking System
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
SYS 15 & 16 HTR & BLKG CONTROL

SYS 15 BLKG MDL
SYS 16 BLKG MDL
ECM/Y2
Rt. TR
ECM/AA2
ECM/AC
Left TR
Left TR
Indicator Light Dimming Control
ECM IND DIMMING
ECM/X2
Left TR
Wave Guide Pressurization

Compressor
ECM PRESS PUMP
ECM/Z2
AC Bus 5
AN/ALE-24 Dispenser Set
CHAFF DISP DEACTIVATE

WING CHAFF CONT PWR
ECM/AD2
ECM/M1
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
AN/ALE-20 Flare Ejector Set
FLARE EJECTOR POWER

FLARE EJECTOR PROGRAM
POWER
ROCKET POD LH
ROCKET POD RH
ECM/O2
ECM/O1
AC Bus 5
Rt. TR
ECM/K1
ECM/L1
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
AN/ALR-20A Search Receiver
AN/ALR-20 AC A
AN/ALR-20 AC B
AN/ALR-20 AC C
AN/ALR-20 DC
ECM/P1
ECM/Q1
ECM/R1
ECM/Q2
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
Rt. TR
Radar Warning Receiver (RWR)
WARNING RCVR AC
ECM/G2
AC Bus 5
Sensor Integration Systems
SI CONTROL DC
SI DISPLAY AC
SI DISPLAY DC
ECM/K2
ECM/I2
ECM/J2
Rt. TR
AC Bus 5
Rt. TR
ECM Systems Miscellaneous
Expendable Countermeasures
Systems
Receiver Systems
1-546
Change 20
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EQUIPMENT
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
Receiver-Transmitter Systems
AN/ALQ-172 Countermeasures
Set
CH ALQ-172 (V) CDU

DT
PRESS PUMP IND
PRESSURE TEST
CH SYS 15 & 16 IND CONT
Less DT
CH SYS 15 & 16 MON CONT
Less DT
SYS 15 & 16 HTR & BLKG CONTROL
SYS 15 PRESS PUMP
SYS 16 PRESS PUMP
ECM/S2
ECM/E3
ECM/J3
ECM/S2
ECM/T2
ECM/Y2
Left TR
Left TR
Left TR
Left TR
Left TR
Rt. TR
ECM/D3
ECM/F3
Left TR
Left TR
Rt. TR
AN/ALQ-153 Tail Warning

System

CM SET
RLC/E30
AN/ALQ-155(V) Power
Management System
MEMORY LOAD VERIFIER

ECM/G3
ECM/H3
ECM/13
AN/ALT-28(V) Jamming
Transmitter
SYS NO.1 AN/ALT-28 ANT SELECT

SYS NO.2
ECM/U2
ECM/V2
Left TR
Left TR
MISCELLANEOUS
NOSE ECM TEST RECP AC
NOSE ECM TEST RECP DC
LLC/C32
LLC/C33
AC Bus 3
Left TR
ECM Test Receptacles

Nose Radome
11
ECM
LLC
RLC
Change 20
1-547/(1-548 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1

DESCRIPTION
POWER SOURCE
OPERATION
THEORY OF OPERATION
NORMAL OPERATION
1-549
1-550
1-551
1-554
1-554
1-562
DESCRIPTION
The terrain avoidance (TA) system comprises a special mode of the OAS strategic radar, a radar processor, display generator, video distribution unit,
and the pilots and copilots terrain display indicators (EVS monitors) and their associated electronic
components.
The TA system provides a radar profile display of
the terrain along the flightpath of the aircraft. By
interpreting the display and maneuvering the aircraft accordingly, the pilot is able to fly the aircraft
at low absolute altitudes (aircraft to terrain separation distance).
Terrain avoidance system circuit protection and the
ground track corridor approximately 12 either side

of center ahead of the aircraft in which terrain
above the clearance plane can be hazardous. The
extremities of the HRL define the limits of the corridor. When flying terrain avoidance, maintain the
terrain trace on or below the entire HRL including
the gap. The gap in the HRL allows unrestricted
forward visibility when used with the EVS sensors.
The verticals at the inner ends of HRL facilitate
recognition of the HRL when used with the EVS
sensors. Fill-in of the gap and loss of the verticals is
an indication of malfunction in the radar scan converter and the terrain avoidance system.
Terrain Display (EVS Monitors)
The pilot and copilot each has an EVS monitor (figure 1-156) which is used to display TA video. A
profile display of the approaching terrain is presented by means of the TA profile terrain trace (14,
figure 1-174). The terrain trace is a continuous line
(consisting of small horizontal elements) giving a
profile video presentation of radar computed terrain azimuth versus elevation data. The terrain
trace displays the profile of the highest terrain in a
selected 3, 6, or 10 mile range in front of the aircraft, within a 45 sector relative to ground track.
The TA horizontal reference line (15, figure 1-174)
is an electronically generated cursor which represents the clearance plane and is used with the terrain trace to establish aircraft and terrain separation. The horizontal reference line (HRL) defines a
If the horizontal reference line becomes an

unbroken line (gap fills in and verticals disappear) or is not present, the TA system
should be used with caution and only when
visual contact with the ground can be maintained.
The vertical dimension of the terrain trace
is based on an angular computation and
consequently the EVS monitor, for TA purposes, contains no vertical scaling for
height.
In addition to the terrain trace and horizontal reference line, the EVS monitor also displays other
flight and symbology data which is described in
EVS MONITOR under ELECTRO-OPTICAL
VIEWING SYSTEM (EVS), this section.
Change 16
1-549
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Terrain Display Control Panel
The terrain display control panel on the aisle stand

provides the pilots with the controls necessary for
operation of the TA system. See figure 1-156 for TA
controls and indicators.
TA Operating Condition Indicators
The TA operating condition indicators on the pilot

and copilot instrument panels provide the pilots
with indications and controls necessary for operation of the TA system. See figure 1-156 for TA controls and indicators.
using the recorder at the NAV station. The radar

navigator AVTR remote control unit (RCU) at the
RN position, is used to turn the system on and off
and select the scope to be recorded (Pilots TA
display, or the RNs left or right MFD). The AVTR
records interphone and number 1 UHF radio. The
video cassette contains sufficient tape for 30 minutes continuous play, or up to 2 hours depending on
the delay setting selected by the RN. Under delay
settings the video is recorded for 10 seconds and
then shuts off for the period of selected delay 10,
20, or 30 seconds). Then again records for 10 seconds, continuously repeating this cycle.
POWER SOURCE
The airborne video tape recorder (AVTR) is used in

conjunction with TA flying and is controlled from
the navigator and radar navigator positions. The
navigator loads and unloads the video cassette
1-550
Power is supplied to the TA system through circuit

breakers located on the right forward BNS circuit
breaker panel, EVS circuit breaker panel, and the
auxiliary BNS circuit breaker panel.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Terrain Avoidance Controls and Indicators
1
2
3
4
5
6
TA INDICATOR INTENSITY KNOB

TERRAIN DISPLAY MODE SELECTOR SWITCH
STABILIZATION REFERENCE SELECTOR
SWITCH
CLEARANCE PLANE CONTROL SWITCH
EVS MONITOR (2 PLACES)
TA WARNING LIGHT
7
8
9
10
11
PROFILE RANGE GATE INDICATOR LIGHTS (3,

6, AND 10)
PITCH BAR ADJUST KNOB
TA TEST BUTTON
TA EVS VECTOR INDICATOR LIGHT
TA OVERHEAT LIGHT (DISCONNECTED)
1-551
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Terrain Avoidance Controls and Indicators (Cont)

NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
TERRAIN DISPLAY CONTROL PANEL
TA INDICATOR INTENSITY Knob
The TA indicator intensity knob is used to vary the contrast between the
TA displays and STV or FLIR video and is enabled when the terrain
display mode selector switch is placed to any position other than OFF.
Rotating the knob in the clockwise direction will increase the intensity of
the TA display and decrease the intensity of the FLIR or STV video. Conversely, counterclockwise rotation will increase the intensity of the STV
or FLIR video and decrease the intensity of the TA display.
Terrain Display Mode Selector Switch
The terrain display mode selector switch has OFF- - PROFILE CAL - PROFILE 3 - - PROFILE 6 - - PROFILE 10 positions. The TA system is
placed in operation when the selector switch is moved out of OFF position. PROFILE CAL position selects profile manual minimum range mode
which provides profile 10 display with a fixed minimum range of approximately 6000 feet. PROFILE 3 position provides a silhouette outline
display on the pilots EVS monitors of the highest terrain between minimum range and 3 nautical miles. PROFILE 6 position provides a silhouette outline display on the pilots EVS monitors of the highest terrain
between minimum range and 6 nautical miles. PROFILE 10 position provides a silhouette outline display on the pilots EVS monitors of the highest terrain between minimum range and 10 nautical miles.
Stabilization Reference Selector Switch
The stabilization reference selector switch has FVR -- HOR -- FRL positions. The clearance plane is oriented to the selected stabilization reference. In FVR (flight vector reference) position, the clearance plane is
maintained parallel to the flightpath of the aircraft. The AOA reference is
generated by the OAS prime NAV model. In HOR (horizontal) position,
the clearance plane is maintained horizontal within the pitch and roll limits
of the vertical gyro. In FRL (fuselage reference line) position, the clearance plane is maintained at a preset angle which is nearly parallel to the
longitudinal axis of the aircraft.
Clearance Plane Control Switch
The clearance plane control switch provides a means of varying the clearance plane. An open-type guard discourages inadvertent actuation of this
switch. The switch has RAISE - - OFF - - LOWER positions, is springloaded to OFF position. Holding the switch to LOWER position lowers the
clearance plane with respect to the aircraft and will be displayed on the
EVS monitor. Holding the switch to RAISE position raises the clearance
plane and will be displayed on the EVS monitor. The clearance plane can
be set from 0 to 1500 feet below the aircraft.
Under no circumstances will TA flight be conducted with clearance plane settings between 0 and 200 feet.
EVS MONITORS
5
EVS Monitors (2 places)
The EVS monitors display terrain avoidance video to the pilot and copilot.
See ELECTRO-OPTICAL VIEWING SYSTEM (EVS) this section for
additional information on the EVS monitors.
1-552
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
TA OPERATING CONDITION INDICATORS
TA WARN (Warning) Light (Red)
A TA warning light provides a means of indicating a failure of some but

not all critical circuits in the TA system. The light is a word warning light
showing TA WARN in black letters on a red background when on. The
brightness of the TA warning light is controlled by the warning light dimming control switch on the pilots light panel. The light may not be visible
under some conditions with the warning light dimming control switch in
the DIM position. This light is used in conjunction with the TA test button
to check failure warning circuits.
If this light illuminates except for bank angles greater than

approximately 15, the TA system should be used with caution and only when visual contact with the ground can be
maintained.
If stabilization data from the OAS prime NAV model (INS 1,
INS 2, or AHRS attitude) is lost, the TA warning light will
come on and the TA trace will be unreliable in FVR, HOR,
and FRL modes.
PROFILE (3, 6, and 10) Range Gate

Indicator Lights (Green)
Three green range gate indicator lights (profiles 3, 6, and 10) are word
warning lights and show PROFILE 3, PROFILE 6, and PROFILE 10 in
green letters on a black background when on. The light on indicates the
TA range selected.
PITCH BAR ADJ Knob
The pitch bar adjust knob adjust the pitch and roll indicator on the EVS
monitor in a vertical direction. Clockwise rotation of the pitch bar adjust
knob moves the pitch and roll indicator up on the display and counterclockwise rotation moves the indicator downward.
TA TEST Button
A TA test button provides a means of testing the TA warning light, the TA

failure warning circuits, and the range gate indicator lights. Pressing the
button with the terrain display mode selector switch in an active mode will
cause the TA warning, TA-EVS vector, and range gate indicator lights to
illuminate, and the gap on the HRL to fill in and become a straight line.
10
TA EVS VECTOR Indicator light
A TA-EVS vector indicator light is a word warning light showing TA-EVS

VECTOR in amber letters on a black background when on. The lights will
come on when the angle of attack system is in a limit if FVR is selected
in the TA system or vector mode is selected in the EVS. The TA-EVS vector light should also come on when ALTER NAV is used as the prime NAV
model and the doppler is off. This indicates that FRL stabilization of the
TA system and/or fixed stabilization of the EVS should be selected.
11
TA OVERHEAT Light
Disconnected.
1-553
T.O. 1B-52H-1
OPERATION
THEORY OF OPERATION
The TA system utilizing the OAS strategic radar

operates on the monopulse radar concept. The system provides range, azimuth and height data on
each target from a single transmitted pulse, hence
the term monopulse, using six line replaceable
units (LRUs) and a dual antenna. The six LRUs are
the display generator, receiver-transmitter modulator (RTM), antenna position programmer, radar
scan converter, radar processor, and antenna unit.
The pilots profile video (profile ()) employs the
RTM, radar processor, and display generator. The
antenna position programmer develops the signals
necessary to drive the antenna in the operational
mode selected. When TA mode is selected, the antenna is automatically placed in sector scan FAST
and one of the stabilization modes can be selected
from the terrain display control panel. The antenna
radiates radio frequency (RF) energy generated in
the RTM.
The RTM transmitter is a magnetron whose characteristics include output frequency, pulse width, and
pulse repetition frequency. The RTM generates
blanking pulses for the beacon radar and electronic
countermeasure systems. The RTM also generates
RF pulses and detects targets from reflected energy.
These return target pulses are routed to the RTM
as monopulse sum and difference inputs. Conversion of these inputs provides terrain elevation and
ground map information.
The same antenna is used for transmission and reception of RF pulses. The transmitter portion of the
RTM is connected to the antenna for transmission
of a short high energy pulse which is reflected off
the terrain ahead of the aircraft. The antenna is
then disconnected from the transmitter and connected to the receivers in the RTM. This switching
cycle is repeated for each transmitter pulse. A delay
prevents detection of radar echoes from objects
which are so close to the aircraft (area A, figure
1-157) that their echo is received before switching is
complete.
This switching delay plus other characteristics results in a short range blind zone which affects the
terrain displays. For example, obstacles within
4500 feet will not be displayed for a 500 foot clearance altitude. The dual antenna contains the usual
1-554
reflector dish and is equipped with two pairs of feed

horns (radiators), one located directly above the
other (figure 1-158). For simplicity, each horizontal
pair can be considered as a single feed horn. Returns from high obstacles tend to focus more energy
into the lower feed horn while returns from low obstacles tend to focus more energy into the upper
feed horn. An obstacle located midway will reflect
equal energy into each horn and is said to be located on boresight; that is, on the principal axis of
the antenna electric field. The antenna design enables accurate height computation of obstacles
within the 8 primary area shown in figure 1-157.
The primary area is defined as 2 above and 6 below boresight and 45 left and right of the aircraft
ground track. Additionally, it is an area outside the
short range blind zone and within the selected
range gate (3, 6, or 10). Obstacles which protrude
into the primary area are computed accurately and
displayed until they are within area A (the short
range blind zone) or are within the minimum range
limits. Returns from obstacles within area B of figure 1-157 are removed electronically to provide profile mode capability (for the pilots only). The display
will present a premature disappearance (dropout)
of the terrain obstacle if the obstacle is within area
B of figure 1-157 regardless of clearance plane setting. When range and azimuth, obtained from the
navigators plan display or visually, are added to
height information, a good description of the obstacle position is available to the pilot. The computation cycle is repeated continuously with the net
output of the radar processor being a chain of longitudinal terrain profiles spaced about 1/7 in azimuth. Since the width of each profile is about 1,
complete overlapping coverage of the terrain is provided within the line-of-sight limitation. Terrain obstacles are displayed in azimuth with respect to aircraft ground track using a drift angle correction signal provided by the OAS. The radar processor generates a clearance plane (figure 1-159) which can be
thought of as a surface positioned at the desired
clearance altitude below the aircraft. All terrain obstacles are displayed relative to the clearance
plane. Noting the position of an obstacle on the
flightpath, the pilot maneuvers the aircraft in pitch
to maintain the clearance plane coincident with the
top of the obstacle. He will then pass over the object
at the desired clearance altitude. The clearance
plane remains parallel with the stabilization line
which is oriented with respect to the horizon, aircraft fuselage, or flightpath, depending on the stabilization mode chosen.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Terrain Avoidance System Geometry
Figure 1-157
1-555
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Terrain Avoidance Dual Antenna
Figure 1-158
1-556
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TA Display
Figure 1-159
1-557
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Stabilization Modes
Three stabilization modes are provided: fuselage

reference line (FRL), flight vector reference (FVR),
and horizontal (HOR). In all three modes of stabilization, a roll correction is applied to the antenna to
compensate for bank angles. This correction maintains the system accuracy up to 15 of bank, beyond
which the antenna strikes the stops on the down
wing side. The distorted display thus produced is
restored as soon as the bank angle is reduced. Bank
angles above approximately 15 may cause the TA
warning lights to illuminate but do not damage the
system physically or electrically.
FVR MODE
In FVR stabilization, the clearance plane is automatically established parallel to the flightpath of
the aircraft for all angles-of-attack. This enables
the pilot to cause obstacles to fall or rise relative to
the HRL by merely pulling the nose of the aircraft
up or pushing it down. Using this technique with
an obstacle displayed, the pilot can change the aircraft attitude and determine how much performance is necessary to clear the obstacle. FVR stabilization is provided by the OAS prime NAV model.
This signal is used to maintain the clearance plane
parallel to the flightpath, making FVR the most desirable stabilization for TA operation. The TA-EVS
vector light will be on continuously when the angleof-attack of the aircraft exceeds the limits of +2.0
and 5.5. The pilot should then select FRL stabilization.
When ALTER is the OAS prime NAV Model, angle

of attack data comes from the doppler system and
the AHRS. These inputs are critical to the terrain
trace as well as the radar video picture. Flying FVR
while the doppler is off or unreliable will be hazardous due to an invalid trace as well as possibility of
the radar presentation being severely range limited. This condition is amplified when the aircraft is
at low gross weights or at higher airspeeds. Though
the terrain trace will respond to aircraft pitch
changes and may appear to be accurate, it is not reliable and will not be used for descents to low level
or TA operation. If FVR is selected while the Alter
Model is prime and the doppler becomes unreliable
or is turned off, revert to FRL operations as the
trace will be unreliable until FRL is selected or
doppler operation is restored. The TA-EVS vector
indication light will come on with the stated conditions.
FVR will not be used for descent to low level

or for TA operation when ALTER NAV is
used as the prime Nav Model and the Doppler is off or unreliable. The TA-EVS vector
indicator light should also come on in this
situation.
When ALTER is the prime nav model and
Doppler data becomes unreliable, do not fly
FVR. The FVR trace is unreliable and will
not be used. Select FRL to continue TA
flight.
NOTE
If stabilization data from the OAS prime

NAV model (INS 1, INS 2, or AHRS attitude) is lost, the TA warning light will come
on and the TA trace will be unreliable in
FVR, HOR, and FRL modes.
1-558
The pilot will notify the navigator prior to

selecting FRL on the stabilization reference
selector switch to ensure the FRL angle is
reset.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
HORIZONTAL MODE
In horizontal stabilization, the clearance plane is
established parallel with the horizon, using a correcting signal obtained from the OAS stabilization
reference. This mode is used principally to check
the TA system accuracy. This mode is of limited use
in contour following. A change in aircraft altitude is
the only way to change the presentation in horizontal stabilization. This characteristic causes excessive clearance altitude when approaching obstacles
in a climb and insufficient clearance when approaching or crossing obstacles in a descent. Horizontal stabilization mode is considered only a backup in TA operations and should only be used when
FRL and FVR stabilization modes are inoperative
or unreliable and then only for operational checks
or for combat TA altitude operations.
Horizontal stabilization mode is considered

a backup mode of operation in the event of
FRL or FVR failure during combat. Its use
is limited to the stab modes comparison
check on training missions.
Use of horizontal stabilization will result in
inconsistent peak crossings at very low
clearance altitudes when peaks are crossed
in a descending attitude. Confine descent
rates to less than 1000 feet per minute.
Ensure active safety pilot monitoring. A
rapidly rising terrain trace, even though the

trace may be well below the horizontal reference line, provides a visible indication of
an impending low crossing or collision.
FRL MODE
In FRL stabilization, the clearance plane is established approximately parallel to the flight path of
the aircraft. The accuracy of FRL stabilization is
dependent on a correct FRL angle of attack setting.
The FRL angle-of-attack is set by the radar navigator for the given conditions, using the FRL control
knob on the radar control test panel and the angleof-attack chart (figure 1-163). In the FRL mode of
stabilization, as the aircraft pitch attitude is
changed, the clearance plane also pitches to remain
approximately parallel with the flight path. This
enables the pilot to cause obstacles to fall or rise
relative to the HRL by merely pulling the nose of
the aircraft up or pushing it down. Using this technique with an obstacle displayed, the pilot can
change the aircraft attitude and determine how
much performance is necessary to clear the obstacle.
NOTE
When using the FRL mode, the FRL angle

should be reset prior to decelerating and
after accelerating. This procedure will keep
the error induced by changing airspeeds in
the safe direction.
1-559
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Pilots Displays
The TA system is equipped with profile -3, -6, and

-10 display ranges, which can be used with any of
the three modes of stabilization. The display presents a view looking forward and displays the azimuth position and elevation angle of terrain features relative to the clearance plane (figure 1-159).
The elevation angle represents the change required
in the aircraft flight vector to clear a given terrain
feature by amount of clearance plane setting. The
vertical displacement of the displayed terrain obstacle from the horizontal reference line increases
as the range decreases (figure 1-164). The clearance
plane is represented on the display by an electronically generated cursor known as the horizontal reference line. The term horizontal refers only to the
cursor position of the line relative to the tube face.
There are three selectable range gates: 3, 6, and 10
miles. Only radar echoes from targets within the
range selected are accepted for processing or display. The highest angular computed terrain obstacle between minimum range and the selected
range gate (3, 6, or 10 miles) is sensed and retained
in a peak detector module in the following manner.
The profile mode peak detector senses the highest
angular terrain computation within the range gate
selected at each degree of azimuth and causes the
computed elevation angle to be displayed. This is
represented by the dashed line in figure 1-160. (The
peak detector is recycled between radar cycles.) The
peak detector output is smoothed and reproduced
on the TA display; thus, only a silhouette of the
highest angular obstacles is seen. Sweep circuits
slaved to the antenna generate the left-right scan of
the trace.
1-560
Change 10
NOTE
Based on past experience with the TA system and because all errors and distortions
are greatest at the longer ranges, profile 10
usually causes the aircraft to fly too high.
PRO CAL selects profile manual minimum range
mode (profile 10 with minimum range fixed at
approximately 6000 feet). The purpose of this mode
is to prevent false returns on the display indicators.
This mode, therefore, can be useful for low level descent.
Navigators Displays
For information on the navigators displays refer to

OFFENSIVE AVIONICS SYSTEM in T.O. 1B-52H1-12.
Failure Warning
The TA system is equipped with a self-test feature

called FAILURE WARNING. Failure warning indications will be noted by TA warning light illumination. Although the failure warning circuit does not
include every system component from the input to
the output, it does check the accuracy of a majority
of the TA system electronics.
TA Test
The TA system is equipped with a self-test feature.

Pressing the TA test button will cause the gap on
the horizontal reference line to fill in and become a
straight line as shown in figure 1-165.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Peak Clearance Command
Figure 1-160
1-561
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NORMAL OPERATION
SHORT
ZONE
RANGE/MINIMUM
RANGE
BLIND
System Characteristics
GROUND TRACK ERROR DUE TO OAS

Drift angle signals are supplied to the TA system to
orient the actual ground track in the ground track
corridor (A, figure 1-161). Drift information is
supplied to the TA System by an INS, if an INS has
been commanded as the prime NAV-Mode. If
ALTER NAV has been selected as the prime Nav
Mode, the drift information is supplied by the Doppler, memory point or emergency set.
With the radar and heading drift switch OFF, the
ground track corridor will represent the projected
longitudinal axis of the aircraft and will not represent the actual ground track (B, figure 1-161). If the
OAS is providing erroneous drift information, the
actual ground track line will be displaced from the
corridor ground track line an amount equal to the
drift error (C, figure 1-161). This error may also
shift back and forth in respect to the ground track
corridor. The doppler radar is more likely to be unreliable in a descent.
TERRAIN VIDEO TRACE BREAKUP
The solidity or continuity of the terrain video trace
is affected to some extent by antenna scan speed,
PRF, drastic terrain profile slope changes (i.e., canyon walls, steep hills, etc), and the rate of TA solution and display. Abrupt changes in transverse
slope of the terrain profile is the greatest cause of
normal profile video trace breakup. Basically the
magnitude of profile video trace breakup depends
on the magnitude and duration of the terrain profile transverse slope changes. This condition will
not prevent operational use, since it is possible to
distinguish between normal trace breakup due to
the above combination of factors and abnormal
breakup due to system malfunction.
SCAN-TO-SCAN DISPARITY
Two types of TA presentation disparity may exist in
the OAS:
Vertical disparity may occur in that the terrain
trace may appear higher on one scan than on the
reverse and/or successive scans.
Azimuth disparity may occur in that the terrain
trace may appear at a slightly different azimuth on
one scan than on the reverse scan.
1-562
The radar utilized in the TA system is blind at close

ranges with the outer limit established by either
the short range or minimum range blind zone
boundary (figure 1-157) whichever is greater. There
is no indication of any target within the short
range/ minimum range blind zone. However, the
radar navigator may occasionally observe terrain
within this zone.
RADAR SHADOWS
Radar energy travels in line of sight. Only targets
visible to the antenna are displayed; other targets
not within the line-of-sight of the antenna, such as
behind a mountain or ridge line, are hidden in the
area known as the radar shadow. During low altitude flight, proper analysis of these shadow effects
is critical to safe flight operations. Under most conditions, range selections of 12 or 25 NM are used for
general terrain assessment. Terrain cannot be effectively assessed in the SPOT or FRZE modes. The
radar navigator should investigate any shadow that
extends beyond the edge of the radar scope by periodically increasing range selections to search for
video beyond the shadow. If there is no video beyond the radar return that casts the shadow at extended ranges (up to 50 NM) the aircraft is below
the terrain and will impact that terrain unless the
altitude or track is altered. Radar shadows are dynamic in level flight. They will either grow larger as
the aircraft approaches the source when the aircraft is below the source, or decrease in size when
the aircraft is above the source of the shadow. In
descents, however, both initial and during TA operations, a unique phenomena is possible. When approaching a mountain or ridge while in a descent,
the shadow cast by an obstacle can appear static,
neither increasing nor decreasing in size. Referred
to as the static shadow effect, it is an indicator of
impending collision with the obstacle. The normal
collision indication (lengthening shadow) will not
become evident until at extremely close range (1 to
2 NMs). Therefore, it is imperative that static shadows be investigated during descents. If such a shadow is observed, level the aircraft off when the return casting the shadow reaches 5 to 6 NMs and
evaluate the associated shadow. If the shadow begins to increase, the aircraft is below the obstacle
and must either climb or maneuver to avoid the terrain.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Since the OAS system uses a computer to process
the returned radar energy prior to being displayed
on the radar presentation, shadowing effects may
not be readily visible. The radar navigator must be
aware of this minor limitation and constantly adjust the presentation for optimum display. Use of
the LOG function with higher than normal GAIN/
VIDEO settings may be required to adequately
paint the terrain.
If a radar shadow is unchanging, appears

to lengthen, or fails to appreciably shorten
with decreasing range, a dangerous condition is indicated and the radar navigator/
navigator must advise the pilots.
BANK ANGLE
The TA display presents a distorted display on the
wing down side when the bank angle exceeds 15.
The short range blind zone affects the display of
targets at close range off the wingtip as well as in
front of the aircraft. These combined effects prevent
display of important targets during turns if the
bank angle exceeds 15.
POOR DISPLAY OF SHEER TARGETS
The system is not capable of consistently displaying
or accurately computing the height of TV or radio
antenna towers, power transmission lines, suspension bridges, very tall office buildings, straightsided cliffs or peaks, etc. These obstacles may be
displayed at partial height with improving accuracy
as range decreases, producing a rapidly rising ter-
rain trace on succeeding scans of the display. If the

target is displayed close to ground track, the pilot
should consider such a sequence as an emergency
and immediately initiate a climbing steep turn.
POOR DISPLAY OF SMALL TARGETS
The returns from small objects (small buildings,
boats, etc) are very weak and are not computed or
displayed accurately, even though they may be discernible to the radar navigator.
WEATHER SENSITIVITY
The TA system will display returns from dense
clouds, moderate rain or snow, etc. The total contrast feature of this display prevents the pilot from
differentiating between weather returns and valid
obstacles. Weather has been observed to make the
terrain trace appear jagged (having an irregular
sawtooth shape composed of many horizontal elements). Areas of precipitation should be avoided because these returns mask the ground returns and
will cause the pilot to climb above the desired clearance altitude. The climb command in this case can
exceed the climb performance of the aircraft. The
radar navigator can often provide guidance through
areas of scattered precipitation. When TA capability
is degraded by weather effects, the pilot should
climb to IFR altitude.
FALSE RETURN ELIMINATOR
The false return eliminator may cause the terrain
trace to drop down and may disappear off the bottom of the monitor. This will occur if the radar altimeter (absolute altitude) exceeds the clearance
setting by a factor of four or more.
1-563
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Ground Track Error
Figure 1-161
1-564
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Planning Considerations
All B-52 low altitude training flights are planned

and flown in accordance with command directives.
Careful planning is essential for safety and effectiveness. The following TA characteristics should be
considered.
1. Plan all turns for 12 bank. (Turn short to
make good the planned track.) If the bank angle
must be increased beyond 15, do not depend on the
TA display for terrain clearance. Maintain visual
clearance or climb to a safe altitude.
2. The system is not capable of consistently displaying radio and TV towers. An increased clearance plane setting can be used if circumnavigation
is not feasible.
3. The TA system will display returns from dense
clouds and precipitation. When TA capability is degraded by weather effects, the pilot should climb to
IFR altitude. Do not rely on TA system displays for
weather penetration.
4. Radar returns from water depend on sea state
and may give erroneously high clearance indications. Close monitoring of the radar altimeter is required over water. If sea state is such that terrain
trace indications appear valid and crosschecks with
the radar altimeter reading, a TA system operational check may be accomplished over water. A recompensation may be necessary when transitioning
from over water to over land.
Do not depend solely on the TA display for

letdown or low absolute altitude operation
over water.
5. Airspeeds will normally be as dictated by the
needs of the mission and may be adjusted in flight
for control time purposes.
6. Preparation during mission planning includes
review of clearance plane setting for each low level
route.
7. Descent rates, drag devices, and airspeed
should be planned. Review terrain over which descent from high altitude to low level is made.
8. Review the maximum climb angle speeds and
climb rates for the aircraft configuration to determine aircraft safety margins.
9. FRL stabilization. Determine the gross weight,

indicated airspeed, and airbrake positions. Using
this information, determine the FRL angle-of-attack value from the angle-of-attack chart (figure
1-163) and set the FRL angle-of-attack into the system using the radar control test panel at the radar
navigators station. EXAMPLE: At 300,000 pounds
gross weight and 260 knots IAS, the computed FRL
angle-of-attack is 1.0 without airbrakes, 0.7
with airbrake position 2 (or position 4 with inboard
airbrake circuit breaker pulled out), and 0.4 with
airbrake position 4.
Positive procedures must be established to

ensure that the FRL angle is reset when
airspeed is changed during terrain avoidance operations. Failure to do so will result
in serious clearance plane errors.
NOTE
The radar navigator will recompute and reset the FRL angle if the planned indicated
airspeed is changed more than 10 knots
and/or the gross weight changes over 20,000
pounds.
When using the FRL mode, the FRL angle
should be reset prior to decelerating and
after accelerating. This procedure will keep
the error induced by changing airspeeds in
the safe direction.
10. FVR stabilization. The FVR stabilization mode

allows choice of any reasonable airspeed/gross
weight combination without TA system accuracy
penalty. The FVR stabilization mode utilizes an
angle-of-attack computer which automatically
senses changes in angle-of-attack and supplies the
proper correcting signal to the TA system.
NOTE
A momentary dropout indication will be visible on the pilots terrain trace when the
radar navigator changes range on his
ground map video.
1-565
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Representative TA Traces
Figure 1-162
1-566
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Aircraft (Body) Angle-of-Attack - Level Flight
Figure 1-163
1-567
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TA System Failure Detection
Timely recognition of TA system failures is essential to safe contour following operations. A failed
condition may be detected using any of the following methods:
The TA failure warning lights (actuated by the

TA failure warning circuits) illuminate.
The failure warning circuits do not detect

every failure of the TA system but do check
the accuracy of the majority of the electronics involved.
The horizontal reference line on the monitor indicates a malfunction when it becomes an unbroken
line (the center gap fills in and the verticals disappear).
The radar altimeter indicates unsatisfactory terrain clearance.
Comparison with pressure altitude and known
terrain elevation indicates unsafe or abnormal terrain clearance.
Pilot not flying the aircraft detects impending
collision.
When, in the radar navigators judgment, the
radar system appears abnormal or the display indicates impending ground collision (based on the
shadow characteristics of terrain along the ground
track). Upon suspicion or recognition of TA system
failure, the pilot should initiate immediate pull-up
to safe altitude. Since the TA failure warning does
not detect every type of TA failure, the radar altimeter must be monitored for indication of TA failures
and so must be included in the pilots normal crosscheck.
If the radar altimeter displays failure indications, the pilot should initiate a pull-up to a safe
altitude.
Failure Verification
If the horizontal reference line becomes an

unbroken line (gap fills in and verticals disappear) or is not present, the TA system
should be used with caution and only when
visual contact with the ground can be maintained.
1-568
Change 10
The general rule when observing a failure warning

indication is to climb to a safe altitude and investigate.
The failure warning circuits may also be actuated
by excessive bank angle which is inconsequential
unless it remains after reducing the bank angle.
Pilots Inflight Procedures (FRL or FVR Stabilization)
Three selectable range gates are provided for different flight conditions and for pilot training. The longer range gates permit the pilot more time to adjust
power and attitude during TA operations. Profile 3
mode is recommended for all normal conditions.
When in extremely rough terrain at high gross
weights and low airspeeds or partial power, the profile 6 mode may be more desirable. Flight operations are straight forward. If an obstacle is displayed above the horizontal reference line within
its extremities, a climb is initiated. The climb attitude is then adjusted to maintain the terrain trace
coincident with the horizontal reference line. This
attitude is maintained until the obstacle is passed
by utilizing the radar altimeter or dropout techniques. The TA display is considered a command
display using the rule terrain up, fly up; terrain
down, fly down. The technique is similar to that
used in following ILS glide slope. See LOW LEVEL
FLIGHT OPERATIONS, Section II, for additional
information.
NOTE
PROFILE CAL position selects profile

manual minimum range mode (profile 10
with minimum range fixed at approximately 6000 feet). When clearance plane setting
is 550 feet or less, use of this mode will help
to eliminate false returns when aircraft altitude above surrounding terrain exceeds
low level altitudes, such as peak-to-peak.
Since the vertical displacement of the terrain trace
from the horizontal reference line represents the
elevation angle between the clearance plane (figure
1-159) and the highest point of the obstacle, it can
readily be seen that the elevation angle increases
(except for obstacle features located directly at
clearance plane elevation) as the range to the obstacle decreases and consequently the vertical displacement of the terrain trace from the horizontal
reference line increases in size accordingly as
shown in figure 1-164.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NOTE
Obstacles located directly at clearance

plane elevation will have an elevation angle
of 0 at all ranges and will appear
coincident with the horizontal reference
line.
When viewed at ranges from 5 to 10 miles, the
change in the aircraft flight vector required to clear
most peaks by the clearance plane setting is small.
Thus, at these ranges the peaks in many instances
appear very small on the ground trace. As the
range to these peaks decreases, they appear to grow
with respect to the ground trace.
COMPLETE DROPOUT SEQUENCE
When approaching an obstacle, it will be displayed
as valid terrain video as long as the obstacle remains in the primary area (area of accurate TA
computation) (figure 1-166). When the obstacle enters area A, minimum range limit, or area B, the
obstacle is no longer displayed as reliable video.
This characteristic is defined as dropout and is very
noticeable as shown in the picture sequence in figure 1-166. Note that the peak is displayed as solid
video in displays A and B, drops down and becomes
ragged and dotted (dropout) in display C, and returns to correct position after passing the peak in
display D. If the pilot should fail to recognize this
complete dropout, he would initiate descent in accordance with the display producing a low crossing.
The proper technique is to note and maintain the
aircraft pitch attitude until peak passage is observed on the radar altimeter (the altitude indicator
needle indicates a decrease in altitude, then stops
and indicates an increase in altitude) and then resume following the terrain trace. Peak passage will
normally occur about 10 seconds after dropout.
During high rates of climb, i.e., 1500 ft/min

or higher, normal dropout sequence will
normally occur. However, at lesser rates of
climb, partial dropout or no dropout sequence at all may occur. Before initiating a
descent, cross-check the radar altimeter
and coordinate with the radar navigator to
ensure adequate terrain clearance.
PARTIAL DROPOUT SEQUENCE

Frequently a situation occurs in which the terrain
trace drops an inch or so on the display without the
ragged and dotty symptoms of a complete dropout.
On aircraft modified with the false return eliminator, a situation frequently occurs in which the terrain trace drops an inch or so on the display. The
difference between partial and complete dropout is
the distance the terrain trace drops on the monitor.
This characteristic is shown in figure 1-167 and indicates a minor ridge (mesa, peak behind peak,
small peak, or ridge) is about to be crossed. The
same peak crossing technique, as described under
the complete dropout sequence, should be applied if
the dropout is recognized, but if the pilot continues
to follow the trace and uses gradual and gentle forward wheel pressure to ease into the descent, a satisfactory, although lower than planned, crossing
will be observed in about 10 seconds.
SIDE DROPOUT SEQUENCE
The side dropout occurs as the aircraft passes
across the shoulder of a ridge or peak. This characteristic is shown in figure 1-168. The dropout symptoms appears at the side because high terrain, right
or left of ground track, is within the short range
blind zone or within the minimum range limit and
the shadowing effect prevents reception of returns
outside the blind zone. Therefore, the video on the
peak side drops down or out until the aircraft
passes beyond the obstacle. When the shadowing
effect no longer blocks return from other obstacles,
the system displays these obstacles as usual.
Dropouts are important because they represent a circumstance in which the terrain
display is inaccurate, displaying obstacle
height much lower than actual height.
WEATHER EFFECTS SEQUENCE
The TA system may react unfavorably to certain
types of clouds or rain in the flight path. This characteristic is shown in figure 1-169. The terrain
trace may provide some symptom indications if the
trace becomes very ragged and gives a fly-up command. The only safe procedure is to climb to safe altitude and prepare for weather penetration. Weather effects not seen by the radar navigator have been
observed to affect the pilots terrain display.
Change 4
1-569
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TA Display Sequence
Figure 1-164
TA Display Test
CLEARANCE PLANE
INDICATION
HORIZONTAL
REFERENCE
LINE FILL IN
Figure 1-165
1-570
A31766
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TA Display Complete Dropout
Figure 1-166
1-571
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TA Display Partial Dropout
Figure 1-167
1-572
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TA Display Side Dropout
Figure 1-168
1-573
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TA Display Weather Effects
Figure 1-169
1-574
T.O. 1B-52H-1
System Error Analysis
TA systems errors are caused by malfunctions and

alignment capability. These errors are angular in
nature due to geometry considerations. For purposes of illustration, they can be divided into two
terms; tilt error and crossover error. It is possible in
most cases to continue TA operations if the TA system errors are determined and appropriate compensation is applied. The DESCENT, AFTER DESCENT, AND TA COMPENSATION checklist in
Section II is provided to help the flightcrews to
evaluate the system error.
The radar processor incorporates auto-correction
circuitry which utilizes three synthetic terrain obstacles generated electronically at different ranges
and supplied to the radar receivers. These synthetic
terrain obstacles are processed and the computed
obstacle elevation is compared to a known solution.
The synthetic targets are used for correction of electronic scaling and electronic offset errors. In the
event an error is detected which cannot be corrected within safe operating limits, a failure warning indication will be actuated.
The clearance plane will not be set to more

than 1000 feet in PROFILE 3. This restriction is necessary because near range video
is lost.
TILT ERRORS
A negative tilt error exists when terrain is computed low at long range but the error decreases as
the peak is approached or as range decreases until
almost no error exists at minimum range as shown
in figure 1-170 detail A. Since the error at short
range is small, the clearance altitudes over peaks or
flat terrain will be near the desired altitude. The
error at long range, however, will prevent timely
warning of approaching obstacles; therefore, increased aircraft thrust is required to clear high obstacles at the desired altitude. This error cannot be
detected over flat and rolling terrain when switching from PROFILE 3 to PROFILE 6 or PROFILE
10 because the angular error from the terrain to the
clearance plane is the same at all ranges.
A positive tilt error exists when terrain is computed
erroneously high at long range but the error diminishes as range decreases as shown in figure 1-170
detail B. The error is small at short range and
clearance altitudes will be essentially as desired;
however, the long range error will cause excessive
clearance altitudes over valleys due to erroneous
long range fly-up commands. This error could not
be detected by selecting a different range gate,
since the trace does not change as the range gate is
changed from 3 to 6 to 10 miles.
The FRL/clearance plane correction required to

compensate these system errors can be determined
during the TA operational check. A positive correction will be required when a negative tilt error exists. A negative correction will be required when a
positive tilt error exists. See TA SYSTEM OPERATIONAL CHECK, this section, and DESCENT, AFTER DESCENT, AND TA COMPENSATION checklist, Section II.
CROSSOVER ERRORS
The different combinations of crossover errors are
illustrated in details D and E of figure 1-170. Crossover errors usually occur with a tilted clearance
plane. As was previously discussed, negative tilt
prevents timely warning of approaching obstacles
and positive tilt causes excessive clearance altitude
over flat terrain and valleys.
Negative crossover errors exist whenever aircraft
altitude over ridges and peaks is lower than desired
while maintaining the terrain trace on the HRL to
the minimum range point (dropout point). Over flat
terrain, negative crossover errors represent terrain
at maximum range, regardless of profile mode selected.
Positive crossover errors exist whenever aircraft altitude over ridges and peaks is higher than desired,
while maintaining the terrain trace on the HRL to
the minimum range point (dropout point). Over flat
terrain, positive crossover errors represent terrain
at minimum range, regardless of profile mode selected.
compensate for these errors can be determined during the TA operational check. See TA SYSTEM OPERATIONAL CHECK, this section, and DESCENT,
AFTER DESCENT, AND TA COMPENSATION
checklist, Section II.
CLEARANCE PLANE ERRORS
A clearance plane error occurs when terrain clearance is consistently different from that desired. Detail C depicts a negative error which results in consistently higher than desired terrain clearance.
Detail F depicts a positive error, resulting in consistently lower than desired terrain clearance.
compensate for these errors can be determined during the TA operational check. See TA SYSTEM OPERATIONAL CHECK, this section, and DESCENT,
AFTER DESCENT, AND TA COMPENSATION
checklist, Section II.
Change 4
1-575
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TA System Errors
1-576
Change 4
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Change 4
1-577
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TA System Errors (Cont)
1-578
Change 4
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TA SYSTEM OPERATIONAL CHECK
PEAK/RIDGE LINE METHOD
The DESCENT, AFTER DESCENT, AND TA COMPENSATION checklist in Section II provides a

means for the pilot to gain a degree of confidence in
the TA system and to determine TA system errors.
A TA System Operational Check will be accomplished prior to relying on the TA system while flying TA altitudes. The pilot can determine the type
and amount of error in the system during this
check. The data recorded during this check will be
used to correct the charted FRL setting for TA
flight while using the FRL mode. There are two
procedures to accomplish the stabilization modes
comparison (flat and rolling and peak/ridge line).
There is one procedure each for accomplishing the
FRL or FVR compensation which may be accomplished over flat and rolling terrain or over peak/
ridge lines. If the compensation is accomplished
over peak/ridge lines, the pilot must evaluate the
crossing altitudes to determine required corrections. Prior to accomplishing the FRL/FVR compensation in mountainous areas, a peak/ridge TA
stab modes comparison and TA correlation is recommended. However, this is mandatory prior to
night TA operations in mountainous areas unless a
flat and rolling FRL/FVR compensation has already
been accomplished. Prior to accomplishing any TA
system compensation, the radar navigator and navigator will ensure that a positive change of navigation responsibilities has been made to the
crewmember NOT responsible adjusting the FRL
settings.
COMPARISON:
Stabilization Modes Comparison
FLAT AND ROLLING TERRAIN METHOD

The stabilization modes comparison is begun at 800
feet absolute altitude above the immediate terrain,
maintaining straight and level flight with the chart
FRL value inserted for aircraft indicated airspeed
and gross weight. Adjust the clearance plane setting to make the terrain trace coincident with HRL
in each of the three stabilization modes and record
the clearance plane setting and the radar altimeter
reading. This allows the pilot to gain confidence in
the operability of the TA system. If the required
clearance plane setting is significantly different for
a single mode, this could be an indication of a tilt
error in that mode. Also, if the required clearance
plane setting for a single mode (or all the modes) is
less than 800 feet, this could indicate a positive tilt
error in that mode (or all the modes). The same is
true for clearance plane settings greater than 800
feet indicating negative tilt.
The stab modes comparison is made at a constant

pressure altitude which establishes the aircraft at
800 feet above the selected terrain feature, maintaining straight and level flight starting at least 10
miles from the feature until crossover. The run is
normally started in PROFILE 10 with FVR stabilization. Between 9 and 6 miles range, compare stabilization modes as follows: adjust the clearance
plane until the terrain trace is coincident with the
horizontal reference line, then record the clearance
plane setting. Switch to the other stabilization
modes. Again move the clearance plane, and record
the setting. At terrain feature crossover (minimum
reading on the radar altimeter), the pilot announces crossover altitude. By accomplishing the
stabilization cross-check, the pilot may be able to
determine the difference in tilt error of the three
stabilization modes. If the required clearance plane
setting is significantly different for a single mode,
this could be an indication of a tilt error in that
mode. Also, if the required clearance plane setting
for a single mode (or all the modes) is less than the
crossover altitude, this could indicate a positive tilt
error in that mode (or all the modes). The same is
true for clearance plane settings greater than the
crossover altitude indicating negative tilt.
CORRELATION:
The radar navigator will advise the pilot when at 6
and 3 miles from the peak. The pilot will reset and
maintain the clearance plane setting at 800 feet
and, at the 6 mile call, select PROFILE 6 and FRL
mode. Compare the actual terrain in front of the
aircraft, the EVS presentation, and the terrain
trace. The TA trace should be a representative presentation of the actual terrain. Observe any vertical
movement of the terrain trace. At the 3 mile call,
select PROFILE 3. From 3 miles to dropout, observe any vertical movement of the terrain trace.
This procedure should provide the pilots with a
measure of confidence in the reliability of the terrain trace. For example, a falling terrain trace
which moves from above the HRL to below the HRL
could indicate a positive tilt error, while a rising
trace which moves from below the HRL to above the
HRL, could indicate a negative tilt. Also, if the terrain trace is above the HRL and remains there
throughout the correlation, this could also indicate
positive tilt; whereas, if the terrain trace is below
the HRL and remains there throughout the correlation, this could indicate negative tilt. A good indication of TA system performance is obtained when a
falling trace (which starts below the HRL) is correlated with a crossing radar altimeter reading of
more than 800 feet and a rising trace (which starts
1-579
T.O. 1B-52H-1
above the HRL) is correlated with a crossing of less
than 800 feet. A combination of tilt and aircraft
crossing errors can complicate the above relationships. If the TA trace is coincident with the HRL,
no vertical movement should be associated with an
800 foot crossing. If the TA trace appears questionable, proceed with the FRL/FVR compensation procedure with caution during day, or night flat and
rolling conditions. At night in mountainous terrain,
if the trace appears questionable, climb to IFR altitude and discontinue TA operations.
Compensation
FRL COMPENSATION
The pilot/copilot will set the desired clearance plane
and the pilot flying will position the aircraft to
make the TA trace coincident with the HRL. If the
terrain trace is obviously commanding an altitude
below the briefed radar altitude, the pilot will level
the aircraft and direct the radar navigator to move
the FRL angle toward the positive until the terrain
trace is coincident with the HRL. The pilot will
instruct the radar navigator to move the FRL angle
in designated increments. While flying the trace,
compare the radar altimeter reading and clearance
plane setting over flat and rolling terrain. Compare
peak/ridge line crossing radar altimeter reading
and clearance plane setting over mountainous terrain. If the trace is flying the aircraft higher than
the desired clearance altitude, request the radar
navigator to move the FRL angle in a negative direction. If the trace is below the HRL while at the
desired altitude or if the trace is flying the aircraft
lower than the desired clearance altitude, request
the radar navigator to move the FRL angle in a positive direction. The terrain trace should move
slightly. This procedure will be repeated as necessary.
1-580
Change 4
If the tilt compensation value exceeds 2 degrees, discontinue the FRL compensation
and do not use FRL mode.
NOTE
If FRL is not used due to excessive tilt, FVR

may be compensated and flown.
Do not move the FRL angle in increments
in excess of 1 degree at a time.
FVR COMPENSATION
Select FVR and fly the aircraft to place the TA trace
coincident with the HRL. If the radar altimeter
reading is greater than the desired clearance plane,
reduce the clearance plane setting until the radar
altimeter reading is equal to the clearance altitude
or until the limit of 250 feet clearance plane change
is reached.
EFFECTS OF TERRAIN VARIATION
Changes in the FRL angle/clearance plane setting
may be required if the terrain overflown changes
from flat and rolling to peak/ridge line or from
peak/ridge line to flat and rolling. This is due to the
difference in terrain trace computation with a positive tilt error. Over flat and rolling terrain, the far
range video is computed, whereas, in peak/ridge
line areas, all ranges including near range video is
computed (see figure 1-171).
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TA System After Compensation
NOTE
When flying over flat terrain with positive tilt and negative crossover error
(See Detail D, figure 1-170), the terrain feature at the far range video (3 NM
in profile 3 model) determines the compensation needed for maintaining the
trace on the HRL and establishes the pitch attitude for desired absolute
altitude
Terrain is displayed at 3 NM because this represents the highest computed
video within the profile 3 mode selected.
Detail A depicts the resultant clearance plane after compensation.
Change 4
1-581
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TA System After Compensation (Cont)
NOTE
Detail B depicts flying trace over peaks/ridges following the compensation

of Detail A.
Detail B indicates the pilot can expect a lower crossing by the amount A
flying the TA trace from flat terrain (Detail A) to peak/ridge type terrain. The
dotted line trace indicates position of trace maintaining as absolute altitude
of 500 feet.
Decreasing the amount of negative correction (FRL MODE) or increasing the
pilots clearance plane, will allow peak crossover at the desired altitude when
flying the TA trace.
With profile 3 mode selected, the highest computed terrain will be displayed
from 3 NM to minimum range.
1-582
Change 4
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NOTE
When flying over flat terrain with negative tilt and positive crossover error
(See Detail E, figure 1-170), the terrain feature at the minimum range video
(approximately 0.8 NM at 500 feet above the absolute altitude) determines the
compensation needed for maintaining the trace on the HRL and establishes
the pitch attitude for desired absolute altitude
The terrain displayed is at minimum because it represents the highest computed video within the profile 3 NM mode selected.
Detail C depicts the resultant clearance plane after compensation.
Change 4
1-583
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TA System After Compensation (Cont)
NOTE
Detail D depicts flying trace over peaks/ridges following compensation of

Detail C.
Detail D indicates the pilot can expect a higher crossing by the amount of
B flying the TA trace from flat terrain (see Detail C) to peak/ridge type terrain, At 3 NM (in profile 3 mode) the aircraft would be lower by the amount
C.
With profile 3 mode selected, the highest computed terrain within 3 NM to
minimum range would be displayed.
1-584
Change 4
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TA System Circuit Protection and Location

CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
EQUIPMENT
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
For All Other Terrain Avoidance System Circuit Protection And Location Data,
See OFFENSIVE AVIONICS SYSTEM (OAS) CIRCUIT PROTECTION AND
LOCATION, This Section.
TA-EVS Vector Indicator Light
11
TA/EVS WARN LIGHTS
PCBP/E15
Left TR
PANELS figure, in the ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS subsection in Section I.
PCBP
Figure 1-172
Change 4
1-585/(1-586 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ELECTRO-OPTICAL VIEWING SYSTEM (EVS) (AN/ASQ-151)

DESCRIPTION
STEERABLE TV (STV) SYSTEM
FORWARD LOOKING INFRARED (FLIR) SYSTEM
DATA PRESENTATION
AIRBORNE VIDEO TAPE RECORDER
EVS CONTROLS AND INDICATORS
POWER SUPPLIES
EVS ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM
EVS TURRET WINDOW WASH SYSTEM
OPERATION
1-587
1-587
1-588
1-589
1-590
1-590
1-591
1-591
1-591
1-592
DESCRIPTION
The EVS provides the crewmembers with a visual
presentation of the area ahead of the aircraft for
low level penetration during both day and night
missions. To accomplish this function, the EVS utilizes a steerable low light level television camera
(STV) and a steerable forward looking infrared sensor (FLIR) to supply video, which is then displayed
on monitors at the pilots and copilots station, and
on the MFDs at the navigators and radar navigators positions. The EVS also receives input signals
from other aircraft ancillary systems, which are
converted to symbology suitable for TV display and
are displayed on the EVS monitors. The offensive
avionics system (OAS) furnishes terrain avoidance
profile (TA) video information for display on the
EVS monitors. For complete information on TA displays, see TERRAIN AVOIDANCE SYSTEM, this
section. OAS also provides the capability for both
navigators to display prime mission data with EVS
on their MFDs. The sensors for STV and FLIR are
mounted within steerable turrets on the under side
of the aircraft just aft of the forward radome. The
STV turret (31, figure 1-1) is on the left side of the
aircraft and the FLIR turret (33, figure 1-1) is on
the right.
Each turret rotates in azimuth to follow the position of its sensor when that sensor is being used,
but rotates to the aft or stow position when the sensor is not in use. The turrets are provided with optical windows to protect the sensors and have window wash facilities to remove debris from the windows during flight. The EVS is composed of three
major electronic/electrical subsystems: the Steerable Television Set (STV) Less DY AN/AVQ-22 or
DY AN/AVQ-37, the Forward Looking Infrared Set
(FLIR) AN/AAQ-6, and the Data Presentation
Group OD-86/ASQ-151. The components are located
in three major areas of the aircraft: the forward ra-
dome area, the pilots area, and the navigators

area.
Electro-optical viewing system circuit protection
STEERABLE TV (STV) SYSTEM
The STV consists of a camera assembly, Less DY

camera electronics unit, DY interconnect box, and a
control panel at the radar navigators station. It
provides high quality video information over a wide
range of ambient light levels, from bright sunlight
to starlight. The night scenes closely approximate
daylight operation for target location and identification, which enables the STV to serve as a low light
level sensor for the EVS.
The STV can view selected areas within 45 in azimuth, referenced to the centerline of the aircraft. In
the elevation plane, the STV can view scenes within
+15 and 45 referenced to the camera mounting
surface. Either the video in the entire field of view,
or in the center 1/3 of the field of view can be selected by the operator to enhance the presentation
on the display. Automatic light control circuits are
used to maintain a relatively constant video signal
over a wide range of lighting conditions. The automatic light control circuits can be disabled and
manual control initiated, if desired. Under extremely low ambient lighting, a high sensitivity mode of
operation provides additional gain, but with some
loss in resolution. A flash protector detects extremely bright flashes of light and closes a shutter in the
camera for the duration of the flash; the automatic
light control circuits are adjusted to be compatible
with shutter opening and the system resumes operation automatically.
Change 16
1-587
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Point sources of high intensity illumination,

relative to the overall scene illumination,
which remain stationary within the field-ofview of the STV, may cause damage to the
STV camera assembly. During operation on
the ground, precautions should be taken to
eliminate stationary sources of high intensity illumination (ramp lights, reflections
from objects, vehicle headlights, etc) from
within the field of view prior to continued
operation of the STV in the operate mode.
The camera assembly is protected from this
type of damage in standby mode.
Less DY BUILT-IN TEST (BIT)
Built-in test (BIT) circuits perform three major

functions:
(1) Continuously monitors critical equipment parameters
(2) Enables the operator to perform front-to-rear
checks to detect degradation
(3) Provides a means of isolating a fault to an
LRU (line replaceable unit).
Failures in BIT monitored functions generate a
malfunction signal. The video output BIT circuit
monitors for loss of video and video saturation. If
loss of video occurs, the BIT circuit causes the system to go to standby and a malfunction signal is
given. If video saturation occurs, the BIT circuit
causes the system to go to ALC FULL; then, if saturation persists, the system goes to standby and a
malfunction signal is given. The STV receives
single-phase 118 volt ac power and TR power
through circuit breakers located on the EVS circuit
breaker panel at the navigators station.
DY BUILT-IN TEST (BIT)
The following BIT modes are provided to monitor

and report operational status:
(1) Power up test. Power up test is automatically
performed whenever power is applied. It monitors
1-588
Change 17
the power supply, timing signals, flash shutter, aperture feedback, FOV feedback, and performs video
level and processor tests.
(2) Background test. The background test runs
transparent to normal operation. The background
test performs all of the checks that are accomplished during the power up test with the exception
of the video level and processor tests.
(3) Operator initiated test or off-line test. The operator initiated or off-line check is initiated by placing the STV control panel BIT switch (64, figure
1-174) to LL. This causes the BIT LED to provide a
flashing light source to the camera. The video is
processed in the normal manner, producing a monitor display of the flashing illumination with no picture. The same checks of system operation are performed as during power up tests. This test provides
a means of checking the STV operation when the
imaged scene is too dark to produce a quality
image.
In all BIT modes, results are reported via the STV
control indicator MALF indicator (69, figure 1-174).
When any fault is detected during any of the BIT
modes, the MALF indicator lights.
FORWARD LOOKING INFRARED (FLIR) SYSTEM
The FLIR consists of a sensor assembly, signal data

converter, and control panel at the radar navigators station. The function of the FLIR is to convert
infrared radiation that is not visible to the unaided
eye into real-time information for display on the
EVS monitor. The FLIR is especially useful for target location and identification through thin cloud
coverage and in complete darkness. The scanner assembly detects thermal radiation and converts the
energy into electrical signals. The signal processor
converts the IR video into video suitable for presentation on the monitors. A refrigerator system in the
scanner assembly provides the extremely low temperatures required by the IR detectors and is controlled by the FLIR panel located on the radar navigators forward panel. The FLIR system receives
205/118-volt three-phase ac power and TR power
through circuit breakers located on the EVS circuit
breaker panel.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DATA PRESENTATION
The OAS furnishes time-to-go, heading error, and

TA profile video information. It also provides azimuth and elevation steering and roll stabilization
for the STV and FLIR sensors when an OAS steering mode has been selected. The aft landing gear
furnishes a crab steering signal to align the STV
and FLIR sensors with the landing gear when crab
steering mode has been selected. The angle-of-attack computer and the OAS prime navigation model furnish angle-of-attack and drift signals, respectively, to position the STV and FLIR sensors in
elevation and azimuth, respectively, when vector
mode of steering has been selected. The pilots and
copilots pitch and roll gyros, Type MD-1 or AHRS,
furnish pitch and roll signals that are converted to
a pitch and roll bar for display on the pilots and copilots monitors. When the OAS is not in bomb
mode, a bank/steering marker, developed from the
bank/steering error signal from the flight director
computer is displayed on the EVS monitor. The IAS
transducer produces an indicated airspeed signal,
which is displayed in numerical value on all monitors. A radar altitude signal from the AN/APN-224
radar altimeter, is used to develop a radar altitude
ribbon, which is in turn displayed on all monitors.
NOTE
The EVS symbology is solely for aiding the

pilot during use of the EVS system. The aircraft flight instruments remain the primary
flight reference.
Types of Presentation
PILOTS
Provided that the STV and FLIR systems are in an
operating mode and that all ancillary systems are
operating, the pilot and copilot have a choice of display on their respective monitors. Either a FLIR,
STV, or terrain avoidance (TA) presentation may be
selected individually or the TA presentation may be
viewed in conjunction with either STV or FLIR. If
any of the above are being viewed and the pilot or
copilot have selected a steering command, the pilots and copilots monitors will also display symbols
developed from inputs from ancillary systems.
These symbols include indicated airspeed blanking
box and numerics, time-to-go blanking box and numerics, radar altitude blanking box, indices, scale
numerics, and altitude ribbon, heading reference
marker, heading error or bank/steering marker, and
pitch and roll bar. Azimuth and elevation short

scales and azimuth and elevation line-of-sight
(LOS) markers are also displayed if either STV or
FLIR steering is selected. See figure 1-174 for a typical pilot/copilot display on the EVS monitor. If the
navigator or radar navigator have command and
the pilot or copilot have elected to view the FLIR or
STV, the pilots and copilots monitors will display
azimuth and elevation long scales with numerics
and azimuth and elevation LOS markers along
with the FLIR or STV video, but no other symbols
will be displayed.
NAVIGATORS
The navigators or radar navigators monitor
displays either an STV or FLIR video presentation with azimuth and elevation long scales and
numerics and azimuth and elevation LOS markers. If either the navigator or radar navigator
elects, he may select symbols for display on his
individual monitor. these symbols will be the
same as the pilots and copilots symbols, except
his monitor will not display the pitch and roll
bar. Also the TA trace is not available for
display on the navigators or radar navigators
monitor. OAS prime mission data may be displayed on both the radar navigators and navigators MFDs as part of the EVS display.
FIELDS OF VIEW
The STV or FLIR presentation is selectable in either wide field of view (WFOV) or narrow field-ofview (NFOV).
The STV WFOV covers a viewing area Less DY 16.8
(1) vertical and 22.4 (1) horizontal or DY 16.9
(0.5) vertical and 22.5 (0.5) horizontal.
The STV NFOV covers a viewing area Less DY
5.6 (1) vertical and 7.5 (1) horizontal or DY
5.7 (0.2) vertical and 7.6 (0.2) horizontal.
The FLIR viewing area is slightly smaller, covering
15 (0.65) vertical by 20 (0.6) horizontal in
WFOV
FLIR NFOV covers 5 (0.2) vertical by 6.7 (0.2)
horizontal in NFOV.
In WFOV, the fiducial marks cover approximately
the center 1/3 of the presentation, and indicate the
viewing area that will be presented when switching
to NFOV.
In NFOV, the fiducial marks extend to the sides
and the bottom of the presentation.
Change 16
1-589
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Steering Priority
Since the primary function of the EVS is to provide

steering information to the pilot for low level penetration, a steering priority has been established
within the system. The priority is pilot, copilot, navigator or radar navigator in that order, meaning
that the pilot can override any other crewmember
in control of either sensor. If the pilot has not selected a steering command, the copilot can assume
steering command, although the pilot can still view
on his monitor the video the copilot has selected to
observe. If neither the pilot nor the copilot has selected a steering command, the navigator or radar
navigator may assume command through use of a
common steering control panel. The pilot and copilot may still view whatever the navigator or radar
navigator have selected to observe.
NOTE
AIRBORNE VIDEO TAPE RECORDER

flight reference.
Individual monitors should be adjusted for
brightness and contrast before the system
is readjusted for the FLIR system. Adjustments for reverse FLIR should be the same
as for normal video.
Under certain environments (low contrast,
desert, flat terrain) the STV picture may
appear degraded and thus require adjusting. This is indicated by a visual effect similar to looking through a screen door. This
effect is a result of intensifier tube sensitivity and does not represent a system malfunction. To resolve this, attempt first to obtain optimal picture utilizing the manual
light control (MLC) feature of the STV Control Panel. Then, if required, individual
crew members may manually adjust the
brightness and contrast of their EVS monitor to achieve the best picture.
The airborne video tape recorder (AVTR) is used in

conjunction with TA flying and is controlled from
the navigator and radar navigator positions. The
navigator loads and unloads the video cassette utilizing the recorder at his station. The radar navigator has an AVTR remote control unit (RCU) with
which he turns the system on and off and selects
the scope to be recorded (Pilots TA display, or the
RNs left or right MFD). The AVTR records interphone and number 1 UHF radio. The video cassette
contains sufficient tape for 30 minutes continuous
play, or up to 2 hours depending on the RNs selected delay setting. Under delay settings the video
is recorded for 10 seconds and then shuts off for the
period of selected delay 10, 20, or 30 seconds). Then
again records for 10 seconds, continuously repeating this cycle.
A guarded two position switch at the Radar Navigators station selects input source for the EVS monitor on the Pilots instrument panel. The two positions of the switch are NORMAL PILOT DATA and
RN RH MFD DATA. For a discussion of the switch
and its operation see PILOT EVS MONITOR INPUT SWITCH in the OFFENSIVE AVIONICS SYSTEM Subsection, this Section.
EVS CONTROLS AND INDICATORS
PILOTS MFD CONTROL PANELS
The EVS controls and indicators are described in

figure 1-174.
EVS Monitors
The EVS monitor with a light or green shaded face

is located at both pilot stations and at both navigator stations (called MFDs). The monitor provides
TV format displays of FLIR and STV sensor video.
In addition, the monitors at each pilot station provide profile mode display of the terrain avoidance
radar system.
1-590
Change 21
EA
PILOTS EVS MONITOR INPUT SWITCH
Two control panels, one on the Pilots side panel and

one on the Copilots side panel are used to select the
display source for the respective EVS monitor. A
two position switch on the panel has EVS and MFD
positions. Each switch operates independently of
the other, allowing one monitor to display EVS
while the other displays MFD data, or both monitors to display data from the same source. For detailed information on the control panel and MFD
displays see GPS IU/TACAN EMULATION, this
section.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ter is not normally used at the navigators station.
The red filter is to be installed over the face of each
monitor during darkness or other low light conditions. The green filters are to be installed over the
pilots light faced monitors during bright light conditions. The filter is installed by placing the bottom
edge of the filter into the groove on the housing located just below the bottom of the CRT and above
the handle. The snap fasteners on the top corners of
the filter must be pushed into matching holes on
the monitor case until they are firmly secured. The
filter is removed by pulling out the snap fasteners
and lifting the filter up and out of the groove.
EVS Control Panels
The EVS is operated from both the pilots station

and navigators station using the following control
panels:
EVS Control Panel (Pilots and Copilots
Instrument Panel)
EVS Steering Control Panel (Radar Navigators
Station)
EVS Video Select Panel (Radar Navigators and
Navigators Station)
EVS Environmental Power Control Panel (Radar
Navigators Station)
FLIR Control Panel (Navigators Station)
STV Control Panel (Navigators Station)
Do not install the external glare filter

(green) over the green CRT screen as too
high a gain control setting would be required. This high gain setting would decrease the service life of the CRT.
EVS Monitor Optical Filters
Red and green EVS monitor optical light filters are

stowed on the pilots and copilots escape hatches
(figure 1-19) and a red filter only on the radar navigators and navigators overhead panel. The red fil-
EVS Sensor Stabilization Modes

MONITOR
DISPLAY
STV
or
FLIR
STV
or
FLIR
With TA
SENSOR
LOS
LOS COMMAND
VECTOR
FIXED
CRAB
Az
Flight Vector (Drift)
Centerline
Crab Angle (Aft Gear)
El
Flight Vector
(Angle of Attack)
+ Roll Stabilization
2 Above Waterline
2 Above Waterline
Az
Flight Vector (Drift)
Centerline
Crab Angle (Aft Gear)
El
Flight Vector
(Angle of Attack)
Waterline
2 Above Waterline
NOTE
Waterline is parallel to the ground when on ground.
Figure 1-173
Change 11
1-590A/(1-590B blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
POWER SUPPLIES
The system incorporates isolated power supplies for

increased reliability. The eight servo control unit
(SCU) power supplies are interconnected with the
system such that pilot and navigator only utilize
one power supply and the copilot and radar navigator utilize the other. The remaining six power supplies separately supply power to the TV and FLIR
steering servo components. Four video distribution
unit power supply assemblies are utilized in a similar manner as the SCU power supplies. The control
circuit breakers for EVS are contained on the navigators EVS circuit breaker panel (figure 1-70).
EVS ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM
The EVS environmental control system circulates

cabin air through the FLIR signal processor for
cooling and through electric heaters and the STV
camera and FLIR scanner components in the EVS
turrets for the prevention of moisture condensation.
The return air from these components is exhausted
into the pressurized compartment by electric fans.
The turret windows are electrically heated to prevent fogging and icing. Environmental control system components are divided into two separate independent subsystems, one for FLIR and one for STV.
The EVS environmental control system is designed
to be operated at all times during flight and is controlled from the environmental control panel on the
left sidewall at the radar navigators station. Heating duct and window heat temperatures in each
subsystem are automatically controlled. In each
subsystem, air heater or window heat shutdown
with power lockout may occur due to overheat,
short circuits, or faulty controller and the only indication would be fogging of the view on the monitor
later in flight. Resetting each subsystem is accomplished by cycling the respective power control
switch to OFF then ON. Each window heat system
is controlled by the same switch that controls the
air heater subsystem. Since there is a lethal voltage
on the surface of the FLIR window when in operation, the landing gear squat switch is included in
the circuit to prohibit operation of the window heat
on the ground. The STV window surface is insulated from this lethal voltage and therefore does not
exhibit a hazard. Heating and fan power is ac and
system control is TR power, all, except FLIR window heat, through circuit breakers on the EVS circuit breaker panel.
Beryllium used as the STV mirror backing

is toxic if particles enter the skin. If STV
mirror breakage is suspected, the radar
navigator will place the STV turret air
switch OFF and the mode switch on the
STV control panel to OFF for the remainder
of the mission. After landing, notify ground
crew of suspected breakage.
Lethal voltage exists on the surface of the
FLIR turret window during normal EVS
flight operations. This voltage should be inhibited during ground operations by action
of the forward landing gear squat switch.
However, as an added precaution, ensure
FLIR turret air switch on the environmental
power control panel is in OFF prior to performing any maintenance, other than operational checkout on or near FLIR turret.
EVS TURRET WINDOW WASH SYSTEM
The EVS turret window wash system provides a

method of cleaning the FLIR and STV turret windows of insect residue and other foreign objects
while in flight. The window wash system washes
the turret windows by directing high pressure jets
of warm water on the window as the turret head
slews to allow washing of the entire width of the
window. A wash cycle is completed in 30 seconds
and uses approximately 1 1/2 gallons of water.
Approximately 14 gallons of demineralized water
are stored in an electrically heated water tank located in the FLIR turret fairing and is enough for
nine wash cycles.
NOTE
Since water capacity is limited, care should

be taken that water is not depleted unnecessarily. Coordination between navigators
may be necessary to ensure sufficient wash
water remains for critical phases of the mission. Fogging of window because of improper turret air system operation should not be
misconstrued as requiring wash operation.
1-591
T.O. 1B-52H-1
The tank is designed to withstand freezing of the
water if it is left at below freezing temperatures
without electric power. A low temperature thermal
switch prevents wash action until a water tank
temperature of 100F is attained. Water tank
insulation minimizes ambient condition effects on
water and tank temperatures. Wash action may be
delayed if initial water temperature is low or water
is frozen since heating action is relatively slow.
position and the servo control unit removes the

wash command signal. When the wash command
signal is removed, bleed air from the aircraft is
conditioning pack purges the window wash system
plumbing and valves after each washing to prevent
freezing damage. Only one window can be washed
at a time.
NOTE
Since several hours may be required to heat

the tank contents to the low temperature
switch setting, it may be desirable to supply
electrical power for heating prior to preflight for some missions.
An ac powered electric pump pumps the wash water to the selected turret nozzles during the wash
cycle. Power control of the turret window wash system is on the environmental power control panel at
the radar navigators station. The system is designed to have power on at all times during aircraft
operation. Wash water is heated by an electric blanket bonded to the water tank. The heater blanket is
thermostatically controlled to maintain the water
at an average temperature of 145F. Overheat
protection for the heater blanket is provided by a
thermal switch which cuts off power to the heater
when overheat is detected. Power to the heater
blanket is locked out until the WINDOW WASH
CONTROL circuit breaker is pulled and reset or
power is removed on the ground. Control of the
window wash cycle is from the EVS steering control
on the navigators front panel. Window wash cannot
be commanded when the pilot or copilot have
command of the turret sensors. When the wash
switch is pressed, the servo control unit commands
the selected turret to be placed in the stowed
position and issues a window wash command. The
turret then slews for the duration of the wash cycle.
After 30 seconds, the turret returns to the stow
1-592
pressurization.
NOTE
The system is designed to be used below

19,000 feet altitude and above 35F (2C)
true temperature. The system will function
at higher altitudes and lower temperatures.
However, at altitudes above 19,000 feet, the
water as it leaves the nozzles turns into
steam in the low pressure environment and
is ineffective for window washing. At
temperatures below 2C, water spray from
the windows may freeze on the fairing
areas.
Water tank heater and pump power is ac while control power is dc, all through circuit breakers on the
EVS circuit breaker panel.
OPERATION
See LOW LEVEL FLIGHT OPERATIONS, Section
II.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EVS Controls and Indicators

EVS MONITOR
3
8
9
10
13
15
14
13
12
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
11
EVS SENSOR ELEVATION INDICATOR

CONTRAST KNOB
INDICATED AIRSPEED INDICATOR
TIMETOGO INDICATOR (BOMB MODE ONLY)
HEADING REFERENCE MARKER
HEADING ERROR MARKER OR BANK/STEERING
MARKER
PITCH AND ROLL INDICATOR
CLEARANCE PLANE SETTING
BRIGHTNESS KNOB
RADAR ALTITUDE INDICATOR
OVERHEAT LIGHT
EVS SENSOR AZIMUTH INDICATOR
FIDUCIAL MARKS
TA TERRAIN TRACE (PILOTS ONLY)
TA HORIZONTAL REFERENCE LINE (PILOTS ONLY)
A32559
1-593
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EVS Controls and Indicators (Cont)
A EVS CONTROL PANEL (PILOTS STATION 2 PLACES)
B MISCELLANEOUS PILOT STATION CONTROLS AND INDICATORS
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
TA VIDEO SWITCH
FLIR VIDEO SWITCH
STV VIDEO SWITCH
MANUAL STEERING KNOB
NFOV LIGHT
SYMBOLS DIMMING KNOB
LAMP TEST SWITCH
23
24
25
26
27
28
POWER SWITCH
CRAB STABILIZATION SWITCH
FIXED STABILIZATION SWITCH
VECTOR STABILIZATION SWITCH
TA/EVS VECTOR INDICATOR LIGHT
NFOV SELECT SWITCH
1-594
Change 4
T.O. 1B-52H-1
C EVS STEERING CONTROL PANEL (RADAR NAVIGATORS STATION)
D EVS VIDEO SELECT PANEL (RADAR NAVIGATORS AND NAVIGATORS STATION)

29
30
31
32
33
34
35
FLIR STEERING SWITCH

FLIR STEERING COMMAND INDICATOR
FLIR NFOV SWITCH
FLIR WASH SWITCH
ALTER SYNC SWITCH
LAMP TEST SWITCH
STV WASH SWITCH
36
37
38
39
40
41
STV NFOV SWITCH

STV STEERING COMMAND INDICATOR
STV STEERING SWITCH
BNS HEADING SWITCH
EVS VIDEO SYMBOLS SWITCH
EVS VIDEO SELECT SWITCH
Change 4
1-595
T.O. 1B-52H-1
E EVS ENVIRONMENTAL POWER CONTROL PANEL (RADAR NAVIGATORS STATION)
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
FLIR CONTROL PANEL (NAVIGATORS STATION)
STV TURRET AIR SWITCH

WASH SYSTEM POWER SWITCH
FLIR TURRET AIR SWITCH
FLIR READY LIGHT
FLIR OPR LIGHT
FLIR STBY LIGHT
FLIR LVPS LIGHT
FLIR REFR LIGHT
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
FLIR
FLIR
FLIR
FLIR
FLIR
FLIR
FLIR
SIG PROC LIGHT

OVHT LIGHT
OVRD SWITCH
CONTROL PANEL LAMP TEST SWITCH
MODE SELECT SWITCH
BIAS KNOB
CONTRAST KNOB
1-596
Change 4
T.O. 1B-52H-1
G STV CONTROL PANEL (NAVIGATORS STATION)
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
STV
STV
STV
STV
STV
STV
STV
STV
MLC GAIN KNOB

MAN LIGHT
ALC SELECT SWITCH
OVLD/OVRD LIGHT
OVLD/OVRD SWITCH
STBY LIGHT
OPR LIGHT
MODE SWITCH
65
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
STV
STV
STV
STV
STV
STV
STV
STV
FLIGHT/GROUND MODE SWITCH DY

HI SENS/HI RES SWITCH Less DY
LAMP TEST SWITCH
IRIS SWITCH
BIT SWITCH
MALFUNCTION LIGHT
CAMERA OVERHEAT LIGHT
ELECTRONICS UNIT OVERHEAT LIGHT
Change 11
1-597
T.O. 1B-52H-1

NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
EVS Sensor Elevation Indicator
The EVS sensor elevation indicator is made up of an elevation reference

scale and an elevation marker. The scale will be a long scale or a short
scale depending on whether pilots or navigators have steering control.
The long scale consists of index marks numbered in degrees, whereas
the short scale consists only of index marks. Both navigators monitors
will always display long scale. Both pilots monitors will display long
scale only when navigators have steering control and will always display
short scale when either pilot has steering control. The elevation marker
will move vertically along the elevation scale in direct proportion to elevation angular positioning of STV and FLIR sensors.
Contrast Knob
The contrast knob marked C is used to vary the gain of the video amplifier
circuit thereby controlling the image contrast of the monitor. Clockwise
rotation of the knob increases the image contrast. The contrast knob is
turned clockwise, after the brightness knob has been set, until a satisfactory display is obtained.
Indicated Airspeed Indicator
The indicated airspeed indicator provides a numeric indication of aircraft

indicated airspeed in knots. The indicator is a box with three enclosed digits that vary from 000 to 450 in 1-knot increments. The numerics are updated every 1/6-second to provide continuously corrected airspeed information.
Time -To-Go indicator
The time-to-go indicator provides an indication of time in seconds remaining before the OAS provides a bomb release pulse or crosses a commanded destination. The indicator is a box with three enclosed digits that
vary from 000 to 200 (Format 3 or pilots display). The time-to-go indicator
is functional when OAS is in bomb or navigation mode.
NOTE
EVS time-to-go indicator should not be considered reliable for
weapon release.
Heading Reference Marker
The heading reference marker consists of two vertical black bars separated by a white bar, and provides a fixed zero-degree azimuth reference
for the movable heading/bank steering marker.
1-598
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
6
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
Heading Error Marker or Bank/Steering

Marker
HEADING ERROR MARKER

The heading error marker indicates bomb mode heading error while in
bomb mode or navigation heading error when the OAS is not in bomb
mode and either of the navigators have actuated the BNS heading switch
on his video select panel. When time-to-go numerics are displayed, this
indicator is showing OAS heading error and conversely when the time-togo numerics are not displayed, this indicator is showing bank/steering.
BANK/STEERING MARKER
The bank/steering marker indicates bank/steering signal when the OAS
is not in bomb mode and neither navigator has selected BNS heading on
his EVS video select panel. When bank/steering bar is displayed, time-togo numerics will be removed.
Pitch and Roll Indicator
The pitch and roll indicator is a line of eight white and six black dashes
and provides pitch and roll attitudes of the aircraft. The indicator indicates
zero pitch and roll when it is level aligned in the center of the monitor. The
indicator functions as an artificial horizon, moving up and down an imaginary vertical axis of the display, and rotating left or right about the center
point of the line. Vertical excursions represent pitch angle, while rotating
around center point of line provides a visual reference of bank angle.
NOTE
A pitch bar adjustment knob located above the pilots and copilots monitors provides a means of vertically positioning the respective pitch and roll indicator to the desired location.
Clearance Plane Indicator
Displays the clearance plane in feet as selected by the TA system

CLEARANCE PLANE control switch.
Brightness Knob
The brightness knob marked B varies the illumination of the monitor.

Clockwise rotation of the knob increases illumination. This knob is normally turned counterclockwise (with the contrast knob fully counterclockwise) until the monitor illumination is not visible. This provides the proper
brightness knob setting for normal ambient lighting conditions.
10
Radar Altitude Indicator
The radar altitude indicator consists of an altitude scale and a white ribbon indicator. The scale is made up of 13 fixed index lines, 11 fixed numerics, and a blanking box. Each numeric indicates a scale factor representing hundreds of feet above terrain. The white ribbon indicator moves vertically along the scale and represents radar altitude determined by the radar altimeter. The indicator is scaled from 0 to 3,000 feet (Fornat 3 and
pilots displays) or 0 to 5,000 feet (Format 4 and 5). The white ribbon indicator blinks at a 3 cycle-per-second rate whenever indicated altitude is
below the lower cursor setting on the pilots radar altimeter for the pilots
and navigators monitors and on the copilots radar altimeter for the copilots monitor. In addition the white ribbon indicator will disappear from the
monitor whenever the radar altimeter is not functional (radar altimeter off/
on function flag reads OFF).
Change 4
1-599
T.O. 1B-52H-1

NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
11
Overheat Light
The amber overheat light is connected to an overheat sensor in the monitor and will come on when the overheat sensor signals an overheat condition and will remain on until the overhead condition is corrected. This light
incorporates an integral press-to-test feature for testing the light bulb.
If this light cannot be extinguished by providing increased cooling air within 5 minutes after initial illumination, the monitor
should be turned off or equipment damage can be expected.
12
EVS Sensor Azimuth Indicator
The EVS sensor azimuth indicator is made up of an azimuth reference

scale and an azimuth marker. The scale will be a long scale or a short
scale depending on whether pilots or navigators have steering control.
The long scale consists of index marks numbered in degrees, whereas
the short scale consists only of index marks. Both navigators monitors
will always display long scale. Both pilots monitors will display long
scale only when navigators have steering control and will always display
short scale when either pilot has steering control. The azimuth marker
will move horizontally along the azimuth scale in direct proportion to azimuth angular positioning of STV and FLIR sensors.
13
Fiducial Marks
Fiducial marks are inscribed on the STV sensor optics and are electronically generated in the FLIR sensor. The fiducial marks are in the form of
an interrupted T in which the gap between the horizontal bars denotes
the center of field of view. The length of the fiducial marks will be magnified three times when switching from wide angle field-of-view to narrow
angle field-of-view. The inner ends of the fiducial marks form a 2 cone
in the center of the field-of-view. The outer ends define the limits of the
narrow angle field-of-view.
NOTE
The projected intersection of the STV or FLIR fiducial marks is
the true line-of-sight (boresight) of the respective sensor and
may be off center in the monitor in some aircraft due to system
design tolerances. This misalignment of the fiducial marks will
not affect the boresight of the respective system. This intersection of the fiducial marks may be displaced from the center of the
monitor as much as 1/2 the distance between the horizontal fiducial marks in WFOV (1/4 of distance in NFOV). The STV/FLIR
marks may be rotated up to 2.
1-600
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
14
TA Terrain Trace (Pilots Only)
The TA terrain trace on the pilots monitors only is used with the terrain
avoidance system and is described under TERRAIN AVOIDANCE SYSTEM, this section.
15
TA Horizontal Reference Line (Pilots

Only)
The TA horizontal reference line on the pilots monitor only is used with
the terrain avoidance system and is described under TERRAIN AVOIDANCE SYSTEM, this section.
EVS CONTROL PANEL (2 PLACES) (PILOTS STATION)
16
TA VIDEO Switch
The TA video switch is a momentary pushbutton switch which provides

selection of the TA terrain trace on the respective pilots EVS monitor. The
TA video may be selected alone or in dual mode with FLIR or STV displays. When TA video is selected by pressing the switch, the word ON in
green is illuminated on the switch face. When TA is selected with FLIR or
STV, the system is automatically placed in vector steering mode. Other
modes may subsequently be selected. The TA video switch must be momentarily pressed again to deactivate the TA circuits.
17
FLIR VIDEO Switch
The FLIR video switch is a momentary pushbutton switch which provides

selection of the FLIR video on the respective pilots EVS monitor. The
FLIR video may be selected alone or in conjunction with TA display. When
FLIR video is selected by pressing the switch, the word ON in green is
illuminated on the switch face. The FLIR circuits may be deactivated by
momentarily pressing the FLIR video switch or STV video switch. In either
case, the ON light will go out.
18
STV VIDEO Switch
The STV video switch is a momentary pushbutton switch which provides

selection of the STV video on the respective pilots EVS monitor. The STV
video may be selected alone or in conjunction with TA display. When STV
video is selected by pressing the switch, the word ON in green is illuminated on the switch face. The STV circuits may be deactivated by momentarily pressing the STV video switch or FLIR video switch. In either
case, the ON light will go out.
19
Manual Steering Knob
The manual steering knob has L- -OFF- -R positions and is spring-loaded

to the center OFF (unmarked) position. The knob must be pressed before
it can be rotated out of the center position. Provided a steering mode is
selected (vector, fixed, or crab switch lights on), the selected sensor and
turret may be manually steered in azimuth left (L) or right (R) by use of
the steering knob. When the knob is released it will return to the center
position and sensor and turret control reverts to the steering mode selected.
This knob should only be used while the aircraft is on the ground
while stopped or during a slow speed maneuver such as taxiing,
etc since disorientation may result.
1-601
T.O. 1B-52H-1

CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
FUNCTION
EVS CONTROL PANEL (2 PLACES) (PILOTS STATION) (Cont)
20
NFOV (NRDU) Light
The NFOV light will indicate the word ON in green when narrow field-ofview has been selected on the respective EVS monitor.
21
SYMBOLS Dimming Knob
The symbols dimming knob is a rotary knob used to set the brightness of
the symbols on the respective EVS monitor. Clockwise rotation of the
knob, as marked, will brighten the symbols and counterclockwise rotation
will dim the symbols.
22
LAMP TEST Switch
The lamp test switch is a pushbutton switch used to test all the indicator
lights on the respective EVS control panel.
23
POWER Switch
The power switch is a push-on/push-off type switch having an ON position (pressed) (switch face flush with switch housing) and an OFF position
(extended) (switch face extends approximately 1/8 inch from switch
housing) which is mechanically latched in each position. The switch is
used to turn on and place the respective EVS monitor in standby mode
and to provide power for turret and sensor drive and other electronic circuits. When pressed in ON position, the word ON in green is illuminated
on the switch face provided power is on in the aircraft. When the switch
is pressed again and the switch face extends from its housing, the switch
is OFF and the respective EVS monitor is deactivated and power is removed from the other circuits provided through the switch.
24
CRAB Stabilization Switch
The crab stabilization switch is a momentary pushbutton switch which

provides selection of crab stabilization of the line-of-sight (LOS) of the selected sensor. When crab LOS stabilization is selected by pressing the
switch, the word ON in green is illuminated on the switch face. In crab stabilization, the selected sensor and turret are driven in azimuth to a position corresponding to the crab angle position of the aft landing gears and
the sensor driven to 2 above the aircraft centerline. See figure 1-173 for
additional stabilization information. The crab stabilization may be
deactivated by pressing the crab, vector, or fixed stabilization switches.
25
FIXED Stabilization Switch
The fixed stabilization switch is a momentary pushbutton switch which

provides selection of fixed stabilization of the line-of-sight (LOS) of the selected sensor. When fixed LOS stabilization is selected by pressing the
switch, the word ON in green is illuminated on the switch face. In fixed stabilization, the selected sensor and turret are driven in azimuth to a position corresponding to 0 or the centerline of the aircraft and the sensor
driven in elevation to 2 above the waterline of the aircraft if TA is not
selected or to the waterline of the aircraft if TA is selected. See figure
1-173 for additional stabilization information. The fixed stabilization may
be deactivated by pressing the fixed, vector, or crab stabilization
switches.
1-602
Change 4
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
26
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
VECTOR Stabilization Switch
The vector stabilization switch is a momentary pushbutton switch which

provides selection of flight vector stabilization of the line-of-sight (LOS)
of the selected sensor. When vector LOS stabilization is selected by
pressing the switch, the word ON in green is illuminated on the switch
face. In vector stabilization, the selected sensor and turret are driven in
azimuth to a position corresponding to the drift angle output of the OAS
and the sensor driven in elevation according to the output of the angle-ofattack computer. See figure 1-173 for additional stabilization information.
The vector stabilization may be deactivated by pressing the vector, fixed,
or crab stabilization switches.
NOTE
If INS drift information is erroneous when an INS is commanded
as a prime NAV mode or if doppler is malfunctioning, vector stabilization should not be used since azimuth position may be unreliable.
MISCELLANEOUS PILOT STATION CONTROLS AND INDICATORS
27
TA/EVS Vector Indicator Light
A TA-EVS vector indicator light is located above each pilots and copilots
EVS monitor. The light is a word warning light showing TA-EVS VECTOR
in amber letters on a black background when on. The lights will come on
when the angle-of-attack system is at a limit if vector mode is selected in
the EVS or FVR is selected in the TA system. This indicates that fixed stabilization of the EVS and/or FRL stabilization of the TA system should be
selected.
28
Narrow Field-Of-View Select Switch
The NFOV select switch is a pushbutton switch on each pilots control

wheel and permits either pilot or copilot, while he has steering command,
a means of selecting NFOV of the selected sensor without removing his
hands from the aircraft control wheel. Pressing and releasing the button
will cause the sensor to switch to the other field-of-view.
1-603
T.O. 1B-52H-1

CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
C
29
FUNCTION
EVS STEERING CONTROL PANEL (RADAR NAVIGATORS STATION)
FLIR STEER Switch
When the FLIR steering switch is in BNS, FLIR steering is accomplished

through the use of Track Control switches on the navigators Integrated
Keyboards When the FLIR steering switch is in MAN, the FLIR will assume a zero azimuth, zero elevation position, and cannot be moved. Returning this switch to BNS will re-engage the IKB Track Control switch inputs. These IKB switches are labeled RDR, EVS, and MAN EVS and illuminate when selected. With RDR and EVS selected, the FLIR sensor is
slaved and track the radar crosshair position. When only EVS is selected,
the FLIR sensor is slaved to an independent EVS crosshair position. This
position is controlled by trackball inputs and results in the FLIR sensor
tracking the EVS sighting point. Sensor positioning without reference to
any crosshair position is accomplished by selecting MAN EVS only. In
all three cases, FLIR steering inputs can be provided by enabling and
moving the trackball. If the FLIR sensor limits are exceeded by either
manual inputs or automatic tracking, the sensor will freeze at its limits until
commanded to move back into range (again, either manually or through
automatic tracking). If both EVS track controls are deselected, the sensors will hold their last commanded position (EVS and MAN EVS commanded positions are stored independently). EVS and MAN EVS cannot
be selected at the same time; one must be deselected prior to selecting
the other switch.
NOTE
These switches will only steer a sensor not controlled by the

pilots. When the navigators have steering control, the pilots
symbols will be removed from their monitors.
RDR and MAN EVS cannot be selected on the same IKB. As
long as RDR is illuminated, OAS radar crosshairs control at
that IKB is not affected by any EVS steering switches.
30
FLIR Steering COMD Indicator
The FLIR steering command light shows whether pilot or copilot has
steering command of the respective sensors. If the pilot has command
of the sensor, the letters PLT are illuminated in green. If the copilot has
command of the sensor, the letters COPLT are illuminated in green. If neither light is on, the pilots have relinquished steering control and the navigators can steer the respective sensor.
31
FLIR NFOV Switch
The FLIR NFOV switch allows the navigator or radar navigator to place
the FLIR sensor (if he has control) into narrow field of view (NFOV). The
switch is a push-in/push-out switch which is mechanically latched in the
selected position. When pressed in to NFOV position, the word ON will
be illuminated in green. When the switch is pressed again to the out position the field of view will return to normal wide condition and the light will
go out.
1-604
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
32
CONTROLINDICATOR
FLIR WASH Switch
FUNCTION
The FLIR turret wash switch is a momentary pushbutton which, when
pressed, will initiate the wash cycle for the FLIR turret. The wash cycle
cannot be interrupted and will cause the green letters ON on the switch
face to be illuminated and remain on during the wash action. A wash cycle
cannot be initiated on a turret if the pilot or copilot is in command of the
sensor, wash water temperature is below the low temperature thermal
switch setting, or the other turret is in a wash cycle. Each switch is covered by a hinged transparent guard which must be raised before actuating the switch.
NOTE
At first actuation of the wash switch, associated command

indications on the navigators steering control panel for the
selected turret will go out while the turret rotates to stow. The
green ON indication will come on when the wash action begins. Under normal conditions, initial turning action of the turret can be seen on the monitor.
If a wash cycle cannot be initiated while either navigator is
in command of the sensor, pull and reset the WINDOW
WASH CONTROL circuit breaker to eliminate a possible
overheat lockout. Allow time for water warmup before initiating another wash cycle.
33
ALTER SYNC Switch
The ALTER SYNC (alternate synchronization) switch allows selection of

redundant synchronization circuits if the primary synchronization circuits
were to fail as indicated by loss of video on all EVS monitors. The switch
is a push-in/ push-out switch which is mechanically latched in each position. When pressed in to the alternate synchronization position, the word
ON will be illuminated in green. When the switch is pressed again to the
out position, the primary synchronization circuits are selected and the
light will go out.
34
LAMP TEST Switch
A lamp test switch is used to test all the indicator lights on that panel. The
switch is a pushbutton switch which, when pressed, will cause all indicator lights on the navigators EVS steering control panel to come on if not
previously on.
35
STV WASH Switch
The STV wash switch functions in the same manner as the FLIR wash
switch (No. 32).
36
STV NFOV Switch
The STV NFOV switch functions in the same manner as the FLIR NFOV
switch (No. 31).
37
STV Steering COMD Indicator
The STV Steering COMD indicator functions in the same manner as the
FLIR Steering COMD indicator (No. 30).
38
STV STEER Switch
The STV Steering switch functions in the same manner as the FLIR
Steering switch (No.29).
1-605
T.O. 1B-52H-1

CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
FUNCTION
EVS VIDEO SELECT PANEL (2 PLACES) (NAVIGATORS STATION)
39
BNS HDG Switch
The BNS heading switch is a push-on/ push-off type switch used as a

three-way switch with the BNS heading switch on the other navigators
panel. Each switch is mechanically latched in each position. The switch
is used to select OAS heading error for display on all EVS monitors when
the OAS is not in BOMB mode. (BOMB mode automatically selects OAS
heading error.) When one switch is pressed and the OAS heading error
is selected, the letters ON in green will illuminate on both navigators panels. When either switch is depressed again, the OAS heading error function is removed and the lights will go off. When the OAS heading error is
used, the bank steering marker is replaced on all active EVS monitors.
40
EVS Video SYMBOLS Switch
The symbols switch has SYMBOLS ON- - OFF- -TEST LAMP positions.
SYMBOLS ON position will cause EVS symbols to be displayed on the
respective navigators monitor. TEST LAMP position is a momentary
position which provides a means of testing the respective BNS heading
select switch indicator light. OFF position will remove the symbols from
the respective monitor (Format 3 only) or terminate the light test function,
whichever has been selected.
41
EVS Video Select Switch
The EVS video select switch is a six-position rotary switch. The switch
has OFF- -STBY- -STV- -FLIR- -FLIR REV- - RCDR positions and is
used to select video for display on the respective EVS monitor. In OFF
position power is removed from the respective EVS monitor and the other
circuits provided through this switch. In STBY position power is supplied
to the respective EVS monitor to place it in standby condition but prevents
video from being displayed. Power is supplied to other electronic circuits.
In STV position the STV video will be displayed on the respective EVS
monitor if the STV system is operating. In FLIR position the FLIR video
will be displayed if the FLIR system is operating. In FLIR REV position the
FLIR video will be displayed in reverse pattern (light areas become dark
and dark areas become light). RCDR position is inoperative.
42
EVS ENVIRONMENTAL POWER CONTROL PANEL (RADAR NAVIGATORS STATION)
STV TURRET AIR Switch
The STV turret air switch is a two-position toggle switch having ON- -OFF
positions. ON position energizes the STV fan, duct heater and controller,
and the STV turret window heater and controller. A controller can experience a power lockout and deenergize the heater while in ON position.
OFF position deenergizes the STV turret environmental equipment and
will reset the heater controller if locked out. The switch should be ON at
all times in flight (except for resetting a locked out heater controller) to prevent condensation from forming on STV components.
1-606
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
43
WASH SYS PWR Switch
The wash system power switch is a two-position toggle switch having

ON- -OFF positions. ON position energizes the window wash system
tank heaters and arms the wash command control circuits. The switch
should be ON at all times in flight and during aircraft ground operation to
facilitate system readiness. With this switch in ON, a wash cycle can be
commanded for either the FLIR or STV windows by actuating the respective wash switch on the navigators steering control panel provided the
navigators have control of the sensor and the water is of proper temperature. OFF position deenergizes the water tank heaters and all wash control circuits.
44
FLIR TURRET AIR Switch
The FLIR turret air switch is a two-position toggle switch having

ON- -OFF positions. ON position energizes the FLIR fan, duct heater and
controller, and the FLIR turret window heater and controller (except while
on the ground the squat switch prevents operation of the window heat).
A controller can experience a power lockout and deenergize the heater
while in ON position. OFF position deenergizes the FLIR turret environmental equipment and will reset the heater controller if locked out. The
switch should be ON at all times in flight (except for resetting a locked out
heater controller) to prevent condensation from forming on FLIR components.
FUNCTION
Lethal voltage exists on the surface of the FLIR turret window

during normal EVS flight operations. This voltage should be inhibited during ground operations by action of the forward landing gear squat switch. However, as an added precaution, ensure FLIR turret air switch on the environmental power control
panel is in OFF prior to performing any maintenance, other than
operational checkout on or near FLIR turret.
F
FLIR CONTROL PANEL (NAVIGATORS STATION)
45
READY Light
A ready light show the word READY in green when the FLIR system is
capable of detecting a target. The light will come on in standby (STBY)
or operate (OPR) mode when the system has cooled down to operating
temperature.
46
OPR Light
An operate light will show the letters OPR in green when the FLIR system
is in operate mode and low voltage power supply, refrigerator system, and
signal processor have power applied and are operating correctly. In case
of any unit failure and resultant shutdown, the OPR indicator will extinguish.
Change 4
1-607
T.O. 1B-52H-1

CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
FUNCTION
FLIR CONTROL PANEL (NAVIGATORS STATION) (Cont)
47
STBY Light
A standby light will show the letters STBY in green when the FLIR system
is in standby mode. The light will go out when the operate light is on.
48
LVPS Light
Not Used.
49
REFR Light
A refrigerator light will show the letters REFR in amber in the event of a
cryogenic cooler overheat. The system will be powered down immediately. The FLIR image may persist for approximately 20 seconds.
50
SIG PROC Light
Not Used.
51
OVHT Light
An overheat light will show the letters OVHT in amber simultaneously in

conjunction with the REFER light. If an overheat of the cryogenic cooler
is sensed the system will be powered down immediately. The FLIR image
may persist for approximately 20 seconds.
52
OVRD Switch
A pushbutton override switch is used to override an automatic shutdown

of the FLIR circuits monitored by the LVPS, REFR, SIG PROC, and
OVHT lights. An overheat condition arms the override circuits providing
the mode select switch is in OPR position. When an overheat condition
occurs, the OVRD switch may be used to continue system operation with
the possibility of equipment damage.
Use of the override feature may cause FLIR system damage.

The override feature should only be used in case of urgent need
for uninterrupted FLIR system operation.
The OVRD switch incorporates a transparent hinged guard that must be
raised before actuating the switch. In addition, an integral light is provided
to indicate OVRD in amber letters when the override function has been
selected. Pressing the switch will energize the override function and
cause the OVHT light to go out and the OVRD light to come on. Prior to
an overheat condition, the override circuits are electrically interlocked to
prevent inadvertent operations that would jeopardize the thermal protection. The system is also interlocked in a manner that sets the system to
the standby mode from the operate mode and causes the operation status lights to switch from OPR to STBY if a shutdown occurs. In the event
that the overheat condition is due to a transient, the system reverts to normal operation, the operation status lights switch from STBY to OPR, and
the OVHT/OVRD lights go out.
1-608
Change 17
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
FUNCTION
53
LAMP TEST Switch
A lamp test switch is used to test all indicator lights on the FLIR control
panel. The mode select switch must be in STBY or OPR position for this
switch to be operative.
54
MODE SELECT Switch
A five position rotary mode select switch has OFF - STBY - OPR - BIT1
- BIT2 positions and selects the mode of operation of the FLIR system.
In the OFF position the FLIR system is completely inoperative with the
exception that the turret stow command will be operative. In the STBY
position the FLIR system is prepared for full operation exception the azimuth scan mirror, thus video signals are not available to the monitors.
Status indicators are either armed or operative and the STBY light is on.
Overheat failure circuits are operative but cannot be overridden. In the
OPR position the FLIR system is completely operational and the OPR
light will be on. The system will perform a 10 second Non-Uniformity
Correction (NUC) and then will enable video output. After cryogenic unit
cool-down the ready light will come on and a display is available to the
monitors. Cryogenic cool-down may take up to 20 minutes, depending on
ambient conditions in the sensor. Overheat failures can be overridden in
the event of an urgent requirement for uninterrupted FLIR system operation. In BIT 1 the system will initiate aNon-Uniformity Correction (NUC).
This position does not initiate BIT. The switch should be placed in the BIT
1 position when the imaged scene changes or video quality degrades.
This enables the system to clear up the display. At the conclusion of NUC,
the system remains in standby state until STBY or OPR is selected. Select OPR anytime after the screen goes blank. The BIT 2 position has no
function.
55
BIAS Knob
A bias knob is used to vary the brightness (bias) of the FLIR signal. Clockwise rotation increases the brightness.
56
CONTRAST Knob
A contrast knob permits the operator to adjust the video gain (contrast)
of the FLIR signal. Clockwise rotation increases the contrast. The contrast is automatically controlled when the knob is placed in the AUTO detent. This position normally provides an optimum IR image. For targets
within a scene of non-uniform temperature distribution, however, (such
as lighted runway markers) the operator may revert to the manual mode,
if required, to fine tune the target for detail.
Change 17
1-609
T.O. 1B-52H-1

NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
G
FUNCTION
STV CONTROL PANEL (NAVIGATORS STATION)
57
MLC GAIN Knob
The MLC gain knob is used to select automatic light control (ALC) or
manual light control (MLC). OFF (detent) position enables ALC sensing
circuits and disables the iris switch. In the event the ALC sensing circuits
fail, the knob may be moved out of the OFF position to disable the ALC
circuits, enable the iris switch, and manually control the remaining light
control circuits. Clockwise rotation of the knob increases the gain of the
STV sensor. The iris switch must be used in conjunction with the MLC
gain knob when in manual mode to provide STV performance equivalent
to that in the ALC mode.
58
MAN Light (Amber)
The amber MAN indicator light will come on when MLC (manual light control) mode has been selected with the MLC gain knob (No.57).
59
ALC Select Switch and ALC FULL/

ALC 1/4 Lights (Green)
The ALC select switch is a pushbutton switch used with the automatic
light control system and provides a means of switching between ALC
FULL and ALC 1/4. In ALC FULL mode, the ALC sensing circuits operate
on the video from the total field of view. In ALC 1/4 mode, the ALC sensing
circuits operate on the video from only the center 1/4 of the field of view
to optimize the display of that portion of the field. Pressing the switch will
switch the system to the other mode. The switch contains two integral
lights illuminating the words ALC FULL or ALC 1/4 in green. The respective indicator light will illuminate indicating the mode selected.
60
OVLD/OVRD Light (Amber)
An integral indicator light on the OVLD/OVRD switch (No. 61) will come
on showing the words OVLD OVRD when the OVLD/OVRD function is
selected and will go off automatically if the video signal saturation condition clears.

1-610 Change 17
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
G
61
OVLD/OVRD Switch
FUNCTION
STV CONTROL PANEL (NAVIGATORS STATION) (Cont)

The OVLD (overload)/OVRD (override) switch is a pushbutton switch on
the STV control panel used to override ALC protection circuits and is
guarded with a transparent guard. With the system operating in the ALC
1/4 mode and the video signal from the outer 3/4 of the field of view saturated, the system will automatically switch to the ALC FULL mode. If the
signal remains saturated, the system will immediately revert to STBY
mode. Under emergency conditions, the OVLD/OVRD switch can be
used to restore the system to the ALC 1/4 mode.
Use of the OVLD/OVRD switch disables the camera tube assembly protection circuits and can result in permanent damage
to the sensor tube.
62
STBY Light (Green)
The standby light comes on when the Mode switch (No 64) is placed to
STBY.
63
OPR Light (Green)
The operate light comes on when the Mode switch (No 64) is placed to
OPR.
64
MODE Switch
Less DY
The mode switch is a rotary selector switch having OFF--STBY-- OPR
positions and controls the primary operating modes of the STV system.
In OFF position the STV system is deenergized and the STV camera iris
is closed. In STBY position power is supplied to all STV system circuits
except the high voltage power supply and the camera iris light control circuits. Also the standby light (No. 62) is illuminated to show the letters
STBY in green. In OPR position the entire STV system is energized for
operation and the operate light (No. 63) will show the letters OPR in green
provided there are no system malfunctions monitored by the built-in-test
circuits. The standby light will go out when the operate light comes on.
NOTE
If the built-in-test circuits detect a malfunction, the system will
be returned to standby, the standby and malfunction lights will
come on, and the operate light will go out. When this occurs the
system can be reset by rotating the mode switch to OFF, back
to STBY and then to OPR. If the detected malfunction is no longer present, the standby and malfunction lights should go out
and the operate light come on.
Change 11
1-611
T.O. 1B-52H-1

CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
64
FUNCTION
MODE Switch
DY
The MODE switch is a rotary selector switch having three positions: OFF,
STBY, and OPR. In the OFF position, the STV camera assembly is deenergized. When the MODE switch is placed in the STBY position, 28 vdc
is routed to circuits with the STV camera assembly, which in turn causes
the STBY light on the control panel to come on. Plus 28 vdc is fed to one
side of all indicator lamps except MAN. In STBY and OPR, 115 vac is applied to the low voltage power supply in the STV camera assembly and
the high voltage power supply is energized as well. The lens has maximum protection with the filter inserted in the optical path. The difference
between STBY and OPR modes is that the STV camera assembly does
not produce video during STBY but produces video during OPER mode.
When power is applied to the STV camera assembly, the power up BIT
is performed. When the MODE switch is placed in the OPR position, the
STV camera assembly is placed in the operate mode, the ALC is set up,
and video is produced. The STBY light goes out and the OPR light comes
on. The background test BIT runs transparent to normal operation.
65
HI SENS/HI RES Switch
Less DY
The HI-SENS/HI-RES switch is a pushbutton switch used to switch between high sensitivity and high resolution of the STV camera. The condition of the switching circuits is indicated by illumination of the green letters
HI-SENS or HI-RES on the switch face. The normal condition is HI-RES
which provides maximum resolution under normal lighting. HI-SENS condition is used when poor lighting conditions exist to improve contrast,
however, some loss in resolution occurs.
65
FLIGHT
Switch
MODE/GROUND
MODE
DY
The FLIGHT MODE/GROUND MODE switch is a pushbutton switch

used to switch between flight mode and ground mode of the STV camera.
The condition of the switching circuits is indicated by illumination of the
green letters FLIGHT MODE or GROUND MODE on the switch face. Under normal conditions, the STV is operated in FLIGHT MODE position,
which provides automatic insertion of the iris or filter into the optical path
as required by light levels. In GROUND MODE operating conditions, the
STV is operated with the filter inserted in the optical path to prevent light
sources such as runway lights from damaging the equipment. This position provides the lowest gain and the best possible image. The image may
be noisy.
NOTE
The STV camera assembly may be operated for short periods of time on the ground with the switch in FLIGHT MODE
position, such as when ground checks are performed
The FLIGHT MODE position must be selected after the aircraft is airborne for proper operation
1-612
Change 11
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CONTROLINDICATOR
NO.
FUNCTION
66
LAMP TEST Switch
The lamp test switch is a pushbutton switch used to test all STV control
panel indicator lights. The mode switch must be in STBY or OPR to enable the test function.
67
IRIS Switch
The iris switch has CLOSE- -OFF- -OPEN positions and is spring-loaded
to the center OFF position. This switch is used in conjunction with the
MLC gain control to control the STV iris opening when manual light control is necessary. When the MLC gain control is moved out of the OFF
position, the IRIS switch is enabled. Holding the switch in CLOSE position
will drive the iris closed, and conversely, holding the switch in OPEN position will drive the iris open.
68
BIT Switch
Less DY
The BIT (built-in test) switches a selector switch used to select the various
built-in-test functions of the STV system, and to isolate faults. Switch
positions are NORM- -LL- -HL- -SHTR- -ILLUM- -ELEC-A- - ELEC-B.
NOTE
Switch positions SHTR, ILLUM, ELEC-A, and ELEC-B provide
fault isolation capability only and should not be used unless a
fault exists. Switch positions other than NORM rotate the camera to stow position.
NORM position must be selected for normal STV operation. This position
enables continuous monitoring of various electronic circuits by the system. LL position provides a low light level by the camera illuminator for
testing. HL position provides a high light level by the camera illuminator
for testing. SHTR position closes the camera shutter to simulate a sun
sense or flash protection ALC shutdown. ILLUM position checks the camera illuminator test light, the malfunction light will illuminate if the camera
light is bad. ELEC A position checks out the system in a minimum gain
condition. ELEC B position checks out the system on a maximum gain
condition.
DY
The BIT (built-in test) selector switch is used to select built-in test functions of the STV system, and to isolate faults. Switch positions on the control indicator are NORM- -LL- -SHTR- -ILLUM- -ELEC-A- -ELEC-B. Only
the NORM and LL positions are functional. SHTR- -ILLUM- -ELEC-A-ELEC-B are not used.
NORM - The BIT switch must be in the NORM position for normal system
operation. With the switch in this position, BIT circuits continuously monitor the power supply, timing signals, flash shutter, aperture feedback, filter
feedback, and field-of-view feedback.
LL - In the LL position, teh BIT LED provides a source of flashing illumination for testing. The monitor screen provides a flashing display and the
MALF indicator will come on when a failure is detected.
Change 11
1-612A
T.O. 1B-52H-1

NO.
CONTROLINDICATOR
G
FUNCTION
69
MALF Light (Amber)
The malfunction light shows the letters MALF when one or more of the
built-in-test functions fail.
70
CAM HOT Light (Amber)
The camera overheat light shows the letters CAM HOT when an overheat
condition exists in the camera assembly.
71
E/U (Electronics Unit) HOT Light

(Amber)
Less DY
The electronics overheat light shows the letters E/U HOT when an overheat condition exists in the camera electronics unit.
71
E/U (Electronics Unit) HOT Light

(Amber)
NOT USED
DY
1-612B
Change 11
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EVS Circuit Protection and Location

EQUIPMENT
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
EVS Monitor and Display Systems

Display Control Power
DC POWER DISPLAY
COPILOT
NAV
PILOT
RADAR NAV
EVS/R1
EVS/Q1
EVS/P1
EVS/S1
Rt. TR
Left TR
Left TR
Rt. TR
Indicator Light Dimming
EVS INDICATOR DIMMING
EVS/R3
Left TR
Monitor Power
115V AC-PHASE A
MONITOR COPILOT
MONITOR PILOT
115V AC-PHASE C
MONITOR NAV
MONITOR RADAR NAV
DC POWER POWER
COPILOT RADAR NAV
PILOT-NAV
EVS/A4
EVS/E3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 5
EVS/K3
EVS/N2
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 3
EVS/T3
EVS/S3
Rt. TR
Left TR
EVS/B3
EVS/D3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
EVS/O1
EVS/N3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
SCU Power
115V AC-PHASE A
SCU COPILOT/FLIR
SCU PILOT/STV
115V AC-PHASE C
SCU-FLIR
SCU-STV
Symbol Generators
115V AC-PHASE A SYMBOL GEN

115V AC-PHASE B SYMBOL GEN
115V AC-PHASE C SYMBOL GEN
DC POWER POWER SSG
EVS/A1
EVS/F1
EVS/J1
EVS/T2
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
Rt. TR
TA-EVS Vector Indicator Light
TA/EVS WARN LIGHTS
PCBP/E15
Left TR
VDU Power
115V AC-PHASE A
VDU COPILOT/TA/SSG
VDU PILOT/STV
115V AC-PHASE C
VDU NAV/PRI SYNC
VDU R NAV/ALT SYNC/FLIR
EVS/A3
EVS/D3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 5
EVS/M3
EVS/N1
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 3
1-613
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EVS Circuit Protection and Location (Cont)

EQUIPMENT
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
EVS Turret Window Wash System

Controls
Pump
Tank Heater
DC POWER
CONTROL
VALVES
115V AC-PHASE A
WINDOW WASH PUMP
115V AC-PHASE B
WINDOW WASH PUMP
115V AC-PHASE C
WINDOW WASH PUMP
115V AC-PHASE A
115V AC-PHASE B
115V AC-PHASE C
EVS/U1
EVS/T1
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
EVS/B2
AC Bus 5
EVS/G2
AC Bus 5
EVS/K2
AC Bus 5
EVS/A2
AC Bus 5
EVS/F2
AC Bus 5
EVS/J2
AC Bus 5
Forward Looking Infrared System

DC POWER CONTROL FLIR

DC POWER POWER FLIR
115V AC-PHASE A FLIR
115V AC-PHASE B FLIR
115V AC-PHASE C FLIR
EVS/P2
EVS/U2
EVS/B1
EVS/G1
EVS/K1
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
Environmental Heater
115V AC-PHASE A FLIR ENV HTR

115V AC-PHASE B FLIR ENV HTR
115V AC-PHASE C FLIR ENV HTR
EVS/C1
EVS/H1
EVS/L1
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
Fan
115V AC-PHASE A FLIR ENV FAN

115V AC-PHASE B FLIR ENV FAN
115V AC-PHASE C FLIR ENV FAN
EVS/D1
EVS/I1
EVS/M1
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
AC Bus 3
Servo Power
FLIR SERVO
AZ & ELEVATION
TURRET
EVS/P3
EVS/Q3
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
DC POWER CONTROL
FLIR ENV
EVS/Q2
Rt. TR
Window Heater Control Power
1-614
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
EQUIPMENT
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
Steerable TV System
115V AC-PHASE C STV

DC POWER POWER STV
EVS/L3
EVS/S2
AC Bus 5
Left TR
Environmental Heater
115V AC-PHASE A STV ENV HTR

115V AC-PHASE B STV ENV HTR
115V AC-PHASE C STV ENV HTR
EVS/C2
EVS/H2
EVS/L2
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
Fan
115V AC-PHASE A STV ENV FAN

115V AC-PHASE B STV ENV FAN
115V AC-PHASE C STV ENV FAN
EVS/D2
EVS/I2
EVS/M2
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
Servo Power
STV SERVO
AZ & ELEVATION
TURRET
EVS/P4
EVS/Q4
Left TR
Left TR
EVS/E2
AC Bus 5
EVS/F3
AC Bus 5
EVS/J3
AC Bus 5
EVS/R2
Left TR
Window Heater Power and

Control
11
EVS
115V AC-PHASE A
STV WINDOW HTR
115V AC-PHASE B
STV WINDOW HTR
115V AC-PHASE C
STV WINDOW HTR
DC POWER CONTROL
STV ENV
PCBP
1-615/(1-616 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
BOMBING SYSTEM
DESCRIPTION
AUTHORIZED WEAPONS
The bombing system provides the aircraft with a

means of carrying, prearming, and releasing nuclear
and nonnuclear weapons. The bomb bay has provisions for carrying the CSRL, with up to eight weapons, or cluster suspension systems. Release methods
the are OAS, D-2, and jettison. Information on the
bombing system is contained in T.O. 1B-52H-1-12,
RADAR NAVIGATORS/NAVIGATORS FLIGHT
MANUAL, T.O. 1B-52H-25-2, NUCLEAR BOMB DELIVERY TECHNICAL MANUAL and T.O. 1B-52H34-2-1, AIRCREW WEAPONS DELIVERY MANUAL (NONNUCLEAR). The aircrew must be familiar
with these manuals to ensure an adequate knowledge
of the requirements, limitations, and restrictions of
the system. Bombing system circuit protection and
location information is contained in figure 1-178.
Only those weapons listed in figure 1-177 are authorized for carriage and delivery in the configuration and quantity shown. Additional information on
nuclear weapons is contained in T.O. 1B-52H-25-1.
Additional information on nonnuclear weapons and
applicable delivery restrictions is contained in T.O.
1B-52H-34-2-1.
JDAM/WCMD Description
Weapon targeting, control, monitoring, release and

jettison for WCMD and JDAM weapons are contained in T.O. 1B-52H-34-2-5 and T.O. 1B-52H-342-6 respectively.
BOMBING SYSTEM CONTROLS AND INDICATORS
Controls and indicators for the bombing system are

located at both the pilots station and the radar
navigators/navigators station.
Pilots Station Bombing System Controls And Indicators
Controls and indicators for the pilots station are

Radar Navigators/Navigators Station Bombing
System Controls And Indicators
Controls and indicators for the radar navigators/

navigators station are contained in T.O. 1B-52H1-12.
BOMB TONE SCORING SYSTEM
A bomb tone scoring system is installed in this aircraft to provide a means of simulated bomb drops
whereby the accuracy of the bomb run can be determined using a radio signal. When initiated, the
bomb tone scoring system causes a continuous tone
to be transmitted by the UHF radio set(s) on the selected frequency(ies). A bomb release pulse from either the OAS or the bomb release switch (but not
the salvo system) stops the tone, simulating bomb
release. The bomb tone scoring system must be reinitiated in order to simulate another bomb run.
Voice communications cannot be transmitted by
means of either UHF radio set when the bomb tone
scoring system is energized. A bomb tone scoring
panel is provided at the radar navigators station.
BOMB TONE SCORING SYSTEM NORMAL OPERATION
The bomb tone scoring system operates whenever

the command or No. 2 UHF transmitter is on and
the bomb tone scoring master switch has been positioned momentarily to INITIATE. The tone is
stopped by a simulated missile launch or a bomb release pulse from the OAS or bomb release switch
through the bomb intervalometer or by momentary
actuation of the bomb tone scoring switch to CUTOFF position. For additional information on the
bomb tone scoring system, refer to T.O. 1B-52H34-2-1.
NOTE
The bomb tone scoring system will cause

the No. 1 UHF and No. 2 UHF radios to
transmit a tone if both are turned on. A
garbled transmission will result if both
UHF radios are tuned to the same frequency; therefore, it is recommended that one
UHF radio be tuned to an unused frequency
during TONE operation.
Change 22
1-617
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Pilots Station Bombing System

1-618
Change 22
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO.
1
CONTROLINDICATOR
BOMB BAY & MISSILE
FUNCTION
The jettison switch is a button type with unmarked RELEASE--OFF positions with the depressed position being Release. The switch is springloaded to Off position and is recessed in the panel to discourage inadvertent actuation. Momentary pressing of the switch to Release position will
energize the jettison circuits by means of aft battery power. When the jettison circuits are energized, the bomb door open circuits will be energized
and if unlock consent is present, all the non-OAS controlled weapons (internal and external) will be released in a safe configuration. For OAS Controlled weapons the OAS must be on and operating and the weapon interface units powered for the locations (LP, RP, and/or Bay) from which
weapons are to be jettisoned. The bomb doors will be held open while the
jettison circuits are energized.
The pilots Bomb Bay & Missile Jettison Control switch jettisons
all GWD and active/primary SMO controlled weapons loaded on
the aircraft and will only be used as a backup to jettison by the
Radar Navigator. If jettison is commanded using the pilots
Bomb Bay & Missile Jettison Control switch, all GWD weapons
and, with OAS operating and MIUs/WIUs powered, all active/
primary SMO controlled weapons will be jettisoned. Proper
separation clearance between weapons and between weapons
and aircraft cannot be ensured.
NOTE
For jettison functions with specific weapon types refer to the applicable Aircrew Weapons Delivery Manual.
2
BOMB RELEASED Light
The bomb release light comes momentarily on each time a release pulse
is issued.
TIME TO GO = 0 Light
The TTG=0 light comes on each time OAS issues a release pulse.
STORES JETTISON Light
The STORES JETTISON light comes on when the jettison control relay
is energized.
LOCK/UNLOCK Consent Switch
The lock/unlock switch gives the pilot the capability to provide consent to
allow unlock of ejectors and release of weapons.
PREARM/OFF Consent Switch
The prearm/off switch gives the pilot the capability to provide consent to
allow prearming commands to be sent to nuclear weapons.
Change 22
1-618A
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Authorized Mixed External Weapon Loads
PYLON NO. 1
PYLON NO. 2
6 GBU-31(V)1/B
6 GBU-31(V)3/B
6 GBU-31(V)1/B
6 GBU-31(V)5/B
6 GBU-31(V)1/B
8 CBU-103
6 GBU-31(V)1/B
8 CBU-104
6 GBU-31(V)1/B
8 CBU-105
6 GBU-31(V)1/B
8 CBU-107
6 GBU-31(V)3/B
6 GBU-31(V)5/B
6 GBU-31(V)3/B
8 CBU-103
6 GBU-31(V)3/B
8 CBU-104
6 GBU-31(V)3/B
8 CBU-105
6 GBU-31(V)3/B
8 CBU-107
6 GBU-31(V)5/B
8 CBU-103
6 GBU-31(V)5/B
8 CBU-104
6 GBU-31(V)5/B
8 CBU-105
6 GBU-31(V)5/B
8 CBU-107
8 CBU-103
8 CBU-104
8 CBU-103
8 CBU-105
8 CBU-103
8 CBU-107
8 CBU-104
8 CBU-105
8 CBU-104
8 CBU-107
8 CBU-105
8 CBU-107
6 AGM-86C
6 AGM-86D
NOTE
Pylon 1 and Pylon 2 may refer to either the right or the left pylon, and vice versa.
Figure 1-176A
1-618B
Change 22
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Authorized Weapons
WEAPON TYPE
WEIGHT CLASS/ACTUAL
NO. LOADED
CLUSTER RACKS
(THREE RACKS)
INTERNAL (ALL AIRCRAFT)

NONNUCLEAR
BOMBS
BDU-50
M117
M117R
M117AIR
M129/M129E-1 Leaflet
MK82
MK82 AIR
500/ 1
750/823 pounds
750/867 pounds
750/852 pounds
750 pounds/ 2
500/531 pounds
500/554 pounds
27
27
27
27
18
27
27
CBU
CBU-87
CBU-89/B
1000/960 pounds
750/710 pounds
6
6
LGB
GBU-12B/B, C/B, D/B (PW II)
500/624 pounds
MINES
MK62 (QS)
500/560 pounds
27
NUCLEAR
WEIGHT
AGM-86B ALCM
BDU-38/B Practice
B61-7
B83-0/B83-1
CSRL
3124 pounds
716 pounds
716 pounds
2444 pounds
8
8
8
8
AGM-86C CALCM
3267 pounds
AGM-86D CALCM (Penetrator)
3280 pounds
NONNUCLEAR
Flight data and limitations are the same for the

BDU-50 as for the MK82 with the same fin.
Minimum weight is 250 pounds.
Change 22
1-619
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Authorized Weapons (Cont)

WEAPON TYPE
NO. LOADED
(MER)
WEIGHT CLASS/ACTUAL
NO. LOADED
(HSAB)
EXTERNAL
NONNUCLEAR
BOMBS
BDU-50
BDU-56
MK82
MK82 AIR
MK84
M117
M117R
M117AIR
M129/M129E-1 Leaflet
500/ 1
2000/1970 pounds
500/531 pounds
500/554 pounds
2000/1970 pounds
750/823 pounds
750/867 pounds
750/852 pounds
750 pounds/ 2
24
24
24
24
24
18
10/12
18
18
10/12
18
18
18
18
CBU
CBU-87
CBU-89/B
1000/960 pounds
750/710 pounds
22
24
18
18
JDAM
GBU-31(V)1/B
GBU-31(V)3/B
GBU-31(V)5/B
GBU-38/B
2000/2065 pounds
2000/2165 pounds
2000/2065 pounds
500/552 pounds
12
12
12
12
LGB
GBU-10C/B, D/B, E/B (PW II)
GBU-10G/B, H/B, J/B (PW II)
GBU-12B/B, C/B, D/B (PW II)
GBU-28A/B
2000/2083 pounds
2000/2147 pounds
500/624 pounds
5000/4700 pounds
10
10
10
4
WCMD
CBU-103
CBU-104
CBU-105
CBU-107
1000/961 pounds
750/738 pounds
1000/949 pounds
1000/977 pounds
16
16
16
16
Flight data and limitations are the same for the

BDU-50 as for the MK82 with the same fin.
24
24
Minimum weight is 250 pounds.
1-620
Change 22
T.O. 1B-52H-1
WEAPON TYPE
NO. LOADED
(MER)
WEIGHT CLASS/ACTUAL
NO. LOADED
(HSAB)
EXTERNAL (CONT)
MINES
MK56 Finned
MK56 Unfinned
MK62 (QS)
MK63 (QS) (w/MAU-91 Fin)
MK63 (QS) (w/MK-12 Mod 0 Tail)
MK65 (QS)
2000/2215 pounds
2000/2150 pounds
500/560 pounds
1000/1060 pounds
1000/1011 pounds
2000/2367 pounds
MISSILES
Less [AMI] AGM-154A JSOW
AGM-158A JASSM
1000/1065 pounds
2000/2250 pounds
NUCLEAR
AGM-86B ALCM
AGM-129 ACM
NONNUCLEAR
AGM-86C CALCM
AGM-86D CALCM (Penetrator)
12
12
18
18
18
10
24
12
12
ACTUAL WEIGHT
CRUISE MISSILE PYLON
3133 pounds
3680 pounds
12
12
3267 pounds
3280 pounds
12
12
Authorized Pods
POD TYPE
WEIGHT
Litening Pod
469 pounds
ACMI
ALE-25 Pylon
93.3 pounds
LAU-105 Launcher
53.0 pounds
AN/ASQ T-35A (P4NS) Pod
124 pounds
AN/ASQ TT-29 (P4AW) Pod
124 pounds
Figure 1-177A
Change 22
1-621
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Bombing System Circuit Protection and Location

CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
EQUIPMENT
Aft Weapon
Coded Switch
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
BOMB SYSTEM AFT ALT

WEAPON
IFC
PARA STATIC LINE CONTR
ABNS/A26
ABNS/A27
ABNS/A25
Fwd Batt.
Rt. TR
AC Bus 3
BOMB SYSTEM
CODED SWITCH SET
ABNS/A24
Rt. TR
BOMB SYSTEM EXTERNAL

CONVENTIONAL
ARM
EXTERNAL CONTROL
ABNS/B16
ABNS/B20
Left TR
Left TR
BOMB SYSTEM FWD ALT

WEAPON
IFC
PARA STATIC LINE CONTR
ABNS/B26
ABNS/B27
ABNS/B25
Fwd Batt.
Left TR
AC Bus 3
BOMB SYSTEM
IND LIGHTS WPN REL
ABNS/A15
Left TR
BOMB SYSTEM JETTISON

CONTR
PWR
RFBNS/B18
RFBNS/B19
Aft Batt.
Aft Batt.
BOMB SYSTEM
SPL WPN RACK SELECT
ABNS/A16
Left TR
RFBNS/B20
Left TR
ABNS/B15
Left TR
CSRL Circuit Protection See HYDRAULIC POWER SUPPLY

SYSTEM CIRCUIT PROTECTION AND LOCATION, This Section.
External Conventional
Forward Weapon
Indicator Lights
Jettison Control
Rack Select
Weapon Release
11
BOMB SYSTEM
NORMAL RELEASE
BOMB SYSTEM EXTERNAL
CONVENTIONAL
NORMAL RELEASE
ABNS
RFBNS
Figure 1-178
1-622
T.O. 1B-52H-1
MISSILE SYSTEM
DESCRIPTION
AGM-129 DESCRIPTION
The missile launch system provides the aircraft

with a means of carrying, prearming, launching/releasing and controlling nuclear and nonnuclear
missiles. The bomb bay has provisions for the CSRL
capable of carrying up to eight missiles. External
missiles can be carried on the cruise missile pylon
or the heavy stores adaptor beam (HSAB). The aircrew must be familiar with the applicable missile
delivery manual to ensure an adequate knowledge
of the requirements, limitations, and restrictions of
the system. Missile system circuit protection and
location information is contained in figure 1-179.
A total of 12 AGM-129 missiles may be loaded externally for launch against preprogrammed targets.
Each left and right underwing pylon will accommodate six missiles. Missile unlock control and missile
prearm require pilot-navigator action. Other missile armament monitor and control functions are
provided at the navigators station. Missile programming and launch are navigator responsibilities. Jettison capability is provided the pilots and
navigators. For further information, refer to T.O.
1B-52H-30-1.
AGM-154 DESCRIPTION
MISSILE SYSTEM CONTROLS AND INDICATORS
Aircrew controls and indicators for missile system

operations are located at both the pilots station and
the radar navigators/navigators station. Information on the missile control and indicators are found
in the respective Aircrew Weapon Delivery Manual.
A total of twelve AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapons

(JSOW) may be loaded externally for release
against inflight selected targets. Weapon control,
monitoring, and launch are the navigators responsibilities. Jettison capability is provided the pilots
and navigators. For further information, refer to
T.O. 1B-52H-34-2-7.
AGM-86B/C/D DESCRIPTION
AGM-158 DESCRIPTION
A total of 12 AGM-86B/C/D missiles may be loaded

externally on cruise missile pylons for launch
against preprogrammed targets. An additional
eight AGM-86B/C/D missiles may be carried internally. Each left and right underwing pylon will accommodate six missiles. Missile unlock control and
missile prearm require pilot-navigator action. Other missile armament monitor and control functions
are provided at the navigators station. Missile programming and launch are navigator responsibilities. Jettison capability is provided the pilots and
navigators. For further information, refer to T.O.
1B-52H-30-4 for AGM-86B and T.O. 1B-52H-34-2-9
for AGM-86C/D.
A total of twelve AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface

Standoff Missiles (JASSM) may be loaded externally for release against inflight selected targets. Weapon control, monitoring, and launch are the navigators responsibilities. Jettison capability is provided
the pilots and navigators. For further information,
refer to T.O. 1B-52H-34-2-8.
Change 22
1-623
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Missile System Circuit Protection and Location

CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
EQUIPMENT
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
CSRL Circuit Protection See HYDRAULIC POWER SUPPLY

SYSTEM CIRCUIT PROTECTION AND LOCATION, This Section.
Pylon Jettison
11
MISCELLANEOUS GAM-72
GEAR JETTISON AGM-69A
PCBP/E23
Aft Batt.
MISCELLANEOUS LEFT PYLON

JETTISON CONTROL
PCBP/E19
Rt. TR
MISCELLANEOUS RIGHT
PYLON JETTISON CONTROL
PCBP/E20
Rt. TR
PCBP
Figure 1-179
1-624
Change 22
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DESCRIPTION
Equipment circuit protection power sources are
container (15, figure 1-181) is located to the left of

the pressure bulkhead door.
WINDSHIELD WIPERS
The instructor pilots seat (27, sheet 3 of figure 1-1)

is located between the pilots and copilots seats and
aft of the aisle stand. The seat is mounted on tracks
and may be stowed by use of a locking lever
mounted on the right side of the seat. The seat is
equipped with a safety belt and shoulder harness
and is stressed for crash landing and ditching.
Electrically operated windshield wipers clear the

windows in front of the pilot and copilot. A separate
motor drives each of the two blades. Both wipers
are controlled by a single rotary-type switch (46,
figure 1-7) on the pilots instrument panel. The
switch has PARK- -OFF- -FULL- -3/4- -1/2- -LOW
positions, giving a choice of wiper speeds. The
switch is spring-loaded from PARK to OFF position.
After use, the switch is held in PARK position until
the blades move to the stowed position and stop.
The switch is then placed to OFF position.
INSTRUCTOR NAVIGATORS SEAT
The instructor navigators takeoff and landing seat

(17, figure 1-181) is located on the aft pressure
bulkhead directly below the pressure bulkhead
door. The seat is equipped with a seat cushion, safety belt, and shoulder harness. The shoulder harness
is mounted on the pressure bulkhead door. The seat
is stressed for crash landing and ditching.
The defense instructors seat (13, figure 1-183) is located directly forward of the EW officers seat. The
seat is installed on top of the chemical toilet and
may be raised and stowed to the right electronic
rack. It is equipped with a seat cushion and safety
belt and is stressed for crash landing and ditching.
TENTH CREWMEMBERS POSITION
The tenth crewmembers position is located next to

the crew bunk utilizing the forward ditching hammock facing aft (figure 1-20). The forward hammock
is stowed inside a flap marked FWD DITCHING
STATION HAMMOCK STOWAGE which is snapfastened on the aft edge of the flap. The hammock
is attached to a single point at the top and has two
studs at the bottom end which attach into flush receptacles on the walkway floor.
RELIEF EQUIPMENT
A toilet (8, figure 1-183) is located directly forward

of the EW officers seat and is mounted on the deck
floor. By the use of a hinged cover, the toilet is also
used as the defense instructors seat. A toilet paper
holder is located outboard of the toilet on the aft
end of the right electronic rack. A central urinal
Do not operate windshield wipers on dry or

dirty glass as this can scratch or damage
the glass.
NOTE
If rain repellent has been applied to the

windshield, hold windshield wiper operation to an absolute minimum as approximately 30 minutes of wiper operation will
remove the rain repellent.
BEST FLARE SPEED INDICATOR
A best flare speed indicator is installed around the

outside of the case of the total fuel quantity gage
(figure 1-180) adjacent to the fuel system panel. The
indicator is to be used prior to landing to determine
the best flare speed when using full flaps. To obtain
this information initially, the gross weight must be
computed after the aircraft is in a landing configuration based on actual load on board. Then the best
flare speed indicator is adjusted so that the computed gross weight value on the gross weight scale
is opposite the pointer on the gage. The airspeed value adjacent to the computed gross weight value is
the best flare speed for that weight with airbrakes in
position 4 and full flaps. As fuel is consumed, the total fuel quantity gage pointer will point to the aircraft gross weight and the corresponding best flare
speed for airbrakes in position 4.
Change 4
1-625
T.O. 1B-52H-1
box is covered with an elastic protective cover and
is permanently installed.
WRITING TABLES AND CLIPS
A writing table and clip are installed at the pilots

and copilots stations. Tables are installed at the
navigators station. A fold-down table and clip
(which is an integral part of the table) are stowed
above the sidewall panels at the pilots and copilots
stations. A pullout table is installed directly in front
of each navigator. The tables are automatically
stowed during seat ejection and may be stowed
manually if desired by pushing them forward. The
tables are stowed underneath the instrument
panel.
LADDER
A five-step metal ladder (18, figure 1-181) is located

on the right side in the crew compartment lower
deck. The ladder provides access between the upper
and lower decks of the crew compartment.
FOOD AND DATA BOX
A food and data box (6, sheet 3 of figure 1-1) is

installed outboard of the pilots and copilots seats.
The food and data box is used for stowage of food,
flight reports, charts, and miscellaneous data. The
CHART HOLDERS
An illuminated chart holder (2, figure 1-2) can be

installed at both pilots stations. The removable
holder can be installed on a bracket on the windshield post at the forward side of the sliding window. A lock on the outboard side of each chart holder must be pulled outboard to release the chart
holder so that it may be lifted off of the bracket. An
electrical connector is installed at the forward end
of each sidewall to provide 28-volt ac power from
the REMOTE FLOOD circuit breaker on the left
load central circuit breaker panel to the connector
on the chart holder. A hook on the copilots side
panel holds the cord out of view of the instrument
panel. The holder permits illumination of letdown
or enroute charts without allowing light to escape
into the cockpit. Controls consist of two ON- -OFF
rheostats at the bottom of the holder which regulate the intensity of white to red light. The left
rheostat controls red light intensity and the right
rheostat controls white light intensity. When removed, the chart holders are stowed in the respective pilots food and data box. The chart holders are
not interchangeable between pilots.
Best Flare Speed Indicator
CONTROLINDICATOR
FUNCTION
A best flare speed indicator is installed around the outside of the case of the total
fuel quantity gage. The indicator is to be used prior to landing to determine the
best flare speed when using full flaps and air brakes 4.
Figure 1-180
1-626
Change 4
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Navigators Compartment-Aft
Less [AMI]
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

OAS INERTIAL ELECTRONICS UNIT (IEU) 1
OAS INERTIAL ELECTRONICS UNIT (IEU) 2
SERVICE DOMELIGHT
HANDLE
VIDEO RECORDER
MRT RECEIVER
EVS COMPONENTS
LEFT EQUIPMENT RACK
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
OXYGEN REGULATOR (INSTRUCTOR

NAVIGATORS)
INSTRUCTOR NAVIGATORS INTERPHONE
CONTROL PANEL
LANDING GEAR GROUND LOCK STOWAGE
CONTAINERS
URINAL
LANDING STATION
LADDER
PORTABLE OXYGEN BOTTLE
Change 21
1-627
T.O. 1B-52H-1
[AMI]
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

SERVICE DOMELIGHT
HANDLE
VIDEO RECORDER
MRT RECEIVER
EVS COMPONENTS
LEFT EQUIPMENT RACK
OXYGEN REGULATOR (INSTRUCTOR
NAVIGATORS)
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
INSTRUCTOR NAVIGATORS INTERPHONE

CONTROL PANEL
A 9000 S/V BOX
LANDING GEAR GROUND LOCK STOWAGE
CONTAINERS
URINAL
LANDING STATION
LADDER
PORTABLE OXYGEN BOTTLE
1-628
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
THERMAL CURTAINS
FLASH DIVIDER CURTAINS
Aluminized thermal curtains (figure 1-182) are provided for each aircraft window to increase the weapons delivery capability. The curtains are provided to
cover the windows by using slides, rollers, or snaps attached to the structure surrounding the window.
They are designed so that the pilots can cover the windows without leaving their seats. The window curtains are closed by pulling knobs upward and stowing
above the windows. The overhead window curtains
are closed by pulling the curtain tabs from inboard to
outboard and snapping the tabs to the escape hatch
structure. Care must be taken to prevent scuffing,
scratching, or otherwise marring the reflective surface of the curtains. The curtains must fit closely
enough to prevent direct outside light ray (straight
line) from hitting a crewmember in his normal sitting
position. Window glass must not be visible to any
crewmember while seated in his normal position. If
either of these cases exist, the thermal curtain(s)
must be readjusted. Translucent light (bright contrasts of indirect light due to scuffing, etc.) is acceptable. However, pin holes, cuts, tears, or curtains that
cannot be adjusted to prevent direct light rays will be
cause for rejection or AFTO Form 781 entry. Light ray
penetration through curtain stitching holes is not acceptable. Two 5-inch square peepholes, one for each
pilot, are provided for forward visibility with the thermal curtains in place. Covers are provided to cover
peepholes when not in use.
Two flash divider curtains, one for each pilot, are

provided to shield the pilot or copilot when the opposite thermal curtain peephole is being used. The
divider curtains are installed with the cloth side toward the centerline of the aircraft which exposes
the black side to the pilot and copilot (figure 1-182).
The divider curtains with the aluminized silver
metal surface are installed with the gray side towards the centerline of the aircraft which exposes
the aluminized silver metal side to the pilot and copilot. The dividers are held in place by the use of
nap pile tape and hook tape. Pressing the hook
tape, which is sewed to the sides of the curtain, into
the nap pile tape attached to the top of the instrument panel cover, to each side of the center window
frame, and to the eyebrow instrument panel will secure the curtains (figure 1-182). To remove, grasp
the curtains at the top and pull down and toward
the centerline of the aircraft. The divider curtains,
when not in use, are stowed in the food and data
box outboard of the pilots and copilots seats.
NIGHT-FLYING CURTAIN
A night-flying curtain (figure 1-1) is provided to shut

out light between the aft crew station and the pilots
station. When not in use, the curtain is pulled back
and stowed with a tieback strap.
SUNSHADE CURTAINS
Thermal curtains will not be used as a sun

shade on crew training missions. use of the
curtains for this purpose subjects the curtains to abnormal wear which will eventually
cause deterioration to the point that their effectiveness as a heat shield is materially decreased.
The thermal curtains will be kept free from
grease, oil, and mold as any discoloration will
seriously impair the value of the curtains. Oil
or grease base materials will ignite upon exposure to thermal radiation. Dirty or cracked
thermal curtains will be replaced.
Roller-type sunshades are installed on the overhead

windows. The sunshades are closed by pulling the
sunshade tab from outboard to inboard and snapping the tab to the escape hatch structure.
GLARE SHIELD
A glare shield is installed on top of the forward instrument panel. The primary purpose of the glare
shield is to prevent instrument reflections in the
windshield area during night flying.
ICE BOX
Provisions for an ice box (figure 1-183) is located on

the deck floor forward of the defense instructors
seat and directly below the food warming oven.
Failure to close thermal curtains (during

SIOP missions) may result in flash blindness from nuclear detonation.
NOTE
Thermal curtains will be replaced after

each flight on which they are exposed to
radiation.
Change 21
1-628A/(1-628B blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Thermal Curtains
Figure 1-182
FOOD WARMING OVEN
FOOD STOWAGE BOXES
A food warming oven (16, figure 1-183) is located

forward and above the defense instructors seat in
the right electronic rack. DC power is supplied to
the food warming oven through a circuit breaker
marked FOOD WARMING OVEN on the MISCELLANEOUS portion of the right load central circuit
breaker panel.
Food stowage boxes (14, sheet 3 of figure 1-1) for

the EW officer are located outboard from the EW
seat. A food storage box is also located at the gunners seat (20, sheet 3 of figure 1-1). The radar navigators food stowage box (15, sheet 4 of figure 1-1)
is located aft and outboard from the RN seat. All
food and stowage boxes are portable boxes.
1-629
T.O. 1B-52H-1
HOT CUP
One hot cup unit (5, sheet 3 of figure 1-1) is located

at pilots station and defense station, and also at
the navigators station (3, sheet 4 of figure 1-1).
Each cup has a 4 1/2 cup capacity.
The crew bunk is not stressed for crash

landing or ditching. Therefore, it should not
be occupied during any takeoff or landing.
ACCESSORY EQUIPMENT
Type B-1 hot cups can explode when operated dry. To avoid injury to personnel, do
not allow the hot cups to operate without
liquid or semisolid food.
DRINKING WATER CONTAINERS
Drinking water for crewmembers is supplied in

2-gallon water containers. The primary container is
above the urinal (7, figure 1-181). Provisions for a
spare container (19, figure 1-181) are aft of the navigators portable oxygen bottle.
NOTE
If containers are not installed, stow container holder securely.

SPARE LAMPS
Five spare lamp containers provide spare lamps for

inflight replacement. The containers hold five different types of lamps. One is located on the circumferential frame of the aircraft to the right of the upstairs entrance hatch forward of the EW officer, one
on the circumferential frame of the aircraft above
and outboard of the gunners seat, one forward and
overhead of the navigator, and one by the pilots
and copilots glare shields.
PULLOUT TABLE
A pullout table (14, figure 1-183) is located in the

right electronic rack below the food warming oven.
CREW BUNK
A crew bunk (figure 1-184) is located directly behind the pilots seat and below the left load central
circuit breaker panel. The bunk is equipped with an
oxygen regulator, interphone panel, safety belt, and
a controllable domelight and switch.
1-630
Each aircraft is provided with stowage facilities for

the following accessory equipment for ground use:
pitot tube covers, landing gear ground locks, engines tailpipe shields, air intake shields, and miscellaneous external opening plugs.
STARTER CARTRIDGE AND BREECH CAP STOWAGE
A stowage rack for eight engine starter cartridges

(24, sheet 1, figure 1-1) is located in the aft wheel
well. Breech caps are stowed in the aft fuselage section.
MISSILE GROUND SAFEING EQUIPMENT STOWAGE
Safeing pins and streamers and the ground safety

pin installation and removal tool are provided. Provisions for stowage of this equipment are installed
in the forward part of the aft wheel well (19 and 20,
sheet 1, figure 1-1).
FLIGHT LOADS DATA RECORDER
60-035, 60-048, 60-056, 60-057, 61-011, 61-019 & 61-040
A flight loads data recorder is installed to record

magnetically on tape the flight loads in selected
portions of the aircraft structure. The loads transducers are located on the fin, left horizontal stabilizer, four stations on the left wing and three stations on the body. Only a portion of the transducers
can be connected at one time. The system monitors
fuel quantity, airbrake position, flap position, and
fuel totalizer reading. The recorder is connected to
the pitot-static system to record airspeed and altitude. The system is energized when the hatches are
all closed and the hatches not closed and locked
light is out, however, loads are not recorded until
the aircraft is airborne and squat switch is actuated
to air position. The recorder utilizes 28 volt ac power.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Defense Instructors Station
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
PERISCOPIC SEXTANT MOUNT

DITCHING CRASH LANDING HAMMOCK
ATTACHMENT SHACKLE
ESCAPE ROPE CONTAINER
PORTABLE OXYGEN RECHARGER
OXYGEN BOTTLE
DELETED
TOILET
HAND AXE
DITCHING CRASH LANDING HAMMOCK
STOWAGE
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
ICE BOX
PULLOUT TABLE
FIRST AID KITS
FOOD WARMING OVEN
DELETED
MODESTY CURTAIN
OXYGEN REGULATOR (DEFENSE
INSTRUCTORS)
DEFENSE INSTRUCTORS INTERPHONE
CONTROL PANEL
Figure 1-183
Change 10
1-631
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Crew Bunk
1
2
3
OXYGEN REGULATOR AND INTERPHONE

BUNK LIGHT SWITCH
CABIN MANIFOLD
4
5
6
Figure 1-184
1-632
LEFT LOAD CENTRAL CIRCUIT BREAKER

PANEL
BUNK SAFETY BELT
IFF TRANSPONDER (BEHIND PANEL)
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Miscellaneous Equipment Circuit

EQUIPMENT
Flight Loads Data Recorder
Food Warming Oven

Hot Cups
Upper Compartment Test Receptacle

Vertical (Strike) Camera
Windshield Wipers
11
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
TITLE
CB PANEL/
LOCATOR
CODE 11
POWER
SOURCE
MISCELLANEOUS
TOTAL FUEL QTY RCDR
RLC/D19
AC Bus 5
MISCELLANEOUS
FOOD WARMING OVEN
RLC/E19
AC Bus 5
MISCELLANEOUS
HOT CUP ECM & FCS
HOT CUP PILOT & COPILOT
HOT CUP
RLC/D16
RLC/F15
ABNS/B6
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 5
AC Bus 3
MISCELLANEOUS
UPPER COMPT TEST RECEP
LLC/B29
??????
CAMERA
AUTO POWER
DOOR CONTR
IND LIGHTS
MASTER POWER
REMOTE INITIATION
ABNS/B4
ABNS/B2
ABNS/B5
ABNS/B1
ABNS/B3
Rt. TR
AC Bus 1
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
Rt. TR
MISCELLANEOUS
COPILOT WINDOW WIPER
PILOTS WINDOW WIPER
RLC/D15
LLC/B25
Rt. TR
Left TR
ABNS
LLC

RLC
Figure 1-185
1-633
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Servicing
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
RIGHT WING SURGE TANK

HYDRAULIC RESERVOIR
ACCUMULATOR
NO. 3 MAIN TANK
RUDDER ELEVATOR HYDRAULIC PUMPS
POWERED RUDDER ACTUATOR
DRAG CHUTE
POWERED ELEVATOR ACTUATOR (TYPICAL)
LIQUID OXYGEN CONVERTERS
STARTER CARTRIDGES (STOWED)
AFT BODY TANK
MID BODY TANK
LEFT WING SURGE TANK
LEFT OUTBOARD WING TANK
LEFT EXTERNAL TANK
AIR BLEED SYSTEM GROUND CONNECTOR
AC GENERATOR DRIVE UNIT RESERVOIR
ENGINE OIL TANK
NO. 1 MAIN TANK
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
AGM-69A LAUNCHER HYDRAULIC ACCUMULATORS

(AIR)
NO. 2 MAIN TANK
MISSILE ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEM PRESSURIZATION
CONNECTOR (AIR)
AIR CONDITIONING GROUND CONNECTION
AFT BATTERY
AIR CONDITIONING PACK RESERVOIR
SINGLE POINT REFUELING RECEPTACLE
FORWARD BATTERY
DRINKING WATER CONTAINERS
EVS WINDOW WASH WATER TANK
AIR REFUELING RECEPTACLE
FORWARD BODY TANK
MISSILE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL UNIT (FREON)
CENTER WING TANK
NO. 4 MAIN TANK
RIGHT OUTBOARD WING TANK
RIGHT EXTERNAL TANK
1-634
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TYPE FLUID
FUEL (Recommended)
12 Tanks
FUEL (Alternate)
FUEL (Alternate)
FUEL (Emergency)
OIL (Turbine)
8 Tanks
HYDRAULIC FLUID
9 Reservoirs
GENERATOR DRIVE
UNIT OIL
4 reservoirs
WATER (EVS WINDOW
WASH)
USAF
SPECIFICATION
NATO
SYMBOL
MIL-T-5624 (JP-4)
F-40
MIL-T-83133 (JP-8)
MIL-T-5624 (JP-5)
MIL-L-7808
F-34
F-44
See Section V
O-148
MIL-H-5606
H-515
MIL-L-7808
O-148
Distilled Water
AIR CONDITIONING PACK OIL

AS SPECIFIED ON PACK NAMEPLATE
1 PACK
BATTERY WATER
DISTILLED WATER
3 BATTERIES
LIQUID OXYGEN
MIL-O-27210 TYPE II
3 CONVERTERS
STARTER CARTRIDGE
STOWAGE PROVISIONS FOR 8 TYPE MXU/4A
DRAG CHUTE
A 44-FOOT RIBBON TYPE DRAG CHUTE IS INSTALLED
IN COMPARTMENT 3 IN THE TAIL SECTION
POWER CARTS
S COMPRESSOR, TYPE MA-1A (OR EQUIVALENT)

S EXTERNAL HYDRAULIC TEST STAND, TYPE D-5A
(OR EQUIVALENT)
S GENERATOR SET, TYPE MD-3 (OR EQUIVALENT)

S EXTERNAL GROUND BLOWER, TYPE A-2
(OR EQUIVALENT)
SEXTERNAL GROUND SUPPORT BLOWER, TYPE MC-1

SPECIFICATIONS
(OR EQUIVALENT)
Change 20
1-635/(1-636 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Normal Procedures
section II
NOTE
This section contains text and an amplified checklist. The text is divided into primary paragraphs which form the phases of a normal flight.
Most of these paragraphs are followed by an amplified checklist for the
particular phase of the flight. The amplified checklist is presented in
a chronological form that will enable the flightcrew to complete their
inspection, checks, and operation of the aircraft in an expedient yet
thorough manner. The amplified checklist describes in detail the steps
to be completed. Each major part has been assigned to one of the pilots
or a crewmember to be read by him, and to be accomplished by others
in the crew. However, there are exceptions as some of the checklists will
be read and completed silently. To show which crewmember will accomplish certain steps, the normal crew coding will be used and the code
letters will appear after the response to each step. At times it may be
advantageous for the copilot to accomplish certain items designated for
the pilot and vice versa. The terms as required, as desired, climatic, and cross-checked as used in the checklist indicate equipment
operation or settings which may vary according to prevailing conditions. In practice, the response to these items will be the required
switch or control position or actual indicator reading. The amplified
checklist has also been designed to accommodate the production of the
abbreviated checklist to be used during aircraft operation.
Some system control switches are provided with a guard, such as stabilizer trim cutout, antiskid, etc. In practice, when these switches are
actuated, the desired toggle position will be ascertained and then the
guard positioned.
The thruflight checklist is integrated into the INTERIOR INSPECTION checklist and BEFORE STARTING ENGINES checklist. Thruflight checklist items are identified by an asterisk (*). The checklist has
been designed to work in conjunction with T.O. 1B-52H-6WC-1 (Inspection Work Cards) and T.O. 00-20-5 and can be used for short time stopovers away from home base as well as turn-around flights. When a
different flightcrew is to be used for the succeeding flight, the present
crew will brief them on the status of the aircraft.
Change 4
2-1
T.O. 1B-52H-1
table of contents
PREPARATION FOR FLIGHT
PREPARATION FOR FLIGHT CHECKLIST

PREFLIGHT CHECK
2-5
2-7
2-10
BEFORE EXTERIOR INSPECTION CHECKLIST
2-10
EW OFFICER NOT FLYING CHECKLIST
2-12
EXTERIOR INSPECTION
INTERIOR INSPECTION CHECKLIST

BEFORE STARTING ENGINES
BEFORE STARTING ENGINES CHECKLIST

STARTING ENGINES AND BEFORE TAXIING
STARTING ENGINES AND BEFORE TAXIING CHECKLIST
2-16
2-16
2-25
2-25
2-41
2-41
ENGINE GROUND OPERATION
2-54
TAXIING AND BEFORE TAKEOFF
2-54
TAXIING AND BEFORE LINEUP CHECKLIST
2-59
GROUND TA FUNCTIONAL CHECK CHECKLIST
2-63
TAKEOFF
TAKEOFF CHECKLIST
AFTER TAKEOFF
AFTER TAKEOFF CLIMB CHECKLIST
2-65
2-72
2-75
2-79
CLIMB
2-82
CRUISE
2-82
FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS
2-84A
AGM INFLIGHT OPERATION
2-84A
AIR REFUELING OPERATIONS
2-84B
AIR REFUELING PROCEDURES - RENDEZVOUS
2-84AW
AIR REFUELING PROCEDURES - PREPARATION FOR CONTACT
2-84AY
AIR REFUELING PROCEDURES - CONTACT
2-84BA
AIR REFUELING PROCEDURES - POST AIR REFUELING
2-84BB
AIR REFUELING DEFINITIONS
2-2
page
Change 17
2-84BJ
T.O. 1B-52H-1
table of contents (cont)
page
LOW ALTITUDE OPERATIONS
2-86
LOW LEVEL FLIGHT OPERATIONS
2-88
INFLIGHT TA FUNCTIONAL CHECK CHECKLIST
2-94
BEFORE LOW LEVEL DESCENT CHECKLIST
2-96
DESCENT, AFTER DESCENT, AND TA COMPENSATION
2-98
CLIMB AFTER LOW LEVEL CHECKLIST
2-106
BOMBING
2-107
HOLDING
2-107
DESCENT
2-107
DESCENT CHECKLIST
TRAFFIC PATTERN
TRAFFIC PATTERN CHECKLIST

APPROACH
AIRBORNE RADAR APPROACHES
LANDING
LANDING CHECKLIST
GO-AROUND
GO-AROUND CHECKLIST
TOUCH-AND-GO LANDING
TOUCH-AND-GO LANDING CHECKLIST

TAXI-BACK LANDING
TAXI-BACK LANDING CHECKLIST

QUICK TURN
QUICK TURN CHECKLIST

AFTER LANDING
AFTER LANDING CHECKLIST
2-110
2-112
2-112
2-117
2-123
2-133
2-136
2-137
2-139
2-142
2-143
2-145
2-145
2-146B
2-146B
2-148
2-148
ENGINE SHUTDOWN
2-151
BEFORE LEAVING AIRCRAFT
2-151
BEFORE LEAVING AIRCRAFT CHECKLIST
2-151
Change 17
2-3
T.O. 1B-52H-1
table of contents (cont)
STRANGE FIELD PROCEDURES
EXTERIOR INSPECTION CHECKLIST
2-157
2-158
NUCLEAR ALERT PROCEDURES
2-165
RECOCKING CHECKLIST
2-167
UNCOCKING CHECKLIST
2-171
DAILY ALERT PREFLIGHT CHECKLIST
2-173
QUICK REACTION RECOCKING CHECKLIST

(Power-On Configuration Copilot reads)
2-178
QUICK REACTION SCRAMBLE CHECKLIST

(Power-On Configuration CP/EW reads)
2-182

(Power-Off Configuration Copilot reads)
2-184

(Power-Off Configuration CP/EW reads)
2-187
GROUND CREW PROCEDURES
2-189
GROUND CREW CHECKLIST
2-189
ALERT LINE PREPARATION
2-189
GROUND CREW SCRAMBLE
2-191
EMERGENCY TAXI PROCEDURES
EMERGENCY TAXI CHECKLIST
2-4
page
2-192
2-192
ACCEPTANCE AND/OR FUNCTIONAL CHECK FLIGHT CHECKS
2-201
LONG ENDURANCE FLIGHTS
2-201
Change 17
T.O. 1B-52H-1
PREPARATION FOR FLIGHT

FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS

!

"#$% % &' ()))) *
+,
"

* . #
,
/, 0
,1 0

2 ())))
+,
"

- ,
2 03
(! * 4
, 56)78795) :!
5! %

; 0 , + -
5))7879)) : + 2 5<) : ,
; 0

/, 0

-!

,= * 2

!
9! , , ,

>
2
,1 0

+5))7875<) :- .

, ! "
,

> 95)
:!
FLIGHT PLANNING

; ,

/,

,
; ,
0 0 !!
(&<5#((!

, ?
; 0
, 2;

0, !
FUEL SERVICING
%
?
1 1 ,
;
1 0
2! ; ? ,
0 , 0
, 0 2 2
* @6( 2 ?
0 ;
, 0 A! *
*" % %&"
(( !! (& <5#((!
TAKEOFF AND LANDING DATA CARDS
A, ? 0

? 0

,

5 6 !! (&<5#((!

,
? ; 0
, 2;
0, !
WEIGHT AND BALANCE
? ? 0

0
20 0! A?

/, , 1 !
20

! % ? 0 2 0
,

! !! ((&B)
# ? '0 & % 20

0 ! , 4,

,
&<5
, ! (5)(
; 0 >

! 4,
C)6C@5

,
; 0 >

!
? *
9C<B +* *-
20
0
0! (( !!
(&<5#((
;!

,
,
* *!
CHECKLISTS
0 , ?

1
0

; ; ,
0

2
2, 2

,

2 ,
0,
,! ,
?

,

A%"

!
NOTE
*
0, 0

2
0

A%"

!
'

; 2

/,

;

!
Nuclear Bombs
,
?
?

!! (&<5#5<5! !!

(&<5#5<5A( "A & & %D
A%" 2

?
2 1 ,

/, !
2 0 ?

!!E
(&<5#5<5 (&<5#5<5A(3
? ,

? ,
0 ; ,
Nonnuclear Weapons
, 2
,

!! (&<5#9B5(! , ' %1;
1 ,
+!! (&<5#9B5(A(2

?
2
1 ,

/, !
JDAM/WCMD Weapons
F% .'A % 2
,
!! (&<5#9B5C! ' 1

; 1 ?
,
+!! (&<5#
9B5CA( F% !! (&<5#9B5CA5
'A %- 2

?

2 1 ,

/, !
Change 15
2-5
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Missiles
AGM CHECKLISTS
Missile procedures (NORMAL) are contained in

Section II of the appropriate missile delivery manual as complete checklists.
Amplified checklists for missile procedures are published in the applicable T.O. 1B-52H-30 series manual
for nuclear armed missiles and T.O. 1B-52H-34-2 series manual for nonnuclear armed missiles. The corresponding abbreviated checklists are published in
the applicable T.O. 1B-52H-30 or T.O. 1B-52H-34-2
series abbreviated checklist.
2-6
Change 16
T.O. 1B-52H-1
PREPARATION FOR FLIGHT CHECKLIST

NOTE
The following items should be checked by the pilot prior to flight.

1. Flight Crew Information File Checked (P)
2. Form 175 Checked (P)
The pilot will complete Form 175 with related attachments in accordance with prescribed procedures.
3. Form 365-4 Completed (CP)
The copilot will compute the Form 365-4 in accordance with T.O. 1B-52H-1-1.
4. Takeoff & Landing Data & Fuel Prediction Curve Completed (CP)
a. Copilot assures that this data is computed in accordance with T.O. 1B-52H-1-1.
b. The minimum items to be accomplished will include all entries on the takeoff data checklist card.
The takeoff data card in T.O. 1B-52H-1CL-1 need not be filled in when a computer generated
takeoff data form is used.
5. Pilots Route Map Completed as required (P-CP)
6. Takeoff Abort & Touch-And-Go Procedures Reviewed (P-CP)
7. Crew Briefing Completed (P)
a. Announce assembly time.
b. Brief all crewmembers on required clothing, equipment, etc.
c.
Brief all crewmembers on crew report procedures.
d. All crewmembers will be familiar with their procedures for emergency ground egress. This includes: position for takeoff and landing, procedures for hatch jettisoning, primary and emergency
ground egress exits, interphone, abandon light signals, and procedures after exiting aircraft.
e.
Brief all crewmembers to configure personal locator beacon lanyards per mission requirements.
For peacetime operations, the lanyard will be snapped. When mission requirements dictate the
necessity to avoid detection and automatic actuation of the beacon is not desired, the lanyard
will be unsnapped.
NOTE
The lanyard should be resnapped once automatic operation is desired.
Change 12
2-7
T.O. 1B-52H-1
PREPARATION FOR FLIGHT CHECKLIST (Cont)

f.
All crewmembers will be familiar with their procedures for controlled bailout. This includes:
primary and secondary exits, interphone verbiage, and abandon light signals.
(1) Interphone is the primary means of crew warning. The command is Bailout.
(2) Alert or Intermittent Signal Prepare for planned crash landing or ditching; alert signal
repeated prior to impact.
(3) Abandon or Steady Signal Abandon aircraft; if above minimum altitude, bailout; on land
or water, exit out escape hatches on abandon signal after aircraft has stopped.
(4) Minimum Bailout Altitudes:
Extra Crewmembers
ft
Downward Ejection
ft
Upward Ejection
ft
Bailout Order N, IN, DI, 10TH IP, G, EW, RN, CP, P
(5) For planned crash landing, all crewmembers not essential to flight will bailout if time and
conditions permit.
g. The pilot will brief all crewmembers that in the event of loss of control of the aircraft, or a need
to eject in a low altitude environment, those crewmembers occupying ejection seats should eject
immediately upon receiving the bailout order over the interphone or when the abandon light
comes on. Extra crewmembers will bail out any opening available.
When the aircraft is below 2000 feet above the terrain or if aircraft control is lost at any altitude, crewmembers occupying ejection seats
should eject immediately upon receiving the bailout command by either
interphone or abandon signal. All crewmembers should be aware of the
urgent need for action when the aircraft commander fails to or is unable to command bailout.
h. Brief all crewmembers on when parachutes, helmets, oxygen masks, and life preserver units
(LPUs) are to be worn. Parachutes, when not being worn, will be located in a manner so as to
be immediately available. Designate a crewmember to preflight the upper deck spare parachutes.
Spare parachutes will be unbuckled and stowed in an easily accessible location.
i.
All crewmembers will be familiar with the location and use of the fire extinguishers, first aid
kits, crash axe, and escape ropes. Spare parachutes will be located in each crew area.
j.
Upper Deck Sliding Hatch. The upper deck sliding hatch will be closed and locked when any
crewmember is required to move about or conduct any activity in the area of the hatch.
The upper deck sliding hatch will be open and locked prior to starting
engines, takeoff, air refueling, low level activity, planned unusual maneuvers, penetration, and landing.
2-8
T.O. 1B-52H-1
PREPARATION FOR FLIGHT CHECKLIST (Cont)

k. Oxygen Report Briefing
Copilot requests oxygen check at level-off and during cruise at 1-hour intervals when cabin altitude is below 12,000 feet, at 30-minute intervals when cabin altitude is 12,000 to 25,000 feet,
and at no longer than 10-minute intervals when cabin altitude is above 25,000 feet. If cabin
altitude is below 12,000 feet, only the pilot/copilot will report. Oxygen checks are not required
below 10,000 feet MSL. The remaining crewmembers will check their equipment and report
when complete.
l.
Station Checks
Pilot and copilot accomplish station checks at level-off, at approximately 30-minute intervals
during cruise, and prior to leaving crew positions during flight. A check for system operation and
proper switch settings for prevailing conditions will be made during each station check.
Station Checks Will Include:
(1) Circuit Breakers
(2) Generators
(3) Fuel Panel
(4) Engine Instruments
(5) Oxygen Quantity
(6) Hydraulic Systems
(7) Anti-Icing Systems
(8) Update AHRS
(9) CG/FLAS
m. Equipment Stowage
Brief crew and extra crewmembers regarding stowing and securing of personal equipment, extra
parachutes, and extra equipment, and the need for constant vigilance during flight to assure that
hot air ducts, outlets, electrical wiring, and electronic equipment areas are free of combustible
materials.
NOTE
Do not use the K-17 camera compartment for storage of equipment other than a properly installed K-17 camera.
n. Long Endurance Flights
Special missions requiring long endurance flights are authorized to carry additional items to
facilitate aircrew rest and provide for necessary food and liquid nourishment. Additional crew
rest and food stowage/preparation equipment is restricted to those items authorized by the flight
manual and the major air command. Specific equipment loading plans will be standardized and
published by each unit and approved by the major subordinate command. This extra equipment
will be stowed, in accordance with approved unit plans, and secured so as to avoid hazardous
locations near air conditioning ducts/outlets, electrical equipment/wiring, flight controls, ejection
seats, and emergency exits. Briefing and preflight checklists requirements on proper stowage of
extra equipment will be completed in accordance with applicable crewmembers checklists.
Change 12
2-9
T.O. 1B-52H-1
PREFLIGHT CHECK
BEFORE EXTERIOR INSPECTION CHECKLIST
NOTE
The crew chief will have Form 781 available to the pilot and the wing
flaps extended when the flightcrew arrives at the aircraft (station
time).
1. Aircraft Form 781 Reviewed (P)
Pilot checks Form 781 to ascertain the status of equipment necessary for anticipated flight. Each
discrepancy noted will be discussed with the crewmember concerned. Pilot or applicable crewmember
checks all entries on Form 781C to ascertain that avionics configuration and load status documents
for items such as ammunition, chaff, photographic equipment, etc, conforms to the mission requirements. If missiles are carried, check status of aircraft systems which may be pertinent to launch
or simulated launch. Ascertain the engineering status of each missile, and the correct payload section
loading for each missile as required for the mission. Pilot compares the fuel load and distribution
as planned on Form 200 with that shown on line 3 of block 1 of Form 6. The line 3 entry on AFTO
Form 6 will be present for aft body, outboard wing, and external tanks. All other tanks will be
compared to the line 2 entry on AFTO Form 6. With the crew chief, verify the status of both maintenance free battery chargers, (BATTERY READY light ON, and BATTERY FAULT and CHARGER
FAULT indicator latches solid black).
2. Ground Crew Briefed (P)
a. Stabilizer Trim Check.
Brief the ground crewmember that he will report the movement of the leading edge of the stabilizer and when the stabilizer reaches 0 position during the trim check.
b. Alarm System Check.
Brief the ground crewmember that he will check the alarm system in the bomb bay during the
crew report and report condition to the pilot.
c.
External Starting Air Check.

Brief the ground crewmember to give actual psi on external starting air.
d. Ground Emergency Procedures.

(1) Brief the ground crewmember on procedures to be followed in the event of an engine fire or
other emergency. Emphasize crew egress in the event of a spreading engine fire or of fire
burning into the wing.
(2) Brief the ground crewmember to ensure all equipment stowed in the aft equipment compartment (47 section) is completely secured in order to prevent damage to systems located in the
aft compartment.
2-10
Change 10
T.O. 1B-52H-1
BEFORE EXTERIOR INSPECTION CHECKLIST (Cont)

e.
Taxi-Out Procedures.
Brief the ground crewmember on the direction of taxi out, and sequence in relation to other
aircraft.
f.
Connect External Power for Lighting (as required).

Exterior and interior lights may be utilized at the discretion of the pilot to assist in loading
equipment and in the interior preflight. Brief the ground crewmember to connect external power
to aircraft after RADAR NAVIGATORS, NAVIGATORS, and EW OFFICERS BEFORE EXTERIOR INSPECTION checklist has been accomplished (if applicable). Ground crewmember or
other crewmember may then enter the aircraft and place ground power on central bus.
Wearing the chemical defense aircrew ensemble, including plastic boots

and overcape, can cause a buildup of static electricity. For this reason,
aircrews will ground themselves on the aircraft grounding cable prior
to entry to aircraft when the aircrew ensemble is worn.
NOTE
If nuclear bombs are aboard, the applicable BOMB PREFLIGHT checklist of T.O. 1B-52H-25-2CL-1 will be used. Radar navigator and navigator will complete the BEFORE EXTERIOR INSPECTION checklist
prior to the bomb preflight.
Prior to preflight of the MC-1 bomb, refer to T.O. 1B-52H-34-2-1, Section I for weapon characteristics and peculiarities.
2-11
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EW OFFICER NOT FLYING CHECKLIST

The pilot or other designated crewmember will accomplish the following checklist as required.
BEFORE EXTERIOR INSPECTION (POWER-OFF)
1. Ejection Seat Arming Levers (EW and Gunners Seats) Stowed, No. 1 safety pins installed and locked
If the arming lever(s) has been rotated on a stowed armrest, raising the
armrest will fire the arming initiator. If the arming lever(s) has been
rotated or the arming lever(s) safety pin is not installed, call
maintenance immediately and stay clear of the seat.
2. Ground Emergency Egress Handle (EW and Gunners Seats) Stowed, No. 6 safety pin installed and
locked
If the ground emergency egress handle is rotated or the No. 6 safety pin
is not installed, call maintenance immediately and stay clear of the seat.
3. ECM Equipment, Chaff & Flare Power Switches OFF
4. WING CHAFF CONT PWR, FLARE EJECTOR POWER, FLARE EJECTOR PROGRAM POWER,
ROCKET POD (2) & WARNING RCVR AC Circuit Breakers OUT
Prior to application of electrical power, ensure that all systems are

deactivated to prevent inadvertent jamming or dispensing of
expendables with the application of electrical power.
5. Less
DT
SYS 15 & 16 IND CONT Circuit Breaker Out
6. SI Control & Display Circuit Breakers Out

7. CM SET Circuit Breakers Out
NOTE
ALQ-122, ALQ-153, and ALQ-172 system status cannot be determined

until power is available to the system(s). An internal self-protection
circuit will ensure the ALQ-172 will remain off until the POWER
switch is activated, following the application of external power to the
aircraft. The ALQ-122 and the ALQ-153 must be checked after external
power is applied to aircraft to ensure the systems are off.
8.
DT
ALQ-172 CDU Circuit Breaker Out
9. ALQ-153 OFF
10. ALQ-122 OFF
11. Hot Cup OFF
EXTERIOR INSPECTION
1. ALE-20 Safety Interlock Switch Door Streamer removed, closed
2-12
Change 20
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EW OFFICER NOT FLYING CHECKLIST (Cont)

INTERIOR INSPECTION
1. DI Oxygen System OFF and 100% OXYGEN

2. EW Officers Oxygen System OFF and 100% OXYGEN
3. Gunners Oxygen System OFF and 100% OXYGEN
4. 10th Mans Oxygen System OFF and 100% OXYGEN
5. Air Outlet & Auxiliary Heat Knobs:
a. Upper As desired
b. Lower Full out
6. Refuel Valve Emergency Control Lever Center
7. IFF:
a. IFF Mode 4 Computer Encoded
Load the cryptographic variables using an electronic fill device.
- - - - - - KYK-13 Key Loading - - - - - -
(1) Mode Select Switch OFF/CHECK

(2) Fill Cable Connect
Remove the dust cover from the fill connector port of the KI-1C and connect the KYK-13 to
the KI-1C using the fill cable.
NOTE
The KYK-13 may be connected directly to the KI-1C fill port and keys
loaded without using the fill cable.
(3) Address Select Switch Set
Set the address select switch to the position where the first key is stored.
(4) Mode Select Switch ON
(6) Address Select Switch Set
Set the address select switch to the position where the second key is stored.
2-13
T.O. 1B-52H-1

(7) Mode Select Switch ON
Observe that the KI-1C fill LED flashes once.
NOTE
If the fill LED doesnt flash after both keys are loaded, the keys did not
load properly. Check the KYK-13 for serviceability and that correct keytapes have been loaded. Repeat steps (1) and (3) through (7).
(9) Fill Cable Disconnect
Disconnect the KYK-13 from the KI-1C and replace the fill connector port dust cover.
- - - - - - KOI-18 Key Loading - - - - - -1.a.
(1) Fill Cable Connect

Remove the dust cover from the fill connector port of the KI-1C and connect the KOI-18 to
the KI-1C using the fill cable.
(2) First Keytape Load
Insert the first keytape and slowly pull it through the KOI-18.
NOTE
Ensure the tape is correctly inserted with the guide holes in the tape
aligned with the dots on the flip-up cover of the KOI-18.
Never pull the tape backwards through the KOI-18. Doing so could
cause damage to or distortion of the tape, causing the tape to be unusable.
(3) Fill Cable Disconnect, then reconnect

NOTE
The fill cable must be disconnected then reconnected in order to successfully load the second key.
2-14
T.O. 1B-52H-1

(4) Second Keytape Load
Insert the second keytape and slowly pull it through the KOI-18 while observing that the
fill LED flashes once.
NOTE
Ensure the tape is correctly inserted with the guide holes in the tape
aligned with the dots on the flip-up cover of the KOI-18.
Never pull the tape backwards through the KOI-18. Doing so could
cause damage to or distortion of the tape, causing the tape to be unusable.
If the fill LED doesnt flash after both keys are loaded, the keys did
not load properly. Check the KOI-18 for serviceability and that correct
keytapes are being used. Repeat steps (2) through (4).
(5) Fill Cable Disconnect

Disconnect the KOI-18 from the KI-1C and replace the fill connector port dust cover.
(6) Keytapes Remove and stow
Return the keytapes to the appropriate storage location (Comm kit).
A keytape should not be left in the KOI-18 reader head for an extended
period of time. This will shorten fill battery life.
b. IFF Mode 2 Set
Set to appropriate setting if required.
AFTER LEVEL OFF
1. Air Outlet & Auxiliary Heat Knobs Adjusted (CP notified)

a. Upper As desired
b. Lower Full out
NOTE
Adjustments should occur at planned level-off altitude and after cabin

temperature has stabilized. Settings may be other than stated above
provided the copilot is notified for each change of setting.
POSTFLIGHT
1. ALE-20 Safety Interlock Switch Door Opened, streamer installed
2-15
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EXTERIOR INSPECTION
Because of the size and complexity of the aircraft,
the detailed inspection will have been completed by
qualified ground crew personnel. The flightcrew exterior inspection is an inspection of general aircraft
condition. This inspection is based on the assumption that the flightcrew is merely accepting the aircraft for flight with emphasis on the items that affect the safety of flight. The exterior inspection is
designed to be accomplished normally by an qualified pilot and copilot. During the inspection, emphasis will be directed toward checking for hydraulic leaks, fuel leaks, and general condition. Additional flightcrew preflight need not be accomplished
unless normal ground support is not available. See
STRANGE FIELD PROCEDURES, this section, for
amplified checklist. For missile/weapon preflight,
see ALERT PROCEDURES, this section, for amplified checklist.
INTERIOR INSPECTION CHECKLIST

*1. Load Central Circuit Breakers IN (P-CP)
2. IP Oxygen Regulator OFF and 100% (CP)
3. Pilot & Copilot Oxygen Bottles Serviced and stowed (CP)
*4. Ejection Seat: (P-CP)
a. Arming Levers Stowed, No. 1 safety pins installed and locked
If the arming lever(s) has been rotated on a stowed armrest, raising the
armrest will fire the arming initiator. If the arming lever(s) has been
rotated or the arming lever(s) safety pin is not installed, call maintenance immediately and stay clear of the seat.
b. Hatch Link Checked
Check link connecting escape hatch to catapult safety pin-pull initiator.
c.
Maintenance Safety Pins No. 2, 3 & 5 Checked removed
Ensure that no streamer has been torn from a maintenance safety pin,
thus inadvertently leaving the pin installed. If a maintenance safety
pin is installed, the status of the seat will be ascertained prior to removal of the pin.
2-16
T.O. 1B-52H-1
INTERIOR INSPECTION CHECKLIST (Cont)

d. Catapult Initiator Safety Pin-Pull Cylinder Pin in place
Catapult initiator safety pin should extend through the catapult initiator. If pin is pulled out,
initiator may have been fired; call maintenance immediately.
e.
Manual Catapult Pin-Pull Lever Checked

Lever latched, pin-pull cylinder secured.
f.
Initiator Tube Runs Checked connected

Check tubes for proper and secure connections.
g. Inertia Reel Checked

Check inertia reel lock for proper functioning.
h. Safety Belt & Shoulder Straps Connected
*5. Parachute Preflight: (P-CP)
a. Inspection Record:
(1) Inspection & Repack Date Checked
(2) Automatic Release Time & Altitude Setting Checked
b. Personal Locator Beacon Lanyard Snapped
For peacetime operations, the personal locator beacon lanyard will be configured for automatic
operation. When mission requirements dictate the necessity to avoid detection and automatic
actuation of the beacon is not desired, the lanyard will be unsnapped for manual operation.
c.
Bailout Bottle Pressure & Hose Connector Checked
d. Parachute Arming Lanyard Anchor Installed
Ensure that the parachute arming lanyard anchor is securely fastened

in the attachment fitting on the seat. Failure to attach the lanyard anchor to the seat will necessitate manual operation after ejection.
e.
Parachute Straps Adjusted
f.
UWARS Checked
Check security of fittings.
NOTE
UWARS BIT is a maintenance function. Do not perform UWARS BIT

since excessive BIT checks will degrade battery life.
Change 17
2-17
T.O. 1B-52H-1

*6. Global Survival Kit: (P-CP)1.
a. Kit Installed & Plunger Depressed Checked
b. Kit Release Handle Checked down
c.
Mode Selector Lever AUTO
d. Kit Straps to Parachute Checked and attached

Check that the attachment fittings are properly connected to the kit, the attachment straps
threaded through the safety belt, and the quick-disconnect fittings are properly attached to the
parachute (with release buttons on outside). Grasp each survival kit strap and perform a quick
jerk to ensure a positive link between the D-Ring and the survival kit straps.
Care will be taken to ensure that the survival kit attachment straps
are properly threaded through the safety belt.
7. PIHM Assembly Connect (as required) (P-CP)2.
a. Blower Attached and secure
Attach the blower to the blower mounting bracket on the inboard rail of the pilots ejection seat
for the pilots system, and on the Food and Data Storage Box on the copilots side panel for the
copilots system. Ensure that the blower is fastened securely in the mounting bracket.
Failure to configure the AERP System properly may result in injury or

death to aircrew member while operating in a contaminated environment.
NOTE
When seated, the crew member should configure the AERP System
with the blower hose connected to ventilation inlet, aircraft oxygen
hose connected to the chemical-biological canister and the crossover
valve in the vertical position.
When not seated, the crew member should configure the AERP System
with aircraft oxygen hose disconnected, the blower hose connected to
the chemical-biological canister, and the crossover valve in the horizontal position.
b. Blower Electrical Connector Connected

Remove the dust cover from the Blower Electrical receptacle and connect the blower into the
electrical receptacle.
2-18
Change 10
T.O. 1B-52H-1

c.
Oxygen Regulator Set

While holding breath, position the Supply Lever to ON and the Emergency Oxygen Toggle Lever
to EMERGENCY.
Hold breath until steps d. and e. are complete. This will preclude the
inhaling of toxic chemicals during the changeover from blower air to
the aircraft oxygen system.
d. Blower Hose Disconnect
Disconnect the Blower Hose from the QD pigtail adapter.
e.
Aircraft Oxygen Connected

Connect the aircraft oxygen hose to the QD. Resume breathing.
If signs of hypoxia occur at high attitudes, ensure the oxygen system

quick disconnect (QD) fittings are properly connected and descend to a
safe altitude as required.
f.
Blower Hose Connected
Pilot Prior to getting in the seat, ensure that the blower hose is properly
routed through the strap assembly on the back of the seat, and then routed
under the right armrest of the seat. After setting down in the seat, ensure
that the blower house is routed under the aircraft oxygen hose. After checking
that the blower hose is properly routed, connect it to the ventilation inlet hose
on the PIHM manifold.
Copilot Ensure that the blower hose is properly routed under the right armrest of the seat. After checking the hose routing, connect it to the ventilation
inlet hose on the PIHM manifold.
Connect the blower hose to the ventilation inlet hose on the PIHM manifold.
Crewmembers using upward ejection seats will ensure that blower hose
is under seat armrest before hooking it up to the PIHM manifold.
2-19
T.O. 1B-52H-1

g. Crossover Valve Vertical
Rotate the valve to the vertical position and check that oxygen from the aircraft system is flowing
into the mask and that filtered ambient air from the blower is flowing through the defog tubes.
h. Oxygen Regulator Emergency Toggle Lever NORMAL
i.
Intercom Unit Disconnect and stow
j.
PIHM Communication Cord Connect

Connect the PIHM communication cord to the aircraft communication cord.
k. PIHM Manifold Connect

Connect the manifold to the CRU-60/P bracket located on the parachute harness.
l.
Emergency Oxygen Hose Connect

Connect the Emergency Oxygen hose to the fitting on the manifold.
*8. Oxygen System Checked (P-CP)3.

The following items may be accomplished silently:
a. Regulator Diluter Lever 100% OXYGEN
b. Shutoff Lever OFF
c.
Mask & Hose - Check disconnect, then reconnect mask and hose
Ensure that oxygen supply hose is under seat armrest before hookup
with oxygen mask hose.
d. Diluter Valve Checked
Attempt to draw air through the oxygen mask. Ability to draw air indicates a defective diluter
valve, oxygen hose, and/or connections or mask.
e.
Regulator Diluter Lever NORMAL

Place the diluter valve to NORMAL position and draw air through the mask; if unable, this
indicates that only 100% oxygen is available.
When the oxygen supply shutoff lever is positioned OFF, on the

CRU-73/A, the regulator diluter lever should automatically move to
100% OXYGEN position or it may only move halfway between the
NORMAL and 100% OXYGEN positions. When the supply shutoff lever
is positioned OFF, do not force regulator diluter lever to NORMAL as
this will break the diluter lever.
2-20
Change 10
T.O. 1B-52H-1

NOTE
f.
If the diluter valve is stuck in the 100% position, this will prohibit the
detection of smoke or fumes when use of normal oxygen is required.
If the CRU-73A regulator is installed, the crewmember will not be able
to draw air through the system with the shutoff lever OFF. The diluter
lever may be moved to NORMAL with the shutoff lever OFF on some
CRU-73A regulators. The diluter valve will be in the 100% oxygen position when the shutoff lever is OFF on all CRU-73A regulators.
Shutoff Lever ON
g. Pressure Checked
Pressure gage reads approximately 300 psi.
h. Emergency Toggle Lever TEST MASK
With mask disconnected at one side of helmet, the flow indicator should indicate continuous flow.
i.
Mask Test
Attach mask to helmet and hold breath; indicator should indicate no flow.
j.
Emergency Toggle Lever NORMAL
k. Regulator Diluter Lever NORMAL/100% (as required)

*9. Life Raft Deflation Tool Installed (P-CP)
10. EVS Monitor Optical Filters Stowed (P-CP)
NOTE
To prevent pilot distraction by a falling filter, check for proper stowage

and security of filters during interior inspection and periodically during
flight.
11. Directional Nozzles & Spray Bars - As desired
12. Pilots Side Panel: (P)4.
a. Readiness Switch Cover Closed, sealed
b. Pylon Jettison Consent Switches (2) Guards closed and sealed
*c. Circuit Breakers In
d. Missile/Munitions Consent Panel Guards closed and sealed
Prearm-Off switch and Lock-Unlock switch, check that both switches are closed and sealed (if
weapons are loaded).
Change 21
2-21
T.O. 1B-52H-1

*e. IFF Antenna BOTH
*f.
Antiskid ON, guard closed (P)
Apply firm pressure to the toggle switch when placing it to the ON position and absolutely ensure it is fully and completely on before closing
the guard.
*g. Mach Indicator ON (P)
NOTE
The Mach indicator will be unreliable and needle oscillation may occur
until sufficient pitot pressure is attained during takeoff. The pilot
should expect and disregard this oscillation.
h. Pilots MFD Display Control Panel Set, as required
*i.
Hydraulic Standby Pumps OFF
*j.
Launcher Hydraulic Control Switch OFF
*k. Rudder/Elevator Hydraulic Pumps OFF

l.
Flare Set Power OFF

The OFF position of the switch is the center position of a three-position switch. The switch locks
in the center position and is ON in the up position. The down position has no function.
13. Copilots Side Panel: (CP)5.

*a. Circuit Breakers IN
*b. Manifold Valve OPEN
*c. [EV] Fuel Enrichment Valve Switch CLOSE
*d. Engine Starter Switches Set
OFF and PNEUMATIC (for pneumatic start); START and FLIGHT (for cartridge start).
*e. AHRS SLV and set
AHRS mode select switch set to SLV. Magnetic variation switch set as follows: variation greater
than 8 East, set 15; variation between 8 East and 8 West, set zero degrees; variation greater
than 8 West, set +15. Latitude dial set to appropriate latitude. Hemisphere selection switch set
to appropriate hemisphere.
2-22
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1

f.
Generator Selector CENTRAL BUS TIE
g. Generator Drive Decouplers NORM

NOTE
If a generator drive decoupler switch is found in MON position, it is

possible the generator drive has been inadvertently decoupled. Verification by flightcrew that a generator drive is not decoupled can be made
only by starting the engine and checking the generator for operation.
*h. Battery OFF
*i.
j.
Battery Charge Test OFF

Copilots MFD Display Control Panel Set, as required
14. Air Outlet Knob Full out (P-CP)

*15. Clock Set (P-CP)
16. Landing Gear Emergency Switches Guards closed and safety wired (P)
Tip gear do not require safety wiring.
*17. Fuel System Switches OFF and CLOSED (CP)
Copilot will ensure all switches on scavenge, fuel, defuel, and air refueling panels are OFF or
CLOSED.
*18. Radar Altimeter Set 1500 feet (P-CP)
19. Yaw & Pitch SAS DISENGAGE (P)
20. Steering Ratio TAKEOFF LAND (P)
*21. Airbrakes OFF (P)
*22. Landing Gear Lever Down (CP)
Copilot will ensure landing gear handle in detent position.
Change 21
2-23
T.O. 1B-52H-1

*23. Air Conditioning Panel SET (CP)6.
a. Pressure Release Switch Guard closed
b. Bleed Selector Switch NORMAL LH INBD guard closed
c.
Air Conditioning Master Switch OFF (RAM, if cooling air connected)
The external air conditioning unit will be disconnected from the cabin
emergency ram airscoop before scoop is retracted.
d. Temperature Selector AUTOMATIC (temperature as desired)
24. Thrust Gate Checked and stowed (CP)
Check thrust gate for freedom of movement and the ability to override the thrust gate with the
throttles.
*25. Throttles CLOSED (CP)
*26. Drag Chute Lever Checked and LOCKED (CP)
Move the drag chute lever toward JETTISON. If resistance is encountered, the drag chute door is
closed and locked. If no resistance is encountered, the drag chute door has opened and the drag chute
is deployed. The drag chute will have to be checked and the door locked prior to flight.
27. Flap Lever OFF (CP)
28, Stabilizer Trim Cutout Switch Guard closed (P)
29. Lateral Trim Cutout Switch Guard closed (P)
30. Terrain Display Mode Selector OFF (CP)
31. Crosswind Crab Knob Down (P)
2-24
T.O. 1B-52H-1
BEFORE STARTING ENGINES

BEFORE STARTING ENGINES CHECKLIST (Pilot/Copilot reads)
*1. Interphone Checked (P-CP)

Pilot and copilot check for operation of the interphone system by noting sidetone. At time of turning
interphone power switch to ON, the aft battery discharging light should come on and the forward
battery discharging and end-of-life lights should remain out.
NOTE
If aft battery discharging light does not come on, turn battery switch
ON. Check that aft battery discharging light comes on and place battery switch OFF.
While the emergency dc power switch is in NORMAL and until charging TR power is available, the forward battery discharging light may
also illuminate, depending on the current sensitivity of its battery detector and the forward battery bus loads.
*2. Gyro Power ON (P)

*3. Emergency DC Power Switch EMER, checked, NORMAL (P-CP)
Copilot positions the emergency dc power switch to EMER and checks that aft battery discharging
light goes out and forward light comes on, indicating that emergency loads have transferred from
the aft battery to the forward battery. Pilot checks operation of gyro flight instruments and illumination of primary and standby ADIs, altimeter, radar altimeter, VVI, airspeed indicator, pilots DG,
pilots clock and magnetic compass on battery power. Pilot also checks standby attitude indicator
operating and off flag out of view. Pilot actuates emergency alarm switch to ALERT to check the
alarm system on emergency battery power. While in ALERT, copilot returns emergency dc power
switch to NORMAL and checks continuous operation of the alarm system. Pilot then turns emergency alarm switch to OFF. Forward battery discharging light goes out and aft light comes on upon
return to NORMAL.
NOTE
Failure of the battery discharging lights system to check satisfactorily

can also affect proper operation of the battery end of life lights. Takeoff
should not be made with a battery detector system malfunction.
If the aft battery discharging light remains on, check that the entry
lights are off.
2-25
T.O. 1B-52H-1
BEFORE STARTING ENGINES CHECKLIST (Pilot/Copilot reads) (Cont)

*4. Battery ON, lights checked (CP)
Both battery discharging lights and battery caution light should come on and end-of-life lights should
remain out.
5. (Deleted)
*6. External Power ON (CP)
External power circuit breaker position indicator will not close if phase sequence is not correct or
if generator circuit breaker is closed. Both battery discharging lights should go out.
*7. Main Tank Low Warning Light Checked on (CP)
Check main tank low warning light immediately after external power is on and prior to main tank
gages indicating 4000 pounds.
8. CG/FLAS Power Switch ON (CP)
9. Antiskid Indicator Panel Checked (CP)
a. Antiskid Test Switch GND
Check that all indicator lights are on. Failure of any light to illuminate indicates there is no
power to the antiskid shield for that wheel, and antiskid protection will not be available for that
wheel.
NOTE
If all eight lights fail to come on, confirm that the anti-skid switch is
ON.
If anti-skid switch is ON, and all lights fail to come on, call for maintenance assistance.
b. Antiskid Test Switch FLT

Check that all indicator lights are off. If any light should come on with the airplane on the
ground and the test switch placed in the FLT position, it indicates that the wheel brake for the
wheel represented by the light is in a release condition and braking will not be available to that
wheel.
NOTE
If any light comes on when the test switch is placed in the FLT position, call for maintenance assistance.
*10. IFF STBY, codes set (P)
*11. Radios ON (CP)
2-26
Change 12
T.O. 1B-52H-1

*12. Warning & Indicator Lights Press-to-test (P-CP)
Pilot and copilot press-to-test all warning and indicator lights that are not illuminated. The TACAN
TEST light will be tested during radio check. Pilot tests central caution panel lights and master
caution light. Copilot tests oil temperature overheat light and master caution light. All central caution panel lights and the marker beacon lights are checked by pressing test switch adjacent to central
caution panel. Pilot and copilot actuate lamp test switches to test EVS panel indicator lights. Press
TA test button above EVS monitor to check TA indicators. Press to test radar altimeter caution
lights. Pilot and copilot press attitude select test switch. NORM and ALT come on.
*13. Engine Fire Shutoff Switches In and checked (P-CP)
Push engine fire shutoff switches to NORMAL (in) and check fire detector system and lights by
moving the fire detector switch to TEST.
*14. EVS Power OFF (P-CP)
Check EVS power switch in OFF position by noting integral indicator not illuminated.
*15. Oxygen Quantity Checked (P)
The quantity gage needle should move toward the zero liter position when the press-to-test switch
is held depressed and should return to the initial indication when the switch is released. The pilot
compares the quantity with Form 781.
*16. Anticollision & Navigation Lights ON, STEADY and BRIGHT (P/CP)
*17. Ground, Connect & Clear Bomb Doors Connected and clear (GC)
*18. Fuel Quantity Check Completed (P-CP)
Copilot depresses fuel quantity gage press-to-test button to assure proper operation of fuel gages.
Copilot calls off individual tank identity and gage reading to the pilot who records them in the No.
2 column of the fuel log. The pilot cross-checks the fuel load dipstick readings from Form 6 with
individual tank gage reading and planned fuel load as recorded in the No. 1 column of the fuel log.
The pilot totals the individual tank gage readings and compares the total with the totalizer reading.
Copilot sets best flare speed computer ring to operating weight plus expendable stores.
NOTE
Fuel will be loaded symmetrically in the main, outboard, and external

tanks. If the difference between a gage reading and dipstick reading,
or planned fuel for tank and dipstick reading (gage reading if tank is
not dipped) appears abnormal, consult Part 10 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1 for
allowable tolerances.
Stabilizer trim should be recomputed for any one tank dipstick reading
(gage reading if not dipped) differing from the planned fuel loading by
1000 pounds or if the absolute total of the differences for all tanks
between planned fuel loading and dipstick reading (gage reading if not
dipped) exceeds 2000 pounds.
There is an allowable tolerance of 3400 pounds between the total fuel
quantity gage and the sum of all individual fuel quantity gage readings,
should individual tank sum and totalizer readings disagree in excess of
5000 pounds, individual quantity readings will be made hourly.
Change 17
2-27
T.O. 1B-52H-1

*19. Flutter Advisory Selector Switch As required (CP)
20. Radios Checked (P-CP)
a. Pilot Check VOR Equipment:
(1) Nav Mode Select Switch VOR
(2) Tune and identify a VOR station.
(3) Check that bearing pointer points to the station.
(4) Set bearing pointer indicator in the course selector window and check that CDI centers and
the TO-FROM indicator indicates TO.
(5) Rotate the course set knob 5 to check for proper CDI displacement.
(6) Rotate course set knob and check that TO changes to FROM indication after approximately
90 of course selector change.
b. Pilot Checks TACAN Equipment:
(1) Nav Mode Selector Switch TACAN
(2) Tune and identify a TACAN station.
(3) Repeat steps (3) thru (6) above using TACAN.
(4) Check TACAN range indicator warning flag out of view and distance indicates correctly.
(5) Set X-Y channel selector and select any channel that cannot be received in the area where
the test is being accomplished.
(6) Select CDI course of 180.
(7) Momentarily depress test switch.
(a) Test light momentarily flashes.
(b) DME mask and course warning flag on ADI in view.
(c) HSI bearing pointer moves to 270.
(d) DME mask and course warning flag on ADI drive out of view.
(e) DME shows 000.0 (0.5); bearing pointer shows 180 (3).
NOTE
DME readings of 300.0 or 399.5 are indications of negative distance

and is not a malfunction.
2-28
T.O. 1B-52H-1

(f) Course deviation indicator centered (1/2 dot) and TO-FROM indicator on HSI indicates
TO.
NOTE
Test indications last about 15 seconds.
See Section I for more detailed information about functions.
(8) Test Light Off

If test light remains on, the AN/ARN-118 system is malfunctioning and all TACAN
information should be disregarded.
NOTE
c.
REC mode may be used. DME will not be available, but other indications will function normally if the TACAN test light does not stay on.
With the exception of DME, test cycle will function the same way.
Test switch may be used as an inflight confidence test of the AN/ARN118 equipment.
Copilot checks primary and secondary radios and obtains altimeter setting. Copilot checks operation of LOS radio ARC-171(V) as follows:
(1) Interphone selector switch to UHF No. 2.
(2) LOS radio function select switch on BOTH. The LOS PMT light on the SATCOM control at
the gunners station will illuminate if SATCOM control mode selector is not in OFF/SATL.
(3) Rotate the test initiate selector switch to LAMP. After TEST FAULT light comes on, return
test initiate selector to OPR.
(4) Set MAIN and GUARD SQUELCH switches to ON, and GUARD-PRESET-MANUAL switch
to PRESET.
(5) Set CHANNEL selector switch for the operating frequency listed on the write-on frequency
chart.
2-29
T.O. 1B-52H-1

d. Copilot checks liaison radio for reception. Allow 30 seconds warmup time for proper system operation.
Ground transmissions of the liaison radio are prohibited on aircraft

within 200 feet of any of the following:
Nuclear weapons loaded in an aircraft (transmitting, or adjacent)
with its bomb bay doors open.
Hazardous RF voltages can exist between the aircraft skin and ground
when transmissions are being made with the liaison radio.
NOTE
This does not prohibit receiver operation on the ground.

e.
Liaison Radio OFF (if transmission check is not required)
21. KY-100 Secure Voice System
DU
Set and checked (CP-N)
a. Interphone Selector Switch On (N-CP)

b. UHF Command (AN/ARC-164 or AN/ARC-210) Radio On, frequency tuned (as required) (CP)f.
c.
COMSEC MODE CONTROL Panel Set (N)

(1) PTT SELECT DIRECT
(2) BASEBAND-DIPHASE Switch BASEBAND
(3) KY/RAD Select AN/ARC-164 or AN/ARC-210
d. Z-AVH Remote Control Panel Set (CP)g.

(1) PRESET Switch MAN
(2) MODE Switch CT
(3) DISPL & PNL Switches Adjusted (as desired)
e.
KY-100 MTU Set (N)h.

(1) PRESET Switch MAN
(2) DISPL & PNL Switches Adjusted (as desired)
2-30
Change 17
T.O. 1B-52H-1

f.
KY-100 MODE Switch CT (N)
g. Fill Device Connect to KY-100 FILL connector (N)

Using the fill cable, connect the fill device to FILL connector on the KY-100 MTU.
h. Fill Device Mode Switch ON (N)
i.
Fill Device Storage Registers Load (N-CP)i.
j.
KY-100 PRESET Switch Set as required (N)
k. Fill Device Mode Switch OFF (N)

l.
Fill Device & Cable Disconnected (N)
m. KY-100 MODE Switch Set (as desired) (N)

n. Z-AVH Remote Control MODE Switch - Set (as desired) (CP)
22.
DJ
V/UHF Radio Checked (CP-N)
VHF AM transmission from 108 to 118 MHz using the V/UHF radio
will be avoided during normal peacetime operation. Such transmissions
may jam navigation signals causing safety of flight hazards.
a. Interphone Selector Switch V/UHF (N-CP)
b. COMSEC MODE CONTROL Panel KY/RAD Selector Switch AN/ARC-164(V) (N)
c.
V/UHF Radio Set and functioning (CP) j.

(1) VOL/SQ OFF In and midrange
Change 20
2-31
T.O. 1B-52H-1

(2) Operational Mode Selector TEST
After 20 seconds BIT is completed. If 888.888 is not displayed, and all display functions are
not illuminated or ARC-210 switch panel FAULT light is on, the V/UHF system is malfunctioning.
See Section III for Abnormal Operating Procedures.
(3) Operational Mode Selector TR
(4) CHAN/FREQ CRSR Switch Set to station frequency
(5) V/UHF Radio Reception and Volume Checked (CP)
d.
2-32
(6)
DU
DQ
NVIS Light Switch Checked and Set (CP)
Change 20
DAMA Set and functioning (as required) (N)
T.O. 1B-52H-1

*23. Radar Altimeters Checked and OFF (P-CP)
a. OFF Flag Out of sight
b. Cursor Check set at 1500 feet
c.
Control Knob Press

The indicator needle should point to 1000 (100) feet, the system test light, the indicator low
altitude caution light, and the RDR ALT LOW light should come on.
d. Radar Altimeter OFF

*24 Altimeters Checked and RESET (P); Checked and STBY (CP)
a. Altimeters Set, STBY flag in sight
Ensure that each altimeter indicates (75) feet of a known check point elevation. Pilot checks
that an altimeter correction card is installed for proper aircraft configuration.
b. RESET-STBY Lever RESET
Hold in RESET position 2 to 3 seconds.
c.
STBY Flag Out of sight

Compare altimeter readings with standby mode reading. Altimeter should read within 75 feet
of standby mode reading. Ensure that each altimeter indicates (75) feet of a known checkpoint
elevation. Pilots and copilots altimeters should read within 75 feet of each other. This allowable
difference of 75 feet between servo mode readings also applies in flight at all altitudes and
speeds.
NOTE
If the STBY flag appears and mission requirements allow, the mission
may be completed.
For flight conducted by the copilot, his altimeter may be operated in
RESET and the pilots in STBY.
Change 8
2-33
T.O. 1B-52H-1

*25. AIMS Checked and OFF (P) 23.
a. RAD-TEST/MON Switch OUT
b. Master Switch NORM
c.
Modes 1, 2, 3A & Mode C Tested

Check for test light illumination as each mode switch is held in TEST position.
NOTE
Mode 2 will not be tested with classified data inserted.

d. Mode 4 ON/OUT Switch ON
e.
Mode 4 Code Switch Set as briefed
f.
Mode Switches Set as briefed
g. Master Switch OFF

*26. Elevator & Rudder Checked and OFF (P); Checked (CP) 24.
NOTE
For thruflight sorties confirm with ground crew that ground cooling
system is operating. No other checks are required.
a. Rudder/Elevator Main & Aux Lights (four lights) On (P)
b. Rudder/Elevator Hydraulic Switches ON, lights out (P); cooling air checked (GC)
Check main and aux hydraulic system lights out.
2-34
Immediately after placing rudder/elevator hydraulic switch to ON, pilot

will confirm with ground crew that ground cooling system is operating.
Ground crew should report air blowing out of two exhaust ports.
Maximum time that rudder/elevator hydraulic systems can be operated
without ground blower in operation is 4 minutes.
T.O. 1B-52H-1

!

"
# "
$

"
%

! "
%
&

' "
% # "
$
(

"
)
*+
, %
-!.
/ " 0+ (+ "
-!1 ,+ *+
% %

%
% + ,$02

& +

'333 !43

& + +

/
5
+ "67)89 :;<= ! =
& +

'333 !43
NOTE
0

& "67)89 :;<= ! =
& +
+

!433 !43 + 5
'33
+
+

5

<

& /

)

+
+ $
& :;<= ! =
&
+

>

)
+5

+ = ! +
+
? :;<= ! =/
& +

'333 !43 ;

& :;<= !

!433 !43
+ " &
+ + +
'333 !43
/ + +
)

+ "
& + 5

+
-!@
/ "
8 "
Change 15
2-35
T.O. 1B-52H-1

*28. Autopilot Checked and OFF (P)
a. Check turn knob and roll trim knob in detent position.
b. Place autopilot power switch - ON
c.
Accomplish built-in test (BIT) sequence check.
d. Depress pilots autopilot release button; autopilot should disengage and the AUTOPILOT
DISENGAGED light comes on.
e.
Turn autopilot power switch OFF
*29. Airbrake, Spoiler & Lateral Trim Check Completed (P-CP)
To prevent pump overheating, the ground test pumps will be limited to

5 minutes continuous operation.
NOTE
This check is made in coordination with ground crew observer. Ground

crew will hold ground test switches ON during this check. Ground crew
observer will report position of spoilers after each movement.
Spoiler rigging tolerances are such that the spoiler groups on each wing
may not exactly line up during partial or full extension of the spoilers.
Also, when airbrakes are in position 6, additional raising of the spoilers
on a wing when the control wheel is moved out of neutral is normal
and the outboard segments will raise from 50 to 60 as more control
wheel rotation is applied.
a. Airbrake & Spoiler Check:

(1) Move airbrake to position 6. Ground reports: Inboard 60; outboard 50.
NOTE
Wing droop associated with high gross weight fuel loads may make it
impossible to see the outboard airbrake segments from the cockpit.
These segments will be at 50 instead of 60.
(2) Move control wheel: Ground reports:
2-36
POSITION
LEFT SPOILERS
Full left
Full right
Neutral
Up
Down
Inboard 60
Outboard 50
RIGHT SPOILERS
Down
Up
Inboard 60
Outboard 50
T.O. 1B-52H-1

NOTE
Full control wheel travel results in both inboard and outboard spoiler
segments assuming the full 60 extension (i.e., with airbrakes in
position 6, control wheel displacement to full left causes the left
spoilers to move from inboards 60, outboards 50 to both segments 60,
and right spoilers from inboards 60, outboards 50 to both segments
zero. Returning control wheel to neutral with airbrakes in position 6
causes spoilers to assume the position of inboards 60, outboards 50).
(3) Airbrake Lever OFF
Ground reports, All airbrakes down.
b. Lateral Trim Check:
(1) Lateral Trim Button LDN (left wing down)
Copilot actuates trim control button to LDN and moves control wheel to new center position.
Pilot actuates lateral trim cutout when trim indicator reaches approximately 5. Copilot
releases trim button, pilot places trim cutout switch in NORMAL, guard closed. Ground
observer reports, Left spoilers up, right spoilers down. Pilot notes the movement of trim
indicator.
(2) Lateral Trim Button RDN (right wing down)
Pilot returns lateral trim to neutral and moves control wheel to neutral. Ground observer
reports, All spoilers down. Pilot observes trim indicator for correct indication.
*30. Wing Standby Pumps OFF (P)
*31. Flaps Checked and up, lever OFF (CP-GC)
Flaps should be full down at the time the crew enters the aircraft. Ground personnel will be on
interphone and advise the pilot of flap position and movement. Flaps should be checked that they
retract in approximately 60 seconds.
To prevent inadvertent movement of the wing flaps after the desired

flap position is obtained, the wing flap lever will be left in DN position
at all times when full flap extension is desired. To prevent flap motor
damage which may be caused by limit switch actuation after flap retraction, the lever will be moved to OFF when the flaps up indication is
received.
2-37
T.O. 1B-52H-1

*34. Fuel Panel Switches Set (CP)
Closure of the main tank switch guard may not actuate the boost pump
switch to the ON position. Apply firm pressure to the toggle switch
when placing it to the ON position and absolutely ensure it is fully and
completely ON before closing the guard.
NOTE
For external cruise missile configurations refer to the appropriate

cruise missile takeoff fuel sequence.
For external nonnuclear weapons configuration, see FUEL SYSTEM
MANAGEMENT, Section I.
For JP-4 configured alert aircraft, run all engines at idle rpm for 10
minutes using JP-4 from the mid-body and external tanks with main
tank fuel boost pumps OFF. After engine shutdown, configure the fuel
panel to feed mid-body and mains (pumps ON) to all engines for engine
start, taxi and takeoff. After takeoff, resume applicable fuel sequence
at the appropriate step.
a. 1 & 4 Above Green Band, Center & Aft Contains 2000 Pounds or More Each 1, 2, 3, and 4 ON; 13
and 16 OPEN; 26 and 28 ENGINE FEED
b. 1 & 4 Above Green Band, Either Center Wing or Aft Body Less Than 2000 Pounds Each 1, 2, 3, and
4 ON; 9, 10, 11 and 12 OPEN
c.
1 or 4 In Green Band 1, 2, 3, and 4 ON; 9, 10, 11, and 12 OPEN
35. Gyro Instruments Checked (P-CP)

a. Check HSI heading.
b. Check both ADIs for indication of power application by noting gyros properly erected and OFF
flags and ATT warning flags not showing. Rotate attitude indicator pitch trim knob clockwise
and attitude indicator should read at least 10 dive. Rotate pitch knob counterclockwise and
attitude indicator should read at least 5 climb. Press and hold the ATT TEST pushbutton for
at least 2 seconds and the attitude sphere should rotate 10 (1) in the roll and pitch axes and
the ATT warning flags should appear. The sphere should always give a right roll and pitch up
indication.
c.
Copilots attitude select switch set to ALT. Check for a perceptible displacement of the copilots
attitude indicator sphere.
d. Pilots attitude select switch set to ALT and copilots attitude select switch set to NORM. Check
for a perceptible displacement of the pilots attitude indicator sphere.
e.
Pilots attitude select switch set to NORM.
f.
Standby attitude indicator should be erected and OFF flag out of view.
g. Heading indicator (gyro) set to aircraft heading.

*36. Ground Locks & Bypass Keys Six and two, counted and stowed (N)
37. Steering Ratio TAXI (P)
*38. Windshield Anti-Icing & Defog NORMAL (P)
2-38
Change 20
T.O. 1B-52H-1

*39. Circuit Breakers As required (P-CP)
The battery will be depleted if the GROUND EGRESS circuit breakers

remain IN for an extended period without aircraft or external power.
*40. Crew Report Completed (P)
a. Pilot actuates the emergency alarm switch to ABANDON, presses the CALL button and announces Crew report.
b. The sequence for crew reporting is as follows: N, G, EW, RN, CP, P, IN, DI, 10th, IP.
c.
All crewmembers will press call button and report (crewmembers) check complete. The check
consists of abandon signal and call operation. If a crewmember was not at his seat during the
check, on return to his seat, the interphone call operation will be checked with the pilot.
d. Ground crew checks the alarm system in the bomb bay and reports condition to pilot.
41. CG/FLAS Initialized, if time permits (CP)
a. PWR Switch ON
b. Initialization Accomplished
(1) Operating weight loaded.
(2) Operating weight cg loaded.
(3) Weapons loaded (select NONE, NUC, or CONV as applicable).
(4) Flares & chaff loaded (as required) .
c.
Mode Selected
Select FUEL, WPN, or WT mode as appropriate to monitor aircraft flight condition.
NOTE
For normal training missions, disregard the remaining items in this

checklist and proceed to STARTING ENGINES AND BEFORE TAXIING checklist.
The aircrew may leave their stations provided they can assure that the
configuration of the various controls and switches will not be changed.
If not, they will accomplish the BEFORE LEAVING AIRCRAFT checklist. Upon returning to the aircraft for flight, the INTERIOR INSPECTION and BEFORE STARTING ENGINES checklists will be reaccomplished for switch positioning prior to starting engines. This requirement does not apply when preparing the aircraft for alert posture.
For alert posture, engines will be started to check and set stabilizer
trim. If no maintenance is required on the aircraft subsequent to the
stabilizer trim check or taxiing to the alert area (if applicable), the
recocking checklist will be used to recock the aircraft. See ALERT PROCEDURES, this section.
Change 16
2-39
T.O. 1B-52H-1

42. Oxygen Regulator OFF and 100% OXYGEN (if leaving the aircraft for an extended period of time)
(P, CP)
43. Flash Blindness Equipment Checked and positioned (if applicable) (ALL)
Flash blindness equipment (gold goggles, eye patches, etc) will be checked and positioned in accordance with command directives.
44. Ground, Close Entry Door Roger (GC); Light out (P)
The external air conditioning unit can build up sufficient cabin pressure to cause the entry door to blow. Ascertain that a sliding window is
open prior to opening or closing the door.
NOTE
The main entry door will be locked to prevent loss of pressurization

during flight. The door can be locked from the inside only.
45. Ground, Open Entry Door Roger (GC)
46. Engine dc Ignition Circuit Breakers Pulled (P-CP)
Pull the corresponding engine dc ignition circuit breaker(s) for the engines to have cartridges
installed. Outboard engine dc circuit breakers are located on the left load central (LLC) circuit breaker panel. Inboard engine dc circuit breakers are located on the right load central (RLC) circuit breaker panel.
47. Cartridges Installed (GC)
48. Engine Ignition Circuit Breakers IN (P-CP)
Before pushing engine ignition circuit breakers in on each central, assure that ground crewmembers are clear of engine starter exhaust
area.
49. Bomb Doors Closed (Alert only) (P)
Bomb doors will be closed and remain closed on alert aircraft except for required maintenance and
special weapons inventory.
2-40
Change 20
T.O. 1B-52H-1

STARTING ENGINES AND BEFORE TAXIING CHECKLIST (Pilot reads)
NOTE
Only the boldface items need be accomplished for Scramble. All items
will be reviewed during climb or as soon as practicable.
During SIOP alert operations, takeoff will not be delayed for items pertaining to crew equipment, radio checks, and IFF settings.
Engines will not be started until both pilots are in position.
1. BRAKES SET (P)

2. BATTERY ON (CP)
3. INTERPHONE ON (P)
4. External Power ON (CP)
The battery override switch will not be used for normal training missions.
For normal operations, place external power on the aircraft by placing the external power switch
to ON. During alert operations or when time is not available to allow external power cart to warm
up properly, place external power on the aircraft in the following manner:
a. Isolate Button Pressed
b. External Power Switch ON
c.
Generator Switches OFF

Momentarily position generator switches to OFF one at a time and check generator circuit breakers open and bus tie circuit breakers closed.
5. Ground, Close Entry Door Roger (GC)
The external air conditioning unit can build up sufficient cabin pressure to cause the entry door to blow. Ascertain that a sliding window is
open prior to opening or closing the door.
NOTE
The main entry door will be left unlocked during engine start.
5A. [EV] FUEL ENRICHMENT VALVE SWITCH AS REQUIRED (CP)
FEV will be open for starts using JP-5 or JP-8 and outside air temperature at or below 0C (32F).
FEV may be used between 32F and 40F.
NOTE
If the airplane is fueled with fuel other than JP-4 or AVGAS, fuel enrichment must be used for starting when fuel temperatures are below
0C (32F). Engine starts can be difficult or impossible if outside air
temperature is below 30C (22F).
Change 22
2-41
T.O. 1B-52H-1
STARTING ENGINES AND BEFORE TAXIING (Pilot reads) (Cont)

6. Ground, Start External Air Roger
PSI (GC)
Ground crew states actual air pressure available for starting. Desired pressure is 30 psi for pneumatic start.
NOTE
Satisfactory starts may be made at less than 30 psi although starting

time will be increased. See STRANGE FIELD PROCEDURES, this section.
6A. Anticollision Lights ON (P/CP)
Leave the lights off if turning the lights on will create a safety hazard for ground personnel.
7. STAND BY TO START ENGINES FIRE GUARD POSTED AND CLEAR (GC)
Ground crewman will have microphone and headset plugged into the external microphone system;
pilot states Stand by to start engines. When equipment and personnel are clear of intake and
exhaust ducts, chocks are in place, and fire guards posted, ground crew replies, Fire guards posted
and clear.
If the aircraft is directly behind another operating jet aircraft or will be

run up with its tail into the wind and contamination is suspected, 100%
oxygen will be used during ground operation and takeoff.
When practicable, start and run up engines with aircraft on a clean

paved surface to reduce possibility of dirt or other objects being drawn
into the engine compressors and damaging the engines.
8. START ENGINES STARTED (CP)
NOTE
2-42
Change 4
If maintenance or other conditions require starting engines in a sequence other than outlined below, engines will be started individually
to preclude possible hot starts. When engines are started one at a time,
engines operating above idle rpm should be retarded to idle. The starter should first be placed on and then an engine advanced to provide
an air bleed source. This is done to prevent starter damage due to bleed
air surge.
External electrical power units will be used for engine starts. Battery
starting procedures may be used in the event of external power unit
failure. While on alert, battery starting procedures will be used; the
external power unit will be positioned for use in the event of battery
failure.
If engine smoke conditions cause an adverse environment for ground
personnel, the stabilizer trim check may be accomplished after starting
only engines 4 and 5.
T.O. 1B-52H-1

The following procedures are designed to be used for starting engines with or without external electrical power. The battery system may not be dependable at low temperatures. When battery start
procedures are used, all normal engine and generator starting precautions will be used; engine oil
pressure and fuel flow indication will be inoperative until a generator is on the line.
NOTE
Pilot monitors starting sequence to prevent engines from exceeding limitations.

Combustion, indicated by a rise in exhaust temperature, will occur
within 20 seconds after throttle is advanced. During a normal start,
fuel flow indication will begin upon movement of the throttle from
CLOSED to IDLE and will increase as scheduled by the fuel control
unit to provide starting acceleration fuel to a peak value after which
it will decrease to a range of 550 to 1200 pph following stabilization
at idle rpm. Fuel flow rates in excess of the above figures can warn of
a hot start condition. If fuel flow is below 550 pph, retard throttle to
CLOSED, place starter switch to OFF, allow at least 30 seconds for fuel
drainage, and check for malfunction before attempting a restart.
Normal starting procedures should be used for all starts; however, if
an engine gives an indication of a hung start in the 26% rpm range,
proceed with engine shutdown and discontinue starting attempts. Engines 1, 2, 7, and 8 are already provided with auxiliary boost pump
pressure, but if one of the inboard pod engines 3, 4, 5, or 6, which are
feeding from main fuel tanks gives an indication of a hung start in the
40% to 52% rpm range, auxiliary boost pump pressure should be supplied by turning the applicable auxiliary tank engine feed control
switch (No. 14 or 15) to OPEN. After the engine accelerates to IDLE,
return the fuel system to its original starting configuration. However,
if the engine does not accelerate to IDLE, proceed with engine shutdown and discontinue starting attempts.
Except during SIOP/ALERT starts, or any other situation requiring an
immediate engine start, allow all engines to idle for 2 minutes prior to
advancing throttles. This will help preclude premature engine wear
due to hot section fatigue.
Change 4
2-43
T.O. 1B-52H-1
2-44
Advancing the throttle before 15% rpm is reached increases the possibility of a hot start.
Starter dropout should occur at approximately 35% to 45%. In order
to prevent starter internal failure in case starters fail to drop out, the
starter switches are moved to CONT as the engines attain 45% rpm.
Oil pressure will be 35 psi minimum within 30 seconds. Disregard the
low oil pressure warning lights when oil pressure is below 40 psi.
If external electrical power is lost during an engine start and engines
1, 2, 7, or 8 are below approximately 35% rpm, immediately retard the
throttle to CLOSED and discontinue the start until electrical power is
restored. The loss of ac power (and TR power) will close outboard strut
air bleed valves depriving the engine of starter assistance. This may
result in a hot start if the throttle is not closed. To prevent starter
damage due to bleed air surge, engine(s) operating above idle rpm
should be retarded to idle before any subsequent attempt to restart.
On first starting a cold engine, the initial idle rpm may be below the
stabilized range of 57% to 60%. This initial lowidle rpm is usually in
the range from 55% to 57%. Engine throttles 1, 3, 5, and 7 should be
positioned to obtain a minimum of 58% rpm to provide safe operating
speed for the constant speed generator drives.
Avoid reengaging the engine starter while the engine is still rotating
unless it becomes necessary to do so. Such practice may reduce starter
service life.
To prevent damage to wing flap structure, operation at engine rpm
greater than 92% with wing flaps extended should be kept to a minimum.
Change 17
T.O. 1B-52H-1

Pneumatic Start With External Electrical Power
NOTE
Check all engine starter switches in OFF and PNEUMATIC.

Pilot announces Starting No. 4. Copilot positions No. 4 starter switch to START. At a minimum
of 15% rpm, pilot advances throttle to IDLE. As No. 4 reaches 45% rpm, copilot places No. 4 starter
to CONT. After No. 4 engine has stabilized in IDLE for 2 minutes, pilot announces Starting No.
5. Copilot positions No. 5 starter switch to START. Pilot advances No. 4 throttle to an rpm that
ensures adequate airflow to obtain 15% rpm on the No. 5 engine. At a minimum of 15% rpm, pilot
advances No. 5 throttle to IDLE. As No. 5 reaches 45% rpm, copilot places No. 5 starter switch to
CONT. Pilot retards No. 4 throttle to IDLE. After No. 5 engine has stabilized in IDLE for 2 minutes,
pilot announces Start the remaining engines. Copilot positions No. 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8 starter
switches to START. Pilot advances No. 4 throttle to 90% rpm and No. 5 throttle to 85% rpm. As the
remaining engines reach a minimum of 15% rpm, pilot advances throttles No. 1, 2, and 3 and copilot
advances throttles No. 6, 7, and 8 to IDLE. As the engines reach 45% rpm, copilot positions the
respective starter switches to CONT. Engines 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8 must be stabilized in idle for 2
minutes.
Pneumatic Start Without External Electrical Power
NOTE
Check all engine starter switches in OFF and PNEUMATIC.

Pilot announces Starting No. 4. Copilot positions No. 4 starter switch to START. At a minimum
of 15% rpm, pilot advances throttle to IDLE. As No. 4 reaches 45% rpm, copilot places No. 4 starter
to CONT. After No. 4 engine has stabilized in IDLE for 2 minutes, pilot announces Starting No.
5. Copilot positions No. 5 starter switch to START. Pilot advances No. 4 throttle to an rpm that
ensures adequate airflow to obtain 15% rpm on the No. 5 engine. At a minimum of 15% rpm, pilot
advances No. 5 throttle to IDLE. As No. 5 reaches 45% rpm, copilot places No. 5 starter switch to
CONT. Pilot retards No. 4 throttle to IDLE, copilot turns No. 5 generator to ON when engine No.
5 reaches 58% rpm. After No. 5 engine has stabilized in IDLE for 2 minutes, pilot announces Start
the remaining engines. Copilot positions No. 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8 starter switches to START. Pilot
advances No. 4 throttle to 90% rpm and No. 5 throttle to 85% rpm. As the remaining engines reach
a minimum of 15% rpm, pilot advances throttles No. 1, 2, and 3 and copilot advances throttles No.
6, 7, and 8 to IDLE. As the engines reach 45% rpm, copilot positions the respective starter switches
to CONT. Engines 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8 must be stabilized in idle for 2 minutes.
Change 17
2-45
T.O. 1B-52H-1

Cartridge Start
During operation of the cartridge-pneumatic starter system, observe limitations given

in Section V.
NOTE
This procedure will be used for simultaneous eight engine cartridge

starts or any combination of cartridge/pneumatic starts.
Check all engine starter switches START and FLIGHT.
Before placing start selector switch to CARTRIDGE, check throttles
fully closed to ensure starter cartridge firing/ignition.
After starting cartridge configured engines when external electrical
power is not available, it will be necessary to delay starting other engines which are pneumatically isolated, until a generator is placed on
the line to provide TR power for opening outboard strut bleed valves.
Pilot announces Starting engines

(designated). Copilot positions start selector switch to
CARTRIDGE momentarily, then releases to FLIGHT. As each engine reaches a minimum of 15%
rpm, advance throttle for that engine to IDLE. For pneumatic starting, advance No. 4 throttle to
90% rpm and No. 5 throttle to 85% rpm. The pilot will advance the throttles for engines 1, 2, 3, and
4 and the copilot No. 5, 6, 7, and 8 as necessary. As each engine reaches 45% rpm, copilot positions
the respective starter switch to CONT. After all cartridge started engines are started and the starter
switches are in CONT, copilot places start selector to PNEUMATIC and places a generator on the
line if necessary to open the strut bleed valves. As each engine reaches a minimum of 15% rpm,
advance the throttle for that engine to IDLE. As each engine reaches 45% rpm, copilot positions
respective starter switch to CONT.
2-46
In the event starter cartridge does not fire, pilot designates engine on
which cartridge did not fire to ground crew over interphone. Copilot
places that starter switch to OFF. Cartridge will not be removed until
there is no evidence of exhaust smoke at the starter exhaust duct and
minimum time interval has elapsed since initiation. Prior to removal
of a cartridge, ensure that the start selector switch is in FLIGHT and
the engine ignition circuit breakers are pulled. The ground crew must
observe the handling precautions outlined in Section V. Pilot makes
entry on Form 781.
Simultaneous cartridge starts of QUICK START configured aircraft can
produce toxic gases in sufficient concentration to be hazardous to individuals who remain in the immediate vicinity of the aircraft. The potential hazard is dependent on aircraft parking configuration, wind velocity and direction, and other ambient conditions. Ground
crewmembers and security police who are required to remain in a toxic
cloud will wear proper eye and respiratory protection.
Change 17
T.O. 1B-52H-1

Unsatisfactory Starts
NOTE
In the event any of the unsatisfactory starts described in the following

steps occur, proceed as directed. If other starting abnormalities occur,
discontinue the starting attempt and investigate. Any of these occurrences, and all cases of exceeding engine operating limits, will be entered in AFTO Form 781A for necessary corrective action by maintenance personnel. See figure 5-2 for engine operating limits.
Should an unsatisfactory start occur, the condition will probably be one of the following:
1.
HOT START.
Any time an EGT of 450C is exceeded prior to reaching idle rpm. Engine combustion occurs usually followed
by greater than normal fuel flow or faster than normal EGT rise. This is usually an indication of an overrich
fuel/air ratio entering the combustion chamber. Such a condition could result from any of several possible
causes. Shut down the engine immediately.
2.
FALSE OR HUNG START.
Usually characterized by failure of the engine to accelerate to idle rpm after normal combustion and is more
likely to occur at temperatures below 45F (7C) or above 100F (38C). EGT may rise slowly and could
terminate in a hot start. This type start could be the result of insufficient air pressure to the starter or
starter cutting out early. If engine does not accelerate to idle rpm within 90 seconds, shut down engine.
3.
NO START.
Engine combustion does not occur when throttle is advanced. Insufficient electrical power, no fuel to the engine, ignition system, or the fuel control unit could be the cause. If combustion, indicated by a rise in EGT,
does not occur within 20 seconds after throttle is advanced discontinue the starting attempt.
Whenever combustion fails to occur, fuel will probably accumulate and

be trapped in the engine, creating a potentially dangerous condition if
another attempt to start is made before the fuel and fumes are cleared
out. Allow at least 30 seconds for fuel drainage before attempting a restart. If necessary, trapped fuel or vapors can be cleared from the engine by turning the compressor with the starter (motoring) for 10 to 15
seconds with the throttle in CLOSED position.
4.
TORCHING DURING START.
This condition may or may not be significant. If accompanied with any abnormal starting indication, shut
down the engine. If no other abnormal indication exists, request maintenance direction. Their decision will
probably be based on engine history of previous occurrences.
2-47
T.O. 1B-52H-1

Disconnecting External Air
NOTE
This step may be accomplished after starting engines 4 & 5, prior to

starting the remaining engines.
Ground will disconnect external air after engines are started and throttles are retarded to IDLE.
9. Starter Caution Light Off (CP)
As soon as engines are started, check light off.
10. Navigator, Lock Entry Door Locked (N); Light out (P)
NOTE
The main entry door must be locked to prevent loss of pressurization

during flight. The door can be locked from the inside only.
11. MANIFOLD VALVE CLOSE (CP)
Place air bleed manifold valve switch in CLOSE position after engines
are started to prevent excessive manifold temperature which will be attained if the switch is left OPEN.
11A. [EV] FUEL ENRICHMENT VALVE SWITCH CLOSE (CP)
12.
GENERATORS ON, BATTERY LIGHTS OUT (CP)

NOTE
When conditions permit, if ambient temperature is 12C (+10F) or

below, idle the appropriate engines for a 5 minute warmup period
before placing generators ON.
a. Momentarily hold each generator switch ON to energize the generator field and close the generator circuit breakers (the generators will parallel).
b. Check that generator and bus tie circuit breaker position indicators show closed and generator
ammeter readings are the same.
NOTE
c.
2-48
If a generator circuit breaker is open and voltage and frequency are not
indicated on the voltmeter and frequency meter, it is probable the generator drive input shaft has been decoupled from the engine shaft.
If any generator circuit breaker is open with voltage and frequency
normal, advance the respective engine throttle, then retard to the desired position. Generator circuit breaker should close.
Using the voltage and frequency selector, check voltage at 205 (5) volts and frequency at 400
(5) Hz on central tie bus. Leave voltage and frequency switch on CENTRAL TIE BUS position.
Change 20
T.O. 1B-52H-1

13. AIR CONDITIONING 7.45 PSI; NOTIFY GC AND RN (CP)
Prior to placing the cabin pressure master switch to 7.45 PSI, the copilot will confirm with the ground crew that the ground cooling air cart
duct has been removed. This is to preclude a pressure buildup and forcible disconnect which could cause minor aircraft damage or injury to
ground crewmembers.
Failure to install the ground cooling cart connector cover will significantly reduce the cooling airflow. This could result in damage to heat
sensitive equipment.
Notify radar navigator that generators are on the line and cooling air is available. If subsequent entry to the
forward cabin is required, cabin pressure will be relieved by opening one of the sliding windows prior to
opening or closing the entry door.
14. Liaison Radio ON (CP)
15. Ground, Clear Aircraft for Taxi Roger (GC)
Ground crew will disconnect and remove all ground support equipment and stand by on interphone.
The external air conditioning unit will be disconnected from the cabin
emergency ram airscoop before the scoop is retracted.
16. IFF STBY (P)
17. Body Standby Pumps OFF (P)
18. RUDDER/ELEVATOR ON, LIGHTS OUT (P)
Pilot checks rudder/elevator main 1 and 2 lights on, rudder/elevator aux 1 and 2 lights out, then
places rudder/elevator main 1 and 2 switches on and checks all lights out.
19. Hydraulic Pressures Checked (P)
Pilot checks each system for pressure (3000 (250) psi); pump-out lights off.
Change 4
2-49
T.O. 1B-52H-1

20. ENGINE ANTI-ICING CHECKED (if applicable), AND CLIMATIC (P)
Turn the engine, nacelle, and scoops anti-icing switch ON if either of the following conditions exist
or are anticipated during ground operations up through flap retraction altitude:
a. The OAT is 47F (8C) or below and visible moisture exists. Visible moisture is defined as rain,
wet snow, or fog with visibility 1 mile or less.
b. The OAT is 47F (8C) or below and the dewpoint is within 4F (2.3C) of the OAT even though
visible moisture is not present.
Engine inlet components are susceptible to icing during extended

ground operations at IDLE power settings even though engine anti-ice
is ON. Periodic engine runups to a nominal 80% rpm can minimize the
ice buildup. Such runups should approximate 10 to 20 seconds duration
at a maximum of 10 minute intervals. The number of engines to be run
up at a time will be dependent upon taxiway surface conditions. Subsequent takeoff under these conditions should be immediately preceded
by a static engine runup to assure normal engine operation. Signs of
engine icing could include abnormal EPR/EGT relationship, abnormally slow rpm response to throttle movement, and indications of engine
surge or stall. If taxiway surface conditions preclude advancing power
enough to dissipate or prevent the inlet ice accumulation, takeoff
should not be attempted.
2-50
T.O. 1B-52H-1

21. Stabilizer Trim Checked, takeoff trim set (P-CP)1.
NOTE
For thruflight sorties set stabilizer trim for takeoff. No other checks are
required.
This step may be accomplished after starting engines 4 & 5, prior to
starting the remaining engines.
a. Advance engines 4 and 5 to 82% rpm. Ground observer reports direction in which leading edge
is moving for both directions operated.
b. Nosedown Trim & Force Switch Operation Checked
(1) Copilot applies nosedown trim electrically, checking that stabilizer trim wheel and indicator
move in correct direction.
(2) Pilot momentarily actuates the trim cutout switch, at approximately 1 unit nosedown position, to check interruption of electrical trim power and abrupt stoppage of manual trim
wheel.
(3) Copilot pulls back on his control column while still trimming until trim actuation stops to
check force switch operation.
(4) Copilot reduces force on control column and continues nosedown trim until trim actuation
starts, then releases trim switch noting that wheel stops abruptly.
(5) Copilot trims electrically toward zero and pushes forward on the control column while still
trimming until trim actuation stops to check force switch operation in opposite direction.
(6) Copilot trims to zero with the pilot again checking operation of trim cutout switch after
approximately 1 unit of travel.
c.
Noseup Trim & Force Switch Operation Checked

(1) Pilot applies noseup trim electrically, checking that stabilizer trim wheel and indicator move
in correct direction.
(2) Pilot pushes forward on his control column while still trimming until trim actuation stops
to check force switch operation.
(3) Pilot reduces force on control column and continues noseup trim until trim actuation starts,
then releases trim switch noting that wheel stops abruptly.
(4) Pilot trims electrically toward zero and pulls back on control column while still trimming
until trim actuation stops to check force switch operation in opposite direction.
(5) Pilot returns stabilizer trim to zero electrically.
d. Ground observer reports leading edge position after pilot returns stabilizer to zero. Acceptable
difference between pilot/copilot zero indication and zero indication as reported by ground observer is 0.25 unit.
e.
Pilot manually moves stabilizer trim approximately 1 unit in each direction. Ground observer
reports corresponding movement of stabilizer leading edge.
f.
Pilot sets stabilizer trim for takeoff. Acceptable difference between pilots indicators is 0.50 unit.
2-51
T.O. 1B-52H-1

22. EVS On (P-CP)
Depress EVS power and STV switches to ON. Rotate brightness knob on monitor clockwise so presentation is just visible and then rotate counterclockwise until presentation just disappears. Rotate
contrast knob clockwise until optimum presentation is displayed. After presentation is adjusted,
select crab mode and rotate the steering knob left or right to check turret operation.
NOTE
Readjustment of the monitor will normally be required only when significant ambient light changes occur.
23. GPS IU/TACAN Equipment Check If required (P/CP):2.
NOTE
The Navigator must have completed GPS initialization with the DDLC
installed prior to accomplishing this check.
a. MFD Control Panel MFD EVS Switch MFD
b. MFD Control Panel Display Mode Switch Select Mission Route Screen
c.
Nav MODE SELECT Switch GPS
d. TACAN Control Panel TACAN channel selected

Selection of the TACAN channel will cause the bearing pointer to point to the selected station,
the TACAN range indicator warning flag will be out of view, and the range indicator will display
the range to the selected station. The Mission Route Screen on the EVS monitor will display the
GPS emulated TACAN data for the currently selected Navaid, including station identifier, channel, radial, and DME.
e.
HSI Check:
(1) Check that bearing pointer points to the station.
(2) Set bearing pointer indicator in the course selector window and check that CDI centers and
the TO-FROM indicator indicates TO.
(3) Rotate the course set knob 5 to check for proper CDI displacement.
(4) Rotate course set knob and check that TO changes to FROM indication after approximately
90 of course selector change.
2-52
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1

f.
TACAN Control Panel Test Switch Press momentarily

(1) Test light momentarily flashes.
First 10 Seconds
(2) DME mask and course warning flag on ADI in view.
(3) HSI bearing pointer moves to 45 with respect to Lubber line.
(4) DME shows 234, range indicator warning flag out of view, CDI set one dot right, TO-FROM
out of view, and the course warning flag on ADI drives out of view.
Second 10 Seconds
(5) HSI bearing pointer moves to 180 with respect to Lubber line.
(6) DME shows XXX (XXX = 000 for no faults, XXX = fault code if faults are present), range
indicator warning flag is in view, CDI set one dot Left, and the course warning flag on ADI
is in view.
g. Test Light Off

h. TACAN Control Panel Test Switch Press momentarily to exit test mode
i.
TACAN Control Panel Set Channel, as required
j.
Nav MODE SELECT Switch Set, as required
k. MFD Control Panel MFD EVS Switch Set, as required
Change 3
2-52A/(2-52B blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1

24. Crew Equipment On (P-CP)
Crew equipment should be donned at this time for normal training missions.
Tighten the parachute-survival kit attachment straps as tightly as possible to prevent the safety belt from inflicting facial injuries during
ejection bailout.
Ensure that the parachute arming lanyard is not entangled in the
parachute harness. Lanyard entanglement could cause failure in seat
separation and failure of the automatic features of the parachute.
NOTE
If it becomes necessary to leave the seat, the crewmember should open

the seat belt and unbuckle the parachute harness, leaving the parachute and survival kit in the seat. If the integrated harness release
handle is pulled so that the parachute and survival kit may be worn
when leaving seat, it will be necessary upon returning to the seat to
take off the parachute in order to attach the parachute shoulder straps
to the inertia reel fitting.
25. Oxygen Regulator As required (P-CP)
26. BOMB DOORS CLOSED (P-GC)
Ground personnel will be on interphone and confirm that bomb doors are clear. Pilot will place the
bomb door switch to OPEN to ensure that both latches are unlatched, check that the bomb doors
not latched light is on, and then place the switch to CLOSED.
27. GROUND, REMOVE WHEEL CHOCKS & DISCONNECT INTERPHONE ROGER (GC)
28. ANTICOLLISION & NAVIGATION LIGHTS ON AND STEADY (CP)
Turn anticollision lights on (if not previously turned on) and navigation lights to steady immediately
prior to taxiing.
The aircraft may be taxied over the ground power unit. It is imperative
that carts be properly positioned to avoid contact with aircraft when
taxiing out. Wing flaps will be up. Pilot taxies aircraft straight ahead
until ground crew signals that he is clear of the power units. As soon as
the aircraft starts rolling, throttles will be retarded to minimum thrust
required for taxiing to avoid upsetting the power carts by jet blast. Aircraft will be positioned so that no aircraft will have to taxi over the
power carts of another aircraft.
Change 4
2-53
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ENGINE GROUND OPERATION
TAXIING AND BEFORE TAKEOFF
Except for SIOP/alert starts or any situation requiring an immediate start, allow all engines to idle for
2 minutes prior to advancing throttles. Additionally,
for temperatures of 31F (35C) and below, engines should be allowed to run at idling speed until
engine readings have stabilized and a ground check
has been completed. After starting however, the
engines (with the exception of engines which are
advanced for starting remaining engines) should be
allowed to run at idling speed until readings have
stabilized and ground check has been completed.
After starting a cold engine, the rpm at the initial
IDLE setting may be below the stabilized idle range
and may require further adjustment of the throttles
to increase rpm. Throttles for engines 1, 3, 5, and 7
shall be positioned to maintain a minimum of 58%
rpm to provide a safe operating speed for the
generator constant speed drives. Rapid movement
of the throttles should be avoided at all times to
prevent
exceeding
allowable
exhaust
gas
temperatures. A minimum of 2 seconds should be
used for transition from IDLE to maximum
allowable. For engine danger areas associated with
operation, see figure 2-1.
PILOT
CROSSWIND OPERATION
During operation of the engines at aircraft velocities of less than 50 knots IAS, the engine stall prevention switch will be used to prevent possible engine stall when both of the following conditions exist:
Wind velocities are reported by the control tower

of 10 knots or more from a direction of 45 or more
to the engine centerline when parked or 45 or
more to runway heading on takeoff.
Thrust setting of 1.3 EPR or more.
The engine stall prevention switch will be depressed and held until either an airspeed of 50 (5)
knots is reached or thrust is reduced below 1.3
EPR.
The pilot releases the brakes upon receiving Clear

to Taxi signal from the crew chief. When the aircraft starts to roll, a check of brakes should be
made. To steer the aircraft, use rudder pedals. Differential braking is not possible and thrust from
the outboard engines is ineffective for turning unless used in conjunction with normal steering. Use
the largest radius of turn possible and never attempt to steer when the aircraft is not rolling. For
minimum turning radius and ground clearance, see
figure 2-2. To avoid severe landing gear oscillations
during low speed braking and to obtain acceptable
brake and tire life and adequate brake performance
especially with regard to potential refused takeoffs,
observe the limitations outlined under GROUND
LIMITATIONS, Section V. To prevent overheating
of the forward brakes and exceeding brake energy
limits, use minimum power during taxi. If possible,
when braking is required, use a firm, steady application of brakes until aircraft slows to below desired taxi speed without applying additional power.
Brake misadjustment combined with abnormal hydraulic pressure may cause wheel shudder/brake
chatter during taxi operation with physical characteristics sufficient to contribute to structural failure
of gear strut components. Wheel shudder/brake
chatter occurring during taxi operation shall be entered in the applicable forms per the POSTFLIGHT
checklist in Section II. Normal brake system operation shall be verified by maintenance prior to next
flight. If wheel shudder/brake chatter occurs, which
in the pilots judgment is of severe magnitude, then
more immediate action is warranted. Taxi operation
should be terminated immediately and maintenance assistance requested. Determining a condition level of severe magnitude will be a qualitative
judgment subjective in nature and based on the pilots experience and perception. Wheel shudder/
brake chatter will be assessed subsequent to initial
rollout and brake check since some temporary
brake chatter unrelated to the misadjustment/ abnormal pressure condition may occur due to the
system being inactive while in the parked mode.
If wheel shudder/brake chatter of a severe

magnitude occurs during taxi operation,
stop immediately and request maintenance
assistance.
2-54
T.O. 1B-52H-1
To prevent structural damage when making

a turn with full rudder travel, maximum
ground turning speeds should be 5 knots
with ratio selector lever in TAXI or 27 knots
with ratio selector lever in TAKEOFF
LAND.
To prevent structural damage during high
speed taxi runs, place the steering ratio selector lever in TAKEOFF LAND. Steering
in TAXI during high speed taxi runs produces excessive steering when small
amounts of rudder pedal displacement are
induced which can produce critical side
loads on aircraft structure. When taxiing in
TAKEOFF LAND, an accumulation of tolerances in the rudder steering system may result in as much as 3 inches of play either
side of the rudder pedal neutral position.
When taxiing at gross weights above
450,000 pounds, taxi speed must be reduced
to limit the loads imposed on the aircraft
structure. Taxi speeds over rough taxiways
should be reduced depending on the degree
of roughness and should be limited to a
maximum of 5 knots for the worst condition. Ground turn speeds with the steering
ratio selector in TAXI position shall be limited to 15 knots for turns not exceeding 20
of forward gear steering and shall not
exceed 5 knots for turns requiring more
than 20 of forward gear steering as
indicated by the crosswind crab position
indicator. Sharp turns and abrupt or hard
braking are to be avoided whenever
possible.
During taxiing, both tip gears should be on
or over maintained surfaces. Structural
damage to the tip gear could be sustained
while taxiing if the tip gear were permitted
to run on rough terrain.
One or both tip protection gear wheels may

be in the trail-forward position (strut inboard) after having been reversed during a
sharp turn on rearward towing. This is particularly true when wing and external
tanks are full. An amber caution light
marked TPG NOT IN TRAIL indicates this
trail-forward condition. For a reversed right
tip gear, introduce 20 nose left crosswind
crab at a rate of approximately 2.5 per foot
while moving forward at 2 or 3 knots until
the gear casters. A minimum distance of 20
feet forward and 5 feet to the side is
required for this procedure. If the gear does
not caster, apply right steering, with the
steering ratio selector in TAXI position,
until the gear casters. Realign the aircraft
with the runway by reverse steering. If
necessary, use reverse crosswind crab to
recenter the aircraft on the runway. For a
reversed left tip gear, the above procedure
should be followed using the opposite
directions to those stated. If space does not
permit use of this procedure, stop the
aircraft and have the gear turned manually
with the use of a turning bar.
COPILOT
The copilot will assist in maintaining a clearance of

all obstacles during taxiing.
PAINTED SURFACES
Painted areas on runways, taxiways, and ramps are

significantly more slippery than nonpainted areas.
In addition, painted areas sometimes serve as condensation surfaces and it is possible to have wet,
frosty, or even icy conditions on painted areas when
the overall weather condition is dry.
Use caution when taxiing over wet painted

areas because braking conditions may deteriorate to the extent that the braking coefficient is near that for an icy condition.
2-55
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Engine Danger Areas

400 FEET
115db
45
300 FEET
13
5o
40
T
EE
FE
ET
40
90o
FE
ET
30
200 FEET
FE
30
ET
120db
20
ET
20
130db
100 FEET
140
db
130db
10
FE
ET
115db
120db
E
FE
125db
FE
EXHAUST BLAST AREA
125db
NOISE INTENSITY CONTOURS AT

TAKEOFF RATED THRUST
WARNING
275o
85
Use ear plugs or muffs within 90 to 140 db. Additional

protection, such as flight line crew helmets, is required
in areas greater than 140 dbs. Areas in which the noise
level exceeds 170 dbs must be avoided.
25
475
450o
NOTE:
The above noise intensity contours are applicable to four engine

operation. For two engine operation, the noise intensity will decrease
by 6 decibels at 200 feet and beyond. The difference between four
and two engine operation at 0 to 200 feet is negligible.
The distances to 100 and 110 decibel contours are as shown:
For disconnecting external air, stay in area

directly under the wrap cowling and approx
imately 2 feet aft from directly under the
engine inlet while engines are at idle rpm.
DISTANCE
ANGLE
100 db
110 db
0o
1400 Feet
500 Feet
1400 Feet
500 Feet
1150 Feet
410 Feet
1500 Feet
660 Feet
45
90
135
35 FEET
(TYPICAL
EACH
NACELLE)
5o
5 FT.
5o spread of fan exhaust air. Fan area velocities aft of

duct exit of edge of exhaust area are approximately
50 fps with temperatures of approximately 100o F.
2-56
A31788
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Engine Danger Areas

50
FE
ET
OCTAVE
BAND
DECIBELS *
OCTAVE
BAND
DECIBELS*
20/75
600/1200
10
75/150
1200/2400
11
150/300
2400/4800
6**
300/600
4800/10KC
8**
115db
* Decibels to be subtracted from the overall at takeoff rated thrust.

**
These values are minimum differences between the octave band

and the overall normally expected at any angle and distance.
Strong pure tone components can be expected in these bands at
the compressor and/or fan blade passage frequencies.
140 DB DANGER AREA

130 TO 140 DB AREA
125 TO 130 DB AREA
120 TO 125 DB AREA
NOISE AREAS
100 TO 120 DB AREA
TURBINE BLAST EFFECT
TURBINE AND FAN

EXHAUST AND INLET
DANGER AREAS
100
TAXI POWER
EGTo F
30
VEL. KNOTS
50
75
100
125
DISTANCE FEET
250
250o
155
185o
120
155o
100
130o
VEL. KNOTS
175
INLET & EXHAUST AREAS

CARTRIDGE STARTER
EXHAUST DANGER
AREAS
EGTo F
MAX. POWER
STARTER TURBINE
DISINTEGRATION AREA
WARNING
BLAST DEFLECTOR
45
100
125
150
175
During cartridge starts,

the engine cartridge
starter exhaust is 850oF.
Therefore, remain clear
of a 4 foot radius area
around the cartridge
starter exhaust directly
below nacelles.
200
A starter turbine disin

tegration area exists to the
side and aft of the starter
turbine area.
The area 35 feet in front
and 200 feet behind (300 feet
if deflector is not avail
able) is the engine inlet
danger and exhaust blast
danger area.
A31789
2-57
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Turning Radius and Ground Clearance
Figure 2-2
2-58
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TAXIING AND BEFORE LINEUP CHECKLIST (Copilot/EW reads)
NOTE
Only the boldface items need be accomplished for Scramble. All items
will be reviewed during climb or as soon as practicable.
The TAXIING AND BEFORE LINEUP checklist should not be performed while taxiing through a congested area.
1. BRAKES CHECKED (P)
Check wheel brakes for proper operation as soon as possible after aircraft starts to move.
If wheel shudder/brake chatter of a severe magnitude occurs during

taxi operations, stop immediately and request maintenance assistance.
Do not attempt to use either steering or crosswind crab when aircraft is

not rolling as severe loads would be applied to tires and landing gear.
2. FLAP LEVER DOWN (CP)
Lower flaps after taxiing to ensure clearance from ground equipment by placing the flap lever in
the down position..
3. TURN & SLIP INSTRUMENTS CHECKED (P-CP)
Check heading indicators, magnetic compass and turn and slip indicator for proper movement during
turns.
4. Crosswind Crab Checked and down (P-CP)
If conditions permit, check operation of the crosswind crab to ensure positive response in both directions. Manually turn the crosswind crab knob in each direction, recentering the crosswind crab control with the centering button in each instance. Check both indicator needles for correct indication.
If time/conditions do not permit system operation, check that the crab is centered and the knob is
in the down position.
2-59
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TAXIING AND BEFORE LINEUP CHECKLIST (Copilot/EW reads) (Cont)

5. Pitot Heat ON (P)
6. Control Surface Trim Set (P-CP)
Pilot and copilot check rudder and lateral trim for takeoff setting.
7. STABILIZER TRIM CHECKED FOR TAKEOFF SETTING (P-CP)
The pilot and copilot should use caution to preclude the possibility of
inadvertent actuation of the stabilizer trim switch. Special care should
be taken during takeoff, landing, and air refueling operations. In addition, the pilot not making the takeoff will monitor the stabilizer trim
indicator during the takeoff roll.
NOTE
During flight, the stabilizer trim switch should be operated in short intermittent bursts to aid in recognizing a malfunctioning electrical trim
system before reaching an extreme out-of-trim condition.
8. Airbrakes OFF (P)
9. FLAPS 100%, LEVER DOWN (P-CP)
Pilot and copilot check wing flap indicators full down and wing flap lever in DN position.
10. Fuel Panel Switches Set (CP); Checked (P)
The pilot and copilot will set and check the fuel panel in accordance with one of the following sequences.
NOTE
For external cruise missile configurations, see the appropriate cruise

missile takeoff fuel sequence.
For external nonnuclear weapons configurations, see FUEL SYSTEM
MANAGEMENT, Section I.
For JP-4 configured aircraft, see RECOCKING checklist, this section
for proper fuel panel configuration.
a. 1 & 4 Above Green Band, Center & Aft Contains 2000 Pounds or More Each 1, 2, 3, and 4
ON; 13 and 16 OPEN; 26 and 28 ENGINE FEED
b. Either Center or Aft Less Than 2000 Pounds Each 1, 2, 3, and 4 ON; 9, 10, 11, 12 OPEN
2-60
Change 17
T.O. 1B-52H-1

11. WINDOWS & DOORS CLOSED AND LOCKED (P-CP)
Check windows closed and hatches-not-locked light out.

12. Flight Instruments Set (P-CP-N)
d. The pilot will announce the latest altimeter setting and the known elevation. The copilot and
navigator will check their altimeters within 75 feet of the known elevation.
e.
The pilot will announce his HSI and magnetic standby compass indications. The copilot and
navigator will cross-check their instruments for errors.
f.
Pilot positions the heading selector switch to MAN and checks bank steering bar for proper
operation. The selector switch will be left in MAN during takeoff and the bank steering bar used
to aid in directional control. Set the heading marker to runway heading with crosswind crab
correction applied, i.e., if the crosswind crab correction is 10 left, the heading marker should
be set 10 left of the runway heading.
NOTE
Cross-checking of bank steering bar, turn needle, and heading indicator

will provide indication of attitude indicator failure in the roll axis. If
the roll axis of the ADI is inoperative on takeoff, the bank steering bar
will aid in maintaining a wings-level attitude until a new heading is
selected.
g. Pilot and copilot set attitude indicators to level flight and check attitude indicator erected and
OFF flag and ATT warning flag out of sight; standby attitude indicator erected and OFF flag
out of view; heading indicators for movement in turns; and all pitot-static pressure instruments
for correct indications.
Any time during critical phases of flight and especially during night
and/or instrument conditions, the pilot not flying the aircraft will closely monitor his flight instruments, and cross-check them against the instruments of the other pilot. If an apparent error in aircraft attitude is
detected, the pilot flying the aircraft will be advised immediately.
13. Radar Altimeter Set (as required) (P-CP)
Set 250 feet (Nav minimum bailout) when all crewmembers are in ejection seats.
Set 500 feet for minimum bailout altitude when additional crewmembers not in
ejection seats are on board.
14. Radio Navigation Instruments Checked VOR/TACAN (P/CP)
When a certified ground checkpoint is available and time permits, the pilot not flying should check
VOR/TACAN equipment within prescribed tolerances. Select the appropriate navigational aids to be
used for the departure and set the navigational instruments and switches as required.
Change 12
2-61
T.O. 1B-52H-1

15. Air Conditioning Head Outlets CLOSED (P-CP)
16. Generator Panel Checked (CP)
Copilot checks ammeters, frequency meter, and voltmeter.
17. STARTER SELECTOR FLIGHT (CP)
18. TAKEOFF DATA REVIEWED (P-CP-RN-N)
Review EPR, thrust gate setting, S1 speed and time, and S2 speed. Procedures to be used in the
event an emergency occurs during takeoff will be reviewed. Both pilots will have a complete understanding of actions to be taken if an emergency occurs prior to or after S1 speed. The pilot/copilot
will brief the crew to ensure that departure procedures are understood. This will include restrictions
and hazardous terrain. Other crewmembers will report any deviations during the departure. Navigator will verify S1 time during this review.
19. THRUST GATE SET FOR TAKEOFF (CP)
Copilot will set the thrust gate according to the THRUST GATE SETTING FOR TAKEOFF chart
in Part 2 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1.
20. YAW & PITCH SAS ENGAGE, LIGHTS OFF (P)
Place yaw and pitch SAS switches to ENGAGE. Check yaw and pitch SAS lights out and channel
fail light out. Engagement of yaw and pitch SAS switches should normally be delayed until the
aircraft is stationary just prior to takeoff in order to preclude possible maintenance problems.
21. Autopilot Power Switch ON (P/CP)
22. SEAT, RUDDER PEDALS & CONTROL COLUMN ADJUSTED AND CHECKED (P-CP)
Pilot and copilot adjust seat and check full displacement of control column and control wheel, then
adjust rudder pedals to enable full displacement. Copilot holds column rigid near neutral while pilot
applies push and pull forces on his column to confirm columns connected.
Do not attempt to check rudder pedal travel as severe loads would be

applied to tires and landing gear.
23. Arming Lever Safety Pins (No. 1) Removed (P-CP-EW-G)
24. Ejection Control Trigger Ring Unstowed (RN-N)
2-62
Change 12
T.O. 1B-52H-1
GROUND TA FUNCTIONAL CHECK CHECKLIST (Pilot/Copilot Reads)
NOTE
Advise navigators prior to start of checklist.

This check should be accomplished prior to takeoff if time and conditions permit.
Coordination with the radar navigator will be made before accomplishing these checks.
A more consistent terrain trace should be obtained if the aircraft is
parked in a position so there is an 0.8 mile area in front of the aircraft
that is clear of large targets (airplanes, trees, and buildings).
1. Radar & Heading Drift OFF (N)

The radar and heading drift switch must be OFF to ensure the radar will be sectoring about the
aircraft heading.
2. MFD Display Control Panel MFD EVS Switch EVS (P-CP)
3. TA Frequency Checked (RN)
Radar navigator should ensure frequency is not set on 125 MHz (10 MHz) or a multiple of 125 MHz
to preclude the radar receiver/transmitter from shifting between adjacent bands and affecting the
TA display.
4. TA Video Select (P-CP)
Press TA video select switch to ON.
5. Terrain Display Mode Selector PROFILE CAL (P/CP)
6. Stabilization Reference Selector HOR (P/CP)
7. Clearance Plane Range Checked and set 0 (P/CP); Checked (RN)
Change the clearance plane elevation throughout its range and observe the movement of the clearance plane indicators. Observe that the terrain trace moves upward on the monitor as the clearance
plane setting is increased. As the clearance plane is decreased, stop prior to reaching 200 feet. Observe the pilots and radar navigators warning lights out. Stop clearance plane again after decreasing through 200 feet. Observe the pilots and radar navigators warning lights on, and the HRL gap
filled in. Set the clearance plane to zero.
NOTE
The TA warning light should not come on for clearance plane settings
between 200 and 1500 feet.
Change 21
2-63
T.O. 1B-52H-1
GROUND TA FUNCTIONAL CHECK CHECKLIST (Pilot/Copilot reads) (Cont)

8. Stabilization Reference Selector FRL (P/CP)
9. FRL Angle 2 to +2 Degrees & Set 0.5 Checked (P/CP-RN)
The radar navigator will vary the FRL angle-of-attack from 2.0 degrees to +2.0 degrees as one of
the pilots notes upward movement of the terrain trace. The radar navigator will set the FRL angleof-attack at 0.5. The base of the terrain trace should be within approximately 1/2 inch of the HRL.
Large targets such as buildings, trees, and other airplanes that are in front of the aircraft and within
minimum range (approximately 0.8 mile) will appear as partial or complete dropout. If complete
dropout occurs, and it is feasible to do so, move or turn the aircraft to obtain a clear area in front
of the aircraft.
10. Clearance Plane Set to 300 feet (P/CP)
11. Profile CAL, 3, 6 & 10 Displays Checked (P/CP)
a. Horizontal Reference Lines
Observe that both horizontal reference lines are present and centered for each range selected.
The horizontal reference line should be approximately 2 inches long at the center of the monitor
with approximately a 1/4 inch break in the line at ground track.
b. Range Gate Lights
The 10 mile range gate light should illuminate when profile CAL is selected. Observe that both
3, 6, and 10 mile range gate lights illuminate as the proper range is selected.
12. TA Test Checked (P-CP)
a. Press and hold TA test switch and observe that:
(1) Profile 3, profile 6, profile 10, TA-EVS vector, and TA warning lights are illuminated.
(2) Horizontal reference line is present on the display and filled in (figure 1-165).
b. Release the TA test switch and observe that:
(1) Profile 3, profile 6, TA-EVS vector, and TA warning lights go off and profile 10 light remains
on.
(2) Profile trace is completely displayed as antenna completes a full scan. The video line shall
remain stable within 1/32 inch for each sweep.
13. Terrain Display Mode Selector OFF (P/CP)
14. Radar & Heading Drift ON (N)
15. EVS TA Video OFF (P-CP)
2-64
Change 4
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TAKEOFF
Close attention will be given to the recommended
procedures in order to obtain the most desirable
takeoff performance. The normal takeoff technique
is that which will be required to produce the results
stated in the takeoff charts in T.O. 1B-52H-1-1.
These procedures have been selected as being the
most desirable from the consideration of safety. The
use of takeoff rated thrust will result in a minimum
directional control speed above unstick speed under
certain conditions. Therefore, a partial thrust procedure is included in T.O. 1B-52H-1-1 which gives
directional control speeds below the unstick speed.
Other advantages to be gained by using this concept are the reduction in both the magnitude and
the rate of trim changes required after takeoff, the
reduction in the magnitude of the climb angle required after unstick to preclude exceeding flap placard, and the extension of airframe and engine life.
The partial thrust procedure is used for all takeoffs
unless the resultant minimum runway required exceeds 80% of the runway available.
If it is absolutely necessary to fly the aircraft

immediately following a heavily braked
landing or reduced takeoff, a check of the
BRAKE ENERGY LIMIT CHART (figure
5-14), should be made prior to takeoff.
If a tire failure is suspected on takeoff before decision speed is reached, the takeoff
should be discontinued. This is to preclude
the possibility of landing gear failure
caused by takeoff with a partially disintegrated tire.
Following any extended takeoff roll, consideration must be given to delaying gear retraction to preclude retracting a gear which
might develop extensive heat buildup and
damage to the wheel well area. The delay
in gear retraction should be a minimum of
15 minutes to allow for any possible heat
dissipation. Care should be taken not to exceed limiting speed while gear are extended
or during retraction.
TAKEOFF PERFORMANCE
Performance Data
All takeoff performance data should be determined

prior to takeoff. This assures accurate planning and
close monitoring of all takeoffs. These data include
such items as takeoff gross weight, runway OAT,
field length and altitude, wind direction and velocity, aircraft cg, and the runway gradient. From such
items, it may be determined what the takeoff EPR
and stabilizer setting are, what the crosswind crab
setting is, and what the takeoff distance will be. A
change in any one of these items will have an effect
on takeoff performance as shown in figure 2-3. Relative humidity, which appreciably affects reciprocating engines, has a negligible effect on turbojet
engines. An increase in takeoff distance not to exceed 100 feet will result from normal use of the engine stall prevention system up to 50 knots IAS.
Sufficient charts to accurately determine takeoff
performance are included in Part 2 of T.O.
1B-52H-1-1.
Takeoff Planning
Adequate takeoff planning will always include the

possibility of poor acceleration during the takeoff
run. Although many factors may cause poor acceleration, the most probable cause is engine failure. If
such a failure occurs, it will be possible either to
stop in the runway distance remaining or to continue the takeoff safely on seven engines. The decision
whether or not a stop can be made in the remaining
runway will be made immediately and with the aid
of predetermined criteria. This information is
shown graphically for all RCR conditions in Part 2
of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1. The minimum runway required
is the runway length required to accelerate to the
decision speed, experience an engine failure, and
then take off with seven engines. Minimum runway
required charts in Part 2 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1 are
used to determine the maximum gross weight for a
specific runway length. It should be pointed out,
however, that climbout performance will be considered when determining the maximum gross weight
for operation from a given runway. This is necessary because it is possible under certain runway
pressure altitude and temperature conditions to
load the aircraft so that, although the takeoff could
be accomplished, very poor and sometimes unsafe
climbout performance exists. This is discussed more
fully under AFTER TAKEOFF, this section.
To determine the maximum takeoff weight, takeoff
rated thrust will be used in the planning as follows:
Enter the appropriate minimum runway required
chart with the runway length available and arrive
at a takeoff ground run. Entering the TAKEOFF
GROUND RUN chart with this distance, arrive at a
weight as determined by the existing field pressure
altitude, temperature, and EPR for TRT. Check the
climbout performance for this weight, temperature,
and field pressure altitude by referring to the
charts in Part 3 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1, keeping in
mind terrain clearance, flap retraction problems,
and engine failure possibility. Once this weight has
been determined, the only other information required is that which will enable the pilot to properly monitor the takeoff. These are the decision time
and speed and the takeoff speed.
2-65
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Factors Affecting Takeoff
INITIAL TIMING SPEED

Initial timing speed is the speed (70 knots IAS) at
which timing is started to determine acceleration
characteristics of the aircraft.
S1. S1 is the computed decision speed (S1 speed)
which must be reached by the termination of the
acceleration check time (S1 time). S1 speed does not
commit the aircraft to takeoff. The end of S1 timing
will determine the decision to take off (committed)
or abort (ABORT).
S2. S2 is the takeoff indicated airspeed (unstick
speed).
Engine Thrust
Figure 2-3
S1 S2 Acceleration Monitor System
The S1 S2 acceleration monitor system is based on a

timed acceleration check between two indicated airspeeds which can be compared against a precomputed acceleration rate taken from charted values
prior to takeoff. Use of this system virtually eliminates wind error, airspeed indicator calibration error is minimized, and no reference point outside of
the aircraft is necessary. The S1 S2 system checks
acceleration only after thrust is set which increases
accuracy during rolling takeoffs. Use of engine stall
prevention system must be discontinued at 50(5)
knots for the S1 S2 acceleration check to be valid.
Excellent crew coordination is essential when using
the S1 S2 acceleration check.
NOTE
When a computed takeoff distance is 4000

feet or less, the S1 S2 takeoff procedure will
not be used. In lieu of timing acceleration,
a check of all engine instruments will be
made when 70 knots is reached during the
takeoff roll. At this point, the decision will
be made to continue or abort the takeoff,
except the takeoff may be aborted at any
time prior to unstick when the aircraft
gross weight is 250,000 pounds or less and
the runway is dry.
2-66
Takeoff thrust is reduced with an increase in outside air temperature and/or field elevation; however, good takeoff performance is obtainable at high
temperatures and high field elevations. The turbofan engine is a part throttle engine in that takeoff
rated thrust is developed with less than full throttle
travel at all temperatures below approximately
100F. At the beginning of the takeoff while at low
airspeed, the throttles are positioned to obtain a
computed EPR reading on the EPR gages. This
value is calculated for the prevailing ambient
conditions. Under certain conditions, the thrust
developed will be less than takeoff rated thrust
when using the computed partial thrust EPR
values. With throttles set in this position, any
change in EPR due to ram effect, as the airspeed
increases during takeoff, is normal and no further
adjustment is ordinarily required. Refer to Part 2 of
T.O. 1B-52H-1-1.
TAKEOFF PROCEDURES
Correct takeoff procedures may vary under different takeoff conditions. There are, however, some
procedures which are standard for every takeoff.
These procedures, which are discussed in ALL
TAKEOFFS, should always be adhered to. For the
takeoff calculations and a summary of the takeoff
procedures, refer to Part 2 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1.
All Takeoffs
The charted EPR and stabilizer trim setting will be

used for all takeoffs except touch-and-go and taxiback. The wing flaps will be set for 100% down and
intermediate settings will never be used.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ROLLING TAKEOFF
In order to minimize the fatigue damage effects to
the wing structure, all takeoffs will normally be
made from a rolling start. In those situations when
safety may be compromised by performing a rolling
takeoff or when runway conditions dictate, takeoff
may be made from a braked condition. However,
maximum thrust operation with brakes locked will
be kept to a minimum. When making a rolling takeoff, the aircraft will be aligned with the runway at
normal taxi speeds using the radius guidelines.
The maximum turn-on groundspeed for a

140 to 150 foot turn radius is 15 knots. This
limit is based on aircraft strength and will
not be exceeded.
Steering ratio selector may be placed in TAKEOFF
LAND after completion of the BEFORE LINEUP
checklist if the runway turn radius permits. Not
permitting, it will be placed in TAKEOFF LAND
when aligned with the runway. Power will never be
advanced to TAKEOFF until within 15 of runway
heading.
THROTTLES
The thrust gate is used for initial positioning of
throttles for takeoff. The thrust gate setting is obtained from the takeoff data card; the card entry is
made at the time of takeoff planning and is obtained from the THRUST GATE SETTING FOR
TAKEOFF chart in Part 2 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1. The
pilot flying the aircraft will advance the throttles
deliberately and evenly to the thrust gate. Initial
reference to the EPR is not necessary. Full throttle
movement should be made in a minimum of two
seconds to avoid compressor stalls and a maximum
of four seconds to stay within computed takeoff
data parameters. As soon as the throttles are
against the thrust gate, and stabilized for approximately two seconds, the pilot not flying will adjust
the throttles to the proper engine pressure ratio
(EPR) as quickly as possible. If any engine fails to
achieve the charted EPR setting, the throttle for
that engine may be advanced through the thrust
gate as necessary to set the charted EPR. Pilots
should not advance throttles that have already
achieved the charted EPR setting. No attempt will
be made to steer by throttles as differential thrust
is ineffective and reduction of thrust on one side
will increase the takeoff ground run. The pilot flying the aircraft will maintain throttle control until
the expiration of S1 timing and the decision has

been made to continue the takeoff (committed). He
will maintain throttle control throughout light
gross weight takeoffs (computed takeoff distance
4000 feet or less), touch-and-go, or taxi-backs to include climb through flap retraction (if applicable).
STABILIZER TRIM
The stabilizer trim setting required for the takeoff
depends on the center of gravity location, aircraft
gross weight and EPR for takeoff. The correct stabilizer trim setting may be determined from charts in
Part 2 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1.
Failure to set the stabilizer correctly could

result in:
1. An accelerated stall if the stabilizer
trim is set too noseup.
2. Longer than predicted takeoff ground
runs if the stabilizer trim is set too
nosedown.
WING FLAPS
The wing flaps are so designed that the highest liftdrag ratio is achieved at the 100% down position.
For this reason, they are always used in this position. Because wing flap extension time is 60 seconds and intermediate settings are ineffective, the
lowering of flaps during the takeoff roll is not recommended.
CONTROL TECHNIQUE
Steering should be accomplished with the rudder
pedals throughout the ground run. The steering
system will be effective until sufficient speed is established for rudder control. The takeoff will require a pull force on the control column approximately 5 to 10 knots prior to unstick speed. The
control column will be pulled back as required to
achieve the computed unstick speed. At the appropriate speed, the forward wheels will come off
the runway first and the aircraft will tend to rotate
about the rear wheels. Relaxing back pressure at
the time the aircraft leaves the ground will stop
this pitching action. However, if the stabilizer trim
is set too high (aircraft nose up) the control column
must be pushed well forward to stop the pitching
action. Should rearward control column movement
be delayed until just before the takeoff point, the
takeoff ground run may be increased as much as
5%. Refer to Part 2 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1 for determination of takeoff distances.
Change 12
2-67
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Heavy Gross Weight Takeoff
Instrument Takeoff and Initial Climb
The takeoff and initial portion of the climbout are

the critical conditions for an aircraft weighing
450,000 to 488,000 pounds. When takeoff is
planned at these weights, performance calculations
should be gone over thoroughly not only for normal
operation but for emergency conditions as well. A
positive vertical velocity cannot always be maintained during the complete flap retraction cycle;
therefore, at these heavy weights, flap retraction
will normally be delayed until reaching 1500 feet.
After takeoff, there is ample climb performance.
Even with one engine out, the aircraft is well above
the outboard engine-out minimum control speed.
An instrument takeoff is essentially the same as a

normal VFR takeoff. Ensure the attitude indicator
is set for takeoff by aligning the horizon bar with
the miniature aircraft.
1. Align the aircraft visually with the runway.
The copilot will visually monitor the takeoff and
initial climb. A takeoff with reference to instruments exclusively may be required because of low
visibility conditions.
NOTE
The bank steering bar will be used during

the takeoff and climb as an aid in heading
control. Cross-checking of the bank steering
bar, turn needle, and heading indicator will
provide indication of attitude indicator failure in the roll axis. If the roll axis of the
ADI is inoperative on takeoff, the bank
steering bar will aid in maintaining a
wings-level attitude until a new heading is
selected. This type of failure has occurred
several times without a warning flag in
view. If a new heading is selected, then the
roll axis failure should become apparent as
the turn is initiated. A rapidly precessing
heading indicator will also give the same indications.
Light Gross Weight Takeoff
When the computed takeoff distance is 4000 feet or

less, the takeoff will be considered a lightweight
takeoff. When takeoff is made at light weight, the
airspeed and rate of climb increase rapidly after unstick. This condition reduces the time during which
trim changes can be made. The pilot should control
any noseup rotation with forward control column
and nosedown trim and check for proper movement
of the manual trim wheel. After the landing gear is
retracted, the thrust should be adjusted during
climb to flap retraction altitude to produce a rate of
climb of approximately 1500 to 2000 feet per minute.
NOTE
Avoid rapid adjustments in thrust level. Anticipate changes sufficiently far in advance
to provide time for change in trim.
When partial thrust is used for takeoff, the above
problems are minimized and thrust may not have
to be adjusted during climb to flap retraction altitude.
2. As the aircraft breaks ground, maintain the

unstick attitude as indicated by the attitude indicator until a cross-check of vertical velocity indicator
and altimeter indicate a definite rate of climb with
increasing airspeed.
2-68
If a pitchup occurs as the aircraft becomes

airborne, failure to initiate positive action
with the elevator control and trim to stop
the aircraft noseup rotation could result in
a stall.
The OFF flag will not appear during every
attitude indicator failure. Therefore, it is
possible that a malfunction of the attitude
indicator might be determined only by
cross-checking it with the turn and slip indicator and the other flight instruments.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NOTE

information displayed on the pilot and/or
copilot attitude director indicator may be
after a forward acceleration and a nosedown direction during and after deceleration. The longer the duration of acceleration
(or deceleration), the greater will be the indicated error and the longer it will persist
when acceleration (or deceleration) ceases.
The erection system reduces the error at
about the same rate as it was generated.
Pitch error may reach one bar width during
a high gross weight takeoff.
3. Retract the gear as recommended for a VFR

takeoff; however, be certain that a safe stabilized
climb has been established. Adjust pitch as necessary to maintain a climb at 180 knots IAS.
4. Retract flaps as recommended for a VFR takeoff.
Night Takeoff
When making a night takeoff, use the same procedure as for a day takeoff. If the pilot wishes to energize the fluorescent dials on his instruments so that
they glow with maximum intensity, the white spotlight may be used for focusing on the applicable instruments for a few seconds while the pilots eyes
are covered. The landing lights, terrain clearance
light, and crosswind landing light may be used at
the pilots discretion.
NOTE
The landing lights are in the leading edge

of the forward landing gear doors and will
remain on until the landing gear is up and
locked or until switch is turned OFF.
Crosswind Takeoff
NOTE
Sustained runway wind velocity plus 1/3 of

the gust factor will be used to compute
crosswind crab settings for a takeoff with
gusty wind conditions.
If a crosswind cannot be compensated for by

use of the crosswind crab system, a takeoff
is not recommended.
If the wind is a variable wind, the average
heading of this variable wind should be
used.
Prior to the time of takeoff, the takeoff weight and

local field wind velocity and direction should be ascertained and the crosswind crab setting determined for these conditions. Refer to Part 2 of T.O.
1B-52H-1-1, for applicable crosswind takeoff information. While taxiing to takeoff position, set the
crosswind crab control knob in the direction the
nose of the aircraft is to be crabbed into the wind.
Taxi into takeoff position so that the nose of the aircraft is pointing into the direction of the wind component (figure 2-4). The miniature aircraft and
pointer on the crosswind crab indicator should
point to the degree setting corresponding to the
crab angle previously determined for the wind and
gross weight. The miniature aircraft and pointer
should be crabbed across the simulated runway on
the indicator in the same direction that the aircraft
is crabbed across the runway on the takeoff.
ENGINE OPERATION
During a crosswind takeoff, the turbofan engine is
susceptible to engine stall under certain conditions
and requires use of the engine stall prevention system. The engine stall prevention system will be
used when the runway wind velocity is 10 knots or
more and the wind direction is 45 or more to the
runway heading. When the aircraft reaches a speed
of 50 knots IAS, the engine inlet airflow distortion
is reduced and use of the system is discontinued.
Use of this system results in a change EPR and
thrust output of the engine. An EPR drop of
approximately 0.1 will occur when the engine stall
prevention switch is depressed with engines operating near TRT and a drop of approximately 0.05
when operating at lower thrust settings. An EPR
jump of the same magnitude will occur when the
engine stall prevention switch is released at the 50
knot point. Normal use of the engine stall prevention switch for a crosswind takeoff is as follows:
During the turn on the runway, the engine stall
prevention switch is depressed and held prior to advancing throttles above 1.3 EPR. The throttles are
advanced to the takeoff EPR adjusted for the drop
due to engine stall prevention switch use. After an
indicated airspeed of 50 (5) knots is reached, the
engine stall prevention switch is released and an
EPR jump is observed.
2-69
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Crosswind Crab Operation
Figure 2-4
CONTROL TECHNIQUE
The takeoff procedure used is the same as that for a
normal takeoff except that the aircraft will be
crabbed into the wind, a condition which may seem
strange the first few times a pilot uses this crosswind crab technique. Engine thrust may pull the
aircraft toward the side of the runway from which
the wind is blowing before the aircraft becomes airborne. This effect is easily overcome by use of the
proper amount of rudder pedal steering. If the
crosswind is of a large enough magnitude, it may
cause the aircraft to heel over on the downwind tip
gear at low speeds. Such a differential tip gear loading can cause high stresses in the tip gear tire as
speed increases. An attempt to level the wings with
2-70
lateral control can be initiated when passing

through 60 knots IAS on the takeoff roll, but full
control wheel travel may be necessary at this airspeed. A slight increase in the ground roll of not
more than 1% can be anticipated because of the
drag imposed by the raised spoilers. The lateral
control required to maintain a wings-level attitude
will diminish as the airspeed increases to the takeoff speed if the crab angle setting being used was
determined for the correct wind and gross weight.
Forward gear steering becomes less effective as the
wheels become lightly loaded; however, the rudder
control becomes more effective and compensates for
the decrease in effectiveness of forward gear steering.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LANDING GEAR RETRACTION
After the aircraft is airborne and brakes have been
applied, retract the landing gear. The crosswind
crab control knob and indicator will be automatically centered prior to the time the gear retracts.
traction cycle if large amounts of stabilizer

trim are applied. This is considered normal
and is due to the design of the hydraulic
system which gives the demands of the stabilizer system priority over the retraction
cycle demands of the landing gear system.
Obstacle Clearance Takeoff
Following any extended takeoff roll, consideration must be given to delaying gear retraction to preclude retracting a gear which
might develop extensive heat buildup and
damage to the wheel well area. The delay
in gear retraction should be a minimum of
15 minutes to allow for any possible heat
dissipation. Care should be taken not to exceed limiting speed while gear are extended
or during retraction.
NOTE
During landing gear retraction, the landing

gear may hesitate momentarily in the re-
If obstacle clearance is marginal, retract the landing gear as soon as possible after becoming airborne, leave wing flaps fully extended, and climb at
10 knots above takeoff speed until the obstacle is
cleared. The charts in Part 2 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1
show the distance required from point of brake release to clear a 50 foot obstacle with seven and
eight engines. Since an engine failure may be encountered after S1, it is recommended that the
charts be entered using the seven engine ground
run distance. After the climb from C to F (figure
2-6), allow the aircraft to accelerate to 180 knots indicated airspeed and continue climb to at least 1000
feet above the terrain before starting flap retraction. See OBSTACLE CLEARANCE CLIMBOUT,
this section, for maximum climb angle discussion.
2-71
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TAKEOFF CHECKLIST
NOTE
This checklist will be reviewed prior to takeoff and need not be read
during takeoff.
1. IFF NORM (P)
Pilot will check that proper mode and code settings are set prior to selecting NORM on the IFF
system.
2. Lights ON (P/CP)
Turn landing, taxi, and crosswind landing lights on for day or night operations unless the reflection
reduces pilot visibility.
3. Crosswind Crab Set, knob down (P-CP)
The pilot not making the takeoff will set the crosswind crab while taxiing to takeoff position. The
pilot making the takeoff will check the indicator for proper setting.
4. Air Conditioning RAM (P/CP)
5. ESP Switch Climatic (if used, release at 50 knots) (P)
When making a crosswind takeoff requiring use of the engine stall prevention switch, the pilot will
depress and hold the engine stall prevention switch during the turn onto the runway and prior to
reaching 1.3 EPR.
6. Steering Ratio TAKEOFF LAND (P)
Steering ratio selector may be placed in TAKEOFF LAND after completion of the TAXIING AND
BEFORE LINEUP checklist if the runway turn radius permits. Not permitting, it will be placed in
TAKEOFF LAND when aligned with the runway.
If the steering ratio lever is not in TAKEOFF LAND, the landing gear
cannot be retracted.
Center the rudder pedals before repositioning the steering ratio selector lever. Actuation of the lever when the rudder pedals are deflected is
very difficult and will result in a sudden change in steering angle.
2-72
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TAKEOFF CHECKLIST (Cont)

7. Throttles Set (P-CP)
Pilot team will advance all throttles to applicable EPR setting when the aircraft heading is within
15 of runway heading. Manifold temperature should not exceed 246C.
If the warning horn sounds and the master caution lights come on as
throttles are advanced beyond approximately 45 from CLOSED, the
flaps should be rechecked at 100% down.
Extended operation of the engines at full thrust reduces wing trailing

edge service life. Wing flap service life is also adversely affected, especially with flaps down. Do not operate in this condition any longer than
necessary.
Exceeding takeoff rated thrust and/or charted takeoff EPR values can
cause structural damage to the engine causing rapid engine deterioration.
NOTE
When making a takeoff from a standing start, pilots should be alert for
possible aircraft movement when throttles are advanced since the parking brakes were not designed to hold the aircraft with all engines at
NRT. If movement is detected, depressing the brakes beyond parking
brake position may reduce the creeping but may not stop it. If takeoff
is not imminent, reduce thrust to stop the aircraft.
If the ESP switch is used, adjust EPR to computed takeoff value minus
the ESP correction factor.
During initial takeoff roll, the copilot will check oil pressure (and the
low oil pressure warning lights), EPR, rpm, and EGT indicators within
limits and will monitor engine instruments during remainder of takeoff
roll.
Copilot monitors the stabilizer trim indicator during the takeoff roll in
order to detect any inadvertent change in takeoff trim setting.
2-73
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TAKEOFF CHECKLIST (Cont)

8. 70 Knots Now (P)
Pilot announces over interphone 70 knots at approximately 60 knots. At 70 knots, pilot announces
Now. As pilot announces Now, the navigator starts his stopwatch. Radar navigator backs up
navigators timing on all takeoffs. If the navigator is not aboard, the radar navigator accomplishes
the time check. Copilot checks his airspeed indicator at the 70 knot check. Airspeed indicators will
be written up in Form 781 if difference exceeds 3 knots. Takeoff will be aborted if difference exceeds
6 knots.
NOTE
Crosswinds or wind gusts will affect airspeed indicators. Fluctuations

of both indicators can be observed (not necessarily in the same direction) and should be considered during cross-check.
9. Acceleration Timing Checked (N) (RN Backup)
Navigator announces over interphone Coming up on
seconds approximately 3 seconds prior
to S1 time. At S1 time, navigator announces Now. At the same time, the pilot checks his airspeed
and announces to the crew his decision to take off (Committed) or abort (Abort), based on the
time-speed relationship. Pilot not flying the aircraft will take control of the throttles and set the
throttle brake. (radar navigator backs up navigators timing on all takeoffs.)
Takeoff will not be aborted after S1 unless, in the opinion of the pilot,
the emergency renders the aircraft definitely unsafe to attain emergency bailout altitude. In those cases where the pilot attempts to abort after S1, he must accept the fact that he will probably fail to stop within
the confines of the runway.
10. Unstick Speed (S2) Now (CP)
Copilot calls over interphone unstick speed approximately 5 to 10 knots before reaching unstick
speed. At unstick speed, copilot announces over interphone Now.
2-74
Change 4
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AFTER TAKEOFF
column and can lead to the false impression that

stabilizer trim is not required.
CLIMBOUT PLANNING
NOTE
Under some operating conditions, climbout can be

the most critical phase of aircraft operation. For
this reason, it is essential that the climbout technique be planned during mission planning prior to
the flight. The climbout procedures essentially fall
into two categories which are explained in the following paragraphs. These are a normal climbout
and an obstacle clearance climbout.
The eight, seven, and six engine maximum rate of
climb charts may be found in Part 3 of T.O.
1B-52H-1-1. Whenever the partial thrust takeoff
procedures can be used, the rate of climb will always exceed 1500 fpm and no check will be necessary. If an obstacle will be cleared, the obstacle
clearance climbout procedure will be used.
AFTER TAKEOFF PROCEDURES
After leaving the ground, the wheel brakes will be

applied before starting gear retraction to avoid
wheel well damage from spinning wheels. The landing gear retraction should be started as soon after
unstick as possible. If at a light gross weight when
climb is started, the power should be adjusted during climb to flap retraction altitude to a setting
which will produce a positive vertical velocity of
approximately 1500 to 2000 feet per minute. When
partial thrust takeoff procedures are used, the
throttles may not have to be adjusted to obtain this
desired rate of climb. Keep aircraft trimmed as
close as possible to zero stick force in the climb.
Stabilizer Trim Use After Takeoff
The period from takeoff to flaps up requires active

stabilizer trim use by the pilot to meet the rapidly
changing trim requirements. Stabilizer trim should
be utilized as required to maintain stick forces near
zero to preclude the rapid development of an out-oftrim condition. Stick forces associated with flaps
down are very light even full travel of the control
Control column force is a function only for

control column position and airspeed; this
force is not dependent on stabilizer position.
If the control column is at full travel and
stabilizer trim is being used, no change in
control column force will occur until the
control column is repositioned by the pilot.
A positive method of determining whether
or not the trim is working is to note the action of the trim wheel.
Excessive force is not required to position the control column at full travel in the flaps-down configuration. Therefore, if a condition develops in which
the pilot is holding the control column hard against
the stops and not effecting positive control of the
aircraft, he will make a conscious effort to utilize
stabilizer trim. If this condition has developed and
trimming action has been started, the response of
the aircraft may not be immediately apparent. Continue trimming until control is regained.
A typical profile of trim requirements is given in
figure 2-5. When the aircraft is out of ground effect,
landing gear is retracted and the aircraft is accelerated to 180 knots IAS, a nosedown stabilizer trim
requirement of approximately 3 units exists. During the first 80% of flap retraction, approximately
1.4 units of stabilizer noseup trim is needed. An
additional 1.1 units of noseup trim is required during the last 20% of flap retraction. For these trim
requirements, the manual trim wheel is too slow to
maintain zero stick force; therefore, the stabilizer
trim button should be used. During flap retraction,
stick forces are light and a few seconds of holding a
rearward control column rather than retrimming
can result in an aircraft out-of-trim condition of 2 or
3 units nosedown trim and an approaching loss of
elevator authority. Application of noseup trim and
full-up elevator will result in immediate recovery.
2-75
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Takeoff-Climb Stabilizer Trim Schedule
Figure 2-5
See FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS, Section VI, for information on elevator and
stabilizer characteristics. After the flaps are fully
retracted, nosedown trim change will be required
during acceleration to best climb speed.
When holding full up elevator, the pilot will

be certain that he is engaging the trim button in NOSEUP position. Due to the position of the control column, he may be pushing in on the button or down on the trim
button guard.
Since during initial climb phase a severe attitude change occurs requiring considerable
manipulation of the stabilizer trim, pilots
should be especially alert for a stabilizer
trim malfunction during this critical phase
of flight, and initiate immediate action as
outlined in FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM
EMERGENCY OPERATION, Section III.
2-76
Normal Climbout Procedure
After unstick, the aircraft is accelerated to 180

knots IAS and a flaps-down climbout made to at
least 1000 feet above the terrain (path CD in figure
2-6). At this point, flap retraction will be initiated.
The aircraft will be accelerated on takeoff heading
during flap retraction whenever possible. The airspeed will be maintained above the minimum recommended with flaps up.
Obstacle Clearance Climbout Procedure
When obstacles near the field will be cleared on

takeoff, the climbout performance becomes very important. A high angle of climb for clearing close obstacles is maintained by leaving the flaps down and
climbing at 10 knots above unstick speed until obstacle is cleared.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
After Takeoff Flight Paths
POINT A.
POINT B.
PATH CD.
POINT D.
PATH CF.
POINT F.
PATH FG.
POINTS E
AND G.
Start takeoff roll using takeoff rated thrust

(TRT) with wing flaps down.
Takeoff point; start gear retraction.
Leave flaps down and climb out at 180
knots IAS to 1000 or 1500 feet above the
terrain.
Start flap retraction at 1000 or 1500 feet
altitude above the terrain.
Leave flaps extended and climb at unstick
speed plus 10 knots until the obstacle is
cleared.
Maximum desired altitude for clearing
obstacle (at least 1000 feet above terrain).
Start flap retraction at 180 knots IAS; maintain a rate of climb sufficient to keep from
exceeding flap placard limits.
Points at which flaps are up. Accelerate
to the best climb speed as given in Part 3
of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1.
conditions of high gross weight, high OAT, and high

field elevation, or any combination of these factors,
it may be impossible to maintain a positive vertical
velocity during the latter part of the flap retraction
period. Flaps must not be retracted in a turn. The
speed schedule of 180 knots IAS at 100% flaps
down, 200 knots IAS flaps 50%, 210 knots IAS
flaps 30%, and 230 knots IAS flaps full up should
be followed. In any event, maintain a sufficient
positive vertical velocity to keep from exceeding the
flap placard speed of 225 knots IAS at the 50%
position and 253 knots IAS at the 10% position. If a
turn is required during flap retraction, stop the
flaps before making the turn and limit the angle of
bank to 20 degrees. Maintain the speed appropriate
for the flap position during the turn. After
completion of the turn and in a wings level attitude,
resume flap retraction.
The OFF flag will not appear during every

attitude indication failure. Therefore, it is
possible that malfunction of the attitude indicator portion of the attitude-director indicator might be determined only by crosschecking it with the turn and slip indicator
and the other remaining flight instruments.
NOTE
Figure 2-6
Flap Retraction Precautions
During flap retraction, the speed schedule shown in

figure 2-7 should be maintained within 10 knots.
This schedule gives a safe margin between flap
placard and minimum speeds. If the airspeed is low,
the vertical velocity should be reduced or power
added. During the flap retraction cycle, it is
required that the pilot monitor the aircraft attitude
as closely as possible, keeping the aircraft trimmed
to a zero stick force, especially during the last 20%
of flap retraction. If the climbout has been properly
planned and no emergency develops, a satisfactory
vertical velocity can be maintained while
accelerating during flap retraction. However, under

information displayed on the pilot and/or
copilot attitude direction indicator may be
after a forward acceleration and in a nosedown direction during and after deceleration. The longer the duration of acceleration
(or deceleration), the greater will be the indicated error and the longer it will persist
when acceleration (or deceleration) ceases.
The erection system will reduce the error at
about the same rate it was generated. Pitch
error may reach one bar width during a
high gross weight takeoff.
2-77
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Flap Retraction Speeds
Heavyweight Flap Retraction Performance
It can be seen from figure 2-8 that on a heavyweight takeoff, the flap retraction performance of
this aircraft is not critical. With one engine out at
100F, the vertical velocity indicator will indicate a
rate of descent of approximately 50 feet per minute
for so short a period of time that the actual altitude
loss will be negligible.
Instrument Flight Procedures
The procedures and techniques outlined in current

instrument flying directives should be followed.
Flight characteristics during instrument conditions
do not differ from those encountered during visual
flight conditions. Limit angle of bank to 30 for all
normal instrument maneuvers.
Figure 2-7
Flap Retraction Performance Heavyweight
Figure 2-8
2-78
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AFTER TAKEOFF CLIMB CHECKLIST
1. Landing Gear UP (P-CP)

Pilot making the takeoff will apply wheel brakes firmly for approximately 3 seconds and then call
for gear up; the landing gear lever will then be moved to the GEAR UP detent position. Under winter
weather, slush and wet runway conditions, leave the landing gear down approximately 30 seconds
prior to wheel brake application, to allow moisture to be blown from the landing gear. After gear
retraction, the pilot not making the takeoff will ensure the warning light is out, and that all six gears
indicate up and locked. The pilot not flying will then announce UP. The pilot flying will acknowledge the call by replying UP.
If any gear fails to indicate up and locked, to prevent system damage,

do not recycle the landing gear system prior to initiating abnormal procedure.
Following any extended takeoff roll, consideration must be given to delaying gear retraction to preclude retracting a gear which might develop extensive heat buildup and damage to the wheel well area. The
delay in gear retraction should be a minimum of 15 minutes to allow
for any possible heat dissipation. Care should be taken not to exceed
limiting speed while gear are extended or during retraction.
2. Flaps UP and OFF (P-CP)

At 180 knots IAS, 1000 fpm vertical velocity, and a minimum altitude of 1000 feet AGL, the pilot
making the takeoff calls for flaps up; the flap lever will then be moved to the UP position. If a 1000
fpm vertical velocity is not attained when reaching 1000 feet AGL, flap retraction will be delayed
until 1500 feet AGL is reached. At the appropriate time, the pilot not making the takeoff advises,
FLAPS coming up, flaps 50%, flaps 30%, and flaps UP & OFF. As a guide, the normal speed
schedule during flap retraction should be 180 knots IAS at 100%, 200 knots IAS at 50%, 210 knots
IAS at 30%, and 230 knots IAS when flaps reach the full-up position. If the actual IAS varies from
these values by 10 knots or more, the pilot not making the takeoff will advise the pilot flying so he
can make the necessary pitch corrections. When the flaps are full up, move the flap lever to OFF
to prevent flap motor damage which may be caused by limit switch actuation after flap retraction.
During last 20% of flap retraction, maintain zero stick force using the
stabilizer trim button. In event of adverse nosedown pitching tendency,
airbrakes may be used to correct to a normal noseup condition.
Any unusual rolling moment encountered during flap operation could
indicate an asymmetrical flap condition for which corrective action will
be taken immediately. (A discussion of flight characteristics with asymmetrical flaps is included in Section III.)
If thrust is reduced during initial climb, it may be necessary to add
thrust during flap retraction to maintain the desired speed schedule
and to preclude loss of altitude.
If flaps fail to start moving within 10 seconds, wing flap operation

should be discontinued to prevent damage to the flap drive system. See
WING FLAP LIMITATIONS, Section V.
Change 12
2-79
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AFTER TAKEOFF CLIMB CHECKLIST (Cont)

3. Throttles Set (P/CP)
An MRT or NRT climb at a specific airspeed or Mach number is accomplished by adjusting to the
EPR tabulated in the appropriate abbreviated checklist chart in T.O. 1B-52H-1CL-1 for the correct
altitude and cockpit OAT gage reading. Computation may be accomplished by the navigator when
aboard. EPR settings can also be obtained from the THRUST SETTING chart Part 3 of T.O.
1B-52H-1-1. It is necessary to recheck the EPR setting by one of the above methods approximately
every 10,000 feet during the climb to ensure that MRT and NRT are not being exceeded. For practical purposes, this check can be made at the 12,000 feet oxygen check and every 10,000 feet thereafter.
Due to characteristics of the engine, it is important to set MRT and

NRT by use of EPR. EGT is not to be used as a means of setting climb
thrust.
NOTE
NRT will normally be used for all climbs. MRT may be used for emergency conditions or as mission requirements dictate.
If normal rated thrust power setting produces a rate of climb greater
than 4,000 feet per minute, thrust may be reduced further if desired.
When EPR computation is accomplished by the navigator, he will be
notified as to whether anti-ice is on or off to ensure proper EPR setting.
4. Air Conditioning 7.45 PSI (P/CP)

Prior to 10,000 feet, select 7.45 PSI. Valves in the bleed air temperature control system have a
tendency to stick when the environmental control system (ECS) is first turned on after takeoff causing the bleed air overheat light to come on. Should this occur, monitor the manifold temperature
gage. If the temperature reaches the red line, throttle back engines 3 and 4 to approximately 0.04
EPR below the highest EPR of remaining engines until the bleed air overheat light goes out. At this
time the bleed air temperature should have returned to normal operating range. Advance throttles
back to desired setting.
5. Slipway Doors Open, then closed (P/CP)
Slipway doors will not be opened above 300 KIAS.

6. Radar Altimeter OFF (P-CP)
2-80
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AFTER TAKEOFF CLIMB CHECKLIST (Cont)

7. 12,000 Foot Oxygen Check Completed (EW-RN-P/CP)
During the climb, the pilots request an oxygen check at 12,000 feet. All crewmembers will check their
oxygen panel for proper operation and visually check other crewmembers for alertness. The EW
officer, radar navigator, and pilot/copilot will report Oxygen panels checked. In addition, pilot/copilot reports Cabin altitude
feet.
8. Fuel Panel Set (CP); Checked (P)
See Section I for proper sequence and check switches 9, 10, 11, and 12 CLOSED.
9. Altimeter Set 29.92 (P-CP-N)
If altimeter indications fail to move during climbs or descents while in

the reset mode, the altimeter should be placed in the standby mode.
When the altimeter is operating in standby mode, the altimeter correction card for the current aircraft configuration will be used to fly corrected altitude for traffic separation.
10. Level-Off Station Check Completed (P-CP)

a. Landing, Taxi & Crosswind Landing Light Switches OFF
b. Oxygen & Station Checks Complete as given in PREPARATION FOR FLIGHT checklist
c.
Thrust Gate 85
d. Starter Switches After engines have stabilized at cruise altitude, turn starter switches OFF
except during instrument flight conditions or turbulence. See Section VII.
e.
EVS Panel Stabilization VECTOR
11. CG/FLAS Initialized

a. PWR Switch ON
b. Initialization Accomplished
(1) Operating weight loaded.
(2) Operating weight cg loaded.
(3) Weapons loaded (select NONE, NUC, or CONV as applicable).
(4) Flares & chaff loaded (as required)
c.
Mode Selected
Select FUEL, WPN, or WT mode as appropriate to monitor aircraft flight condition.
2-81
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Climb Flight Paths
CLIMB
The normal climb technique described herein will
be required to produce the results stated in Part 3
of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1. NRT will normally be used for
climb. If climbs are made at less than normal rated
thrust, a loss of range will result because of the excessive time spent in climbing. MRT may be used
for emergency conditions or as mission requirements dictate. Referring to figure 2-9, it should be
noted that point A will be reached at approximately
the same time regardless of whether military rated
thrust or normal rated thrust is used for the climb.
Approximately 575 pounds less fuel will be required
when military rated thrust is used, but engine life
probably will be shortened slightly since higher engine speeds and higher temperatures will be encountered.
Figure 2-9
NOTE
If the aircraft was serviced with aviation

gasoline in any tanks, see RATE OF CLIMB
LIMITATIONS WITH EMERGENCY FUEL
(AVIATION GASOLINE), Section V.
CLIMB DATA
A study of the climb charts, Part 3 of T.O.

1B-52H-1-1, will show that a constant airspeed is
maintained during climb until the proper constant
climb Mach number is reached. The loss of one engine during a climb will decrease the aircraft rate of
climb. Refer to Part 3 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1 for data
on eight-and seven-engine climb performance.
INSTRUMENT CLIMB
Maintain recommended best climb schedule as given in Part 3 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1.

ICING DURING CLIMB
If icing conditions are suspected to exist within the

climb flight path, the engine and nacelle anti-icing
system should be turned on prior to the time icing
conditions are encountered.
2-82
CRUISE
NOTE
With the engines stabilized at cruise flight

condition, the copilot should monitor the oil
temperature of each engine at convenient
intervals and observe any temperatures
above 120C or any significant temperature
variations between engines. Note
temperatures above 135C on Form 781.
INSTRUMENT CRUISE
The aircraft has satisfactory handling characteristics throughout the design airspeed and altitude
range. Use the recommended procedures given in
Part 4 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1, for cruise operation.
NOTE
The rotating anticollision lights should be

turned off during actual instrument flight
conditions whenever the pilot can notice the
rotating light reflections in the cockpit. A
pilot may experience vertigo from these reflections. In addition, the lights will be ineffective during such instrument flight conditions.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
RANGE
FUEL MANAGEMENT FOR LATERAL TRIM AND WING

FUEL UNBALANCE
Normally, a combat mission will be flown using procedures which will produce maximum range. The
performance of a jet aircraft is such that maximum
range is attained by flying at one particular Mach
number and gradually increasing altitude as aircraft weight is decreased through fuel consumption.
Such a climbing flight path is accomplished by setting the throttles so as to provide a given engine
pressure ratio (EPR) for a corresponding cruise
Mach number and checking the altitude frequently
to make certain it agrees with that specified by the
altitude curve. The rate of climb required is very
small (averaging from 16 to 20 feet per minute or
about 1000 to 1200 feet per hour). Therefore, rather
than attempt to fly at some specified rate of climb,
check the flight altitude with that given in the altitude curve at frequent intervals (not to exceed 30
minutes) to assure that the proper climbing flight
path is being maintained. Adjust charted EPR as
necessary to maintain airspeed and altitude for aircraft gross weight. The autopilot altitude hold position may be used until the airspeed increases, at
which time a shallow climb should be initiated to
place the aircraft at the correct altitude for the decreased weight. This step climb procedure will be
repeated as necessary. The cruise True Mach number should be checked frequently by means of the
airspeed indicator. The Machmeter may be inaccurate, causing a range loss of several percent. There
is only one weight-altitude schedule which will result in maximum range. Such information is provided in Part 4 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1, and is the maximum range curve on the charts. The remaining
curves on these charts are called the best range for
the particular flight condition and result in slightly
less range than that attained by flying maximum
range. Best range (constant altitude) cruise is usually used for a noncombat mission because the difference in range between this type of cruise and
maximum cruise is not great if the altitude is above
35,000 feet. Also, see FUEL MANAGEMENT FOR
LATERAL TRIM AND WING FUEL UNBALANCE, this section.
When all engines are developing the same thrust

and there is no lateral unbalance due to fuel load,
small amounts of lateral and rudder trim are required to maintain hands off in level flight. Normally a correctly rigged aircraft meeting the above
requirements will need no more than 1 unit of rudder and 2 of spoiler deflection. In the event that
maximum range is desired, it should be considered
that some degradation of range (in the order of 1%
per degree of spoiler deflection) will result from the
displaced spoiler.
Maximum
range
and/or
endurance may be obtained by using fuel from the
heavy wing in such a way that a differential fuel
loading will exist between main tanks 1 and 4
sufficient to attain minimum lateral trim. To
maintain desired main tank fuel balance during
cruise conditions, the following procedures may be
used during the main tank to engine sequence.
1. Check auxiliary tank fuel flow control switches
(13, 14, 15, and 16) closed.
2. Open crossfeed valve switches as required to
feed the low tank engines from the high tank.
3. Shut off boost pump switches in the low tank.
(Boost pumps should not be shut off in more than
one main tank at any time.)
4. When the desired main tank balance is attained, turn on all main tank boost pump switches
prior to closing the crossfeed valves.
NOTE
NOTE
Cruise at airspeeds in excess of best range

or maximum range airspeeds are detrimental to engine life and should be avoided except when mission requirements dictate.
Refer to Part 4 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1, for engine thrust settings.
In order to achieve a maximum range and/

or endurance with this procedure, the spoilers will be down when the aircraft is in the
trimmed out condition.
To achieve a spoiler down position, return
the lateral trim system to the indicated zero
position and the control wheel to the spoiler
down position as determined during preflight check.
Approximately 1000 pounds of differential
fuel is required to compensate for 1 unit of
trim under cruise conditions.
The fuel load configuration established is
only an indicated differential and may actually be correcting an unbalanced condition
which has been caused by fuel gage error.
(Continued)
2-83
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Fuel weight differential between main wing

tanks 1 and 4 is limited to the following
maximums:
Above 450,000 pounds gross 2000
pounds
400,000 to 450,000 pounds gross 5000
pounds
Below 400,000 pounds gross 20,000
pounds
Under normal conditions, minimum lateral
trim should be obtained with a fuel differential between main wing tanks 1 and 4 as
follows:
400,000 pounds gross and above 2000
pounds maximum
Below 400,000 pounds gross 4000
pounds maximum
Loss of an engine or engines, use of any unusual combination of engines, or any fuel
usage problems will require close attention
to fuel panel settings to assure lateral balance and desirable cg location are maintained. It is essential that any required
deviation from the aircraft configuration
fuel sequence be planned to maintain the
proper differential/balance between paired
main/auxiliary tanks. This will preclude an
adverse effect on cg location.
NOTE
If minimum lateral trim cannot be achieved

within the normal condition limits, an abnormal condition exists which requires
maintenance action.
CENTER OF GRAVITY
Control of the center of gravity of this aircraft during any cruise operation is simple if the fuel sequence recommended in Section I is followed. See
Section V and Part 4 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1, for center
of gravity information. As fuel is consumed, the cg
location will shift slightly, and a running check
should be maintained so that the approximate cg
location is known at all times. The stabilizer trim
wheel may be used to make such a check by referring to the chart in Part 4 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1. For
maximum range cruise operation at the chart Mach
number, the stabilizer trim indicator should be in
the vicinity of zero units. If the stabilizer setting is
within the limits of 1 unit noseup and 1 unit nosedown, the cg could be expected to be within normal
limits. If the stabilizer trim is set outside of these
limits, the cg location should be checked against the
stabilizer trim chart in Part 4 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1,
and compared to calculations based on fuel distribution. Since knowledge of the amount and location of fuel aboard is necessary for flight safety, special care should be taken to detect fuel gage errors.
See FUEL SERVICING, this section. To aid in detecting gage errors, a close cross-check should be
maintained between planned fuel consumption and
gage readings.
2-84
The normal limits of 1 unit noseup and 1

unit nosedown for the stabilizer trim setting are valid only for maximum range
cruise operation (maximum range altitude
and chart Mach number) and then for gross
weights of 410,000 pounds or less. At gross
weights above 410,000 pounds, 1 unit of
noseup trim would indicate that the aircraft
is out of the forward cg flight limit.
The normal fuel usage sequences are designed to assure maximum aircraft service
life. Precluding wing flutter is a prime factor in the development and use of the prescribed fuel usage sequences as well as
wing structural life, lateral balance, and cg
location. All of these factors are interrelated. Therefore, use of other than normal
fuel sequences to correct a lateral balance
or cg problem may impose wing flutter airspeed limitations as defined in figure 5-5.
If engine shutdown or other emergency precludes the proper fuel sequence steps, compute the center of gravity for the landing
condition. This may be accomplished by use
of the load adjuster or by reference to the
APPROXIMATE CG LOCATION LANDING CONFIGURATION chart in the APPROACH AND LANDING section of T.O.
1B-52H-1-1.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ENDURANCE
Endurance Procedures
Maximum endurance is frequently desired during

operational missions when it becomes necessary to
hold over a checkpoint, rendezvous with a tanker,
accomplish a navigational check, or provide time to
correct aircraft functional difficulties. Maximum
endurance can be attained only if the recommended
airspeeds are observed within 10 knots, by
operating the engines as specified in Part 5 of T.O.
1B-52H-1-1, and by maintaining zero lateral trim.
See FUEL MANAGEMENT FOR LATERAL TRIM,
under CLIMB, this section.
Maximum endurance is accomplished by flying at a

gradually decreasing airspeed and gradually increasing altitude as the gross weight is decreased
through fuel consumption. If the endurance operation lasts less than 4 hours, the gain in endurance
by flying a climbing flight path is negligible and
constant altitude operation is recommended. The
optimum endurance airspeed for any weight and altitude is the airspeed at which the pounds of fuel
per hour is at a minimum. This is slightly less than
the airspeed at which the aircraft drag is at a minimum (figure 2-10). The recommended endurance
speed schedule is at the minimum drag point. This
results in a negligible penalty in fuel flow while the
increased speed is desirable from a piloting standpoint. Shutting down some engines at certain altitudes and airspeeds will result in the remaining engines operating in a more favorable range of rpm
with higher efficiencies. Refer to Part 5 of T.O.
1B-52H-1-1.
Endurance Airspeed
See Section VI for information regarding flight
characteristics.
AGM INFLIGHT OPERATION
Figure 2-10
Amplified checklists for missile operations are published in the applicable T.O. 1B-52H-30 series manual
for nuclear armed missiles and T.O. 1B-52H-34-2 series manual for nonnuclear armed missiles. The corresponding abbreviated checklists are published in
the applicable T.O. 1B-52H-30 or T.O. 1B-52H-34-2
series abbreviated checklist.
Change 16
2-84A
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AIR REFUELING OPERATIONS

GENERAL
The general information contained in this section,

together with the detailed procedures specified in
the remaining sections, will be used for all refueling
operations.
Procedures described here are mandatory and must
be performed in the described manner, except where
deviations are required in the interest of safety of
flight.
MISSION PLANNING
This manual reflects Emission Option 2 procedures

unless noted within the text.
Inflight situations and sound judgment may dictate
discontinuing communications procedures outlined
for Emission Option 2.
Both tanker and receiver crew must be thoroughly
familiar with all aspects of the refueling in order to
adequately plan the mission. Planners will coordinate and crews will be thoroughly familiar with
mission requirements as prescribed in the appropriate command directives.
Crewmembers will be briefed and will become thoroughly familiar with the weather forecast for the air
refueling area so that alternate plans can be utilized
when the primary track is unsuitable. Tanker crews
should become familiar with the receivers flight plan
from departure base to the air refueling track, if possible, so that late changes to the orbit or air refueling
tracks, when required, might be passed on to the receiver more readily. Tankers should carry sufficient
fuel on board to allow for 15 minutes additional orbit
time to accommodate late receivers. Air refueling
tracks should be planned to coincide with the receivers route of flight, where possible. In addition, both
tanker and receiver crews must be thoroughly familiar with the following in order to adequately plan for
the mission:
Air Refueling Track
Rendezvous Point (RZ), if applicable
Air Refueling Initial Point (ARIP)
Air Refueling Control Point (ARCP)
Air Refueling Control Time (ARCT)
Air Refueling Altitude(s)
Air Refueling Abort Point
Air Refueling Exit Point
Number of receivers (each element/cell and total)
Tanker and receiver call signs
Standby tanker requirements
2-84B
Change 21
Cell or individual tactics

Rendezvous/air refueling frequencies and beacon
settings (if available)
Fuel offload/onload requirements
Air Traffic Control clearance limits
Recovery and Emergency Bases
NOTE
All air refueling operations should be conducted in areas which are within range of
suitable airfields to allow safe recovery of
tankers and receivers if the briefed transfer
of fuel cannot be accomplished.
When ARCPs are located 60 degrees north latitude
or above, polar navigation (USAF Grid) may be required to provide common grid headings. Grid
courses may vary significantly from one type projection to another although the grid courses are drawn
between the same two geographical points. Consequently, the type charts used by the receiver and
tanker navigators must be considered when
comparing grid headings. Crews will be briefed and
coordination assured between tanker and assigned
receiver crews as to grid configuration requirements and heading reference to be used.
Control Of Tanker/Receiver Forces
During air refueling operations involving multiple

tankers and/or multiple receivers, appropriate
air-borne commanders or leaders will be designated
to be in command of each force or cell in accordance
with applicable directives.
Wingman/Receiver Responsibilities
To assist the cell leader in insuring the safety and

integrity of the flight, the wingman/receiver will:
a. Keep the leader in visual or electronic contact
at all times.
b. Maintain briefed position at all times.
c. Anticipate corrections/changes and plan accordingly.
d. Monitor all aspects of formation operations
and advise the cell leader if an unsafe condition is noted.
COMMUNICATIONS
General
Emission Option 2 will be used as the normal rendezvous and air refueling procedures. Emission Option 2, 3, or 4 procedures do not preclude verbal
communications for safety of flight situations or to
insure mission success.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
During air refueling operations communications between tanker and receiver flight crews must be a
highly coordinated effort. Lengthy and improper
call signs often cause confusion and/or block essential radio transmissions.
Tanker(s) and/or receiver(s) will make an additional

radio call confirming level at the proper rendezvous
altitude if they are not at the proper rendezvous altitude when the 15 minute prior to the rendezvous
control time call is made.
Communications procedures and plans for rendezvous and air refueling as outlined in pertinent command directives will apply. Deviations must be specifically authorized by the appropriate command
headquarters.
NOTE
Unless directed otherwise, communication capability between tankers and receivers will be maintained during all normal rendezvous and air refueling operations. Voice transmission, however, will be
held to an absolute minimum during rendezvous
and air refueling to be in accordance with the Emission Option being used.
All crewmembers must be thoroughly familiar with
all required oral, visual, and electronic means of
communications. Strict radio discipline must be adhered to at all times. All calls will be prefaced with
individual call signs. Tankers will begin monitoring
designated frequencies and will have the Radar/
Rendezvous Beacon operating at least 30 minutes
prior to the Air Refueling control time. The A/A Tacan will be tuned to the appropriate channel 15
minutes prior to the Air Refueling control time unless it is required for navigational purposes. Receivers will call 15 minutes prior to the air refuel-ing
control time, advising the tanker(s) of call signs,
any changes in ETA (minutes early or late), and altitude.
Tankers and receivers will include altimeter

setting with appropriate altitude calls if
other than 29.92 is used. For example,
RENO 01, ONE TWO THOUSAND FEET,
ALTIMETER SETTING THREE ZERO
ZERO FOUR, ON TIME. If EMCON 3 or
4, altimeter setting must be pre-briefed.
For all rendezvous and air refueling operations,
tankers and receivers will normally use their individual tactical call signs unless directed otherwise
in operational plans. When assured no other co-unit
formation will be in range of or using the frequency,
and/or a discrete tactical frequency has been assigned to the formation, tactical call signs may be
abbreviated for clarity and brevity purposes, for example, RENO FLIGHT .... GO ECHELON (acknowledge) TWO THREE.
Mandatory call for the receivers are as follows:
a. Initial radio call 15 minutes prior to the rendezvous control time.
b. Notify the tanker when established on the proper rendezvous altitude, if not at the proper rendezvous altitude at the 15 minute prior to the ARCT
call.
NOTE
c. Precontact call.
If tankers and receivers are in contact with
a common facility providing rendezvous assistance then radio contact between the
tankers/receivers may be delayed to accomplish the rendezvous.
During enroute rendezvous all A/R equipment operations, interplane communications, and timing should be based on the RZ
time. For example, the A/A Tacan should be
tuned to the appropriate channel 15 minutes prior to the RZIP unless it is required
for navigational purposes.
The tanker will advise the receiver(s) of their call

sign, air refueling altitude and if applicable any
change in tanker timing that would affect the rendezvous (in minutes early or late).
Except during an emergency fuel situation,

air refueling operations will not be conducted
when radio communications capability is lost
between tanker and receiver. If radio communications are lost, or unreadable between
boom operator and receiver pilot, contacts
will not be attempted.
NOTE
AEW&C airplanes or Tactical Air Control/

FAA facilities, when available, may be used as
a backup source of information for rendezvous and communications relay purposes.
Change 16
2-84C
T.O. 1B-52H-1
1. Receiver briefings.
Oral Communications
NOTE
With the exception of the breakaway calls,

crewmembers may shorten individual call
signs using only the number. Example:
Tank 11 would be 11.
Normally the receiver leader will proceed to
the precontact position. When the leader
has completed refueling subsequent receivers will move from the observation position
as precoordinated.
a. The communications requirements should be

established prior to the flight. Normally boom visual signals will be used exclusively; however, if required or requested by the receiver, the boom operator will begin communications when the receiver
reaches approximately 50 feet for the the contact
position. Direction, if required, will precede distance for receiver to move and will be given until
the receiver reaches the contact position. Example:
Forward 50, Up 4, Back 2. When contact is established the tanker will state, (Tanker call sign)
contact.
b. For Emission Option 1 and 2, the boom operator
will make a precontact radio check with the receiver(s) and the receiver(s) will acknowledge. Example: Tanker will say 25/57, the receiver will reply
25.
c. During receiver pilot demonstration of air refueling envelope limits, the boom operator will state
boom limit and give the boom position for the limit
being demonstrated in increments of 2.
d. Voice procedure for tanker manual operation
and manual boom latching.
2-84D
Change 16
(a) Tanker manual operation briefing (required anytime tanker does not have disconnect capability). (Receiver call sign), the following contacts will be made in tanker manual operation. Receiver air refueling system will remain in normal
and receiver pilot must initiate all disconnects.
(Tanker call sign), ready. Receiver pilot acknowledges by stating, (Receiver call sign), ready.
(b) Manual boom latching briefing. (Receiver call sign), the following contacts will be made
in manual boom latching and receiver pilot must
initiate all disconnects. (Tanker call sign), ready.
Receiver pilot acknowledges by stating, (Receiver
call sign), ready.
2. Disconnect. Use the word disconnect or call
breakaway, as the case warrants, prior to the receiver exceeding normal envelope limits.
VISUAL SIGNALS
Radio silent air refueling can be conducted by use
of visual signals provided the following precautions
and procedures are observed:
The method, time and place of rendezvous, and
amount of fuel to be transferred must be covered in
the briefing of each crew. The tanker will use the
receiver director lights (red only) to aid in positioning the receiver. A steady red light indicates a large
correction and a flashing red light indicates a small
correction in the direction indicated. If the need for
an emergency breakaway occurs during radio silent
air refueling, oral breakaway procedures will be
used. Use the visual signals in figure 2-10A for radio silent refueling.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
VISUAL SIGNALS
INDICATION
SIGNAL
BOOM
AIR REFUELING
1. Boom in Trail
Extended 10 Feet
Ready for contact
Fully Extended
1. Tanker manual operation without tanker disconnect

capability
2. Acknowledge receivers MBL signal
Fully Retracted
Offload complete
2. Boom Stowed
Fully Retracted
Tanker air refueling system inoperative
Extended 5 Feet
System malfunction, tanker and

receiver check air refueling systems
3. Flashing Receiver
Director Lights/
Tanker Lower Rotating Beacon ON
BREAKAWAY
4. Receiver Director Lights Going Out During Contact
Tanker request for disconnect; receiver return to pre-contact

position
5. Receiver Closing and Opening Receptacle Door in PreContact Position
1. Manual boom latch
6. Steady Light From Receiver or Rock Wings
Emergency fuel shortage exists
7. Flashing Light From Receiver Cockpit Area
Initiate toboggan maneuver
8. (DAY) Same Receiver Returns to Pre-Contact With

Receptacle Door Open; Pilot Signals Closed Fist,
Thumb to Mouth, Plus Hand Signaling Number
Additional fuel required EMCON 2 thru 4
2. Acknowledge tankers manual operation without tanker

disconnect capability signal
(NIGHT) Same Receiver Returns to Pre-Contact With

Receptacle Door Open, Ready For Contact
(a).(DAY) Same Receiver Returns to Pre-Contact,
Ready For Contact. Pilot Signals Closed Fist Plus
Hand Signaling Number
(NIGHT) Same Receiver Returns to Pre-Contact,
Ready For Contact
Receiver(s) in the observation position will move to the pre-contact position in their briefed sequence only after ensuring that the boom
is in the ready-for-contact position and the preceding receiver has cleared the tanker. The receiver will stabilize in the pre-contact position,
then move to the contact position. The boom operator will not give the ready-for-contact signal until the preceding receiver has cleared
the tanker.
The receiver(s) will advise the tanker of any pilot director light malfunctions or deficiencies.
If fuel shortage occurs at times other than scheduled air refueling, the receiver should be positioned so that the signal may be seen
from the tanker cockpit.
Additional fuel offloaded on each subsequent contact will be 5000 pounds for large receiver aircraft, 2000 pounds for small receiver
aircraft.
Figure 2-10A
Change 16
2-84E
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Receiver Director Lights Illumination Profile
24 IN
27 IN
24 IN
B35833
Figure 2-10B
2-84F
Change 16
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LIGHTING
Rendezvous Lighting
Receiver Director Lights
While accomplishing a rendezvous, both tanker and

receiver will have all specified exterior lights on full
bright to aid in visual sighting. Tanker strobe
lights, position lights, underwing, underbody, and
nacelle illumination lights will be on at least 15
minutes prior to the rendezvous control time.
The director lights do not give true vertical and horizontal information. The up-and-down lights change
because of angular movement of the boom and the
fore-and-aft lights change because of the in and out
movements of the boom. The axis of the director
light system is inclined at a 30 degree angle to the
tanker fuselage. This angle causes an inter-action
in both lights when a true vertical or horizontal
movement is made by the receiver. For example,
flying straight forward while in contact will cause
the boom to compress and also increase its angle
with the tanker fuselage. The lights will show that
the airplane is flying forward and down. If a true
up movement is made, the boom will compress and
also lessen its angle with the tanker fuselage giving
combined up and forward indication from the
lights. When this interaction between the lights is
under-stood, it can be used to advantage in keeping
position. Small fore-and-aft corrections can be made
with little or no power change by moving vertically.
The receiver pilot director lights will remain illuminated and follow boom movements in both the contact made and disconnect conditions.
Receiver director lights (figure 2-10B) are on the
bottom of the fuselage between the nose landing
gear and the main landing gear. They consist of two
rows of lights; the left row for elevation and the
right row for telescoping. The elevation lights consist of five colored panels with a green stripe, green
and red colors, and two illuminated letters, D and
U, for down and up respectively. Background lights
are located behind the panels. The colored panels
are illuminated by lights that are controlled by
boom elevation during contact made. On the telescoping side, the colored panels are not illuminated
by background lights. There is an illuminated white
panel between each panel to serve as a reference.
The letters A for aft and F for forward augment the
colored panels on the telescope side. The receiver
pilot director lights will remain illuminated and follow boom movements in both the con-tact made and
disconnect conditions. There are no lights for azimuth position. A fluorescent yellow stripe on the
bottom center of the tanker fuselage may be used as
a centerline by the receiver pilot.
During rendezvous the receivers anti-collision with

position lights will be set to bright and steady. As
the receiver approaches the precontact position, the
anti-collision and position lights will be set as requested by the boom operator. While in the precontact position, the receiver pilot can adjust the intensity of the slipway and wing lights as requested by
the boom operator.
NOTE
Visual contact for night air refueling can be

aided by requesting the tanker to flash its
landing lights prior to and or during the
turn.
Single tankers will display white upper and lower
strobe lights with position lights set to bright and
steady. Tanker formations will set lights according
to the following table.
STROBE LIGHT COLOR
TANKER
NO.
UPPER
POSITION
LIGHTS
LOWER
Red
Red
Bright &
Flashing
White
White
Bright &
Steady
Red
White
Bright &
Flashing
White
Red
Bright &
Steady
Additional tankers will continue this lighting sequence. After the receiver has established visual
contact and has closed to 1/2 nm in trail, tankers
will set position lights to steady and dim. Turn lower strobe light off and upper strobe to red. Set other
external lights as desired by the receiver pilot.
When any aircraft will be flying visual wing formation on the tanker, the tanker may also turn off the
upper strobe light.
Change 16
2-84G
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Exterior Lighting
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NOSE LANDING AND TAXI LIGHT

NACELLE ILLUMINATION LIGHT (TYPICAL)
TAXI LIGHT
LANDING LIGHT (FIXED)
NAVIGATION LIGHT
BOOM SEARCHLIGHT (KT-MODEL TANKER
ONLY)
UNDERWING ILLUMINATION LIGHT (TYPICAL)
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Figure 2-10C
2-84H
Change 16
STROBE LIGHTS
UNDERBODY ILLUMINATION LIGHT (TYPICAL)
TERRAIN LIGHT (RETRACTABLE)
RECEIVER PILOT DIRECTOR LIGHTS
FIN TIP AERIAL REFUELING FLOODLIGHT
BOOM MARKER LIGHTS (FLUORESCENT)
BOOM NOZZLE LIGHT
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Boom Envelope Limits
Figure 2-10D
BOOM ENVELOPE LIMITS
The air refueling boom envelope (figure 2-10D) is

the operational limits dictated by the aerodynamic
control authority of the boom. As long as the receiver is positioned inside these limits, contact can be
held despite rolling, yawing, or pitching. The envelope limits are set well within the mechanical limits
of the boom so that disconnect will normally take
place before any structural damage occurs.
Approaching boom limits at relatively high

velocity can cause structural damage as a
result of an inability to disconnect due to
binding action of the nozzle.
NOTE
The boom operator will disconnect when 10

left or right azimuth is exceeded.
NAVIGATION AND POSITION REPORTING
During all air refueling operations, regardless of

the number of tankers or receivers involved, tankers will be responsible for all navigation, weather
avoidance and position reporting for the receivers
after the rendezvous is complete.
This does not relieve the receivers from normal fixing requirements. The receivers will notify the
tankers if it appears that the protected airspace
will be exceeded.
When operating in manual operation the

limit switches are deactivated.
Change 16
2-84J
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Electro-optical Viewing System (EVS)
Post Air Refueling
The EVS is designed to be used as an aid in enroute

cell formation and rendezvous procedures. Although either the STV or FLIR system may be
used, the FLIR system has been determined to be
more suitable for identification purposes. During
reduced visibility, the FLIR will allow identification
and provide relative position of the tanker well in
advance of establishing visual contact. In the event
of BNS/OAS radar failure, the EVS can greatly aid
joinup and closure.
Upon completion of air refueling, the receiver normally descends to the bottom of the assigned altitude block while awaiting post air refueling report
(if required) and further ARTC clearance, If multiple refueling is being performed, the entire receiver
cell will descend in refueling formation, with the receiver leader at the bottom of the altitude block.
Tankers will establish the briefed formation during
the turn to return track. The tanker will give post
air refueling information to the receiver as required. The receiver will advise the tanker of any
pilot director light malfunctions/deficiencies, eg.,
lights intermittent, inoperative, dim, dirty, etc.
Upon termination of air refueling, all exterior lights
will be returned to normal.
Normally, the azimuth will be set at zero on the

sensor so that the trail position can be assumed.
However, the azimuth of the sensor may have to be
changed to bring the tanker/ lead airplane into the
field of view of the sensor. The elevation of the sensor is set at 10 degrees up in the rendezvous checklist. This has been determined to be the optimum
setting to be used for a point parallel rendezvous. It
must be realized that a different type of rendezvous, airplane altitude separation, and distance between airplanes may require a change in the elevation of the sensor.
2-84K
Change 22
Receiver(s) required to accelerate and climb

on the refueling heading will maneuver either left or right (minimum of 1 NM) of the
tanker(s)/ remaining receiver(s) prior to accelerating and climbing. This will preclude
the departing receivers jetwash from causing injury to personnel on or damage to the
tanker(s)/remaining receiver(s).
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EMISSION OPTIONS
COMMUNICATIONS
EMISSION OPTION
2
3
4
Radios set 30 minutes prior to ARCT (if dual

radio capable)
15 minute call
A/A Tacan set 15 minutes prior to ARCT
Beacon positive identification (if applicable)
ARIP call (if applicable)
ADF check (if applicable)
1/2 way thru turn call (tanker)
1 mile closure call (receiver)
Mandatory Boom Operator Calls

a. Precontact Call
b. Clear Receiver to Contact
c. Acknowledge Contact/Disconnect
d. Verbal Corrections
e. Advise Receiver(s) to Return to
Precontact for checklist or equipment
considerations
ITEM
ACTION
10
11
Mandatory Receiver Calls After 15

Minute Call
a. Visual Contact Established/
Lost to Include Overrun
b. Precontact Call
c. When Contact or Disconnect is made
d. Verbally notify boom operator
prior to Manual/Emergency
Boom Latching procedures
Post Air Refueling Report
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
NOTE
Variations may be indicated by EMCON 2. Item 9a./10b. COMM N/A. This

would mean normal Emission Option 2 procedures except the Precontact call
would be deleted.
Radio silent. Use of other emitters is authorized unless prohibited by Supported Operations Plans.
No emissions (radios, doppler, navigation transmitters, radar, IFF, exterior lighting, etc.) unless
authorized by Air Tasking Order, Rules of Engagement, Operations Plans, Safe Passage Procedures,
or other mission directives.
Point Parallel only.
Figure 2-10E (Sheet 1 of 2)
Change 16
2-84L
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EMISSION OPTIONS (Cont)

EMITTERS
ITEM
EQUIPMENT
EMISSION OPTION
2
3
RADAR
On
On
As Required Off
DOPPLER
On
On
As Required Off
RADIO ALTIMETER
On
On
As Required Off
TACAN/DME
On
On
As Required Off
IFF
On
On
As Required Off
UHF/VHF
On
On
Monitor
Monitor
HF
On
On
Monitor
Monitor
LIGHTING
On
On
As Required OFF
NOTE
Variations may be indicated by EMCON 3. Item 1 EMITTERS Off. This would

mean normal Emission Option 3 procedures, except the radar would be off.
Figure 2-10E (Sheet 2 of 2)
2-84M
Change 16
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ENROUTE PROCEDURES
CELL LEADER RESPONSIBILITY
The tanker cell leader or specified commander is responsible for the command and control of the
formation and the air refueling operation. The cell
leader or specified commander will coordinate with
the receiver force commander to insure successful
mission completion. Formation integrity and discipline begin with the formation briefing. The cell
leader must insure that all aspects of the mission
are clarified and understood.
Normally, lead responsibilities pass from number
one to number two to number three; however, all pilots must be prepared to assume full responsibility
for the formation at any time. When it is necessary
to transfer lead responsibilities, all airplanes in the
affected formation will be notified when the new
leader assumes responsibility for the formation.
The tanker cell leader/specified commander must
take every feasible action to enhance the possibility
of completing air refueling.
BUDDY PROCEDURES
abort call on the prebriefed common frequency as

soon as possible so that succeeding airplanes can
adjust the takeoff interval. This call is especially
important when minimum visibility conditions exist. Frequency changes will not be made by tanker/
receivers until all airplanes in the same element
are airborne.
Climb
Following takeoff, airplanes will accelerate and

climb using airspeeds specified in the Flight Manual and/or operations order. Radar contact will, in so
far as possible, be maintained throughout the climb
to insure safe separation. When practical, a
planned turn will be included in the departure routing to help expedite closure.
Assembly
a. Receiver(s) and tanker(s) will join into enroute

cell formation on the tanker leader using AN/
APN69, differential airspeed, and, when required to
expedite assembly, a planned dog leg.
b. Recommended differential airspeed is Mach
0.70 vs Mach 0.81. For rapid closure, the differential airspeed schedule may be broadened.
General
Enroute Procedures
a. Tanker and receiver forces will use the procedures outlined in Section III for buddy procedures
and refueling.
b. The buddy type procedures may be planned
when both forces are launched from the same base
or have completed an on-course rendezvous.
Takeoff Procedures
Usually the bomber force will take off first, followed

by the tanker force; however, mission requirements
may dictate otherwise. Search radar and AN/
APN-69 (as required) will be turned on for takeoff.
Each airplane will establish radar contact with the
preceding airplane as soon as possible.
Airplanes will normally take of at one minute intervals; however, this timing may be varied to suit local weather, terrain, or airfield conditions, and mission requirements. Airplanes will follow the briefed
departure route during climb to level-off altitude.
Abort During Takeoff
a. The tankers will lead the formation. All airplanes will maintain 500 feet separation and 1 NM
in trail (see figure 2-10F).
b. Route altitude will be lead tankers optimum altitude for maximum range.
c. Cruise airspeed will be 444 KTAS.
Enroute cell formation procedures will be maintained utilizing station keeping techniques until
the ARIP (See figure 2-10G) - the tanker and receiver cell will then adjust to air refueling formation. At the ARIP the receiver formation
will then start a descent to prepare for air refueling. The receiver level off altitudes will be planned
to provide for a 1000 foot altitude separation between the highest receiver altitude and the tanker
leader base altitude. After the receiver leader
reaches level-off altitude, he will inform the tanker
leader at which time the tanker formation will adjust to air refueling airspeed. Normal air refueling
formation procedures will then apply for the remainder of air refueling and departure.
When two or more airplanes are using close interval for takeoff, an aborting airplane will make an
Change 16
2-84N
Change 16
T.O. 1B-52H-1
2-84P
Figure 2-10F
Buddy Procedures and Refueling Formation Profile
Figure 2-10G
2-84Q
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Change 16
T.O. 1B-52H-1
RENDEZVOUS PROCEDURES
BASIC RENDEZVOUS PROCEDURES
GENERAL
Normally rendezvous are planned with an altitude

differential of at least 2,000 feet but not more than
9,000 feet, with the receiver at the higher attitude.
NOTE
To enhance visual tanker acquisition, the receiver or ground agency controlling the rendezvous may request the tanker to jettison
fuel. It should only be used if a receiver low
fuel state or other similar circumstances require the rendezvous be expedited.
NOTE
When the planned ARIP is one hour from

the receivers planned level-off point after
takeoff, or any low level activity, the receiver(s) may plan their level-off to the closest
hemispherical altitude below planned air
refueling altitude.
Altimeter Settings
Unless otherwise directed, an altimeter setting of

29.92 inches Hg will be used for air refueling operations at or above transition altitude or when over
water and operating in accordance with ICAO procedures. For all other air refueling operations, the
briefed altimeter settings will be used.
Track
The inbound track of receivers to the ARCP has a

definite bearing on the success of the rendezvous.
Receivers will pass over the ARIP, if applicable, and
make good the planned inbound track to the ARCP.
If this is not possible due to weather, etc., tankers
will be informed of the receivers intentions as soon
as practical. If radio contact between the tankers
and receivers is not established prior to the ARCT,
the tankers will be over the ARCP at the ARCT.
Visibility
Rendezvous closure will not be continued inside 1

NM range (2 NM for receiver cell formations) unless visual contact is established with the tanker(s).
Air refueling will not be continued when inflight
visibility is deemed insufficient for safe air refueling operations.
The receiver descent point will be planned at the

ARIP. The receiver level-off altitude will be 1,000
feet below the assigned tanker base altitude. Receiver crews will monitor the designated radio frequencies and have rendezvous equipment operating
at least 30 minutes prior to the planned rendezvous
control time. Emission Option 2 will be the normal
rendezvous and air refueling procedure. The receiver will call 15 minutes prior to the ARCT and relay
call sign, ETA (minutes early or late) and altitude.
The tanker will then confirm his call sign, air refueling altitude and timing (minutes early or late) if
it will affect the rendezvous. If either the tanker or
the receiver is not on the appropriate rendezvous
altitude, an additional radio call will be made when
the proper rendezvous altitudes are established.
The receiver will maintain skin paint contact as
much as possible to monitor the rendezvous. Figure
2-10H lists the rendezvous equipment for both receiver and tanker in preferred order with the primary means of rendezvous equipment at the top.
NOTE
In the event weather conditions may affect

the accomplishment of the rendezvous, a capable receiver will be specifically designated
to maintain radar weather watch and will
have the primary responsibility of insuring
that all airplanes involved are directed (within his capability) clear of hazardous weather.
2-84R
Change 21
KC-135 aircraft may not have an AN/

APN-69 Radar Beacon installed.
KC-135 aircrafts WXR-700X Weather Radar does not have beacon mode and is not
capable of painting a beacon.
If communication between the tanker and receiver

is not established by rendezvous control time minus
10 minutes, the tanker will transmit in the blind
giving the information normally given during initial radio contact.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Rendezvous Equipment
B-52
KC-135
TACAN (A/A)
OAS POSITION
TACAN (A/A)
INS POSITION
AN/APX-64
IFF TRANSPONDER
AN/APN-69
RADAR BEACON
(If installed)
AN/APQ-166
STRATEGIC RADAR
TRAFFIC ALERT
COLLISION AVOIDANCE
SYSTEM (TCAS)
AN/ARC-164,
AN/ARC-171(V),
AN/ARC-210(V)
UHF COMMAND
WXR-700X
WEATHER RADAR
AN/ARN-14
OMNI-RANGE RCVR
AN/ARA-25
UHF DF HOMING
For KC-10 rendezvous equipment see KC-10 AIR REFUELING PROCEDURES, RENDEZVOUS EQUIPMENT, this
section.
Figure 2-10H
Point Parallel Rendezvous
When accomplishing a point parallel rendezvous,

(see figure 2-10J), the tanker will orbit over the designated orbit point in a racetrack pattern to the
left, parallel to the track between ARIP and ARCP.
The orbit pattern will be established to fly 2 minute
legs with 30 degree bank turns with the orbit point
at the down-stream end of the leg that coincides
with the track between ARIP and ARCP. The tanker orbit will be at the same altitude that air refueling is to be initiated. Normally, the base air refueling altitude for the tanker will be at least 2,000
feet below assigned receiver maximum range cruise
altitude. If radio contact between the tanker and receiver has not been established prior to the ARCT,
the tanker will maintain orbit over the ARCP until
10 minutes after the ARCT, unless otherwise
briefed. All crewmembers will be alerted to visual
sighting of the tanker.
The tanker is responsible for directing the rendezvous with the receiver monitoring. To aid in the
success of the rendezvous, the receiver will remain
in electronic contact (including radar and EVS)
from the 100 NM range or the ARIP, whichever occurs first, until reaching the precontact position.
The receiver will pass over the ARIP and maintain
centerline from the ARIP to the ARCP. To provide
A/A TACAN ranging, the tanker and receiver will
set the assigned TACAN channels 15 minutes prior
to the ARCT. The receiver will set the numerically
lower TACAN Y-channel and the tanker will set the
numerically higher Y-channel.
Receivers should monitor the tankers beacon, if
available. Receivers will not deviate from the ARIP/
ARCP centerline unless directed to do so by the
tanker. Navigational responsibility will be primary
for the tanker and secondary for the receiver from
the precontact position to the end air refueling
point. Receivers will begin descent at the ARIP and
the level-off altitude will provide 1000 foot separation between the highest receiver and lowest tanker
base altitude. When it is determined that the receiver is at or inside the ARIP, the tanker will turn
to, or continue on, the reciprocal of the receivers inbound track. Ranges are measured directly from
airplane to airplane (slant range) down to the computed turn range.
The receiver will continue range monitoring during
and after the tankers final turn. At the turn range the
receiver will assume the responsibility for closing on
the tanker.
The tanker will note the receivers distance when halfway through the turn back to the ARCP. This is the
best time to determine if an overrun condition exists
and the best time for visual sighting. If an overrun
condition exists, appropriate action should be taken.
The tanker will adjust to appropriate air refueling
speed when rolled out toward the ARCP.
NOTE
Radio silence will be broken if the tanker or

receiver determines that either the tanker or
receiver will exceed ATC protected airspace
while maneuvering to attain the offset.
Change 21
2-84S
T.O. 1B-52H-1
The receiver Radar Navigator will make the 3, 2, 1,
and 1/2 NM range calls over interphone to the pilot.
Radar skin paint should be attempted as soon as practiced to insure more accurate range monitoring. If
skin paint is not possible, continue the rendezvous using any available means. The rendezvous altitude
separation will be maintained until 1 NM from the
tanker and visual contact is established. A gradual
climb will then be initiated, with a minimum altitude
separation of 500 feet at 1/2 NM in trail, to arrive at
the precontact position.
When refueling with a tanker cell, the last tanker
in the cell, if equipped, will turn his beacon to operate, single code.
When the receiver is responsible for directing rendezvous, the previously mentioned procedures will
be used, except the receiver will make the turn
range call (start turn) to the tanker.
NOTE
Use drift correction inbound to the ARCP

and closure rate (receiver TAS added to
tanker TAS) to determine turn range. Use
drift correction inbound to the ARCP and
tanker TAS to determine offset. To determine tanker TAS convert 275 KIAS to TAS.
When more than one tanker is involved,
add 1 NM to the turn range for each additional tanker in the formation.
Figure 2-10J
2-84T
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Turn Range/Offset Chart 25 Degrees Bank

TURN RANGE
DRIFT CORRECTION HEADING INTO ARCP
C
L
O
S
U
R
E
R
A
T
E
KTAS
+15L
+10L
+5L
5R
10R
15R
975
25
27
28
30
32
34
36
950
24
26
27
29
31
33
35
925
23
24
26
28
29
31
33
900
22
23
25
27
28
30
32
887
21.5
23
24.5
26.5
27.5
29.5
31.5
875
21
23
24
26
27
29
31
862
20.5
22
23.5
25
26.5
28
30
850
20
21
23
24
26
27
29
837
19.5
20.5
22
23.5
25
26.5
28
825
19
20
21
23
24
26
27
813
18.5
19.5
21
22.5
23.5
25.5
26.5
800
18
19
21
22
23
25
26
787
17.5
18.5
20
21.5
22.5
24
25.5
775
17
18
19
21
22
23
25
762
16.5
17.5
18.5
20.5
21.5
22.5
24.5
750
16
17
18
20
21
22
24
737
15.5
16.5
17.5
19
20.5
21.5
23
725
15
16
17
18
20
21
22
713
15
15.5
16.5
17.5
19
20
21
700
15
15
16
17
18
19
20
675
12
13
14
15
15
16
17
NOTES
3 NM
ROLLOUT
RANGE
Figure 2-10K (Sheet 1 of 2)
Change 16
2-84U
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Turn Range/Offset Chart 25 Degrees Bank (Cont)

OFFSET
KTAS
+15L
+10L
+5L
5R
10R
15R
520
11
13
15
17
20
22
26
500
10
12
14
16
18
21
23
480
11
13
15
17
19
21
460
10
12
13
15
18
20
440
11
12
14
16
18
430
7.5
8.5
10.5
11.5
13.5
15.5
17.5
T
A
N
K
E
R
420
10
11
13
15
17
410
6.5
7.5
9.5
10.5
12.5
14
16
400
10
12
13
15
390
8.5
9.5
11.5
12.5
14.5
K
T
A
S
380
11
12
14
370
5.5
6.5
7.5
8.6
10
11.5
13
360
11
12
350
5.5
6.5
7.5
8.5
10.5
11.5
340
10
11
320
10
300
280
260
240
220
NOTE
Offsets in the shaded area may place the aircraft outside FAA protected airspace.
Figure 2-10K (Sheet 2 of 2)
2-84V
Change 16
NOTES
25
BANK
TURN
T.O. 1B-52H-1
KC-135 Turn Range/Offset Chart 30 Degrees Bank

TURN RANGE
C
L
O
S
U
R
E
R
A
T
E
KTAS
+15L
+10L
+5L
5R
10R
15R
1000
22
23
25
26
28
30
32
975
21
22
24
25
27
28
30
950
20
22
23
24
25
27
29
925
19
21
22
23
24
26
28
900
19
20
21
22
24
25
27
875
18
19
20
21
23
24
26
850
17
18
19
20
22
23
24
825
16
17
18
19
20
21
23
800
15
16
17
18
19
21
22
775
15
16
16
17
18
20
21
750
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
725
13
14
15
16
16
17
18
700
12
13
14
15
16
16
17
NOTES
3 NM
ROLLOUT
RANGE
OFFSET
T
A
N
K
E
R
T
A
S
KTAS
+15L
+10L
+5L
5R
10R
15R
460
11
12
14
16
440
10
11
13
15
420
10
12
14
400
11
12
380
10
11
360
10
340
320
300
280
260
240
NOTES
30
30
BANK
Figure 2-10L
Change 16
2-84W
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DESCENT AND CLOSURE PROCEDURES
The receiver will begin descent to an altitude 1000

feet below the assigned air refueling altitude at the
ARIP.
To help ensure safe separation of airplanes

during descent when range to tanker is not
known, descent will not be unnecessarily
delayed. Addition-ally, tankers will not initiate final turn to refueling track unless receiver has confirmed level at rendezvous altitude.
The receiver will descend at 2500 FPM. Establish

Mach 0.84 until reaching 310 KIAS or prebriefed
airspeed, then maintain 310 KIAS or prebriefed airspeed through level-off. The receiver will maintain
310 KIAS or prebriefed airspeed until the following
ranges vs airspeed schedules apply:
NOTE
If the tanker or receiver must use an increased air refueling speed increase entire
speed schedule the same amount the air refueling speed is increased.
If the receiver is more than 4 NM in trail
with the tanker, the airspeed may be increased for closure.
b. 2 NM . . . . . . Mach 0.84 or 310 KIAS, whichever is lower.
c. 1 NM . . . . . . Mach 0.83 or 290 KIAS, whichever is lower (or briefed refueling airspeed plus 15 knots).
During deceleration, it is imperative that the airspeed schedule be maintained. The receiver radar
navigator will pass the range calls to the receiver
pilot at 3, 2, 1, and 1/2 NM.
2-84X
Change 16
Any time it becomes apparent that closure

overrunning will occur, a breakaway will be
called.
If the receiver for any reason has over-run
the tanker to the extent of being closely
positioned directly under the tanker fuselage, the best and most positive means in
obtaining vertical and horizontal separation
is to lower the receiver landing gear.
If the receiver loses sight of the tanker at
any time after overrunning, the receiver
shall establish a positive rate of descent to
1000 feet below air refueling altitude until
the receiver is definitely positioned aft of
the tanker and has the tanker in visual contact. From this point normal closure procedures shall be used.
NOTE
a. 3 NM . . . . . . Mach 0.84 or 310 KIAS, whichever is lower.
d. 1/2 NM . . . . Mach 0.81 or 285 KIAS, whichever is lower (or briefed refueling airspeed plus 10 knots).
A nose high altitude must be assumed by

the receiver to maintain level flight as it is
flown into the downwash of a tanker. A sudden gain in altitude will result if the receiver moves forward and out of the tanker
downwash. This will require instantaneous
and positive forward control pressure with
a simultaneous decrease of engine power to
avoid a mid-air collision.
Level-off altitude will be maintained until

it is ascertained overrunning will not occur.
When utilizing one tanker to one or more
receivers (single cell refueling) if the tanker
rolls out at a greater distance ahead than
desired during rendezvous, the rate of closure may be increased by having the tanker
accomplish a series of double drift turns (if
cleared by FAA).
When more than one tanker per refueling
is used (multiple cell refueling), the only
procedure authorized to increase the closure rate during the rendezvous is differential airspeed.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ALTERNATE RENDEZVOUS PROCEDURES
When primary means are not available, or are lost,

alternate means will be utilized to perform the rendezvous. When using alternate means, the tankers
and receivers will fly the same profiles as described
in the previous paragraphs entitled, NORMAL
RENDEZVOUS PROCEDURES. Following are
some suggested alternate means for conducting the
rendezvous. The various alternate means should be
used in conjunction with each other when equipment availability permits, and when practical, to
Insure a successful rendezvous (i.e., AN/ARA-25
UHF/DF, common VORTAC/TACAN DME, Radar
Beacon and FAA/GCI advisories, etc.).
a. Tactical Air Control/FAA facilities, when available, may be used for vector and separation advisories to accomplish rendezvous.
b. DME/radial information from a common TACAN/VORTAC may be exchanged, with the final
turn to the air refueling track being accomplished
when the DME difference equals proper turn range.
c. Where adequate navigational check points are
available, the tanker may adjust final orbit pattern
to depart over the ARCP on the refueling heading
on the receivers ETA to the ARCP.
d. ARA-25 UHF/DF means may be utilized providing the tanker is so advised prior to the receiver
reaching a point 40 NM upstream of the rendezvous
point. As soon as reliable radio contact has been
established between airplanes, DME/radial information from a common TACAN/VORTAC station
will be exchanged, if available, When the receivers
call departing the ARIP, the tanker(s) will turn to
or continue to fly the reciprocal of the receivers inbound track. For DF steers, receivers will use the
mike switch without talking. The receiver will
transmit on the air refueling frequency approximately 10 seconds out of every 20 second period,
ending each transmission with the receivers call
sign. When the receiver bearing shows 26 degrees
left (NO WIND) of the tanker heading, the tanker
will notify the receiver starting turn to the refueling track. The homing signal will be transmitted
until visual sighting is made. The tanker(s) and receiver(s) will follow their normal rendezvous speed
schedule for the rendezvous.
e. Radar/Rendezvous Beacons. The receiver/ tanker beacons may be used for range and offset infor-
mation with suitably equipped airplanes. Depending on equipment capability, one airplane should
maintain the planned outbound or inbound track
while the other airplane maneuvers to establish the
planned offset. The tanker will clearly establish
which airplane will be maneuvering.
f. If communications are not established, the
tanker(s) will continue to orbit at the ARCP until
visual contact with receiver(s) is made. If visual
contact is not established, the tanker(s) will depart
the ARCP 10 minutes after the ARCT, or as briefed.
g. If communications are not established and the
receiver arrives early he will orbit over the ARCP.
The receiver will orbit at an altitude that Insures
a 1000 feet separation between the highest receiver(s) and the lowest tanker(s). This orbit will be accomplished with the receiver(s) at the lower altitude.
NOTE
If, after rendezvous procedures using alternate means are started, electronic contact is
established, the receiver/tanker will be notified and normal electronic rendezvous will
be accomplished.
If radar skin paint can be obtained during
the final phase of an alternate rendezvous,
the receiver/tanker will be notified and final
closure will be accomplished utilizing skin
paint.
ENROUTE RENDEZVOUS PROCEDURES
An enroute rendezvous is used when the tanker(s)

and bomber(s) fly individual flight plans to a common rendezvous (RZ) where joinup is accomplished,
and continue in refueling route cell formation to the
air refueling area (see figure 2-10F). Joinup is accomplished at the RZ by making good a scheduled
time.
Either tanker(s) or bomber(s) may be scheduled to
arrive at the RZ point first, orbit If necessary, and
then depart at a preplanned time.
The rendezvous point (RZ) will be located a minimum of 50 NM prior to the ARIP/SD. Tracks from
the ARIP/SD may be established from any direction
and need not necessarily be an extension of the air
refueling track.
Change 16
2-84Y
T.O. 1B-52H-1
If orbit delays are required they will be accomplished by orbiting upstream of the RZ point along
an extension of the track from the RZ to the ARIP/
SD. Orbit in a racetrack pattern using 30 degree
banked turns and a maximum of 15 NM straight
legs (unless operational directives or clearance
specify longer straight legs) with the RZ at the
downstream end of the orbit. Orbit airspeed will
normally be 275 KIAS or Mach 0.78 whichever is
lower.
When close Interval stream operations are

being conducted, do not use orbit delays to
control timing.
The following paragraphs outline procedures for accomplishing the enroute rendezvous (see figures
2-10M, 2-10N, or 3-10P).
Tanker(s) and receiver(s) will join-up at the RZ by
controlling timing so they arrive at the RZ at the
same time. Timing to the RZ may be adjusted using
differential airspeeds, orbit delays or timing
triangles. If a planned orbit delay is used, receiver(s) and tanker(s) may accomplish join-up in the
orbit.
Assigned altitudes at the RZ point will provide at
least 1000 feet separation between affected airplanes (highest tanker and lowest receiver), with
the receivers normally at the highest altitude. If
the receiver(s) planned level off altitude is within 1
hour flying time from the ARIP, the receiver(s) may
level off below the tanker and maintain an altitude
which provides a minimum of 1000 feet vertical
separation between the highest receiver(s) and the
lowest tanker(s).
For Emission Option 2, the receiver(s) will call 15
minutes prior to the rendezvous control time and
2-84Z
Change 16
will advise the tankers) of call signs, ETA (minutes

early or late) and altitude. The tanker(s) will then
advise the receiver(s) of call signs, altitude and
ETA, it it will adversely affect the rendezvous. If radio contact between the airplanes has not been established prior to the rendezvous control time, or
the adjusted rendezvous control time, airplanes will
maintain altitude and depart the RZ to cross the
ARCP at the ARCT. Delays at the ARCP will use
normal orbit procedures unless otherwise directed.
If there is minimal separation between following
aircraft or cells using the same track, orbits at the
ARCP will require close coordination and thorough
crew briefing to ensure altitude separation.
When the aircraft or cells pass the ARIP/SD, the
tanker(s) and the receiver(s) will echelon and the
receiver(s) will begin descent to the base air refueling altitude. Receiver(s) will descend to be at the
base altitude 80 NM prior to the ARCP. Tanker(s)
will maintain published buddy cruise KCAS and
adjust to air refueling airspeed crossing the ARCP.
NOTE
For peacetime training missions, the ARIP

or the ARCP may be designated as the RZ
point. In these cases, cells will echelon and
start descent to the base refueling altitude
as soon as practical after rendezvous
completion.
If prebriefed, tanker(s) and receiver(s) may adjust
to air refueling airspeed and begin air refueling after passing the RZ point. Once departing the RZ/
ARIP the tanker(s) should fly centerline. The receiver is the maneuvering aircraft. If the tanker is
behind the receiver, the tanker should accelerate
and pass slightly off the left wing of the receiver.
Once airplanes have departed the RZ in cell, Normal Enroute Cell, Descent, and Formatting for Air
Refueling procedures will apply.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Enroute Rendezvous (B-52)

(Stream, Single Ship, SingleCell)
Figure 2-10M
Enroute Rendezvous Alternate Procedure (B-52)

(Single Ship, Single Cell)
Figure 2-10N
Change 16
2-84AA
Change 16
T.O. 1B-52H-1
2-84AB
Enroute Cell Procedures
Figure 2-10P
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Emission Option 3
FORMATION PROCEDURES
MISSION PLANNING
General
The elimination of the 15 minute prior calls increase the element of risk, and the following guidelines should enhance safety considerations.
a. Normally accomplish when clear of clouds.
BASE ALTITUDE FOR REFUELING/TANKER

ORBIT
a. Normally, 30,000 feet will be used as the base
planning altitude for refueling, modified as required by the following:
b. If unable to remain clear of clouds, tanker(s)

and receiver(s) will immediately confirm altitudes.
(1) The base refueling altitude should be at

least 2000 feet below the receiver maximum cruise
range altitude for refueling with a single tanker.
c. The receiver and tanker inbound courses to the

RZ/ARIP should be separated by a minimum of 30
degrees.
(2) The tanker leader should be at

feet below the receiver maximum cruise
tude in a two-tanker formation and at
feet below the receiver maximum cruise
tude in a three-tanker formation.
d. The receiver and tanker inbound legs to the RZ/

ARIP must be a minimum of 40 NM in length.
This type rendezvous should be an enroute rendezvous at the ARIP with both aircraft using the same
RZ time. The receiver should rendezvous 1000 feet
below the tanker. An ETE from the ARIP to the
ARCP should be planned which permits an airspeed which falls in the middle of the aircraft speed
performance envelope. It is essential that crews/
planners coordinate certain items during mission
planning/development. Minimum items include:
a. Rendezvous altitudes.
b. RZ time and ARCT.
c. Inbound courses to the RZ/ARIP.
d. Radio silent termination time in the event a
missed rendezvous.
MISSED RENDEZVOUS PROCEDURES
If contact is not established at the RZ/ARIP the
tanker will arrive at the ARCP at the ARCT. This
procedure begins when either aircraft arrives at the
ARCP and does not have visual contact with the
other. In this case a left hand orbit should be entered and orbit controlled so as to be over the ARCP
at intervals of every eight minutes (ARCT plus 8,
plus 16, etc.). While in the orbit, every attempt
should be made to establish visual contact with the
other aircraft. The length of the delay and decision
as to how long to continue radio silence should be
determined during mission planning/development
prior to flight.
least 2500
range altileast 3000
range alti-
b. The tanker orbit altitude will normally be base

refueling altitude.
c. The base altitudes listed in this paragraph are
based on optimum performance and will provide
the greatest net fuel gain for the receivers. These
altitudes are required for planning purposes and
should be scheduled when possible.
Normal Formation Rendezvous Procedures
Normal rendezvous procedures, supplemented by

the following instructions, will be utilized when in
formation.
a. If equipped, the lead tanker will transmit a
multiple code on his radar beacon.
b. On rollout to rendezvous/refueling heading, if
equipped, the last tanker in the cell will transmit
a single code on his radar beacon.
c. If either the tanker or receiver leader cannot
make electronic contact well enough to effect the rendezvous, he will direct other airplanes in his cell to attempt contact. An airplane successful in establishing
electronic contact with the other force will advise his
cell leader, who will either direct the rendezvous
based upon that information or permit that airplane
to effect the rendezvous. It should always be clearly
established between the tanker and receiver leaders
whose equipment is being used for the rendezvous.
d. Tankers will adjust to refueling formation during
the final turn to refueling track. Airplanes will be
stacked up at 500 foot intervals or as required from
the leader with 2 NM nose-to-nose separation measured along the 60 degree echelon line (see figure
2-10Q).
Change 21
2-84AC
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Air Refueling Formation
Prior to Descent
When utilizing any tanker/receiver ratio (i.e., one

tanker/one receiver, two tankers/three receivers,
three tankers/four receivers, etc.), the receiver cell
will move into appropriate refueling formation on
the right of the receiver leader at 100 NM from the
known tanker position. This formation will be
maintained during descent, level-off and refueling.
NOTE
If range to the tanker is not known the receiver cell will establish refueling formation at
the ARIP or 100 NM from the ARCP. (Tanker
range may be determined by using Air-to-Air
TACAN, TACAN differential, radar beacon (if
equipped) or FAA/GCI advisory.)
Descent
Receivers will begin descent at the ARIP. Level-off altitude will insure a 1000-foot separation between the
highest receiver and the tanker leader base altitude.
Climb to Refueling Position
For cells consisting of more than one receiver, the

receivers may initiate the climb into precontact
position when approximately 2 NM behind the
tankers. This procedure will facilitate maintaining
radar contact with the tanker until reaching minimum range. Minimum visibility for cell formation
rendezvous is 2 NM. Visual contact must be made.
with the tankers prior to reducing the altitude separation between the receiver and tanker cells.
Fig 2-10Q
2-84AD
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EVS RENDEZVOUS
This technique allows the EVS, rather than electronic emitters, to be used during AR rendezvous.
By setting the EVS elevation to a predetermined
angle and then monitoring the position of the tanker on the EVS display, range information between
the two aircraft can be obtained. It has been determined that a 10 degree up elevation offers the optimum EVS display for establishing a range to tanker reference point system with the EVS symbology.
However, there are two areas of concern with the
EVS display; aircraft altitude errors and aircraft
angle of attack (airspeed vs gross weight) induced
errors. Angle of attack errors are negligible and
should not significantly detract from the overall
rendezvous at airspeeds of 20 knots from briefed.
On the other hand, errors in aircraft altitude separation (300 feet or greater) are critical. Any deviation from planned altitude quickly translates into
aircraft ranging error. Therefore, a key assumption
of this technique is that both aircraft are at their
proper altitude (1000 feet separation to 1 NM) at
any given time.
Once established in a trail position, either visually
or with the FLIR/STV, configure the EVS display
(i.e., IKB - MAN EVS, Steering Control - BNS,
Wide Field of View, Sensor elevation - 10 degrees
up) and prepare for final closure. As indicated in
figure 2-10R, when the tanker enters the bottom of
the EVS display (Wide Field of View selected), the
range between aircraft is approximately 3 NM. As
aircraft range decreases, the tankers relative position on the EVS monitor will begin to edge or climb
towards the top of the monitor. At approximately 2
NM, the tankers position on the EVS display will
just clear the azimuth indicators located at the bottom of the monitor. 1 NM separation is achieved
when the tankers position nears the top of the ver-
tical fiducial marker (refer to figure 2-10R). Until

now, aircraft altitude separation has been 1000
feet. At this point, the receiver continues to close
slightly inside of the 1 NM position - still at 1000
feet below the tanker/refueling altitude - until the
tankers position becomes centered in the EVS fiducial marks. Upon reaching this position, the 30 degree extension line off the tanker, a gradual climb is
initiated keeping the tanker centered in the fiducial
marks. At 500 feet below the refueling altitude, and
the tanker still centered in the fiducial marks, 1/2
NM separation is achieved and a continued closure/
climb with the tanker remaining centered will place
the receiver in the precontact position. Receivers
should not attempt to close to contact position using
solely the FLIR/ STV monitor. Normal visual closure from the 1/2 mile point will be completed.
RENDEZVOUS OVERRUN
The following procedures will be utilized if the receiver passes the tanker prior to or during the tanker rendezvous turn. The receiver will reduce airspeed to 275 KIAS, or refueling airspeed, and maintain track and altitude. The tanker will increase
the airspeed 310 KIAS, maintain altitude, adjust
track as required, and overtake the receiver. After
overtaking the receiver, the tanker will reduce the
airspeed to 275 KIAS (or refueling airspeed) for final receiver closure.
EARLY ARRIVAL OF RECEIVERS
The following procedure will be utilized in the event

the receiver(s) arrives ahead of the tanker at the
ARCP or RZ point. The receiver will orbit at an altitude that insures a 1000 feet separation between
the highest receiver(s) and the lowest tanker(s).
This orbit will be accomplished with the receiver(s)
at the lower altitude.
Change 16
2-84AE
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EVS Presentations - Air Refueling Rendezvous
Figure 2-10R
2-84AF
Change 16
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ANCHOR REFUELING OPERATIONS
Receivers will proceed from the ARIP to the ARCP

using all navigation aids necessary to arrive over
ARCP via the planned inbound track. The rendezvous will be directed by the tactical air controller or
the tanker lead. The tactical air controller or the
tanker lead will determine the type rendezvous to
be used. The receiver lead will monitor the rendezvous closely and offer to assist as required. The
tanker will adjust to refueling airspeed when directed by the receiver lead. Receiver cells will rendezvous with the highest bomber 1000 feet below
the lowest tanker in their tanker cell and maintain
this separation until visual contact is established.
The lowest tanker should be at the air refueling
base altitude. Multiple anchors may be used for certain operations. When more than one anchor is
used, adjoining anchors will be parallel and separated by a minimum of 60 NM between anchor
points. The refueling base altitude of adjoining anchors will normally be separated by 2000 feet. Normally, the rendezvous and refueling will be accomplished in the anchor pattern.
ALTERNATE ANCHOR RENDEZVOUS
If a tactical air controller is not directing the anchor

refueling operations, the following procedures will
be used: the tanker will establish a normal point

parallel rendezvous orbit at the anchor point. Receiver flights will proceed to an anchor ARIP a
minimum of 70 NM upstream from the anchor
point. Receivers will rendezvous 1000 feet below
the refueling base altitude until visual contact is established. Normal point parallel rendezvous procedures will be used to conduct the rendezvous.
NOTE
After the receiver flight joined up is complete, the anchor pattern will be used for
refueling. If cleared by the tanker commander, subsequent receiver flights may
depart the ARIP if the receivers have both
the capability to assure safe aircraft separation and to join on the tanker using onboard
equipment. At least 1000 feet vertical separation will be maintained between each
joining flight, and between the highest receiver flight and the lowest refueling element until visual contact is established.
Use of secondary frequency is recommended. To preclude conflict with receivers
clearing the tanker, or during a breakaway,
ensure all receivers maintain adequate in
trail spacing from the refueling formation.
Anchor Pattern
Figure 2-10S
Change 16
2-84AG
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AIR REFUELING PROCEDURES

GENERAL
During training missions, if any flight control system malfunction exists, which denies the pilot a safe margin of control in any
axis, air refueling will be aborted.
Level flight air refueling is recommended when possible.
than position 2 airbrakes. Using more than position

2 airbrakes is hazardous because the resultant up
pitch cannot be controlled with stick alone. If normal procedures do not adequately control the closure and overrunning the lead airplane appears imminent, extend the landing gear. This has the advantage of adding drag and pitching the airplane
nose down. If visual contact with the lead airplane
is lost, accomplish the breakaway procedure.
NOTE
If the receiver becomes power limited while

using airbrakes position 1, retract the airbrakes.
Airbrakes at higher positions may be used at light

receiver weights to increase the amount of required
engine power in order that the throttles may be
used in a more responsive engine range.
Fuel Transfer Rate
The fuel transfer rate normally will be 6500 PPM

(all four air refueling pumps operating).
READY FOR CONTACT
Since the air refueling contact position is behind

and below the tanker, the danger is in overrunning
the tanker during an attempt to formate. Normally,
the rate of closure is determined by a crosscheck of
airspeeds between the two airplanes. When closing
on the lead airplane, the rate of closure is reduced
by retarding the throttles. If closure rate remains
too rapid with throttles at idle, put up not more
2-84AH
Change 16
If extremely close formation is encountered

inadvertently, be on guard for large and
rapidly varying aerodynamic interference
forces. Refer to FORMATION FLYING, Section VI, for a discussion of these forces.
The receiver will stabilize in the precontact
position and attain a zero rate of closure. If
the receiver fails to attain stabilized position, or it becomes apparent that a closure
overrun will occur, a breakaway will be initiated. Failure to initiate a breakaway under closure overrun conditions can result in
a mid-air collision.
Because of the magnitude of interrelated
aerodynamic effects, flying two airplanes in
close vertical proximity is not safe. Upwash
and downwash effects may occur drawing
the air-planes together. Low pressure areas
created by an overrunning receiver flying
under the tanker will affect static ports
causing possible erroneous airspeed and altitude indications to both airplanes. The
tanker autopilot altitude hold function may
sense the low pressure as a climbing indication and initiate a descent into the lower
airplane.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
The receiver will tend to drop back as tanker downwash is encountered, and it will be necessary to increase the power to maintain the proper position
behind the tanker. It may also be necessary to retrim the stabilizer to an angle of attack sufficient to
overcome the effects of the downwash. The air refueling formation is best initiated by the receiver
closing in from below, behind, and directly in trail,
being careful to maintain a safe altitude separation
until it is certain that overrunning will not occur.
When formation has been established, the receiver
should be in the precontact position approximately
50 feet aft, 10 feet below, and in trail from the tanker. In event there is a tendency to overshoot, airspeed can best be decreased by using airbrakes not
to exceed position 2 and retarding the throttles to
idle. The advantage of initiating a formation in this
manner is that the tanker can be seen clearly at all
times. After attaining the precontact position, the
receiver pilot will proceed toward the contact position. Since the rate of deceleration of this airplane
is low, the receiver pilot should use a slow rate of
closure to prevent overrunning the tanker. As the
tanker is approached, it will be necessary for the receiver pilot to lower his seat below the normal position so that he may have a better view of the tanker. When the seat is in the normal position, the pilots view is obstructed by structural members over
the top of the windshield. The boom operator will
trail the boom 10 feet extended. The receiver will
move forward and up to a point approximately 20
feet aft and slightly below the boom nozzle. From
this point, the receiver will proceed slowly forward
and up to the contact position. As the receiver
reaches the contact position, the receiver pilot
should hold a steady platform until the boom is in
the slipway. When the boom is in the slipway and
the boom nozzle seats in the air refueling receptacle, the receptacle toggles will secure the nozzle
in place.
CONTACT MADE
The air refueling boom envelope (figure 2-10D) is

the operational limits dictated by the aerodynamic
control authority of the boom. As long as the receiver is positioned inside these limits, contact can be
maintained despite rolling, pitching, or yawing. The
envelope limits are set well within the mechanical
limits of the boom so that a disconnect will take
place soon enough to allow ample time for a separation. This is true even though the envelope limits
are approached at a relatively high velocity.
To preclude the possibility of inadvertent

actuation of the stabilizer trim switch, the
pilot should rest his thumb between the
horizontal spur and the upright position of
the control wheel grip during all normal operation. Special care should be taken during
takeoff, landing, and air refueling operations.
If the control cabin is not pressurized, all
unnecessary electrical equipment should be
turned off.
If the receiver director lights fail to illuminate when contact is established, the receiver pilot will inform the boom operator if he
wishes to continue refueling operations. If
refueling is continued, verbal corrections
from the boom operator may be requested.
To preclude damage to the tanker boom ice
shield and/or receiver slipway doors, do not
make UP correction when receiver director
lights indicates an UP and AFT. Use AFT
correction only.
Extreme azimuth disconnect should be
avoided at all times. If the boom is released
at this azimuth limit, slipstream forces attempt to streamline the boom to the trail
position. This results in the boom striking
the slipway doors before the operator can
elevate the boom, causing damage to the
doors and slipway lights located in the
doors.
Attempts to affect a contact during loss of
any air refueling lighting that results in
less than desired illumination will be at the
discretion of the boom operator.
NOTE
If the crew compartment is pressurized, the

radar navigator should operate all equipment as desired and maintain definitely
known positions during air refueling in order to give the pilot the desired heading
upon completion of air refueling.
Change 16
2-84AJ
T.O. 1B-52H-1
REFUELING AIRSPEED
The refueling airspeed is normally 275 KIAS. If 275

KIAS is less than tanker charted endurance speed,
tanker endurance speed will be used for refueling
airspeed. This speed change will be coordinated by
the tanker, as soon as possible, prior to the final
turn to rendezvous/refueling heading.
upon completion of aircraft refueling. A receiver will not depart individually until
cleared by the receiver leader. The receiver
leader will maintain control of his formation
and depart as a complete cell, if, in his opinion, individual departure by receiver airplanes would present a flying safety hazard.
FORMATION REFUELING PROCEDURES
a. After the receiver formation comes into visual

contact with the tanker formation, and during the final phase of closure, the receiver
leader will direct receivers/element leaders to
assume the precontact position behind assigned tankers.
b. During conditions of poor visibility (2 NM or
less) when the tanker/receiver ratio is one
tanker to two receivers, a receiver completing
refueling will move aft and left to assume 60
degree echelon to the left of the refueling element, stacking down at 500 foot intervals
from the refueling element, with 1 NM noseto-nose separation measured along the 60 degree echelon line until all receivers have completed refueling.
c. Upon completion of refueling, the receiver
leader will report refueling complete, instruct
the tanker leader to clear the refueling track,
reform the receiver cell, and continue the
mission.
d. Upon completion of refueling, tankers will
turn rotating beacons ON, navigation lights
to BRIGHT and STEADY, then clear the refueling track.
e. If refueling has not been completed before
reaching the tankers planned turning point,
the tanker cell leader will advise the receiver
leader of his intentions.
f. The tanker leader will not clear the refueling
track without first notifying the receiver of
his intentions and receiving acknowledgment.
g. Depending on the mission requirements, the
receiver aircraft may proceed individually
2-84AK
Change 16
Receivers will insure a safe clearance from

the tanker(s) as they proceed on their assigned mission. Receiver(s) required to accelerate past the tanker(s) and climb on the
air refueling heading will maneuver either
left or right of track to preclude climbing
directly in front of the tanker(s)/ remaining
receiver(s). Tanker(s)/ remaining receiver(s)
flying through departing receivers jetwash
may experience damage to the airplane and
injury to personnel.
Observation Position
When specified, the observation position is authorized for a receiver wingman awaiting refueling. A
receiver wingman maintaining the observation
position will maintain a 40 degree echelon position
and 500 feet lateral clearance (wingtip clearance)
from the tanker (see figure 2-10T). The observation
position will only be conducted when flight visibility
is 2 NM or more.
If breakaway is initiated by any airplane,

the airplane flying the observation position
will accompany the tanker and remain clear
of the descending receiver.
One Tanker/Two Receivers
Once the receiver leader has reached the precontact

position, receiver 2 may assume the observation
position. After completing refueling, the receiver
leader will move aft and left of the tanker to assume 60 degree left echelon, 1 NM nose-to-nose separation from the tanker, stacking down 500 feet.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Figure 2-10T
Change 16
2-84AL
T.O. 1B-52H-1
One Tanker/Three or More Receivers
Once the receiver leader has reached the precontact

position, receiver number 2 may assume the observation position. Receiver number 3 will maintain
2 NM echelon position until receiver 2 has reached
the precontact position. Receiver 3 may then assume the observation position. After completing refueling, the receiver leader will move aft and left to
assume 60 degrees left echelon, 2 NM nose-to-nose
separation from the refueling element, stacking
down 1,000 feet. When receiver 2 has completed refueling, it will move aft and left to assume 60 degrees left echelon 1 NM nose-to-nose separation
from the refueling element, stacking down 500 feet.
For each additional receiver (four or more), the receiver leader and each subsequent receiver will increase echelon spacing by 1 NM and stack down an
additional 500 feet.
Formation Procedures
(One Tanker/Three or More
Receivers)
Two Tankers/One Receiver
Applicable procedures in the preceding paragraphs

will be utilized. Each unit of two tankers and one
receiver will be assigned a separate ARCP. The
tanker cell will adjust from orbit formation (500
feet and 1 NM separation) to 60 degrees right echelon and 2 NM nose-to-nose separation during the final turn to refueling track (see figure 2-10V). The
receiver will rendezvous with the lead tanker.
When reaching 3 NM, or when skin paint is acquired on number 2 tanker, the receiver will maneuver to the precontact position, stabilize and refuel from tanker number 2. The number 2 tanker
will use station keeping techniques to maintain
position. Upon completion of refueling between
number 2 tanker and the receiver, the receiver will
descend 1000 feet and move slightly aft, and assure
that he is clear of the receiver before clearing the
refueling track. Upon visually clearing from the
number 2 tanker, the receiver will then move left
and into precontact position, stabilize, and refuel
from the tanker leader. Upon completion of refueling between the lead tanker and the receiver, the
lead tanker will start acceleration. At this time the
lead tanker will complete the post air refueling
checklist. The receiver will allow two minutes from
the time the tanker starts climb before resuming
the briefed flight path.
2-84AM
Change 16
Figure 2-10U
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Two Tankers/Three Receivers
After receiver leader and receiver 2 have reached

the precontact position, receiver 3 may assume the
observation position on tanker 2. The receiver leader will receive his total scheduled onload from tanker leader; receiver 2 will receive one-half his scheduled onload from tanker 2 and the other one-half
from the tanker leader. Receiver number 3 will receive his total scheduled onload from tanker number 2. After completing his onload, the receiver
leader will disconnect, move aft, and echelon 60 degrees on the left of the tanker leader, 2 NM nose-tonose, stacked down 500 feet. Receiver number 2
will onload required fuel from tanker number 2. After the receiver leader has cleared the tanker leader track, receiver number 2 will move left and into
precontact position, stabilize, and refuel from the
tanker leader. When receiver number 2 has cleared
tanker number 2 track, receiver number 3 will
move into precontact position, stabilize, and refuel
from tanker number 2. When the tankers have
cleared the refueling track, the receiver leader will
momentarily accelerate to assume the number 1
position in the cell. Tankers or receivers may reform into enroute cell formation or proceed individually after clearing the air refueling track.
ceiving the other one-third of his scheduled onload.

When the tankers have cleared the refueling track,
tankers or receivers may reform into enroute cell
formation or proceed individually after clearing the
air refueling track.
(Two Tankers/One Receiver)
Three or More Tankers/One Receiver
The receiver will rendezvous with the lead tanker.

The receiver will maneuver to the precontact position to refuel from the last tanker in the cell. Upon
completion of refueling between the last tanker and
the receiver, the pilot of the last tanker will give the
Post Air Refueling Report. The receiver will move
into precontact position to refuel from the next
tanker forward. The same procedures will be repeated (receiver progressing forward) until the fuel
is off loaded by the lead tanker.
Three Tankers/Two Receivers
For three tankers/two receivers, the receiver leader

will move into precontact position, stabilize, and refuel from tanker number 2, receiving one-third of
his scheduled onload. The receiver leader will then
move left and into precontact position, stabilize,
and refuel from the tanker leader, receiving the
other two-thirds of his scheduled onload. Receiver
number 2 will move into precontact position, stabilize and refuel from tanker number 3, receiving
two-thirds of his scheduled onload. After the receiver leader has cleared tanker number 2 track, receiver number 2 will move left and into precontact position, stabilize and refuel from tanker number 2, re-
Figure 2-10V
Change 16
2-84AN
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Three Tankers/Four Receivers (Odd Ball Procedures)
Each receiver will onload three-fourths of the total

available tanker off load. Receiver 4 will maintain
refueling formation, 2 NM right echelon, stacked up
500 feet. On initial refueling contact, receiver leader will onload three-fourths of tanker leaders available off load, receiver 2 will onload one-half of tanker 2 available off load and receiver 3 will onload
one-fourth of tanker 3 available off load. After completing onload, receiver leader will echelon 60 degrees left of tanker leader, 2 NM nose-to-nose,
stacked down 500 ft. After receiver leader has
cleared tanker leaders track, receiver 2 will move
left into precontact position, stabilize and onload remaining one-fourth of tanker leaders available off
load. When receiver 2 has cleared tanker 2 track,
receiver 3 will move left into precontact position,
stabilize and onload remaining one-half of tanker 2
available off load. When receiver 3 has cleared
tanker 3 track, receiver 4 will move left into precontact position, stabilize and onload remaining threefourths of tanker 3 available off load. After tankers
have cleared track the receiver leader will accelerate straight ahead, maintaining altitude and assume cell lead position. At the direction of the receiver cell leader the bombers will reform into enroute cell.
NOTE
When utilizing three tanker/four bomber

procedures, receiver will not change initial
refueling position until it has been positively determined that the preceding receiver
has cleared refueling track and a change of
refueling position can be safely accomplished.
Three Tankers/Six Receivers
After receiver leader and receivers 3 and 5 have

reached the precontact position, receivers 2, 4, and
6 may assume the observation position on their receiver mate (figure 2-10W). As receiver 1, 3, and 5
2-84AP
Change 16
complete refueling they will move aft and left of the

tanker and assume an observation position on receivers 2, 4, and 6 respectively that will insure a
minimum of 300 feet aft (nose-to-tail clearance) and
150 feet lateral (wingtip clearance). After the first
receiver has cleared the precontact position, stabilize, and refuel. Upon completion of refueling, the
second receiver will move aft and right to assume
an observation position on the right of the element
leader that will insure a minimum of 300 feet aft
(nose-to-tail clearance) and 150 feet lateral (wingtip
clearance).
Four Tankers/Three Receivers
For four tankers/three receivers, the receiver leader

will move into precontact position, stabilize, and refuel from tanker number 2, receiving one-fourth of
his scheduled onload. Receiver leader will then
move left into precontact position, stabilize, and refuel from the tanker leader, receiving the remaining
three-fourths of his onload. Receiver number 2 will
move into precontact position, stabilize, and refuel
from tanker number 3, receiving one-half of his
scheduled onload. After receiver leader has cleared
tanker 2 track, receiver 2 will move left and into
precontact position, stabilize, and refuel from tanker 2, receiving the remaining one-half of his onload.
Receiver 3 will move into precontact position, stabilize, and refuel from tanker 4, receiving threefourths of his scheduled onload. After receiver 2 has
cleared tanker 3 track, receiver 3 will move left and
refuel from tanker 3, receiving the remaining onefourth of his onload. When tankers have cleared air
refueling track, tankers and receivers will reform
into enroute cell.
One Tanker for Each Receiver
After receiver wingmen have acquired visual/electronic contact with their respective tankers, they
will conduct individual closure for refueling at the
direction of receiver leader. Number 3 receiver will
initiate closure first, followed by number 2 and
number 1 in that order.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
(Three Tankers/Six Receivers)
Figure 2-10W
Change 16
2-84AQ
T.O. 1B-52H-1
(Three Tankers/Three Receivers)
Figure 2-10X
2-84AR
Change 16
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Receiver Formation
(Three Receivers)
Figure 2-10Y
Change 16
2-84AS
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Receiver Formation
(Six Receivers)
Figure 2-10Z
2-84AT
Change 16
T.O. 1B-52H-1
RECEIVER PILOT TECHNIQUE
Closure for contact from the precontact position

should be made very slowly to enable both the tanker and receiver pilots to compensate for the required trim changes. In addition, with slow closure
rates, the power adjustments required to finally
stabilize in the air refueling position will be smaller. The receiver director lights and the boom operators directions should be utilized as information on
the exact location of the receiver in the envelope,
but basically the technique is to fly formation on
the tanker. While approaching the tanker and during contact, the receiver pilot should make his visual observations on the forward section of the tanker
fuselage and crosscheck with the receiver director
lights to maintain the optimum position. The director lights do not give true vertical and horizontal
information. The up-and-down lights change because of angular movement of the boom and the
fore-and-aft lights change because of in-and-out
movements of the boom. The axis of the director
light system is inclined at a 30 degree angle to the
tanker fuselage. This angle causes an interaction in
both lights when a true vertical or horizontal movement is made by the receiver. For example, flying
straight forward while in contact will cause the
boom to compress and also increase its angle with
the tanker fuselage. The lights will show that the
airplane is flying forward and down. If a true up
movement is made, the boom will compress and
also lessen its angle with the tanker fuselage giving
a combined up and forward indication from the
lights. When this interaction between the lights is
understood, it can be used to advantage in keeping
position. Small fore and aft corrections can be made
with little or no power change by moving vertically.
Rough usage of the controls on the part of either
the receiver or tanker pilot will cause a chain reaction with progressively larger corrections required
to maintain position; therefore, development of a
smooth technique is necessary. Control changes in
the air refueling envelope should be made early in
order to maintain the desired position and to avoid
automatic disconnects. Turns and banks may be
made during contact without disconnects, provided
no abrupt motions are made by either the tanker or
receiver and the proper airspeed is maintained. The
lateral control spoilers introduce an up pitching moment, but during normal air refueling operations,
this characteristic is not objectionable. During air
refueling in rough air, it may be necessary to apply
a small amount of elevator to offset the pitch tendency if a large amount of lateral correction is rapidly made. Sufficient rudder control should be used
to maintain the receiver fuselage in alignment with
the tanker fuselage. Good azimuth control can be
maintained by observing the center stripe painted
on the bottom of the tanker fuselage. Elevation control is best maintained by small, well anticipated
corrections in the elevator while making a visual

crosscheck between movement of the tanker nose
section and corrections obtained from the receiver
director lights. Lateral control is best accomplished
by maintaining a parallel wing condition with that
of the tanker. Small banks with lateral control are
used to center the receiver behind the tanker and
then maintain a parallel wing condition.
Pilot Fatigue
One of the greatest potential hazards during air refueling is fatigue. On becoming fatigued, or if for
any reason large oscillations develop which require
increased amounts of control displacement, disconnect and let the other pilot fly the airplane in the
precontact position for a few minutes. The time
spent in stabilizing and resting will result in better
air refueling in a shorter time, since fewer disconnects will be experienced.
Automatic Flight Control System
An automatic flight control system has been incorporated to substantially reduce the loads imposed
during air refueling and to reduce pilot fatigue.
When using the aerial refuel mode of the automatic
flight control system, pilot techniques should be
easier to implement since control forces are reduced
and flying the airplane through the autopilot gives
the pilot a power steering effect. Smoother refueling
is possible in the aerial refuel mode since pilot inputs are damped out by the autopilot and added lateral stability helps to hold the airplane in position
by eliminating wallowing or rolling from side to
side. Pitch oscillations are also damped out by the
autopilot. With the electromechanical yaw damper
engaged, the rudder controls may be used but the
requirement is greatly reduced because the yaw
damper is sensing and correcting any lateral-directional oscillations of the airplane. The autopilot will
assist the pilot in maintaining an attitude and will
trim the airplane automatically in the refueling envelope and during fuel transfer as CG and gross
weight change. For additional information, see AUTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM Section I.
NOTE
When using the aerial refuel mode on airplanes equipped with the automatic flight
control system, the autopilot will disengage
in the normal manner by pressing either
the pilots or copilots autopilot disconnect
button. The autopilot will also be disengaged by abrupt pitch control inputs or rapid reversals on the control column. Boom
disconnects caused by excessive pressure,
exceeding boom envelope limits, or boom operators command will not disengage the autopilot.
Change 16
2-84AU
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DISCONNECT
There are two major classifications of disconnects;

planned and inadvertent. Planned disconnects may
be initiated by either the receiver pilot, copilot, or
tanker boom operator activating his disconnect
switch. Disconnects may be initiated by the receiver
if less than a full load is required, if a malfunction
is suspected, or for training purposes. If a prearranged quantity of fuel is to be transferred, the
disconnect will be initiated by the tanker boom operator after the planned amount of fuel is transferred. Inadvertent disconnects may be caused by
exceeding the air refueling boom envelope limits. A
pressure disconnect switch located aft of the air refueling receptacle will cause a disconnect if excessive pressure surges occur either from transfer
pressure or when the selected tanks become full
and the high level float switches close. Upon disconnect, the boom will automatically retract, except
when using manual boom retract. When a disconnect occurs, the disconnect light illuminates and
the contact made light goes out. In case of an inadvertent disconnect, depress and release the reset
button for the ready light. The blue ready light will
illuminate, the amber disconnect light will go out,
and the green contact made light will be out.
During normal operation using air refueling mode,
the boom operator should initiate all disconnects.
This will allow the receiver autopilot to remain engaged while moving back for airplane separation
and for subsequent contacts as required. To disconnect in an emergency, the receiver pilot and copilot
must be prepared at all times to press the autopilot
and air refueling (IFR) boom release buttons. Unless a serious emergency arises, every effort should
be made to stay in contact position until certain
that the boom nozzle is clear of the air refueling receptacle.
Should it become necessary for the receiver

pilot to initiate a disconnect while in the air
refueling mode, the autopilot and air refueling (IFR) boom release button(s) should be
held in the depressed position until well
clear of the tanker. This procedure will preclude the possibility of the autopilot reengaging due to a system malfunction while
in close proximity to the tanker.
2-84AV
Change 16
Unless a serious emergency arises, every effort should be made to stay in contact position until certain that the boom nozzle is
clear of the air refueling receptacle. Remain
stabilized in the contact position until the
boom operator or pilot not flying the aircraft
visually confirms a disconnect has been
made. This will prevent damage to the
boom and/or receptacle through a brute
force disconnect.
NOTE
If an autopilot malfunction occurs, the autopilot master switch should be positioned to

OFF and a visual check made to insure that
both the servos engage switch and the air
refuel switch have disengaged.
When attempting to refuel with the autopilot in the air refueling mode, if the toggles
fail to engage, it may be due to a fault in
the AFCS. Under these conditions, the pilot
should return to the precontact position, regain manual control of the airplane, and attempt refueling manually.
In the event of failure to obtain a contact
and after each disconnect, the receiver will
move aft and stabilize in a position in trail
of the boom or precontact, reset air refueling system and await clearance from the
boom operator to return to the contact position.
REFUELING WEATHER ABORT PROCEDURES
a. Receivers must take every feasible action to

enhance the possibility of completing air refueling. Such actions include altitude and
course deviations necessary to avoid severe
weather. Deviations, when required, must be
made judiciously to prevent conflict with
tanker/receiver cells on adjacent tracks.
b. When the receiver leader determines that
weather conditions are such as to make
formation refueling hazardous, he may abort
the cell. When the cell is to be aborted, the
receiver leader will instruct the tanker leader
to clear the refueling track. Normal end refueling procedures will apply.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AIR REFUELING PROCEDURES

NOTE
All asterisk (*) items will be read by the copilot and response given over
interphone. All other items may be completed silently by the appropriate crewmember.
RENDEZVOUS
The RENDEZVOUS Checklist will normally be started at least 30 minutes prior to the planned RENDEZVOUS CONTROL TIME. When a token or delayed on-load is planned, stopping of the fuel usage sequence
should be delayed to prevent excessive depletion of main tanks fuel prior to on-load.
NOTE
The rendezvous checklist shall be completed prior to 3 NM range.

*1. Rendezvous Equipment On at briefed time (CP, N, RN)
Begin this checklist 30 minutes prior to planned ARCT.
a. A/A TACAN Set (CP)
Tankers primary rendezvous aid is set to their assigned channel 15 minutes prior to ARCT.
b. Rendezvous Beacon On (if applicable) (N)
c.
Beacon Signal of Assigned Tanker Identify (if applicable) (RN)
d. Range and Bearing of Tanker Determined (CP/RN)

*2. Radios Set to air refueling frequencies (as applicable) (P/CP)
UHF and HF radios will be set to briefed air refueling frequencies.
3. ECM Equipment Switches Positioned as required (EW)
During air refueling, a possibility exists that fuel may enter the vertical
fin air scoop and form a combustible mixture in the aft equipment
compartments. Placing ECM transmitters and ALQ-122 in STANDBY
(Put ALQ-155 receiver/ transmitters into warm-up mode with standby
1 on mode selector switch) 15 minutes prior to initial contact until 15
minutes after termination of final contact will allow equipment to cool
prior to refueling and ensure dissipation of combustible mixtures after
refueling. This procedure is applicable to either wet and/or dry refueling contacts. Both forward and aft transmitters will be placed in
STANDBY to preclude the inadvertent turning on of the aft transmitters.
Due to the high operating temperature of the ALQ-153 in the standby
mode, the ALQ-153 will be turned OFF 15 minutes prior to initial contact until 15 minutes after termination of final contact. This will allow
the equipment to cool prior to refueling and ensure dissipation of combustible mixtures after refueling. This procedure is applicable to either
wet or dry contacts.
Change 22
2-84AW
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AIR REFUELING PROCEDURES (Cont)

RENDEZVOUS (Cont)
4. MASTER REFUEL Switch ON (CP)

5. Fuel Valves Switches, 9 thru 16 CLOSED as required (CP)
6. Main Manifold Interconnect Valves Switch (No. 29) OPEN (CP)
Copilot places fuel system panel switch No. 29 to OPEN position.
*7. Main and Auxiliary Tank switches REFUEL as required (CP) Checked (P)
Refer to AIR REFUELING MANAGEMENT, Section I for further details.
Fuel can be pumped in a reverse direction from the receiver through the air refueling boom to the
aft tanks of the tanker. This can occur if any auxiliary tank boost pumps are energized or if the
defuel valve and any crossfeed manifold valve is open. Conversely, if certain engine feed control
valves (valves 13, 14, 15, and 16) are open, engine fuel pressure could be increased by pressure from
the refueling boom. Therefore, all fuel system panel switches, except those being used specifically,
should be checked in OFF or CLOSED position during all air refueling contacts, wet or dry.
8. REFUEL VALVE Switch OPEN, REFUEL VALVE Position Indicator OPEN (CP)
When refueling valve is open, REFUEL VALVE Position Indicator will read OPEN.
9. SIGNAL AMP POWER Switch NORMAL (CP)
10. MANUAL TOGGLE LATCH Switch RELEASE (CP)
*11. Anti-Icing Panel CLIMATIC (P)
12. Starter Switches CONT (CP)
13. Level Off Altitude Report (P)
After the receiver reaches level-off altitude, report the altitude to the tanker.
*14. Altimeters 29.92 or as briefed (P-CP-N)
*15. EVS On, VIDEO selected (P/CP)
Pilot or Copilot selects an EVS monitor which will best allow them to monitor aircraft range and
closure (insure LOS Command is out).
*16. EVS Preset Accomplished (N)
Navigator presets the elevation 10 degrees up and zero the azimuth on the most appropriate (STV/
FLIR) monitor. If desired, both monitors may be set.
2-84AX
Change 22
T.O. 1B-52H-1

PREPARATION FOR CONTACT
*1. Radio Contact Established (P)

Pilot may establish radio contact at the 3 NM range with the tankers pilot depending on EMCON
condition.
*2. Tanker Position Determined (CP-RN)
Copilot determines the tanker position visually or on the EVS monitor. Radar Navigator determines
the tanker position on the radar or on the EVS monitor. The EVS may be moved from the preset
position to bring the tanker into the field of view of the sensor. Adjust the EVS bias and contrast
knobs for optimum display.
*3. IFF/SIF As required (P)
*4. Air Conditioning System Checked, cabin pressurized; no smoking (CP)
During air refueling operations, it is desirable that the crew compartment be pressurized. If compartment pressurization is lost, the air conditioning selector switch should be placed in RAM if air refueling is necessary. This will tend to prevent fuel spillage that may occur from entering the cabin.
There will be no smoking by any crewmember during the air refueling

operation, since combustible fuel fumes may be present.
If the control cabin is not pressurized, all unnecessary electrical equipment should be turned off.
*5. Rendezvous Equipment As required (N)

Turn off equipment if no further rendezvous are planned.
6. Anticollision Lights OFF (night only) (CP)
7. Navigation Lights FLASH (night only) (CP)
*8. Autopilot Disengaged (P)
*9. Airbrake Lever POSITION 1 (P)
Before reaching precontact position, place airbrake lever in POSITION 1 unless power limited.
10. SLIPWAY and AIRPLANE (Wing) LIGHTS Switches Full BRIGHT (night only) (CP)
*11. EVS Video Selected (P)
Pilot may monitor the appropriate EVS monitor for the rendezvous prior to 3 NM range if needed
to facilitate the rendezvous. Pilot will have the appropriate EVS sensor selected by 1 NM to aid
closure to 1/2 mile range.
Change 16
2-84AY
T.O. 1B-52H-1

PREPARATION FOR CONTACT (Cont)
*12. TACAN SET (P/CP)

Set TACAN as required for navigation A/A TACAN should be left in A/A until 1/2 NM.
*13. NORMAL SLIPWAY DOORS Switch OPEN, READY Light ON (CP)
To prevent damage to the slipway doors, do not exceed 300 KIAS when
slipway doors are open.
NOTE
During icing conditions when formatting is still possible, icing within

the receptacle cavity can be prevented by keeping the slipway doors
closed until just before contact.
*14. Autopilot Aerial Refuel (P/CP)
Pilot not flying the aircraft will engage the air refueling autopilot on request from the other pilot
by first engaging the autopilot servos and then engaging the air refueling switch.
15. Signal Amplifier Reset Button PUSH TO RESET (if applicable) (CP)
To eliminate potential fire hazards, the OAS should not be operated in

RADIATE during air refueling if any of the following conditions exists.
a. The radar beam is sweeping across tanker (antenna tilt is a plus value).
b. A radar malfunction is occurring.
NOTE
When engaging the aerial refuel mode of the AFCS, transient voltages
are frequently sufficient to cycle the signal amplifier. When this occurs,
the blue ready for contact light will go out and the amber disconnect
light will illuminate. To correct the situation, depress and release the
signal amplifier reset button. The disconnect light will go out and the
ready for contact light will illuminate.
2-84AZ
Change 16
T.O. 1B-52H-1

CONTACT
On making contact, the following steps will be accomplished silently:

1. READY Light Out (contact made) (CP)
CONTACT Made Light ON (CP)
When the boom is bottomed in the receptacle, the toggles will engage, the blue READY Light will
go out, and the green CONTACT Made Light will illuminate, indicating contact has been made.
Nozzle binding can occur while in contact with a tanker. This condition
will depend on the relative position of the tanker and receiver and the receivers stability while in the air refueling envelope. Nozzle binding occurs
at many positions depending on degree of azimuth and/or elevation and
rate of closure. The receiver pilot must be constantly aware of the tankers
position and be prepared to initiate a disconnect or breakaway before the
receiver gets into a position where nozzle binding could occur.
Receiver pilots experiencing pitching tendencies or large out-of-trim conditions will discontinue air refueling and drop back to the precontact position.
The source of difficulty will be determined prior to resuming air refueling.
a. Check of rudder trim indicator should indicate if inadvertent trim has been induced by malfunctioning rudder actuator brake.
b. Torn balance bay fabric in the elevator balance system will induce pitching action which will be
aggravated by tanker slipstream and downwash.
2. Main Tank and Auxiliary Tank Control Switches REFUEL (as required to maintain CG) (CP)
Route fuel as required to maintain desired CG. The copilot must maintain a continuous visual check
of the fuel panel and open or close refueling valves to assure that lateral and CG control is maintained. Refer to AIR REFUELING FUEL MANAGEMENT, Section IV.
3. Signal Amplifier Reset Button PUSH TO RESET when disconnect occurs (CP)
When planned or inadvertent disconnect occurs, depress and release the reset button for the ready
for contact light. The blue READY Light will illuminate, the amber DISCONNECT Light will go out,
and the green CONTACT Made Light will be out.
During contact, if excessive fuel spillage is noted in the slipway, an immediate disconnect should be made. If the malfunction of the equipment cannot be corrected, no further contact should be made.
NOTE
An automatic disconnect occurs as a result of high fuel pressure when all

fuel level control valves are closed. The valves are closed either by operation of the appropriate switches on the refuel panel or by float switches in
each tank. In the event of an inadvertent disconnect, press the signal amplifier reset button to prepare the refuel system for another contact.
The boom operator has an excellent view of the slipway and can report
any fuel spillage to the receiver pilot.
Change 16
2-84BA
T.O. 1B-52H-1

POST AIR REFUELING
When a disconnect occurs, the tanker boom is automatically disconnected, the DISCONNECT Light illuminates, and the CONTACT Made Light goes out. The following steps are accomplished at termination:
NOTE
When the boom is clear following termination, the tanker is pulled up

and the receiver pushes over, clears the tanker and cleans up the airplane.
1. Anticollision and Navigation Lights ON and STEADY (CP)
*2. Slipway Doors CLOSED, SLIPWAY DOOR CLOSED-AND-LOCKED Light On (CP)
When the slipway doors are closed and locked, the amber SLIPWAY DOOR CLOSED-AND-LOCKED
Light will illuminate.
*3. Airbrake Lever OFF (P)
*4. IFF/SIF NORM (P)
5. SLIPWAY and AIRPLANE (Wing) LIGHTS Switches OFF (CP)
6. REFUEL VALVE Switch CLOSE, Position Indicator CLOSED (CP)
When the main refuel valve is closed, the REFUEL VALVE Position Indicator will read CLOSED.
7. FUEL SCAVENGE SYSTEM Switch CABIN (CP)
Continuous operation of a fuel scavenge pump may cause damage. If

the FUEL IN MANIFOLD Light fails to go out after 20 minutes of operation, turn the FUEL SCAVENGE SYSTEM Switch OFF and annotate in the AFTO Form 781A.
8. MASTER REFUEL Switch OFF (CP)
Fuel Flow Indicator Lights will go out.
*9. Fuel Panel Switches As required (CP) Checked (P)
*10. Altimeters Reset (if required) (P-CP-N)
11. FUEL IN MAIN MANIFOLD/FUEL IN CABIN MANIFOLD Light OFF (CP)
12. FUEL SCAVENGE SYSTEM Switch OFF (CP)
Scavenge refuel manifold after each air refueling operation. FUEL IN MAIN MANIFOLD/FUEL IN
CABIN MANIFOLD Light out indicates all fuel has been removed from the refuel manifold and the
scavenge system will be turned OFF.
2-84BB
Change 16
T.O. 1B-52H-1

POST AIR REFUELING (Cont)
NOTE
If the FUEL IN MAIN MANIFOLD/FUEL IN CABIN MANIFOLD

Light blinks on and off, it indicates that only a small amount of fuel
remains in the cabin manifold. At this time, it is permissible to turn the
FUEL SCAVENGE SYSTEM Switch to OFF.
13. Starter Switches As required (CP)
*14. Rendezvous Equipment As required (N)
Turn equipment off if no further rendezvous activity is planned.
KC-10 AIR REFUELING PROCEDURES

INTRODUCTION
NOTE
The following information is provided to

amplify only the differences to KC-135
tanker procedures contained herein.
Pilot Director Lights
The pilot director lights consist of two rows of lights

located forward of the wing root. Relative elevation
position is provided by the left row and the right
row provides telescoping position. The elevation
row contains one striped green, two amber and two
red triangular panels and two white letters; U at
the forward end for UP, and D at the aft end for
DOWN. The colored panels and letters are dimly illuminated by background lights. The telescoping
row contains one striped green, two amber, two red
and four white rectangular panels and two white
letters: A at the forward end for AFT, and F at
the aft end for FORWARD. The colored panels are
not background lighted; however, the letter at each
end of the row is dimly illuminated. Separation is
provided by the white panels. The pilot director
lights are adjusted by the boom operator to the size
air refueling envelope for each receiver and provide
guidance during contact.
To provide more response time, the appropriate
panel and letter are illuminated in anticipation of
receiver movement. The director lights provide commands based on both receiver position and rate of
movement. Figure 2-10AB shows the lights with no
receiver motion. With rapid motions of the receiver,
the lights can show a correction required even

though the receiver is in the center of the envelope.
The red panel and letter at the ends of each row
can be illuminated by the boom operator to aid the
receiver in attaining the contact position.
Radar Beacon (APX-78) (Two Pulse, Variable

Width), Search Radar, UHF/DF, TACAN A/A
(Range and Bearing) and INS.
Communications UHF, HF and VHF
Do not transmit on the HF radio when in

contact with or when in close proximity to
the air refueling boom. Transmitting on HF
when in contact with or in close proximity
with the air refueling boom may cause uncommanded air refueling boom movement,
endangering the tanker or receiver aircraft
and crews.
Normal Rendezvous Procedures Point Parallel Rendezvous
Receivers will proceed from the ARIP to the ARCP

using all navigational aids available to arrive over
the ARCP via the inbound track. After the tanker
has departed his orbit on the reciprocal of the receiver inbound track, the tanker INS will be programmed to maintain the computed offset. The
KC-10 turn range and offset chart is based on a
tanker bank angle of 25 (see figure 2-10K).
Change 16
2-84BC
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Disconnect
The KC-10 aerial refueling boom is controlled by a

digital fly-by-wire system. Certain failure conditions of this system may cause one or more axes of
the boom control system to become inoperative.
Should this occur, the boom operator may not be
able to maneuver the boom to avoid striking the receiver airplane. In this situation, the boom operator
will issue instruction to direct the receiver to a position where a safe disconnect can be effected.
When notified that a KC-10 boom flight

control system failure has occurred, do not
initiate a disconnect unless directed by the
boom operator.
2-84BD
Change 22
Follow the boom operators instruction explicitly. To reduce the probability of boom
strike after disconnect, it may be necessary
to remain in a stabilized position to allow
for aerodynamic fairing of the boom control
surfaces.
Another feature of the KC-10 is the Independent

Disconnect System. This system allows the KC-10
boom operator to obtain a disconnect even when the
receiver toggles remain in the latched position. This
system should be used in lieu of a Brute Force Disconnect.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Exterior Lighting
Figure 2-10AA
Change 16
2-84BE
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Pilot Director Lights Illumination Profile (KC-10)

20
21 1/2
23
24 1/2
26
30
34
35 1/2
37
38 1/2
T
21 F
14 3
/4 F
T
16 F
T
17 1
/4 F
T
18 1
/2 F
T
T
/4 F
12 1
8 1/
2 FT
9 3/4
FT
11 F
T
6 FT
40
2 1/2 FT
2 1/2 FT
2 1/2 FT
A93144
Figure 2-10AB
2-84BF
Change 16
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Figure 2-10AC
Change 16
2-84BG
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Air Refueling Mission Planning

and Inflight Data Chart
TYPE
TANKER
CRUISE A/R
ALTITUDE
BUDDY CRUISE
TANKER MACH
A/R TANKER
KIAS/MACH
KC-10
30,000
275/0.80
275/0.80
If KC-10 gross
weight or altitude
precludes normal
refueling airspeed,
the KC-10 will determine the minimum airspeed to
be used for refueling
OVERRUN
TANKER
KIAS/MACH
TRANSFER
RATE
310/0.88
7300 PPM
Figure 2-10AD
Receiver Disconnect Limits

RCVR
TYPE
UPPER
LIMIT
LOWER
LIMIT
LEFT
LIMIT
RIGHT
LIMIT
INNER
LIMIT
OUTER
LIMIT
B-52G/H
20
40
19
19
6 ft.
21 ft.
Figure 2-10AE
2-84BH
Change 16
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AIR REFUELING DEFINITIONS

The following standard air refueling terms are used
throughout this manual and all air refueling supplements. All tanker and receiver crews who participate in air refueling operations shall become familiar with the following terms and abbreviations.
NOTE
For purposes of air refueling procedures the

B-52 is considered a heavy receiver.
JOINT OPERATIONS
These definitions incorporate air refueling operation instructions from US NAVY NAVAIR
00-80T-110 and NATO ALLIED TACTICAL PUBLICATION (ATP)-56. When procedures differ from
normal operations, they will be annotated as follows:
AIR REFUELING ENVELOPE The area limits

behind the tanker within which the receiver must
fly to remain in contact with the tanker.
AIR to AIR REFUELING (AAR) AREA An area
of airspace designated for the purpose of AAR. The
tanker will establish a left hand race track pattern.
AIR REFUELING ENTRY POINT (AREP) A designated point at which the receiver enters the anchor area.
AIR REFUELING EXIT POINT (A/R EXIT PT)
The designated geographic point at which the refueling track terminates. In a refueling anchor it is
a designated point where tanker and receiver may
depart the anchor area after refueling is completed.
AIR REFUELING INITIAL POINT (ARIP) A
point located upstream from the ARCP at which the
receiver aircraft initiates a rendezvous with the
tanker.
NATO ATP-56
NAVAIR
AIR REFUELING (A/R) The refueling of an aircraft inflight by another aircraft.
AIR REFUELING AIRSPEED An airspeed or
Mach number at which air refueling will be initiated.
AIR REFUELING ABORT POINT A planned
point along the air refueling track at which the receiver or tanker is directed to proceed to the recovery base in the event that fuel transfer is not successful.
AIR REFUELING CELL (TANKER/RECEIVER
CELL) Two or more tankers and/or receivers.
AIR REFUELING CONTROL POINT (ARCP)
The planned geographic point over which the receiver(s) arrive in the observation/precontact position with respect to the assigned tanker.
AIR REFUELING RENDEZVOUS The procedures employed to enable the receiver(s) to reach
the precontact position behind the assigned tanker(s) by electronic, radio, and/or visual means. The
basic types of rendezvous procedures are the Point
Parallel and Enroute. All other rendezvous procedures are modifications of the basic types.
AIR REFUELING SYSTEM NORMAL OPERATION Both tanker and receiver using normal signal system.
AIR REFUELING TIME Planned elapsed time
from ARCP to completion point.
AIR REFUELING TRACK A track designated for
air refueling.
ALTERNATE AIR REFUELING TRACK That
track designated for air refueling in event the primary track cannot be used.
AIR REFUELING CONTROL TIME (ARCT) The

planned time that the receiver and tanker will arrive over the air refueling control point (ARCP).
ALTERNATE RENDEZVOUS A rendezvous accomplished when primary means are not available.
Means may be radar beacon, common TACAN, Timing, DF Steer, ACT/GCI assistance etc., or any combination of these.
AIR REFUELING ELEMENT One tanker and

one or more receivers.
ALTITUDE DIFFERENTIAL The difference between the receiver altitude and the tanker altitude.
Change 18
2-84BJ
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AMPLIFIER OVERRIDE Procedure for using receiver override boom latching when receiver air refueling system malfunctions. Also see MANUAL
BOOM LATCHING.
BUDDY JOINUP PROCEDURE These procedures are utilized when the tanker(s) and receiver(s) approach the ARIP on a common track by taking off from the same base and joining up.
ANCHOR POINT A designated geographical

point on the downstream end of the inbound course
of the Anchor Refueling Pattern.
BUDDY TAKEOFF/DEPARTURE When tanker

and receiver take off and climb as an element/cell.
ANCHOR REFUELING Air refueling performed

as the tankers maintain a prescribed pattern which
is anchored to a geographical point or fix.
ANCHOR RENDEZVOUS The procedures normally employed by radar (CRC/GCI/AWACS) to vector the tanker(s) and receiver(s) for a visual join-up
for refueling.
COMMUNICATIONS OUT Radio silent air refueling/rendezvous operations. All other rendezvous
aids may be used.
CONTACT That configuration in which the tankers and receivers are physically engaged and if applicable, their respective electrical systems indicate
a contact made condition.
ANGELS A brevity code meaning aircraft altitude

(in thousands of feet).
CONTACT POINT The geographical point along

the planned air refueling track where fuel transfer
should commence.
AWAITING AIR REFUELING POSITION (SKE) A

right 60 degree echelon off the last tanker, 1 NM nose
to nose spacing, stacked 500 feet above that tanker.
CONTACT POSITION The stabilized position of

the receiver within the A/R envelope where it is
possible to make contact.
BASE ALTITUDE A reference altitude at which

lead aircraft of a tanker formation (or single aircraft for individual air refueling) will fly at initial
contact.
DESCENT RANGE That distance from the tanker at which the receiver desires to initiate letdown
to the tanker.
BEACON RENDEZVOUS Use of an airborne radar

or rendezvous beacon to provide range and offset.
BREAKAWAY The command used by either tanker or receiver crewmembers to indicate a need for
emergency vertical and horizontal separation of
tanker and receiver.
BRUTE FORCE DISCONNECT A disconnect as a
result of the receiver aircraft moving aft to full
boom extension and overriding hydraulic pressure
or a mechanical malfunction holding the receivers
toggles in the engaged position. A brute force disconnect may occur inadvertently or as part of a controlled tension disconnect procedure, coordinated
between the boom operator and the receiver pilot.
BUDDY CRUISE When tanker(s) and receiver(s)
cruise as an air refueling element/cell.
2-84BK
Change 18
DISCONNECT When tanker and receiver separate from air refueling contact; also a command to
separate, but not warranting a breakaway.
DRY CONTACT Air refueling engagement for aircrew proficiency, during which fuel is not transferred.
EMERGENCY/OVERRIDE BOOM LATCHING
Procedure for using receiver override boom latching
when receiver air refueling system malfunctions.
Also see MANUAL BOOM LATCHING.
EMISSION CONTROL (EMCON) The management of electromagnetic radiations to counter
an enemys capability to detect, identify, or locate
friendly emitters for exploitation by hostile action.
This manual adopts NATO EMCOM designation.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EMISSION OPTIONS Options developed to
allow aircrews to rendezvous and air refuel using
four levels of emission control. These four levels
are:
EMISSION OPTION 1 Any and all emitters
are authorized to insure timely training/feedback
and maximum safety; Emission Option 1 will normally be used for qualification, requalification,
category qualification and difference training for
tanker or receiver units. Emission Options 2 and 3
may be used for essential training provided tanker
and receiver units conduct verbal coordination prior
to flight. Tanker boom operators will give verbal
corrections when required to ensure receiver aircraft maintains proper envelope position.
EMISSION OPTION 2 (Restricted Communications) Radio silent formation except for rendezvous and air refueling conducted with only two
radio exchanges. Fifteen minutes prior to the rendezvous control time, receivers and tankers will exchange call signs, altitude and timing. The tanker
will also give the aerial refueling altitude and any
change in tanker timing that would affect the rendezvous (in minutes early or late). Altimeter setting
and hot armament check will also be coordinated, if
applicable. If not at the planned rendezvous altitude, an additional call is required when reaching
that altitude. An abbreviated precontact radio
check is required. Receivers will not depart precontact until either this radio check is accomplished or
visual signals direct approach to contact. Tanker
boom operators will give verbal corrections when
required to ensure receiver aircraft maintains proper envelope position. Emission option 2 is the desired standard for daily air refueling operations.
More restrictive procedures under emission option
2 will be fully coordinated between tanker and receiver units. In an emergency/abnormal condition
(KC-10) the tanker/receiver may transmit over air
refueling frequency.
EMISSION OPTION 3 (Communications out)
Radio silent operations including formation, rendezvous and refueling. The use of other emitters is
authorized unless prohibited by supported operations, plans, etc.
EMISSION OPTION 4 (Emission out) No

emitters will be used unless specifically authorized
by the plan supported. This includes radios, doppler, radio navigation transmitters, radar, radio altimeters, IFF, exterior lighting, etc. This option will
not be practiced during peacetime operations unless
specifically tasked by NAF or higher headquarters.
EMISSION OUT No emitters utilized except as
authorized. Doppler navigation systems may be
used as required for mission accomplishment.
EMITTER A piece of equipment that emits electromagnetic radiation (radios, radar, TACAN, IFF,
doppler, radio altimeter, etc.).
END AIR REFUELING (E A/R) A planned point
or the actual position within the confines of the air
refueling track where all refueling operations/requirements are complete.
ENROUTE CELL FORMATION (KC-135/KC-10A)
Two or more tankers in trail, 1 NM separation,
and stacked up at 500 foot intervals.
ENROUTE RENDEZVOUS Procedure used when
joinup is to be accomplished enroute to the refueling area at the RZ by making good a scheduled
time. Timing may be accomplished by utilizing an
orbit delay or timing triangle.
HARD HOSE A hose condition caused by electrical, hydraulic or mechanical failure in which
hose slack is not properly taken up on contact. Also
called DEAD HOSE
HEAD-ON OFFSET RENDEZVOUS (HAR) This
procedure consists of the tanker intercepting the
predetermined refueling track of the receiver. This
type of rendezvous is employed when the tanker is
off to one side of the refueling track, between the
receiver and the ARCP.
HOT ARMAMENT Forward firing ordnance that
can be selected and fired by the receiver pilot or
crew.
Change 18
2-84BL
T.O. 1B-52H-1
INDEPENDENT DISCONNECT SYSTEM (IDS)
(KC-10) The independent disconnect system is an
electronically controlled, pneumatically actuated
system located in the nozzle assembly. It causes the
sides of the KC-10 boom nozzle to collapse, allowing
the boom to be retracted from the receiver aircraft,
while its toggles are in the latched, extended position.
MACH All Mach numbers referenced are true
MACH.
MANUAL BOOM LATCHING Procedure for using receiver boom latching when receiver air refueling system malfunctions. Both tanker and receiverair refueling systems in manual operation. Also
known as EMERGENCY/OVERRIDE BOOM
LATCHING and AMPLIFIER OVERRIDE.
MARK A request for the tanker to assist a receiver in achieving visual contact by dumping a few
hundred pounds of fuel or switch on/vary the high
intensity lighting.
MARSHALL STACK A predetermined distance
from an aircraft carrier in which aircraft hold to
await an individual instrument approach to the
deck. Marshall radials extend 20 to 45 NM from the
carrier.
NORMAL COMMUNICATIONS Normal procedures as established in current air refueling technical orders. All rendezvous aids may be utilized as
necessary.
OBSERVATION POSITION
HEAVY A position to the right and/or left and
slightly behind the tanker where receivers fly while
observing or awaiting air refueling.
OFFLOAD/ONLOAD The amount of fuel transferred between tankers and receivers.
OFFSET (TRACK) The lateral distance the tanker is displaced from the ARIP to ARCP track to
compensate for turn radius and drift.
ON DECK POSITION Right or left hand, fingertip
to close route formation off the receiver in the contact
position. Applies to Quick Flow Procedure only.
ORAL COMMUNICATIONS The following terminology will be used as a guide by the boom operator when verbal instructions to the receiver are necessary:
BACK Move receiver backward.
DOWN Descend receiver.
MIXED AIR REFUELING CELL Two or more

tankers refueling two or more dissimilar types of
aircraft simultaneously.
FORWARD Move receiver forward.
MODIFIED POINT PARALLEL RENDEZVOUS

A rendezvous procedure optionally employed when
the receiver aircraft is established on-station in a
command-and-control orbit or airspace patrol. The
tanker enters the area, effects the rendezvous, and
completes the refueling within the confines of receivers assigned airspace.
RIGHT Move the receiver right.
MULTI-POINT REFUELING SYSTEM (MPRS)

(KC-135) Self-contained pods mounted on
wingtips of selected KC-135R aircraft which allows
a single tanker to support both probe and drogue
air refueling and boom air refueling missions.
NIGHT AIR TO AIR REFUELING (NAAR) Air
refueling operations which take place between official sunset and sunrise.
2-84BM
Change 18
LEFT Move the receiver left.
STABILIZE Hold receiver steady in present position.

UP Ascend receiver.
ORBIT DEPARTURE TIME That time at which
the tanker will depart the orbit point to effect the
planned rendezvous.
ORBIT PATTERN (TANKER) The pattern flown
by the tanker at the orbit point.
ORBIT POINT (TANKER) A geographical point
along the planned air refueling track where the
tanker will orbit.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
OVERRUN
a. RENDEZVOUS An overrun when the receiver
passes the tanker prior to or during the tanker rendezvous turn.
b. CLOSURE An overrun when the receivers
closure rate prevents stabilizing in the precontact
position, or when forward movement of the receiver
is considered excessive during contact or approach
to contact.
POINT PARALLEL RENDEZVOUS PROCEDURES The procedure normally used when the
tanker arrives in the refueling area ahead of the receiver (A tanker orbit is normally planned).
POST AIR REFUELING POSITION The position
to be maintained by single ship (heavy) receivers
upon completion of air refueling. At least 1,000 feet
below and no less than 1/2 mile in trail behind the
lead tanker (if unable to maintain visual contact,
in-trail distance is increased to 1 NM). This position
will be maintained until clearance is received from
ARTCC. In EMCON other than 3 or 4, tanker lead
and receiver will verbally coordinate their respective separation maneuvers prior to either aircraft
departing formation.
POST AIR REFUELING PROCEDURES The procedures employed by tankers and receivers after final disconnect and prior to establishing cruise.
PRACTICE EMERGENCY SEPARATION The
term to be used by tanker and receiver aircrews
when referring to a Practice Breakaway, prior to accomplishing the maneuver.
PRECONTACT (READY) POSITION
a. BOOM AND RECEPTACLE The position
approximately 50 feet behind and slightly below the
tanker boom nozzle where the receiver stabilizes
before being cleared to the contact position.
b. PROBE AND DROGUE or MPRS A position
where the probe is approximately 5 feet directly aft
of the drogue where the receiver stabilizes before
contact.
PRIMARY RENDEZVOUS A point parallel rendezvous accomplished with the tanker maintaining
an appropriate offset, the receiver flying the ARIP
to ARCP track, and the tanker turning in front of
the receiver at a computed range. Tanker offset is
maintained with INS/DNS information and turn
range is determined by A/A TACAN DME.
POST AIR REFUELING POSITION (SKE) A 60

degree left echelon, 2 NM nose to nose separation,
stacked down 1,000 feet off the lead tanker.
Change 18
2-84BN
T.O. 1B-52H-1
QUICK FLOW AIR REFUELING (QF) Visual air
refueling formation procedures used to expedite air
refueling operations by minimizing required air refueling time.
RADIO SILENCE Air refueling without the aid of
verbal instructions.
RECEIVER HOLDING POINT A point along the
upstream end of the inbound course to the Anchor
Point where the receiver(s) will hold until cleared
for rendezvous by the tanker. This point is used
during Anchor Refueling Alternate Procedures.
RECEIVER REFORM AREA An area to the left
and/or right, and slightly below the tanker formation, where receivers reform upon completion of air
refueling.
REFUELING HEADING A magnetic/grid heading taken by the tanker(s) and receiver(s) to maintain A/R TRACK.
RENDEZVOUS CONTROL TIME A general term
that applies to any control time utilized for accomplishing a rendezvous between tanker and receiver
at a specific point (i.e. at the ARCP, RZ, RZIP, etc.).
RZ Identifier for geographic point at which joinup is initiated by starting descent at the scheduled
rendezvous control time.
SAFE POSITION (KC-10) The position during a
partial or complete boom control system failure that
it is safe for the boom operator to initiate a disconnect. This position is when the receiver is approximately 0 degrees roll and moving down and back.
STABILIZED
PRECONTACT
POSITION
(KC-10) A position directly aft of the drogue
where the receiver aircraft stabilizes with the
drogue before contact.
START DESCENT POINT (SD) The point where
descent is initiated during a rendezvous.
TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM This may
be any CRC, GCI, or AWACS control system.
TACTICAL STREAM Two or more air refueling
elements/cells proceeding at a predetermined spacing along identical flight paths.
TANKER CELL Two or more tankers in formation.
RENDEZVOUS EQUIPMENT Electronic/radio

equipment installed in tanker and receivers for use
in accomplishing a rendezvous.
TANKER MANUAL OPERATION (TMO) Receiver air refueling system in normal operation: tanker
air refueling system in manual operation.
RENDEZVOUS INITIAL POINT (RZIP) A

planned geographical point prior to ARCP at which
joinup is initiated by starting descent at the scheduled rendezvous control time.
TANKER MANUAL OPERATION (TMO) WITHOUT TANKER DISCONNECT CAPABILITY

Mode of operation used when tanker air refueling
signal system malfunctions. Receiver air refueling
system will remain in normal operation. Air refueling will not be accomplished except during fuel
emergencies or when continuance of air refueling is
dictated by operational necessity.
RENDEZVOUS POINT A general term that applies

to any planned geographical point where a joinup between two or more airplanes is accomplished (i.e.
ARCP, RZIP, RZ, Anchor Point, etc.).
RENDEZVOUS ROLLOUT HEADING A magnetic/grid heading taken by the tanker(s) on the final
turn toward the rendezvous point (ARCP, RZ, etc.)
to maintain the receivers inbound track.
REVERSE FLOW AIR REFUELING The transfer
of fuel from receiver to tanker.
2-84BP
Change 18
TOBOGGAN Request from receiver for the tanker

to start a slow descent maintaining the refueling
airspeed. The standard rate of descent is 300 ft. per
minute and should be used, unless tanker or receiver requests otherwise.
TURN RANGE The distance used to determine
the tanker start turn point and is measured directly
from aircraft to aircraft.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
UNDERRUN When the tanker turns prior to actual turn range, or receiver does not fly correct closure airspeed resulting in the tanker rolling out on
air refueling track more than 3 NM ahead of receiver.
UNIVERSAL AERIAL REFUELING RECEPTACLE SLIPWAY INSTALLATION (UARRSI)
A modular aerial refueling unit incorporating an
aerial refueling receptacle and slipway to guide the
tanker boom nozzle into the receptacle. (This system has boom interphone capability.)
VISUAL The words announced by the receiver or
tanker pilot upon visual sighting of the other aircraft.
VISUAL FORMATION Receiver(s) flying off tankers wing. Visual formation will be flown in accordance with established MAJCOM directives.
AIR REFUELING CREWMEMBER ABBREVIATIONS
The following abbreviations are used in supplements and checklists to designate action by specific
crewmembers.
AG Aerial Gunner
BO Boom Operator
CP Copilot
DSO Defense System Officer
E/FE Engineer/Flight Engineer
EWO Electronic Warfare Officer
LM Loadmaster
N Navigator
0 Observer
OSO Offensive System Officer
P Pilot
RN Radar Navigator
RO Radio Operator/Airborne
Communication Specialist
S Scanner
WSO Weapon Systems Officer
Change 16
2-85
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LOW ALTITUDE OPERATIONS

Penetration airspeed to the low altitude entry point
will normally be 280 knots IAS, unless aircraft restrictions apply or command directives dictate
otherwise. The altitude descending to should be determined during flight preparation. The type of descent profile (drag devices, airspeed, rate of descent, etc.) will be determined by applicable directives. Before initiating descent, ensure by all means
available that the route of flight over which the descent is to be made is clear of high terrain. This will
include crosschecking any combination of:
Chart reference for high terrain
Radar navigator advice
Terrain trace
EVS presentation
The DESCENT, AFTER DESCENT, and TA COMPENSATION checklist will be accomplished during
entry to a low altitude tactic. As level off altitude is
approached, the terrain avoidance crosscheck including the terrain trace, EVS horizon depiction,
pressure altimeter and radar altimeter, coupled
with the instrument flight crosscheck must be used
in determining the point at which level-off is initiated.
1. Pull out the INBD AIR BRAKE CONTR circuit

breaker located on the pilots circuit breaker panel.
2. Move airbrake lever to position 4. Drag and
range degradation will be approximately the same
as that when operating normally in position 2. Buffet level will be substantially reduced. Roll response
will be the same since spoiler operation is not affected by pulling out the airbrake control circuit
breaker.
Noise interference with the interphone and radio
communication is experienced when the air conditioning pack is in operation during high power settings. This interference may be avoided by positioning the air conditioning master switch to RAM. On
climbout, place the air conditioning master switch
in 7.45 before reaching 10,000 feet as shown in the
CLIMB AFTER LOW LEVEL checklist, this section. Another obvious consideration while flying at
low altitude is that of planning the mission to ensure an awareness of any hazardous terrain conditions and an avoidance of dangerous aircraft-terrain relationships. See LOW ALTITUDE FLIGHT
CHARACTERISTICS, Section VI. There is no
necessity to deviate from normal fuel management
sequences during operation at low altitudes.
NOTE
During low altitude flight, if the indicated

EPR values fall below the EPR instrument
range scale, thrust equalization should be
accomplished by maintaining equal rpm on
all engines.
If icing conditions are encountered during cruise at
low altitude, airbrakes may be used as necessary
(do not exceed position 4) to maintain sufficient
power for engine anti-icing. (See ENGINE, NACELLE, AND SCOOPS ANTI-ICING SYSTEM
NORMAL OPERATION under ANTI-ICING, Section I.) However, this will impose range penalties.
Refer to RANGE CORRECTION FACTORS and
FUEL FLOW CORRECTIONS FOR ANTI-ICE in
Part 5 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1.
With airbrakes in position 2, the range loss is
approximately 21% and in position 4, approximately 46%; fuel flow increase is approximately 27% and
85% respectively. These approximate figures should
be used when flying at low altitude only.
If conditions require the use of airbrake position 2
during low level flight, the following procedure is
recommended:
2-86
pressurization.
NOTE
Use of RAM setting during low level operation for extended periods of time may result
in OAS equipment and/or pressurization
compartment overheating.
For operation of terrain avoidance system,
see Section I.
For operation of the autopilot during low altitude tactic, see AUTOPILOT, Section I.
For operation of the electro-optical viewing
system (EVS), see Section I.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
All pilots are susceptible to visual illusions. During
night low level operations the pilot not flying the
aircraft is especially prone to this hazard and must
be aware of visual illusions at night. The eye is incapable of perceiving fine detail at night. Generalized contours and outlines are discernible, but
small distinguishing features are not visible. Also
images tend to fade away if the eyes are held stationary. This requires that the pilot consciously
make scanning movements and use off-center vision. This will keep the pilot from losing sight of the
object.
These physical limitations to night vision make
proper preparation for night low level operation
imperative. This first preparation is to reduce the
amount of lighting in the cockpit. This allows the
pilot to see more clearly outside the cockpit and
adapt for night vision. In complete darkness it
takes 30 to 40 minutes to attain maximum sensitivity for night vision. Prepare well in advance of the
low level entry. Turn down the cockpit lighting to
the minimum intensity that will allow instrument
interpretation. Turn off all unnecessary lights.
Close the upper deck night curtain to prevent glare
from the defensive station. Night vision is also reduced by glare from the interior surface of the
windscreen. For this reason, dirt, grease, and
scratches on the windscreen can be a handicap at
night. Make certain the windscreen is free of foreign material. After adapting to night vision, take
precautions to prevent exposure to intense white
light. The sensitivity to dim light acquired by staying in darkness for 30 minutes can be lost by turning on a bright light for as little as 5 seconds. The
use of red lights allows the reading of instruments
and other data at night with minimal reduction in
night vision. The effects of oxygen on improving
night vision are well known. However, one hundred
percent oxygen may not be required since the object
is to maintain the blood oxygen level at the equivalent of 5,000 feet or below. The oxygen regulator diluter lever may be set to the NORMAL OXYGEN
position and the mask worn until a cabin altitude of
5,000 feet or lower can be maintained. Finally, sunglasses/dark visor can be used during daylight to
help prepare for night condition. Even though
adapted for night vision, the pilot can still encounter visual illusions at night. Many of the visual cues
for depth perception are lost due to the loss of terrain features. Also many of the horizontal and vertical cues are lost. The stars, coupled with sparse
ground lights, can become confused creating a false
horizon, causing the safety pilot to not question the
pilot to banking the aircraft or establishing an incorrect pitch attitude. Crosschecking the flight instruments and equipment can help overcome these
illusions.
2-87
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LOW LEVEL FLIGHT OPERATIONS

CREW COORDINATION FOR LOW LEVEL FLIGHT
TA/SCA operation without a properly operating radar altimeter is extremely hazardous. See command directives for flight restrictions.
Due to degradation of TA system accuracy,
do not allow the radar navigator to manually tune during the TA operational check or
actual TA operations.
Failure of the OAS radar tilt control circuitry will cause an inaccurate TA display.
NOTE
The radar altimeter is to be used in conjunction with the TA system. It will be included in the pilots normal instrument
scanning pattern for continuous cross-check
with other terrain clearance information
and for observing peak passage before following a fly-down command.
flight reference.
Low level flight operations may be conducted using integrated TA-EVS equipment, TA only, or
EVS only, but the crew coordination remains essentially the same. The descent to the low altitude
tactic requires close monitoring by all crewmembers. Descent rates while descending to TA altitudes are dependent on visibility, radar presentation, and good judgement. During peacetime operations at night, however, pilots will limit their
maximum rate of descent to 1500 fpm during
descent to TA/SCA altitudes and during all actual
TA/SCA operations. During TA operations, this
may require use of a higher range gage to allow
the pilot to place the HRL on the terrain trace,
as discussed under TA/EVS INTEGRATED
FLIGHT this Section.
During descent or while at TA/SCA altitudes,
when hazardous terrain is observed on radar, the
radar navigator or navigator will advise the pilot
of its location. Normally, only terrain forward of
the aircraft between 10 oclock and 2 oclock will
be a factor. However, terrain outside these parameters can be of concern if associated with an enroute turning point. Using EVS, the radar naviga-
2-88
Change 22
tor may be able to confirm the position and size of

significant terrain observed on radar. The radar
navigator/navigator should announce the approximate elevation of the terrain. The pilot can compare the current aircraft altitude, range from the
terrain, and available climb performance to make
an initial determination on what distance from
the terrain to initiate a climb.
When the pilot observes the terrain on the TA
trace, he will advise the radar navigator. The radar navigator should continue to call terrain
ranges at 10, 6, and 3 NM or until terrain clearance is assured as observed on radar and/or the
EVS. After crossover is determined, the pilot may
begin a descent to re-establish the desired clearance plane altitude. The navigator should advise
the pilot of terrain elevation forward of the aircraft and the radar navigator should advise the
pilot of the next significant terrain. This will aid
in TA/EVS interpretation and cross-checking pressure/radar altimeter indications. The radar navigator can normally see out as far as 35 NM ahead
of the aircraft and provides information on large
obstacles and weather beyond the range selected
by the pilot.
In flight, TA operation is essentially an extension
of instrument flying with the TA-EVS system displays included in the crosscheck. The TA display
does not provide any direct indication of pitch or
roll, although an approximate indication of pitch
changes can be obtained by noting the scan-toscan changes in the position of the terrain trace.
Frequent use of airbrakes for deceleration is not
recommended. The climbing portions of TA operation require close monitoring of airspeed in rough
terrain. Pilots should overshoot throttle settings
by early advancement to higher power settings
than required, then retard throttles as required to
maintain desired airspeed. It is especially important to maintain correct indicated airspeed when
operating in FRL stabilization mode because airspeed reduction causes lower than desired crossing altitudes. When operating in FRL, crews
should plan to maintain an average true airspeed
and a constant indicated airspeed.
The radar navigator must verbally clear the proposed flightpath prior to all turns greater than 10
degrees. Blank, missing, or jagged (sawtooth)
areas of the terrain may be caused by radar shadow from a large obstacle at very close range. Plan
turns so that no more than 15 degrees of bank is
used. Use slow rate of roll-in, not to exceed 3 degrees per second. The pilot not flying the aircraft
must monitor all the instruments and provide visual clearance of the aircraft. The radar navigator
may recommend small course changes to utilize
terrain cover or for weather avoidance. The pilots
T.O. 1B-52H-1
use the flight command indicator (FCI) as the primary heading instrument. When the FCI is not
available, the pilot may use the bank steering bar
as the primary heading instrument. When this
procedure is used, the pilot/copilot must reset the
heading marker, as required, during heading
corrections or when azimuth deviations are noted
on the FCI. OAS steering may also reduce crew
work load by maintaining correct aircraft heading
while the pilot maintains pitch control. It has
been found helpful to assign airspeed (throttles)
control to the pilot not flying the aircraft who
then maintains airspeed without further instructions. The navigator must also monitor OAS drift
values and, in the event of a malfunction, notify
the pilot. The radar heading and drift switch
should be placed in OFF until the radar navigator
has accomplished a memory point wind run, then
it should be positioned to ON. This will align the
TA presentation about ground track derived from
the OAS memory point winds. All subsequent
wind runs will be made with the radar heading
and drift switch in OFF. Inform the pilot before
making any changes in the radar and heading
drift switch position. The navigator will monitor
minimum safe altitudes for the low altitude leg.
For low altitude operations both EVS sensors
should normally be configured to monitor the flight
track of the aircraft. The sensor used by the pilot
flying the aircraft, with Vector selected (and TA, if
applicable) on his EVS Control Panel, will automatically be positioned by the OAS (or terrain avoidance system if using TA). If the navigation team
wishes to monitor the alternate sensor, the navigator can manually position this sensor by selecting
MANUAL EVS on his IKB and positioning the sensor drift angle downwind from zero azimuth and
adjusting the elevation for an optimum presentation (normally zero elevation 2) with his track
ball. If the alternate sensor is used for a systems
update or aimpoint crosscheck, it should be
returned to the track monitor position as soon as
this activity is complete. As a technique, if both
sensors are providing near equal presentations and
allow the pilot not flying the aircraft a valid
crosscheck capability, the pilot not flying the
aircraft may select the alternate sensor and TA on
his EVS control panel slewing the alternate sensor
to the aircraft flight vector (track) position.
TA-EVS Integrated Flight
The maximum effectiveness and safety during low

level flight can be derived by the integrated use of
both the TA trace and EVS displays. When notified
of approaching high terrain by the radar navigator,
the pilot/copilot may select the appropriate range
gate and monitor the TA trace for indications of the
terrain. Terrain position and relative height can be
confirmed using the EVS sensor currently displayed, but pilots should be aware that the relative
fields of view of the TA display and the EVS are significantly different with the EVS providing 10-11
degrees right and left of center and the TA providing 45 degrees either side of center. No upward
movement of the TA trace may indicate insignificant terrain, terrain outside the selected range
gate, or TA system errors.
If significant trace movement is observed, it is possible to determine the required rate of climb to
clear the feature by raising the nose of the aircraft
to place the HRL coincident with the terrain trace
and allowing the vertical velocity to stabilize momentarily. Comparing this value to the available
climb performance will let the crew judge if a continued climb is required or if climb can be delayed
until closer to the feature. As crew TA-EVS proficiency increases, pilots may exercise good judgment
concerning the need to select an extended range
gate to evaluate terrain reported by the radar navigator. Correlate current aircraft altitude, terrain
elevation, and the EVS presentation to determine if
a larger range gate is required. In any case, if a
climb is not initiated, return to the appropriate
range gate (normally Profile 3) and continue flying
the TA trace while monitoring the EVS display.
Once a climb to clear an obstacle is initiated, continue to follow the trace until dropout occurs or it
becomes otherwise unreliable. Cross-check the EVS
picture to ensure a proper pitch attitude has been
established for terrain clearance. When the attitude
is initially established, the obstacle should be below
the aimpoint as observed in the EVS. Once dropout
occurs, maintain the last pitch attitude until crossover is confirmed by the radar altimeter reaching
its minimum value and beginning to increase. The
obstacle will normally be going off the bottom of the
EVS monitor at the time dropout occurs. When flying in rough but not rugged terrain, dropout may
not occur, but instead a valid terrain trace may appear low on the monitor immediately after the terrain feature enters the short range blind zone. Do
not follow the TA fly down commands until after
confirming crossover on the peak/ridge line.
Once crossover is confirmed, descent back to the
programmed altitude may be started. If a valid
trace is available, it should be followed. If no usable
trace is present, begin an EVS descent to reacquire
a valid trace. When initially pushing over, monitor
the bottom of the EVS display, watching for secondary peaks or ridges appearing in the near range
video. Establish an attitude that gives a rate of descent back to the TA trace and note the aimpoint
you have established. During this descent, monitor
the near range video for low clearance and terrain
near the top of the monitor for upcoming climb re-
Change 22
2-89
T.O. 1B-52H-1
quirements. In many cases, simply lowering the aircraft nose toward the terrain will re-establish a valid trace; however, the absolute altitude of the aircraft may prevent this from occurring.
Selecting Profile 6, 10, or Pro Cal may prove helpful
in re-establishing a valid trace, and as absolute altitude decreases, return to smaller range gates.
During descent continue to cross-check the radar
and pressure altimeters, EVS picture, and TA trace
to ensure excessive rates of descent are not established and prevent unintentional descent below the
desired clearance altitude. If not already flying the
trace, transition back to TA when it becomes valid.
During turns at programmed turn points or for terrain masking, continue to fly the trace while monitoring the EVS and radar altimeter. Do not attempt
to exceed TA system bank angle limits for purposes
of terrain masking as TA remains the primary reference. Large bank angles may exceed the coverage
area of the EVS and also prevent the radar navigator from adequately monitoring the turn on radar.
TA-Only Contour Flight
TA-only flight is similar to TA-EVS integrated

flight. The primary differences include: loss of the
ability to monitor for terrain beyond the selected
range gate, inability to confirm climb indications
commanded by the TA trace, and lack of available
aids for descent from altitudes where a usable TA
trace is not available down to the desired clearance
altitude. The lack of EVS information will mean no
backup is available when the trace drops out, displays false returns, or becomes otherwise unreliable. This will require close coordination with the
radar navigator in rugged terrain and increased reliance on the radar and radar altimeter indications.
During contour flight (especially over rolling terrain), the pilot may notice a tendency to over control the aircraft. This results from the time lag between elevator command input and the corresponding flightpath change. This condition may be overcome by making only part of the indicated pitch correction after each sweep appears on the display.
EVS-Only Contour Flight
EVS contour flight is essentially an extension of visual contour flight. Both have a near range blind
zone and require the visualization of an extended
flightpath. The point where the flightpath intercepts terrain/obstacles is called the aimpoint. During a landing from a visual traffic pattern, the pilot
visualizes the landing area by establishing a similar aimpoint. The landing aimpoint uses the same
principle as an EVS aimpoint. It is a point where
the terrain/obstacles remain in a stationary position on the EVS monitor or windscreen and appear
to grow larger as range is decreased. EVS video ex-
2-90
pansion of the area around the aimpoint becomes

very prominent at near ranges. In areas of rugged
terrain relief, the expansion of the aimpoint video
can occur at such a close range that a high g maneuver is required to clear the terrain/obstacle. The
pilot must monitor sheer terrain and initiate clearance procedures, prior to entering the area where
pilot reaction and aircraft capabilities become critical.
EVS only contour flight, in sheer terrain

(i.e. cliffs and straight-faced mountains), is
extremely hazardous since near range video
expansion does not occur until very close
range. When below the crossover altitude,
pilot reaction and aircraft response time
will become critical if the flight profile into
sheer terrain/obstacles is allowed to progress to a critically near range.
The pilot must continually scan the EVS
monitor for sheer terrain and initiate a
climb, prior to entering the area where pilot
reaction time and aircraft capabilities become critical.
NOTE
If the angle-of-attack data from OAS is lost,

the EVS may be erroneously oriented for
use in EVS contour flight.
It is helpful to assign airspeed (throttles) control to
the pilot not flying the aircraft, who maintains the
required airspeed without further direction. Climbs
and descents over rough terrain during EVS operation require close monitoring of airspeed. Pilots
should anticipate airspeed changes and actually begin throttle movement as aircraft pitch change is
initiated. Large and rapid throttle movements may
be required. After the desired pitch attitude is established, the throttle setting can be refined to
maintain airspeed. Frequent use of airbrakes for
deceleration is not recommended. The aimpoint
should be monitored throughout EVS flight. This
will eliminate the potential errors in pitch and drift
reference caused by the use of fixed references on
the EVS monitor.
Apply good judgement for turns during terrain following. The radar navigator must verbally clear the
proposed flightpath prior to all turns greater than
10 degrees. Since the EVS monitor field of view is
approximately 10 11 degrees left and right of
centerline, turns should be planned so that no more
than 15 degrees angle of bank is used. The pilot not
flying the aircraft must monitor all the instruments
T.O. 1B-52H-1
and provide visual clearance of the aircraft. The radar navigator provides terrain assessment beyond
the pilots range. When hazardous terrain is observed, the radar navigator will continue to advise
the pilot until crossover since it is difficult to judge
distance to terrain on EVS.
During the EVS-only flight, the desired flight profile for safety and maximum terrain masking, is obtained by flying a flight profile which closely resembles that of TA-EVS integrated. It is obtained
by smoothly employing instrument flight techniques to periodically adjust the aimpoint:
tored with wide field of view selected, since it provides a larger look-down angle to monitor near
range video. It is possible to impact terrain, during
crossover maneuvers, with no terrain on the EVS
monitor, due to a combination of EVS sensor looking angle and flight path vector.
1. Further downrange to maintain the desired

clearance on upsloping terrain,
2. Near the horizon for level terrain,
3. To near range during descent to the desired
clearance altitude.
Flat and rolling, or sloping terrain can be flown at
desired clearance altitudes relatively easily. Terrain
with rapid transverse slope profiles demands a high
degree of crew experience to clear at specified clearance altitudes. There is no scaling of vertical height
on the EVS monitor to guarantee specified clearances; therefore, actual crossing altitudes will be
determined by crew experience and proficiency.
Climb should be initiated at a range consistent with
aircraft performance and climb requirements. As a
technique, place the bottom of the vertical fiducial
mark on the top of the terrain feature to initially
set the attitude. Remain in wide field of view. Maintaining this relationship until 3 miles and then
holding the pitch attitude established on the flight
instruments until crossover will give approximately
an 800 foot crossover. Maintaining the relationship
until 2 miles will give approximately a 500 foot
crossover. This technique will give a slightly different flight profile than a TA climb and results in a
flatter profile at crossover. Make no attempt to keep
the fiducial mark on the terrain inside 1 1/2 miles
as this will result in a very low crossing or collision.
Whenever this technique is employed, care must be
taken to ensure the terrain visible on the EVS continues to drop toward the bottom of the monitor. To
ensure safe terrain clearance, the terrain should
drop out of view at the bottom of the monitor at
approximately 1 mile. An EVS flight profile, using
shallow pitch angles to place the aimpoint above
terrain/obstacles, will provide the highest degree of
safety, particularly during peak and sheer terrain
crossovers, and provide the maximum terrain
masking by keeping the aircraft near the specified
clearance altitude, without ballooning. As soon as
crossover has occurred, as determined by radar altimeter indications, an immediate descent should
be initiated. Crossover and descent should be moni-
Any attempt to see and maintain an angular relationship of terrain on the EVS monitor will result in progressively less terrain
clearance as range is decreased. If this angular relationship is maintained, the aircraft will impact the terrain at zero range
(i.e., maintaining terrain on the EVS monitor by constantly reducing pitch angle until
zero range will cause the aircraft to impact).
It is imperative that the pilot evaluate near
range video to determine actual altitude
clearance during terrain feature crossings.
If any doubt exists, as to final clearance
crossings, the pilot will initiate a rapid
climb to a safe altitude.
NOTE
EVS-only terrain clearance can be accomplished by keeping the aimpoint clear of terrain/obstacles and monitoring near range
video for terrain/obstacle movement. To assure terrain clearance, the pitch angle
should be maintained until near range terrain video disappears and crossover has
been verified.
The area covered by the near range blind zone varies with aircraft height above terrain, sensor looking angle, and aircraft pitch angle. The pilot will
learn to determine actual crossover by evaluating
the movement of near range video. There is no provision to accurately determine range information
from the EVS monitor.
To initiate a descent, during low level at high
speeds and high power settings, it may be necessary to reduce the power settings to decrease the
pitch angle when flying with the low level autopilot
off, since it requires moderate pressure to reduce
the pitch. This tendency is much less noticeable
when the low level autopilot is on. If the pilot not
flying the aircraft is maintaining airspeed with the
throttles, he must anticipate the pilots pitch inputs
and adjust power as required. When pushing over,
monitor closely for near range terrain at the bottom
of the monitor. It is not necessary to have a visual
2-91
T.O. 1B-52H-1
of the monitor. It is not necessary to have a visual
horizon to fly EVS only. The pilot must determine
the amount of EVS monitor visual range required
(by considering aircraft performance requirements
and crew proficiency) for the terrain relief which
will be encountered. EVS monitor visual range can
be determined by timing or radar ranging.
The pilot should be aware of pitch angles and/or
climb/descent rates while flying EVS only. While
flying through rugged terrain it is absolutely necessary to be aware of aircraft pitch angles and/or
climb/descent rates in order to fully understand remaining aircraft performance capabilities.
During EVS only descents, the pilot should gradually decrease his rate of descent as he approaches
the desired clearance altitude. This will provide a
longer reaction time to near range video expansion
and allow the aircraft to be leveled off without
abrupt maneuvering. The EVS sensor should not be
completely filled with terrain, since this eliminates
the capability to determine height of terrain at the
top of the EVS monitor.
Experience has shown that detection of towers, antennas, cables, etc, by use of EVS equipment is not
reliable and cannot be depended upon. During low
level operation, a periodic check for obstacles in
NFOV will enhance resolution in a direct line with
the flight path of the aircraft; however, resolution
may not occur until the aircraft has closed to such
position that collision is imminent. It is absolutely
necessary that the crew fly at a safe altitude which
will ensure clearance of man-made obstacles, or
plan to circumnavigate these obstacles, since obstacle detection is not reliable.
SAFE CLEARANCE ALTITUDE (SCA) ONLY FLIGHT
SCA low level flight is conducted by flying an altitude determined by mission planning. See command directives for further guidance.
OPERATION OF EVS
EVS should be operated to provide the best available picture for low level flight. The following may
improve EVS performance.
2-92
Change 22
1. The FLIR should be retuned by the radar navigator after descent as necessary to provide the best
picture.
2. EVS monitors may require retuning when
changing from STV to FLIR or FLIR to STV.
3. FLIR may be the optimum sensor, particularly
at night. Experience has shown that it is necessary
to stay in FLIR long enough to become proficient at
interpreting the display.
4. Limitations of the EVS are most noticeable at
night. The STV is significantly affected by ground
lights or the moon in front of the aircraft. These
bright light sources cause the camera iris to close
down excessively and results in a partial or complete loss of picture detail. The FLIR picture may
become washed out or partially blanked during
turns and remain unusable until after rollout.
TA FUNCTIONAL CHECK
An inflight or ground functional check of the TA system will be accomplished on every mission where
use of the TA system is planned.
LOW LEVEL DESCENT AND TA COMPENSATION
The BEFORE LOW LEVEL DESCENT and the

DESCENT, AFTER DESCENT and TA COMPENSATION checklists will be accomplished prior
to and during every entry to a low level tactic or
when a check of the TA system accuracy is required.
TA SYSTEM OPERATIONAL CHECK
A TA system operational check will be performed

prior to entry into a TA low level tactic or when a
check of the TA system accuracy is required.
CLIMB AFTER LOW LEVEL
After completion of low level tactic when climbing

back to altitude, perform the items in the CLIMB
AFTER LOW LEVEL checklist.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EVS Only Sequence, Clearing High Terrain

2
C
1
3
1 TERRAIN
2 EVS AIM POINT
3 FIDUCIAL MARK (Bottom of vertical mark)
A 4 MILE RANGE
B APPROXIMATELY 3 MILE RANGE CLIMB
ATTITUDE ESTABLISHED
C APPROXIMATELY 1 1/2 MILE RANGE,
TERRAIN CONTINUES TO DROP TOWARD
BOTTOM OF MONITOR
A34355
NOTE
To ensure safe terrain clearance, the terrain should drop out of view at the bottom
of the monitor at approximately 1 mile.
Figure 2-11
2-93
T.O. 1B-52H-1
INFLIGHT TA FUNCTIONAL CHECK CHECKLIST

NOTE
Advise N/RN prior to start of checklist.

This check will be accomplished prior to descent to low level if ground
TA functional check was not accomplished.
A failure warning indication may be obtained at high altitude with a
normal system due to ground returns. If this occurs, accomplish applicable functional check items.
1. MFD Display Control Panel MFD EVS Switch EVS (P-CP)

2. EVS Power ON, TA video selected (P-CP)
3. TA Frequency Checked (RN)
Radar navigator should ensure frequency is not set on 125 MHz (10 MHz) or a multiple of 125 MHz
to preclude the radar receiver/transmitter from shifting between adjacent bands and affecting the
TA display.
4. Terrain Display Mode Selector PRO CAL (P/CP)
5. Stabilization Reference Selector FRL (P/CP)
6. Clearance Plane Range Checked and set 800 (P/CP); Checked (RN)
Change the clearance plane elevation throughout its range and observe the movement of the clearance plane indicators. Observe that the terrain trace moves upward on the monitor as the clearance
plane setting is increased. As the clearance plane is decreased, stop prior to reaching 200 feet. Observe the pilots and radar navigators warning lights out. Stop clearance plane again after decreasing through 200 feet. Observe the pilots and radar navigators warning lights on, and the HRL gap
filled in. Set the clearance plane to 800 feet.
NOTE
The TA warning light should not come on for clearance plane settings
between 200 and 1500 feet.
7. Profile CAL, 3, 6 & 10 Displays Checked (P-CP)
a. Horizontal Reference Lines
Observe that both horizontal reference lines are present and centered for each range selected.
The horizontal reference line should be approximately 2 inches long at the center of the monitor
with approximately a 1/4 inch break in the line at ground track.
b. Range Gate Lights
The 10 mile range gate light should illuminate when profile CAL is selected. Observe that 3,
6, and 10 mile range gate lights illuminate as the proper range is selected.
2-94
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
INFLIGHT TA FUNCTIONAL CHECK CHECKLIST (Cont)

8. TA Test Checked (P-CP)8.
a. Press and hold TA test switch and observe that:
(1) Profile 3, profile 6, profile 10, TA-EVS vector, TA warning lights are illuminated.
(2) Horizontal reference line is present on the display and filled in (figure 1-158).
b. Release the TA test switch and observe that:
(1) Profile 3, profile 6, TA-EVS vector, and TA warning lights go off and profile 10 light remains
on.
(2) Profile trace is completely displayed as antenna completes a full scan. The video line shall
remain stable within 1/32 inch for each sweep. Profile terrain trace may not be present at
high altitude due to overranging.
9. Navigators Inflight TA Functional Check Accomplished (RN/N)
Navigators Inflight TA Functional Check may be accomplished at this point. Radar navigator/ navigator should accomplish their check and report when complete.
Change 4
2-95
T.O. 1B-52H-1
BEFORE LOW LEVEL DESCENT CHECKLIST (Copilot/Nav reads)
NOTE
For combat missions, omit circled items. Circled items may be omitted
during peacetime operations IAW command guidance.
1. Interior Lighting Adjusted (P-CP)
Adjust all interior lighting to lowest practicable level of intensity.
During night operations, the use of white lighting (spotlights, flashlights, etc) can severely degrade night vision for short periods. This can
critically decrease recognition of terrain obstructions and can reduce
reaction time during TA operations.
2. Altimeter Settings Obtained/Computed (CP/N)
Training: Obtain updated forecast altimeter setting from a designated PMSV station, if possible.
Combat: Compute altimeter setting(s) for descent and level-off using available data.
3. FLIR/STV Mode Switches OPR (RN)
When an EVS sensor is available (providing a usable display) at least one EVS display will be maintained and monitored on an MFD at either the RNs or NAVs station from the start descent point
at low level route entry through initiation of climb for route exit when three or more MFDs are
usable. When two or less MFDs are usable the EVS should be used to cross-check the radar display
but need not be displayed continuously. In all situations the display may be deselected momentarily,
when terrain clearance is not critical, to accomplish systems checks but will be reselected as soon
as the check is complete.
4. MFD Display Control Panel MFD EVS Switch EVS, as required (P-CP)
5. (TA Only) EVS ON, TA video selected (P-CP)
Press EVS power switch to ON. Pilot and copilot should both select the EVS sensor with the best
display and select vector stabilization.
EVS monitor optical filters of red color must be used on both pilots and
copilots monitors during all TA operations at night, except when night
vision goggles (NVG) are being used for low level operations.
6. (TA Only) Stabilization Reference Selector FVR (FRL if FVR is unusable) (P/CP)
FVR will not be used for descent to low level or for TA operation when
ALTER NAV is used as the prime NAV Model and the doppler is off or
unreliable. The TA-EVS vector indicator light should also come on in
this situation.
2-96
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
BEFORE LOW LEVEL DESCENT CHECKLIST (Copilot/Nav reads) (Cont)

7. Taxi Lights ON (P/CP)
8. Circuit Breakers Checked (RN-N)
9. (TA Only) Altimeter Calibration/Stab Modes Comparison Altitude Determined
MSL (N-P)
feet
Compute an altitude 800 feet above the terrain (flat and rolling) or selected terrain feature (mountainous) where planned level-off for the low level route will occur. The level-off altitude will initially
be determined during mission planning and then reconfirmed inflight. A lower altitude may be required during combat operations.
9A. (SCA Ops) Initial Safe Clearance Level Off Altitude Determined
feet MSL (N-P)
10. (TA Only) Radar Frequency Checked (RN)

Ensure frequency is not set on 125 (10) MHz or a multiple of 125 MHz to preclude the radar
receiver/transmitter from shifting between adjacent bands and affecting the TA display. Set to alignment frequency.
11. (TA Only) FRL Angle-of-Attack Indicator Computed (N); Set (RN)
The copilot will state the fuel weight and the navigator will compute the FRL angle for the IAS,
gross weight, and airbrake position. The FRL angle-of-attack must be reset periodically due to
changes in aircraft gross weight and or airspeed. The radar navigator will set the value in the RCTP.
NOTE
The navigator will recompute and ensure the FRL angle is reset if the
planned indicated airspeed is changed more than 10 knots and/or the
gross weight changes over 20,000 pounds.
When using the FRL mode, the FRL angle should be reset prior to
decelerating and after accelerating. This procedure will keep the error
induced by changing airspeeds in the safe direction.
Tightening or loosening the FRL locking knob could cause the FRL
control knob to turn, changing the FRL setting. Ensure the correct FRL
is still present in the FRL/BIT window after tightening or loosening the
FRL locking knob.
Airspeed control is critical during TA operation in FRL mode. Care
must be taken to ensure that the airspeed used by the navigator for
FRL angle computation is maintained while flying TA with FRL mode
selected.
Change 22
2-97
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DESCENT, AFTER DESCENT AND TA COMPENSATION CHECKLIST (Copilot/Nav reads)
NOTE
For combat missions, omit circled items. Circled items may be omitted
during peacetime operations IAW command guidance.
1. Altimeters Set (P-CP-N)
Set altimeters to station pressure immediately prior to initiating penetration or upon passing
through transition altitude. ARTC furnished altimeter setting will be used if available. For combat
operations, compute altimeter setting(s) for descent and level off using available data.
NOTE
Altimeter settings will be updated throughout all low level operations.

The setting of a station along the route and within 100 NM of the aircraft will be used.
2. (TA Only) Terrain Display Mode Selector PROFILE 10 (P/CP)
NOTE
Radar navigator and navigator will monitor radar scope presentations.

The navigator will monitor all other instruments available.
The radar navigator provides terrain assessments beyond the pilots
range. When hazardous terrain is observed, the radar navigator will
continue to advise the pilot until the pilot is tracking the obstacle on
his indicator.
When flight at IFR altitude/emergency minimum safe altitude is required (prior to TA compensation), the pilots should select profile 10
with a clearance plane setting of 800 feet. After TA compensation, pilot
should select profile 6 with the briefed TA clearance plane set. This TA
display will provide additional altitude monitoring information.
Terrain trace breakup with fly-up command may occur when the AN/
ALQ-172 is transmitting and the TA is operated in any mode other
than PRO 3.
All descents into low level require close attention to the pressure and
radar altimeter, radar display, and the EVS displays. Monitoring descents into sheer/rugged/mountainous terrain requires close attention
to the radar presentation since the ability to confirm an impending
collision may not occur until at close ranges when reaction time is critical.
3. (TA Only) Clearance Plane Set to 800 feet (P/CP)

4. (TA Only) Radar Altimeter Set to 800 feet (P-CP)
Set the radar altimeter when descending through 6000 feet AGL.
2-98
Change 22
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DESCENT, AFTER DESCENT AND TA COMPENSATION (Copilot/Nav reads) (Cont)

NOTE
Pilot flying aircraft monitors TA and or EVS display, radar altimeter,

and flight instruments. The radar altimeter is to be used in conjunction
with the TA/EVS system. It will be included in the pilots normal instrument scanning pattern for observing peak passage before following
a fly down command and verifying actual ground clearance over level
terrain. Pilot not flying aircraft monitors aircraft position and aircraft
systems operation.
4A. (SCA Ops) Radar Altimeter Set to computed initial level off altitude ___________ feet (AGL) (P-CP)
Set the radar altimeter when descending through 6000 feet AGL.
On training missions, continue this checklist once past the ST VFR/TA/SCA point.
5. Level Off at 800 Feet (TA Only) / Planned Altitude (Non-TA Ops) Accomplished (P-N)
The preplanned level off altitude will be determined during mission planning. Initial level off will
be accomplished at the pressure altitude, radar altitude, or terrain trace/EVS, whichever is reached
first. If this level off is above the desired altitude, reevaluate the terrain using visual, TA/EVS, radar,
and radar altimeter prior to continuing the descent. For flat and rolling terrain level off will be
accomplished at 800 feet on the radar altimeter. For peak/ridge checks, level off at the pressure
altitude which is based upon 800 feet above the designated terrain feature or point. The CP and RN
will monitor level off and no response is required unless a discrepancy is detected. A lower altitude
may be required for combat operations.
The primary duty of the pilot not flying the aircraft is to visually monitor the terrain clearance of the aircraft.
If high terrain exists between the descent point and the level off area/
feature, the navigator/radar navigator will announce the high terrain
elevation to the pilot.
If a radar shadow is unchanging, appears to lengthen, or fails to appreciably shorten with decreasing range, a dangerous condition is indicated and the radar navigator/navigator must advise the pilots.
Due to degradation of TA system accuracy, manual tuning will not be
used during actual TA operations.
For all peacetime low level operations at night, confine descent rates
to 1500 fpm or less while descending to TA altitudes and during actual
TA operations.
Commence an immediate climb to a safe altitude if any distraction is
noted during any phase of low level operation.
Change 22
2-99
T.O. 1B-52H-1

6. Autopilot ALTITUDE HOLD (P/CP)
If turbulence prohibits the use of Altitude Hold but is not of such magnitude to require discontinuing low level operation, use the autopilot low level mode.
The trim condition of the aircraft should be closely monitored during

the TA compensation check. In the event of automatic trim system failure, large amounts of stabilizer trim can be compensated for by the autopilot. This can result in severe pitchdown or pitchup when either a
change in attitude or power setting causes an automatic disconnect or
when a manual disconnect is accomplished. To minimize the effect of an
automatic trim system failure, fore and aft position of the control column should be closely monitored. If several units of nosedown stabilizer trim and aft position of the control column are detected while flying
with autopilot altitude hold engaged, be aware that autopilot disengagement by any means will cause abrupt pitchdown unless proper
preventive steps are taken.
7. Low Altitude Calibrate Accomplished (RN)
Accomplish a low altitude calibration over terrain of known elevation while in level flight. In mountainous terrain, calibration may not be possible until crossover of the selected terrain feature upon
which level off was based. In this case, proceed with the checklist and update at crossover.
8. Radar Altimeter Cross-Check Accomplished (P-N); Pressure altimeter set (P-CP-N)
The navigator will state terrain elevation. The pilot and copilot will then compare the sum of the
radar altimeter indication and the terrain elevation to the pressure altimeter reading. The radar
navigator and navigator will make similar comparisons of their instruments including the OAS HA
value. Once the comparisons are complete the pilot and navigator will respond Accomplished (P/N)
or with any noted discrepancy, if applicable. The copilot and radar navigator need only respond if
a discrepancy is present and not acknowledged by either the pilot or navigator. Training: Make a
note of the difference between the systems and write up equipment malfunctions, as required. Combat: Set computed true altitude in the pressure altimeter.
2-100
T.O. 1B-52H-1

9. (TA Only) Stabilization Modes Compared Stab modes check complete (P/CP)
NOTE
The TA stabilization modes comparison and TA correlation will only be

accomplished in a designated TA evaluation area.
If ALTER NAV is used as the prime NAV model and the doppler is off
or unreliable, only FRL and HOR need to be compared. FVR will not
receive stabilization information.
The stabilization mode comparison is accomplished to check the FVR,
FRL, and HOR (ground align) modes. The stabilization modes comparison may be accomplished separate from the FRL/FVR compensation,
unless this portion of the check is being accomplished in a mountainous
designated TA evaluation area at night.
For night operations, a peak/ridge TA stab modes comparison and TA
correlation is required prior to descent for the FRL/FVR compensation
if the designated TA evaluation area is mountainous.
For operations in mountainous areas, (day or night), a stab modes comparison and FRL/FVR compensation is not required when the TA system has been previously compensated by either flat and rolling or peak/
ridge methods.
If time and/or conditions do not allow the necessary compensation procedure to be accomplished prior to commencing the bomb run, see command directives for guidance.
The pilot will pass all readings to the navigator during this check for
recording.
The radar navigator is responsible for monitoring terrain beyond the
range selected on the pilots EVS monitors, and will advise the pilot of
hazardous terrain until the pilot is tracking the terrain on his monitors.
a. Flat and Rolling Terrain:

Select each stabilization mode and, while in each stabilization mode, adjust clearance plane until
terrain trace is coincident with horizontal reference line.
b. Peak/Ridge:
(1) Comparison:
The navigator/radar navigator will advise the pilot when at 10, 6, and 3 miles. Between 9
and 6 miles, select each stabilization mode and, while in each stabilization mode, adjust the
clearance plane until the terrain trace is coincident with the horizontal reference line.
Change 15
2-101
T.O. 1B-52H-1

(2) Correlation:
At 6 and 3 miles, select the corresponding profile range gate and FRL stabilization mode,
with the clearance plane set to 800 feet. Without further clearance plane adjustments, correlate the actual terrain trace, EVS presentation, and radar altimeter crossover. This procedure
should provide the pilots with a measure of confidence in the reliability of the terrain trace.
For instance, a falling terrain trace could indicate a positive tilt error, while a rising trace
could indicate a negative tilt error. Additionally, a rapidly changing trace may indicate a
large tilt error. Also see PEAK METHOD under TA SYSTEM OPERATIONAL CHECK, Section I.
10. (TA Only) Autopilot LOW LEVEL (P/CP)
11. (TA Only) Profile 3 Selected (P/CP)
12. (TA Only) Clearance Plane Set to TA Altitude
13.
Feet Set
feet (P-CP)
In profile 3, the clearance plane will never be set to more than 1000
feet.
The clearance plane will never be set to a value less than 200 feet.
Radar Altimeter Set
feet (P- CP)
To avoid nuisance flashing of the EVS radar altitude indicator, the cursor may be set up to 100 feet
lower than the clearance altitude being flown. The actual setting will be based on crew judgement
and altitude. The cursor will not be set below 200 feet for TA operations.
14. (TA Only) FRL Compensation Accomplished (P-RN)
Tilt error compensation can only be accomplished using data collected in FRL stabilization mode.
Fly the aircraft to establish the terrain trace coincident with the HRL. Compare the radar altimeter
reading and clearance plane setting over flat and rolling terrain or peak/ridge crossing radar altimeter reading and clearance plane setting over mountainous terrain. If a difference between the radar
altimeter reading and clearance plane setting exists, then proceed with one of the applicable following steps to adjust the FRL angle:
2-102
Change 22
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Large altitude errors can occur while maintaining the terrain trace coincident with the HRL if the airspeed or gross weight changes without
resetting the FRL angle. If the airspeed increases or the gross weight
decreases and the FRL angle is not changed, the aircraft will climb to
a higher radar altitude. If the airspeed decreases and the FRL angle
is not changed, the aircraft will descend to a lower radar altitude.
If a TA system has excessive negative tilt, the terrain trace may initially command a descent well below the briefed radar altitude as the pilot
is maintaining the terrain trace coincident with the HRL. If the terrain
trace is obviously commanding an altitude below the briefed radar altitude, the pilot will level the aircraft and direct that the FRL angle be
moved toward the positive until the terrain trace is coincident with the
HRL. The pilot will then continue with the FRL compensation.
If tilt compensation value exceeds 2 degrees, discontinue the FRL compensation and do not use FRL mode.
NOTE
Each degree of FRL angle change usually results in 100 to 250 feet of
altitude change after the terrain trace is reestablished on the HRL.
Do not move the FRL angle in increments in excess of 1 degree at a
time.
An FRL/FVR compensation can be accomplished by making FRL angle/
clearance plane adjustments based upon a series of peak/ridge crossings or over flat and rolling terrain. While a flat and rolling compensation may be easier to accomplish, adjustments to the FRL angle/clearance plane may be required if the terrain overflown changes from
mountainous to flat and rolling or from flat and rolling to mountainous.
The radar navigator will be responsible for monitoring altitude and
position during the TA compensation checks.
The radar navigator is responsible for monitoring terrain beyond the
range selected on the pilots EVS monitors. The radar navigator will
alert the pilot when approaching the preselected compensation check
area and will make a 10-mile range call. On peak compensation checks,
the radar navigator will also make calls at 6 and 3 miles.
If time and/or conditions do not allow the necessary compensation procedures to be accomplished prior to commencing the bomb run, see command directives for guidance.
a. Radar Altitude Greater Than the Clearance Plane Setting Move the FRL
degrees toward the negative.
angle
2-103
T.O. 1B-52H-1

The pilot will instruct the navigator/radar navigator to move the FRL angle a designated increment (not to exceed 1 degree at a time) toward the negative (i.e., Pilot: Move the FRL angle
0.5 degrees toward the negative). After resetting the FRL angle, the terrain trace should move
down slightly. The pilot will reestablish the terrain trace coincident with the HRL and once again
compare the radar altimeter reading and clearance plane setting. If a difference between the
radar altimeter reading and clearance plane setting exists, repeat the previous steps, as necessary. The navigator will note the number of degrees and in which direction (positive or negative)
the FRL angle was moved from the chart value. The number of degrees and direction the FRL
angle was moved from the chart value is the correction value and will be applied to all computed
chart value FRL settings (i.e., Chart value FRL setting was +0.2 degree. The FRL angle was
moved to a final setting of -1.1 degrees. The FRL angle was moved 1.3 degrees toward the negative, so 1.3 degrees toward the negative is the correction value).
b. Radar Altitude Less Than the Clearance Plane Setting Move the FRL angle
degrees toward the positive
Use the same procedure as outlined in step a, except make the FRL angle corrections toward
the positive and the terrain trace should move up slightly.
15. (TA Only) FVR Compensation Accomplished (P-N)
If ALTER NAV is used as the prime Nav Model and the doppler is off or
unreliable, do not compensate or use FVR for TA operations. The TAEVS vector indicator light should be on in this situation.
Switch to FVR mode and fly the aircraft to establish the terrain trace coincident with the HRL.
Adjust the clearance plane setting to fly the desired clearance plane altitude. If the clearance plane
change exceeds 250 feet, discontinue use of FVR and return to FRL.
2-104
If a TA system has excessive negative tilt, the terrain trace may initially command a descent well below the briefed radar altitude as the pilot
is maintaining the terrain trace coincident with the HRL. If the terrain
trace is obviously commanding an altitude below the briefed radar altitude, the pilot will level the aircraft and lower the clearance plane until
the terrain trace is coincident with the HRL. The pilot will then continue with the FVR compensation.
The clearance plane will never be set to a value less than 200 feet.
In profile 3, the clearance plane will never be set to more than 1000
feet.
Use of horizontal stabilization mode (HOR) is restricted to the stabilization modes check for peacetime TA flight operations. During combat,
HOR will only be used for TA operations when FRL and FVR modes
are inoperative or unreliable. Section I HOR system limitations must
be strictly observed when HOR must be used for TA flight.
Change 15
T.O. 1B-52H-1

NOTE
If the terrain trace commands a fly up when FVR is selected (as opposed to FRL), then it may not be possible to adjust the clearance plane
sufficiently to fly SIOP altitudes when in FVR mode. In this case, it
is recommended that FRL mode be used.
The pilot will notify the navigator prior to reselecting FRL on the stabilization reference selector switch to ensure the FRL angle is reset.
2-105
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CLIMB AFTER LOW LEVEL CHECKLIST
1. Throttles Set (CP)

2. Autopilot Low Level Disengaged (P/CP)
The EVS TA system should be turned OFF when aircraft has reached either the IFR altitude or the
minimum safe altitude as applicable to the mission being flown.
6. MFD Display Control Panel MFD EVS Switch As required (P-CP)
7. Air Conditioning 7.45 PSI (CP)
8. 12,000-Foot Oxygen Check Completed (EW-RN-P/CP)
9. Altimeter Set 29.92 (P-CP-N)
10. Level-Off Station Check Completed (P-CP)
a. Taxi Light Switch OFF
b. Oxygen & Station Checks Complete as given in PREPARATION FOR FLIGHT checklist
c.
Thrust Gate 85
d. Starter Switches After engines have stabilized at cruise altitude, turn starter switches OFF
except during instrument flight conditions or turbulence. See Section VII
e.
2-106
EVS Panel Stabilization VECTOR
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
PENETRATION
BOMBING
All bombing procedures and operational information are contained in T.O. 1B-52H-1-12, T.O.
1B-52H-25-2 (nuclear bombs), and T.O. 1B-52H-34
-2-1 (nonnuclear bombs). Those procedures involving the pilots are directed by the navigators. Therefore, there is no abbreviated checklist pertaining to
bombing for the pilots. A description of bombing
equipment is given in Section I.
HOLDING
Enter the holding pattern in accordance with procedures as outlined in current directives. Establish a
holding airspeed of 230 knots IAS for all altitudes
from 15,000 to 35,000 feet and for all gross weights
up to 325,000 pounds. For all gross weights greater
than 325,000 pounds, refer to the appropriate fuel
mileage chart in Part 4 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1, with the
existing gross weight and altitude for a best endurance indicated airspeed. Maintain the airspeed 10
knots above that given or Mach 0.77, whichever is
less, for endurance at the given weight to allow for
holding turns.
NOTE
If it is necessary to endure and fuel quantity is low, establish the holding airspeed recommended in Part 5 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1, for
the existing gross weight and altitude. Increase the airspeed 10 knots or maintain
Mach 0.77, whichever is less. Maximum endurance altitude is recommended.
DESCENT
The following procedures are for all letdowns where
there is no range emergency and should be accomplished as follows:
Care should be taken to retrim between

each 2 unit increment of airbrake operation.
1. Maintain cruising altitude until reaching the

computed distance from the landing base. This distance will depend upon aircraft altitude and weight
at the end of mission. The performance data for this
descent may be determined from Part 7 of T.O.
1B-52H-1-1.
2. Lower the landing gear (as required) and retard all throttles to the IDLE stops. Observe the
gear extension placard limits in Section V.
3. Extend airbrakes to position 4 or as required.
4. Make descent at 240 knots IAS or Mach 0.75,
whichever is slower.
ENROUTE
1. Throttles idle, gear up, and airbrake as necessary to provide desired airspeed and rate of descent
to comply with ATC requirements for the particular
enroute descent.
2. The many variables of an enroute descent will
prevent precise calculations of range-time-fuel performance.
TACTICAL
Assuming the descent will start from cruise altitude and airspeed, the initial task is to retard the
throttles to idle and establish a nosedown attitude
of approximately 10. Extend airbrakes to position
6 in increments of 2, trimming to approximate zero
stick force prior to raising the airbrakes to the next
position. Maintain approximately zero stick force by
continually trimming the aircraft during descent.
Maintain approximately 10 nosedown attitude and
a speed schedule of 0.84 Mach until reaching 305
knots IAS. Maintain 305 knots IAS during the
remainder of the descent. Close coordination
between the pilot and copilot is required to ensure
that a transition is made from indicated Mach to
indicated airspeed. Pilot will coordinate with the
navigator as to level-off altitude to be used for this
maneuver. Initiate level off approximately 1000 feet
above the desired level flight altitude by retracting
airbrakes from position 6, to position 4, to position
2, and retrimming. Complete airbrake retraction at
approximately 500 feet above the desired level
flight altitude, retrim, and add power as required.
(Continued)
2-107
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NOTE
See ALTITUDE CALL PROCEDURES in

Section IV.
If turbulence is encountered such that the
airspeed indicators are hard to read, hold a
10 nosedown attitude until the turbulence
has been penetrated. Aircraft attitude
should not exceed 12 nosedown.
TYPICAL DESCENTS AND PENETRATIONS
dure. See ICE AND RAIN, Section VII, for

icing descent procedures.
3. Conform to published procedures.
4. See Part 7 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1, for time, fuel,
and distance requirements.
5. Copilot obtains altimeter setting prior to descent
and pilot, copilot, and navigator set altimeters at
the prescribed time during descent. The pilot and
copilot will cross-check each altitude called by the
navigator.
NOTE
The GPS receiver is not certified for instrument procedures. Do not accomplish a TACAN penetration and/or approach with the
navigation mode selector in the GPS position.
NOTE
Enroute descents are compatible with the

typical penetration procedures except for
aircraft configuration, airspeed, rate of descent, and routing to the final approach.
1. A typical penetration is shown in figure 2-12.
Prior to starting a penetration, initiate DESCENT
checklist.
2. Accomplish a penetration with throttles,
airbrakes, and gear as required at 240 knots IAS or
0.75 Mach, whichever is slower.
Care should be taken to retrim between

each 2-unit increment of airbrake operation.
NOTE
Vary rate of descent by airbrake, throttle, or

gear position to satisfy penetration proce-
2-108
Change 3
See ALTITUDE CALL PROCEDURES in

Section IV.
6. Retract airbrakes as required. Allow the aircraft to decelerate to 220 knots IAS. Complete the
DESCENT and TRAFFIC PATTERN checklists as
required. Establish best flare speed plus 30 knots.
Reduce airspeed to best flare plus 10 knots prior to
the final approach fix or glide slope interception.
(About 20,000 pounds per hour, total fuel flow will
be required during descent on final approach.)
Maintain best flare plus 10 knots until the flare for
landing is started. If visual references at the missed
approached point are insufficient to land, execute
the missed approach procedure.
Partial Panel Operation
In case of flight instrument failure, especially the

attitude indicators and heading indicator, do not
use airbrakes during descent and use minimum
angles of bank in all turns (1 1/2 per second
maximum rate). Make descent under radar control
if possible and maintain 0.75 Mach or 240 knots
IAS, whichever is slower, but not less than 220
knots IAS. Plan a long straight-in approach,
keeping turns to a minimum.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Typical Penetration
NOTE
For descents through icing, the following configuration

should be used: Gear Down, Throttles IDLE,
Airbrakes Position 6. Descent as rapidly as practical.
For a penetration, throttles and airbrakes may be used
as required.
Figure 2-12
2-109
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DESCENT CHECKLIST
If one or more generators are off line, all electronic warfare equipment
not required for defense of the aircraft will be turned off prior to descent for landing.
NOTE
To conserve fuel, descent should be conducted with minimum use of

drag devices (landing gear and airbrakes).
1. Flight Instruments Checked (P-CP)
The pilot will compare HSI heading with the standby magnetic heading and OAS inertial heading.
Check attitude indicators for proper operation.
2. MFD Display Control Panel MFD EVS Switch As required (P-CP)
Setting one pilots control to the MFD position and the other to the EVS position will allow one pilot
to monitor to display MFD screens and the other to monitor to display EVS displays, respectively.
If both the Pilots and Copilots MFD controls are set to the MFD position, then changing MFD
screens on one monitor will change the display on the other monitor as well.
3. EVS ON, video and stabilization selected (P-CP)
Depress EVS power switch to ON. Pilot and copilot should both select EVS sensor with best display
and vector stabilization.
4. Penetration & Approach Reviewed (P-CP-RN-N)
Obtain approach, landing weather, compare forecast versus reported altimeter setting, and review
the planned penetration and approach. This review will include navigation aid frequencies, minimum and emergency safe altitudes, descent rates, minimums for the approach to be flown, missed
approach procedures, and aerodrome sketch. As a minimum the pilot flying the approach will brief
the crew on the descent rate, MDA/DH/VDP and missed approach procedures for the planned approach. Lost communications procedures will be coordinated if required. During the descent and
approach other crewmembers will back up the pilot flying and report any deviation from prescribed
procedures.
Active Runway
PA
RCR
RVR
Altimeter
Forecast Altimeter Dest
Alt
Wind
Temp
Ceiling & Vis
5. Radar Altimeter Set (P-CP)

The pilot flying the aircraft will set his radar altimeter cursor to the HAA/HAT for the approach
being flown. The pilot not flying the aircraft will set his radar altimeter cursor to 100 feet above
the HAA/HAT for the approach being flown.
6. Landing Data Computed and checked (CP-N)
Compute gross weight and best flare speed for planned airbrake position. Adjust best flare speed
indicator so that the operating weight plus expendable stores is at the zero point on the total fuel
quantity gage. The weight and airspeed value that is adjacent to the needle on the totalizer is the
gross weight and the best flare speed for that weight with airbrakes in position 4. As fuel is consumed, the total fuel quantity gage pointer will point to the aircraft gross weight and the corresponding best flare speed for airbrakes in position 4. Check landing data card and recompute required
items. A conservative flare distance can be determined for an airbrakes 4, flaps down landing from
Part 8 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1. Thrust gate setting will be computed and set (see figure 2-13).
2-110
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DESCENT CHECKLIST (Cont)

7. Fuel Panel Switches 1, 2, 3, and 4 ON; 9, 10, 11, and 12 OPEN; 13, 14, 15, and 16 CLOSED (CP);
Checked (P)
Establish a fuel management configuration of main tanks to engines (switches 1, 2, 3, and 4 ON;
9, 10, 11, and 12 OPEN; 13, 14, 15, and 16 CLOSED. For takeoffs, transition, low approaches and
landings, open crossfeed valve switches 9, 10, 11 and 12 regardless of the green band. In addition,
when any main tank is down to 5000 pounds, open crossfeed valve switches 9, 10, 11 and 12.
Failure to accomplish prescribed fuel panel settings with fuel level in

main tanks 1 or 4 in green band area or when any main tank is down
to 5000 pounds can provide a potential for engine flameout during a
critical phase of flight.
During all auxiliary fuel transfer operations below 25,000 feet MSL, an
explosive condition exists due to the auto-ignition temperature of fuel
vapors and the potential ignition source from a malfunctioning auxiliary tank boost pump. Therefore, the auxiliary tanks fuel flow switches
will be turned off when the gage reads empty or the no flow indicator
light indicates a no flow condition. Auxiliary fuel flow control switches
will be turned off whenever fuel transfer is to be stopped.
NOTE
If auxiliary fuel usage is desired, it will be transferred directly into

main tanks through the main manifold. See WING FLUTTER AIRSPEED LIMITATIONS, Section V, for speed restrictions associated
with use of auxiliary fuel in various aircraft/missile configurations.
Auxiliary fuel will be used in order of omitted steps.
8. CG/FLAS Set (CP)
Select appropriate mode to monitor fuel weight or sequence, as desired.
9. Lights ON (P/CP)
Turn landing, taxi, and crosswind landing lights on for night or day operations unless reflection
reduces pilot visibility.
10. Altimeter Set (P-CP-N)
Reset altimeters to station pressure immediately prior to initiating penetration or upon passing
through transition altitude.
12. NAV MODE SELECT Switch Set as required (P/CP)
Nav MODE SELECT switch must match the desired mode to ensure proper displays on the HSI CDI.
Change 21
2-111
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TRAFFIC PATTERN
TRAFFIC PATTERN FUEL MANAGEMENT
Traffic pattern procedures are given in the TRAFFIC PATTERN checklist. Fuel system management
procedures during traffic pattern operations are
given in the following paragraph.
For takeoffs, transition, low approaches, and landings open crossfeed valves 9, 10, 11, and 12 regardless of the green band. If auxiliary fuel usage is
desired, it will be transferred directly into main
tanks 1 and 4 (all main tanks in lieu of step 10)
through the main manifold. See WING FLUTTER
AIRSPEED LIMITATIONS, section V for speed restrictions associated with use of auxiliary fuel in
various aircraft/missile configurations.
TRAFFIC PATTERN CHECKLIST
1. Planned Approach Reviewed (P-CP-RN-N)

Check the appropriate navigation aids tuned and identified. If the type of approach or pilot making
the approach changes, brief the planned approach. Emphasis will be placed on altitude restrictions,
descent rates, instrument MDA/DH/VDPs, and missed approach procedures.
The pilot flying the aircraft will set his radar altimeter cursor to the published instrument HAA/HAT
for the approach being flown. The pilot not flying the aircraft will set his radar altimeter cursor to
100 feet above the HAA/HAT for the instrument approach being flown. For visual patterns, the radar
altimeter cursor may be set at pilot discretion to any altitude between 200 feet AGL (visual decision
point) and 500 feet AGL (minimum altitude for roll-out on a visual final).
3. Flaps 100%, Lever DOWN (P-CP)
Allow aircraft to decelerate to 220 knots IAS. At the request of the pilot flying the aircraft, the other
pilot will extend flaps. Flap indicators will be monitored to ascertain both flaps are extending simultaneously. The pilot not flying the aircraft will report when the flaps are 50% and when full down.
Flaps may be extended during the penetration descent as required.
If flaps fail to start moving within 10 seconds, wing flap operation

should be discontinued to prevent damage to the flap drive system. See
FLAP LIMITATIONS, Section V.
NOTE
If a flaps-up landing is required, discontinue use of this checklist and

see LANDING WITH WING FLAPS UP checklist, Section III.
4. NAV MODE SELECT Switch Set in mode other than GPS (P/CP)
The GPS receiver is not certified for instrument procedures.
2-112
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TRAFFIC PATTERN CHECKLIST (Cont)

5. Fuel Panel Switches 1, 2, 3, and 4 ON; 9, 10, 11, and 12 OPEN; 13, 14, 15, and 16 CLOSED (CP);
Checked (P)
9, 10, 11 and 12 OPEN; 13, 14, 15 and 16 CLOSED. For takeoffs, transition, low approaches and
landings open crossfeed valve switches 9, 10, 11 and 12 regardless of the green band. In addition,
when any main tank is down to 5000 pounds, open crossfeed valve switches 9, 10, 11, and 12.
To maintain balance in main tanks and replenish mains 1 and 4, open the appropriate engine feed
control valves 19, 20, 21, or 22. Set the applicable auxiliary fuel control switch to ENGINE FEED
and place the master refuel switch ON. The master refuel and auxiliary fuel control switches will
be turned OFF prior to any low approach, touch-and-go landing, fullstop landing, or whenever transfer is stopped.

During low level or traffic pattern fuel panel operations, the master
refuel switch will not be used by itself to control auxiliary tank fuel
transfer operations. Whenever engine feed is selected with the auxiliary tank fuel flow control switch and the master refuel switch is off, the
auxiliary tank boost pumps will continue to run with a no flow condition. Therefore, both the master refuel switch and all auxiliary fuel
control switches will be turned off whenever fuel transfer is to be
stopped. This is necessary since below 25,000 feet MSL, an explosive
condition exists due to the auto-ignition temperature of fuel vapors and
the potential ignition source from a malfunctioning auxiliary boost
pump.
explosive condition exists due to auto-ignition temperature of fuel vapors and the potential ignition source from a malfunctioning auxiliary
tank boost pump. Therefore, the auxiliary tanks fuel flow control
switches will be turned off when the gage reads empty or the NO
FLOW indicator light indicates a no flow condition. Auxiliary fuel flow
stopped.
6. Best Flare Speed Checked (CP-N)
Copilot reads best flare speed for airbrakes position 4 from best flare speed indicator ring or computes for other airbrake positions and cross-checks airspeed indicator with pilots indicator. Navigator cross-checks the speed.
Change 17
2-113
T.O. 1B-52H-1

7. Thrust Gate Set (CP)
The copilot will recheck the thrust gate setting from figure 2-13 or by advancing throttles 4 and 5
and checking approximately 5000 pph increase in total fuel flow. Readjust thrust gate as necessary.
8. Landing Gear DOWN (P-CP)
Copilot checks gear lever in detent. Both pilots check that the gear warning light is out and that
all six gear indicate down and locked.
If any Normal Gear Control circuit breakers were previously pulled while performing the Main Landing Gear Fails to Retract checklist, ensure those circuit breakers are reset. Failure to reset the
Normal Gear Control circuit breakers for the affected gear after landing gear extension for landing
could result in a gear retraction and gear up landing.
With the landing gear down and locked, move the test switch to the FLT position. Check that all
indicator lights are on. A lit indicator light signifies that the individual brake represented by the
light has released and is ready for landing. Failure of any light to illuminate indicates there is no
power to the anti-skid shield for that wheel, and anti-skid protection will not be available for that
wheel.
With any indicator lights not on, when the gear down and locked and
the test switch in FLT, hard braking during landing may cause skidding and/or a blown tire on the wheel corresponding to the unlighted
indicator.
NOTE
If all eight lights fail to come on, recheck that the antiskid switch is
ON.
2-114
Change 17
T.O. 1B-52H-1

11. Target Trim Noted (P/CP)
When the aircraft is established on final approach in landing configuration (landing gear and flaps
down, and airbrakes in planned position) at best flare speed plus 10 knots IAS, the pilot not flying
the aircraft will note the stabilizer trim setting for zero stick force. This value will be called out as
target trim during an approach with airbrakes in position 0 or 2. For an approach with airbrakes
in position 4 or 6, a computed trim value of 2 units in the noseup direction from that noted will be
called out as target trim.
NOTE
If the computed target trim value is not within the range of 1.0 to 3.0,
units nosedown, a further check of aircraft center of gravity should be
made by reference to the APPROXIMATE CG LOCATION LANDING
CONFIGURATION chart at the specified conditions Part 8 of T.O.
1B-52H-1-1, or the load adjuster.
It is preferable to note stabilizer trim while in straight and level flight.
In VFR traffic patterns or situations where it is not readily feasible to
establish straight and level on final approach, the stabilizer trim target
setting during descent may be used provided the rate of descent does
not exceed 1000 feet per minute.
12. Landing Check Completed (P-CP)

a. Gear
b. Flaps
c.
Airbrakes 4 (or as required)
d. Lights
e.
Fuel
A check of the above items will be made when established on final.
During low level or traffic pattern fuel panel operations, the master
refuel switch will not be used by itself to control auxiliary tank fuel
transfer operations. Whenever engine feed is selected with the auxiliary tank fuel flow control switch and the master refuel switch is off, the
auxiliary tank boost pumps will continue to run with a no flow condition. Therefore, both the master refuel switch and all auxiliary fuel
stopped. This is necessary since below 25,000 feet MSL, an explosive
condition exists due to the auto-ignition temperature of fuel vapors and
the potential ignition source from a malfunctioning auxiliary boost
pump.
explosive condition exists due to auto-ignition temperature of fuel vapors and the potential ignition source from a malfunctioning auxiliary
tank boost pump. Therefore, the auxiliary tanks fuel flow control
switches will be turned off when the gage reads empty or the no flow
indicator light indicates a no flow condition. Auxiliary fuel flow control
switches will be turned off whenever fuel transfer is to be stopped.
Change 17
2-115
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Thrust Gate Setting for Go-Around

THRUST GATE
SETTING
DATA BASIS: ESTIMATED
CONDITIONS:
DATE: MARCH 1961
FOR GO-AROUND
AIRPLANE:
B-52H
REMARKS:
ENGINES:
TF-33-P-3
Figure 2-13
2-116
NO AIRBRAKES
FLAPS AND GEAR DOWN
DATA CONTAINED IN T.O. 1B-52H-1CL-1

CHART IS VALID FOR ANY AIRBRAKE
POSITION USED PRIOR TO GO-AROUND
SINCE AIRBRAKE RETRACTION
SHOULD BE NEAR SIMULTANEOUS
WITH SETTING GO-AROUND THRUST
T.O. 1B-52H-1
APPROACH
Since conditions at airports are continually changing, the landing approach techniques must be varied to meet existing conditions. In general, a normal landing pattern can be used.
INSTRUMENT APPROACHES
For normal approach purposes, the B-52 and all

modified versions thereof is considered a Category
D aircraft. In those cases where speed for a circling
maneuver exceeds 166 knots, Category E minima
will be applied.
Radar Approach
Entry into the radar approach pattern (figure 2-14)

is normally made with gear down at 220 knots IAS.
Complete TRAFFIC PATTERN checklist as outlined in Section II. Adjust power to maintain best
flare speed plus 30 knots IAS after the flaps are
down. Reduce airspeed to best flare plus 20 knots
on base leg. After the turn to final approach and
prior to reaching the glide slope, reduce airspeed to
best flare plus 10 knots IAS. (About 20,000 pounds
per hour, total fuel flow will be required during descent on final approach.) Maintain best flare plus
10 knots until the flare for landing is started. When
the minimum altitude is reached as indicated by
the altimeter or when advised by the controller,
whichever occurs first, perform the missed approach procedure if visual references are inadequate for landing.
Instrument Landing System
The following procedures apply to manual approaches.

TRANSITION TO FINAL
Accomplish a normal transition as specified in the
FLIP terminal charts. Set the NAV mode select
switch to ILS, tune the ILS frequency, set the inbound localizer course in the course selector window, and set the heading selector switch to NOR.
Complete the TRAFFIC PATTERN checklist and
establish best flare plus 30 knots IAS. When the
aircraft is within 90 of the inbound course, decelerate to best flare plus 20 knots IAS and center the
bank steering bar. This will initially establish up to
a 45 intercept to the localizer. As the aircraft approaches the localizer, the bank steering bar will direct a turn on course. Stabilize the aircraft at best
flare plus 10 knots IAS prior to the glide slope interception point.
FINAL APPROACH
When the glide slope indicator reaches center, adjust power to maintain best flare plus 10 knots IAS.
Keeping the bank steering bar centered will automatically correct for wind, and keeping the pitch
steering bar centered will establish the pitch attitude necessary to correct to or maintain the glide
slope. Continue the approach until visual references are sufficient to land or to published minimums, whichever is higher. At this point, commit to
land or follow the missed approach procedures.
During an ILS final approach using the

Flight Director System (ILS APP mode selected) the loss, or reduction in strength, of
the glide slope signal will normally cause
the glide slope warning flag to appear. Simultaneously with the warning flag appearance, the glide slope indicator and pitch
steering bar may remain at or slowly move
toward a centered position. Failure to immediately observe the (red) warning flag
under conditions requiring high instrument
(red) lighting intensities, coupled with the
false on glide slope indication, could result
in misinterpretation by the pilot. During
the ILS final approach phase, a frequent
cross-check should be made for the glide
slope warning flag and/or unduly stabilized
glide slope indicator/pitch steering bar combination. A continuous cross-check of altitude and rate of descent should be made as
well as monitoring marker beacons, aural
signals, and radar altimeters, whenever
possible.
2-117
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Radar Approach (Typical)
2-118
T.O. 1B-52H-1
2-119
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ILS Approach (Typical)
2-120
T.O. 1B-52H-1
2-121
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Circling Approach
Generalized procedures for circling approaches are

contained in current instrument flight directives.
Follow enroute descent or jet penetration procedures; however, reduce airspeed to best flare plus
20 knots prior to the final approach fix. Maintain
20 knots above best flare speed during the circling
maneuver until beginning rollout to align with the
landing runway. At that time, reduce to best flare
speed plus 10 knots until the landing flare point is
reached. Bank angle should be limited to 30 degrees throughout the maneuver.
Missed Approach
Missed approaches are accomplished using the

same procedures as given for VFR go-arounds. Advance throttles as required, retract airbrakes, establish a positive climb (approximately 1000 feet
per minute is appropriate for most missed approaches), trim as required, and check for a positive
increase in airspeed. Aircraft acceleration upon executing the missed approach procedure is such that
at light weights under instrument conditions flap
placard speeds may be rather quickly exceeded.
2-122
Care should be exercised in applying power

at light gross weights due to pitchup developing during acceleration. See GOAROUND, Section VI, for a detailed discussion of this characteristic.
Retract gear as soon as it is certain that the aircraft
will not touch the ground and retract flaps using
normal procedures if the published missed approach procedure is to be followed or if proceeding
to an alternate airport. During the flap retraction
cycle, it is required that the pilot monitor the aircraft attitude indications as closely as possible,
keeping the aircraft trimmed to a zero stick force,
especially during the last 20% of flap retraction.
NOTE
If a visual approach pattern is to be made,

the pilot may, at his discretion, leave the
gear and flaps down and maintain airspeeds as specified for a normal radar approach pattern.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Airborne Radar Approaches
1. In view of the fact that radar equipment installed in the aircraft permits the radar navigator to
monitor the position of the aircraft constantly regardless of weather conditions or outside approach
facilities, it is essential that the equipment be utilized during instrument approaches. In an emergency the equipment within the aircraft will make it possible for the radar navigator to direct the
pilot to a safe approach.
2. Radar navigators will properly monitor all letdowns and approaches regardless of type (i.e., VFR,
GCA, ILS, etc) until the aircraft is in the landing pattern and the pilot is definitely assured that
visual contact with the runway can be maintained during the remainder of the approach, including
an emergency go-around if necessary.
3. Radar approaches are divided into two classes:
a. Radar monitored or directed approaches:
These are approaches to fields for which standard jet penetrations or enroute penetrations have
been published. The pilot directs the aircraft by using normal approach facilities or the radar
navigator directs the airplane using the OAS.
b. Radar directed emergency approaches:
These are approaches to fields for which no published letdown procedures have been established
or approaches wherein the normal ground or aircraft approach facilities are inoperative (e.g.,
GCA or omni equipment failure). The radar navigator directs the aircraft by using the procedure
outlined in this manual (figure 2-16).
RADAR MONITORED OR RADAR DIRECTED PRACTICE APPROACH
Pilots and radar navigators should become completely familiar with the penetration patterns and
approach and landing patterns to be used at both the destination and alternates. Applicable
publications should be studied. Annotated scope photos of previous approaches, if available, will
be a great aid to radar navigators.
PENETRATION PATTERN. The published or interim jet penetration patterns for the specific
station will be utilized by the pilot for the initial portion of the pattern.
APPROACH AND LANDING PATTERNS. The published approach pattern ground track and
altitude restrictions will be followed from the final approach fix to the published missed approach
point.
ALTITUDES. Altitudes for any phase of the approach will be those published in the current FLIP
terminal approach plate for the penetration and approach phase of the maneuver.
AIRSPEEDS. Airspeed for the penetration and approach will be as specified for the aircraft
configuration being used.
RADAR DIRECTED EMERGENCY APPROACH
The radar navigator may accomplish a radar directed approach when:
(1) An instrument approach is necessary at a field without a published penetration.
(2) A normal instrument or visual approach cannot be made because of failure of ground or
aircraft equipment.
(3) It is not prohibited by directives or known traffic at base of intended landing.
2-123
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AIRBORNE RADAR APPROACHES (Cont)

REQUIRED INFORMATION. Prior to attempting a radar directed emergency approach, the following information should be known:
1. Field elevation.
2. Active runway.
3. All terrain and prominent radar returns within a 25-mile radius of the airbase.
4. Obstructions located on the final approach.
5. Offset aiming point.
6. Initial point will be a point approximately 25 miles beyond the approach end of the runway in the
direction of intended landing.
7. Terminal weather.
APPROACH PROCEDURE
1. Accomplish the BEFORE DESCENT checklist.
2. Aircraft will descend to 25,000 feet.
3. Accomplish the TRAFFIC PATTERN checklist as applicable.
4. The radar navigator will direct the aircraft to the initial point and then position the crosshairs on
the end of the runway or OAP when identification becomes possible.
NOTE
Each time the radar navigator moves his crosshairs he must press the
POS button on the RNMP or command FLY TO + to update FCI and
time-to-go indications.
FLY TO + should only be used if crosshairs can be placed directly on
the runway.
5. Pilot should be instructed to follow the FCI over the runway.

6. When the time-to-go indicator reads zero, the pilot will execute a standard rate turn to the right
to the reciprocal of the runway heading plus 20 (drift must be considered if crosswind exists) and
an immediate penetration will be initiated from 25,000 feet. Maintain crosshairs on the approach
end of the runway or OAP during the entire approach.
7. Upon reaching 12,000 feet, a 200 standard rate turn to the left will be initiated, rolling out on the
runway heading (to which drift correction angle has been applied), continuing the descent to 2000
feet above the runway or 1000 feet above highest terrain within 5 miles of either side of approach
heading, whichever is higher. After rolling out and leveling off, an IAS of best flare speed plus 20
knots will be established.
NOTE
Right and left turns indicated above may be reversed if local terrain
makes this advisable.
2-124
T.O. 1B-52H-1

8. Pilot will continue to track the FCI using standard ADF instrument technique. Example: If aircraft
is on runway heading and FCI is 10 to the left, pilot should turn 20 to the left and hold the new
heading until the FCI moves 20 to the right. At this point, the pilot should turn back 20 to the
right. This will center the FCI and put the aircraft on the runway heading. Corrections should be
continued as required to maintain FCI centering with aircraft on runway heading. The radar
navigator should occasionally view a full scan presentation to check the position of the aircraft with
respect to the on course track to the runway. If necessary, appropriate heading changes will be made
to reposition the aircraft to the runway track after which the aircraft will be returned to the runway
heading.
9. When 8 nm from runway, a 600 feet per minute descent will be initiated at an IAS of best flare speed
plus 10 knots. This descent will be continued until the time-to-go reading is discernible. At this time,
the rate of descent will be adjusted. If aircraft was leveled off above 2000 feet, the descent will be
at a range equal to altitude above the runway, divided by 1000, times 3.5 nm, and reference to
time-to-go indicator as outlined above.
NOTE
If BFS plus 10 has not been established, the time-to-go indicator reading of 200 seconds will indicate an erroneous descent point.
10. During descent, the pilot will cross-check altimeter readings against time-to-go readings at 150, 100,
and 60 seconds and will adjust rate of descent accordingly. At 60 seconds, the aircraft should be at
600 feet and under visual conditions. Except under extreme emergency conditions, descents will not
be made below 600 feet unless the pilot has visual contact with the runway. If the approach is
continued, the aircraft will be approximately 1000 feet down the runway when time-to-go is zero.
NOTE
The 1000 foot distance is based on a combination of pulse length and

spot size error and the average width of the range crosshair. While the
exact distance will vary somewhat with control settings, this procedure
will establish a glidepath comparable to that of GCA and should ensure
the aircraft will not land short of the runway.
2-125
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Typical Radar Directed Emergency Approach
2-126
T.O. 1B-52H-1
2-127
T.O. 1B-52H-1

MISSED APPROACH PROCEDURE
1. Go-arounds or GCA patterns - If a go-around becomes necessary or the pilot desires to complete the
pattern utilized under normal GCA procedures, a pull-up will be made to 2000 feet at best flare
speed plus 30 knots. The radar navigator will monitor the aircraft position and terrain during goaround procedures or GCA patterns. To do so he will use a PPI or DC/PPI radar presentation.
2. Heading and altitude will be maintained until the aircraft has reached a point approximately 5 miles
beyond the approach end of runway. This may be determined by timing (90 seconds) or by reference
to the ground range indicator. At this point the pilot will be directed to execute a 90 turn to the
left. This heading will be the crosswind leg and will be maintained for 90 seconds or until the runway
is approximately 5 miles behind. At this point the radar navigator will direct the pilot to turn 90
left to the downwind heading. Downwind heading should be maintained until the aircraft is
approximately 15 miles beyond the approach end of the runway. When the aircraft is 15 miles beyond
the approach end of the runway, another 90 turn to the left will be executed to the base leg and
the IAS will be reduced to best flare speed plus 20 knots. After completion of the turn onto the base
leg, the radar navigator will press the X-HAIR marker button. When FCI reads 80 left, pilot will
execute the turn to runway heading and steps 8 thru 10 of APPROACH PROCEDURE RADAR
DIRECTED EMERGENCY APPROACH will be repeated.
3. In the event of failure of the FCI or time-to-go indicator, the same approach may be made utilizing
range marks. Under these conditions the radar navigator will direct the aircraft. The 600 feet per
minute descent will be started at 8 miles. The standard GCA glidepath closely approximates 250
feet per mile and this may be cross-checked by checking ranges against the altimeter.
4. To prevent conflict with other traffic during simulated radar directed emergency approaches, the
pilot will remain in contact with approach control or the tower and will keep them informed on
aircraft location.
5. The pilot will evaluate the approach at the point go-around is initiated. The approach will be considered successful if, in his opinion, a safe landing would be accomplished from that point. He will
further note the position of the aircraft when the time-to-go indicator reads zero to evaluate the
glidepath.
All altitudes referred to above, except penetration altitudes, are absolute altitudes above terrain.
2-128
T.O. 1B-52H-1
APPROACH PROCEDURE (VISUAL PATTERN)
Referring to figure 2-18, the downwind leg is entered at the altitude specified in applicable regulations. The TRAFFIC PATTERN checklist will be
completed at this point and the airspeed reduced to
30 knots above computed best flare speed. The turn
from the downwind leg will be a descending 90
turn to the base leg with a reduction in airspeed
and altitude. Roll out to a wings-level attitude
while descending on the base leg for sufficient
duration (approximately 10 seconds) to allow for
visual clearance of other aircraft in all directions.
Maintain 20 knots above computed best flare speed
until starting turn to final approach. A 90
descending turn to final approach will then be
initiated and, at the completion of rollout on final
approach, the airspeed will be 10 knots above
computed best flare speed, minimum altitude as
specified in applicable directives. A 30 bank will be
the maximum allowable in the traffic pattern. The
10 knots above best flare speed will be maintained
until the flare point is reached. As the flare point is
reached and the aircraft is rotated for landing, the
throttles will be retarded so as to cross the end of
the landing runway at best flare speed. After
touchdown, the airbrakes should be fully extended
and the drag chute deployed.
NOTE
During the approach and landing, the copilot should monitor the altitude and airspeed. Warn the pilot when above or below
safe altitude or airspeed, or whenever the
angle of bank exceeds recommended values.
Pitch response of the aircraft becomes more
sensitive with aft center of gravity conditions particularly in the landing gross
weight range. In lightweight aft cg landings, there may be a tendency to flare high
and hold the aircraft off the runway in a
higher than normal noseup attitude due to
lower stick force characteristics and reduced requirements for stabilizer trim during landing flare.
The pilot should be alert for the condition
of forward throttle creep from IDLE position throughout approach and landing to
preclude unscheduled power resulting from
advanced throttle settings.
If a crosswind leg is flown, the aircraft will
be rolled out to a wings-level attitude on the
crosswind leg for sufficient duration to permit visual clearance of other aircraft in all
directions.
The pilots and/or copilots sliding window

may be opened at normal traffic pattern
speeds and maneuvers provided all hatches
are in place. If a hatch has been released,
the opening of a sliding window should be
avoided as inward acting airloads may
cause the window to blow into the cabin
area.
APPROACH CONSIDERATIONS
Heavyweight Landing
It is possible to make landings at any weight up to

the maximum gross weight as long as rates of descent at touchdown are limited. (See WEIGHT
LIMITATIONS, Section V.) Since most landing experience will have been obtained at gross weights
less than 290,000 pounds, landings below this
weight will be considered a routine operation. If it
becomes necessary to land the aircraft above
290,000 pounds, normal landing techniques may be
used up to approximately 325,000 pounds. If it
should become necessary to land the aircraft above
325,000 pounds gross weight, the following techniques are recommended:
1. Use airbrake position 1. Approach speed will
be 10 knots above the airbrake position 1 best flare
speed. The slower approach and flare speed with
airbrakes 1 will give less flare distance. The danger
of a hard landing will also be less because of the
slower deceleration when using airbrakes 1.
2. Intercept the approach path farther out than
usual. Maintain a fairly normal approach slope
with rates of descent on the order of 500 fpm. Plan
to arrive over the end of the runway at the best
flare speed at a lower altitude than for a normal
landing.
3. Reduce thrust cautiously during the landing
flare to ensure that the rate of descent is controlled.
The key to a good heavyweight landing is not the
attitude but the speed control using thrust after
crossing the end of the runway. The aircraft may
settle very rapidly if thrust is suddenly reduced.
4. The landing attitude will be considerably more
nosedown than for a normal landing because the
airbrakes are at 1. For a typical normal weight
landing with No. 4 airbrakes the fuselage will be
approximately 2 to 3 noseup at the minimum
touchdown speed. For a heavyweight landing with
airbrakes position 1, the fuselage will be approximately 0 to 1 noseup.
To determine approach speeds and to estimate flare
and runway stopping distances, refer to Part 8 of
T.O. 1B-52H-1-1.
2-129
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Airbrakes
The airbrakes are operated by a throttle type control located next to the throttle quadrant. The aircraft noses up when airbrakes are extended. Although the trim change can be handled by elevator
use, retrimming should be accomplished after each
position change. Position 4 should be used for landings at gross weights below 325,000 pounds, and
airbrakes position 1 above 325,000 pounds gross
weight. When a reduced thrust condition is encountered, airbrake position 2 may be selected instead of
position 4 to preclude excessive drag due to
airbrakes. Any airbrake position from 0 thru 6 may
be used for an approach and landing under unusual
conditions. If changes in airbrake position are made
on final approach, the change in trim requirements
will be observed, particularly between airbrake
positions 2 and 4. Airspeeds flown will be based on
the actual airbrake position used during final approach. The airspeed versus airbrake position relationship becomes critical at the start flare point due
to the change in trim and in airspeed bleed off with
various airbrake settings. Therefore, final airbrake
selection should be made to allow stabilization at
the proper airspeed and trim condition prior to the
start flare point. Best flare speed for airbrake position 4 is approximately 10 knots faster than the no
airbrake best flare speed and for airbrake position 2
is approximately 5 knots faster than the no airbrake best flare speed. Regardless of airbrake position utilized for approach, a normal glidepath (2.5
to 3.0) should be established as early as practical
on the final approach. The minimum touchdown
speed is not changed regardless of the amount of
2-130
airbrake extension, although there is some change

in landing attitude. Using full airbrake extension
changes the touchdown attitude to such an extent
that at minimum touchdown speed the aircraft will
touch down rear gear first with the front gear about
one-third of a wheel diameter in the air. Touching
down all wheels simultaneously with airbrakes
fully extended will add 11% to the minimum
touchdown speeds. Stalling speeds are not affected
by airbrake position. With practice, airbrakes can
be used to a great extent to vary the approach and
landing pattern, to steepen the final approach, or to
reduce airspeed rapidly.
NOTE
If touchdown is to be made with full

airbrakes, maintain higher approach speed
to the flare point. Refer to Part 8 of T.O.
1B-52H-1-1 for precise best flare speeds
with full airbrakes.
Minimum Speeds
The minimum recommended airspeeds at which the

aircraft should be flown in straight flight with flaps
either up or down are given in figure 2-17. It will be
remembered that in turns the minimum speeds will
be increased from those shown. The minimum pattern maneuvering speed for bank angles up to 30
degrees is best flare speed plus 20 knots (approach
speed plus 20 knots for flaps up). If required to maneuver in the pattern prior to turn to final, maintain minimum pattern airspeed for aircraft configuration.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Minimum Speeds - Low Altitude
FLAPS UP
210
200
190
CONDITIONS:
180
FLAPS DOWN
ED
D
EN
M
160
ET
EC
R
M
U
AL
NG
BU
I
IN
RO
ST
TI
IN
F
UF
ET
FF
IM
150
ED
140
D
EN
OM
130
UM
M
NI
C
RE
AL
T
TI
IN
ET
FE
F
UF
F
BU
ON
R
ST
MAX. INFLIGHT GROSS WEIGHT
INDICATED AIRSPEED KNOTS
170
120
FLIGHT
PROHIBITED
110
100
90
80
NO GROUND
EFFECT
FLAPS UP OR DOWN
AS SHOWN
SEA LEVEL TO
10,000 FT
LANDING GEAR UP
OR DOWN
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
REMARKS:
Landing gear extension
or retraction has no ef
fect on speeds shown.
Increase chart airspeeds
by 1% for each 5,000 feet
above 10,000 feet pres
sure altitude.
500
GROSS WEIGHT 1000 POUNDS

A31808
Figure 2-14
2-131
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Wind Shear
Wind shear is a complex phenomena that can adversely affect the aircraft in all phases of flight, but
is most critical during the approach and landing
phase. Wind shear can exist as a rapid change in
wind velocity and direction as well as vertical air
movement. There are many factors which influence
or contribute to a wind shear condition. As a general rule, the amount of wind shear is greater ahead
of warm fronts, although the most common occurrences follow the passage of cold fronts during periods of gusty surface winds. When a temperature
change of 10F or more is reported across the front,
or if the front is moving at 30 knots or more,
conditions are excellent for wind shear. In addition,
when thunderstorms are present in the area of
intended landing or a strong temperature inversion
is near the ground, the possibility of encountering
wind shear is increased.
1. Wind Shear Effects. The thrust required, vertical velocity, and pitch attitude on final approach,
used in conjunction with the wind reported on the
ground, provide an indication of potential wind
shear. Be alert for:
a. Unusual changes in airspeed and rate of descent followed by corresponding changes in glideslope and pitch attitude.
b. An unusually high or low power setting required to maintain airspeed.
Caution will be exercised in initial reductions of
thrust and pitch to avoid a steep glideslope intercept in a low power, high sink condition.
2-132
2. Wind Shear Phenomena. The following are two

wind shear phenomena that are commonly found
during final approach:
a. Decreasing Headwind. Initial reaction of
the aircraft when encountering a decreasing
headwind (or an increasing tailwind) is a drop in
indicated airspeed and a decrease in pitch resulting
in a loss of altitude. If the wind shear occurs at low
altitude, the pilot will add power and increase pitch
to regain the proper glideslope. In severe conditions, higher than normal thrust and higher than
normal pitch attitudes may be required to maintain
the proper descent profile.
b. Increasing Headwind. The initial aircraft
reaction to an increasing headwind (decreasing
tailwind) is an increase in indicated airspeed and
an increase in pitch resulting in a gain in altitude.
The pilot should reduce pitch and power to regain
the proper glidepath. Caution will be exercised in
initial reductions of thrust and pitch to avoid a
steep glide slope intercept in a low power, high sink
condition. This could result in the aircraft landing
well short of the intended touchdown point.
If the aircraft becomes unstable on final approach due to wind shear and the approach
profile cannot be promptly reestablished, a
go-around should be immediately accomplished.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LANDING
LANDING WITH GUSTY WIND CONDITIONS
If wheel brakes are applied immediately before and held during touchdown when the
main gear is turned more than 14 (by any
combination of crosswind crab setting and
steering) the aircraft will land with wheels
locked because the antiskid system is
inoperative in this condition. When the
landing gear is turned, the landing gear
centering cams compress the landing gear.
At more than 14 from center, the landing
gear is compressed enough to actuate
landing gear safety switches as though the
aircraft were actually on the ground. The
antiskid system (which is tied into the
landing gear safety switches) allows the
wheels to be locked when the aircraft is on
the ground and not moving. Releasing the
brakes will activate the antiskid system.
It is not necessary to increase the final approach

speed for gust velocities up to and including 15
knots. For gust velocities in excess of 15 knots, the
final approach speed should be increased two-thirds
of the gust velocity in excess of 15 knots. For example, with a wind velocity of 20 knots with gusts to
50 knots, 10 knots would be added to the final approach speed (total gust velocity 30 knots; 30 15
= 15 knots; 15 x 2/3 = 10 knots).
TOUCHDOWN
The recommended touchdown is with the rear gear

first at minimum touchdown speed. Refer to Part 8
of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1 for landing speeds. This allows
for an adequate flare without a bounce. However, if
the forward gear is too high when the rear gear
touches, a hard landing may result. Full airbrakes
should be applied immediately after touchdown
provided there is no bounce. With the antiskid system operative, the wheel brakes may also be applied immediately after touchdown although this
decreases brake service life. The runway available
will determine when the wheel brakes should be
applied. After establishing a stable ground roll,
brakes will be checked for proper operation followed
by intermittent application of the brakes as required. The normal landing charts in Part 8 of T.O.
1B-52H-1-1, show the landing ground roll distances
with wheel brakes applied at 90 knots IAS. See
MINIMUM RUN LANDING, this section, for more
details on use of brakes and drag chute.
NOTE
The front gear is well forward of the cg and

if allowed to touch down first, a bounce is
almost certain to occur. This usually is the
result of too much speed.
CROSSWIND LANDING
Prior to or during the time the aircraft is in the

traffic pattern, a decision will be made as to whether or not the crosswind crab system is to be used.
After obtaining the wind direction and velocity from
the tower located at the field at which the landing
is to be made, compute the crab angle for the wind
and landing gross weight.
NOTE
Sustained runway wind velocity plus onethird of the gust factor will be used to compute crosswind crab settings when landing
with gusty wind conditions.
If a crosswind cannot be compensated for by
use of the crosswind crab system, a landing
is not recommended.
If the wind is a variable wind, the average
heading of this variable wind should be
used.
With Use of Crosswind Crab System
Smooth landings can be made through use of the

crosswind crab system even though crosswinds of
high velocity are encountered. Such landings also
require very little additional effort from the pilot.
Touching down the aircraft in a crabbed attitude
may seem strange the first few times such landings
are tried, but this technique is easily learned by the
pilot.
2-133
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CROSSWIND CRAB SETTING
LANDING ROLL
After voice radio contact has been established with

the tower, obtain the runway surface wind and direction. From this data, determine the crosswind
crab setting to be used in landing by reference to
the chart in Part 8 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1. After the
landing gear has been extended, turn the crosswind
crab control knob until the miniature aircraft and
pointer on the indicator point to the crab angle setting determined for the wind and gross weight. Extend the flaps, raise airbrakes to position 4, and
control the airspeed in the same manner as for a
normal approach. After rolling out onto final approach and after the aircraft is crabbed into the
wind to establish a flight path straight down the
runway, recheck the position of the miniature aircraft and pointer on the crosswind crab control indicator. The nose of the aircraft, as well as the nose of
the miniature aircraft and pointer on the indicator,
should always be pointed off the runway into the direction of the wind component. Lower the crosswind
crab control knob after the crab setting has been established.
After the aircraft is on the runway, more and more

lateral control will be required to hold the wings
level as the speed decreases. If difficulty is encountered in maintaining track down the runway at low
speeds, the control wheel should be centered since
an asymmetric spoiler condition will cause an unfavorable turning force. Do not change the crosswind
crab setting until the aircraft is ready to turn off
the runway. Under slippery runway conditions, the
crosswind crab setting will help to maintain steering control. The crosswind crab system is not normally used to steer the aircraft on the ground.
If rudder trim is used on landing, ensure

that the crosswind crab control knob is not
turned instead of the rudder trim knob
since they are located concentrically.
NOTE
The upper and lower pointers on the crosswind crab position indicator may show a
difference in heading once crosswind trim is
established. This condition is normal and is
caused by the fact that only the forward
gear are steerable and operate even when
set for crosswind conditions. As a result,
any rudder pedal deflections will show up
as a difference in indication between the
two pointers.
2-134
NOTE
When landing under conditions of high

crosswinds, light gross weights, and a slippery runway, loss of steering may result.
For further information, see LANDING
WITH CROSSWIND ON SLIPPERY RUNWAYS under ICE AND RAIN, Section VII.
Be alert for indication of a missetting of
crosswind crab at touchdown. Corrections
should be accomplished by normal rudder
pedal steering. Do not use the crosswind
crab control knob for steering except in an
emergency. On very smooth landings, a missetting of the crosswind crab will not immediately manifest itself by the aircraft diverging off either side of the runway; the
first indication of incorrect setting will be a
deceleration force due to tires scuffing.
Without Use of Crosswind Crab System
If the crosswind crab system is not to be used because of a malfunction, the landing may be made by
approaching fully crabbed with rudder and lateral
controls centered. If desired, a combination of crabbing into the wind and a slight lowering of the upwind wing may be accomplished, but the wing
should not be lowered to such an extent that the tip
gear touches the ground first upon landing. Touchdown in the crabbed attitude with normal landing
rates of descent will not induce detrimentally high
side loads on the landing gear since the gear is
lightly loaded at this time. By landing rear gear
first, the aircraft will tend to pivot about the rear
gear and thereby reduce the crab angle by the time
the forward gear touches. Full airbrakes should be
applied and the drag chute may be deployed at
touchdown since forward gear steering will be adequate by the time the drag chute becomes effective.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
MINIMUM RUN LANDING
The approach for a minimum run landing should be

planned so as to arrive over the end of the runway
with the throttles at IDLE and at a speed as close
to best flare speed as possible. A minimum run
landing is accomplished by having the brake antiskid system operative, deploying the drag chute, using full airbrakes after touchdown, applying wheel
brakes immediately after touchdown, and continuing to apply brakes throughout the landing roll.
The drag chute provides considerable deceleration
force over the first portion of the landing roll while
the wheel brakes have a small decelerating effect
because the wheels are lightly loaded. As the aircraft decelerates, the drag chute becomes less effective while the brakes become more effective.
All landings should be planned from a landing distance standpoint as though the drag
chute were not installed. The chute should
be considered only an aid to braking and a
means of reducing tire and brake wear.
WHEEL BRAKE APPLICATION
Each wheel is equipped with a complete brake antiskid assembly, eight units per aircraft. Therefore,
when one wheel approaches a skid and the brake
pressure is released by the skid detector, no other
wheel brake assembly is affected. Regardless of this
desired feature, however, the wings should be held
as near level as possible during the landing roll so
that all wheels are on the ground. If the wings are
not level, the high tire on each landing gear becomes lightly loaded causing a loss in braking effectiveness because of the limited braking torque on
the heavily loaded wheels. Maximum braking effectiveness with antiskid operative is obtained by depressing the rudder pedals fairly hard and letting
the individual brakes cycle as required to prevent
skids. Application of a fairly hard force on the brake
pedals will result in the heavily loaded wheels being cycled at a slower and more desirable rate,
while the lightly loaded wheels are cycled quite rapidly. This cycling can be felt by the pilot and becomes quite noticeable, especially if several of the
gears cycle on and off at approximately the same
time. If several of the gears do start to cycle in uni-
son and cause a violent vibration, the pedals should

be released momentarily and then reapplied. The
difference between conventional braking and use of
antiskid is that with antiskid operating, the brakes
can be applied earlier in the landing roll and maximum braking can be maintained throughout the
entire roll without excessive tire wear due to skids.
On slippery surfaces at low taxi speeds, wheel deceleration is very fast when brakes are applied and
skid signals are generated more frequently, releasing brake pressure before a locked wheel occurs.
Aircraft deceleration is not felt by the pilots because of the fast cycling of the antiskid system.
However, the use of antiskid under these conditions
is the recommended procedure since attempting to
brake without it results in greater stopping distances. See TOUCHDOWN, this section, and Part 8
of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1, for maximum rolling speeds for
brake application. For brake energy limits, see figure 5-14.
DRAG CHUTE DEPLOYMENT
Normally, the drag chute will be deployed on all

landings. The drag chute should be deployed only
after touchdown. The time required for the drag
chute to open is about 4 seconds after the drag
chute lever is pulled to DEPLOY position. It is not
recommended that the drag chute be deployed during the flare while the aircraft is floating since
there is a tendency for the aircraft to pitch up or
down, depending on the speed, and to drop in due to
rapid deceleration. See Section V for drag chute
limitations.
Dragging the chute along the runway

causes considerable wear on the chute suspension lines and canopy. If possible, keep
engine thrust high enough at the lower
ground run speeds to hold the chute off the
ground until the aircraft can be turned off
the runway. Request the ground crew to
stand by to retrieve the chute as soon as the
aircraft is clear of the runway and the chute
is jettisoned.
During prevailing surface winds of 15 knots
or greater, do not turn more than 90 away
from the wind while drag chute is deployed.
2-135
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NIGHT LANDING
The procedures and techniques used for a night

landing are the same as those used for a normal
day landing. In addition, the terrain clearance light
may be used at the pilots discretion.
OBSTACLE CLEARANCE LANDING
The distance to touchdown after clearing a 50-foot

obstacle with full flaps is shown on charts in Part 8
of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1. If a relatively high altitude
must be maintained to clear some obstacle located
within the traffic pattern, a steeper approach must
be made after clearing the obstacle. A normal approach with full flaps and airbrake lever in position
4 is made with sufficient altitude to clear the obstacle. If a steeper approach is desired, airbrakes
position 6 may be used. Should the obstacle be located close to the end of the runway, it may be necessary to place the airbrake lever in position 6 and
steepen the approach before passing over the obstacle. In this case, the pilot should approach at a
sufficiently high altitude to assure clearance with
the steeper approach. If full airbrakes are used, the
rate of descent will be higher than normal and the
flare will have to be started earlier.
NOTE
If touchdown is to be made with full

airbrakes, maintain higher approach speed
to the flare point. Refer to Part 8 of T.O.
1B-52H-1-1, for precise best flare speeds
with full airbrakes.
LANDING CHECKLIST
Accomplish After Touchdown (need not be read):

1. Airbrakes Six (P)
2. Drag Chute DEPLOY (CP)
Drag chute will be deployed on pilots command. In the event a go-around is not anticipated and
the drag chute does not deploy, do not jettison the drag chute. This will permit the cause of the
malfunction to be determined during the POSTFLIGHT INSPECTION. See Section V for drag chute
limitations.
3. Brakes Checked (P)
After establishing a stable ground roll and checking hydraulic system pressure, check brakes for
operation followed by intermittent application of brakes as required.
4. Hydraulic System Checked (P)
Check all hydraulic lights off.
5. Crosswind Crab Centered (P)
Center the rudder pedals before repositioning the steering ratio selector lever. Actuation of the lever when the rudder pedals are deflected
could result in a dangerously abrupt change in steering angle.
2-136
Change 4
T.O. 1B-52H-1
plied simultaneously with any large increase in thrust to maintain positive control
of the aircraft. Conversely, any large decrease in thrust may be critical. If the aircraft has been allowed to rotate to an extreme nosehigh attitude and is no longer accelerating at MRT, any attempt to control
the pitch by thrust reduction at this time
will result in a stall. If the pitch attitude
has progressed to this point, the last resort
for possible recovery is to maintain MRT for
the pushover and start retrimming as the
airspeed begins to increase. It must be
noted that MRT is achieved short of full
throttle and it is possible to obtain excessive
overthrust if throttles are advanced full forward.
GO-AROUND
The decision to make a go-around should be made
as early as possible since engine acceleration time
is a factor and approach speeds are relatively close
to touchdown speeds. Normally, this decision can be
made prior to touchdown. As soon as it has been decided to go around, advance throttles to go-around
thrust which is the thrust required to arrest descent and produce a satisfactory rate of climb and/
or acceleration, retract airbrakes, trim as required,
and, after it is certain that the aircraft will not
touch the ground, retract the landing gear.
Further thrust refinements will be accomplished as
necessary to obtain the desired performance during
the go-around.
In cases where a go-around is initiated just

prior to or during the landing flare and
where adequate runway is remaining, it
may be necessary to maintain a touchdown
attitude, contact the runway, then retrim
the aircraft during the ground run before
initiating power application for a goaround.
The thrust produced by the turbofan engines demands the use of proper procedure
and pilot technique when executing touchand-go or go-around maneuvers. If MRT is
applied for touch-and-go or go-around below
approximately 340,000 pounds, the aircraft
will respond very rapidly. Immediate nosedown trim will be required as a result of 1)
any increase in airspeed, 2) the aft cg shift
due to fuel movement to the rear of the
tanks in the case of partially full tanks, and
3) the noseup tendency produced by the engine thrust line being below the cg. The adverse effect on aircraft trim is much more
pronounced at light gross weights. At light
gross weights, nosedown trim must be ap-
The decision to go-around or land on the remaining runway must remain with the pilot
based upon all factors involved. However, if
a situation is allowed to develop, which in
the pilots judgment requires a go-around
from a low airspeed/low altitude condition,
the pilot must be extremely aware of the
hazards of aircraft pitchup and the items
affecting pitch control. An unscheduled goaround with a mistrim condition can occur
where several other trim items occur simultaneously due to fuel shift, thrust,
airbrakes, and ground effect. Each item can
be controlled by the use of elevator alone.
But when several of these items are combined, the elevator, which is the primary
flight control system, may not have sufficient authority, and additional authority
must be obtained from the stabilizer or
airbrakes. A 20 degree pitch attitude and
strong buffet can easily occur in 3 seconds
from which a recovery may not be possible.
See GO-AROUND under FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS UNDER VARIOUS SPEED
CONDITIONS in Section VI and GOAROUND WITH ONE OR MORE ENGINES INOPERATIVE in Section III.
2-137
T.O. 1B-52H-1
The use of MRT for go-around or touch-and-go
without simultaneous application of nosedown trim
will be critical. MRT will not be required except at
heavy gross weights; therefore, the applicable
checklists call for initial application of target
thrust or go-around thrust rather than MRT.
Target thrust is obtained by setting throttles
against the preset thrust gate. Another method of
establishing target thrust is to set the throttles for
a total fuel flow equal to the downwind fuel flow
plus approximately 20,000 pph (flaps down, gear
up, and airbrake lever OFF). The thrust gate
is used to assist the pilot in not exceeding the target thrust level by feel rather than by visual attention to engine instruments at a time when he must
be rigorously cognizant of aircraft attitude and airspeed and rate of change of aircraft attitude and
airspeed. The thrust may be subsequently refined
by retarding the throttles or by pushing the thrust
gate ahead with additional force on the throttles as
required to safely accomplish the go-around or
touch-and-go. The thrust gate is preset during the
downwind leg portion of the landing pattern and
will be preset for go-around for all go-arounds and
landings. See GO-AROUND AND TOUCHAND-GO LANDINGS, Section VI, for additional
discussion.
maintain the desired speed schedule and to preclude loss of altitude. When aircraft reaches 1000
feet and 180 knots IAS, the flaps may be retracted.
However, if a positive vertical velocity of 1000 feet
per minute is not attained when reaching 1000 feet
above the terrain, flap retraction will be delayed
until an altitude of 1500 feet above the terrain is
reached. During the flap retraction cycle, it is required that the pilot monitor his aircraft attitude as
closely as possible keeping the aircraft trimmed to a
zero stick force especially during the last 20% of
flap retraction. (See figure 2-18 for a go-around pattern.)
A go-around should not be attempted if the

drag chute has been deployed since it is possible that the drag chute may not jettison.
Sufficient thrust is available from eight engines to fly the aircraft with the drag chute
deployed at weights below approximately
300,000 pounds; however, this is not recommended since the associated control problems have not been flight tested.
NOTE
For pilot comfort and ease in flying, the thrust

should be adjusted during climb to flap retraction
altitude to a setting which will produce a rate of
climb of approximately 1000 feet per minute. If
thrust is reduced during this initial climb, it may be
necessary to add thrust during flap retraction to
2-138
When go-around is accomplished during

closed traffic pattern work, the pilot may, at
his discretion, leave the landing gear and
flaps down.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
GO-AROUND CHECKLIST
NOTE
If a go-around is required under low altitude/low airspeed conditions,

pilots may not have sufficient time to refer to the checklist. Therefore
this checklist should be accomplished as necessary and need not be
read. When a safe altitude and airspeed is attained, the pilots will review the checklist and complete required items.
1. Go-Around Thrust Applied (P)
The pilot will advance the throttles as required to arrest descent and produce a satisfactory rate of
climb and/or acceleration. Further thrust refinement will be accomplished as necessary to obtain
desired performance during the go-around. The throttle position should not exceed the thrust gate
initially. The copilot monitors the engine instruments and notifies the pilot of any abnormal engine
operating characteristics.
If the throttles are advanced beyond the thrust gate position for any
reason, extreme care should be exercised due to noseup rotation during
acceleration.
If a go-around is initiated after starting landing flare, immediately
counter the resultant pitching moment with nosedown elevator.
Throttles will not be advanced beyond the thrust gate position without
simultaneously resetting the stabilizer toward target trim. Failure to
retrim during the thrust application phase of a go-around can result
in pitchup, which combined with other pitch trim items, will exceed
nosedown elevator authority. Also, with asymmetrical thrust, thrust
must not be applied faster than any generated roll-yaw problem can
be controlled.

Pilot retracts airbrakes, levels off, and checks for a positive increase of airspeed.
3. Landing Gear UP (as required) (P-CP)
On pilots command, copilot retracts the gear when it is established that aircraft will not contact the
runway.
4. Thrust Reduced (P)
Pilot accelerates to desired IAS (best flare speed plus 30 knots IAS or 180 knots IAS) and adjusts
thrust to establish a rate of climb of approximately 1000 fpm.
NOTE
If the flaps are raised to accomplish flaps-up training, or if the pilots

intentions are to remain in the aircraft traffic area/terminal control
area, accelerate to approach speed plus 30 knots IAS.
Accomplish AFTER TAKEOFF CLIMB checklist or TRAFFIC PATTERN checklist, as applicable.
2-139
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Landing and Go-Around Patterns
2-140
T.O. 1B-52H-1
2-141
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TOUCH-AND-GO LANDING
Failure to lower the airbrakes to OFF and/or retrim
to target trim value will result in an excessive nose
up rotation immediately following unstick. Any
time these abnormal pitching tendencies are encountered, stabilizer trim and forward column
should be used to counteract the nose up condition.
The large amount of thrust available from the turbofan engines makes the use of partial thrust procedures for touch-and-go of the utmost importance
to preclude a possible hazard due to the rapid acceleration. The thrust gate is used to provide a satisfactory partial thrust level for touch-and-go landings. See GO-AROUND, this section, for a comprehensive discussion of this procedure. Rapid pitch
changes must be countered immediately by continuous use of stabilizer trim in addition to control column movement.
Touch-and-go landings can normally be performed
within the specified limits while utilizing procedures contained in the amplified TOUCH-AND-GO
checklist. Major commands may further impose restrictions on touch-and-go landings.
2-142
During touch-and-go landings, after the stabilizer

trim has been reset to target trim value, the
airbrakes positioned to OFF and power is applied to
accelerate to unstick speed, the aft gear may rise off
the runway prior to the forward gear and before
reaching unstick speed. The resultant nose low attitude coupled with bank angles of approximately 8
degrees or more can result in the outboard engine
pods striking the runway surface causing damage
to the aircraft and possible loss of control.
To preclude premature liftoff of the aft gear

during touch-and-go landings, positive back
column pressure must be maintained as
power is applied to accelerate to unstick
speed.
NOTE
See TRAFFIC PATTERN FUEL MANAGEMENT, this section.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TOUCH-AND-GO LANDING CHECKLIST
NOTE
While touch-and-go landings may be accomplished successfully under

conditions more extreme than those listed below, in the interest of flying safety, they will not be performed when:
1.
Gross weight exceeds 290,000 pounds.
2.
Crosswind crab control setting requirement is more than 8.
3.
Any spoiler is inoperative.
4.
Any hydraulic system is inoperative due to loss of normal system
pressure or when a hydraulic standby pump is known to be
inoperative.
5.
Any time stab trim cannot be electrically set.
Landing gear will remain down a minimum interval of 15 minutes air
time prior to a touch-and-go landing after a taxi-back landing.
Continuous ignition will be used during touch-and-go landings by turning the engine starter switches to the CONT position.
This checklist will be reviewed prior to touch-and-go landings and need
not be read while on the runway.

2. Stabilizer Trim Reset (P/CP)
Pilot not flying the aircraft will position the stabilizer trim to target trim value noted and notify the
other pilot that the trim has been reset.
If the stabilizer trim is not reset prior to takeoff, the excessive amount
of noseup trim will cause a noseup rotation after takeoff. Any pitch attitude changes following a takeoff will be countered immediately by continuous use of the stabilizer trim in addition to control column movement.
NOTE
The operation of the stabilizer trim mechanism during the ground roll
of touch-and-go landings is considered to be an inflight procedure and
inflight operation limitations will apply.
If too much aft column pressure is utilized on touch-and-go landings
prior to the resetting of target trim, possible force switch actuation
would interrupt stabilizer trim setting.

It is essential that the airbrake lever be returned to OFF before executing the takeoff following a
touch-and-go to preclude an unexpected pitchup following takeoff.
2-143
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TOUCH-AND-GO LANDING CHECKLIST (Cont)

4. Throttles Advance (P/CP)
To preclude premature liftoff of the aft gear on touch-and-go landings,

positive back column pressure must be maintained as power is applied
to accelerate to unstick speed.
The pilot performing the takeoff after a touch-and-go landing will advance the throttles slowly
to an intermediate setting allowing engines to accelerate and stabilize prior to advancing the
throttles to the thrust gate. Do not advance throttles until the pilot resetting the stabilizer trim has
verbally verified that the trim has been reset. The pilot occupying the other seat will monitor the
engine instruments and notify the pilot making the takeoff of any abnormal engine acceleration
characteristics. Further thrust refinement will be accomplished as necessary to obtain the desired
performance during takeoff and climb. See GO-AROUND, this section, for thrust effects. Premature
liftoff prior to unstick speed (minimum touchdown speed) can be hazardous since there is only a 7
to 12 knot margin between unstick speed and initial stall speed. Premature liftoff can only occur
when stabilizer is mistrimmed and/or excessive back column is introduced prior to unstick. However,
to maintain the aft gear on the runway as the aircraft accelerates, a positive back pressure will be
required. Accelerate to best flare speed plus 30 knots IAS on climbout.
NOTE
Accomplish AFTER TAKEOFF CLIMB checklist or TRAFFIC PATTERN checklist, as applicable.
2-144
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TAXI-BACK LANDING
Full stop taxi-back landings may be accomplished
under the following limitations:
1. Airplane gross weight will not exceed 270,000
pounds.
2. Touchdown will be accomplished in the first
one-third of the existing runway to include the sterile portion of the approach end.
3. Planned landing ground run will not exceed
50% of the available runway exclusive of the sterile
portion of the approach end.
4. After establishing a stable ground roll, brakes
will be checked for operation followed by intermittent application of brakes, as required.
5. A minimum interval of 15 minutes air time

will be established between landings or prior to retracting the gear to provide wheel and brake cooling.
6. If the first taxi-back landing accomplished is:
a. Above 250,000 pounds, a maximum of one
full stop taxi-back landing may be accomplished on
each sortie, followed by a final full stop landing utilizing the drag chute.
b. At or below 250,000 pounds, a maximum of
four full stop taxi-back landings may be accomplished on one sortie. The fourth landing may be
followed by a final full stop landing utilizing drag
chute.
TAXI-BACK LANDING CHECKLIST (Copilot reads)

NOTE
Taxi-back landings or engine-running crew changes may be accomplished using the following checklist. Upon completion of required crew
changes the checklist will resume with step 14.
Circled items will be accomplished whenever a change in crew position(s) is made.
Asterisked items will be accomplished when selected engines are shutdown.
1. IFF STBY (P)

2. Drag Chute JETTISON (if applicable) (CP)
3. Brakes Set (P)
4. Wheel Chocks In place (GC)
5. Sliding Window Open (P/CP)
6. Arming Lever Safety Pins (No. 1) INSTALLED (P-CP-EW-G)
7. Ejection Control Trigger Ring Stowed, pin No. 1 installed (RN-N)
8. Stabilizer Trim Target trim set (P-CP)
NOTE
During ground operation of stabilizer trim mechanism, advance engines 4 and 5 to 82% rpm.
Target trim will be the trim used as target trim for the last approach.
*9. Starter Switches OFF and PNEUMATIC (CP)
Change 11
2-145
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TAXI-BACK LANDING CHECKLIST (Copilot reads) (Cont)

*10. Generators 1 & 7 OFF (CP)
*11. Throttles 1, 2, 6, 7 & 8 75% then CLOSED (P-CP)
NOTE
Allow the engines which are to be shut down to idle for 2 minutes.
12. Brakes Released (P)
13. Crew Change Completed, as required
*14. Drag Chute Lever Checked and LOCKED (CP)
*15. Ground, Close Entry Door Roger (GC)
*16. Manifold Valve OPEN (CP)
*17. Brakes Set (P)
*18. Standby to Start Engines Fire guard posted and clear (GC)
NOTE
Engines will be started individually.

*19. Start Engines Started (CP)
Allow the engines that are being restarted to idle for 2 minutes prior to advancing throttles out of
the idle position.
20. Engine Start Switches CONT (CP)
*21. Starter Caution Light Off (CP)
*22. Navigator, Lock Entry Door Locked (N); light off (P)
*23. Manifold Valve CLOSE (CP)
*24. Generators 1 & 7 ON (CP)
*25. Ground, Clear Aircraft for Taxi Roger (GC)
*26. Hydraulic Pressures Checked (P)
27. Crew Equipment On and adjusted (ALL)
28. Ground, Remove Wheel Chocks & Disconnect Interphone Roger (GC)
29. Radar Altimeter Set (as required) (P-CP)
30. Control Surface Trim Set (P-CP)
32. Flaps 100%, lever down (P-CP)
2-146
Change 17
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TAXI-BACK LANDING CHECKLIST (Copilot reads) (Cont)

33. Fuel Panel Switches 1, 2, 3, and 4 ON; 9, 10, 11, and 12 OPEN (CP); Checked (P)
NOTE
See TRAFFIC PATTERN FUEL MANAGEMENT, this section.

34. Windows & Doors Closed and locked (P-CP)
*35. Starter Selector FLIGHT (CP)
36. Takeoff Data Reviewed (P, CP, RN, N)
Review EPR, thrust gate setting, S1 speed, S1 time, and S2 speed. Procedures to be used in the event
an emergency occurs during takeoff will be reviewed. Both pilots must have a complete understanding of actions to be taken if an emergency occurs prior to or after S1 speed.
38. Seat, Rudder Pedals & Control Column Adjusted and checked (P-CP)
39. Arming Lever Safety Pins (No. 1) Removed (P-CP-EW-G)
40. Ejection Control Trigger Ring Unstowed (RN-N)
Change 17
2-146A
T.O. 1B-52H-1
QUICK TURN
Full stop, quick turns may be accomplished under
the following limitations:
1. Airplane gross weight will not exceed 290,000
pounds.
2. Touchdowns will be accomplished in the first
3000 feet of existing runway.
3. Planned landing ground run will not exceed runway length minus touchdown distance.
4. After establishing a stable ground roll, brakes
will be checked for operation followed by intermittent application of brakes, as required.
5. Full runway length will be used for stopping.
QUICK TURN CHECKLIST (Copilot reads)

NOTE
Quick turn sorties may be accomplished using the following checklists.

CONTINUATIONIN CREW
1. Drag Chute JETTISON (CP)

The drag chute will be jettisoned and the control handle returned to LOCKED by the copilot after
the aircraft has turned off the runway and prior to being stopped for completion of the AFTER
LANDING checklist.
To prevent or minimize damage to aircraft structure as the drag chute

disconnect link strikes it during the jettison sequence, jettison the
chute at the lowest taxi speed that will keep the chute inflated.
2. Arming Lever Safety Pins (No. 1) Installed (P-CP)
3. Readiness Switch Cover Closed and latched (P)
4. IFF ZERO, A, and OFF (P)
Zeroize the mode 4 and turn the IFF off as soon after landing as possible. This assures removal of
the mode 4 code and eliminates signals from taxiing or parked aircraft which would otherwise block
the controllers scope and interfere with the control of airborne aircraft.
NOTE
If it is desired to retain the mode 4 code, momentarily place the mode 4

code switch to the HOLD position. Electrical power will be left on the
aircraft a minimum of 15 seconds to lock the code in.
5. Launcher Hydraulic Control Switch OFF (P)
6. Rudder/Elevator Hydraulic Pumps OFF (P)
7. Flare Set Power OFF (P)
8. Pitot Heat OFF (P)
9. Windshield Anti-Ice OFF (P)
2-146B
Change 17
T.O. 1B-52H-1
QUICK TURN CHECKLIST (Copilot reads) (Cont)

13. Stabilizer Trim Zero and CUTOUT (P)
NOTE
14. Autopilot Master Switch OFF (P)
15. Starter Switches OFF and PNEUMATIC (CP)
16. Liaison Radio OFF (CP)
17. Generators 1 & 7 OFF (CP)
18. Throttles 1, 2, 7 & 8 75% rpm, then CLOSED (P-CP)
Allow the engines that are to be shut down to idle for 2 minutes. While taxiing back to the ramp,
advance throttles 1, 2, 7, and 8 to approximately 75% rpm for not less than 15 nor more than 30
seconds before moving to the CLOSED position. This assures complete scavenging of engine oil and
prevents overservicing. This procedure also prevents fuel from accumulating underneath the engines
after shutdown. No. 6 engine may also be shut down, if necessary, to reduce taxi speed and still
maintain sufficient electrical and hydraulic power for the aircraft.
NOTE
If the engine is allowed to idle for more than 27 seconds, the oil sump
area fills and the hydraulic reservoir air pressurization lines accumulate condensation and require scavenging again. Moisture in the reservoir air pressurization lines can collect in the relief valves, freeze in
cold weather, and prevent valve operation. Failure of the valves to function can cause partial to complete loss of brakes while taxiing for the
next mission.
19. Fuel Transfer As required (CP)
20. Brakes Set (P)
21. Body Standby Pumps STBY (CP)
22. EVS Power OFF (P-CP)
23. Bomb Doors Closed (P)
24. Manifold Valve OPEN (CP)
25. Sliding Window Open (P/CP)
Change 17
2-146C
T.O. 1B-52H-1

26. OAS & EVS Off (RN)
The OAS, radar, and all EVS subsystems must be OFF to prevent
power surge damage when switching from aircraft power to external
power or if aircraft power is interrupted.
27. Air Conditioning OFF (CP)
31. Throttles 75% rpm, then CLOSED (P)
Allow the engines to idle for 2 minutes and, prior to shutting down any engine, advance throttles
to 75% rpm to accomplish scavenging. Allow engines to scavenge for not less than 15 nor more than
30 seconds while operating at 75% rpm. Move throttle to CLOSED within a few seconds after retarding throttle from the 75% setting.
NOTE
area fills and the hydraulic reservoir air pressurization lines
accumulate condensation and require scavenging again. Moisture in
the reservoir air pressurization lines can collect in the relief valves,
freeze in cold weather, and prevent valve operation. Failure of the
valves to function can cause partial to complete loss of brakes while
taxiing for the next mission.
33. Engine Anti-Ice OFF (P)
34. Body Standby Pumps OFF (CP)
External power may remain connected throughout the Quick Turn, unless maintenance requirements
dictate otherwise.
2-146D
Change 17
T.O. 1B-52H-1

CONTINUATIONOUT CREW
1. Parachute Preflight: (P-CP)

a. Inspection Record:
(1) Automatic Release Time & Altitude Setting Checked
b. Personal Locator Beacon Lanyard Snapped
For peacetime operations, the personal locator beacon lanyard will be configured for automatic
operation.
c.
Bailout Bottle Pressure & Hose Connector Checked
d. Parachute Arming Lanyard Anchor Installed
Ensure that the parachute arming lanyard anchor is securely fastened

in the attachment fitting on the seat. Failure to attach the lanyard anchor to the seat will necessitate manual operation after ejection.
e.
Parachute Straps Adjusted
2. Drag Chute Lever Checked and LOCKED (CP)

3. Flaps UP and OFF (CP)
4. Fuel Panel Set for takeoff (CP); Checked (P)
5. IFF STBY, codes set (P)
6. IFF OFF (P)
7. Windshield Anti-Icing and Defog Normal (P)
8. Body Standby Pumps STBY (CP)
9. Crew Report Accomplished (P)
10. Accomplish Normal Checklists starting with the Starting Engines and Before Taxiing checklist
Change 17
2-147
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AFTER LANDING
The after-landing check shall be performed after
the aircraft has been turned off the runway. Hard
taxi braking or riding the brakes shall be avoided
at all times, particularly after a landing or refused

takeoff. See WHEEL BRAKE SYSTEM OPERATION, Section I, and BRAKE ENERGY LIMIT
CHARTS (figure 5-14), Section V.
AFTER LANDING CHECKLIST (Copilot reads)
1. Drag Chute JETTISON (CP)

The drag chute will be jettisoned and the control handle returned to LOCKED by the copilot after
the aircraft has turned off the runway and prior to being stopped for completion of the AFTER
LANDING checklist.
To prevent or minimize damage to aircraft structure as the drag chute

disconnect link strikes it during the jettison sequence, jettison the
chute at the lowest taxi speed that will keep the chute inflated.
2. Arming Lever Safety Pins (No. 1) & Armrests Installed and stowed (P-CP)
3. Arming Lever Safety Pins (No. 1) & Armrests Installed and stowed (EW-G)
4. Ejection Control Trigger Ring & Pin No. 1 Stowed and installed (RN-N)
5. Readiness Switch Cover Closed and latched (P)
6. Mach Indicator OFF (P)
7. IFF ZERO, A, and OFF (P)
Zeroize the mode 4 and turn the IFF off as soon after landing as possible. This assures removal of
the mode 4 code and eliminates signals from taxiing or parked aircraft which would otherwise block
the controllers scope and interfere with the control of airborne aircraft.
NOTE
If it is desired to retain the mode 4 code, momentarily place the mode 4

code switch to the HOLD position. Electrical power will be left on the
aircraft a minimum of 15 seconds to lock the code in.
10. Flare Set Power OFF (P)
12. Windshield Anti-Ice OFF (P)
2-148
Change 12
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AFTER LANDING CHECKLIST (Copilot reads) (Cont)

16. Stabilizer Trim Zero and CUTOUT (P)
NOTE
If snow and icing conditions necessitate leaving the stabilizer leading
edge in the up position after parking, it may be set at this time. Procedures and CAUTIONS outlined under COLD WEATHER PROCEDURES, Section VII, will apply.
17. Autopilot Master Switch OFF (P)

18. Starter Switches OFF and PNEUMATIC (CP)
19. Liaison Radio OFF (CP)
20. TACAN & VOR OFF (CP)
21. CG/FLAS:
a. Data Erase Accomplished, if required (CP)
b. Power Switch OFF (CP)
Allow the engines that are to be shut down to idle for 2 minutes. While taxiing back to the ramp,
advance throttles 1, 2, 7, and 8 to approximately 75% rpm for not less than 15 nor more than 30
seconds before moving to the CLOSED position. This assures complete scavenging of engine oil and
prevents overservicing. This procedure also prevents fuel from accumulating underneath the engines
after shutdown. No. 6 engine may also be shut down, if necessary, to reduce taxi speed and still
maintain sufficient electrical and hydraulic power for the aircraft.
NOTE
area fills and the hydraulic reservoir air pressurization lines accumulate condensation and require scavenging again. Moisture in the reservoir air pressurization lines can collect in the relief valves, freeze in
cold weather, and prevent valve operation. Failure of the valves to function can cause partial to complete loss of brakes while taxiing for the
next mission.
Change 12
2-149
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AFTER LANDING CHECKLIST (Copilot reads) (Cont)

24. Fuel Panel Checked (CP)
Close all fuel valves not required.
25. Sliding Window Open (P-CP)
Open sliding window approximately 2 inches to relieve cabin pressure.
26. Bomb Doors Open (P)
If internal weapons were carried the flight crew must visually check
bomb bay prior to opening bomb doors.
2-150
Change 12
T.O. 1B-52H-1
down. If an engine has been operating at
above 85% rpm for a period exceeding 1
minute after landing, allow the engine to
idle at least 5 minutes before shutting
down. This will prevent damage resulting
from rapid temperature change.
ENGINE SHUTDOWN
Normally, an engine will be sufficiently cool

after landing to permit an immediate shut-
BEFORE LEAVING AIRCRAFT

BEFORE LEAVING AIRCRAFT CHECKLIST (Copilot reads)
1. Brakes Set (P)

2. Gyro Power OFF (P)
3. AHRS OFF (CP)
The OAS, radar, and all EVS subsystems must be OFF to prevent
8. External Power ON (if available) (CP)
External power will not be applied until shackle locking pins,

MER/MAU-12 rack lock pins and MER electrical safety pins for each
shackle/rack/weapon have been installed. (RN/N perform if qualified
personnel not available.)
NOTE
When conventional missiles are on board, standard safeing procedures

for the weapon suspension (shackles/racks/electrical safety pins) will be
accomplished. When additional safeing procedures unique to that
missile must be accomplished, they will be listed in the AFTER
PARKING checklist for that missile.
9. Engine Anti-Ice OFF (P)
Change 4
2-151
T.O. 1B-52H-1
BEFORE LEAVING AIRCRAFT CHECKLIST (Copilot reads) (Cont)

Allow the engines to idle for 2 minutes and, prior to shutting down any engine, advance throttles
to 75% rpm to accomplish scavenging. Allow engines to scavenge for not less than 15 nor more than
30 seconds while operating at 75% rpm. Move throttle to CLOSED within a few seconds after retarding throttle from the 75% setting.
NOTE
area fills and the hydraulic reservoir air pressurization lines
accumulate condensation and require scavenging again. Moisture in
the reservoir air pressurization lines can collect in the relief valves,
freeze in cold weather, and prevent valve operation. Failure of the
valves to function can cause partial to complete loss of brakes while
taxiing for the next mission.
10A. Anticollision & Navigation Lights OFF and FLASH (CP)
If anticollision lights create a safety hazard for ground personnel they may be turned off prior to
this step.
11.
DU
Z-AVH Remote Control OFF (CP)
a. Z-AVH MODE Switch PT (CP)

b. Z-AVH PRESET Switch PWR OFF (CP)
12. UHF Radios OFF (CP)
13.
DJ
V/UHF Radio OFF (CP)
14. PIHM Assembly Disconnect (as required) (P-CP)

a. PIHM Manifold Disconnect
Disconnect the manifold from the CRU-60/P bracket located on the parachute harness.
b. Emergency Oxygen Hose Disconnect
Disconnect the emergency oxygen hose from the fitting on the manifold.
c.
Aircraft Oxygen Hose Disconnect

While holding breath, disconnect the aircraft oxygen hose from the QD pigtail adapter.
Hold breath until steps d. and e. are complete. This will preclude the
inhaling of toxic chemicals during the changeover from blower air to
the aircraft oxygen system.

2-152 Change 19
T.O. 1B-52H-1

d. Blower Hose:
Disconnect blower hose from the ventilation inlet hose on the PIHM manifold, remove from
under right armrest and connect the QD on chemical-biological canister.
e.
Crossover Valve Horizontal

Rotate the valve to the horizontal position. Resume breathing.
f.
Oxygen Regulator OFF and 100% OXYGEN
g. PIHM Communication Cord Disconnect

Disconnect PIHM communication cord from the aircraft communication cord.
h. Intercom Unit Connect
Connect the intercom unit to the PIHM communication cord.
i.
Blower Hose Reconnect (P)

While holding breath, disconnect blower hose from the QD on the chemical-biological canister,
remove from the strap assembly on back of the seat and reconnect blower hose back to the QD
on the chemical-biological canister.
j.
Blower Electrical Connector Disconnect

Disconnect the blower from the blower electrical receptacle and replace the receptacle dust cover.
k. Blower Remove
Remove the blower from the aircraft mounting bracket.
15. Fuel Panel Switches OFF (CP)
16. Oxygen System OFF and 100% OXYGEN (P-CP)
a. Oxygen Supply Shutoff Lever OFF
b. Regulator Diluter Lever 100% OXYGEN
c.
Supply hose disconnect and stowed.

19. Lights OFF or as required (P-CP)
2-153
T.O. 1B-52H-1

20. Battery OFF (CP)
21. Interphone OFF (P)
NOTE
The remainder of this checklist will be accomplished silently by the appropriate crewmember.
22. Control Columns Stowed (P-CP)
23. Seat DOWN and TILT FWD (external power available) (P-CP)
24. Generator Drive Decoupler Circuit Breaker OUT (CP)
Pull out the GEN DRIVE DECOUPLE circuit breaker on the ENGINE portion of the right load
central circuit breaker panel.
25. GROUND EGRESS Circuit Breakers Pull (P-CP)

26. Brakes Checked (CP)
The copilot will check for possible cold brakes. He will consider the conditions contained in BRAKE
DESIGN under WHEEL BRAKE SYSTEM OPERATION in Section I before writing up a cold brake
discrepancy.
27. Applicable Forms Completed (ALL)
The copilot will assemble the crew to collect completed logs and forms and discuss items pertinent
to the mission. The pilot will interrogate each crewmember to determine the proper entries in all
applicable forms to facilitate maintenance inspections.
a. Record any limits and/or tolerances that have been exceeded during the mission.
NOTE
All entries shall include to the maximum extent possible, duration, degree, and prevailing conditions for each occurrence.
b. Record the occurrence of any of the following:
(1) Stick forces deemed to be excessively heavy for a given condition.
(2) If, in the pilots opinion, the aircraft has encountered heavy loads due to turbulence (record
highest and lowest accelerometer readings).
(3) Flutter or buffet.
2-154
T.O. 1B-52H-1

c.
Record any unusual or excessive operations, such as:

(1) Failure to obtain charted EPR setting at full throttle, or failure to obtain charted EPR
values without exceeding the EGT limits.
(2) Wing flap clutch slippage.
(3) Jettisoning of drag chute or deployment of drag chute over 135 knots IAS.
(4) Long taxi runs at high speed.
(5) Excessive braking during aborted takeoffs.
(6) A live starter cartridge being carried in the starter breech during flight.
(7) Landing or takeoff with wheel shimmy or hard vibrations.
(8) Emergency descent or spoiler buffet being encountered.
(9) Engine failure resulting in seizure or unbalance.
(10) OAS IMU despin on IMU battery.
(11) Flight through lightning.
(12) Hard landings (any landing with sink rate in excess of allowable limits).
(13) Landings at gross weights over 400,000 pounds.
(14) Contact of flaps with the fuselage.
(15) Excessive tail shake and/or abnormal twisting of aft body or empennage.
(16) Excessive dutch roll.
(17) Wheel shudder/brake chatter during taxiing operations (subsequent to initial rollout/brake
check).
2-155/(2-156 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
STRANGE FIELD PROCEDURES

If the aircraft is landed at an airfield where normal
ground support is not available, there are several
items which must be performed by the flightcrew
after parking the aircraft and prior to takeoff. To
assist the flightcrew in accomplishing these steps
properly, the following checklists are provided:
When attempting a start at less than 30 psi,

monitor the exhaust gas temperature and
starting time very closely. Close throttles
immediately if EGT exceeds 450C. Starting
at reduced pressure may require starter operation longer than 2 minutes, in which
case the minimum rest period between
starting attempts should be extended beyond the minimums set forth in STARTER
NOTE
If landing with retained weapons/missiles

refer to the applicable T.O. 1B-52H-30 series or T.O. 1B52H-34-2 series Aircrew
Weapon Delivery Manual for unscheduled
landing procedures when weapons/missiles
are aboard.
NOTE
AFTER PARKING
1. Parking Ramp Checked

The pilot should ascertain that the parking ramp is
constructed to withstand the aircraft gross weight
after refueling.
2. Wheel Chocks In place
3. Landing Gear Ground Locks Installed
4. Bypass Keys Installed
5. Bomb Door Actuators Disconnected
6. Nuclear Bombs Aboard Accomplish bomb
AFTER LANDING checklist
Use bomb AFTER LANDING checklist contained in
T.O. 1B-52H-25-2CL-1.
7. Nonnuclear Weapons Aboard Install shackle
locking pins
8. Bomb Door Actuators Connected (if nuclear
bomb(s) aboard)
9. Bomb Doors Closed (if nuclear bomb(s)
aboard)
10. Duct Plugs In place
11. Pitot Tube Covers In place
12. Oxygen Buildup & Vent Valves Handles
Leave in SERVICE
13. Windows & Doors Closed
14. Security Guard Posted
15. Drag Chute (if used) Dried and replaced
PRIOR TO NORMAL PREFLIGHT
Due to unfamiliarity with this aircraft by maintenance personnel at strange fields, the following
items must be closely checked by the flightcrew:
1.
Electrical and air power carts available.
Electrical power can be obtained from an

external power cart or any source of 400 Hz
three-phase 200 (5) volt ac power having
an AN3430 plug. About 10 amperes of 24
volt dc power is needed on pin E to close the
relays to energize the aircraft circuits with
external ac power.
External electrical power is not required for
starting. See STARTING ENGINES AND
BEFORE TAXIING CHECKLIST, this section. To provide starting without use of external pneumatic power, starter cartridges
will be installed as given under INSTALLATION OF STARTER CARTRIDGES, this
section.
A pneumatic power source that can supply
approximately 1.8 pounds of air per second
at a pressure of not more than 200 or less
than 30 psi and at a temperature of 300F
for the length of time it will take to start an
engine can be used. If the air temperature
is below 300F, a flow of air greater than 1.8
pounds per second will be needed. The use
of an air source not specifically designed for
aircraft should be limited to starting one
engine.
If the available source of pneumatic power
cannot supply air at a pressure of 30 psi, a
start may be attempted at a lower pressure.
With no other pneumatically operated
equipment operating, allow available pressure to build up and stabilize, then follow
normal starting procedures.
See figure 1-179 for fuel, oil, and hydraulic
oil grades and specifications.
For partial fuel loading charts, refer to
HANDBOOK OF WEIGHT AND BALANCE DATA.
Change 12
2-157
T.O. 1B-52H-1
2. Drag chute installed.
3. Fuel system serviced.
4. Oil tanks serviced.
5. Oxygen system serviced as necessary.
6. Hydraulic tanks checked, service as necessary.
7. Hydraulic accumulator preloads checked.
8. EVS Window Wash System Serviced as necessary.
9. Perform normal flightcrew checklist.
EXTERIOR INSPECTION CHECKLIST

NOTE
The exterior inspection is designed to be accomplished normally by an experienced pilot and copilot, each inspecting one side of
the aircraft simultaneously, one pilot starting with nose section (right) through empennage and the other pilot starting with
the left aft wheel well through the nose section (left). However, in the event only one
pilot is available, he can perform the complete inspection. The following inspection is
based on the assumption that appropriate
maintenance personnel are not available to
perform this preflight and that the
flightcrew is accomplishing the preflight
with emphasis on the items that affect the
safety of flight. See figure 2-19 for a diagram of the route to be followed during the
exterior inspection.
Installation of Starter Cartridges
Before installing cap and cartridge on engine, ensure that the engine dc ignition circuit breakers (four on each load central) are
pulled and starter switches in OFF and
PNEUMATIC.
Starter Cartridges should be installed in accordance with procedures contained in T.O.
1B-52H-2-2JG-4 Job Guide.
1.
2.
Right Nose Section
Pitot Tube Covers Removed and clear

EVS FLIR Turret Free and unobstructed
Lethal voltage exists on the surface of the

FLIR turret window during normal EVS
flight operations. This voltage should be inhibited during ground operations by action
of the forward landing gear squat switch.
However, as an added precaution, ensure
FLIR turret air switch on the environmental power control panel is in OFF prior to
performing any maintenance, other than
operational checkout on or near FLIR turret.
3.
TACAN Antenna Checked
Check for cleanliness and security.
2-158
Change 12
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Exterior Inspection Diagram
Figure 2-19
2-159
T.O. 1B-52H-1
4.
5.
Escape Hatch Secure

Static Ports & Drain Plugs Checked
Check static ports clear and drain plugs installed.

(Static ports are located high on the right side of
the fuselage.)
6.
Air Ducts & Vents Clear
All vent openings clear, access doors secure, duct

plugs removed, and fuel cap in place.
7.
B
Single Point Refuel Cap Secure

Right Forward Wheel Well
1. Landing Lights Checked

Check the right landing, terrain clearance, crosswind, and taxi lights for cleanliness and security
and glass and filament intact.
3. Tires & Hydraulic Lines Checked
Ascertain tires have been inflated to proper pressure for present gross weight. Check tires for cuts,
blisters, and worn spots and hydraulic lines for security and leaks.
4. Safety Switch Linkage, Torsion Link & Oleo
Extension Checked
Oleo safety switch linkage connected and secure.
Torsion link connected and pin in place and safetied. Oleo strut for cleanliness, hydraulic leaks, and
proper inflation.
5. Landing Gear Ground Lock Installed
6. Battery Cover Secure
7. Leaks & General Condition Checked
Check entire wheel well area for foreign objects, hydraulic or fuel leaks, and security of all equipment.
8. Doppler Radome Checked
Check for security, cracks, buckling, and cleanliness.
C
Right Wing
1. Access Panels, Vents & Drains Checked

Check access panels fastened and secure, drains
clear and unobstructed, and no leaks.
2. No. 3 Strut for Condition Checked
Check strut for cracks, buckling, and loose rivets.
3. Engines 5 & 6 Aft Section Checked
Engine exhaust plugs removed. Ensure tailpipes
free of foreign matter and turbine buckets not
nicked or missing.
4. Nacelle Cowlings Checked
Check nacelle cowlings for cracks and security.
2-160
5. Constant Speed Drive Oil Cooler & Generator

Cooling Air Exhausts Checked
Check the generator cooling air and constant speed
drive oil cooler exhausts on the left engine unobstructed.
6. Nose Sections 5 & 6 Checked
Engine intake plugs removed. Ensure intakes free
of foreign matter. Check for nicked compressor
blades.
7. Access Panels Checked
Check access panels fastened and secure.
Check strut for cracks, buckling, and loose rivets.
Engine exhaust plugs removed. Ensure tailpipes
free of foreign matter and turbine buckets not
nicked or missing.
Check nacelle cowlings for cracks and security.
Check the generator cooling air and constant speed
drive oil cooler exhausts on the left engine unobstructed.
Engine intake plugs removed. Check for nicked
compressor blades.
13. Taxi Light Checked
Check for cleanliness and security and glass intact.
14. Access Panels Checked
Check access panels fastened and secure.
15. Tip Gear Door & Well Checked
Check hydraulic lines and actuators secure, no
leaks, and wiring and other equipment secure.
16. Tip Gear Ground Lock Installed
17. Oleo Strut, Wheel & Tire Checked
Check oleo strut for cleanliness, hydraulic leaks,
and proper inflation. Inspect wheel for cracks and
tires for cuts, blisters, worn spots, and slippage.
18. External Tank Checked
Check access door and filler neck cap secure and
vent unobstructed.
19. Access Panels & Surge Tank Vent Checked
Check access panels secure and surge tank vent
clear of obstructions.
20. Wing Tip & Upper Surface Checked
Check wing tip antennas for cracks and dents.
Check upper wing surface for frost, snow, ice, or
dust and security of access openings and fuel caps.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
21. Outboard Wing Trailing Edge Checked
Check skin for cracks, buckling, and loose rivets.
22. Fuselage Tanks Filler Caps Secure
23. Outboard Wing Flap Well Checked
Check hydraulic lines for leaks and security of wiring.
24. Inboard Wing Flap Well Checked
Check hydraulic lines for leaks and security of wiring, control cables, and circuit breakers set.
25. Lower Surface of Wing Flaps Checked
Check lower surfaces for loose rivets, cracks or
buckling in skin, security, and condition of actuators and screws.
26. Upper Surface of Wing Flaps Checked
Check upper surfaces for loose rivets, cracks or
buckling in skin, security, and condition of rollers
and connecting links.
27. Vortex Generators Checked
Check vortex generators not missing or damaged.
28. Fuselage & Bomb Doors Checked
Check fuselage and bomb doors for loose rivets,
buckling, snow, and ice.
D
Bomb Bay
The bomb door actuator struts will be disconnected before entering the bomb bay if
power is applied to the aircraft.
1. Bomb Bay for Leaks, Security of Wires &
Cables Checked
Check bomb bay for fuel and hydraulic leaks, security of wires and cables, and crew movement doors
closed.
2. Hydraulic Controllable Check Valve Handle
safety wired closed
Check valve handle perpendicular to hydraulic line.
3. Nuclear Bombs Check for proper configuration. Use the GROUND SAFEING or SIOP RESTRIKE (MMS NOT AVAILABLE) procedures (as
applicable) of T.O. 1B-52H-25-2CL-1 to properly
configure the nuclear bombs.
E
1.
blisters, and worn spots. Check hydraulic lines for
security and leaks. Check bypass key not installed.
Extension Checked
proper inflation.
4. Left Brake Accumulator Air Pressure Gage
1000 ( 200) psi
F
Right Aft Fuselage
1. Anticollision Light Checked

Check for cleanliness, security, and glass intact.
2. UHF Command Antenna Checked
Check for cleanliness and security.
3. Access Panels & Vents Checked
Check all plugs removed from vents, vents clear
and unobstructed, and access panels and ECM antennas secure.
4. Right Oxygen Buildup & Vent Valve Handle
Checked
Check that liquid oxygen buildup and vent valve
handle has been placed in SERVICE position. Close
and secure access panel.
G
Aft Equipment Compartment
1. Hatch Jettison Handle Stowed; pin installed,

safetied
2. Rudder Q-Spring Checked
Check hose and clamp connections.
3. Stabilizer Nut & Jackscrew Checked
4. Elevator Q-Spring Checked
5. Powered Rudder/Elevator Systems Checked
Check for general condition of hydraulic systems;
ground cooler blower housing and ducting. Check
for system hydraulic leaks.
6. Radio Navigation Equipment Rack Checked
Right Aft Wheel Well
Tires & Hydraulic Lines Checked
2-161
T.O. 1B-52H-1
7. No. 2 & 3 Liquid Oxygen Converters
Checked
Inlets and vents clear and unobstructed. Q-spring

opening in leading edge of fin clear.
I
Do not touch the converters with bare

hands as serious injury may result.
8. No. 1 Liquid Oxygen Converter Checked
9. Camera Cover Checked
Camera door handcrank removed from door motor
and stowed.
10. Aft Body Fuel Tank Checked
11. Aft AC Power Box Cover closed
12. Crawlway Door Closed
Check for general condition, security of equipment,
and loose items; excessive wear or unsafe condition
of wiring, control cables, and ducting; hydraulic,
fuel, and oxygen leaks.
14. Compartment Hatch Checked and closed
Check for dents and general condition of latch,
hinges, and seals.
H
Empennage
1. Right Horizontal Stabilizer & Elevator

Checked and set at 0
Check all surfaces for loose rivets, cracks and buckling in skin, snow and ice, and general condition.
Specifically check for ice on seal between stabilizer
and fuselage.
2. Drag Chute Compartment Checked
Check door closed, handle flush, and crank removed. If the drag chute has been in place during
damp weather, check with crew chief to ascertain
that chute is dry.
3. Drag Chute Personnel Safety Rod Removed
4. Vertical Fin & Rudder Checked
5. Left Horizontal Stabilizer & Elevator
Checked
Specifically check for ice on seal between stabilizer
and fuselage.
6. Air Inlets & Vents Clear
2-162
Left Aft Fuselage
1. Ammunition Door Closed

2. Electronics Rack Door Closed
3. Left Liquid Oxygen Buildup & Vent Valve
Handles (2) Closed
Check that liquid oxygen buildup and vent valve
handles have been placed in SERVICE. Close and
secure access panels.
4. ECM Antenna Secure
5. V/UHF LOS Antenna DJ Check for cleanliness and security
Care should be taken when maneuvering

around antenna protruding from the underside of the aircraft. Failure to exercise caution could result in injury to the head and/
or eyes.
6.
Electronic Ram Airscoop Unobstructed

J
Left Aft Wheel Well

security and leaks. Check bypass key not installed.
Extension Checked
proper inflation.
4. Right Brake Accumulator Air Pressure Gage
1000 (200) psi
Check entire wheel well area for foreign objects, hydraulic or fuel leaks, and security of all equipment
6. Hydraulic Controllable Check Valve Handle
safety wired closed
Check valve handle perpendicular to hydraulic line.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
K
Left Wing
Repeat procedures for right wing in the following

order:
1. Fuselage & Bomb Doors Checked
2. Vortex Generators Checked
3. Upper Surface of Wing Flaps Checked
4. Lower Surface of Wing Flaps Checked
5. Inboard Wing Flap Well Checked
6. Outboard Wing Flap Well Checked
7. Outboard Wing Trailing Edge Checked
8. Wing Tip & Upper Surface Checked
9. Access Panels & Surge Tank Vents Checked
10. External Tank Checked
Check access door and filler neck cap secure and
surge tank vent clear of obstructions.
11. Left Taxi Light Checked
12. Oleo Strut, Wheel & Tire Checked
13. Tip Gear Ground Lock Installed
14. Tip Gear Well & Door Checked
18. Nacelle Cowlings & Surge Bleed Valves (2)
Checked
23. Heat Exchanger, Ram Air Inlet Checked
24. Engines 3 & 4 Aft Sections Checked
L
Left Forward Wheel Well

security and leaks.

Extension Checked
proper inflation.
4. Landing Gear Ground Lock In place
5. Right & Left Forward Brake Accumulator Air
Pressure Gages 1000 (200) psi
6. Hydraulic Handpump Handle stowed
7. Battery Cover & Drain Lines Secure
Check covers fastened.
8. Battery Condition Checked
Check the CHARGER FAULT, BATTERY FAULT,
and BATTERY READY indicators for battery and
charger operational status.
10. Landing Light Checked
Check left landing light for cleanliness and security
and glass and filament intact.
M
Left Nose Section
1. Air Ducts & Vents Clear

Check all vent openings clear, access doors secure,
and duct plugs removed.
Operation of an air conditioning unit with

the wing duct plugs in place can result in
destruction of the unit due to overspeeding
of the turbine-driven blower.
2. Static Ports & Drain Plugs Checked
Check static ports clear and drain plugs installed.
(Three ports are located high on side of fuselage.)
3. Escape Hatch Secure
Check left escape hatch secure and flush with the
aircraft skin.
4. Pitot Tube Covers Removed and clear
5. EVS STV Turret Free and unobstructed
6. Inlet Ram Airscoops Unobstructed
Change 6
2-163/(2-164 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NUCLEAR ALERT PROCEDURES

The normal checklists in this section are designed
to permit use during alert. The additional checklists in this section are used in situations peculiar
only to the alert cycle. Any time bombs/missiles are
aboard, the normal two-man policy will be observed. After maintenance has declared an aircraft
ready for alert and the bombs/missiles have been
loaded, the aircrew will conduct an initial acceptance check. When the aircrew declares the aircraft
ready for alert and the aircraft is on the alert line,
it will be placed in a cocked configuration. The
daily alert preflight will be accomplished once each
24 hours, normally at a predesignated time.
A fully loaded CSRL mated to an aircraft does not
provide the crew the ability to accomplish a complete weapons preflight. Timers, baro settings, and
other required preflight items are not readily accessible to the aircrew. As a result the following procedures will be used. The munitions maintenance
load team will load the weapons loaded CSRL and
complete all required checks up to and including
the post load check. During the post load check, the
wing air weapons officer (must be certified), the alternate wing air weapons officer or a designated
representative (must be certified by the air weapons officer) will be called to the aircraft. These individuals will perform a weapons preflight, examine
the general condition of the bomb bay, preflight the
CSRL, its associated equipment and will verify the
quantity of weapons and the launcher number. After completing checks and preflight, the individual
accomplishing the required checks will make the
following entry into the AFTO Form 781: A complete weapons preflight has been accomplished.
Weapons status and settings have been verified.
Upon arriving at the aircraft, the aircraft commander will check the AFTO Form 781 to ensure
the required entry is in the forms. The aircrew will
conduct a check of the general condition of the
bomb bay, preflight the CSRL and validate the
launcher number, then validate the correct number
and types of weapons. During engine runs, the radar navigator will monitor the status of the weapons through Format 7. The command post will be
notified that the aircraft is ready to be cocked on
alert.
During crew changeover, the radar navigators and
navigators BEFORE EXTERIOR (POWER OFF)
checklist will be accomplished by the new crew. The
AGM-86B EXTERIOR INSPECTION/AGM-129 EXTERIOR INSPECTION/EXTERIOR INSPECTION

(BOMB BAY INTERIOR) checklists (as applicable)
may be deferred until after an alert force exercise
when engines are started.
INSTRUCTIONS
Thermal Curtains
During initial acceptance for an alert aircraft or

prior to deploying to assume satellite alert, the pilots will ensure that all thermal curtains at transparent openings in the cockpit are installed,
checked for proper fit, and positioned as required.
Curtains for cockpit windows No. 6L&R, and the pilot/copilot escape hatches will remain closed while
the aircraft is on alert. Curtains for cockpit windows No. 1, 2L&R, 3L&R, 4L&R and 5L&R will be
returned to the open/stowed position. The pilot/copilot flash divider curtains will be positioned on top of
the instrument panel cover with the lower tapes
fastened. For information regarding inspection acceptance criteria, see THERMAL CURTAINS, Section I.
Thermal curtains will be kept free from

grease, oil, and mold as any discoloration
will seriously impair the value of the curtains. Oil or grease base material will ignite
upon exposure to thermal radiation. Use extreme care when handling the curtains during installation. Dirty or cracked curtains
will be replaced.
All thermal and flash divider curtains will be
placed in the open/stowed position or appropriate
storage containers when deploying to and from the
satellite alert base. When assuming initial satellite
alert, thermal/flash divider curtains need not be rechecked; however, they will be positioned in accordance with the initial alert acceptance procedures.
When assuming alert duty, the pilot and copilot will
check that the flash blindness goggle case seal is
not broken and the cases positioned where they are
readily available. Monocular eyeshields for remaining crewmembers will be positioned where they are
readily available.
2-165
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Security
Entrance to the designated No Lone Zone of a

cocked configured aircraft will be in accordance
with command directives.
Maintenance While On Alert
At any time while the aircraft is cocked, if a requirement exists to refuel (except wing tanks), the
aircrew will uncock the aircraft using the UNCOCKING checklist. Normal servicing requirements for oxygen, hydraulics, or pneumatics, which
do not require access to the cockpit, may be accomplished on a cocked aircraft. Maintenance may be
performed without uncocking provided force timing
is not degraded, power is not placed on the aircraft,
access to the cockpit or bomb bay area is not required, and no electrical component is involved.
When the aircraft is uncocked for maintenance/refueling and the maintenance/refueling is complete,
the aircraft will be recocked by the alert crew using
the EXTERIOR INSPECTION checklist as applicable, INTERIOR INSPECTION checklist, and BEFORE STARTING ENGINES checklist. If other
than the alert flightcrew personnel have had access
to the bomb bay and/or missiles during the required
maintenance, the navigators BEFORE EXTERIOR
INSPECTION and the bomb preflight and/or missile preflight inspections must also be completed.
NOTE
If the aircraft has been towed for tire rotation, etc, ensure that the ground locks and
bypass keys are removed upon completion
of the towing operation.
Pilot Procedures
AIRCRAFT AND WEAPONS ACCEPTANCE

1. Before Exterior Inspection
2. Bomb Preflight. If the bomb preflight is accomplished by a substitute crew, it must be reaccomplished by the crew assigned for alert prior to aircraft cocking.
3. Exterior Inspection (this includes missile preflight)
4. Interior Inspection
5. Before Starting Engines
6. Starting Engines and Before Taxiing. Normally, only engines 4 and 5 will be started to check stabilizer trim and load the Basic Load and Mission
Data Programs into the OAS. All engines may be
2-166
Change 4
started if the aircraft is to be taxied to the alert

area.
7. Recocking. For JP-4 configured alert aircraft,
run all engines at idle rpm for 10 minutes using
JP-4 from the mid-body and external tanks with
main tank fuel boost pumps OFF. After engine
shutdown, configure the fuel panel to feed mid-body
and mains (pumps ON) to all engines for engine
start, taxi and takeoff. After takeoff, resume applicable fuel sequence at the appropriate step.
AIRCRAFT COCKING
1.
2.
Interior Inspection
Before Starting Engines
SCRAMBLE
Pilots will use the normal checklist when the execution order is given. Engines will not be started until
both pilots are in position. Boldfaced items contained in the checklist for STARTING ENGINES
AND BEFORE TAXIING, TAXIING, and BEFORE
LINEUP checklists are the minimum items required for a fast reaction takeoff. During SIOP alert
operations, takeoff will not be delayed for items
pertaining to crew equipment, radio checks, and
IFF settings. If time permits, these checklists
should be used in their entirety. After the aircraft is
safely airborne, the STARTING ENGINES AND
BEFORE TAXIING, TAXIING, and BEFORE
LINEUP checklists should be reviewed and applicable items not previously completed should be performed when time permits. BEFORE LINEUP
checklist will be completed as continuation of the
TAXIING checklist without stopping the aircraft
prior to taking the runway. Transfer of control of
the aircraft between pilots will be accomplished to
ensure proper monitoring of aircraft movement and
clearance. Upon completion of alert scramble procedures, pilots may recock the aircraft using the RECOCKING checklist.
NOTE
The specially designed rollover chocks for

alert aircraft do not require removal before
taxiing; however, very high thrust settings
may be required to taxi over the chocks.
Upon clearing chocks, immediately reduce
thrust to prevent excessive acceleration.
UNCOCKING
Use UNCOCKING checklist.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
RECOCKING CHECKLIST (Copilot reads)
NOTE
The following checklist will be used to recock the aircraft after an alert
exercise including checklist progression up through the BEFORE
LINEUP checklist. It may also be used after starting engines to check
the stabilizer trim or to taxi to the alert parking area (if applicable).
This checklist is valid provided no maintenance is required on the aircraft following any of the above actions.
Following an alert scramble exercise, this checklist should be initiated
after clearing the active runway, time and conditions permitting.
1. IFF OFF (P)

3. Pitot Heat, Windshield & Engine Anti-Icing OFF (P)
5. Stabilizer Trim - Reset (P)
If snow and icing conditions necessitate leaving the stabilizer leading edge in the up position after
parking, it may be set at this time. Procedures and CAUTIONS outlined under COLD WEATHER
PROCEDURES, Section VII will apply.
NOTE
Unless local conditions and/or command directives dictate otherwise,

steps 6, 7, and 8 should be accomplished as soon as practical to conserve fuel.
7. Engine Starter Switches OFF and PNEUMATIC (CP)
If the aircraft is to remain in the present parking spot, engine No. 6 may also be shut down. However, for sufficient thrust, the engine should be left operating if the aircraft is to be taxied.
Fuel may be transferred as necessary in accordance with local refuel procedures.
Change 4
2-167
T.O. 1B-52H-1
RECOCKING CHECKLIST (Copilot reads) (Cont)

12. Brakes Set (P)
13. Body Standby Pumps STBY (P)
15. Bomb Doors Closed (P)
17. Sliding Window Open (CP)
18. Flaps UP and OFF (CP)
19. Fuel Panel Switches Set for takeoff (CP), checked (P)
Pilot and copilot will refer to the appropriate fuel sequence for the aircraft configuration and set and
check the fuel panel for takeoff.
The OAS, radar, and all EVS subsystems should be OFF to prevent
22. Generators 1, 5 & 7 (External Power Not Available) OFF (CP)
23. Generators (External Power Available) OFF (CP)
26. Throttles (Except No. 3) 75% rpm, then CLOSED (P-CP)
27. Engine dc Ignition Circuit Breakers OUT (P-CP)
installed. Outboard engine dc circuit breakers are located on the left load central (LLC) circuit breaker panel. Inboard engine dc circuit breakers are loacated on the right load central (RLC) circuit
breaker panel.
2-168
Change 4
T.O. 1B-52H-1

28. Cartridge on Engine No. 5 Installed (GC)
29. Heading Indicator (Gyro) Checked and set (P)
30. AHRS SLV and set (CP)
31. Generator No. 3 OFF (CP)
32. Throttle No. 3 75% rpm, then CLOSED (P)
33. Anticollision & Navigation Lights OFF and FLASH (CP)
If anticollision light create a safety hazard they may be turned off prior to this step.
34. Cartridge on Remaining Engines Installed (GC)
Check that circuit breakers are in after starter cartridges are installed.
Before pushing engine ignition circuit breakers in on each load central,

ensure that ground crewmember is clear of engine starter exhaust
area.
36. Engine Starter Switches OFF and FLIGHT (CP)
37. Oxygen OFF and 100% (ALL)
38. Brakes OFF (P)
39. External Power OFF (CP-GC)
Copilot checks with ground observer and flightcrew to determine if further power is required prior
to turning external power OFF.
41. Engine Starter Switches START and FLIGHT (CP)
42. Pitot Heat & Windshield Anti-Icing ON and NORMAL (P)
43. Antiskid ON, guard closed (P)
45. Sliding Windows Closed (P-CP)
Change 4
2-169
T.O. 1B-52H-1


47. All Other Circuit Breakers IN (P-CP)
48. Crosswind Crab Knob & Indicator Down and zero (P)
49. Entry Light OFF (P)
50. Downlocks & Bypass Keys Stowed (P/CP)
If the aircraft has been towed, ascertain that the downlocks and bypass keys have been removed
and stowed.
51. Weapons Preflight Accomplished (P)
If engines were started, accomplish weapons checklists as applicable to your sortie.
2-170
T.O. 1B-52H-1
UNCOCKING CHECKLIST (Aircraft on Alert Line Copilot reads)
1. Interphone ON (P)
Pilot and copilot connect interphone and pilot checks for operation of the interphone system by noting sidetone in headset. Aft battery discharging light comes on and battery end-of-life lights remain
out.
2. IFF:
a. Code Classified settings removed (P-EW)
Mode 2 will be set to unclassified setting.
Mode 4 will be zeroized.
b. Master Switch OFF (P)
3. Standby Pumps OFF (P)
4. Fuel Panel Switches OFF or CLOSED (CP)
6. Radar Altimeters OFF (P-CP)
7. Gyro Power OFF (P)
8. AHRS OFF (CP)
10. Windshield & Engine Anti-Icing OFF (P)
11. Air Conditioning As required (CP)
OFF unless cooling air is required for OAS operation. For OAS operation, ensure cooling air cart
is attached to ground cooling connection in left forward wheel well to provide adequate air supply.
12. Battery ON, lights checked (CP)
Copilot places battery switch ON and checks battery discharging lights and battery caution lights
come on and end-of-life lights remain out.
Battery discharging lights and battery caution lights go out.
14. OAS Classified Data Erase Completed (N)
Use CF 64 for data erase.
15. DTU Cartridges Removed (N)
16. Flaps As required (CP)
Copilot contacts ground observer and ascertains that flap area is clear prior to placing flap lever in
DOWN.
17. Downlocks & Bypass Keys Installed (GC)
Change 10
2-171
T.O. 1B-52H-1
UNCOCKING CHECKLIST (Aircraft on Alert Line Copilot reads) (Cont)

18. Lights OFF, or as required (P-CP)
19. Radios OFF (P-CP)
20. External Power OFF (CP)
Copilot checks with ground observer and other crew positions for power requirements prior to turning off electrical power.
22. Engine Ignition Circuit Breakers OUT (P-CP)
Pull out four engine ignition circuit breakers on each load central.

25. ALE-20 Safety Interlock Switch Door Open, streamer installed (EW)
26. Bomb Doors Open (P-RN-N)
The bomb door actuator struts will be disconnected before entering the
bomb bay, if power is applied to the aircraft.
Unlatching the bomb doors using the aft bomb door latch release cable
will not be attempted with power on the aircraft.
Do not pull down on the door latch release cables as bent and damaged
turnbuckles will result. Actuate cables in the proper direction of travel
only.
NOTE
2-172
When uncocking for short periods of time, i.e., to perform maintenance

on an alert aircraft, the bomb doors will be left closed if not required
to be open for specific maintenance.
Manual opening of the bomb doors will be accomplished using the bomb
door latch release cable in the aft wheel well. The cable is the same
cable actuated by the aft hydraulic latch actuator and is directly linked
to the aft latches and through the coordinating unit to the forward
latches.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DAILY ALERT PREFLIGHT CHECKLIST (Aircraft on Alert Line Copilot reads)
1. Interphone ON (P)
2. CSS Indicator Window Checked A (RN)
NOTE
Cease all activity and request CSS custodians (through the Command
Post) if any CSSC indicator window is found set to other than A.
3. Missile/Munitions Consent Panel: (P)
a. Prearm-OFF Switch Guard closed and sealed
b. Lock-Unlock Switch Guard closed and sealed
4. Pylon Jettison Consent Switches (2) Guards closed and sealed (P)
6. Circuit Breakers IN (P)
7. Radar Navigators & Navigators Stations:
a. Normal Release, Jettison Power, & Relays Circuit Breakers Out (RN)
b. All Other Circuit Breakers IN (RN-N)
c.
Release Circuits Disconnect Disconnected, sealed (RN)
d. Master Bomb Control Switch OFF (RN)

e.
Bombing System Switch MANUAL (RN)
f.
PDUC Power Switch (If Installed) OFF (N)
g. Pressure Bulkhead Door Closed, latched, and locked (N)

h. Weapon Control Panel: (N)
(1) Weapon Jettison Select Switch Guard closed and sealed
(2) Pylon Lock-Unlock Consent Switch Guard closed and sealed
(3) Nuclear Lock-Unlock Switch Guard closed and sealed
(4) Nuclear Prearm Enable Switch Guard closed and sealed
i.
FWD IFC Circuit Breaker Out (RN)
Change 20
2-173
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DAILY ALERT PREFLIGHT CHECKLIST (Aircraft on Alert Line Copilot reads) (Cont)
9. Windshield Anti-Icing OFF (P)
10. Electronic Warfare Section:
a. Chaff, Flare & Rocket Circuit Breakers OUT (EW)
b. ALR-46 Warning Rcvr Circuit Breaker OUT (EW)
c.
Sys 15 & Sys 16 Ind Cont Circuit Breaker OUT (EW)
d. DOC & SUD Dispense Switches Guards down (EW)

e.
ECM Power Switches OFF (EW)
f.
SI Control & Display Circuit Breakers Out (EW)
11. EMER INVTR Circuit Breaker OUT (P)

12. Battery ON, lights checked (CP)
Battery discharging lights should come on and end-of-life lights should remain off.
13. External Power On (CP)
Both battery discharging lights and battery caution lights go out.
14. IFF STBY (P)
15. Flaps Clear, Down (CP)
16. Ground, Check Flap Well & Generator Trip Boxes (CP)
17. Special Weapons Lock Indicators Indicate locked (RN)
18. Oxygen Quantity Checked (P)
2-174
Change 17
T.O. 1B-52H-1
19. Coded Switch Set Controller (CSSC): (RN)
NOTE
Cease all activity and request CSS custodians (through the Command
Post) if the enable light comes on at any time other than during the
lamp test button check. For other abnormal indications refer to CSS
MALFUNCTION ANALYSIS in T.O. 1B-52H-25-2, T.O. 1B-52H-30-1,
or T.O. 1B-52H-30-4.
Steps c thru g need only be accomplished on the first day of each alert
tour unless there has been a change of aircraft or is required as a result
of maintenance.
a. Oper/Mon Switch MON, disen light on

Hold the oper/mon switch in MON and check disen light on.
b. Lamp Test Button Depressed
Disen, enable, and code lights should illuminate.
c.
Sum Code
Set
Set briefed sum code in CSSC by rotating thumbwheels.

NOTE
Sum code need only be set and accomplished once during the current
tour of alert unless there has been a change of aircraft or is required as
a result of maintenance.
d. Oper/Mon Switch OPER
Code light should blink until end of cycle (approximately 2 minutes).
e.
Code & Disen Lights On

Illumination of the code and disen lights verifies operation of system, that proper enable codes
have been entered in the code enable switch, and that the system is disenabled.
f.
Oper/Mon Switch MON (momentarily)

Code and disen lights should go off.
NOTE
System status (enable/disenable) may be verified at any time by holding the oper/mon switch in MON and observing disen and enable light
indication.
g. CSSC Indicator Windows Set all As
Change 17
2-175
T.O. 1B-52H-1
20. Crew Report Completed (P)
21. Ground Exterior Check Completed (GC)
22. Flaps Clear, up, lever OFF (CP)
23. Portable Oxygen Bottles Serviced and stowed (ALL)
24. Mode 4:
a. Code Set (EW)
b. Code Switch Position A (P)
c.
Caution Light Out (P)
25. IFF OFF (P)

26. External Power OFF (CP-GC)
External power will be applied for a minimum of 15 minutes daily to charge the batteries.
28. EMER INVTR Circuit Breaker IN (P)
NOTE
When a requirement exists to apply external power to a cocked aircraft,

ensure that pitot heat and windshield anti-ice switches are turned off
and the EMER INVTR circuit breaker is pulled out prior to application
of power. Reaccomplish steps 26 thru 30 of checklist before leaving the
aircraft.
2-176
Change 17
T.O. 1B-52H-1

32. Flash Blindness Equipment Checked (ALL)
Flash blindness equipment will be checked and positioned in accordance with command directives.
33. Exterior Check:
a. Pilots will complete visual inspection checking for hydraulic leaks, fuel leaks, and general condition.
b. Bomb preflight inspections will include accomplishment of all steps in T.O. 1B-52H-25-2CL-1.
The bomb preflight need only be accomplished once during the current tour of alert unless there
has been a change of aircraft or is required as a result of maintenance.
c.
Missile Preflight
The missile preflight need only be accomplished once during the current tour of alert unless there
has been a change of aircraft or is required as a result of maintenance.
Change 17
2-177
T.O. 1B-52H-1
(Power-On Configuration Copilot reads)
NOTE
Quick reaction configuration may be assumed from a normal alert posture. Assumption from this posture will require completion of the
QUICK REACTION RECOCKING checklist. If engines are not started,
accomplish only applicable items. Quick reaction may also be assumed
through normal generation procedures. Assumption from this method
requires completion of all checklists through STARTING ENGINES
AND BEFORE TAXIING to cock the aircraft. The QUICK REACTION
RECOCKING (POWER-ON CONFIGURATION) checklist may be used
after starting engines to taxi to the quick reaction parking area, if applicable.
If after assuming QUICK REACTION (POWER-ON CONFIGURATION), it is necessary to transition to QUICK REACTION (POWEROFF CONFIGURATION), accomplish the applicable items of the
QUICK REACTION SCRAMBLE (POWER-ON CONFIGURATION)
checklist followed by accomplishing the QUICK REACTION RECOCKING (POWER-OFF CONFIGURATION) checklist.
Windows may be left open as provided in the checklist, but doors will
remain closed except as provided in local plans for crew relief and/or
changeover.
Flightcrews will ensure that takeoff data and trim are updated at all
times as climatic conditions require. Any significant change will be reviewed by the pilot, copilot, and navigator.
Ensure that aircraft is parked where Command Post radio reception
is possible.
Ground crew support for engine start must be provided from additional
sources. Ground power equipment will be hooked in tandem with the
fast ride vehicle for quick removal by the crew chief prior to taxiing or
positioned well clear of the wing to allow rapid aircraft exit.

NOTE

2-178
T.O. 1B-52H-1
QUICK REACTION RECOCKING CHECKLIST (Power-On Configuration Copilot reads) (Cont)

10. Brakes Set (P)
12. Engine Anti-Icing OFF (P)
13. Bomb Doors CLOSED (P/RN)
15. Sliding Windows OPEN (P-CP)
Flaps may be up or down as dictated by climatic conditions and removal of ground power equipment.
19. Air Conditioning RAM (CP)
20. Generators 1, 5 & 7 (External Power Not Available) OFF (CP)
21. Generators (External Power Available) OFF (CP)
Change 4
2-179
T.O. 1B-52H-1
QUICK REACTION RECOCKING CHECKLIST (Power-On Configuration Copilot reads) (Cont)

24. Throttles, Except No. 3 75% rpm, then CLOSED (P-CP)
25. Engine dc Ignition Circuit Breakers OUT (P-CP)
29. Anticollision & Navigation Lights OFF and STEADY (CP)
If anticollision light create a safety hazard they may be turned off prior to this step.
30. Cartridges on Remaining Engines Installed (GC)

area.
32. Oxygen As required (ALL)
If the aircraft has been towed, reposition the antiskid switch ON, guard closed.

2-180
Change 17
T.O. 1B-52H-1
QUICK REACTION RECOCKING CHECKLIST (Power-On Configuration Copilot reads)

(Cont)
37. Downlocks & Bypass Keys Stowed (N-GC)
and stowed.
38. Entry Door As required (P-N-GC)
This could be the primary heading reference for takeoff.
40. AHRS SLV and Set (CP)
43. Rudder/Elevator Hydraulic Pumps ON (P)
2-181
T.O. 1B-52H-1
(Power-On Configuration CP/EW reads)
During QUICK REACTION POWER-ON CONFIGURATION, use the following SCRAMBLE checklist.
NOTE
The QUICK REACTION SCRAMBLE (POWER-ON CONFIGURATION) checklist places aircrews in the optimum sustainable response position. While in this posture, crews will ensure that they accomplish all steps necessary for rapid takeoff capability.
Takeoff data and stabilizer trim will be updated and reviewed as necessary. They are not included again in the checklist. Flaps should be left
in the down position unless climatic conditions or ground equipment
(AGE) positioning dictate otherwise. If possible, windows and doors
should be kept in the closed and locked position.
Crew equipment should be on or readily available.
BOLD FACE items will be completed before takeoff is initiated.
If determined previously to be inappropriate for takeoff or already accomplished, asterisked (*) items should be omitted from this checklist.
The EW officer may not be available to aid in checklist completion.
1. PITOT HEAT ON (P)

2. START ENGINES STARTED (P-CP)
3. MANIFOLD VALVE CLOSED (CP)
4. GENERATORS ON (CP)
*6. WINDOWS & DOORS CLOSED AND LOCKED (P-CP-N)
7. GROUND REMOVE WHEEL CHOCKS, CLEAR AIRCRAFT FOR TAXI, DISCONNECT
INTERPHONE ROGER (GC)
NOTE
Taxiing may be initiated at any time after this item when a visual signal is received indicating all equipment and personnel are clear.
8. ANTICOLLISION & NAVIGATION LIGHTS ON and STEADY (CP)
*9. FLAPS DOWN (CP)
Lower flaps after clear of ground power equipment.
2-182
Change 4
T.O. 1B-52H-1
QUICK REACTION SCRAMBLE CHECKLIST (Power-On Configuration CP/EW reads) (Cont)

10. ENGINE ANTI-ICING CLIMATIC (P)
*11. STABILIZER TRIM SET (P-CP)
*13. TAKEOFF DATA REVIEWED (P-CP-N)
Review S1 speed and time.

14. IFF STBY (P)
15. TAKEOFF USE NORMAL TAKEOFF PROCEDURES (P-CP)
NOTE
Pilots will monitor extension of flaps to ensure flaps are 70% extended
taking the runway. Copilot will check flap indicator for full extension
at the 70 knot call.
After the aircraft is safely airborne, the STARTING ENGINES AND
BEFORE TAXIING, TAXIING, and BEFORE LINEUP checklists
should be reviewed and applicable items not previously completed
should be performed when time permits.
2-183
T.O. 1B-52H-1
(Power-Off Configuration Copilot reads)
NOTE
Quick reaction configuration may be assumed from a normal alert posture. Assumption from this posture will require completion of the
QUICK REACTION RECOCKING checklist. If engines are not started,
accomplish only applicable items. Quick reaction may also be assumed
through normal generation procedures. Assumption from this method
requires completion of all checklists through STARTING ENGINES
AND BEFORE TAXIING to cock the aircraft. The QUICK REACTION
RECOCKING (POWER-OFF CONFIGURATION) checklist may be
used after starting engines to taxi to the quick reaction parking area,
if applicable.
Windows may be left open as provided in the checklist, but doors will
remain closed except as provided in local plans for crew relief and/or
changeover.
Flightcrews will ensure that takeoff data and trim are updated at all
times as climatic conditions require. Any significant change will be reviewed by the pilot, copilot, and navigator.
Ensure that aircraft is parked where Command Post radio reception
is possible.
Ground crew support for engine start will be provided from additional
sources.

2. Pitot Heat & Windshield Anti-Icing OFF (P)
NOTE

10. Brakes Set (P)
2-184
T.O. 1B-52H-1
QUICK REACTION RECOCKING CHECKLIST (Power-Off Configuration Copilot reads) (Cont)

12. Engine Anti-Icing OFF (P)
13. Bomb Doors CLOSED (P/RN)
15. Sliding Windows OPEN (P-CP)
Flap position may be up or down as dictated by climatic conditions and removal of ground power
equipment.
19. Air Conditioning RAM (CP)
20. Generator 1, 5 & 7 OFF (CP)
22. Throttles, Except No. 3 75% rpm, then CLOSED (P-CP)
23. Engine Ignition Circuit Breakers OUT (P-CP)
26. AHRS SLV and set (CP)
Change 17
2-185
T.O. 1B-52H-1
QUICK REACTION RECOCKING CHECKLIST (Power-Off Configuration Copilot reads) (Cont)

29. Cartridges on Remaining Engines Installed (GC)

area.
31. Oxygen As required (ALL)
32. Brakes OFF (P)
If the aircraft has been towed, reposition the antiskid switch ON, guard closed.

40. Entry Light OFF (P)
41. Downlocks & Bypass Keys Stowed (N-GC)
and stowed.
44. Rudder/Elevator Hydraulic Pumps ON (P)
2-186
T.O. 1B-52H-1
(Power-Off Configuration CP/EW reads)
During QUICK REACTION POWER-OFF CONFIGURATION, use the following SCRAMBLE checklist.
NOTE
Crews will ensure that they accomplish all steps necessary to ensure
rapid takeoff capability.
Takeoff data and stabilizer trim will be updated and reviewed as necessary. They are not included again in the checklist. Flaps should be left
in the down position unless climatic conditions or ground equipment
(AGE) positioning dictate otherwise. If possible, windows and doors
should be kept in the closed and locked position.
BOLD FACE items will be completed before takeoff is initiated.
Crew equipment should be on or readily available.
If determined previously to be inappropriate for takeoff or already accomplished, asterisked (*) items should be omitted from this checklist.
The EW officer may not be available to aid in the checklist completion.
1. INTERPHONE ON (P)
2. BATTERY ON (CP)
3. BRAKES SET (P)
4. START ENGINES STARTED (P-CP)
5. MANIFOLD VALVE CLOSED (CP)
6. GENERATORS ON (CP)
*8. WINDOWS & DOORS CLOSED AND LOCKED (P-CP-N)
9. GROUND REMOVE WHEEL CHOCKS, CLEAR AIRCRAFT FOR TAXI, DISCONNECT INTERPHONE
ROGER (GC)
NOTE
Taxiing may be initiated at any time after this item when a visual signal is received indicating all equipment and personnel are clear.
2-187
T.O. 1B-52H-1
QUICK REACTION SCRAMBLE CHECKLIST (Power-Off Configuration CP/EW reads) (Cont)

10. ANTICOLLISION & NAV LIGHTS ON AND STEADY (CP)
*11. FLAPS DOWN (CP)
Lower flaps after clear of ground power equipment.

12. ENGINE ANTI-ICING CLIMATIC (P)
*13. STABILIZER TRIM SET (P-CP)
15. TAKEOFF DATA REVIEWED (P-CP-N)
Review S1 speed and time.

16. IFF STBY (P)
17. TAKEOFF USE NORMAL TAKEOFF PROCEDURES (P-CP)
NOTE
2-188
Pilots will monitor extension of flaps to ensure flaps are 70% extended
taking the runway. Copilot will check flap indicator for full extension
at the 70 knot call.
After the aircraft is safely airborne, the STARTING ENGINES AND
BEFORE TAXIING, TAXIING, and BEFORE LINEUP checklists
should be reviewed and applicable items not previously completed
should be performed when time permits.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
GROUND CREW PROCEDURES

GROUND CREW CHECKLIST
NOTE
The abbreviated ground crew checklist is contained in T.O. 1B-52H- 1-CL-2.

1. When the aircraft is moved into the alert line, the ground crew accomplishes the ALERT LINE
PREPARATION checklist.
2. When the execution order to scramble is received, one ground crewmember and one flightcrew member will remove all plugs and covers and accomplish the applicable ground crew scramble checklist
without delay.
3. When practice alerts are terminated, the ALERT LINE PREPARATION checklist will be completed
in conjunction with the flightcrew recocking the aircraft.
ALERT LINE PREPARATION
1. Position aircraft in designated parking position.

2. Position wheel chocks (install one chock in front of each forward gear and one chock behind each
aft gear).
3. Install static ground/PASS wire (forward).
4. Position AGE.
a. Position the external power cart on either side of the aircraft in a location that will permit the
aircraft to taxi safely. Use 30-, 60-, or 120-foot cables. When 60-foot cable is used, position the
external power cart between the inboard and outboard engine pods. When 120-foot cable is used,
position the external power cart outboard of the wing tip.
5. Check AGE fuel and oil service.
6. Position fire extinguishers at each wingtip.
7. Connect interphone cord and headset. Headset and interphone cord will be stored in a suitable location out of the weather and near the ground cord receptacle.
8. Cold Weather Operation. Position ground heaters, as required, to preheat the external power cart
and crew compartment.
9. Position stands as required.
10. Install nose and tail covers (climatic, or as desired).
11. Install pitot covers (climatic).
2-189
T.O. 1B-52H-1
GROUND CREW CHECKLIST (Cont)

12. Install ram air inlet plugs (climatic, or as required).
13. Install engine inlet and tailcone plugs (climatic).
14. Remove and secure all unnecessary stands and equipment.
15. After aircraft is cocked, place COCKED sign on entry door. (If door is to remain closed, place
COCKED sign in cockpit facing pilots window.)
2-190
T.O. 1B-52H-1
GROUND CREW SCRAMBLE
This checklist will be accomplished by one ground crewmember and the flightcrew member when the order to
scramble is given.
During aircraft engine cartridge starts, the cartridge starter produces

extremely hot exhaust gases. Therefore, remain clear of a 4 foot radius
area around the cartridge starter exhaust directly below nacelles of any
engine being cartridge started.
Simultaneous cartridge starts of QUICK START configured aircraft can
produce toxic gases in sufficient concentration to be hazardous to individuals who remain in the immediate vicinity of the aircraft. The potential hazard is dependent on aircraft parking configuration, wind velocity and direction, and other ambient conditions. Ground
crewmembers and security police who are required to remain in a toxic
cloud must wear proper eye and respiratory protection.
Crew Chief
1. REMOVE AIRCRAFT PITOT COVERS AND RAM AIRSCOOP PLUG.
2. REMOVE FRONT AND REAR ENGINE PLUGS FROM ENGINES 5, 6, 7, AND 8, IN THAT ORDER, AND PLACE
CLEAR OF AIRCRAFT (AS REQUIRED).
3. ENSURE ENGINE PLUGS ARE REMOVED FROM ENGINES (AS REQUIRED).
4. PUT ON HEADSET AND REPORT TO PILOT, CLEAR TO START ENGINES.
5. CUT OFF HEATER AND REMOVE, ALONG WITH DUCTING, CLEAR OF THE WINGTIPS (AS REQUIRED).
6. MONITOR STARTING OF ALL AIRCRAFT ENGINES.
7. CLOSE ENTRY DOOR.
8. ADVISE PILOT THAT PITOT COVERS ARE REMOVED, AND GROUND EQUIPMENT IS CLEAR. ACKNOWLEDGE PILOT WHEN INSTRUCTED TO DISCONNECT INTERPHONE CORD AND REMOVE CHOCKS PRIOR TO
DEPARTING THE AIRCRAFT.
9. THE CREW CHIEF WILL THEN DISCONNECT THE INTERPHONE CORD, REMOVE CHOCKS IF APPLICABLE,
AND MOVE TO THE PROPER POSITION (AS LOCAL CONDITIONS REQUIRE) TO DIRECT PILOT WHILE TAXIING OUT OF THE PARKED POSITION.
10. Accomplish the ALERT LINE PREPARATION checklist when practice alert is terminated (if
applicable).
2-191
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EMERGENCY TAXI PROCEDURES

DO NOT USE FOR FLIGHT.

NOTE
Minimum cockpit crew may be one pilot and one ground crewmember
who serves as copilot. Both will meet the requirements of AFI 11-218
concerning movement of aircraft.
Pilot and copilot will perform their respective BEFORE STARTING
ENGINES checklists simultaneously.
This checklist is designed for emergency use. Two copies of the abbreviated checklist are to be placed in the cockpit of each aircraft. It is not
to be carried in the crewmembers individual checklist folder.
Before Starting Engines (Pilot)
1. Status of Aircraft Checked

Pilot will check with ground crew for status of aircraft for taxiing and for desired starting mode
(cartridge/pneumatic). He will issue instructions to clear aircraft of all obstructions and to stand by
on interphone.
2. Circuit Breakers IN
Pilot checks left load central and pilots circuit breakers.
3. Interphone Power ON
4. Ground, Start External Power & Air Roger (GC)
5. Body Standby Pumps STBY
6. Engine Fire Shutoff Switches IN
7. Antiskid ON, guard closed
8. Steering Ratio TAXI
9. Brakes Set
10. Ground, Remove Bypass Keys Roger (GC)
11. Radio Call Completed
Contact Command Post or tower. Advise ready to start engines and request instructions.
2-192
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EMERGENCY TAXI CHECKLIST (Cont)

Before Starting Engines (Copilot)
Copilot checks right load central and copilots circuit breakers.
2. Battery Switch ON
3. Navigation Lights BRIGHT and FLASH
4. UHF Radios ON
5. V/UHF Radio
DJ
ON
6. Manifold Valve OPEN

7. Engine Starter Switches OFF and PNEUMATIC (for pneumatic start); engines 3, 4, 5, and 6
START, others OFF and FLIGHT (for cartridge start)
8. Generator Selector CENTRAL BUS TIE
9. Generator Switches OFF (momentarily)
10. External Power ON
External power circuit breaker position indicator will not close if phase sequence is not correct or
if generator circuit breaker is closed.
11. Fuel Panel Switches No. 2 & 3 ON
12. Flaps Up, lever OFF (GC)
Ground crew will advise flap position and movement.
2-193
T.O. 1B-52H-1

Starting Engines and Taxiing (Pilot/Copilot)
1. Stand by to Start Engines Fire guard posted and clear (GC)

2. Start Engines 4, 3, 5 & 6 (Pneumatic Start); 3, 4, 5 & 6 Simultaneously (Cartridge Start) Started
(CP)
Copilot starts No. 4 engine, then No. 3 engine. When No. 3 engine reaches IDLE rpm, copilot places
No. 3 generator ON. Copilot then starts No. 5 and 6 engines. When starting with cartridges installed,
copilot starts engines 3, 4, 5, and 6 simultaneously. See this section, STARTING ENGINES AND
BEFORE TAXIING checklist, line item START ENGINES STARTED (CP), for detailed starting
procedures.
4. Manifold Valve CLOSE (CP)
Place air bleed manifold valve switch in CLOSE position after engines
are started to prevent excessive manifold temperature which will be attained if the switch is left OPEN.
5. Generators ON (CP)
a. Momentarily hold generator switches ON to energize the generator field and close the generator
circuit breakers.
b. Check that generators and bus tie breaker position indicators show closed.
8. Ground, Clear Aircraft for Taxi, Remove Chocks & Disconnect Interphone Roger (GC)
9. Anticollision & Navigation Lights ON and STEADY (CP)
10. Taxi on Crew Chief s Signal (P-CP)
2-194
T.O. 1B-52H-1

Engine Shutdown (Copilot reads)
1. Brakes ON (P)
Advance throttles to 75% for 15 to 30 seconds, then retard to CLOSED.
5. UHF Radios OFF (CP)
6. V/UHF Radio
DJ
OFF (CP)
7. Fuel Switches OFF or CLOSED (CP)

9. Brakes OFF (P)
10. Lights Off, or as required (P-CP)
12. Seat Positioning Switch DOWN and TILT FWD (external power available) (P-CP)
13. Interphone Power OFF (P)
2-195/(2-196 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CUT ON LINE
(EXTRACTED FROM T.O. 1B-52H-1)
DO NOT USE FOR FLIGHT.
NOTE
Minimum cockpit crew may be

one pilot and one ground
crewmember, who serves as copilot. Both will meet the requirements of AFI 11-218 concerning movement of the aircraft.
Pilot and copilot will perform
their respective BEFORE
STARTING ENGINES checklist
simultaneously.
This checklist is designed for
emergency use. Two copies of
the abbreviated checklist are to
be placed in the cockpit of each
aircraft. It is not to be carried in
the crewmember s individual
checklist folder.
BEFORE STARTING ENGINES (PILOT)
1. Status of Aircraft Checked

3. Interphone Power ON
31 August 1996
Page 1 of 4
2-197
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CUT ON LINE

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
Ground, Start External Power & Air Roger (GC)

Body Standby Pumps - STBY
Engine Fire Shutoff Switches IN
Antiskid ON, guard closed
Steering Ratio TAXI
Brakes SET
Ground, Remove Bypass Keys Roger (GC)
Radio Call Completed
BEFORE STARTING ENGINES (COPILOT)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
Page 2 of 4
2-198
Circuit Breakers IN
Battery Switch ON
Navigation Lights BRIGHT and FLASH
UHF Radios ON
V/UHF Radio DJ ON
Manifold Valve OPEN
Engine Starter Switches OFF and PNEUMATIC (for pneumatic start); engines 3, 4, 5, and
6 START, others OFF and FLIGHT (for cartridge
start)
Generator Selector CENTRAL BUS TIE
Generator Switches OFF (momentarily)
External Power ON
Fuel Panel Switches 2 & 3 ON
Flaps Up, lever OFF (GC)
31 August 1996
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CUT ON LINE

STARTING ENGINES AND TAXIING
(Pilot/Copilot Reads)
1. Stand By to Start Engines Fire guard posted

and clear (GC)
2. Start Engines 4, 3, 5 & 6 (Pneumatic Start); 3, 4,
5 & 6 Simultaneously (Cartridge Start) Started
(CP)
4. Manifold Valve CLOSE (CP)
5. Generators ON (CP)
8. Ground, Clear Aircraft for Taxi, Remove Chocks
& Disconnect Interphone Roger (GC)
9. Anticollision & Nav Lights ON and STEADY
(CP)
10. Taxi on Crew Chief s Signal (P-CP)
31 August 1996 Page 3 of 4
2-199
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CUT ON LINE

ENGINE SHUTDOWN (Copilot Reads)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
Brakes ON (P)
Generators 3 & 5 OFF (CP)
External Power ON (if available) (CP)
Throttles 75% rpm, then CLOSED (P)
UHF Radios OFF (CP)
V/UHF Radio DJ OFF
Fuel Switches OFF or CLOSED (CP)
Wheel Chocks In place (GC)
Brakes OFF (P)
Lights Off, or as required (P-CP)
Battery OFF (CP)
Seat Positioning Switch DOWN and TILT
FWD (external power available) (P-CP)
13. Interphone Power OFF (P)
Page 4 of 4
2-200
31 August 1996
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ACCEPTANCE AND/OR FUNCTIONAL CHECK

FLIGHT CHECKS
Procedures and criteria for functional check flights
will be accomplished in accordance with T.O.s
1B-52H-6CF-1 and 1B-52H-6CF-1-1, Acceptance
and/or Functional Check Flight Procedures manuals. Each manual contains three amplified checklists identified as BEFORE INFLIGHT checklists,
INFLIGHT SYSTEM OPERATIONAL CHECKS,
and AFTER INFLIGHT checklists. Flightcrew
abbreviated checklists are contained in T.O.s
1B-52H-6CL-1 thru -6. The EMERGENCY PROCEDURES contained in T.O. 1B-52H-1 will be used.
Aircraft requiring functional check flights are redelivered aircraft, modification maintenance aircraft,
and aircraft wherein maintenance performed
requires a functional check flight as specified in
T.O. 1-1-300.
LONG ENDURANCE FLIGHTS

Special missions requiring long endurance flights
are authorized to carry additional items to facilitate
aircrew rest and provide for necessary food and liquid nourishment. Additional crew rest and food
stowage/preparation equipment is restricted to
those items authorized by the flight manual and
the major air command. Specific equipment loading
plans will be standardized and published by each
unit and approved by the major subordinate command. This extra equipment will be stowed, in
accordance with approved unit plans, and secured
so as to avoid hazardous locations near air conditioning ducts/outlets, electrical equipment/wiring,
flight controls, ejection seats, and emergency exits.
Briefing and preflight checklists requirements on
proper stowage of extra equipment will be completed in accordance with applicable crewmembers
checklists.
2-201/(2-202 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
section III
table of contents
INTRODUCTION
EMERGENCY ENTRANCE AND GROUND FIRE ACCESS
GROUND EMERGENCIES
page
3-9
3-9
3-11
ENGINE FIRE ON THE GROUND CHECKLIST
3-11
WHEEL BRAKE SYSTEM FAILURE CHECKLIST
3-13
TAKEOFF EMERGENCIES
3-15
ABORTED TAKEOFF
3-15
ABORT CHECKLIST
3-15
TAKEOFF WITH ONE OR MORE ENGINES INOPERATIVE
3-16
ENGINE FIRE ON TAKEOFF
3-16
ENGINE FAILURE DURING TAKEOFF
3-16
TAKEOFF RUN
3-16
TAKEOFF CONTINUED
3-16
ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE DURING TAKEOFF TAKEOFF CONTINUED CHECKLIST
3-17
TAKEOFF WITH UNBALANCED/FAILED TIRE
3-17
CRASH LANDING OR DITCHING IMMEDIATELY AFTER TAKEOFF CHECKLIST
3-18
RUNAWAY OR UNSCHEDULED STABILIZER TRIM CHECKLIST
3-19
COMPLETE FAILURE OF ALL GENERATORS CHECKLIST
3-21
INFLIGHT EMERGENCIES
SMOKE AND FUMES ELIMINATION
SMOKE AND FUMES ELIMINATION CHECKLIST
3-23
3-23
3-23
ELECTRICAL FIRE
3-24
PRESSURIZED COMPARTMENT FIRE CHECKLIST
3-25
ENGINE FAILURE
3-26
ENGINE FAILURE INDICATIONS
3-27
ENGINE FAILURE DURING CLIMB
3-27
ENGINE FAILURE DURING CRUISE
3-27
ENGINE FIRE WARNING LIGHT(S) ILLUMINATED
3-27
EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN CHECKLIST
3-28
PRECAUTIONARY/PRACTICE ENGINE SHUTDOWN
3-30
PRECAUTIONARY/PRACTICE ENGINE SHUTDOWN CHECKLIST
3-31
3-1
T.O. 1B-52H-1
table of contents
page
INFLIGHT EMERGENCIES (Cont)

ENGINE AIR STARTING
ENGINE FLAMEOUT AND RELIGHT
3-32
ENGINE AIR STARTING CHECKLIST
3-34
FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS WITH ENGINE FAILURE

CONTROL WITH LOSS OF ENGINES
3-36
3-36
PERFORMANCE WITH LOSS OF ENGINES
3-36A
LOSS OF ENGINE POD
3-36A
STRUCTURAL EFFECTS OF MULTI-ENGINE FAILURE ON ONE SIDE
3-36A
RADOME FAILURE/LOSS
3-37
AIRSPEED INDICATION FAILURE
3-37
FUEL FLOW FOR AIRSPEED INDICATION FAILURE
3-40
UNSCHEDULED AUTOPILOT INPUTS CHECKLIST
3-41
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
3-41
AIRCRAFT STRUCTURE
3-41
PRELIMINARY PROCEDURES
3-42
ADDITIONAL PROCEDURE
3-44
WINDSHIELD/WINDOW CRACKS
3-44
EXPLOSIVE DECOMPRESSION
3-44A
CABIN PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM FAILURE
3-44A
OXYGEN SYSTEM FAILURE
3-44A
EMERGENCY DESCENT
EMERGENCY DESCENT CHECKLIST
3-45
3-45
EMERGENCY INFLIGHT MOVEMENT
3-45
EMERGENCY JETTISONING
3-46
ALE-20 INFLIGHT EMERGENCY JETTISON CHECKLIST
3-46
NUCLEAR BOMB JETTISON
3-47
NONNUCLEAR WEAPONS JETTISON
3-47
MISSILE EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
3-47
BAILOUT/EJECTION PROCEDURES
3-2
3-32
3-47
EJECTION BAILOUT
3-49
PREPARATORY STEPS FOR EJECTION/BAILOUT CHECKLIST
3-52
BAILOUT CHECKLIST
3-58
UPWARD EJECTION CHECKLIST
3-59
DOWNWARD EJECTION CHECKLIST
3-61
NON-EJECTION (MANUAL) BAILOUT
3-62
MANUAL BAILOUT CHECKLIST
3-65
Change 16
T.O. 1B-52H-1
table of contents
page
INFLIGHT EMERGENCIES (Cont)

EMERGENCY AIR REFUELING PROCEDURES
3-66A
BREAKAWAY PROCEDURES
3-66A
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS
3-66A
FUEL SYPHONING
3-66B
FAILURE TO DISCONNECT
3-66B
BRUTE FORCE DISCONNECT
3-66B
INADVERTENT DISCONNECT
3-66B
CONTROLLED TENSION DISCONNECT
3-66C
MANUAL BOOM LATCHING
3-66C
INOPERATIVE BOOM/RECEPTACLE LATCHING
3-66D
REVERSE AIRFLOW AIR REFUELING (RECEIVER TO TANKER) CHECKLIST
3-66E
LANDING EMERGENCIES
LANDING GEAR FAILURE TO EXTEND
3-67
3-67
MAIN GEAR FAILS TO EXTEND CHECKLIST
3-67
TIP GEAR FAILS TO EXTEND CHECKLIST
3-69
LANDING WITH BRAKE SYSTEM HYDRAULIC FAILURE
3-71
LANDING WITH MAIN BODY HYDRAULIC PUMPS INOPERATIVE
3-72
BOTH BODY STANDBY PUMPS OPERATIVE CHECKLIST
3-72
LEFT BODY STANDBY PUMP OPERATIVE, RIGHT BODY STANDBY

PUMP INOPERATIVE CHECKLIST
3-72
RIGHT BODY STANDBY PUMP OPERATIVE, LEFT BODY STANDBY

PUMP INOPERATIVE CHECKLIST
3-73
BOTH MAIN BODY HYDRAULIC PUMPS AND ONE BODY STANDBY

PUMP INOPERATIVE
3-75
BOTH MAIN BODY HYDRAULIC PUMPS AND BOTH BODY STANDBY

PUMPS INOPERATIVE
3-75
LANDING WITH PARTIAL GEAR CHECKLIST
3-76
ONE MAIN GEAR RETRACTED OR ONE FORWARD AND ONE

REAR RETRACTED ON OPPOSITE SIDES CHECKLIST
3-76
ONE FORWARD AND ONE REAR GEAR RETRACTED ON

THE SAME SIDE CHECKLIST
3-76
BOTH FORWARD GEARS RETRACTED CHECKLIST
3-77
BOTH REAR GEARS RETRACTED CHECKLIST
3-77
ONE OR BOTH TIP GEARS RETRACTED CHECKLIST
3-78
LANDING WITH UNBALANCED/FAILED TIRE
3-79
LANDING WITH ONE FORWARD GEAR STEERING FAILURE
3-80
WITH ENGINES 4 AND/OR 5 INOPERATIVE
3-80
Change 16
3-3
T.O. 1B-52H-1
table of contents
page
LANDING EMERGENCIES (Cont)

LANDING WITH COMPLETE STEERING FAILURE
FAILURE OF STEERING WITH REAR GEAR CROSSWIND CRAB OPERABLE
3-81
FAILURE OF STEERING WITH REAR GEAR CROSSWIND CRAB INOPERATIVE
3-81
LANDING WITH INSUFFICIENT STEERING ANGLE
3-81
LANDING WITH CROSSWIND CRAB SYSTEM MALFUNCTION
3-82
ONE GEAR INOPERATIVE
3-82
TWO OR MORE GEARS INOPERATIVE
3-82
LANDING WITH RUDDER/ELEVATOR SYSTEMS INOPERATIVE
3-83
3-83
CONTROL TECHNIQUE
3-83
GO-AROUND WITH RUDDER/ELEVATOR SYSTEMS INOPERATIVE
3-85
LANDING WITH STABILIZER TRIM FAILURE
3-86
LANDING WITH SPOILER CONTROL FAILURES
3-87
PARTIAL SPOILER FAILURE ON ONE WING
3-87
COMPLETE SPOILER FAILURE AND AIRBRAKES FAILURE ON ONE WING
3-87
COMPLETE SPOILER FAILURE ON ONE WING, AIRBRAKES OPERATIVE
3-88
THREE SPOILER GROUPS INOPERATIVE
3-88
ALL SPOILER GROUPS INOPERATIVE
3-88
WING FLAP SYSTEM EMERGENCY OPERATION
3-89
ASYMMETRICAL WING FLAP CONDITIONS
3-89
WING FLAP STOPPAGE
3-90
UNSCHEDULED FLAP MOVEMENT
3-91
MAXIMUM LANDING GROSS WEIGHT WITH ONE MISSING OR

DAMAGED FLAP AND FUEL LOADS TO BALANCE STATIC MOMENT
3-91
LANDING WITH WING FLAPS INOPERATIVE
3-93
WING FLAPS-UP LANDING DATA
3-93
LANDING WITH WING FLAPS UP CHECKLIST
3-94
FLAPS-UP BEFORE LANDING CHECKLIST
3-94
FLAPS-UP LANDING CHECKLIST
3-97
FLAPS-UP GO-AROUND CHECKLIST
3-98
DEPARTURE FROM PREPARED SURFACES
3-103
CRASH LANDING
3-103
EMERGENCY EXIT
3-103
CRASH LANDING AND DITCHING CHECKLIST
3-105
DITCHING
DITCHING TECHNIQUE
3-4
3-81
Change 16
3-108A
3-108A
T.O. 1B-52H-1
table of contents
page
LANDING EMERGENCIES (Cont)

MINIMUM SPEED FOR DIRECTIONAL CONTROL
3-108A
FUEL SHIFT EFFECTS ON DIRECTIONAL CONTROL SPEED
3-109
GEAR RETRACTION AND EXTERNAL STORE EFFECTS ON

DIRECTIONAL CONTROL SPEED
3-109
OPERATION WITH ONE OR MORE ENGINES INOPERATIVE

USE OF CHARTS FOR ASYMMETRIC THRUST
LANDING WITH ONE OR MORE ENGINES INOPERATIVE
3-114
3-114
3-115
LANDING FOLLOWING LOSS OF AN ENGINE POD
3-116
THREE OR FOUR ENGINE FAILURE ON ONE SIDE WITH FLAPS UP
3-116
LANDING WITH THREE OR FOUR ENGINE FAILURE ON ONE SIDE

AND WING FLAPS UP CHECKLIST
3-119
THREE OR FOUR ENGINE FAILURE ON ONE SIDE WITH FLAPS DOWN
3-122
GO-AROUND WITH ONE OR MORE ENGINES INOPERATIVE
3-127
GO-AROUND WITH ASYMMETRICAL THRUST
3-127
LOSS OF ENGINE POD
3-128
ONE ENGINE FAILURE
3-128
TWO ENGINE FAILURE
3-128
THREE OR FOUR ENGINE FAILURES
3-128
THREE OR FOUR ENGINE FAILURE ON ONE SIDE
3-128
GO-AROUND WITH THREE OR FOUR ENGINE FAILURE ON ONE SIDE

AND WING FLAPS UP CHECKLIST
3-129
Change 16
3-5
T.O. 1B-52H-1
table of contents
SYSTEMS EMERGENCY/ABNORMAL OPERATION

AIR REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS
3-135
3-135
AIR REFUELING WITH MAIN MANIFOLD INTERCONNECT VALVES FAILED
3-135
MAIN REFUEL VALVE ABNORMAL OPERATION
3-135
SLIPWAY DOORS ABNORMAL OPERATION
3-135
ANTI-ICING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS

WINDSHIELD ANTI-ICING AND WINDOW DEFOGGING ABNORMAL OPERATION
AUTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROL MALFUNCTIONS
3-135
3-135
3-136
AUTOPILOT ABNORMAL OPERATION
3-136
STABILITY AUGMENTATION SYSTEM (SAS) MALFUNCTION
3-136
SAS ABNORMAL OPERATION
3-137
BOMB DOOR MALFUNCTIONS
3-138
BOMB DOOR ABNORMAL OPERATION WITH FORWARD SPECIAL WEAPON

MANUAL RELEASE HANDLE
3-138
BOMB DOOR ABNORMAL OPERATION WITH JETTISON SWITCHES
3-138
BOMB DOOR CONTROL VALVE LIGHTS ILLUMINATED
3-138
BOMB DOOR OPERATION WITH FAILURE OF RIGHT BODY HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
3-139
GROUND MANUAL UNLATCHING OF BOMB DOORS
3-139
CENTER OF GRAVITY, FUEL LEVEL ADVISORY SYSTEM ABNORMAL OPERATION
3-139
COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTIONS
3-140
INTERPHONE SYSTEM ABNORMAL OPERATION
3-140
V/UHF RADIO AN/ARC-210 ABNORMAL OPERATION
3-140
KY-100 ERROR MESSAGE DISPLAYS
3-140
DRAG CHUTE MALFUNCTIONS
3-141
ACCIDENTAL DRAG CHUTE DEPLOYMENT
3-141
DRAG CHUTE MALFUNCTION
3-141
ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY MALFUNCTIONS
3-6
page
3-142
AC CIRCUIT FAULTS
3-142
AC POWER SYSTEM FAILURE
3-142
AFT TRANSFORMER RECTIFIER SYSTEM FAILURE
3-143
COMPLETE AC POWER FAILURE
3-145
CONSERVATION OF BATTERY POWER CHECKLIST
3-146
DC POWER SYSTEM FAILURE
3-157
FAILURE OF AFT BATTERY CHARGING TR UNIT CHECKLIST
3-158
FAILURE OF FORWARD BATTERY CHARGING TR UNIT

CHECKLIST
3-159
FAILURE OF BOTH BATTERY CHARGING TR UNITS CHECKLIST
3-160
FORWARD TRANSFORMER-RECTIFIER SYSTEM FAILURE CHECKLIST
3-161
Change 8
T.O. 1B-52H-1
table of contents
page
SYSTEMS EMERGENCY/ABNORMAL OPERATION (Cont)

ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY MALFUNCTIONS (Cont)
GENERATOR TRIP CHECKLIST
3-162
GENERATOR AMPS OR FREQUENCY FLUCTUATION CHECKLIST
3-162
GENERATOR DRIVE OVERHEAT LIGHT ILLUMINATES CHECKLIST
3-163
SHUTDOWN AFTER GENERATOR DRIVE DECOUPLER FAILURE

CHECKLIST
3-164
ENGINE MALFUNCTIONS
3-165
ACCELERATION HANGUP
3-165
COMPRESSOR STALL
3-165
FLAMEOUT
3-167
RPM FLUCTUATIONS
3-167
STARTER HANGUP
3-168
CARTRIDGE STARTER MALFUNCTIONS
3-168
SURGE
3-169
VARYING EXHAUST GAS TEMPERATURE
3-169
ENGINE OIL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS
3-169
EXCESSIVE OIL TEMPERATURE
3-169
OIL PRESSURE ERRATIC
3-169
OIL PRESSURE HIGH
3-170
OIL PRESSURE LOW
3-170
FLIGHT CONTROL MALFUNCTIONS
3-171
ASYMMETRIC AIRBRAKE CONTROL
3-171
ELEVATOR AND RUDDER CONTROL MALFUNCTION
3-171
LATERAL TRIM MALFUNCTION
3-172
STABILIZER TRIM MALFUNCTION
3-173
FUEL SUPPLY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS
3-174
FUEL QUANTITY GAGE MALFUNCTION
3-174
FUEL MANAGEMENT WITH MAIN MANIFOLD INTERCONNECT VALVES FAILED
3-174
FUEL LEAK DETECTION
3-174
MAIN TANK FUEL LEAK
3-175
EMERGENCY EMPTYING OF A MAIN TANK
3-176
EMERGENCY EMPTYING OF AN AUXILIARY TANK
3-176
MAIN TANK BOOST PUMP FAILURE
3-176
EMERGENCY FUEL TRANSFER FOR WEIGHT REDISTRIBUTION AUXILIARY

TANK TO MAIN TANK
3-177
EMERGENCY FUEL TRANSFER FOR WEIGHT REDISTRIBUTION MAIN TANK

TO AUXILIARY TANK
3-177
Change 16
3-7
T.O. 1B-52H-1
table of contents
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS
3-180
PUMP-OUT WARNING LIGHT FLICKER
3-180
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE CHECKLIST
3-181
ROTARY LAUNCHER POWER PUMP LOW PRESSURE LIGHT ON
3-183
ROTARY LAUNCHER POWER PUMP LOW PRESSURE LIGHT ON CHECKLIST
3-183
LANDING GEAR MALFUNCTIONS
3-184
MAIN GEAR FAILS TO RETRACT CHECKLIST
3-184
TIP GEAR FAILS TO RETRACT CHECKLIST
3-186
PNEUMATICS SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS
3-8
page
3-187
AIR BLEED SYSTEM ABNORMAL OPERATION
3-187
AIR CONTAMINATION THROUGH AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM
3-187
FAILURE OF BLEED AIR PRECOOLER
3-188
FAILURE OF CABIN PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
3-189
FAILURE OF NORMAL BLEED AIR SOURCE IN FLIGHT
3-190
FAILURE OF NORMAL BLEED AIR SOURCE ON THE GROUND
3-190
FAILURE OF WATER SEPARATOR
3-190
FAILURE TO REGULATE CABIN TEMPERATURE
3-191
FILTER FAILURE
3-191
OPERATION WITH EMERGENCY BLEED AIR
3-192
RELEASING CABIN PRESSURE
3-192
REPRESSURIZING
3-192
SHUTDOWN OF AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM WITHOUT DUMPING

CABIN PRESSURE
3-193
WATER SEPARATOR FREEZEUP
3-193
T.O. 1B-52H-1
INTRODUCTION
This section contains text and amplified checklists
for operation of the aircraft during any emergency/
abnormal conditions. Abnormal operation of the
OAS and the Weapon Release system is contained
in T.O. 1B-52H-1-12, and abnormal operation of the
Defensive
systems
is
contained
in
T.O.
1B-52H-1-13. The text is divided into primary paragraphs in accordance with the type of emergency
and, where applicable, is followed by an amplified
checklist for that particular emergency.
The amplified checklists describe in detail the action to be taken. Certain actions are printed in capital and bold face type. These actions are called
critical actions and constitute the minimum required steps to be taken by a crewmember to ensure survival and must be committed to memory.
Each crewmember should be thoroughly acquainted
with the information covering emergencies which
may directly affect their actions. Regular personnel
coding is used to designate the crewmembers that
will accomplish the actions.
All steps in each checklist must be accomplished
when time permits in order to ensure complete control of each emergency. However, multiple emergencies, weather, or other factors may require modification of the recommended procedures. Accomplish
only those steps which will best control the most
critical emergency. When dealing with emergency/
abnormal conditions, determination of the most correct action to be taken must be derived using
SOUND JUDGEMENT, COMMON SENSE, and
FULL UNDERSTANDING OF APPLICABLE SYSTEMS.
Line items directing standard actions such as alerting the crew and maintaining directional control or
items involving a crewmembers analysis and judgment of the particular situation (i.e., land as soon
as practicable) are not included as critical emergency steps, but will apply to all critical emergencies.
The procedures in this section are based on the assumption that all crewmembers will be alerted to
the emergency condition as soon as possible.
1. MAINTAIN AIRCRAFT CONTROL

Establish a safe airspeed, attitude, and thrust setting. Ensure safe terrain clearance is maintained.
2. ANALYZE THE SITUATION
A thorough evaluation of each emergency should be
made prior to initiating corrective action. Pilots
must critically evaluate the necessity for an immediate landing versus continued flight or controlled
bailout under emergency conditions.
3. TAKE PROPER ACTION
When accomplishing emergency steps, coordinated
action by crewmembers is essential to ensure each
step is correctly completed in the proper sequence.
NOTE
Accomplishing critical actions steps of any

emergency procedures checklist solely and
without deviation is the immediate response expected. Failure to follow the proper sequence of the checklist as published
can cause subsequent steps to be ineffective, e.g., the subsequent steps may require
electrical power, pneumatic pressure, or
other aircraft systems which may no longer
be available.
The terms Land as soon as possible and Land as
soon as practical are used throughout this section
and are defined as follows:
Land As Soon As Possible The mission will be
terminated and an emergency declared. Landing
should be accomplished at the nearest suitable
base.
Land As Soon As Practicable The mission

should be terminated and landing accomplished at
the planned destination or a suitable alternate at
the discretion of the pilot.
EMERGENCY ENTRANCE
FIRE ACCESS
Three basic rules apply to all emergency situations.
These basic rules are not repeated in each of the
listed procedures; however, in all emergencies, the
overriding considerations shall be to:
AND
GROUND
Access for rescue of flight crew by ground personnel

and access routes for fire fighting on the ground are
3-9
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Emergency Entrance and Ground Fire Access
FOAM
1 CREW COMPARTMENT EMERGENCY ENTRANCE

THRU EJECTION SEAT HATCHES
2 WING EQUIPMENT BAY ACCESS
3 ENGINE ACCESSORY AND COMBUSTION SECTION
(HINGED SPRING-LOADED DOORS)
4 CREW COMPARTMENT NORMAL ENTRY
5 FORWARD WHEEL WELL AREA EQUIPMENT
6 WING FLAP MOTORS IN CENTER WING EQUIPMENT
BAY (ACCESS THRU BOMB BAY)
7 AFT WHEEL WELL AREA COMPARTMENT
8 AFT EQUIPMENT COMPARTMENT ACCESS
Slightly alkaline. Corrosive if left on. Wash off with water.

Nontoxic.
WATER FOG
Plain water. Noncorrosive, nontoxic. No residue.
CO2
A heavy colorless gas. Leaves the bottle under pressure

and extreme low temperature. Evaporates quickly and
leaves no residue. Do not remain in confined areas where
CO2 has been released.
CB, CBM (CHLOROBROMOMETHANE)

Toxic. Avoid prolonged or repeated breathing of vapor.
Avoid use of water. Heat or moisture breaks down CB into
acids which are corrosive to aluminum and other metals.
Purge areas with clean dry air.
HALON 1211
Low level toxicity. Noncorrosive, colorless, faintly sweet
smelling, no residue. Avoid prolonged or repeated breathing of vapor. Leaves the bottle under pressure and low temperature. On decomposition, a sharp acrid odor can be detected even in small concentrations.
CARBON TETRACHLORIDE
Breaks down to form gases which are highly toxic and corrosive. Avoid prolonged breathing of vapor.
Entrance into the aircraft during any emergency such as fire

or crash can best be accomplished by using the various hinged
or latched access doors and escape hatches located throughout the aircraft. The escape hatches located in the top of the
aircraft are the primary entrances for use in crew rescue work.
Flush-mounted external hatch release handles are provided for
the forward upper hatches. Release handles for the aft upper
hatches are flush-mounted to the side of the hatch lifters. Secondary access for crew rescue and primary access to fuselage
fires are gained thru the use of the bomb bay, wheel wells, and
aft equipment compartment door. Access to wing fires is accomplished thru the use of hinged flush-latching doors in the
wing surface and by placing the flaps down. The knock-in panels in the engine nacelles are hinged and spring-loaded.
Figure 3-1
3-10
T.O. 1B-52H-1
GROUND EMERGENCIES
ENGINE FIRE ON THE GROUND
1. THROTTLE(S) CLOSED (P)
An engine fire on the ground may be originated and supported by fuel, oil, or hydraulic fluid. When
an indication of engine fire is evidenced, the affected engine throttle will be closed. If practicable, the
throttle for the adjacent engine should be closed to aid personnel in putting out the fire.
2. FIRE SHUTOFF SWITCH(ES) PULL (P/CP)
The affected engine fire shutoff switch will be pulled out to assure closing of the firewall fuel shutoff
valves in case the throttle fails to do so. The firewall fuel shutoff valves require dc power for operation. See ENGINE FIRE SHUTOFF SWITCHES, Section I.
3. Starter Switch(es) ON (if air available) (CP) (accomplish only if an internal engine fire is reported
by the ground crew)
The most effective means of extinguishing an internal engine fire is to motor the engine.
If engine fire occurs after starter dropout, it will be necessary to turn

the starter switch to OFF and back to START in order to motor the
engine. Moving the starter switch to OFF deenergizes the starter
lockout relay allowing the starter to be engaged for engine motoring.
Ignition should not occur since closing the throttle will interrupt the
ignition circuits.
If engine fire occurs after closing the air bleed manifold valves, they
must be reopened to supply bleed air for engine motoring in a nacelle
in which the engines have been shut down.
If the starter selector switch is in FLIGHT position and engine
motoring is desired, it will be necessary to place the selector switch
to PNEUMATIC to provide air to the starter.
4. Ground Crew & Control Tower Notified (P/CP)
CO2 should not be directed into the engine air inlet or tailpipe unless
fire is restricted to those areas and is of serious proportions. Shut
down the engine if possible, in order to minimize engine damage if
CO2 is to be applied. HALON, if available, may be directed into the
engine air inlet or tailpipe.
Change 17
3-11
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ENGINE FIRE ON THE GROUND (Cont)

5. Throttle(s) CLOSED (P)
When fire is out or becomes uncontrollable by the crew, close the throttles to shut down all remaining
engines. If fire is uncontrollable, accomplish this step immediately to assist firemen and the first
crewmembers who evacuate the aircraft.
6. Starter Switch(es) OFF (CP)
When fire is out or becomes uncontrollable by the crew, turn starter switches OFF.
7. If Fire Is Uncontrollable Abandon aircraft on pilots order (ALL)
The pilot will activate the abandon light and crewmembers will immediately evacuate the aircraft.
Before leaving his position, the copilot will turn all fuel controls off or closed, and will turn off the
battery switch and external power switch.
3-12
T.O. 1B-52H-1
WHEEL BRAKE SYSTEM FAILURE
This checklist is primarily designed for loss of braking action during taxi operations. Hydraulic failure procedures affecting brakes and steering during landing that reference this procedure will have provided steps for
the operation of the antiskid and hydraulic switches. See LANDING WITH COMPLETE STEERING FAILURE AND LANDING WITH BRAKE SYSTEM HYDRAULIC FAILURE, this section. Therefore, with normal
body system hydraulic indications and when ineffective or inadequate braking situations arise during high
speed aborts or landings, and stopping on the remaining runway is in doubt, the use of this checklist would
likely begin with the closing of selected throttles.
1. ANTISKID SWITCH OFF (IF APPLICABLE) (P)
NOTE
Improper servicing of the shock struts or a malfunctioning landing

gear safety switch may prevent transfer of the antiskid system from
the airborne mode to the ground mode. If this occurs, the antiskid
system automatically releases brakes on the affected gear (possibly
all gear) when the aircraft is moving at a slow rate of speed, as during
taxiing. When loss of braking due to this condition is experienced,
turning the antiskid switch OFF will restore braking action without
antiskid protection.
When the antiskid is OFF, braking action depends entirely on the
pressure applied to the brake pedals. Do not pump brakes when only
accumulator pressure is available.
While taxiing on a slippery surface, it is possible to lose up to 50%
of the effective braking due to locked wheel conditions; however, for
this condition leaving the switch ON provides more effective braking
action than full braking without antiskid. See ANTISKID OPERATION, Section I.
2. BODY SYSTEM STANDBY PUMP SWITCHES STBY (P)

3. THROTTLES 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 & 8 CLOSED (P-CP)
NOTE
Electrical power and hydraulic pressure source is provided by leaving

the remaining engines operating. Steer aircraft to avoid collision. If a
collision is imminent and the above procedures fail to slow or stop the
aircraft, steer toward the selected ground course prior to shutting down
remaining engines. Consider steering off prepared surface onto the adjacent sod to slow the aircraft.
4. THROTTLES 4 & 5 CLOSED (P-CP)
If steering is not available and the previous procedures do not slow the aircraft, shut down remaining
engines.
3-13/(3-14 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TAKEOFF EMERGENCIES
ABORTED TAKEOFF
If a takeoff emergency arises as a result of engine
fire, tire failure, fire during ground roll, or other
aircraft malfunction necessitating an aborted takeoff, the procedure to be followed for aborting shall
always be the same. See the following checklist for
a standard step-by-step procedure for aborting
takeoff.
Takeoff will not be aborted after S1 unless,

in the opinion of the pilot, the emergency
renders the aircraft definitely unsafe to attain emergency bailout altitude. In those
cases where the pilot attempts to abort after S1, the aircraft will probably fail to stop
within the confines of the runway.
ABORT
1. THROTTLES IDLE (P)
2. AIRBRAKES SIX (P)
3. DRAG CHUTE DEPLOY (CP)
The drag chute will be deployed at airspeeds above 70 knots. The maximum drag chute deployment
speed is 135 knots.
4. BRAKES APPLY (P)
Full brakes should be applied with the antiskid switch ON. Braking at high speeds with antiskid
switch OFF is almost certain to cause locked wheel conditions and tire failures resulting in a serious
loss of braking effectiveness. At high speeds initial braking action or response may seem ineffective
and be misleading to the pilot causing him to suspect brake failure since optimum braking action
cannot be expected until the tires are carrying heavy loads. See WHEEL BRAKE SYSTEM OPERATION, Section I.
A ground loop should not be attempted at heavy gross weights since

structural failure may occur at speeds above 30 knots. A turn of any
kind should not be attempted unless conditions straight ahead appear
more hazardous.
5. Brake Energy Limits Checked (P/CP)
See instructions provided in Section V to determine the heat energy absorbed during the abort.
3-15
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TAKEOFF WITH ONE OR MORE ENGINES

INOPERATIVE
Takeoff with one or more engines inoperative is not
recommended. However, if conditions are such that
it becomes necessary to fly the aircraft to another
location, such takeoffs are possible. It will be necessary to consider carefully the field altitude, ambient
runway temperature, available runway length,
wind velocity, and gross weight at takeoff.
A successful takeoff will be possible by use of the
normal takeoff procedure. Charts are provided in
Part 2 of T. O. 1B-52H-1-1 giving takeoff distances
required for seven-and six-engine takeoffs. When
using partial thrust procedures under these conditions, it is necessary to check climbout performance
to assure that climbout is not critical with the failure of an engine.
NOTE
If throttles are advanced beyond the takeoff

setting after an outboard engine failure, the
directional control speed may be above unstick speed.
Safe takeoffs can be made on seven engines at intermediate and high gross weights with throttles at
TRT.
Takeoff will not be aborted after S1 unless

in the opinion of the pilot, the emergency
renders the aircraft definitely unsafe to attain emergency bailout altitude. In those
cases where the pilots attempts to abort after S1, he must accept the fact that he will
probably fail to stop within the confines of
the runway.
TAKEOFF CONTINUED
Because of marginal lateral directional control, it is

recommended that no takeoffs be made with two
engines inoperative on the same side.
ENGINE FIRE ON TAKEOFF

If a fire warning light comes on after takeoff is committed, do not retard the throttle for the engine on
fire if its thrust is needed for takeoff unless the engine is vibrating seriously. When the landing gear
and wing flaps have been retracted and a safe altitude is reached, retard throttle to CLOSED and use
EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN procedure, this section.
ENGINE FAILURE DURING TAKEOFF

TAKEOFF RUN
The possibility of an engine failure during the takeoff run influences takeoff procedure and should always be considered and planned for prior to the
time the takeoff run is started. When an engine
failure occurs on takeoff, the pilot must be able to
stop on the runway remaining or continue the takeoff safely. To aid in making a decision to stop or continue takeoff, charts are presented in Part 2 of T. O.
1B-52H-1-1 from which may be determined the decision speed time. A check of the airspeed at S1 will
indicate how the aircraft is accelerating. A failing
engine may be detected in this manner and, if the
speed is below the decision speed, the takeoff must
be aborted. If an engine failure occurs above this
speed, a safe takeoff can be made on seven engines
when the partial thrust procedures are used.
3-16
Be prepared to encounter asymmetric thrust on all

takeoffs. Mental preparation has proven to be a significant factor in the successful takeoff with asymmetric thrust. During lineup, pilot and copilot will
adjust seat and check full displacement of control
column and control wheel; then adjust rudder pedals to enable full displacement. To the pilot flying
the aircraft, aircraft yaw will most likely be the
first indication of engine failure on takeoff and
must be controlled. The pilot should maintain runway centerline. Visually maintaining centerline will
ensure proper rudder application. When the yaw
forces exceed the capability of rudder/steering, the
pilot has two options to maintain aircraft control: 1)
reduce asymmetric thrust, or 2) increase flight control effectiveness. Asymmetric thrust can be reduced by retarding throttle(s) for engine(s) opposite
to those that have failed.
Given full input, flight control effectiveness can be
increased by increasing airspeed. Proper pitch control is the pilots most expeditious method to increase airspeed. Reducing parasite drag and applying asymmetric thrust should also be considered.
Conditions permitting, accelerate in ground effect
and retract the gear. Energy required for rate of
climb can be converted to accelerate the aircraft.
Attempt to maintain some bank into the operating
engines to take advantage of lateral fuel shift. Do
not relax and then reapply control inputs as this
will allow the asymmetric condition to become dynamic. Realize it may take some time for the airspeed to increase enough to make the aircraft respond to proper control application.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Landing Gear
Wing Flaps
If an engine fails during or immediately after the

takeoff, climb performance is considerably reduced
until the landing gear is retracted. Gear drag lowers the rate of climb approximately 200 feet per
minute at takeoff with flaps down on a 488,000
pound aircraft. Therefore, the landing gear should
be retracted as soon as possible after the aircraft is
airborne. An engine failure decreases the rate of
climb about 500 feet per minute, under the same
conditions.
Wing flap drag increases as the flaps are retracted

to the 37.5% position, an increase about equal to
the drag that would occur if the landing gear were
extended again. After this point in retraction, drag
decreases rapidly. It is therefore recommended that
with an engine failure on a high weight takeoff, the
flaps be left down until a safe altitude is reached
and flap retraction can be accomplished in level
flight or in a slight dive. Speeds for maximum rate
of climb with flaps down while operating on eight or
seven engines are presented in Part 3 of T. O.
1B-52H-1-1.
NOTE
With full control wheel positions, the pilots

view of some instruments, including the airspeed and attitude director indicators, may
be obstructed.
ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE ON TAKEOFF TAKEOFF CONTINUED
1. Engine(s) Shut down (P-CP)

Use EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN procedures when a safe altitude and airspeed are
reached.
TAKEOFF WITH UNBALANCED/FAILED TIRE

The landing gear can be seriously damaged under
high speed ground run conditions (such as takeoff
or landing ground run) with a badly unbalanced
tire. A blowout and subsequent high speed wheel
rotation may result in partial disintegration of the
tire and cause such an unbalance. Tire blowout and
subsequent tire separation may result in extreme
vibration and noise. Interphone and radio transmissions may be very limited because interphone/radio
foot switches may be very difficult to keep depressed. Crewmembers may not physically be able
to speak because of extreme vibration. Therefore,
prior to every takeoff following a braked landing
(other than a taxi-back landing using normal braking) or refused takeoff, a visual inspection should
be made to determine the safe condition of the tires.
In addition, if a tire failure is suspected on takeoff
before S1 is reached, the takeoff should be discontinued. If a strong vibration is experienced or tire
failure occurs after S1 is reached, brakes should be
applied immediately after the aircraft leaves the

ground to minimize possible damage from resultant
vibration. Assessment of damage by a crewmember
or chase plane should be the first consideration after wheel rotation is stopped. The landing gear
should not be retracted until assessment of damage
has been accomplished. The condition of tires,
structure, and adjacent system components should
be ascertained before any decisions are made. An
unbalanced tire condition will be impossible to determine visually unless obvious tire failure can be
seen. Failed tire condition (blown out, flat, or chunk
loss) can usually be determined by visual inspection. If assessment of damage reveals no degradation of airworthiness, the mission could be continued with either an unbalanced or failed tire condition. However, unless otherwise warranted, it is
recommended that the mission be aborted. If necessary to continue the mission, the landing gear
should be retracted only after wheel rotation has
stopped and hydraulic system pressures have been
checked for satisfactory indications.
3-17
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CRASH LANDING OR DITCHING IMMEDIATELY AFTER TAKEOFF
If unable to sustain controlled flight, immediate bailout of all possible

crewmembers is imperative and offers the best chance for survival.
NOTE
If a crash landing must be made, the touchdown should be accomplished in a wings level attitude.
For crash landing or ditching immediately after takeoff, the crew will
be alerted over interphone rather than by use of the emergency alarm
switch to prevent the possibility of incorrectly positioning the switch
or of improper crew response. Just prior to touchdown, crewmembers
will be notified over interphone to brace for impact.
1. Landing Gear DOWN (UP for ditching) (CP)

Landing gear will only be lowered after it has definitely been determined that a crash landing will
be made.
2. Throttles CLOSED (after impact) (P)
Do not shut down engines prior to touchdown. This would result in an

immediate loss of all primary electric power. Electrical control of stabilizer trim will be lost. The spoilers will operate at a reduced rate on
windmill rpm hydraulic pressure.
4. Battery Switch OFF (CP)
5. Aircraft Abandon (ALL)
Remain in position until aircraft comes to complete stop. After complete stop is made, pilot places
emergency alarm switch to ABANDON. Remove upper escape hatches and all crewmembers exit
using escape ropes.
3-18
To prevent personal injury, ascertain that the escape ropes are fully
extended before using them.
Crewmembers will be aware of protruding objects on the sides of the
aircraft fuselage such as pitot tubes, antennas, etc. Attempt to avoid
these objects by pushing away from the fuselage with your feet.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
RUNAWAY OR UNSCHEDULED STABILIZER TRIM
NOTE
For complete information on nose high and dive recoveries, see RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL POSITIONS, MANEUVER FLIGHT, Section VI.
1. AUTOPILOT DISENGAGE AND OFF (P/CP)
As soon as an unscheduled trim indication is noted, the pilot flying the aircraft will immediately
attempt to counter a trim input with control column movement and actuate the autopilot release
button. At the same time, the pilot not flying will turn the autopilot power switch to the OFF position. The pilot flying the aircraft will then confirm the trim button in neutral position and monitor
the manual trim wheel to ensure the trim wheel has stopped. Attempt to alleviate control column
forces through the use of the electrical trim in the desired direction, and ensure the trim wheel is
moving in the appropriate direction. If the unscheduled inputs cease, a malfunction of the autopilot
has occurred. See AUTOPILOT ABNORMAL OPERATION, this section.
Pilots will disconnect the autopilot immediately if unscheduled autopilot inputs are observed. Autopilot disengagement by means of the
autopilot release button will be confirmed by placing the autopilot
power switch to the OFF position.
If the stabilizer trim or an unscheduled autopilot input places the aircraft in or near an unusual position before disconnect is accomplished,
smooth coordinated recovery techniques will be made to prevent exceeding aircraft structural limitations. (Structural loads will be less if
the controls are manually held in their displaced position during autopilot disengagement.) See RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL POSITIONS,
MANEUVER FLIGHT, Section VI.
3-19
T.O. 1B-52H-1
RUNAWAY OR UNSCHEDULED STABILIZER TRIM (Cont)

2. STABILIZER TRIM CUTOUT SWITCH CUTOUT (P/CP)
If electrical trim cannot be obtained in the desired direction or cannot be stopped, the stabilizer trim
cutout switch will be actuated to CUTOUT. The stabilizer trim cutout switch should be retained in
CUTOUT (guard open) to ensure that the electrical trim circuit remains interrupted. Pilot utilizes
the manual trim wheel to reposition the stabilizer. If the application of opposing control column
movement and the actuation of the cutout switch plus the autopilot disengagement fail to stop the
trim runaway, the manual trim wheel must be held against rotation.
Do not use the stabilizer trim cutout switch until positive that the attitude change is due to runaway trim.
NOTE
If a runaway stabilizer trim is experienced and caused by certain multiple malfunctions, actuation of the stabilizer trim cutout switch to
CUTOUT will have no effect. The application of 24 to 36 pounds of control force in opposition to the unscheduled trim will open the force
switch(es) and interrupt the trim input only as long as the column force
is present. To prevent reinitiation of the unscheduled trim input when
control column force is reduced pull the circuit breaker marked TRIM
CONTR on the MISCELLANEOUS section of the pilots circuit breaker
panel.
3. Airbrakes Set (as required) (P)
The pilot may raise the airbrakes to help raise the nose or lower the airbrakes, if they were up, to
lower the nose.
Incorrect actuation of the airbrakes during recovery from a runaway or

unscheduled trim condition will aggravate an already dangerous situation. Caution should be exercised not to retract extended airbrakes during a nosedown trim condition and, conversely, airbrakes should not be
extended during a noseup trim condition.
3-20
T.O. 1B-52H-1
COMPLETE FAILURE OF ALL GENERATORS
1. MASTER ISOLATE SWITCH PUSH IN AND HOLD WHILE PLACING GENERATOR SWITCHES ON (CP)
If complete ac or forward TR electrical failure occurs, the only fuel

available to the engines will be the fuel remaining in the main tanks.
Changes in flight attitude, acceleration forces or unknown fuel quantity
may cause the main tank boost pumps to become uncovered allowing
air to be drawn into the system, thus causing engine flameout; therefore, crewmembers must anticipate the possible loss of any or all engines any time electrical power is lost and act accordingly.
If unable to restore generator power, close crossfeed valves (9, 10, 11,
12) to prevent air from being drawn into fuel lines and subsequent
engine flameout. Crossfeed valves will remain closed for the remainder
of the flight or until generator power is restored.
NOTE
If all generators fail to restart, see FUEL MANAGEMENT WITHOUT

BOOST PUMPS and CONSERVATION OF BATTERY POWER checklists, this section.
2. Direct All Crewmembers to Reduce Electrical Loads Accomplished (P/CP)
Copilot monitor ac ammeters for overload indications. Pilot will notify crew to reduce unnecessary
electrical loads (OAS, AGM-86B/C, AGM-129, and ECM).
3. Frequencies & Voltages Checked (CP)
Check frequency and voltage of each generator using the frequency and voltage selector switch to
detect malfunctioning generator.
4. Generator Switch for an Operating Generator ON (CP)
Place generator switch for one good operating generator ON to provide an electrical power source
to the central bus tie.
5. Malfunctioning Generator(s) OFF/DECPL (CP)
If any generator indicates abnormal voltage fluctuations with normal frequency, place generator
switch off. If generator will not turn off, decouple generator drive using GENERATOR DRIVE
OVERHEAT LIGHT ILLUMINATES checklist. If any generator indicates abnormal frequency fluctuations, proceed to decouple using the GENERATOR DRIVE OVERHEAT LIGHT ILLUMINATES
checklist.
6. Generator Switch for all Operative Generators ON (CP)
Reparallel all good generators.
3-21/(3-22 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
INFLIGHT EMERGENCIES
SMOKE AND FUMES ELIMINATION
If smoke and fumes are evident in the pressurized
compartment, locate the source immediately. If it
can be determined that the smoke or fumes are
coming from the cabin air outlets, refer to the following checklist.
sembling smoke can occur. Reporting this

vapor as smoke or fire at a critical point of
the takeoff could create a hazard.
NOTE
When wearing the CBO mask and filter

pack, the user is unable to detect fumes
such as fuel, hydraulic fluid, oil, etc.
Under takeoff thrust conditions and with

low temperature selection, fog or vapor reSMOKE AND FUMES ELIMINATION
If fire is suspected or evidenced by visible flames and smoke in the

pressurized compartment, see PRESSURIZED COMPARTMENT FIRE
checklist, this section.
NOTE
Check manifold temperature gage indication. With high engine thrust

settings an open strut bleed valve (for any reason) can result in excessive temperatures in the distribution ducts causing strong odors and
fumes to enter the cabin.
1. Oxygen 100% (All)
All primary crewmembers and extra crewmembers will report to pilot when mask is on and oxygen
100%.
2. Throttles Partially retard one of the throttles providing bleed air to the air conditioning system.
Check for continued smoke and/or fumes. If smoke and/or fumes still exist, retard the other throttle.
(P/CP)
NOTE
Only the engine at the highest rpm of those connected to the air bleed
system manifold will supply the manifold due to check valves at the air
bleed ports on the engines. Therefore, by partially retarding the
throttle of a suspected engine, it is possible to isolate that engine as a
source of bleed air contamination.
3-23
T.O. 1B-52H-1
SMOKE AND FUMES ELIMINATION (Cont)

3. Air Bleed Selector Opposite position (CP)
The bleed selector switch should be returned to NORMAL LH INBD

position before descending below 25,000 feet. Excessive duct temperatures may result if this operation is not accomplished. If EMERG RH
INBD position must be selected, see AIR BLEED SYSTEM ABNORMAL OPERATION, this section, for control of air bleed manifold temperatures.
Place airbleed selector switch to its opposite position. Leave switch in selected position if incoming
flow of smoke and/or fumes ceases. Additional ventilation may be obtained by placing the cabin
pressure release switch to DUMP (42,000 feet or below) and opening the sextant port. If smoke
and/or fumes continue to enter the pressurized compartment, descend to 42,000 feet or below and
position air conditioning master switch to RAM. Additional ventilation may be obtained by opening
the sextant port. After smoke and fumes have dissipated, repressurize by placing the cabin pressure
release switch to RESET or air conditioning master switch to 7.45 PSI and closing the sextant port.
Do not depressurize until all crewmembers are on oxygen and the aircraft is 42,000 feet or below.
4. Affected Nacelle Engines for Malfunction Monitored (P/CP)
ELECTRICAL FIRE
Since the aircraft electrical circuits have fault clearance protection, it is not likely that short circuits
will cause electrical fires. If an electrical fire
3-24
does occur, however, the only practical means of

stopping it is to deenergize the circuits in the affected area and cautiously put essential equipment
back in operation, one circuit at a time.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
PRESSURIZED COMPARTMENT FIRE
1. OXYGEN 100% (ALL)
All primary crewmembers and extra crewmembers will report to pilot when mask is on and oxygen
100%. If possible, extra crewmember oxygen outlets should be used when engaged in firefighting
procedures.
2. CABIN PRESSURE MASTER SWITCH OFF (CP)
The switch must be moved to the OFF position; this allows cabin leakage to depressurize the compartment, and shuts down incoming air.
Do not depressurize until all crewmembers are on oxygen and the aircraft is 42,000 feet or below.
3. UNNECESSARY ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT OFF (ALL)
Pilot will notify crew to reduce unnecessary loads (OAS, AGM-86B/C, AGM-129, and ECM).
4. Fire Combat (RN/N/EW/Extra crewmember)
Pilot will direct adjacent or extra crewmembers to institute firefighting procedures.
a. Locate the fire.
b. Remove objects that would spread the fire or restrict firefighting procedures from the vicinity
of the fire area.
c.
Apply extinguishing agent at base of fire.
When fighting a fire with the fire extinguisher, remember when using
the HALON 1211, the fumes from the decomposed products are toxic.
A noxious, irritating atmosphere will be present with its use when the
agent is used on the open fire source and burning material. The supply
of extinguisher agent is depleted in approximately 12 to 15 seconds of
continuous use. Because of the HALONs effectiveness, short bursts of
2 to 3 seconds should be used to fight small localized fires.
Crewmembers not engaged in fighting fire should not look toward extinguisher or fire to prevent extinguisher discharge stream from
splashing into eyes.
When using a portable oxygen bottle during firefighting, the regulator
setting will be 30M or higher, commensurate with aircraft altitude.
This setting should be used where there is the possibility of heavy concentrations of fumes. The supply in the portable oxygen bottle will last
a minimum of 4 minutes depending on regulator setting, cabin altitude,
and physical activity.
d. Remove involved combustibles from fire source area.
3-25
T.O. 1B-52H-1
PRESSURIZED COMPARTMENT FIRE (Cont)

5. Airspeed/Altitude Reduced (P/CP)
Reduce airspeed to ensure safe ejection and extra crewmember bailout, and then reduce altitude to
25,000 feet.
If Fire Is Controlled:
6. Aircraft Repressurized (CP)

After fire is completely extinguished, the most effective way to eliminate smoke from the pressurized
compartment is to position the air conditioning master switch to 7.45 PSI, move the cabin pressure
release switch to DUMP, and open the sextant port. After smoke has dissipated, repressurize by
placing the cabin pressure release switch to RESET and close the sextant port.
If Fire Is Uncontrollable:
7. Aircraft Abandon on pilots order (All)

If it is apparent the fire cannot be controlled, the pilot will order crewmembers to bail out.
In the event of fire in forward wheel well area, the jettisoning of an escape hatch will cause smoke and flames to be drawn into the crew compartment. In the event of fire in crew compartment, the jettisoning of
an escape hatch will rapidly intensify and spread the smoke and flames
throughout the crew compartment. Therefore, the jettisoning of an upward escape hatch prior to the egress of all lower deck members and
extra crewmembers could seriously hamper their escape. In this event,
the revised order of bailout would be: N, EXTRA CREWMEMBERS,
RN, G, EW, CP, and P.
ENGINE FAILURE
The loss of an engine at any time is considered an
emergency, regardless of the amount of thrust still
available, since some emergency procedure must be
executed. Anytime an engine either does not respond to throttle movement or fails due to an unknown condition, it should be shutdown, except
when its thrust is essential for flight. There are
two engine failure during flight procedures. If a catastrophic engine failure occurs such as disintegration, seizure, or abnormal vibration, with or without an associated fire, use the EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN checklist to shut the engine
down. If the engine is to be shut down for reasons
other than those described above, use the PRECAUTIONARY/PRACTICE ENGINE SHUTDOWN
checklist to shut it down. After completing either
3-26
Change 1
shutdown checklist, compensate for the unbalanced

thrust condition by adding appropriate directional
and lateral trim. If you elect to keep the engine
running, do not depend on its continued operation.
Also consider future loss of engine driven accessories. The asymmetrical thrust capabilities with loss
of engine(s), are charted in the appropriate flight
manual appendix. The failure of engine 1, 3, 5, or 7
will be accompanied by the loss of electrical power
from the generator geared to that engine. See
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM EMERGENCY OPERATION, this section. Failure of both engines 3 and 4
will result in loss of the normal bleed air source for
the air conditioning system. See PNEUMATICS
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS, this section. Failure
of engine 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7 will result in loss of, or
reduced, fluid flow in the hydraulic system which is
serviced by the respective engine-driven hydraulic
T.O. 1B-52H-1
pump installed on that particular engine. Even
though an engine has failed but is windmilling,
near normal system operation can be expected since
system pressure will be maintained until the engine reaches a low windmilling speed. See LANDING WITH BRAKE SYSTEM HYDRAULIC FAILURE and HYDRAULIC SYSTEM EMERGENCY
OPERATION, this section.
NOTE
If engine(s) fail/flameout during either

climb or cruise, accomplish the EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN or the PRECAUTIONARY/PRACTICE
ENGINE
SHUTDOWN checklist, this section, prior to
determining if an engine air start is warranted.
ENGINE FAILURE INDICATIONS
The first and most positive indication of an engine

failure affecting thrust will be a change in the engine pressure ratio gage reading. This method will
determine the failure of any engine during takeoff,
climb, cruise, or descent. In addition, rpm, exhaust
temperature, oil pressure, and fuel flow may
change, depending on the type of failure. Some engine failure indications may appear as simply the
engine slowing to a nonresponsive, sub-idle condition. These conditions are consistent with a rupture
of the burner pressure to fuel control tube assembly. Burner pressure is one of four control inputs
the fuel control uses to determine thrust. Loss of
burner pressure results in fuel control decreasing to
minimum flow and engine slowing to a sub-idle
state dependent on indicated airspeed and flight level. Any abnormal vibration may indicate internal
failure of an engine. Aircraft yaw may give a good
indication of failure if an outboard engine fails. The
failure may be overlooked, however, if one of the inboard engines fail, especially if the aircraft is in a
turn.
engine down unless its operation is necessary to maintain safe flight.
Vibration associated with internal failure of

an engine can be of severe magnitude and
prolonged exposure can result in structural
damage to the engine mount components
with possible engine separation. If vibration
continues in a nacelle after shutdown of
both engines, avoid flight over populated
areas and land as soon as practicable. A reduction in IAS and/or altitude should be
made to reduce windmill rpm.
ENGINE FAILURE DURING CLIMB
Engine failure during a climb is not considered critical provided the recommended airspeed climb
schedule is followed. If an engine failure is encountered during a climb, the airspeed or rate of climb
or both will decrease. If the mission is to be continued, a new climb schedule will have to be flown. Directional control can be maintained easily by adding rudder trim and a slight amount of lateral trim.
Minimum directional control speed charts have also
been included (figure 3-15) for preflight planning to
cover engine failure(s) during the initial climb
phase immediately after takeoff.
ENGINE FAILURE DURING CRUISE
Failure of an engine during cruise will not appreciably affect directional control but will result in a
decrease in the speed being flown. Normally, the
cruise altitude will also be decreased depending on
the amount of fuel remaining, type of mission being
flown, etc. Applicable charts covering eight-, seven-,
and six-engine operation are included in Part 4 of T.
O. 1B-52H-1-1. Minimum speeds for directional
control can be found for inflight EPR setting, pressure altitude, and gross weight by using the one-engine-out line on figure 3-15. If the engine which
failed was not on fire and the malfunction can be
corrected, restart the engine as outlined under ENGINE AIR STARTING, this section.
ENGINE FIRE WARNING LIGHT(S) ILLUMINATED
Serious engine damage can occur from bird

ingestion without accompanying abnormal
indications on engine instruments. If bird
ingestion is known or suspected, shut the
If engine fire warning light(s) come on, shut down

engine(s) in accordance with the EMERGENCY
ENGINE SHUTDOWN checklist, this section.
Change 1
3-27
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN
NOTE
If a catastrophic engine failure occurs such as disintegration, seizure,

severe vibration, and/or fire, use the EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN checklist to shut down the engine. If the engine is to be shut
down for other than these reasons, the PRECAUTIONARY/PRACTICE
ENGINE SHUTDOWN checklist, this section, should be used.
1. THROTTLE(S) CLOSED (P)
2. FIRE SHUTOFF SWITCH(ES) PULL (P/CP)
a. This ensures closing of the firewall fuel shutoff valves in case the throttle fails to do so. If the
engine drives a generator, the switch will also turn the generator off and open the generator
circuit breaker. If the engine drives a hydraulic pump, the hydraulic shutoff valve will be closed
and no hydraulic pressure will be received from that engine.
b. After closing the throttle and pulling the fire shutoff switch, if fire warning light continues to
illuminate, shut down adjacent engine in nacelle. If fire warning light goes out, do not restart
either engine in nacelle. If fire warning light does not go out, both engines should normally
remain shut down. However, multiple failures may cause the pilot to consider restarting an
engine shutdown for precautionary reasons (so long as no additional indications of fire or overheat are noted), e.g., a critical need for electrical power, or for thrust when a marginal go-around
capability exists.
Except on engine(s) shut down for fire or fuel leak, windmilling above
25% rpm, have fuel available to the firewall fuel shutoff valve, push
the engine fire shutoff switch in, and advance the throttle to IDLE for
3 minutes out of every hour to prevent overheating the fuel control
unit. If the firewall fuel shutoff valve circuit breaker has been pulled
during shutdown of engines, the respective firewall fuel shutoff valve
circuit breaker must be reset in order to obtain fuel to the engine.
If engine 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7 is still windmilling after the fire is extinguished, the hydraulic shutoff valve can be reopened to prevent damage to the pump by pulling the corresponding firewall fuel shutoff valve
circuit breaker and returning the engine fire shutoff switch to the
NORMAL position. Before reopening the hydraulic shutoff valve, ensure that the starter switch is OFF and the respective engine ignition
circuit breaker is pulled. If the fire re-ignites due to opening of hydraulic shutoff valve, engine fire shutoff switch should be pulled for complete shutdown.
NOTE
When an excessively high oil temperature occurs following an engine

shutdown that is not due to engine fire or fuel leak, the firewall fuel
shutoff valve may be returned to NORMAL position and the throttle
advanced beyond IDLE provided the starter switch for the affected engine is OFF. This allows oil cooling until the temperature has reduced
below 120C by means of fuel flow through the fuel-oil cooler which is
controlled at this temperature.
3-28
Change 18
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN (Cont)

3. Starter Switch(es) OFF (CP)
Ensure that the starter switches for engines which have been shut
down are OFF and remain in OFF for the remainder of flight unless
intentional engine air starting is accomplished.
When fuel is available to an engine, even with some failures of the fuel
control unit, restart could occur if the starter switch is placed to START
and the throttle is moved out of the CLOSED position. Continuous ignition will occur regardless of throttle position if the firewall fuel shutoff
valve circuit breaker is out and the starter switch is placed to START.
4. AC Electrical Loads Checked (CP)

If the failed engine is one which drives a generator, check that the remaining generators are not
overloaded. Reduce loads if necessary.
5. Bleed Selector Switch EMERG RH INBD (if Engines 3 & 4 Shut Down) (CP)
Use bleed selector switch as required:
a. When emergency shutdown is necessary on both engines of nacelle No. 2, switch to EMERG RH
INBD.
b. Leave switch in NORMAL LH INBD position if fire occurs on engines of No. 1, 3, or 4 nacelles.
See PNEUMATICS SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS, this section.
An engine air start after an emergency shutdown should not be attempted unless it is ascertained that it is reasonably safe to do so. A
recurrence of the emergency condition could be more serious than the
first occurrence.
If Fire Continues Proceed With Steps 6 And 7 :
If Fire Is Out, Proceed To Steps 8 And 9:
NOTE
If fire persists, it may be possible to save the aircraft by allowing the

fire to burn the nacelle off the strut.
3-29
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN (Cont)

6. Airspeed Increased to Maximum (as applicable to configuration) (P)
Increase airspeed to maximum allowable for the configuration and initiate a shallow descent if conditions permit. Descent will increase acceleration to maximum speed and decrease the angle of attack.
Both the increased airspeed and the resultant decreased angle-of-attack will help keep fire from the
wing until the fire is extinguished or controlled.
7. Cowling, Strut & Wing Observe (if conditions permit) (P/CP)
If conditions permit, maintain visual surveillance of affected area. When blackened discoloration
appears on the cowling, burn-through is probably only a few seconds away and fire will be exposed
to airstream. If the fire intensifies and spreads to the strut area, the upper strut surface and the
wing should be closely observed. Discoloration of the upper strut indicates the fire will probably
spread to the wing. Discoloration may be very difficult to detect with a camouflaged aircraft.
NOTE
Cowling burn-through should not be confused with fire burning into

the wing.
8. Fuel System Management Monitor (as required) (CP)
NOTE
At any time an engine is shut down or any unusual combination of engines is used, care should be taken to manage fuel so as to maintain
proper center of gravity and fuel distribution. See Section V for further
information about fuel loading and cg location. Also, see FUEL MANAGEMENT FOR LATERAL TRIM AND WING FUEL UNBALANCE,
under CLIMB, Section II.
9. Restart See ENGINE AIR STARTING checklist, this section (if applicable) (P/CP)
If engine was not shutdown for fire or fuel leak and it has been determined that it is safe to restart
engine, proceed with ENGINE AIR STARTING checklist.
If Fire Appears To Be Burning Into The Wing:
10. Aircraft Abandon (All)
PRECAUTIONARY/PRACTICE ENGINE
SHUTDOWN
When a engine is to be shutdown inflight because of
a malfunction not requiring immediate shutdown or
for practice, the PRECAUTIONARY/PRACTICE
ENGINE SHUTDOWN checklist, this section, will
be used. When an engine is to be air started in
flight for practice, the ENGINE AIR STARTING
checklist, this section, shall be used. Practice starts
3-30
Change 18
should be made in the NORMAL WINDMILLING

START area of the air start envelope, figure 3-2. Air
starts may be demonstrated in the PROBABLE
START range, but the POSSIBLE SLOW OR HOT
START area should be avoided except in an actual
emergency. Use of engine starters for air starts will
be restricted to emergency operations only. Practice
shutdown and air starting shall be made on only
one engine at a time.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
PRECAUTIONARY/PRACTICE ENGINE SHUTDOWN
It is recommended that engine shutdown and air starting be practiced

at altitudes between 10,000 and 40,000 feet, one engine at a time. Practice starts should be made in the NORMAL WINDMILLING START
area of the air start envelope (figure 3-2). Air starts may be demonstrated in the PROBABLE START range but the POSSIBLE SLOW OR
HOT START area should be avoided except in an actual emergency.
Use of engine starters for air starts is restricted to emergencies only.
NOTE
If a catastrophic engine failure occurs such as disintegration, seizure,

severe vibration, and/or fire, use the EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN checklist, this section, to shut down the engine. If the engine is
to be shut down for other than these reasons, the PRECAUTIONARY/
PRACTICE ENGINE SHUTDOWN checklist should be used.
1. Throttle Retard to IDLE for 3 minutes (P)
The throttle for the engine to be shut down should be retarded to IDLE for 3 minutes before the
engine is shut down. This will prevent damage resulting from rapid temperature changes.
If the engine is to be shut down from a thrust setting above cruise

thrust, cool the engine at reduced thrust setting for approximately 5
minutes before placing the throttle in CLOSED position.
Do not pull engine fire switch for practice engine shutdown. Leaving
the hydraulic shutoff valve open on engines 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, & 7 when not
required to be closed, will prevent damage to the engine-driven hydraulic pump. When the hydraulic shutoff valve is closed, damage will be
caused from hydraulic fluid starvation while the engine is windmilling.
Except on engine(s) shutdown for fire or fuel leak, windmilling above
25% rpm, have fuel available to the firewall fuel shutoff valve, push
the engine fire shutoff switch in, and advance the throttle to IDLE for
3 minutes out of every hour to prevent overheating the fuel control
unit. If the firewall fuel shutoff valve circuit breaker has been pulled
during shutdown of engine, the respective firewall shutoff valve circuit
breaker must be reset in order to obtain fuel to the engines.
2. Generator Switch OFF (if applicable) (CP)

If the engine to be shutdown drives a generator, the generator should be taken off the line so that
it will not be motored by power from the others in case of high windmill speeds or system malfunction which would not allow the generator to be taken off the line automatically. Check that the
generator circuit breaker position indicator shows open. Make certain that the remaining generators
are not overloaded. Reduce loads if necessary.
3. Oil Temperature Selector Positioned (CP)
Position the oil temperature selector switch to the engine being shut down in order to monitor oil
temperature.
3-31
T.O. 1B-52H-1
PRECAUTIONARY/PRACTICE ENGINE SHUTDOWN (Cont)

4. Throttle CLOSED (P)
5. Starter Switches OFF (CP)
Ensure that the starter switches for engines which have been shut
down are OFF and remain in OFF for the remainder of flight unless
intentional engine air starting is accomplished.
6. Fuel System Management Monitor (as required) (CP)
NOTE
At any time an engine is shut down or any unusual combination of engines is used, care should be taken to manage fuel so as to maintain
proper center of gravity and fuel distribution. See Section V for further
information about fuel loading and CG location. Also, SEE FUEL
MANAGEMENT FOR LATERAL TRIM AND FUEL BALANCE, under
CLIMB, section II.
7. Restart See ENGINE AIR STARTING checklist (if applicable) (P/CP)
After windmilling rpm has stabilized, the engine may be restarted using the procedure outlined
under ENGINE AIR STARTING, this section.
If engine is not restarted and windmilling above 25% RPM, have fuel
routed to the engine and advance the throttle to IDLE for 3 minutes
out of every hour to prevent overheating the fuel control unit.
ENGINE AIR STARTING
ENGINE FLAMEOUT AND RELIGHT
The airstart envelope (figure 3-2) indicates the altitude and indicated airspeed envelope in which
windmilling starts normally should be attempted.
The rpm lines on the curve are approximate. Starts
may be attempted up to the airspeed limits of the
aircraft. Starts made at an rpm below 65% are
termed airstarts. The starting rpm of different engines is variable depending on the resistance to
normal windmilling rpm created by the enginedriven accessories. Engines 4 and 6, which provide
power to operate hydraulic pumps, windmill at
slightly lower rpm than engines 2 and 8 when the
hydraulic pumps are supplying pressure. Engines
1, 3, 5, and 7, which are equipped with engine-driven generators and hydraulic pumps, have a windmilling rpm which is approximately 4% lower than
engines 2 and 8 when the hydraulic pumps are supplying pressure. Windmilling engine speed may be
developed up to 45% rpm with variations of airspeed and altitude. Considering that the engines do
not develop the same windmilling rpm under the
same airspeed and altitude conditions, airspeed
should be controlled to provide starting rpm in accordance with normal windmilling rpm of the particular engine.
Immediate response by the pilots to an engine

flameout can make a relight possible without the
necessity of descending to the altitudes and rpm
limits shown on figure 3-2. Relights may be made
at as low as 65% rpm. To simplify relight procedures, the starter selector switch should always be
positioned to FLIGHT when the aircraft is in flight.
See ENGINE AIR STARTING checklist this Section. For recommended procedures in the event of
multiple engine flameout at high altitudes, see ENGINE OPERATION, Section I, and TURBULENCE
AND THUNDERSTORMS, Section VII.
3-32
Change 17
NOTE
If the adjacent engine in the same nacelle

starts to surge or vibrate during the engine
relight, retard the adjacent engine throttles
to idle and advance both engine throttles to
the desired setting after the relight has
been accomplished.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Air Start Envelope

DATA BASIS: FLIGHT TEST
DATE: MARCH 1962
CONDITIONS:
ICAO STANDARD DAY
REMARKS
Engines 2, 4, 6, and 8.
Engines 1, 3, 5, and 7 (with ac generator).
Figure 3-2
3-33
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ENGINE AIR STARTING
Do not attempt a restart or relight of a flamed-out engine in a nacelle

with a known or suspected fuel leak unless a critical need for thrust
exists.
Immediate response by the pilots to an engine flameout can make it
unnecessary to follow the complete engine air starting procedure. This
type of relight may be made as low as 65% rpm. To obtain a relight,
retard the throttle to IDLE and place the starter switch to START. Do
not place the starter switch to START at engine rpm below 65% without following the complete procedure because engine fire or damage can
result from accumulation of fuel in the engine.
NOTE
This checklist applies to a normal windmilling airstart (rpm below

65%). See AIRSTART ENVELOPE (figure 3-2) for speed and altitude
required for normal windmilling starts.
1. Fire Shutoff Switch Reset (P/CP)
If the firewall fuel shutoff valve circuit breaker and the ignition circuit breakers have been pulled,
reset these circuit breakers to ensure ignition and fuel is available to the engine.
2. Fuel Routed to Engine (CP)
NOTE
If engine start is unsuccessful and auxiliary fuel is available, open auxiliary tank engine feed control valves (13, 14, 15 or 16), as required,
to utilize auxiliary to engine feed and initiate restart.
Verify fuel boost pressure is available to the firewall fuel shutoff valve.
If on main-tanks-to-engines fuel sequence, open crossfeed valves 9, 10,
11, and 12.
3. Oil Temperature Checked (CP)

For monitoring of engine oil temperature, the oil temperature selector switch should be positioned
to the engine being started. Oil temperature should be below 120C which is the controlled temperature of the fuel-oil cooler.
4. Starter Switch OFF (CP)
5. Throttle IDLE, then CLOSED (P)
Open throttle to IDLE until stable fuel flow (550 to 1200 PPH) is established. This normally requires
30 seconds, but may require repeat attempts depending on the amount of air in the system. This
T.O. allows continuous windmilling with throttle at idle for up to 3 minutes for cooling of the fuel
control unit. With stable fuel flow, retard throttle to CLOSED for 30 seconds to purge the fuel control
unit of air and the engine of fuel. In case of excessive oil temperature, throttle may be advanced
beyond IDLE to provide sufficient cooling. If the firewall fuel shutoff valve circuit breaker has been
pulled during shutdown of engines, the respective firewall fuel shutoff valve circuit breaker must
be reset in order to obtain fuel to the engine.
3-34
Change 16
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ENGINE AIR STARTING (Cont)

6. Engine RPM Checked (P)
Establish an indicated airspeed which will give an engine speed within the normal air start rpm
range. If sufficient airspeed cannot be obtained, use engine starter to increase rpm above 18%. See
figure 3-2 for recommended airspeed and altitude for engine air starting.
7. Oil Pressure Checked (P)
8. [EV] Fuel Enrichment Valve Switch As required (CP)
NOTE
When above 15,000 feet and operating on any fuel other than JP-4 or
AVGAS, set the FUEL ENRICHMENT VALVE switch to ON.
9. Start Selector FLIGHT (CP)
The start selector switch should be placed in FLIGHT position unless the engine starter is to be used
to aid in the start.
The use of engine starters for air starts is restricted to emergencies only.
10. Engine Anti-Icing Switch OFF (P)
11. Starter Switch START (CP)
12. Throttle IDLE (P)
Fuel flow should be between 550 and 1200 pounds per hour prior to combustion. Starts with less
than 550 pounds per hour may be attempted. When flow is more than 1200 pounds per hour, retard
the throttle below IDLE to reduce the flow below 1200 pounds per hour. During acceleration from
combustion to idle rpm, the normal fuel flow may be 2000 pounds per hour. In both cases, the engine
operation should be watched carefully for evidence of further malfunctioning of the fuel control unit.
IDLE position may not control fuel flow sufficiently to prevent an overtemperature condition between light-up and idle rpm. The EGT and
fuel flow should be monitored closely and regulated by manipulation of
the throttle as necessary until the desired power setting is restored.
13. Engine Indicators Checked (P)
Adjust throttle as necessary until engine indicator readings have stabilized as follows:
a. Tachometer 58% to 85% RPM Checked
b. Exhaust Gas Temperature Stabilized
Change 20
3-35
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ENGINE AIR STARTING (Cont)

c.
Oil Pressure Within Limits Checked (Section V)

NOTE
Combustion normally should occur within 20 seconds and will be evidenced by a rise in exhaust gas temperature. Retard throttle as necessary to maintain EGT within limits when a tendency to overtemperature is observed. If the EGT exceeds limits, if the engine fails to accelerate to idle rpm, or if the oil pressure does not reach 35 psi, discontinue the restart by retarding the throttle to CLOSED and turning the
starter switch to OFF. Allow the engine to windmill for 30 seconds before attempting another start.
14. Throttles Advanced (desired setting) (P)
15. Oil Temperature Monitored (CP)
In case of excessive oil temperature, throttle may be advanced as necessary to provide oil cooling
by means of fuel flow until temperature has reduced below 135C which is the upper temperature
limit for steady state operation.
16. Starter Switch Climatic (CP)
17. [EV] Fuel Enrichment Valve Switch CLOSE (CP)
18. Generator ON (if applicable) (CP)
19. Engine Anti-Icing Switch Climatic (P)
FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS WITH ENGINE

FAILURE
The loss of an engine at any time during takeoff or
while in flight is considered an emergency, regardless of the amount of thrust still available, since
some emergency procedures must be executed.
CONTROL WITH LOSS OF ENGINES
With loss of engines, the pilot is presented with the

problem of maintaining control and ensuring satisfactory performance of the aircraft. Loss of outboard engines is most critical since this imposes the
largest asymmetrical loads.
When an engine fails, the pilot has several methods
by which the aircraft may be controlled: thrust adjustment, lateral control, and rudder control. To illustrate these methods, consider an aircraft flying
with progressive outboard engine failure; that is,
engine No. 1 loses thrust and stops, then engine No.
2 fails, etc. This situation gives an increasingly
3-36
Change 20
larger turning force on the aircraft. The most effective way to overcome the problem would be to eliminate the turning force by reducing thrust on an engine or engines on the opposite side of the aircraft
and advancing thrust on the remaining symmetrical engines. This method will work unless the
thrust required to fly the aircraft is greater than
that which is available from operating engines. As
the turning force from the progressive engine failure becomes larger, spoiler and gradual rudder application may also be used to counteract the turning
force. The total effect of these corrections must exactly balance the turning force due to the asymmetric thrust if the aircraft is to hold a constant heading. When a sideslip is imposed on the aircraft by
the combination of asymmetrical thrust and spoiler
and rudder deflection, the wing on the side toward
which the aircraft is slipping becomes more effective. Thus the upwind wing will have more lift
than the downwind wing and this lift differential
will impose a rolling force on the aircraft which
must be overcome by increased spoiler deflection.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
When full rudder is insufficient to counteract the
induced turning force, it will be necessary to hold a
bank angle with the inoperative engines on the
high side to balance the force. This is an uncoordinated maneuver since the aircraft is not turning.
As the turning forces due to the progressive engine
failures increase, the point will be reached when
full rudder and full wheel must be held in order to
maintain a constant heading. If the turning forces
increase beyond this, the aircraft will turn because
the pilot has no more control authority to overcome
the turning force. Minimum speed for directional
control is defined as the speed at which a constant
heading can be maintained with full rudder and
one-half lateral control authority with all of the operative engines at a given amount of thrust. (TRT
assumed for sea level and MRT assumed for 10,000
feet.) This leaves the remaining one-half lateral
control available for maneuvering. The minimum
speeds for directional control are shown in figure
3-15. It should be recognized that any attempt to fly
below these speeds will result in a further reduction
of the maneuvering margin to the point of absolute
control limits. Two alternatives are available to the
pilot. The pilot must either reduce the thrust on the
remaining engines to balance the turning force or
allow the aircraft to turn slowly while the speed increases to a point where the directional control
margin is regained. In some cases, it may be necessary to use a combination of these two alternatives.
PERFORMANCE WITH LOSS OF ENGINES
The aircraft is unique in its ability to handle asymmetrical thrust conditions provided the prescribed
procedures are followed. (See MULTI-ENGINE
FAILURE ON ONE SIDE, this section.) The takeoff
and climbout performance of the aircraft with inoperative engines is shown in Parts 2 and 3 of T. O.
1B-52H-1-1. In each case, the inoperative engines
are assumed to be in the most outboard positions
and all on the same side. This is the most adverse
condition from the standpoint of trim drag which is
associated with control surface deflections. The turbofan engine is a part throttle engine in that TRT
can be developed with less than full throttle travel.
Advancing the throttles to full travel in an emergency situation will give maximum thrust. This
may exceed normal engine limits. Overthrusting
the engines will accentuate the aircraft control
problems and reduce engine life. All instances of
overthrust as indicated by excessive EGT and/or
rpm will be recorded in Form 781. See ENGINE
Nonzero lateral trim resulting from inoperative engines must not be compensated
for by fuel manipulation because an uncontrollable roll may occur when thrust is reduced on approach for landing.
LOSS OF ENGINE POD
In the event of an engine pod loss, the resulting lateral imbalance may be partially corrected through
fuel differentiation as shown in figure 3-15A.
STRUCTURAL EFFECTS OF MULTI-ENGINE FAILURE
ON ONE SIDE
The application of large amounts of lateral and rudder control which is necessary in order to maintain
control when extreme amounts of asymmetrical
thrust exist creates severe loads on the aircraft
structure. These loads vary in magnitude in accordance with the degree of thrust asymmetry, degree
of deflection or corrective rudder, rate of rudder application, amount of yaw/roll displacement that has
taken place prior to rudder application, abruptness
with which engine thrust is changed, indicated airspeed, gross weight, center of gravity, fuel distribution, amount of air turbulence present, aircraft configuration including flaps and landing gear positions, missile loading, external tank loading, etc. If
these variables occur in certain combinations, critical structural loads can result. In view of the difficulty in controlling these variables, close observance of the following procedure will minimize the
possibility of structural overload.
1. If asymmetrical thrust develops abruptly, the
resulting yaw/roll tendency should be counteracted
with lateral control followed by steady rudder application. Trim as required to balance control forces.
(If asymmetric thrust develops at low speed see
GO-AROUND WITH ONE OR MORE ENGINES
INOPERATIVE, this section for the proper lateral
control techniques.)
2. If thrust requirements permit, readjust the
thrust on the remaining engines to minimize control surface deflections. Thrust adjustments should
be applied slowly and simultaneously with control
surface movement.
3. Avoid turbulent air and limit maneuvering
bank angle to 20 maximum.
Change 20
3-36A/(3-36B blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
RADOME FAILURE/LOSS
AIRSPEED INDICATION FAILURE
Failure of the large nose radome may begin as a

collapse in the form of an inward bulge against the
radar antenna. Such collapse could result from a
delaminated or soft spot in the radome caused by
inflight collision with birds or hailstones or by
ground damage. Failure will be audible as a loud
thump accompanied by nose of the antenna bumping or scraping against the radome. If the antenna
is completely jammed, the scope will so indicate.
Therefore, in the event of a collapsed radome:
Loss of airspeed indication can result from pitot ice,

leaks, loss of radome, and other system malfunctions. There is no single best solution to deal with
the loss of all airspeed indications under all conditions. However, there are a number of factors which
must be considered in arriving at the best solution
under a particular set of circumstances. If in formation, useful airspeed information can be obtained by
maintaining a position relative to the other aircraft.
All of the aircraft can aid in station keeping. Setting the EVS pitch and roll indicator on the aircraft
ahead may help. The OAS wind displays, which
have a TAS input, will be unreliable; but unless
otherwise malfunctioning, the doppler and OAS
groundspeeds will be reliable. It may also be possible to obtain groundspeed from ground radar. To
convert groundspeed to airspeed requires accurate
wind values which may be obtained from other aircraft in the vicinity of ground stations. If the aircraft is not in formation, consideration providing a
chase aircraft. A chase aircraft should be used for
airspeed and altitude if a landing is attempted with
no airspeed indication.
1. Immediately shut down radar.

2. Reduce airspeed to the lowest value that will
leave a safe and reasonable margin above stall.
(See AIRSPEED INDICATION FAILURE, this section, in case of lost airspeed indication.)
3. Continue flight only as long as necessary.
Continued flight with radome collapsed

may result in further structural failure
with subsequent departure of the radome
and loss of airspeed indications.
Inflight loss of the nose radome will cause
complete loss of airspeed and Mach indications during all flight conditions. An extreme increase in noise level will occur, accompanied by possible buffeting.
Change 1
3-37
T.O. 1B-52H-1
The first consideration is to keep the aircraft under
control and in a safe speed range; i.e., well away
from the low speed or high speed buffet. As altitude
and gross weight increase, the usable airspeed
range between high speed buffet and low speed buffet is decreased. The B-52 aircraft in level flight is
unlikely to encounter high speed buffet at high altitude and high gross weights because of engine
thrust limitations. However, if the aircraft is descending under such a condition, the airspeed can
rapidly increase and high speed buffet can be encountered. At low altitudes, a descent maneuver
can cause the aircraft to exceed the structural placard before the high speed buffet is encountered.
The stabilizer trim should be monitored. Progressive noseup trim requirements indicate the aircraft
is decelerating and low speed buffet will be encountered. Nosedown trimming indicates that the aircraft is accelerating. Nosedown trimming followed
by reverse or noseup trimming indicates that the
high speed tuck region has been encountered and
increasing speed will result in high speed buffet. If
buffeting is accompanied by the nose of the aircraft
dropping and a rapid decrease in altitude, the aircraft is either stalling or in a high speed dive. In a
stall, elevator and rudder control pressures will be
light, the aircraft will tend to wallow in the lateral
axis, and lateral control/airbrakes will be ineffective. In high speed dives, the elevator and rudder
pressures will be heavy and the lateral control/airbrakes will be effective. Lateral control pressures
will remain the same in all conditions. At spoiler
blowdown conditions with airbrakes extended, the
wheel movement will have a dead spot in it; however, full wheel will provide a significant lateral control capability. See SPOILER AND AIRBRAKE
BLOWDOWN, Section VI. Recovery procedures for
both conditions are described in Section VI. The aircraft can be successfully operated without airspeed
indications as follows:
1. The pilot will alert all crewmembers over
interphone to assume their positions and wear
parachutes as directed under critical phases of
flight.
2. If practicable, request the immediate services
of a chase aircraft for obtaining accurate airspeed
checks and land as soon as conditions permit.
Pilot of the chase aircraft will be briefed on

command chase aircraft procedures prior to
engaging in chase operations.
It is unsafe to fly two aircraft in close vertical proximity because of the magnitude of
interrelated aerodynamic effects.
3-38
NOTE
A VFR landing with chase aircraft to monitor approach speed would be the most desirable procedure after due consideration of
the following factors; gross weight, weather
conditions at intended place of landing,
length of time chase aircraft can remain in
formation with B-52, and advisability of reducing gross weight prior to landing. If
landing above 325,000 pounds gross weight
becomes necessary, see HEAVY WEIGHT
LANDING, Section II.
3. Depending on flight conditions when loss of
airspeed occurred, accomplish the following appropriate procedure:
a. When airspeed is lost during level flight,
see paragraph 4.
b. When airspeed is lost during climb, see
paragraph 5.
c. When airspeed is lost during descent, see
paragraph 6.
4. LEVEL FLIGHT. If all airspeed indications are
lost in stable level flight, there should not be any
immediate problem. If desired, engage autopilot;
however, do not engage altitude hold if there is also
a static system (altimeter or vertical velocity indicator) problem. Maintain thrust at the existing setting. Note and monitor stab trim setting especially
when altitude hold is engaged. Rapid or continued
changes of stab trim in one direction are danger
signs. Avoid steep turns.
5. CLIMB. If all airspeed indications are lost in a
climb, the problem is more complex. If altitude and
conditions permit, the best solution is to level off.
However, there may be factors favoring continuation of the climb, such as maintenance of cell integrity, adverse weather, terrain, and conflicting traffic. These must be balanced against dangers inherent in coping with the additional variables of attitude and vertical velocity, decreasing performance,
and increasing susceptibility to stall.
a. Level-off should present no problem if prescribed climb airspeed was being maintained. The
existing NRT fuel flow would be safe for initial level-off. After the aircraft is in level flight, reduce fuel
flow using the chart value from figure 3-3. At low
weight and low altitude, do not delay this reduction
as aircraft will accelerate rapidly. When level, follow procedures in paragraph 4. The chart values
may not accelerate the aircraft to the charted
speed, but will maintain it, once reached. The
greatest danger is low speed and resultant stall.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
b. Level flight fuel flow for charted airspeed
can be immediately determined by entering figure
3-3 with altitude and gross weight. Adjusting the
fuel flow to the values shown in the chart for a specific altitude and gross weight will not necessarily
prevent a stall if level-off airspeed is less than that
required for best endurance. If in doubt, use NRT
and allow the aircraft to accelerate to a safe airspeed. Airspeeds that are less than best endurance
will place the aircraft on the back side of the drag
curve. For additional discussion of the drag curve,
see THRUST-DRAG SPEED STABILITY, Section
VI. The data presented in the chart was extracted
from the fuel flow charts in the RANGE part of
T. O. 1B-52H-1-1. Flight conditions are for a clean
aircraft on a standard day. If protuberances or operational factors are present, apply the range
correction factors given in the RANGE section of
T. O. 1B-52H-1-1.
c. If it is necessary to continue climb, concentration on aircraft attitude and performance is
mandatory. Engage autopilot, if desired. Monitor
vertical velocity and pitch attitude closely. Note and
monitor stabilizer trim. Closely monitor EPR to ensure that NRT is maintained. Avoid steep turns. If
in cell, use every aid for station keeping and coordinate closely with other aircraft concerning relative
position and performance. Cross-check doppler
groundspeed. At level-off, follow procedures in
paragraph 5a; however, it must be assumed that
airspeed will have varied during continued climb. If
at high weight and/or altitude, it would be safe to
maintain NRT for several minutes to ensure that a
safe airspeed has been reached.
6. DESCENT. If all airspeed indications are lost
during descent, a different set of problems will ensue. Again, there may be factors which might suggest continued descent, but unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary, leveling off is probably the better decision. During descent, concentrate on aircraft attitude and performance. Use
autopilot and monitor vertical velocity and attitude
closely. Note and monitor stabilizer trim and crosscheck doppler groundspeed. An important consideration would be to level off at an altitude which
would permit safe bailout if controlled flight becomes impossible.
a. When the decision is made to level off,
break descent in the normal manner, lower
airbrakes, and apply thrust. Prior to level-off, time
permitting, obtain fuel flow from the chart. If time
does not permit, 5.5% of the aircraft gross weight
(clean aircraft) will equal a safe initial fuel flow setting, e.g., for a 300,000 pound aircraft, initially set
16,500 pph fuel flow until the flight manual can be
consulted.
7. If altitude changes become necessary because
of weather or other reasons and no chase aircraft is
available, use of the following procedure will provide an approximate target airspeed. This procedure should be used only if another means of obtaining airspeed information is not available.
Due to variations in engines and aircraft

and rpm lag due to engine inertia, the actual airspeed could be considerably lower
when using engine rpm to obtain target airspeed during letdown. Closely monitor for
indications of low or high speed conditions
as described in the previous AIRSPEED INDICATION FAILURE text.
Shut down engine 2 or 8. Enter chart in figure 3-2,
AIR START ENVELOPE, with pressure altitude
and desired indicated airspeed for letdown and obtain the desired windmill rpm for the engine that
has been shut down. The following example lists desired windmill rpm for a 240 knots IAS letdown:
PRESSURE
ALTITUDE FEET
DESIRED
WINDMILL
RPM PERCENT
40,000
43
35,000
39
30,000
37
25,000
33
20,000
31
15,000
28
10,000
27
5,000
25
2,000
23
NOTE
During level flight on 7 engines, the chart

can be entered with pressure altitude and
stable windmill rpm to obtain the resultant
indicated airspeed.
Pitch corrections should not exceed 2 on the
attitude gyro. Corrections in excess of 2 will cause
overcontrol due to time lag to achieve stabilized
windmill rpm. Traffic pattern should not be flown
without chase aircraft; however, knowledge of wind
velocity and direction, coupled with Doppler
groundspeed, will provide the most reliable
airspeed information. Subtract effective tailwind or
add effective headwind from doppler groundspeed
3-39
T.O. 1B-52H-1
than best endurance will place the aircraft on the
back side of the drag curve. If the speed is less than
the speed for minimum drag (best endurance) and
thrust equals drag, altitude will be held. If a gust or
control input occurs, it can cause a drag increase
and a deceleration will occur. If the pilot or
autopilot is trying to hold altitude, this will not permit an accelerating force to develop and the deceleration will become more severe. In this situation,
the aircraft will continue to decelerate further and
stall will result unless thrust is applied or the nose
is lowered enough to develop an accelerating force.
The data presented in figure 3-3 was extracted from
the fuel flow charts in the RANGE part of T. O.
1B-52H-1-1. Flight conditions are for a clean aircraft on a standard day. If protuberances or operational factors are present, apply the fuel flow
correction factors in the RANGE section of T. O.
1B-52H-1-1.
to obtain approximate knots IAS. Eight engine

operation should be resumed after arrival of chase
plane.
FUEL FLOW FOR AIRSPEED INDICATION FAILURE
Level flight fuel flow for charted airspeed can be

immediately determined from figure 3-3 by entering the chart with altitude and gross weight. This
chart provides a minimum speed of 240 knots IAS
except for some low weight/high altitude conditions.
All airspeeds shown are at least 15 knots above
best endurance and generally approach best range
speeds. Adjusting the fuel flow to the values shown
in the chart for a specific altitude and gross weight
will not necessarily prevent a stall if level-off airspeed is less than that required for best endurance.
If in doubt, use NRT and allow the aircraft to accelerate to a safe airspeed. Airspeeds that are less
Fuel Flow for Airspeed Indication Failure

TOTAL FUEL FLOW (1000 LBS/HR) LEVEL FLIGHT
200
240
280
320
360
400
440
480
ALTITUDE
1000 FT
KIAS
FUEL
FLOW
KIAS
FUEL
FLOW
KIAS
FUEL
FLOW
KIAS
FUEL
FLOW
KIAS
FUEL
FLOW
KIAS
FUEL
FLOW
KIAS
FUEL
FLOW
KIAS
FUEL
FLOW
SEA LEVEL
240
17.9
240
19.0
250
15.5
270
18.0
290
20.9
290
21.8
290
22.9
290
23.9
240
12.8
240
13.6
260
16.3
280
18.9
300
21.3
300
22.3
300
23.2
300
24.2
10
240
12.7
240
13.5
260
15.9
280
18.3
300
20.8
300
21.5
300
22.6
300
23.5
15
240
12.4
240
13.2
260
15.5
280
17.7
300
20.0
300
20.9
300
21.8
300
22.8
20
240
12.2
240
12.8
260
15.0
280
17.2
290
18.7
300
20.3
300
21.3
300
22.4
25
240
11.6
240
12.4
260
14.5
280
16.5
290
18.1
300
19.7
300
20.6
300
21.5
30
240
11.4
240
12.0
260
14.0
280
16.2
280
17.0
285
18.4
290
19.7
290
21.0
35
240
10.9
240
11.8
250
13.0
260
14.2
260
15.8
270
18.3
270
20.0
40
230
10.6
230
11.4
230
12.4
240
14.6
245
17.5
245
20.5
45
220
10.9
220
12.2
220
14.3
220
17.7
Below 23,000 feet, NRT may accelerate aircraft past structural speed
limits.
NOTE
Increase fuel flow by 10% if loss of airspeed was caused by radome failure. In this case these speeds may cause severe buffeting and a lower
speed may be appropriate.
Increase fuel flow by 2% for each 10C over standard day temperature.
Thrust setting in this chart will not necessarily prevent a stall if level off
airspeed is less than that required for best endurance. If in doubt, use
NRT and allow aircraft to accelerate to a safe airspeed.
If protuberances or operation factors are present, apply the fuel flow
correction factors in the RANGE section of T. O. 1B-52H-1-1.
Figure 3-3
3-40
T.O. 1B-52H-1
UNSCHEDULED AUTOPILOT INPUTS
Pilots will disconnect the autopilot immediately if unscheduled autopilot inputs are observed. Autopilot disengagement by means of the autopilot release button will be confirmed by placing the autopilot power
switch to the OFF position.
If an unscheduled autopilot input places the aircraft in or near an unusual position before disconnect is accomplished, smooth coordinated
recovery techniques will be made to prevent exceeding aircraft structural limitations. (Structural loads will be less if the controls are manually held in their displaced position during autopilot disengagement.)
See RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL POSITIONS, MANEUVERING
FLIGHT, Section VI.
1. AUTOPILOT DISENGAGE AND OFF (P/CP)
Upon experiencing an unscheduled autopilot input, the pilot flying the aircraft will immediately
depress the autopilot release button. At the same time, the pilot not flying the aircraft places the
autopilot power switch to OFF position. See AUTOPILOT ABNORMAL OPERATION, this section,
prior to reengaging.
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
Occasionally, structural damage may be incurred by
an aircraft while in flight. Such damage may be
caused by mid-air collision, overstressing the aircraft, and other causes. If the aircraft is still controllable following structural damage, certain procedures may be accomplished to assist in assuring a
safe landing. One basic rule which is generally
applicable is to make no gross change in aircraft
configuration until the extent of the damage or adverse effect on flying characteristics can be determined. A chase plane may provide valuable assistance in determining the extent of damage. The
reason for retaining the configuration existing at
the time the damage occurs may be readily appreciated from the following: Flight loads imparted to
the wing structure with flaps full up will vary considerably from the loads that exist with flaps full
down. A wing can conceivably contain structural
damage or failure of a type and in a location which
will permit continued safe flight to a landing under
certain prescribed operational conditions. To move
the flaps to their opposite position, however, could
effect a change in wing loading which would result
in further progression of the existing damage. If
structural damage has occurred to a flap or portions
of its mechanism, an attempt to move the flaps
could result in loss of the damaged flap. Structural
damage to an aircraft sometimes results in tank
rupture and leakage of fuel or other combustible
materials. If this should occur, it is necessary under
certain circumstances to take precautions in order

to reduce to a minimum the possibility of inflight
fire. Major sources of ignition are, of course, electrical arcs and high temperature surfaces or environment.
AIRCRAFT STRUCTURE
NOTE
The following general description and definition of aircraft structure is intended to

aid in flight crew comprehension of the B-52
structural makeup and is not intended to be
all-inclusive. For additional information, refer to applicable technical manuals.
Primary Structure
Primary structure is the major load carrying members or assemblies, the failure of which would materially decrease the safety of the aircraft as a whole.
Each of the aircraft airfoil surfaces (wing, fin, and
horizontal stabilizer) has a primary structural skeleton. This structure is generally described as follows: Wing box beam, encompassing structure
between the forward and rear spars and extending
from one tip through the center section to the other
tip; Fin box section between the main and auxiliary spars extending from the base up to the fiber-
3-41
T.O. 1B-52H-1
glass insulator; Horizontal stabilizer box section
between the main and auxiliary spars extending
through the center section to the middle of each
surface then becoming a single spar to each tip.
Certain ribs running aft to the control surfaces and
flaps are also regarded as primary structure. The
primary structure of the fuselage is generally the
entire fuselage with the exception of the radomes,
wheel well doors and covering, bomb bay doors, and
the turret.
Secondary Structure
Secondary structure is all structure that is not part

of the primary structure and is normally used to
maintain the aerodynamic contour of aircraft components. Failure of a small portion of secondary
structure will normally affect aircraft control characteristics or performance efficiency, while a major
loss of that structure could completely destroy flight
capability. Wing trailing edge is an example of secondary structure which could be damaged to a
small extent and slightly affect controllability and
performance whereas its complete loss would preclude further flight.
PRELIMINARY PROCEDURES
1. If the aircraft is still controllable following

inflight structural damage or failure, do not immediately make any major changes in existing configuration (retain flaps, gear, and airbrakes in the
position existent at time damage was incurred).
2. Avoid turbulence or any maneuver that could
apply unnecessary air loads to the aircraft.
Known bird strikes, static discharges, and

lightning strikes should be considered to
have caused at least secondary structural
damage. Airspeed should be reduced so as
not to exceed 250 knots IAS or Mach .77,
whichever is lower, for the remainder of the
flight. DAMAGE DETERMINATION procedures will be utilized and consideration given to early termination of the flight.
It is unsafe to fly two aircraft in close vertical proximity because of the magnitude of
interrelated aerodynamic effects.
1. If examination reveals that damage has occurred to secondary structure only and the damage
does not include flaps or control surfaces, the flaps
may be utilized as necessary.
2. If damage has occurred to wing primary structure, the existing flap position should not be
changed.
3. If damage has occurred to elevator or horizontal stabilizer, flap position should not be changed
until it is determined that sufficient longitudinal
control is available to take care of the changing
pitch trim requirements.
4. If damage has occurred to one of the flaps, flap
position should not be changed.
Controllability Check
If damage has occurred to any portion of the aircraft structure sufficient to affect the aircraft
thrust, drag, lift, or in any other manner change
the aircraft normal flight and control characteristics, a controllability check should be accomplished.
This check should be conducted at an altitude at
least 10,000 feet above the terrain or cloud cover. At
these altitudes, the best flare speed will be increased by 1% for each 5000 feet above 10,000 feet
pressure altitude. The check should be accomplished in the intended landing configuration and
immediately prior to descent for landing so that the
gross weight and airspeed checked will be valid.
The controllability check should be accomplished
down to, but not below, estimated minimum touchdown speed for the existing aircraft configuration
and gross weight. Speed reduction for the last 30
knots above best flare speed should not exceed a
rate of 1 knot per second. Following the controllability check, maintain aircraft loads and accelerations at a minimum by making all turns and maneuvers as shallow and gentle as possible and
avoiding turbulence during the descent and approach to landing. For further information, see
STALL OR CONTROLLABILITY CHECKS, Section VI.
Damage Determination
If it is practicable under the existing situation, request a chase plane to assist in determination of
the extent of damage.

engaging in chase operation.
3-42
When any controllability check is made due

to doubtful control characteristics of the aircraft, the airspeed should not be reduced
below the estimated minimum touchdown
speed for the aircraft configuration in which
the check is to be made. Under these conditions, the check should be discontinued immediately if any buffet or control problems
are encountered.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
When the flaps are in a full-down or intermediate position and flap damage exists,
such as a missing segment, the best flare
speed and minimum touchdown speed given
in T. O. 1B-52H-1-1 may no longer apply. In
this case, reduce speed slowly until the estimated minimum touchdown speed is
reached or until approximately one-half
lateral control authority is required to
maintain the wings level. For the controllability check, minimum touchdown speed for
intermediate flap settings can be estimated
by subtracting 9 knots from the best flare
speed at the appropriate flap setting. If onehalf lateral control authority is encountered
before minimum touchdown speed is
reached, add 9 knots to the minimum speed
reached to determine the best flare speed.
NOTE
As the aircraft is decelerated in the stall approach, it is essential that it not be trimmed
to speeds below best flare speed (approach
speed flaps up). The stall recovery should be
made using forward elevator control only. If
the aircraft has been trimmed below the
best flare speed trim setting, stabilizer trim
may be used to augment the elevator as required. The use of stabilizer trim in a normal practice stall recovery may result in
overcontrolling the aircraft with a resultant
potentially dangerous nosedown attitude
developing.
It is not always advantageous in modern
aircraft to make large reductions of gross
weight prior to landing after receiving
structural damage. If the damage is a type
that has reduced flight control capabilities,
the reduced airspeed that would result from
landing at low gross weights could result in
control difficulties during the final portion
of approach.
Fuel Leaks
If a fuel leak is known or suspected to exist due to

structural damage or tank rupture, the following
procedures, as appropriate, should be followed:
Deenergize all electrical equipment not essential to continued safe flight and necessary communications.
If the leak is such as to cause the emptying of
a tank in a few minutes:
1. Move the boost pump switch for the affected
tank to OFF position.
2. Move the tank fuel level control switch for the
affected tank to OFF position.
3. If the leak is in a wing tank, the following procedures should be followed:
a. Reduce airspeed so as not to exceed 250
knots IAS or Mach 0.77, whichever is lower.
b. Avoid turbulence or any maneuver that
could apply unnecessary airloads to the aircraft.
c. Use center wing and body fuel. This will
lessen wing bending and cause wing structure loads
to become increasingly less.
d. Land as soon as practicable.
NOTE
If the fuel leak is of a magnitude such as to

deplete one or more tanks in a few minutes,
the aircraft may have a tendency to rapidly
become wing heavy, tail heavy, or nose
heavy. Compensating fuel management for
any of these conditions should be set up as
soon as possible.
If the rate of leakage is not excessively high, it

is desirable to remove fuel from the leaking tank as
rapidly as possible in order to keep any possible
fuel contamination of the aircraft and its various
compartments at a minimum. See FUEL SYSTEM
EMERGENCY OPERATION, this section, for tank
emptying procedures.
If the fuel leak exists in the area of any of the
engine pods, the engines in the affected pod should
be shut down.
If the leak is in the bomb bay section, the aircraft should not be depressurized since strong fuel
fumes may enter the crew compartment.
Change 12
3-43
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Electrical Circuit Damage
All electrical components of the flap and landing

gear control circuits are hermetically sealed or explosion proof; therefore, no special precautions will
be required in the utilization of these circuits. If,
however, structural damage has broken any wires
or conduits, arcing could result from energizing
these wires or conduits. If it is suspected that such
damage may exist, explosion hazard may be minimized by utilizing the following procedure:
1. If damage to gear and flap circuitry is suspected, explosion possibility will be greatly reduced
by energizing these circuits at altitudes above
30,000 feet. When gear and flaps are extended at
high altitude, pull all circuit breakers to these control systems before descending.
NOTE
At altitudes above 30,000 feet, the possibility of accidentally igniting JP-4 fuel is reduced considerably. Altitudes between
15,000 and 25,000 feet may be more conducive to auto-ignition than either higher or
lower altitudes.
2. Deenergize all circuitry suspected of being damaged by pulling the appropriate circuit breakers to
the extent that is possible, while still retaining the
required functions.
ADDITIONAL PROCEDURE
It is seldom that two inflight emergencies are identical; therefore, the proper remedial measures will
not necessarily be identical. When the necessary
preliminary emergency procedures have been accomplished, contact the appropriate command within radio range for further assistance in determining
additional emergency procedures.
WINDSHIELD/WINDOW CRACKS
If crack(s) appear in a heated window or if the window suddenly shatters or spider webs (usually accompanied by a pop or thump) immediately turn off
windshield anti-icing and window defogging. For
3-44
Change 12
arcing, discoloration, or bubbles in the windows, see

WINDSHIELD ANTI-ICING AND WINDOW DEFOGGING ABNORMAL OPERATION, this section.
The structural integrity of a cracked window may
be checked by sliding a fingernail across the inner
surface to feel for cracks and determine if a crack is
in the load bearing inner pane. However, the effect
of cockpit pressurization may hold the cracked
pieces together and preclude this method of detection. The brown band of the vinyl core between the
inner and outer panes or the heating element, also
sandwiched between the panes may assist in determining which pane is cracked. If the brown vinyl
band around the window perimeter or the heating
element is not visible in the cracked window, and is
visible in a similar paired window, the inner pane
may be cracked. A crack in only the outer pane will
not impair the strength and normal pressurization
and flight may be continued. (Unheated windows
6L and 6R are made of laminated acrylic plastic
and carry the load on the outer surface.) All other
windows including the pilot and copilot escape
hatch windows carry the load on the inner pane.
The following procedure is recommended when a
heated window cracks or shatters:
1. Place windshield anti-icing and defogging
switch OFF.
2. Pull circuit breaker for affected window.
3. Place windshield anti-ice and defogging switch
ON.
4. If the load bearing pane has cracked:
a. Ensure all primary and extra crewmembers
are on oxygen.
b. All crewmembers in upper deck crew
compartment should lower helmet visor.
c. Place air conditioning master switch to
COMBAT 4.50 PSI.
d. Conditions permitting, do not exceed 10,000
feet cabin pressure altitude.
e. Restrict airspeed to 250 knots IAS or less.
f. Do not conduct low level tactic operations.
g. Land as soon as practicable.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EXPLOSIVE DECOMPRESSION
An explosive decompression occurs when the cabin
pressure is reduced to the outside pressure in less
than 1 second. Any explosive decompression affects
all crewmembers and can be extremely dangerous if
occurring at high altitudes. Following are some of
the effects accompanying explosive decompression:
Rush of air from lungs
A momentary dazed sensation that passes immediately
Possible gas pains
Hypoxia if oxygen equipment is not immediately available.
Following are precautions to observe in pressurized compartments:
Maintain a safe pressure differential
Have oxygen equipment immediately available
Have heavy flight clothing available.
If an explosive decompression occurs, ascertain, if
possible, the cause of the trouble and, if it cannot be
fixed in flight, the pilot should decide whether to
continue the mission or to descend to a safe altitude
immediately.
NOTE
If decompression occurs, an apparent loss of

interphone volume may occur due to increased cabin noise level. This situation
may be alleviated by increasing interphone
volume.
CABIN PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM FAILURE

In the event of failure of the normal bleed air supply from No. 2 nacelle, either through duct failure
or shutdown of engines 3 and 4, emergency airflow
may be obtained from No. 3 nacelle by placing the
bleed selector switch to EMERG RH INBD position.
For operation using emergency bleed air, air contamination, difficulty in controlling cabin temperature and other air conditioning failures, see PNEUMATICS SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS, this section.
If the cabin fails to pressurize or the cabin pressure schedule is not maintained, see PRESSURE
REGULATION, Section I and PNEUMATICS SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS, this section.
OXYGEN SYSTEM FAILURE

Descend to safe cabin altitude using emergency oxygen supply available.
If explosive decompression occurs above

42,000 feet, descend immediately to 42,000
feet or below.
Change 12
3-44A/(3-44B blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EMERGENCY DESCENT
This procedure involves flying a descent speed
schedule which is determined by the initial onset of
high speed buffet limit and should not be used unless it is necessary to descend to a low altitude at
the maximum rate of descent. If buffeting is en-
countered, it can be stopped by reducing the speed

of the aircraft or by lowering the airbrakes to position 4. Do not subject the aircraft to negative g maneuvers or nosedown flight attitudes more severe
than is necessary to maintain the emergency descent speed schedule. Trim to zero force on the control column during the descent.
EMERGENCY DESCENT
1. Throttles IDLE (P/CP)
2. Gear DOWN (CP)
Raise airbrakes to position 4 initially, then to position 6 only after the landing gear is down and
locked. Trim to zero force on the control column during the descent.
Severe pitchup will be encountered at any altitude if nosedown stabilizer trim is not started prior to raising airbrakes. This pitchup becomes
less severe at lower altitudes and lower speeds or with less than full
airbrake extension.
NOTE
Descend to safe altitude at 0.84 Mach until reaching 305 knots IAS.
4. Bleed Selector Switch NORMAL LH INBD (CP)
NOTE
When use of EMERG RH INBD is necessary below 25,000 feet, see AIR
BLEED SYSTEM ABNORMAL OPERATION this section.
5. IFF Set (P)
If over friendly territory, place IFF master switch in EMER.
EMERGENCY INFLIGHT MOVEMENT

An inflight emergency may make it necessary to
send a crewmember from the forward crew compartment to the unpressurized portion of the fuselage. There are no oxygen recharge points in the
crawlway. Emergency alarm lights along the crawlway are the only means of communication (there
are no interphone stations in the crawlway) and
must be monitored closely by the crewmember in
the crawlway. This movement should be made

below 10,000-foot pressure altitude.
NOTE
A time delay (up to 2 minutes) may be expected between the time that the cabin
pressure is dumped and residual pressure
can be depleted, allowing the pressure door
to be opened.
3-45
T.O. 1B-52H-1
The insulation material around the catalytic filter
and air ducting exceeds 140F during normal operation. The material must be cooled below 140F prior
to entry into the unpressurized section.
Prior to entry into unpressurized section, perform
the following in order to cool down the ECS filter
and air ducting:
1. All Overhead Air Outlets Closed
2. Cabin Pressure Master Switch RAM for 10
minutes
3. Aft Crew Compartment Bulkhead Door Open
and Secure
Following re-entry to cabin:
1. Aft Crew Compartment Bulkhead Door
Closed and secure
2. Cabin Pressure Master Switch 7.45 PSI
3. All Overhead Air Outlets As desired
EMERGENCY JETTISONING
ALE-20 INFLIGHT EMERGENCY JETTISON
During a planned crash landing or landing with

both rear gears retracted, a possibility exists that
loaded flares may be ignited from the ensuing heat
and/or shock. For this reason, it is recommended
that the flares be jettisoned if conditions permit.
Time available, aircraft performance, fuel remaining, etc, are all considerations in electing to jettison
the flares. The flares should be expended over an
open water or isolated land area. If over land, the
minimum altitude for jettisoning is 5000 feet. When
flares are to be jettisoned, follow the procedures in
the ALE-20 INFLIGHT EMERGENCY JETTISON
checklist.
ALE-20 INFLIGHT EMERGENCY JETTISON

NOTE
During flare dispensing, as each flare leaves the aircraft, crewmembers

can expect a bright white flash visible within the crew compartments
accompanied by a slight vibration of the aircraft. These flashes will be
most noticeable at night, in the vicinity of cloud formations, or during
IFR flight conditions; however, the flashes are discernible even during
daytime VFR flight conditions.
1. Flare Circuit Breakers IN (EW)
2. Pilots Flare Set Power Switch ON (P)
3. Power Switch ON (EW)
4. Transfer Switch OFF (EW)
5. Fast Train Button Pressed (EW)
The PROGRAM IN PROGRESS light will illuminate when the fast train button is depressed. When
the last flare has left the aircraft, the RH EMPTY light will illuminate.
6. Power Switch OFF (after RH EMPTY light illuminates) (EW)
7. Pilots Flare Set Power Switch OFF (P)
3-46
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NUCLEAR BOMB JETTISON
Amplified checklists for nuclear bomb jettison procedures are published in T.O. 1B-52H-25-2. The abbreviated checklists for Emergency Manual Bomb
Release, Safe Jettison Procedures, DCU-238/A Malfunction Correction Procedures, and CSS Malfunction Analysis are published in T.O. 1B-52H-252CL-1.
NONNUCLEAR WEAPONS JETTISON
Amplified checklists for nonnuclear weapons jettison procedures are published in the applicable T.O.
1B-52H-34-2 series manual. The corresponding abbreviated checklists are published in the applicable
T.O. 1B-52H-34-2 series abbreviated checklist.
MISSILE EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
Amplified checklists for missile emergency procedures are published in the applicable T.O. 1B-52H
-30 series manual for nuclear armed missiles and
T.O. 1B-52H-34-2 series manual for nonnuclear
armed missiles. The corresponding abbreviated
checklists are published in the applicable T.O.
1B-52H-30 or T.O. 1B-52H-34-2 series abbreviated
checklist.
NOTE
The interphone will be considered the primary means for crew warning in the crew
compartment. The emergency alarm lights
will be the only means of crew warning outside the crew compartment.
It is recognized that emergencies can arise where
loss of aircraft control may be experienced without
sufficient warning to allow the pilot to alert the
crew before giving the command to bail out. Furthermore, in these cases, time will not permit the
pilot to receive an acknowledgment of the bailout
command prior to initiating the ejection sequence.
Upon hearing the bailout command, all personnel
will initiate immediate action to bail out as expeditiously as possible. Before ejecting, the pilot will determine insofar as possible that all other crewmembers have left the aircraft. The bailout alarm light
signals are as follows: For bailout, one abandon
light signal. This is obtained by placing the emergency alarm switch in ABANDON position. In addition, a steady signal is obtained when either the pilots or copilots control column is stowed during the
ejection sequence.
BAILOUT/EJECTION PROCEDURES
At any time an emergency arises which may progress to a point where loss of aircraft control is possible, the pilot will alert all aboard over interphone to
prepare to abandon.
Immediately
following
an
alarm,
crewmembers in ejection seats should ascertain that safety belts are fastened, ejection
seat flight safety pins are removed, emergency equipment is in readiness, and all
other equipment is stored or secured, as the
situation permits. Crewmembers not occupying ejection seats should check their
equipment and proceed to the lower deck
after depressurization.
Pilots should remove night vision goggles
(NVG) and counter weights at the first indication of a serious aircraft emergency that
could result in bail-out/ejection since the
added weight and configuration of the
NVGs can cause possible severe to fatal injuries during the ejection sequence.
When the aircraft is below 2000 feet above

the terrain or if aircraft control is lost at
any altitude, crewmembers occupying ejection seats should eject immediately upon receiving the bailout command by either interphone or abandon signal.
Ejection of other crewmembers will not be
delayed while pilots remove night vision
goggles.
If unable to sustain controlled flight, immediate bailout of all possible crewmembers is
imperative and offers the best chance for
survival.
The primary means for abandoning the aircraft are

the ejection seats which are provided for all regular
crewmembers (figure 3-4). Although there are alternate means of getting out of the aircraft, the ejection seats will be used unless a seat were to malfunction. Nominal minimum ejection altitudes are
shown in figure 3-5. When additional crewmembers
are carried, manual bailout only is available for
them.
Change 20
3-47
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Bailout Exits and Routes
Figure 3-4
3-48
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EJECTION BAILOUT
Both upward and downward ejection seats will

function at any speed; however, if time permits, a
reduction in aircraft speed would be desirable since
it will reduce air blast on the seat occupants. During any low altitude ejection, the chances for
successful ejection can be greatly increased by
zooming the aircraft (if airspeed permits) to exchange airspeed for altitude. Ejection should be accomplished while the aircraft is in a positive climb
and while the airspeed is above 120 knots IAS. This
will result in a more nearly vertical trajectory for
the seat and crewmember, thus providing more altitude and time for seat separation and parachute deployment. When the aircraft is descending and cannot be leveled out, ejection should not be delayed.
Time required to get free of the aircraft may be the
most important factor. Figure 3-6 provides parameters for emergency minimum ejection altitudes
level and diving (wings level) flight. Figure 3-7 provides parameters for emergency minimum ejection
altitudes banked (constant altitude) flight.
Minimum Ejection Altitude
No one minimum ejection altitude can be given to

cover all types of ejections. Minimum altitude depends on aircraft speed and attitude, time required
for human response and actuation of ejection controls, whether ejection is upward or downward, harness release time delay, type of parachute, and
parachute deployment time delay. The minimum
ejection altitudes presented in figure 3-5 are based
on conditions and configurations stated therein.
These minimum ejection altitudes represent equipment capability only, and do not include loss of aircraft altitude occurring during actuation of ejection
controls or resulting from improper use of equipment. In many instances, emergencies occur at
safe altitudes, but ejections are delayed to levels
that make unsuccessful ejections inevitable. Also,
improper or imperfect functioning of equipment or
human response time may increase the minimum
altitude required for escape. For increased safety,
ejection should not be delayed to the minimum if
higher ejection is possible. Ejection must be initiated at higher altitudes when in steep descent or
dives. Therefore, to ensure the highest degree of

survival, the following rules must be observed:
Under level flight conditions, eject at least 2000
feet above the terrain whenever possible.
Under spin or dive conditions, eject at least
15,000 feet above the terrain whenever possible.
Do not delay ejection to below 2000 feet

above the terrain in futile attempts to start
engines or for any other reason that may
commit you to an unsafe ejection or a dangerous landing. Accident statistics emphatically show a progressive decrease in successful ejections as altitude decreases below
2000 feet above the terrain.
If parachute automatic opening device has
obviously failed, pull ripcord T-handle manually to open the parachute.
Manually pull ripcord T-handle to open automatic parachute for all ejections below
14,000 feet.
Pull survival kit release handle as soon as
stable in parachute to lessen impact shock
when kit is not automatically deployed.
When the aircraft is below 2000 feet above
the terrain or if aircraft control is lost at
any altitude, crewmembers occupying ejection seats should eject immediately upon receiving the bailout command by either interphone or abandon signal. All crewmembers should be aware of the urgent need for
action when the aircraft commander fails to
or is unable to command bailout.
NOTE
The survival kit is automatically deployed

if deployment selector lever is positioned to
AUTO.
Change 10
3-49
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Low Altitude Ejection
Ejection Speeds
In order to provide for completely automatic separation of crewmember from seat, the downward
ejection seats and the EW and gunner seats are
equipped with a man-seat separator.
Recent study and analysis of escape techniques

from aircraft have revealed that ejection from the
B-52 aircraft may be successfully accomplished at
airspeeds ranging from 120 knots to the limit speed
of the aircraft. Whenever circumstances permit,
slow the aircraft down as much as possible prior to
ejection. When ejecting at low altitudes, pull the
nose of the aircraft above the horizon if at all possible and use excess speed to gain altitude. Eject at
the lowest practical airspeed above 120 knots IAS
(lowest practical would be that speed below which
level flight cannot be maintained). The need to be
at the lowest possible airspeed down to 120 knots
IAS prior to ejection is predicated on many factors
such as avoiding bodily injury, precluding parachute or seat structural failure, and providing adequate tail clearance. Below 120 knots IAS, airflow
is not sufficient to assure rapid parachute deployment. Therefore, it becomes extremely important
during low altitude ejection to obtain at least 120
knots IAS, if possible, to assure complete parachute
deployment at the greatest height above the terrain. During high altitude ejection, observing this
minimum airspeed (120 knots IAS) becomes less
important since there is adequate time (altitude)
for parachute deployment. If the aircraft is not controllable, ejection will be accomplished at whatever
speed exists as this offers the only opportunity for
survival.
The downward seats are one-control seats and the

EW and gunner seats are two-control seats with
two nylon straps installed in the seat under the
survival kit and parachute. A reel-type ballistic actuator is connected to the integrated harness release actuator system. The nylon straps are connected to a jackshaft driven by the reel-type actuator. During ejection immediately after integrated
harness release, the reel-type actuator pulls the
nylon straps tight to provide automatic controlled
separation of the seat occupant from the seat. Since
this is completely automatic, the time delay incurred by a crewmember making a conscious physical effort to kick free of the seat is eliminated. Further, injured or unconscious crewmembers will be
automatically separated from the seat and parachute deployed following ejection.
All ejection seats (both upward and downward) are
equipped with drogue parachutes to provide for
rapid, positive separation of the crewmember from
his seat. The drogue parachutes are automatically
deployed as the seat leaves the aircraft rails. No action is required by the crewmember. This minimizes
the delay required for separation of the seat from
the crewmember and hastens deployment of his
personal parachute.
3-50
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Emergency Minimum Ejection Altitudes

Level Flight
UPWARD EJECTION/M-3 CATAPULT
DOWNWARD EJECTION/M-4 CATAPULT
0.75 SECOND PARACHUTE
0.75 SECOND PARACHUTE
FXC 11,000 TIMER

C-9 CANOPY
0 FT
FXC 11,000 TIMER

C-9 CANOPY
250 FT
Upward ejection figures are applicable to airspeeds from 90 to 400 knots IAS.
Downward ejection figures are applicable to airspeeds from 120 to 400 knots IAS.
These are emergency minimums above the terrain. Ejection

should be started at or above 2000 feet, if possible.
1.
All figures applicable to LEVEL FLIGHT only and are to be used only as guides.
They are optimistic for diving attitudes and conservative for climbing attitudes.
2.
All altitudes given are contingent upon separation from the seat without delay following ejection.
Emergency minimum ejection altitudes quoted in this table were determined

through extensive flight tests and are based on distance above terrain on initiation
of seat ejection (i.e., time seat is fired). These figures do not provide any safety
factor for such matters as equipment malfunction, delays in separating from the
seat, etc. These figures are quoted only to show the minimum altitude you must
go up to in the event of such low altitude emergencies as fire on takeoff. They shall
not be used as the basis for delaying ejection when above 2000 feet since accident
statistics show a progressive decrease in successful ejections as altitude decreases below 2000 feet. Therefore, whenever possible, eject above 2000 feet. To
ensure survival during extremely low altitude ejections, the automatic features of
the equipment must be depended on.
Figure 3-5
3-51
T.O. 1B-52H-1
PREPARATORY STEPS FOR EJECTION/BAILOUT
NOTE
If time permits during a controlled bailout, accomplish the following

emergency steps.
For illustration of ejection bailout procedures, see figure 3-8.
1. Airspeed Reduced (P)

Whenever circumstances permit, pilot will reduce airspeed, trim for level flight, and engage the
autopilot prior to bailout.
Maximum airspeeds for manual bailout from the navigators escape

hatch are 250 knots IAS for gear down and 275 knots IAS for gear up.
Bailout from the escape hatch at higher airspeeds could result in fatal
injuries.
Pilots should remove night vision goggles (NVG) at the first indication
of a serious aircraft emergency that could result in bailout/ejection
since the NVGS can cause possible severe to fatal injuries during the
ejection sequence.
Use of NVG counter weights on ejection seat aircraft can cause improper head positioning, leading to potentially fatal injuries in the event of
an ejection. NVG counter weighting is not authorized on the B-52.
NOTE
At extremely low altitudes, it is recommended that the nose of the aircraft be pulled up in a zoom up maneuver during ejection to provide
more time for parachute deployment. If an open hatch or bomb bay is
being used for bailout, however, the aircraft should be trimmed for level
flight.
2. IFF Set (P)
If over friendly territory, place IFF master switch in EMER.
3. MRT Remote Control Unit ZEROIZE Switch Pressed (N)
3-52
Change 19
T.O. 1B-52H-1
PREPARATORY STEPS FOR EJECTION/BAILOUT (Cont)

4. Safety Belt Fastened (ALL)
Additional crewmembers should remain strapped in position until the aircraft is depressurized or
after the navigators hatch has left the aircraft in the ejection sequence.
Do not attempt downward ejection with safety belt unfastened under

any circumstances.
Do not manually open the safety belt prior to ejection at any altitude.
5. Equipment Checked (ALL)

Crewmember will check parachute harness fastened, oxygen mask and chin strap fastened, helmet
visor down, and beacon lanyard set as desired.
6. Warning Acknowledged (ALL)
Acknowledge the pilots warning signal in the normal crew report sequence.
Change 13
3-52A/(3-52B blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Emergency Minimum Ejection Altitudes Level

and Diving (Wings Level) Flight
NOTE
These are emergency minimums above the terrain. Ejection should be started at or above 2000 ft (level flight) or 15,000 ft (diving),
if possible.
These data are based on full automatic operation of seat and parachute no safety factor for equipment malfunction. Based on
time from seat firing, other time delays, i.e., arming lever rotation, are not included. These can add additional large altitude penalties,
especially in high speed dives.
Assumes 0.3 sec. delay to integrated harness release. BA-27A automatic parachute with FXC 11,000 timer (0.75 sec. delay) and
improved C-9 canopy.
For diving turns, clearance requirements from this chart and banked flight chart are additive.
Figure 3-6
3-53
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Emergency Minimum Ejection Altitudes Banked

(Constant Altitude) Flight
NOTE
These are emergency minimums above the terrain. Ejection should be started at or above 2000 ft, if possible.
These data are based on full automatic operation of seat and parachute no safety factor for equipment malfunction.
Assumes 0.3 sec. delay to integrated harness release. Type BA-27A automatic parachute with FXC 11,000 timer (0.75 sec. delay)
and improved C-9 canopy.
For diving turns, clearance requirements from this chart and diving flight chart are additive.
Banking the aircraft at altitudes below 93 feet may result in the wing tip impacting the ground (see scale on bottom right side of
plots for specific altitudes at various aircraft roll angles).
Figure 3-7
3-54
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Ejection Bailout Procedures
A. CHECK SAFETY BELT LOCKED AND

TIGHT, OXYGEN MASK FIRMLY SECURED,
HELMET VISOR DOWN, BAILOUT BOTTLE
RELEASE KNOB PULLED.
B. RAISE ARMRESTS, PLACE FEET FLAT ON
FLOOR, AND HEAD AGAINST HEADREST.
C. SQUEEZE ARMING LEVER RELEASE TO

RELEASE ARMING LEVER.
UPWARD SEAT
A32719
3-55
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Ejection Bailout Procedures (Cont)
D.
ROTATE ARMING LEVERS UPWARD TO

LOCKED ARMING POSITION.
E.
SQUEEZE FIRING TRIGGER TO FIRE

CATAPULT AND EJECT SEAT.
NOTE:
Personal equipment shown may not be typical.
UPWARD SEAT
A31815
3-56
T.O. 1B-52H-1
A. CHECK SAFETY BELT LOCKED AND

TIGHT, OXYGEN MASK FIRMLY SECURED,
HELMET VISOR DOWN,BAILOUT BOTTLE
RELEASE KNOB PULLED.
B. PLACE HEAD AGAINST HEADREST.
C. PULL FEET FULL BACK AGAINST SEAT,
THUS TRIPPING ANKLE RESTRAINT
TRIGGERS WITH LEGS TO POSITION
ANKLE RESTRAINTS.
D. GRASP EJECTION CONTROL TRIGGER
RING AND PULL CONTINUOUSLY TO
ROTATE LEG GUARDS, FIRE CATAPULT
AND EJECT SEAT.
DOWNWARD SEAT
NOTE:
Equipment shown may not be typical.
A31816
3-57
T.O. 1B-52H-1
BAILOUT
1. Order Crew Members to Bail Out (P)

Pilot gives command Bail out by interphone and by placing the emergency alarm switch in ABANDON position. Bailout should be conducted in the following order: N, IN, DI, 10th, IP, G, EW, RN,
CP, P for controlled bailout. The navigator ejects prior to the radar navigator in order to make this
hatch available for bailout in case an ejection seat in the compartment fails or for use by extra
personnel aboard. Extra crewmembers will commence bailout immediately following navigator in
order briefed. The radar navigator waits to inform the pilot that all crewmembers using the navigators escape hatch have left before ejecting himself. If time permits, each crewmember will inform
pilot just before leaving the aircraft. In the event of loss of control of the aircraft, those crewmembers
occupying ejection seats should eject immediately upon receiving the bailout order over the interphone, or when the abandon light comes on. Extra crewmembers will bail out any opening available.
In the event of fire in the forward wheel well area, the jettisoning of an
escape hatch will cause smoke and flames to be drawn into the crew
compartment. In the event of fire in the crew compartment, the jettisoning of an escape hatch will rapidly intensify and spread the smoke
and flames throughout the crew compartment. Therefore, the jettisoning of an upward escape hatch prior to the egress of all lower deck
members and extra crewmembers could seriously hamper their escape.
In this event, the revised order of bailout would be: N, EXTRA CREWMEMBERS, RN, G, EW, CP, and P.
NOTE
3-58
When wearing the CBO ensemble, the hood skirt must be under the
chute torso harness. This lowers the possibility of hood skirt entanglement when ejection is initiated. The hood is flammable, and should be
removed immediately in case of fire.
On receiving the pilots order to bail out, pull bailout bottle release
knob and assume position for bailout or ejection.
Under flight conditions of high cabin pressure differential, the best indication of a hatch having been jettisoned will be a rapid decompression within the crew compartment.
If time permits, additional crewmembers should bail out prior to firing
of upward escape hatch.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
UPWARD EJECTION
1. ARMING LEVERS ROTATE (P-CP-EW-G)
Squeeze arming lever release to release arming lever and rotate arming levers upward to locked
arming position. Rotating either or both arming levers forward and upward to their full travel locks
the inertia reel, jettisons the escape hatch, arms the seat, unlatches the drogue parachute deployment arms on the pilot and copilot seats, and stows the control column (on pilots seats).
If the control column fails to stow automatically, it should be stowed

manually to prevent possible leg injury during egress. If the control
column fails to latch in the stowed position automatically, it can be
latched by fully depressing the control column disconnect lever or by
manually assisting the control column to the stowed position, whichever is most expeditious.
Do not attempt manual release of the hatch. If the hatch fails to jettison, the ejection system has malfunctioned. There is no assurance that
manual hatch release can be accomplished or that manual hatch release will correct the ejection system malfunction and make the seat
safe for further use. Therefore, if hatch does not jettison, proceed with
non-ejection (manual) bailout as this provides the greatest survival potential.
If rotation of the ejection seat handles (all upward ejection seats) fails
to jettison the hatch, use of the emergency ground egress handle (EWO
or Gunner position) to attempt jettisoning of the hatch is solely at the
discretion of the seat occupant. To avoid serious or fatal injuries after
use of the ground egress handle (EWO or Gunners position), the seat
occupant must reassume the proper body position before squeezing the
ejection seat triggers to complete the ejection sequence. Should the
hatch fail to jettison after rotation of the ejection seat handles (all upward ejection seats), and rotation of the emergency ground egress handle (EWO or Gunner position), the ejection system has malfunctioned.
Do not attempt manual release of the hatch. Proceed immediately with
non-ejection manual bailout, as this now provides the seat occupant
with the only survival possibility.
Pilots should remove night vision goggles (NVG) and counter weights
at the first indication of a serious aircraft emergency that could result
in bailout/ejection since the added weight and configuration of the
NVGS can cause possible severe to fatal injuries during the ejection
sequence.
2. TRIGGER SQUEEZE (P-CP-EW-G)
Squeeze either trigger against the arming lever to fire the seat. The integrated harness release will
operate automatically 0.3 second after ejection and release the safety belt and parachute shoulder
straps from the seat. Simultaneously with integrated harness release on the EW and gunners seat,
the man-seat separator actuates to provide controlled automatic man-seat separation and automatic
parachute deployment. If the automatic feature fails, pull the yellow integrated harness release
handle located on the left side of the seat to manually accomplish release. The automatic timer will
start to operate at preset altitude, then, after the delay set on the timer expires, the parachute will
open, or, if bailout occurs below the preset altitude, 0.75 second after separating from the seat. The
parachute arming knob will be pulled if integrated harness is released by actuation of integrated
harness release handle. Pulling the ripcord T-handle will override the automatic device and open
the parachute immediately.
(Continued)
Change 10
3-59
T.O. 1B-52H-1
UPWARD EJECTION (Cont)
If the trigger does not fire the catapult:

1.
Ensure that the escape hatch has jettisoned.
2.
Reach under the armrest and lift the manual catapult initiator
safety pin-pull lever, at the same time pulling the assembly forward to withdraw the pin from the catapult initiator. (Do not
squeeze the firing trigger while performing this procedure.)
3.
Reposition yourself for ejection.
4.
Squeeze trigger(s).
If the seat fails to eject (figure 3-9):
1.
Pull survival kit release handle (RH).
2.
Lock inertia reel (LH).
3.
Pull integrated harness release handle (LH).
4.
Proceed with manual bailout.
Immediately after ejection:
1.
Release arming levers.
2.
Kick free of the seat with positive action. (Experience has shown
many casualties are caused by people freezing in the seat).
If the integrated harness fails to release automatically and the safety
belt is unfastened by use of the buckle, the seat occupant will remain
attached to the seat by the inertia reel and the survival kit attachment
straps threaded through the safety belt.
If the integrated harness fails to release after ejection:
1.
Pull the integrated harness release handle (LH).
2.
Kick free of the seat with positive action.
3.
Pull parachute arming knob or ripcord T-handle as applicable.
If parachute automatic opening device has obviously failed, pull ripcord
T-handle manually to open the parachute.
Manually pull ripcord T-handle to open automatic parachute for all
ejections below 14,000 feet.
Pull survival kit release handle as soon as stable in parachute to lessen
impact shock when kit is not automatically deployed.
NOTE
3-60
The integrated harness release system has additional reliability and

the seat will be positively separated from the occupant by the drogue
parachute system.
The survival kit is automatically deployed if deployment selector lever
is in AUTO.
Change 10
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DOWNWARD EJECTION
1. TRIGGER RING PULL (N-RN)
Grasp the trigger ring with both hands and pull. This action will lock the shoulder harness inertia
reel, rotate the leg guards, stow the table, jettison the escape hatch, eject the seat, and unlatch the
drogue parachute support arms. Approximately 0.3 second after ejection, the integrated harness
release will operate, automatically releasing the shoulder harness and safety belt from the seat.
Simultaneously with integrated harness release, the man-seat separator actuates to provide controlled automatic man-seat separation and automatic parachute deployment. The parachute automatic timer will start to operate at a preset altitude, then, after the delay set on the timer expires,
the parachute will open or if bailout occurs below preset altitude, 0.75 second, after separating from
the seat. If the automatic feature of the integrated harness release fails, pull the yellow integrated
harness manual release handle located on the left side of the seat to manually accomplish release.
If the integrated harness release initiator fails, the man-seat separator will not operate, and a positive effort will be made to kick free of the seat. The parachute arming knob will be pulled if integrated harness is released by actuation of the integrated harness release handle. In either case,
pulling the ripcord T-handle will override the automatic device and open the parachute.
When pulling the trigger ring:

1.
2.
If the trigger ring does not fire the catapult:

1.
2.
3.
4.
2.
Determine positively that the escape hatch has departed the aircraft.
Pull upward on the manual catapult pin-pull handle on the left
side of the seat.
Reposition yourself for ejection.
Pull trigger ring.
If the hatch fails to jettison:

1.
The ring will be held tightly during ejection to prevent flailing of

the arms.
To prevent injury, the elbows will be kept in against the body
when pulling the trigger ring.
Do not attempt manual release of the hatch. The ejection system

has malfunctioned. There is no assurance that manual hatch release can be accomplished or that manual hatch release will correct the ejection system malfunction and make the seat safe for
further use.
Proceed with nonejection (manual) bailout as this provides the
greatest survival potential.
If the integrated harness fails to release automatically, and the safety

belt is unfastened by use of the buckle, the seat occupant will remain
attached to the seat by the inertia reel and the survival kit attachment
straps threaded through the safety belt.
If the integrated harness fails to release after ejection:
1.
Pull the integrated harness release handle (LH).
2.
Kick free of the seat with positive action.
3.
Pull parachute arming knob or ripcord T-handle as applicable.
If the seat fails to eject, proceed with nonejection manual bailout as
follows. Pull the survival kit release handle, lock the inertia reel to
ensure release of the integrated harness, then pull the integrated harness release handle. Occupant can then leave the seat with the parachute and safety belt.
(Continued)
3-61
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DOWNWARD EJECTION (Cont)

NOTE
During controlled bailout, RN will report bailout for additional

crewmembers.
The integrated harness release system has additional reliability and
the seat will be positively separated from the occupant by the drogue
parachute system.
The survival kit is automatically deployed if deployment selector lever
is in AUTO.
NON-EJECTION (MANUAL) BAILOUT
If a regular crewmembers ejection seat malfunctions

(figure 3-9) or a crewmember is out of the crew
compartment, it will be necessary to make a non-ejection manual bailout. The aircraft will be trimmed for
straight and level flight. If additional crewmembers
are aboard, they will make manual bailouts (figure
3-9). The minimum safe altitude for non-ejection bailout is 500 feet above the terrain. Emergency alarm
lights are provided at all exit points. However, all
crew compartment manual bailouts should be made
through the downward ejection hatches.
Bailout procedures for the downward ejection hatch

opening are given in the ADDITIONAL CREWMEMBER MANUAL BAILOUT checklist this Section.
Aft Equipment Compartment Bailout
No interphone communication is available at this

station. The hatch jettison handle will be pulled up
after the safety lockpin has been removed in order
to jettison the hatch door. Bailout is accomplished
by facing forward (figure 3-10).
Downward Ejection Hatch Bailout

Bomb Bay Bailout
The open downward ejection hatch from which the

ejection seat has ejected (figure 3-10) is recommended
for bailout of additional crewmembers, for regular
crewmembers whose seats may have malfunctioned,
and for bailout of injured personnel by attachment of
the static line. For bailout of injured personnel above
14,000 feet, the static line should be connected to the
automatic parachute arming lanyard. At lower altitudes, the static line should be connected directly to
the ripcord T-handle of the parachute.
Bailout from the bomb bay may be accomplished

provided that time is available to reach the bailout
position at the forward end of the bomb bay. No
interphone communication is available at this station. Due to the length of the bomb bay, no special
technique is necessary; the crewmember drops out
from the walkway, taking care not to hit either side
of the opening. This bailout may be made at any
airspeed.
NOTE
Detach survival kit before leaving the seat to

bail out an alternate exit. Detachment of the
kit is necessary because the bulk of the kit
would hamper or prevent egress. Pull kit release handle to disconnect the kit. Be sure to
pull the handle while sitting on the kit.
Do not pull the kit release handle when the
global survival kit is not installed in the seat.
Pulling the handle with the kit suspended
will cause the lid to open leaving the
crewmember attached to the survival kit. In
an emergency, this could cause a fatal delay
in escaping from the aircraft.
3-62
Change 18
The bomb bay doors should be opened at either the radar navigators or pilots position
prior to proceeding to the bomb bay for bailout. However, the bomb bay doors can be
opened by pushing down the gang switches
at the forward actuator rod, provided generator power and hydraulic pressure is available to perform the operation. This will allow the bomb doors to fully open and remain open. Unless the bomb bay doors have
previously been opened by the pilot or radar
navigator, availability of electrical power
and hydraulic pressure will be ascertained
before attempting to open the doors from
the bomb bay for bailout.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Release From Ejection Seats for Manual Bailout
PULL SURVIVAL KIT RELEASE HANDLE
LOCK INERTIA REEL
4
LEAVE SEAT
DISCONNECT
OXYGEN
3
PULL INTEGRATED HARNESS RELEASE HANDLE
A31817
Figure 3-9
3-63
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Manual Bailout Procedures
Figure 3-10
3-64
T.O. 1B-52H-1
MANUAL BAILOUT
Unrestrained crewmembers are subject to injury during hatch jettison

by air currents caused by the depressurization.
NOTE
The open navigators escape hatch is the primary exit for controlled
bailout. The open radar navigators escape hatch may be used with
equal success. In the event of loss of control of the aircraft, extra
crewmembers will bail out any opening available.
1. Bail Out, Then Pull Parachute Arming Knob (above 14,000 feet) or
ripcord T-handle (below 14,000 feet)
Assume position facing forward and crouch with hands placed on the compartment floor on each side
of the hatch opening. Draw arms and legs in close to body. Exit head first, faced away from the
slipstream, by rolling forward and downward through the opening. Be sure to duck head and crouch
as much as possible to avoid hitting forward part of hatch. No serious turbulence exists in the area
inside the open hatch. Altitude does not play a part in clearing the aircraft satisfactorily. Pull the
arming knob immediately after clearing the aircraft. If bailout is accomplished above preset altitude,
the automatic timer will start to operate at preset altitude, then, after the delay set on the timer
expires, the parachute will open. If bailout is accomplished below preset altitude, parachute will open
in 5 seconds (0.75 second for ejection seat parachutes). In either case, pulling the ripcord T-handle
will override the automatic device and open the parachute immediately.
Do not attempt to bail out from the side of the escape hatch as this type
of bailout cannot be made in a crouched position. Bailout with the body
in an extended position would result in bodily injuries even at moderate airspeeds.
If parachute opening device has obviously failed, pull the ripcord Thandle manually to open the parachute.
Manually pull ripcord T-handle to open automatic parachutes for all
bailouts below 14,000 feet.
3-65/(3-66 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EMERGENCY AIR REFUELING PROCEDURES

BREAKAWAY PROCEDURES
Relative position of both airplanes must be closely

monitored by all crewmembers during all phases of
air refueling. When either a tanker or receiver
crewmember determines that an abnormal condition exists which requires an immediate separation
of the airplanes, he will transmit the breakaway
call on air refueling frequency. This will include,
but not be limited to, excessive rate of closure, closure overrun and engine failure. The airplanes do
not necessarily have to be in contact made to call a
breakaway. During loss of interplane communications, the crewmember desiring a breakaway, or observing the tanker initiating a breakaway, will
transmit the breakaway call on interphone.
For all breakaways, transmit the tankers call sign
and the word Breakaway three times (Example:
Chevy 2, breakaway, breakaway, breakaway) and
simultaneously take the following actions, as indicated:
a. Tanker Pilot The pilot will increase power
to obtain forward separation. Unless lateral
separation cannot be assured, the tanker will
accelerate in level flight and will not climb.
When the receiver is well clear, the breakaway may be terminated. The receiver pilot
will be notified of and will acknowledge any
reduction in power by the tanker to resume
air refueling speed. If a climb is required, the
tanker pilot will disengage the autopilot and
climb straight ahead. If in a turn the tanker
will maintain the established bank angle until the receiver is well clear. The lower rotating beacon will be turned on, the pilot director lights will be flashed, and the Radar/Rendezvous Beacon will be turned on, if appropriate.
b. Receiver Pilot Press the autopilot and air
refueling (IFR) boom release button. Retard
throttles to IDLE and establish a positive
rate of descent; add drag if necessary. If possible, drop aft of tanker until entire tanker is
in sight and monitor flight instruments.
If the receiver has overrun the tanker to the

extent of being closely positioned under the
tanker fuselage, the best and most positive
means in obtaining vertical and horizontal
separations is to lower the receiver landing
gear.
The use of more than airbrakes position 2
is hazardous because the resultant pitchup
cannot be controlled with the stick alone at
refueling altitudes and speeds.
The receiver pilot should use caution not to
overrun the tanker. If overrunning does occur, under no conditions should a turn, either right or left, be made until positive
separation has been attained.
If the receiver loses sight of the tanker at any
time after overrunning, the receiver shall establish a positive rate of descent to 1000 feet
below air refueling altitude until the receiver
is definitely positioned aft of the tanker and
has the tanker in visual contact.
If a breakaway is initiated by any airplane,
the airplane flying loose visual formation
will accompany the tanker and remain clear
of the descending receiver.
c. Receiver Copilot Press the autopilot and air
refueling (IFR) boom release button, maintain
visual contact with the tanker until clear, and
standby for instructions from the pilot.
SYSTEMS MALFUNCTIONS
When any system malfunction or condition

exists which could jeopardize safety, air refueling will not be accomplished, except
during fuel emergencies, or when continuance of air refueling is dictated by operating
necessity.
Change 21
3-66A
T.O. 1B-52H-1
FUEL SYPHONING
At any time fuel syphoning is noticed, fuel transfer

will be stopped and the receiver notified. The requirement to continue fuel transfer will be at the
discretion of the receiver pilot.
NOTE
A small amount of fuel spray from the

nozzle and receptacle during fuel transfer
does not require fuel transfer to be terminated. The receiver pilot should be notified
if this condition exists and the air refueling
operation will be continued or discontinued
at his discretion.
FAILURE TO DISCONNECT
It is possible for the tanker signal system to change

to disconnect while the receiver signal system stays
in contact made. For this remote possibility and
other signal system malfunctions which might occur, the copilot must be prepared to place the signal
amplifier power switch in the MANUAL position.
An air refueling system malfunction is indicated by
the blue ready for contact light staying on or coming back on after contact is established. However, a
malfunction may occur and not be indicated in this
manner.
At any time, if the boom operator is unable to accomplish disconnect, or if the blue ready for contact light stays on or comes back on after contact
has been established, the following procedure
should be used:
a. Receiver pilot maintains position in the air
refueling envelope and presses the autopilot
and air refueling (IFR) boom release button.
b. If toggles do not release, receiver copilot
places signal amplifier power switch in the
manual position.
c. Pilot presses the autopilot and air refueling
(IFR) boom release button.
Should it become necessary for the receiver

pilot to press the autopilot and air refueling
(IFR) boom release button while using the
autopilot air refueling mode, the release
3-66B
Change 16
button should be held in the depressed position until well clear of the tanker. The pilot
must also be alert to possible abrupt pitch
changes when the autopilot disengages.
NOTE
If all other procedures have failed to effect

a release, a signal amplifier failure has
been confirmed.
If a portion of the boom remains with the receiver,
insure the Air Refueling Master switch is OFF and
remains OFF for the remainder of the flight.
d. After attempting paragraphs a., b., c. and if
conditions permit, open the Manual/Alternate
(as appropriate) slipway door circuit breaker
to isolate power from the toggles and bleed
pressure. Then request the boom operator to
retract the boom from the receptacle.
BRUTE FORCE DISCONNECT
There are two types of brute force disconnect: inadvertent and controlled tension (coordinated).
Air refueling will be terminated except during fuel emergencies or when continuation
of air refueling is dictated by operational
necessity.
NOTE
Enter any brute force disconnect as a discrepancy in the AFTO Form 781. The entry
will specify which type of brute force disconnect occurred.
INADVERTENT DISCONNECT
An inadvertent brute force disconnect is defined as

any unplanned disconnect which is the result of one
of the following:
the receiver aircraft moving rapidly to the aft
limit causing mechanical tanker/receiver separation
boom pullout occurs at 38 degrees elevation or
below
T.O. 1B-52H-1
c. With contact made (green) light on, receiver
copilot will then place toggle latching switch
in HOLD position.
(1) Ready (blue) light off.
(2) Contact made (green) light on.
CONTROLLED TENSION DISCONNECT
A controlled tension brute force disconnect is defined as an intentional, coordinated disconnect occurring above 38 degrees elevation, and 18 feet extension, accomplished by gradual movement of the
receiver aircraft to the aft limit, and ending with a
smooth tension boom pull out. Coordination between the receiver pilot and the boom operator is
required to ensure as smooth a disconnect as possible. The receiver pilot will maintain contact altitude and gradually reduce power to establish a positive separation rate. Disconnect will occur when
boom reaches maximum extension.
If the toggle latching switch is placed in

HOLD position before the boom nozzle is in
the bottom of the air refueling receptacle, it
is possible for the boom nozzle to damage or
break the extended toggles, preventing any
further air refueling.
d. Receiver pilot will advise tanker boom operator, (Receiver call sign), contact.
e. Proceed with normal air refueling methods.
Tanker boom operator will advise receiver pilot of corrective action to be used to remain
within air refueling envelope.
f. When fuel transfer has been completed, tanker boom operator will call, Disconnect.
g. Receiver pilot will disconnect by depressing
the autopilot and air refueling (IFR) boom release button to release toggles and inform
tanker boom operator, Disconnect. Receiver
pilot must hold the boom release button until
the boom nozzle leaves the air refueling receptacle and visual inspection reveals the
boom nozzle is clear of the air refueling receptacle.
A controlled tension disconnect will be accomplished only as a last resort, after all
other normal and emergency methods of
disconnect have failed.
The receiver pilot must not jerk the boom
out with rapid thrust change toward IDLE
or by using speed brakes; to do so may
cause serious structural damage. Gradual
power reduction will suffice to effect a disconnect.
Fly stabilized at contact altitude until certain the nozzle is clear of the receptacle and
slipway.
MANUAL BOOM LATCHING
If failure of the signal amplifier system occurs, the

boom may be latched in the receptacle by placing
the signal amplifier power switch in MANUAL and
the toggle latching switch in HOLD position.
There is no visual means of knowing when the
boom nozzle is in the bottom of the air refueling receptacle except when the green contact made light
illuminates. When the manual boom latching system is in use, the following procedure should be
used:
a. Fly receiver into contact position with signal
amplifier power switch in MANUAL and
toggle latching switch in RELEASE position.
(1) Manual power light on.
(2) Ready (blue) light on.
b. Boom operator will place boom nozzle in bottom of air refueling receptacle and advise receiver pilot, (Tanker call sign), contact.
It is possible to cause structural damage to

the air refueling boom and slipway by severe relative movement between the two
airplanes when operating with manual
latching of the boom as the limit switches
are deactivated. The receiver pilot must initiate all disconnects before exceeding any of
the limits.
If the autopilot aerial refueling mode is being used in conjunction with manual boom
latching, both receiver pilots must be especially alert. An inadvertent disengagement
of the autopilot may result in abrupt pitch
up or down of the receiver, requiring an immediate response from the receiver pilot to
prevent airplane damage.
Change 16
3-66C
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NOTE
The boom operator is unable to release the

boom toggles during manual boom latching.
(KC-135 only) The KC-10 can obtain a disconnect using the Independent Disconnect
System.
h. Boom operator will actuate his disconnect
switch and, when boom nozzle is free in air
refueling receptacle, he will retract boom.
INOPERATIVE BOOM/RECEPTACLE LATCHING
When all other recognized means of fuel transfer

have failed, and a bona fide fuel shortage emergency aboard the receiver airplane exists, fuel can be
transferred by maintaining boom/receptacle contact
using a slight extend pressure on the boom telescope lever.
ENGINE FAILURE
In the event that tanker engine failure is experience during air refueling, the refueling will be terminated immediately except for EWO operation or
actual contingency operations, in which case every
effort will be made to complete the scheduled off
load utilizing a descending flight path if required.
ABORT PROCEDURES
A tanker aborting during refueling will inform the

receiver, initiate a slow descending turn clearing
the formation, and take action as required by the
abort. Both tanker and receiver cell leaders will be
informed of the tanker abort.
A receiver aborting during the refueling operation
will inform his tanker that he is aborting and initiate a slow descending turn to clear the formation,
and take action as dictated by the cause of the
abort. (P-CP)
CRASH LANDING, DITCHING, OR BAILOUT
Prior to attempting this method of transferring fuel, the boom operator will brief the
receiver pilot and thoroughly coordinate the
procedures to be used. Both tanker and receiver crews will monitor the refueling with
extreme caution.
The boom operator must apply only the minimum
required extend pressure to maintain adequate
boom receptacle seal, preventing excessive fuel
leakage. Unusual and varying trim changes may be
required of both tanker and receiver airplanes. Excessive pressure may push receiver airplanes outward and place undue stress on the boom tele-scope
mechanism.
The boom operator must anticipate receiver relative
movement to maintain contact during receiver deceleration and must be especially alert to relieve extend pressure during sudden receiver closure.
3-66D
Change 16
If an emergency occurs which necessitates a crash

landing, ditching, or bailout, an airplane designated by the leader will accompany the disabled airplane or will cover personnel at a safe distance
above the surface. The designated airplane will render all assistance possible, orbiting the area until
aid arrives or until fuel supply requires leaving the
area.
NOTE
(EWO only) If an emergency occurs which

necessitates a crash landing, ditching or
bailout by the receiver, the tanker airplane
designated by the tanker leader will accompany the disabled airplane or will cover personnel at a safe distance above the surface.
The designated airplane will render all assistance possible, orbiting the area until aid
arrives or until fuel supply requires leaving
the area.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
REVERSE AIRFLOW AIR REFUELING (RECEIVER TO TANKER) (Copilot reads)
NOTE
Prior to reverse flow air refueling, the pilot will determine fuel quantity, tanks to be defueled, and in what sequence, so as to maintain a
desirable CG.
All asterisk (*) items will be read by the copilot and response given over
interphone. All other items may be completed silently by the appropriate crewmember.
RENDEZVOUS
The RENDEZVOUS Checklist will normally be started at least 30 minutes prior to the planned RENDEZVOUS CONTROL TIME. When a token or delayed onload is planned, stopping of the fuel usage sequence
should be delayed to prevent excessive depletion of main tanks fuel prior to onload. In this case, line items 10
thru 14 must be completed no later than 3 NM range.
1. Rendezvous Equipment On at briefed time (if applicable) (N)
*2. Radios Set to air refueling frequencies (as applicable) (P/CP)
UHF and HF radios will be set to briefed air refueling frequencies.
3. ECM Equipment Switches Positioned as required (EW)
During air refueling, a possibility exists that fuel may enter the vertical
fin air scoop and form a combustible mixture in the aft equipment
compartments. Placing ECM transmitters and ALQ-122 in STANDBY
(Put ALQ-155 receiver/ transmitters into warm-up mode with standby 1
on mode selector switch) 15 minutes prior to initial contact until 15 minutes after termination of final contact will allow equipment to cool prior
to refueling and ensure dissipation of combustible mixtures after refueling. This procedure is applicable to either wet and/or dry refueling contacts. Both forward and aft transmitters will be placed in STANDBY to
preclude the inadvertent turning on of the aft transmitters.
Due to the high operating temperature of the ALQ-153 in the standby
mode, the ALQ-153 will be turned OFF 15 minutes prior to initial contact until 15 minutes after termination of final contact. This will allow
the equipment to cool prior to refueling and ensure dissipation of combustible mixtures after refueling. This procedure is applicable to either
wet or dry contacts.
4. MASTER REFUEL Switch ON (CP)

5. Fuel Panel Set
When only main tank fuel is available from the receiver, it is recommended that fuel be transferred
to the body tank(s) (preferably to mid-body) prior to reverse air refueling. Only as a last resort will
transfer be made with the main tanks pumping into the manifold for transfer to the tanker.
a. Main Tank Boost Pump Switches ON
b. All Other Switches and Valves OFF and CLOSED (CP)
Change 16
3-66E
T.O. 1B-52H-1
REVERSE FLOW AIR REFUELING (RECEIVER TO TANKER) (Copilot reads) (Cont)
Transfer from main wing tanks can expose the fuel control units and
engines to damage due to surge pressures which might be generated in
the manifold, i.e., boom disconnect and recontact.
NOTE
If transfer is made from the main wing tanks to the tanker, crossfeed
valves 9, 10, 11 and 12 and the defuel valve must be opened. During
transfer the copilot must maintain a continuous visual check of the fuel
panel to assure that c.g., lateral control and an adequate fuel reserve
are maintained.
6. Main Manifold Interconnect Valve Switch (No. 29) OPEN (as required) (CP)
*7. Main and Auxiliary Tank Switches REFUEL as required (CP); Checked (P)
Refer to AIR REFUELING MANAGEMENT, Section I for further details.
Fuel can be pumped in a reverse direction from the receiver through the air refueling boom to the
aft tanks of the tanker. This can occur if any auxiliary tank boost pumps are energized or if the
defuel valve and any crossfeed manifold valve is open. Conversely, if certain engine feed control
valves (valves 13, 14, 15, and 16) are open, engine fuel pressure could be increased by pressure from
the refueling boom. Therefore, all fuel system panel switches, except those being used specifically,
should be checked in OFF or CLOSED position during all air refueling contacts, wet or dry.
8. REFUEL VALVE Switch OPEN, REFUEL VALVE position indicator OPEN (CP)
When refueling valve is open, REFUEL VALVE position indicator will read OPEN.
9. SIGNAL AMPLIFIER POWER Switch NORMAL (CP)
10. MANUAL TOGGLE LATCH Switch RELEASE (CP)
*11. Anti-Icing Panel CLIMATIC (P)
13. Level Off Altitude Report (P)
At the ARIP the receiver pilot will notify tanker of the planned level-off altitude. After the receiver
reaches level-off altitude, report the altitude to the tanker.
14. Air-to-Air TACAN Set (if required) (P/CP)
If tanker/receiver have A/A TACAN capability, set assigned channel and place function switch to A/A T/R.
*15. EVS ON, Video and Stabilization selected (P-CP)
Pilot flying the aircraft selects STV and Vector. Copilot selects FLIR and LOS command out and
monitors the sensor for tanker identification.
16. FLIR Preset Accomplished (N)
3-66F
Change 16
T.O. 1B-52H-1
PREPARATION FOR CONTACT
*1. Radio Contact Established (P)

Pilot will establish radio contact at the 3-NM range with the tanker pilot.
*2. IFF/SIF As required (P)
*3. Air Conditioning System Checked, cabin pressurized; no smoking (CP)
During air refueling operations, it is desirable that the crew compartment be pressurized. If compartment pressurization is lost, the air conditioning selector switch should be placed in RAM if air refueling is necessary. This will tend to prevent fuel spillage that may occur from entering the cabin.
There will be no smoking by any crewmember during the air refueling

operation, since combustible fuel fumes may be present.
If the control cabin is not pressurized, all unnecessary electrical equipment should be turned off.
4. Rendezvous Equipment As required (N)

5. Anticollision Lights OFF (night only) (CP)
6. Navigational Lights FLASH (night only) (CP)
*7. Autopilot DISENGAGED (P)
*8. Airbrake Lever POSITION 1 (P)
Before reaching precontact position, place airbrake lever in position 1 unless power limited.
9. Slipway and Airplane (Wing) Light Switches FULL BRIGHT (night only) (CP)
*10. NORMAL SLIPWAY DOOR Switch OPEN, READY Light on (CP)
To prevent damage to the slipway doors, do not exceed 300 KIAS when
slipway doors are open.
NOTE
During icing conditions when formatting is still possible, icing within

the receptacle cavity can be prevented by keeping the slipway doors
closed until just before contact.
Change 16
3-66G
T.O. 1B-52H-1

*11. Tanker Position Determined (CP-RN)
Determine the tanker position on the EVS monitor. The FLIR may have to be moved from the present position to bring the tanker into the field of view of the sensor. Adjust the FLIR bias and contrast
knobs for optimum display.
*12. FLIR Video Selected (P)
At one nautical mile pilot will release LOS command, select FLIR and use the EVS to aid in closure
to 1/2 mile.
*13. AIR REFUELING Switch AIR REFUELING (P/CP)
Pilot not flying the aircraft will engage the air refueling autopilot on request from the other pilot
by first engaging the autopilot servos and then engaging the air refueling switch.
*14. SIGNAL AMPLIFIER RESET Button Push to reset (if applicable) (CP)
NOTE
When engaging the aerial refuel mode of the AFCS, transient voltages
are frequently sufficient to cycle the signal amplifier. When this occurs,
the blue ready-for-contact light will go out and the amber disconnect
light will illuminate. To correct the situation, depress and release the
signal amplifier reset button. The disconnect light will go out and the
ready for contact light will illuminate.
To eliminate potential fire hazards, the OAS radar should not be operated
in RADIATE during air refueling if any of the following conditions exist:
a. The radar beam is sweeping across tanker (antenna tilt is a plus value).
b. A radar malfunction is occurring.
15. TACAN Set (P/CP)
Set TACAN as required for navigation.
3-66H
Change 16
T.O. 1B-52H-1

CONTACT
1. READY Light Out (contact made) (CP)

CONTACT Made Light ON (CP)
2. Auxiliary Tank Control Switches Transfer fuel as required to maintain CG (CP)
NOTE
Normally, transfer should be from the center wing, the forward, mid,
and aft body tanks. The copilot must maintain a continuous visual
check of the fuel panel to assure that CG control is maintained.
For an Inadvertent Disconnect:
a. Auxiliary Tank Control Switches REFUEL (CP)
If an inadvertent disconnect is experienced during transfer, it will be

necessary to place the auxiliary tank control switches to REFUEL until
after contact is made. This will provide a relief for pressure in the refuel manifold during recontact.
b. SIGNAL AMPLIFIER RESET Button Push to reset when disconnect occurs (CP)
c.
Auxiliary Tank Control Switches Transfer fuel as required after contact (CP)
During transfer from all body auxiliary tanks, a high rate of transfer is
obtained and it will be necessary to monitor CG very closely.
POST AIR REFUELING
When a disconnect occurs, the tanker boom is automatically disconnected, the disconnect light illuminates,
and the contact made light goes out. The following steps are accomplished at termination.
NOTE
When the boom is clear following termination, the tanker is pulled up and
the receiver pushes over, clears the tanker and cleans up the airplane.
1. Anticollision Lights Checked ON (CP)
*2. SLIPWAY DOORS CLOSED, SLIPWAY DOOR CLOSED-AND-LOCKED light on (CP)
When the slipway doors are closed and locked, the amber slipway door closed-and-locked light will
illuminate.
Change 16
3-66J
T.O. 1B-52H-1

*3. Airbrake Lever OFF (P)
*4. IFF/SIF NORM (P)
5. Slipway and Airplane (Wing) Light Switches OFF (CP)
6. Navigation Lights STEADY (CP)
7. REFUEL VALVE Switch CLOSE, POSITION INDICATOR CLOSED (CP)
When the main refuel valve is closed, the refuel valve position indicator will read CLOSED.
8. SCAVENGE SYSTEM Switch CABIN (CP)
9. MASTER REFUEL Switch OFF (CP)
Fuel flow indicator lights will go out.
*10. Fuel Panel Switches As required (CP); Checked (P)
NOTE
If reverse air refueling was accomplished using fuel directly from main
tanks, position crossfeed valves as required and close the defuel valve.
*11. Altimeters Reset (if required) (P-CP-N)
12. Cabin Fuel-In-Manifold/Fuel-In-Cabin-Manifold Light OFF (CP)
13. SCAVENGE SYSTEM Switch OFF (CP)
Scavenge refuel manifold after each air refueling operation. The air refueling manifold in the forward crew compartment should be scavenged at all times when not in use. Cabin fuel-in-manifold/
fuel-in-cabin- manifold light out indicates all fuel has been removed from the refuel manifold and
the scavenge system will be turned OFF.
NOTE
If the cabin fuel-in-manifold/fuel-in-cabin-manifold light blinks on and

off, if indicates that only a small amount of fuel remains in the cabin
manifold. At this time, it is permissible to turn the scavenge system
switch to OFF.
14. Starter Switches As required (CP)
15. Rendezvous Equipment As required (N)
Turn equipment off if no further rendezvous activity is planned.
3-66K
Change 16
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LANDING EMERGENCIES
LANDING GEAR FAILURE TO EXTEND
MAIN GEAR FAILS TO EXTEND
1. Hydraulic Pressure Checked (P)

Check hydraulic pressure on affected body system.
Hydraulic Pressure Normal, Accomplish the Following:
2. Normal Gear Control Circuit Breaker for Affected Gear Pulled and reset (CP/EW)
During gear extension, an intermediate gear position may be the result of a malfunctioning position
switch; pulling and resetting the breaker will break the holding circuit of the position switch relay.
If the gear is actually down and locked, a gear down indication should appear and a normal landing
can be made. If a gear down indication is not obtained, proceed with step 3.
3. Normal Gear Control Circuit Breakers for All Unaffected Gear Pulled (CP/EW)
By pulling the normal gear control circuit breakers for all unaffected gear, the unaffected gear will
not be recycled unnecessarily.
4. Landing Gear Recycled (CP)
Position gear handle to GEAR UP (observe landing gear retraction placard speed) and wait for the
gear up indication; then return gear handle to GEAR DOWN.
5. All Normal Gear Control Circuit Breakers Reset (CP/EW)
6. Landing Gear Emergency Switch EXTEND (P)
If gear does not indicate down and locked after recycling and if opposite body system pressure is
normal, move the respective landing gear emergency switch to EXTEND for a period not exceeding
10 seconds if landing gear does not move.
Actuation of the landing gear emergency switch for more than 10 seconds without gear movement may result in complete loss of the opposite body hydraulic system fluid.
To reduce the possibility of system damage, do not change operating
position of emergency switch while the gear is in motion.
NOTE
Pressure for emergency actuation of a main gear is provided by the opposite body system.
Change 20
3-67
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LANDING GEAR FAILURE TO EXTEND (Cont)

7. Landing Gear Emergency Switch OFF (P)
As soon as landing gear is down and locked, return emergency switch to OFF. Do not reposition
emergency switch to EXTEND unless the gear attempts to move from down with the switch OFF.
There are no limit switches in the emergency system and the emergency circuits are energized when the emergency switch is out of OFF.
8. LANDING WITH PARTIAL GEAR Checklist Accomplished (P)
If (after executing proper emergency procedures) gear does not indicate down and locked, further
actuation attempts should not be made; use appropriate procedure outlined under LANDING WITH
PARTIAL GEAR checklist, this section, when ready to land.
Due to hazards involved, installation of downlocks in flight is not recommended.

Hydraulic Pressure Low, Accomplish the Following:
2. Normal Gear Control Circuit Breaker for the Affected Gear Pulled (CP/EW)
If any main gear does not indicate down and locked and pressure is low on the affected body system,
a ruptured hydraulic system may have occurred. Pull the normal gear control circuit breaker for the
affected gear. Pulling the breaker will deactivate the gear normal control valve and may prevent loss
of fluid from a malfunction downstream of the normal control valve.
NOTE
If the circuit breaker is found to be popped out, reset it and observe position indicator.
If opposite body system pressure is normal, move the respective landing gear emergency switch to
EXTEND for a period not exceeding 10 seconds if landing gear does not move.
NOTE
3-68
T.O. 1B-52H-1

There are no limit switches in the emergency system and the emergency circuits are energized when emergency switch is out of OFF.
Due to hazards involved, installation of downlocks inflight is not recommended.

6. Before Landing, Standby Pump Switch STBY (P)
Depending on the nature and location of the malfunction, use of the body standby pump on the same
side as the malfunctioning gear will provide pressure for brakes, steering, and crosswind crab. The
standby pump should be turned on immediately prior to landing.
If main landing gear malfunction is associated with loss of hydraulic

fluid, anticipate loss of 1/2 rate of stabilizer trim capability and possible
loss of braking and steering on the extended gear which operates on the
same hydraulic system as the malfunctioning gear.
TIP GEAR FAILS TO EXTEND

Check hydraulic pressure on affected outboard wing system.
Hydraulic Pressure Normal, Accomplish the Following:
By pulling the normal gear control circuit breakers for all unaffected gear, the unaffected gear will
Position gear handle to GEAR UP and wait for the gear up indication; then return gear handle to
GEAR DOWN.
Change 4
3-69
T.O. 1B-52H-1

If gear does not indicate down and locked after recycling and if adjacent inboard wing system pressure is normal, move the respective landing gear emergency switch to EXTEND.
NOTE
Pressure for emergency extension of a tip gear is provided by the adjacent inboard wing system.
PARTIAL GEAR checklist this section, when ready to land.
2. Normal Gear Control Circuit Breaker for the Affected Gear Pulled (CP/EW)
If either tip gear does not indicate down and locked and pressure is low on the affected outboard
wing system, a ruptured hydraulic system may have occurred. Pull the normal gear control circuit
breaker for the affected gear. Pulling the breaker will deactivate the gear normal control valve and
may prevent loss of fluid from a malfunction downstream of the normal control valve.
NOTE
If the circuit breaker is found to be popped out, reset it and observe

position indicator.
If adjacent inboard wing system pressure is normal, move the respective landing gear emergency
switch to EXTEND.
Actuate switch one time only; do not repeat. Further attempts may result in a complete loss of hydraulic fluid if a rupture exists in the lines
or component parts within the system. A 120 cubic inch automatic reset
fuse is installed in emergency tip gear system upstream of emergency
extend control valve. One cycle of the fuse will not deplete the system
to such an extent that normal spoiler operation will be impaired.
3-70
T.O. 1B-52H-1

NOTE
Pressure for emergency extension of a tip gear is provided by the adjacent inboard wing system.
As soon as the landing gear is down and locked, return emergency switch to OFF. Do not reposition
There are no limit switches in the emergency system and the emergency circuits are energized when emergency switch is out of OFF.
6. Before Landing Approach, Standby Pump Switch STBY (P)
Depending on the nature and location of the malfunction, use of the outboard wing standby pump
on the same side as the malfunctioning gear will provide pressure for operation of the outboard
spoilers and airbrake systems. The standby pump should be turned on prior to the landing approach.
LANDING WITH BRAKE SYSTEM HYDRAULIC

FAILURE
It is probable that the only indication of reduced
braking capabilities that will be known in advance
by the pilot will be the loss of an engine-driven
pump which provides normal body system pressure
or the loss of pressure on either body system. If a
loss of the left main body pump is experienced,
pressure can be supplied to the left forward brake
system only by the use of the respective standby
pump. If the right main body pump is inoperative,
pressure can be supplied to the right rear brake

system only by use of the respective standby pump.
If the loss of system pressure is due to lack or loss
of hydraulic fluid, pressure may still be supplied by
the standby pump which has a 1 gallon fluid reserve in the standby tank. Further reduction of the
fluid supply will result in the loss of braking capabilities as provided by pressure from the respective
standby pump. Charts and correction factors for
stopping distances when brakes are applied at
touchdown and for partial braking are included in
Part 8 of T. O. 1B-52H-1-1.
3-71
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LANDING WITH MAIN BODY HYDRAULIC PUMPS INOPERATIVE

BOTH BODY STANDBY PUMPS OPERATIVE
When landing with standby pumps as the only source of hydraulic pressure, the following procedures should
be used after landing gear extension:
1. Antiskid Switch OFF (P)
Turning off the antiskid system will prevent cycling of brakes and depletion of brake accumulator
pressure on the left aft and right forward gear during brake application.
2. Normal Approach and Landing Accomplished (P)
Normal approach and landing procedure should be followed except that crosswind crab should not
be used. Deployment of the drag chute and raising of full airbrakes should take place as soon after
touchdown as possible.
NOTE
With only standby pumps supplying pressure to the body hydraulic systems, the right body system standby pump will supply pressure for stabilizer trim. Stabilizer trim rate will be reduced to approximately one
unit of trim every 10 seconds.
3. Brakes Apply (P)
Brake application should take place as soon as the weight of the aircraft is on the wheels and should
be smooth and firm. Pumping or repeated brake application should be avoided.
LEFT BODY STANDBY PUMP OPERATIVE, RIGHT BODY STANDBY PUMP INOPERATIVE
When landing with the left body standby pump as the only source of body system hydraulic pressure, the following procedures should be used for landing gear extension, approach and landing:
1. Left Body System Bypass Valve Open
With standby pressure available only to the left body system, the left forward main landing gear
can be extended by normal actuation of the landing gear lever. By opening the bypass valve located
on the left side of the forward bomb bay bulkhead the left aft gear can also be lowered using the
gear handle. The right forward and aft main gear must be lowered using the respective Landing
Gear Emergency Switches.
NOTE
This valve must be opened before landing gear extension.

2. Landing Gear Lever Down (CP)
The left forward and left aft gear will extend (at a reduced rate) when the landing gear lever is
placed in the GEAR DOWN position.
Actuate landing gear emergency switches for the right forward and right aft gear, one at a time.
The right forward and aft gear will extend (at a reduced rate).
3-72
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NOTE
If, after executing the procedures above, any gear does not indicate
down and locked, use the appropriate procedure outlined under LANDING WITH PARTIAL GEAR checklist, this section.
5. LANDING WITH PARTIAL GEAR Checklist Accomplished (if required) (P)
pressure on the left aft and both right gear during brake application.
7. Approach and Landing Accomplished (P)
Approach and landing may need to be accomplished without the aid of stabilizer trim. See LANDING
WITH STABILIZER TRIM FAILURE, this section. Crosswind crab should not be used. Deployment
of the drag chute and raising the full airbrakes should take place as soon after touchdown as possible.
NOTE
The left body system standby pump will not supply sufficient pressure
to operate the stabilizer trim system at its normal rate. Stabilizer trim
rate will be reduced to approximately one unit of trim every 10 seconds.
8. Brakes Apply (P)
RIGHT BODY STANDBY PUMP OPERATIVE, LEFT BODY STANDBY PUMP INOPERATIVE
1. Right Body System Bypass Valve Open

With standby pressure available only to the right body system, the right aft main landing gear can
be extended by normal actuation of the landing gear lever. By opening the bypass valve located on
the right side of the aft wheel well, the right forward gear can also be lowered using the gear handle.
The left forward and aft gear must be lowered using the respective Landing Gear Emergency
Switches.
NOTE
This valve must be opened before landing gear extension.

2. Landing Gear Lever Down (CP)
The right aft and right forward gear will extend (at a reduced rate) when the landing gear lever
is placed in the GEAR DOWN position.
3-73
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Actuate landing gear emergency switches for the left forward and left aft gear, one at a time. The
left forward and aft gear will extend (at a reduced rate).
NOTE
If, after executing the procedures above, any gear does not indicate
down and locked, use the appropriate procedure outlined under LANDING WITH PARTIAL GEAR checklist, this section.
5. LANDING WITH PARTIAL GEAR Checklist Accomplished (if required) (P)
pressure on the right forward and both left gear during brake application.
7. Approach and Landing Accomplished (P)
Approach and landing may need to be accomplished without the aid of stabilizer trim. See LANDING
WITH STABILIZER TRIM FAILURE, this section. Crosswind crab should not be used. Deployment
of the drag chute and raising the full airbrakes should take place as soon after touchdown as possible.
NOTE
The right body system standby pump will not supply sufficient pressure to operate the stabilizer trim system at its normal rate. Stabilizer
trim rate will be reduced to approximately one unit of trim every 10
seconds.
8. Brakes Apply (P)
3-74
T.O. 1B-52H-1
BOTH MAIN BODY HYDRAULIC PUMPS
INOPERATIVE AND ONE BODY STANDBY PUMP
INOPERATIVE
NOTE
With only one body system standby pump

operating, stabilizer trim rate will be reduced to approximately one unit of trim
every 10 seconds. With the left body system
bypass valve closed, the left body system
standby pump will not supply pressure to
the stabilizer system.
Left Body Standby Pump Operative
The landing gear may be extended by opening the

manually operated bypass valve for the left body
system (open with the gear up). The left body system bypass valve is located on the left side of the
forward bomb bay bulkhead. The left forward and
aft gear will extend (at a reduced rate) when the
landing gear lever is placed in the GEAR DOWN
position and the right forward and aft gear will extend (at a reduced rate) when the right forward and
aft landing gear emergency switches are placed to
EXTEND.
Right Body Standby Pump Operative
tors; therefore, the following landing procedure

should be used: Reduce the aircraft gross weight as
low as practicable in order to keep touchdown speed
low. Turn the antiskid system switch OFF.
Prior to landing, the crosswind crab system

should not be moved from the neutral position. With steering inoperative, the directional heading of the gears should be restricted to that of the aircraft.
Deployment of the drag chute and raising of full
airbrakes should take place as soon after touchdown as possible. Brake application should take
place as soon as the weight of the aircraft is on the
wheels. One smooth and gradually increasing brake
application should be made.
Do not pump the brakes. Pumping will deplete brake accumulator pressure causing
complete loss of all braking action. See
WHEEL BRAKE SYSTEM FAILURE, this
section.
The landing gear may be extended in the same

manner as that of the previous procedure except
that the right forward and aft gear will extend
when the landing gear lever is placed in the GEAR
DOWN position and the left forward and aft gear
will extend when the left forward and aft landing
gear emergency switches are placed to EXTEND.
The right body system bypass valve is located on
the right side of the left aft wheel well.
If system pressure is less than 3000 psi, the parking brake hydraulic hand pump located in the forward wheel well may be used to build up the brake
pressure for the left forward main gear. This pressure will not register on the cockpit gage; however,
it may be read from the gage in the wheel well.
BOTH MAIN BODY HYDRAULIC PUMPS AND BOTH

BODY STANDBY PUMPS INOPERATIVE
This action should be considered as a last

resort due to the location of the hand pump
and handle.
When landing with both main body system pumps

and their respective standby pumps inoperative,
the only source of hydraulic pressure for the forward brakes and slave control pressure for the rear
brakes will be from the forward brake accumula-
3-75
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LANDING WITH PARTIAL GEAR

ONE MAIN GEAR RETRACTED OR ONE FORWARD AND ONE REAR GEAR RETRACTED ON OPPOSITE SIDES
1. Gross Weight Reduced (P)

Reduce gross weight to as low as possible, but ensure that 20,000 pounds of usable fuel remains
when initiating the landing. If missiles and/or internal weapons are aboard, the landing gross weight
may be above 200,000 pounds. Landing gear loading at 200,000 pounds with one gear retracted
corresponds to a 400,000 pound landing with all gear extended. Weight reduction can be accomplished by flying at low altitude and high thrust settings (up to NRT) with airbrakes and landing
gear extended.
NOTE
In the case of one main gear retracted, there is no requirement to establish a lateral fuel unbalance in order to reduce the tip gear load on
the side with the retracted gear. A differential significant enough to reduce tip gear load would result in an increase in landing gross weight,
lateral unbalance which could introduce controllability problems, and
possible fuel starvation due to uncovered pumps. The tip gear load imposed in this situation is relatively small when compared to ultimate
design load.
2. Normal Approach & Landing Accomplished (P)
Make normal approach with airbrakes in position 4. Touch down on main gears simultaneously at
the minimum rate of descent. Hold the wings level and apply minimum braking and steering. Use
all of the runway if necessary to stop the aircraft on minimum braking.
Do not move steering ratio selector lever to TAXI during ground roll.
Even if the retracted gear is a forward gear, sufficient steering normally should be available. Stop the aircraft straight ahead on the runway.
Do not attempt to taxi the aircraft except in an emergency which requires clearing the runway.
ONE FORWARD AND ONE REAR GEAR RETRACTED ON SAME SIDE
1. Weight Distribution Checked (CP)

Reduce gross weight to as low as possible, but ensure that 20,000 pounds of fuel remain when initiating the landing. Distribution of the 20,000 pounds of asymmetrical fuel should be: 7500 pounds in
each main tank and 5000 pounds in the outboard wing tank on the side opposite the gear failure.
Prior to initiating landing, fuel should be depleted from the main tanks on the side with gear failure
and boost pumps turned off. Full lateral trim plus partial lateral control will be required at all flaps
down speeds to compensate for asymmetrical fuel loading.
NOTE
3-76
Landing gross weight may be less than shown in the MINIMUM

LANDING GROSS WEIGHT WITH LATERAL UNBALANCE chart in
the APPROACH AND LANDING section of T. O. 1B-52H-1-1. More
than 50% of lateral control may be required at touchdown speed.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LANDING WITH PARTIAL GEAR (Cont)
If time is available, a controllability check should be made to determine

the control characteristics which will be encountered on landing. This
check is described under STALL OR CONTROLLABILITY CHECKS in
Section VI.
2. Crossfeed Valves 9, 10, 11 & 12 OPEN (CP); Checked (P)

The landing should be made by operating all engines on the fuel remaining in the main tanks on
the side with gear extended.
Make normal approach with airbrakes in position 4. Touch down with both main gears simultaneously at the lowest possible rate of descent. Hold the wings nearly level with the tip gear on the side
with the extended main gear riding firmly on the runway. Apply minimum braking and steering.
Use all of the runway if necessary to stop the aircraft with minimum braking.
Do not move the steering ratio selector lever to TAXI during ground
roll. Stop the aircraft straight ahead on the runway.
BOTH FORWARD GEARS RETRACTED
It is not recommended that a gear-down landing be made when the forward landing gear cannot be extended.
In such a case, all extended landing gear should be retracted if a crash landing must be made.
BOTH REAR GEARS RETRACTED
NOTE
When the rear main landing gears will not extend but the landing conditions are otherwise favorable, a landing on the runway with the forward and tip gears extended is recommended. This will probably result
in less damage to the aircraft than crash landing off the runway. The
fire hazard due to the location of the fuel vent in the bottom of the fuselage is a small additional risk in a rear gear up landing on concrete.
1. Gross Weight Reduced (P)
Reduce gross weight to an absolute minimum. Weight reduction can be accomplished by flying at
low altitudes and high thrust settings (up to NRT) with airbrakes and landing gear extended.
2. CRASH LANDING AND DITCHING Checklist Accomplished (All)
3-77
T.O. 1B-52H-1

ONE OR BOTH TIP GEARS RETRACTED
1. Weight Distribution Checked (CP)

a. Landing With One Tip Gear Retracted:
Establish a 6000 pound differential between tanks No. 1 and 4 with the greater weight on the
side of the extended tip gear.
b. Landing With Both Tip Gears Retracted:
(1) Landing Without Crosswind:
Maintain symmetrical fuel load.
(2) Landing With Crosswind:
Establish a 3000 pound differential between tanks No. 1 and 4 with the greater weight on
the upwind side.
NOTE
Every effort will be made to land into the wind avoiding crosswinds.
If time is available, a controllability check should be made to determine
the control characteristics which will be encountered on landing. This
check is described under STALL OR CONTROLLABILITY CHECKS,
Section VI and CONTROLLABILITY CHECK in this section.

With one tip gear retracted, make a normal approach and landing, touching down at the lowest
possible rate of descent. Hold wings nearly level with the extended tip gear riding firmly on the
runway. Apply minimum braking and steering.
Stop the aircraft straight ahead on the runway. If taxiing is required,

make only large radius turns and make all turns away from the extended tip gear if possible.
3-78
T.O. 1B-52H-1

With both tip gears retracted, make a normal approach and landing, touching down at the lowest possible
rate of descent. Hold the wings as level as possible. If a wing starts to drop while at low speeds during landing roll, even though full lateral control is used, a sharp turn toward the dropping wing may assist in bringing it back up. If crosswind crab is used, brake application may tend to cause the aircraft to heel over toward
the downwind wing. Therefore, brake application should not be heavy until crosswind crab has been centered
during the roll. Apply only small forward gear steering corrections during the roll, unless steering is used to
bring up a wing.
Stop the aircraft straight ahead on the runway.
Do not attempt to taxi the aircraft with the tip gears retracted.
LANDING WITH UNBALANCED/FAILED TIRE

If the decision is made to land with a failed tire condition (blown out, flat, or chunk loss), the following
criteria are recommended in order to determine
landing configuration.
1. If the specific unbalanced or failed tire cannot be
identified, it is recommended that the landing be
accomplished at minimum gross weight with all
gear extended.
2. When the specific main landing gear tire failure
can be determined and the affected gear can be retracted with the normal system, subsequent landing on the affected gear will not be attempted. Since
there is no way to determine certain minor damage
to the landing gear strut or assembly, a landing on
that gear may induce initial damage or aggravate
already existing damage resulting in possible complete failure of the landing gear.
NOTE
The following procedures apply to main

landing gear only. An affected outrigger
gear should be down and locked for landing;
however, the landing checklist for one or
both tip gear retracted will be followed.
Before landing (if the landing gear has been retracted), pull the normal and emergency control circuit breakers for the affected gear to assure that
it will remain up and locked when landing gear lever is actuated to lower the landing gear. If the
landing gear remained down and locked after takeoff, the affected gear should be retracted using the
following procedures:
1. Pull the normal gear control circuit breakers for
the non-affected gear.
2. Place gear lever to the GEAR UP position.
3. When the affected gear indicate up and locked,
pull the normal and emergency control circuit
breakers for the affected gear.
Do not attempt retraction of the affected

gear by the emergency retraction system
when main gear hydraulic system damage
is suspected since alternate hydraulic system fluid may be depleted. If the affected
gear remained fully extended, additional
gear damage may be expected upon landing.
4. Place the gear lever to the GEAR DOWN position. Reset the normal gear control circuit breaker
for the non-affected gear.
5. Check all non-affected gear down and locked.
NOTE
See LANDING WITH PARTIAL GEAR

checklist, this section, when ready to land.
3-79
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LANDING WITH ONE

STEERING FAILURE
FORWARD
GEAR
In case steering is lost on one forward main landing

gear, the aircraft may still be landed without undue
concern. As the other main landing gear is turned,
a sufficiently large turning moment is introduced to
change the direction of the aircraft path down the
runway. The main landing gear on which steering
has failed will tend to caster and normally will follow the wheels which are turning unless some unusual failure has occurred. More rudder pedal travel along with more rudder pedal force will be required to obtain the same amount of effective steering as when both steering systems are operating.
Maintain the aircraft in as near a level attitude as
possible during the landing roll and, when the aircraft slows down to taxi speed, move steering ratio
selector lever to TAXI position.
NOTE
The rudder pedals should be in neutral

when the steering ratio selector lever is
moved to the TAXI position.
Drag chute deployment during a strong crosswind
is not desirable since this tends to turn the aircraft.
If drag chute deployment is necessary, the chute
should be jettisoned early.
WITH ENGINES 4 AND/OR 5 INOPERATIVE
When engine No. 5 has failed and reaches a low

windmilling rpm, hydraulic pressure will not be
available on the right body system to provide steering control of the right forward landing gear and
may result in the forward gear being out of alignment with each other when steering is attempted at
slow taxi speed or if a complete stop is made following landing roll. Standby pump pressure is not
available to the right forward landing gear since
the manually operated bypass valve is not readily
accessible to the flightcrew. Steering control may be
maintained by avoiding slow turns and complete
stops. If engine No. 5 has been shut down in flight
but is still capable of windmilling, the procedure
listed below can be used to maintain hydraulic
pressure for the right forward landing gear steering
and brake system. However, if the engine has been
shut down due to fire and it is not desired to push
the engine fire shutoff switch in, this procedure
cannot be used as hydraulic supply fluid is not
available to the pump with the engine fire shutoff
switch out. It will then be necessary to have ground
crew open the manual check valve and allow the
forward gear to move to alignment by use of standby pressure.
3-80
The following procedure can be used to turn

off of the active runway and to make subsequent turns while taxiing. After completion
of a turn, No. 5 starter switch should be
turned OFF to avoid unnecessary motoring
during straight-line taxiing. Avoid engaging
the engine starter while the engine is still
rotating unless it becomes necessary to do
so. Such a practice may reduce starter service life. Should the engine starter limitations as listed in Section V be exceeded, a
notation to that effect will be entered in
Form 781 indicating the time used.
1. Pull No. 5 ignition circuit breaker on the right
load central.
2. Push engine No. 5 fire shutoff switch in.
3. Place starter selector switch in PNEUMATIC.
4. With throttle No. 5 in CLOSED, place No. 5
starter switch to START.
5. Increase engine No. 6 rpm a sufficient amount
to allow engine No. 5 to be motored at approximately 20% rpm by the engine starter. This will supply
sufficient hydraulic pressure to steer the aircraft
throughout a turn.
NOTE
Approximately 67% rpm will be necessary

initially on engine No. 6 in order to obtain
20% rpm on No. 5. No. 6 throttle will be
adjusted thereafter to maintain a constant
20% rpm on No. 5.
6. If engine No. 6 is not available, open the air
bleed manifold valves and increase appropriate engine(s) rpm in order to obtain 20% rpm on engine
No. 5.
Do not attempt to motor engine No. 5

through use of bleed air from the outboard
nacelles. This practice will result in excessive bleed air manifold temperatures even
though the manifold temperature gage does
not exceed the red lined value. When using
engine No. 3 or 4 to motor engine No. 5, its
rpm will exceed all other engine rpm by at
least 10%. This will prevent airflow from
the outboard nacelles.
7. After completion of the turn, place No. 5 starter switch OFF.
When engine No. 4 and the left standby body pump
have become inoperative, a motoring procedure
similar to that for engine No. 5 may be used.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LANDING WITH COMPLETE STEERING

FAILURE
Prior to landing, crosswind crab should never be set if steering has failed on both forward gears. Rotation of the rear gear only
will produce turning moments which may
result in a high speed ground loop.
If the forward gear steering fails because of
complete loss of right and left body hydraulic system pressure, normal brake operation
will not be available and braking will be
limited to brake accumulator pressure as
supplemented by the left and right body
systems standby pumps. Only the left front
and right rear brakes will receive pressure
from the standby pumps. See LANDING
WITH BRAKE SYSTEM FAILURE, this
section.
FAILURE OF STEERING WITH REAR GEAR CROSSWIND CRAB OPERABLE
It is quite unlikely that both of the forward gear

steering systems will fail at the same time. This
would require that the left and right body hydraulic
system main pumps as well as the left body hydraulic system standby pump will fail at the same time,
or it would require some multiple failure of the
steering or hydraulic mechanism. However, if such
a combination of failures is encountered, the aircraft can be steered by use of the rear gear through
actuation of the crosswind crab system which can
be supplied pressure by the right body hydraulic
system standby pump. Corrections should be made
by turning the crosswind crab control knob and
pushing the rudder pedals in the direction in which
it is desired that the aircraft go. For instance, if the
aircraft is about to run off the right side of the runway, the knob should be turned to the left by a very
small amount. This will cause the rear wheels to
turn to the right which in turn will result in the aircraft turning to the left.
If the crosswind crab system is used on the

rear gear in order to keep the aircraft on
the runway, only a very small turning
correction should be applied since a small
turning angle introduces large turning components.
FAILURE OF STEERING WITH REAR GEAR CROSSWIND CRAB INOPERATIVE
If it is known that both forward gear steering systems have failed while the aircraft is still in the air
and the crosswind crab system is also inoperative,
it is recommended that the landing be made at
some field which has no crosswind. If no such field
is located within the vicinity, the runway selected
should be the one with the least amount of crosswind and the one that has the smoothest grading
off the runway proper. Without use of the crosswind
crab system on the rear gear, only small turns can
be made by applying full rudder. Such action will
cause the tires to corner slightly, but is only effective down to speeds of approximately 90% of touchdown speed. At speeds below 90% of touchdown
speed, the rudder becomes ineffective in producing
any change in direction. Some steering at lower
speeds can be accomplished by banking the aircraft
in the direction in which it is desired to turn. In
this manner, a roller skate turning effect is
introduced which may aid in keeping the aircraft on
the runway. If the failure has occurred because of
complete loss of hydraulic pressure, limited braking
may be available from brake accumulator pressure.
See LANDING WITH BRAKE SYSTEM FAILURE,
this section. If brakes are available, the drag chute
should not be deployed unless the wind is straight
down the runway since any wind at some angle off
the runway will cause the chute to stream in a similar direction with the result that the aircraft will
turn further into the wind. The chute should be jettisoned at any time an insufficient amount of directional control is available to keep the aircraft on the
runway unless an overrun is probable.
LANDING WITH INSUFFICIENT STEERING

ANGLE
Under certain emergency conditions on the ground,
if a larger steering angle is necessary to control the
aircraft, the steering ratio selector lever may be actuated toward the TAXI position. Applying pressure
to the steering ratio selector lever steers the aircraft further in the direction applied by the rudder
pedals. Gaining this additional steering angle with
the steering ratio selector lever may require the application of considerable force. The action will be
smooth and firm.
Extreme caution will be exercised to avoid

overcontrolling the aircraft and causing
structural damage.
3-81
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LANDING WITH CROSSWIND CRAB SYSTEM

MALFUNCTION
ONE GEAR INOPERATIVE
If the crosswind crab control knob is turned and the

indicator shows that one or more of the gears has
not turned with the others, additional checks must
be made to determine whether or not the crosswind
crab system should be used for the landing. It cannot be established from observations made in the
cockpit that the crosswind crab system has failed
on any one gear since the indicator is electrically
connected only to one forward and one rear gear.
Therefore, in order to determine if a single or multiple failure has occurred, a visual inspection of the
wheels must be made by a member of the flightcrew
at the wheel well. If it can be determined that
crosswind crab has failed on only one gear, a normal crosswind landing can be accomplished if the
crosswind encountered is of such magnitude to warrant such use. Such a landing should be accomplished using the minimum rate of sink at touchdown so as to minimize the side loads which will be
imposed on the misaligned gear. Depending on the
type of malfunction, the misaligned gear normally
will caster so that it will trail in approximately the
same direction as the remaining wheels. If the
crosswind component is of low magnitude, the
crosswind crab should not be used and a normal
landing made. The decision to accomplish the landing with or without use of the crosswind crab system will depend on the experience the pilot has had
in making crosswind landings without use of the
crosswind crab system.
When landing with left rear crosswind crab

inoperative due to No. 4 hydraulic pump inoperative or No. 4 engine shut down, perform crosswind centering manually as the
centered signal originates from the centered
position of the left rear gear which will lag
the powered gear.
NOTE
The crosswind crab centering button will

not center the gear properly since the centered signal originates from the inoperative
left aft gear. Depressing the centering button will drive the centering motor which
would normally cause all gears to center. If
3-82
the left aft gear hydraulic system is inoperative, the left aft gear will lag the other
three gears during centering. Consequently,
the other gear will drive on past center before the left aft gear reaches center and
shuts off the centering motor. Therefore, it
is necessary to monitor the position of the
indicator in the crosswind crab control knob
while centering the gear.
TWO OR MORE GEARS INOPERATIVE
Prior to landing, crosswind crab should never be set if forward gear steering has failed
on both the forward gears. Rotation of only
the rear gear will produce turning moments
which may result in a high speed ground
loop.
If the magnitude of the crosswind is large and the
crosswind crab system has failed on only the rear
gear, then a landing may be made using crosswind
crab on the forward gear only. Under such a condition, the gross weight should be decreased as low as
possible and the computed crab angle applied to the
forward gear by rotation of the crosswind crab control knob. The crab angle setting will not exceed 9
since the misalignment between the front and rear
wheels will tend to swing the aircraft in a circle
which will be counteracted by the forward gear
steering as the aircraft swings parallel with the
runway.
Twelve degrees of steering are available to
counteract the 9 of misalignment leaving a 3
margin in case the aircraft starts heading off the
downwind side of the runway. The approach should
be made so as to remove most of the drift by
crabbing. The landing should be accomplished
using the minimum rate of sink at touchdown so as
to minimize side loads imposed on the rear gear
and, if possible, touch down all gears at the same
time.
The drag chute may be deployed, but should be
jettisoned if it starts to turn the aircraft off the
runway. This action will be especially noticeable if
the runway is icy. Again, the decision to accomplish
the landing with or without use of partial crosswind
crab will largely depend on the experience the pilot
has had in making crosswind landings without use
of the crosswind crab system.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LANDING WITH RUDDER/ELEVATOR SYSTEMS INOPERATIVE

NOTE
With complete failure of both rudder/elevator systems, a flaps-up landing is required.

Flight test with simulated failure of the rudder/elevator systems has demonstrated that the aircraft
can be landed safely with this condition. However, a
complete failure rendering the rudder and elevators
completely inoperative is a serious emergency. The
aircraft will be quite difficult to control and the procedure for landing will be difficult to execute and
requires some practice. The decision to attempt to
land or abandon the aircraft will remain with the
pilot based on all the factors involved for there may
be conditions that make it impossible to land safely.
Landing procedures for coping with the complete
loss of all rudder and elevator control are basically
the same as for a flaps-up approach which places
the aircraft in a noseup attitude and requires little
or no attitude change from final approach to touchdown.
CONTROL TECHNIQUE
Observe the LANDING WITH WING FLAPS INOPERATIVE procedures and checklists as applicable, modified by particular techniques applicable to
this emergency as follows:
The recommended landing condition is between
230,000 and 260,000 pounds gross weight and cg of
20 to 25% MAC. The aircraft can be landed outside
these limits, but it is recommended that weights
above 270,000 pounds and cgs forward of 17% or
aft of 30% not be attempted. Normal or forward cgs
provide better handling qualities while aft cgs reduce the longitudinal stability, increase the sensitivity to pitch control inputs, and increase the aircraft response to gusts.
Normal trim change requirements should be reviewed and some trim changes made automatically
because there will be no stimulus from feel to trim
as with normal controls. For instance, the gear extension requires approximately 1 unit of noseup
trim. Airbrake extension to position 2 provides an
equal compensation if it is applied as the gear extends, but a small input of stabilizer trim might be
necessary. Trim is required as the airspeed changes.
When the airspeed decreases, noseup trim is required to raise the nose and hold altitude. Rolling
into a turn causes a pitch up tendency because of

spoiler extension (airbrake position 2 or 3 minimizes this) but after the turn is established the
nose will drop unless noseup trim is applied. (A
little thrust increase is also required to maintain
airspeed and this provides some pitch up assistance.) Increased thrust causes a pitch up and decreased thrust causes a pitch down.
All of the above normal trim requirements should
be expected and anticipated if the aircraft is to be
kept under control. Care must be taken not to overtrim, since large pitching motions can develop
which are very difficult to control. Should a pilot experience the situation where he is chasing the
pitching motion due to excessive trimming or inappropriate airbrake control, the aircraft can best be
stabilized by referring to the attitude indicator and
trimming as necessary to obtain and hold a
constant attitude, then correcting the attitude to
obtain the desired flight path. If the trim is moved,
the aircraft will pitch and continue to move until
the trim is removed. Therefore, each trim input will
be removed with an opposite input to stop the pitching motion. For instance, assume a level flight attitude and an in trim condition. It is desired to gain
500 feet of altitude. The nose may be raised a few
degrees with a small input of nose up trim. As soon
as a noseup attitude is achieved, the trim will be returned to near its original position to prevent the
nose from pitching up further.
The airbrake lever is operated in the same manner.
Pulling aft on the airbrake lever will start a noseup
motion, but when the desired attitude is achieved,
the airbrake lever will be returned to its original
position. The procedure recommends using small
inputs of stabilizer trim for most of the maneuvers
entering downwind leg, turning base, and turning
final. The airbrake lever is recommended for pitch
control on final approach. Combinations of both
controls may sometimes be necessary. Most important is the control of the pitch attitude by constant
reference to the attitude indicator. Control of altitude, and control of descent and ascent rate is
maintained only by establishing a proper pitch attitude. All control inputs should be made with reference to the attitude indicator with rapid crosschecks to the altimeter and vertical velocity indicator. This control is critical and demands much concentration. There is a natural tendency to continue
moving the control column for pitch control even after it is realized the elevator has failed. The feel
mechanism will still be operative and control column forces will still be present. Therefore, a conscious effort will be made to use the airbrake lever
and the stabilizer trim for pitch control.
3-83
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DESCENT
The following items are emphasized and should be
reviewed before commencing a descent and approach for landing.
A penetration type approach is not desirable

and should be avoided.
A gradual descent with a gradual approach to
a precision instrument (PAR/ILS) glideslope is recommended with a transition to runway reference at
approximately 600 feet AGL or above.
It is expected that several practice approaches
will be required before the pilot can commit to a
landing. Since go-arounds are not difficult or hazardous, do not hesitate to abandon any approach.
The pilot should be relieved of some duties by
having the copilot control airspeed with the
throttles, handle communications, set navigational
aids, etc.
The minimum ceiling and visibility recommended for an approach is 600 feet and 2 miles.
Turbulence and/or gusty winds or crosswinds may
make it impossible to land the aircraft. In the event
conditions prevail which are less than desirable at
the landing destination, or if after some practice approaches, satisfactory control cannot be maintained, proceed to a suitable alternate or consider
abandoning the aircraft.
The recommended landing weight is between
230,000 and 260,000 pounds gross weight with a cg
of 20 to 25% MAC.
Do not attempt to operate an ineffective control
column. The column will still have feel but will be
ineffective with complete elevator system failure.
Remember that the airbrakes do not operate
smoothly as the lever is moved but move suddenly
in step fashion and create abrupt pitching motions.
Therefore, the lever will be moved from one position
to the other with constant reference to the attitude
indicator.
Do not use airbrake position 6 for pitch control
below 100 feet above ground level. Position 6 initially results in a momentary sink rate prior to
noseup rotation.
MANEUVERING FLIGHT
The higher speeds, larger turning radius, and difficulty in establishing speeds in an unfamiliar configuration require additional maneuvering space and
make a long extended landing pattern desirable.
The only controls available for pitch are the stabilizer trim and the airbrakes. These controls do not
provide sufficient control to flare or rotate the aircraft precisely for a flaps-down approach. If the aircraft is already in a gear-down, flaps-down configu-
3-84
ration, raise the flaps in increments, maintaining

altitude with small inputs of stabilizer trim as necessary. Leave the gear down and stabilize with
airbrake position 3 at flaps-up approach speed plus
30 knots IAS. If in the cruise configuration, gear
and flaps up, and airbrakes down, proceed as follows:
1. Extend the landing gear at the normal gear extension time, altitude, and speed. Place airbrakes to
position 2 as the gear extends.
2. Gradually decelerate to flaps-up approach
speed plus 30 knots IAS and set airbrakes to position 3.
3. Maintain a trim condition, i.e., constant attitude and altitude with small inputs of stabilizer
trim.
NOTE
Extreme care should be exercised to avoid

over-trimming. Normally after trim is applied for an attitude change, the trim will
be removed to avoid over-trimming. This
technique will be practiced carefully prior to
commencing an approach.
4. Request either a straight-in approach or a wide
extended pattern with shallow turns (limit bank
angles to 20) and slow changes in altitude. Several
small turns to final are helpful.
5. The copilot will operate the throttles to maintain the desired airspeed, handle communications,
set navigational aids, etc.
APPROACH AND LANDING
The final approach to glideslope should be flown
with gear down, flaps up, and trimmed for level
flight at airbrake position 3. The airbrake lever
should now be considered as the control column or
control stick with its neutral position springloaded to position 3. All pitch corrections should be
made with the lever in and out of position 3. Since
there is no feel or detent at position 3, it is necessary to make continuous visual reference to the
airbrake lever to ensure its constant return to position 3. The copilot will take the throttles on the
downwind leg and maintain desired airspeed from
there through final approach to touchdown. He
should make smooth thrust changes and attempt to
hold constant airspeed on final approach by minimizing the size and rate of thrust changes. He
should anticipate the pilots requirements and attempt to stay in phase. For instance, at glide slope
intercept, throttle movement should be phased with
T.O. 1B-52H-1
the pilots pitch down input to hold a constant airspeed. The copilot should be alert for a go-around
requirement. The throttles should be placed to idle
after touchdown. Another item to consider is
ground effect on the aircraft during the pre-touchdown phase. The term ground effect refers to
change in airflow around an aircraft as a result of
proximity to the ground. The B-52 feels ground effect at approximately 60 feet above the ground.
When entering ground effect, the aircraft will pitch
slightly nosedown unless a noseup control input is
made to maintain the original attitude. If the nose
is allowed to drop as the aircraft enters ground effect, the rate of descent will increase. However, if
the controls are operated to maintain the original
pitch attitude, the aircraft rate of descent will be
decreased sufficiently through ground effect to allow the aircraft to be landed in this attitude. Assuming that the aircraft was stable on glide slope
with airbrakes in position 3, a movement of the
airbrake lever to position 4 will usually be sufficient to maintain aircraft attitude when compensating for ground effect. The timing and amplitude of
this pitch input will be based on pilot judgment and
should not be performed in a mechanical manner.
In the event of an over-rotation, either (1) decrease
the airbrake position and lower the nose and then
reapply a noseup airbrake input, or (2) initiate a goaround if there is any doubt of the ability to control
the aircraft motion.
pected with some deviations above and below. Ideally, operating the lever from 3 to 4 and back to 3,
and 3 to 2 and back to 3, will keep the aircraft sufficiently close to the glide slope. Re-trim as necessary
to maintain trim at airbrake position 3. However, if
large pitch oscillations are experienced, abandon
the approach by applying thrust and going around,
see GO-AROUND WITH RUDDER/ELEVATOR
SYSTEMS INOPERATIVE, this section.
5. From 600 feet AGL or above, control the flight
path and glide slope by flying with visual reference
to the runway. Monitoring the glide slope by using
PAR, ILS, or VASI is helpful for aircraft position information, but reference to the runway and attitude
control are primary. A stabilized attitude and
constant airspeed should be maintained to touchdown.
6. At between 50 and 100 feet above ground level,
a slight noseup control input (airbrakes) is usually
necessary to compensate for ground effect and to
maintain touchdown attitude.
7. As the aft wheels touch down, reduce thrust to
idle. Expect a firm contact with the runway with
the nose lowering rapidly to the ground. Raise
airbrakes to position 6 after all gear are firmly on
the ground. Extend the drag chute observing the
chute placard.
GO-AROUND WITH RUDDER/ELEVATOR

SYSTEMS INOPERATIVE
NOTE
The use of airbrake position 6 is not recommended since initially a high sink rate occurs before the aircraft pitch angle is increased.
Establish the aircraft on the final approach and
proceed as follows:
1. Decelerate to approach speed and carefully
keep the aircraft in trim so that it flies constant altitude with airbrake position 3.
2. Control the heading with small bank angle
changes.
3. At glide slope intercept, lower the nose approximately 2 to 3 and reduce thrust smoothly to
maintain airspeed.
4. The primary pitch control is the airbrake lever,
with the lever being modulated about position 3.
There is no detent in position 3; therefore, constant
reference to the lever position will be made. Less
than precise control of the glide slope can be ex-
The basic FLAPS-UP GO-AROUND procedure will

apply except that the airbrakes will not be retracted (left in position 3). Also thrust will be advanced smoothly to avoid putting the aircraft suddenly out of trim. Judgment must prevail with respect to the rate of thrust change required. Some
steps to be emphasized during go-around follow:
1. Pilot calls for go-around and the copilot advances the throttles smoothly until a 500 to 1500
foot per minute rate of climb is established. The pilot will then command more or less thrust and control the aircraft pitch using airbrakes and trim.
Climb straight ahead until well stabilized.
2. Accelerate to approach speed plus 30 knots.
3. Make all turns gradually and limit bank
angles to 20. Make all altitude changes gradually.
NOTE
Some difficulty may be encountered if turns

and altitude changes are made simultaneously.
3-85
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LANDING WITH STABILIZER TRIM FAILURE

If stabilizer trim should fail during flight, the aircraft can still be flown satisfactorily through proper
application of the elevator control. Normally, at the
time of failure, the aircraft would be trimmed to fly
hands off for that particular weight and cg location.
This cg location should be held at approximately
the same value by shifting the fuel loading during
the remainder of the flight. If such action is not possible or practicable, then the cg location may shift
as required since the elevator is powerful enough to
counteract for a shift within the limits of 18% and
34% MAC as long as the stabilizer fails within its
normal operating range.
The further the cg location moves from the location
which existed at time of stabilizer trim failure, the
greater the pilot control column forces will be at the
original trim speed. The elevator is also sufficiently
powerful to permit a safe landing if stabilizer trim
fails within its normal operating range. If possible
for landing, the cg should be shifted aft to approximately 30% MAC by transferring fuel so as to compensate for the noseup trim which will be required
as the speed is decreased.
Between 3 and 5 of stabilizer nosedown trim normally is required when the wing flaps are moved
rapidly from the flaps up to the fully extended position; therefore, lower the flaps in small increments.
While lowering the wing flaps, allow airspeed to decrease. This will assist in compensating for the outof-trim condition by keeping the control forces at a
low level and will require less down elevator or forward control column travel. The change in trim due
to wing flap extension will actually work to the pilots advantage and probably result in the requirement for down elevator and a push force on the control column during the final approach.
For this reason, adequate up elevator travel should
be available for the final flare. The airbrakes produce a noseup trim so that considerable trading is
available between airbrake position and elevator
position to obtain a desirable trim and control situation. If the emergency is such that, even with the
aid of airbrakes, little elevator can be made available for landing flare, fly a very flat approach at
normal approach speeds by carrying thrust. Under
such conditions, it may not be possible to get the
tail down far enough with the result that the forward landing gear will touch down first. Such a
landing may cause the aircraft to porpoise between
the forward and rear landing gear.
3-86
An extreme deflection of the stabilizer, either full

nose up or full nose down, poses a serious situation
for aircraft recovery. The stabilizer could be at or
near an extreme limit, well outside the normal operating range, following a mechanical failure at the
stabilizer trim unit and subsequent hydraulic runaway. Required control columns could be as high as
70 pounds in either direction to maintain the aircraft attitude for the particular flight condition.
Some relief for the control column forces can be
achieved by use of flaps, airbrakes, fuel manipulation, and aircraft speed. In all cases, more elevator
effectiveness for a given elevator deflection and corresponding control column pressure is available if
the aircraft is flown in the lower speed regimes
such as best flare plus 30 flaps down or flaps up approach speed plus 30.
With the stabilizer stuck at or near the nose down
extreme of nine units, the total mistrim for landing
will be at a minimum with flaps down, airbrakes
four, and available fuel transferred aft not to exceed
the aft flight limit of 35% MAC. Moving the cg aft
about 5%, (for example transfer 7000 pounds from 2
& 3 Mains to the Aft Body), will net about one unit
of trim relief.
A stabilizer at the four units nose up extreme requires a flaps up landing to handle the mistrim.
Further reduction of the mistrim is possible using
airbrakes zero for landing and transferring fuel forward. However, since a reduced gross weight is desirable for a flaps up landing, little fuel may be
available for transfer.
NOTE
Condensation can occur during extended

periods of ground operation or while flying
low level when moisture is present or when
the temperature of the aircraft structure is
at or below the dewpoint. When the aircraft
then encounters freezing conditions, the
condensation can freeze on the stabilizer
trim cables and manual trim control cable
drums, resulting in binding of the stabilizer
trim. If this condition is encountered and
the situation allows, descend below the
freezing level and attempt to free the stabilizer trim.
If time is available, a controllability check
should be made to determine the control
characteristics which will be encountered
on landing. This check is described under
STALL OR CONTROLLABILITY CHECKS,
Section VI.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LANDING WITH SPOILER CONTROL

FAILURES
NOTE
If either inboard or outboard airbrake control circuit breaker was pulled as suggested
under ASYMMETRICAL AIRBRAKE CONTROL, this Section, the circuit breaker will
be reset after penetration has been completed and flaps extended for the following
landing procedures.
In case of partial loss of operation of any of the
spoilers, sufficient lateral control will be available
from the remaining spoilers and the rudder to fly
the aircraft satisfactorily during normal flaps-up
operation.
NOTE
If complete loss of spoiler operation is experienced, the only remaining lateral control
available is that which the rudder can provide. In this circumstance, the aircraft can
be flown satisfactorily at altitude, but a
landing under these conditions is not recommended.
When landing with partial spoiler operation, the
aircraft will exhibit lower maximum roll rates, and
larger control wheel deflections will be required for
normal corrections. The landing should be made at
a gross weight of approximately 250,000 to 270,000
pounds. At lighter gross weights, the stopping distance will decrease; however, lateral control response will deteriorate as airspeed is reduced. It is
recommended that a normal approach and landing
be planned except that a wider than normal traffic
pattern should be flown to compensate for the slower roll response. In order to reduce lateral control
requirements, the crosswind crab system should always be utilized when making any landing in crosswind conditions after partial loss of lateral control
has been experienced.
side with the operative spoiler groups if the

airbrake capability has also been lost on the affected spoiler group. Airbrake capability of an affected outboard spoiler group may remain if the
malfunction is due to a cable failure between the inboard and outboard spoiler differential units. Trim
the aircraft by applying rudder trim toward the
wing with the inoperative spoiler group. Approximately two-thirds directional trim will be required.
When stabilized in a straight flight path, the aircraft will be in a slightly banked and sideslipped attitude.
COMPLETE SPOILER FAILURE AND AIRBRAKES FAILURE ON ONE WING
Loss of both inboard and outboard spoiler groups on

one side will result in marginal lateral control for
landing purposes. However, the remaining lateral
control can be used in both directions by establishing a fuel differential between main tanks 1 and 4,
the heavier load being on the side with the inoperative spoilers. Obtain the needed weight differential
by turning the master refuel switch ON, the defuel
valve switch OPEN, and open valves 9 and 22 to
transfer fuel from 1 to 4, or open valves 12, 19, and
29 to transfer fuel from 4 to 1. All auxiliary tank
fuel flow control switches should be OFF and all
auxiliary tank engine feed control switches should
be CLOSED.
NOTE
PARTIAL SPOILER FAILURE ON ONE WING
Loss of either an inboard or an outboard group of

spoilers will result in a loss of approximately onehalf the lateral control power in the direction of the
affected wing. A normal landing can be made with
more nearly equalized lateral control in the following manner: After the flaps are fully extended,
raise the airbrakes to position 4. Extending the
airbrakes will cause the aircraft to roll toward the
Approximately 4000 pounds of fuel differential should contribute sufficient lateral control when both spoiler groups on one wing
are inoperative, but both groups on the opposite wing are functional.
The copilot should monitor fuel transfer
closely since the fuel transfer rate is well
over 20,000 pounds per hour.
If time is available, a controllability check
should be made to determine the control
characteristics which will be encountered
on landing. This check is described under
STALL OR CONTROLLABILITY CHECKS,
Section VI.
Rudder trim, rudder, and differential thrust
are still available as an aid to lateral control.
(Continued)
3-87
T.O. 1B-52H-1
The hydraulic systems malfunctions causing loss of both spoiler groups on one side
may also prevent extension of the tip gear
on that side. Since the lateral control problem is the most critical, disregard the procedure outlined in ONE OR BOTH TIP GEAR
RETRACTED under LANDING WITH
PARTIAL GEAR checklist, this section. The
fuel differential established to compensate
for the loss of both spoiler groups will not
cause the external tank on that side to contact the runway during a properly executed
landing under optimum wind conditions
even though the tip gear is retracted.
The landing should be made in the following manner: After the flaps are fully extended, raise the
airbrakes to position 4. This will cause the aircraft
to roll toward the wing with the operative spoiler
groups and is compensated for by displacing the
control wheel in the opposite direction. Continue
approach and landing with flare, touchdown, and
drag chute deployment executed as normal. Stop
the aircraft straight ahead on the runway. Sufficient lateral control is available to maintain a nearly wings-level attitude down to 50 knots provided
no adverse surface winds exist.
Do not attempt to taxi the aircraft with the

tip gears retracted.
NOTE
The use of airbrakes position 4 may not be

appropriate when three spoiler groups are
inoperative. See THREE SPOILER
GROUPS INOPERATIVE.
COMPLETE SPOILER FAILURE ON ONE WING, AIRBRAKES OPERATIVE
Certain cable failures can result in loss of spoiler

control on one wing; however, partial or full airbrake capability will remain. Airbrake capability
contributing to lateral control can be determined by
displacing the control wheel in the direction of the
affected wing and extending airbrakes. If airbrakes
are operative, the aircraft will roll toward the affected wing. If airbrakes are used as spoilers for
turns into the affected wing, displace the control
wheel in the desired direction and extend airbrakes
in single increments until the desired bank angle is
obtained (not to exceed 15 bank). To maintain the
desired bank angle, adjust airbrakes as necessary.
To roll out of a turn, airbrake lever should be placed
3-88
to the OFF position in single increments prior to

displacing the control wheel in the desired direction. Procedures described under COMPLETE
SPOILER FAILURE AND AIRBRAKES FAILURE
ON ONE WING, will apply except the amount of
fuel differential required will be less with airbrake
capability contributing to lateral control.
THREE SPOILER GROUPS INOPERATIVE
With three spoiler groups inoperative, lateral control will be very low and a landing under anything
but ideal conditions will be extremely hazardous.
Lateral control can be obtained in both directions
by partial extension of the airbrakes and applying
rudder trim, in the manner described above, toward
the wing with both spoiler groups inoperative. In
addition, the rudder should be used to augment lateral control.
If only one inboard spoiler group is functional,
airbrake position 2 will provide lateral control in
both directions.
If only one outboard spoiler group is functional,
airbrake position 1 will provide lateral control in
both directions with minimum drag. Airbrake position 4 may be used if controllability is marginal
when using only airbrake position 1.
With three spoiler groups inoperative, a flaps up
landing is recommended. An approximate 250,000
to 270,000 pound gross weight for landing with
wing flaps retracted is recommended. See LANDING WITH WING FLAPS INOPERATIVE. Prior to
landing, the airbrake control circuit breaker for two
of the inoperative spoiler segments (inboard or outboard segments) may be pulled to prevent inadvertent operation during landing.
NOTE
When three spoiler groups are inoperative,

the establishment of an approximate 2000
pound fuel differential between main tanks
1 and 4 will contribute to improved lateral
control. The heavier load should be on the
side with the most inoperative spoiler
groups.
ALL SPOILER GROUPS INOPERATIVE
With all spoiler groups inoperative, the only roll

control available will be that resulting from sideslip
produced by the rudder. The time required to establish a roll rate will be extremely long because a
sideslip motion must first be established before any
roll motion can be effected. A landing under these
conditions is not recommended.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
WING FLAP SYSTEM EMERGENCY

OPERATION
NOTE
The aircraft is not equipped for emergency

extension or retraction of the flaps; however, all four flap sections are simultaneously
driven by a power unit which normally has
two 205-volt ac motors operating at the
same time. Normally, the flaps will fully extend or retract in approximately 60 seconds.
If either motor becomes inoperative, the
other motor will extend or retract the flaps
in approximately 120 seconds.
ASYMMETRICAL WING FLAP CONDITIONS
An asymmetrical wing flap condition may or may

not be evidenced to the pilot by an unusual rolling
and yawing moment. The asymmetrical wing flap
yawing effect arises from the increased drag of the
flapped wing as compared to that of the wing without flaps. Furthermore, when the rolling moment is
counteracted by spoiler action, the resulting yawing
moment adds to that from the flaps. Effective countermeasures for asymmetrical wing flap conditions
which result in unusual rolling and yawing moments will then include the application of opposite
rudder in addition to lateral control. Flap damage
which could result in an asymmetrical condition is
most likely to occur during extension or retraction.
To successfully counteract any adverse rolling moment due to asymmetrical flaps, it is essential that
corrective action be taken immediately. The possible conditions which could cause asymmetrical flaps
and the results expected are as follows:
1. An outboard section could leave the aircraft instantaneously with the other three sections either
full or partially down. Normally, this condition can
be adequately counteracted by the application of
full lateral control and rudder. However analysis indicates that adequate lateral control to maintain
the wings level may not exist at all conditions, particularly at low speeds when the remaining flap
segments are fully extended. Fuel should be shifted
laterally to reduce the requirement for lateral control. If possible, fuel should be added to the wing
without flap damage and removed from the wing
with flap damage.
2. An inboard section could leave the aircraft instantaneously with the other three sections either
full or partially down. Experience shows that this
condition typically can be counteracted by application of one-half to two-thirds of the lateral control
authority. However, analysis and experience have
shown that adequate lateral control to maintain the
wings level may not exist at all conditions, particularly at low speeds when the remaining flap seg-
ments are fully extended. Fuel should be shifted

laterally to reduce the requirement for lateral control. If possible, fuel should be added to the wing
without flap damage and removed from the wing
with flap damage.
3. If a torque tube fails between the two sections
on one side, the outboard section could go to full up
while the others went to full down (corrective capabilities are the same as for the first condition above)
or could go to full down when the other three sections went to full up. In the latter case, full lateral
control and rudder can counteract the rolling moment at speeds over 20% above unstick speed.
4. If a torque tube breaks between an inboard
flap section and the power unit, both sections on
one side could go up or down while the two sections
on the other side went in the opposite direction.
This condition may be controlled by immediately
chasing the free flap sections with the driven sections. Free travel of a broken torque tube is limited
by an overspeed flap drive brake which allows
enough time to establish control if immediate corrective action is taken. Full lateral control and rudder can control a maximum of 25% asymmetry in
the up position (flaps up on one side and 25% extended on the other side) and a maximum of 60%
asymmetry in the down position (flaps down on one
side and 40% down on the other side).
Wing Flap Movement Following Torque Tube Failure
If the flaps are less than 20% extended and a section becomes disconnected from the torque tube
drive, airloads will probably carry the section to the
full up position. If the break occurs when the flaps
are 30% or more extended, the airloads will probably move the section to the full down position. In
the range between 20% and 30% extended, airloads
could move the section either up or down with the
probable crossover point at 25%. Therefore, if a
torque tube broke when the flaps were 30% extended and the flap lever was immediately moved
to DN, a free flap section could reach full down in
not less than 25 seconds. The maximum asymmetry
would occur at that time with the free section, or
sections, full down and the driven section 71.5%
down.
Action To Be Taken With Asymmetrical Wing Flaps
When an asymmetrical flap condition exists, a landing in that configuration will be necessary. A check
of aircraft controllability and initial buffet speed
should be made. See STALL OR CONTROLLABILITY CHECKS, Section VI. Use normal flaps down
LANDING checklist. Determine the best flare
speed from Part 8 in T. O. 1B-52H-1-1 for intermediate flap settings.
3-89
T.O. 1B-52H-1
When the flaps are in a full-down or intermediate position and flap damage exists,
in T. O. 1B-52H-1-1 may no longer apply. In
reached or until approximately one-half lateral control authority is required to maintain the wings level. If the speed requiring
one-half lateral control is above the minimum touchdown speed, add 9 knots to the
higher speed and use as the best flare
speed.
engaging in chase operation. It is unsafe to
fly two aircraft in close vertical proximity
because of the magnitude of interrelated
aerodynamic effects.
NOTE
If time is available, visual observation of

the wing flap condition may be made by a
chase plane pilot or tower flyby to aid in
assessing the damage.
a. When any unusual rolling moment is encountered during wing flap operation and the flap
indicator needles remain synchronized and/or stop,
immediately place the flap lever to OFF. The synchronized indicator needles usually mean that the
torque tubes are intact and therefore a flap section
has either ceased to move or has fallen from the aircraft. The pilot must maintain the flap placard
speed that is commensurate with the indicated flap
position until a controllability check can be made.
If visual observation reveals that one of the

flap sections is damaged or cocked, or if visual observation cannot be made and the
condition of the flaps is unknown, further
operation of the flaps will be discontinued
and a landing made with the flaps remaining in the position in which they stopped.
Additional attempts to operate damaged
flaps can result in further damage to the
aircraft and could cause an increase in roll-
3-90
ing moment. A cocked flap is subject to buffeting and vibration and may fall from the
aircraft. To reduce this hazard, consideration should be given to landing the aircraft
when practical.
b. When any unusual rolling moment is encountered during wing flap operation and/or the
flap indicator needles become unsynchronized, immediately place the flap lever to OFF. Since the
flap position indicator transmitters are on the outer
extremities of the torque tubes, an unsynchronized
indicator needle movement accompanied by a rolling moment can usually be associated with failed
torque tube. If the rolling moment continues to increase, the copilot must chase the free flap section
with the flap lever.
(1) If the flaps were more than 25% down,
move the flap lever to DN. Monitor the needles to
ensure that both are moving in the down direction.
If one needle has stopped or is going in the up direction, reposition the flap lever to OFF or UP as
required to synchronize the needles.
(2) If the flaps are less than 25% down, move
the flap lever to UP. Monitor the needles to ensure
that both are moving in the up direction. If one
needle has stopped or is going in the down direction, reposition the flap lever to OFF or DN as required to synchronize the needles.
WING FLAP STOPPAGE
If both needles stop during extension or retraction,

immediately move the flap lever to OFF. Flap stoppage can usually be associated with electrical problems or excessive friction in the system. The landing should be made with the wing flaps remaining
in the position where they stopped. Determine the
best flare speed from Part 8 in T. O. 1B-52H-1-1 for
intermediate flap settings.
If a partial flap landing is inadvisable due

to critical landing factors, only flap extension may be attempted, and then only if visual observation by a chase plane pilot reveals that no unusual position or alignment
of flaps exists. Flap extension may be continued while under visual observation. Use
caution in reactivating the flaps, and be
prepared to counteract any unusual rolling
moment that may be encountered. Discontinue extension of flaps if the flap indicator
needle motion becomes jerky or if the
needles stop or become unsynchronized.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
UNSCHEDULED FLAP MOVEMENT
All four flap sections are simultaneously driven by

a common drive shaft operated by the wing flap
power unit. Certain failures within the power unit
could cause loss of flap response to the flap motors
and flap lever. Such a failure would allow airloads
to position all four flap sections, depending on flap
position when failure occurs, as described under
WING
FLAP
MOVEMENT
FOLLOWING
TORQUE TUBE FAILURE, this section. During
flap operation if the flaps stop and reverse direction, reposition the flap lever to agree with flap
movement. When flap movement stops, place flap
lever OFF to prevent extended flap motor operation
should limit switches not be deenergized.
MAXIMUM LANDING GROSS WEIGHT WITH ONE MISSING OR DAMAGED FLAP AND FUEL LOADS TO BALANCE STATIC MOMENT
It may become necessary to land the aircraft with a

missing or damaged flap under various conditions
of lateral unbalance. Prior to landing under such
conditions, the pilots should attempt fuel transfer
to maintain a favorable lateral and longitudinal
center of gravity. A missing inboard flap needs aft
cg, and a missing outboard flap needs forward cg.
Fuel should be transferred from the wing with damaged flaps to the wing with undamaged flaps, if
possible, to reduce lateral trim requirements. The
pilot must also determine maximum landing weight
based on expected lateral moment balance. Figure
3-11 shows maximum landing weights with various

amounts of lateral (rolling) moment balance with
fuel for the following configurations:
1. Outboard flap missing and remaining flaps
down with full rudder control and airbrakes in position 4.
2. Inboard flap missing and remaining flaps
down with full rudder control and airbrakes in position 4.
For instance, consider a missing outboard flap with
the other flaps fully extended and a planned landing weight of 250,000 pounds; a rolling moment of
approximately 13,800,000 inch-pounds is needed to
assure lateral control authority at minimum touchdown speed.
Maximum rudder deflection is required to maintain
wings level or keep bank angle to a minimum. The
chart data is based on the assumption that 50 percent of the maximum available spoiler authority is
used to balance the resulting moment from the
asymmetric flap condition and asymmetric fuel
loading. The chart shows that the aircraft with a
missing flap benefits from laterally balancing with
fuel and lighter gross weights. At normal landing
gross weights with little or no lateral balance of
fuel, landing should not be attempted with a missing flap and remaining flaps extended, since the
aircraft will likely land with controls against the
stops.
3-91
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Maximum Landing Gross Weight With One Missing

or Damaged Flap and Fuel Loads to Balance
Static Moment
NOTE
ample, if there is a 3000 lb differential in the external wing

tanks, it generates 2,800,000 inch lb of rolling moment,
and if there is a 5000 lb differential in the outboards
4,300,000 inch lb of rolling moment is generated. These
moment values are additive and any additional moment
needed can be generated by fuel differential in the main
tanks. The rolling moment can be generated by any combination of fuel differential depending on the fuel available.
All data is based on the assumption that 50% of maximum available spoiler authority is being used to balance
the asymmetric flap and fuel loading, full rudder control
is applied, and the designated flap is missing. See Section VI for lateral control discussion.
All data is based on airplane control characteristics at
minimum touchdown speed.
REMARKS:
The rolling moment needed to oppose the moment generated by the missing flap can be obtained by fuel differential. The fuel needed is shown in the Balance Fuel Loads
Chart.
Fuel should be transferred to the side opposite the missing flap.
The required rolling moment can be obtained by differential between a set of opposite tanks or a combination of
opposite tanks depending on the fuel available. For ex-
EXAMPLE
GIVEN:
Landing gross weight - 250,000
Missing outboard flap segment
FIND:
Rolling moment for 50% spoiler authority remaining
SOLUTION:
Rolling moment - 13,800,000 in, lb
Figure 3-11
3-92
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LANDING WITH WING FLAPS

INOPERATIVE
Normally, landings should not be made with wing
flaps retracted since the touchdown speed is significantly higher than for a wing flaps-down landing.
However, if the wing flaps malfunction or some other emergency exists, a safe landing can be made.
Flaps-up landings at heavy gross weights are not
recommended. To preclude exceeding tire and brake
energy limits and to reduce landing ground run, the
gross weight should be reduced to as low a value as
practicable. The airspeed schedule for flaps-up traffic pattern is as follows:
Downwind Leg Approach speed plus 30

knots
Base Leg Approach speed plus 20 knots
Turn to Final (until established on final) Approach speed plus 10 knots
Final Approach Approach speed
The higher speeds require additional maneuvering
space and an extended final approach is desirable.
Control response during the entire traffic pattern
will be more positive than that experienced during
a flaps-down pattern. The use of airbrakes provides
excellent engine response and airspeed control
throughout the final approach. A precision instrument approach should normally be flown. Under
emergency landing conditions, glideslope angles of
3 or less may be utilized; however, an angle of
approximately 2.5 is most desirable. If facilities or
equipment are inoperative, the VASI approach
lights may be used or, if necessary, a visual final
approach may be flown.
NOTE
For lower gross weights, flare is not required since the flare resulting from ground
effect alone will reduce the rate of descent
to a value that is less than the design ultimate contact sinking speed. See figure 3-12.
For gross weights above 250,000 pounds,
some flare may be required to prevent possible structural damage depending upon the
glideslope angle. See figure 3-12. Since flare
will increase the touchdown distance, a
touchdown decision point will be required.
Subtracting the charted ground roll distance from the available runway length results in a touchdown decision point. (Touchdown decision point may be computed as
runway remaining to make it compatible to
runway markers.) If this touchdown decision point is exceeded, a go-around will be
necessary. The flare required for aircraft
gross weights above 250,000 pounds but below 310,000 pounds is minimal and only required to reduce vertical velocity to an acceptable value.
The latter stage of the final approach is the critical
phase of a flaps-up landing. The aircraft should be
flown onto the runway at approach speed and attitude. At aft gear touchdown, the thrust should be
reduced to idle and the control column should be
positioned aft to cushion forward gear touchdown.
Thrust should not be reduced to idle prior to aft
gear touchdown. If thrust is reduced to idle prior to
aft gear touchdown, airspeed may decrease below
minimum touchdown speed resulting in a hard
landing.
WING FLAPS-UP LANDING DATA
Landing data for flaps-up landings are given in figure 3-13. These charts have been designed to provide the required landing data in a minimum
amount of time. The charts are: LANDING
GROUND RUN FLAPS UP WITH AIRBRAKES
ONLY, SL TO 1000 FEET and LANDING
GROUND RUN FLAPS UP WITH AIRBRAKES
AND DRAG CHUTE, SL TO 1000 FEET. Normally,
the airbrakes only chart is used for planning purposes. The landing data supplied by the charts include the flaps-up approach speed, minimum touchdown speed, landing ground run, and wheel brake
application speed. When the field pressure altitude
is above 1000 feet, the altitude correction rules
shown with the charts will be used to adjust the
ground run and wheel brake application speed values given in the chart. For example, with airbrakes
only and with a gross weight of 315,000 pounds,
temperature of 60F and field pressure altitude of
1000 feet, the ground run and brake application
speed with airbrakes only is found to be 9600 feet
and 146 knots. If, however, the field pressure altitude were 3000 feet, it would be necessary to increase the ground run by 1140 feet (to 10,740 feet)
and to reduce the wheel brake application by 6
knots (to 140 knots). When making a flaps-up landing, the brake energy limits chart (figure 5-14)
should be used to determine if the brake energy
limits will be exceeded. With this chart, the total
heat energy absorbed by the brakes, with or without the drag chute, may be readily determined. The
12,000 foot landing ground run lines on the chart
are provided for a quick reference only of the stopping distances involved at particular gross weights
and brake application speeds. Any point lying
above these lines indicates a ground run of more
than 12,000 feet at sea level, standard day conditions.
3-93
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Effect of Glide Slope Angle on Flare Technique With

Ground Effect
Figure 3-12
LANDING WITH WING FLAPS UP (COPILOT READS)

FLAPS-UP BEFORE LANDING (COPILOT READS)
NOTE
If a flaps-up landing is due to electrical failure, see CONSERVATION

OF BATTERY POWER checklist, this section, for fuel system, landing
gear, airbrakes, etc, operation.
The following information may be extracted and/or computed from data presented on charts located
in the EMERGENCY PROCEDURES parts of the pilots and navigators abbreviated checklists.
a. Flaps-Up Approach Speed ____________________ .
For gust conditions, increase approach speed by full gust factor. Example: Winds 230 at 30 knots
gusting to 40, add 10 knots to approach speed.
b. Go-Around Speed (approach speed plus 30 knots) ____________________ .
c.
Maximum Brake Application Speed ____________________ .
d. Landing Ground Run (flaps up with airbrakes and no drag chute) ____________________ .
3-94
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LANDING WITH WING FLAPS UP (COPILOT READS) (Cont)

e.
Check Brake Energy Limits ____________________ .

Brake energy limits should be checked to determine if the limits will be exceeded. Data should
be based on a no-drag chute situation.
NOTE
Landing ground run is the amount of runway that will be available

after touchdown for a complete stop on the remaining runway. If the
runway remaining after touchdown is less than this distance, a goaround is mandatory.
The landing ground run distances on these tabular charts (figure 3-13) are
based on dry surfaces. When other than dry conditions exist, obtain the
RCR and use the appropriate flaps-up chart in Part 8 of T. O. 1B-52H-1-1.

Check the appropriate navigation aids tuned and identified and review the planned approach with
the applicable crewmembers. Altitude restrictions, ceiling and visibility minimums, DH/MDA, and
missed approach procedures will be emphasized. Review if type approach/pilot changes.
5. Fuel Panel Switches 1, 2, 3, & 4 ON; 9, 10 11 and 12 OPEN; 13, 14, 15 and 16 CLOSED (CP);
Checked (P)
9, 10, 11, and 12 OPEN; 13, 14, 15, and 16 CLOSED. For takeoffs, transition, low approaches and
landings, open crossfeed valve switches 9, 10, 11 and 12 regardless of the green band. In addition,
when any main tank is down to 5000 pounds, open crossfeed valve switches 9, 10, 11 and 12.

During low level or traffic pattern fuel panel operations, the master refuel
switch will not be used by itself to control auxiliary tank fuel transfer operations. Whenever engine feed is selected with the auxiliary tank fuel
flow control switch and the master refuel switch is off, the auxiliary tank
boost pumps will continue to run with a no flow condition. Therefore, both
the master refuel switch and all auxiliary fuel control switches will be
turned off whenever fuel transfer is to be stopped. This is necessary since
below 25,000 feet MSL, an explosive condition exists due to the auto-ignition temperature of fuel vapors and the potential ignition source from a
malfunctioning auxiliary boost pump.
explosive condition exists due to the auto-ignition temperature of fuel
vapors and the potential ignition source from a malfunctioning auxiliary tank boost pump. Therefore, the auxiliary tanks fuel flow switches
will be turned off when the gage reads empty or the no flow indicator
light indicates a no flow condition. Auxiliary fuel flow control switches
will be turned off whenever fuel transfer is to be stopped.
Change 22
3-95
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LANDING WITH WING FLAPS UP (COPILOT READS) (Cont)
6. Approach Speed Rechecked (CP-N)
Recheck approach speed (plus gust factor) and cross-check airspeed indicators. On downwind leg, maintain approach speed plus 30 knots; on base leg, maintain approach speed plus 20 knots; and on turn to
final, maintain approach speed plus 10 knots. After established on final and during remainder of approach, maintain approach speed.
NOTE
Flaps-up approach speeds do not change if airbrakes are inoperative.

Copilot checks gear lever in detent. Pilot checks that the gear warning light is out and that all six
gears indicate down and locked.
With the landing gear down and locked, move the test switch to the flight (FLT) position. Check that
all indicator lights are on. Failure of any light to illuminate indicates there is no power to the antiskid shield for that wheel, and anti-skid protection will not be available for that wheel.
With any indicator light(s) not on, when the gear is down and locked and
the test switch in FLT, hard braking during landing may cause skidding
and/or a blown tire on the wheel corresponding to the unlighted indicator.
NOTE
If all eight lights fail to come on, ensure the antiskid switch is ON.
9. Airbrakes Four (P)
Obtain wind direction and velocity. Compute and set crosswind crab as required using 70% of the flapsdown crosswind crab setting. If crosswind crab is not to be used, knob and position indicator will be
checked for zero setting and gear position.
If wheel brakes are applied immediately before and held during touchdown when main gear is turned more than 14 (by any combination of
crosswind crab setting and steering), the aircraft will land with wheels
locked because the antiskid system is inoperative in this condition. Releasing the brakes will activate the antiskid system.
11. Target Trim Noted (P/CP)
When aircraft is on final approach in landing configuration at approach speed, pilot not flying will
note the stabilizer trim setting for zero stick force and call out this value as target trim.
12. Landing Check Completed (P-CP)
a.
b.
c.
d.
3-96
Gear
Airbrakes Four
Lights
Fuel
Change 22
T.O. 1B-52H-1
FLAPS-UP LANDING
Accomplish after flaps-up touchdown (need not be read).

Full airbrakes should be extended as soon as all wheels are on the ground.
2. Wheel Brakes Applied (P)
Normally pilot applies brakes at touchdown and copilot deploys drag chute at or below 135 knots
IAS. However, brake application will be delayed until below charted maximum brake application
speed.
Application of brakes above the maximum brake application speed will

exceed the brake energy limit and may result in complete loss of
brakes, rupture of hydraulic lines, and subsequent fire.
3. Drag Chute Deployed (135 KIAS or below) (CP)
Center the rudder pedals before repositioning the steering ratio selector lever. Actuation of the lever is very difficult when the rudder pedals
are deflected and could result in a dangerously abrupt change in steering angle.
3-97
T.O. 1B-52H-1
FLAPS-UP GO-AROUND
NOTE

pilots may not have sufficient time to refer to the checklist. Therefore
1. Go-Around Thrust Set (as required) (P)
2. Airbrakes As required (P)
Level off and check for a positive increase of airspeed.
3. Aircraft Trimmed (P)
At all times during go-around, pilot will make a conscious effort to keep the aircraft trimmed to zero
stick forces.
On pilots command, copilot retracts the gear when it is established that aircraft will not contact the
runway.
5. Thrust Adjusted (P)
Pilot accelerates to approach speed plus 30 knots and adjusts thrust to establish approximately 1000
feet per minute rate of climb.
NOTE
Accomplish AFTER TAKEOFF CLIMB checklist, TRAFFIC PATTERN checklist, or FLAPS-UP BEFORE LANDING checklist as applicable.
3-98
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Flaps-Up Landing Data

LANDING GROUND RUN FLAPS UP, WITH AIRBRAKES ONLY,
SL TO 1000 FEET (Chart 1 of 2)
GROSS APPROACH
MINIMUM
WEIGHT
SPEED
TOUCHDOWN
1000 LB
KIAS
SPEED
KIAS
120F
100F
80F
60F
40F
20F
0F
200
140
132
4150
132
3950
132
3850
132
3750
132
3650
132
3550
132
3400
132
205
142
134
4250
134
4100
134
3950
134
3850
134
3750
134
3650
134
3550
134
210
143
136
4400
136
4250
136
4150
136
4000
136
3900
136
3750
136
3650
136
215
145
137
4550
137
4400
137
4250
137
4100
137
4000
137
3850
137
3700
137
220
147
139
4700
139
4550
139
4400
139
4250
139
4150
139
4050
139
3900
139
225
149
140
4850
140
4700
140
4550
140
4450
140
4300
140
4150
140
4050
140
230
150
142
5000
142
4850
142
4700
142
4550
142
4450
142
4300
142
4150
142
235
152
143
5150
143
5000
143
4850
143
4700
143
4550
143
4450
143
4300
143
240
154
145
5300
145
5100
145
4950
145
4850
145
4700
145
4550
145
4400
145
245
155
146
5500
146
5300
146
5150
146
5000
146
4850
146
4700
146
4550
146
250
156
148
255
158
149
260
160
151
265
161
152
270
163
154
275
164
155
280
166
156
285
167
158
290
169
295
170
5650
148
5450
148
5300
148
5150
148
4950
148
4850
148
4700
148
5850
149
5650
149
5500
149
5300
149
5150
149
5000
149
4800
149
6050
151
5800
151
5650
151
5450
151
5300
151
5150
151
5000
151
6200
152
6000
152
5800
152
5650
152
5450
152
5300
152
5150
152
6500
153
6200
154
6000
154
5800
154
5700
154
5450
154
5300
154
6950
151
6500
154
6150
155
6000
155
5850
155
5650
155
5450
155
7550
149
7000
152
6550
155
6200
156
6050
156
5850
156
5650
156
8000
148
7500
151
6950
154
6500
156
6150
158
6000
158
5800
158
159
8550
146
8000
149
7500
152
6950
154
6550
157
6150
159
5950
159
161
9050
145
8500
148
8000
151
7550
153
7050
156
6550
159
6100
161
3-99
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Flaps-Up Landing Data (Cont)

LANDING GROUND RUN FLAPS UP, WITH AIRBRAKES ONLY,
GROSS APPROACH
MINIMUM
WEIGHT
SPEED
TOUCHDOWN
1000 LB
KIAS
SPEED
KIAS
120F
100F
80F
60F
40F
20F
0F
300
172
162
9600
143
9050
146
8550
149
8050
151
7550
154
7050
157
6600
159
305
173
163
10,150
141
9600
144
9050
147
8550
149
8050
152
7550
155
7100
157
310
175
165
10,650
140
10,100
143
9600
146
9050
148
8550
151
8050
154
7550
156
315
176
166
11,150
138
10,650
141
10,050
144
9600
146
9100
149
8550
152
8100
154
320
178
168
11,750
137
11,150
140
10,650
143
10,100
145
9600
148
9050
151
8550
153
325
179
169
12,300
135
11,750
138
11,150
141
10,650
143
10,200
146
9550
149
9100
151
330
180
170
12,250
136
11,750
139
11,150
141
10,650
144
10,150
147
9600
149
335
182
171
12,200
137
11,700
139
11,200
142
10,600
145
10,150
147
340
183
173
12,200
138
11,700
141
11,200
144
10,650
146
345
184
174
12,250
139
11,650
142
11,150
144
350
186
175
12,200
140
11,700
142
355
187
177
360
188
178
365
190
179
GROSS
APPROACH
WEIGHT
SPEED
280
166
156
CONDITIONS:
DRY RUNWAY
ONLY
12,200
141
SHADED AREA INDICATES BRAKE ENERGY LIMITS
TOUCHDOWN
WILL BE EXCEEDED IF BRAKES ARE APPLIED
GROUND RUN
SPEED
PRIOR TO CHARTED BRAKE APPLICATION SPEED.
DISTANCE
7550
149
7000
152
NOTE
6550
155
6200
156
6050
156
5850
156
APPLICATION
SPEED
5650
156
FIELD PRESSURE ALTITUDE CORRECTION:

For gross weights less than altitude correction line (
), increase ground run by 170 feet for each 1000
feet altitude above 1000 feet.
For gross weights greater than altitude correction line (
), increase ground run by 570 feet for each
1000 feet altitude above 1000 feet.
For gross weights in shaded area, delay brake application 3 knots for each 1000 feet altitude above 1000 feet.
3-100
BRAKE
MINIMUM
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LANDING GROUND RUN FLAPS UP, WITH AIRBRAKES AND DRAG CHUTE,
GROSS APPROACH
MINIMUM
WEIGHT
SPEED
TOUCHDOWN
1000 LB
KIAS
SPEED KIAS
120F
100F
80F
60F
40F
20F
0F
200
140
132
3300
132
3250
132
3150
132
3000
132
3000
132
2900
132
2850
132
205
142
134
3450
134
3350
134
3300
134
3200
134
3150
134
3050
134
2950
134
210
143
136
3550
136
3450
136
3350
136
3300
136
3200
136
3150
136
3050
136
215
145
137
3700
137
3600
137
3500
137
3450
137
3350
137
3250
137
3150
137
220
147
139
3800
139
3700
139
3600
139
3500
139
3400
139
3350
139
3300
139
225
149
140
3950
140
3800
140
3700
140
3600
140
3500
140
3400
140
3300
140
230
150
142
4100
142
3950
142
3850
142
3750
142
3650
142
3500
142
3450
142
235
152
143
4250
143
4100
143
4000
143
3900
143
3750
143
3650
143
3550
143
240
154
145
4350
145
4200
145
4100
145
4000
145
3900
145
3800
145
3700
145
245
155
146
4450
146
4300
146
4200
146
4100
146
4000
146
3900
146
3800
146
250
156
148
4650
148
4500
148
4350
148
4200
148
4100
148
4000
148
3900
148
255
158
149
4800
149
4650
149
4500
149
4350
149
4200
149
4100
149
4000
149
260
160
151
4950
151
4800
151
4600
151
4450
151
4300
151
4200
151
4100
151
265
161
152
5100
152
4950
152
4750
152
4600
152
4400
152
4300
152
4200
152
270
163
154
5250
154
5100
154
4950
154
4800
154
4650
154
4500
154
4350
154
275
164
155
5400
155
5250
155
5100
155
4950
155
4800
155
4600
155
4500
155
280
166
156
5600
156
5450
156
5250
156
5050
156
4950
156
4750
156
4650
156
285
167
158
5800
158
5600
158
5400
158
5250
158
5050
158
4900
158
4800
158
290
169
159
6000
159
5800
159
5600
159
5450
159
5250
159
5100
159
4900
159
295
170
161
6200
161
6000
161
5800
161
5600
161
5400
161
5250
161
5100
161
300
172
162
6550
160
6100
162
5950
162
5800
162
5600
162
5400
162
5250
162
305
173
163
7100
159
6500
161
6150
163
5950
163
5750
163
5600
163
5400
163
310
175
165
7500
158
7000
154
6500
163
6100
165
5900
165
5700
165
5550
165
315
176
166
8050
157
7500
159
7000
162
6600
163
6100
166
5850
166
5700
166
320
178
168
8500
156
7900
158
7450
161
7000
163
6550
166
6000
168
5850
168
325
179
169
8950
155
8400
157
7950
158
7500
161
6950
164
6550
167
6000
169

3-101
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Flaps-Up Landing Data (Cont)

LANDING GROUND RUN FLAPS UP, WITH AIRBRAKES AND DRAG CHUTE,
GROSS APPROACH
MINIMUM
WEIGHT
SPEED
TOUCHDOWN
1000 LB
KIAS
SPEED
KIAS
120F
100F
80F
60F
40F
20F
0F
330
180
170
9450
153
8900
156
8400
158
7950
160
7500
162
7000
165
6550
168
335
182
171
9950
151
9400
154
8900
157
8450
159
7900
161
7450
163
6950
166
340
183
173
10,400
151
9900
153
9350
156
8900
158
8400
161
7850
163
7400
165
345
184
174
10,900
150
10,350
152
9850
154
9400
156
8850
159
8350
162
7850
164
350
186
175
11,400
148
10,900
151
10,350
153
9900
155
9400
157
8850
160
8350
163
355
187
177
12,000
147
11,350
150
10,850
153
10,400
155
9850
157
9350
159
8800
162
360
188
178
12,500
146
11,900
148
11,300
151
10,800
153
10,300
156
9750
158
9250
160
365
190
179
12,350
147
11,800
149
11,300
151
10,700
154
10,200
157
9,700
159
370
191
180
12,250
148
11,750
150
11,200
152
10,600
155
10,150
158
375
192
182
12,150
150
11,600
152
11,100
154
10,550
157
380
193
183
12,150
151
11,600
153
11,100
155
385
194
184
12,150
152
11,600
154
390
196
185
12,000
153
395
197
187
12,450
152
GROSS
WEIGHT
310
APPROACH
SPEED
175
165
CONDITIONS:
DRY RUNWAY
ONLY
MINIMUM
TOUCHDOWN
SPEED
7550
158
SHADED AREA INDICATES BRAKE ENERGY LIMITS

WILL BE EXCEEDED IF BRAKES ARE APPLIED
PRIOR TO CHARTED BRAKE APPLICATION SPEED.
7000
154
NOTE
6500
163
6100
165
5900
165
5700
165
BRAKE
APPLICATION
SPEED
5550
165
FIELD PRESSURE ALTITUDE CORRECTION:

For gross weights less than altitude correction line (
), increase ground run by 190 feet for each 1000
feet altitude above 1000 feet.
For gross weights greater than altitude correction line (
), increase ground run by 570 feet for each
1000 feet altitude above 1000 feet.
For gross weights in shaded area, delay brake application 3 knots for each 1000 feet altitude above 1000 feet.
3-102
GROUND RUN
DISTANCE
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DEPARTURE FROM PREPARED SURFACES
Unfavorable conditions during landing or taxi could

cause the aircraft to depart the runway or taxiway
surface. The conditions or combinations that could
lead to this occurring are loss of steering, loss of
braking, crosswinds, and slippery surfaces. If departure from a prepared surface appears imminent,
shut down engines 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8. Immediately
prior to departing the prepared surface, center the
rudder pedals. Departing a prepared surface with
the forward gear turned may result in severe damage to the landing gear. If time permits, jettison either or both of the aft upper escape hatches before
surface departure by pulling the No. 6 emergency
ground egress handle safety pin and then pulling
and rotating the emergency ground egress handle.
If the hatch jettison initiator does not fire and unlock the hatch, rotating an arming lever may unlock the hatch. Experience has shown that the aircraft tends to sink into the soil sufficiently to block
the crew entry door. Prepared surface departure
can also cause fuselage bending/twisting sufficient
to bind the escape hatches and the sliding windows.
When the aircraft stops, shut down the remaining
engines, turn off the fuel switches and the battery
switch. Abandon the aircraft using the escape ropes
or go down the back bone and off a wing tip close to
the ground.
Even at slow speeds the aircraft forward

gear can be folded or sheared with large
steering inputs to the gear when the aircraft departs a prepared surface.
NOTE
Although jettisoning the upper escape

hatches arms the upward ejection seats, inertia forces due to a runway departure normally are not large enough to fire the catapult.
CRASH LANDING
A crash landing is defined as a controlled landing
under conditions such that damage to the aircraft is
to be expected. If a crash landing or ditching becomes imminent and time and conditions permit, a
bailout of crewmembers is recommended. However,
if conditions dictate for survival or other reasons,
extra crewmembers may, at pilots discretion, stay
with the aircraft. These people are taking a calculated risk and they should brace themselves as best
they can. Individuals have crash landed in this aircraft under these conditions and were not injured.
EMERGENCY EXIT
If aft hatches fail to jettison after pulling

and rotating the ground emergency egress
handle, immediately attempt to jettison the
escape hatch(es) by rotating the arming lever(s) before the aircraft departs the prepared surface. If escape hatch(es) fails to
jettison using the primary or alternate
method, do not attempt manual release of
the hatch until the aircraft has come to a
complete stop. To prevent accidental firing
of the upward ejection seats during ground
egress, do not attempt to stow the arming
levers once they have been rotated. Lower
the armrests to the fully stowed position.
This will deactivate the firing triggers by
adjusting a series of mechanical linkages.
Primary emergency exits are listed in figure 3-14. A

manual hatch release handle is provided inside
each escape hatch in order that the hatch may be
manually opened from inside the aircraft during
ground emergency or after crash landing or ditching. A ground emergency egress handle is installed
at the EW officers and gunners positions. Rotation
of this handle releases the hatch locking cam. If
manual removal of the hatch is necessary, observe
the following procedure:
Upper Deck Crewmembers (P-CP-EW-G)
1.
2.
Install armrest pins.

Unfasten safety belt.
Change 12
3-103
T.O. 1B-52H-1
3. Disconnect oxygen and interphone or disconnect PIHM system.
a. Remove PIHM manifold from CRU-60/P
bracket.
b. Disconnect the emergency oxygen from the
manifold.
c. Disconnect aircraft oxygen hose from QD on
the chemical-biological canister.
d. Disconnect blower hose from ventilation inlet hose.
e. Connect blower hose to the QD on the
chemical-biological canister.
f. Rotate crossover valve to the horizontal position.
g. Disconnect PIHM communication cord from
aircraft communication cord.
4. Remove parachute and survival kit by unfastening parachute leg and chest straps.
5. Stow control column (P-CP).
6. Pull hatch release handle down and rotate full
length of travel (approximately 80) or pull and rotate ground emergency egress handle.
7. Release hatch release handle.
NOTE
It is not necessary to hold the hatch release

handle or the ground emergency egress
handle when removing the hatches. Although the hatch settles somewhat when
the handle is released (because of hatch
weight), the locking cam will not travel
back past overcenter.
8. For forward hatches (P-CP), grasp the hatch
torque tubes, rotate the torque tubes (turn the
torque tubes inward bringing your thumbs together
towards the center of the hatch window) while
pushing upward and aft, stepping into the seat
while doing so. Continue pushing until hatch has
rotated approximately 95, then pull the hatch toward you until you feel the back of the hatch drop.
For aft hatches (EW-G), pull the No. 6 safety pin,
then pull and rotate the ground emergency egress
handle to unlock and open the escape hatch ballistically. Crouching in the seat with your back to the
seat, grasp the hatch insulation, and push up and
aft on the hatch until it rotates approximately 95,
then pull the hatch until the back of the hatch
drops slightly, and then throw the hatch over the
side of the aircraft. The slight drop is the hatch
hinges coming off the hinge pivot points.
3-104
Change 12
NOTE
As the hatch is rotated, the mechanical

linkage connecting the hatch to the catapult
safety pin-pull initiator will fire the initiator. (P-CP: as the initiator fires, it will unlock the drogue parachute support assembly, allowing it to move upward, forcibly
contacting the aft end of the escape hatch
as the drogue parachute support moves into
pre-ejection position). Do not be alarmed;
this is normal system operation. Although
the seat catapult is now armed, it will not
fire unless the firing trigger(s) on the armrest(s) is/are squeezed.
Lower Deck Crewmembers (N-RN)
1. Stow ejection control trigger ring.

2. Unfasten safety belt.
3. Disconnect oxygen and interphone or disconnect PIHM system.
a. Remove PIHM manifold from CRU-60/P
bracket.
b. Disconnect the emergency oxygen from the
manifold.
c. Disconnect aircraft oxygen hose from QD on
the chemical-biological canister.
d. Disconnect blower hose from ventilation inlet hose.
e. Connect blower hose to the QD on the
chemical-biological canister.
f. Rotate crossover valve to the horizontal position.
g. Disconnect PIHM communication cord from
aircraft communication cord.
4. Remove parachute and survival kit by unfastening parachute leg and chest straps.
5. Reach down and forward of footrest, grasp
hatch release handle, and rotate upward full length
of travel (approximately 80). Hatch will fall free of
aircraft.
NOTE
As the hatch falls, the mechanical link connecting the hatch to the catapult safety pinpull initiator will fire the initiator. Do not
be alarmed; although the seat catapult is
now armed, it will not fire unless the firing
trigger ring is pulled.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Takeoff and Landing Emergencies Exit Chart

POSITION
PRIMARY EXIT
PILOTS EJECTION SEAT
PILOTS ESCAPE HATCH
COPILOTS EJECTION SEAT
COPILOTS ESCAPE HATCH
RADAR NAVIGATORS EJECTION SEAT
NAVIGATORS EJECTION SEAT
EW OFFICERS EJECTION SEAT
GUNNERS EJECTION SEAT
PILOTS/COPILOTS ESCAPE HATCH
10TH MAN POSITION
INSTRUCTOR NAVIGATORS SEAT

NOTE
Use escape ropes where applicable.

If primary exit route is blocked, proceed to nearest available exit.
Any additional passengers will exit as instructed at crew briefing.
Figure 3-14
Change 12
3-104A/(3-104B blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CRASH LANDING AND DITCHING
If an emergency arises necessitating immediate abandonment of the

aircraft under unplanned circumstances, all crewmembers free themselves of parachute and safety belt in the quickest possible manner to
evacuate the aircraft.
After the alert signal has been given to warn the crew to stand by for
ditching or crash landing, it will be realized that the situation which
dictated the pilots decision to crash land or ditch may become so critical that the pilot will decide a bailout is mandatory. Therefore, if the
abandon (steady light) signal is given, the crew should bail out immediately.
NOTE
The crash landing and ditching alarm light signal is an alert (flashing
light) signal. This signal is obtained by placing the emergency alarm
switch in ALERT position. The alert signal will remain on until the EW
officer, radar navigator, and copilot have acknowledged over
interphone. Just prior to touchdown, the emergency alarm switch will
be placed in ALERT position and crewmembers will be notified over
interphone to brace for impact. Use of ABANDON position after contact
with the ground will be the signal to exit from the aircraft after the aircraft comes to a stop.
1. Landing Gear DOWN (UP for ditching) (CP)
Landing gear will only be lowered after it has definitely been determined that a crash landing will
be made (except when both forward gear will not extend, in which case all gear will be retracted).
2. Flaps 100%, lever down (CP)
3. Flares Jettison (as directed) (P-EW)
At the pilots discretion, the flares will be jettisoned as directed.
NOTE
During flare dispensing, as each flare leaves the aircraft, crewmembers

can expect a bright white flash visible within the crew compartments
accompanied by a slight vibration of the aircraft similar to firing of
guns. These flashes will be most noticeable at night, in the vicinity of
cloud formations, or during IFR flight conditions; however, the flashes
are discernible even during daytime VFR flight conditions.
4. Stores Jettison (as directed) (P-RN-EW)
At the pilots discretion, the stores may be jettisoned as directed.
5. Bomb Doors Closed (RN)
The radar navigator will close the bomb doors immediately after completing jettison operation.
Change 4
3-105
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CRASH LANDING AND DITCHING (Cont)

6. Emergency Radio Transmission Completed (P-CP)
Set IFF master switch to EMER. The pilot/copilot will call Mayday over UHF.
7. MRT Remote Control Unit ZEROIZE Switch Pressed (N)
8. Loose Equipment Stowed in lower deck compartment (RN-N)
All loose equipment from the upper deck should be passed to the lower deck.
9. Aft Upper Escape Hatches Jettisoned (EW-G)
Hatch jettison is accomplished by pulling the No. 6 safety pin from the ground emergency egress
handle, then pulling the handle inboard and rotating it aft to fire the ground emergency egress
handle initiator. If hatch fails to jettison after rotating the emergency ground egress handle, attempt
to jettison the escape hatch using the arming lever. Once the arming lever has been rotated, immediately lower the armrest by depressing the release tab on the armrest support fitting. Do not attempt
to stow the arming levers in flight or during ground egress. Lowering the armrest will deactivate
the ejection controls by adjusting a series of mechanical linkages.
Because of high noise level, air buffeting, and the circulation of foreign
particles by turbulent air, the aft upper escape hatches should be jettisoned below 250 knots IAS and at a low altitude, preferably not lower
than 1000 feet. If the hatch does not jettison, do not attempt manual
release until the aircraft has come to a complete stop. The forward
upper escape hatches will not be removed until aircraft comes to a complete stop.
The ejection seat cannot be safetied until the arming levers have been
stowed. Installation of the No. 1 safety pins with the arming levers
rotated to the up position will not prevent the seat from firing if either
trigger is squeezed.
To prevent accidental firing of the upward ejection seats, do not attempt to stow the arming levers inflight or during ground egress. Lower the armrests to the fully stowed position. This will deactivate the
firing triggers by adjusting a series of mechanical linkages.
NOTE
Although jettisoning the upper escape hatches arms the upward ejection seats, inertia forces due to crash landing or ditching normally are
not great enough to fire these seats.
3-106
Change 19
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CRASH LANDING AND DITCHING (Cont)

10. Airbrakes Four (P)
At gross weights above 325,000 pounds, the airbrakes should be used only as required to maintain
pitch control.
11. Crew Warning Accomplished (P)
Warn crewmembers of impending impact over interphone and again actuate emergency alarm switch
to ALERT. Crewmembers will unbuckle parachute leg straps, tighten safety belt, lock inertia reels,
disconnect the male bayonet connector on the end of the oxygen mask hose, disconnect the seat
oxygen hose from the CRU-60/P connector, and lower clear helmet visor, if installed. All personnel
brace for impact.
Touch down at lowest possible rate of descent in a wings level attitude.

Do not stall the aircraft; such action will probably result in complete
destruction of the underside of the fuselage and may cause the fuselage
to break completely apart.
The crewmember is prevented from bending forward when the shoulder

harness inertia reel is locked. Therefore, all switches not readily accessible should be properly positioned prior to locking the shoulder harness.
12. Throttles CLOSED (after impact) (P)
Do not shut down engines prior to touchdown. This would result in loss
of all primary electrical power. Electrical control of the stabilizer trim
will be lost. The spoilers will operate at reduced rate on windmill rpm
hydraulic pressure.
Change 12
3-107
T.O. 1B-52H-1
15. Aircraft Abandon (All)
Remain in position until aircraft comes to complete stop. After complete stop is made, pilot places
emergency alarm switch to ABANDON and pilot and copilot remove the two forward escape hatches.
Opening the pilots or copilots escape hatches will fire the catapult safety pinpull initiator allowing
the drogue parachute support assembly to move upward and lock in the preejection position. Do
not be alarmed as this is the normal sequence of operation; the seat is not ejecting. Remove available
survival kits and pass them to crewmembers who have already abandoned the aircraft. All crewmembers exit through upward escape hatches and lower themselves to the ground using either the escape
ropes or move down the back bone of the aircraft and off one of the wing tips, preferably the one
closest to the ground if possible and the crewmember is not exposed to any additional risk.
3-108
To prevent personal injury, ascertain that the escape ropes are fully
extended before using them.
Crewmembers must be aware of protruding objects on the sides of the
aircraft fuselage such as pitot tubes, antennas, etc. Attempt to avoid
these objects by pushing away from the fuselage with your feet.
Change 12
T.O. 1B-52H-1
the aircraft. If the aircraft remains afloat after
ditching, stay with the aircraft. However, if the aircraft appears as though it will sink, get clear of the
aircraft prior to the time it sinks.
DITCHING
Bailout of all crewmembers is recommended

in lieu of ditching the aircraft. The aircraft
should be ditched only as a last resort.
If an emergency condition arises when over water
which indicates that continued flight is impossible,
it is not recommended that the crew ditch the aircraft. The aircraft is not structurally designed to
withstand ditching and no information is available
to indicate the resultant structural condition of the
aircraft if ditched. Further, crewmembers with survival kits attached would find escape from the aircraft difficult after ditching even though the aircraft was not badly damaged. Therefore, it is recommended that the aircraft commander bail out all
crewmembers in any ditching situation where time
and conditions will permit. This procedure will ensure that each crewmember is equipped with
liferaft and survival kit upon abandoning the aircraft.
NOTE
For procedure to be followed when there is

no alternative to ditching, see CRASH
LANDING AND DITCHING checklist, this
section.
MINIMUM SPEED FOR DIRECTIONAL

CONTROL
The use of full rudder is mandatory to realize the charted minimum direction control
speeds. Failure to use full rudder to counteract an engine-out condition can increase
the minimum control speed for one inoperative outboard engine by approximately 25
knots.
Minimum speed for directional control (VMCA) (figure 3-15) is defined as the speed at which a
constant heading can be maintained with full rudder and one-half lateral control authority with all
operative engines at a given amount of thrust. Only
one-half lateral control authority is used in order to
allow some reserve for maneuvering, gust loads,
and dynamic conditions.
NOTE
DITCHING TECHNIQUE
The aircraft should be prepared for ditching by

transferring fuel to move the cg aft of 27% MAC.
After the alert signal has been given, the direction
of the ditching operation should be chosen carefully.
The recommended procedure is to ditch into the
wind unless very high swells are running, accompanied with very light wind conditions. Try to touch
down on the crest of the swell if landing across the
swells. Under light wind conditions accompanied
with uniform wave or swell patterns, best results
will be achieved by ditching parallel to the waves or
swells. Under such a condition, try to touch down
on the crest of the swell or just after the crest
passes. Touch down at a speed of approximately 5
knots above initial stall warning if possible.
Airbrakes do not provide a lower stalling speed but
may be used as desired to vary the approach path
and determine the point of touchdown. In a properly executed ditching, the control cabin and the body
and wing fuel tanks should keep the aircraft afloat
long enough to allow the crewmembers to abandon
The minimum speed for directional control

for engine pod loss is lower than the minimum speed for directional control for engine failure without pod loss. However, in
the interest of conservatism and to provide
aircrews with only one VMCA reference, the
minimum speed for directional control referenced in figure 3-15 will be used in both
situations.
With full control wheel positions, the pilots
view of some instruments, including the airspeed and attitude director indicators, may
be obstructed.
For takeoff preplanning to cover engine-out occurrences shortly after takeoff (initial climb), use figure 3-15 (sheets 1 and 2) to find minimum speeds
for directional control. It should be recognized that
any attempt to fly below the speeds shown in figure
3-15 will result in a further reduction of the maneuvering margin to the point of absolute control limits. The pilot can reduce the thrust on the asymmetric engines to balance the yaw and subsequent
roll forces.
Change 12
3-108A/(3-108B blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
The pilot can also reduce pitch and retract gear to
accelerate the aircraft so that control effectiveness
can be enhanced. In some cases, it may be necessary to use a combination of these alternatives. For
go-around, figure 3-15 (sheets 3 & 4) may be used
to estimate the maximum thrust (EPR) which can
be applied to the asymmetric engines if the entering airspeed is maintained or exceeded. In no case
should asymmetric thrust be applied just to enhance climb capability if sufficient performance can
be achieved. When using the charts to determine
the maximum thrust (EPR) which can be applied
for a go-around at any given approach speed, it is
not intended to restrict the EPR on engines which
are not opposite to inoperative engines. As an example, engines No. 4 and 5 may be set up to MRT
with three outboard engines inoperative; engines
No. 3, 4, 5, and 6 may be set to MRT with two outboard engines inoperative. These charts can also be
used to obtain minimum speed for directional control speeds for an inflight EPR setting, pressure altitude, and gross weight. For approach planning,
both the minimum control speed with all operating
engines at MRT and the maximum allowable EPR
setting (engines opposite to inoperative engines) for
a go-around from best flare speed plus 10 knots
should be computed.
NOTE
When entering figure 3-15 with an airspeed

to determine a maximum allowable EPR,
the line brought up from the bottom of the
chart should be taken first to the proper
pressure altitude line. This determines the
maximum allowable EPR on engines opposite inoperative engines for purposes of directional control. The EPR for MRT should
then be determined by following the pressure altitude line to the reported field temperature line. Use the lesser of the two
EPRs as maximum allowable asymmetrical
thrust EPR for go-around.
Temperature lines have been omitted from
figure 3-15 (sheets 1 and 2) because the
takeoff EPR setting that is used is already
based on temperature, so pressure altitude
lines are all that are needed for reference.
FUEL SHIFT EFFECTS ON DIRECTIONAL CONTROL

SPEED
It has been determined in a limited flight test that

fuel shift can have a significant effect on minimum
directional control speed. Theoretically, aircraft
gross weight has no effect on minimum directional

control speed. However, when flying in uncoordinated flight, such as multiple engine out flight with
a wing low, the fuel does not remain level in the
fuel tanks but assumes an equilibrium attitude
which depends on the bank angle. This causes the
lateral center of gravity to shift from the aircraft
centerline when the fuel tanks are partially full. In
an engine out condition, the primary requirement
for lateral control is to balance the roll moment due
to sideslip. The sideslip causes a lateral fuel shift
that reduces the lateral control requirement. As the
center of gravity moves laterally, airplane sideslip
can be increased while retaining half lateral control
authority. As a result, lower minimum directional
control speeds can be obtained when wing tanks are
partially full. However, the MINIMUM SPEED
FOR DIRECTIONAL CONTROL charts (figure
3-15) do not include the beneficial effects of lateral
fuel shift, thus allowing the charts to be used for a
variety of fuel sequences with some conservation at
lighter gross weights.
NOTE
The pilot must be aware that any beneficial

effects of lateral fuel shift are due entirely
to the aircraft sideslip being controlled by
rolling toward the operative engines. In the
event the aircraft is allowed to roll toward
the inoperative engines the amount of sideslip that can be controlled will be greatly
reduced and minimum speed for directional
control will increase significantly. This is
true for both flaps up and flaps down configurations and is at its maximum during
normal landing gross weights.
GEAR RETRACTION AND EXTERNAL STORE EFFECTS
ON DIRECTIONAL CONTROL SPEED
For the flaps up configuration, retracting the landing gear results in lower obtainable minimum directional control speeds. However, for the flaps
down configuration, the opposite is true. That is, retracting the landing gear results in a higher minimum directional control speed, although the increase is very small compared to the flaps up configuration. Gear corrections are provided on the applicable charts.
The installation of external stores increases minimum directional control speed by approximately 2
knots for the flaps up configuration. External store
corrections are also provided on the applicable
charts.
Change 12
3-109
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Minimum Speed for Directional Control

TAKEOFF RATED THRUST (FULL & PARTIAL) FLAPS AND GEAR DOWN
CONDITIONS:
OUT OF GROUND EFFECT

BASED ON FULL RUDDER
AND 50% LATERAL CONTROL
AUTHORITY
WITH OR WITHOUT EXTERNAL WEAPONS
REMARKS:
EXAMPLE:
Does not include the effects of fuel shift.

EPR setting (from flight manual) is
Takeoff
input and V
is output.
GIVEN:
MCA
chart is for gear down conditions. For

This
gear up, there is no change from this chart
at VMCA below 150 KIAS. For readings

above 150 KIAS, add 2 knots to VMCA.
Engine-out lines represent worst possible
cases. For other combinations of asymmetric engine failure, a conservative VMCA
is found by using the appropriate engineout line.
The pressure altitude lines are for altitude
at which VMCA is required.
Runway pressure altitude = 2000 ft..

Runway ambient temperature = 80F
Engine thrust setting - Full TRT
EPR = 1.675
Flaps and gear down
Preplanned conditions - Engines 3, 4, and
5 out (only one asymmetric) at 2500 ft.
Gross weight = 400,000 lbs.
FIND:
Minimum speed for directional control
at 2500 ft.
SOLUTION:
Minimum
control =
If gear is
Minimum
control =
3-110
speed for directional

134 KIAS
raised at same condition;
speed for directional
134 + 0 = 134 KIAS
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TAKEOFF RATED THRUST (FULL & PARTIAL) FLAPS AND GEAR UP

CONDITIONS:

AUTHORITY
REMARKS:
EXAMPLE:

EPR setting (from flight manual) is
Takeoff
input and VMCA is output.
With external stores, add 2 knots to VMCA.
lines represent worst possible
Engine-out
cases. For other combinations of asym-
GIVEN:
metric engine failure, a conservative VMCA

is found by using the appropriate engineout line.
The pressure altitude lines are for altitude
at which VMCA is required.

Engine thrust setting - Full TRT
EPR = 1.77
Flaps and gear up
Preplanned conditions - Engines 7 and 8 out
at 4000 ft.
With external stores
FIND:
Minimum speed for directional control
at 4000 ft.
SOLUTION:
Minimum speed for directional
control = 172 + 2 KIAS (for external
store) = 174 KIAS
3-111
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Minimum Speed for Directional Control (Cont)

VMCA AND MAXIMUM EPR FOR GO-AROUND FLAPS AND GEAR DOWN
CONDITIONS:

AUTHORITY
WITH OR WITHOUT EXTERNAL WEAPONS
REMARKS (Cont):

This chart is for gear down conditions. For
REMARKS:
When using this chart to find
maximum EPR, do not read
up the pressure altitude line
to the temperature.

at VMCA at or below 150 KIAS. For readings
above 150 KIAS, subtract 2 knots from goaround airspeed before entering chart or add
2 knots to VMCA read from chart.
This chart is used by entering at go-around
airspeed, then reading thru to get the maximum EPR that can be set on the asymmetric
engines.
cases. For other combinations of asymmetric
engine failure, a conservative EPR is found
by using the appropriate engine-out line.
For thrust settings < MRT, this chart may

be used to find VMCA by disregarding temperature lines.
The MRT temperature lines are for quick
reference only and were calculated for an
average pattern speed.
EXAMPLE:
GIVEN:
Flaps and gear down in go-around condition; go-around airspeed = 140 KIAS
Preplanned conditions - Engines 1 and 2
failed
FIND:
Maximum EPR for asymmetric engines.
SOLUTION:
Maximum EPR = 1.58
GIVEN:
Flaps and gear down; inflight EPR = 1.6
(some thrust less than MRT)
Preplanned conditions - Two outbd
engines failed
FIND:
Minimum speed for directional control.
SOLUTION:
Minimum speed for directional control =
142 KIAS
3-112
T.O. 1B-52H-1
VMCA AND MAXIMUM EPR FOR GO-AROUND FLAPS UP AND GEAR DOWN
CONDITIONS:

AUTHORITY
REMARKS:
When using this chart to find
maximum EPR, do not read
up the pressure altitude line
to the temperature.
Does not include the effects of
fuel shift.
REMARKS (Cont):
chart is for gear down conditions. For

This
at VMCA at or below 150 KIAS. For every 10

knots above 150 knots, add 1 knot to goaround airspeed before entering chart or
subtract 1 knot from VMCA read from chart.
This chart is used by entering at go-around
airspeed, then reading thru to get the maximum EPR that can be set on the asymmetric
engines.
cases. For other combinations of asymmetric
engine failure, a conservative EPR is found
by using the appropriate engine-out line.
For thrust settings < MRT, this chart may

be used to find VMCA by disregarding temperature lines.
With external stores, subtract 2 knots from
go-around airspeed before entering chart
or add 2 knots to VMCA read from chart.
EXAMPLE:
GIVEN:
Flaps up and gear down in go-around condition; go-around airspeed = 140 KIAS
Preplanned conditions - Engines 1, 2 and 3
failed
No external stores
FIND:
Maximum EPR for asymmetric engines.
SOLUTION:
Maximum EPR = 1.40
For gear up at same conditions, corrected goaround airspeed = 140 KIAS with maximum
EPR = 1.40
With external stores and same conditions
(gear down), corrected go-around airspeed =
140 - 2 = 138 KIAS with max EPR = 1.38
3-113
T.O. 1B-52H-1
OPERATION WITH ONE OR MORE ENGINES

INOPERATIVE
For any partial thrust operation, observe the following:
1. Avoid turbulent air and limit maneuvering
bank angle to 20 maximum to reduce the gs
encountered and the resulting fuselage loads (two
or more engines inoperative).
2. All engine starter switches should be positioned to CONT for duration of practice maneuvers.
3. Simulated inoperative engines should be idled
and not shut down.
4. Trim follow-up should be made with thrust
changes.
5. Thrust should be applied smoothly when simulating a go-around.
Whenever engine-out condition is simulated

(or actually experienced), it is important
that the engines not be retarded or accelerated suddenly. This will induce over-yaw
and then any sudden application of rudder
could exceed structural limits of the aircraft. Rudder alone will not be used to oppose the initial yaw/roll tendency.
During simulated or actual failure of one or two engines on one side, the airspeed should not be reduced below best flare speed plus 30 knots, (BF +
30) until established on final. When BF + 30 is below the computed minimum directional control
speed for MRT, asymmetric engines should not be
advanced beyond computed go-around EPR faster
than the pilots ability to maintain aircraft control.
The final approach phase should be flown at best
flare speed plus 10 knots. The maximum thrust
(EPR) should be computed from figure 3-15 for the
particular indicated airspeed being used on the final approach. Use of asymmetrical thrust up to this
value is desired in order to simulate thrust requirements encountered during heavyweight, multi-engine out operation. This EPR value does not prohibit using a higher EPR value up to MRT on opposite
engines for balanced thrust if necessary to maintain thrust requirements. These minimum directional control airspeeds are based on the use of not
more than 50% of the lateral control available.
When simulating failure of one or two engines on
one side, the aircraft gross weight should not be
greater than that established by command directives. In addition, descents should not be made below the minimum altitude as specified by command
3-114
Change 12
directives. Under these conditions, minimum control speeds will be lower than those shown in figure
3-15; however, considering that operations are accomplished with throttle levers controlling simulated failed engines positioned at IDLE, the minimum airspeeds shown in the chart should be adhered to as a safety factor. When practical, make
turns into the good engines. Within these limitations, operations such as simulated approach and
landing and go-around with reduced thrust may be
practiced safely with an engine or engines retarded
to IDLE rather than shut down completely. With an
engine throttle positioned at IDLE, the reduction in
thrust will provide control and maneuverability
problems essentially the same as with a complete
loss of thrust on an engine.
USE OF CHARTS FOR ASYMMETRIC THRUST
After experiencing engine failure, engine pod loss,

or when simulating failure of engines shortly after
takeoff or for go-around, figure 3-15, sheets 1 and 2
can be used only one way to find air minimum control speed for a specific takeoff EPR. Figure 3-15,
sheets 3 and 4 are for go-around conditions and can
be used to determine the maximum EPR that can
safely be applied to the asymmetric engines or to
find minimum directional control speed from a
known inflight EPR. Gear up and external store
corrections, contained in the remarks for some figures, should also be applied to the airspeed where
necessary. The following are examples on the use of
these figures and the corrections for various conditions:
1. Determine the minimum speed for directional
control at a pressure altitude of 2500 feet under the
following conditions:
Full Takeoff Thrust
Runway Pressure Altitude 2000 feet
Runway Ambient Temperature 80F
Flaps Down, Gear Down
Preplanned Failure Engines 3, 4 and 5 out
(Only 1 asymmetric) at 2500 feet
Gross weight 400,000 pounds
With or Without External Stores
Enter figure 3-15, sheet 1 with a takeoff EPR
setting = 1.675 (found from Flight Manual using
given runway data) out to pressure altitude 2500
foot line. Dropping down from this point to the line
representing the number of engines out (one) read
right to gross weight 400 line and down to minimum speed for directional control (134 KIAS). If the
landing gear is raised at the same altitude and condition, the procedure for finding minimum control
is the same because no correction can be applied.
This results in a minimum control speed remaining
the same (134 KIAS).
T.O. 1B-52H-1
2. Determine the maximum thrust (EPR) that
can safely be applied to the operating asymmetric
engines at a specific speed for a go-around under
the following conditions:
140 KIAS Go-Around Airspeed
Pressure Altitude 6000 Feet
Ambient Temperature 20F
Flaps and Gear Down
Engine Failure Engines 1 and 2 Out at Pressure Altitude 6000 Feet
Gross Weight 250,000 Pounds
Enter figure 3-15, sheet 3 with 140 KIAS up to
gross weight 250 line. Read left to number of engines out line (two) and up to pressure altitude
6000 foot line. Going up the pressure altitude line
to the temperature is not allowed, so the maximum
EPR is read from the initial point on the altitude
line (1.58).
3. Determine the minimum speed for directional
control at a pressure altitude of 6000 feet under the
following conditions:
Inflight EPR = 1.6 (some thrust less than MRT)
Flaps and Gear Down
Engine Failure Engines 1 and 2 Out at 6000
Feet
Enter figure 3-15, sheet 3 with an inflight EPR setting = 1.6 out to pressure altitude 6000 foot line.
Dropping down from this point to the line representing the number of engines out (two) read right
to gross weight 250 line and down to the minimum
speed for directional control (142 KIAS). This example demonstrates that figures 3-15, sheets 3 and 4
can be used in both directions, either for finding air
minimum control speed for a given EPR or for finding the maximum EPR that can safely be applied to
operating asymmetric engines.
4. Determine the maximum thrust (EPR) that
can be safely applied to the operating asymmetric
engines at a specific speed for a go-around under
the following conditions:
140 KIAS Go-Around Airspeed
Flaps Up, Gear Down
Engine Failure Engines 1, 2, and 3 Out at
8200 Feet
No External Stores
Enter figure 3-15, sheet 4 with 140 KIAS up to
gross weight 200 line. Read left to number of engines out line (three) and up to pressure altitude
8200 foot line. Going up the pressure altitude line
to the temperature 20F line is not allowed,
therefore a maximum EPR = 1.40 is determined. If
gear is raised at the same condition the go-around

airspeed will remain the same since no chart
corrections are required at 140 KIAS. If external
stores are added to the flaps down case at the same
condition the go-around airspeed is corrected to 138
KIAS before entering chart and the maximum EPR
is (1.38).
LANDING WITH ONE OR MORE ENGINES INOPERATIVE

Landing with an engine failure can be accomplished by following the normal landing procedure
with the addition that, as thrust is decreased, trim
will have to be decreased to compensate for reduction of the unequal thrust. Engine failure will not
materially affect the landing gear extension time.
The gear is normally extended in 15 to 20 seconds.
Consideration will be given to planning for a goaround. See GO-AROUND WITH ONE OR MORE
ENGINES INOPERATIVE, and if applicable,
LANDING FOLLOWING LOSS OF AN ENGINE
POD, both this section.
NOTE
Under any approach conditions involving

reduced thrust, the necessity of early anticipation of additional thrust requirements
cannot be overemphasized. Most landing
experience has been obtained at gross
weights less than 290,000 pounds; therefore, it is strongly emphasized that weight
be reduced to this value or less to allow
landing in a familiar configuration and provide better performance capability.
All procedures and data provided for three
or four engine failure on one side include
the beneficial effects of fuel shift. Outboard
EPR setting and rate of climb corrections
have been included in GO-AROUND WITH
ONE OR MORE ENGINES INOPERATIVE
section to cover cases when no fuel shift
benefit is desired.
With three or four engines inoperative on
one side, a flaps-up landing is recommended
rather than a flaps-down landing. The
flaps-up approach will provide more positive control of the aircraft, is less hazardous, and results in a lower altitude goaround capability.
If conditions permit, at least one practice
approach and go-around should be made at
an altitude of 5000 feet above ground level
except that the landing gear should not be
lowered until the actual landing approach.
Change 1
3-115
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LANDING FOLLOWING LOSS OF AN ENGINE POD
Following the loss of an engine pod, a flaps down

landing is recommended. A flaps up landing would
require more lateral control authority to trim the
aircraft than would a flaps down landing, and
would lead to an unacceptable landing ground run
distance. This is particularly critical in the event of
an inboard engine pod loss, since the wheel brakes
for one of the landing gear may be inoperative. In
either case the corresponding spoilers would likely
be inoperative.
THREE OR FOUR ENGINE FAILURE ON ONE SIDE WITH
FLAPS UP
Flight tests have demonstrated that, with three or

four engines inoperative on one side, a flaps-up
landing provides more positive control of the aircraft during the approach as well as a lower altitude go-around capability than a flaps-down landing. Airbrake position 2 will be used on final approach for all gross weights. The roll response of
the aircraft is significantly increased with airbrake
position 2 over airbrake position zero or 1. For
airbrake position zero, a half-wheel deflection represents 50% lateral control authority; the same lateral control authority for airbrake position 2 is obtained at approximately one-third wheel deflection.
This characteristic allows the pilot to obtain a large
portion of the spoiler authority with small wheel inputs, thus reducing pilot effort.
There are several factors that should be considered
because of possible system failures and multiple
emergencies associated with engine failures. Two
generators and three engine-driven hydraulic
pumps could be rendered inoperative on one side.
Standby pumps may or may not be available. These
conditions will affect the brakes, steering, crosswind crab setting, stabilizer trim operation, powered rudder/elevator, and landing gear extension
and retraction time as well as having a possible effect on the pilots ability to control the aircraft due
to reduced pitch trim and roll rates available or
lack of spoiler operation. An emergency with four
engines shut down on one side may preclude fuel
transfer from the engine-out side; thus, once body
fuel is consumed, a lateral fuel unbalance could not
be prevented. In this case, the pilot should either
land immediately or be aware of lateral control
problems if a go-around is attempted. Approximately 20,000-pound fuel unbalance between the total of
No. 1 and No. 2 main tanks and the total of No. 3
and No. 4 main tanks will cause a rolling moment
which will require an additional one-quarter of the
3-116
Change 1
lateral control authority. If the inoperative engines

are on the heavy wing, this will leave only onefourth lateral control authority for maneuvering,
etc.
Loss of engines will require close attention

to fuel panel settings to control lateral balance and desirable cg locations. Required
deviations from the aircraft configuration
fuel sequence will be planned to maintain
the proper differential/balance between
paired main/auxiliary tanks whenever possible.
Observe the LANDING WITH THREE OR FOUR
ENGINE FAILURE ON ONE SIDE WITH FLAPS
UP, procedures and checklist. Also, see LANDING
WITH WING FLAPS INOPERATIVE, this section.
The higher speeds, larger turning radius, and difficulty in establishing speeds in an unfamiliar configuration require additional maneuvering space and
make a long extended final approach desirable. A
long straight-in pattern or an extended rectangular
pattern should be flown at least 2000 feet above
ground level, in the clean configuration, and
airbrakes zero. Approach speed plus 30 knots IAS
up to 30 of bank in either direction may be used
with no adverse effects on handling qualities or
performance. However, it is recommended that
bank angle be limited, normally to 20. The speed
schedule in the pattern will depend on the
availability of hydraulic pressure to the landing
gear. If hydraulic pressure is available, fly the
normal no-flaps speed schedule. When approaching
the glide slope, extend the landing gear, place
airbrakes to position 2, and reduce to final
approach speed just before glide slope interception.
If only standby pump pressure is available for the
landing gear, maintain approach speed plus 30
knots IAS (either straight in or rectangular) until 2
minutes from glide slope interception. Extend the
landing gear and allow airspeed to decrease so as to
intercept the glide slope at approach speed with
airbrake position 2. Systems failure may require
the use of some emergency gear extension switches.
The final approach should be flown with landing
gear down, airbrakes position 2, and at approach
speed using a precision instrument (PAR ILS) glide
slope with a transition to VASI when appropriate. If
facilities or equipment are inoperative, the VASI
approach lights may be used, or if necessary, a
visual final approach may be flown while
attempting to maintain a 2.5 glide slope angle.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Landing Following Loss of an Engine Pod
NOTE
All data is based on the assumption that 50% of maximum available spoiler control authority is used to balance
the asymmetrical loading due to the loss of an engine pod
and the subsequent corrective fuel shift. A minimum rate
of climb of 300 ft/min is available at all times. See LATERAL CONTROL, Section VI.
All data is based on aircraft control characteristics during
go-around at best flare + 10 kts, with full flaps and no
ground effect.
Outboard pod loss data is based on using full rudder control. Inboard pod loss data is based on using full rudder
trim.
For inboard pod loss, a gross weight below 340,000
airbrakes 1 or 4 should be used, above 340,000 use only
airbrakes 1.
For outboard pod loss, a gross weight below 300,000
airbrakes 1 or 4 should be used, above 300,000 use only
airbrakes 1.
REMARKS
The rolling moment which results from loss of an inboard

or outboard engine pod may be partially corrected
through fuel differential. This rolling moment is shown in
the ROLLING MOMENT DUE TO LOSS OF AN ENGINE
POD chart. The required fuel imbalance is shown in the
BALANCE FUEL LOADS chart, subject to the limitations
of the MAXIMUM CORRECTING ROLLING MOMENT
chart.
Fuel should be transferred to the side with the missing
engine pod.
The correct rolling moment can be obtained by differential
between a set of opposite tanks or a combination of opposite tanks depending on the fuel available.
Change 1
3-116A
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LANDING FOLLOWING LOSS OF AN ENGINE POD EXAMPLE PROBLEMS:
EXAMPLE 1, LOSS OF OUTBOARD ENGINE POD
EXAMPLE 2, LOSS OF INBOARD ENGINE POD
Given:
1. Outboard Engine Pod Loss

2. Planned Landing Gross Weight
of 240000 lbs
Given:
1. Inboard Engine Pod Loss

2. Planned Landing Gross Weight
of 250000 lbs
Find:
Maximum correcting rolling moment with

associated unbalance fuel loads.
Find:
Maximum correcting rolling moment with

associated unbalance fuel loads.
SOLUTION
SOLUTION
Figure 3-15A shows that for a planned landing gross weight

of 240000 pounds, the maximum correcting rolling moment
is 6.3 million in-lbs. This is less than the 8.2 million in-lb rolling moment due to an outboard pod loss. A fuel unbalance
of approximately 13,600 lbs between number 1 and 4 main
tanks will achieve this maximum correcting rolling moment.
Another solution would be a 7000 lb unbalance between
number 1 and 4 main tanks and a 3800 lb unbalance on the
outboard wing tanks. Fuel should be transferred to the side
with the missing engine pod. Landing can be made with either airbrakes 1 or 4.
Figure 3-15A shows that for a planned landing gross weight

of 250000 pounds, the maximum correcting rolling moment
is 4.7 million in-lbs. This is equal to the rolling moment due
to an inboard pod loss. A fuel unbalance of approximately
10,600 lbs between number 1 and 4 main tanks will achieve
this rolling moment. Another solution would be a 25,000 lb
unbalance between number 2 and 3 main tanks. Fuel
should be transferred to the side with the missing engine
pod. Landing can be made with either airbrakes 1 or 4.
3-116B
Change 1
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Intercept the glide slope at 2000 feet or more above
the runway elevation. Maintain the flaps-up
approach speed on the glide slope by using all
operating engine throttles together in a staggered
setting with the inboard throttles further forward.
Rudder trim should be used as necessary
throughout the pattern and approach. With full
rudder trim and some rudder input by the pilot,
zero bank angle can be maintained during the
pattern and approach. The approach patterns are
illustrated in figure 3-16.
NOTE
Full rudder trim should be used on the approach and should be zeroed when the decision to land is made. Caution will be exercised not to zero the rudder trim too quickly
and to carefully compensate with rudder
pedal force while doing so.
Landing With Three or Four Engines Inoperative

on One Side, Flaps Up
STRAIGHT-IN APPROACH PATTERN
Commence approach 20 miles downwind from the landing

end of the runway with the aircraft in the clean configuration
(flaps up, gear up, airbrakes down), 2000 feet above the runway elevation in level flight at approach speed plus 30 knots
IAS.
Two minutes (approximately 5 nm) prior to glide slope intercept at 2000 feet above the runway, extend landing gear and
place airbrakes in position 2.
Continue the approach, maintaining approach speed until assured runway can be reached. From this point, accomplish a
normal landing.
Change 1
3-117
T.O. 1B-52H-1

on One Side, Flaps Up (Cont)
DOWNWIND ENTRY PATTERN
Commence downwind leg with the aircraft in the clean configuration (flaps up, gear up, airbrakes down), in level flight,
2000 feet above the runway elevation at approach speed plus
30 knots IAS.
After rollout from base leg, commence final approach at approach speed plus 30 knots IAS, 2000 feet above the runway.
After rollout on final, extend landing gear and place airbrakes
in position 2.
Commence turn onto final approach leg, planning to roll out 2

minutes (approximately 5 nm) prior to glide slope intercept,
2000 feet above the runway at approach speed plus 30 knots
IAS.
Continue the approach, maintaining approach speed until assured runway can be reached. From this point, accomplish a
normal landing.
3-118
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LANDING WITH THREE OR FOUR ENGINE FAILURE ON ONE SIDE AND WING FLAPS UP
Flaps Up Before Landing With Three or Four Engine Failure on One Side (Copilot reads)

The following information may be extracted and/or computed from data presented on charts located
in the EMERGENCY PROCEDURES parts of the pilots and navigators abbreviated checklists.
a. Flaps-Up Approach Speed ________________ .
For gust conditions, increase approach speed by full gust factor. Example: Winds 230 at 30 knots
gusting to 40, add 10 knots to approach speed.
b. Go-Around Speed (approach speed plus 10 knots) _______________ .
c.
Maximum Brake Application Speed _______________ .
d. Landing Ground Run (flaps up with airbrakes and no drag chute) ___________ .
NOTE
Landing ground run is the amount of runway that will be available

after touchdown for a complete stop on the remaining runway. If the
runway remaining after touchdown is less than this distance, the pilot
will accept the fact that he will probably fail to stop within the confines
of the runway.
The landing ground run distances on these tabular charts (figure 3-13)
are based on dry surfaces. When other than dry conditions exist, obtain
the RCR and use the appropriate flaps-up chart in Part 8 of the Appendix.
e.
MRT EPR ___________ . See figure 3-15.
f.
Maximum EPR for Outboard Engines _____________ . See figure 3-18.

NOTE
If figure 3-18 is to be used neglecting fuel shift effects, outboard EPR

must be reduced by 0.06 and rate of climb capability reduced by 140
feet per minute.
g. Gear-Down Rate of Climb ______________ . See figure 3-18.
A go-around should not be attempted unless a gear-down climb capability of 300 feet per minute exists. If the charts (figure 3-18) indicate that
a climb potential of less than 300 fpm exists, gross weight should be
decreased prior to the approach.
h. Check Brake Energy Limits ____________ . See Section V figure 5-14.
Brake energy limits should be checked to determine if the limits will be exceeded. Data should
be based on a no-drag chute situation.
3-119
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LANDING WITH THREE OR FOUR ENGINE FAILURE ON ONE SIDE AND

WING FLAPS UP (Cont)
Use the MRT EPR calculated earlier and the OAT to determine the thrust gate setting by using the
THRUST GATE SETTING FOR TAKEOFF chart in Part 2 of T. O. 1B-52H-1-1 or the chart in the
PERFORMANCE DATA section of the pilots checklist.
Check the appropriate navigation aids tuned and identified and review the planned approach with
the applicable crewmembers. Altitude restrictions, ceiling and visibility minimums, DH/MDA, and
missed approach procedures will be emphasized.
6. Fuel Panel Set, as required (CP); Checked (P)
Copilot checks gear lever in detent. Pilot checks that the gear warning light is out and that all six
gears indicate down and locked. Flight tests have shown that when the landing gear is extended
using the standby pump and windmilling pressure, extension time is approximately 45 seconds.
With the landing gear down and locked, move the test switch to the flight (FLT) position. Check that
all indicator lights are on. Failure of any light to illuminate indicates there is no power to the antiskid shield for that wheel, and anti-skid protection will not be available for that wheel.
With any indicator light(s) not on, when the gear is down and locked
and the test switch in FLT, hard braking during landing may cause
skidding and/or a blown tire on the wheel corresponding to the unlighted indicator.
NOTE
If all eight lights fail to come on, recheck that the antiskid switch is
ON.
3-120
Change 12
T.O. 1B-52H-1

9. Airbrakes Two (P)
Normally the landing should be made with airbrake position 2. Airbrake position 2 should be used
from glideslope interception until after touchdown or until completion of the go-around. However,
once a decision to land has been made airbrake position 4 may be used to reduce excessive speed.
The aircraft should be flown onto the runway at approach speed and attitude in accordance with
published flaps-up procedures.
Obtain wind direction and velocity. Compute and set crosswind crab as required using 70% of the
flaps-down crosswind crab setting. If crosswind crab is not to be used, knob and position indicator
must be checked for zero setting and gear position.
If wheel brakes are applied immediately before and held during touchdown when main gear is turned more than 14 (by any combination of
crosswind crab setting and steering), the aircraft will land with wheels
locked because the antiskid system is inoperative in this condition. Releasing the brakes will activate the antiskid system.
11. Landing Check Completed (P/CP)
a. Gear
b. Airbrakes Two
c.
Lights
d. Fuel
Change 12
3-120A/(3-120B blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1

Flaps Up Landing With Three or Four Engine Failure on One Side
Accomplish after flaps-up touchdown (need not be read).

After forward gear touchdown, select airbrake position 6 with a pause at position 4 to prevent an
abrupt wing dip should an unbalanced airbrake condition exist.
2. Wheel Brakes Applied (P)
Normally pilot applies brakes at touchdown and copilot deploys drag chute at or below 135 knots
IAS. However, brake application will be delayed until below charted maximum brake application
speed.
Application of brakes above the maximum brake application speed will

exceed the brake energy limit and may result in complete loss of
brakes, rupture of hydraulic lines, and subsequent fire.
3. Drag Chute Deployed (135 KIAS or below) (CP)
Center the rudder pedals before repositioning the steering ratio selector lever. Actuation of the lever is very difficult when the rudder pedals
are deflected and could result in a dangerously abrupt change in steering angle.
Change 12
3-121
T.O. 1B-52H-1
THREE OR FOUR ENGINE FAILURE ON ONE SIDE WITH
FLAPS DOWN
With three or four engines inoperative on

one side, altitude cannot be maintained
with gear and flaps extended based on yawing moment capability that does not take
advantage of fuel shift effects.
and retraction time as well as having a possible effect on the pilots ability to control the aircraft due
to reduced pitch trim and roll rates available or
lack of spoiler operation. An emergency with four
engines shut down on one side may preclude fuel
transfer from the engine-out side; thus, once body
fuel is consumed, a lateral fuel unbalance could not
be prevented. In this case, the pilot should either
land immediately or be aware of lateral control
problems if a go-around is attempted.
It is recommended that a landing under

this condition should not be attempted at
gross weights in excess of 270,000 pounds.
Loss of engines will require close attention

to fuel panel settings to control lateral balance and desirable cg locations. Required
deviations from the aircraft configuration
fuel sequence will be planned to maintain
the proper differential/balance between
paired main/auxiliary tanks whenever possible.
NOTE
With three of four engines inoperative on

one side, a flaps-up landing is recommended
rather than a flaps-down landing. The
flaps- up approach will provide more positive control of the aircraft, is less hazardous, and results in a lower altitude goaround capability.
Flight tests have demonstrated that landings can
be successfully accomplished with three or four engines inoperative on one side provided proper techniques and procedures are followed. However, the
hypothetical case of no fuel shift results in no rate
of climb capability for all flaps down conditions. If
altitude can be maintained for a given condition the
following procedure is used. Figure 3-17 illustrates
two landing patterns from which landing may be
accomplished with three or four engines inoperative
on one side. From an operational standpoint, it is
desirable to make the emergency patterns as near
normal as possible. With three or four engines inoperative on one side for any given speed, there is a
thrust level which will make that speed the minimum directional control speed. In order to keep the
landing pattern speeds normal, the only way to reduce the thrust level is to increase the rate of descent. For example, an approach slope of 10 to 1 is
required on the final approach leg to keep the
thrust below the critical value as contrasted to the
normal approach slope of approximately 20 to 1.
There are several factors that should be considered
because of possible system failures and multiple
emergencies associated with engine failures. Two
generators and three engine-driven hydraulic
pumps could be rendered inoperative on one side.
Standby pumps may or may not be available. These
conditions will affect the brakes, steering, crosswind crab setting, stabilizer trim operation, powered rudder/ elevator, and landing gear extension
3-122
Downwind Entry Pattern
1. The downwind entry pattern shown in figure

3-17 may be flown making turns into or away from
the inoperative engines with no appreciable difference in aircraft flight handling characteristics. The
downwind leg, which is the same distance out from
the runway as for a normal landing, should be intercepted with the aircraft in clean configuration
(flaps up, gear up, airbrakes down) at 220 knots
IAS, 4000 feet above the runway elevation.
2. Maintain 4000 feet and 220 knots IAS until opposite the landing end of the runway. At this point,
start the flaps down. Continue downwind 1 minute,
maintaining 4000-foot altitude by accepting a decrease in airspeed to approximately 170 knots IAS.
NOTE
Slight thrust adjustment may be required

during flap extension if 220 knots IAS is
maintained prior to initiating flap extension. Thrust reduction is required after full
flap extension is accomplished in order to
descend properly throughout the remainder
of the landing pattern.
It is recommended that directional control
be maintained using lateral control with
rudder control as necessary without use of
lateral or rudder trim. This eliminates the
requirement for trim changes throughout final approach, flare, and touchdown. Sideslip may be decreased slightly by use of the
rudder.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
3. After 1 minute on downwind from a point opposite the landing end of the runway, commence
turn on base leg from 4000-foot altitude at 170
knots IAS. Extend the landing gear on base leg and
plan to roll out on final approach 3 miles from end
of runway at 150 knots IAS with landing gear and
flaps down. If a go-around is to be made, it will be
initiated prior to descending below 2000 feet above
the terrain. MRT may be required in order to arrest
the rate of descent and accelerate the aircraft to
climb speed within the 2000-foot altitude and still
retain a satisfactory safety margin.
A successful go-around with three or four

engines inoperative on one side cannot be
assured any time the aircraft descends below 2000 feet above the terrain. Flight tests
have indicated that a minimum of 1000 feet
in altitude will be sacrificed in order to arrest the descent and accelerate the aircraft
to minimum directional control speed if
flaps and landing gear are retracted simultaneously with thrust increase. Thrust increase must be commensurate with the pilots ability to control the sideslip and maintain the heading. The use of rudder will assist in keeping sideslip to a minimum during a go-around. Any hesitation on the part
of the pilot in performing any of the above
steps will result in a loss of altitude in excess of 1000 feet. It is recommended that
climb back to pattern altitude be accomplished at 220 knots IAS.
4. Commence turn to final approach leg, planning
to roll out on final approach at 2000 feet, 150 knots
IAS.
If a landing is necessary at gross weights

above 270,000 pounds, final approach leg
should be flown at best flare speed plus 10
knots or 150 knots, whichever is higher.
However, landing above 270,000 pounds
should not be attempted unless no other alternative exists.
For weights above 270,000 pounds, do not
attempt a go-around since the thrust required to arrest the loss of altitude may exceed the thrust permitted to maintain directional control.
5. After rollout from base leg, commence final approach at 150 knots IAS, 2000 feet above the runway altitude, with landing gear and flaps down.
This altitude initially appears high for landing;
however, since a rate of descent of approximately
1500 feet per minute can be expected, it is necessary to be at this altitude in order to accomplish a
normal touchdown with minimum thrust.
This is the final point in the landing pattern from which a successful go-around can
be initiated. In addition, 150 knots IAS is
below minimum directional control speed
for four engines inoperative on one side and
the operating engines at MRT. A go-around
from such a speed is potentially hazardous.
Flight tests conducted from this speed and
configuration demonstrated that this maneuver required loss of altitude but could be
made within the control capability of the pilot.
6. Continue the approach, maintaining 150 knots
IAS until ensured the runway can be reached. From
this point, thrust may be gradually further reduced,
sideslip and bank angle further decreased, and a
normal landing accomplished. Airbrake response
may be limited as dictated by engine-out configuration. Airbrakes should be used if available to decrease altitude and airspeed to compensate for wind
effect and/or pilot technique. Avoid abrupt lateral
control movements by raising airbrakes in increments of two. If airbrake position 6 is to be used to
decrease speed on the runway, raising airbrakes in
increments of two will prevent an abrupt wing dip
should an unbalanced airbrake condition exist.
Straight-in Approach Landing
1. The straight-in approach is shown in figure

3-17 and is basically an extended downwind entry
pattern which has been straightened out and
aligned with the centerline of the landing runway.
It should be planned to intercept a point 20 miles
downwind from and lined up with the runway, 4000
feet above runway elevation, in level flight at 220
knots IAS, with the aircraft in clean configuration
(flaps up, landing gear up, airbrakes down).
2. Continue approach to the runway, maintaining
4000-foot altitude and 220 knots IAS in clean configuration to a point 12 miles from the runway. At
this point, start the flaps down, maintaining
4000-foot altitude by accepting a decrease in airspeed to approximately 170 knots IAS.
(Continued)
3-123
T.O. 1B-52H-1
climb back to pattern altitude be accomplished at 220 knots IAS.
NOTE
Slight thrust adjustment may be required

during flap extension if 220 knots IAS is
maintained prior to initiating flap extension. Thrust reduction is required after full
flap extension is accomplished in order to
descend properly throughout the remainder
of the landing approach.
It is recommended that directional control
be maintained using lateral control with
rudder control as necessary without use of
lateral or rudder trim. This eliminates the
requirement for trim changes throughout final approach, flare, and touchdown. Sideslip may be decreased slightly by use of rudder.
3. Flaps should be fully extended at a point

approximately 9 miles from the runway at an altitude of 4000 feet and an indicated airspeed of 170
knots.
4. Maintain 170 knots IAS, planning to reach a
point 6 miles from the runway, at 3000 feet and 170
knots IAS. At this point, extend landing gear. Plan
to arrive at a point 3 miles from the landing end of
the runway at 2000-foot altitude and 150 knots IAS
with landing gear and flaps down. If a go-around is
to be made, it must be initiated prior to descending
below 2000 feet above the terrain. MRT may be required to arrest the rate of descent and accelerate
the aircraft to climb speed within the 2000-foot altitude and still retain a satisfactory safety margin.
A successful go-around with three or four

engines inoperative on one side cannot be
assured any time the aircraft descends below 2000 feet above the terrain. Flight tests
have indicated that a minimum of 1000 feet
in altitude must be sacrificed in order to arrest the descent and accelerate the aircraft
to minimum directional control speed if
flaps and landing gear are retracted simultaneously with thrust increase. Thrust increase must be commensurate with the pilots ability to control the sideslip and maintain the heading. The use of rudder will assist in keeping sideslip to a minimum during a go-around. Any hesitation on the part
of the pilot in performing any of the above
steps will result in a loss of altitude in excess of 1000 feet. It is recommended that
3-124
5. Start down final leg of approach from a point 3

miles from the runway, 2000-foot altitude, 150
knots IAS. This altitude initially appears high for
landing; however, since a rate of descent of approximately 1500 feet per minute can be expected, it is
necessary to be at this altitude to accomplish a normal touchdown with minimum thrust.
If a landing is necessary at gross weights

above 270,000 pounds, final approach leg
should be flown at best flare speed plus 10
knots or 150 knots, whichever is higher.
However, landing above 270,000 pounds
should not be attempted unless no other alternative exists.
For weights above 270,000 pounds, do not
attempt a go-around since the thrust required to arrest the loss of altitude may exceed the thrust permitted to maintain minimum directional control
This is the final point in the landing pattern from which a successful go-around can
be initiated. In addition, 150 knots IAS is
below minimum directional control speed
for four engines inoperative on one side and
the operating engines at MRT. A go-around
from such a speed is potentially hazardous.
Flight tests conducted from this speed and
configuration demonstrated that this maneuver required loss of altitude but could be
made within the control capability of the pilot.
6. Continue the approach, maintaining 150 knots

IAS until ensured the runway can be reached. From
this point, thrust may be further gradually reduced,
sideslip and bank angle further decreased, and a
normal landing accomplished. Airbrake response
may be limited as dictated by engine-out configuration. Airbrakes should be used if available to decrease altitude and airspeed as required to compensate for wind effect and pilot technique. Avoid
abrupt lateral control movements by raising
airbrakes in increments of two. If airbrake position
6 is to be used to decrease speed on runway, raising
airbrakes in increments of two will prevent an
abrupt wing dip should an unbalanced airbrake
condition exist.
T.O. 1B-52H-1

on One Side, Flaps Down
DOWNWIND ENTRY PATTERN
Landing with three or four engines inoperative on one side should not be attempted at gross
weights in excess of 270,000 pounds. If a landing is necessary at gross weights above
270,000 pounds, final approach should be flown at best flare speed plus 10 knots or 150
knots, whichever is higher.
Commence downwind leg with the aircraft in the clean configuration (flaps up, gear up, airbrakes down), 4000 feet above
the runway elevation in level flight at 220 knots IAS.
Commence turn onto final approach, planning to roll out 3

miles from the end of the runway, 2000 feet above the runway
at 150 knots IAS with landing gear and flaps down.
Start flaps down at a point opposite the landing end of the

runway and continue downwind 1 minute, maintaining 4000
feet altitude by accepting a decrease in airspeed to approximately 170 knots IAS.
After rollout from base leg, commence final approach at 150

knots IAS, 2000 feet above the runway with landing gear and
flaps down.
5
3
After 1 minute on downwind from point 2 , commence turn

onto base leg from 4000 feet altitude at 170 knots IAS. Extend landing gear on base leg.
Continue the approach, maintaining 150 knots IAS until assured runway can be reached. From this point, accomplish a
normal landing.
3-125
T.O. 1B-52H-1

on One Side, Flaps Down (Cont)
STRAIGHT-IN APPROACH PATTERN
Landing with three or four engines inoperative on one side should not be attempted at gross
weights in excess of 270,000 pounds. If a landing is necessary at gross weights above
270,000 pounds, final approach should be flown at best flare speed plus 10 knots or 150
knots, whichever is higher.
Commence approach 20 miles downwind from the landing

end of the runway with the aircraft in the clean configuration
(flaps up, gear up, airbrakes down), 4000 feet above the runway elevation in level flight at 220 knots IAS.
After maintaining 4000 feet altitude and 220 knots IAS in

clean configuration to a point 12 miles from the runway, start
flap extension, maintaining 4000 feet altitude by accepting a
decrease in airspeed to approximately 170 knots IAS.
After maintaining 170 knots IAS to a point 6 miles from the

runway at 3000 feet, extend landing gear and plan to arrive at
a point 3 miles from the landing end of the runway at 2000
feet altitude and 150 knots IAS, with landing gear and flaps
down.
From a point 3 miles from the landing end of the runway at

2000 feet altitude and 150 knots IAS, continue the approach,
maintaining 150 knots IAS until assured runway can be
reached. From this point, accomplish a normal landing.
Flaps should be fully extended approximately 9 miles from the

runway at an altitude of 4000 feet and an airspeed of 170
knots IAS.
3-126
T.O. 1B-52H-1
GO-AROUND WITH ONE OR MORE ENGINES

INOPERATIVE
It may not be possible to maintain directional control if all throttles are advanced
to MRT. MRT may be set on all symmetric
engines. See MINIMUM SPEED FOR DIRECTIONAL CONTROL, this section.
Thrust will not be applied faster than any
generated roll-yaw problem can be controlled. Maintain directional control and accelerate to climb speed. (It may be safer to
descend and trade altitude for airspeed.)
When one or more engines have been shut

down and fuel usage and management have
been modified, compute the center of gravity for the landing condition or refer to the
APPROXIMATE CG LOCATION LANDING CONFIGURATION chart in the APPROACH AND LANDING section of T. O.
1B-52H-1-1. A determination of the cg is
necessary to assess the handling characteristics for landing.
For effect of control displacement on performance during go-around, see GO-AROUND
CHARACTERISTICS WITH ASYMMETRIC THRUST, Section VI.
GO-AROUND WITH ASYMMETRICAL THRUST
The decision to go around should be made

as early as possible. This is of extreme importance when one or more engines are inoperative or following an engine pod loss
since the reduced thrust available and limited directional control under such circumstances may make a go-around impossible
near the ground.
A go-around can be extremely hazardous
when one or more engines are inoperative
or following an engine pod loss. Existing
conditions (i.e., gross weight, ambient temperature, pressure altitude, center of gravity, and asymmetrical thrust) make controllability or performance of the aircraft marginal.
If two outboard engines on the same side
are inoperative and go-around is required,
it is imperative that full rudder be applied
as thrust is applied. If full rudder is not
used to oppose the yaw, the spoiler deflection required to maintain control can reduce
the climb or acceleration capability at heavy
weights to almost zero. The rudder pedal
force required to achieve full rudder deflection is approximately 200 pounds during a
go-around when rudder trim is not used.
NOTE
Pilot height, seat position, rudder pedal adjustment, and foot position on the rudder
pedal will determine the pilots ability to
counteract the high rudder pedal force and
obtain full rudder. The copilot should assist
in holding full rudder during the go-around.
Airbrake settings during go-around have
negligible effects on maximum EPR settings
read from air minimum control speed chart.
Aircraft climb performance with seven, six, and five

engines operating at MRT at best climb speed is
shown in Part 3 of T. O. 1B-52H-1-1. These charts,
along with the minimum speed for directional control charts (figure 3-15, sheets 3 and 4) can be used
as a guide to the feasibility of making a go-around
with less than eight engines under specific circumstances. The charts can also be used, for preplanning an engine failure during the last stages of the
landing pattern, to determine air minimum control
speed or to find the maximum EPR that can be set
on the asymmetric engines. When landing with engines out, the minimum speed for directional control should be regarded as the minimum speed from
which a go-around can be safely accomplished.
However, it may be possible to perform a go-around
from lower speeds using a combination of engines
which will result in a symmetrical thrust. In this
case, directional control would not be a problem.
Under extreme circumstances, it may be possible to
make a go-around from a speed at which full control deflections are not sufficient to maintain a
heading. This will cause the aircraft to make a
gradual turn and, as speed is increased, directional
control will be regained. The point to remember is
that a safe go-around is not ensured from a speed
lower than the minimum directional control speed
even though it may be possible to do so in some
cases. See LOSS OF ENGINES, this section. Therefore, in planning an approach with engines out, the
minimum speed for directional control should be
used to determine whether the landing is committed or a go-around can be safely executed. The
use of nosedown trim due to thrust application will
still be required in case of a go-around with less
than eight engines; therefore, care should be taken
to keep the aircraft trimmed for zero stick force as
in a normal go-around. This is particularly important since other distractions will be present during
this time.
Change 1
3-127
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LOSS OF ENGINE POD
The lateral imbalance resulting from the loss of an

engine pod may be partially corrected by transferring fuel as described in figure 3-15A. Under conditions of lateral imbalance, the symmetrical engines
should be smoothly advanced to thrust required for
go-around, to a maximum of MRT while the EPR
for the nonsymmetrical engines should be set in accordance with figure 3-15 sheet 3. Full rudder and
up to 50% lateral control may be required to maintain directional control. For more information see
LANDING FOLLOWING LOSS OF AN ENGINE
POD, this section.
NOTE
In the event of an engine pod loss, the minimum directional control speed is unchanged.
ONE ENGINE FAILURE
When attempting a landing with one engine inoperative and a go-around becomes necessary, adequate directional control can be maintain quite easily by application of a symmetrical thrust. If a symmetrical thrust is not sufficient, lateral control and
rudder will be used.
TWO ENGINE FAILURE
If two outboard engines located on the same side

are inoperative and a go-around is necessary, there
may be an insufficient amount of rudder available
to completely balance out the turning force encountered at the low go-around speeds. However, by applying appropriate lateral control as well as full
rudder, straight ahead directional control can be
maintained. See figure 3-15 for minimum speeds for
directional control. At light gross weights where
3-128
Change 1
sufficient thrust is available, the directional control

problem may be relieved by reducing thrust from
the unbalancing engines. If rudder trim is used,
limitations established by Section V will be observed. Rapid rudder manipulations will be avoided
because of the structural limits of the vertical tail
and rudder. Steady flight conditions can be established only with the thrust deficient wing a few degrees high.
THREE OR FOUR ENGINE FAILURES
Many different combinations of engine failures are

possible and go-around techniques will vary slightly
with each. The most critical conditions are those goarounds which occur when the outboard engines
have failed, since directional control is the limiting
condition. Five-engine climb curves are presented
in Part 3 of T. O. 1B-52H-1-1. Any go-around which
must be made with more than two outboard engines inoperative on the same side should be accomplished with the utmost caution. Pilot application of
directional and lateral control will be simultaneous
with throttle movement. It is recommended that
the throttles be moved to some position less than
full forward until the pilot has determined his capabilities for handling such an emergency. Engine
failure will not materially affect the landing gear
retraction time if the failure is on any engine other
than 4 or 5. However, gear retraction time will be
longer if either engine 4 or 5 is shut down. For
additional information, see LANDING WITH
THREE OR FOUR ENGINE FAILURE ON ONE
SIDE, this section.
THREE OR FOUR ENGINE FAILURE ON ONE SIDE
Observe the LANDING WITH THREE OR FOUR

ENGINE FAILURE ON ONE SIDE WITH FLAPS
UP, procedures and checklist. Also, see LANDING
WITH WING FLAPS INOPERATIVE, this section.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
GO-AROUND WITH THREE OR FOUR ENGINE FAILURE ON ONE SIDE AND FLAPS UP
A go-around should not be attempted unless a gear-down climb capability of 300 feet per minute exists. If the charts (figure 3-18) indicate that
a climb potential of less than 300 fpm exists, gross weight should be
decreased prior to the approach.
Observe for a lateral fuel unbalance. If possible avoid a heavy wing and
inoperative engines conditions on the same side. A go-around should
not be attempted if a fuel unbalance of 20,000 pounds or more exists.
The effects of spoiler deflection, gear down, and fuel unbalance can
become critical if go-around speed is not quickly attained and maintained.
NOTE
The decision to go around or land will remain with the pilot and be
based on all factors involved. The decision should be made as early as
possible and not later than 600 feet above ground level.
If fuel shift effects are to be neglected, outboard EPR obtained from
figure 3-18 must be reduced by 0.06 and rate of climb by 140 feet per
minute.
pilots may not have sufficient time to refer to the checklist. Therefore,
1. Go-Around Thrust Set (as required) (P/CP)

The pilot flying the aircraft should smoothly advance inboard throttles to MRT. After MRT has been
set on the inboard engines, the outboard throttles will be advanced as their thrust is needed. Maximum EPR for outboard engines may be varied depending on conditions and requirements, and can
be found using the OUTBOARD ENGINES EPR for GO-AROUND charts.
Rudder will be applied as thrust is applied; the pilot should anticipate

the bank angle requirement by rolling 10 degrees toward the operative
engines. If sufficient rudder is not used to combat yaw, controllability
and climb or acceleration capability will be significantly degraded. The
rudder pedal force required to achieve full rudder deflection during a
go-around is approximately 130 pounds. This force increases markedly
when rudder trim is not used.
It may not be possible to maintain directional control if all throttles are
advanced to MRT.
(Continued)
3-129
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NOTE
Pilot size, seat position, rudder pedal adjustment, and foot position on
the rudder pedal will determine the pilots ability to counteract the
high rudder pedal force and obtain full rudder. The copilot should assist
in holding full rudder during the go-around if requested by the pilot.
Accelerate to a minimum of approach speed plus 10 knots by continuing descent, using MRT on inboard engines, and retracting the landing
gear prior to increasing pitch and/or application of outboard EPR setting. Do not increase pitch to level-off until necessary to avoid obstructions or sufficient airspeed is obtained. The aircraft will become much
easier to control as airspeed increases.
2. Airbrakes Two (P)

Leave airbrakes in position 2. Airbrake position 2 will give more spoiler authority with less wheel
deflection than position 1 or zero and require less pilot effort, with no significant increase in drag.
Raising the landing gear will increase rate of climb approximately 500 fpm and will allow the aircraft
to accelerate more rapidly.
4. Aircraft Trimmed (P)
At all times during go-around, pilot will make a conscious effort to keep the aircraft trimmed to zero
stick forces.
NOTE
If the computed thrust for one-half lateral control authority is applied

and speed is less than approach speed plus 10 knots, then more roll
control will be required to maintain a heading. This will result in an
increase in drag and a decrease in remaining roll control.
5. Thrust Adjusted (P)
Accelerate to approximately approach speed plus 30 knots and adjust thrust to establish positive rate
of climb.
NOTE
Accomplish AFTER TAKEOFF CLIMB checklist, FLAPS UP BEFORE LANDING WITH THREE OR FOUR ENGINE FAILURE ON
ONE SIDE checklist, and FLAPS UP LANDING WITH THREE OR
FOUR ENGINE FAILURE ON ONE SIDE checklist, as applicable.
3-130
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Outboard Engines EPR for Go-Around

FOUR ENGINES OUT ON ONE SIDE, SEA LEVEL, APPROACH SPEED + 10 KNOTS
DATE: MARCH 1975
NOTE
To convert C to F, refer to Part 1 of
T.O. 1B-52H-1-1.
If only three engines are inoperative
on one side, the performance data is
conservative.
If fuel shift is to be neglected, subtract 0.06 from outboard EPR read
from chart and 140 ft/min from rate of
climb read from chart.
CONDITIONS:
FLAPS UP
GEAR DOWN
AIRBRAKES POSITION 2
INBOARD ENGINES AT MRT
FULL RUDDER
50% LATERAL CONTROL AUTHORITY
APPROACH SPEED PLUS 10
KNOTS
BENEFICIAL FUEL SHIFT EFFECTS ARE INCLUDED
EXAMPLE:
GIVEN:
Runway pressure altitude = Sea level
Inboard engines at MRT
FIND:
EPR for outboard engines and rate of climb
without fuel shift effects.
SOLUTION:
EPR = 1.25 0.06 (Correction) = 1.19
Rate of Climb = 490 140 (Correction) = 350
ft/min
3-131
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Outboard Engines EPR for Go-Around (Cont)

FOUR ENGINES OUT ON ONE SIDE, 2000 FEET, APPROACH SPEED + 10 KNOTS
DATE: MARCH 1975
CONDITIONS:
FLAPS UP
GEAR DOWN
FULL RUDDER
APPROACH SPEED PLUS 10 KNOTS
BENEFICIAL FUEL SHIFT EFFECTS ARE
INCLUDED
3-132
NOTE
T.O. 1B-52H-1-1.
conservative.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
FOUR ENGINES OUT ON ONE SIDE, 4000 FEET, APPROACH SPEED + 10 KNOTS
DATE: MARCH 1975
CONDITIONS:
FLAPS UP
GEAR DOWN
FULL RUDDER
NOTE
T.O. 1B-52H-1-1.
conservative.
INCLUDED
3-133
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Outboard Engines EPR for Go-Around (Cont)

FOUR ENGINES OUT ON ONE SIDE, 10,000 FEET, APPROACH SPEED + 10 KNOTS
DATE: MARCH 1975
CONDITIONS:
FLAPS UP
GEAR DOWN
FULL RUDDER
INCLUDED
3-134
NOTE
T.O. 1B-52H-1-1.
conservative.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
SYSTEMS EMERGENCY/ABNORMAL OPERATION

AIR REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS
MAIN REFUEL VALVE ABNORMAL OPERATION
AIR REFUELING WITH MAIN MANIFOLD INTERCONNECT VALVES FAILED
The main refuel valve is operated by a dc motor. If

this motor should fail in the closed position, it
would be impossible to receive fuel from a tanker
until the valve was manually opened. If the refuel
valve is to be manually operated, pull the REFUEL
VALVE circuit breaker located on the right load
central circuit breaker panel since the electrical actuator may tend to resist valve movement by the
emergency lever cable control system. To manually
open the valve, move the main refuel valve emergency control lever to OPEN, and to close the valve,
move the lever to CLOSE position. An erroneous indication may be obtained when manually operating
this valve since the refuel valve position indicator
receives dc power through the REFUEL VALVE circuit breaker, which will be pulled.
An alternate method of fuel management is provided to assure safe aircraft operation and permit
air refueling in event of failure of the main manifold interconnect fuel valves. The interconnect
valves are open during refueling and during fuel
usage steps 5-MID TO ALL, 6-AFT TO 1, 2, 7, AND
8; NO. 2 MAIN TO 3 AND 4; NO. 3 MAIN TO 5
AND 6, and 11-FWD TO ALL. Failure of the main
manifold interconnect valves will, in practically all
cases, occur when the valves are closed. See FUEL
MANAGEMENT WITH MAIN MANIFOLD INTERCONNECT VALVES FAILED CLOSED, under
FUEL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS, this section.
If failure is encountered during air refueling, the
forward body and center wing fuel tanks should not
be refueled to a total quantity greater than the
quantity in the aft body tank minus 6000 pounds at
the beginning of the refueling operation. This permits a normal fuel usage sequence, using equally
from center wing and aft body and from forward
body and aft body tanks. In the event refueling is
desired after the aft body tank fuel has been used
down to 6000 pounds in the normal sequence, the
mid body tank can be filled to capacity and used in
accordance with the FUEL MANAGEMENT WITH
MAIN MANIFOLD INTERCONNECT VALVES
FAILED CLOSED procedure, under FUEL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS, this section.
NOTE
The refueling operations as described previously are based on the assumption that
the external and outboard wing tanks are
full and the main wing tank fuel levels are
above the green band marking on the fuel
quantity gages.
SLIPWAY DOORS ABNORMAL OPERATION
Failure of the left body hydraulic system will prevent actuation of the slipway doors from the normal
system. In such an emergency, place the alternate
slipway door switch in OPEN to operate the slipway
doors. Hydraulic pressure is supplied from the right
body system with the alternate slipway door switch
in OPEN position.
ANTI-ICING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS

ABNORMAL OPERATION
In case of arcing at the power terminals on the

heated windows, arcing at the sensing element,
cracking, or discoloration or bubbles in the windows, immediately pull the individual circuit breakers for each affected window autotransformer.
These circuit breakers are located on the pilots and
copilots circuit breaker panels and marked for
identification with the respective windows.
NOTE
If the main manifold interconnect fuel valves

should fail in the open position, air refueling operations would not be affected. During fuel usage, following an air refueling of body tanks, control of cg
would be affected. In this case, more fuel will be
used from the aft body tank during sequences
where it is used along with fuel from other body
tanks. Monitoring of the fuel quantity gages will indicate this condition.
Do not pull the window control units and

relays circuit breakers located on the left
and right load central circuit breaker panels for an individual window malfunction
since these circuit breakers each provide
power for control of heat to more than one
window.
(Continuted)
3-135
T.O. 1B-52H-1
The structural integrity of a cracked window may be checked by sliding a hand

across the inner surface to feel for the
crack. Since the inner pane of a heated window is the primary structure, a crack in
only the outer pane will not impair the
strength. (Unheated windows, 6L and 6R,
are made of laminated plastic and carry the
load on the outer surface.)
AUTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROL MALFUNCTIONS

AUTOPILOT ABNORMAL OPERATION
There are no special operating procedures to be

used during an emergency. However, if the
autopilot is engaged and manual flight control is
desired, press the pilots or copilots autopilot release buttons for immediate autopilot disconnect. If
the methods outlined under AUTOPILOT DISENGAGEMENT fail, pull the five circuit breakers located on the AUTOPILOT portion of the left load
central circuit breaker panel.
If a malfunction or erratic behavior is experienced in any mode of the autopilot, the aerial refueling and/or low level modes will
not be used for the remainder of the flight.
If a malfunction or erratic behavior is experienced in the normal mode (other than aerial refueling and/or low level) disengage
the autopilot and investigate the cause of
the malfunction. The pilot will determine
whether the malfunction in the normal
mode precludes further use of this mode of
the autopilot. Normal autopilot disengagements as discussed in this section, such as
those occurring due to turbulence, improper
pilot technique, or electrical system malfunctioning should not be considered an
autopilot malfunction.
NOTE
The autopilot may fail to engage following

abnormal engage procedures. The autopilot
may be reset by placing the autopilot power
switch off for a minimum of 3 seconds to
ensure a complete reset. Switch autopilot
back on and autopilot should now engage
and perform normal operation.
3-136
STABILITY AUGMENTATION SYSTEM (SAS) MALFUNCTION
Malfunction within the SAS electronic units or foreign matter in the elevator or rudder hydraulic actuators can cause unscheduled pitch or yaw inputs.
Unscheduled Pitch Oscillations
If unscheduled pitch-inputs are observed, accomplish the following:

1. Disengage the autopilot. If oscillations do not
cease immediately, place the pitch SAS switch to
DISENGAGE.
The urgency of this step is increased if

these oscillations occur during takeoffs,
landings, air refueling, low altitude flight,
and low level operations.
2. If oscillations cease upon disengaging the pitch
SAS, leave pitch SAS switch disengaged and continue mission. Autopilot may be reengaged to ascertain if malfunction was in the SAS pitch control,
and left engaged if no further oscillations are experienced.
Unscheduled Yaw Oscillations
Unscheduled yaw oscillations of small amplitude

from the SAS are classified as a nuisance factor and
do not affect safety. If such a condition occurs, continue the mission; however, the following instructions will apply:
NOTE
These small amplitude oscillations are usually noticed in smooth air only when the
system is searching around a null point.
When the aircraft is in turbulence, refueling, or is not in a clean configuration, the
oscillations are not likely to be observed.
1. Do not disengage the yaw SAS switch to eliminate these nuisance oscillations.
Turbulence encounters with yaw SAS disengaged and no yaw damping could result in
structural damage.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
2. The source of the malfunction causing the oscillations should be determined and a Form 781
entry made.
NOTE
Of special interest to the maintenance debriefing team will be the flight conditions
associated with the write-up. Therefore, it
should be established that oscillations were
not due to turbulence.
3. If the oscillations are observed with autopilot
engaged, it should be disengaged. If oscillations do
not cease, place the yaw SAS switch to disengage. If
oscillations cease upon disengaging the yaw SAS,
the malfunctioning system has been identified. The
yaw SAS switch will be reengaged and left engaged.
The autopilot may be reengaged if the malfunctioning system was identified as the yaw SAS.
If unscheduled yaw oscillations severe enough to
cause yaw SAS switch disengagement occur, accomplish the following:
1. Attempt to reengage the yaw SAS switch.
2. If the switch will not engage, leave switch in
DISENGAGE. Continue mission and observe the
restrictions under YAW SAS SWITCH DISENGAGEMENT, this section.
SAS ABNORMAL OPERATION
Stability Augmentation System (SAS) Switch Disengagement
PITCH SAS SWITCH DISENGAGEMENT

1. Check circuit breakers closed; attempt to reengage pitch SAS switch.
2. If switch will not engage, leave switch in DISENGAGE and continue mission.
NOTE
Re-engagement of the pitch SAS switch

may produce an engage transient. This is
considered normal.
YAW SAS SWITCH DISENGAGEMENT

NOTE
If airbrakes are actuated with yaw SAS disengaged and the autopilot engaged, unscheduled dutch roll oscillations may be observed. Disengaging the autopilot and/or retracting the airbrakes should eliminate the
oscillations.
The aircraft will be without yaw damping
if yaw SAS is inoperative.
Re-engagement of the yaw SAS switch may
produce an engage transient. This is considered normal.
1. Check circuit breakers closed; attempt to reengage yaw SAS switch.

2. If the switch will not engage, leave switch in
DISENGAGE. The mission may be continued while
observing the following restrictions/instructions.
a. Avoid turbulence or any maneuver that
could apply unnecessary side loads to the aircraft.
If turbulence is encountered, accomplish turbulent
air penetration procedures as given in Section VII.
b. Low level activity will not be continued/attempted.
c. Compute an altitude 10,000 feet below the
Mach 0.765 line on the BEST RANGE CONSTANT
MACH CRUISE ALTITUDE CHART in T.O.
1B-52H-1-1. Cruise near but not above this altitude. If turbulence is encountered or forecast descend as necessary.
d. Air refueling will be conducted only when
necessary to extend the flight during emergencies.
The air refueling mode of the autopilot will substantially reduce the loads on the aircraft during
refueling and will be used if operative.
e. Do not conduct evasive action or breakaway
maneuvers associated with bomb runs.
f. A minimum of 250 knots IAS should be
maintained during cruise flight conditions.
g. Low approaches and touch-and-go landings
may be accomplished during smooth, stable flight
conditions. Do not practice flaps up approaches or
simulated engine out conditions.
3-137
T.O. 1B-52H-1
BOMB DOOR MALFUNCTIONS

BOMB DOOR ABNORMAL OPERATION WITH FORWARD SPECIAL WEAPON MANUAL RELEASE HANDLE
Pulling the forward special weapon manual release

handle through the first 9 inches of travel will
manually unlatch the bomb doors. After they are
unlatched, airloads will position the bomb doors to
some intermediate position between closed and full
open, depending on indicated airspeed, provided the
bomb door system is not receiving a door close signal from the bomb door switches or the OAS. When
the bomb doors are unlatched, the bomb-doors-notlatched lights will illuminate provided TR power is
available. To close the bomb doors, use a procedure
described under BOMB DOOR SYSTEM NORMAL
OPERATION in Section I.
NOTE
Due to a mechanical interlock incorporated

in the forward special weapon manual release system, the bomb doors cannot be unlatched with the forward special weapon
manual release handle without first pulling
the special weapons manual lock handle.
All special weapon racks are unlocked when
the special weapons manual lock handle is
actuated.
BOMB DOOR ABNORMAL OPERATION WITH JETTISON
SWITCHES
When the jettison circuits are energized, the bombdoors-close signal from the OAS is interrupted and
the bomb doors are opened. The jettison circuits can
be deenergized by actuation of either bomb door
switch to CLOSED if the bombing system switch is
in MANUAL and the master bomb control switch is
ON. When the bombing system switch is in AUTO,
the pilot may deenergize the jettison circuits and
close the bomb doors by placing the bomb door
switch to CLOSE position.
BOMB DOOR CONTROL VALVE LIGHTS ILLUMINATED
An illuminated bomb door control valve light indicates the corresponding bomb door control (four-
3-138
way) valve is directing hydraulic pressure to the respective bomb-door-close line which may damage
the bomb doors if opening is attempted. If a bomb
door control valve light is illuminated when there is
no pressure on the corresponding hydraulic system,
it indicates the corresponding bomb door control
valve light pressure switch is malfunctioning because the bomb door control (four-way) valve cannot
trap pressure in the hydraulic lines.
Bombing System Switch in the AUTO Position
If both bomb door control valve lights are illuminated when the bomb doors are supposed to be
closed and locked and the bombing system switch is
in AUTO position, the OAS (when operating in the
bomb mode) may be sending a door close signal
through a defective door close limit switch which is
actuating the door close system. The following steps
are recommended to check this condition:
1. Bombing System Switch MANUAL
Positioning the bombing system switch to MANUAL stops OAS control of the bomb doors.
2. Bomb door system is safe for operation if the
bomb door control valve lights are not illuminated
and the respective hydraulic systems are pressurized. Care should be taken after the bomb run to
position the bombing system switch to MANUAL.
Bombing System Switch in the MANUAL Position
If the bomb door switches are both out of the

CLOSED position and the bombing system switch
is in MANUAL with the respective hydraulic system pressurized, an illuminated bomb door control
valve light may indicate the corresponding bomb
door control (four-way) valve is stuck in a position
to direct hydraulic pressure to the corresponding
bomb-door-close line. Opening the bomb doors in
this condition may cause them to be damaged.
Do not attempt to free a bomb door control

(four-way) valve by opening the bomb doors
as this procedure may damage the bomb
door system.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
BOMB DOOR OPERATION WITH FAILURE OF THE
RIGHT BODY HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
Failure of the right body hydraulic system will not

prevent operating the bomb bay doors, since the left
body hydraulic system will provide pressure to the
forward bomb door actuator and unlatch the doors.
When the bomb bay doors are operated with

hydraulic power to only the forward bomb
door actuator, aircraft speed should not exceed 325 knots IAS, if practicable, as a precaution against buffeting and structural
damage to the doors.
GROUND MANUAL UNLATCHING OF BOMB DOORS
Manual opening of bomb bay door latches may be

accomplished using the bomb door latch release
cable in the aft wheel well (6, figure 1-1). The cable
is the same cable actuated by the aft hydraulic
latch actuator and is directly linked to the aft
latches and through the coordinating unit to the
forward latches.
CENTER OF GRAVITY, FUEL LEVEL

ADVISORY SYSTEM ABNORMAL
OPERATIONS
There are no procedures for CG/FLAS failure, but
the system can be utilized for FQIS tank gage sensor failures. In the fuel level advisory, weight status
and weapon status modes, a GAGE FAIL will be
displayed when an under or over voltage condition
is detected for any tank. If a CHG process is in
progress, GAGE FAIL will not be displayed until
the ENTER key is pressed. GAGE FAIL will not be
displayed any time during initialization regardless
of operator action. GAGE FAIL is removed by pressing the WT key. Aircraft cg will be computed on the
last accurate reading prior to gage failure. The first
tank to be displayed when entering the weight
mode is the failed tank. GF is displayed on the center row second and third digits to indicate the failed
tank and the designated tank and last accurate
quantity is displayed on the bottom row. Use the
CHG process to manually update the tank input to
O or M.
Unlatching the bomb doors using the aft

bomb door latch release cable will not be attempted with power on the aircraft.
3-139
T.O. 1B-52H-1
COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT
MALFUNCTIONS
INTERPHONE SYSTEM ABNORMAL OPERATION
In an emergency, the interphone system can be operated from the forward battery by placing the
emergency dc power switch in EMERGENCY position. This provides normal interphone operation for
all stations. The HOT MIC or CALL facility will
provide reliable communication on a battery voltage
as low as 12 volts.
V/UHF RADIO AN/ARC-210 ABNORMAL OPERATION
DJ
Should the V/UHF radio fail to operate properly,

and the fault light is not illuminated on the AN/
ARC-210(V) switch panel, rotate the operational
mode selector switch to TEST. This initiates builtin-test (BIT) of the control unit, receiver-transmitter, applique, antenna converter unit, and antenna.
Figure 3-19 contains BIT readouts. A decimal will
appear on the display while the test is in progress.
Within 20 seconds 888.888 and all functions of the
display, are illuminated to indicate that the system
has successfully passed BIT. The test routine is continuous from start to finish; however, the operator
may step through each test step and display each
step by pushing the LOAD/OFST push-button
switch within two seconds of selecting test mode. If
no faults are detected in continuous test, the display illuminates all function indicators on the front
panel. If the fault light is illuminated on the AN/
3-140
Change 8
ARC-210(V) switch panel there is a fault in the

HPA. If the radio will not transmit or receive in the
SATCOM range and there is no fault in the BIT or
HPA, there is a fault in the duplexer/preamplifier,
high power RF switch or the SATCOM antenna.
Discontinue SATCOM transmissions until the
faulty component has been replaced. If the radio
does not display 888.888, faults are detected, and
the faulty unit will be displayed in the channel
position. Push LOAD/OFST switch to display the
three-digit failed assembly repair code in the frequency position of the display. Enter the faulty
LRU and this code on AFTO Form 781. (The code
will facilitate radio repair). For those LRUs not
tested by BIT enter the suspected faulty LRU. Replace the faulty unit and try to operate the radio
again. If the operator has elected to step through
each test the display will have the test number in
the two-digit channel position and the words pass
or fail following the test number.
NOTE
Test mode takes precedence over all operations except 243 MHz guard.
KY-100 ERROR MESSAGE DISPLAYS DU
Figure 3-19A lists the error messages displayed on

the Z-AVH Remoter Control and the KY-100 MTU.
In addition to the message, the meaning of the message and its corrective action are also listed.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AN/ARC-210(V) Radio Built-In-Test (BIT) Readouts
Figure 3-19
Change 8
3-140A
T.O. 1B-52H-1
KY-100 Error Message Displays DU

ERROR DISPLAY
MEANING AND CORRECTIVE ACTION
AbORT
The AbORT message indicates that a transmission has been preempted during
MILSTAR voice operation in the Narrowband Black Digital mode. The abort message is accompanied by a repeating tone. Release the PTT switch and retry the
transmission.
When the CTS (Clear To Send) option is selected (188 or SW GND) it indicates
that the CTS signal at J1-c of the RADIO connector has deactivated before the user
has released the PTT switch.
bAd KEY
The bAd KEY message indicates a incorrect or corrupted key is selected. Select the
proper key and retry the call. If the call fails again, perform an off-line test and alarm
check. If necessary reload the key.
bAd CLK
The bAd CLK message indicates no clock signal is present in Narrowband (ANDVT)
Black Digital mode. Retry operation. If the operation still fails, notify maintenance.
bAd EbM
The bAd EbM message indicates the user has attempted to enter the EB (Emergency Backup) mode with a corrupted or non-existent EB key. Load a valid EB key.
bUZY
The bUZY message indicates the terminal is in the Narrowband Black Digital mode
with the MILSTAR option set to OFF. The Signal Present input at J1-M of the RADIO
connector is active. A single depression of the PTT switch will result in a bUZY message. A double depression of the PTT will override the Signal Present indication
and cause a transmit condition which may interfere with a co-channel user.
CM bAT
The CM bAT message indicates the Fill battery is low. The battery should be replaced.
COMM ERR
The COMM ERR message indicates a communication error has occurred between
the Modem and the COMSEC PWAs. Perform an off-line AUTO test. If test fails
notify maintenance.
CONF ERR
The CONF ERR messages indicates a terminal configuration error. In Wideband

(VINSON) modes, operating with the EB key, selecting the red data operation will
result in a configuration error.
dEV ERR
The dEV ERR message indicates a fill device error. The fill device is improperly
configured during a COMSEC operation involving the FILL connector. Causes include: improperly connected fill cable, invalid key at the selected location, fill device
in wrong mode (especially the OFF position), more than one key selected on the
NCD when only one is required, a malfunctioning fill device, etc.
Eb ERR
The Eb ERR messages indicates that the COMSEC subsystem received a command restricted command while in the EB mode. Perform an off-line AUTO test. If
the test fails, turn the unit off then back on and repeat the test. If the test still fails,
notify maintenance.
ER RK
The ER RK messages indicates the terminal has received a signal with a preamble
indicating that the message is a rekeying message, however the MODE control is
not in the RK position. This message can also occur if the preamble is received improperly due to a noisy receive signal or a poor clock in Black Digital mode.
3-140B
Change 18
T.O. 1B-52H-1
KY-100 Error Message Displays DU (Cont)

ERROR DISPLAY
FAIL bIO
The FAIL bIO message indicates a failed Black I/O test. Notify maintenance.
FAIL CM
The FAIL CM message indicates a possible COMSEC fault has been detected. Perform off-line AUTO tests. If the tests pass, resume normal operation. If a failure is
detected, notify maintenance.
FAIL CMA
The FAIL CMA message indicates a failed COMSEC A PWA test. Operation will be
restricted to plaintext voice only or off-line modes depending on the severity of the
failure.
FAIL CMb
The FAIL CMb message indicates a failed COMSEC B PWA test. Operation will be
restricted to plaintext voice only or off-line modes depending on the severity of the
failure.
FAILEd
The FAILEd message indicates a failed menu lock or unlock operation. Attempt the
operation again. If the operation still fails, turn off the KY-100 and remove the Fill
battery is low. The battery should be replaced and the terminal should be reinitialized.
FAIL FP
The FAIL FP message indicates a failed front panel test. Notify maintenance.
FAIL KEY
The FAIL KEY message indicates a incorrect or corrupted key is selected. Select
the proper key and retry the call. If the call fails again, perform an off-line test and
alarm check. If necessary reload the key. This message can also occur if the
preamble is improperly received due to a noisy receive signal or poor clock in Black
Digital mode.
FAIL MP
The FAIL MP message indicates a failed Modem Processor PWA test. Notify maintenance.
FAIL RCU
The FAIL RCU message indicates a failed Z-AVH Remote Control Unit (RCU) test.
Notify maintenance.
FAIL RIO
The FAIL RIO message indicates a failed Red I/O PWA test. Notify maintenance.
FAIL VP
The FAIL VP message indicates a failed Voice Processor PWA test. Notify maintenance.
INVALId
The INVALId message indicates the user has selected PT mode with the MODE
switch and the terminal configured for CT ONLY operation. Using the on-line CT/CT
ONLY menu, select CT.
NO KEY
The NO KEY message indicates not valid keys (traffic or unique) are present.
Change 8
3-140C
T.O. 1B-52H-1
KY-100 Error Message Displays DU (Cont)

ERROR DISPLAY
NO TEK
The NO TEK message indicates the selected TEK location does not contain a valid
TEK. Load a valid key in the location or select another key location. A different key
location can be selected using the on-line menus with PRESET control in the MAN
position or by selecting a different preprogrammed PRESET position.
PT ONLY
The PT ONLY messages indicates Plain Text only mode. The terminal has experienced a COMSEC failure or does not contain a valid TEK. Perform an off-line AUTO
test to clear the condition. If the terminal is zeroized, load a TEK. If the condition
cannot be cleared, operate the terminal in the PT mode. Notify maintenance.
PUL ZALL
The PUL ZALL message indicates to the operator to PULL Z ALL (select the Z ALL
position on the MODE switch).
RCV NG
The RCV NG indicates a signal has been received, but the preamble is corrupted
due to a noisy signal or poor external clock in Black Digital modes. When using the
EB key, the reception of a digital data or rekey transmission will cause the RCV NG
message.
RMV NCD
The RMV NG message indicates the user has improperly configured the NCD during and NCD related operation. Turn off and remove the NCD, check the key location if appropriate, then reconnect the NCD and repeat the operation.
TX NG
The TX NG message indicates the transmit operation has failed. In Narrowband

modes operating with the EB key, application of digital PPT (J2-T) will cause the TX
NG message.
3-140D
Change 8
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DAMA Error Messages DU

NOTE
If you receive any of the the following codes:

1.
2.
3.
4.
Type the error code on the DAMA keypad and Enter.

The system should automatically resend your call request and give you control of the DAMA RCU.
Look up the error code and accomplish any corrective actions.
Re-attempt the Activation or Call Request, if necessary.
ERROR
CODE
REQUEST
TYPE
CONDITION
CORRECTIVE ACTION
***Unused***
13
Disconnect constant key offender.

The controller has determined the requestor is a
constant key offender and is being disconnected.
4
568
***Unused***
Any
Terminal ID duplicates an existing operational address. The requesting terminal ID duplicates the address of an operational controller.
Use another Terminal Base Address.
Common
Guard Private
Guard All-Call
Requesting partys guard list does not contain guard

address. The requesting users port guard list does
not contain the guard address of the guard it is trying
to activate.
Check or change the guard address.
Service Request Access Restriction Violation.

The service request either has a higher precedence
than is allowed by the MAJCOM or it has a lower precedence than the network channel requires.
Check precedence and network channel requirements.
71
Two Party
Conference
Common
Guard
Private Guard
Requesting party already has an outstanding request. Only one request at a time may be queued
from a user. The user has a request queued, therefore this request is being canceled.
If required, cancel the first request

and re-attempt new request.
72
Two Party
Conference
Common
Guard
Private Guard
All-Call
Requesting party is not authorized to activate AllCall. Only the controller operator may activate a service to the All-Call address.
Two Party
Requested terminal is already connected to a DASA

service. The requested user is already connected to
a DASA service and therefore this service is unavailable.
75
Two Party
Conference
Common
Guard
Private Guard
Request canceled by user.

The source of the service has now canceled that request while it was queued waiting for a response.
76
Two Party
Conference
Common
Guard
Private Guard
Queued call canceled; service queue time-out timer

expired. The previous queue has been canceled due
to the controller imposed time-out limit.
69
70
73
74
Re-attempt in a few minutes.
Change 21
3-140E
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DAMA Error Messages DU (Cont)

ERROR
CODE
REQUEST
TYPE
Your terminal does not exist in the controller database. The controller has no record of the requestors
terminal address.
Check your Terminal Base Address.
77
Two Party
Conference
Common
Guard
Private Guard
Two Party
Conference
Private Guard
Request queue is currently full. The controller has

too many requests in queue and cannot accept any
more at this time.
78
Two Party
Conference
Private Guard
Queued call canceled; connection is no longer possible. The controller has deleted a request from
queue, either at the request of the controller operator
or because it is no longer valid.
Operator did not enter a configuration code for the
current port in use.
Enter a Configuration Code in parameters and re-attempt.
80
Two Party
Conference
Common
Guard
Private Guard
Two Party
Conference
Private Guard
Required data rate cant be supported. The data rate

requested for this connection is not supported by any
channels on this satellite.
Check the entered data rate.
81
Two Party
Guard
1. Requested party unknown.

2. The requested user or guard doesnt exist in the
controller database.
1. Check Call Directory and try again.

2. Check guard list(s) and re-attempt.
Common
Guard
Private Guard
1. Cannot add users to this guard.

2. The requesting party is already connected to a
guard and has attempted to add user ports to the
guard connection.
Common
Guard
Private Guard
1. Cannot add a guard to your existing call.

2. The requesting user is already participating in a
call and has attempted to add another guard to the
existing connection.
If you need to add another guard, do

an end call, stop mode, add the new
guard to your parameters and then reconnect with the network.
Private Guard
Requesting party is not authorized to activate this

guard. You have tried to activate a guard list you are
not authorized to use.
Check the guard list entered.
Private Guard
Requesting party is not a member of this Private

Guard. Attempted to join a Private Guard, but not an
authorized member of this guard.
Check the guard list entered.
Two Party
Requested partys terminal is unauthorized or zeroized. The controller sees your terminal as zeroized
or unauthorized.
Check Terminal Base Address and

crypto keys.
Common
Guard
Private Guard
1. Requesting partys device is not compatible with

this guard.
2. The port you told the controller you are using
doesnt agree with what the controller sees.
Check port setting on the status page

and use the same port on another call
request.
79
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
CONDITION
3-140F
Change 21
CORRECTIVE ACTION
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ERROR
CODE
REQUEST
TYPE
CONDITION
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Two Party
1. Requested party has no compatible baseband

device.
2. The port on your terminal is not compatible with
the port on the terminal of the other party.
Conference
Common
Guard
Private Guard
1. None of the users requested are available.

2. Not enough requested users are capable and
available (for various reasons) to activate the service
request.
Two Party
Conference
1. Connection could cause contention.

2. Your request could cause contention with an ongoing communication.
Conference
1. Not all requested parties could be connected.

2. At least one, but not all, of the requested parties
could not be connected. However, all available parties will be connected.
Link Test
Other Link Test in progress. Only one link test can be

done at a time on a channel and another user is conducting a link test at this time.
Two Party
Conference
Common
Guard
Private Guard
94
1. Unable to connect parties from different channels.

2. Frequency switching is required to connect the requested service, but cannot be accomplished for any
of the following:
Terminals that must switch arent capable.
Communications and channels arent on same
satellite.
Communications and channels arent controlled
by the same controller.
Frame segment on the communications and
channels dont match.
Channel frame timing may not be aligned.
95
1. DASA requests are reserved for guards only.

2. Your config code indicates a DASA service and
you have requested connection to another user or
users. Config codes 98 and 99 are reserved for
DASA services and only Private Guards can be assigned to DASA channels.
89
90
91
92
93
No DASA channel available.
96
Two Party
Conference
Common
Guard
Private Guard
97
Two Party
Conference
Common
Guard
Private Guard
Party is already connected to a DAMA time slot.

If you or your requested parties are on a DAMA time
slot the controller cant assign a DASA connection.
Conference
1. Too many guards specified in this request.

2. More than one guard was specified in the conference request.
N/A
Reserved for Home Channel Change at the terminal.
98
99
Both parties should check their port

settings.
Check your config code and try again.
Change 21
3-140G/(3-140H blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DRAG CHUTE MALFUNCTIONS

ACCIDENTAL DRAG CHUTE DEPLOYMENT
The drag chute is designed to operate without failure at indicated airspeeds (IAS) of 135 knots or
less. If the drag chute is fully inflated at higher
speeds, it will seriously weaken the risers and failure may result; also a shear pin may fail, thus releasing the chute. Such accidental deployment will
exert only minor effect upon the aircraft handling
characteristics but deployment at lower airspeeds
would be critical. It would induce considerable drag
causing a pitchdown tendency with wing flaps up or
a slight pitchup with the wing flaps extended. This
pitching would be controllable but the sudden decrease in airspeed could result in a stall condition.
It is necessary, therefore, to increase thrust and to
jettison the drag chute immediately under these

conditions. If the drag chute is jettisoned or
deployed over 135 knots IAS, the pilot shall so note
on the Form 781. The drag chute mechanism is designed so that if the drag chute door should open inadvertently while the drag chute lever is in
LOCKED position, the chute will jettison automatically.
DRAG CHUTE MALFUNCTION
If the drag chute fails to deploy when the drag

chute deployment lever is actuated, there is nothing
else that the pilot can do to get the drag chute out
of the compartment. The effect of the drag chute on
ground roll distance is shown by the landing charts
in Part 8 of T. O. 1B-52H-1-1.
Change 8
3-141
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY

MALFUNCTIONS
can be located and corrected, the unit should be

shut down.
NOTE
AC CIRCUIT FAULTS
Current Limiters (Fuses)
Each fuse has an indicator that provides a visual

indication of a blown fuse. Short-time electrical
faults will burn themselves out (with the multiwire
feeder system) without interruption of electrical
power.
Checking for opened circuit breakers is necessary during the execution of most emergency checklists in this section; however, an
item for specific circuit breakers appears on
the checklists only where special emphasis
or action is required.
AC POWER SYSTEM FAILURE
Changing fuses located in the power distribution boxes, load boxes, and panels (excluding neon light indicating fuses on panels at crew stations) in flight is extremely
dangerous and should not be attempted unless a serious emergency exists.
If possible, all electrical power including battery
power should be shut off before changing fuses.
Care should be exercised to use fuses of the correct
rating.
NOTE
Any fuse which is in series with a blown

fuse should be replaced because it may have
been damaged.
Circuit Breakers
If the popped out circuit breaker is associated with the fuel system flow indicators, fuel
pumps, or fuel valves, do not reset the circuit breaker(s) unless necessary for the safe
recovery of the aircraft.
Two types of trip free circuit breakers are used on
the aircraft. The most widely used is the round type
with IN and OUT positions. The other type is more
like a switch with ON and OFF positions. A circuit
breaker which has opened because of an existing
fault condition (short circuit or overload) should be
reset only when absolutely necessary. If it is necessary, two resets can be attempted. However, if the
circuit breaker continues to open, one additional reset may be attempted after a 5 minute time interval. If this procedure fails to close the circuit, the
fault will not clear by itself and, unless the trouble
3-142
The electrical power system has been designed to

automatically clear system faults and shut down
malfunctioning generator systems. When a generator fails during normal (parallel) operation, its
loads are automatically redistributed. During parallel operation, the load of a failed generator receives power from the central bus tie. If a generator
fails to trip off automatically when an abnormal operating condition is indicated on the ac control
panel, the generator should be isolated or turned
off, depending upon the situation. If a bus tie circuit breaker opens automatically and cannot be
closed, the generator should be operated isolated
rather than shut down if voltage and frequency are
stable and within limits. If a generator drive malfunction is indicated by the generator drive overheat light on the ac control panel, the generator
drive shaft should be decoupled from the engine
shaft by use of the decoupler switch, and the generator should be turned off. If the drive fails to decouple or the drive overheat light comes on again after
decoupling, the engine should be shut down. For a
list of possible generator failures, their probable
causes, and the corrective action to be taken, see
GENERATOR EMERGENCY OPERATION, figure
3-20. When operating with one generator isolated
and that generator fails, its load will be automatically placed on the central bus tie. If the load is not
automatically placed on the central bus tie, the
failed generator load may be placed on the central
bus tie by placing the respective generator switch to
OFF position and checking the bus tie circuit
breakers closed.
NOTE
If the fire shutoff switch is pulled and for

some reason a bus tie circuit breaker is
opened, the only means to close the breaker,
other than resetting the fire shutoff switch,
is to pull and reset the respective generator
control circuit breaker on the copilots circuit breaker panel.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
If two generators are lost, unneeded loads should be
dropped and consideration should be given to terminating the mission. For further information on
loads, see EQUIPMENT POWER SOURCE AND
ELECTRICAL LOADS CHART, Section 1.
NOTE
If a generator drive is decoupled during

flight, it can only be recoupled while on the
ground.
In the event of a generator bus failure and/
or generator shutdown that would require
reducing loads from the buses, a bus-by-bus
listing of the ac equipment is in figure 3-23
and in the emergency portion of the pilots
abbreviated checklist.
If the powered rudder/elevator main pumps
have been turned off to conserve electrical
power and a body hydraulic failure occurs,
it will be necessary to turn the respective
rudder/elevator main pump switch on.
Additional load reduction may be necessary
to compensate for this added load.
AC Power Loss Due to Engine Shutdown
The shutdown of engine 1, 3, 5, or 7 will be accompanied by the loss of electrical power from the generator geared to that engine. Although an engine at
idling speed will transmit enough energy to the
generator drive to maintain full ac power output, a
windmilling engine will not. The underexcitation
(undervoltage) relay will detect the low output and
will automatically trip the generator circuit breaker
and deexcite the generator. As during generator
failure for any other reason, the electrical loads on
the remaining generators should be closely monitored through the ammeters to prevent overloading.
If failure of the underexcitation (undervoltage)
relay and associated circuits allows the generator to
remain on (generator circuit breaker closed) when
the engine is windmilling, it could effect the power
provided through the central bus tie from the remaining generators. Since the motoring of a generator will drain ac power which may be needed for
other equipment, the generator on the dead engine
should be taken off the line. Pulling the fire shutoff
switch in the course of engine shutdown will open
the generator circuit breaker taking the generator
off the line. If the fire shutoff switch is not pulled,
the generator switch may be used placing it to OFF

position.
AC Transformer Failure
If any 28-volt ac autotransformer fails, flight will be

continued with the loss of some units, mostly lights
which are powered by the transformers. No emergency power for these units is available.
Failure of Three Generators
If three generators are lost, the aircrew must monitor electrical loads very closely to avoid overloading
the one remaining good generator. Priority for operation of ac electrical equipment should go to those
systems essential for safe recovery of the airplane.
Prior to turning on ac powered equipment, check
the ammeter for the operating generator to ensure
the generator has sufficient remaining capacity to
support the added load.
When operating on one generator, check

electrical loads prior to operating flaps.
Turn off all unnecessary ac loads. If it appears that the sum of existing essential
loads plus the added load of two flap motors
may overload the generator, consider operating the flaps on one flap motor. In that
case, pull the circuit breaker for one flap
motor.
NOTE
Full extension or retraction of the flaps will

take two minutes when operating on one
flap motor.
AFT TRANSFORMER RECTIFIER SYSTEM FAILURE
There is no indication of total aft TR bus failure

other than the failure of the equipment supplied by
that bus (figure 3-22 sheet 3). There is no indication
of partial aft TR unit failure. Equipment that will
be lost includes the ILS, VOR, and marker beacon.
If you lose the aft transformer rectifier system, it
should not be considered a serious emergency. With
the exception of a radar-directed approach (PAR,
ASR, ARDA), the only instrument procedure available to the crew will be TACAN.
Change 12
3-143
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Generator Emergency Operation

INDICATION OF
TROUBLE
POSSIBLE CAUSE
Generator circuit breaker

position indicator open
Generator protective circuit

trips or generator drive trips
See GENERATOR TRIP checklist, this section.
Generator control
breaker pops
Fault within the circuit or fault

within circuit components
Reset circuit breaker. If circuit breaker will not reset

and loss of the generator is not critical, hold the generator switch in OFF, set and hold the circuit breaker in
until the generator turns off. If the generator will not
turn off, the generators should then be isolated to preclude possible complete ac power failure, and consideration should be given to landing at the nearest suitable base.
circuit
REMEDY
NOTE
If it becomes necessary to shut down the affected engine, the respective bus will not be
powered.
Generator
light
drive
overheat
Generator drive overheat or

drive failure
Accomplish GENERATOR DRIVE OVERHEAT LIGHT

ILLUMINATES checklist, this section.
Bus tie circuit breaker position indicator open
Abnormal excitation or generator overheated or fluctuating voltage on affected generator
Hold generator switch ON until generator parallels.

Should bus tie circuit breaker remain open, operate generator isolated if within limits. Place faulty generator
switch in OFF if not within limits. If generator will not turn
off, decouple generator drive using GENERATOR DRIVE
OVERHEAT LIGHT ILLUMINATES checklist, this section.
Multiple bus tie position indicators open
Multiple malfunctions
Attempt reparalleling. If circuit breakers do not close, operate generators isolated if within limits.
All bus tie circuit breaker

position indicators open
Fault on central bus tie
Hold generator switches ON until generators parallel. If

bus tie circuit breakers trip, operate isolated.
Multiple generator and bus

tie circuit breaker position indicators open
Push master isolate switch in and hold while placing generator switches ON.
Abnormally unbalanced ammeter reading in parallel
Component failure
Press isolate switch. Check voltage, frequency, and load;

if readings are not within limits, first reparallel the properly
operating generators by holding the generator switches
ON and then place the faulty generator switches OFF. If
generator will not turn off, decouple generator drive using
GENERATOR DRIVE OVERHEAT LIGHT ILLUMINATES checklist, this section.
Excessive load oscillations
Fluctuating frequency or voltage
See GENERATOR AMPS OR FREQUENCY FLUCTUATION checklist, this section.
Failure of three generators
Turn off nonessential loads. Place good generator switch

ON; monitor loads to avoid overloading the generator. Attempt to restart failed generators by placing generator
switches ON. If failed generators do not start, place failed
generator switches OFF and check all bus tie circuit
breakers closed. Check loads prior to operating flaps.
Figure 3-20
3-144
Change 12
T.O. 1B-52H-1
COMPLETE AC POWER FAILURE
If all four generators fail and the procedures outlined in figure 3-20 do not result in regaining any
generator, the only power source remaining will be
the batteries. This condition will result is an emergency condition which will require conservation of
battery power.
NOTE
With all electrical power turned off, the fuel

boost pumps will be inoperative and the engines will operate at reduced thrust.
The buses receiving battery power are shown on
figure 1-65. For information on dc loads, see figures
1-69 and 3-21. The battery system is designed to
provide 4 hours of battery power to the loads connected by the emergency dc power switch. This time
element is based on fully charged relatively new
batteries. The procedures outlined under CONSERVATION OF BATTERY POWER checklist should be
followed.
When fuel in the main tanks has been used

to the point that the fuel inlets on boost
pumps not having pressure-loaded check
valves are uncovered (5000 pounds in 1 or
4 and 7000 pounds in 2 or 3 however, all
fuel gages will be inoperative), air will be
drawn into the fuel lines resulting in fuel
starvation. The fuel management procedure
should be such that each main tank is supplying its own nacelle with the engine crossfeed manifold valves CLOSED.
NOTE
Restarts after flameouts caused by cavitation or fuel starvation are doubtful at any
altitude without a source of boost pump
pressure; however, an altitude of 14,000 feet
or below will provide the fuel pressure required at the engine-driven fuel pump to
warrant a restart attempt.
Fuel Management Without Boost Pumps
After complete ac or forward TR electrical failure

occurs, the only fuel available for the engines will
be that fuel which remains in the main tanks. Use
of auxiliary tank fuel will not be possible because
the boost pumps are powered by alternating current and the engine-driven fuel pumps draw fuel
from the main tanks only. The auxiliary tank boost
pumps incorporate pressure-loaded check valves
that prevent engine-driven fuel pumps from drawing auxiliary fuel. Above 14,000 feet, the enginedriven fuel pumps tend to cavitate without boost
pump pressure. This may cause some or all engines
to flame out. Sufficient fuel pressure will be available to the engine-driven pumps for substantial
thrust and reliable engine operation on all engines
at 14,000 feet or below. Although engine operation
on suction feed at higher altitudes is possible, it
cannot be considered reliable. Conditions permitting a descent to 14,000 feet or below should be considered. A restart should be attempted since engine
ignition will be available from battery power (battery switch must be ON to obtain ignition.) See
ENGINE AIR STARTING and ENGINE FLAMEOUT AND RELIGHT, this section. The engine
crossfeed manifold valves (switches No. 9 thru 12)
are operated by battery power.
If complete electrical failure occurs, accomplish the

following:
1. If on an override sequence, close all auxiliary
tank engine feed control valves (13 thru 16) as soon
as possible, using essential battery power. When on
the ground and starting engines without the use of
external electrical power, it is permissible to have
valves 13 and 16 open.
2. If on a crossfeed operation, close all engine
crossfeed manifold valves (9 thru 12) as soon as
possible, using essential battery power.
3. Maintain aircraft in as nearly level attitude as
possible and avoid abrupt changes in speed or direction.
In the event of complete ac or forward TR

electrical failure, the only fuel available to
the engines will be the fuel remaining in
the main tanks. Changes in flight attitude,
acceleration forces or unknown fuel quantity may cause the main tank boost pumps to
become uncovered allowing air to be drawn
into the system, thus causing engine flameout; therefore, crewmembers must anticipate the possible loss of any or all engines
any time electrical power is lost and act accordingly.
3-145
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Instrument Operation
The only pilot instruments operating after complete

ac electrical power system failure will be:
Airspeed Indicators
Altimeters (pitot-static)
Magnetic Standby Compass
Clocks
Tachometers
EGT Gages
Pilots Attitude Indicator
Pilot Turn-and-Slip Indicator
Pilot C-2A Heading Indicator (gyro)
Emergency instrument lights for the pilots essential flight instruments, emergency alarm system,
and interphone power for all stations will be available. The EPR gages and fuel quantity gages will be
inoperative. In case of ac power failure on generator
bus No. 3, an emergency flight gyro inverter will
supply 115 volt three-phase ac power to the pilots
attitude-director indicator and pilots C-2A heading
indicator (gyro). In addition, the inverter supplies
lighting power for the pilots attitude indicator. The
inverter utilizes emergency dc power through a circuit breaker marked EMER INVTR on the FLIGHT
GYRO portion of the pilots circuit breaker panel
and is automatically controlled by the gyro power
switching relay when the pilots gyro power switch
is in ON position.
CONSERVATION OF BATTERY POWER

NOTE
Failure of the forward TR bus may result in illumination of either or

both battery discharging lights because the essential dc bus loads added to the battery buses as a consequence of the failure may result in
battery bus loads that exceed the capacity of the battery charging TR
unit. The battery discharging lights are powered from the forward battery. Autopilot, electrical stabilizer trim, and master caution light are
powered from the forward TR bus. Failure of these systems is proof
that the forward TR system bus failed. Proceed with the following
steps:
1. Emergency DC Power NORMAL or EMER (as required) (CP)
a. Leave switch NORMAL if conditions do not require power for emergency instrument lights, pilots turn-and-slip indicator, pilots attitude indicator, and standby attitude indicator.
b. Place switch to EMER if conditions require power for emergency instrument lights, pilots turnand-slip indicator, pilots attitude indicator, and standby attitude indicator. If forward battery
end of life light comes on, place emergency dc power switch to NORMAL. If power for emergency
instrument lights, pilots turn-and-slip indicator, standby attitude indicator, and pilots attitude
indicator is still needed, place battery switch to ON.
2. Battery OFF (CP)
Turn battery switch OFF to conserve as much battery power as possible for later use.
3. Pilots Gyro Power Set (as required) (P)
If ac power is not available, turn pilots gyro power off when attitude indicator is not required.
4. Battery Loads Reduced (P-CP)
It is essential that battery power be conserved to allow operation of airbrakes during final approach, antiskid after touchdown, and command
radio.
3-146
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CONSERVATION OF BATTERY POWER (Cont)

NOTE
The flaps will be inoperative. Therefore, if the flaps are up, a flaps-up
landing will be made. See LANDING WITH WING FLAPS UP checklist, this section.
a. Do not use airbrakes for descent.
b. If pilots turn-and-slip indicator is not required, pull the RATE OF TURN circuit breaker on
pilots CB panel.
c.
If the heading indicator (gyro) is not required, pull the DIR IND C-2 circuit breaker on pilots
CB panel.
d. If the standby attitude indicator is not required, pull the STANDBY ATTITUDE circuit breaker
on the pilots CB panel.
e.
If Emergency Flight Instrument Lights are not required, pull the EMER FLIGHT INSTR
LIGHTS circuit breaker on the MISCELLANEOUS portion of the pilots CB panel.
f.
Turn interphone power switch to OFF during any period when communications are not necessary.
g. If ac generators are inoperative, pull all four GEN circuit breakers on the AC GENERATOR
CONTROL portion of the copilots CB panel.
h. Pull RIGHT FWD, RIGHT AFT, LEFT FWD, and LEFT AFT SQUAT SWITCH CONTR circuit
breakers on pilots circuit breaker panel. Locked wheel protection and gear retraction capability
will not be available. (Do not apply brakes before wheels start to rotate.) However, antiskid
operation will be normal after touchdown.
i.
Pull the GROUND EGRESS circuit breaker on the right and left load central circuit breaker
panels. No light to the ground emergency egress handle is available, although the system will
operate normally.
5. Landing Gear DOWN (when required) (CP)

When ready to lower landing gear, proceed as follows:
NOTE
If fuel, gross weight, and other conditions permit, the landing gear
should be lowered as soon as it is determined that TR power will not be
available for the remainder of the flight. Landing gear extension may
be delayed if a landing cannot be made immediately and fuel quantity
is such that a suitable landing field could not be reached due to increased drag. When the end of life light comes on, the battery is almost
depleted and gear extension may not be possible.
a. Battery ON Until All Gears Indicate Down (CP)
b. Battery OFF (CP)
c.
POS IND Circuit Breaker Pulled (P)
3-147
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CONSERVATION OF BATTERY POWER (Cont)

6. If Crossfeed Valves Are Open:
a. Crossfeed Valves CLOSED (CP)
b. Battery ON for 15 seconds, then OFF (CP)
7. System Configuration Change:
If ac generators or other systems on the essential battery bus require changes, proceed as follows:
a. System Switches As required (P-CP)
b. Battery ON until changes are accomplished (CP)
c.
Battery OFF (CP)
8. Battery ON (for antiskid) (CP)

Just prior to final approach, place battery switch ON to provide antiskid.
9. Airbrakes Set (P)
Set airbrakes as required during final approach and landing.
3-148
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Battery Loads
1. DC LOADS AVAILABLE WITH BATTERY SWITCH ON AND EMERGENCY DC POWER SWITCH NORMAL
AFT BATTERY
LEFT ESSENTIAL START BUS
FORWARD BATTERY
RIGHT ESSENTIAL START BUS
Firewall Fuel Shutoff Valves Outboard Engines
Firewall Fuel Shutoff Valves Inboard Engines
Ignition and Cartridge Power Engines 1, 2, 7, and 8
Ignition and Cartridge Power Engines 3, 4, 5, and 6
LEFT ESSENTIAL BUS
RIGHT ESSENTIAL BUS
Antiskid Control Left and Right Forward
Antiskid Control Left and Right Aft
Battery Detector Power
Battery Caution Light
Bomb Door, Forward Emergency Valve
Battery Detector Power
Engine Fire Detectors Outboard
Bomb Door:
Engine Starter Valves Outboard

Engine Firewall Hydraulic Shutoff Valves Engines 1 & 7
Fuel:
Bomb door forward valve control

Bomb door aft valve control
Cartridge Start Engine No. 6
Auxiliary tank, engine feed control valves No. 14 & 15
Central Caution Controllers
Command Radio
Engines No. 1 and 7 control
Engine Fire Detectors Inboard
Bus tie and generator circuit breaker position

indicators (outbd) 1
Engine Starter Valves Inboard

Engine Firewall Hydraulic Shutoff Valves Engines 3,
4, 5 and 6 1
Landing Gear:
Bomb door control relays
Engine crossfeed manifold valves No. 9 and 12
Generator:
Left forward gear control (normal)
Fuel:
Right aft gear control (normal)

Left forward and right aft squat switch control (normal
and emergency)
Engine crossfeed manifold valves No. 10 and 11

Auxiliary tank, engine feed control valves No. 13 & 16
Generator:
Left tip gear control (normal), right tip gear
control (emergency)
Engines No. 3 and 5 control
Bus tie and generator circuit breaker position

indicators (inbd) 1
Generator trip indicator power box
External power and bus tie isolate
(Cont)
(Cont)
WITH BATTERY POWER ONLY, LOADS ON THIS BUS WILL AUTOMATICALLY SWITCH TO THE OTHER BATTERY
IN EVENT OF MALFUNCTION OF THE NORMAL BATTERY SHOWN.
COPILOTS ESSENTIAL BUS
3-149
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Battery Loads (Cont)

1. DC LOADS AVAILABLE WITH BATTERY SWITCH ON AND EMERGENCY DC POWER SWITCH NORMAL (Cont)
AFT BATTERY
FORWARD BATTERY
LEFT ESSENTIAL BUS (Cont)
RIGHT ESSENTIAL BUS (Cont)
Start Control Aft Bus
Landing Gear:
AFT BATTERY BUS

Aft Battery Bailout Warning Lights (Aft Fuselage)
Aft Battery End-of-Life Light
Antiskid Valves Left Forward and Right Forward
Emergency Manual Bomb Release
Entry Light
GAM-72 Gear Jettison & AGM-69A
Jettison Power (Bombs)
Main Landing Gear Emergency Control Right Forward
and Left Aft
Right forward gear control (normal)

Left aft gear control (normal)
Left aft and right forward squat switch control (normal
and emergency)
Right tip gear control (normal), left tip gear control
(emergency)
Landing gear (and lever position) warning
Landing gear position (all gear)
Tip protection gear caution light
Start Control Forward Bus

FORWARD BATTERY BUS
Rotor Support Power Adapter IEU No. 2

Aft Weapon IFC
Standby Start Power Inboard Engines
Antiskid Valves Left Aft and Right Aft
EMERGENCY BUSES
Forward and Aft Battery Detector Power

Emergency Battery Bus
Forward Battery Bailout Warning Lights (Crew Compartment)
Airbrake Control
Forward Battery End-of-Life Light
Bailout Warning Control
Forward Weapon IFC
Interphone Power
Emergency Instrument Bus
Main Landing Gear Emergency Control Right Aft and Left

Forward
Heading Indicator C-2A (gyro)
Rotor Support Power Adapter IEU No. 1
Emergency Flight Instrument Lights
Standby Start Power Outboard Engines
EMERGENCY BUSES
(No forward battery loads. Emergency instrument bus and

emergency battery bus are energized by aft battery.)
3-150
Change 19
T.O. 1B-52H-1
2. DC LOADS AVAILABLE WITH BATTERY SWITCH ON AND EMERGENCY DC POWER SWITCH IN EMER
AFT BATTERY
FORWARD BATTERY
LEFT ESSENTIAL BUS
RIGHT ESSENTIAL BUS
Same loads as with emergency dc power switch

NORMAL

NORMAL
AFT BATTERY BUS
FORWARD BATTERY BUS

NORMAL

NORMAL
EMERGENCY BUSES
EMERGENCY BUSES
(No aft battery loads. Emergency instrument bus and

emergency battery bus are energized by forward
battery.)
(Emergency instrument bus and emergency battery bus are

energized by forward battery.)
Emergency Battery Bus

Airbrake Control
Bailout Warning Control
Interphone Power
Emergency Instrument Bus

Heading Indicator C-2A (gyro)
Emergency Flight Instrument Lights
Change 12
3-151
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TR Powered Equipment
DC SYSTEMS/INDICATORS INOPERATIVE WITH LOSS OF FORWARD TR POWER
LEFT TR BUS
AIR CONDITIONING
Cabin air control
Bleed valve struts 1 & 4
Water separator bypass valve
Manifold air temperature gage
AIR CONDITIONING
Cabin emergency ram air control
Free air temperature indicator
ANTI-ICE CONTROL
Control pods 1 & 2
Airscoop shutoff valve
Left window and left auxiliary window relays
ANTI-ICE
Control pods 3 & 4
Right window and right auxiliary window relays
ELECTRONICS
V/UHF RADIO (ARC-210) DJ
Autopilot
Doppler radar
IFF
TACAN (AN/ARN-118(V))
FCS control system
ECM indicator lights
ECM set (AN/ALQ-172)
ECM system 1 & 2 antenna selectors
ECM systems 15 and 16 monitor control
ECM system 15
blanking module
pressure pump
ECM system 15 and 16 indicator control
ECM system 16
pressure pump
ECM transmitters 7 & 8
blanking module
pressure pump
FCS pressurization
APN-69 pressure kit control
Pressure pump
System 15
System 16
Indicator
Stability augmentation system
MRT (AN/ARR-85(V))
ELECTRONICS
UHF command
AFSATCOM
LOS radio control
Modem
SATCOM control
SYNC power supply
Monitoring set (AN/AJM-14)
ECM system 16
PD power
PR power
ECM transmitters 3, 4, 5 & 6
ECM transmitter system 20
Radar receiver (AN/ALR-20A)
Radio nav indicator (AN/ARN-21)
Wing chaff continuous power
ELECTRICAL MISCELLANEOUS
Faceplate defog
Left chaff dispensers 1, 2, 3 & 4
Pilots windshield wiper
ENGINE
Compressor bleed valves 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 & 8
Starter engines 1 & 2
EVS
EVS indicator dimming
Navigators display (monitor)
Pilots display (monitor)
Pilot-navigator power
STV ENV control
STV power
STV servo AZ & elevation
STV servo turret
RIGHT TR BUS
FUSE
ELECTRICAL MISCELLANEOUS
Faceplate defog (DI)
Faceplate defog (G)
Camera auto power
Camera door control
Camera indicator lights
Camera remote initiation
Master camera power
Central caution
Flight loads recorder
Copilot window wiper
Flare ejector program power
Wing chaff, right 5, 6, 7 & 8
Chaff deactivate
Generator drive decoupler 1, 3, 5 & 7
Rocket pod jettison left and right
EVS
Copilots display (monitor)
Copilot-radar nav power
FLIR servo AZ & elevation
FLIR control
FLIR ENV control
FLIR power
FLIR servo turret
Radar nav display (monitor)
SSG
Window wash control
Window wash valves
3-152
Change 19
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DC SYSTEMS/INDICATORS INOPERATIVE WITH LOSS OF FORWARD TR POWER (Cont)

LEFT TR BUS
RIGHT TR BUS
FUSE
FUEL
Level control
Aerial refueling
Flow indicator dc
Management indicator
Refuel valve
Defuel valve 30
Main tank low level warning
Outboard and external tank level warning
Main manifold scavenge control
Cabin manifold scavenge control
Master right level control
Crossfeed control valve 29a
Pump control
Left wing external tank, pump 1
Left outboard, pump 3
Main 1, pumps 4 & 5
Main 2, pumps 8 & 9
Main 3, pumps 14 & 15
Main 4, pumps 18 & 19
Forward body, pump 23
Center wing, pump 26
Mid body, pumps 27 & 28
Aft body, pump 31
Right outboard, pump 21
Right wing external, pump 22
Quantity indicating system
FUEL
Left master fuel level control
Pump control
Left outboard pump 2
Main tank 1, pumps 6 & 7
Pump control
Forward body tank, pump 24
Center wing body tank, pump 25
Mid body tank, pump 29
Aft body tank, pumps 30 & 32
Right outboard, pump 20
Crossfeed fuel valve 29
GPS
Interface unit
Navigator programmable keyboard
HYDRAULICS
Powered rudder elevator system
Hydraulic ground cooling control
Hydraulic pressure warning light
Hydraulic pump control No. 1
Pressure warning lights
Standby pump control, left outboard
Standby pump control, left body
LANDING GEAR
Crosswind crab indicator
GPS
LIGHTS
Hatch position warning
Press-to-test
Walkway light, aft control
Pilot and copilot dim control
Taxi and crosswind control
Vector warn light
HYDRAULICS
Powered rudder elevator system
Pump control No. 2
Standby pump control, right body
Standby pump control, right outboard
Interface unit control panel
OAS
See equipment power source chart in Section I
for details
SURFACE CONTROLS
Wing flap position indicator
Lateral trim indicator
Trim control
Left wing flap control
Left flap brake
Flight controls (Pitch and Yaw SAS)
WEAPON SYSTEMS
Weapon release indicator lights
Normal release bomb systems
Special weapon rack select
Forward bomb bay IFI power
Bomb door position indicator
Bomb door hold open
BNS timer door close
Forward parachute static line control
LANDING GEAR
Centering control
Position and flap warning horn
LIGHTS
Low altitude warning light
Master caution light
Aerial refueling external light
OAS
See equipment power source chart in Section
I for details
SURFACE CONTROLS
Right wing flap control
Right flap brake
WEAPONS SYSTEM
Aft bomb bay IFI power
Aft parachute static line control
Coded switch set
Change 21
3-153
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TR Powered Equipment (Cont)

DC SYSTEMS/INDICATORS INOPERATIVE WITH LOSS OF AFT TR POWER
AFT TR BUS
MISSILE SYSTEM
Rotary launcher hydraulic control power
Omni-range radio (AN/ARN-14)

VOR navigation
ILS localizer
Marker beacon (AN/ARN-32)
Rendezvous beacon
Flare ejector power
ELECTRONICS
ECM transmitter systems 9 thru 14
ECM system 15
PD power
PR power
ECM system 21
Fire control system
Camera and camera vacuum pump
Radar altimeter
AC Powered Equipment
NOTE
The equipment shown in this chart is a bus-by-bus listing of the ac operated equipment. This
will give the crew an idea of a system or portion of a system that would be lost if a bus was
not receiving power.
GENERATOR NO. 1
Battery heater (aft)
Camera blowers, doors, and heaters
ECM system 15
Fire control system
Flap motor (left)
Fuel pumps auxiliary
Aft body tank, pump No. 32
Center wing tank, pump No. 25
Left external tank, pump No. 1
Left outboard tank, pump No. 3
Mid body tank, pump No. 29
Fuel pumps main
Tank No. 1, pump No. 4
Fuel scavenge pump (main manifold)
GPS
Interface unit prime (3)
Receiver
Hydraulic standby pumps (left outboard and right body)
Lights
Aft walkway dome
Section 43 walkway
Landing (left)
Liaison radio (AN/ARC-190 (V))
Parastatic line control (fwd)
Powered rudder/elevator pump No. 1
Precooler (bleed air) (Pod 2)
Q-Spring airscoop anti-ice
Rendezvous radar (AN/APN-69)
Rotary launcher hydraulic pump
Section 43 28 volts ac power
Stabilizer screw heat
Stabilizer trim
Trim control
TR units No. 5, 6 & 7 (aft)
Wing chaff dispensers (No. 1, 2, 3 & 4)
3-154
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
GENERATOR NO. 3
AHRS
Altitude computer
Anti-ice pod valves No. 1 & 2
Attitude selector indicator
Automatic pilot
Cabin air conditioning (emergency ram airscoop)
ECM systems 1, 2, 7, 8 & 20
EVS
Displays (monitors) (CP & RN)
FLIR ENV fan
FLIR ENV heater
FLIR system
FLIR window heater
SCU
SSG
VDU
Flight controls (Pitch and Yaw SAS)
Flight instruments
Flight gyro (pilot) (MD-1)
AS indicator
Forward battery TR unit
Forward body tank, pump No. 23
Left outboard tank, pump No. 2
Fuel pumps main
Hot cup (BNS)
Hydraulic pressure indicator
Hydraulic standby pump (left body)
Lateral trim actuator
Lights
Aisle and spot
Anticollision
Dome (miscellaneous and OAS)
Flood (OAS and copilot)
Instrument (pilots and RN/N)
Navigation
Panel (pilots and RN/N)
Remote flood
Table (OAS)
Terrain clearance
Walkway (Fwd)
MRT (AN/ARR-85(V))
OAS power
OAS vane htrs
Oxygen quantity indicator
Pitot tube heat (left and SAS)
Pitot heaters-altitude computer
Radar
Altimeter (AN/APN-224)
Astrocompass
OAS ground heat
OAS pressure kit
Doppler radar (AN/APN-218)
IFF (AN/APX-64)
Rendezvous radar pressure kit 61-001
Seat position (pilot and RN/N)
Symbol signal generator
TACAN (AN/ARN-118)
TR unit No. 3 & 8 (fwd)
Transformer 28 volts ac (left)
Window heat (auxiliary and left)
GENERATOR NO. 5
AFSATCOM (AN/ARC-171(V))
Aft battery charging TR unit
AJQ-23 power supply
ALQ-122 duplexer (fwd)
AN/ALR-20A
AN/ALR-46
Anti-ice pod valves No. 3 & 4
Battery heater (fwd)
Cabin air conditioning (CTCS shutoff and
pressure regulator valve)
Continuous ignition
ECM pressure pump
ECM systems 3, 4, 5, 6 & 21
ECM system 15
Engine pressure ratio
EVS
Displays (monitors) (P & N)
STV
STV ENV fan
STV ENV heater
STV window heater
VDU pilot/STV
Window wash pump
Window wash tank heater
Flare ejector (ALE-20)
Forward body tank, pump No. 24
Right outboard tank, pump No. 21
Fuel pumps main
Fuel flow
Fuel quantity
Fuel scavenge pump (cabin manifold)
Glide slope receiver
GPS
Interface unit fill-in (3)
Hot cup (DECM & FCS)
Hot cup (pilot and copilot)
LCHR rotational tool
Lights
Air refueling
Dome (copilot, pilot, EW, and gunner)
Flood (EW, gunner, and pilot)
Instrument (copilot)
Panel (copilot, EW, and gunner)
Periscopic sextant
Signal
Thunderstorm
Wing taxi
Memory loader verifier
Oil press & temp ind
Pitot tube heat (right and SAS)
Pod No. 1 thru 4 EPR ind
Power management system
Seat position (copilot, EW, and gunner)
Strut No. 3 and body crossover
Total fuel quantity recorder
TR unit No. 4 (fwd)
Transformer 28 volts ac (right)
Window heat (auxiliary and right)
Change 21
3-155
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AC Powered Equipment (Cont)

GENERATOR NO. 7
AN/ALQ-122 ECM
ECM systems No.11 thru 15
ECM system 16 (AN/ALQ-172)
Flap motor (right)
Center wing tank, pump No. 26
Right external tank, pump No. 22
Right outboard tank, pump No. 20
Fuel pumps main
Hydraulic standby pump (right outboard)

Lights
Crosswind landing and taxi
Landing (right)
Powered rudder/elevator pump No. 2
TR units No. 2 (fwd)
Wing chaff dispensers (No. 5, 6, 7 & 8)
3-156
T.O. 1B-52H-1
see DC SYSTEM EMERGENCY OPERATION, figure 3-24.
DC POWER SYSTEM FAILURE
For a list of possible dc power failures, their probable causes, and the corrective action to be taken,
DC System Emergency Operation

INDICATION OF
TROUBLE
POSSIBLE CAUSE
REMEDY
Aft battery discharge

light
Fault within charging TR

unit
See FAILURE OF AFT BATTERY CHARGING TR

UNIT, this Section.
Forward battery
discharge light
Fault within charging TR

unit
See FAILURE OF FORWARD BATTERY

CHARGING TR UNIT, this Section.
Failure of BNS/autopilot
stab trim & master
caution
Forward TR failure
See FORWARD TRANSFORMER-RECTIFIER SYSTEM

FAILURE, this Section.
Figure 3-24
3-157
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Failure of Aft Battery Charging TR Unit
Failure of the aft battery charging TR unit will result in no charging current for the aft battery and
will cause the master caution light to come on if dc
power is available on the right essential bus. If the
interphone power switch is ON, and the battery
switch is ON, the aft battery charging TR unit is
not functioning; the indication will be the illumina-
tion of the aft battery discharging light on the copilots side panel. This light will illuminate when the
aft battery discharging rate is greater than 0.25
(+0.75/0) ampere. If the aft battery becomes totally
discharged, control power to the copilots left essential bus will be lost. The loads on the aft battery
should be minimized. If failure of aft battery charging TR unit occurs, accomplish the following checklist:
FAILURE OF AFT BATTERY CHARGING TR UNIT
1. L ESS BATT CONT Circuit Breaker Pulled (P/CP/EW)

Pulling the 5 ampere circuit breaker on the left load central will allow TR power to be routed to
the copilots left essential bus.
2. Emergency DC Power EMERGENCY (CP)
This will power the emergency instrument bus and the emergency battery bus from the forward
battery.
3. Entry Light OFF (CP)
NOTE
If the forward battery discharging light comes on, see FAILURE OF

BOTH BATTERY CHARGING TR UNITS checklist, this section.
4. Consideration should be given to terminating the mission.
3-158
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Failure of Forward Battery Charging TR Unit
Failure of the forward battery charging TR unit will

result in no charging current for the forward battery and will cause the master caution light to come
on if dc power is available on the right essential
bus. If the interphone power switch is ON, and the
battery switch is ON, the forward battery charging
TR unit is not functioning; the indication will be the
illumination of the forward battery discharging

light on the copilots side panel. This light will illuminate when the forward battery discharging rate
is greater than 0.25 (+0.75/0) ampere. If the forward battery becomes totally discharged, control
power to the copilots right essential bus will be
lost. The loads of the forward battery should be
minimized. If failure of forward battery charging
TR unit occurs, accomplish the following checklist:
FAILURE OF FORWARD BATTERY CHARGING TR UNIT
1. R ESS CONTR Circuit Breaker Pulled (P/CP/EW)

Pulling the 5 ampere circuit breaker on the right load central will allow TR power to be routed to
the copilots right essential bus.
2. Emergency DC Power NORMAL (CP)
NOTE
See figure 3-21 for loads on the forward battery bus.

3. Consideration should be given to terminating the mission.
NOTE
If the aft battery discharging light illuminates, see FAILURE OF

BOTH BATTERY CHARGING TR UNITS checklist, this section.
3-159
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Failure of Both Battery Charging TR Units
Complete failure of the battery charging TR units

will result in an emergency condition which will require conservation of battery power. The failure of
these units will result in no charging power for either the forward or the aft battery. This condition
will cause the master caution light to come on if dc
power is available on the right essential dc bus.
Failure of both battery charging TR units will be indicated by the illumination of the battery discharging lights. Proceed to the nearest suitable air base.
Since there are no means to positively measure the

amount of battery charging capacity remaining, it
is essential that the capacity be conserved to the
maximum degree possible. Battery power should
not be used for any equipment item, unless the use
of the item is necessary to maintain flight. Antiskid, airbrakes, and interphone will become inoperative when the batteries are discharged. Do not
use airbrakes for descent and turn off antiskid until
ready to land. If failure of both battery charging TR
units occurs, accomplish the following checklist:
FAILURE OF BOTH BATTERY CHARGING TR UNITS
1. Battery OFF (CP)

Turn the battery switch OFF to conserve as much battery power as possible for later use.
2. L ESS DC BATT CONT & R ESS CONTR Circuit Breakers Pulled (P/CP/EW)
Pulling both 5 ampere circuit breakers on the left and right load centrals allows power to be available
to the copilots left and right essential buses.
3. Emergency DC Power NORMAL (CP)
This will supply power to the emergency instrument bus from the forward TR units.
4. Battery Loads Reduced (P/CP)
It is essential that battery power be conserved to allow operation of airbrakes during final approach, antiskid after touchdown, and command
radio.
a. Do not use airbrakes for descent.
b. Turn interphone switch to OFF during any period when communications are not necessary.
c.
Check entry light OFF.
5. Airbrakes Set (P)

Set airbrakes as required during final approach and landing.
3-160
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Forward Transformer Rectifier System Failure
Complete failure of the forward TR bus will result

in an emergency condition. Proceed to nearest suitable field. Those loads on right and left essential
buses will transfer to battery power; however, systems which utilize TR power or are controlled by
TR power will cease to function. As a result, even
some systems which are ac powered will be unusable.
Among such systems which will be unusable are

flaps, fuel boost pumps, fuel transfer pumps, electrical stabilizer trim, OAS, and radar. Crossfeed
valves should be closed. For TR powered equipment, see figure 3-22. There is no indication of partial forward TR unit failure. If failure of forward
transformer rectifier system occurs accomplish the
following checklist:
FORWARD TRANSFORMER-RECTIFIER SYSTEM FAILURE

NOTE
If the autopilot or OAS systems have failed during flight, check the
electrical stabilizer trim and press the master caution light. If these
circuits are not functioning, the forward TR system has failed.
See CONSERVATION OF BATTERY POWER checklist, this section.
TACAN navigation and use of the No. 2 UHF radio will not be possible.
The only fuel available for the engines will be that fuel which remains
in the main tanks. See FUEL MANAGEMENT WITHOUT BOOST
PUMPS, this section.
Anti-icing will be inoperative.
1. Proceed to the nearest suitable airfield.

2. Crossfeed Valve CLOSED (if open) (CP)
In the event of complete ac or forward TR electrical failure, the only

fuel available to the engines will be the fuel remaining in the main
tanks. Changes in flight attitude, acceleration forces or unknown fuel
quantity may cause the main tank boost pumps to become uncovered
allowing air to be drawn into the system, thus causing engine flameout;
therefore, crewmembers must anticipate the possible loss of any or all
engines any time electrical power is lost and act accordingly.
3. See LANDING WITH WING FLAPS-UP checklist (if flaps are up).
The flaps will be inoperative.
3-161
T.O. 1B-52H-1
GENERATOR TRIP
1. Generator Reset (CP)

Attempt to reset generator by placing generator switch to ON. If generator resets and load is fluctuating, see GENERATOR AMPS OR FREQUENCY FLUCTUATION checklist.
NOTE
A total of two resets may be attempted at approximately 15-second

intervals.
2. Generator OFF (if generator fails to reset) (CP)
If generator will not reset, place generator switch momentarily to OFF and check all bus tie circuit
breakers closed.
GENERATOR AMPS OR FREQUENCY FLUCTUATION
1. Master Isolate Switch Pushed (CP)

2. Isolated Generators Checked (CP)
Check frequency and voltage of each generator using the frequency and voltage selector switch to
determine malfunctioning generator(s).
3. Operating Generator ON (CP)
Place generator switch for a good operating generator on to provide an electrical power source to
the central bus tie.
4. Malfunctioning Generator(s) OFF/DECPL (CP)
If any generator indicates abnormal voltage fluctuations with normal frequency, place generator
switch off. If generator will not turn off, decouple generator drive using GENERATOR DRIVE
OVERHEAT LIGHT ILLUMINATES checklist. If any generator indicates abnormal frequency fluctuations, proceed to decouple using the GENERATOR DRIVE OVERHEAT LIGHT ILLUMINATES
checklist.
5. Remaining Generators (All) Paralleled (CP)
3-162
T.O. 1B-52H-1
GENERATOR DRIVE OVERHEAT LIGHT ILLUMINATES
NOTE
If a generator drive overheat light comes on during ground operations,

do not decouple the generator drive. Shut down the affected engine and
have maintenance investigate to determine the cause of the overheat.
The generator drives cannot be recoupled during flight. Therefore, prior
to decoupling more than two drives, factors other than drive damage
such as electrical power should be considered.
Do not isolate generators.
1. Voltmeter & Frequency Selector Switch Affected Generator (CP)

2. Voltage & Frequency Indication Checked (CP)
3. GEN CIRCUIT BKR Checked (CP)
4. Generator Drive DECPL (CP)
Hold switch in DECPL for 1 to 2 seconds, then release.
NOTE
Throttle will be out of CUTOFF when actuating decoupler switch.

5. Generator Drive Decoupled Verified (CP)
If generator circuit breaker indicator opens and generator voltage and frequency drop, the drive has
decoupled.
6. Reset Central Caution Lights Reset (CP)
If Generator Drive Decoupled, Continue Mission With All Engines Operating.
7. Generator Switch OFF (CP)

8. Generator Drive Overheat Light Check off (CP)
Check generator drive decoupler switch in MON position. The overheat light should be off.
NOTE
A drive overheat light that remains illuminated does not require engine
shutdown provided it is positively determined that drive decouple has
occurred.
If Generator Drive Decouple Was Not Verified & the Overheat Light Remains On (Or Comes On Later);
9. Engine Shut down (P-CP)

Shut Down Engine Using SHUTDOWN AFTER GENERATOR DRIVE DECOUPLER FAILURE
Checklist
3-163
T.O. 1B-52H-1
SHUTDOWN AFTER GENERATOR DRIVE DECOUPLER FAILURE
1. Generator OFF (CP)

2. Throttle CLOSED (CP)
3. Establish 25% or Less Windmill RPM Established (P)
After engine shutdown, establish 25% or less windmill rpm as soon as possible.
Continued operation at higher windmill rpm may result in extensive

damage to CSD gearbox and adjacent components.
NOTE
At some gross weights, it will be necessary to change altitude to establish a 25% windmill rpm maximum.
Maintain 40 knots above initial stall warning speed if possible until
entry into traffic pattern.
The 25% windmilling rpm may be exceeded, if necessary, to maintain
a safe landing speed.
The following chart is a quick reference table. The speeds indicated are Initial Stall Warning plus
40 knots (flaps up).
3-164
Change 12
GROSS
WEIGHT
SPEED
200,000
220,000
240,000
260,000
280,000
300,000
320,000
340,000
161 K
167 K
173 K
178 K
184 K
189 K
194 K
199 K
GROSS
WEIGHT
SPEED
360,000
380,000
400,000
420,000
440,000
460,000
480,000
203 K
208 K
212 K
216 K
220 K
224 K
228 K
T.O. 1B-52H-1
SHUTDOWN AFTER GENERATOR DRIVE DECOUPLER FAILURE (Cont)

4. If Fire is Observed in Engine Area, Fire Shutoff Switch Pulled (P-CP)
The fire shutoff switch should not be reset for remainder of flight since
fuel, oil, hydraulic, and bleed air lines in the area of the constant speed
drive may have been damaged by shrapnel.
NOTE
If the bus tie circuit breaker is opened, the only means to close the
breaker, other than resetting the fire shutoff switch, is to pull and reset
the respective generator control circuit breaker on the copilots circuit
breaker panel.
5. Electrical Loads Adjusted (as necessary) (P-CP)
6. Bleed Selector As required (CP)
Change 12
3-164A/(3-164B blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ENGINE MALFUNCTIONS
ACCELERATION HANGUP
Acceleration hangup is a type of malfunction in

which the engine fails to accelerate past a specific
rpm. This hangup sometimes occurs after the
throttle has retarded and an attempt has been
made to accelerate to a higher rpm. Acceleration
hangup can be attributed to a faulty fuel control
unit or to continuous engine stall. In case of a
faulty fuel control unit, engine shutdown may be
necessary; in the case of continuous engine stall, it
may be necessary to reduce thrust, increase airspeeds, or decrease altitude. See COMPRESSOR
STALL, this section. Some engine fuel control units
have been found to exhibit characteristics which
may result in a random hung start during the engine starting cycle. A hung start is defined as any
start during which the engine is not accelerating for
5 seconds or more at an rpm below idle. The rpm at
which a hung start occurs is usually between 40%
and 52%. A hung start which occurs at approximately 26% rpm can indicate an internal mechanical malfunction in the fuel control unit, in which
case further starting attempts should be discontinued. Auxiliary boost pump pressure should be supplied if an engine, while feeding from main fuel
tanks, gives an indication of hung start in the 40%
to 52% rpm range. For hung start procedures, see
checklist in Section II.
COMPRESSOR STALL
Engine compressor stall is inherent in a jet engine

due to the airfoil characteristics of the compressor
blades. Compressor stall is an aerodynamic stall
caused by the reduction of airflow through the engine. With reduced airflow through the engine, the
compressor blades, which are in effect miniature
airfoils, stall in a similar manner to an aircraft
wing in slow flight, and as a result of variations in
the pattern of reduced air flow across the compressors, complex differences in stalls are created.
Compressor blade stalls vary in severity, depending
on whether the stall involves only a portion of a
stage, a complete stage, several stages, or an entire
compressor. Reduced airflow can happen over the
complete engine area and can extend back into all
of the compressor stages right up to the diffuser
section, or it can happen to only one or two stages,
or to any degree between these extremes. The usual
causes of compressor blade stall are low temperatures, reduced air densities, engine inlet conditions,
and the adjustment and operation of the engine fuel
control unit and overboard air bleed valve. The
propagation of a stall occurs so rapidly it appears to

be instantaneous and results in a complete reversal
or breakdown of airflow in the engine. This breaking down of airflow occurs as a result of an imposed
pressure rise across a stage of compressor blades.
An increased pressure rise across a compressor
stage results on an increased angle of attack of incoming air with respect to the compressor blades.
This also may be thought of as a reduction in the
incoming air velocity component which results
when pressure rise is increased.
Stalling of a single blade or circumferential row of
blades will reduce the pressure rise of that compressor stage. This in turn loads up the remaining
stages of compression by requiring them to increase
the pressure by the amount lost at the stage which
stalled. The stalling of one stage will in turn increase the pressure rise at the next stage and cause
it to stall since it also is highly loaded. The increase
in pressure rise across the low speed compressor of
the TF33-P-3 engine is produced by reduced pressures at the inlet which are a result of excessive
flow separation over the cowl lip and which are further aggravated by crosswinds.
Due to the effect of crosswinds during static engine
operation, air entering the inlet around the cowl lip
separates and creates pressure distortion across the
face of the forward compressor. A stall which is due
to pressure distortion results in a complete reversal
of airflow with expulsion of gases from both the inlet and exit of the engine. The stall may be aggravated due to use of the engine, nacelle, and scoops
anti-icing system. Use of the anti-icing system can
induce engine stall at altitudes above 35,000 feet
and during crosswind ground operation because of
the airflow discharged from the nose dome into the
engine inlet.
If the stall causing condition persists, further stalls
will occur in a random fashion; however, this type
of stall, which follows the reversal of airflow stall, is
not of a continuous nature but is momentary, lasting only a fraction of a second. In addition to the
compressor blade design contributing to stalls, the
high thrust output and low specific fuel consumption of an axial flow compressor engine necessitates
that the engine be operated as close as possible to
the stall region of the compressors. Stall can be designed out of an engine operating schedule at the
expense of efficiency. The loss of efficiency though
would be so great that it is essential that the engine
and fuel flow schedule be designed in such a manner that stall will normally be avoided during periods of acceleration, deceleration, and low thrust operation.
3-165
T.O. 1B-52H-1
On TF33-P-3 engines, stall-free operation in high
crosswinds on the ground may be accomplished by
use of the engine stall prevention system which
opens interstage overboard surge bleed valves sufficiently to reduce the pressure rise across the low
speed compressor. The occasional stalls experienced
during acceleration and deceleration are caused by
blade stall. During acceleration, extra fuel is fed to
the burners to provide the extra energy needed to
accelerate the rotating masses. If the engine inlet
conditions result in operation near a stall condition,
the compressor stall process begins with a relatively high internal pressure being built up in the combustion chambers as a result of the extra fuel
introduced. This slows down the air coming through
the high pressure compressor to the point where
the air velocity and the rpm in some part of the
compressor no longer match up properly and a stall
occurs.
When a throttle is retarded under conditions which
will produce stall during deceleration, the high
pressure compressor slows first because it has the
lightest mass. Slowing of the high pressure compressor, in effect, blocks the airflow through the low
pressure compressor and, following blade stall, a
stall of the low pressure compressor results when
the air velocity through it gets low enough. The reduction of airflow through the engine is induced by
rapid engine throttle movements, high angle of attack, extreme altitude operation, and high altitude
turns. The most common of these conditions is the
rapid advancement or retardation of the throttles
and high altitude turns.
To prevent engine stall, avoid rapid throttle

retardation, particularly during deceleration above 45,000 feet.
There is another type of compressor stall which appears to originate with ice crystals in the air at
high altitudes and which usually is encountered in
and around thunderheads. The crystals apparently
go into the engine with the air and ingest the engine with water as they are melted during compression. Ice crystal stalls appear to be due to operation
of the high pressure compressor approaching a stall
condition when water is ingested at the time of low
air density as encountered at high altitude. Although possible, an ice crystal stall of TF33-P-3 engines is unlikely to occur. The construction of the
engine provides an outlet for water through the turbofan exit ducts; these engines also have a continuous ignition system for prevention of flameout.
3-166
The inlet cowl design for the TF33-P-3 engine permits maximum aircraft Mach number during high
speed thrust runs and, in order to reduce drag, requires high inlet air velocity at static conditions.
The inlet nose dome anti-icing overboard exit air
passages have been changed to eliminate engine
stalls caused by anti-icing exit airflow. To eliminate
stall conditions induced by the nose dome exit airflow, the nose dome air passages direct the anti-icing air into that portion of the forward compressor
face, near the inlet cowl splitter, where pressures
remain uniform under all conditions of crosswind
operation. The inter-compressor bleed valve operation combined with the nose dome passage design
allows stall-free operation in high crosswinds with
engine and nacelle anti-icing operating.
Compressor stall is usually associated with unstable engine operation and may in some instances be
recognized by compressor pulsations which cause
very loud explosive reports to be emitted. This may
be startling to a flightcrew when a severe engine
stall is first experienced. Some stalls do not make
themselves known by noise or surges but simply result in the engine not being able to accelerate or in
losing rpm with no change in the throttle position.
Incipient stall may produce roughness in engine operation with or without any audible reaction. More
pronounced stalls may produce audible pulsations
of varying intensity. With recognition of the operational symptoms, it is possible to take corrective action in time to minimize the possibility of engine
damage or to correct an engine malfunction.
The conditions of acceleration hangup, engine
surge, and engine flameout are associated with respective characteristics of engine compressor stall
and may be either reduced in intensity or avoided
by use of applicable procedures.
Stall may be avoided or the intensity of a stall reduced by use of the following procedures:
Use of the engine stall prevention (ESP)

pushbutton switch on the pilots control wheel will
prevent engine stall due to crosswind during engine
ground operation.
Avoid erratic or abrupt throttle movements.
Rapid throttle advances during periods of high distortion of the air at the engine inlet are sometimes
the cause of acceleration stalls.
Carefully coordinated flying will increase the
efficiency of the air inlet ducts and reduce the tendency of engine stall. Airspeeds should be maintained above the acceptable minimum.
Operation at a higher airspeed and at a reduced
angle of attack or rate of climb of the aircraft may
help to eliminate a stall condition.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
When a stall occurs, slowly retard the throttle

to IDLE or until the stall ceases, then slowly accelerate the engine until the desired thrust is obtained.
During periods of compressor stall, observe the
exhaust gas temperature closely. Reduce the
throttle to avoid overtemperature, when necessary.
If a stall occurs at high altitude, reduce the altitude, if necessary, to aid stall recovery. Dropping
the nose of the aircraft slightly sometimes produces
smoother airflow into the inlet duct, eliminating the
stall.
If the stall condition cannot be controlled, shut
down the engine depending on circumstances such
as whether or not one or more engines have developed uncontrollable stall. Continued severe compressor stall could conceivably be detrimental to an
engine.
FLAMEOUT
Engine flameout is the complete loss of combustion.

The main causes for flameout are unstable engine
operation such as a compressor stall condition and
engine fuel starvation. Flameout from compressor
stall usually occurs at altitudes above 45,000 feet
and results from a change in the inlet air pressure
gradient of the engine at high angles of attack. Fuel
starvation to the engine generally is associated
with low main tank fuel quantity during penetration maneuvers when for a brief period of time all
or most of the boost pumps in a main tank may become uncovered. Uncoordinated maneuvers, negative gs plus the effects of deceleration, pitch, and
turbulence increase the possibility of uncovering
operable boost pumps. To reduce the possibility of
engine flameout, it is recommended that during
transition phase of flight (penetration and low approaches) extreme pitch and roll angles and abrupt
or uncoordinated maneuvers be avoided whenever
possible. If engine flameout does occur, the rpm and
EGT will begin dropping at once. Generally engine
flameout can be remedied by restarting the engine.
For additional information and proper inflight restarting procedure, see ENGINE FLAMEOUT AND
RELIGHT and ENGINE AIR STARTING under
ENGINE FAILURE in this section.
RPM FLUCTUATIONS
Engine instability may occur because of some malfunction in the engine or fuel control unit and may
be recognized if any of the following are noted:
1. Erratic increase of exhaust gas temperature.
2. Rapid reduction or fluctuation of rpm at
constant throttle setting or failure of rpm to continue to increase during acceleration.
3. Shock of compressor pulsations felt in the aircraft structure.
4. Loss of thrust reflected in aircraft instruments.
5. No response of EPR to throttle movement.
Corrective Measures
ACCELERATION
If erratic engine performance is experienced during
acceleration of the aircraft:
1. Retard throttle to IDLE position.
2. Obtain stable operation.
3. Slowly advance throttle to the desired thrust
condition.
STEADY STATE OPERATION
While in a stabilized cruise condition, if erratic engine performance is experienced:
1. Slowly retard or advance throttle to a more
stable thrust range.
2. Reduce altitude.
While in a stabilized climb condition, if erratic engine performance is experienced:
1. Slowly retard or advance throttle to a more
stable thrust range.
2. Increase airspeed by reducing climb.
DECELERATION
During periods of deceleration of the aircraft, if erratic engine performance is experienced:
1. Change the throttle position to obtain stable
engine operation.
2. Slowly adjust throttle to the desired thrust
condition.
3-167
T.O. 1B-52H-1
STARTER HANGUP
Starter hangup is a type of malfunction wherein

the starter fails to drop out during engine start.
Starter dropout should occur at approximately 35%
to 45% rpm. TF33-P-3 engines are subject to hung
starts at temperatures of 45F (75C) and below. In
freezing temperature, a hung start may result from
improper sensing caused by water or ice formation
if there is an accumulation of water in the
compressor burner pressure bellows chamber of the
engine fuel control unit. A drain screw is installed
to provide a means for maintenance personnel to
drain accumulated moisture from the compressor
burner pressure bellows chamber. During freezing
temperature if ice has formed, it may be melted to
allow drainage by directing hot air on the engine
fuel control unit. Hung starts are usually
characterized by failure of the engine to accelerate
beyond 40% rpm. The EGT may rise slowly but
should not be allowed to exceed the starting limit.
CARTRIDGE STARTER MALFUNCTIONS
In the event starter cartridge does not fire,

pilot designates engine on which cartridge
did not fire to ground crew over interphone.
Copilot places that starter switch to OFF.
Cartridge will not be removed until there is
no evidence of exhaust smoke at the starter
exhaust duct and minimum time interval
has elapsed since initiation. Prior to removal of a cartridge, ensure that the start selector switch is in FLIGHT and the engine
ignition circuit breakers are pulled. The
ground crew must observe the handling
precautions outlined in Section V. Pilot
makes entry on Form 781.
Simultaneous cartridge starts of QUICK
START configured aircraft can produce toxic gases in sufficient concentration to be
hazardous to individuals who remain in the
immediate vicinity of the aircraft. The potential hazard is dependent on aircraft
parking configuration, wind velocity and direction, and other ambient conditions.
Ground crewmembers and security police
who are required to remain in a toxic cloud
will wear proper eye and respiratory protection.
3-168
Change 4
During operation of the cartridge-pneumatic starter system, observe limitations given

in Section V.
Cartridge Malfunction During Alert Response
When encountering a cartridge malfunction during

alert response, start the remaining engines as expeditiously as possible using bleed air from a started
engine or external air, as applicable. All cartridge
start restrictions will be observed unless the alert is
determined to be actual SIOP or an impending disaster makes moving the aircraft necessary. Under
these conditions, if a malfunction occurs in both
cartridges, the waiting period between start of initiation and removal of unfired cartridge may be reduced to not less than 1 minute provided the specific ground handling precautions outlined in Section
V are met. Cartridge malfunctions of two types may
occur during the start attempt; hangfire or misfire.
Malfunction indications and appropriate alert reactions are as follows:
1. HANGFIRE.
A delay in the functioning of a propelling charge at
the time of firing. The amount of delay is unpredictable, but in most cases will fall within the range of
a split second to several minutes. There will be evidence of smoke at the starter exhaust duct. The engine rpm will increase rapidly and the cartridge
will give evidence of nearly normal operation. In
this type malfunction, the energy is expended and
presents no hazard to engine operation.
2. MISFIRE.
A cartridge that fails to ignite. There will be no
physical evidence of smoke at the starter exhaust
duct and no engine rotation. If a misfire occurs, observe the proper waiting period from start of initiation prior to removing the unfired cartridge. Upon
removal of the defective cartridge, a normal pneumatic start can be accomplished. For actual SIOP
or if an impending disaster makes moving the aircraft necessary, no attempt should be made to remove the defective cartridge provided the affected
engine can be expeditiously started by other means.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
SURGE
EXCESSIVE OIL TEMPERATURE
Engine surge, which is intermittent engine compressor stall, produces thrust variations which may
be indicated by fuel flow fluctuations or a marked
rise in EGT. Shock and pulsation can frequently be
felt, sometimes heard, in the cockpit during flight.
Although there have been occasions when engine
surge has occurred on the ground, it usually manifests itself above 45,000 feet. It generally occurs
with rapid throttle movements during slow speed
(high angle of attack) flight or high altitude turns.
Surging which occurs during engine acceleration
usually ceases as the engine speed increases. If it
does not, a thrust reduction followed by a slower
rate of throttle advance will usually give satisfactory results. Surging which occurs during slow speed
high angle of attack flight (usually with fixed
throttles) may require changing the throttle position of the affected engines and/or an increase in
airspeed to furnish relief. Persistent or severe surge
occasionally results in engine flameout unless very
prompt corrective actions are taken.
Oil temperature will increase with an oil system

malfunction. With each engine equipped for immediate identification of oil temperature, engine seizure due to excessive temperatures is unlikely to
occur. Advancing the throttles for an engine with
high oil temperature will usually reduce the oil
temperature by increasing fuel flow through the oil
cooler. With the engines stabilized at cruise flight
condition, the copilot should monitor the engine oil
temperature at convenient intervals and observe
any temperatures above 120C or any significant
temperature variations between engines. By
monitoring the separate engine oil systems,
excessive temperatures may be detected in time to
accomplish engine shutdown and prevent an
eventual oil system emergency condition. If the
temperature does not reduce because of an oil
system malfunction, the malfunction may be
identified in advance of the 149C normal shutdown
limitation by the continued illumination of the
engine oil overheat light. In the event oil
temperatures of 149C or above are attained, the
engine should be shut down in accordance with
temperatures per OIL SYSTEM LIMITATIONS,
Section V.
VARYING EXHAUST GAS TEMPERATURE
Varying exhaust gas temperature will be accompanied by engine rpm fluctuations that follow the
EGT. Depending on the magnitude of the fluctuations, the indications will be the same as an unstable engine speed fluctuation. The same corrective
procedures will apply. Monitor the engine operation
within operating limits of rpm and EGT.
ENGINE OIL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS

NOTE
When a malfunction occurs in the oil system which could cause damage to the
engine bearings, or when an engine has
windmilled in flight with low or zero oil
pressure, an entry will be made on the
Form 781. This information will aid maintenance personnel in determining the extent
of damage and/or maintenance inspections
required. Entries should provide information on elapsed time the engine(s) windmilled, what percent RPM windmilled, the
oil pressure indicated, and the low oil pressure warning light indication.
If the oil pressure indicator circuit breaker
has popped out, oil pressure gage indications are unreliable.
NOTE
When an excessively high oil temperature

occurs following an engine shutdown that is
not due to engine fire or fuel leak, the
firewall fuel shutoff valve may be returned
to NORMAL position and the throttle advanced beyond IDLE provided the starter
switch for the affected engine is OFF. This
allows oil cooling until the temperature has
reduced below 120C by means of fuel flow
through the fuel-oil cooler which is
controlled at this temperature.
OIL PRESSURE ERRATIC
If the engine oil pressure gage shows erratically

lowering oil pressure below 40 psi, when operating
above idle rpm, or rises to approximately 55 psi,
monitor the engine and continue normal operation
until pressure drops to 35 psi or rises to 55 psi. Oil
pressure fluctuations up to 5 psi total are allowable;
however, the mean should not be lower than 35 psi.
It may not be possible to distinguish between an oil
pressure transmitting system malfunction and an
engine oil pressure system malfunction. Therefore,
if engine oil pressure drops below 35 psi, proceed as
instructed under OIL PRESSURE LOW, this section.
Change 4
3-169
T.O. 1B-52H-1
OIL PRESSURE HIGH
If oil pressure exceeds the maximum limit, shut the

engine down unless its thrust is necessary to maintain flight.
OIL PRESSURE LOW
When engine oil pressure drops below 40 psi while

operating above idle rpm, the following instructions
apply:
1. If oil pressure readings drop below 40 psi while
operating above idle rpm and a low oil pressure
light illuminates, shut down the engine unless its
thrust is necessary to maintain flight, using the
EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN checklist,
this section.
2. If oil pressure readings are normal and the low
oil pressure light illuminates, continue normal operation monitoring the engine instruments closely.
Any erratic operation of any of the affected engine
instruments will require an immediate shutdown of
the engine unless its thrust is necessary to maintain flight.
3. If oil pressure readings drop below 35 psi and
the low oil pressure light does not illuminate, press
to test light. If light illuminates, continue normal
operation monitoring the engine instruments.
If the thrust of an engine with low oil pressure is
required to maintain flight, the pilot should be
aware of the results of operating an engine during
oil starvation. If an engine oil system malfunction
has caused prolonged oil starvation of engine bearings, the result will be a progressive bearing failure
and subsequent engine seizure. This progression of
bearing failure starts slowly and will normally continue at a slow rate up to a certain point at which
the progression of failure accelerates rapidly to
3-170
Change 4
complete bearing failure. The time interval from

the moment of oil starvation to complete failure depends on such factors as condition of bearings prior
to oil starvation, operating temperature of bearings,
and bearing loads. A good possibility exists for up to
30 minutes of operation after experiencing oil
starvation. Bearing failure due to oil starvation is
generally characterized by a rapidly increasing
vibration; when vibration becomes moderate to
heavy, complete failure is only seconds away and
may be avoided only by immediate engine shutdown. Since the end result of oil starvation is engine seizure, at the first indication of oil system
malfunction, the following outlined procedure
should be followed to forestall engine seizure as
long as possible.
1. Immediately shut down the engine unless its
thrust is necessary to maintain flight, using the
EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN checklist,
this section.
2. If thrust is required from the affected engine,
reduce thrust to minimum required to maintain
flight. Avoid rapid and large variations in thrust
settings on affected engine.
3. Jettison stores if necessary.
4. Avoid all abrupt maneuvers causing high g
forces; this prevents unnecessary bearing loads.
5. After critical thrust conditions are past, immediately shut down the affected engine. Reduction in
IAS and altitude will reduce the engine windmilling
rpm and delay engine seizure after the engine is
shut down.
6. After engine shutdown, if the oil pressure gage
does not indicate a positive value, land the aircraft
as soon as practicable to prevent possible engine
damage or seizure. Consideration should be given
to gross weight for landing (325,000 pounds or less)
and availability of a suitable landing base.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
FLIGHT CONTROL MALFUNCTIONS

ASYMMETRICAL AIRBRAKE CONTROL
Whenever a hydraulic or mechanical malfunction

occurs to a spoiler group, pulling the respective (inboard or outboard) airbrake control circuit breaker
will assure symmetrical airbrake position during
subsequent airbrake operation. If a malfunction affects any outboard spoiler group, turn the applicable outboard wing system standby pump switch to
STDBY prior to pulling the circuit breaker. If this
does not restore system pressure, pull the outboard
airbrake control circuit breaker. Pulling these circuit breakers does not affect the operation of the
spoilers. Airbrake effect will be reduced for a selected airbrake position, but the desired results can
be obtained by using a higher airbrake position, if
available. If airbrakes are used after a hydraulic
failure has occurred and the applicable circuit
breaker is not pulled, a sudden roll to the side of
the operating airbrakes will occur. The character of
the roll will depend on the spoiler group or groups
inoperative and the position of the airbrakes used.
Although the aircraft is less maneuverable, it can
be flown without the assistance of one or two spoiler groups. With one or more spoiler groups inoperative, see LANDING WITH SPOILER CONTROL
FAILURE under LANDING EMERGENCIES, this
section.
ELEVATOR AND RUDDER CONTROL MALFUNCTION
Loss Of Artificial Feel
If, at any time, loss of artificial feel is encountered,

check the flight instruments for aircraft response to
control movement. Loss of feel may be interpreted
as loss of control response especially in the yaw
axis. The start of yaw with rudder deflection is slow
and close observance of flight instruments is necessary to detect aircraft response to control movement. If abnormally light elevator or rudder control
forces are encountered, abrupt maneuvers should
be avoided to prevent overstressing the aircraft.
Loss of artificial feel can occur as a result of Qspring ram air inlet ice or loss of ram air pressure
from other causes. An additional tension spring
provides partial feel in the elevator axis in event Qspring pressure is lost. The most significant indica-
tion of loss of Q-spring pressure is loss of rudder

feel. The loss of elevator feel is masked for small
control column displacements by the centering
spring. Therefore, in event of loss of rudder feel, it
should always be suspected that the elevator feel
has also been lost and caution should be exercised
when applying large control column inputs.
Control Stiffness
Stiffness of elevator and rudder control may be encountered when Q-spring ram air duct blockage
from ice or other foreign material has occurred or
when mechanical jamming or failure has taken
place. Blockage of this duct may result in pneumatic locking of the feel system. If such a condition occurs, descend to a warmer altitude. If a landing
must be made with stiff controls, accomplish the
following:
1. Check aircraft center of gravity location. Forward center of gravity loadings should be avoided
and a more aft cg utilized since elevator requirements to maneuver during flare diminish as cg
moves aft. In no case should a landing be made
with cg outside the normal flight and ground handling limits.
2. Trim aircraft carefully during approach. During approach, the flare may require judicious use of
stabilizer trim and airbrakes for a safe landing.
3. If steering control is inadequate after touchdown, place steering ratio selector lever to TAXI.
Steering in TAXI position requires cautious use of
rudder pedals, especially if steering control returns
to normal during the landing roll.
Steering in TAXI during high speeds produces excessive steering when small
amounts of rudder displacement are induced which can produce critical side loads
on aircraft structure.
If the above procedure does not provide sufficient
steering, application of spoiler control in the desired
direction may produce enough landing gear bicycling effect to maintain the desired heading.
3-171
T.O. 1B-52H-1
during stabilizer trim and landing gear operation. This can be alleviated by using the
body standby pumps for landing gear operation and for large trim requirements (such
as flaps).
Rudder/Elevator Hydraulic Malfunctions

NOTE
Should certain hydraulic hardware failures

occur in both rudder/elevator systems or if
the rupture of an elevator or rudder actuator occurs, complete hydraulic fluid loss can
result. Complete fluid loss from both systems will render the rudder/elevator flight
controls inoperative; however, the control
column forces and artificial feel system will
not be affected. There are no mechanical
cables or rods to provide any backup or alternate source of control. The only source of
pitch control will be thrust, airbrakes, and
stabilizer trim.
Complete loss of the rudder/elevators is unlikely
since the system is highly redundant. If failure of a
main hydraulic power supply pump does occur,
check RUD/ELEV AUX lights off for the failed main
system, and attempt reset of the circuit breaker for
the failed pump. If the circuit breaker will not reset
or pump out light will not go out, place the system
power switch to off and continue mission. If any two
of the hydraulic power supplies fail (any combination of main or auxiliary supplies or main power
supply and opposite body hydraulic system), abort
the mission and land as soon as practicable.
When operating on one auxiliary pump

only, flight control power will be reduced
during stabilizer trim and landing gear operation. If remaining auxiliary pump is the
right hand pump, use the right hand body
standby pump to augment the body low
pressure condition.
NOTE
When operating on auxiliary pumps only,

flight control power will be slightly reduced
3-172
Change 13
When operating on auxiliary pumps only,

the use of stabilizer trim and demands from
elevator inputs during the landing flare can
reduce hydraulic pressure available to these
systems. Therefore, use of stabilizer trim
should be minimized or discontinued during
the landing flare to ensure adequate elevator authority for attitude control during
touchdown. See FLARE in Section VI.
Landing gear and flap operation should be
accomplished when in straight and level,
trimmed flight.
Should complete failure of both systems ever occur

requiring cruise flight conditions to destination the
aircraft can be controlled fairly well. An airspeed of
250 knots IAS or 0.72 Mach, whichever is less is
recommended. Air refueling is considered impracticable to attempt and is probably impossible. Yaw
SAS will be inoperative and the pilot will be required to manually damp any dutch roll motion using only lateral control inputs. The manual damping procedures, see DUTCH ROLL DAMPING, Section VII, applies except that the airbrakes will be in
position 3 and used for pitch control.
NOTE
Avoid turbulence to the maximum extent

possible if complete loss of both rudder/elevator systems occurs.
LATERAL TRIM MALFUNCTION
Unscheduled operation of the lateral trim system

due to an electrical control circuit malfunction can
be stopped by actuation of the guarded lateral control trim cutout switch on the pilots side of the aisle
stand.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
STABILIZER TRIM MALFUNCTION
Unscheduled stabilizer trim operation in flight can

cause severe attitude changes if immediate corrective action is not taken. The time required for the
stabilizer to travel beyond the limit of elevator control capability is approximately 5 seconds under
most conditions. However, at maximum indicated
airspeeds, the time may be as short as 2 seconds;
therefore, it is essential that immediate corrective
action be taken by the pilots when an unscheduled
or runaway trim condition arises in flight. In most
cases of runaway stabilizer trim, one of the following has occurred to give the pilots the idea that the
stabilizer trim was running away:
1. A malfunction which allows the autopilot to remain on when the pilot is flying manually and believes the autopilot is off.
2. One of the pilots trim buttons stuck in NOSE
UP or NOSE DN.
3. The aircraft has been thrown out of trim by
use of flaps and/or airbrakes. For complete information on flaps and airbrakes, see FLIGHT CONTROLS, Section I.
4. One of the pilots actuating the trim button,
causing the other pilot to believe that the trim was
malfunctioning.
5. Stabilizer trim response in the opposite direction to that commanded (caused by stabilizer trim
motor reversal).
Any of the above situations can cause the pilots to
take actions resulting in a dangerous flight condition; therefore, use the RUNAWAY OR UNSCHEDULED STABILIZER TRIM checklist, this Section,
whenever a stabilizer trim malfunction is suspected.
posite the fault side continues to be operative, unless deactivated by the trim circuit cutout switch or
circuit breakers, electrically controlled trim opposing the unscheduled trim movement is available
through actuation of the trim button. Normally,
trim cutout switch actuation should be delayed until the opposing force on the control column is reduced to the preset value by corrective trimming
because an out of trim condition can be corrected
more rapidly by using electrical trim. It should be
noted that as soon as the control column force is reduced to this point, the force switches will close and
allow an unscheduled trim to be reactivated. To prevent continuation of the unscheduled stabilizer
trim operation and to permit manual trimming for
the remainder of the flight, the trim cutout switch
should then be placed in the CUTOUT position in
sequence with the other corrective action measures
noted in the RUNAWAY OR UNSCHEDULED STABILIZER TRIM checklist found in this section.
NOTE
Force Switch Operation
Application of a forward load of more than the preset value (24 to 36 pounds) on a spring in the force
switch assembly compresses the spring to interrupt
the stabilizer nose up trim circuit. When this same
preset value is exceeded in the aft direction, the
spring is also compressed and the nose down trim
circuit is interrupted. Since the electrical circuit op-
Certain malfunctions within the aircraft

electrical system can create a condition
wherein the stabilizer trim motor may drive
in the opposite direction to the input signal
commanded by the stabilizer trim button.
In event of such stabilizer trim motor reversal, the pilots natural reaction in responding to an aircraft pitch movement with an
opposing control column force will not interrupt driving the reversed trim motor. The
force switches interrupt the power to the
trim motor clutch on the side opposite that
required for proper trim direction. In the reversed motor situation, the correct clutch is
engaged but the direction of rotation is reversed. Stabilizer trim reversal can be interrupted by repositioning the trim button
to neutral or by actuating the stabilizer
trim cutout switch to the CUTOUT position.
Stabilizer trim reversal will not be interrupted by actuation of the force switches for
the reasons noted in the previous paragraph.
3-173
T.O. 1B-52H-1
FUEL SUPPLY SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS
If any fuel system flow indicator, fuel pump,

or fuel valve circuit breaker is found open,
do not reset the circuit breaker(s) unless
necessary for the safe recovery of the aircraft.
NOTE
An emergency condition may make it necessary to deviate from the prescribed normal
fuel sequence (see figure 3-25). After the
emergency has passed, the remaining fuel
load should be adjusted to re-establish a
proper cg. See Section V for flutter limits if
using other than normal fuel sequence.
FUEL QUANTITY GAGE MALFUNCTION
A malfunction of any fuel quantity gage may indicate a failure that would, with proper sequence of
events, allow the introduction of high voltage electrical power into the associated fuel tank. Therefore, if any fuel quantity gage malfunction occurs,
pull the applicable fuel quantity indicator circuit
breaker. Attempt to pull the circuit breaker so the
gage pointer will indicate the estimated landing
quantity (or zero if desired) in that specific tank.
mid body fuel is only being fed to engines on the

right wing. To feed all engines during this step,
place engine crossfeed valve switches No. 9, 10, 11,
and 12 in OPEN. To accomplish subsequent steps in
fuel sequence, place crossfeed valve switches in
OPEN as necessary to use fuel through the
crossfeed manifold. At a point in the sequence when
using MAINS TO ALL, use normal main tank balancing procedure to attain balance between main
tanks 1 and 2 and main tanks 3 and 4. Failure of
the main manifold interconnect valves in the closed
position will be indicated during normal air refueling to all body and center wing tanks simultaneously by the aircraft center of gravity moving forward
with no indication of fuel quantity increase in the
aft body tank.
Valves Failed Opened
If either one or both of the main manifold valves

fail in the open position, there is a possibility of
having unequal fuel usage during auxiliary fuel
feed steps utilizing pairs of auxiliary tanks. This
unequal usage could affect cg or lateral balance. In
general, during steps using pairs of body tanks,
such as forward body and aft body, cg could be affected. During steps using outboard wing tanks or
external tanks, lateral balance could be affected.
Monitoring the fuel quantity gages will indicate
this type of malfunction and can be corrected by
momentarily stopping feed from the lightweight
tank and providing all override feed from the
heavyweight tank.
FUEL LEAK DETECTION
If any fuel quantity gage malfunction occurs, pull the applicable fuel quantity indicator circuit breaker. The gage will not be
removed or changed and the circuit breaker
will not be reset until proper inspection and
repairs have been made.
FUEL MANAGEMENT WITH MAIN MANIFOLD INTERCONNECT VALVES FAILED
Valves Failed Closed
If both main manifold valves (No. 29 and 29A)

should fail in the closed position, it will be indicated
first during the fuel feed step of MID BODY-TOALL by a gradual decrease in the quantity of fuel in
main tanks 1 and 2 while the quantities in main
tanks 3 and 4 remain unchanged. This indicates
3-174
Small fuel leaks may only be detected by plotting

against a predicted fuel consumption. The following
procedure will isolate and detect a suspected fuel
leak:
1. Press-to-test all fuel quantity gages.
2. At the first indication of a fuel leak, stop all
auxiliary tank fuel feed, isolate all tanks, close all
crossfeed valves, and feed mains to engines with all
auxiliary tank fuel flow control switches closed.
3. Take complete fuel gage readings.
NOTE
If a fuel indicating system malfunction is

suspected, the most positive indication of a
fuel leak may be an abnormal change in the
pitch or lateral trim requirements.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
4. If an auxiliary tank continues to lose fuel while
isolated with boost pumps off, it is leaking and
should be emergency emptied. See EMERGENCY
EMPTYING OF AN AUXILIARY TANK, this section.
5. If a main tank leak is indicated by excessive
fuel consumption for that particular tank, provide
an alternate source of fuel from the adjacent main
tank (open crossfeed valves 9 and 10 or 11 and 12
as appropriate) and turn off the affected main tank
boost pump switch.
6. If the adjacent main tank now indicates an excessive fuel consumption, the fuel leak is in the nacelle or engine fuel lines of the tank with the boost
pump switch off. In this instance, the nacelle will
be isolated to stop the fuel leakage by closing
crossfeed valves 9 and 10 or 11 and 12 as appropriate and keeping the effected boost pump off. Shut
down both engines using the EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN checklist, this section.
Do not attempt a restart of either engine

unless a critical need for thrust exists.
Do not attempt cooling of the fuel control
unit as specified in the EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN checklist.
Do not open corresponding crossfeed valve
(9, 10, 11, or 12) for that engine during the
DESCENT and LANDING checklists.
NOTE
7. If no fuel leak is detected with the above procedure, there is still the possibility of a fuel leak in
the main manifold. Turn on an auxiliary tank with
engine feed control valve switches No. 13, 14, 15,
and 16 closed. If the fuel flow indicator light does
not flash, there is probably a leak in the main manifold. This leak may be isolated by closing valve No.
29 and rechecking the fuel flow indicator light. If
the light flashes, the leak is on the downstream
side of valve No. 29 and can be further verified by
energizing the pumps in an auxiliary tank on the
downstream side of valve No. 29. If the fuel flow indicator light does not flash, the leak is upstream of
valve No. 29. The manifold leak may be isolated by
leaving valve No. 29 closed and feeding all engines
from the side opposite the manifold leak. See FUEL
MANAGEMENT WITH MANIFOLD INTERCONNECT VALVES FAILED CLOSED, this section.
Since the main manifold lines are routed through
all fuel tanks, the main manifold may leak into
another tank. This can only be detected by taking
an accurate reading of each fuel tank gage. Check
for an increase in fuel quantity in any tank. If any
tank shows an increase in fuel quantity, it is an indication that the main manifold line through that
tank is leaking. This should not present a problem
since the fuel can be safely transferred from the
tank and used as desired.
MAIN TANK FUEL LEAK
If a rapid main tank fuel leak is experienced, it

will be assumed that some structural damage has
occurred to the wing since the fuel tanks are an integral part of the main wing structure. For a comprehensive discussion and procedures to accomplish
for a main tank fuel leak, see STRUCTURAL DAMAGE, this section.
Hydraulic pump power may be available

from an engine that has been shut down.
See EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN
checklist and HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
EMERGENCY OPERATION, this section.
For weight distribution, it may be desirable
to transfer fuel from the affected main tank.
See EMERGENCY EMPTYING OF A
MAIN TANK, this section.
3-175
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EMERGENCY EMPTYING OF A MAIN TANK
Severe fuel leaks or combat damage could make it

necessary to empty a main tank to prevent loss of
fuel. In this event, fuel remaining in the tank
should be transferred to other main tanks or auxiliary tanks as desired (figure 3-25). This is accomplished by the following procedures:
1. Check all auxiliary tank engine feed control
switches (13 thru 16) and engine crossfeed manifold
valve switches (9 thru 12) CLOSED.
2. Check all auxiliary tank fuel flow control
switches OFF.
3. Check boost pump switch for main tank to be
emptied in ON position.
4. Open the engine crossfeed manifold valve (9,
10, 11, or 12) of the tank to be emptied.
5. Set defuel valve switch to OPEN.
6. Set master refuel switch to ON.
7. Set the desired tank fuel level control valve
switch(es) to the REFUEL position.
8. If necessary, open the main manifold interconnect valve No. 29.
Monitor the cg and lateral trim changes. Due to the
rapid transfer of fuel from the emptying tank, the
tank low warning light should be monitored for the
first indication of fuel depletion. When the low
warning light glows, reset the fuel panel using the
following procedures:
1. Turn the tank fuel level control valve
switch(es) OFF.
2. Move the defuel valve switch to CLOSED.
3. Turn the master refuel switch OFF.
4. Open the engine crossfeed manifold valve for
the corresponding tank on the opposite wing. This
will pressurize the crossfeed manifold from an additional source and will prevent flameout of the two
engines being fed from the damaged main tank as
this tank becomes empty.
5. When tank is empty, turn the affected main
tank boost pump switch OFF to prevent boost pump
operation in an empty tank.
3-176
EMERGENCY EMPTYING OF AN AUXILIARY TANK
During all auxiliary fuel transfer operations

below 25,000 feet MSL, an explosive condition exists due to auto-ignition temperature
of fuel vapors and the potential ignition
source from a malfunctioning auxiliary tank
boost pump. Therefore, the auxiliary tanks
fuel flow control switches will be turned off
when the gage reads empty or the no flow
indicator light indicates a no flow condition.
Auxiliary fuel control switches will be
turned off whenever fuel transfer is to be
stopped.
An auxiliary tank may be emptied quickly by routing fuel from it to all engines (figure 3-25). This is
accomplished by moving the respective auxiliary
tank fuel flow control switch to ENGINE FEED and
moving switches 13, 14, 15, 16, and 29 to OPEN
(figure 3-25). When the affected tank is empty, the
main tank boost pumps will take over fuel supply to
the engines with no interruption in fuel flow.
MAIN TANK BOOST PUMP FAILURE
Fuel boost pumps 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, 16, and 19

must be operational in flight to preclude engine
flameouts during aircraft maneuvers while operating in the MAINS TO ALL fuel sequence. If any of
these pumps become inoperative, or if any two
boost pumps in a main tank become inoperative,
open crossfeed valves 9, 10, 11, or 12, as appropriate, while operating in the MAINS TO ALL fuel sequence.
If all boost pumps in a main tank fail and fuel pressure is not available, engines normally supplied by
that tank can be supplied fuel from another main
tank by using the crossfeed manifold (figure 3-25).
If this emergency should occur before all auxiliary
tank fuel is used, fuel can be supplied to the affected engines from any auxiliary tank by using the
normal override system fuel control selections.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NOTE
The engines may be operated at substantial

thrust with the boost pumps inoperative.
The engine-driven fuel pumps can supply
sufficient fuel pressure to sustain thrust
and assure reliable engine operation at an
altitude of 14,000 feet or below. See FUEL
MANAGEMENT WITHOUT BOOST
PUMPS, this section, for additional information.
EMERGENCY FUEL TRANSFER FOR WEIGHT REDISTRIBUTION AUXILIARY TANK TO MAIN TANK
Emergency conditions may make it necessary to

transfer fuel to correct aircraft cg location or to obtain desired balance of wing fuel loading. Aircraft
cg may be moved forward by transferring fuel from
a rearward body tank to the inboard wing tanks
and balance of wing fuel loading may be adjusted
by transferring fuel from a body tank to a wing
tank. This is accomplished by turning the master
refuel switch ON, turning the desired main tank
fuel level control valve switch to OPEN, turning

main manifold interconnect valve No. 29 to OPEN
if necessary, and turning the desired auxiliary tank
fuel flow control switch to ENGINE FEED (figure
3-25).
EMERGENCY FUEL TRANSFER FOR WEIGHT REDISTRIBUTION MAIN TANK TO AUXILIARY TANK
Emergency conditions may make it necessary to

transfer fuel to correct aircraft cg location. Aircraft
cg may be moved aft by transferring fuel to the
rearward body tanks as discussed in LANDING
WITH STABILIZER TRIM FAILURE, this section.
This is accomplished by turning the master refuel
switch ON, the defuel valve switch OPEN, the desired engine crossfeed manifold valve OPEN, main
manifold interconnect valve OPEN if necessary, and
the desired auxiliary tank fuel flow control switch
to REFUEL (figure 3-25). This routes main tank
fuel from the crossfeed manifold through the defuel
valve to the main manifold and then to the desired
auxiliary tank.
3-177
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Fuel System Emergency Operation

REFUEL VALVE
EMERGENCY EMPTYING OF MAIN TANK

Main Tank No. 1
OPEN
MASTER REFUEL
DEFUEL
VALVE
ON
OPEN
OFF
CABIN
OPEN
OFF
CLOSE
MAIN
CLOSE
REFUEL PANEL
3 ENG 4
FWD
BODY
10
9
7 ENG 8
25
12
11
16
PUMP
PRESSURE
CHECKOUT
14
ON
CTR
WING
AFT
BODY
OFF
MAINS
NO.1NO.2
13
GROUND AND
EMERGENCY
USE ONLY
5 ENG 6
1 ENG 2
ON
15
26
OFF
MAINS
NO.3NO.4
R OUTBD
WING
TANK
WARNING
MID
BODY
27
28
17
R EXTERNAL
L OUTBD
18
19
REFUEL
RECPT
L EXTERNAL
FUEL
SCAVENGE
SYSTEM
WING
TANK
WARN
20
22
21
23
24
29
MAIN TANK COMPLETE BOOST PUMP FAILURE

Main Tank No. 1
5 ENG 6
3 ENG 4
1 ENG 2
FWD
BODY
10
9
12
11
16
PUMP
PRESSURE
CHECKOUT
14
ON
CTR
WING
AFT
BODY
OFF
MAINS
NO.1NO.2
13
7 ENG 8
25
ON
15
26
OFF
MAINS
NO.3NO.4
R OUTBD
MID
BODY
27
28
17
R EXTERNAL
L OUTBD
18
19
REFUEL
RECPT
L EXTERNAL
WING
TANK
WARNING
WING
TANK
WARN
20
23
22
21
24
29
EMERGENCY EMPTYING OF AUXILIARY TANK

Aft Body Tank
5 ENG 6
3 ENG 4
1 ENG 2
FWD
BODY
10
9
12
11
16
PUMP
PRESSURE
CHECKOUT
14
ON
AFT
BODY
OFF
MAINS
NO.1NO.2
13
7 ENG 8
25
CTR
WING
ON
15
26
OFF
MAINS
NO.3NO.4
R OUTBD
WING
TANK
WARNING
MID
BODY
27
28
17
R EXTERNAL
L OUTBD
18
19
REFUEL
RECPT
L EXTERNAL
20
WING
TANK
WARN
21
22
23
24
29
A31833
3-178
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EMERGENCY FUEL TRANSFER FOR WEIGHT REDISTRIBUTION

Left Outboard To No. 3 Main
REFUEL VALVE
OPEN
MASTER REFUEL
ON
OPEN
OFF
CLOSE
REFUEL PANEL
5 ENG 6
3 ENG 4
1 ENG 2
FWD
BODY
10
9
25
12
11
16
PUMP
PRESSURE
CHECKOUT
14
ON
AFT
BODY
OFF
MAINS
NO.1NO.2
13
7 ENG 8
CTR
WING
ON
15
26
OFF
MAINS
NO.3NO.4
R OUTBD
MID
BODY
27
28
17
R EXTERNAL
L OUTBD
18
19
REFUEL
RECPT
L EXTERNAL
WING
TANK
WARNING
WING
TANK
WARN
20
22
21
23
24
29
EMERGENCY FUEL TRANSFER FOR WEIGHT REDISTRIBUTION

No. 3 Main To Aft Body
REFUEL VALVE
MASTER REFUEL
OPEN
DEFUEL
VALVE
ON
OPEN
OFF
CABIN
OPEN
OFF
CLOSE
MAIN
CLOSE
REFUEL PANEL
3 ENG 4
FWD
BODY
10
9
7 ENG 8
25
12
11
16
PUMP
PRESSURE
CHECKOUT
14
ON
AFT
BODY
OFF
MAINS
NO.1NO.2
13
GROUND AND
EMERGENCY
USE ONLY
5 ENG 6
1 ENG 2
CTR
WING
ON
15
26
OFF
MAINS
NO.3NO.4
R OUTBD
WING
TANK
WARNING
MID
BODY
27
28
17
R EXTERNAL
L OUTBD
18
19
REFUEL
RECPT
L EXTERNAL
FUEL
SCAVENGE
SYSTEM
20
WING
TANK
WARN
21
22
23
24
29
NORMAL FUEL FLOW

EMERGENCY FUEL FLOW
STATIC
A31834
3-179
T.O. 1B-52H-1
been shut down to conserve electrical power, the respective rudder/elevator main
pump should be turned on.
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS

If any hydraulic system fails to operate, the cause
may be hydraulic fluid loss, mechanical failure of
the engine-driven pump, or failure of the engine
which drives the pump. All important and necessary hydraulically operated systems have an alternate source of hydraulic pressure available as described in HYDRAULIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEMS, Section I. If No. 5 engine fails and the engine reaches a low windmilling speed at which hydraulic pressure is no longer furnished, it is difficult to turn the aircraft at the end of a landing roll.
After a complete stop, the right forward gear will
not caster into alignment with the left forward gear.
See LANDING WITH ONE FORWARD GEAR
STEERING FAILURE under LANDING EMERGENCIES, this section, for a procedure to obtain
hydraulic pressure to allow the gear to be steered
and the aircraft taxied from the runway.
In event of a complete loss of right body hydraulic system pressure, the bomb bay
doors should not be operated at aircraft
speeds in excess of 325 knots IAS, if practicable, as a precaution against buffeting and
structural damage to the doors. See bomb
door operation with failure of the right body
hydraulic system, this section.
NOTE
If a body hydraulic failure occurs and the

powered rudder/elevator main pumps have
3-180
Change 17
If the loss of hyraulic fluid is known or suspected, shut down the engine with the affected hydraulic pump after landing, when
safety permits, to minimize the fire potential.
For a summary list of hydraulic system failures, the

affected system, and the corrective procedure to be
used, see HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE CONSEQUENCES, figure 3-26.
PUMP-OUT WARNING LIGHT FLICKER
A pump-out warning light cycling between on and

off may indicate hydraulic reservoir pressurization
has been lost. This can occur with the aircraft at or
above 13,000 feet altitude and is dependent on atmospheric pressure. It is caused by not maintaining
an adequate head of available hydraulic fluid at the
pump. Under these conditions, the pump cannot
suck fluid from the reservoir fast enough to keep up
with demand and momentary low pressure conditions occur. Equipment will still operate through its
complete range but operation will be on a startstop- start basis. Below 13,000 feet altitude, atmospheric pressure will be great enough to overcome
this difficulty.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE
For a body system malfunction, accomplish this checklist just prior to

landing gear extension.
NOTE
Failure of hydraulic system pressure normally will be indicated by illumination of the respective hydraulic pump out light on the hydraulic
control panel and the master caution light on the pilots instrument
panel. If system pressure, as indicated by the gage, returns to normal
after a demand is placed on hydraulic power supply system it is the
warning system which has malfunctioned.
There may be no hydraulic system failure indications from a failed engine that is windmilling until the engine reaches a low windmilling
speed, e.g., landing phase. Before landing the appropriate hydraulic
system failure should be planned and standby pump pressure provided
if available.
1. Standby Pump STBY (P)

If hydraulic pressure builds up slowly, pressure loss was due to engine-driven pump failure or tubing
break upstream of the check valve. The pump out warning lights will remain illuminated even
though the standby pump provides system pressure. There is no time limit on operation of the standby pumps.
NOTE
Each standby pump provides ample flow and pressure for normal operation of a system; however, with continuous use of the various hydraulic power supply systems, the response of operation will slow down
because the rate of flow is considerably less than that of an enginedriven pump.
If Pressure Stays Down:
3. Standby Pump Circuit Breakers IN (P)

If Pressure Still Down:
4. Standby Pump OFF OFF (P)

If pressure is not increased by the standby pump, it is possible that a tubing break exists downstream of the system one-way check valve and the fluid is depleted. As a result, all equipment
depending on that hydraulic system will not be supplied hydraulic power for normal operation. However, equipment which is supplied alternate power from another system may be operated from that
system by use of the emergency (or alternate) switch for that system.
NOTE
For malfunctions involving lateral control, see ASYMMETRICAL

AIRBRAKE CONTROL, this Section.
3-181
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Hydraulic System Failure Consequences

WING HYDRAULIC FAILURE
ENGINE PUMPS
1
X*
X*
X*A
SYSTEM AFFECTED
X*
X*
X*A
X
X
X
X
Outbd Spoilers
Outbd Airbrakes
Tip Gear Extension
Inbd Spoilers
Inbd Airbrakes
PROCEDURE TO BE USED
Spoiler Control Failure
Asymmetrical Airbrake Control
Gear Failure to Extend
Spoiler Control Failure
Asymmetrical Airbrake Control
BODY HYDRAULIC FAILURE

ENGINE PUMPS
5
SYSTEM AFFECTED
X*
Left Fwd Landing Gear

Right Fwd Landing Gear
Steering Left Gear
Steering Right Gear
Fwd Gear Crosswind Crab
Fwd Brakes
Left Aft Landing Gear
Right Aft Landing Gear
Aft Gear Crosswind Crab
Aft Brakes
Stab Trim Nut
Stab Trim Screw
Rotary Launcher
Rud/Elev Aux 1
Rud/Elev Aux 2
Slipway Doors (Norm)
Slipway Doors (Alt)
Bomb Doors
X
X*
X
X
X
X*
X*
X
X*
X*
X*
X
X
X
X*
X
X
X*
X*
X
X
One Fwd Gear Steering Failure
One Fwd Gear Steering Failure
Crosswind Crab System Malf
Brake Failure
Crosswind Crab System Malf
Brake Failure
Normal Procedures
Normal Procedures
On RH BODY
Normal Procedures
Normal Procedures
Slipway Doors (Alt)
Slipway Doors (Norm)
Operation with Failure of RH BODY
Hyd System
RUDDER/ELEVATOR FAILURE
RUD/ELEV PUMPS
MAIN
AUX 1
AUX 2
X 1 or 2
X1
X2
X 1 and 2
SYSTEM AFFECTED
Rudder and Elevator
Flt Control Malfunction (Elevator

and Rudder Control Malfunction)
Rudder and Elevator
Landing with Rud/Elev System Inop
(X) Indicates Pump Inop;
(*) Operates on Stdby Pump;
() Operates on Opposite System;

Figure 3-26
3-182
Change 12
(A) Operates on Adjacent System
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ROTARY LAUNCHER POWER PUMP LOW PRESSURE
LIGHT ON
Illumination of the rotary launcher power pump

low pressure warning light with the launcher control switch in the ON PRIMARY position indicates
insufficient pressure is being supplied by the
launcher power pump to rotate the launcher. Returning the control switch to OFF deactivates the
launcher power pump and causes the low pressure

light to go out. Operation of the launcher may be
continued using the secondary (right body) hydraulic system by selecting ON RH BODY with the control switch.
If the rotary launcher power pump low pressure
warning light illuminates, proceed as follows:
ROTARY LAUNCHER POWER PUMP LOW PRESSURE LIGHT ON
1. Rotary Launcher Control OFF
If a hydraulic line failure has occurred downstream of the launcher

power pump, continued operation in the ON PRIMARY position will result in depletion of the left body system hydraulic fluid.
If launcher operation is to be continued
2. Rotary Launcher Control ON RH BODY

When operating the launcher with the secondary hydraulic system, a hydraulic line failure downstream of the solenoid operated control valve can be detected by a low pressure indication on the
right body pressure gage. If this condition occurs, the launcher control switch should be returned
to OFF, as continued operation of the launcher will deplete the right body system hydraulic fluid.
3-183
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LANDING GEAR MALFUNCTIONS

MAIN LANDING GEAR FAILS TO RETRACT

If landing gear appears to be centered and fails to retract, leave the landing gear lever in GEAR
UP, hold rudder pedals neutral, and use 5 right and/or left crosswind crab control. If the gear was
not centered, it should retract when it reaches center position. If gear does not retract, proceed with
step 2.
Check hydraulic pressure on affected body system.
Hydraulic Pressure Normal Accomplish the Following:
3. Normal Gear Control Circuit Breakers Pulled for all unaffected gear (CP/EW)
By pulling the Normal Gear Control circuit breakers for all unaffected gear, the unaffected gear will
Position gear handle to GEAR DOWN and wait for the gear down indication; then return gear handle
to GEAR UP. (Observe landing gear retraction placard speed.)
5. Normal Gear Control Circuit Breakers Reset all (CP/EW)
In certain landing gear indicator malfunctions with positive gear down

indications in the cockpit, failure to reset the Normal Gear Control circuit breaker for the affected gear after landing gear extension for landing, could result in a gear retraction and gear up landing.
NOTE
If an extended gear cannot be retracted and it is decided to continue

the mission (training only), pull the Normal Gear Control circuit breaker for the affected gear. This will prevent inadvertent retraction of the
gear while exceeding gear retraction airspeed limitations. Reset the
Normal Control Circuit breaker for the affected gear after landing gear
extension for landing.
6. Landing Gear Emergency Switch RETRACT (SIOP only) (P)
If gear does not indicate up and locked after recycling and if opposite body system pressure is normal, move the respective landing gear emergency switch to RETRACT.

NOTE
3-184
Change 17
T.O. 1B-52H-1
As soon as landing gear is up and locked, return emergency switch to OFF. Do not reposition
emergency switch to RETRACT unless the gear attempts to move from up with the switch OFF.
8. If gear has not retracted, it is possible that a partial gear landing will be necessary. See LANDING
WITH PARTIAL GEAR checklist, this section.
3. Normal Gear Control Circuit Breaker Pulled for the affected gear (CP/EW)
If any main gear does not indicate up and locked and pressure is low on the affected body system,
a ruptured hydraulic system may have occurred. Pull the normal gear control circuit breaker for the
affected gear. Pulling the breaker will deactivate the gear normal control valve and may prevent loss
of fluid from a malfunction downstream of the normal control valve.
NOTE
If the circuit breaker is found to be tripped, reset it and observe position indicator.
4. Landing Gear Emergency Switch RETRACT (SIOP only) (P)
If opposite body system pressure is normal, move the respective landing gear emergency switch to
RETRACT for a period not exceeding 10 seconds if landing gear does not move.
NOTE
As soon as landing gear is up and locked, return emergency switch to OFF. Do not reposition
emergency switch to RETRACT unless the gear attempts to move from up with the switch OFF.
3-185
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LANDING GEAR FAILURE TO RETRACT (Cont)

TIP LANDING GEAR FAILS TO RETRACT
NOTE
There is no provision for emergency retraction of the tip gear.

Check hydraulic pressure on affected outboard wing system.
Hydraulic Pressure Normal Accomplish the Following:
By pulling the normal gear control circuit breakers for all unaffected gear, the unaffected gear
will not be recycled unnecessarily.
Position gear handle to GEAR DOWN and wait for the gear down indication; then return gear
handle to GEAR UP. (Observe tip gear retraction placard speed.)
Hydraulic Pressure Low Accomplish the Following:
2. Normal Gear Control Circuit Breaker Pulled for the affected gear (CP/EW)
If either tip gear does not indicate up and locked and pressure is low on the affected outboard wing
system, a ruptured hydraulic system may have occurred. Pull the normal gear control circuit breaker
for the affected gear. Pulling the breaker will deactivate the gear normal control valve and may
prevent loss of fluid from a malfunction downstream of the normal control valve.
NOTE
If the circuit breaker is found to be tripped, reset it and observe position indicator.
3-186
T.O. 1B-52H-1
PNEUMATICS SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS

AIR BLEED SYSTEM ABNORMAL OPERATION
NOTE
A failure of a precooler servo pressure regulator/torque motor in the

No. 2 strut can close the ram air ejector valves, preventing cooling airflow across the bleed air precooler heat exchanger. With the precooler
failed, distribution ducting and the air conditioning system components
can be subjected to temperatures of up to 427 C. The bleed air ducting
routed along the wing leading edge is not designed for safe operation at
temperatures above 246 C. The ACP compressor overtemperature
switch will actuate at 224 C, shutting down the ACP, resulting in loss
of cabin pressurization.
HOT AIR LIGHT ILLUMINATED (FAILURE OF BLEED AIR PRECOOLER)
NOTE
Bleed air precooler failure may be indicated by a high bleed air temperature gauge reading and/or illumination of the bleed air overheat master caution light(s). Continued operation of the air conditioning system
with abnormally high bleed air temperature may result in air conditioning pack (ACP) shutdown and loss of cabin pressurization.
If MASTER CAUTION and HOT AIR lights illuminate with or without loss of cabin pressurization,
complete the following checklist to determine if a bleed air precooler failure has occurred.
1. BLEED SELECTOR Switch NORMAL LH INBD
2. MANIFOLD VALVE Switch CLOSE
3. Throttles 3 & 4 Idle
4. Bleed Air Manifold Temperature Monitor
Note
If temperature does not return to normal range, see STUCK STRUT

BLEED VALVE, this section. If temperature returns to normal range,
continue this checklist with step 5.
If the ACP has shut down due to excessive bleed air temperature, proceed as follows:
5. Cabin Pressure Master Switch Recycle RAM or OFF and then back to 7.45 PSI
NOTE
Leaving switch in RAM or OFF will cause loss of cabin pressurization.

The ACP can be reset by positioning the cabin pressure master switch
to RAM or OFF and back to the 7.45 or 4.50 PSI position. When the
ACP thermal switch is tripped, the ACP pressure regulator/shutoff
valve will close, isolating the bleed air manifold temperature gage sensor and bleed air overheat warning light switch. This results in bleed
air manifold temperature being unmonitored and unknown if the ACP
is not successfully reset.
Change 12
3-187
T.O. 1B-52H-1
6. Throttles 3 and 4 Slowly advance
Monitor bleed air manifold temperature gage. Normal manifold temperature range is 190 (+/8) C.
If the ACP shuts down again due to reoccurrence of high bleed air manifold temperature, a precooler failure is
probable. Proceed as follows:
7. BLEED AIR SYSTEM Circuit Breaker (RLC E23) Pull

8. Cabin Pressure Master Switch Recycle RAM or OFF then back to 7.45.
This may restore a limited operation of the precooler; however, continue to closely monitor the manifold temperature gage.
NOTE
Under these conditions of partial precooler operation, the manifold

temperature may drop below the normal operating range of 190 (+/ 8)
C. With the BLEED AIR SYSTEM circuit breaker pulled, electronic
temperature control is lost and the precooler will operate in the maximum cooling mode.
If this procedure does not restore precooler operation, proceed as follows:
9. BLEED AIR SYSTEM Circuit Breaker (RLC E23) Reset

10. Throttles 3 and 4 Idle
11. Cabin Pressure Master Switch Recycle
Recycle to RAM or OFF, then back to 7.45 PSI if ACP has shut down as a result of Step 7.
12. Throttles 3 and 4 Slowly advance
Slowly advance while monitoring the manifold temperature gage. Maintain throttles 3 and 4 at a
setting that results in a maximum temperature of below 210 C on the manifold temperature gage.
(210 C is the lower limit of the overheat light switch setting.)
13. Known or Suspected Icing Conditions Avoid
Bleed air from the number two nacelle is also used for anti-icing of the
ram air scoops located in the left and right wing root leading edges. The
ENGINE NACELLE and SCOOPS anti-icing switch located at the pilots position operate the controlling valves for anti-icing to the ram air
scoops. With a precooler failure and the anti-icing system ON, the wing
leading edge bleed air manifold temperature may exceed 246 C. The
wing leading edge ram air scoops will also be subjected to these higher
temperatures.
3-188
Change 12
T.O. 1B-52H-1
If flight conditions dictate the use of anti-icing with the ACP operating under this limited use situation, continuously monitor the manifold temperature gage and maintain throttles 3 and 4 at settings that will maintain manifold temperatures below 210 C. If the ACP compressor overtemperature switch shuts down the
pack (224 C), the pilot will not be able to monitor the actual manifold temperature.
If the ACP shuts down, either as the result of an ACP compressor overtemperature switch shutdown (>224 C), or by turning the air conditioning master switch to OFF or RAM, the resulting lack of airflow to
the bleed air manifold temperature gage sensor and bleed air overheat
warning light switch will give the pilot an inaccurate and possibly
much lower temperature reading than the actual manifold temperature.
The anti-icing system, operating with a bleed air precooler failure/malfunction and the ACP off, may eventually subject the bleed air distribution ducting in the wing leading edge to temperatures in excess of 246 C.
Below 25,000 feet, an explosive condition may exist in the wing if fuel vapors have accumulated near the hot
air ducting and the duct temperatures exceed 246 C.
To prevent excessive bleed air temperature following a precooler malfunction/failure and the ACP is OFF, do
not actuate the anti-icing system under normal flight conditions. However, if anti-icing becomes a necessity
for safe flight, retard throttles 3 and 4 to idle prior to actuation of the anti-icing switch. If flight conditions
permit, leave throttles 3 and 4 in idle until exiting the icing area and the anti-icing system is turned off.
STUCK STRUT BLEED VALVE
If excessive manifold temperatures are encountered when the manifold valve switch is returned to CLOSE
after starting engines. To determine which nacelle is the source of overtemperature air, retard throttles in
pairs in the following sequence. In each case, check for a drop in manifold temperature before restoring
thrust and retarding the next pair of engines.
1. Throttles 3 & 4 Retard, check manifold temp
Relatively small reductions in thrust should close engine bleed air check valves in one nacelle if engines in
another nacelle are supplying bleed air to the system. If a bleed valve had failed to close after engine start
and a takeoff has been made, operation with a differential thrust setting may be necessary to maintain safe
manifold temperatures.
Change 12
3-188A
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LOSS OF BLEED AIR FROM NACELLE NO. 2
In the event of failure of the bleed air supply from the No. 2 nacelle, either through duct failure or shutdown
of engines 3 and 4, emergency bleed air may be obtained from the No. 3 nacelle by use of the EMERG RH
INBD position on the cabin pressure master switch. Before placing the cabin pressure master switch to EMERG RH INBD, see OPERATION WITH EMERGENCY BLEED AIR, this section.
When the use of EMERG RH INBD is necessary below 25,000 feet,

reductions in thrust settings on engines 5 and 6 will usually be necessary to limit manifold temperatures to 246 C or less. If thrust requirements will not permit reductions in thrust settings, the cabin pressure
master switch should be placed in RAM or OFF position. If NORMAL
LH INBD bleed air is not available during a landing, the air conditioning master switch should be placed to RAM since the use of EMERG
RH INBD bleed air during a landing will result in excessive manifold
temperatures if a go-around is necessary.
When EMERG RH INBD is selected below 25,000 feet, an explosive
condition may exist in the wing if fuel vapors have accumulated near
the hot air ducting and the duct temperature exceeds 246 C. Therefore, the HOT AIR light and the manifold temperature gage will be
closely monitored to prevent exceeding 246 C below 25,000 feet, since
bleed air is not precooled in EMERG RH INBD. The explosive danger
no longer exists above 25,000 feet, due to the high auto-ignition temperature of fuel vapor above this altitude.
Hazardous conditions exist at all altitudes when combustible materials
are stored on hot air ducts or close to hot air duct outlets.
AIR CONTAMINATION THROUGH AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM
Oil or fumes may enter the cabin due to failure of an engine or a system in the No. 2 nacelle that normally
supplies bleed air to the air conditioning system. If this occurs, proceed as follows:
1. Oxygen 100% (All)
2. Throttle No. 3 Idle
Check for drop in contamination level. It may take several minutes for the contamination to dissipate. If no drop is noticed, retard throttle No. 4 and check for drop in contamination level. If a
particular throttle is identified as the source of contamination, ensure that it is maintained at a
reduced setting to isolate it from the bleed air system.
NOTE
Only the engine at the highest RPM of those connected to the bleed air
system manifold will supply the manifold due to check valves at the
bleed ports on the engines. Therefore, by partially retarding the
throttle of a suspected engine, it is possible to isolate that engine as a
source of bleed air contamination.
3-188B
Change 12
T.O. 1B-52H-1
3. EMERG RH INBD Select, if required

If contamination still exists, and the mission must be continued, it may be necessary to select EMERG RH INBD, thus providing unprecooled bleed air to the air conditioning pack for heating and
pressurization. See OPERATION WITH EMERGENCY BLEED AIR, this section. If this action cures
the bleed air contamination problem, it will be necessary to continuously monitor the manifold temperature gage and maintain throttles 5 and 6 at settings that will maintain manifold temperature
below 210 C. See FAILURE OF BLEED AIR PRECOOLER, this section.
4. Cabin Pressure Master Switch RAM, if required
Continuing contamination on alternate source of bleed air indicates probable malfunction of the ACP,
which should then be shut down by placing cabin pressure master switch in RAM position. This
action also depressurizes the cabin and provides ram air ventilation.
Monitor engines in suspect nacelle for signs of malfunction if alternate air bleed source cleared
contamination of cabin.
NOTE
Check manifold temperature gage indication. With high engine thrust

settings, an open strut bleed valve (for any reason) can result in excessive temperatures in the distribution ducts causing strong odors and
fumes to enter the cabin.
FAILURE OF CABIN PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM (CABIN AIRFLOW LOW LIGHT ILLUMINATED)
Cabin pressurization problems may be caused by a loss or reduction of pressurizing/cooling airflow from the
air conditioning pack (ACP) or a blocked cabin outflow valve.
The CABIN AIRFLOW LOW caution light coming on may be the first indication of an air conditioning system (ACS) failure. It may have been shut down by the overspeed pressure switch, compressor discharge overtemp switch, or the water separator overtemp switch. If any of these circuits detect a fault, then bleed air to
the ACP is shut off and the flow of air into the pressurized compartment ceases. The cabin altitude will begin
to rise and the CABIN AIRFLOW LOW caution light will come on. If the ACP shutdown is from the protective circuitry mentioned, the cabin pressure master switch must be recycled to restart the ACP.
If the CABIN AIRFLOW LOW caution light comes on in flight with the air conditioning master switch in 7.45 or 4.50
and will not go off with an increase in power on engines three or four, proceed as follows:
1. Check for a flow of air at the pilots or navigators cold air overhead vents.
If no flow exists, the ACP has shut down and loss of cabin pressurization has begun. Attempt to
restart the ACP by proceeding with steps 2 and 3 as follows:
2. Oxygen As required
Accomplish crew warning and monitor cabin altitude.
3. Cabin Pressure Master Switch RAM or OFF, then 7.45 or 4.50 (as appropriate)
On aircraft 60-001, 60-007, 60-008, 60-010, and 60-014, if the air conditioning system is operating
normally, a crewmember should check the lower deck right side and upper left side outflow valves
to determine if the cabin lining has been sucked into the valve, blocking it in the open position. If
this condition exists, the lining should be removed from the valve. The lower deck right side valve
is located in the area forward of the navigators instrument panel while the upper left side valve
is located behind the upper LH electronic equipment rack.
Change 12
3-189
T.O. 1B-52H-1
FAILURE OF NORMAL BLEED AIR SOURCE IN FLIGHT
To regain air conditioning and pressurization in the

event of failure of the normal bleed air source, place
the bleed selector switch to EMERG RH INBD and
monitor the manifold temperature gage. If NORMAL LH INBD bleed air is not available during a
landing, the cabin pressure master switch should
be placed to RAM since the use of EMERG RH
INBD bleed air during a landing will result in excessive manifold temperatures if a go-around is necessary.
When EMERG RH INBD is selected below

25,000 feet, an explosive condition may exist in the wing if fuel vapors have accumulated near the hot air ducting and the duct
temperature exceeds 246C. Therefore, the
bleed air overheat light, and the manifold
temperature gage will be closely monitored
to prevent exceeding 246C below 25,000
feet, since bleed air is not precooled in
EMERG RH INBD. The explosive danger
no longer exists above 25,000 feet, due to
the high auto-ignition temperature of fuel
vapor above this altitude.
Hazardous conditions exist at all altitudes
when combustible materials are stored on
hot air ducts or close to hot air duct outlets.
Engines in outboard nacelles should not be
considered an alternate source of emergency bleed air (by use of OPEN position of the
manifold valve switch) since outboard sections of the air bleed manifold are not designed for such use and are therefore not
insulated. As a result, the heat loss from
the outboard air bleed manifolds is much
greater than the heat loss from the inboard
air bleed manifolds. This prevents accurate
manifold temperature readings by the manifold temperature gage and can result in
overheating of the outboard air bleed manifolds without any indications.
3-190
Change 4
FAILURE OF NORMAL BLEED AIR SOURCE ON THE

GROUND
For maximum safety and equipment life, emergency air bleed should not be selected for air conditioning while on the ground as there is a possibility of
reaching excessive duct temperatures and of reducing air conditioning pack bearing life. In case of
failure of normal bleed air source for air conditioning on the ground, the following procedure should
be observed:
1. OAS Equipment OFF
2. Cabin Pressure Master Switch RAM
3. Takeoff Delay until failure is remedied
FAILURE OF WATER SEPARATOR
To prevent or minimize reduction of visibility from

fogging caused by a failed water separator, the following procedures should be used:
1. During takeoff, increase the cabin temperature
setting if fog streamers come from air outlets and
tend to reduce visibility.
2. During descent, and at approximately 10,000
feet altitude, fog streamers in excess of 15 inches
may issue from air outlets. Increase the temperature setting until fog streamers are reduced to approximately 6 inches in length.
3. During descent at approximately 5000 feet altitude, if fog streamers exceed 6 inches in length,
turn the cabin pressure master switch to RAM and
continue descent and landing.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
FAILURE TO REGULATE CABIN TEMPERATURE
NOTE
To provide accurate temperature control, do

not obstruct the louvered airflow openings
in the cabin temperature sensor case by
placing briefcase, clothing, or other items in
the area.
In case of difficulty in controlling cabin temperature, proceed as follows:
1. CTCS PWR Circuit Breaker Set (EW)
2. If the automatic control system fails to provide
the proper temperature regulation, turn the cabin
temperature selector switch to OFF position of
MANUAL TEMPERATURE CONTROL. Then manually control cabin temperature by actuation of the
switch momentarily to COOL or WARM, as necessary.
Failure of the cabin temperature modulating valve(s) in full hot position will result
in overheating the navigators compartment
due to an uncontrollable hot air supply and
will necessitate eventual evacuation of that
compartment. If flight must be continued, it
is recommended that descent be made to
10,000 feet or below with the pack turned
OFF to maintain partial pressurization before switching to RAM position of the cabin
pressure (air conditioning) master switch.
Depressurized flight at lower altitudes will be necessary to alleviate either extreme in temperature
caused by failure of the cabin temperature modulating valve. The cabin temperature modulating valve
is located near the ACP and an attempt can be
made to free the butterfly valve within the valve to
restore normal control. This has been successfully
accomplished by rapping the outer surface of the
valve with a soft-faced tool such as a flight boot.
NOTE
FILTER FAILURE
To minimize overshooting of desired temperatures, on manual control, allow sufficient time between readjustments for cabin
temperature to change, then make new
changes in increasingly smaller increments.
3. If only hot air is available from the upper outlets, turn cabin pressure master switch to RAM
when the cabin airflow low warning light glows
since air at the same temperature is delivered to
electronic equipment as from crew upper air outlets. Since cabin pressure will be dumped, crew will
use oxygen as indicated under OXYGEN SYSTEM,
Section I.
4. Complete loss of heat control (automatic and
manual) usually indicates jamming of the cabin
temperature modulating valve.
Failure of the cabin temperature control

system which results in a full cold situation
is cause to abort flight at altitude. Extended
flight will result in supercooling of cabin
temperature which will drop to a value near
that of OAT.
Failure of the air conditioning system catalytic filter will cause a finely divided black powder to issue
from the cabin air outlets. In some cases, crew visibility will be totally obscured, and manual control
of the aircraft will be marginal. Therefore, consideration should be given to engaging the autopilot as
soon as filter failure is detected, to assist in maintaining a stabilized flight condition. All crewmembers should go on 100% OXYGEN and the air conditioning master switch should be turned to OFF. After the powder has settled, the air conditioning
master switch should be turned to RAM and left in
this position for the remainder of the mission.
To avoid possible harmful effects of breathing the powder when failure of the filter occurs during flight, crew will go on 100% OXYGEN.
3-191
T.O. 1B-52H-1
OPERATION WITH EMERGENCY BLEED AIR
When cabin pressurization cannot be maintained or

cabin temperature regulated (by automatic or manual operation of temperature selector switch) while
operating in NORMAL LH INBD position as outlined in this section, the procedures for emergency
operation of EMERG RH INBD position should be
followed.
The bleed selector switch must be returned

to NORMAL LH INBD position before descending below 25,000 feet unless a failure
of the normal bleed air source has occurred.
Excessive duct temperature may result if
this operation is not accomplished. If
EMERG RH INBD position must be selected, see AIR BLEED SYSTEM ABNORMAL OPERATION, this section, for control
of air bleed manifold temperatures.
If cabin heating problem is caused by overcooling of
the bleed air supplied to the air conditioning system
due to a precooler failure, the bleed selector switch
may be placed to the EMERG RH INBD position to
increase cabin heat and restore cabin pressurization. With the bleed selector switch in either position, the cabin temperature control system regulates the temperature in the mixed air foot outlets
to 121C maximum when in AUTO MODE. Selection of the MANUAL MODE will allow the maximum foot outlet air temperature to approach the
manifold temperature.
TEM ABNORMAL OPERATION, this section, must

be followed to ensure safe operation.
1. Recheck all exposed hot air ducts and inlets to
insure no flammable articles are within 12 inches
from air outlets or 6 inches from hot air ducts.
2. Select manual operation on both the upper and
lower compartment temperature control rheostat
switches and hold in the COOL position for 30 seconds.
3. Position the bleed selector switch to EMERG
RH INBD.
4. Manually control cabin temperature by actuation of the temperature control rheostat momentarily to the WARM position until there is adequate
warm airflow.
RELEASING CABIN PRESSURE
If for any reason immediate release of cabin pressure is desired, place the cabin pressure release
switch to DUMP or the cabin pressure master
switch to RAM position. If these electrical means of
dumping cabin pressure are not operable, turn the
manual emergency cabin pressure dump handle to
DUMP position. If it should become necessary to
bleed cabin pressure down to zero differential in order to open the pressure bulkhead door, turn the
cabin pressure master switch to OFF.
The OAS equipment will be turned off when

the cooling airflow is stopped by turning the
air conditioning system master switch OFF.
NOTE
When operating in EMERG RH INBD position, the hot air entering the compartment
could possibly ignite material such as cushions, cloth, or paper. Prior to placing the
bleed selector switch in this position, the
pilot shall direct crewmembers to confirm
that all hot air outlets and adjacent areas
are free from combustible materials.
When operating in EMERG RH INBD, the following procedures and those under AIR BLEED SYS-
3-192
The OAS may remain on for short periods

of time, not to exceed 10 minutes.
REPRESSURIZING
To repressurize, check that:

1. Cabin Pressure Release Switch RESET
2. Cabin Pressure Master Switch 7.45 PSI (or
COMBAT 4.50 PSI)
3. Emergency Cabin Pressure Dump Handle
CLOSED
T.O. 1B-52H-1
SHUTDOWN OF AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM WITHOUT
DUMPING CABIN PRESSURE
To shut down the air conditioning system in flight

without dumping cabin pressure, turn the cabin
pressure master switch to OFF position. However,
the cabin will depressurize in a few minutes due to
normal leakage and no ram air will be provided.
WATER SEPARATOR FREEZEUP
Frequent cases have been reported in which freezeup of the water separator has, due to pressure, resulted in blowing the connecting tube sleeve off.
Separation of the sleeve located near the separator
is normally accompanied by an explosive sound and

loss of cabin pressurization. Normally, at medium
and low altitudes, the blowoff of this tube is evidenced by dense fog in the wheel well area. The
sleeve can be safely replaced if the clamps are not
broken. To proceed with repair, immediately turn
the cabin pressure master switch to RAM position
and descend to 10,000 feet or below. Partial pressurization can be temporarily restored during descent by selecting a cabin temperature near the extreme hot position; however, this will result in loss
of equipment cooling and uncomfortable cabin temperatures. Ordinarily, this means of partial pressurization should not be used except during emergency descent or last resort.
3-193/(3-194 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Crew Duties
table of contents
section IV
page
INTRODUCTION
4-1
CREW COORDINATION
4-2
ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT INTERFERENCE
4-4
LOW ALTITUDE NAVIGATION
4-4
ALTITUDE CALL PROCEDURES
4-4
PILOT
4-5
COPILOT
4-5
RADAR NAVIGATOR/NAVIGATOR
4-6
EW OFFICER
4-7
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this section is to provide a compact
collection of material wherein each crewmember
can readily determine his duties in relation to the
accomplishment of over-all mission. Instructions relating to crew duties do not include information
which is already covered in other sections.
4-1
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CREW COORDINATION
Coordination of actions within a crew is of prime
importance to ensure the optimum degree of mission success and safety during all phases of operation. This coordination is not necessarily limited to
actions alone. Complete familiarity with ones crew
position, the responsibilities thereof, and a working
knowledge of the other crewmembers duties will
contribute immeasurably toward crew coordination.
Each crewmember will be constantly on the alert
and should notify the responsible crewmember of
any deviation or discrepancy which affects successful accomplishment of the mission. Liaison between
individuals concerned will be established prior to
initiating any action or procedure which alters aircraft configuration or requires correlation of activities between crewmembers. Prior to flight the pilot
will ensure that all crewmembers are thoroughly
familiar with all aspects of the assigned mission as
pertains to their crew specialty to include:
Applicable instructions in the Flight Information Publications
Departure routes, altitudes, obstructions, and
traffic procedures
Route of flight
Navigation (to include low altitude)
Air refueling information
Bombing
EW activities
Normal and emergency communications procedures
Any special instructions or procedures pertaining to the mission.
NOTE
The pilot, copilot, radar navigator, and navigator will be thoroughly familiar with the
penetration, approach, missed approach,
landing patterns, altitudes, and obstructions at both destination and alternate airfields. Available aids such as current FLIP
terminal and approach charts will be studied. A complete set of current approach
charts will be available for inflight use of
both of the pilots and the radar navigator.
The radar navigator, as well as the pilot not
actually flying the aircraft, will closely monitor all penetrations and approaches. The
pilot at the controls will be notified immediately of any deviation from published procedures.
It is imperative that positive measures be taken to
ensure that safety of personnel and aircraft are not
4-2
jeopardized. Flight attitude of the aircraft will be

carefully monitored by either pilot or copilot at all
times. Prior to accomplishment of any of the following, verbal coordination between applicable crewmembers will be required when:
1. Control of aircraft is transferred between pilot
and copilot.
2. Control column of either the pilot or copilot is
disconnected or reengaged.
3. Changing fuel control settings.
4. A crewmember returns to position, comes back
on interphone, and removes his inflight safety pins
or unstows downward ejection control trigger ring.
5. A crewmember leaves position or goes off interphone.
6. A crewmember goes off oxygen and when he
resumes oxygen use during flight when oxygen is
required.
7. Autopilot control of aircraft is transferred between the radar navigator/navigator and pilot.
8. Any electrical power source is changed.
9. It is necessary for the pilot flying the aircraft
to transfer control of the aircraft to the other pilot
when the pilot flying the aircraft is required to accomplish an action which will divert his attention
from flying, such as checking oxygen, tuning radios,
changing fuel control setting, etc.
10. The pilot intends to perform any critical maneuver, at which time all crewmembers will be secured in their respective positions.
11. Changing air outlet knob positions (notify copilot).
12. The inflight safety pins are installed or the
downward ejection trigger ring is stowed. Conditions requiring pin installation or trigger ring stowage are:
a. All ground operations.
b. Whenever the crewmember leaves his seat
in flight.
c. When the parachute is not worn.
d. When the safety belt and shoulder straps
are not fastened.
All applicable crewmembers will acknowledge that
the intended course of action is understood prior to
actual accomplishment and will conduct themselves
accordingly. All crew positions, when practical,
should monitor communications outside the aircraft
at all times.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Whenever a change of crew position is necessary, climb to a safe altitude and area before the change is made. The pilots will not
exchange seats when only two pilots are
aboard the aircraft.
Any time during critical phases of flight
and especially during night and/or instrument conditions, the pilot not flying the aircraft will closely monitor his flight instruments and cross-check them against the instruments of the other pilot. If an apparent
error in aircraft attitude is detected, the pilot flying the aircraft will be advised immediately. The pilot not flying the aircraft will
also monitor the engine instruments.
handle, lock the inertia reel to ensure release of the integrated harness, then pull
the integrated harness release handle. Occupant can then leave the seat with the
parachute and safety belt.
Extreme care will be exercised by the pilots,

when leaving seats, to avoid inadvertent operation of switches or controls on the aisle
stand or overhead panel.
Before leaving a pilots ejection seat, stow
the control column prior to releasing the
safety belt. When returning to the seat, fasten the safety belt prior to engaging the
control column. This should prevent inadvertent actuation of the control column by
an unrestrained crewmember.
When leaving the upward ejection seat, replace both arming lever safety pins, unbuckle the parachute harness and safety
belt, leaving the parachute and survival kit
in the seat. Upon returning to the seat,
safety pins will be removed immediately after donning the parachute and fastening
the safety belt.
To prevent accidental firing of downward
ejection seat, stow the ejection control trigger ring prior to leaving the seat during
flight. Upon returning to the seat, fasten
parachute and safety belt, then unstow the
ejection control trigger ring from the stowed
position.
Prior to stowing/unstowing the ejection control ring, make a positive check that the
trigger ring is properly seated in the detent
and that the area is clear of straps and other equipment. If the trigger ring is found to
be out of the detent, carefully secure all
equipment, pull the survival kit release
When moving around an ejection seat, care

will be taken not to actuate the seat ejection
mechanism.
To prevent injury to personnel, the upper
deck sliding hatch will be closed and locked
when any crewmember is required to move
about or conduct any activity in the area of
the hatch.
To ensure an escape route for crewmembers
normal or alternate bailout/crash landing
exits and to provide access to the lower compartment for rescue personnel, the upper
deck sliding hatch will be open and locked
prior to starting engines, takeoff, air refueling, low level activity, planned unusual maneuvers, penetration, and landing.
Extreme caution will be exercised by all
crewmembers when stowing and securing
gear aboard the aircraft. Care will be taken
to ensure that gear is safely secured and is
not stowed on or near heating ducts, outlets, electrical wiring, and electronic equipment. Periodically during flight, each crewmember should check ducts, outlets, electrical wiring, and electronic equipment in his
immediate area to see that they are free of
combustible materials.
If safety belt is removed in flight or on the

ground, place the belt carefully so as not to
inadvertently operate any switches.
Extreme caution must be exercised when
moving around and stowing equipment
near upward ejection seats to avoid inadvertent actuation of the integrated harness
release trip.
Extreme caution will be exercised near the
ground emergency egress handle. Do not
pull safety pin No. 6 until it is called for by
the pilot. To prevent accidental firing, do
not suspend equipment from or use as a
handhold.
Change 10
4-3
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT INTERFERENCE
Due to the electronic characteristics of certain aircraft equipment, intraplane interaction/interference

may occur. An interference check will be accomplished in such detail as necessary so that each
crewmember responsible for operation of electronic
equipment will be thoroughly familiar with the effect of interaction, magnitude of interference, presence of spurious responses, and be able to determine the usable portion of the frequency spectrum
that will allow the most effective and coordinated
operation of this equipment. Amplification of the interference check will appear in the EW officers
checklist.
LOW ALTITUDE NAVIGATION
During low altitude flight, special emphasis by all

crewmembers will be directed to maintaining route
corridor and prescribed altitudes. Crew coordination
is extremely essential for each change of heading
and/or altitude. The navigator will notify the pilot
when altitude deviates significantly from that
planned. The navigator will announce each new
magnetic heading, altitude, and ETA/ETE. This information will be cross-checked by the pilot/copilot.
The pilot/copilot will monitor the aircraft position
and take action as necessary to ensure corridor limits are not exceeded.
ALTITUDE CALL PROCEDURES
The pilot, copilot, radar navigator, and navigator

will be thoroughly familiar with all planned altitudes to be flown throughout the mission. In flight,
the pilot, copilot, and radar navigator/navigator
4-4
having primary altimeter responsibility will monitor all altitudes being flown to ensure no deviations
of flight altitude clearances. The following calls are
mandatory and will be made over interphone when
required altitude changes are being made.
1. The pilot flying the aircraft will announce, over
interphone, when departing an assigned altitude
with the altitude climbing or descending to (e.g.,
Descending to 1900). No acknowledgment is required by other crewmembers unless an error is
noted.
2. The responsible radar navigator/navigator will
announce, over interphone, when 2000 and 1000
feet below or above any assigned altitude when
climbing or descending (e.g., 4000 for 2000). Acknowledgment by the pilot flying the aircraft is required.
announce, over interphone, each 5000 feet MSL
during all descents commencing at 15,000 feet
MSL. This call will include the altitude the aircraft
is descending to (e.g., 10,000 for 1900). Acknowledgment is required by the pilot flying the aircraft.
announce approaching DH/MDA during all instrument approaches. This call should be made approximately 100 feet above the DH/MDA and will include the appropriate DH/MDA altitude (e.g., Approaching 363). Acknowledgment by the pilot flying the aircraft is required.
5. The pilot not flying will announce DH, MDA,
VDP, and, if required, MAP. Upon making a decision to land or execute a missed approach, the pilot
flying will announce his intentions to the crew over
interphone.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
PILOT
Bomb Run
The pilot is the aircraft commander and is responsible for the aircraft and crew. For simplification and
to avoid any misunderstanding, the pilot and copilot will be referred to as such during interphone
transmissions. The successful accomplishment of
the mission is of prime importance; in no instance,
however, will the safety of the aircraft or crew be
compromised. The pilot is responsible for the issuance of instructions governing all phases of flight
operation. In addition to his regular function, the
pilot will perform the following:
1. Center FCI on radar navigators request and, if

desired, transfer control of the aircraft to the radar
navigator.
Mission Preparation
1. Attend general briefing.

2. Coordinate with other crewmembers on route,
charts, targets, items pertinent to individual crew
procedures, and supervise the completion of required forms.
a. The pilots low level chart will contain data
as required to orient the pilot to actions necessary
for the accomplishment of the low level portion of
the mission. The altitude for each TA operational
check will be established during mission planning
and clearly annotated on the pilots, radar navigators, and navigators charts.
NOTE
If the planned mission includes a low altitude portion, a forecast altimeter setting
will be obtained for the low altitude entry
point. This forecast setting will be compared with that received from the Air Traffic Control agency prior to starting the descent. When executing a descent prior to
landing or for low altitude tactic, the pilot
coordinates the altimeter setting with the
navigator and both will compare actual and
forecast altimeter settings at this time.
The altitude for each TA operational check
will be established during mission planning
and clearly annotated on the pilots, radar
navigators, and navigators charts.
3. Complete and file DD Form 175.

4. Attend specialized briefings for air refueling
weather, and other pertinent information.
5. Compile latest information relative to flight to
brief the crew.
6. Conduct specialized crew and emergency procedures briefing.
7. Check personal and professional equipment for
completeness and working order.
8. Check publications and technical data for currency.
NOTE
One of the pilots should maintain the desired IAS and monitor engine instruments
on the bomb run, to enable the other pilot
to handle any emergency in minimum time,
and visually clear the aircraft.
2. The pilot will call time-to-go and heading error
indicator position at appropriate intervals and, if
applicable, request Tone on at 20 seconds time-togo.
COPILOT
The copilot is the deputy aircraft commander and

will assist the pilot in the proper flight of the aircraft. In as much as the fuel panel and electrical
system are controlled by the copilot, he will also act
as the flight engineer.
NOTE
Increased attention will be devoted to monitoring all engine instruments and warning
indicators any time the pilots attention is
devoted solely outside the cockpit, i.e., during rendezvous, air refueling, formation flying, etc.
In addition to this regular function, the copilot will
perform the following:
Mission Preparation

2. Assist the pilot and navigator in mission planning and flight plan preparation. The copilot will
prepare the fuel prediction curve and compute takeoff performance data.
3. Prepare aircraft loading and weight and balance forms for pilots signature.
4. Attend specialized and emergency procedures
briefings with pilot.
6. Check publications and technical data for
currency.
Change 4
4-5
T.O. 1B-52H-1
RADAR NAVIGATOR/NAVIGATOR
Preparation of Charts
The navigator and radar navigator will work together continuously to ensure successful completion
of the mission. Each will have sufficient knowledge
of the others duties to enable him to perform them
if the need arises. The radar navigator/navigator
will monitor aircraft position and advise the pilot
when course corrections are required to maintain
required navigation performance criteria.
With OAS all mission materials (including charts)

will normally be preplanned (canned) by the local
units staff. The crewmember will be responsible for
ensuring the following points are annotated on the
chart:
Whenever a mission is flown with only a radar navigator or navigator, the RN/N flying will perform all
applicable checklist items of his assigned position.
In addition, the RN/N flying will accomplish all
items for the position not occupied by a qualified
RN/N, as applicable to the mission.
Mission Preparation
1. Attend general and specialized mission briefings as required. (RN-N)

2. Accomplish target study on assigned targets.
(RN-N)
3. Review target weapon settings, weapon release/launch points, and aircraft release parameters.
4. Determine gross safe in-range and/or launch
acceptability region envelopes.
5. Procure the following charts and forms as indicated by mission requirements:
a. Charts of suitable scale for the mission profile.
b. Additional chart coverage, as needed, for inflight.
c. Forms needed to plan, fly and debrief the
mission.
7. Check publications and technical order accuracy.
1. Special use airspace areas within 50 NM of

planned route (20 NM for low level route portion)
and within the planned altitude structure (high altitude vs low altitude) will be clearly annotated
with time and altitude limitations. (N)
2. Planned air refueling ARIP, ARCP, AREX, refueling altitude, start descent point (if applicable),
and FLIP AP/1B CR plan. (N)
3. Fixpoints and enroute turnpoints with corresponding reference numbers. (N/RN)
4. Applicable action points (as a minimum) as follows. The navigators will notify the applicable crew
members when each of these points is reached.
a. PCTAP, HHCL, HEW, SCM, TAT, TTAT,
TCM, LSL-In, LSL-Out.
b. All planned gravity weapons IPs and Targets.
5. All planned missile, JDAM and WCMD action
points and areas. (RN-N)
a. Launch/Simulated launch and/or release
areas.
b. TAL maneuver areas.
c. Fuel transfer (as applicable)
6. Planned start climb , start descent and level off
points on the applicable chart. (RN-N)
7. Highest obstruction within 50 NM of planned
route/route segment. (RN-N)
8. Emergency airfields within 300 NM of planned
route/route segment. (RN-N)
9. Scheduled control times on the appropriate
chart near the affected control point. (N)
Preparation of Forms
When preplanned mission planning forms are not

available, the crewmember will be responsible for
ensuring that the flight plan is complete and accurate. (RN-N)
4-6
Change 22
T.O. 1B-52H-1
EW OFFICER
Mission Preparation
The primary responsibility of the EW officer is the

utilization of the installed electronic countermeasures equipment to provide an active electronic defense against ground based or airborne electronic
devices that pose a threat to the safety of the aircraft and the completion of its mission. This is accomplished through the coordinated efforts and aid
of all crewmembers. In addition, the EW officer will
monitor liaison radio communications as prescribed
in governing directives. Monitoring responsibility
may be assumed by another crewmember during
those periods in which the EW officer is accomplishing required checklists, or ECM activity.

2. Accomplish study of all intelligence data necessary for the accomplishment of the EW portion of
the mission.
3. Contact the wing EW officer for correct reprogrammable EC systems software versions and ECM
application instructions directed for the mission.
4. The EW officer will accomplish flight planning,
coordinating with other crewmembers on the necessary phases of EW activity.
5. Complete required logs/forms in accordance
with applicable directives.
6. Attend specialized briefing when applicable.
7. Attend crew briefing.
9. Check publications and technical data for currency.
4-7/(4-8 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
section V
table of contents
page
INTRODUCTION
5-1
MINIMUM CREW REQUIREMENTS
5-1
INSTRUMENT MARKINGS
5-1
ENGINE LIMITATIONS
5-6
FUEL GRADE PROPERTIES AND LIMITS
5-9
AIRSPEED LIMITATIONS
5-13
PROHIBITED MANEUVERS
5-16
ACCELERATION LIMITATIONS
5-16
ALTITUDE AND TEMPERATURE LIMITATIONS
5-17
RATE OF DESCENT LIMITATIONS
5-17
SYSTEMS LIMITATIONS
5-24
GROUND LIMITATIONS
5-25
CENTER OF GRAVITY LIMITATIONS
5-31
WEIGHT LIMITATIONS
5-31
INTRODUCTION
This section covers the operating limitations of the
aircraft that will be observed during normal conditions.
Three colors define instrument markings:

Red Radial
Red Arc
Yellow Arc
Green Arc
MINIMUM CREW REQUIREMENTS

A pilot, a copilot, and a radar navigator/navigator
constitute the minimum crew required for flight in
this aircraft.
NOTE
INSTRUMENT MARKINGS
Special attention should be given to the instrument
markings (figure 5-1) since these limitations are not
necessarily repeated under their respective sections
in this manual. When necessary, an additional explanation of instrument markings is covered under
appropriate headings in this section.
Maximum and minimum limits

Prohibited operating ranges
Precautionary ranges
Normal operating ranges
All aircraft instruments will be marked in

accordance with the limitations reflected in
figure 5-1.
The term within limits as used herein pertains to the operating range between minimum and maximum red line markings on
the applicable gage.
5-1
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Instrument Markings
OIL TEMPERATURE
40135C
NORMAL OPERATION
EXHAUST GAS TEMPERATURE

TF33P3 ENGINES
149C
MAXIMUM
200460C CONTINUOUS OPERATION (NRT

AND BELOW)
460530C LIMITED OPERATION (SEE FIGURE
52 FOR DETAILED LIMITS)
MAXIMUM FOR STARTING (450C
APPLIES UP TO THE TIME ENGINE
REACHES IDLE RPM. FROM IDLE
RPM ON UP, THE ACCELERATION
EGT LIMIT APPLIES)
MAXIMUM DURING ENGINE
ACCELERATION (2 MINUTES)
450C
560C
C A U T I O N
APPLICABLE
TO ANY
GRADE OF FUEL
TACHOMETER
OIL PRESSURE
35 PSI
MINIMUM FOR ENGINE OPERATION
3540 PSI LIMITED OPERATION

4055 PSI CONTINUOUS OPERATION
58% RPM
OPERATION BELOW THIS
POINT IS TO BE AVOIDED
(MARKED ON
ENGINES 1, 3, 5, EXCEPT FOR START
AND 7)
5560 PSI LIMITED OPERATION
5760% RPM
IDLE RANGE (GROUND)
MAXIMUM FOR FLIGHT

NOTE
See OIL SYSTEM LIMITATIONS, this section,
for additional information.
8494% RPM
RANGE FOR NORMAL CRUISE
106.7% RPM
MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE
60 PSI
5-2
PROLONGED ENGINE OPER

ATION AT THE MAXIMUM
OPERATING LIMITS WILL
SHORTEN ENGINE LIFE.
A31835
T.O. 1B-52H-1
NO. 1 AND 4
MAIN TANKS SHOWN
15
20
FUEL
10 QUANTITY 25
5
LBS X1000
5
FUEL
QUANTITY
OUTBD WING
TANKS SHOWN
30
LBS X 1000
35
FUEL QUANTITY
MAIN TANKS
FULL BY WEIGHT SWITCH SETTING (FOR

OTHER MAIN TANK VALUES, SEE TABLE
BELOW)
SAFE TO USE FUEL FROM OUTBOARD
WING TANKS
MAIN TANKS 1 AND 4, 8850 ( 150)
MAIN TANKS 2 AND 3, 22,000 (200)
NOTE
All figures shown are based
on a fuel weight of 6.5 pounds
per gallon.
3
HYD
AUXILIARY TANKS
FULL BY WEIGHT SWITCH
SETTING (FOR OTHER
AUXILIARY TANK VALUES,
SEE TABLE BELOW)
FULL BY WEIGHT
SWITCH SETTING
TANK
OUTBD WING
7500 (150)
1&4
31,800 (400)
2&3
44,250 (400)
CTR WING
21,000 (200)
FWD BODY
13,300 (150)
MID BODY
46,400 (400)
AFT BODY
55,200 (400)
EXTERNAL
4550 (100)
3
2
2
X 1000
C
X100
HYDRAULIC PRESSURE
2400 PSI
27503250 PSI
3800 PSI
MANIFOLD TEMPERATURE
MINIMUM
NORMAL
MAXIMUM
246 C
MAXIMUM
A31836
5-3
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Instrument Markings (Cont)
AC FREQUENCY METER (TYPICAL)

360 CPS MINIMUM FREQUENCY
AT WHICH EQUIPMENT
WILL OPERATE
SATISFACTORILY
380420 ALLOWABLE OPERA
CPS
TING RANGE
395405 NORMAL OPERATING
CPS
RANGE
420 CPS MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE
FREQUENCY
AC VOLTMETER
AC AMMETER
200210 VOLTS NORMAL

RANGE
210 VOLTS MAXIMUM
320 AMPS MAXIMUM
OAS TEMPERATURE
SENSING INDICATOR
ACCLEROMETER
MAXIMUM POSITIVE VERTICAL
ACCELERATION AT MAXIMUM
GROSS WEIGHT
+1.33G MAXIMUM POSITIVE
ASYMMETRIC VERTICAL
ACCELERATION
0.67G MAXIMUM NEGATIVE
VERTICAL ACCELERATION
+1.8G
MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE
TEMPERATURE
Red line temperature is calibrated for
each individual indicator and is in range
from 90 to 102C.
1
A31837
5-4
T.O. 1B-52H-1
190 KNOTS
IAS
250 KNOTS
IAS
FULL FLAPS
305 KNOTS
IAS
MAXIMUM WITH LANDING GEAR

EXTENDED
390 KNOTS
IAS
MAXIMUM
MAXIMUM FOR FUEL SEQUENCE

DEVIATION. SEE FIGURE 5 5
1
8
6
AIRSPEED
NOTE
The instrument setting is such that the striped pointer will move to indicated the limiting structural airspeed 390
knots IAS or the airspeed, representing a Mach of .84, whichever is less.
.70 MACH INDICATED
MAXIMUM FOR FUEL SEQUENCE

DEVIATION. SEE FIGURE 5 5
.84 MACH INDICATED
MAXIMUM FOR NORMAL FUEL

SEQUENCE (CLEAN)
MACH INDICATOR
A31838
5-5
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ENGINE LIMITATIONS
ENGINE AND STARTER LIMITATIONS
ENGINE RATING DEFINITIONS
Engine
The following terms are used to define engine

thrust ratings and limitations associated with the
ratings:
Each engine is trimmed when it is installed to assure that it will develop takeoff thrust. As takeoff
thrust is set by EPR, the rpm at takeoff may be expected to vary for each engine due to the difference
in tolerances between engines. Engine rpm at takeoff will also increase as ambient temperature increases and will decrease as temperature decreases.
Takeoff rpm at any temperature should never exceed the operating limit of 106.7% (10,300 rpm)
which can damage an engine.
Thrust ratings are not established by setting EGT.

NOTE
EPR is the only parameter that indicates

thrust; therefore, the charted EPR value as
given in T.O. 1B-52H-1-1 should not be exceeded. Thrust ratings as defined are subject to the applicable EGT limitations specified in figure 5-2.
All instances of overspeed or overtemperature will

be recorded on Form 781 in order that the engine
may be inspected for possible damage before being
released for further operation. Figure 5-2 presents
the engine limitations in tabular form.
NOTE
1. TAKEOFF RATED THRUST (TRT)
TRT is restricted to 5 minutes of operation at the

highest value of thrust recommended for ground or
flight conditions. This rating is obtained by positioning the throttle to obtain a predetermined EPR
reading on the EPR gages. This value is calculated
for prevailing conditions of field barometric pressure and runway temperature and is obtained from
the EPR FOR TAKEOFF RATED THRUST chart in
Part 2 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1.
2. MILITARY RATED THRUST (MRT)
MRT is restricted to 30 minutes of consistent operation at a high thrust value for which the throttle is
positioned with reference to a predetermined value
of EPR for specific ground or flight conditions. The
information is obtained from the THRUST SETTING chart in Part 3 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1.
3. NORMAL RATED THRUST (NRT)
NRT is the highest value of thrust at which the engine may be operated continuously with the prevailing ground or flight conditions. Throttle position
is selected with reference to a predetermined EPR
which is obtained from the THRUST SETTING
chart in Part 3 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1.
4. IDLE THRUST
Idle thrust is not an engine rating, but rather a

throttle position suitable for minimum thrust operation on the ground or in flight. It is obtained by
placing the throttle in the IDLE detent on the
throttle quadrant.
See figure 1-30 for thrust ratings.
5-6
The initial idle rpm attained on starting a

cold engine may be below the stabilized
range of 57% to 60%. This initial low-idle
rpm is usually in the range from 55% to
57%. If the low-idle condition is encountered, advance the throttle to 75% and observe acceleration. If the engine accelerates
normally, the fuel control is operating properly and the low-idle does not necessarily
indicate an improper adjustment of idle
rpm. Since the engine idle rpm is affected
by ambient temperature, the adjustment
should be checked only on a stabilized engine in accordance with established maintenance procedures.
Aviation gasoline and JP-4 fuel mixed in
any proportion are suitable for continuous
operation from an engine performance
standpoint. However, the use of aviation
gasoline will be restricted to air refueling
operations and to emergency evacuation
ferry-type missions to minimize undesirable
lead deposits in the engines. Furthermore,
RATE OF CLIMB LIMITATIONS WITH
EMERGENCY FUEL (AVIATION GASOLINE) under FUEL GRADE PROPERTIES AND LIMITS, this section, will be
observed to prevent overpressurization of
the fuel tanks.
The engine operating limits are the same
for all fuel grades; however, with the use of
aviation gasoline, the charted EPR values
may not be obtained at takeoff rated thrust.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Engine Operating Limits

OPERATING CONDITION
EXHAUST GAS TEMPERATURE LIMIT
TIME LIMIT
Takeoff Rated Thrust (TRT)
510 530C
5 minutes
Military Rated Thrust (MRT)
500 C
30 minutes
460 C
Continuous
Normal Rated Thrust (NRT)
Idle
340 C
Air Starting
450 C
Ground Starting
450 C
Acceleration (Engine)
____
560 C
2 minutes
Engine operating limit speed is 106.7% rpm.

When a tendency to overtemperature is observed, the throttle should be retarded in an attempt to maintain the EGT
within limits.
NOTE
In flight if temperature or rpm cannot be controlled, the engine should be shut down as
soon as possible if the EGT exceeds 600C for any length of time or the rpm exceeds
108.7%
1
2
3
4
At ambient temperatures below 59F (15C), the maximum allowable exhaust gas temperature for takeoff is 510C. The
EGT limit for ambient temperatures between 59F (15C) and 100F (37.8C) varies in a straight line from 510C to
530C.
The 30-minute time limit at MRT includes acceleration time and the 3 minutes allowed for the EGT to stabilize.
At thrust settings less than NRT, the NRT temperature limit applies.
This temperature is not a limit. It is given as a guide to indicate the exhaust gas temperature which, if exceeded, may
signify an engine malfunction. The exhaust gas temperature limits for throttle settings below normal rated thrust are the
same as the temperature limit for normal rated thrust.
The following information is applicable to acceleration time and temperature limits:
6
7
Acceleration temperature time limit is defined as the period between advancing the throttle and the time that the EGT is
first observed to start falling after reaching its peak.
Three additional minutes are allowed following an engine acceleration for the EGT to decrease to a stabilized temperature
at or below the applicable limit.
For accelerations from idle to MRT or TRT, the acceleration temperature limit applies.
For accelerations to a thrust setting below MRT or from an intermediate thrust setting to MRT, use the temperature limit
for the desired thrust setting as the acceleration temperature limit.
Any time 450C is exceeded prior to reaching idle rpm during start, the engine will be shut down.
Any time 450C is exceeded prior to reaching idle rpm during start, the engine will be shut down and the ground crew
notified.
NOTE
For all inflight thrust settings (EPR) above NRT, the MRT limitations will apply.
Each time a limit as outlined above is exceeded, it will be recorded accurately on Form
781. Record the maximum temperature or rpm observed and the length of time the temperature limit was exceeded.
Figure 5-2
Change 4
5-7
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Starter
In event of failure of a start attempt in one

mode (pneumatic/cartridge) of the starter,
do not attempt a start in the other mode
until the malfunction is determined.
The pneumatic starters have the following limitations:
1. Maximum continuous operation
2. Minimum rest after 2-minute
continuous operation
3. Minimum rest after two
2-minute cycles
2 minutes
3 minutes
10 minutes
The cartridge-pneumatic starters have the following limitations:

1. Not more than two cartridge starts shall be
made in any period of 60 minutes.
2. After normal cartridge firing, at least 5 minutes shall elapse before removing the breech cap,
inserting another cartridge, and initiating another
cartridge start. If the cartridge malfunctioned (misfired or hangfired), wait at least 5 minutes before
attempting to remove the cartridge, except as noted
below. The time intervals, based on experience and
consideration of safety, have been established to
minimize the danger associated with misfire or
hangfire. Cartridge malfunctions are defined as:
a. Hangfire. A delay in the functioning of a
propelling charge at the time of firing. The amount
of delay is unpredictable, but in most cases will fall
within the range of a split second to several minutes. There will be evidence of smoke at the starter
exhaust duct. The engine rpm will increase rapidly
and the cartridge will give evidence of nearly normal operation. In this type malfunction, the energy
is expended and presents no hazard to engine operation.
b. Misfire. A cartridge that fails to ignite.
There is no physical evidence of smoke at the starter exhaust duct and no engine rotation. This type
malfunction presents a potential fire and explosive
hazard to engine operation until removed.
Do not remove a cartridge that has fired

normally, hangfired, or misfired until there
is no evidence of exhaust smoke at the
starter exhaust duct and minimum time intervals have elapsed since start of initiation. Wear leather gloves when removing
cartridge. Do not point screened end of cartridge at personnel or equipment.
NOTE
When a hangfire/misfire occurs during

SIOP conditions, a 2-minute wait before removal is recommended. However, this time
limit may be waived by the unit commander
based on his assessments of the situation
provided the following conditions are met:
No smoke can be observed from starter
exhaust.
Starter breech cover is not hot to the
bare hand.
There is no evidence of pressure inside
breech chamber. (Breech cover offers no
undue resistance to removal.)
Cartridge screen end is pointed away
from aircraft, equipment, or personnel.
Cartridge is treated as a potential hangfire (fire hazard) for a period of 10 minutes after removal from breech.
3. Not more than three pneumatic starts shall be
made in any period of 15 minutes.
4. If cartridge starts and pneumatic starts are interspersed, no more than three starts shall be made
within a 15-minute period. Two of these starts may
be cartridge starts provided the limitations noted
previously are not exceeded.
Except in an emergency, engine operation is

prohibited when a live or misfired cartridge
is installed in the starter. Abnormal cartridge conditions of explosive nature could
be generated due to the combination of
vibration and high temperatures that can
exist in the engine nacelle.
In the event an unfired cartridge has remained in
the breech during engine operation, the cartridge
will not be used for a subsequent start.
5-8
T.O. 1B-52H-1
IGNITION SYSTEM LIMITATIONS
A continuous duty (CONT) position of the engine

starter switch is provided for use of continuous ignition. With the starter switch in CONT position for
use of continuous ignition, there are no cooling period requirements for the ignition system.
For the purpose of engine starting on the ground, operation of the engine ignition system is limited to 2
minutes followed by a 3-minute cooling period. The
system may be energized for another 2 minutes following the 3-minute cooling period; however, during
flight, if the system has not been energized, ignition
may be used continuously for a period of 10 minutes
or in excess of this period during emergencies. The
system should not be energized longer than necessary, but with 10 minutes or more of continuous operation, the ignition system will be turned off for a
cooling period of at least 10 minutes.
Continuous use of START position of the

ignition system for a period in excess of 10
minutes without 10-minute interim cooling
periods may damage the ignition system
and render it inoperable for subsequent engine restarts.
[EV] ENGINE FUEL ENRICHMENT LIMITATIONS
If the airplane is fueled with fuel other than JP-4 or

AVGAS, fuel enrichment must be used for starting,
when fuel temperatures are below 0C (32F). The
FEV may be used when the temperature is 32F to
40F.
Fuel enrichment will not be used, except for

engine starting, as increased fuel flow could
cause damage in case of compressor stall.
If the airplane is fueled with JP-4 or AVGAS, do not use fuel enrichment for starting, regardless of temperature. Increased
fuel flow could damage the engine.
OIL SYSTEM LIMITATIONS
Each engine oil system normally operates at a pressure of 40 to 55 psi when operating above IDLE
rpm and at temperatures between 40 and 135C.
The minimum allowable oil pressure at IDLE is 35
psi. Engines may be operated in flight with
pressures from 35 to 40 psi or 55 to 60 psi when
necessary, but preferably at reduced power setting.
High oil pressures (55 to 65 psi) may be

encountered on engine start in cold weather, but
should drop to normal pressure range within 2
minutes. Due to the fuel-oil cooler being
thermostatically controlled, the oil pressure soon
returns to the normal operating range as the
temperature increases following a cold engine start.
NOTE
Oil pressure fluctuations up to 5 psi may be

observed. These fluctuations are generally
in the pressure indicating system and do
not indicate abnormal engine operation.
Following high engine thrust settings, such as for
climb, the oil temperature may exceed 135C
causing illumination of the engine oil overheat
light. Transient temperatures in the range from
135 to 149C are not uncommon following a
reduction from high thrust settings to below normal
rated thrust and are not limited with respect to
duration or frequency. The transient temperature
limit of 149C is permissible up to 10 minutes
following a reduction in thrust. Advancing the
throttle will usually reduce oil temperature because
of increased fuel flow through the fuel-oil cooler.
However, if the temperature does not decrease
because of an oil system malfunction, the
malfunction may be identified in advance of the
149C normal shutdown limitation by the continued
illumination of the engine oil overheat light. Engine
operation with transient temperatures between
149 and 163C is to be avoided wherever possible
by making appropriate thrust setting adjustments
or by shutting down the engine. The copilot will
monitor oil temperatures during flight whenever
the oil overheat light is on and will:
1. Record in Form 781 any temperature of 149C
or above with time duration.
2. Consider engine shutdown at 149 up to 163C.
3. Shut down the engine when temperature
reaches or exceeds 163C.
FUEL GRADE PROPERTIES AND LIMITS

Definitions of the various kinds of fuels are given in
the following paragraphs. Fuel grade properties
and limits are given in figure 5-3. Freeze points of
various mixtures of JP-4 and commercial jet fuel
are given in figure 5-4.
RECOMMENDED FUEL
Recommended fuel is a fuel which has been proven

to operate satisfactorily under all conditions. The
recommended fuel for the B-52 type aircraft shall
conform to Specification MIL-T-5624 Grade JP-4.
Change 22
5-9
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Fuel Grade Properties and Limits
FUEL
TYPE
USE
Recommended
Fuel
Alternate
Fuel
Emergency
Fuel
GRADE
NATO
SYMBOL
U.S.
MILITARY
SPECIFICATION
SPECIFIC
GRAVITY
(MAX-MIN
AT 60F)
FREEZE
POINT
F C
F-40*
MIL-T-5624
.802-.751
72
58
LIMITS
Wide Cut
Gasoline
JP-4
Wide Cut
Gasoline
Commercial
Jet B 5
None
None
.802-.751
58
50
Kerosene
JP-5
F-44*
MIL-T-5624
.845-.788
51
46
JP-8
F-34*
MIL-T-83133
.84-.775
53
47
Commercial
Jet A-1 5
F-35
None
.839-.775
53
47
Commercial
Jet A 5
None
None
.839-.775
40
40
JP-8+100
F-37
MIL-T-83133
.84-.775
53
47
F-12
None
F-18
None
F-22
MIL-G-5572
None
MIL-G-5572
None
MIL-G-5572
76
76
76
76
76
60
60
60
60
60
Kerosene
Aviation
Gasoline
(AVGAS)
Plus
3% MIL
-L-22851
Type II
80/87
91/96
100/130
108/135
115/145
.706
.709
.703
.707
.703
4
4
4
4
1
1
1
1
1
*Fuel identified by NATO symbols F-34, F-40, and F-44 contain a fuel system icing inhibitor.
1
Follow climb restrictions.
Avoid flying at altitudes where indicated OAT is below the freeze point of the fuel.
Prior to using alternate or commercial fuel, obtain freeze point from vendor or airline supplying the fuel, then follow limit
2
. The pilot should exercise caution if he suspects or observes improper fuel handling procedures. If there is any
indication that cleanliness is not up to standard, a fuel sample should be taken in a glass container and observed for
fogginess, presence of water, or rust.
Average value-limits are not controlled by specification.
See figure 5-4, JET FUEL MIXTURE FREEZE POINT CHARTS.
JP-8+100 is categorized as Emergency Fuel due to its potential to damage filter elements in the ground fuel systems
and requiring special ground handling procedures. JP-8+100 properties are the same as JP-8.
Figure 5-3
5-10
Change 15
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Jet Fuel Mixture Freeze Point Charts
Figure 5-4
5-11
T.O. 1B-52H-1
gines is recommended at ambient temperatures below zero (0) degrees F to improve starting performance and reliability.
ALTERNATE FUEL
NOTE
Alternate or emergency fuels may or may

not contain icing inhibitor additives. Precautions should be taken to avoid flight conditions which are conducive to fuel icing.
Alternate fuel is a fuel which can be used continuously with a possible loss of efficiency and may result in increased maintenance or overhaul costs.
The alternate fuel for this aircraft shall conform to
Specification MIL-T-5624 Grade JP-5. Use of alternate fuels may require engine retrimming if takeoff
is critical. To determine if trim is required, use the
EPR to check rated thrust; i.e., if rated EPR cannot
be obtained, retrim the engines. It is recommended
that if a landing is made at a base having only alternate grade fuels and no facilities for engine retrimming, only enough fuel be loaded to accomplish
a one-time flight to a base where JP-4 is available.
Engine thrust settings below takeoff thrust will not
be limited. Engines operating on alternate fuels can
be trimmed to produce the same thrust as obtained
with JP-4. The engine operating limits discussed
under ENGINE LIMITATIONS, this section, also
apply to alternate fuels.
JP-8 FUEL
JP-8 is a heavier (denser) fuel. JP-8 fuel weights

range from 6.45 lbs/gal. to 7.00 lbs/Gal. at 15 degrees C (59 degrees F). JP-8 is the military equivalent of commercial jet fuel, Grade Jet A-1. The basic
difference between JP-8 and Jet A-1 is that JP-8
contains icing (water) inhibitor, static dissipator,
and corrosion inhibitor additives.
NOTE
For JP-8 fuel loading use the 6.5 lbs/Gal.

fuel loading charts in T.O. 1B-52H-5.
Fuel quantity indicating system accuracy should
not be affected.
Engine and AGE starting difficulty will increase
with decreasing ambient temperature. Starting
times will increase with decreasing ambient temperature regardless of starting method. The individual starting performance. from engine to engine,
will be more varied with JP-8. The variation in
starting performance will increase with decreasing
temperature. Pneumatic starts will be more reliable
and consistent than cartridge starts. At colder temperatures, starting times may exceed started duty
cycle limits or become impossible. Preheating en-
5-12
Change 10
Current starter duty cycle limitations in

this Section will be observed.
At ambient temperatures below zero (0) degrees F,
it is recommended engines be started one at a time
until flight and ground crews become familiar with
the difficulties and peculiarities of cold weather
starting with JP-8.
Fuel puddling in engine turbine and exhaust cone
sections and/or on the ground may increase with
decreasing ambient temperature.
NOTE
If fuel puddling is present or suspected, motoring the engine should aid in dissipating
the fuel and fumes. see Section II for Hung
Start procedures.
Frequency of engine torching may increase with decreasing ambient temperature. Torching may be
more intense and/or produce more visible flame,
particularly at colder temperatures. Observe current engine fire procedures.
Initiating ground starts with auxiliary fuel pumps
on is recommended. The higher pressure auxiliary
tank fuel pumps will provide better cold weather
starting performance, shorter times to idle rpm, reduces the probability of hung starts and engine
torching. If the first step in the fuel sequence requires main tank fuel, initiate the start with the
auxiliary tank fuel pumps. Once engines are at idle
rpm, switch to the required fuel sequence. Flutter
limits in this Section apply if outboard/external
tanks are used for auxiliary starting.
Stabilized idle rpm may be below normal. If below
normal stabilized rpm is experienced and a hung
start or other problem is not suspected, allow the
engine to warm up for two minutes after the starter
is energized. After the two minute warm up,
throttles should be positioned to obtain a minimum
of 58% rpm to provide safe operating speed for the
constant speed generator drives. If there is no
throttle response, the start should be treated as a
hung start.
Engine emissions will include more smoke and visible mist. Engine emissions may reduce or obscure
visibility at lower temperatures.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Fuel freezing is more likely to occur. Avoid flying at
conditions (altitude and Mach number) where the
OAT gage indication is within 8 degrees C (14 degrees F) of fuel freezing temperature.
NOTE
The freezing temperature of JP-8 is 47 degrees C (53 degrees F).

The current air start envelope will not be
affected by JP-8, if air restarts are attempted within ten (10) minutes of engine
shutdown. Use current air restart envelope.
Observe current engine air restart procedures and limitations.
If the engine fails to air restart and mechanical trouble is not suspected, flight conditions (altitude and air speed) inward from
the edges and toward the center or bottom
of the current air restart envelope improve
the probability of air restarting. Using the
higher pressure auxiliary fuel pumps may
also improve the probability on air restarting. Observe current engine air restart procedures and limitations.
EMERGENCY FUEL
NOTE
Aviation gasoline and JP-4 fuel mixed in

any proportion are suitable for continuous
operation from an engine performance
standpoint. However, the use of aviation
gasoline must be restricted to emergency
evacuation or ferry-type missions to minimize undesirable lead deposits in the engines.
RATE OF CLIMB LIMITATION WITH EMERGENCY FUEL
(AVIATION GASOLINE)
The fuel tank vent system is designed for JP-4 fuel

which has a Reid vapor pressure of 3 psi. Aviation gasoline has a Reid vapor pressure of 7 psi. If any tanks
are refueled with aviation gasoline and a rapid rate
of climb is established at altitudes above the boiling
altitude of the fuel, the flow of vapor will exceed the
capacity of the tank vent system. This will result in
hazardous excess pressures in the tanks and vent system. When aviation gasoline is used, the rate of climb
at altitudes above the boiling altitude of the fuel must
be reduced. This is required as approximately 0.5% of
the tank fuel quantity will be evaporated overboard
per 1000 feet of tank altitude above the boiling point
altitude of the fuel. The kerosene-type fuels will not
limit aircraft climb rate.
NOTE
Alternate or emergency fuels may or may

not contain icing inhibitor additives. Precautions should be taken to avoid flight conditions which are conducive to fuel icing.
Emergency fuel is a fuel which may cause significant damage to the engines or other systems. Emergency fuel for this aircraft must conform to Specification MIL-G-5572, the lowest grade aviation gasoline available. This fuel is limited to a one-time
flight and should be used only if recommended or
alternate fuels are unavailable. When using aviation gasoline, the engine-driven fuel pump life becomes critical because of the poor lubricating properties of the gasoline. In addition, the use of aviation gasoline leaves lead deposits in the burners,
turbine section, and tailpipe. For these reasons, the
use of aviation gasoline is to be avoided. When an
emergency fuel is used, the AFTO Form 781 should
be annotated and maintenance should be notified at
the next landing base.
Gasoline and JP-4 fuel mixtures that contain less than 10% gasoline in all fueled
tanks have no climb rate limitations.
Ground Refueling
When the aircraft is serviced on the ground with aviation gasoline and subsequently is flown above the
limiting altitudes for the initial fuel temperatures
shown in the table below, the rate of climb shall be restricted to not more than 200 feet per minute. Initial
fuel temperature is the temperature of the aviation
gasoline in the tanks shortly before takeoff time.
INITIAL FUEL
TEMPERATURE
LIMITING ALTITUDE
(FEET)
60F
70F
80F
90F
100F
110F
53,000
44,000
36,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
Change 20
5-12A/(5-12B blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Air Refueling
SPEED RESTRICTIONS FOR PYLON MISSILE

SEPARATION
If the fuel received from the tanker includes a portion of aviation gasoline, no accurate fuel temperature data will be available. The rate of climb restrictions will be determined by altitude and by the
percent of aviation gasoline in any of the receiver
tanks after refueling. If the aircraft is flown above
the limiting altitudes for the percent of aviation
gasoline shown in the table below, the rate of climb
shall be restricted to not more than 200 feet per
minute.
Prior to jettisoning an aft inboard missile

on either pylon, refer to the applicable missile technical order (T.O. 1B-52H-30-1, T.O.
1B-52H-30-4, T.O. 1B-52H-34-2-7, T.O.
1B-52H-34-2-8, or T.O. 1B-52H-34-2-9) for
restrictions.
WING FLUTTER
% AVIATION
GASOLINE
LIMITING ALTITUDE
(FEET)
50
75
100
45,000
35,000
Transfer Altitude
Mach number limitations shown in this section are
indicated unless otherwise noted. The airspeed limitations, other than those shown in figure 5-1, are
listed herein and are summarized in figure 5-8.
NOTE
Significant Mach position errors exist at

airspeeds above Mach 0.81 indicated due to
the EVS pod installation. The pods create
a region of localized supersonic flow in the
vicinity of the pitot tube. This results in
sensing a lower pressure and causes the
airspeed and Mach indicating systems to
read low. Therefore, the aircraft will not be
flown at speeds greater than 0.84 Mach indicated to prevent exceeding the limiting
Mach of 0.91 true.
If an airspeed calibration is made, the aircraft (clean or with cruise missile pylons)
may be flown to 400 knots calibrated airspeed and 0.91 Mach true under conditions
allowing 390 knots IAS and 0.84 Mach indicated. Cruise missile pylons with or without
missiles have no effect on the previous limitations.
The normal fuel management sequence provides

the highest practical airspeed capabilities while
avoiding wing flutter. It requires that fuel in the
main tanks must be used down to their respective
green bands, as marked on the fuel quantity gages,
prior to using fuel from full outboard wing tanks or
full external tanks. Once external tank fuel usage
is begun, there will be a more restrictive airspeed
limitation, as shown in figure 5-5.
ECM EQUIPMENT
The aircraft should not exceed 300 knots IAS unless

one of the following is accomplished:
1. ECM transmitters and heat exchangers are installed in systems 1 thru 8, ALQ-122 components
are installed in system 9, ECM transmitters are installed in systems 11 thru 14, ALT-32 transmitter
and power supply are installed in system 20, and
ALQ-122 components are installed in system 21.
2. Dummy boxes or blank adapter plates are installed in lieu of any of the above equipment. Possible ram air duct, radome, or ECM shroud failures
may occur if the aircraft exceeds 300 knots IAS
without one of the above installations due to the
flow of the unrestricted ram air.
Flight is prohibited if ALQ-172 components or
dummy boxes are not installed in systems 15 and
16.
WING FLAPS
Wing flap airspeed limits for extension and retraction are illustrated in figure 5-6. It should be noted
that the maximum airspeed to start flap extension
is 225 knots IAS. Maximum speed for 50% flaps is
225 knots IAS and the maximum speed for flaps
full down is 190 knots IAS.
Change 18
5-13
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Wing Flutter Airspeed Limitations

KNOTS OR MACH INDICATED
(WHICHEVER IS LESS)
WING TANK LOADING POUNDS
CLEAN
WING OR
ACM PYLON
OR
AGM-86
PYLON
WITH OR
WITHOUT
MISSILES
STUB
PYLON
OR
AGM-28
PYLON
WITH OR
WITHOUT
STORES
STUB
PYLON/
HSAB
WITH
JASSM
STUB
PYLON/
HSAB
WITH OR
WITHOUT
JSOW
OUTBOARD
WING TANKS
EXTERNAL
TANKS
7000 or Greater
Each
4000 or Greater
Each
390/.84
390/.84
390/.84
390/.84
Less Than 7000 Less Than 4000

in Either
(or) in Either
250/.70
250/.70
250/.70
250/.70
All Mains in Green

Band
Any or Empty
4000 or
Greater Each
390/.84
390/.84
390/.84
390/.84
All Mains in Green

Band and Any
Greater Than 5000
Any or Empty
Less Than 4000

in Either
ABOVE
19,000 FT
340/.77
ABOVE
25,000 FT
290/.77
ABOVE
29,000 FT
270/.75
ABOVE
25,000 FT
290/.77
19,000 FT
OR BELOW
390/.72
25,000 FT
OR
BELOW
390/.70
29,000 FT
OR BELOW
350/.70
25,000 FT
OR
BELOW
390/.70
ABOVE
19,000 FT
340/.84
ABOVE
25,000 FT
290/.77
ABOVE
29,000 FT
270/.75
ABOVE
25,000 FT
290/.77
19,000 FT
OR BELOW
390/.72
25,000 FT
OR
BELOW
390/.70
29,000 FT
OR BELOW
350/.70
25,000 FT
OR
BELOW
390/.70
MAIN TANKS
Any Main Greater
Than Green Band
5000 or Less in Each
Any or Empty
Less Than 4000

in Either
For Stub Pylon/HSAB without JASSM use Stub Pylon/HSAB with or without JSOW
Deviation from normal fuel management sequence. Placards apply.
Figure 5-5
5-14
Change 16
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Wing Flap Airspeed Limits
NONNUCLEAR WEAPONS RELEASE LIMITATIONS
INDICATED AIRSPEED KNOTS
Cluster Racks
260
N
TIO
240
C
RA
RE
Without protective guide plates installed in

the bomb bay, nonnuclear weapons released
from the outboard stations of the aft cluster
bomb rack may strike and damage the
bomb doors. If guide plates are not installed, stores will not be loaded at outboard
aft stations. The bomb bay capacity will
then be reduced to a maximum of 21 stores.
EXTENSION
220
200
RD
CA
AP
A
PL
FL
180
160
100
Nonnuclear Weapons
80
60
40
20
FLAP POSITION PERCENT
0
A31840
Figure 5-6
Refer to T.O. 1B-52H-34-2-1 for data and limitations on nonnuclear gravity weapons and the appropriate -34 series manuals for nonnuclear missile
weapon data and limitations.
TERRAIN CLEARANCE LIGHT
LANDING GEAR
Retraction:
Main gear (Maximum) 220 knots IAS
Tip gear (Maximum) 305 knots IAS
Extension: (Maximum) 305 knots IAS at 30,000 feet
and below.
Indicated Mach 0.81 at 35,000 feet
NOTE
Maximum speed at which all gears will lock

down is 305 knots IAS.
Extended: (Maximum) 305 knots IAS or aircraft
flutter speed restriction.
AIRBRAKES
At speeds above 305 knots IAS, do not select an airbrake position greater than position 4. See FLIGHT
CHARACTERISTICS, Section VI.
AIR REFUELING SLIPWAY DOORS
Slipway Doors Open: (Maximum) 300 knots IAS.
Terrain Clearance Light Extended: (Maximum) 305

knots IAS.
RUDDER TRIM LIMITATIONS
In order to stay within the structural limits of the

fin, observe the rudder trim limits tabulated below.
These limits protect the aircraft structure during
normal maneuvering and also allow trimming of
single outboard engine failures throughout the normal speed range in the clean configuration. Double
outboard engine failures can be trimmed in cruising
flight.
IAS (KNOTS)
TRIM UNITS
Under 320
320 to 350
Over 350
12 units (full trim)

10 units
8 units
NOTE
It should be observed that these limits are

not identical to those listed on the rudder
trim placard. The placard limits, being
more conservative, should be adhered to operationally whenever possible. In any event,
the above-listed structural limits should not
be exceeded.
5-15
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DRAG CHUTE LIMITATIONS
ASYMMETRIC ACCELERATION LIMITATIONS
During the deceleration of a landing or refused

takeoff, the drag chute may be deployed at or below
135 knots IAS. Deployment at higher speeds may
result in failure of the chute or the shear pin.
Asymmetric g forces occur anytime the aircraft has

a roll rate. In steady state banked coordinated
flight, (roll rate = 0), g forces are symmetrical.
Asymmetrical g limitation is +1.33 and occurs anytime the spoilers are deflected and a roll-rate exists.
The asymmetrical g limit is constant for all configurations and gross weights.
BUFFET BOUNDARY LIMITATIONS

Flight Speed Envelope
ROLL MANEUVER LIMITS
Figure 5-7 represents the flight speed envelope of

the aircraft at high altitude. It is possible to fly fast
enough to cause a progressive airflow separation
over the wing which results in aircraft buffet. Buffet is also encountered at low speeds prior to stalling. The aircraft can be flown safely through the
first indication of buffet to the speed for maximum
recommended buffet. (Maximum recommended buffet is defined as a buffet or vibration amplitude of
0.1 g at the pilots stations.) The MRT lines on figure 5-7 define the level flight speed range at high
altitude. See WING BUFFETING, Section VI.
PROHIBITED MANEUVERS
Acrobatics of any kind are strictly prohibited. This
includes intentional spins, vertical stalls, and steep
dives, as well as any maneuver resulting in abrupt
accelerations. Normal stalls, accidental spins, and
shallow dives are discussed in Section VI.
LIMIT LOAD FACTOR
Figure 5-9 illustrates the structural limits on maneuver load factor. It also shows the limit gust load
factors throughout the gross weight range. The
chart is for normal fuel loading and sequencing as
defined by Section I. The aircraft positive maneuvering limit is 2.0 gs at all gross weights up to
450,000 pounds. Above 450,000 pounds, the limit
maneuver load factor decreases linearly to 1.8 gs at
488,000 pounds maximum flight weight. At normal
loading, strength has been provided for gust encounters (turbulence) which result in load factors
above 2.0 gs and up to those shown in figure 5-9.
See TURBULENCE AND THUNDERSTORMS,
Section VII, for selection of best speed and altitude
in turbulence.
NOTE
Limit maneuvering to 30 degrees of bank

when above 390,000 pounds gross weight.
There is an increased possibility of exceeding maneuver load factor limits at gross
5-16
Change 12
Rapid roll rates such as those induced by full control wheel deflection in 1.5 seconds should not be
initiated at altitudes above 30,000 feet when the
positive load factor exceeds 1.33 gs. Since 41 degrees bank angle results in a 1.33 g load, a slow
entry and exit in performing level, coordinated
turns should be planned when bank angles exceed
41 degrees. Structural limit loads can be reached
with a 30 degree per second roll rate combined with
a 1.33 g positive load factor or with a zero roll rate
at the 2.0 g positive limit load factor. At low altitudes, structural limit loads can be reached with a
10 degree per second roll rate combined with the
1.78 g positive load factor resulting for a 55 degree
bank angle.
LIMIT LOAD FACTOR COMBINED MANEUVERS
The aircraft maneuver limit load factor (figure 5-9)

is based on aircraft maneuvers such as a wings
level pull-up or a steady turn with zero roll rate. A
combined maneuver involves rotations about two
axes such as a rolling pull-up. The maneuver limit
load factor decreases with increasing roll rate when
performing combined maneuvers. Figure 5-10 depicts the flaps up combined maneuver limit load
factor as a function of roll rate. The maximum
achievable roll rates for different altitudes are also
plotted on the chart. For example, operation of the
aircraft at the maximum achievable roll rate of 31
degrees per second at 40,000 feet pressure altitude
results in a maneuver limit load factor of 1.33 gs
while a maximum achievable roll rate of 16 degrees
per second at sea level results in a maneuver limit
load factor of 1.82 gs. Since accurate roll rate information is not displayed to the pilot, combined maneuvers should be performed with deliberate caution.
MANEUVER LIMITS FLAPS DOWN
Figure 5-11 provides curves which may be used to

determine the allowable flaps down maneuver limits to avoid stall buffeting, stalls, or exceeding the
structural placard limits. This chart is useful in
planning the approach.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
MANEUVER LIMITS FLAPS UP
Figure 5-12 depicts the flaps-up maneuvering limits

above 10,000 feet. Three reference curves are
plotted on the chart to compute minimum recommended speed, initial buffet speed, and strong buffet speed. Strong buffet and maximum recommended buffet are synonymous. The chart may be
used to compute high speed initial buffet at a given
bank angle by using the top portion of the buffet
curve, or the low speed initial buffet at a given
bank angle by using the lower portion of the buffet
curve. (See example on figure 5-12.) Maximum
bank angle for initial buffet may be computed by
establishing the point of convergence of the high
speed and low speed buffet curves (note asterisk on
figure 5-12) and following vertically to the intersection of the bank angle curve developed from the
gross weight and altitude conditions. The same process would be used for computing strong buffetmaximum recommended. Acceleration gs may also
be computed for any selected condition from the
scale on the left side of the bank angle chart.
ALTITUDE AND TEMPERATURE

LIMITATIONS
Although there is no unqualified altitude restriction
on the aircraft, the table below lists limitations on
equipment not designed for operation above the
noted altitude or which will be shut down under
specific temperature conditions:
1.
Oxygen Regulator and

42,000 feet (cabin
Oxygen Mask Combination
(altitude)
2. If ECM equipment is to be operated on the
ground without ground cooling equipment, specific
time and temperature limitations will be complied
with to prevent overheating. ALR-46 and Sensor
Integration equipment has no time or temperature
limitations.
Due to probable equipment damage, operation of ECM equipment without complying

with proper cooling, time, and/or temperature limitations is prohibited.

The maximum rate of descent is 25,000 feet per
minute.
Change 10
5-17
T.O. 1B-52H-1

CONDITIONS:
EXAMPLE:
GIVEN:
Gross Weight 360,000 pounds
Altitude 40,000 feet
FIND:
Maximum speed in level flight
SOLUTION:
Maximum level flight Mach No. = .865
CLEAN CONFIGURATION
ICAO STANDARD DAY
8 ENGINES MRT
Figure 5-7
5-18
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Airspeed Limitations
INDICATED SPEED
CONDITION
KNOTS
MACH
135
Drag chute deployed
190
Full flaps
220
Main gear retraction
225
Half flaps
300
Air refueling slipway doors open
300
ECM transmitters and heat exchangers, or dummy boxes or blank adapter plates not
installed
305
Airbrakes greater than position 4
305
Terrain clearance light extended
305
Tip gear retraction
305
Gear extension 30,000 feet and below
.81
Gear extension at 35,000 feet
.82
.83
.84
305
390
.84
Landing gear extended

Maximum airspeed
NOTE
For additional speed restrictions with various aircraft/missile configurations, see figure 5-5.
Figure 5-8
5-19
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Structural Limitations Limit Load Factor
Figure 5-9
5-20
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Combined Maneuver Limits Flaps Up

REMARKS:
Subtract 0.2Gs
for gross weights
above 450,000 pounds
Figure 5-10
5-21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Maneuver Limits Flaps Down
Figure 5-11
5-22
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Maneuver Limits Flaps Up
Figure 5-12
5-23
T.O. 1B-52H-1
SYSTEMS LIMITATIONS
STABILIZER TRIM MECHANISM LIMITATIONS
There are no restrictions on the use of the manual

stabilizer trim system. However, when using the
electrical portion of the system, observe the following limitations:
1. Do not actuate one trim switch in the NOSE
UP position while applying nosedown trim with the
other trim switch. (An exception to this is a runaway trim condition.) This operation causes the
electric actuator to stall, since one electric actuator
clutch cancels the effect of the other. Overheating
and eventual failure results if this condition is
maintained for long periods of time (in excess of 2
minutes) due to a stalled actuator rotor.
2. Continuous energizing of the stabilizer trim
switch in either the NOSE UP or NOSE DN position for long periods of time can result in driving
the electric motor-driven followup screw into its
limit stops. This stalls the output shaft of the actuator motor and causes excessive clutch slippage,
tending to overheat the clutch and motor, resulting
in shortened clutch service life. Extreme trim position can be obtained manually after approaching
the extremes electrically.
3. Do not attempt continuous operation of the
stabilizer in the air or on the ground, except in
emergencies, with standby pump pressure. Operate
only by momentary actuation of the trim buttons.
High attrition replacement rate of the stabilizer
trim electric actuator results if this practice is not
followed due to high wear rate of the actuator
clutch.
4. In order to prevent excessive wear on the trim
actuator clutch and the hydraulically released motor drive brake, engines 4 and 5 should have a
throttle setting of 82% rpm or more during stabilizer operation on the ground.
5. During flight, the stabilizer trim should be operated only in short bursts. This serves as an aid in
recognizing a malfunctioning electrical trim system
before an extreme out-of-trim condition is reached.
WING FLAP LIMITATIONS
Wing flap operation shall be discontinued within 10

seconds if the flaps fail to start moving. Slippage of
the power unit clutch or malfunction of the wing
flap system can be detected by monitoring the wing
flap indicator while using the system.
5-24
Since the friction of braking and continuous operation of the flap motors cause considerable heat, actuation is limited as follows:
1. A 20-second interval is required between braking actions of the flap motors.
2. A maximum of 6 minutes motor operation is allowed in any 30-minute period.
3. A maximum of 10 starts are allowed in any
6-minute period followed by a cooling off interval of
not less than 24 minutes.
TERRAIN CLEARANCE LIGHT LIMITATIONS
Ground operation of the terrain clearance

light should not exceed 5 continuous minutes without allowing a 5-minute cooling
period before a subsequent operating period. The light should be extended beyond a
30 position (beam from vertical) to allow
maximum heat dissipation.
Inflight operation of the terrain clearance
light should not exceed 15 continuous minutes without allowing a 4-minute cooling
period before subsequent operating periods.
BOMBING SYSTEM LIMITATIONS

Nonnuclear Weapons Jettison
In an emergency, jettison of weapons with the aft

gear down may be attempted; however, consideration will be given to possible gear damage. A
planned release in this configuration is not authorized.
Jettison of weapons with the aft landing

gear in the down position may result in
landing gear damage.
BOMB DOOR OPERATION LIMITATIONS
Maximum bomb door open speed is 390 knots IAS.

Noticeable bomb door fatigue damage (loose rivets,
cracked skin and ribs, etc) can be expected after the
doors have been open for 5 minutes at 390 knots
IAS. Fatigue damage can also be expected at lesser
airspeeds if the doors are open for longer periods. If
the doors remain open for extended periods due to
system malfunction or any limit is exceeded, make
a Form 781 entry.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
GROUND LIMITATIONS
ECM, RADIO, AND RADAR TRANSMITTER LIMITATIONS
Ground operation of ECM or radar transmitters is prohibited on aircraft within 200

feet of any of the following:
Weapons which are not fully assembled.
Weapons to which continuity testers are
connected.
Weapons with open access doors.
Ground operation of AN/ARC-190 liaison
radio is prohibited on aircraft within 200
feet of any of the following:
Nuclear weapons loaded in an aircraft
(transmitting or adjacent) with its bomb
bay doors open.
and is determined by the speed of the aircraft and

its gross weight at the time the brakes are applied.
Sufficient heat energy can be generated by the
brakes to cause tire explosion and hydraulic fire.
The brake energy limit is 298 million foot-pounds
total for eight brakes. This is the maximum energy
the brakes can absorb before becoming ineffective
and is the stopping capability limit. Tire explosions
and hydraulic fire will result at lower levels of
brake energy absorption. Above 230 million footpounds accumulation, fire and tire explosion are
imminent and above 150 million foot-pounds accumulation, fire and tire explosion are possible.
Charts are provided in figure 5-14 to determine the
amount of brake energy absorbed. The following operating procedures and restrictions are necessary to
preclude possible injury to personnel and damage to
equipment from overheated brakes and tires.
NOTE
Hazardous RF voltages can exist between

the aircraft skin and ground when transmissions are being made with the liaison
radio.
The radar should not be in radiate when
the aircraft radar antenna is within 50 feet
of personnel or 200 feet of any ground refueling operation or open fuel tank.
The area in line with the radiation of a nonrotating radar antenna is hazardous to personnel. For this reason, do not stop the antenna while the radar is in radiate operation.
GROUND TURNING LIMITATIONS
Maximum ground turning speeds with full rudder

travel are 5 knots with the steering ratio selector
lever in TAXI or 27 knots with the lever in TAKEOFF LAND. For ground turning speeds at gross
weights above 450,000 pounds, see TAXIING, Section II.
WHEEL BRAKE LIMITATIONS

Brake Energy Limits
The brakes are limited in the amount of work they

can perform and still function properly because this
work will be dissipated in the form of heat. The
amount of work performed or heat absorbed by the
brakes is the kinetic energy expended, measured in
millions of foot-pounds. The amount of heat added
to the brakes for each braking effort is cumulative
Unequal brake energy absorption may result from unequal gear loading due to crosswind conditions. The brake energy charts
do not account for such unequal brake energy absorption. Providing realistic data to
account for such unequal braking is not
practical due to variables in aircraft roll
during ground operation. Follow procedures
in Section II under CROSSWIND LANDING AND WHEEL BRAKE APPLICATION, and Section VI under LANDING to
minimize such unequal braking.
The affect of aerodynamic braking has been
considered in the BRAKE ENERGY LIMITS charts. This aerodynamic braking slows
the aircraft the same amount whether the
brakes are applied steadily or in short applications.
The same amount of heat is generated by
the brakes in stopping the aircraft within a
given stopping distance or in deceleration of
the aircraft during taxiing or ground maneuvers, regardless of whether the brakes
are applied in one steady application or in
a series of short applications.
The internal heat generated by the brakes
does not reach the outer surface of the
brake assembly for several minutes whereas the ground roll requires only a few seconds; therefore, all but an insignificant
amount of the heat generated by the brakes
remains in the brake assembly for the duration of the ground roll. Peak temperatures
are reached in the tire bead seat of the
wheel as late as 20 minutes after stopping.
(Continued)
Change 12
5-25
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CAUTION ZONE 150 TO 230 MILLION

FOOT-POUNDS
The brake energy charts and procedures are

based on equal braking among operable
brakes. Accounting for brake energy differences due to brake and antiskid system tolerances, wear, maintenance, and pilot technique are not realistic. The brake energy
charts should be considered as a best possible estimate in assessing heat energy absorbed and determining necessary action.
Tire explosion and hydraulic fluid fire are

possible.
DANGER ZONE OVER 230 MILLION

FOOT-POUNDS
Tire explosion and hydraulic fire are imminent.

1. Taxi aircraft clear of runway, other aircraft,
and personnel. Taxi distance and braking shall be
an absolute minimum. Stop aircraft and release
brakes as soon as possible.
2. Request firefighting equipment.
3. Evacuate aircraft as soon as possible by moving forward or aft from main landing gear wheels.
4. Leave immediate vicinity.
5. Enter computed brake energy in Form 781.
6. Do not make a subsequent takeoff until tires,
wheels, and brakes have been replaced.
1. Taxi aircraft clear of runway, other aircraft,

and personnel. Minimize taxi distance and braking.
Stop aircraft and release brakes as soon as possible.
2. Request standby firefighting equipment.
3. Evacuate aircraft as soon as practical by moving forward or aft from main landing gear wheels.
4. Leave immediate vicinity and do not reapproach aircraft until maintenance personnel determine the area is safe for reentry.
5. Enter computed brake energy in Form 781.
6. Do not make subsequent takeoff prior to tire,
wheel, brake, and hydraulic leak inspection.
7. Delay subsequent takeoff to allow adequate
brake cooling per criteria under TAKEOFF SUBSEQUENT TO A REFUSED TAKEOFF OR BRAKED
LANDING.
NORMAL ZONE UP TO 150 MILLION
FOOT-POUNDS
1. No special inspection is required.
2. Delay subsequent takeoff to allow adequate
brake cooling per criteria under TAKEOFF SUBSEQUENT TO A REFUSED TAKEOFF OR BRAKED
LANDING.
Brake Energy with Inoperable Brakes

BRAKE ENERGY MILLIONS FOOT-POUNDS
WHEEL BRAKES
OPERABLE
BRAKES
INEFFECTIVE
DANGER
ZONE
CAUTION
ZONE
NORMAL
ZONE
3 Gear
223
172 223
112 172
Up to 112
2 Gear
149
115 149
75 115
Up to 75
1 Gear
74
57 74
37 57
Up to 37
Figure 5-13
5-26
Change 12
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Inoperable Brakes
The brake energy limit and brake energy absorption zones shown in figure 5-14 and under BRAKE
ENERGY LIMITS are based on operable brakes on
each gear. The values which apply when some
brakes are known to be inoperable are contained in
figure 5-13.
Refer to Part 8 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1 for stopping distances with inoperable brakes.
Takeoffs Subsequent to a Refused Takeoff or Braked
Landing
Before a second takeoff is attempted, the

possibility of a refused takeoff will be considered. The cumulative effect of energy absorbed in prior braking and energy required
for a refused takeoff may exceed brake energy limits resulting in tire explosions and
fire which could endanger the crew and aircraft.
A subsequent takeoff may be made if the total of
brake energy already absorbed plus brake energy
that will be required in aborting the takeoff at decision speed does not exceed the brake ineffectiveness
limit of 298 million foot-pounds. If the calculated total of brake energy previously used and to be used
in a refused takeoff exceeds 298 million footpounds, allow brake cooling time of 6 minutes for
each 8 million foot-pounds the calculated sum exceeds 298 million foot-pounds. Unless mission requirements dictate otherwise, adequate cooling
time should be used to allow dissipation of previously absorbed energy and avoid entering the
Caution or Danger brake energy zones where possible. A cooling rate of 8 million foot-pounds per 6
minutes should be used to estimate cooling time required to dissipate absorbed brake energy. Cooling
requirements should be timed subsequent to leaving the active runway with additive time for taxi
brake energy taken into account. If a stop has been
made exceeding 100 million foot-pounds and an immediate takeoff is accomplished, leave the gear extended 2 minutes for each 8 million foot-pounds in
excess of 100 million foot-pounds unless climb rate
is critical. If it is necessary to retract the gear, extend as soon as practical to meet cooling criteria.
Use of the Brake Energy Charts
The brake energy charts in figure 5-14 should be

used whenever a takeoff is aborted, for all flaps-up
landings, for all normal flaps-down landings at
gross weights over 300,000 pounds, for takeoff subsequent to an abort or braked landing, and when
the pilot suspects that the combination of gross
weight, runway altitude, temperature, runway
grade, IAS, and the number of stops and decelerations will result in brake energy reaching the Caution or Danger Zone. To determine the heat energy
absorbed, enter the appropriate flaps-up or flapsdown chart with gross weight, brake application
speed, runway pressure altitude, runway temperature, and drag chute configuration. Correct for runway gradient using chart on sheet 3. For stops and
decelerations, determine the heat energy absorbed
during each brake application by entering the table
on sheet 3 with the taxi speed at brake application
and the final taxi speed. The heat absorbed from
each maneuver is totaled as shown per example on
the charts.
Landing Gear Oscillation
If landing gear oscillation is experienced, brakes

shall be fully released immediately. Brakes may be
reapplied as soon as fuselage and landing gear oscillations have ceased.
TIRE LIMITATIONS
Maximum Groundspeed
To prevent main landing gear tire casing failures,

limit all takeoffs and landings to a maximum
groundspeed of 217 knots. Refer to Part 8 of T.O.
1B-52H-1-1 for tire limit speeds.
Change 12
5-27
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Brake Energy Limits

REMARKS:
CONDITIONS:
Onehalf the HEADWIND component measured by the tower

should be subtracted from the IAS at brake application.
A TAILWIND component must be added to the IAS.
If aircraft is allowed to creep during engine run up, add
10,000,000 footpounds for each 100 feet of travel.
To determine total heat energy absorbed, gradient correc
tion and ground maneuvering increments from sheet 3
must be applied.
EIGHT ENGINES AT IDLE

RCR 23
NO WIND, NO GRADIENT
EQUAL BRAKING
DRAG CHUTE FULLY
EFFECTIVE AT 130 KIAS
DATE: JANUARY 1968
500
TE
15
0
14
0
13
T
HU
12
IT
A
DR
IT
80
90
350
NORMAL
100
10
11
0
12
400
10
70
300
250
200
150
100
0
6
IAS AT BRAKE
APPLICATION
250
300
50
60
12
450
CAUTION DANGER
LANDING GROUND RUN S.L. STANDARD DAY

WITH DRAG CHUTE
WITHOUT DRAG CHUTE
TOTAL HEAT ENERGY ABSORBED

BY BRAKES 1,000,000 FT LBS
BRAKE ENERGY LIMIT (BRAKES INEFFECTIVE)
200
RE
TU
FE
00
RA
10
PE
TE
DE
TU
RU
NW
AY
TI
AL
RE
12
PR
ES
SU
60
ET
BRAKES APPLIED
AT TOUCHDOWN
FLAPS DOWN
EXAMPLE:
GIVEN:
Gross weight = 350,000 pounds.
Brakes applied at 90 KIAS.
Pressure altitude = 2000 feet.
Runway temperature = 60o F
With drag chute.
Gradient
1 % downhill.
Four brake applications during taxi to parking
area, decelerating from 20 to 5 knots.
One brake application from 5 knots to 0.
FIND:
Heat energy absorbed by brakes for a complete
stop after landing and taxi to parking area.
SOLUTION:
From the chart.
Initial heat energy absorbed to stop after landing
118,000,000 footpounds.
From the gradient correction chart (sheet 3).
Heat energy absorbed to stop after landing
5-28
Change 12
From the ground maneuvering table (sheet 3).

Four brake applications at 9,000,000 footpounds each
upon each application
One brake application at 1,000,000 footpounds.
Total heat energy absorbed
162,000,000 footpounds
(caution zone).
A31846
T.O. 1B-52H-1
CONDITIONS:
8 ENGINES AT IDLE
RCR 23
WITH AIRBRAKES
NO WIND, NO GRADIENT
EQUAL BRAKING
DRAG CHUTE FULLY EFFECTIVE
AT 130 KIAS
EXAMPLE:
GIVEN:
Gross weight 315,000 pounds
Pressure altitude = 3000 feet
Brakes applied at 140 KIAS
Runway temperature = 60o F
Without drag chute
DATE: AUGUST 1968
FIND:
Heat energy absorbed by
brakes for a complete stop
SOLUTION:
Total heat energy absorbed
= 298,000,000 foot pounds
(danger zone).
BRAKE ENERGY LIMIT (BRAKES INEFFECTIVE)
TE
CAUTION
200
NORMAL
100
TOTAL HEAT ENERGY ABSORBED

BY BRAKES 1,000.000 FT LBS
DANGER
E
UT
H
C
A
H
W
IT
IT
W
UT
HO
0
16
0
15
BRAKES APPLIED
AT TOUCHDOWN
250
250
150
14
13
12
110
50
4
12
SU
RE
AY
AL
TE
TI
TU
DE
PE
RA
TU
10
0
RE
FE
ET
60
PR
ES
RU
N
300
DR
17
IAS AT BRAKE
APPLICATION
350
AG
CH
400
90
100
300
LANDING GROUND RUN = 12,000 FEET,
S.L. AND STANDARD DAY
WITHOUT DRAG CHUTE
WITH DRAG CHUTE
FLAPS UP
A31847
5-29
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Brake Energy Limits (Cont)
CONDITIONS:
REMARKS:
ANY LANDING CONFIGURATION

RCR = 23
NO WIND
DATE: SEPTEMBER 1973
BRAKE ENERGY LIMIT
300
DANGER
300
CAUTION
250
200
150
250
200
150
NORMAL
TOTAL HEAT ENERGY ABSORBED BY BRAKES

FOR NO GRADIENT CONDITION
1,000,000 FT LBS
The table is based on maximum ground handling

of the aircraft and will be conservative for lesser
weights.
100
50
100
50
UPHILL
2
DOWNHILL
1
0
1
RUNWAY GRADIENT PERCENT
TAXI SPEED AT BRAKE

APPLICATION KNOTS
BRAKE ENERGY CORRECTIONS

DUE TO RUNWAY GRADIENT
FINAL TAXI SPEED KNOTS
60
50
40
30
20
10
5
50
25
40
45
20
30
60
35
15
20
70
45
25
10
10
77
52
32
17
7
5
79
54
34
19
9
2
0
80
55
35
20
10
3
1
HEAT ENERGY ABSORBED

1,000,000 FT LBS
GROUND MANEUVERING
BRAKE ENERGY INCREMENT
A31848
5-30
T.O. 1B-52H-1

The allowable cg limits are shown in the chart on
figure 5-15. Maintaining the cg within these limits
is required by structural rather than aerodynamic
considerations. The cg may easily be maintained
within these limits by following the prescribed normal fuel scheduling. Should an emergency situation
occur that requires other than normal fuel sequence, or loading, every effort should be made to
avoid exceeding the cg limits.
not recommended that landings above 450,000

pounds be attempted except in extreme emergencies.
NOTE
Landings performed above 400,000 pounds

will be reported on Form 781 so the landing
gear and the support bulkheads can be inspected for possible structural damage.
LANDING GEAR LIMITATIONS
WEIGHT LIMITATIONS
MAXIMUM GROSS WEIGHT
The maximum gross weight on the ground is

500,000 pounds. The maximum flight gross weight
is 488,000 pounds.
LANDING LIMITATIONS
The normal landing gross weight at the limit contact sinking speed of 470 fpm is 270,000 pounds. It
is possible to land the aircraft up to the maximum
flight weight limit if the contact sinking speed is
limited (figure 5-18). Landings above 400,000
pounds are difficult because of the necessary shallow angle of approach, and there will be little
thrust margin for maneuvering or go-around. It is
The main landing gear is limited structurally in the

braked-roll condition. The strength of the body and
gear for drag loads allows application of the brakes
for aircraft gross weights up to 500,000 pounds.
The hydraulic pressure of the brake system is limited to preclude gear failure up to 500,000 pounds
gross weight.
WEIGHT LIMITATIONS CHART
NOTE
Refer to T.O. 1B-52H-5 Chart E and Section

I of this manual for normal fuel usage and
loading information pertaining to the weapon configuration involved.
Change 10
5-31
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Structural Center of Gravity Limits

14
500
480
460
18
22
26
30
34
42
38
46
TOWING
FLIGHT
PROHIBITED
TAXIING
440
FORWARD CG LIMIT
420
400
FLIGHT
380
TOWING
360
340
320
C A U T I O N
300
THE AIRCRAFT WILL NOT BE MOVED

WITH ITS OWN POWER WITH THE CG
OUTSIDE ON THE TAXIING LIMITS.
280
GROUND HANDLING
(TAXIING AND TOWING)
260
TAXIING
240
FLIGHT
220
200
AFT CG LIMIT
180
160
14
18
22
26
30
34
38
42
46
CG PERCENT MAC
DATE: MARCH 1982
A31849
Figure 5-15
5-32
Change 13
T.O. 1B-52H-1
External Missile Launch/Jettison CG Limits

(AGM-86B/86C/86D)
Figure 5-16
Change 16
5-33
T.O. 1B-52H-1
External Missile Launch/Jettison CG Limits

(AGM-129)
Figure 5-17
5-34
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Contact Sinking Speed Limitations
Figure 5-18
Change 12
5-35
T.O. 1B-52H-1
SIOP INCREASED GROSS WEIGHT INFLIGHT

OPERATING LIMITATIONS
The following information will provide the aircrew

additional operating limitations required to operate
the aircraft at increased gross weights. These limitations take into account the different flying qualities encountered and the unique procedures required when flying the B-52H with aft cg for fuel
economy. This material is presented with the same
titles and sequence as found elsewhere in Section V
where possible, to enable the aircrew to readily
identify the differences in aircraft operating limitations when operating at increased gross weights.
488,000 pounds gross weight and above. The difference in the aircraft cg location and fuel sequences
for increased gross weights requires restriction of
the positive and negative maneuver limits at all
gross weights above 488,000 pounds.
Do not exceed 325 KIAS or Mach 0.80 indicated

above 488,000 pounds gross weight. This limitation
is to protect the aircraft from excessive wing bending loads and provides limited gust load protection.
BUFFET BOUNDARY LIMITATIONS

Figure 5-19, FLIGHT SPEED ENVELOPE, is similar to the corresponding chart in the basic flight
manual. Charts have been revised to include operation at increased inflight gross weight. The data in
figure 5-19 is important to aircraft operation in that
it defines level flight speed attainable at MRT
thrust settings. This information in conjunction
with the high and low speed buffet airspeeds attained from figure 5-21, MANEUVER LIMITS - FLAPS UP, defines a safe region of airspeed
for aircraft operation, both high speed and low
speed, for specific gross weight- altitude-bank angle
combinations. This figure is similar to the corresponding chart in the basic flight manual with the
gross weight revised appropriately.
Because of the related increase in load on

aircraft structure, operation of the aircraft
at increased gross weight requires understanding the following:
As gross weight increases above 488,000

pounds, the pilots must exercise additional care in operating the aircraft.
The probability of exceeding aircraft g
limits increases substantially at gross
Pitchup from abrupt airbrake extension at

increased gross weights could easily overstress the aircraft. Therefore, no more than
two increments of the airbrakes will be extended at once, and the aircraft will be retrimmed between each two increment extensions of the airbrakes.
Recovery from any unusual attitude will be
made with cautious application of flight
controls. Any abrupt control input at increased gross weights could easily overstress the aircraft.
Figure 5-21, MANEUVER LIMITS - FLAPS UP, is

similar to the figure in the basic flight manual with
appropriate allowances made for increased gross
weight inflight operations. It is important to remember the additional airspeed restriction above
488,000 pounds gross weight while using this figure. See AIRSPEED LIMITATIONS in this part for
increased gross weight airspeed restrictions.
Limit Load Factor
Figure 5-20, STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS - LIMIT LOAD FACTOR, is revised to accommodate increased gross weight operations. This figure differs
from the figure in the basic flight manual at
5-36
Change 12
Bank angles should not exceed 20 for gross

weights in excess of 488,000 pounds. If
more bank angle is desired, see figure 5-21.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
No aircraft dive tests have been performed with increased gross weight configurations. Therefore, all
level offs from descent/dive conditions should be
performed as smoothly as possible. Consider starting level offs from descents earlier so as to accomplish the maneuver with the minimum g load required.
Aircraft center of gravity (cg) limits have been revised for increased gross weight operation and are
represented by figure 5-22, STRUCTURAL CENTER OF GRAVITY LIMITS, which is similar to the
figure in the basic flight manual. The forward cg
limit is changed to 23% MAC for increased gross
weight operations. Additional procedures for fuel
transfer have been provided in the fuel system
management text and chart in Section I.
GROSS WEIGHT LIMITATIONS
Operation of the aircraft above existing flight

manual limits carries some additional risk and operation in excess of 488,000 pounds gross weight is
reserved for SIOP operations only. The degree of
risk is dependent on the amount aircraft gross
weight exceeds 488,000 pounds. Although flights
have been conducted at gross weights up to 567,000
pounds, they were flown under ideal conditions. Operation of the aircraft above 540,000 pounds gross
weight involves a significant risk. At no time should
the gross weight of the aircraft exceed 570,000
pounds as the risk for structural failure is very
high.
jettison envelope for cruise missile pylons. Figure

5-23 should be used in conjunction with Figure
1-45, Forward Body Ballast Fuel Required for
Launch/Jettison of External Cruise Missiles, and
the SIOP Increased Gross Weight fuel sequences
with external missiles (Figure 1-46B, C, or D as appropriate).
AIR REFUELING LIMITATIONS
Additional limitations are applicable during increased gross weight air refueling operations. Aircraft bank angle is limited to 20 maximum prior to
contact and to 10 maximum while in the air
refueling contact position. The maximum refueling
altitude with the aircraft gross weight between
488,000 pounds and 520,000 pounds is 26,000 feet
MSL. Above 520,000 pounds gross weight, the
maximum refueling altitude is 24,000 feet MSL.
Exceeding these altitudes degrades the aircraft
handling qualities and can cause the aircraft to be
thrust limited. The ideal speed schedule for air
refueling is 265 KIAS at 440,000 pounds receiver
gross weight with gradual acceleration of 3 knots
per 10,000 pounds increase in receiver gross
weight. This gradual increase in speed, based on
receiver aircraft gross weight, ensures the aircraft
does not become thrust limited due to induced drag.
The gradual acceleration should continue until
reaching the maximum speed of 300 KIAS for air
refueling slipway doors. Although the speed
schedule based on receiver gross weight provides
the optimum aircraft handling qualities and thrust
response, operational considerations may make a
constant airspeed for refueling more desirable. If a
constant airspeed is to be used, 285 KIAS is
adequate for most situations.
CRUISE MISSILE LAUNCH LIMITATIONS
Figure 5-23 depicts the launch and jettison envelope for external AGM-86 cruise missiles, and the
Change 22
5-37
T.O. 1B-52H-1

HEAVY GROSS WEIGHT EXTENSION
DATE:
DECEMBER 1981
DATA BASIS:
ESTIMATED
CONDITIONS:
CLEAN
CONFIGURATION
STANDARD DAY
8 ENGINES, MRT
NORMAL MAXIMUM
FLIGHT WEIGHT:
1.8G OPERATION:
488,000 LB
2.0G OPERATION:
400,000 LB
A87502
Figure 5-19
5-38
Change 12
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Structural Limitations Limit Load Factor

DATE: DECEMBER 1981
CONDITIONS:
CLEAN CONFIGURATION
STANDARD DAY
8 ENGINES, MRT
NORMAL MAXIMUM FLIGHT WEIGHT:
1.8G OPERATION: 488,000 LB
A87503
Figure 5-20
Change 12
5-39
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Maneuver Limits Flaps Up

DATE: DECEMBER 1981
CONDITIONS:
CLEAN CONFIGURATION
STANDARD DAY
8 ENGINES, MRT
NORMAL MAXIMUM
FLIGHT WEIGHT:

A87504
Figure 5-21
5-40
Change 12
T.O. 1B-52H-1


THE AIRCRAFT WILL NOT BE MOVED UNDER
ITS OWN POWER WITH THE CG OUTSIDE OF
THE TAXIING LIMITS.
A87505
Figure 5-22
Change 12
5-41
T.O. 1B-52H-1
AGM-86 Launch/Jettison Center of Gravity Limits

A87506
Figure 5-23
5-42
Change 12
T.O. 1B-52H-1
section VI
table of contents
page
DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
6-1
STALLS
6-3
SPINS
6-8
FLIGHT CONTROLS
6-8
FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS UNDER VARIOUS SPEED CONSIDERATIONS
6-20
MANEUVERING FLIGHT
6-33
FORMATION FLYING
6-39
DIVING
6-40
FLIGHT WITH ASYMMETRICAL LOADS
6-40
LOW ALTITUDE FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS
6-40
DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
AERODYNAMIC DESIGN
The following discussions are intended to give some

of the aerodynamic design background of the aircraft in order to aid in understanding the aircraft
flight characteristics.
Wing Selection
The effects of compressibility are the primary limiting factors on the performance of high speed aircraft. In order that a wing may produce lift, the air
must pass over the top surfaces of the wing at a
higher speed than the lower surface. As the aircraft
speed is increased, the air velocity over the top of

the wing reaches the speed of sound much sooner
than the lower surface. When the air over the top
surface of the wing exceeds the speed of sound, a
shock wave is produced resulting in a sharp pressure rise. This, in turn, causes an increase in drag
and a decrease in lift because of the airflow separation induced behind the shock wave. Since the air
velocity over the top of the wing is greater than the
aircraft speed, this condition always occurs at aircraft speeds less than the speed of sound (Mach
1.0). The speed where this effect becomes great
enough to be noticeable is termed the critical Mach
number.
6-1
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Elevator and Stabilizer Selection
Because of the large spread between stalling speed

and top speed and the overall aircraft aerodynamic
characteristics, the longitudinal trim requirements
of this aircraft are much greater than would be required for a comparable aircraft of lower performance. An adjustable horizontal stabilizer is utilized for longitudinal trim rather than elevator surfaces for the following reasons:
1. An elevator surface to be used for both primary
longitudinal control and for longitudinal trim would
be so large that its aerodynamic balancing would
present extreme difficulties.
2. The drag of such a control surface held in a
displaced position for trim purposes would adversely affect performance.
flaps in order to have moderate takeoff and landing

speeds. This is one of the main reasons why the aircraft is equipped with large area Fowler-type flaps.
The swept wing, in conjunction with its flexibility,
also helps to reduce the loads imposed on the wing
and body structure at high speeds and gusty conditions. Swept back wings, however, have the disadvantage that sweepback tends to cause a stall progression from the wing tips to the root. This disadvantage was overcome by changing the wing airfoil
section at different spanwise locations and providing spoilers for lateral control.
Comparison of Air Velocity

Effective Components
HIGH SPEED DESIGN FEATURES
Every presently known means for increasing the

critical Mach number of this aircraft has been
employed in the design. The more important features employed to attain a high critical Mach number are wing and tail surface sweepback, choice of
thin high speed airfoil sections, careful selection of
wing loading, and smooth clean surfaces with a
minimum of protuberances.
Sweepback
Sweeping back the wing and tail surfaces is one of

the most effective methods of increasing the critical
Mach number. The lift of a wing is produced from
the component of air velocity traveling at right
angles to the leading edge of the wing. A swept
wing has a smaller effective component as shown in
figure 6-1. Since the velocity of the effective air
passing over the top of the wing is less on a swept
wing than on a straight wing, the aircraft can fly at
a higher speed before reaching the critical Mach
number. Swept forward wings would be just as effective as swept back wings in producing high critical Mach numbers. However, swept forward wings
are seldom used because of stability, control, and
structural problems which are more severe than
those for swept back wings. The maximum lift of a
swept wing is also less than a comparable straight
wing. The decreased lift is not detrimental at high
speed but it must be offset by the use of efficient
6-2
Figure 6-1
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Airfoil Section
STALLS
The thickness ratio of a wing has an important

bearing on its critical Mach number. When the
thickness ratio of an airfoil section is decreased, the
critical Mach number increases since the air flowing over the top of the wing travels relatively slower, thereby permitting higher aircraft speeds before
the wing critical speed is reached. Wind tunnel
tests conducted on models showed that the airfoil
section at the root of the wing could be quite thick
without reducing the critical Mach number. The
aircraft has a relatively thick airfoil section near
the root of the wing and tapers down to a very thin
section at the tip. The outstanding disadvantages of
a thin airfoil section as compared to one with more
thickness, are that there is less space in the wing to
house fuel and equipment, a heavier structure is required because of the decreased beam depth of the
spars, and the maximum lift is lower.
The stall characteristics of the aircraft will vary

with wing flap extension. The following stall characteristics can be expected:
Wing Loading
The design wing loading (weight per square foot of

wing area) is an important parameter in the aerodynamic and performance characteristics of the aircraft. The critical Mach number of the wing is
strongly dependent on the magnitude of the wing
loading. A decrease in the wing loading of the aircraft (increase in the aircrafts wing area) will generally increase the critical Mach number. This effect can be explained from the fact that for a given
speed, altitude, and weight, the wing angle of attack is proportionally reduced with a decrease in
wing loading. Since the velocity of the airflow over
the wing is proportionally less at low angles of attack than at high angles of attack, the aircraft
speed corresponding to where the airflow reaches a
sonic velocity is increased. This increase in aircraft
speed is the change in the critical Mach number of
the wing. The increased wing area associated with
a reduction in wing loading will improve the takeoff
performance but may reduce the range performance
of the aircraft due to the additional frictional drag
and the heavier structural weight required. A compromised wing loading was necessary in order to
achieve an optimum configuration from all design
considerations.
1. With flaps extended, a fair amount of stall

warning will exist. The stall is preceded by a mild
buffet approximately 5 to 10 knots above the stall,
increasing to strong buffeting at the stall.
2. With flaps retracted, the initial buffet occurs at
approximately 10 to 15 knots above the stall.
3. There is approximately a 20 to 35 knot difference in the stalling airspeed depending upon
whether the flaps are extended or retracted. The
use of airbrakes has a negligible effect on the stalling speed but full airbrakes will cause the initial
buffet to occur at an airspeed approximately 2 to 4
knots higher than if no airbrakes are used.
PRACTICE STALLS
Practice stalls may be executed without difficulty

provided the following procedures are observed:
1. Gross weight does not exceed 300,000 pounds.
2. A minimum altitude of 20,000 feet above the
terrain.
3. Extend flaps and adjust thrust to allow the aircraft to decelerate while holding a constant altitude. Engine thrust has a negligible effect on the
stall characteristics or stall speed; however, high
thrust settings in the stall approach will result initially in a fairly large rate of climb.
NOTE
As the aircraft is decelerated in the stall approach, it is essential that it not be trimmed
to speeds below best flare speed (approach
speed flaps up). The stall recovery should be
made using forward elevator control only. If
the aircraft has been trimmed below the
best flare speed trim setting, stabilizer trim
may be used to augment the elevator as required. The use of stabilizer trim in a normal practice stall recovery may result in
overcontrolling the aircraft with a resultant
potentially dangerous nosedown attitude
developing.
6-3
T.O. 1B-52H-1
4. Continue to decelerate the aircraft using back
pressure on the wheel. The amount of force and column movement needed to stall the aircraft will
vary with cg position. Maintain wings level attitude
with lateral control as the stall is approached. Fairly large lateral corrections may be necessary. Caution should be used because lateral control capability decreases rapidly as the stalling speed is approached. Shown in figure 6-2 is the deterioration
of the lateral control effectiveness as the speed is
reduced below best flare speed. Rudder may be
used to maintain heading; however, during low
speed flight, a delay in aircraft response after control input of up to 3 seconds may exist before a roll
correction develops.
5. With flaps down, there will be a 5 to 10 knot
stall warning buffet which increases as speed is reduced. At the stall there will be fairly heavy buffeting.
6. The stall should be terminated by sufficient forward control column movement to lower the nose
below the horizon and simultaneously advancing
the throttles to MRT until safe and proper airspeed
is attained. Trim the aircraft as required.
7. If practice stalls are performed in the flaps-up
configuration, procedures are the same as flaps
down. There will be a 10 to 15 knot stall warning
buffet. Generally, there is a reduced tendency for a
wing to drop in the flaps-up configuration as
compared to the flaps-down configuration. The stall
should be terminated if a wing drops or before
heavy buffet is reached.
lup or turn at any speed higher than 1 g stalling

speed. As a rule at normal cgs, if the aircraft is
trimmed for 1 g flight, sufficient elevator control is
available at high altitudes to produce an accelerated stall at any speed. At low altitudes, the elevators will be augmented by stabilizer trim and, in
some cases, the wing structural limits are exceeded
to obtain an accelerated stall. Approaches to accelerated stalls requiring flight in the strong buffet region can be safely executed and may be necessary
in escape maneuvers at high altitudes.
Decay of Lateral Control

Effectiveness from Best
Flare Speed
Under no circumstances should an attempt

be made to carry a stall to completion by
holding the column back until the nose falls
through the horizon. Any such attempt will
result in severe buffeting. Severe buffeting
has resulted in damage to secondary structure and aircraft equipment.
8. Accelerated stalls can occur at any speed as a result of pulling excessive gs in turns or pullups.
Generally they are similar to unaccelerated stalls
except that speed and altitude changes occur much
faster. An accelerated stall will occur if the aircraft
is placed in a stalling angle of attack during a pul-
6-4
Figure 6-2
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Complete stalls while pulling gs are not recommended for the following reasons:
a. The drag associated with accelerated stalls
will result in rapid speed and altitude changes.
b. Loss of accurate orientation due to the
extreme attitudes which can occur during and
following an accelerated stall may delay recovery or
jeopardize control of the aircraft so that
considerable altitude will be lost in the maneuver.
c. The strong buffeting encountered will have
adverse effects on the aircraft structure and
equipment.
d. If the accelerated stall occurs at Mach
numbers well above the low speed stall, the aircraft
can accelerate beyond the flight placards during
recovery. Close monitoring of aircraft attitudes in
turns should be observed to avoid pitchup into
inadvertent accelerated stalls.
STALL OR CONTROLLABILITY CHECKS
Under some unusual aircraft configurations or conditions, it may be desirable to conduct a stall check
or controllability check of the aircraft prior to landing. A check of the stalling speed should be made if
the accuracy of the pitot-static system is seriously
in doubt or if the fuel quantity indicating system
becomes inoperative resulting in an unknown landing gross weight. If the aircraft sustains damage or
has a control system malfunction which makes its
controllability doubtful, its control characteristics
should be determined at a safe altitude prior to descent for landing. It is recommended that a minimum altitude of 10,000 feet above the terrain or
cloud cover be used for these checks. At these altitudes, the initial buffet speed will be increased,
compared with those shown in figure 2-17, by a factor of 1% per 5000 feet for altitudes above 10,000
feet pressure altitude.
RECOVERY FROM INADVERTENT STALLS
Recovery procedures from any stalled condition are

standard: stick forward, add thrust, maintain heading with rudder, level wings, recover to level flight
with adequate airspeed. Most common of the inadvertent stalled conditions is maneuvering stall or
stall during a turn. Turning flight increases stall
speed similar to the effect of increased weight. Both
require increased lift for level flight. Any steady
level turn requires that the vertical component of
lift be equal to the weight, and the horizontal component be equal to the centrifugal force. Stall
speeds increase with bank angles and this increase
becomes significantly more rapid at bank angles
over 30. See MANEUVER LIMITS charts, Section
V. This fact emphasizes the need to avoid steep
bank angles at low airspeeds. Approach and entry
into a stall is accompanied by mild, moderate, then
severe buffeting. Stabilizer trim can be an
important factor both in stall entry and stall
recovery. An aircraft trimmed into a stall can be
difficult or sometimes impossible to recover unless
the mistrimmed condition is corrected. The
autopilot can cause a mistrimmed condition if a
turn is established on autopilot and thrust is not
increased to maintain airspeed. An aircraft
trimmed to the best flare speed trim setting can be
recovered with elevator only and does not require
stabilizer trim until the stall recovery has been
completed. An aircraft that has been trimmed into
the stall will require proper stabilizer trim
application to recover from the stall.
When any controllability check is made due

to doubtful control characteristics of the aircraft, the airspeed should not be reduced
below the estimated minimum touchdown
speed for the aircraft configuration in which
the check is made. Under these conditions,
the check should be discontinued immediately if any buffet or control problem is encountered.
When the flaps are in a full down or intermediate position and flap damage exists,
in T.O. 1B-52H-1-1 may no longer apply. In
reached or until approximately one-half lateral control authority is required to maintain the wings level. For the controllability
check, minimum touchdown speed for intermediate flap settings can be estimated by
subtracting 9 knots from the best flare
speed at the appropriate flap setting. If onehalf lateral control authority is encountered
before minimum touchdown speed is
reached, add 9 knots to the minimum speed
reached to determine the best flare speed.
6-5
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Determination of Stalling Speed
If the airspeed indicators are suspected of giving

inaccurate readings or if the fuel quantity gages are
inoperative, a check of the initial buffet speed
should be made at an altitude of 10,000 feet above
the terrain or cloud cover and the resulting speed
compared with the appropriate (flaps up or down)
initial buffet curve in figure 2-17. The percentage
change in stalling speed can be determined and
applied to the charted landing speeds. If the gross
weight is unknown, comparing the initial buffet
speed found with that shown on the charts will give
the approximate gross weight directly. If the landing is to be made in a short period of time, this
weight should be used to compute the landing data.
Otherwise, the anticipated fuel consumption between the stall check time and the landing time can
be subtracted from the weight found by the check.
REDUCED LONGITUDINAL CONTROL OR LONGITUDINAL UNBALANCE

In cases of reduced elevator and/or stabilizer trim
control or of longitudinal unbalance, a control check
may be made at 10,000 feet by putting the aircraft
in the landing configuration including airbrakes at
position 4 and cautiously slowing the aircraft to
best flare speed (approach speed for flaps-up configuration). If the lowest speed at which the available
stabilizer trim will hold the aircraft level without
aid of the elevators is above best flare speed (approach speed for flaps up), the trim speed should be
noted. The landing approach should be made at 10
knots above this noted speed. This margin will allow sufficient elevator control for the flare but the
landing approach should be made as shallow as
possible in order to minimize the amount of flare
required for landing. Power should not be reduced
until after completion of the flare.
NOTE
Figure 6-3 shows the increase in stall speed

with increased bank angle and also shows
the load factor in gs for various bank
angles.
Determination of Aircraft Controllability
REDUCED LATERAL CONTROL OR LATERAL

UNBALANCE
In case of reduced lateral control or of lateral unbalance, a control check may be made at an altitude
of 10,000 feet above the terrain or cloud cover by
putting the aircraft in the landing configuration
and slowing it to the minimum touchdown speed
shown on the LANDING SPEEDS charts in Part 8
of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1. As the minimum touchdown
speed is approached, care must be taken to avoid
slowing the aircraft to a speed at which full lateral
control is required to keep the wings level. If control problems are encountered at a speed higher
than best flare speed (approach speed for flaps up),
the speed at which control is considered adequate
should be noted. The landing approach should be
made at 20 knots higher than the noted speed. This
speed will allow the same maneuvering capabilities
as the speed for a normal approach provides under
normal conditions.
6-6
AIRCRAFT DAMAGE
In cases where the aircraft has been damaged (such
as damage to the wing leading edge, to the control
surfaces, or with asymmetrical wing flaps) so that
both controllability and stalling speed could be affected, a controllability check should be made prior
to landing. The altitude for this check will depend
on the extent of damage sustained. In any case, an
altitude below 10,000 feet above the terrain or
cloud cover is not recommended. The aircraft
should be slowed to the minimum speed at which
the pilot feels he has adequate control (controllability speed). This speed should not be lower than the
speed at which the first indications of buffet are
felt. If a pressure altitude above 10,000 feet is used,
the airspeeds (for landing) found during the check
may be reduced by 1% for each 5000 feet above
10,000 feet that the check is made. If the controllability speed is above the charted minimum touchdown speed, the final approach should be made at
20 knots above the controllability speed. If the controllability speed is below minimum touchdown
speed, fly the normal final approach speed. For the
case where initial buffet speed is reached before a
controllability speed and the initial buffet speed
checks the charted value, fly the normal final approach speed. If the initial buffet speed is above the
charted value, the percentage change should be determined and applied to the normal final approach
speed.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Airspeed at Initial Buffet Versus Bank Angle
Figure 6-3
6-7
T.O. 1B-52H-1
dive recovery procedures apply following
spin stop.
SPINS
INVERTED SPINS
Intentional spins are prohibited.

The B-52 is critical in body side loading at
high sideslip angles and the possibility of
aft fuselage and empennage failure is almost certain for the fully developed spin
condition. In the event of structural failure,
emergency egress must be accomplished immediately.
Recovery from an inverted spin will be accomplished by the least structurally hazardous method.
Full rudder and lateral control against the spin will
be applied and held until rotation stops and a zero
g roll made to right side up. Airbrake, throttle,
and gear utilization should be accomplished as
noted above. A dive recovery then will be made following recommended procedures.
FLIGHT CONTROLS
The ability of an aircraft to spin is dependent upon
cg location, distribution of mass, basic aerodynamic
configuration, and control deflections. Forward cgs
tend to make spinning more difficult while aft cgs
promote spinning. Extended gear and/or flaps have
no appreciable effect on spin recovery; however, extended gear will reduce speed buildup during dive
recovery after spin rotation stops. In a developed
spin, an indicated airspeed of approximately 200 to
220 knots can be expected. The pilot should not interpret this as sufficient flying speed but should
make certain that angle of attack is reduced to less
than stall angle during recovery.
STANDARD SPINS
In case an inadvertent yaw or roll is encountered at

low indicated speed, corrective rudder and lateral
control plus nosedown elevator should be immediately applied. In case a spin is entered accidentally,
apply full opposite rudder immediately followed by
forward control column to reduce angle of attack
with neutral lateral control. Apply nosedown trim
and close the airbrakes if they are extended. Reduce throttles to idle. Extend the gear. To augment
the rudder, apply throttles asymmetrically to develop thrust against the spin. As spin rotation stops,
set all throttles in idle and neutralize rudder. Recover from dive attitude by retrimming. If excessive
nosedown trim was introduced during the spin recovery, airbrakes may be extended as required to effect recovery from the dive attitude.
NOTE
The airbrakes will give the fastest pitch

control possible but should be used judiciously and in conjunction with the elevators and stabilizer trim so that design limit
g forces are not exceeded and buffeting is
not reencountered. The airbrakes in position 6 produce maximum drag to reduce
speed buildup in the steep nosedown attitude required to recover. Recommended
6-8
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM COMPONENTS
The flight controls on this aircraft have been designed to give the aircraft good flying qualities at
all speeds, altitudes, and aircraft weights. This is
accomplished through the use of powered elevator
and rudder flight controls and a two-axis (pitch and
yaw) stability augmentation system (SAS). The
pitch and yaw SAS provides increased aircraft stability and structural life with improved handling
qualities over non-SAS operation. An artificial feel
system is used in the rudder and elevator control
systems to provide the desired pilot control forces
throughout the speed range. Lateral control is provided by hydraulically operated wing spoilers. Longitudinal trim is provided by a hydraulically driven
adjustable stabilizer.
Yaw SAS
The yaw SAS commands the rudder to dampen aircraft oscillations in yaw as measured by triply redundant yaw rate and lateral acceleration sensors
located in the fuselage. Electrical signals from these
sensors are fed to the rudder hydraulic actuator.
The yaw SAS can command maximum rudder
deflections of 10.
Pitch SAS
The pitch SAS commands the elevator to dampen

aircraft oscillations in pitch as measured by triply
redundant pitch rate sensors located in the aft portion of the fuselage. Electrical signals from these
sensors are fed to the elevator hydraulic actuators.
The hydraulic actuators can command maximum
elevator deflections through the pitch SAS of 5.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Artificial Feel System
To provide the pilot with control forces which are

proportional to airspeed and control surface deflections, an artificial feel system is used with the rudder and elevator flight controls. This is necessary
because the rudder and elevator control surfaces of
this aircraft are hydraulically actuated and the
aerodynamic forces acting on the control surfaces
do not reach the control column and rudder pedals.
Without the artificial feel system, the rudder and
elevator could be moved by the pilot with equal
ease at high and low airspeeds which is highly undesirable. The heart of the artificial feel system is a
ram air pressure bellows, commonly called a Qspring. The Q-spring is essentially a bellows which
is pressurized from a ram air inlet on the leading
edge of the fin. Use of ram air as the pressure
source provides an increase in control forces with
increased airspeeds which aids the pilot in limiting
flight maneuvers at high speeds so that the structural limits of the aircraft will not be exceeded. The
desired artificial feel characteristics have been obtained by proper design of the linkage between the
Q-spring and the flight control. As with any aircraft, there is a practical limit to the control force
which can be added without causing excessive control forces for normal operation. For this reason, no
violent control movement should be made at high
indicated airspeeds as it is still possible to overstress the aircraft with the artificial feel system
installed.
After disengagement of the autopilot, either

automatically or manually, while operating
in or after leaving an icing condition, check
the elevator and rudder systems for artificial feel.
Malfunction of the Q-spring system, either

due to the inlet being plugged by icing or
loss of ram pressure for other reasons, can
result in loss of control forces. If, at any
time, abnormally light control forces are encountered in the elevators or in the rudder,
abrupt maneuvers should be avoided so as
not to structurally overload the aircraft.
If, at any time, abnormally stiff controls are
encountered and icing is suspected, descend
to a warmer altitude. Icing or other blockage of the ram air duct can result in a pneumatic lock of the artificial feel system.
If a landing must be made with stiff controls, see ELEVATOR AND RUDDER CONTROL MALFUNCTIONS under FLIGHT
CONTROL MALFUNCTIONS, Section III.
NOTE
Springs in the mechanical linkage of the artificial feel system will provide partial elevator and rudder feel in the event Q-spring
pressure is lost.
Control Column Balance
Balance weights are installed on each control column below the pivot point to automatically dampen
unstable oscillations of the longitudinal (pitch) control system which can be induced under certain
flight conditions. These oscillations are divergent
and if allowed to continue could result in undue
stress and/or loss of control of the aircraft. If such
oscillations are encountered, they can be stopped by
a slight pull force on the control column with a reduction in airspeed. The pendulum action of the
balance weights aids in control centering.
6-9
T.O. 1B-52H-1
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS
Pitch Control
Pitch control is provided by a 10% chord elevator located on the trailing edge of the stabilizer. The elevator is positioned by hydraulically powered actuators which respond to mechanical control inputs
from the column, inputs from the autopilot elevator
servo motor, electrical signals from the pitch SAS,
and combinations of electrical and mechanical inputs. Longitudinal trim is provided by an adjustable stabilizer. Actuation of the trim switch causes
the stabilizer to move at the rate of approximately
six units every 10 seconds. The stabilizer may be
actuated also by a manual trim wheel, which results in 1 degree or unit of stabilizer deflection for
each revolution of the trim wheel. In either case,
operation of the stabilizer trim system is accompanied by rotation of the manual trim wheel. Basically, the stabilizer is intended as a trimming device
while the elevators are intended for maneuvering
at a given speed and control for small speed
changes. The elevators are adequate for maneuvering purposes and should be used whenever possible.
The stabilizer, in conjunction with the elevator,
should be used to counteract all trim changes occurring, such as when using the landing gear, flaps,
and airbrakes. In general, use of the stabilizer as
the primary control is not considered desirable.
More specifically, use of the stabilizer as the primary control in steep turns is undesirable because in
turn recoveries, the elevators may not be able to
counter the combined pitchup used to establish the
turn and the pitchup moment produced from the
lateral control spoilers.
PITCH SAS
The pitch SAS assists the pilot by automatically
providing elevator inputs which help reduce aircraft pitch oscillations. The SAS inputs to the elevator actuators do not result in movement of the control column. A noticeable improvement due to pitch
SAS occurs during air refueling where the magnitude of pitch oscillations and aircraft pitchup due to
lateral control inputs is reduced with the pitch SAS
in operation. Pitch SAS also assists the pilot during
6-10
configuration changes, such as airbrakes and flaps,

if he lags trim changes and allows a pitch rate to
develop. In the absence of corrective action by the
pilot, the pitch SAS acts to momentarily reduce the
pitching induced by these configuration changes.
PITCH CONTROL SYSTEMS
To better understand the difference in trim technique between a fixed stabilizer aircraft and this
aircraft, it is necessary to consider one fact; when
any aircraft is flying in equilibrium, the pitching
moment about the center of gravity is zero and no
change in pitch rate can exist. An aircraft in equilibrium does not necessarily have to be trimmed to
a hands off condition. It means only that a tail
load is being developed by the stabilizer and elevator control system that is just sufficient to balance
the aircraft and maintain a desired attitude or
flight path. An aircraft having a fixed horizontal
stabilizer is placed in trim by the pilot positioning
the elevator with the control column to maintain
the desired attitude as shown in figure 6-4. Any
forces the pilot might be holding on the control column can be eliminated by means of the trim tab
system but the control column and elevator remain
in their original position. The pilot can detect the
operation of the trim system by a lightening of
forces as control column position is held constant.
This aircraft is placed in trim by the pilot positioning the elevator through the control column. When
the stabilizer is moved to relieve the force being
held, the pilot detects the movement by a change in
attitude rather than a reduction of force and must
allow the column to return to neutral to prevent an
attitude change and realize a force reduction. This
aircraft can only be in hands off trimmed flight
when the control columns are neutral and the elevators are faired with the horizontal stabilizer as
shown in figure 6-4. To sum it up, holding a
constant control column position while trimming results in a change in attitude with no change in
force - but in a fixed horizontal stabilizer aircraft,
this results in a change of force with no change in
attitude. This difference in trimming will be thoroughly understood for safe operation of this aircraft.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
STABILIZER JACKSCREW CAPABILITY
ELEVATOR FEEL CHARACTERISTICS
The structural limits of the horizontal tail and its

components will not be exceeded when operating
within the flight placards of the aircraft; however, it
is possible to exceed the operating capability of the
jackscrew hydraulic mechanism if abnormal trim
procedures are used. The stabilizer jackscrew mechanism is stalled at speeds very near the structural
placard speed when push forces are held on the
stick by the pilot. The jackscrew cannot be stalled
by a pull force under any circumstances. In case the
aircraft is in this very unusual condition (near the
placard airspeed with large push forces on the
stick), the pilot can do one of two things to free the
stabilizer hydraulic trim mechanism. One is to momentarily reduce elevator deflection while operating the trim button. This reduces the force on the
jackscrew and allows the mechanism to start. The
other method is to momentarily reverse the trim
mechanism by operating the button in the wrong
direction before pushing it in the correct direction.
This relieves friction and allows starting against a
higher load. If placard speeds are inadvertently exceeded, the aircraft must be kept trimmed as closely as possible with the stabilizer to prevent the stabilizer from being stalled. When decelerating from
high speed flight, if the region of Mach tuck was entered, nose down trim or forward stick will be required to counteract the nose up pitching moment.
If a turn is entered while decelerating, it is possible
to rapidly approach two gs with very little aft stick
due to this pitching moment. A push force to counteract the building g-forces will likely stall the stabilizer jackscrew. Use caution when decelerating
and entering a turn to avoid an over g situation.
The elevator feel force required to accomplish a maneuver varies with control column deflection and
airspeed. The major contribution to stick force is
produced by the Q-spring, with secondary forces being contributed by mechanical springs. The mechanical springs are installed to produce a more
positive centering of the elevator controls at all airspeeds and to increase trim stimulus through higher stick forces. In the event Q-spring pressure is
lost, the tension provided by the mechanical springs
will provide partial feel. The outboard sections of
the elevators have a simple type of aerodynamic
balance while the inboard sections have the compound type of aerodynamic balance. The elevator
control system provides control force gradients and
feel characteristics that should prohibit inadvertent
maneuvers. The elevator control force necessary to
pull a maximum g loading, by performing some normally executed maneuver, is approximately 20 to 40
pounds. Elevator control forces as high as 80 to 120
pounds may be encountered at heavy weights with
forward cg locations. At low airspeeds, the pilot can
obtain full elevator without encountering excessive
stick forces. Therefore, at low airspeeds, it is important to keep the aircraft in trim with stabilizer because high forces are not present to warn the pilot
of a mistrim condition and the resulting loss of elevator authority.
6-11
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Pitch Control Systems
Figure 6-4
ELEVATOR EFFECTIVENESS
The total elevator authority in the low speed flight
regime is essentially independent of the flap configuration, with more authority to counter a nose up
mistrim than a nose down mistrim. With flaps
down, the elevator authority is equivalent to 13
units of stabilizer trim, six units in the nose up trim
direction and seven units in the nose down trim direction. The maximum elevator authority significantly reduces as the aircraft speed is increased,
and in terms of equivalent stabilizer travel at the
high speed structural placard, that authority may
be reduced to as little as 1/3 of the authority available in the slow speed flight regime. A row of vortex
generators installed on the upper and lower surface
of the stabilizer increases the energy of the air in
the boundary layer which passes over the elevators.
This results in the relatively high elevator authority for the low speed flight regime. The longitudinal
control power is a function of center of gravity location for an aircraft flying at a constant altitude and
airspeed. A lesser amount of elevator is required to
maneuver the aircraft at an aft center of gravity
than at a forward center of gravity. A nose up mistrim occurring with an aft center of gravity will
cause the aircraft to be trimmed into a higher load
6-12
factor maneuver than for a forward center of gravity. The elevator effectiveness is sufficient to adequately maneuver the aircraft under all conditions
where the stabilizer trim is set in its normal operating range. The elevator is particularly beneficial in
countering the noseup pitching moments induced
by the extension of airbrakes and flaps and the rapid application of thrust such as during go-around.
The elevator is also sufficiently effective to permit
the aircraft to be landed by means of the elevator
system alone should the stabilizer actuating system
become inoperative with the stabilizer set in its
normal operating range. See figure 6-5 for an illustration of the stick forces required during flap retraction for different stabilizer trim settings.
When holding full noseup elevator, the pilot

will be certain that he is engaging the trim
button in the noseup position. Due to the
position of the control column, he may be
pushing in on the trim button or down on
the trim button guard.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Stick Force Required

During Flap Retraction
STABILIZER TRIM FAILURE

See FLIGHT CONTROL MALFUNCTIONS, Section III, for detailed instructions pertaining to stabilizer trim failure.
NOTE
A temporary failure may be experienced in

the stabilizer trim system under certain
conditions of temperature and humidity if
the trim followup screw heater elements are
inoperative. This condition would result
from frost or ice buildup on the followup
screws which could jam the followup screw
and cause the stabilizer trim system to be
inoperative both electrically and manually
until the frost or ice had melted.
Lateral Control
Lateral control is provided by seven spoiler segments on each wing. Lateral trim is provided by
electrically repositioning the entire lateral control
system to a new neutral point of the system centering springs. At normal operating speeds and altitudes, roll rates are quite high (figure 6-6). Care
should be exercised that roll corrections during instrument flying are not excessively applied nor in
the wrong direction. The highest roll rates at any
altitude will occur at approximately 250 knots IAS.
Beyond this speed hydraulic pressure is insufficient
to obtain full deflection of the spoilers so that roll
rates will decrease. However, because of the location of the spoilers, roll rates will not decrease to
zero. (Reversal will not occur at any speed.) Use of
rudder in the direction of the roll during initiation
of the roll at low speeds tends to improve the roll
response characteristics.
Figure 6-5
A loss of lateral control authority will occur in the

low speed flight regime as the aircraft approaches a
stall. The decay of lateral control, for the flapsdown configuration as the speed is reduced below
best flare speed, is shown in figure 6-2. This loss in
lateral control results from airflow separation on
the wing ahead of the spoilers at the high angles of
attack associated with wing stall. In the low speed
flight regime where lateral control authority is severely reduced, control inputs in correcting bank
angle should be made primarily with the rudder assisted by whatever lateral control is available.
6-13
T.O. 1B-52H-1
The maximum roll rate capability of the flaps-down
configuration is slightly higher than that for the
flaps-up configuration for the same airspeed and altitude. However, when a landing must be made
flaps up, the roll rate capability during the approach will be essentially the same as for a normal
flaps- down approach due to the effect of the higher
flaps-up airspeed.
SPOILER SYSTEM
LATERAL UNBALANCE
SPOILERS AS A LATERAL CONTROL DEVICE
During the landing operation, roll control can be

marginal in at least one direction when large
amounts of lateral unbalance exist. There is a minimum speed at which roll control can be maintained.
As speed decreases below the point where more
than 50% lateral control is required, the lateral
control is used up rapidly. Lateral control can be
augmented during such conditions through use of
rudder which will provide a sizeable rolling moment from the sideslip induced. It is not desirable,
during normal operations, to deliberately enter regions where more than 50% of lateral control is required for lateral balance. Part 8 of T.O.
1B-52H-1-1 shows minimum landing weight for
various amounts of unbalance. This data is based
on the use of not more than 50% lateral control and
illustrates the advantage of higher touchdown
speeds obtained by flaps-up landings. Additional
advantage can be gained through the use of
airbrakes which will allow simultaneous contact of
the landing gear at higher than normal touchdown
speeds. (See figure 6-10.)
The extension of spoilers on one wing decreases the

lift produced by that wing and also increases the
drag. The loss of lift on the wing with the spoilers
extended causes it to rotate downward, thereby producing a rolling moment in that direction. The addition of drag causes a slight yawing motion in the direction toward the wing with the spoilers extended
which assists the pilot in bringing the wing down or
in starting a turn. With application of roll control, a
pitchup is induced directly proportional to the
amount of spoiler deflection used. This pitchup is
favorable during entry into a turn, but unfavorable
in coming out of a turn. For large wheel deflections,
the pilot will have to make small push corrections
at the entry of a bank and large push corrections at
the termination of a bank to prevent inadvertent
nose-high attitudes and pulling excessive gs. Spoiler authority for a fixed amount of wheel deflection
is dependent on the airbrake position selected. The
greatest spoiler authority for a given amount of
wheel deflection occurs when the airbrakes are in
position 4. (See figure 6-7.) The main reason for this
characteristic is the pickup schedule of the spoilers
on one wing to reach full deflection nearly simultaneously with spoilers on the opposite wing being
fully retracted. This characteristic of the spoiler
system is especially important since it allows the
pilot to obtain a large portion of the spoiler authority with small control wheel inputs, thereby increasing his ability to make roll adjustments.
6-14
Seven spoilers are provided on each wing, each having its own hydraulically operated actuator. The
three inboard spoilers are interconnected and operate as one unit and the four outboard spoilers are
interconnected and operate as one unit. Wheel travel of 80 will give full extension of the spoilers.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Maximum Roll Rates
Figure 6-6
6-15
T.O. 1B-52H-1
LATERAL TRIM SYSTEM
Control of lateral trim is through a trim button on
the control wheel which operates a single electric
trim motor. The motor is connected by cables to a
trim mechanism and centering spring located in
each wing. Actuation of the trim motor repositions
the centering springs and the entire lateral control
system to a new neutral position.
AIRBRAKES
All of the spoilers are also used as airbrakes. The
extension of the airbrakes is controlled by an airbrake lever located at the pilots station. In the case
of simultaneous actuation of spoiler and airbrake
controls, the spoiler groups on the wing requiring
spoiler action will rise to the angle called for by the
spoiler control input, plus the angle called for by
airbrake control input up to the maximum. At the
same time, the spoiler groups on the opposite wing
will rise to the angle called for by the airbrake control input minus the spoiler control input. With
airbrakes in position 6, a subsequent application of
spoiler control input will result in a proportionate
lowering of the spoilers on the wing which will
rise,and a proportionate raising of the outboard
spoilers on the wing which will lower. A full application of spoiler control will override the airbrake input to the extent of completely lowering the
spoilers on one wing. Such action causes a maximum lift differential between the two wings, resulting in a roll in the direction toward the wing producing the smaller lift.
EFFECT OF ENGINE POD LOSS ON LATERAL

CONTROL SYSTEM
The loss of an engine pod will likely result in complete loss of control authority from the corresponding spoiler. The subsequent aerodynamic rolling
moment which can be generated by the aircraft at a
given wheel position will be reduced for an engine
pod loss condition. The subsequent effect on spoiler
authority for a given wheel deflection is shown in
figure 6-7A and 6-7B for the relevant airbrake positions.
Spoiler Authority With

Wheel Position
NOTE
Application of airbrakes will tend to pitch

the aircraft noseup. The pitching moment
produced by airbrake extension can be used
to augment elevator authority in counteracting an undesirable nosedown aircraft attitude.
Figure 6-7
6-16
Change 1
T.O. 1B-52H-1

Wheel Position For
Outboard Pod Loss

Wheel Position For
Inboard Pod Loss
Figure 6-7A
Figure 6-7B
Change 1
6-16A/(6-16B blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
SPOILER AND AIRBRAKE BUFFET
SPOILER AND AIRBRAKE BLOWDOWN
Flight testing with the spoilers and airbrakes in

many different configurations and positions has
been accomplished over the entire flight envelope of
the aircraft and no appreciable buffet has been encountered. Mild buffet will occur at position 2 or 3
with flaps up; therefore, position 4 should be used
for all normal descents. At high altitudes, an
abrupt buffet may be noted just as the spoilers begin to extend if the control wheel is rotated very
rapidly but this opening shock has no damaging effects.
At indicated airspeeds in excess of 250 knots, the

airloads acting upon spoilers raised to the full up
position (position 6) are greater than the force
available from the spoiler actuators. Obviously, under these conditions, the spoilers will be unable to
maintain normal extension of position 6. This reduction of the spoiler or airbrake angle by airloads
is termed blowdown. The greater the speed above
250 knots, the farther the spoilers will blow down.
For example, at the maximum airspeed, the maximum extension is reduced to approximately 20.
During blowdown, oil displaced from the hydraulic
actuators exits through relief valves. Since it is
difficult to adjust several relief valves to open at
exactly the same pressure, blowdown may occur in
one bank of spoilers sooner than in another. Such
an occurrence will cause a rolling moment to be
applied to the aircraft which requires compensating
lateral control. During asymmetrical airbrake
blowdown from the full airbrake position, the pilot
will feel a dead spot in control wheel movement.
The first portion of control wheel travel will have
greatly reduced effect and considerable movement
will be required to produce roll. A lag between the
control wheel position and the spoiler position
resulting from blowdown causes the dead spot. The
most extreme condition will require control wheel
rotation of approximately 55 to obtain lateral
control from the spoilers. Depending on aircraft
speed, control forces required to reach the required
wheel deflection may be greater than that
obtainable with one hand operation of the control
wheel. By using less airbrake at the higher speeds,
the dead spot will be reduced or possibly
eliminated. Airbrake position 6 is satisfactory for
speeds up to 305 knots IAS.
As the airbrakes are extended, a noseup

pitching moment is produced. This pitchup
tendency is more pronounced when the aircraft is in the clean configuration than
when the flaps and gear are down. Therefore, to compensate for this pitchup tendency as airbrakes are extended, nosedown elevator or stabilizer trim will be applied. The
amount of corrective action necessary becomes larger with higher altitudes and
higher indicated airspeeds. Full airbrake
application at speeds up to 250 knots IAS
requires approximately 3.5 units of nosedown stabilizer trim or a major portion of
the available nosedown elevator authority
when the aircraft is trimmed hands off prior
to the application of full airbrakes. The
airbrakes should not be moved rapidly
through their full travel since a sufficient
amount of elevator may not be available to
counteract the spoiler pitching moment produced. The greatest trim change between
airbrake positions is between positions 2
and 4. This trim change is equivalent to 2
units of stabilizer trim and is approximately
three times that associated with changing
the airbrakes from position 0 to 2 or from
position 4 to 6. By moving the airbrake lever not more than two positions without retrimming the aircraft, sufficient elevator
will be available to stop the pitching tendency.
At speeds above 305 knots IAS, do not select an airbrake position greater than position 4 since an excessive dead spot may occur.
MALFUNCTION OF SPOILERS OR AIRBRAKES
For instructions pertaining to malfunction of spoilers or airbrakes, see LANDING EMERGENCIES,
Section III.
6-17
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Directional Control
YAW SAS
Directional control is provided by a 10% chord rudder located on the trailing edge of the fin. Directional trim is provided by mechanical adjustment of the
neutral point of the artificial feel system. The rudder is positioned by a hydraulically powered actuator which responds to mechanical control inputs
from the rudder pedals, electrical signals from the
yaw SAS, and combinations of mechanical and electrical inputs. The rudder feel force is developed by
two Q-springs and mechanical linkage. The incorporation of a yaw SAS effectively dampens lateral-directional (Dutch roll) oscillations.
The yaw SAS provides a very significant improvement in damping the lateral-directional oscillations
known as Dutch roll. For typical conditions of high
altitude cruise, low level high speed, and landing
approach conditions, Dutch roll oscillations are almost eliminated by the yaw SAS. This is particularly beneficial during air refueling, precision approaches, and whenever precise aircraft control is
required. The yaw SAS, unassisted by rudder pedal
deflections by the pilot, provides sufficient rudder
deflection to coordinate rolls performed with onehalf or less control wheel deflection. This is also of
particular benefit during instrument approaches
and manual air refueling. The yaw SAS also assists
the pilot when abrupt loss of engine thrust, particularly outboard engines at high thrust settings,
causes a yaw rate to develop. In the absence of corrective action by the pilot, the yaw SAS acts to momentarily reduce the yawing induced by asymmetric thrust. The SAS inputs to the rudder actuator
do not result in movement of the rudder pedals.
RUDDER EFFECTIVENESS
The rudder control forces during normal operations
are moderate at all airspeeds and altitudes. At airspeeds approaching minimum touchdown speed,
the rudder becomes the primary flight control system to control an asymmetric thrust condition, especially since the lateral control effectiveness deteriorates as speed is reduced below best flare speed.
See LATERAL CONTROL, this section. The use of
full rudder is mandatory to realize the charted
flight manual minimum control speeds. Failure to
use full rudder to counter an engine-out condition
can increase the minimum control speed for one
outboard engine by approximately 25 knots.
RUDDER LIMITS
Structural strength of the fin is adequate to allow
use of rudder trim to accomplish the trimming required for asymmetrical thrust operations; however, abrupt rudder manipulations will be avoided
when using more rudder trim than indicated in
RUDDER TRIM LIMITATIONS, under AIRSPEED
LIMITATIONS, Section V. These limits were provided to aid the pilot in staying within the structural limits of the vertical fin. The average thickness of
the fin is 2% less than the average thickness of the
wing. This was done to ensure that the fin would
not reach its critical Mach number before the wing.
Therefore, no buffet will be encountered resulting
from the fin at speeds below that at which the
wings start to buffet. Any tendencies for the aircraft to get into the steady combined roll and yaw
oscillation commonly known as Dutch roll are adequately canceled by the yaw SAS. If conditions become such that very rough air is encountered, it
will be the natural reaction for the pilot to attempt
to assist the yaw SAS in making the necessary corrections. This may be done by application of either
lateral control or rudder as required.
6-18
Wing Flap Characteristics
The wing flaps are designed so that the highest liftdrag ratio is achieved in the 100% down position.
For this reason, full flaps are always used for both
takeoff and landing. Extending the flaps causes an
increase in lift which requires the pilot to lower the
nose of the aircraft to hold altitude. The converse
occurs when the flaps are retracted. During
climbout while accelerating the aircraft to 180
knots IAS in preparation for flap retraction, a considerable amount of nosedown trim may be required to maintain zero stick force. During the period of flap retraction, trim requirements change in
the opposite direction, necessitating noseup trim if
zero stick forces are to be maintained. During flap
retraction, most of the trim requirement will be noticed between the 37 1/2% extended position and
the full up position. Approximately 2 units of the
trim change occurs during this portion of the flap
retraction travel. Only about 1 unit of trim change
occurs during the first 62 1/2% of the flap retraction. An out-of-trim condition may exist during the
last portion of flap retraction if the pilot lags the
rapid trim change rate occurring during this period.
The elevator is the primary pitch control during
flap operation; however, the stabilizer trim should
be used to maintain the control column close to a
zero stick force position. Figure 6-8 shows the rotational position of the flaps in relation to their percent of retraction. During flap retraction, drag
builds up during the retraction to the 37 1/2% position and drops off as flaps are fully retracted. The
effect of wing flaps on the stalling characteristics is
discussed under STALLS, this section.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Wing Flap Characteristics
Figure 6-8
6-19
T.O. 1B-52H-1
FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS UNDER

VARIOUS SPEED CONDITIONS
Thrust-Drag Speed Stability
THRUST-DRAG SPEED STABILITY
The B-52 has a thrust-drag type speed stability. If

the flight condition is such that the aircraft is flying
on the front side of the drag curve, i.e., faster than
the speed for minimum drag (best endurance) at
constant altitude, such as point A on figure 6-9,
then there will be a thrust-drag speed stability.
That is, an increase in drag due to a gust or control
input will cause a deceleration that will reduce the
speed to a new stabilized speed shown as point A.
If the speed is less than the speed for minimum
drag, then the additional drag due to gusts or
control inputs will again cause a deceleration but a
stabilized speed will not be reached because the
excess drag gets greater as speed reduces causing
the problem to be aggravated. Point B is an
example of this case and it illustrates the fact that
if flying below the minimum drag speed, the same
fuel flow that existed at point A will result in a
thrust-drag speed instability. In this situation, the
aircraft will continue to decelerate further and stall
will result unless thrust is applied or the nose is
lowered enough to develop an accelerating force.
LATERAL TRIM
When all engines are developing the same thrust

and there is no lateral unbalance due to fuel load,
small amounts of lateral and rudder trim are required to maintain hands off in level flight. Normally, a correctly rigged aircraft meeting the above
conditions will need no more than 1 unit of rudder
and 2 of spoiler deflection during cruise conditions.
When the landing gear is extended, however, the
aircraft will yaw and fly slightly left wing heavy.
This is caused by the asymmetrical location of the
landing gear doors on the fuselage. Approximately
4 units of rudder trim may be required to retrim
the aircraft. If desired, the aircraft may be trimmed
by the use of a slight amount of asymmetrical
thrust. In the flaps down configuration, the control
wheel forces required to balance the wing heavy
tendency are so small that the condition may not be
noticed. The correction used may vary with pilot
preference and flight conditions.
6-20
Figure 6-9
TAKEOFF
Stabilizer Trim
If the normal takeoff procedure is used, no unusual

characteristics will be experienced. The stabilizer
trim should always be set to the position corresponding to the cg location and the aircraft gross
weight at takeoff. The stabilizer trim setting as given in Part 2 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1 have been calculated so that, with the control column partially
back, the aircraft will unstick at the proper speed
at the planned ground run distance.
With this stabilizer setting, retrimming will be required to maintain zero stick force during landing
gear retraction, climbout of ground effect, and acceleration to best flaps-down climb speed. If
nosedown mistrim exists, the rear gear will lift off
the runway near computed unstick speed and will
result in a longer ground run. This increase
amounts to 10% for each unit of nosedown mistrim.
If noseup mistrim exists, steering will become less
effective as unstick speed is approached and the
aircraft will unstick in a nose-high attitude. Immediate application of forward column and nosedown
trim will be required.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
It is imperative during flap retraction that the aircraft be kept trimmed to a zero stick force condition. This is especially important during the last
20% of flap retraction. If a nosedown mistrim of 2.5
units of stabilizer (approximately 30 pounds pull
column force) is allowed to exist at the start of flap
retraction and no retrimming of the stabilizer is
made, the elevator authority is marginal until the
airspeed is above approximately 250 knots (figure
6-5). During the latter portion of flap retraction, the
pilot cannot keep up with the trim requirement
changes using the manual trim system. However,
the aircraft can quite easily be kept in trim with
the stabilizer trim button.
NOTE
Proper pilot technique requires that stabilizer trim be used to reduce stick forces during flap retraction and at any other time
when trim is changing rapidly.
EXTENDED TAKEOFF GROUND ROLL
Periodically, extended takeoff ground rolls have

been reported on the B-52H. Investigation into the
causes reveals that lineup distance, thrust, drag,
and rolling friction or braking forces are factors
that contribute to increased ground runs. Pilot
techniques and/or airplane malfunctions impact
these factors and result in extended ground roll distances.
Lineup Distance
The distance required to align the airplane with the

runway centerline when first pulling onto the runway can vary greatly depending on pilot technique.
The actual lineup distance may exceed the lineup
allowance by several hundred feet if care is not exercised to follow the turn-on-runway markings.
Thrust
The takeoff data presented in performance charts is

based on constant throttle position thrust levels
with statically set EPRs. Since EPR initially increases with airspeed due to ram effects, any attempt by the pilot to reset or maintain a constant
EPR during the takeoff roll will result in lower
thrust being supplied by the engines and a longer
ground roll than indicated by the charts. Also, any
delay in the normal procedure of advancing the
throttles will result in a lower average thrust and a
corresponding increase in ground roll. Therefore,
set the takeoff EPR expeditiously, early in the
ground roll (preferably prior to 50 KIAS) and do not

adjust the EPR settings to compensate for ram effects.
Drag
Drag increases with airspeed and does not become

significant until the latter part of the ground roll.
Changes in drag do not have a large impact on the
ground roll distance.
Rolling Friction/Braking Force
Rolling friction is proportional to the vertical force

on the tires. This force is a maximum at zero airspeed and decreases to zero at lift-off. Rolling friction is small under normal circumstances. Maximum wheel braking, however, produces a retarding
force of 53,000 pounds (equivalent to approximately
four engines at sea level TRT) over the beginning
portion of the takeoff ground run. Tests have revealed that even with care, pilots can apply partial
braking with very small movement of the top portion of the rudder pedals while steering. Pilots with
large boot sizes tend to inadvertently apply the
brakes more often than pilots with small sized
boots. Pilots should use extreme caution not to apply brakes while making steering inputs during the
takeoff roll. This braking force will retard acceleration up to unstick speed. As airspeed increases, lift
is produced reducing the vertical force on the
wheels which in turn decreases the braking force.
The effect of dragging brakes or inadvertently applied brakes decreases as the airplane accelerates,
approaching zero at lift-off. The effect on takeoff
ground roll may be in the thousands of feet.
S1 Speed Tolerance
The S1 speed check provides the pilot with a general guide to the performance capability of the aircraft. However, airspeed indicator instrument error
can allow subnormal acceleration to go undetected.
Where no instrument error exists, the indicated airspeed at the end of the acceleration check time with
normal acceleration should be exactly the uncorrected S1 speed from the takeoff charts in T.O.
1B1-52H-1-1. In this situation, if only corrected S1
speed is attained, subnormal acceleration exists. An
additional 600 to 1200 feet takeoff ground roll (depending on atmospheric conditions and decision distance) can be expected. Under some conditions, airplane acceleration can be impaired even more and
the pilot will still pass the acceleration time/speed
criterion and takeoff roll will be extended significantly.
6-21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ENGINE FAILURE
See ENGINE FAILURE, in Section III.

CLIMB
No unusual characteristics should be experienced

during the climb. Adequate rudder control is available to handle the loss of one outboard engine with
the remaining engines at military rated thrust.
During initial climbout at altitudes near sea level,
the rudder control in combination with bank angle
is sufficiently powerful to maintain zero sideslip
with two inoperative outboard engines on the same
side at indicated airspeeds of approximately 200
knots and higher, with the remaining good engines
at military rated thrust. As much rudder trim and
lateral trim as required may be used to trim out the
asymmetrical thrust, but abrupt rudder manipulation must be avoided if the trim used is greater
than recommended in RUDDER TRIM LIMITATIONS, Section V.
CRUISE (LEVEL FLIGHT)
During a maximum range cruise operation no unusual characteristics are to be expected if the recommended speeds and altitudes are maintained.
However, if high airspeeds and/or high altitudes are
to be flown, then buffeting or tuck under may be
encountered.
DESCENT
The normal descent procedure will be used for most

descents and requires that the landing gear be extended and airbrakes be extended to position 4.
During the transition period between cruise and descent, application of airbrakes will cause a pitchup
and lowering of the landing gear will cause a slight
pitchdown. If the airbrakes are extended to position
4 at a constant cruising speed, approximately 2.6
units of aircraft nosedown trim will be required to
compensate for the noseup pitching moment produced. Lowering the landing gear at speeds near
the gear extension placard limit requires approximately 1 unit aircraft noseup stabilizer trim to compensate for the nosedown pitching moment pro-
6-22
duced. Therefore, if the gear and airbrakes are extended at approximately the same time, less change
in stabilizer trim will be required. Airbrakes normally should be extended slowly to allow sufficient
time for the stabilizer trim to keep up with the trim
requirements. In case the emergency descent procedure is used, the descent speed shown by the chart
in Part 7 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1 will take the aircraft
down the edge of the buffet region. Caution should
be observed not to make any sudden maneuvers
which will place the aircraft within the buffet region. See BUFFET, this section, for additional information on this subject.
APPROACH
The main change in aircraft attitude during the approach will be encountered when the flaps are extended. The first 37 1/2% of flap extension causes
the greatest trim change. Approximately 2 units of
aircraft nosedown trim is required during this interval and an additional 1 unit of nosedown trim is
required during the remainder of the extension.
When airbrakes are extended to position 4, an additional noseup pitching moment is produced requiring approximately 2.8 units of nosedown stabilizer
trim.
FLARE
The aircraft should be trimmed during final approach so as to maintain near zero control forces on
the elevator. Throttles are gradually retarded when
flare point is approached and further reduced when
over the overrun and flare is being completed. As
back pressure is applied to the elevator during
flare, stabilizer trim should be utilized to maintain
near zero control forces until a landing attitude is
attained. The elevator then becomes primary for attitude control to touchdown. Continued application
of noseup trim after touchdown attitude has been
established is not recommended since it will result
in an excessive noseup trim condition in the event
of unplanned go-around. In cases of forward cgs
and/or heavy gross weights, gradual thrust reduction should be made as flare is entered and continued until touchdown.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
WIND SHEAR
Wind shear is a complex phenomena that can adversely affect the aircraft in all phases of flight, but
is most critical during the approach and landing
phase. Wind shear can exist as a rapid change in
wind velocity and direction as well as vertical air
movement. There are many factors which influence
or contribute to a wind shear condition. As a general rule, the amount of wind shear is greater ahead
of warm fronts, although the most common occurrences follow the passage of cold fronts during periods of gusty surface winds. When a temperature
change of 10F or more is reported across the front,
or if the front is moving at 30 knots or more,
conditions are excellent for wind shear. In addition,
when thunderstorms are present in the area of
intended landing or a strong temperature inversion
is near the ground, the possibility of encountering
wind shear is increased.
1. Wind Shear Effects. The thrust required, vertical velocity, and pitch attitude on final approach,
used in conjunction with the wind reported on the
ground, provides an indication of potential wind
shear. Be alert for:
a. Unusual changes in airspeed and rate of descent followed by corresponding changes in glide
slope and pitch attitude.
b. An unusually high or low thrust setting required to maintain airspeed.
Caution will be exercised to initial reductions of
thrust and pitch to avoid a steep glide slope intercept in a low thrust, high sink condition.
2. Wind Shear Phenomena. The following are two
wind shear phenomena that are commonly found
during final approach:
a. Decreasing Headwind. Initial reaction of
the aircraft when encountering a decreasing
headwind (or an increasing tailwind) is a drop in
indicated airspeed and a decrease in pitch resulting
in a loss of altitude. If the wind shear occurs at low
altitude, the pilot will add thrust and increase pitch
to regain the proper glidepath. In severe conditions,
higher than normal thrust and higher than normal
pitch attitudes may be required to maintain the
proper descent profile.
b. Increasing Headwind. The initial aircraft
reaction to an increasing headwind (decreasing
tailwind) is an increase in indicated airspeed and
an increase in pitch resulting in a gain in altitude.
The pilot should reduce pitch and thrust to regain
the proper glidepath. Caution will be exercised in

initial reductions of thrust and pitch to avoid a
steep glide slope intercept in a low thrust, high sink
condition. This could result in the aircraft landing
well short of the intended touchdown point.
If the aircraft becomes unstable on final approach due to wind shear and the approach
profile cannot be promptly reestablished, a
go-around should be immediately accomplished.
LANDING
After touchdown, adequate directional control can

be maintained by the rudder at the higher speeds
and by forward wheel steering at the lower speeds.
The effectiveness of lateral control for maintaining
a wings-level attitude will decrease as the aircraft
slows down but the tip gear will maintain adequate
clearance for the nacelles and tip tanks. In case a
strong crosswind exists, the landing can be accomplished quite easily using the steering and crosswind crab system. In order to obtain most effective
braking, it is desirable to keep the wings as level as
possible during the braking roll. Limit braking to
no more than that required to stop on the available
runway so that brake life can be increased. The
speed corresponding to a simultaneous gear touchdown attitude, shown in figure 6-10, is dependent
on both the airbrake position and the aircraft gross
weight. The speed for simultaneous gear touchdown
increases with higher airbrake positions but is always above the minimum touchdown speed. The
speed range between the simultaneous touchdown
speed and the minimum touchdown speed can be
thought of as a touchdown speed margin. For a typical landing gross weight of 250,000 pounds, this
speed margin, with airbrakes in position 2, is only 5
knots. Selection of airbrake position 4 will increase
this speed margin to 11 knots and significantly reduce the possibility of a poor landing due to a forward gear first ground contact. The desirability of
having a large touchdown speed margin is one of
the main reasons for selection of airbrake position 4
as the normal aircraft landing configuration. The
stopping distance charts have been computed based
on the minimum touchdown speeds and it should be
noted that the actual ground roll will be longer if
the touchdown is made at higher speeds.
6-23
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Minimum Speed for Directional Control
GO-AROUND AND TOUCH AND GO LANDINGS
It has been determined in flight tests that fuel shift

can have a significant effect on air minimum directional control speed. When flying in uncoordinated
flight, such as multiple engine out flight with a
wing low, the fuel does not remain level in the
tanks but assumes an equilibrium attitude which
depends on the bank angle. This causes the lateral
center of gravity to shift from the airplane
centerline when the fuel tanks are partially full. In
an engine out condition, the primary requirement
for lateral control is to balance the roll moment due
to sideslip. The sideslip causes a lateral fuel shift
that reduces the lateral control requirement. As the
center of gravity moves laterally, aircraft sideslip
can be increased while retaining half lateral control
authority. As a result, lower air minimum directional control speeds can be obtained when wing tanks
are partially full. The MINIMUM SPEED FOR DIRECTIONAL CONTROL charts (figure 3-15) do not
include the beneficial effects of lateral fuel shift,
thus allowing the charts to be used for a variety of
fuel sequences with some conservatism at lighter
gross weights.
The thrust available on this aircraft, resultant from

the turbofan engines, demands much more attention to operating techniques, especially during goaround and touch and go landings. It would be possible under extreme conditions of low temperature
and weight to closely approach vertical flight from
which recovery would be impossible. Excess performance of this magnitude can be as deadly as it is
valuable unless controlled with utmost caution. The
turbofan engines produce thrust more rapidly after
throttle application than will previous jet engines.
This characteristic tends to compress or shorten the
time for the pilot to react to the situation. The pilot
must therefore anticipate the need and limit the
thrust to the level necessary for the condition. Any
thrust in excess of that required for safely conducting a maneuver tends to create problems. Consider
for a moment a condition where full thrust is applied when only half was needed; an immediate and
serious pitch problem is introduced and, at the
same time, a hidden but potentially disastrous
asymmetric power configuration is set up. Available
thrust held in reserve is like money in the bank, to
be used when needed for performance, that is, following engine failures, high drag requirements, etc.
Simultaneous Touchdown
Speeds
Target Thrust
The use of target thrust for go-arounds and touch

and go landings as discussed in Section II will preclude pitch and directional control problems on this
aircraft. See figure 6-11 for a comparison of TRT
and target thrust go-arounds. Figure 6-11 shows
that the attitude change is slower with target
thrust than with TRT. Target thrust increases the
amount of time available to initiate stabilizer trimming during go-around.
Figure 6-10
6-24
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Go-Around Trim
Figure 6-11
TARGET THRUST DETERMINATION
The increase in thrust necessary to execute the
touch and go or go-around is that amount required
to arrest approach descent or accelerate to takeoff
speed and establish a satisfactory rate of climb.
Any thrust exceeding this is excess energy and can
precipitate serious problems. The immediate question is how to approximate the maximum amount
which may be safely applied. Generally, at conditions combining two or more of high gross weight,
high temperature, and high field elevation, MRT
can be safely applied provided the pilot is attentive
to maintaining essentially zero stick force by adequate trimming. Otherwise, thrust increments up
to a partial thrust limit should be used. For the determination of this partial thrust limit, a chart,
THRUST GATE SETTING, is provided in Part 8 of
T.O. 1B-52H-1-1. Entering this chart with gross
weight, field pressure altitude, and temperature, a
thrust gate position is obtained which will provide
approximately 2000 fpm rate of climb with flaps
and gear down. The thrust gate is set to assist the
pilot in not exceeding the target thrust level. Further slight adjustment of the throttles to meet any
precise requirement may be accomplished at a less
critical time. The pilot has an alternate method of
establishing target thrust which does not utilize a
chart, but instead uses information obtained while
on the downwing leg. This should be accomplished
with flaps and gear down and airbrakes in position
4 at best flare speed + 30 knots. An increase in
thrust is always accompanied by an increase in total fuel flow. The increase in fuel flow which is necessary to execute a touch and go and go-around
with climb performance in the order of 1500 to 2000
fpm is approximately 13,000 pph over that used for
straight and level flight, flaps and gear down,
airbrakes in position 4 at best flare speed + 30
knots. The resultant figure establishes alternate
target thrust. To set the thrust gate using this alternate method, the throttles on one or more engines are momentarily advanced until the total fuel
flow indicator shows a proportionate increase of the
desired 13,000 pph. For example, in the previous
configuration of flaps-down, gear-down, and
6-25
T.O. 1B-52H-1
airbrakes in position 4, if eight engines are operating, two throttles can be advanced to give 3250 pph.
With flaps-down, gear-up, and airbrake lever OFF,
two throttles can be advanced to give 5000 pph.
The thrust gate should be set to coincide with these
throttles and the throttles returned to their original
setting. Advancing all eight throttles to the thrust
gate will give the desired 13,000 pph with flapsdown, gear-down, and airbrakes in position 4 or
20,000 pph with flaps-down, gear-up, and airbrake
lever OFF, over the base number and the desired
thrust to execute touch and go or go-around. Substantially less thrust will take the aircraft around if
gear and flaps are retracted. See ENGINE FAILURE, Section III. When the decision to go around is
reached, the pilot will advance the throttles as required with the thrust gate serving as a reminder
of target thrust level. In the case of a touch and go,
the pilot will advance the throttles to the thrust
gate. To again emphasize the magnitude of excess
thrust available, if throttles were advanced to full
travel under certain conditions, the total thrust developed could approach 160,000 pounds. On a light
gross weight aircraft, this could amount to almost 1
g of longitudinal acceleration. The available reaction time and trim rate required for this condition
can be insufficient to accomplish a safe margin of
control over the aircraft.
The rapid application of full thrust will result in a dynamic condition that will 1) accelerate the aircraft rapidly, and 2) produce a movement of fuel to the back of each
tank (rearward shift of cg). This condition,
coupled with the inherent noseup movement caused by the engine thrust lines being below the cg, can produce an untenable
nose-high attitude. An aircraft with an aft
cg location will have a stronger tendency to
pitch up than an aircraft with a mid to forward cg position.
The stabilizer trim should be reset to the
target trim value and the airbrakes lowered
to counteract the noseup trim changes that
result from large thrust applications during
go-around.
6-26
In cases where a go-around is initiated just

prior to or during the landing flare and
where adequate runway remains, it may be
advisable to maintain a touchdown attitude, contact the runway, then retrim the
aircraft during the ground run before initiating a large thrust application.
Stabilizer trim requirements change considerably

when advancing thrust from low thrust settings. At
light gross weights when thrust is rapidly applied,
as in an emergency go-around situation, the rapid
aircraft acceleration and high rate of climb will
cause a pronounced aft cg shift due to fuel shift in
the tanks. This effect is most severe at low airspeeds, especially near or below minimum touchdown speed. Under certain fuel distributions, the
aircraft cg may shift as much as 10% MAC with application of MRT. The greatest tendency for fuel
shift occurs when the gross weight is in the normal
landing weight range, with partially full wing fuel
tanks. The second most severe case is at high gross
weights when the body tanks are only partially full;
however, this case is considerably less severe. The
trim change required to counteract the fuel shift
due to application of MRT at landing speeds is
approximately 4.2 units of nosedown stabilizer
trim. The trim change requirement due to an increase of thrust from idle to MRT is about 2.2 units
nosedown stabilizer trim. (This is due to thrust moment arm alone and not to fuel shift.) As the aircraft comes into ground effect (about 150 feet above
the runway), the downwash at the tail is reduced
causing a trim change requirement of approximately 1.8 units noseup. Conversely, on climbing out of
ground effect, a change of about 1.8 units of
nosedown trim is required. Retracting the landing
gear causes a noseup pitching moment which is
equivalent to 1 unit of stabilizer trim. These trim
changes, which may occur almost simultaneously
during a go-around, account for the requirement of
resetting the stabilizer trim and retracting the
airbrakes during go-around.
NOTE
Retracting the airbrakes from position 4 results in a nosedown pitching moment which
is equivalent to approximately 3 units of
stabilizer trim.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
GO-AROUND CHARACTERISTICS WITH ASYMMETRIC
THRUST
The proper control technique to achieve maximum

performance during an engine out go-around is to
use full rudder pedal deflection and wheel deflection only as required to control the rolling moment.
The small 10% chord rudder on B-52 aircraft has a
negligible drag penalty. The lateral control on B-52
aircraft includes a spoiler control device. The extension of spoilers on one wing decreases the lift produced by that wing and increases the drag. Increasing wheel deflection increases spoiler deflection and
in turn increases the aircraft drag. Basically two
cases of engine out control exist:
1. Rudder control sufficient to control the yaw
asymmetry.
2. Rudder control insufficient to control the yaw
asymmetry. Sheet 1 of figure 6-12 is a graphical illustration of Case 1 with the rudder control sufficient to overcome the yaw asymmetry without sideslipping the aircraft. The roll moment due to rudder
deflection is small for the 10% chord rudder surface
of B-52 aircraft. Small wheel deflections are required to control the roll moment. Sheet 2 of figure
6-12 is a graphical illustration of Case 2 with the
rudder control insufficient to overcome the yaw
asymmetry. When the yaw asymmetry is greater
than the rudder capability, the aircraft will sideslip
so the yaw moment due to the engine out condition
will be counteracted and balanced by the yaw moment due to the rudder plus the yaw moment due
to the vertical tail sideslip. A swept wing in a sideslip condition will experience a large roll moment
due to increased wing span effectiveness on the advancing wing and decreased wing span effectiveness on the retreating wing. This lift asymmetry
must be counteracted by control wheel deflection.
Since lateral control is achieved with the help of
spoiler type controls, a spoiler must be raised on
the advancing wing so that the lift on both wings is
equal during the sideslip. Raising of a spoiler on
one wing reduces the lift on that wing, but also
creates a drag component. The spoiler drag component assists the rudder and vertical tail in controlling the yaw moment but reduces the aircraft climb
performance. If the rudder control is now relaxed
from the full control position, the aircraft sideslip
will increase requiring an increase in wheel deflection to control the increase in rolling moment. The
increased spoiler drag component will further re-
duce the aircraft climb performance. Figure 6-13 illustrates the reduction in rate-of-climb capability
due to control wheel deflection. Retraction of the
landing gear during a flaps down go-around will result in a climb performance improvement of approximately 250 fpm.
PRACTICE LANDING PATTERNS AT ALTITUDE
Thrust available decreases rather rapidly with increased altitude. At 6500 feet altitude, eight engines at MRT produce approximately the same
thrust as seven engines at sea level; at 12,500 feet,
eight engines are equivalent to six engines at sea
level; at 19,000 feet, eight engines are equivalent to
five engines at sea level; at 25,000 feet, eight engines are equivalent to four engines at sea level.
Aircraft acceleration and trim characteristics are
affected by this decrease in thrust with increases in
altitude and these characteristics are not directly
comparable with those for sea level conditions. Because of altitude effects on initial buffet and aircraft thrust, it is recommended that practice landing patterns be performed at aircraft gross weights
below 300,000 pounds and an altitude under 20,000
feet. If the best flare speed with No. 4 airbrake as
presented in Part 8 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1 is used, at
least 10% margin between initial buffet and the
best flare speed will be available. It should be kept
in mind that, as thrust available decreases with altitude, the change in pitch trim required as full
thrust is applied at the best flare speed is less than
would be encountered at sea level. Thus, when a goaround is accomplished at sea level, the change in
nosedown trim required to maintain zero stick force
is much more severe than that encountered for a
go-around at altitude. The amount of force which
will turn the aircraft in an engine-out condition decreases at higher altitudes because of less thrust on
the operating engines. Since idle thrust increases
with altitude, this further decreases the amount of
asymmetry when simulating an engine-out condition. The loss of No. 1 engine during takeoff under
standard sea level conditions can be demonstrated
at 10,000 feet by retarding No. 3 and 4 engines to
idle and placing all other engines to MRT. Even
though an aircraft can be easily controlled at altitude under a given asymmetrical thrust condition,
sufficient control may not be available at sea level
to maintain aircraft heading under the same engine-out conditions.
6-27
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Rudder Control for Yaw Asymmetry
6-28
T.O. 1B-52H-1
6-29
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Effect of Wheel Application on Incremental Rate of

Climb Capability
Figure 6-13
6-30
T.O. 1B-52H-1
HIGH SPEED FLIGHT
flight at MRT since the high speed buffet region

might be entered.
Wing Buffeting
During high speed operations, a slight buffet begins

when the aircraft critical Mach number is reached.
This is caused by the turbulent airflow behind the
shock wave which is established when the airflow
over a portion of the top surface of the wing has
reached sonic velocity. As the speed of the aircraft
increases above this initial buffet speed, additional
turbulence of the airflow over the upper surface of
the wing is produced which causes a further increase in buffeting resulting in aircraft vibration.
Unless some emergency exists, the aircraft should
not be flown at speeds greater than that at which
light buffeting is encountered. Increasing the altitude or the gross weight will cause buffeting to occur at a lower airspeed since the critical Mach number is reduced when the angle-of-attack of the aircraft is increased.
BUFFET BOUNDARY
The point where buffeting occurs is called the buffet boundary (figure 6-14). Buffet free flight can be
conducted in the area below the curve but as the
aircraft approaches the buffet boundary, a small
gust, maneuver, or slight increase in the aircraft
normal acceleration can cause the buffet region to
be entered. Buffeting occurs during flight in any
portion of the shaded region. The two types of buffeting encountered at high altitudes are low speed
stall buffeting which occurs on the curve in the vicinity of point B and high speed buffeting which occurs in the vicinity of point C. For example, an aircraft weighing 220,000 pounds and cruising at 0.80
Mach at 45,000 feet altitude would be at point A on
the curve. If speed is decreased far enough while
maintaining the same altitude, buffeting will be encountered at point B. The buffeting encountered at
point B is a low speed stall buffet and is essentially
the same in nature as that described in STALLS,
this section. The only difference between high altitude low speed buffeting and that described under
STALLS, is that at high altitude, low speed buffeting occurs at higher indicated airspeeds. If the airspeed is increased from point A while maintaining
the same altitude, buffeting will be encountered at
point C. The aircraft can be flown past point C in
level flight by increasing power to military rated
thrust. Therefore, use caution when flying in level
RECOVERY FROM BUFFET

Level flight operation near the high speed buffet
boundary or in the high speed buffet region is not
dangerous provided the aircraft shaking is not
great and the pilot understands that the quickest
way to get out of the buffet region is to reduce
speed or altitude or both. Since the aircraft drag in
the buffet region is very high, the most effective
method of getting out of this region is by reduction
of thrust without change of trim. This will result in
reduction of speed and loss of altitude. A very slight
climb produced by slight back pressure on the control column, while momentarily increasing the buffeting, will eventually aid in the loss of speed.
While operating at low altitudes in level flight, the
low speed buffet region can be entered, but at lower
airspeeds than that for higher altitudes. During
normal flight operation, the high speed buffet region will never be entered.
Buffet Boundary Limits
Figure 6-14
6-31
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Tuck Under
As the speed of any aircraft is increased, the normal requirement is more aircraft nosedown trim.
However, with this aircraft as with many other
high speed aircraft, the trim requirement reverses
as the buffet region is entered and noseup trim is
required. Such a condition is called tuck under
and is considered critical on those aircraft which do
not provide sufficient longitudinal control or when
the trim reversal is large. Since the aircraft is
equipped with an adjustable stabilizer, sufficient
longitudinal control is available to handle any condition within structural capabilities. The inboard
portion of the wing approaches its critical Mach
6-32
number first with the result that the center of lift of

this area moves rearward with increasing speed.
Because of this action the resultant lift produced
from the entire wing moves aft (center of pressure
moves aft) which produces an aircraft nosedown
pitching moment. The trim changes are small and
gradual as speed is increased above the critical
Mach number. They can be handled easily by use of
the stabilizer trim or by use of elevator alone with
not more than 50 to 60 pounds of pilot effort. Such
a reversal of longitudinal trim is not unusual, but
the amount of reversal and the speed at which reversal starts will vary depending upon the amount
of sweepback used, flexibility of the wing, wing airfoil sections used, and wing taper ratio employed.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
MANEUVERING FLIGHT
LOAD FACTOR
When the aircraft is being flown in level unaccelerated flight, the wings produce sufficient lift to counteract the weight of the aircraft such that 1 g loading (a load factor of 1) is being produced. If the nose
is pushed over, the loading decreases to less than 1
g during the maneuver, while if a pullup is performed, a loading greater than 1 g is produced. If a
turning maneuver is accomplished while maintaining the same speed, the wings produce less lift in a
vertical direction and the angle-of-attack must be
increased to compensate for this loss of lift if a
constant altitude is to be maintained. This increase
in angle-of-attack causes a loading increase greater
than 1 g.
EFFECT OF POSITIVE ACCELERATION
The effect of positive acceleration caused by coordinated turns or pullups is to increase the load factor
on the aircraft. Performing any normal maneuver
during maximum range cruise flight is generally
not critical from buffet considerations. However, if
level flight is being maintained in an area very
close to the buffet region, even a small maneuver
can cause the aircraft to enter the buffet region.
Starting from level flight at point A (figure 6-14), a
turn can be made at 0.80 Mach until buffeting is
encountered at point D. A coordinated bank of
approximately 53 is required to reach point D for
this condition. Recovery from buffeting occurring
during a turn or pullup is best made by rolling out
of the turn or nosing over slightly or both.
COMBAT BREAKAWAY MANEUVERS
Techniques for combat breakaway maneuvers may

vary depending upon the nature of the bomb run
and status of equipment being utilized. This maneuver may be accomplished either using automatic
pilot or by manual controls but a combination of the
two is not advised. Prior to the bomb run, consult
figure 6-15 to determine the maximum recommended bank angle. It will be noted that the maximum recommended bank angle chart has reduced
the bank angle 10 from the maximum
recommended buffet and there is no need to further
reduce the bank angle if best performance is

desired. When making this maneuver on automatic
pilot, rotation of the turn knob past the detent will
allow up to 50 of bank. Entry into and recovery
from the bank angle should be accomplished
smoothly to prevent inadvertent disengagement of
the autopilot.
NOTE
In the event of autopilot disengagement

during breakaway maneuver, be prepared
for a pitchup during manual recovery resulting from the trimming accomplished by
the autopilot in the turn.
When performing this maneuver manually, the
turn should be completed utilizing little or no stabilizer trim. Constant thrust and altitude should be
maintained with a small resultant loss of airspeed
during the breakaway maneuver; thrust should not
be increased over what was maintained during the
bomb run.
RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL POSITIONS
An unusual position is any abnormal bank attitude,

pitch attitude, or speed which the aircraft has inadvertently assumed. The recovery from unusual positions may be safe or unsafe, depending on whether
or not there is an easily understood and executed
procedure assuring straight and level flight without
damage to the aircraft. More specifically, an unusual position for this aircraft may be considered as
any attitude or speed which results in inadvertent
operation outside the following limitations:
1. An unintentional bank angle greater than 45.
2. A nose-high attitude greater than that required for a maximum steady climb angle at aircraft gross weights with which the pilot has had
flight experience.
3. A nose down attitude greater than that required for the established descent procedures under
conditions with which the pilot has had experience.
4. Maximum placard speed or structural load factor limitations for the particular aircraft configuration.
5. Minimum recommended speed.
6-33
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Maximum Recommended Bank Angle

(Breakaway Maneuvering)
Figure 6-15
6-34
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Aircraft attitudes that exceed the prior listed limits
which the pilot has intentionally caused the aircraft
to safely assume, such as a combat breakaway maneuver, are not considered unusual positions and
the following procedures for recovery from unusual
position will not apply if the aircraft is operating
safely after intentionally establishing the aircraft
attitudes or speeds. If, after intentionally exceeding
the limits, the aircraft operation appears to become
unsafe, then the recovery from unusual positions
procedures will be used. Acrobatic maneuvers in
this aircraft are prohibited; however, it is imperative that procedures for recovery from inadvertent
unusual positions be understood. During action
over a target, it may be necessary to recognize and
recover from extreme maneuvers. Incorrect recovery from normal over-the-target maneuvers or incorrect procedures during instrument flight, especially descents, can lead to unusual positions. During recovery from unusual positions, the pilot must
be aware of the aircraft limitations and be able to
make a decision as to whether to attempt recovery
or abandon the aircraft. Recovery from normal
over-the-target maneuvers can be safely practiced if
ordinary precautions are taken. Any procedure
however which requires the pilot to recognize and
recover from an unusual position, with limits in excess of those established in this paragraph, which
he has not observed being established is not recommended. This is because orientation cannot always
be easily established unless the maneuver entry
has been progressively observed, and incorrect interpretation of attitude may lead to incorrect recovery. Any protracted delay in recovery from an unusual position will result in a dive. The time required to exceed placard speeds from cruise Mach
number at 30,000 feet at various dive angles is as
follows: In a 13 dive, the flutter placard can be
exceeded in less than 20 seconds. In a 25 dive, the
structural placard and the flutter boundary can be
exceeded in less than 20 seconds. At 45 or more, all
placards are exceeded in less than 10 seconds if
recovery procedures are not initiated immediately.
Basically, the techniques required for recovery from
unusual positions are the same as for other aircraft
of this class, except that a higher degree of
proficiency may be required. The pilot should,
however, be familiar with the following pilot
techniques and flight characteristics which are
peculiar to this aircraft:
1. Although the electrical trim features make it

very easy to maintain elevator control forces at a
minimum, little or no stabilizer trim should be used
during fast rate roll-ins or pull-ups. This assures
that release of the controls will return the aircraft
toward the original trim condition if rapid recovery
is required.
2. Rolling the wings level during a dive recovery
can be accomplished at high indicated airspeeds
since adequate control exists.
3. If lateral controls are used in the recovery, forward column movement is required to compensate
for pitchup due to the lateral control spoilers unless
the pitchup is required as part of the recovery procedure.
4. Application of stabilizer trim should very closely follow corrective control column movement. This
is desirable in order to keep recovery effort to a
minimum and to assure that the stabilizer screw is
not loaded beyond operating capacity if aircraft
placard speeds are unintentionally exceeded in the
recovery. It is not considered good practice to move
the stabilizer ahead of time in anticipation of a certain aircraft response unless it has been previously
experienced that this response is certain to occur.
This is especially true if placard speeds have inadvertently been exceeded. Control characteristics beyond placard speeds are covered in Section V.
5. Airbrakes can be used in emergencies, such as
loss of stabilizer trim, for a pitch trimming device.
When used at low airspeeds, incremental extension
of the airbrake following application of full noseup
elevator will assist in recovering from a nosedown
attitude. In addition, they can be used as a drag device at high speed; however, they should be applied
gradually, keeping in mind their strong pitchup effects and blowdown characteristics at speeds above
250 knots IAS. Use of more than airbrake position 2
at high indicated airspeeds will make full lateral
control more difficult to attain (higher wheel deflections and forces) and result in unpredictable but
controllable roll caused by asymmetrical spoiler
blowdown.
6. Extension of landing gear as a drag device in
recovery from steep nosedown attitudes is recommended but every effort should be made to extend
the gear as soon as the attitude or the possibility of
such an attitude is recognized. At high speeds however, successful egress of personnel without ejection
seats is virtually impossible after gear extension. In
addition, if aircraft placard speeds are exceeded, it
is likely that gear doors will be lost with possible
collision damage to horizontal and vertical tail.
6-35
T.O. 1B-52H-1
7. Since improper recovery from an unusual position may result in exceeding placard speeds, rudder
trim should be returned to zero before initiating a
deliberate unusual position in order to preclude
structural failure.
Rudder deflection can cause structural failure if speeds greater than aircraft placard
speeds are inadvertently reached.
8. Aircraft buffet cannot be relied upon as an indication that structural limit load factors have been
reached since, in most cases, buffet is not reached
until after structural load factor limitations have
been exceeded. This is shown on the NORMAL ACCELERATION AT MAXIMUM RECOMMENDED
BUFFET chart. (Refer to Part 9 of T.O.
1B-52H-1-1.) No reliable flight experience exists on
the buffet characteristics at combined Mach numbers and indicated speeds above the structural and
flutter placards.
Instrument misinterpretation during the

initial phase of the recovery would result in
improper recovery action which could overstress the aircraft. Pilots will be alert to
prevent improper recovery action. Caution
will also be exercised during recoveries because the accelerometer is not a precise or
easily read instrument.
9. Large amounts of lateral and rudder control
inputs may be necessary for recovery from certain
situations and the pilot must be aware of recovery
techniques and aircraft limitations. Improper recovery actions from an unusual position can result in
critical structural loads and/or exceeding placard
speeds. These loads vary in magnitude depending
on indicated airspeed, degree of corrective lateral
and rudder input, rate of rudder application,
amount of yaw/roll displacement that has taken
place prior to rudder application, gross weight, cg,
fuel distribution, turbulence, aircraft configuration,
missile loading, external tank loading, etc. If these
variables occur in certain combinations, critical
structural loads can result. To minimize the possibility of structural overloads that could occur at
other than low speed conditions, any yaw/roll tendency requiring large lateral and rudder displace-
6-36
ment should be counteracted initially with lateral

control followed by steady rudder application.
Nose-High Attitudes
A nose-high condition can develop immediately after takeoff or touch and go because of the following
conditions:
Stabilizer trim not set properly for takeoff

Stabilizer trim not reset properly for touch and
Airbrakes left extended

Unscheduled and/or runaway noseup trim
Misinterpretation of visual or artificial horizon.
go
Do not use the stabilizer trim cutout switch

until positive that the attitude change is
due to runaway trim.
Recovery from a nose-high attitude immediately after takeoff can best be accomplished
with full forward control column, retracting
airbrakes if extended, continuous application of nosedown trim, and maintaining
takeoff thrust and a wings-level attitude.
During touch and go, the trim will be reset prior to

making the takeoff. If this action is not accomplished immediately following unstick, forward column will be required in order to prevent pitchup,
and nosedown stabilizer trim will have to be initiated to obtain zero stick force. To be sure that the
trim action desired is being accomplished, note that
the movement of the manual trim wheel is in the
proper direction. If electrical trim appears inoperative, manual trim will be applied as rapidly as possible while holding wings level and the control column full forward. Recovery is still possible but will
be slower. The airspeed will fall alarmingly low but
lateral control will be good. As the nose of the aircraft drops through the horizon, recovery can be
made as the descent is begun by use of trim and
thrust as required. Do not release forward pressure
on the control column until the desired attitude is
established and airspeed increases to a safe value.
Because of the tendency to over trim during the recovery from the nose-high condition, prompt opposite trim action will be required after the aircraft
assumes a nosedown attitude. Caution will be exercised to avoid an accelerated stall.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Even though a reduction of thrust will decrease the
amount of mistrim in the noseup direction, there
are definite advantages to be gained by maintaining thrust. When thrust is maintained, the minimum speed encountered in the recovery will be
higher, altitude gained will be greater, and the possibility of a secondary stall in the recovery will be
decreased.
Do not use a steep turn maneuver for recovery from nose-high attitudes, one reason being that dangerous sideslip could occur
causing structural failure.
If nose-high attitude develops after takeoff, recover
straight ahead. Maintain wings level, full takeoff
thrust, and full forward control column. Retract
airbrakes if extended and apply continuous
nosedown trim until recovery is made. the use of a
steep bank to control the aircraft can be fatal if at a
low airspeed and close to the ground, and should
not be attempted.
Do not attempt to take off unless trim has

been properly set for takeoff and airbrakes
are down.
A steep turn as a last resort maneuver will compensate for a considerable amount of noseup mistrim;
however, if the mistrim condition is undetected until a high noseup attitude and a low airspeed is
reached, there is a danger, when entering a turn, of
causing an uncontrollable maneuver which may result in structural failure. Two other factors should
be considered: 1) While rolling the aircraft, the
spoilers aggravate the mistrim, and 2) the time taken establishing a turn would be better spent trimming manually. Therefore, a steep turn maneuver
to compensate for an excess of noseup trim is not
recommended even at high altitude except in the
case when both electric and manual trim are inoperative. When starting a steep turn under these circumstances, alert the crew to prepare to abandon
the aircraft. If unscheduled noseup trim is encountered while in a turn, the best action will be to continue the turn and use the RUNAWAY OR UNSCHEDULED STABILIZER TRIM checklist, Section III. If nose-down trim is encountered in a turn,
roll wings level while using the RUNAWAY OR UN-
SCHEDULED STABILIZER TRIM checklist, Section III.

Dive Recovery
Dives can result from stabilizer trim in the

nosedown direction, autopilot malfunction, unscheduled loss of airbrakes, or instrument misinterpretation or malfunction. Because of its extremely
low drag with landing gear and flaps retracted, this
aircraft will increase in speed very rapidly any time
the nose is dropped. Therefore, during dive recovery, the application of a positive load factor (back
stick) should be made immediately up to the structural limit of 2.0 gs or to the point of buffeting,
whichever occurs first. In cases where elevator authority alone is found to be insufficient to control
the dive or when nosedown mistrim is suspected,
airbrake extension should be used as a backup to
the elevator for pitch authority. The application of
load factor should have precedence over thrust reduction. See figure 6-16 for altitude loss during a
dive recovery.
Spiral Dives
If an aircraft reaches too large a bank angle or falls

off on one wing, a spiral dive can result. This maneuver is easily entered when visual orientation is
not possible or if instrument orientation is momentarily lost because of distraction or vertigo. To recover from a spiral dive, roll out of the bank and
hold wings level while holding a constant heading.
At the same time, the recommended procedures for
dive recovery should be initiated.
Vertigo
When the pilot becomes disoriented or experiences

vertigo, the aircraft can be returned to wings level
by engaging the autopilot. It is not necessary for
the aircraft to be in trim. If a spoiler is up when the
autopilot is engaged, the aircraft will only return to
approximately wings level, with the autopilot holding some spoiler and rudder to compensate for an
out-of-trim condition. After the pilot is reoriented, it
is recommended that the autopilot be disengaged
momentarily and then reengaged after trimming
aircraft. Recovery from a climb or dive must be
commanded through the pitch knob or the altitude
control switch. If the autopilot disengages itself
when engaged in such an emergency, continuos
manual reengagements will introduce signals in a
recovery direction.
6-37
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Dive Recovery Capability
Figure 6-16
Summary of Causes for Unusual Positions
The following conditions are the most prevalent

causes for unusual positions in the aircraft:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Pilot disorientation or vertigo

Turbulence or weapons effects
Improper use or malfunction of airbrakes
Improper use or malfunction of stabilizer trim
Split flap operation
Unscheduled autopilot inputs.
Summary of Procedures for Recovery From Unusual

Positions
The following procedures will be used for recovery

from nose-high unusual positions when the bank is
less than 45:
1. Add thrust as required and later adjust as necessary to obtain the desired airspeed.
2. Lower nose of aircraft to slightly below the horizon (approximately 3) and maintain the original
bank angle when lowering the nose. If the wings
are level when starting the recovery, maintain
6-38
wings level attitude and lower nose to slightly

below the horizon. If applicable, use the RUNAWAY
OR
UNSCHEDULED
STABILIZER
TRIM
checklist, Section III, to help correct the nose high
attitude.
3. After obtaining a slightly nose-low attitude,
roll wings level and establish straight and level
flight.
from nose-high unusual positions when the bank is
more than 45:
1. Add thrust as required and later adjust as necessary to obtain the desired airspeed.
2. Simultaneously lower nose of aircraft to slightly below the horizon (approximately 3) and reduce
the bank to 45 or less. If applicable, use the
RUNAWAY OR UNSCHEDULED STABILIZER
TRIM checklist, Section III, to help correct the
nose-high attitude.
3. After obtaining a slightly nose-low attitude,
roll wings level and establish straight and level
flight.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
FORMATION FLYING
would be disturbed more. Also the aerodynamic effect increases with decreasing airspeed since, for
the same weight aircraft, the distortion in the airflow is greater at slower speed. The extension of
wing flaps distorts the airflow in a manner to increase the disturbance so that it is more hazardous
to fly formation at low speeds with the flaps extended on the lead aircraft. In addition, formation
flying at high Mach numbers can introduce large
unfavorable interactions between the two aircraft.
The pilot feels all of these aerodynamic effects as
changing control force requirements as the two aircraft maneuver near each other. If the relative position of the two aircraft is changing rapidly, the control force requirements will also change rapidly. For
this reason, one of the basic rules for formation flying is to make all position changes slowly. The direction of the disturbing force is different for every
relative position, but generally the force is in the direction to bring the two aircraft closer together.
Consider a B-52 under running a KC-135 during an
attempt to formate for refueling. If the center lines
of the two aircraft coincide, they will tend to fly together and the B-52 pilot must push on the control
column to maintain clearance. As the B-52 wing
passes forward of the KC-135 wing, it passes from a
region of downwash to a region of upwash and the
lift is suddenly increased; therefore, the B-52 pilot
will strongly increase the push force at this time to
prevent pitching up into the tanker. If the B-52
were to underrun the tanker to one side so that
their wings overlapped on one side only, the pitching tendency would not be quite as strong but the
aerodynamic interaction is such that less lift is generated on the top wing and more lift is generated on
the bottom wing. This causes the two aircraft to
bank in the same direction with the two wings
tending to collide since one goes down and the other
goes up.
AERODYNAMIC EFFECTS
LIMITATIONS
Aircraft flying in close formation have an aerodynamic effect on each other due to the interaction of
the airflow around the two aircraft. This effect, in
general, tends to draw the two aircraft together and
the strength of this effect is inversely proportional
to the distance. The closer the two aircraft are, the
stronger the effect. The strength is also directly
proportional to the size and weight of the aircraft.
For example, a T-38 chase plane would not noticeably affect a B-52 but the T-38 would experience a
strong disturbance from the B-52. Two B-52s would
experience similar forces but the lighter of the two
Prior to participating in air refueling operations or

formation flight, all crews will be properly briefed
on information tactics and procedures that will be
used and to (1) never fly over or under the other
aircraft, and (2) maintain safe separation in all directions as specified in the applicable air refueling
flight manuals or the major air command formation
flying directives. In the event an emergency requires a chase aircraft for airspeed reference or a
visual inspection, the pilot of the chase aircraft will
be briefed on command chase aircraft procedures
prior to engaging chase operations.

from nose-low unusual positions:
NOTE
A nose-low unusual position can be entered

as the result of a low speed stall. For recovery techniques from this low speed condition, see RECOVERY FROM INADVERTENT STALLS, this section.
1. Back stick, thrust reduced as required, and drag
devices such as airbrakes and landing gear should
be used as necessary to avoid exceeding airspeed
limitations.
2. Simultaneously correct pitch and bank to establish level flight condition. Elevator control should
be closely followed by stabilizer trimming in order
to keep elevator control forces and jackscrew loads
at a minimum. The structural or buffet limits
should not be exceeded in an attempt to level off too
rapidly. If the wings are level when starting the recovery, maintain wings-level attitude when correcting the pitch attitude so the maximum effectiveness
of lift will be available for producing a recovery
flight path.
Spins
For spin recovery, see SPINS, this section.

Inverted Attitudes
The best way to recover from an inverted attitude

with a minimum loss of altitude is to roll out. Since
this aircraft has spoilers there is no problem of lateral control reversal.
6-39
T.O. 1B-52H-1
At cruising altitude, a considerable increase in

speed above the maximum range cruise speed may
be made before reaching the buffet boundary.
Therefore, a shallow dive may be made without entering the buffet region. However, because of the
extremely low drag of the aircraft with the gear and
flaps retracted, the speed increases very rapidly at
any time the nose is dropped or a dive is started. If
the buffet region is entered while in a dive, recovery
may be made by immediately retarding the
throttles to IDLE and leveling out very slowly. Leveling off too rapidly will cause the load factor to increase to a value considerably greater than 1 g with
the result that buffeting will increase. In cases
where a rapid descent is to be accomplished, the
landing gear and airbrakes should be extended and
the procedures followed as outlined under DESCENT, Section II.
Considerable motion in the lateral plane from the

effects of turbulence and strong or gusty surface
winds is apparent while flying at low altitude, especially if the airspeed is above 325 knots IAS. Motion
in the lateral plane due to horizontal gusts is similar to earlier series B-52s; however, due to a difference in wing construction and fuel distribution, the
B-52H reacts differently to vertical gusts than earlier models. When a vertical gust is encountered,
the initial gust input causes the aircraft to bounce
vertically but the vertical motion damps out rapidly
as the gust dissipates. The effect is to give relatively long periods of time when the flight is quite
smooth. Observation of the wing shows very little
up and down motion and nacelles move only occasionally. The normal operating limitations contained in Section V apply to low altitude operation.
For further information, see LOW ALTITUDE TACTIC, Section II, and TURBULENCE AND THUNDERSTORMS, Section VII.
FLIGHT WITH ASYMMETRICAL LOADS
AIRCRAFT RESPONSE TO FLIGHT CONTROLS
See FUEL MANAGEMENT FOR LATERAL TRIM,

Section II; and refer to Part 8 of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1
for information regarding flight with asymmetrical
loads.
The most significant problem with which the pilot

must familiarize himself at high speed is the aircraft control characteristics while encountering severe turbulence at low altitudes. Aircraft response
to use of the elevators only is sluggish, while response to change in stabilizer trim is rapid and positive. However, any change in pitch should be made
by leading with the elevators and using stabilizer
trim to relieve the physical effort required by the
pilot. Fine control is then maintained by use of the
elevators. Use of the low level mode of the autopilot
will substantially reduce stick forces required and
lateral forces will also be lighter than manual. With
the yaw SAS engaged, lateral-directional oscillations of the aircraft are sensed and increased positive damping is provided for easier rudder control.
The autopilot will also provide automatic stabilizer
trim to compensate for any pitch or thrust changes.
See AUTOPILOT, Section I. Figure 6-17 compares
load factors developed during low altitude pull-ups
at high and low airspeeds. See ACCELERATION
LIMITATIONS, Section V, for inflight limit load factors. When using the low level mode of the
autopilot, a g limiter will automatically disengage
the autopilot before the pilot inadvertently exceeds
the normal acceleration (load) limits. For additional
information, see G LIMITER under AUTOPILOT,
Section I. The use of airbrakes is not advisable except in maintaining the necessary EPR for anti-icing, or under other controlled conditions. The upward pitch change associated with the use of
airbrakes (or downward when retracted) can have
undesirable effects at extremely low altitudes.
DIVING
LOW ALTITUDE FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS

NOTE
Due to the wide wing span of the B-52, wing

tip terrain clearance at extremely low altitudes can become critical as the bank angle
increases during turns, e.g., a 20 bank will
place the wing tip approximately 25 feet
closer to the terrain than the bottom of the
fuselage and a 40 bank approximately 55
feet closer. See following table.
BANK
ANGLE
DEGREES
APPROXIMATE
DISTANCE
FEET
12
11
15
16
20
25
30
40
40
55
6-40
T.O. 1B-52H-1
The roll-yaw response of a B-52 resulting from a
typical asymmetrical thrust condition is shown in
figure 6-18. For a particular case where corrective
action is applied 4 seconds after thrust loss, the roll
rate does not reduce to zero until an additional 3
seconds have elapsed. During this period, the aircraft continues to bank even though full corrective
control has been applied. A sensation that the controls are not effective will be felt since the bank
angle continues to increase for several seconds
when full controls are applied to oppose the roll.
The aircraft is, however, in a process of responding
by reducing the roll rate. Control inputs must be
held in to speed the recovery.
Roll-Yaw Recovery (Typical)
Load Factors During Low

Altitude Pullups
Figure 6-18
PILOT CONTROL TECHNIQUE

Manual Control
Figure 6-17
During low altitude operations, pilot technique is

extremely important and proper coordination between pilot and copilot is essential. Prolonged low
altitude operation may require assistance from the
copilot, depending upon turbulence level and character of the terrain. An effective method of controlling the aircraft while experiencing difficult control
forces may be accomplished by the pilot using both
hands on the control wheel while the copilot controls airspeed with the throttles. The B-52 requires
6-41
T.O. 1B-52H-1
constant pilot attention to maintain a wings-level
attitude and hold a heading within 2. However,
due to the elimination of ailerons, the lateral
control system has a desirable feature in that
control forces do not increase with airspeed. This
effectively reduces pilot effort and makes the low
altitude mission much easier even though lateral
control inputs are frequently necessary. See
LATERAL CONTROL, this section.
Autopilot Control
Autopilot non-steering modes are not suited to low

altitude flying and cannot be relied upon to maintain control. Autopilot response, particularly in using the pitch control knob, is not rapid enough to
6-42
perform low altitude maneuvers and is subject to

disengagement due to turbulence. However, the
autopilot low level mode may be used for low altitude operations. This mode reduces loads imposed
on the aircraft and also reduces pilot fatigue during
low altitude flying by allowing the pilot to command the aircraft through the autopilot. The pilot
flies the aircraft through the autopilot by control
column and control wheel inputs in the same manner that he flies without the autopilot. Control column and wheel forces are considerably reduced by
the power steering effect provided by the system
because the autopilot is sensing the pilots force on
the controls and provides the necessary action to
move the control surfaces. For additional information, see AUTOPILOT, Section I.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
SIOP INCREASED GROSS WEIGHT

IN FLIGHT
FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS FOR AIR REFUELING OPERATIONS
Although aircraft handling characteristics have

been investigated up to 567,000 pounds gross
weight during air refueling with a KC-135 tanker, a
weight of 540,000 pounds is recommended as maximum for planning purposes. Air refueling handling
qualities at increased weights are somewhat more
demanding than at 488,000 pounds, but are acceptable for a pilot qualified in heavy weight air refueling. The most significant constraints to aircraft
handling qualities are the decreased load limit and
the degraded thrust response. Additional operating
limitations apply. Lower altitudes and higher airspeeds are necessary for air refueling. Pilots should
be cognizant of the characteristics and limitations
of SIOP increased weights.
G Excursions
The most severe restriction when refueling at SIOP

increased gross weights is the limited factor capability. Both sustained and momentary g must be
minimized. The pilot must be aware of the g limitations (1.5 g at 540,000 pounds gross weight) on the
aircraft and not let fixation on the air refueling
task lead to any abrupt control inputs. The limit of
1.5 g (at 540,000 pounds gross weight) is considered
by test pilots to be a reasonably safe SIOP refueling
limit. Under ideal refueling conditions, the pilot
may elect to exceed 540,000 pounds gross weight,
but he must realize the significant increase in risk
he is taking. He should also realize the aircraft accelerometer is inadequate to warn of approach to
the aircraft load limit.
Handling Qualities
There is a tradeoff between better air refueling

handling qualities at low altitude and better range
at higher altitudes. At low altitudes, more thrust is
available and the refueling task is generally easier,
but more fuel is required to climb back to cruise altitude. At gross weights up to 520,000 pounds,
26,000 feet is the recommended air refueling altitude, and 24,000 feet should be used when above
that weight. Air refueling contacts above these altitudes are possible, but the task becomes significantly more difficult. It is important to minimize the
time spent behind the tanker because fuel consumption is high. If difficulty is encountered at the
recommended refueling altitude, consider refueling
at a lower altitude where the task is easier. Although fuel consumption is higher at lower altitudes, the overall time spent behind the tanker
may be less, resulting in a net decrease in fuel consumed during the air refueling task. It is preferable
to descend and spend less time refueling than to
waste time and fuel through repeated disconnects
at higher altitudes.
Lateral Control
There is no significant change in lateral-directional

characteristics above 488,000 pounds if all wing
tanks are full.
Pitch Control
Pitch control becomes more demanding as aircraft

gross weight increases from 460,000 to 530,000
pounds. If aircraft pitch oscillations are aggravated
by the autopilot when in the air refueling mode,
initiate a disconnect and safely stabilize the aircraft
before attempting another contact. During flight
test, pilots preferred the air refueling autopilot off
although autopilot on was acceptable. The pitch
SAS should normally be used during air refueling,
but refueling may be accomplished with a pitch
SAS failure.
Thrust Control
The thrust required to maintain the contact position at increased gross weights will frequently exceed NRT. MRT may be needed during portions of
the rendezvous and air refueling to maintain proper receiver position. Excess thrust is limited at increased gross weights. When maintaining the contact position, exercise care to prevent developing an
aft motion. With limited excess thrust, aft motion
that could easily be arrested at normal weights will
cause a disconnect. This in turn can require long
periods at MRT to regain airspeed and return to the
desired receiver position.
Breakaway
At increased gross weights, separation aft and

down from the tanker is easily accomplished by retarding the throttles to idle. The pilot should complete the breakaway maneuver with a gentle pull
out/level off to avoid exceeding the aircraft load limit.
Change 12
6-43/(6-44 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
All Weather Operation
section VII
table of contents
page
ICE AND RAIN
7-3
ICING
7-3
HYDROPLANING
7-7
TURBULENCE AND THUNDERSTORMS
7-11
OPERATION
7-11
COLD WEATHER PROCEDURES
7-15
ALERT
7-15
GROUND
7-15
FLIGHT
7-17
HOT WEATHER PROCEDURES
7-19
GROUND
7-19
FLIGHT
7-19
DESERT PROCEDURES
7-21
GROUND
7-21
FLIGHT
7-22
Change 16
7-1/(7-2 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ICE AND RAIN

ICING
TAXIING
This aircraft is equipped to prevent ice formation in

critical areas of each engine and nacelle, air conditioning pack, Q-spring ram airscoops, pitot heads,
and pilots windshield and windows. If rain repellent has been applied to the windshield, do not use
windshield wipers unless necessary.
On ice-covered taxiways and runways and on

painted areas that are moisture covered, taxi with
extreme caution. High crosswinds or excessive
speed during turns may start a skid. Also, be alert
for extreme slipperiness at the approach end of
snow-covered runways. The intense heat produced
by jet engine blasts may form ice due to melting
and refreezing.
FLIGHT OPERATION
Ice formation in the Q-spring system is possible during some flight conditions even
with the anti-icing system on. This may
constitute a hazardous flight condition due
to loss of Q-spring pressure. Springs in the
artificial feel system will provide partial artificial feel to both the elevator and rudder
in the event Q-spring pressure is lost. For
additional information, see Q-SPRING under FLIGHT CONTROL COMPONENTS,
Section VI.
There is a possibility of engine damage occurring when the engine is operated during
freezing rain. No part of the system has sufficient capacity to anti-ice during extended
operation in a freezing rain.
Caution will be observed to avoid areas of

known or suspected icing conditions when
flying with complete ac power failure since
no pitot anti-icing is available.
No EPR drop noted on one or more engines

upon actuating the engine and nacelle antiicing control switch would indicate possible
malfunction of the anti-icing system and
known or suspected icing conditions should
be avoided.
NOTE
NOTE
To prevent engine damage caused by formation of ice which enters the inboard engine
inlet area of the nacelles, the nose cowl gap
covers between the engines are equipped for
bleed air anti-icing.
The engine and nacelle anti-icing system

should be turned ON before suspected icing
conditions are encountered. All engines
should show a noticeable EPR drop at the
time of switch actuation to indicate a properly operating system.
If anti-icing is required, refer to T.O.
1B-52H-1-1 for range degradation.
7-3
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Takeoff
5

.

"

#
4 * 1234(11 5
.

0

$)$

$

#
4 * 1234(11

6

.

78

9 .
87

$)$

.
8: .

.

Cruise

.

%

Descent
"

% = %
,#$

.

*

.

,#$

! /##$*/)( /%>
'/%>%&

5

.

NOTE
/ 9

9

NOTE
5

)*% )*%

)*%

"

)*%

)*%

)*%

*%

; %$<

*""
,#$

Climb

.

.
7-4
Change 15
T.O. 1B-52H-1
To reduce engine compressor stalls, anti- icing should be turned off when making an
engine deceleration above 15,000 feet. Antiicing can then be turned on after the engines have stabilized at the reduced throttle
settings.
If ice is accumulating in the compressor inlet, surge

may occur when the throttle is advanced, indicating
that a slower airspeed is necessary until the icing
region has been penetrated. At the relatively high
thrust settings used during climb or cruise, ample
heat is provided to assure protection of the compressor inlet during severe icing conditions.
Anti-Icing System Inoperative
In cases of engine and nacelle anti-icing system

malfunction wherein ice formations are observed on
the engine cowl lips, engine struts, and oil coolers,
ensure that the starter switches are placed in
CONT and idle the respective engines, if operating
conditions permit, before the ice is ingested. There
is considerably less possibility of damage at low engine rpm. After the ice has been ingested, check idle
engine operation and, if normal, increase power.
Maximum Allowable
Crosswind Component
Approach and Landing
Care should be exercised when landing on

a runway covered by water and/or slush.
Under such conditions, hydroplaning, which
will cause severe control and braking losses,
may occur even though a low RCR reading
has not been reported.
Ice formations on the aircraft will increase the
stalling speed and consequently the final approach
speed should be increased above normal. The
amount of increase required depends upon the
thickness and shape of the ice formations on the
wings and empennage of the aircraft. For ice formations less than 1 inch in thickness, increase final
approach speed 5 knots IAS. Increase speed 10
knots IAS for 1 to 2 inches and 15 knots IAS for
more than 2 inches. Except for increased speed on
final approach, use normal approach and landing
procedures. When making an approach under
known or suspected icing conditions, the minimum
EPR given below will be maintained to ensure adequate anti-icing for the engines and nacelles. Under
most conditions, normal approach configuration
(flaps and gear down, No. 4 airbrakes) will be sufficient to maintain these EPRs. However, if necessary, the airbrakes may be further extended.
ALTITUDE FEET
EPR
Below 5,000
1.07
5,000 to 10,000
1.09
When landing under possible inlet icing conditions,

ignition should be set to CONT (continuous) prior to
final power reduction. Turn ignition OFF as soon as
possible after landing to keep operating time to a
minimum.
CONDITIONS
FLAPS DOWN
AIRBRAKE POSITION 6 IMMEDIATELY AFTER
TOUCHDOWN
WITH OR WITHOUT DRAG CHUTE
REMARKS
USE AVERAGE HEADING OF A VARIABLE WIND AND
ONE THIRD GUST VALUE TO COMPUTE CROSSWIND
COMPONENT. THE CROSSWIND LANDING GEAR POSITION CHART MAY BE USED FOR THE COMPUTATION
Figure 7-1
Change 15
7-5
T.O. 1B-52H-1
er, when the runway is slick, the tire force
is not sufficient to maintain steering control. Therefore, use of the crosswind crab
system will relieve some of this side force by
turning the nose of the aircraft into the
wind which will give less exposed side area.
Landing With Crosswind on Slippery Runways
When landing with a strong crosswind and a low

RCR, directional control may be lost which could allow the aircraft to skid sideways off the downwind
side of the runway. This loss of directional control
will occur at low speeds where the aerodynamic
controls will have lost their effectiveness and the
steering forces are small because of the slippery
runway. Figure 7-1 shows the maximum crosswind
component which will allow a safe landing under a
given weight and RCR conditions. In order to accomplish a safe landing when the crosswind component is near the maximum, it is imperative that the
crosswind gear be left at the landing setting during
rollout and not centered until ready to turn off the
runway. If these conditions exist, the following is
recommended:
1. Landing should not be attempted if the stopping distance is critical since the drag chute may
have to be jettisoned and braking stopped during
the ground run to maintain directional control.
Compute and set in the crosswind crab in the normal manner, noting the crosswind component for
use in determining if safe conditions exist from figure 7-1.
2. Anticipate that the aircraft will have a tendency to skid downwind at slow speeds. Therefore, in
the early part of the roll, take advantage of any desirable runway position that might be attainable at
that time. Retain the drag chute as long as possible
but, if difficulty is encountered in maintaining directional control, the drag chute should be jettisoned.
3. After touchdown, use normal procedures for
applying the brakes and deploying the drag chute.
Use normal steering techniques in the first part of
the ground roll. Do not center the gear. As the aircraft slows, the nose will tend to rotate into the
wind and more and more rudder will be required to
maintain track down the runway. At speeds below
approximately 60 knots, nearly full rudder may be
required. Keep the wings level by using lateral control until difficulty is encountered in maintaining
track down the runway, then center the control
wheel.
NOTE
7-6
As the aircraft slows on the runway, the relative wind comes more and more directly
from the side. Because of the large side area
of the fuselage and fin, a large force is generated at low speed which tends to force the
aircraft sideways off the downwind side of
the runway. Normally, this side force is opposed by the friction of the tires on the runway and the aerodynamic controls. Howev-
Most aircraft which slip off the runway under crosswind conditions do so between
speeds of approximately 10 to 30 knots.
Therefore, do not relax steering or center
the crosswind crab until after the aircraft is
ready to turn off the runway.
4. Low RCRs infer low coefficients of friction

which may not be sufficient for simultaneous braking and steering. A loss of directional control can
occur at low speeds where the aerodynamic controls
will have lost their effectiveness and the steering
forces are small because of the slippery runway.
Braking effectiveness and steering effectiveness
may be lost simultaneously although steering usually seems to be effective even after braking is lost.
If directional control is lost as the aircraft slows, relaxing brake pressure may assist in regaining some
steering effectiveness. This does not mean that intermittent braking is either desirable or necessary,
but does mean that it may become necessary to momentarily release brake pressure to optimize steering at slow speeds.
Landing With Glare Ice Runway Conditions
Under conditions of light gross weight, low ambient

temperatures, and glare ice-covered surfaces, taxiing the aircraft with all eight engines operating at
idle is considered hazardous. The amount of thrust
produced by the fan engines under such conditions
can equal or even exceed the friction coefficient of
the tires, resulting in unacceptable stopping distances, even from speeds as low at 5 to 10 knots. Pilots will be aware of these facts when operating under these conditions and be prepared to execute
timely actions to avoid accidents. Conditions which
appear most conducive to such loss of effective
braking are 1) gross weight below 200,000 pounds,
2) glare ice-covered surface recently traversed by
another jet aircraft, and 3) OAT of 10F (12C) or
less. It should be noted that braking effectiveness
and
steering
effectiveness
may
be
lost
simultaneously although steering usually seems to
be effective even after braking is lost. Use the
following procedures after landing on glare ice covered runway:
1. When aircraft is firmly on the runway and full
under control, turn off generators 1 and 7 and shut
down engines 1, 2, 7, and 8.
2. Clear the runway and perform AFTER LANDING checklist.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
HYDROPLANING
When a tire hydroplanes during the aircraft ground
roll, it is either partially or totally supported by a
thin layer of water and/or slush covering the runway. If hydroplaning occurs, the pilot may either
have difficulty stopping the aircraft or controlling it
directionally unless adequate precautions are taken
against: 1) dynamic hydroplaning, 2) viscous hydroplaning, and 3) reverted rubber skidding.
DYNAMIC HYDROPLANING
Dynamic hydroplaning can occur during takeoff or

stopping whenever water or slush stands on the
runway. It is caused by the buildup of hydrodynamic pressure between the tire and the runway. When
this water pressure builds up to the tire inflation
pressure, the tire is deflected, forming a wedge of
water which initiates the partial hydroplaning condition. For a takeoff roll condition, the tire footprint dry area decreases at a faster rate during
partial hydroplaning than would normally occur
during a dry runway takeoff. When total hydroplaning speed is reached, the tire to runway dry
footprint area reduces to zero. The tire is then supported above the runway and rolls (with perhaps
some spin-down) on a thin film of water or slush
until the aircraft reaches its takeoff (S2) speed.
With the exception of a hysteresis effect (delay) on
total hydroplaning speed, these same hydroplaning
conditions occur in reverse order for landing or
aborted takeoff. The reduction in normal dry footprint area can present problems in braking and directional control of the aircraft. These takeoff and
landing problems can be compounded if there is a
significant crosswind or tailwind. There are many
factors which influence or contribute to the hydroplaning condition of an aircraft tire, and it is difficult to determine which factors and the extent of
each that exist for a given time and location.
1. Velocity of Aircraft. Since the rate of build-up
of hydrodynamic pressure ahead of the tire is proportional to the square of the aircraft ground speed,
onset of partial hydroplaning for some conditions
can occur at a relatively low indicated airspeed during the ground roll.
2. Tire Inflation Pressure. Partial and total dynamic hydroplaning speeds are proportional to the
square root of tire inflation pressure which is a linear function of takeoff gross weight. Therefore the
tires should be properly inflated in order to keep
the hydroplaning speeds as high as possible.
3. Depth of Water or Slush. Depths of about 0.1
inch or greater on nongrooved runways will cause
dynamic hydroplaning at predicted indicated airspeeds if the depth is equal to or greater than the
average tire tread groove depth. Although 0.1 inch
depth is approximately the minimum for dynamic
hydroplaning, other types of hydroplaning exist at
shallower depths or on a damp runway surface.
4. Slush. Hydroplaning speeds in slush are
approximately 8% higher than on water.
5. Tire Tread Groove Depth. Tests show that for
tire tread groove depths which are less than the
water/slush depth covering the runway, the tread
pattern and wear have no effect on total dynamic
hydroplaning speed, but if 50% or more of the tread
depth remains, the braking coefficient of friction is
increased in the partial hydroplaning region. If the
average groove depth is greater than the water/
slush depth, hydroplaning will be delayed to higher
speeds since the water or slush will be allowed to
escape from the tire footprint, relieving hydrodynamic pressure.
6. Runway Surface Texture. Open textured or
coarse runway surfaces tend to relieve hydrodynamic pressures and delay slightly the onset of hydroplaning. Recent tests show that groove runways
(perpendicular to the runway centerline) have a
very pronounced effect on hydroplaning, and may
prevent it in some cases.
7. Tire Geometry and Design. Rib tread tires with
circumferential grooves of optimum width are best
for the relief of hydrodynamic pressure during the
ground roll. Also for a given tire diameter, wider
tires hydroplane earlier than the narrow ones.
8. Aft Gear Tracking. When there is no crosswind
during the takeoff or landing roll, the aft gear will
track the forward gear and will usually be exposed
to a much shallower depth of water or slush. Depending on the average depth of the tread, the aft
gear tires may not hydroplane at all.
7-7
T.O. 1B-52H-1
VISCOUS HYDROPLANING
-
* !

)

-
; )

,

;
,
)

" 8
+ ), ;

# ) ) $ -

REVERTED RUBBER SKIDDING

,

)

+

7-8
Change 15
, )

(
(
)

&& ''

, 8
,

SUMMARY OF HYDROPLANING FACTORS
. 2<$89/=.>>6

2

. ,

:" +

2

:"
0?3
" . ,

)

# .

)

1 @

*+ + !
5 )

7

)

.

A

: )

,
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Dynamic Hydroplaning Speeds

EXAMPLE 1:
EXAMPLE 2:
EXAMPLE 3:
GIVEN:
Gross weight = 450,000 lb
Runway wind component = 10 knot headwind
Runway pressure altitude = 2000 ft
Runway temperature = 60F
FIND:
Total and partial hydroplaning speeds for takeoff.
SOLUTION:
Total hydroplaning speed is 127 knots IAS, and
the partial hydroplaning speed is 96 knots IAS.
GIVEN:
Gross weight = 450,000 lb
FIND:
Total and partial hydroplaning speeds for an
aborted takeoff.
SOLUTION:
Total hydroplaning speed is 115 knots IAS, and
the partial hydroplaning speed is 96 knots IAS.
GIVEN:
Takeoff gross weight = 450,000 lb (gross weight
entry is based on takeoff tire pressure)
Landing gross weight = 270,000 lb
FIND:
Total and partial hydroplaning speeds for landing.
SOLUTION:
Total hydroplaning speed is 105 knots IAS, and the
partial hydroplaning speed is 88 knots IAS.
TAKEOFF GROSS WEIGHT

1000 POUNDS
500
CONDITIONS:
REMARKS:
NONGROOVED RUNWAY SURFACE

WATER/SLUSH DEPTH ON RUNWAY
MUST BE EQUAL TO OR GREATER
THAN AVERAGE TIRE TREAD
GROOVE DEPTH FOR HYDRO
PLANING TO OCCUR
450
400
For hydroplaning on
slush covered run
ways, multiply chart
speeds by 1.08
Forward gear hydro
planing is used be
cause these tires are
inflated at a lower
pressure and will hy
droplane at a lower
speed than aft gear.
AFT LANDING GEAR NOT TRACKING

FORWARD GEAR
350
TIRES PROPERLY INFLATED ACCORD

ING TO TAKEOFF GROSS WEIGHT
300
RUNWAY WIND COMPONENT

KNOTS
10 20 30 40
20 10 0
250
150
200
250
300
TIRE PRESSURE PSI
00
500,0
FF
0
0
O
,0
KE 400
TA
00 200,000
300,0
GROSS
WEIGHT
LBS
IN
IN
LW
DW
I
TA
A
HE
STOPPING
0
2
4
6
100
60
20
ET
00
DE
0
1
FE
ITU
LT
A
RE
SU
UR
ES
RU
NW
AY
TE
MP
ER
AT
PR
50
40
40
150
100
60
60
80
80
100
200
120 140
100 120 140 160
160
TOTAL HYDROPLANING SPEED ON A WATER COVERED

RUNWAY KNOTS IAS
PARTIAL HYDROPLANING SPEED FOR TAKEOFF ON A
WATER COVERED RUNWAY KNOTS IAS
PARTIAL HYDROPLANING SPEED FOR ABORTED TAKEOFF

OR LANDING ON A WATER COVERED RUNWAY KNOTS IAS
A31873
Figure 7-2
7-9/(7-10 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TURBULENCE AND THUNDERSTORMS

OPERATION
MOUNTAIN WAVE TURBULENCE
Turbulence created by mountain wave activity occurs when a strong wind blows from a direction
nearly perpendicular to a large mountain range.
The air is forced up and over the mountain range
and a series of standing waves is formed in the flow
downstream of the range (figure 7-3). The mountain
wave effect extends up above the range and, if well
developed, will extend up into the stratosphere. The
wave is created when the air is deflected upward by
the mountain and the air, having some degree of
stability, tends to return to its original level. Due to
its momentum, it will overshoot and an oscillatory
motion will be set up in the lee of the mountain
range. Isolated peaks will not produce as strong an
effect as a ridge or range of mountains extending
across the wind and the higher the mountain range
and the stronger the wind, the more pronounced
the wave will be. A reversal in wind direction on
the ground occurs in the lee of the mountain range

because of the presence of a rotor. The name rotor
is derived from the rotating appearance of clouds or
dust that may be visible in the area. Mountain
waves are sometimes accompanied by unique cloud
formations which serve as a warning of turbulent
and possible hazardous flying conditions. The level
of turbulence associated with mountain waves can
be as strong as that found in thunderstorms but the
entire region influenced by the wave may not be
turbulent. The bulk of the wave may consist of a
smooth flow of air with strong vertical components
while certain parts will break down into true turbulence. Maximum turbulent areas during mountain
wave activity occur just downwind and below the
ridge line, from the top of the range upward for several thousand feet, and at the tropopause. Turbulence created by the mountain wave may extend
leeward as much as 300 miles.
Mountain Wave Turbulence
Figure 7-3
7-11
T.O. 1B-52H-1
phase with the inherent aircraft stability
reactions will aggravate and increase yaw
deviations and dutch roll. Such out-of-phase
inputs can induce large structural loads on
the aircraft empennage and must be
avoided.
TURBULENT AIR PENETRATION
The following restrictions and operating procedures

are necessary to avoid severe turbulence and reduce the effects of turbulent air:
1. Do not intentionally fly into areas at altitudes
of known or forecast severe turbulence.
2. Thunderstorm cells must be avoided and operation in thunderstorm areas is prohibited unless
the aircraft is equipped with a serviceable radar
system which will permit the crew to identify and
avoid the cells. If thunderstorm activity cannot be
avoided, the following procedures are recommended
prior to entering the storm.
a. Use a penetration altitude of at least 5000
feet below maximum range cruise altitude for better control of the aircraft and establish turbulent
air penetration speed.
b. Turn on the engine and nacelle anti-icing
system.
c. Energize engine ignition systems by placing
starter switches to the CONT position for the operative engines.
d. Thunderstorm lights may be used to lessen
the blinding effect of lightning flashes.
3. Corrective action to be taken if turbulence
greater than forecast is encountered will be preplanned with the assistance of the weather forecaster during the weather briefing for all flights.
For further information on corrective action, see
step 6.
The turbulent air penetration speed is 270

knots IAS or 0.77 Mach, whichever is less.
When in turbulence at any altitude, extreme care should be exercised to ensure
that all control and thrust inputs are applied in a smooth positive manner, avoiding
abrupt application of thrust and flight controls whenever possible. Uncoordinated control inputs and applied corrections out of
7-12
If the aircraft has been trimmed for the turbulent air penetration speed, disregard momentary airspeed changes and do not
change the stabilizer trim setting.
NOTE
The autopilot in nonsteering modes will repeatedly disengage in turbulence and

should not be used in turbulence at low altitudes. The autopilot will not disengage in
turbulent conditions when operated in low
level mode and will assist in relieving the
effect of gust loads on the aircraft.
Pitch and yaw SAS will assist in relieving
the effect of gust loads on the aircraft and
should be left on at all times.
Bank angles in excess of 15 should be
avoided.
Allow the aircraft to ride out gust strikes.
4. At altitudes other than low level, if turbulence

is encountered, observe the MA-1 accelerometer
readings immediately. If the readings exceed 1.4 or
0.6 g (1.0 (0.4) g), disengage autopilot to prevent
an inadvertent disconnect in an unusual attitude
and to allow the pilot to assess the degree of
turbulence. If the readings reach 1.6 or 0.4 g (1.0
(0.6) g) more than twice per minute, adjust speed
immediately to the appropriate turbulent air penetration speed and place airbrakes in position 2. (See
DUTCH ROLL DAMPING, this section.)
Never climb above maximum range cruise

altitude to clear the turbulence.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
5. Flights at TA contour altitude are prohibited in
mountainous areas if peaks extend more than 1000
feet above the terrain within 5 miles either side of
the low level corridor when reported or observed
flight level winds (at IFR altitude) are 40 knots or
greater. If observed flight level winds during TA
contour operations are 40 knots or greater in mountainous areas as defined above, continue low level
training at IFR altitude. All low level operations, either TA or IFR altitude, are prohibited when moderate or severe turbulence in mountain wave activity is reported or forecast.
NOTE
NOTE
Prior to descending for any low level operation, the latest forecast or inflight reports
regarding winds or mountain wave activity
along the intended low level route will be
obtained from the Air Traffic Control facility or the nearest Pilot to Forecaster service.
See Section VI for LOW ALTITUDE
FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS.
OAS will be used to measure flight level winds. If

turbulence is encountered, observe the MA-1 accelerometer readings immediately. If the magnitude
and frequency of the readings reach 1.6 or 0.4 g (1.0
(0.6) g) more than twice per minute, adjust speed
immediately to the appropriate turbulent air
penetration speed. If autopilot low level mode is not
available, place airbrakes in position 2.
6. When operating at turbulent air penetration
speed and the MA-1 accelerometer readings reach
1.6 or 0.4 g (1.0 (0.6) g) more than twice per
minute, preplanned corrective action must be
initiated. Corrective action will be as follows:
a. During low level training, start a gradual
climb not to exceed 1000 feet per minute at turbulent air penetration speed. Continue the climb until
the turbulence decreases to an allowable level and
resort to alternate training, mission abort, etc, as
planned or directed.
b. During other than low level training, corrective action may include turns, descent, or climb
at penetration airspeed to avoid the areas of turbulence. When the turbulence decreases to an allowable level, continue the mission or resort to alternate training as planned or directed.
The incremental acceleration criteria based

on MA-1 accelerometer readings are intended for use as a guide to assist in identifying the level of turbulence in which the
aircraft should not be operated without severely compromising flight safety. Turbulence having intensity levels below that associated with these criteria may cause incremental accelerations in excess of the values previously noted at frequencies less
than twice per minute. These criteria alone
will not provide adequate warning in cases
where the turbulence intensity increases
abruptly from light or moderate to extremely severe.
At any time in the pilots judgment, if turbulence is approaching a critical level (horizontal or vertical) regardless of whether
limiting accelerometer readings are observed or not, penetration airspeed should
be established and preplanned corrective
action taken.
7. If turbulence is encountered such that the

MA-1 accelerometer readings exceed:
1) those charted on figure 5-11;
2) if, in the pilots opinion, the aircraft has encountered heavy loads due to turbulence, the pilot will
make entry on Form 781 after landing to the effect
that turbulence was encountered and will enter the
highest and lowest accelerometer readings so that
the appropriate structural inspection will be made
prior to the next flight.
DUTCH ROLL DAMPING
Dutch roll is the name given to a combined rolling, yawing motion, often described as wallowing.
The motion is named for its resemblance to the
characteristic rhythm of an ice skater, where the
yawing is out of phase with the rolling; e.g., the
nose is yawing to the left while the right wing is
still going down. This motion is more pronounced
with swept wing aircraft than with straight wing
aircraft of similar size because of the larger rolling
moments produced by sideslip or yaw. Dutch roll is
usually generated by disturbances such as gust encounters together with lateral/directional overcontrolling. The frequency of the dutch roll oscillation
in the B-52 is one complete cycle in 6 to 8 seconds.
The amplitude, however, depends on the magnitude
of the disturbances, the fuel loading, and the flight
condition (angle-of-attack). Because the cyclic yawing motion of the dutch roll adds to the load already
imposed on the vertical tail by random turbulence,
it is important to minimize the dutch roll, particularly when flying in turbulence.
7-13
T.O. 1B-52H-1
The directional damping stability of the aircraft has
been increased by means of the yaw SAS. This device will operate satisfactorily in turbulence unless
the magnitude of the turbulence becomes so great
that the yaw damper no longer has sufficient authority to overcome the resulting dutch roll. In this
event, the pilot must use manual inputs to assist in
damping the dutch roll. If these manual inputs are
not correctly applied, the dutch roll is aggravated
and the loads on the vertical tail increase. Dutch
roll exists because of a combination of rolling and
yawing motions which, being out of phase, tend to
complement or feed each other. Dutch roll cannot
exist in the absence of either of these motions. In
order to stop dutch roll, at least one of these motions must be controlled. Rudder control can be
used to damp dutch roll, but this action requires
close observance of the turn rate needle since it can
and does become erratic in turbulence. Because the
yawing motion is out of phase with, and of considerably lower amplitude than the rolling motion, it is
more effective to apply corrective action with lateral
control.
er buffet is experienced in airbrake position 2, this

is not considered detrimental. Airbrake positions
greater than 2 are not recommended because of the
associated pitch trim change and the possibility of
an unfavorable gust encounter while the aircraft is
in a mistrimmed condition. Extension of airbrakes
to position 2 should be accomplished cautiously in
turbulence making every effort to maintain zero
mistrim throughout the procedure to minimize
loading. The transient mistrim incurred during
airbrake extension is justified by the considerably
more stable configuration which results. Based on
the foregoing discussion, the following technique for
manually damping dutch roll is recommended:
1. Apply lateral control as necessary in opposition
to the direction of the rolling motion.
2. Continue lateral control inputs in small pulses
to maintain wings-level attitude.
3. When moderate or greater turbulence is encountered, raise airbrake to position 2 except when
in autopilot low level mode.
NOTE
In the application of lateral control corrections, the

pilots natural inclination is to correct for displacement rather than rate; i.e., he applies control inputs to raise the low wing rather than to stop the
rolling motion. Continued lateral control inputs in
this manner can cause the dutch roll to diverge (increase in amplitude). The pilot actually feeds the
dutch roll rather than dampens it. The lateral control inputs must therefore be applied in opposition
to the rolling motion. In the turbulence-induced
dutch roll situation, the yaw SAS is still attempting
to stabilize the aircraft about the yaw axis but is
prevented from being fully effective by the magnitude of the turbulence upsets. The pilot, by applying
lateral
control
deflections
in opposition to the direction of the rolling motion, reduces the magnitude of the dutch roll sufficiently to
allow the yaw damper to regain control of the yaw
motion. Thereafter, continued lateral control inputs
as necessary to oppose any tendency to roll away
from a wings-level attitude should prevent regeneration of the dutch roll. Extending the airbrakes
increases the dutch roll stability and therefore decreases the vertical tail loads. For low altitude
airbrake usage, see TURBULENT AIR PENETRATION, this section. The maximum recommended
position is airbrake position 2. Although some spoil-
7-14
Extend airbrakes cautiously and maintain

as near to zero mistrim as possible during
extension.
ENGINE COMPRESSOR STALL
Compressor stall may occur when flying in or

around thunderheads due to ice crystal ingestion.
At high altitudes, the weight of airflow into the engine is low so the allowable water/air ratio may be
exceeded in extreme cases. Normal compressor stall
procedures as described in Section I under ENGINE OPERATION should be employed to counter
this condition.
ENGINE FLAMEOUT AND ICING
During icing or turbulent flight conditions, the engine starter switches should be placed in CONT
position to provide ignition for prevention of flameout. Icing may also be expected within a thunderstorm area or when precipitation is present with
turbulent conditions. To prevent ice formation in
critical areas, the engine, nacelles, and scoops antiicing switch should be placed in ON position.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
COLD WEATHER PROCEDURES

NOTE
Only those cold weather operating procedures not common to all large jet aircraft
are included here. Icing conditions during
flight are covered under ICE AND RAIN,
this section.
Many cold weather operating difficulties can be
eliminated by proper caution during ground operation. Extreme diligence on the part of both flight
and ground crews is essential to successful cold
weather operation. If preheating is required, arrange preheating periods so that all aircraft equipment will be inspected, warmed, ready, and operating at the time of starting the engines. While preheating is being accomplished, inspections and operational checks can be made. This work must be
thorough since low temperatures may cause hidden
difficulties. Avoid touching cold metal with bare
skin; it may freeze to the metal.
ALERT
Physical characteristics of JP-8 fuel cause excessive
smoke, torching, slow ignition, and slow engine acceleration during engine start when the ambient
temperature is below 30 degrees F. To overcome the
potentially adverse affects of JP-8 during alert start
at these temperatures, JP-4 fuel will be loaded in
the mid body and external fuel tanks. The mid body
and external tanks will be serviced with JP-4 jet
fuel to the required fuel load IAW T.O. 1B-52H-5.
This requirement applies when temperatures are
expected to remain below 30 degrees F.
GROUND
BEFORE ENTERING THE AIRCRAFT
Do not attempt to operate DTUs at ambient

temperatures below 40F (40C) as damage to the DTUCs may result.
Snow removal should be completed prior to beginning the preheating operation since running water
from melted snow will seek hidden places and re-
freeze. Any personnel on the wings and fuselage

should be protected by safety lines to prevent their
falling to the ground. All surfaces should be swept
with brooms and not beaten or chopped since skin
damage may result. Isopropyl alcohol applied with
sprayers is effective in removing ice and snow and
is particularly valuable in removing ice from between the stabilizer and fuselage. Snow or ice accumulations can increase takeoff distance and adversely affect climbout performance, stalling speed,
and handling characteristics. Inflight structural
damage can result from vibrations induced by unremoved accumulations.
NOTE
The same special tool is used to attach a hot

air line to the radome ram air inlet for this
purpose as is used for a ground cooling air
line when cooling is required.
Leakage can be expected of the antenna
high pressure air when operation is begun
at extremely low ambient temperatures.
The pressurization system pump will recycle frequently in attempting to maintain
pressure during the 20 to 30 minutes which
may be required for operation to warm the
equipment sufficiently for the seals to hold
pressure.
The nickel-cadmium batteries have heaters and are

capable of satisfactory operation at 40F (40C).
The batteries may be heated by the use of external
electrical power. At a temperature of 65F (54C)
1 hour of heating will condition the batteries for
normal operation.
Although not required, it is desirable to preheat the
crew compartment during cold weather operations.
Failure to remove snow from the fuselage

before applying interior heat will result in
ice refreezing on the sides of the fuselage,
causing drag and possible erratic airspeed
indications if it forms around the pitot
heads or static ports.
Change 4
7-15
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Ice formed from runoff water has been found in a
thin clear sheet over static ports. The air refueling
slipway doors are vulnerable to runoff icing as are
the static ports for the air conditioning system.
Melting snow from above the aft compartment may
freeze on the junction of fuselage and horizontal
stabilizer, thus preventing movement of the stabilizer. When operating out of a nose dock and snowfall is occurring, open nose dock doors in time to
cool the skin of the aircraft before removing it from
the dock as snow will cling to a warm surface and
freeze. Flight tests have revealed that takeoff can
be made with frost formations up to 1/8 inch thick
on the lifting surfaces without appreciably affecting
performance.
If heat is used to remove ice or snow, check

movable control surfaces for freedom of
movement prior to entry into the aircraft.
Before removing snow and ice from the empennage of the aircraft, the stabilizer leading edge should be placed in the up position.
Start engines 4 and 5 and set the stabilizer
trim to 8 units aircraft nosedown position.
The stabilizer should remain in this position during deicing and for a period of 10 to
15 minutes after deicing so that runoff from
the deicing operation does not seep into the
balance bay areas and refreeze. Any ice or
slush in the balance bay could possibly limit
control surface movement and reduce aircraft control. If the aircraft is to be left unattended or is to be put on alert for extended periods under snow and icing conditions, the stabilizer may be left in this position and will be reset to takeoff trim setting
prior to takeoff during the BEFORE LINEUP checklist.
NOTE
Pre-heating engines is recommended when

the temperature is below +30 degrees F (for
an extended period of time) for cartridge
starts, or below +20 degrees F (for an extended period of time) for pneumatic starts.
If an air supply is available inside the hangar or dock,
the engines should be motored for a short period before removing the aircraft. This procedure should remove any moisture from the ducts and starter system. If a starter valve fails to open during engine
start, use of the starter switch and hot pressurized air
is recommended for thawing of the starter valve.
Often the starter valve will open after the starter
switch has been energized for 3 minutes and hot pressurized air is being supplied from an adjacent engine
or ground cart. The heat created by the energized
starter solenoid will penetrate the regulator housing
and the hot pneumatic air, through gradual flow, will
help heat the valve area thus allowing the valve to
open and operate properly.
NOTE
The indicated oil pressure may be slow to

rise to the normal operating range after
starting a cold-soaked engine during very
cold weather. Provided some indication of
the oil pressure is observed when the engine is first started, up to 3 1/2 minutes may
be allowed for indicated oil pressure to
reach the minimum limit.
[EV] If the airplane is fueled with fuel other than JP-4 or AVGAS, fuel enrichment
must be used for starting when fuel temperatures are below 0C (32F). The FEV may
be used for starts when the temperature is
32F to 40F. Engine starts can be difficult
or impossible if outside air temperature is
below 30C (22F).
STARTING ENGINES
AFTER STARTING ENGINES
Whenever an aircraft is removed from a heated

hangar or dock, a ground heater should be available
to supply heat to the engine fuel control units,
starter valves, and starter turbine if this becomes
necessary.
Except for SIOP/Alert starts or any situation requiring an immediate start, allow all engines to idle
for 2 minutes prior to advancing the throttles from
the IDLE position. For ambient temperatures of
31F (35C) allow the engines to run at idling
speed until the readings have stabilized and a
ground check has been completed.
7-16
Change 22
T.O. 1B-52H-1
TAXIING
On Ice and Snow covered areas, taxi speed should

be reduced and normal taxi interval between airplanes should be increased. Taxiing in deep snow
should be avoided as taxiing and steering are extremely difficult and frozen brakes and gear may
result. During low temperatures, a slight delay in
brake response can be expected. Care should be
taken when maneuvering near other parked aircraft as the jet blast will blow melted snow onto
other aircraft where cold metal will freeze it. The
wide spread of the wingtip protection gear requires
close observation during taxiing to prevent damage
from snow banks.
1B-52H-1-1 for appropriate correction factors. Information regarding inflight icing may be found under ICE AND RAIN, this section.
CROSSWIND OPERATION
On takeoffs and landings, set in any crosswind crab

component required. Refer to the Crosswind landing gear position charts in Part 2 of T.O.
1B-52H-1-1.
NOTE
When landing on a slippery runway, do not

center the crosswind crab until ready to
turn off the runway.
LANDING APPROACH
In cold weather, make sure all instruments

have warmed up sufficiently to ensure normal operation. Check for sluggish instruments during taxiing.
Long flat unbroken stretches of snow make depth

perception difficult. The tendency is to overestimate
the aircraft altitude. During snow periods, if approaching at night, visibility will be reduced by using both landing lights.
NOTE
On very slick surfaces, come to a complete

stop prior to attempting to turn the aircraft.
Under certain atmospheric conditions at
temperatures of 22F (30C) and lower, a
large amount of ice fog may be caused by
the engines. Taxiing on the runway should
be kept to a minimum to keep from
lowering the visibility.
At temperatures below 40F (40C), the
spoilers should be cycled continuously for
three complete cycles to assure adequate
lateral control for takeoff, and the stabilizer
trim should be cycled three times to assure
satisfactory operation of the system during
takeoff and climb.
FLIGHT
TAKEOFF
Gear retraction time will be slightly longer than the

normal retraction time of 10 to 15 seconds. At a
temperature of 20F (28.9C), retraction time will
be 2 seconds longer and at a temperature of 40F
(40C), retraction time will be 30 to 35 seconds.
This delay is due to the cold temperature of the
hydraulic oil.
DURING FLIGHT
LANDING
Care should be exercised when landing on

a runway covered by water and/or slush in
excess of 0.3 inch depth. Under such conditions, hydroplaning, which will cause severe
control and braking losses, may occur even
though a low RCR reading has not been reported.
A slippery runway combined with a crosswind may
result in a condition such that a landing is not recommended. For further information, see LANDING
WITH CROSSWIND ON SLIPPERY RUNWAYS
under ICE AND RAIN in this section. Braking action approaches normal on a slippery runway if all
weather tires are installed. When landing on snow
or ice, use normal braking action except when large
amounts of crosswind crab are used. Refer to Part 8
of T.O. 1B-52H-1-1 for the increase in ground run
using the proper RCR number.
AFTER LANDING
Engine Shutdown
The engines should be permitted to idle for at least

2 minutes before normal shutdown procedures are
accomplished. This will prevent damage resulting
from rapid temperature changes.
Range and endurance are both affected favorably

by low temperatures. Refer to Parts 4 and 5 of T.O.
Change 10
7-17/(7-18 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
HOT WEATHER PROCEDURES

Hot weather operation, both arid and tropical, requires additional attention and preparation other
than the normal operating instructions given in
Section II. Only specific information for care of the
aircraft during ground and flight operation will be
covered in this section.
TAXIING
GROUND
TAKEOFF AND CLIMB
1. Wear gloves and use care when working

around metal surfaces of the aircraft that are exposed to the sun.
2. Delicate electrical equipment such as communications and instruments must be completely dry.
In locations where high humidity is encountered,
equipment will be subject to malfunctions due to
corrosion, fungus, and moisture absorption by nonmetallic materials. Such equipment should be kept
warmer than the ambient temperature if possible to
prevent condensation of moisture inside the units.
3. Units incorporating plastic or rubber should be
protected from excessive temperatures and direct
sun rays by the use of suitable covers.
4. Crew compartments will be cooled with a portable air conditioner prior to entering the aircraft.
ON ENTERING THE AIRCRAFT
If high humidity causes instruments and cabin controls to become covered with moisture, dry thoroughly with flow of warm air from portable ground
heater.
Use brakes as little as possible as cooling will be retarded by high temperatures.
FLIGHT
1. Required takeoff distance increases during hot

weather operation. Refer to Part 2 of T.O. 1B-52H1-1 for takeoff distances.
2. Follow normal climb pattern for conditions prevailing.
NOTE
The rate of climb should be held as low as

practicable to reduce fuel vaporization
losses.
LANDING
Use normal landing technique but expect a longer

ground roll in hot weather. As soon as the parking
position has been reached, have wheel chocks securely placed and release parking brakes at once to
forestall possible damage to brake discs because of
excess heat generated during taxiing.
POSTFLIGHT
1. Have closures and covers installed for protection from sun.

2. Leave windows and doors open for ventilation.
NOTE
STARTING ENGINES
Use normal engine starting procedures, keeping

ground tests to the minimum required time.
If fuel tanks are topped off, overflow from

expansion may present a fire hazard.
NOTE
Engine will accelerate to idle rpm on a hot

day much more slowly than on a normal or
cold day.
7-19/(7-20 blank)
BLA
T.O. 1B-52H-1
DESERT PROCEDURES
Very high and low temperatures and low humidity,
together with the abrasive effect of blowing sand
and dust, make desert operations considerably
more difficult than normal conditions which are
covered by operating instructions in Section II.
Considerable damage to both aircraft and engines
can occur if the extra precautions covered here are
not observed.
ON ENTERING THE AIRCRAFT
Excessive dust accumulations on instrument dials

and blown sand on and around movable flight controls, dials, and switches must be cleaned away.
STARTING ENGINES
Use normal starting procedures.
GROUND
On exterior inspection, if sand is evident on shock

strut pistons or other hydraulic pistons where piston touches cylinder seal, have it removed with a
dry soft cloth. The bomb doors should be closed
manually prior to engine start to prevent blowing
sand from entering the bomb bay area. The forward
and aft bulkhead doors to the bomb bay should be
checked to ensure they are closed and latched.
Get the aircraft into the air as soon as possible after engines have been started so that
dust and blowing sand will not be drawn
through the engines with resultant damage
to internal parts.
TAXIING
When taxiing, keep adequate distance between aircraft to prevent sand and dust kicked up by engine
blast from being blown on and into the aircraft engines.
Position the aircraft so that consideration
can be given to other aircraft, personnel,
and ground installations when engines are
started. Sand blown by operating engines of
one aircraft can add hours to the maintenance problems of other aircraft or do bodily harm to personnel.
BEFORE TAKEOFF
Do not take off during sand or dust storms unless

absolutely necessary; instead, head aircraft into
wind, stop engines, and have all protective covers
and closures installed.
7-21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
FLIGHT
BEFORE EXITING THE AIRCRAFT
TAKEOFF
Prior to exiting the aircraft, a soft cloth or other

such protective device should be placed over the radar navigators and navigators keyboards and the
RNMP to prevent unnecessary sand or grit particles from entering the area beneath the keyboards
and damaging circuits.
Be prepared for sudden gusts of wind during takeoff run. In arid localities, extreme temperature
variation may occur within a relatively short time.
Therefore, takeoff data should be reviewed immediately prior to takeoff.
POSTFLIGHT
DURING FLIGHT
See that all ducts and openings are covered. Have

both forward and aft main landing gear wheel
wells, fuselage nose, pitot tube, and windshield covers installed, if such covers are available.
Avoid flying through dust storms if possible;
excessive dust and grit in the air will cause
considerable damage to internal parts of the
engine.
NOTE
ENGINE SHUTDOWN
Have dust covers and closures installed immediately to prevent blowing sand and dust from entering
engines.
7-22
In extremely dusty locations where it is necessary to leave hatches or doors open for
ventilation, all equipment in the cabin
should be covered with dust-proof covers
where possible to keep out dust and blowing
sand.
For Performance Data refer to T.O. 1B-52H1-1.
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Glossary
AC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Alternating Current
ACM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Advanced Cruise Missile
ACP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Air Conditioning Pack
ACU . . . Avionics Control Unit (Avionics Processor)
ADI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Attitude Director Indicator
AFSATCOM . Air Force Satellite Communications
AGC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Automatic Gain Control
AGM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Air to Ground Missile
AHRS . . . . . . . Attitude Heading Reference System
AIU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Armament Interface Unit
AJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Anti-Jam
ALCM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Air Launched Cruise Missile
ANT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Antenna
AOA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Angle-of-Attack
AR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Air Refueling
ARCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Air Refueling Control Point
AREX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Air Refueling Exit
ARIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Air Refueling Initial Point
ATA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Actual Time of Arrival
ATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Actual Time Enroute
ATV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Auxiliary Throttle Valve
AUX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Auxiliary
AUXBNS . . . Auxiliary BNS Circuit Breaker Panel
AVTR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Airborne Video Tape Recorder
BARO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Barometric
BIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Built-In-Test
BITE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Built-In-Test Equipment
BNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bomb Navigation System
CB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Circuit Breaker
CCU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Compass Compensation Unit
CG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Center of Gravity
COMSEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Communications Security
CP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Copilot
CRT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cathode Ray Tube
CSD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Constant Speed Drive
CSCP . . . . Computational Subsystem Control Panel
CSRL . . . . . . . . Common Strategic Rotary Launcher
D/A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Drift Angle
DAMA . . . . . . . . . Demand Assigned Multiple Access
DH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Decision Height
DC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Direct Current
DCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Drift Correction Angle
DG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Directional Gyroscope
DTD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Data Transfer Device
DTU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Data Transfer Unit
DTUC . . . . . . . . . . . . . Data Transfer Unit Cartridge
EAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Emergency Action Messages
ECA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Electronic Control Amplifier
ECM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Electronic Countermeasures
ECCM . . . . . . Electronic Counter-Countermeasures
ECU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Environmental Control Unit
EGT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Engine Gauge Temperature
EMCON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Emission Control
EMI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Electromagnetic Interference
EMP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Electromagnetic Pulse

EPR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Engine Pressure Ratio
ESD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Electrostatic Discharge
ESP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Engine Stall Prevention
ETA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Estimated Time of Arrival
ETE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Estimated Time Enroute
EVS . . . . . . . . . . . . . Electro-Optical Viewing System
EW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Electronic Warfare
FCI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Flight Command Indicator
FCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Flight Computer Program
FCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Flight Control System
FDM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Force Direction Message
FEV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fuel Enrichment Valve
FLIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Forward Looking Infrared
FMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Flight Management System
FPROM . . . . . . . . . . . . . Front-Panel Programmable
Read-Only Memory
FRL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fuselage Reference Line
FRMT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Format
FRZE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Freeze
FVR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Flight Vector Reference
FWD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Forward
FWOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Future Word-of-Day
GM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ground Map
GPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Global Positioning System
GRU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gyro Reference Unit
GS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Groundspeed
HAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . High Altitude Calibration
HRL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Horizontal Reference Line
HSI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Horizontal Situation Indicator
IAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Indicated Airspeed
ICSMS . . . . . . . . . . Integrated Conventional Stores
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Management System
IEU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Interface Electronic Unit
IKB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Integrated Keyboard
IME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Inertial Measuring Equipment
IMU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Inertial Measuring Unit
INS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Inertial Navigation Set/System
IFF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Identification Friend or Foe
ILS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Instrument Landing System
I/O . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Input/Output
IP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Initial Point
JASSM . . . . . . Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile
JDAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joint Direct Attack Munition
JSOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joint Standoff Weapon
KBD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Keyboard
KVA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kilovolts Average
LCD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Liquid Crystal Display
LH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Left Hand
LOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Line of Sight
LP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Left Pylon
LRU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Line Replaceable Unit
MAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mean Aerodynamic Chord
MAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Magnetic Azimuth Detector
Change 20
Glossary-1
T.O. 1B-52H-1
MAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Missed Approach Point
MCS . . . . . . . . . . . . Missile Conditioning Subsystem
MDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Minimum Descent Altitude
MEM PT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Memory Point
MFD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Multifunction Display
MGMT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Management
MHI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Magnetic Heading Indicator
MIL STD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Military Standard
MIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Minimum
MISN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mission
MIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Missile Interface Test
MIU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Missile Interface Unit
MLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Manual Light Control
MOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Modification
MOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Momentary
MP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Memory Point
MRT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Miniature Receive Terminal
MSG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Message
MSL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mean Sea Level
MSN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mission
MSTR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Master
MTU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Main Terminal Unit
NAV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Navigation, Navigator
NAWC . . . . . . . . . . . Navigation and Weapon Control
NAWD . . . . . . . . . . Navigation and Weapon Delivery
NC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Network Controller
NCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Network Control System
NG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . No Go
NKB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Navigator Keyboard
NM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nautical Mile
NTIK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nontactical Instrument Kit
NTSF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not Safe
NVRAM . . . . Non-Volatile Random-Access Memory
OAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Offset Aimpoint
OAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Offensive Avionics System
OAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Outside Air Temperature
OW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Operating Weight
PCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Primary Channel Controller
PDU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Power Drive Unit
PDUC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Power Drive Unit Control
PIHM . . . . . . . . . Protective Integrated Hood/ Mask
PMD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Prime Mission Data
PME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Prime Mission Equipment
POS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Position
PP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Present Position
PPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Plan Position Indicator
PRN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Print
PROC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Processor
PROM . . . . . . . . Programmable Read-Only Memory
PSI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pounds per Square Inch
PTA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Planned Time of Arrival
PTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Planned Time Enroute
PWR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Power
Q Fix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quality Fix
RA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Radar Altimeter
RBS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Radar Bomb Scoring
RCR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Runway Condition Reading
RCU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Remote Control Unit
RF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Radio Frequency
Glossary-2
Change 22
RG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Range (Ground)
RH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Right-Hand
RIU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Radar Interface Unit
RN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Radar Navigator
RNKB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Radar Navigator Keyboard
RNMP . . . . . . Radar Navigator Management Panel
RP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Right Pylon
RTM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Radar-Transmitter Modulator
RS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Slant Range
SAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . Stability Augmentation System
SCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Safe Clearance Altitude
SIF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Selective Identification Feature
SINCGARS . . . . Single Channel Ground-Air Radio
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . System
SIOP . . . . . . . . . . Single Integrated Operations Plan
STV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Steerable Television
SLU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Station Logic Unit
TA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Terrain Avoidance
TACAN . . . . . . . . . . . Tactical Air Navigation System
TAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . True Airspeed
TB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . True Bearing
TE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Track Error
TH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . True Heading
TOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Time of Day
T/P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Turn Point
TR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tanker, Transformer-Rectifier
TRT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Takeoff Rated Thrust
TRANSEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Transmission Security
TSM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Time Standard Module
TSTC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Test Configuration
TTG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Time to Go
TTGS . . . . Time to Go Tanker Start Turn Maneuver
TX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Transmit
UC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Upper Corner
UTC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Universal Coordinated Time
UL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Uplink/Upper Left
UR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Upper Right
V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Velocity
VAC/Vac . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Volts Alternating Current
VDC/Vdc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Volts Direct Current
VDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Visual Descent Point
VFR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Visual Flight Rules
VID RCDR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Video Recorder
VG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vertical Gyroscope
VOR . . . . . . . . . VHF Omnidirectional Radio Beacon
VV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vertical Velocity
V, v . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Volts
WCMD . . . . . Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser
WCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Weapon Control Panel
WIU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Weapon Interface Unit
WOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Word-of-Day
WOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . Word-of-Month (same as WOD)
W/V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Wind/Velocity
XH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Crosshair
X-HAIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Crosshair
XMTR/XMIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Transmitter/Transmit
X RANGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Crossrange
XTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Crosshair Track Error
T.O. 1B-52H-1
ALPHABETICAL INDEX
*DENOTES ILLUSTRATION
Page
Page
ABORT
3-15
Acceleration Limitations
5-16
Combined Maneuver Limits Flaps Up
5-21*
Limit Load Factors, Structural
Limitations
5-16, 5-20*
Maneuver Limits
5-16
Flaps Down
5-16, 5-22*
Flaps Up
5-17, 5-23*
Accelerometer
1-399
AFSATCOM
See Satellite Communications Terminal
After Takeoff
2-75
After Takeoff Flight Paths
2-77*
AGM Inflight Operation
See Missile Systems
AGM-86B
See Missile Systems
AGM-86C
See Missile Systems
AGM-86D
See Missile Systems
AHRS
See Attitude Heading Reference System
AIMS
See IFF Transponder
Air Bleed System (Pneumatic
Systems)
1-355, 1-356*
Description of System
1-355
Malfunctions
3-187
Manifold Temperature Gage
1-368*
Manifold Valve Switch
1-357, 1-368*
Air Conditioning System (Pneumatic
Systems)
1-358, 1-360*, 1-362*
Air Contamination Through Air
Conditioning System
3-188B
Air Distribution
1-359
Air Outlet Controls
1-367
Air Outlet Knob Positions
1-375*
Air Supply Regulation
1-358
Cabin Altimeter
1-370
Cabin Pressure Schedule
1-366*
1-377
Control Power Supply
1-364
1-367, 1-368*
1-358
Emergency Cabin Pressure

Release Handle
1-369*
Explosive Decompression
3-44A
Failure of Cabin Pressurization System
(CABIN AIRFLOW LOW
light illuminated)
3-189
Failure of Normal Bleed Air Source
Inflight
3-190
Failure of Normal Bleed Air Source
on the Ground
3-190
Failure of Water Separator
3-190
Failure to Regulate Cabin
Temperature
3-191
Filter Failure
3-191
HOT AIR Light Illuminated
(Failure of Bleed Air Precooler)
3-187
Hot/Mixed Air Duct Locations and
Outlets
1-365*
Loss of Bleed Air From Nacelle No. 2
3-188B
1-357
Missile Environmental Control System
1-357
Normal Operation
1-374
Operation With Emergency Bleed Air
3-192
Pressure Regulation
1-359
Pressurization and Pneumatic
System
1-360*
Releasing Cabin Pressure
3-192
Repressurizing
3-192
Shutdown of System Without
Dumping Pressure
3-193
Stuck Strut Bleed Valve
3-188A
Temperature Control Selector
1-370
Water Separator Freeze-Up
3-193
Air Refueling Crewmember Abbreviations
2-85
Air Refueling Definitions
2-84BJ
Air Refueling Operations
2-84B
Air Refueling Formation
2-84AD*
Air Refueling Mission Planning and Inflight
Data Chart (KC-10)
2-84BH*
Air Refueling Procedures
2-84AH, 2-84AW
Alternate Rendezvous Procedures
2-84Y
Alternate Anchor Rendezvous
2-84AG
Anchor Refueling Operations
2-84AG
Anchor Pattern
2-84AG*
Basic Rendezvous Procedures
2-84R
2-84J*, 2-84BG*
Buddy Procedures
2-84N
and Refueling Route Cell
2-84P*
and Refueling Formation Profile
2-84Q*
Change 22
Index-1
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Page
Page
Cell Leader Responsibility

2-84N
Communications
2-84B
Contact Checklist
2-84BA
Contact Made
2-84AJ
Descent and Closure Procedures
2-84X
Disconnect
2-84AV
Early Arrival of Receivers
2-84AE
Emission Options
2-84L*
Enroute Procedures
2-84N
Enroute Rendezvous
Procedures
2-84Y
(Stream, Single Ship, Single Cell) 2-84AA*
Alternate Procedure (Single Ship,
Single Cell)
2-84AA*
Enroute Cell Rendezvous
2-84AB*
EVS Presentations - Air Refueling
Rendezvous
2-84AF*
EVS Rendezvous
2-84AE
Exterior Lighting
2-84H*, 2-84BE*
2-84AC
Formation Refueling Procedures
2-84AK
One Tanker/Three or More
Receivers
2-84AM*
Six Receivers
2-84AT*
Three Receivers
2-84AS*
Three Tankers/Six Receivers
2-84AQ*
Three Tankers/Three Receivers
2-84AR*
Two Tankers/One Receiver
2-84AN*
KC-10 Air Refueling Procedures
2-84BC
KC-135 Turn Range/Offset Chart 30 Degrees
2-84W*
Lighting
2-84G
Mission Planning
2-84B
Navigation and Position Reporting
2-84J
2-84AL*
Pilot Director Lights Illumination Profile
(KC-10)
2-84BF*
2-84T*
Post Air Refueling Checklist
2-84BB
Preparation for Contact Checklist
2-84AY
Ready for Contact
2-84AH
Receiver Director Lights
Illumination Profile
2-84F*
Receiver Disconnect Limits
2-84BH*
Receiver Pilot Technique
2-84AU
Refueling Airspeed
2-84AK
Refueling Weather Abort Procedures
2-84AV
Rendezvous Checklist
2-84AW
2-84S*
Rendezvous Procedures
2-84R
Rendezvous Overrun
2-84AE
Turn Range/Offset Chart - 25 Degrees 2-84U*

Visual Signals
2-84D, 2-84E*
Air Refueling System
1-164
Boom Release Button
1-173
1-182
1-165, 1-168*
1-164
Fuel Flow
1-165
Fuel Management
1-177, 1-178*
Hydraulic Pressure
1-164
Malfunctions
3-135
Normal Operation
1-176
Procedure With External Cruise
Missiles or Conventional
Weapons
1-180*, 1-181*
Refuel System
1-166*
Scavenge System
1-165
Air Starting
See Engines
1-590
Airbrakes
See Spoiler and Airbrake System
Aircraft
Coding
v
Dimensions
1-4
General Arrangement
1-6*
Gross Weight
1-4, 5-31
Movement of Flight Personnel
1-4
Personnel Coding
vi
Pilots Station
1-11*
TCTOs, Retrofit
vii
Aircrew Eye/Respiratory Protection
(AERP) System
1-33, 1-34*, 1-35*
Airspeed at Initial Buffet vs. Bank Angle
6-7*
Airspeed Indicators
See Instruments
5-13, 5-19*
Airbrakes
5-15
Air Refueling Slipway Doors
5-15
Drag Chute
5-16
ECM Equipment
5-13
Landing Gear
5-15
Nonnuclear Weapons Release
5-15
Rudder Trim
5-15
Speed Restrictions For Pylon Missile Separation
5-13
5-15
Wing Flaps
5-13, 5-15*
Wing Flutter
5-13, 5-14*
Aisle Stand
1-17*
Alarm System
1-43
Altitude and Temperature Limitations
5-17
Index-2
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Page
Anti-Icing Systems
1-379
1-387
1-382*
1-379
Engine, Nacelle, and Scoops
Anti-Icing Normal Operation
1-383
Anti-Icing Switch
1-382
Anti-Ice Systems
1-379, 1-381*
EVS Turret Window Anti-Ice
1-385
Pitot Anti-Icing
1-384
Pitot Heat Switches
1-382
System Inoperative
7-5
Windshield Anti-Icing and
Window Defogging
1-384
Windshield Anti-Icing and
Defogging Normal Operation
1-385
Windshield and Window
Numbering
1-386*
Antiskid System
See Brake System
Approach
2-117
Airborne Radar Approaches (ARA)
2-123
Approach Considerations
2-129
ILS Approach (Typical)
2-120*
Radar Approach (Typical)
2-118*
Typical Radar Directed Emergency
2-126*
Visual Approach
2-129
6-9
Loss of Artificial Feel System
3-171
Asymmetric Thrust
Go Around Characteristics
6-27
1-407, 1-410*
Attitude Heading Reference
System (AHRS)
1-402
1-403*
Attitude Select Switch
1-409
Automatic Flight Control
System (Autopilot)
1-337
Automatic Flight Control System
1-337
Boom Release Buttons
1-173, 1-344
1-353
1-342, 1-343*
1-337
Disengagement
1-352
Nonsteering Modes
1-337
Normal Operation
1-348
Pilot Control Technique
6-41
Pitch and Roll Steering Modes
1-338
Characteristics
1-339
Safety Features
1-338
1-342
Unscheduled Autopilot Inputs
3-41
Authorized Mixed External Weapon Loads 1-618B*
Authorized Pods
1-621*
Authorized Weapons
1-619*
Axe
1-40
Page
B
Bailout/Ejection
See Ejection
Battery
See Electrical Power Supply Systems
1-625, 1-626*
Bleed Selector Switch
1-368
Bomb Door System
1-309, 1-310*
1-317
Close Timer
1-309
1-312*
1-309
Malfunctions
3-138
Normal Operation
1-315
Operation Limitations
5-24
Bombing System
1-617
Authorized Weapons
1-617, 1-619*
Bomb Tone Scoring System
1-617
1-622
1-617, 1-618*
1-617
Brake System
1-299, 1-300*
Antiskid Operation
1-305
Antiskid System
1-304
1-306
1-302*
Design
1-305
Energy Limits
5-25, 5-28*
Hydraulic System
1-299
Normal Operation
1-305
System Failure
3-13
Buffet Boundary Limitations
5-16
Buffet Boundary Limits
6-31*
C
Cabin Pressurization
See Air Conditioning System
Cartridge Start
Cartridge Starter Malfunctions
Center of Gravity/Fuel Level
Abbreviations
Advisory System (CG/FLAS)
Abnormal Operation
Asymmetrical Fuel Load
Description
Fuel Level Advisory Mode
Initialization
Normal Operation
Power Source
Self-Test
Weapon Status Mode
Weight Status Mode
2-46
3-168
1-151
1-151
3-139
1-161
1-162
1-151, 1-152*
1-151
1-160
1-158
1-158
1-151
1-158
1-161
1-161
Change 21
Index-3
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Page
Page

1-40, 1-42*
Center of Gravity (Cruise)
2-84
Center of Gravity Limitations
5-31
Structural
5-32*
Chart Holder
1-626
Checklists
See Normal Procedures
1-224*
Clearance Plane
See Terrain Avoidance System
Climb
2-82
Climbout Procedures
2-76
Climb Flight Paths
2-82*
Cold Weather Procedures
7-15
Combat Breakaway Maneuvers
6-33
Combined Maneuver Limits, Flaps Up
5-21*
Communication and Associated
Electronic Equipment
1-437, 1-438*
Antenna Locations (Except ECM)
1-439*
1-535
DAMA (Demand Assigned Multiple
Access) System
1-452
DAMA Modem
1-452
DAMA Deactivation
1-464R
DAMA Operation
1-464R
DAMA Power On
1-464Q
DAMA Remote Control Unit Control
and Indicators
1-458A*
DAMA Remote Control Unit Menus 1-458C*
Description
1-437
Interphone System AN/AIC-18
1-440
Controls
1-441*
KY-100 Secure Voice System
1-444
KY-100 Error Message Displays
3-140
KY-100 LCD Display Annunciators
and Display Fields
1-446G*
KY-100 LCD Display Operator
Prompts and Messages
1-446Q*
KY-100 Operating Procedures
1-464K
1-446C*
Liaison Radio AN/ARC 190(V)
1-480
Controls
1-480*
Normal Operation
1-483
AN/ARR-85(V)
1-527
1-528*
MRT Receiver with
Transfer Module
1-532*
Satellite Communications Terminal
AN/ASC-19
1-485
Control Panel
1-485, 1-487*
Dual Modem Control Panel
1-493*
Dual Modem Operating Modes
1-507
Keyboard
1-486A, 1-497*
Printer
1-486A, 1-502*
UHF Command Radio AN/ARC-164
(Have Quick II)
1-465
Controls
1-468*
UHF Line-of-Sight Radio (LOS)
AN/ARC-171(V)
1-478
Controls
1-478A*
V/UHF Radio AN/ARC-210(V)
1-447
1-454*
Maritime Channel Assignment Transmit
Frequencies (MHZ)
1-450*
Normal Operation
1-459
NIVS Light Switch
1-453, *1-454
Comparison of Air Velocity Effective
Components
6-2*
Compressor Stalls
3-165, 7-14
Contact Sinking Speed Limitation
5-35*
Controllability Checks
3-42, 6-5
Copilots Side Panel
1-14*
Crash Landing
Crash Landing and Ditching Checklist
3-105
Ditching Hammocks
1-48*
Ditching Procedures
3-108A
Immediately After Takeoff
3-18
Procedures
3-103
Station
1-47
Crew Coordination/Crew Duties
4-1
Altitude Call Procedures
4-4
Copilot
4-5
Electronic Equipment Interference
4-4
EW Officer
4-7
Low Altitude Navigation
4-4
Low Level Flight
2-88
Pilot
4-5
Radar Navigator/Navigator
4-6
Crosswind Crab System
1-293
1-297
Malfunctions
3-82
Operation
2-70*
Steering and Crosswind Crab Controls
and Indicators
1-294*
Turning Angles Available With
Maximum Crosswind Crab
Setting
1-292*
Crosswind Landing
2-133
Crosswind Takeoff Procedures
2-69
Cruise
2-82
Index-4
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Page
D
DAMA (Demand Assigned Multiple
Access) System
1-452
DAMA Error Messages
3-140E*
DAMA Modem
1-452
DAMA Deactivation
1-464R
DAMA Operation
1-464R
DAMA Power On
1-464Q
DAMA Remote Control Unit Control
and Indicators
1-458A*
DAMA Remote Control Unit Menus
1-458C*
Decay of Lateral Control Effectiveness
From Best Flare Speed
6-4*
Defense Instructors Seat
1-625
Defense Instructors Station
1-631*
Departure From Prepared Surface
3-103
Desert Procedures
7-21
Descent, Rate of (Limitation)
5-17
Design Considerations
6-1
Aerodynamic Design
6-1
High Speed Design Features
6-2
Ditching
See Crash Landing
Dive Recovery Capability
6-38*
Diving
6-40
Doors
1-21
Aft Equipment Compartment Hatch
1-22
Hatches, Escape
1-43
Hatches Not Closed and Locked Light
1-44
Lower Deck Folding Hatch
1-22
Main Entry
1-21, 1-21*
Pressure Bulkhead
1-21
Upper Deck Sliding Hatch
1-22
Drag Chute
1-307
Accidental Deployment
3-141
Deployment
2-135
1-307
Lever
1-307
Limitations
5-16
Malfunction
3-141
Personnel Safety Rod
1-307
Drinking Water Containers
1-630
Dutch Roll Damping
7-13
7-9*
E
Effect of Glide Slope Angle on Flare
Technique With Ground Effect
Effect of Wheel Application on
Incremental Rate of Climb Capability
Ejection/Bailout
3-94*
6-30*
1-80
Page
Downward Ejection Seat
1-65, 1-66*
System
1-68*
Equipment
1-76*
Exits and Routes
3-48*
Global Survival Kit
1-78
Integrated Harness System
1-74
Manual Bailout
3-65
Procedures
3-47, 3-55*
Release from Ejection Seats for
Manual Bailout
3-63*
Sequence P-CP Seats
1-60B
Sequence EW-G Seats
1-161
Upward Ejection Seat
Arming Lever and Trigger Sequence 1-59*
Controls & Indicators
1-53*
System
1-60*
Electrical Power Supply Systems
1-185
AC Circuit Faults
3-142
AC Control and Indicators
1-192*
AC Power Distribution Boxes,
Panels, Fuses, Circuit Breakers
1-191
AC Power Routing
1-187*
AC Power System
1-185, 1-188*
AC Powered Equipment
3-154*
Aft Transformer Rectifier System
Failure
3-143
Battery Chargers
1-196, 1-198*
Battery Loads
3-149*
1-224*
1-239
Complete AC Power Failure
3-145
DC Power System
1-196, 1-197*
DC Power System Controls
and Indicators
1-199*
DC Power System Failure
3-157*
1-185
Electrical Loads
1-207
Electrical Loads Chart
1-208*
External Electrical Power Systems
1-202
External Electrical Power System
1-204*
Flight Gyro Emergency Power Inverter
1-191
Generators
1-185
Generator Drive Decoupler System
1-190*
Generator Emergency Operation
3-144
Generator Normal Operation
1-207
Malfunctions
3-142
Generator Amps
3-162
Generator Trip
3-162
Normal Operation of System
1-206
TR Powered Equipment
3-152*
Transformer Rectifier Units, Buses,
and Circuit Breakers
1-196A
Change 21
Index-5
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Page
Page
Electro-Optical Viewing System (EVS)

(AN/ASQ-151)
1-587
1-613
1-590, 1-593*
Data Presentation
1-589
1-587
Environmental Control System
1-591
EVS only Sequence, Clearing
High Terrain
2-93*
Forward Looking Radar Infrared
(FLIR) System
1-588
Monitor Optical Filters
1-590A
Operation of
2-92
1-538A*
Power Supplies
1-591
Sensor Stabilization Modes
1-590A*
Steerable TV System (STV)
1-587
Steering Priority
1-590
TA-EVS Integrated Flight
2-89
Turret Window Anti-Ice
1-385
Turret Window Wash
1-591
Types of Presentations
1-589
Electronic Clocks
1-399
Emergency Air Refueling Procedures
3-66A
Breakaway Procedures
3-66A
Brute Force Disconnect
3-66B
Controlled Tension Disconnect
3-66C
Failure To Disconnect
3-66B
Fuel Syphoning
3-66B
Inadvertent Disconnect
3-66B
Inoperative Boom/Receptacle Latching
3-66D
Manual Boom Latching
3-66C
Reverse Airflow Air Refueling
(Receiver To Tanker) Checklist
3-66E
System Malfunctions
3-66B
Emergency DC Power Switch
1-199*
Emergency Descent
3-45
Emergency Entrance and Ground Fire
Access
3-10*
Emergency Equipment
1-37
Location and Description
1-37, 1-39*
Emergency Minimum Ejection
Altitudes
Banked (Constant Altitude)
Flight
3-54*
Level and Diving (Wings Level)
Flight
3-53*
Level Flight
3-51*
3-1
Endurance Airspeed
2-84A*
Engines
1-81, 1-82*
Air Start Envelope
3-33*
Air Starting
3-32
1-96
Compressor Stalls
7-14
1-88*
Danger Areas
2-56*
1-81
Emergency Shutdown
3-28
Fire Detection System
1-37
Fire on Takeoff
3-17
Fire on the Ground
3-11
Fire Shutoff Switches
1-37, 1-88*, 1-267
Fire Warning Lights
1-37, 1-89*
Flameout and Icing
7-14
Fuel Control System
1-83, 1-84*
Fuel Enrichment Limitations
5-9
Ignition and Starter Controls
1-89*
Ignition and Starting Systems
1-87
Ignition System Limitations
5-9
Instruments
1-88*
Life
1-95
Limitations, Engines
5-6
Malfunctions
3-165
Normal Operation
1-95
Oil Supply System
1-86
Oil System Malfunctions
3-169
5-7
Pod Loss
3-36A, 3-128
Effect on Lateral Control
6-16, *6-16A
Landing Following Pod
Loss
3-116, *3-116A
Precautionary/Practice Engine
Shutdown
3-31
Stall Prevention System
1-87
Starter Limitations
5-6
Throttle Position Chart
1-85*
Engine, Nacelle, and Scoops Anti-Ice
See Anti-Ice Systems
Escape Hatches
1-43, 1-45*
Escape Ropes
1-40
Exterior Inspection Diagram
2-159*
External Missile Launch/Jettison CG
Limits (AGM-86B/86C)
5-33*
External Missile Launch/Jettison CG
Limits (AGM-129)
5-34*
External Power
Index-6
Change 20
F
Factors Affecting Takeoff Distance
Fire
See Engines
Fire Extinguishers, Hand
Firefighting Gloves
Pressurized Compartment Fire
Fire Control System External Power
First Aid Kits
Flap System
Airspeed Limits
Asymmetrical Flap Condition
Characteristics, Wing
2-66*
1-38
1-40
3-25
1-202
1-40
1-329, 1-330*
5-19*
3-89
6-18, 6-19*
1-331*
1-329
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Page
Page
Emergency Operation
3-89
Flaps-Up Landing Data
3-93, 3-99*
Flaps-Up Warning Signal
1-329
Landing With Wing Flaps
Inoperative
3-93
Limitations
5-24
Retraction Precautions
2-77
Retraction Performance, Heavyweight
2-78*
Retraction Speeds
2-78*
Stoppage
3-90
Unscheduled Flap Movement
3-91
Flash Divider Curtains
1-628A
2-84A
Flight Characteristics Under
Various Speeds
6-20
Flight Command Indicator (FCI)
1-537, 1-538*
Flight Control Systems
1-319
Airbrake Actuation
1-327
6-9
1-335*
1-331*
Control Columns
1-320
Control Column Balance
6-9
Control Stiffness
3-171
Control Wheels
1-325
1-319
Elevator Artificial Feel
1-322
Force Switch Operation
3-173
Lateral Control System
1-325
Lateral Trim Malfunction
3-172
Lateral Trim System
1-327, 1-328*
Loss of Artificial Feel
3-171
Malfunctions
3-171
Maximum Roll Rates
6-15*
Pitch Control Systems
6-10, 6-12*
Powered Rudder/Elevator
Hydraulic System
1-264, 1-266*
Powered Rudder/Elevator
System
1-319, 1-321*
Roll-Yaw Recovery (Typical)
6-41*
Rudder Artificial Feel
1-320
6-28*
Rudder and Elevator Actuators
1-319
Rudder and Elevator Control
Malfunctions
3-171
Rudder Pedals
1-320
Rudder Trim
1-320, 5-15
Runaway or Unscheduled Stabilizer
Trim
3-19
1-322, 1-324*
Stabilizer Trim Malfunction
3-173
Stabilizer Trim Mechanism
Limitation
5-24
Stick Force Required During
Flap Retraction
6-13*
System Characteristics
6-10
Flight Director System
1-407
1-407, 1-410*
Attitude Select Switch
1-409, 1-411*
1-421*
1-410*
Data Flow
1-408*
Heading Select Switch
1-418
Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI)
1-409
ILS Approach
1-420, 2-120*
Instrument Control Switch
1-417
Nav Mode Select Panel
1-409
1-419
TACAN or VOR Navigation
1-419
5-16, 5-18*
Food Stowage Boxes
1-629
Formation Flying
6-39
Aerodynamic Effects
6-39
Limitations
6-39
Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR)
System
1-588
Fuel Grade Properties and Limits
5-9, 5-10*
Alternate Fuels
5-12
Emergency Fuels
5-12A
JP-8 Fuels
5-12
Recommended Fuels
5-9
Fuel Sequences
Sequence Increased Gross Weight
No External Missiles
1-136C*
Sequence Increased Gross Weight
2 and 4 AGM-86B Missiles
1-136E*
Sequence - Increased Gross Weight
6 thru 12 AGM-86B Missiles
1-136H*
Sequence - Increased Gross Weight
Asymmetrical External Load of
1 thru 6 AGM-86B Missiles on
One Pylon
1-136L*
Sequence When Carrying External
Cruise Missiles Asymmetrically
Loaded
1-126*
Sequence When Carrying External Cruise
Missiles AGM-86B/C & AGM-129
1-124*
Sequence When Carrying External Cruise
Missiles or Conventional Weapons
1-137*
Fuel Supply System
1-99, 1-100*
Aft Body Fuel Adjustment Chart
For Carrying External
Conventional Weapons
1-143*
Aft Body Fuel Adjustment Chart
For Carrying External Cruise Missiles or
Conventional Weapons
1-128*, 1-139*
Aft Body Fuel Adjustment Chart,
No Pylons
1-122*
Change 21
Index-7
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Page
Ballast Fuel for Landing With External
Conventional Weapon Configurations 1-145*
Ballast Fuel For Landing With
1-135*
Checkout System
1-105, 1-114, 1-115*
1-147*
Composite
1-102*
1-105, 1-106*
Emergency Operation
3-174, 3-176, 3-178*
Flow for Airspeed Indication
Failure
3-40*
Forward Body Ballast Fuel Required
for Launch/Jettison of External
Cruise Missiles
1-131*
Jet Fuel Mixture Freeze Point
Charts
5-11*
Malfunctions
3-174
Panels
1-106*
Quantity Data
1-104*
Scavenge System
1-105
Single-Point Refueling System
1-163
System Management
1-116
System Operation
1-114
System Operation With No Pylons
1-120*
Tank Venting
1-99
Fuses
G
Gear
See Landing Gear Systems
Gear Retraction and External Store
Effects on Directional Control Speed
3-109
General Arrangement Diagram
1-6*
Generators
Glare Shield
1-628A
Glide Slope Equipment (AN/ARN-31)
1-428Y
Go-Around, Normal
2-137, 2-140*
Go-Around With Asymmetrical Thrust
3-127
Characteristics
6-27
Ground Turning Speed Limitations
5-25
GPS IU/TACAN Emulation
1-428
Abnormal Operations Fault Table
1-428P*
Annunciator Messages
1-428N*
Data Flow
1-428D*
Destination Data Screen
1-428L*
MFD Control Panel Controls
and Indicators
1-428F*
Mission Route Screen/Moving
Map Display
1-428G*
Mode Data
1-428E*
Gyro Power Switch
1-397, 1-400*
Index-8
Change 21
Page
H
Hatches
See Doors
Head Outlets
1-367
Heading Indicator (C-2A Gyro)
1-397
Heading Select Switch
1-418
HF Radio
1-480
High Speed Flight
6-31
Horizontal Situation Indicator
(HSI)
1-409, 1-410*
Hot Cup
1-630
Hot Weather Procedures
7-19
Hydraulic Power Systems
1-257
1-276*
1-267, 1-268*
1-257
Engine Driven Hydraulic Systems
1-259
Hydraulic Pump Capacities
1-264
Landing with Main Body Hydraulic
Pumps Inoperative
3-72
Malfunctions
3-180
1-273
Powered Rudder/Elevator Hydraulic
System
1-266*
Pump Out Warning Light Flicker
3-180
Pressure Fluctuations
1-274
Rotary Launcher Hydraulic System
1-265
Rotary Launcher Hydraulic
System Normal Operation
1-275
Rotary Launcher Power Pump Low
Pressure Light On
3-183
Rudder/Elevator System
1-264
Rudder Elevator System
Normal Operation
1-274
Standby Pumps
1-264
Supply Systems
1-260*
System Failure
3-181, 3-182*
System Locations
1-258*
Hydroplaning
7-7
Dynamic
7-7
7-9*
Reverted Rubber Skidding
7-8
Summary of Hydroplaning Factors
7-8
Viscous Hydroplaning
7-8
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Page
Page
Icing
7-3
IFF Transponder Set (AN/APX-64) (AIMS)
1-430
Control and Indicators
1-431*
Normal Operation
1-434
Instructor Navigators Seat
1-625
Instructor Pilots Seat
1-625
Instruments
1-389
Accelerometer
1-399
Altimeter (Pilot and Copilot)
1-393
Altimeter (Navigators)
1-392
Altimeter Computer
1-391
Attitude Heading Reference
System (AHRS)
1-402, 1-403*
1-405*
Clocks
1-399
Engine Instruments
1-88*
Gyro Power Switch
1-397
Heading Indicator (C-2A Gyro)
1-397
Indicated Airspeed Indicators
1-391
Mach Indicator
1-392
1-399
Pitot Static Indicators
1-395*
Pitot Static Instruments
1-391
Pitot Static System
1-389, 1-390*
Radar Altimeter
1-398
1-397
True Airspeed Computer
1-389
1-392
Vertical Velocity Indicator
1-395
Instrument Landing System (ILS)
Equipment
1-428Y
Omni-Range Radio Controls
1-429*
Instrument Markings Limitations
5-2*
Interphone System
1-440
Controls
1-440, 1-441*
Normal Operation
1-443
Power Switch
1-442
Ladder
1-626
Landing
2-133
and Go-Around Patterns
2-140*
Crash Landing
3-103
Crosswind
2-133
Emergencies
3-67
Heavyweight
2-129
Limitations
5-31
Maximum Landing Gross Weight With
One Missing or Damaged Flap and
Fuel Loads to Balance Static Moment 3-92*
Minimum Run
2-135
Night Landing
2-136
Obstacle Clearance Landing
2-136
Taxi Back Landings
2-145
Touch-and-Go Procedures
2-142
Touchdown
2-133
With Brake System Hydraulic Failure
3-71
With Complete Steering Failure
3-81
With Crosswind Crab Malfunction
3-82
With Crosswind on Slippery Runways
7-6
With Glare Ice Runway Conditions
7-6
With Gusty Wind Conditions
2-133
With Insufficient Steering Angle
3-81
With Main Body Hydraulic Pumps
Inoperative
3-72
With One Forward Gear Steering Failure 3-80
With One or More Engines Inoperative
3-115
With Partial Gear
3-76
With Rudder/Elevator
Systems Inoperative
3-83
With Spoiler Control Failures
3-87
With Stabilizer Trim Failure
3-86
With Three or Four Engines
Inoperative on One Side Flaps
Down
3-122, 3-125*
With Three or Four Engines Inoperative
on One Side, Flaps Up
3-116, 3-117*
With Unbalanced/Failed Tire
3-79
With Wing Flaps Inoperative
3-93
With Wing Flaps Up
3-94
Landing Gear System
1-277
1-287*
1-283*
Emergency Switches
1-284
Failure to Extend
3-67
Failure to Retract
3-184
Ground Locks
1-277, 1-278*
Limitations
5-15, 5-31
Main Landing Gear System
1-277, 1-279*
Oleo Safety Switches
1-280
System Controls
1-281
Tip Gear System
1-281, 1-282*
J
Jettison Procedures
Joint Operations
JP-8 Fuel
3-46
2-84BK
5-12
K
Error Message Displays
LCD Display Annunciators
and Display Fields
LCD Display Operator
Prompts and Messages
Operating Procedures
1-444
1-446C*
3-140
1-446G*
1-446Q*
1-464K
Change 17
Index-9
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Page
Page
Lateral Control System See

Flight Control Systems
Liaison Radio AN/ARC-190 (V)
1-480
1-480*
Normal Operation
1-483
Liferaft Deflation Tool
1-79
Lighting Equipment
1-243
Air Refueling Lights
1-243
Anticollision Lights
1-243
1-254*
Crosswind Landing Lights
1-243
Entry Light Controls and Indicators
1-252*
Exterior Lighting
1-243, 1-244*
Exterior Light Controls
and Indicators
1-244C*
Interior Lighting
1-244B
Interior Lighting Controls
and Indicators
1-246*
Landing Lights
1-243
Navigation Lights
1-243
OAS Panel Lights
1-253
Signal Light
1-244B
Spotlights
1-244B
Taxi Lights
1-243
1-243, 5-15, 5-24
Load Factors During Low Altitude
Pullups
6-41*
Load Factors, Maneuvering Flight
6-33
Loss of Engine Pod
3-36A, 3-128
6-16, *6-16A
Loss
3-116, *3-116A
Low Altitude Flight Characteristics
6-40
Low Altitude Operations
2-86
Low Level Flight Operations
2-88

AN/ARR-85(V)
1-527, 1-528*
Minimum Crew Requirements
5-1
Minimum Speed for Directional
Control
3-108A, 3-110*, 6-24
Minimum Speeds Low Altitude
2-131*
Miscellaneous Equipment
Accessory Equipment
1-630
1-625, 1-626*
Chart Holders
1-626
1-633*
Crew Bunk
1-630, 1-632*
Defense Instructors Seat
1-625
Drinking Water Containers
1-630
Flash Divider Curtains
1-628A
Flight Loads Data Recorder
1-630
Food and Data Box
1-626
Food Stowage Boxes
1-629
Food Warming Oven
1-629
Glare Shield
1-628A
Hot Cup
1-630
Ice Box
1-628A
Instructor Navigators Seat
1-625
Instructor Pilots Seat
1-625
Ladder
1-626
Night Flying Curtain
1-628A
Pullout Table
1-630
Relief Equipment
1-625
Spare Lamps
1-630
Starter Cartridge and Breech
Cap Stowage
1-630
Sunshade Curtains
1-628
Tenth Crewmember Position
1-625
Thermal Curtains
1-628A, 1-629*
Windshield Wipers
1-625
Writing Tables and Clips
1-626
Missile Systems
AGM Inflight Operation
2-84A
AGM-86B Description
1-623
AGM-86C Description
1-623
AGM-86D Description
1-623
AGM-129 Description
1-623
1-624*
1-623
Environmental Control System
1-357
Ground Safeing Equipment
1-630
Jettison Procedures
3-47
Mountain Wave Turbulence
7-11, 7-11*
Movement of Personnel
1-4
M
Mach Indicator
1-392
Maneuvering Flight
6-33
1-357
Manual Bailout
3-65
Marker Beacon Receiver (AN/ARN-32)
1-428Y
Master Caution Lights
1-41
Master Isolate Switch
1-194
Maximum Allowable Crosswind Component
7-5*
Maximum Recommended Bank
Angle Chart
6-34*
Index-10
Change 22
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Page
N
Nav Mode Select Switch
1-418
Navigation Equipment
1-537
Flight Command Indicator
(FCI)
1-537, 1-538*
Offensive Avionics System (OAS)
1-537
True Airspeed Computer
1-389
1-627*
Night Flying Curtain
1-628A
Night Takeoff Procedures
2-69
NIVS Light Switch
1-453, *1-454
Normal Procedures
Section II
Air Refueling Procedures Contact
2-84BA
Air Refueling Procedures Rendezvous 2-84AW
Post Air Refueling
2-84BB
Preparation For Contact
2-84AY
After Landing Checklist
2-148
After Takeoff-Climb Checklist
2-79
Alert Line Preparation Checklist
2-189
Alert Procedures Checklists
2-165
Before Exterior Inspection Checklist
2-10
Before Leaving Aircraft Checklist
2-151
Before Low Level Descent Checklist
2-96
Before Starting Engines Checklists
2-25
Climb After Low Level Checklist
2-106
Daily Alert Preflight Checklist
2-173
Descent, After Descent, and TA
Compensation
2-98
Descent Checklist
2-110
Emergency Taxi Checklist
2-192
EW Officer Not Flying Checklist
2-12
Exterior Inspection Checklist
2-158
Go-Around Checklist
2-139
Ground Crew Checklist
2-189
Ground Crew Scramble
2-191
Ground TA Functional Check
2-63
Inflight TA Functional Check
2-94
Interior Inspection Checklists
2-16
Landing Checklist
2-136
Preparation for Flight Checklist
2-7
Quick Reaction Recocking Checklist
(Power-On Configuration CP reads)
2-178
Quick Reaction Scramble Checklist
(Power-On Configuration
CP/EW reads)
2-182
Quick Reaction Recocking Checklist
(Power-Off Configuration CP reads)
2-184
Quick Reaction Scramble Checklist
(Power-Off Configuration
CP/EW reads)
2-187
Recocking Checklist
2-167
Page
Starting Engines and Before
Taxiing Checklist
Takeoff Checklist
Taxi-Back Landing Checklist
Taxiing and Before Lineup Checklist
Touch and Go Landing Checklist
Traffic Pattern Checklist
Uncocking Checklist
2-41
2-72
2-145
2-59
2-143
2-112
2-171
O
Offensive Avionics System
Oil Supply System
Limitations
Excessive Oil Temperature
Pressure Erratic
Pressure High
Pressure Low
Omni-Range Radio AN/ARN-14
Outboard Engines EPR for
Go-Around
Overhead Panel
Oxygen System
Altitude Limitation
Bottles/Recharger Points
Build-up and Vent Valve Handle
Duration
Normal Operation
Portable Oxygen Bottles
1-537
1-86
5-9
3-169
3-169
3-170
3-170
1-428Y
1-429*
3-131*
1-399
1-16*
1-25
5-17
1-26*
1-31, 1-31*
1-36
1-28*
1-27*
1-32
1-32
P
Parachute
Automatic Parachute
1-74
Bailout Equipment
1-76*
Personal Locator Beacons
1-75
Static Lines
1-40
Universal Water Activated
Release System (UWARS)
1-74
Pilot Control Technique
6-41
Autopilot Control
6-42
Manual Control
6-41
1-538A*
Pilots Instrument Panel
1-18*
Pilots Side Panel
1-12*
Pitch Control Characteristics
See Flight Control Systems
Pitch SAS See Flight Control Systems
Pitot-Static System
1-389, 1-390*
Pneumatic Systems
See Air Conditioning System
Change 21
Index-11
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Pressurized Compartment Fire

Pod Loss (Engine)
Loss
Prohibited Maneuvers
Page
Page
3-25
3-36A, 3-128
6-16, *6-16A
Cruise Missile Launch Limitations

5-37
Flight Characteristics for
Air Refueling Operations
6-43
5-38*
Fuel System Management
1-136A
Gross Weight Limitations
5-37
Maneuver Limits - Flaps Up
5-40*
5-36
Rate of Descent Limitations
5-37
5-41*
Structural Limitations Limit Load Factor 5-39*
Slipway Door Switches
1-168
Airspeed Limitation
5-15
Smoke and Fume Elimination
3-23
Spare Lamps
1-630
Spins
6-8, 6-39
Spoiler and Airbrake System
1-326*
Airbrake Activation
1-327
Landing with Spoiler Failure
3-87
Spoiler Authority With Wheel Position
6-16*
Spring-Wound Clocks
1-399
Stability Augmentation System (SAS)
1-342
Abnormal Operation
3-137
1-343*
Malfunctions
3-136
Normal Operation of SAS
1-342
Unscheduled Pitch Oscillations
3-136
Unscheduled Yaw Oscillations
3-136
Yaw and Pitch SAS Control Panel
1-343*
Stalls
6-3
Practice Stalls
6-3
Recovery from Inadvertent Stalls
6-5
Stall or Controllability Checks
6-5
1-397
Starting System See Engines
Steerable TV (STV) System
1-587
Steering System
and Crosswind
Crab System
1-289, 1-290*, 1-293
1-294*
System Malfunctions
3-82
Turning Angles Available with Maximum
Crosswind Crab Setting
1-292*
5-32*
Structural Limitations See Acceleration
Limitations
Sunshade Curtains
1-628A
Survival Kit
See Ejection
3-116, *3-116A
5-16
Q
Quick Turn
2-146B
R
Radar Altimeter
1-398, 1-400*
Radar Approach
2-117, 2-118*
Radios See Communication and Associated
Electronic Equipment
Recovery from Unusual Positions
6-33
Relief Equipment
1-625
Rudder Control for
Yaw Asymmetry
6-29*
Rudder/Elevator Hydraulic System
See Hydraulic Power Supply System
S
Safety Belt
1-80
Satellite Communications Terminal
AN/ASC-19 (SATCOM)
1-485
Control Panel
1-485, 1-487*
Dual Modem Operating Modes
1-507
Keyboard
1-486A, 1-497*
Printer
1-486A, 1-502*
Time Standard Module
1-486, 1-496*
1-57
Servicing
1-634*
Signal Amplifier
See Air Refueling
Simultaneous Touchdown Speeds
6-24*
Single Point Ground Refueling System
1-163
SIOP Increased Gross Weight In Flight
1-136A
Acceleration Limitations
5-36
AGM-86 Launch/Jettison
Center of Gravity Limits
5-42*
Air Refueling Limitations
5-37
5-36
Buffet Boundary Limitations
5-36
Center of Gravity Limitations
5-37
Index-12
Change 21
T.O. 1B-52H-1
Page
T
TACAN Radio AN/ARN-118(V)
1-423
1-425*
Normal Operation
1-427
Takeoff
2-65
and Landings Emergencies Exit
Chart
3-104A*
Climb Stabilizer Trim Schedule
2-76*
Crosswind Crab Operation
2-70*
Crosswind Takeoff
2-69
Factors Affecting Takeoff
2-66*
Heavy Weight Takeoff
2-68
Instrument Takeoff and Initial Climb
2-68
Light Weight Takeoff
2-68
Night Takeoff
2-69
Obstacle Clearance Takeoff
2-71
Performance
2-65
Procedures
2-66
S1, S2 Acceleration Monitor System
2-66
Taxiback Landing
2-145
Taxiing
7-3, 7-16, 7-19, 7-21
Taxiing and Before Takeoff
2-54
Temperature Control Selector
1-368*
Terrain Avoidance System
1-549
1-550
Aircraft (Body) Angle-of-Attack
Level Flight
1-567*
1-585*
1-551*
1-549
Dual Antenna
1-556*
Failure Verification
1-568
Failure Warning
1-560
Ground Track Error
1-564*
Navigators Displays
1-560
Normal Operation
1-562
Peak Clearance Command
1-561*
Pilots Displays
1-560
Pilots Inflight Procedures
1-568
Planning Considerations
1-565
Power Source
1-550
Stabilization Modes
1-558
System Error Analysis
1-575
System Geometry
1-555*
TA Display
1-557*
TA Display Complete Dropout
1-571*
TA Display Partial Dropout
1-572*
TA Display Sequence
1-570*
TA Display Side Dropout
1-573*
TA Display Test
1-570*
TA Display Weather Effects
1-574*
TA Operating Condition Indicators
1-550
TA System After Compensation
1-581*
TA System Errors
1-576*
TA System Failure Detection
1-568
TA System Operational Check
1-579
TA Test
1-560
Page
TA Traces, Representative
1-566*
Terrain Display (EVS Monitors)
1-549
Terrain Display Control Panel
1-550
Theory of Operation
1-554
Thermal Curtains
1-628A, 1-629*
Thrust-Drag Speed Stability
6-20, 6-20*
Touch and Go Landings
2-142
Transformer Rectifier
Transponder Loading Devices
1-435*
1-392
Turbulence and Thunderstorms
7-11
Turn and Slip Indicators
1-413
Turning Radius and Ground Clearance
2-58*
Typical Penetration
2-109*
U
UHF Command Radio AN/ARC-164(V)
(Have Quick II)
1-465
Controls
1-468*
Normal Operating Procedures
1-471
UHF Line-of-Sight Radio AN/ARC-171(V)
1-478
Controls
1-478A*
Normal Operation
1-479
Universal Water Activated Release System
(UWARS)
1-74, 1-77*
Unusual Positions, Recovery
6-33
V
1-391, 1-395*
V/UHF Radio AN/ARC-210(V)
1-447
VOR Receiver See Omni Range Radio
W
Wheel Brake System See Brake System
Windows
Anti-Ice Systems
1-384
Anti-Ice System Controls and
Indicators
1-382*
Cracks
3-44
Pilots Sliding
1-22, 1-23*
Windshield and Window
Numbering
1-11*, 1-386*
Wind Shear
2-132, 6-23
Windshield Wipers
1-625
Wing Flap System
See Flap Systems
Writing Tables and Clips
1-626
Y
Yaw SAS See Flight Control Systems
Change 21
Index-13/(Index-14 blank)
BLA

Manual de Vuelo Boeing B 52

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Manual de Vuelo Boeing B 52

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

T.O.

This manual contains unverified procedures. Refer to the validation/verification status

THIS PUBLICATION INCORPORATES OPERATIONAL SUPPLEMENT -1S-19.

PUBLISHED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

INSERT LATEST CHANGED PAGES. DESTROY SUPERSEDED PAGES.

The portion of the text affected by the changes is indicated by a

Dates of issue for original and changed pages are:

TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES IN THIS PUBLICATION IS 1422 CONSISTING OF THE FOLLOWING:

CURRENT FLIGHT CREW CHECKLISTS

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES (continued)

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES (continued)

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES (continued)

TECHNICAL ORDER VALIDATION/VERIFICATION STATUS PAGE

CHANGE NO. DATE

TCTO Listings (P, PG vii)

PTO CHANGE NO. DATE

(B) VALIDATION OR VERIFICATION METHOD:

(P) = PERFORMANCE, (S) = SIMULATION, (A) = ANALYSIS (TABLE-TOP)

TECHNICAL ORDER VALIDATION/VERIFICATION STATUS PAGE

CHANGE NO. DATE

GPS IU/TACAN Abnrm Ops/Faults

PTO CHANGE NO. DATE

(B) VALIDATION OR VERIFICATION METHOD:

(P) = PERFORMANCE, (S) = SIMULATION, (A) = ANALYSIS (TABLE-TOP)

STATUS OF SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL SUPPLEMENTS

Fuel Enrichment Valve

Systems Description and Operation

All Weather Operation

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS - Titles included in alphabetical index

Before operating the B-52 aircraft

B-52H Flight Manual Appendix 1, Performance Data

Operating procedures, techniques, etc, which could result in personal

Operating procedures, techniques, etc, which could result in damage to

An operating procedure, technique, etc, which is considered essential to

The instructions or procedures prefaced by shall or will

Normally used to indicate a preferred but nonmandatory

An acceptable or suggested means of accomplishment.

CS Aircraft modified by TCTO 1B-52H-756 (Integrated Conventional Stores

# Aircraft not CSRL capable

USAF B-52H Serial No.

Where necessary to distinguish

Applies when Coventional Weapon (Integrated Convential Stores Management

Installation of AN/ARC-210(V) V/UHF Radio on B-52H Aircraft.

Installation of Dual Modem II AFSATCOM Radio System on B-52H Aircraft.

Installation AN/ARC-210 Retrofit.

Installation of Electronic Countermeasures Improvement on all B-52H Aircraft.

Installation of Engine Fuel Enrichment Valve on B-52H Aircraft.

Installation of Pilot EVS Monitor Input switch on B-52H Aircraft.

Replacement of Ballistics Computer Set AN/AYQ-10 and Inertial Navigation System

Installation of Targeting Pod on B-52H Aircraft.

The B-52H Stratofortress

All data on pages ix and x deleted.

Systems Description and Operation

DOORS AND WINDOWS

FUEL SUPPLY SYSTEM

CENTER OF GRAVITY/FUEL LEVEL ADVISORY SYSTEM

ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEMS

HYDRAULIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEMS

LANDING GEAR SYSTEM

STEERING AND CROSSWIND CRAB SYSTEMS

WHEEL BRAKE SYSTEM

DRAG CHUTE SYSTEM