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JURISPRUDENCE IN CRIMINAL LAWS

[1]

Compiled by Judge Philger B. Noel Inovejas[2]


A. Book 1 (Articles 1-99, RPC, Excluding Provisions on Civil Liability)
1. Fundamental principles
Suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code to Special Laws
Sharica Mari Go-Tan v. Sps. Perfecto Tan and Juanita Tan, G.R. No. 168852,
September 30, 2008
While the said provision (Section 3 of R.A. 9262) provides that the offender be related or
connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it
does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of the
RPC, thus:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and
other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)
Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in
the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of
this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary
capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special
law is silent on a particular matter.
Thus, in People v. Moreno, the Court applied suppletorily the provision on subsidiary penalty
under Article 39 of the RPC to cases of violations of Act No. 3992, otherwise known as the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law, noting that the special law did not contain any provision that
the defendant could be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In People v. Li Wai Cheung, the Court applied suppletorily the rules on the service of
sentences provided in Article 70 of the RPC in favor of the accused who was found guilty of
multiple violations of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, considering the lack of similar rules under the special law.
In People v. Chowdury, the Court applied suppletorily Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the RPC to
define the words principal, accomplices and accessories under R.A. No. 8042,
otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, because said

words were not defined therein, although the special law referred to the same terms in
enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment.
In Yu v. People, the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment
under Article 39 of the RPC to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise known as the
Bouncing Checks Law, noting the absence of an express provision on subsidiary
imprisonment in said special law.
Most recently, in Ladonga v. People, the Court applied suppletorily the principle of
conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary provision
therein.
With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be
applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section 47 that the
RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their
nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.
Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or
action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.
a) Definition of Criminal Law
Elvira Yu Oh v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125297, June 6, 2003
A penal law, as defined by this Court, is an act of the legislature that prohibits certain acts
and establishes penalties for its violations. It also defines crime, treats of its nature and
provides for its punishment.
There is no crime if there is no law that punishes the act
P/Insp. Ariel Artillero v. Orlando Casimiro, et al., G.R. No. 190569, April 25, 2012
While this Court does not condone the acts of Aguillon, it cannot order the prosecutor to file
a case against him since there is no law that penalizes a local chief executive for imbibing
liquor while carrying his firearm. Neither is there any law that restricts the kind of firearms
that punong barangays may carry in the performance of their peace and order functions.
Unfortunately, it also appears that the term "peace and order function" has not been
adequately defined by law or appropriate regulations.
(i) Difference between Mala in Se and Mala Prohibita
Mala in se
People v. Cora Ojeda, G.R. Nos. 104238-58, June 3, 2004
The prosecution failed to prove deceit in this case. The prima facie presumption of deceit
was successfully rebutted by appellants evidence of good faith, a defense in estafa by
postdating a check. Good faith may be demonstrated, for instance, by a debtors offer to
arrange a payment scheme with his creditor. In this case, the debtor not only made

arrangements for payment; as complainant herself categorically stated, the debtor-appellant


fully paid the entire amount of the dishonored checks.
It must be noted that our Revised Penal Code was enacted to penalize unlawful acts
accompanied by evil intent denominated as crimes mala in se. The principal consideration is
the existence of malicious intent. There is a concurrence of freedom, intelligence and intent
which together make up the "criminal mind" behind the "criminal act." Thus, to constitute a
crime, the act must, generally and in most cases, be accompanied by a criminal intent.
Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. No crime is committed if the mind of the person
performing the act complained of is innocent. As we held in Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan:
The rule was reiterated in People v. Pacana, although this case involved falsification of public
documents and estafa: "Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to
be a crime. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal
mind is wanting."
American jurisprudence echoes the same principle. It adheres to the view that criminal
intent in embezzlement is not based on technical mistakes as to the legal effect of a
transaction honestly entered into, and there can be no embezzlement if the mind of the
person doing the act is innocent or if there is no wrongful purpose.
The accused may thus prove that he acted in good faith and that he had no intention to
convert the money or goods for his personal benefit. We are convinced that appellant was
able to prove the absence of criminal intent in her transactions with Chua. Had her intention
been tainted with malice and deceit, appellant would not have exerted extraordinary effort
to pay the complainant, given her own business and financial reverses.
Mala prohibita
Elenita Fajardo v. People, G.R. No. 190889, January 10, 2011
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not
necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by
the special law. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be
distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did
intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the
first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to
perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously.
In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to
possess. While mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for
illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an
intent to possess on the part of the accused. Such intent to possess is, however, without
regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which the accused may have harbored in
possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit
an offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important in convicting a
person under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of
a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to
possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was
made in good faith and without criminal intent.

Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a


firearm cannot be considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind
of weapon, such as Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical or
constructive possession, for as long as the animus possidendi is absent, there is no offense
committed.
People v. Ruper Posing, G.R. No. 196973, July 31, 2013
X x x This Court held in a catena of cases that mere possession of a regulated drug per se
constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an
accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such possession - the onus probandi is shifted
to the accused, to explain the absenceof knowledge or animus possidendi.
Arnold James Ysidoro, G.R. No. 192330, November 14, 2012
But criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act of
diverting public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to
another public purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not
inherently immoral but becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its
commission based on considerations of public policy, order, and convenience. It is the
commission of an act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that
determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Hence, malice or criminal intent
is completely irrelevant.
(ii) Construction of penal laws
Basic rule: if the law is clear, there is no room for construction
PDEA v. Richard Brodett, et al., G.R. No. 196390, September 28, 2011
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear and unambiguous, the
court has no alternative but to apply the same according to its clear language. The Supreme
Court had steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that the first and fundamental duty of courts
is to apply the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called only when
such literal application is impossible. No process of interpretation or construction need be
resorted to where a provision of law peremptorily calls for application.
Michael Padua v. People, G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for drug
trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the privilege
granted by the Probation Law or P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory construction
is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning
must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean
exactly what it says. If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the
plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or
speech is the index of intention. Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
Socorro Ramirez v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995

First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express
terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be
either impossible or absurb or would lead to an injustice.
Statutes are construed to give effect to legislative intent
People v. Roman Derilo, et al., G.R. No. 117818, April 18, 1997
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the
framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to
be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions
themselves. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. A law should be
interpreted with a view to upholding rather than destroying it.
Joemar Ortega v. People, G.R. No. 151085, August 20, 2008
The Court is bound to enforce this legislative intent, which is the dominant factor in
interpreting a statute. Significantly, this Court has declared in a number of cases, that intent
is the soul of the law, viz.:
The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the
purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and
the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of
the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained,
although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow
the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature
and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which
gives life to a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out
and follow the true intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best
with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the
legislature.

Words are interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary meaning


Joseph Ejercito Estrada
November 19, 2001

v.

Sandiganbayan,

G.R.

No.

148560,

Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be


interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is
evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.
The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and
lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus,
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of
the words "combination" and "series."
Romarico Mendoza v. People, G.R. No. 183891, August 3, 2010
The provision of the law being clear and unambiguous, petitioners interpretation that a
"proprietor," as he was designated in the Information, is not among those specifically

mentioned under Sec. 28(f) as liable, does not lie. For the word connotes management,
control and power over a business entity.
Efren Alvarez v. People, G.R. No. 192591, June 29, 2011
Indeed, Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019, as amended, provides as one of its elements that the
public officer should have acted by causing any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or by giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his functions. The use of the disjunctive term "or" connotes that either
act qualifies as a violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), or as aptly held in Santiago, as two (2)
different modes of committing the offense. This does not, however, indicate that each mode
constitutes a distinct offense, but rather, that an accused may be charged under either
mode or under both.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus
People v. Sandiganbayan, and Alejandro Villapando, G.R. No. 164185, July 23,
2008
Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code defies legal cogency. Legal disqualification cannot be
read as excluding temporary disqualification in order to exempt therefrom the legal
prohibitions under the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991. We
reiterate the legal maxim ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Basic is the
rule in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not
distinguish. There should be no distinction in the application of a law where none is
indicated.
Judge Adoracion Angeles v. Hon. Manuel Gaite, et al., G.R. No. 165276, November
25, 2009
Courts must not bring cases within the provision of a law which are not clearly embraced by
it. No act can be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by statute; so, too, no
person who is not clearly within the terms of a statute can be brought within them. Any
reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.
Exclusio unius est exclusio alterius
Rodolfo Llamas v. Executive Secretary Oscar Orbos, et al., G.R. No. 99031 October
15, 1991
Moreover, applying the doctrine "Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemos," We
cannot sustain petitioner's view. In other words, if the law does not distinguish, so We must
no distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive
clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases.
By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would
indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the
coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed
interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do
not necessarily involve criminal offenses.

In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President
cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is Our considered view that if
the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in
administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

People v. Pedro Itnong, G.R. No. 145034-35, February 5, 2004


The victim's relationship with appellant, however, is not among the qualifying circumstances
of relationships covered by the law. Article 266-B requires that "the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim." Conformably with the
principle of exclusio unius est exclusio alterius, the relationship of the offender, as being just
a step-grandfather of the victim, cannot be deemed embraced by the enumeration.
Furthermore, there is no evidence submitted that appellant is legally married to the victim's
grandmother.
Benjamin Romualdez v. Hon. Simeon Marcelo, et al., G.R. Nos. 165510-33, July 28,
2006
Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one
person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar
maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly
limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to
others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made
specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to
confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.
People v. Victoriano Abesamis, G.R. No. 140985, August 28, 2007
The appeal was not mooted by accused-appellants release on parole. His release only
meant that, according to the Board, he had already served the minimum penalty imposed
on him and that he was "fitted by his training for release, that there [was] reasonable
probability that [he would] live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that such
release [would] not be incompatible with the welfare of society." Should he violate the
conditions of his parole, accused-appellant may be ordered rearrested, to serve the
remaining unexpired portion of the maximum sentence.
Parole refers to the conditional release of an offender from a correctional institution after he
serves the minimum term of his prison sentence. The grant thereof does not extinguish the
criminal liability of the offender. Parole is not one of the modes of totally extinguishing
criminal liability under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code. Inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius.

The particular clauses and phrases of the statute should be taken as a whole
Edgardo Gaanan v. IAC and People, G.R. No. L-69809, October 16,
1986

It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent


of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should
not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every
part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. X x
xx
X x x Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No.
4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be
construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is,
instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line
of a telephone. X x x
Statutes may not be enlarged by implication
Luis Marcos Laurel v. Zeus Abrogar, et al., G.R. No. 155076, February
27, 2006
Penal statutes may not be enlarged by implication or intent beyond the fair meaning of the
language used; and may not be held to include offenses other than those which are clearly
described, notwithstanding that the Court may think that Congress should have made them
more comprehensive. Words and phrases in a statute are to be construed according to their
common meaning and accepted usage.

The law must be considered as a whole


Regino Sy. Catiis v. CA, et al., G.R. NO. 153979, February 6, 2006
Petitioners interpretation that the term "any person" in the first paragraph of section 1
could mean that even one person can be indicted for syndicated estafa is contrary to the
provision of the law. It bears stressing that the law must be considered as a whole, just as it
is necessary to consider a sentence in its entirety in order to grasp its true meaning. It is a
dangerous practice to base construction upon only a part of a section since one portion may
be qualified by the other portion. In fact, there is no need for any construction or
interpretation of P. D. No. 1689 since the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity.
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1689 has defined what constitutes a syndicate and such definition is
controlling. Where a requirement is made in explicit and unambiguous terms, no discretion
is left to the judiciary. It must see to it that its mandate is obeyed.

Interpretare et concordare legis legibus est optimus interpretandi


Urbano Moreno v. Comelec, et al., G.R. No. 168550, August 10, 2006
The Courts function, in the face of this seeming dissonance, is to interpret
and harmonize the Probation Law and the Local Government Code.
Interpretare et concordare legis legibus est optimus interpretandi.
Francisco Sycip, Jr. v. CA, G.R. No. 125059, March 17, 2000

X x x Moreover, protection must also be afforded the interest of townhouse buyers under
P.D. No. 957. A statute must be construed in relation to other laws so as to carry out the
legitimate ends and purposes intended by the legislature. Courts will not strictly follow the
letter of one statute when it leads away from the true intent of legislature and when ends
are inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. More so, when it will mean the
contravention of another valid statute. Both laws have to be reconciled and given due effect.

In dubilis reus est absolvendus


Nari Gidwani v. People, G.R. No. 195064, January 15, 2014
Moreover, it is a basic principle in criminal law that any ambiguity in the interpretation or
application of the law must be made in favor of the accused. Surely, our laws should not be
interpreted in such a way that the interpretation would result in the disobedience of a lawful
order of an authority vested by law with the jurisdiction to issue the order.

Francisco Sycip, Jr. v. CA, G.R. No. 125059, March 17, 2000
Penal statutes are strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.
Norma Abdulla v. People, G.R. NO. 150129 April 6, 2005
Hence, here we must fall back on a truism of the law, in dubilis reus est absolvendus. All
doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused.
Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcung, G.R. No. 181409,
February 11, 2010
Further, it is an established principle of statutory construction that penal laws are strictly
construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Any reasonable doubt must
be resolved in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of Article 332 (1) of the
Revised Penal Codes simple language is most favorable to Sato.
XXX
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity. The rule applies when
the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial
to the accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an
interpretation which is more lenient to the accused.
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the lens of the
basic purpose of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to preserve family harmony by
providing an absolutory cause. Since the goal of Article 332(1) is to benefit the accused, the
Court should adopt an application or interpretation that is more favorable to the accused. In
this case, that interpretation is the continuing affinity view.
Avelino Casupan, et al. v. Mario Laroya, G.R. No. 145391, August 26, 2002

Statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in
that sense and to that extent.
Fernando Miguel v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172035, July 4, 2012
Another reason that militates against the petitioners position relates to the nature of
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019; it is not a penal provision that would call for a liberal
interpretation in favor of the accused public official and a strict construction against the
State. The suspension required under this provision is not a penalty, as it is not imposed as
a result of judicial proceedings; in fact, if acquitted, the accused official shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during his
suspension.
b) Scope of application and characteristics of Philippine criminal law
(i) Generality
People v. Romeo Jalosjos, G.R. No. 132875-76, February 3, 2000 (Separate opinion
of Justice Gonzaga-Reyes)
Penal laws are obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in Philippine territory. Since the
Constitution itself provides for the immunities from the general application of our criminal
laws which a Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may enjoy, it follows that
any expansion of such immunities must similarly be based upon an express constitutional
grant.
Suzette Nicolas v. Alberto Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 175888, February 11, 2009
The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter ones territory is
immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon.
(ii) Territoriality
Suzette Nicolas v. Alberto Romulo, G.R. No. 175888, February 11, 2009
The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter ones territory is
immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The Status of Forces
Agreements involving foreign military units around the world vary in terms and conditions,
according to the situation of the parties involved, and reflect their bargaining power. But the
principle remains, i.e., the receiving State can exercise jurisdiction over the forces of the
sending State only to the extent agreed upon by the parties.
People v. Roger Tulin, G.R. No. 111709, August 30, 2001
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is
an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if
Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the
penal code but under a special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in
Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here
since its purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People

v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law
penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world (People v. Lollo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).
(iii) Prospectivity
People v. Roman Deliro, G.R. No. 117818, April 18, 1997
Being a penal law, such provision of Republic Act No. 7659 may not be applied to the crime
of murder committed in 1982 by appellant, based on the principle of prospectivity of penal
laws. Further, the presumption is that laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary clearly
appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocally expressed or necessarily implied. In every
case of doubt, the doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws. X x x
Xxx
One of the universally accepted characteristics of a penal law is prospectivity. This general
principle of criminal law is embodied in Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code which provides
that "no felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its
commission," and was applied by the Supreme Court in two early cases to mean that no act
or omission shall be held to be a crime, nor its author punished, except by virtue of a law in
force at the time the act was committed.
Besides, to give retroactive effect to the pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 7659 (The
Death Penalty Law) would be violative of the constitutional prohibition against ex post
facto laws. Among others, an ex post facto law has been defined as one which changes the
punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it
was committed.
It is settled that a penal law may have retroactive effect only when it is favorable to the
accused. Obviously, with a penalty more onerous than that provided by the Revised Penal
Code for murder, the pertinent amendment thereof by Republic Act No. 7659 cannot fall
within the exception to the general rule on prospectivity of penal laws.
People v. Sixto Padua, G.R. No. 192821, March 21, 2011
However, the crime was committed in 1991, i.e., prior to the passage of the law imposing
the death penalty for rape cases and prior to the new rape law. The law then in place
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code should apply. Under this law, simple rape is
punishable by reclusion perpetua.
(a) Effects of repeal/amendment of penal law
Statutory amendment that is favorable to the accused is given retroactive effect
People v. Javier Morilla, G.R. No. 189833, February 5, 2014
X x x Originally, under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6425, the penalty for illegal
transportation of methamphetamine hydrochloride was imprisonment ranging from six years
and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos.
Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1683, the penalty was amended to life imprisonment to

death and a fine ranging from twenty to thirty thousand pesos. The penalty was further
amended in Republic Act No. 7659, where the penalty was changed to reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos.
From the foregoing, we sustain the imposed penalty of fine of P10,000,00.00 to be paid by
each of the accused but amend the penalty to reclusion perpetua following the provisions of
Republic Act No. 7659 and the principle of retroactive application of lighter penalty.
Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict
becomes eligible for pardon. It also carries with it accessory penalties, namely: perpetual
special disqualification, etc. Life imprisonment, on the other hand, does not appear to have
any definite extent or duration and carries no accessory penalties.
The full particulars are in Ho Wai Pang v. People, thus:
As to the penalties imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the appellate court, we find
the same in accord with law and jurisprudence. It should be recalled that at the time of the
commission of the crime on September 6, 1991, Section 15 of R.A. No. 6425 was already
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1683. The decree provided that for violation of said
Section 15, the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to
P30,000.00 shall be imposed. Subsequently, however, R.A. No. 7659 further introduced new
amendments to Section 15, Article III and Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended. Under the new amendments, the penalty prescribed in Section 15 was changed
from "life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00" to
"reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million." On the
other hand, Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 amended Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425 in
that the new penalty provided by the amendatory law shall be applied depending on the
quantity of the dangerous drugs involved.
The trial court, in this case, imposed on petitioner the penalty of reclusion perpetua under
R.A. No. 7659 rather than life imprisonment ratiocinating that R.A. No. 7659 could be given
retroactive application, it being more favorable to the petitioner in view of its having a less
stricter punishment
We agree. In People v. Doroja, we held:
"In People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994) this Court ruled (a) that the
amendatory law, being more lenient and favorable to the accused than the original
provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, should be accorded retroactive application, x x x."
And, since "reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty than life imprisonment, and considering
the rule that criminal statutes with a favorable effect to the accused, have, as to him, a
retroactive effect," the penalty imposed by the trial court upon petitioner is proper.
Consequently, the Court sustains the penalty of imprisonment, which is reclusion perpetua,
as well as the amount of fine imposed by the trial court upon petitioner, the same being
more favorable to him.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the assailed 13 July 2009
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 02967 is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION with respect to the penalty to be imposed as Reclusion Perpetua instead of
Life Imprisonment and payment of fine of P10,000,000.00 by each of the accused.

Joemar Ortega v. People, G.R. No. 151085, August 20, 2008


Given this precise statutory declaration, it is imperative that this Court accord retroactive
application to the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 9344 pursuant to the well-entrenched
principle in criminal law - favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which
are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect. This principle is embodied in Article
22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides: x x x
People v. Francisco Talaro, et al., G.R. No. 175781, March 20, 2012
R.A. 9346 (Anti Death Penalty Law) x x x retroactive x x x pursuant to the principle in
criminal law, favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable
to accused are given retroactive effect. This principle is embodied under Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code, which provides as follows: x x x
Non-penal statutory amendment favorable to the accused is not given retroactive effect
Susan Go and People v. Fernando Dimagiba, G.R. No. 151876, June 21, 2005
The rule on retroactivity states that criminal laws may be applied retroactively if favorable to
the accused. This principle, embodied in the Revised Penal Code, has been expanded in
certain instances to cover special laws.
X x x SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code is not applicable. The circular applies only to those cases pending as of the date
of its effectivity and not to cases already terminated by final judgment.
Elvira Yu Oh v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125297, June 6, 2003
R.A. No. 7691 (Judiciary Re-Organization Act) does not prohibit certain acts or provides
penalties for its violation; neither does it treat of the nature of crimes and its punishment.
Consequently, R.A. No. 7691 is not a penal law, and therefore, Art. 22 of the RPC does not
apply in the present case.
Statutory amendment that is not favorable to the accused is not given retroactive effect
People v. Rolando Valdez, G.R. No. 127663, March 11, 1999
X x x there can be no separate conviction of the crime of illegal possession of firearms
under Presidential Decree No. 1866 in view of the amendments introduced by Republic Act
No. 8294.
Instead, illegal possession of firearms is merely to be taken as an aggravating circumstance
per Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294, which in part, provides:
If homicide or murders is committed with the use of unlicensed firearm, such of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
Republic Act No. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997, fifteen days after its publication on July
21, 1997. The crimes involved in the case at bar were committed on September 17, 1995.
As in the case of any penal law, the provisions of Republic Act No. 8294 will generally have

prospective application. In cases, however, where the new law will be advantageous to the
accused, the law may be given retroactive application (Article 22, Revised Penal Code).
Insofar as it will spare accused-appellant in the case at bar from a separate conviction for
the crime of illegal possession of firearms, Republic Act No. 8294 may be given retroactive
application in Criminal Case No. U-8749 (for Illegal Possession of Firearm) subject of this
present review

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