PEOPLE vs VALDEZ

G.R. No. 129296

September 25, 2000
FACTS:
The police force of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya
received a tip from an unnamed informer about
the presence of a marijuana plantation allegedly
owned by Abe Valdez.
Thereafter the Chief of Police of Villaverde formed
a reaction team to verify the report and instructed
them to uproot said marijuana plants and arrest
Valdez.
The following day, the police team together with
the informer left for the site where the marijuana
plants were allegedly being grown.
After a 3-hour trek the police arrived at the place
and found Valdez in his nipa hut. They looked
around the area where Valdez had his kaingin and
saw 7 5-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in 2
rows, approximately 25 meters from appellant's
hut.
One of the police asked Valdez who owned the
prohibited plants and, according to the former,
the latter admitted that they were his.
The police uprooted the seven marijuana
plants. The police took photos of appellant
standing beside the cannabis plants.
Valdez was then arrested and charged with a
violation of the Dangers Drugs Act of 1972.
The RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt
ISSUE:
WON the seized marijuana plants are admissible in
evidence against the accused.
RULING: No
The Court held that the search and seizure without a
warrant that was made by the police officers was violative
of Sec. 2 Art. 3 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides
for the rights of persons against unreasonable searches
and seizure.
The Constitution[31] lays down the general rule that a
search and seizure must be carried on the strength of a
judicial warrant. Otherwise, the search and seizure is
deemed "unreasonable." In the instant case, there was no
search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination of the existence of probable cause. From
the declarations of the police officers themselves, it is
clear that they had at least one (1) day to obtain a warrant
to search Valdez's farm. Furthermore, contrary to OSGs
contention, the plain view doctrine cannot apply in the
case. Said doctrine applies where the police inadvertently
came across the object. Clearly, their discovery of the
plants was not inadvertent. The seized marijuana plants
were not "immediately apparent" and a "further search"
was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question
were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand."
Therefore, the marijuana plants cannot, as products of an
unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against
Valdez. They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It
was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of the court a
quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized
marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant.

In the instant case we find that, from the start, a tipster

had furnished the police appellant's name as well as the
location of appellant's farm, where the marijuana plants

were allegedly being grown. While the police operation

was supposedly meant to merely "verify" said information,
the police chief had likewise issued instructions to arrest
appellant as a suspected marijuana cultivator. Thus, at the
time the police talked to appellant in his farm, the latter
was already under investigation as a suspect. The
questioning by the police was no longer a general inquiry.
We find appellant's extrajudicial confession flawed with
respect to its admissibility. For a confession to be
admissible, it must satisfy the following requirements: (1)
it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the
assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it
must be express; and (4) it must be in writing. [51] The
records show that the admission by appellant was
verbal. It was also uncounselled. A verbal admission
allegedly made by an accused during the investigation,
without the assistance of counsel at the time of his arrest
and even before his formal investigation is not only
inadmissible for being violative of the right to counsel
during criminal investigations, it is also hearsay. [52] Even if
the confession or admission were "gospel truth", if it was
made without assistance of counsel and without a valid
waiver of such assistance, the confession is inadmissible
in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even
if it had been voluntarily given.[53]

PEOPLE vs ADOR
G.R. Nos. 140538-39
June 14, 2004
FACTS:
-

The appellants, Godofredo and Diosdado III Ador,

are suspects in the killing of Abe Cuya and
Rodolfo Chavez.

On the way to the crime laboratory, Godofredo

told his police escort that he had been entrusted
with a handgun which he kept in his residence,
which he fired on the night of the killing. The
information was relayed to Major Idian, then
Deputy Chief of Police of Naga City, who ordered
PO3 Nepomuceno to accompany him in
recovering the gun. Thus, Major Idian, PO3
Nepomuceno and some others accompanied
Godofredo to the latters residence.

Upon reaching the Ador residence, Godofredo,

together with PO3 Nepomuceno, went to their
backyard, retrieved the gun from under a fallen
coconut trunk and turned it in to the latter.

Both appellants were found guilty by the trial,

thus the appeal.

ISSUE:
WON the admissions of Godofredo Ador without counsel
may be admitted as evidence in the case.
RULING: No
The admissions made by Godofredo to Major Idian and
PO3 Nepomuceno including the gun in question cannot be
considered in evidence against him without violating his
constitutional right to counsel. Godofredo was already
under custodial investigation when he made his
admissions and surrendered the gun to the police
authorities. The police had already begun to focus on the
Adors and were carrying out a process of interrogations
that was lending itself to eliciting incriminating statements
and evidence: the police went to the Ador residence that
same evening upon being informed that the Adors had a
long-standing grudge against the Cuyas; the following
day, all the male members of the Ador family were told to
go to the police station; the police was also informed of
the dying declaration of deceased Chavez pointing to the
Adors as the assailants; the Adors were all subjected to
paraffin examination; and, there were no other suspects
as the police was not considering any other person or
group of persons. The investigation thus was no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime as the Adors were
already being held as suspects for the killings of Cuya and
Chavez.
Consequently, the rights of a person under custodial
investigation, including the right to counsel, have already
attached to the Adors, and pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 12(1)
and (3), 1987 Constitution, any waiver of these rights
should be in writing and undertaken with the assistance of
counsel. Admissions under custodial investigation made
without the assistance of counsel are barred as evidence.
[78]
The records are bare of any indication that the accused
have waived their right to counsel, hence, any of their

admissions are inadmissible in evidence against them. As

we have held, a suspects confession, whether verbal or
non-verbal, when taken without the assistance of counsel
without a valid waiver of such assistance regardless of the
absence of such coercion, or the fact that it had been
voluntarily given, is inadmissible in evidence, even if such
confession were gospel truth.

The rules of evidence allow the courts to rely on

circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt.
[51]
It may be the basis of a conviction so long as the
combination of all the circumstances proven produces a
logical conclusion which suffices to establish the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. [52] All the
circumstances must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the theory that all the accused are guilty
of the offense charged, and at the same time inconsistent
with the hypothesis that they are innocent and with every
other possible, rational hypothesis except that of guilt.
[53]
The evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis
which may be consistent with their innocence. [54] Also, it
should be acted on and weighed with great caution.
[55]
Circumstantial evidence which has not been adequately
established, much less corroborated, cannot by itself be
the basis of conviction.[56]
Thus, for circumstantial evidence to suffice, (1) there
should be more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. [57] Like an ornate
tapestry created out of interwoven fibers which cannot be
plucked out and assayed a strand at a time apart from the
others, the circumstances proved should constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. [58] The test to
determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on
record are sufficient to convict the accused is that the
series of the circumstances proved must be consistent
with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his
innocence.

PEOPLE vs BACONGUIS
GR No. 149889
Dec. 2, 2003
FACTS:
-

Appellant, Ruel Baconguis, was charged of murder

for allegedly killing Roberto Mercado.
The only witness in the crime was Lydia MercadoLledo, the sister of the victim.
Crediting Lydias
positive
identification
of
appellant as the man she saw leaving her house
and jumping over the fence and the results of the
paraffin test, the trial court convicted appellant by
the decision on review.

ISSUE:
WON the result of the paraffin test is conclusive.
RULING: No
It is well settled that nitrates are also found in substances
other than gunpowder.[34]Thus, in a number of cases, 32 the
Court acquitted the accused despite the finding of
gunpowder nitrates on his hand, noting that:
Scientific experts concur in the view that the result of a
paraffin test is not conclusive. While it can establish the
presence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand, it does not
always indubitably show that said nitrates or nitrites were
caused by the discharge of firearm. The person tested
may have handled one or more of a number of substances
which give the same positive reaction for nitrates or
nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, pharmaceuticals,
and leguminous plants such as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A
person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite
deposits on his hands since these substances are present
in the products of combustion of tobacco. The presence of
nitrates, therefore, should be taken only as an indication
of a possibility but not of infallibility that the person tested
has fired a gun.33
In fact, prosecution witness Police Superintendent Liza
Madeja Sabong, who conducted the paraffin test on
appellant, testified that a person who fires a gun can
transfer gunpowder from his hands to someone standing
very near him even if the second person did not fire a gun
himself.34
But even assuming arguendo that appellants being
positive for gunpowder may be credited as circumstantial
evidence indicating his culpability, that is only one
circumstance, and since no other circumstance was
established by the prosecution, the first requirement for
circumstantial evidence to warrant conviction of appellant
has not been met.
The prosecution having failed to discharge its burden of
proving the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt, he
must be acquitted.

Prosecution witness Lydia identified appellant, then alone

in the detention cell, and in open court as the person she
saw leaving the house.
The value of the in-court identification made by Lydia,
however, is largely dependent upon the out-of-court
identification she made while appellant was in the custody
of the police. In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,[19] this Court held
that corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates

the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the

case.
In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court
identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality
of circumstances test where they consider the following
factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree
of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior
description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the
length of time between the crime and the identification;
and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure.[20] (Underscoring supplied)
The totality of circumstances test has been fashioned to
assure fairness as well as compliance with constitutional
requirements of due process in regard to out-of-court
identification.[
A showup, such as what was undertaken by the police in
the identification of appellant by Lydia, has been held to
be an underhanded mode of identification for "being
pointedly suggestive, generating confidence where there
was none, activating visual imagination, and, all told,
subverting their reliability as an eyewitness. [29] Lydia knew
that she was going to identify a suspect, whose name had
priorly been furnished by her brother-policeman, when she
went to the police station. And the police pointed
appellant to her, and told her that he was the suspect,
while he was behind bars, alone.[30]
The unusual, coarse and highly singular method of
identification, which revolts against accepted principles of
scientific crime detection, alienates the esteem of every
just man, and commands neither respect nor acceptance.

PEOPLE vs TUMIMPAD
GR No. 109144
August 19, 1994
FACTS:
-

Accused-appellant,
Moreno
Tumimpad,
was
charged and found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape.
He allegedly rape Sandra Salcedo, a 15-year old
mongoloid child.
The trial court convicted Tumimpad of the crime
basing its decision on the results of the "Major
Blood Grouping Test" and "Pheno Blood
Typing" conducted on the 2 accused and the
victim.
The result showed that Tumimpad had the same
blood type with the child conceived by the victim.

PEOPLE vs CARPO
GR No. 132676
April 4, 2001
FACTS:
-

ISSUE:
WON the lower court erred in convicting Tumimpad based
on the result of the blood test.
What is the value of the blood test as evidence.
RULING: No
Accused-appellants' culpability was established mainly by
testimonial evidence given by the victim herself and her
relatives. The blood test was adduced as evidence only to
show that the alleged father or any one of many others of
the same blood type may have been the father of the
child. As held by this Court in Janice Marie Jao vs. Court of
Appeals 19:
Paternity Science has demonstrated that by the analysis
of blood samples of the mother, the child, and the alleged
father, it can be established conclusively that the man is
not the father of a particular child. But group blood testing
cannot show only a possibility that he is. Statutes in many
states, and courts in others, have recognized the value
and the limitations of such tests. Some of the decisions
have recognized the conclusive presumption of nonpaternity where the results of the test, made in the
prescribed manner, show the impossibility of the alleged
paternity. This is one of the few cases in which the
judgment of the Court may scientifically be completely
accurate, and intolerable results avoided, such as have
occurred where the finding is allowed to turn on oral
testimony conflicting with the results of the test. The
findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove
the fact of paternity as they show only a possibility that
the alleged father or any one of many others with the
same blood type may have been the father of the child.

Accused-appellants were convicted by the trial

court of multiple murder complexed with
attempted murder for the death of Florentino,
Norwela, Nissan and Noemi Dulay.
They allegedly caused the explosion in the house
of the victims by means of a hand grenade.
After conviction, the case was elevated to the
Supreme Court for automatic review.
After the filing of briefs, the accused filed
an Addendum to Appellant's Brief urging that the
favorable results of their lie detector tests with
the NBI be admitted into the records.

The lie detector reports state that when

accused-appellants answered NO to a series of
questions related to the incident the polygrams
revealed (they had) no specific reactions
indicative (of) deception.

ISSUE:
WON the accused-appellants should be acquitted based on
the poygrams.
RULING: No
A lie detector test is based on the theory that an individual
will undergo physiological changes, capable of being
monitored by sensors attached to his body, when he is not
telling the truth. The Court does not put credit and faith on
the result of a lie detector test inasmuch as it has not
been accepted by the scientific community as an accurate
means of ascertaining truth or deception.

PEOPLE vs MENESES
GR No. 111742
March 26, 1998
FACTS:
-

Accused-appellant, Roman Meneses, was found

guilty of murder for the killing of his brother-inlaw, Cesar Victoria.
His conviction was based mainly on the testimony
of the victims son, Christopher, who testified that
he was awakened from sleep at around 3:00 in
the morning and saw his father being stabbed in
the heart with a veinte nueve by Meneses.

ISSUE:
WON the testimony of Christopher is credible enough to
convict Meneses.
RULING: No
Meneses conviction is anchored entirely on the testimony
of the single eyewitness, Christopher Victoria, who
identified appellant as the one who he allegedly saw stab
his father.
We find that the trustworthiness of the identification of
appellant by Christopher is dubious, raising reasonable
doubt in the mind of the Court as to appellants culpability.
It was established that the crime took place in the wee
hours of the morning, before the crack of dawn, at around
three oclock.[11] The court can take judicial notice of the
laws of nature,[12] such as in the instant case, that at
around three in the morning during the Christmas season,
it is still quite dark and that daylight comes rather late in
this time of year.[13] Nowhere in the description of the
crime scene by witness SPO3 Mendoza in his testimony
was it established that there was light or illumination of
any sort by which Christopher could see the attacker.
The crime took place in a makeshift room measuring about
three by five square meters. While the room had a door,
there was no mention of a window which could have
allowed entry of some kind of light from the outside. It is
highly improbable that a young boy, just roused from
sleep and his eyes adjusting to the unlit room, could
identify the attacker, much less identify the knife used, as
Christopher did, as a veinte nueve.
The prosecution failed to paint a crystal-clear picture of
the environment by which Christopher could have made
an
accurate
and
reliable
identification
of
the
attacker. Christophers testimony being improbable, is not
credible. Evidence is credible when it is such as the
common experience of mankind can approve as probable
under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of
human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge,
observation, and experience.

DEL ROSARIO vs PEOPLE

GR No. 142295
May 31, 2001
FACTS:
-

Petitioner, Vicente Del Rosario, was found guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal
possession of firearms.
Among the evidences presented against him was
a certification issued by the Chief, Firearms and
Explosives Division, PNP, stating that a certain
Vicente Vic Del Rosario of Brgy. Bigte,
Norzagaray, Bulacan, had not been issued a
license to carry a firearm.
Petitioner argued that he is Vicente Del Rosario of
Brgy. Tigbe, Norsagaray, Bulacan, and that he has
a valid firearm license.

ISSUE:
WON the court is correct in convicting Del Rosario in
consideration of the certification issued by the CFED,PNP.
RULING: No
petitioner submitted that he was not the person referred
to in the said certification because he is Vicente del
Rosario y Nicolas from Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray,
Bulacan. The Court takes judicial notice of the existence of
both barangay Tigbe and barangay Bigte, in Norzagaray,
Bulacan.[16] In fact, the trial court erred grievously in not
taking judicial notice of the barangays within its territorial
jurisdiction, believing the prosecutions submission that
there was only barangay Tigbe, and that barangay Bigte in
the certification was a typographical error. [17] Petitioner
presented to the head of the raiding team, Police Senior
Inspector Jerito A. Adique, Chief, Operations Branch, PNP
Criminal Investigation Command, a valid firearm license.
The court is duty bound to examine the evidence
assiduously to determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. It is true that the court may rely on the
certification of the Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division,
PNP on the absence of a firearm license. [18] However, such
certification referred to another individual and thus,
cannot prevail over a valid firearm license duly issued to
petitioner.

PEOPLE vs ESTOMACO
GR No. 117485-86
April 22, 1996

is egregious error; it would be different if local dialect was

used to denote an alternative and different medium but,
inexplicably, without identifying what it was.

FACTS:

The significance of this distinction is found right in the

provisions of Section 1(a) of Rule 116 which, cognizant of
the aforestated linguistic variations, deliberately required
that the complaint or information be read to the accused
in the language or the dialect known to him, to ensure his
comprehension of the charges. The Court takes judicial
notice, because it is either of public knowledge or readily
capable of unquestionable demonstration, [19] that in the
central and northwestern part of Iloilo province and all the
way up to and throughout Antique, including necessarily
San Joaquin where the offenses were committed and of
which appellant and his family are natives, the local
dialect is known as kinaray-a.

Accused-appellant,
Melchor
Estomaco,
was
charged with five counts of incestuous rape of her
daughter.
The trial court found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in two of the cases filed against
him, imposing upon him the penalties of reclusion
perpetua and death, respectively.

RULING:
In the automatic review of the cases, the Supreme Court
emphasized the consistency of non-compliance by the
court a quo of the procedural rules to be observed for the
validity of the arraignment of an accused.
Among said non-compliance is the proper reading of the
complaints to the accused during his arraignment.
Court: Likewise of very serious importance and
consequence is the fact that the complaints were
supposedly read to appellant in Ilonggo/local dialect.
Parenthetically, there was no statement of record that
appellant fully understood that medium of expression. This
assumes added significance since Ilonggo, or properly
called Hiligaynon, is a regional language, [18] spoken in a
major part of Iloilo province, Negros Occidental and, with
variations, in Capiz. Within a province or major
geographical area using a basic regional language, there
may be other local dialects spoken in certain parts
thereof. If said indication in the aforequoted portion of the
transcript intended to convey that Ilonggo is merely a
local dialect and was also the idiom referred to, the same

Barring previous exposure to or as a consequence of

extended social or commercial intercourse, kinaray-a is
not readily understandable to nor spoken by those born to
the Hiligaynon regional language or who have lived in the
areas under its sway for an appreciable period of
time. The converse is true for those whose native tongue
is the dialect of kinaray-a, since they are generally not
well-versed in Ilonggo, or Hiligaynon. Since all the
complaints are not only in English but in technical legal
language, we are again at sea as to whether and how the
indictments were translated to Ilonggo and/or to kinaraya, or that the appellant was truly and honestly made of
the charges and, especially, the consequences of his guilty
plea thereto. The records are silent and do not reveal
anything on this point, nor how the dialogue between the
presiding judge and appellant was translated. Yet a mans
life is at stake while this Court wrestles with that dilemma
created by an omission of official duty.
(Judgment Set aside Remanded)