PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR No. L-51065: June 30, 1987 FACTS: Arturo Mejorada was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(E) of RA No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Mejorada was a rightaway agent whose main duty was to process the claims for compensation of damages with property owners affected by highway construction and improvements. He required claimants to sign blank copies of Sworn Statements and Agreements to Demolish, where it appeared that the properties of the claimants have higher values than the actual value claimed by them. However, the claimants did not bother reading through the paper because they were very much interested in the payment of damages. After processing the claims, instead of giving to the claimants the proper amount, Mejorada gave one of them P5,000 and the rest P1,000 each, saying that there are many who would share in said amounts. The claimants werent able to complain because they were afraid of the accused and his armed companion. The Sandiganbayan sentenced Mejorada to 56 years and 8 days of imprisonment which is equivalent to the eight (8) penalties for eight information filed against him. However, Mejorada contended that the penalty imposed upon him is contrary to the three-fold rule under Article 70 of the RPC where the duration of the aggregate penalties should not exceed 40 years. ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty imposed upon him violate the three-fold rule under Article 70 of the RPC. DECISION: No, the penalty imposed upon him does not violate the three-fold rule under Article 70 of the RPC. RATIO: This article is to be taken into account not in the imposition of the penalty but in connection with the service of the sentence imposed. Article 70 of the RPC does not state anything about the imposition of penalty. It only explains the service of sentence, duration of penalty and penalty to be inflicted. It merely provides that the prisoner cannot be made serve more than three times the most severe of these penalties the maximum of which is forty (40) years. As stated in a previous case, The courts can still impose as many penalties as there are separate and distinct offenses committed, since for every individual crime committed, a corresponding penalty is prescribed by law. With these reasons, Mejorada cannot correctly contend that his penalty is excessive. There are eight charges against him and each has an equivalent penalty as prescribed by RA 3019, thus, Sandiganbayan has imposed the correct penalty.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF PETE C. LAGRAN
363 SCRA 275 (2001) FACTS: Petitioner Pete C. Lagran was convicted of three (3) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of one (1) year for each count. Petitioner was then committed to the Quezon City Jail on February 24, 1999 and was later on transferred to the New Bilibid Prison where he has been serving his sentence. Petitioner filed the instant petition for habeas corpus. He prayed for his immediate release as he had allegedly completed the service of his sentence. He cited Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, arguing that if the penalties or sentences imposed on the accused are identical, and such penalties or sentences emanated from one court and one complaint, the accused shall serve them simultaneously. He stated that he has been incarcerated for two (2) years and four (4) days, counted from February 28, 2001, thus, his detention in the New Bilibid Prison is now without legal basis. ISSUE: Whether or not the sentence imposed on the accused shall serve them simultaneously. DECISION: No, the sentence imposed on the accused shall serve them successively. RATIO: As a general rule, Article 70 of the RPC allows simultaneous service of two or more penalties but only if the nature of the penalties so permit. The exception is that penalties consisting in deprivation of liberty cannot be served simultaneously by reason of the nature of such penalties. Where the accused is sentenced to two or more terms of imprisonment, the terms should be served successively. In the case at bar, petitioner was sentenced to suffer one year imprisonment for every count of the offense committed (three years in all for 3 counts of violation). The nature of the sentence does not allow petitioner to serve all the prison terms simultaneously. Applying the rule on successive service of sentence, petitioner has not yet completed the service of his sentence as he commenced serving his sentence only on February 24, 1999. His prayer, therefore, for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus has no basis.
MONSANTO VS FACTORAN
170 SCRA 190 (1989)
FACTS: The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant city treasurer of Calbayog City) with the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced to imprisonment and to indemnify the government. She was later given an absolute pardon by President Marcos which she accepted. By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Finance Ministry requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer. The Minister of Finance referred the issue to the Office of the President. In response, the Office denied Monsantos request. The Office averred that Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the absolute pardon granted to her does not automatically reinstate her former position and that despite said absolute pardon, she is still civilly liable from her previous conviction. Petitioner stressed however that the full pardon extended to her had already wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted and that she is entitled to back pay during her period of suspension and that she should not be required to pay the government. ISSUE: 1. Does the absolute pardon granted to petitioner automatically reinstate her former position without need of a new appointment? 2. Does the absolute pardon extinguish her civil liability? DECISION: 1. No, the absolute pardon does not automatically reinstate her former position without need of a new appointment. 2. No, the absolute pardon does not extinguish her civil liability. RATIO: 1. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction. Stated differently, the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment. 2. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioners civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.