Evidence Case Digest

EVIDENCE
Case Digests (Project 2014)

Atty. Lu, Thursday, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2014-2015
PART ONE
I. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
A. RULE 128, SECTIONS 1 4
RULE 128
GENERAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 1. Evidence defined. Evidence is the means, sanctioned by these rules, of
ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact. (1)
SECTION 2. Scope. The rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and
hearings, except as otherwise provided by law or these rules. (2a)
SECTION 3. Admissibility of evidence. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue
and is not excluded by the law or these rules. (3a)
SECTION 4. Relevancy; Collateral Matters. Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in
issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall
not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or
improbability of the fact in issue.
CASES
1. Reyes vs. Court of Appeals
2. People vs. Turco
3. Agustin vs. CA
216 SCRA 25 (1993)

337 SCRA 714 (2000)
G.R. No. 162571
REYES VS. COURT OF APPEALS

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216 SCRA 25 (1993)
By: Abdullah, Naila
The rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and
hearings except as otherwise provided by law
Facts:
Juan Mendoza, the father of defendant Olympio, is the owner of Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106, devoted to the
production of palay. The lots are tenanted and cultivated by Julian de la Cruz, the husband of plaintiff Eufrocina de
la Cruz. In her complaint, Eufrocina alleged that upon the death of her husband, she succeeded him as bona fide
tenant. However, Olympio in conspiracy with the other defendants prevented her daughter Violeta and her workers
from entering and working on the farm lots. Defendants likewise refused to vacate and surrender the lots, which
prompted Eufrocina to file a case for the recovery of possession and damages with a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction in the meantime.
The petitioners in this case, the defendants Reyes, Parayao, Aguinaldo and Mananghaya, are duly elected
and appointed barangay officials of the locality, who denied their interference in the tenancy relationship existing
between Olympio and Eufrocina. Olympio, for his part, raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage of the farm lots
without his consent, and non-payment of rentals as his defenses.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the agrarian courts decision with modification, which ordered the
defendants to restore possession of the farm lots to plaintiff Eufrocina. The CA likewise ruled that the petitioners
are solidarily liable to pay to Eufrocina the value of cavans of palay until they have vacated the area. On appeal, the
petitioners questioned the favorable consideration given to the affidavits of Eufrocina and EfrenTecson, since the
affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination.
Issue:
1.
Whether or not the trial court erred when it gave favorable consideration to the affidavits of plaintiff,
even if the affiant was not presented and subjected to cross-examination.
Ruling:
1. The judgment is affirmed. The trial court did not err when it favorable considered the affidavits of
Eufrocina and EfrenTecson although the affiants were not presented and subjected to crossexamination. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that the Rules of Court shall not be applicable in
agrarian cases even in a suppletory character. The same provision states that In the hearing,
investigation and determination of any question or controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits may
be allowed and are admissible in evidence, Moreover, in agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence
required is no more than substantial evidence. Thus, this case is an application of the rule with regard
the scope of the Rules on Evidence which states that The rules of evidence shall be the same in all
courts and in all trials and hearings except as otherwise provided by law (ex. Section 16 of P.D. No.
946)or these rules.
PEOPLE VS. TURCO

337 SCRA 714 (2000)
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By: Abdullah, Naila
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the
law or these rules (Section 3, Rule 128) or is competent
Facts:
Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (a.k.a. Totong) was charged with the crime of rape. The prosecution alleged that the
victim, Escelea Tabada (12 yrs and 6 months old at the time of the incident) and accused Turco were neighbors. On
the night of the incident, upon reaching her home, Escelea heard a call from outside. She recognized the voice to be
Turcos since they have been neighbors for 4 years and are second cousins. When she opened the door, the accused
with the use of a towel, covered the victims face. Then the accused bid the victim to walk. When they reached a
grassy part, near the pig pen which was about 12 meters away from the victims house, the accused laid the victim
on the grass, went on top of her an took off her short pants and panty. The victim tried to resist by moving her body
but to no avail. The accused succeeded in pursuing his evil design by forcibly inserting his penis inside the victims
private parts.
Upon reaching home, the victim discovered that her short pants and panty were filled with blood. For
almost ten days, she kept to herself the harrowing experience, until she had the courage to tell her brother-in-law,
who in turn told the victims father about the rape of his daughter. Thereafter, they did not waste time and
immediately asked the victim to see a doctor for medical examination. After the issuance of the medical certificate,
they went to the Isabela Municipal Station and filed a complaint against the accused charging him with rape.
The trial court convicted the accused, stating that the defense of sweetheart theory was a mere concoction
of the accused in order to exculpate him from criminal liability. Appealing his conviction, the accused-appellant
argues that the trial court erred because no actual proof was presented that the rape of the complainant actually
happened considering that although a medical certificate was presented, the medico-legal officer who prepared the
same was not presented in court to explain the same.
Issue:
1.
Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting the medical certificate in evidence, although the
medico-legal officer who prepared the same was not presented in court to testify on it.
Ruling:
1. Conviction affirmed. We place emphasis on the distinction between admissibility of evidence and the
probative value thereof. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or
these rules (Section 3, Rule 128) or is competent. Since admissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance and
competence, admissibility is therefore, an affair of logic and law. On the other hand, the weight to be given to such
evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided in rule 133 and the
jurisprudence laid down by the Court. Thus, while evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to little or no
weight at all. Conversely, evidence which may have evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special rule
forbids its reception.
However, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence admissible as evidence,
it has very little probative value due to the absence of the examining physician. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that
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the prosecution relied solely on the medical certificate. In fact, reliance was made on the testimony of the victim
herself, which standing alone even without the medical examination, is sufficient evidence. The absence of medical
findings by a medico-legal officer does not disprove the occurrence of rape. It is enough that the evidence on hand
convinces the court that conviction is proper. In the instant case, the victims testimony alone is credible and
sufficient to convict.
AGUSTIN VS. CA
G.R. No. 162571
By: Abdullah, Naila
DNA evidence Rule shall apply in all criminal actions, civil actions and special
proceedings
Facts:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged biological father, petitioner
Arnel Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Quezon City RTC.
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe, after which they entered into an intimate
relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday but despite Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe
decided to give birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin. The babys birth certificate was purportedly signed by
Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for
Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for
adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.
On January 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club
parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fes leg. This incident was reported to the
police. Several months later, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy.
Fe and Martin then sued Arnel for support.
Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA
paternity testing, which Arnel opposed by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination and moving to
dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action.
The trial court denied the MTD and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at
the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, thus this petition.
Issue:
1.
Whether or Not, The respondent court erred in denying the petitioners MTD.
2.
Whether or Not, the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA paternity testing and was a form
of unreasonable search.
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Ruling:
1. NO. The trial court properly denied the petitioners motion to dismiss because the private respondents
complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of action against the petitioner. The elements of a cause of action
are: (1) the plaintiffs primary right and the defendants corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful
act or omission of the defendant, by which the primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is
determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged.
2. NO. In Ople v. Torres,the Supreme Court struck down the proposed national computerized identification
system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into
individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public
service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance
public service and the common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the infringement of
privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioners case
involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no
water.
RELEVANCE
SECTIONS 3 AND 4, RULE 128
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SECTION 3.Admissibility of evidence. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue

SECTION 4.Relevancy; Collateral Matters. Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in
issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall
not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or
improbability of the fact in issue.
CASES
1. Lopez vs. Heesen
2. State vs Ball
365 P.2d 448 (1961)

339 S.w2d 783 (1960)
LOPEZ VS. HEESEN

365 P.2d 448 (1961)
By: Abdullah, Naila
The testimony as to the reputation of other firearms companies using the same
safety device is material and relevant to the issue of whether the safety device on
the Higgins Model 51 was unsafe or safe, and that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting this testimony
Facts:
Appellee Heesen, an air Force officer, purchased a J.C. Higgins Model 51 30.06 rifle from the store of
appellee Sears. The rifle has a bolt action known as a Mausser type action with a Class 1 safety mechanism. At
the time of the purchase, Heesen was given an instruction pamphlet which he read, explaining the composition of
the rifle and gave operating instructions, including the method to be pursued to make the gun safe.
Immediately after the purchase, Heesen left for a deer hunting trip in an area known as Ute Park. He
placed a live cartridge in the chamber and placed the gun on safety position. He traveled a good deal during the
hours before the shooting and on one of two occasions, he discovered the gun off safety position. This occurred
when he had come down a long hill covered with rocks and boulders. Heesen was not aware that the rifle moved
from safe to fire position at least twice before the shooting. Ten minutes before the accident began, he left the
knoll and he was carrying the gun on his shoulder.
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He later heard a rustle and saw a deer go between some trees. When he followed the deer, his left foot went
down hard on the ground on one side of a log and his right foot slipped on the grass. This brought the rifle down
and the rifle discharged, the bullet hitting appellant Lopez, who was nearby.
Lopez brought suit against Heesen for allegedly unlawfully assaulting him, thereby inflicting dangerous
and painful wounds. He also included as party-defendant, the designer, manufacturer and seller of the rifle, Sears,
for allegedly negligently designing and manufacturing the rifle bought by Heesen.
Defendants presented expert testimony on the general reputation of other firearms companies who use the
same modified leaf safety device as the Higgins Model 51. Lopez objected to this evidence on the ground that it
was wholly immaterial and irrelevant to any issue in the case. He likewise objected on the introduction of testimony
on the poundage pressure required to move the safety levers from safe to fire position on the ground of irrelevance
and immateriality. Lastly, he objected to the introduction of opinion evidence regarding the design of the safety
mechanism, on the ground that it was a subject which is within the province of the jury to determine.
Issues:
1. Whether or not expert testimony on the general reputation of other firearms companies using the same
safety device is material and relevant.
2. Whether or not testimony on the poundage pressure required is relevant and material.
3. Whether or not the design of the safety mechanism was a proper subject of expert testimony.
Ruling:
1. The expert testimony is admissible. The allegations on the ultimate facts in issue involve whether the
Higgins Model 51 rifle was in a dangerous and defective condition due to its negligent manufacture, in that the
safety mechanism moved re4adily from safe to fire position. This is an issue, the proper understanding of
which, requires knowledge or experience and cannot be determined independently merely from deductions made
and inferences drawn on the basis of ordinary knowledge. Moreover, the conduct of others is proper evidence for a
jury to consider, in determining whether the tendency of the thing is dangerous, defective, or the reverse.
Considering these principles, the Court held that the testimony as to the reputation of other firearms companies
using the same safety device is material and relevant to the issue of whether the safety device on the Higgins Model
51 was unsafe or safe, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony.
2. The testimony was introduced under Lopezs contention that the Higgins model was unsafe and thus, the
issue arose as to the poundage pressure required to move the safety lever from safe to fire. It was then proper for
Sears to show the amount of pressure required to move the safety lever as this was relevant to the issue posed.
3. Expert testimony is admissible because the expert testimony was upon the ultimate issue of whether or
not the safety device was dangerous and defective. It was the proper subject of expert testimony. It does not usurp
the functions of the jury as the latter may still reject these opinions. Said opinion evidence is not binding on the
jury.
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STATE VS. BALL
339 S.w2d 783 (1960)
By : Abutal, Ivydel
Articles found in person at the time of arrest were of course relevant and
admissible in evidence and there is no objection to them
Facts:
Ball appeals from an order of the trial court, convicting him of robbery.
At about 2:30 in the afternoon, two colored men, one of them tall and the other short, entered the Krekeler
Jewelry Store. As the taller man looked at jewelry and made his purchase, the shorter man looked in the cases and
moved about in the store. Later in the same day, at around 5:30 p.m., as John Krekeler was placing the rings and
watches in the safe preparing for the closing of the store, the two men who had been in the store at 2:30, entered the
store. They were immediately recognized by Krekeler, especially the taller mans narrow-brimmed tall hat, brown
jacket, gray short and particularly a scar on his face.
The shorter man walked behind the counter and as Krekeler tried to intercept him, the man hit Krekeler on
the face using a 0.38 long barreled pistol. With the gun on his back, the two men directed Krekeler to go to the
watch repair department, then to the restroom, where he was positioned, facing the wall. Thereafter, he could hear
jewelry being dumped in a bag, and the jingle of the car register. After hearing the door slam, Krekeler call the
police. He reported that the two men took $4,455.21 worth of watched and rings, and $140 in cash.
Three weeks later, Ball was arrested by Officers Powell and Ballard while walking in the street. Ball
shoved Officer Powell over and ran down the avenue. The officers ran after him and he was only pacified when the
Officers fired a bullet which fell in his back. Ball claims that this evidence of flight was not material or relevant,
since it was too remote from the date of the robbery (3 weeks later), to indicate a consciousness of guilt. Ball
likewise objected to the admissibility of the following articles found in his person during the arrest on grounds of
immateriality and irrelevance: a brown felt hat, a brownish windbreaker type jacket, trousers, gray shirt and shoes,
and $258.02 in currency and two pennies.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the evidence of flight is inadmissible for reason of remoteness to the time of the
commission of the crime.
2. Whether or not the articles found in the person of the accused at the time of his arrest are inadmissible
for being irrelevant and immaterial.
Ruling:
1. Unexplained flight and resisting arrest even thirty days after the supposed commission of the crime is a
relevant circumstance. The remoteness of the flight goes to the weight of the evidence rather than to its
admissibility.
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2. In identifying Ball, Krekeler was impressed with and remembered the brown ensemble, particularly the
tall brown hat. These items were of course relevant and admissible in evidence and there is no objection to them.
However, the money is inadmissible. The proof of the money here was evidently on the theory that Ball
did not have or was not likely to have such a sum of money on his person prior to the commission of the offense.
However, Krekeler was not able to identify the money or any of the items on Balls person as having come from the
jewelry store so that in fact, they were not admissible in evidence. There was no proof as to the denomination of the
money in the cash register, it was simply a total of $140. Here, nineteen days had elapsed, there was no proof that
Ball had suddenly come into possession of the $258.02 and in all these circumstances the mere possession of a
quantity of money is in itself no indication that the possessor was the taker of the money charged as taken, because
in general all money of the same denomination and material is alike, and the hypothesis that the money found is the
same as the money taken is too forced and extraordinary to be receivable.
COMPETENCE:
SECTION 3, RULE 128
SECTION 3.Admissibility of evidence. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue
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EXCLUSIONARY RULES UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

SECTIONS 2 AND 3, ARTICLE III
SEC. 2, Article III
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
SEC.3. Article III
1. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.
SECTION 12, ARTICLE III

Section 12, Article III
1. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
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2. No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited.
3. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
4. The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.
SECTION 17, ARTICLE III
SEC. 17.No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
CASES
People vs. Marti
Pollo vs. David
193 SCRA 57
G.R. No. 181881
PEOPLE VS. MARTI

193 SCRA 57
By : Abutal, Ivydel
In the absence of governmental interference, the libertied guaranteed by the

Constitution cannot be invoked against the State
Facts:
Andre Marti and his wife went to Manila Packing and Export Forwarders, carrying with them four gift
wrapped packages to be delivered to his friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes (wife of the proprietor) asked if
she could inspect the packages, however, Marti refused assuring that it only contained books, cigars and gloves as
gift to his friend.
Before delivery to Bureau of Customs/Posts, the proprietor Job Reyes, following standard operating
procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened Marti's boxes, a particular odor emitted therefrom
and he soon found out that the boxes contained dried marijuana leaves. He reported the incident to the NBI who
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acknowledged custody of the incident. Marti was convicted for violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
Issue:
Marti contends that the evidence had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against
unreasonable seach and siezure and privacy of communication.
Ruling:
1. Evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a
private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. In the absence of
governmental interference, the libertied guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
2. Mere presence of NBI agents does not convert it to warrantless search and siezure. Merely to look at that
which is plain sight is not search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been
committed is not search.
Commissioner Bernas :The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional
democracy...is a protection against the State. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the
individual and the State. Its concern is not the relation between individuals, between a private individual
and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere
inaccessible to any power holder.
PEOPLE VS. DAVID

G.R. No. 181881
By : Abutal, Ivydel
In OConnor the Court recognized that special needs authorize warrantless

searches involving public employees for work-related reasons. The Court thus
laid down a balancing test under which government interests are weighed against
the employees reasonable expectation of privacy
Facts:
Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an anonymous letter complaint alleging of an anomaly
taking place in the Regional Office of the CSC. The respondent then formed a team and issued a memo directing the
team to back up all the files in the computers found in the MamamayanMuna (PALD) and Legal divisions.
Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers
were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSCs Office for Legal
Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer
assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or lettersin
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connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David
issued the Show-Cause Order, requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation or
counter-affidavit within five days from notice.
In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against him and accused the CSC Officials of fishing
expedition when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer.
He was charged of violating R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees). He assailed the formal charge and filed an Omnibus Motion ((For Reconsideration, to Dismiss
and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis having proceeded from an illegal search which is
beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court.
The CSC denied the omnibus motion and treated the motion as the petitioners answer to the charge. In
view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the motion of the prosecution, petitioner was deemed to
have waived his right to the formal investigation which then proceeded ex parte.
The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a petition to the CA which was dismissed by the latter
on the ground that it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents. He filed a motion for
reconsideration which was further denied by the appellate court. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
1.
WON the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of the petitioner constituted an illegal search
and was a violation of his constitutional right to privacy
1.
The search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files was lawful and did
not violate his constitutional right.
In this case, the Court had the chance to present the cases illustrative of the issue raised by the
petitioner. In Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 437 (1967), the US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI
agents in electronically recording a conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone
booth violated his right to privacy and constituted a search and seizure. Because the petitioner had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call, the
protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area. Moreso, the concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Harlan noted that the existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-fold
requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).
Ruling:
Mancusi v. DeForte 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed2d 1154 (1968),thus recognized that
employees may have a reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by police.
OConnor v. Ortega 480 U.S. 709 (1987), the Court categorically declared that [i]ndividuals do
not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of a private
employer. In OConnor the Court recognized that special needs authorize warrantless searches
involving public employees for work-related reasons. The Court thus laid down a balancing test under
which government interests are weighed against the employees reasonable expectation of privacy.
This reasonableness test implicates neither probable cause nor the warrant requirement, which are
related to law enforcement.
Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633 and 161658,
November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410, 427, (citing Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, 293
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SCRA 141, 169), recognized the fact that there may be such legitimate intrusion of privacy in the
workplace.
The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office
and computer files.
As to the second point of inquiry, the Court answered in the affirmative. The search authorized by
the CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioners computer reasonable in its
inception and scope.
The Court noted that unlike in the case of Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel
Morales, Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila A.M. Nos. P-08-2519 and P-08-2520,
November 19, 2008, 571 SCRA 361, the case at bar involves the computer from which the personal
files of the petitioner were retrieved is a government-issued computer, hence government property the
use of which the CSC has absolute right to regulate and monitor.
STATUTORY RULES OF EXCLUSION

SECTION 201, TAX REFORM ACT OF 1997
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SEC. 201.Effect of Failure to Stamp Taxable Document. - An instrument, document or paper which is required by
law to be stamped and which has been signed, issued, accepted or transferred without being duly stamped, shall not
be recorded, nor shall it or any copy thereof or any record of transfer of the same be admitted or used in evidence in
any court until the requisite stamp or stamps are affixed thereto and cancelled.
R A 1 4 0 5 , L AW O N S E C R E C Y O F B A N K D E P O S I T S
L AW O N S E C R E C Y O F B A N K D E P O S I T S
Republic Act No.1405, as amended
AN ACT PROHIBITING DISCLOSURE OF OR INQUIRY
INTO, DEPOSITS WITH ANY BANKING INSTITUTION AND
PROVIDING PENALTY THEREFOR
Section 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government to give encouragement to the people to deposit
their money in banking institutions and to discourage private hoarding so that the same may be properly utilized by
banks in authorized loans to assist in the economic development of the country.
Sec 2.1 All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including investments in
bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby
considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person,
government official, bureau or office, except when the examination is made in the course of a special or general
examination of a bank and is specifically authorized by the Monetary Board after being satisfied that there is
reasonable ground to believe that a bank fraud or serious irregularity has been or is being committed and that it is
necessary to look into the deposit to establish such fraud or irregularity, or when the examination is made by an
independent auditor hired by the bank to conduct its regular audit provided that the examination is for audit purposes
only and the results thereof shall be for the exclusive use of the bank, or upon written permission of the depositor, or
in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public
officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. (As amended by
PD No.1792, January 16, 1981)
Sec 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a bank to disclose to any person other than those
mentioned in Section Two hereof, or for an independent auditor hired by a bank to conduct its regular audit to
disclose to any person other than a bank director, official or employee authorized by the bank, any information
concerning said deposits. (As amended by PDNo.1792)
Sec 4. All acts or parts of Acts, Special Charters, Executive Orders, Rules and Regulations which are inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.
Sec 5. Any violation of this law will subject the offender upon conviction, to an imprisonment of not more than five
years or a fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos or both, in the discretion of the court.
Sec 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
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APPROVED, September 9, 1955.

__________
1
This Section and Section 3 were both amended by Pres. Decree No.1792, issued January 16, 1981, PD 1792 was
expressly repealed by Sec. 135 of Rep. Act No.7653, approved June 14, 1993. The original Sections 2 and 3 of Rep.
Act No.1405 are hereby reproduced for reference, as follows: "Sec. 2 All deposits of whatever nature with banks or
banking institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines,
its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and
may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon
written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of
bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials. or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject
matter of the litigation," "Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking institution to disclose
to any person other than those mentioned in Section two hereof any information concerning said deposits."
R.A. NO. 4200 WIRETAPPING ACT

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4200
AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE TAPPING AND OTHER RELATED VIOLATIONS OF
THE PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next
preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or
copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in
the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the
contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any
other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in Section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
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SECTION 2. Any person who willfully or knowingly does or who shall aid, permit, or cause to be done any of the
acts declared to be unlawful in the preceding section or who violates the provisions of the following section or of
any order issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes such violation shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by
imprisonment for not less than six months or more than six years and with the accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification from public office if the offender be a public official at the time of the commission of the
offense, and, if the offender is an alien he shall be subject to deportation proceedings.
SECTION 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it unlawful or punishable for any peace officer,
who is authorized by a written order of the Court, to execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the two
preceding sections in cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of war,
piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion,
sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal Code, and
violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage and other offenses against national security:
Provided, That such written order shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the examination
under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and a showing: (1) that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed or is being
committed or is about to be committed: Provided, however, That in cases involving the offenses of rebellion,
conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and
inciting to sedition, such authority shall be granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the
case may be, have actually been or are being committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
evidence will be obtained essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of,
any such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence.
The order granted or issued shall specify: (1) the identity of the person or persons whose communications,
conversations, discussions, or spoken words are to be overheard, intercepted, or recorded and, in the case of
telegraphic or telephonic communications, the telegraph line or the telephone number involved and its location; (2)
the identity of the peace officer authorized to overhear, intercept, or record the communications, conversations,
discussions, or spoken words; (3) the offense or offenses committed or sought to be prevented; and (4) the period of
the authorization. The authorization shall be effective for the period specified in the order which shall not exceed
sixty (60) days from the date of issuance of the order, unless extended or renewed by the court upon being satisfied
that such extension or renewal is in the public interest.
All recordings made under court authorization shall, within forty-eight hours after the expiration of the
period fixed in the order, be deposited with the court in a sealed envelope or sealed package, and shall be
accompanied by an affidavit of the peace officer granted such authority stating the number of recordings made, the
dates and times covered by each recording, the number of tapes, discs, or records included in the deposit, and
certifying that no duplicates or copies of the whole or any part thereof have been made, or if made, that all such
duplicates or copies are included in the envelope or package deposited with the court. The envelope or package so
deposited shall not be opened, or the recordings replayed, or used in evidence, or their contents revealed, except
upon order of the court, which shall not be granted except upon motion, with due notice and opportunity to be heard
to the person or persons whose conversation or communications have been recorded.
The court referred to in this section shall be understood to mean the Court of First Instance within whose
territorial jurisdiction the acts for which authority is applied for are to be executed.
SECTION 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning
of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation
of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.
SECTION 5. All laws inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or accordingly amended.
SECTION 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
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CASES:
Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Salcedo-Ortaez vs. Court of Appeals
Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals
145 SCRA 112 (1986)

235 SCRA 111 (1994)
248 SCRA 590 (1995)
GANAAN VS. IAC

145 SCRA 112 (1986)
By : Abutal, Ivydel
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone,

dictagraph or the other device enumerated un Section 1 of R.A. No. 4200 as the
use thereof cannot be considered as tapping the wire or cable of a telephone
line. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the
deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept,
or record the spoken words
Facts:
Complainant Atty. Pintor and his client Montebon, were in the living room of complainants residence,
discussing the terms from the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed against Laconico.
After they decided on the conditions, Atty. Pintor made a phone call to Laconico.
That same morning, Laconico telephoned Atty. Gaanan to come to his office and advise him on the
settlement of the direct assault case.
When Atty. Pintor called, Laconico requested Atty. Gaanan to secretly listen to the telephone conversation
through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Twenty minutes
later, Atty. Pinto called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico agreed. An
amount of P5,000 as settlement money was agreed upon. He was instructed to give the money to give the money to
Atty. Pintors wife at the office of the Department of Public Highways. However, Laconico insisted that Atty. Pintor
himself should receive the money. However, when Atty. Pintor received the money, he was arrested by agents of the
Philippine Constabulary. On the following day, Atty. Gaanan executed an affidavit that he heard complainant Atty.
Pintor demand P8,000 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit to the
complaint for robbery/extortion which he filed against Atty. Pintor. Since Atty. Gaanan listened to the telephone
conversation without Atty. Pintors consent, Atty. Pintor charged Atty. Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the
Anti-Wiretapping Act (R.A. No. 4200).
Atty. Gaanan and Laconico were found guilty by the trial court. The decision was affirmed by the
Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) stating that the extension telephone which was used to overhear the telephone
conversation was covered in the term device as provided in R.A. No. 4200.
Issue:
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1.
Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited device in Section 1 of the AntiWiretapping Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful
interception of communications between the two parties using a telephone line.
Ruling:
1. The main issue revolves around the meaning of the phrase any other device or arrangement. The law
refers to a tap of a wire or cable or the use of a device or arrangement for the purpose of secretly overhearing,
intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the
deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other
device enumerated un Section 1 of R.A. No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as tapping the wire or
cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to
be there for ordinary office use.
The phrase device or arrangement, although not exclusive to that enumerated, should be construed to
comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to
tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by
the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is
precisely for tapping, intercepting, or recording a telephone conversation.
An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit
does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place to place within a radius of
a kilometer or more.
An extension telephone is not among such device or arrangements covered by Section 1 of R.A No. 4200.
SALCEDO VS CA
235 SCRA 111 (1994)
By. Balajadia, Nasreen
RA 4200 Section 1: It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by
all parties to any private conversation or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable,
or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known
as a dictaphone, or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder,
or however otherwise described
Facts:
Rafael Ortaez filed a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against his wife TeresitaSalcedoOrtaez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of Teresita. Among the exhibits
offered by Rafael were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between Teresita and unidentified
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persons. These tape recordings were made and obtained when Rafael allowed his friends from the military to
wiretap his home telephone.
Teresita objected to Rafaels oral offer of the said tapes. However, the Regional Trail Court (RTC) of
Quezon City admitted the tapes into evidence. Teresita filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA),
but the CA upheld the lower courts order for two reasons: (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. hey are
admissible depending on how they are presented and offered and how the trial judge utilizes them and (2) Certiorari
is inappropriate since the order admitting the tape into evidence is interlocutory. The order should be questioned in
the appeal from the judgment on the merits and through the special civil action of certiorari. Hence, Teresita filed a
petition for review with the Supreme Court (SC).
Issues:
1. Whether or not the recordings of Teresitas phone conversations, made and obtained through wiretapping
are admissible as evidence (not per se inadmissible)
2. Whether or not a petition for certiorari is the appropriate remedy to question an order admitting the tapes
into evidence
Ruling:
1. The tape recordings are inadmissible. Relevant provisions of R.A. 4200 (Anti-Wiretapping Act)
provides that:
Section 1: It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all parties to any private
conversation or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a dictaphone, or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however
otherwise described x xx
Section 4. Any communication, or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or meaning
of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained, or secured by any person in
violation of the preceding section of this Act shall not be admitted in evidence in any judicial, quasijudicial, legislative, or administrative hearing or investigation.
Hence, absent any clear showing that both parties consented to the recording, the inadmissibility of the
tapes is mandatory under R.A. No. 4200
2. Certiorari was the appropriate remedy. Generally, the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not available to
challenge interlocutory orders of a trial court. The proper remedy is an ordinary appeal from an adverse
judgment, incorporating in the said appeal the grounds fro assailing the interlocutory order. However,
where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford
adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress.
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RAMIREZ VS CA
248 SCRA 590 (1995)
Section 1 of the Act clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person,
not authorized by all parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The phrase private
communication are put to rest by the fact that Senator Taada in his
Explanatory Note to the Bill used communication and conversation
interchangeably
Facts:
Ester Garcia filed a criminal case for violation of R.A. No. 4200 (Anti-Wiretapping Act) against Socorro
Ramirez, for secretly taping their confrontation. Socorro filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay granted, agreeing that the facts charged did not constitute an offense under
R.A. No. 4200 since the law refers to the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to the
communication. After which, Ester filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the
ruling of the lower court. Hence, Socorro filed this instant petition where she raised three
Issues:
1.That R.A. No. 4200 does not apply to the taping of the conversation by one of the parties to the
conversation. She contends that R.A. 4200 only refers to unauthorized taping of a conversation of a person
other than those involved in the conversation.
2. That the substance or contents of the cnvesation must be alleged in the information; otherwise, the facts
charged will not constitute a violation of R.A. No. 4200.
3. That R.A. No. 4200 penalizes the taping of private communication not a private conversation and
that, consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with Ester was not illegal under the said Act.
Ruling:
1. R.A. No. 4200 applies to recordings by one of the parties to the conversation. Section 1 of the Act
clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all parties to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no
distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private communication. The statutes intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier any. Consequently, the
CA was correct in concluding that even a person privy to a communication, who records his private
conversation with another without knowledge of the latter, will qualify as a violator under R.A. No.
4200. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports such conclusion.
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2. The substance of the conversation need not be alleged in the information.
The nature of the

communication is immaterial. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of
R.A. No. 4200 As the Solicitor General pointed out, Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before
one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third
person should be professed.
3. Private communication includes private conversation. The word communicate comes from the
Latin word communicare, meaning to share or to impart. In its ordinary signification, communication
connotes an act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation (process by which meanings or thoughts
are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols). These broad definitions are
likely to include the confrontation between Socorro and Ester.
Moreover, any doubts about the
legislative bodys meaning of the phrase private communication are put to rest by the fact that Senator
Taada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill used communication and conversation interchangeably.
WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED

RULE 129, SECTIONS 1-4;
SECTION 1.Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history,
forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime
courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the
official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of
nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (1a)
SECTION 2.Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial notice of matters
which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be
known to judges because of their judicial functions. (1a)
SECTION 3.Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. During the trial, the court, on its own
initiative, or on the request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any
matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request
of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such
matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. (n)
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SECTION 4.Judicial Admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the

course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made. (2a)
RULE 10, SECTION 8

SECTION 8.Effect of amended pleadings.An amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it
amends. However, admissions in superseded pleadings may be received in evidence against the
pleader; and claims or defenses alleged therein not incorporated in the amended pleading shall be
deemed waived.
CASES:
City of Manila vs. Garcia
Baguio vs. .Vda de Jalagat
Prieto vs. Arroyo
Yao-Kee vs. Sy-Gonzales
Tabuena vs. Court of Appeals
People vs. Godoy
BPI-Savings vs. CTA
Calamba Steel Center Inc. v CIR
People v. Tomas Tundag
19 SCRA 413 (1967)

42 SCRA 337 (1971)
14 SCRA 549 (1965)
167 SCRA 736 (1988)
196 SCRA 650 (1991)
250 SCRA 676 (1995)
330 SCRA 507 (2000)
G.R. No. 151857
G.R. No.s 135695-96
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JUDICIAL NOTICE:
CITY OF MANILA VS. GARCIA
19 SCRA 413 (1967)
For in reversing his stand, the trial judge could have well taken because he
was duty bound to take judicial notice of Ordinance 4566. The reason being that
the city charter of Manila requires that all courts sitting therein to take judicial
notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila
Facts:
Finding that it was necessary to expand the school grounds of Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School,
Manilas City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayors directive, ordered the illegal occupants/squatters (defendants) to
vacate the property contiguous to the school. The defendants refused to vacate, thus, prompting the City of Manila
to file a suit to recover possession over the land. The Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila favored the plaintiff.
Consequently, the squatters appealed and questioned the lower courts finding that the city needs the
premises for school purposes. The citys evidence on this point was the certification of the Chairman Committee on
Appropriations of the Municipal Board. The certification recites that the amount of P100,000 had been set aside in
Ordinance 4566, the 1962-63 Manila City Budget, for the construction of an additional building of the elementary
school. The said document was originally deemed inadmissible, but was, subsequently, admitted into evidence by
the lower court. Hence, the defendants appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not the CFI of Manila had properly found that the City of Manila needs the premises for school
purposes (considering that it had a contradictory stance regarding the admissibility of the evidence of the City on
this point).
Ruling:
The CFI of Manila properly found that the city needs the premises for school purposes. It is beyond debate
that a court of justice may alter its ruling while the case is within its power, to make it conformable to law and
justice. Such was done here. The defendants remedy was to bring the attention of the court to its contradictory
stance. Not having done so, the Supreme Court will not reopen the case solely for this purpose.
Anyway, elimination of the certification as evidence would not benefit the defendants. For in reversing his
stand, the trial judge could have well taken because he was duty bound to take judicial notice of Ordinance 4566.
The reason being that the city charter of Manila requires that all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all
ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila.
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BAGUIO VS. VDA. DE JALAGAYT
42 SCRA 337 (1971)
Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether or
not the case pending is a moot one or whether or not the previous ruling is
applicable in the case under consideration
Facts:
GABRIEL BAGUIO filed for the quieting of title to real property against TEOFILA JALAGAT and her
minor children with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Misamis Oriental. The Jalagats filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that the present complaint is barred by a previous judgment rendered by the same court. The previous
case involved practically the same property, the same cause of action, and the same parties, with MelecioJalagat
(Teofilas deceased husband and predecessor in interest) as the defendant. The previous case was terminated with
the court dismissing Baguios complaint.
Acting on the motion and taking judicial notice of its previous judgment, the lower court dismissed the
present complaint on the ground of res judicata. Consequently, Baguio appealed the order of dismissal. He claimed
that for the ground of res judicata to suffice as a basis for dismissal it must be apparent on the face of the complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the CFI of Misamis Oriental was correct in finding that there was res judicata by taking
judicial notice of its previous judgment.
Ruling:
THE CFI OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL WAS CORRECT IN TAKING JUDICIAL OF ITS PREVIOUS
JUDGMENT. It ought to be clear even to the appellant that under the circumstances, the lower court certainly could
take judicial notice of the finality of judgment in a case that was previously pending and thereafter decided by it.
That was all that was done by the lower court in decreeing the dismissal. Certainly, such an order is not contrary to
law. The Supreme Court quoted Chief Justice Morgan, who said: Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous
cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one or whether or not the previous ruling is applicable
in the case under consideration.
PRIETO VS ARROYO
P a g e 25 o f 285
EVIDENCE

14 SCRA 549 (1965)
By: Dauz, Maricel
As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the
adjudication of the cases pending before them, of the contents of other cases, even
when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court and
notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been tried or actually pending
before the same judge
Facts:
ZEFERINO ARROYO and GABRIEL PRIETO were registered owners of adjoining lots in Camarines Sur.
After Zeferino died, his heirs had a new certificate of title registered in their names. Subsequently, the heirs
discovered that the technical description set forth in their transfer certificate of title and in the original certificate of
title did not conform with that embodied in the decision of the land registration court (which registered the land in
Zeferinos name), and was less in area by 157 square meters. They, therefore, filed a petition for the correction of
the said description in their titles. Thereafter, the court issued an order directing the correction of the technical
description of the land covered by their title.
Gabriel filed a petition to annul the order granting the correction claiming that the 157 square meters were
unduly taken from his lot. However, his petition was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Thus, Gabriel filed a
second petition containing similar allegations. As expected, the court dismissed his second petition on the ground of
res judicata.
Hence, Gabriel appealed to the Supreme Court to question the dismissal of his second petition. He insisted
that there was no res judicata since the dismissal of his first petition was erroneous. He claimed that the lower court
should have not dismissed his first petition for failure to prosecute because no parole evidence need be taken to
support it, the matters therein alleged being part of the records land registration proceedings, which were well within
the judicial notice and cognizance of the court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Camarines Sur (in dismissing the first petition of
Gabriel) erred in not taking judicial notice of the parts of the records of the land registration proceedings that would
have supported Gabriels allegations, thus, making the dismissal for failure to prosecute erroneous.
Ruling:
THE CFI OF CAMARINES SUR WAS CORRECT IN NOT TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE
RECORDS THE LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS. As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice, in the adjudication of the cases pending before them, of the contents of other cases, even when such
cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been
tried or actually pending before the same judge. Besides, if Gabriel really wanted the court to take judicial notice of
such records, he should have presented the proper request or manifestation to that effect. For failing to do so in the
appropriate time, the dismissal of the first petition is now valid and binding on him. Thus, the dismissal on the
ground of res judicata must be sustained.
YAO-KEE VS. SY-GONZALES

167 SCRA 736 (1988)
P a g e 26 o f 285
EVIDENCE

By: Dauz, Maricel
To establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven: (1) the
existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign
marriage by convincing evidence. She has failed to prove the Chinese laws on
marriage that would show the validity of her marriage to Sy
Facts:
SyKiat, a Chinese national, died intestate, leaving real and personal properties in the Philippines. AIDA
SY-GONZALES and the other children of Sy with Asuncion Gillego filed a petition for the settlement of his estate.
YAO KEE filed her opposition to the petition claiming that she is the legitimate wife of Sy. The probate court
sustained the validity of Yaos marriage to Sy, but the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the lower courts decision and
held that the petitioners and Yaos children were all of illegitimate status. The CA ruled that the marriage between
Yao and Sy was not proven to be valid under the Chinese laws.
Hence, Yao filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court claiming that the CA erred in holding that
the validity of the foreign marriage between Yao and Sy had not been proven. To support this contention, Yao
claimed that the CA should have taken judicial notice of the Chinese laws on marriage which show the validity of
her marriage to Sy.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA should take judicial notice of foreign laws (i.e. Chinese laws on marriage), thus,
relieving Yao of her duty of proving the validity of her marriage under Chinese laws.
Ruling:
COURTS CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAWS. Under the Philippine
jurisprudence, to establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven: (1) the existence of the foreign law
as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence. Though Yao may have
established the fact of marriage, she has failed to prove the Chinese laws on marriage that would show the validity
of her marriage to Sy.
Well-established is the rule that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws or customs.
They must be alleged and proved as any other fact. On this point, Yao cannot rely on a the case of SyJocLieng v.
SyQuia (16 Phil. 137 (1910)) to prove her case. The ruling that case did not show that the court took judicial notice
of Chinese laws on marriages. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the court did take judicial notice of
Chinese laws or customs on foreign marriages in that case, Yao still failed to show that the law assumed to
recognized in SyJocLieng case (wherein the marriage was celebrated in 1847) was still applicable during the time of
her marriage to Sy, which took place 84 years later. Hence, the CA was correct in considering that the validity of the
marriage between Yao and Sy has not been established.
TABUENA VS. CA
196 SCRA 650 (1991)
By: Dauz, Maricel

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It applied the exception that in the absence of objection, with the knowledge
of the opposing party, or at the request or with the consent of the parties, the
case is clearly referred to or the original or part of the records of the case are
actually withdrawn from the archives and admitted as part of the record of the
case then pending
Facts:
The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land of about 440 sq. meters in Makato, Aklan. In 1973,
an action for recovery of ownership was filed by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena. After trial,
the court ordered Tabuena to return the property to Tabernilla.
At the trial, it was found that the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. in 1926 to Tabernilla while they were in
the United States. Upon Tabernillas return to the Philippines in 1934, DamasaTimtiman, mother of Juan Peralta
acting upon Juans instructions conveyed the land to Tabernilla. Upon her request, she was supposedly allowed by
Tabernilla to remain in the said lot provided she paid the realty taxes on the property which she did do so. She
remained on the lot until her death and, thereafter, the property was taken possession by Tabuena. This complaint
was filed after a demand for Tabuena to vacate was made.
The trial court rejected his defense that the subject of the sale was a different lot and that he was the
absolute owner of the said property by virtue of the inheritance he acquired from his deceased parent. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, rejecting therein his claim that the trial court erred in taking
cognizance of Exhibits A, B, & C which had been marked but not formally offered in evidence by Tabernilla.
Issue:
1. Whether or not it was proper for the CA and trial court properly took cognizance of the exhibits even if
they were not formally offered during trial?
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of Tabuenas testimony in a case it had
previously heard which was closely connected with the case before it?
Ruling: The SC reversed the decision and ruled in favor of Tabuena.
1. No. The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not mean it has thereby
already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. It is true that Exhibits A, B, and C were marked at
pre-trial but this was only for identifying them and not for making a formal offer. It is during the trial that the party
presenting the marked evidence decides whether to offer the evidence or not. In case they dont, such documents
cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary value.
An exception was given in People vs. Napat-a, wherein the court ruled that evidence even if not offered
can be admitted against the adverse party if: first, it has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and
second, it has itself been incorporated in the records of the case. In this case, these requirements had not been
satisfied. The documents were indeed testified to but there was no recital of its contents having been read into the
records.
2. Yes. The Court of Appeals conceded that as a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice in the adjudication of cases pending before them of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such
events have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been
heard or are actually pending before the same judge. Nevertheless, it applied the exception that in the absence of
objection, with the knowledge of the opposing party, or at the request or with the consent of the parties, the
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case is clearly referred to or the original or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn from the archives
and admitted as part of the record of the case then pending. These conditions however, were not established in this
case. Tabuena was completely unaware that the court had taken judicial notice of Civil Case no. 1327. Thus, the
said act by the trial court was improper.
PEOPLE VS. GODOY

250 SCRA 676 (1995)
By: Dauz, Maricel
In taking Judicial Notice, SC said that it is not aware that in rape cases, the
claim of the complainant of having been threatened appears to be a common
testimonial expedient and face-saving subterfuge
Facts:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the RTC in view of the death sentence imposed upon Danny
Godoy, who was charged in two separate informations with rape and another for kidnapping with serious illegal
detention.
Complainant Mia Taha alleged that Godoy, her Physics Teacher and a married man raped her first on Jan.
21, 1994 in her cousins boarding house wherein upon entering the back door, Godoy pointed a knife at her. As
Godoy removed her panties and brought out his penis to rape her, a knife was pointed at her neck. As such, she was
not able to resist. The next day, Godoy came by their house and asked the permission of her parents if she can join
him in soliciting funds, since Mia was a candidate for Ms. Palawan National School (PNS). Mias parents allowed
her to go with Godoy and she was allegedly brought to the Sunset Garden Motel where she was repeatedly raped
again. After three days, they transferred to Edwards subdivision where she was kept in a lodging house and was
again raped.
During this time, a police blotter had already been placed for the missing Mia. She was later released by
Godoy after a certain Naem interceded and only after her parents agreed to settle the case. It was after Mias return
that her parents accompanied her to a medico-legal which found lacerations in her vagina concluding that she just
had sexual intercourse. She and her mother Helen went to the police and executed sworn statements stating that the
accused Godoy had raped and abducted Mia.
Godoy denied that he raped Mia Taha. He admitted having had sex with her and that they indeed stayed in
Sunset Gardens and in Edwards Subdivision, but it was because they were lovers and that Mia had consented to
their having sex. To support his claim that they were lovers, he presented two letters supposedly delivered to him in
the provincial jail while he was detained by Mias cousin Lorna. There Mia explained that it was her parents who
forced her to testify against him.
The delivery of the letter was denied by Lorna but the defense presented the provincial jail guard on duty
on the supposed date of the delivery and testified that indeed Lorna had visited Godoy on said date. Several
witnesses were also presented including two former teachers of Mia who knew the handwriting on the two said
letters as belonging to Mia having been their former student and where thus familiar with her handwriting
particularly those made in her test papers. Other witnesses were presented by the defense attesting that they saw the
two together in a manner that was affectionate and cordial, prior to the said kidnapping and even during such.
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Issue: Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused
Ruling: The Supreme Court acquitted Danny Godoy.
Three guiding principles in the appellate review of the evidence of the prosecution for the crime of rape,
namely: a) while rape is a most detestable crime, it must be borne in mind that it is an accusation easy to be made,
hard to be proved, but harder to be defended by the party accused, though innocent; b) the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and c) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall
on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
Mia claimed that the appellant always carried a knife but it was never explained how she was threatened
with the same in such a manner that she was allegedly always cowed into giving in to his innumerable sexual
demands. In taking judicial notice, the Supreme Court said that it is not unaware that in rape cases, the claim of the
complainant of having been threatened appears to be a common testimonial expedient and face-saving subterfuge.
But it had not been duly corroborated by other evidence nor proved that the accused indeed always carried a knife.
The SC also takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas (such as in Palawan) young ladies are
strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that their reputations shall
remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their character humiliates their entire families. It
could precisely be that complainants mother wanted to save face in the community where everybody knows
everybody else, and in an effort to conceal her daughters indiscretion and escape wagging tongues of their small
rural community, she had to weave the scenario of this rape drama.
BPI SAVINGS VS. CTA

330 SCRA 507 (2000)
By: Del Mundo, Ma. Fe
Courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of
other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same
court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are
actually pending before the same judge
Facts:
This case involves a claim for tax refund in the amount of P112,491.00 representing BPIs tax withheld for
the year 1989. BPIs 1989 Income Tax Return (ITR) shows that it had a total refundable amount of P297,492
inclusive of the P112,491.00 being claimed as tax refund in this present controversy. However, BPI declared in the
same 1989 ITR that the said total refundable amount of P297,492.00 will be applied as tax credit to the succeeding
taxable year.
On October 11, 1990, BPI filed a written claim for refund in the amount of P112,491.00 with the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) alleging that it did not apply the 1989 refundable amount to its 1990
Annual ITR or other tax liabilities due to the alleged business losses it incurred for the same year. Without waiting
for the CIR to act on the claim for refund, BPI filed a petition for review with the CTA, seeking the refund of the
amount of P112,491.00.
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The CTA dismissed BPIs petition on the ground that petitioner failed to present as evidence its Corporate
Annual ITR for 1990 to establish the fact that BPI had not yet credited the amount of P297,492.00 to its 1990
income tax liability. BPI filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the CTA. The CA affirmed the
CTA. Hence, this Petition.
Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner called the attention of the Court to a Decision rendered by the Tax
Court in CTA Case No. 4897 involving its claim for refund for the year 1990 wherein the Tax Court held that
petitioner suffered a net loss for the taxable year 1990. Respondent, however, urges the Supreme Court not to do
so.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court may take judicial notice of the Decision by the CTA in deciding the present case?
Ruling:
AS A RULE, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases,
even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases
may have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge." Be that as it may, Section 2, Rule 129 provides
that courts may take judicial notice of matters ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. In this
case, the Court notes that a copy of the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 was attached to the Petition for Review filed
before this Court. Significantly, respondents do not claim at all that the said Decision was fraudulent or nonexistent.
Indeed, they do not even dispute the contents of the said Decision, claiming merely that the Court cannot take
judicial notice thereof. This merely showed the weakness of the respondents case because they did not take steps to
prove that BPI did not suffer any loss in 1990. Respondents opted not to assail the fact appearing therein - that
petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990 the same way that it refused to controvert the same fact established by
petitioners other documentary exhibits. The Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 is not the sole basis of petitioners
case. It is merely one more bit of information showing that the petitioner did not use its 1989 refund to pay its taxes
for 1990.
CALAMBA STEEL CENTER VS. CIR

G.R. No. 151857
By : Del Mundo, Ma. Fe
Judicial notice could have been taken by the CA and the CTA of the 1996 final
adjustment return made by petitioner in another case then pending with the CTA
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Facts:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of steel blanks for use by manufacturers of
automotive, electrical, electronics in industrial and household appliances.
In it's amended Corporate Annual Income Tax Return on June 4, 1996 it declared a net taxable income of
P9,461,597.00, tax credits of P6,471,246.00and tax due in the amount of P3,311,559.00. It also reported quarterly
payments for the second and third quarters of 1995 in the amounts of P2,328,747.26 and P1,082,108.00,
respectively.
It is the contention of the petitioner in this case filed in 1997, that it is entitled to a refund. The refund
was purportedly due to income taxes withheld from it,and remitted in its behalf, by the withholding agents. Such
withheld tax, as per petitioners 1997 return, were not utilized in 1996 since due to it's income/loss positions for the
three quarters of 1996.
Issue:
Whether or not a tax refund may be claimed even beyond the taxable year following that in which the tax
credit arises.
Ruling:
Yes, however; it is still incumbent upon the claimant to prove that it is entitled to such refund. Tax refunds
being in the nature of tax exemptions such must be construed strictissimijuris against the taxpayer-claimant.
Under the NIRC, the only limitation as regards the claiming of tax refunds is that such must be made within two
years. The claim for refund made by Calamba steel was well within the 2 year period.
As regards the procedure taken by counsel of Calamba Steel in submitting the final adjustment returns
(1996) after trial has been conducted, the Court said that although the ordinary rules of procedure from upon this
jurisprudence mandates that the proceedings before the tax court's shall not be governed by
strictly technical rulesof evidence.
Moreoover, as regards evidence, the court further said that Judicial notice could have been taken by the CA
and the CTA of the 1996 final adjustment return made by petitioner in another case then pending with the CTA.
PEOPLE VS. TOMAS TUNDAG

G.R. No.s 135695-96
Death penalty should not have been imposed. It was incorrect for the Court to
take judicial notice of Mary Anns age without a proper hearing. Judicial notice is
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the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on
without proof because they already know them
Facts:
Mary Ann Tundag, alleged that her father, Tomas Tundag, raped her twice. First was on September 5, 1997
and the other on November 18, 1997. 2 separate criminal cases were filed against her father.
Mary Ann Tundag also alleged that she was 13 years old when she was raped by her father. (However, the
prosecution in the case at bar was not able to show any documents pertaining to Mary Anns age at the time of the
commission of the rape. The prosecution then asked the Court to take judicial notice that Mary Ann was under
18years of age which was subsequently granted without conducting a hearing.)
She narrated that her father used a knife to threaten her not to shout while he was raping her on both
occasions. While raping her, he was even asking her if it felt good. He was even laughing.
After the commission of the second rape, Mary Ann went to her neighbor (by the name of BebieCabahug)
and told her what happened to her. They reported this to the police and was later examined by a doctor who
concluded that she was not a virgin anymore.
The Trial Court convicted Tomas Tundag on both counts of rape and was sentenced to the penalty of death.
On appeal to the CA, Tomas flatly denied that the incidents complained of ever took place. He contends that on
September 5, 1997, he was working as a watch repairman near Gals Bakery in Mandaue City Market and went home
tired and sleepy at around 11:00 oclock that evening. On November 7, 1997, he claims he was at work.
In his brief, he argues that it was impossible for him to have raped his daughter because when the incidents
allegedly transpired, he went to work and naturally, being exhausted and tired, it is impossible for him to do such
wrongdoings.
Issue:
1. WON Tomas Tundag is guilty of the crime of rape
2. WON the penalty of death imposed on him is correct. WON it was correct for the Court to take judicial
notice of Mary Anns age without a hearing.
Ruling:
Yes! Tomas Tundags defense of alibi and denial is negative and self -serving. It hardly counts as a worthy
and weighty ground for exculpation in a trial involving his freedom and his life. Against the testimony of private
complainant who testified on affirmative matters, such defense is not only trite but pathetic. Denial is an inherently
weak defense, which becomes even weaker in the face of the positive identification by the victim of the appellant as
the violator of her honor.
The victims account of the rapes complained of was straightforward, detailed, and consistent. Her
testimony never wavered even after it had been explained to her that her father could be meted out the death penalty
if found guilty by the court. Dr. Acebes testified that her findings of healed hymenal lacerations in the complainants
private parts meant a history of sexual congress on her part. According to her, the lacerations may have been caused
by the entry of an erect male organ into complainants genitals. But this does not conclusively and absolutely mean
that there was sexual intercourse or contact because it can be caused by masturbation of fingers or other things,
nonetheless, the presence of the hymenal lacerations tends to support private complainants claim that she was raped
byappellant.
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Appellant next contends that his daughter pressed the

rape
charges
against
him
because she had quarreled with him after he had castigated her for misbehavior. But such allegation of a family feud,
however, does not explain the charges away. Filing a case for incestuous rape is of such a nature that a daughters
accusation must be taken seriously. It goes against human experience that a girl would fabricate a story which would
drag herself as well as her family to a lifetime of dishonor, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to
protect her honor.
Appellant likewise points out that it was very unlikely for him to have committed the crimes imputed
to him considering that he and his wife had ten children to attend to and care for. This argument, however, is
impertinent and immaterial since he was estranged from his wife, and private complainant was the only child who
lived with him. Nor does appellants assertion that private complainant has some psychological problems and a low
IQ of 76 in any way favor his defense. These matters did not affect the credibility of her testimony that appellant
raped her twice. We note that the victim understood the consequences of prosecuting the rape charges against her
own father - her fathers death.
2. No. Death penalty should not have been imposed. It was incorrect for the Court to take judicial notice
of Mary Anns age without a proper hearing.
Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 penalizes rape of a
minor daughter by her father as qualified rape and a heinous crime. The elements are as follows: (1) sexual
congress; (2) with woman; (3)by force or without her consent; and in order to warrant the imposition of capital
punishment, the additional elements that:(4) the victim is under 18 years old at the time of the rape and (5) the
offender is a parent of the victim.
In this case, Mary Anns age was not properly and sufficiently proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Shetestified that she was13 years old at the time of the rapes. However, she admitted that she did not know exactly
when she was born because her mother did not tell her.
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without
proof because they already know them.
Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may either be mandatory or discretionary.Section 1 of Rule 129 of
the Rules of Court provides when court shall take mandatory judicial notice of facts
SECTION 1.Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice without the introduction
of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols
of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of
the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
Section 2 of Rule 129 enumerates the instances when courts may take discretionary judicial notice of facts
SEC. 2.Judicial notice, when discretionary.- A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public
knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions.
JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
LUCIDO VS. CALUPITAN
27 Phil. 48 (1914)
By : Fernandez, Antonino
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The Court held that its admission was proper, especially in view of the fact that
it was signed by Calupitan himself, who was acting as his own attorney.
Pleadings were originally considered as inadmissible as admissions because it
contained only pleaders matter (fiction stated by counsel and sanctioned by the
courts), modern tendency was to treat pleadings as statements of real issues and
herein, admissions of the parties
Facts:
The properties of Leonardo Lucido were sold on auction on Feb. 10, 1903 to Rosales and Zolaivar. On
March 30, 1903, Rosales and Zolaivar with the consent of Lucido, sold the properties to Calupitan via a public
document. On the same day, Calupitan and Lucido executed a document admitting the sale and that their real
agreement was that redemption by Lucido can only be effected 3 years. from the date of the document. Lucido
tendered the redemption price to Calupitan. For failure of the latter to surrender the properties to Lucido, this case
was instituted.
Calupitan claimed that the sale was not one with a right to redeem. The lower court decided in favor of
Lucido.
Issue:
Whether or not Calupitans original answer to the complaint may be used as evidence against him to prove
that a sale with a right to redeem was in fact agreed to by both parties?
Ruling:
Yes, Calupitans original answer to the complaint expressly stated that the transaction was one of sale with
right to repurchase. The Court held that its admission was proper, especially in view of the fact that it was signed by
Calupitan himself, who was acting as his own attorney.
The Court cited Jones on Evidence (sec. 272, 273) which stated that although pleadings were originally
considered as inadmissible as admissions because it contained only pleaders matter (fiction stated by counsel and
sanctioned by the courts), modern tendency was to treat pleadings as statements of real issues and herein, admissions
of the parties.
TORRES VS. CA
11 SCRA 24 (1984)
Having been amended, the original complaint lost its character as a judicial
admission, which would have required no proof, and became merely an
extrajudicial admission of which as evidence, required its formal offer
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Facts:
This is a Petition for Review, treated as a special civil action praying that the decision of the CA be set
aside. Lot no. 551 was originally owned by Margarita Torres. Margarita was married to Claro Santillan and out of
this union were begotten Vicente and Antonina. Claro died. Antonina married and had six children, who, together
with Vicente are the private respondents. After Claros death, Margarita cohabited with Leon Arbole, and out of this,
petitioner Macaria Torres was born.
Lot no. 551, an urban lot, was leased to Margarita, who was the actual occupant of the lot. A Sale
Certificate was issued to Margarita by the Director of Lands. The purchase price was to be paid in installments.
According to testimonial evidence, Leon paid the installments out of his own earnings. Before his death, Leon sold
and transferred all his rights to portion of the lot in favor of petitioner Macaria. Subsequently, Vicente executed
an Affidavit claiming possession of Lot no. 551 and petitioned the Bureau of Lands for the issuance of title in his
name. A title was then issued in the name of the legal heirs of Margarita (private respondents).
On June 3, 1954, respondents filed a complaint against petitioner for forcible entry alleging that petitioner
entered a portion of Lot no. 551 without their consent and constructed a house therein. The case was decided
against the petitioner. On June 8, 1954, petitioner instituted an action for Partition of Lot. N0. 551 alleging that said
lot was conjugal property and the she is the legitimated child of Margarita and Leon. The ejectment case and the
partition case was consolidated. The trial court ruled that the lot was paraphernal property of Maragarita and
adjudicated 2/3 of the lot to respondents and 1/3 to petitioner Macaria. On Motion for Reconsideration, the decision
was amended with Macaria being entitled to 4/6 of the lot. On appeal to the CA, the CA changed Macarias share to
of the lot and declared that she is not a legitimated child.
Petitioner now alleges that although the CA is correct in declaring that she is not a legitimated child of the
spouses, it has overlooked to include in its findings of facts the admission made by the respondents that she and
Vicente and Antonina are brothers and sisters and they are the legal heirs and nearest of relatives of Maragarita. The
admission adverted to appears in paragraph 3 of respondents original complaint in the Ejectment Case, which was
however subsequently amended.
Issue:
Whether or not said statement in the original complaint must be treated as a judicial admission despite the
fact that the same statements no longer appears in the amended complaint?
Ruling:
No, in the Amended Complaint filed by respondents in the same ejectment case, the supposed admission
was deleted and in fact the statement simply read, That plaintiffs are the legal heirs and nearest of kin of
Margarita. By virtue thereof, the amended complaint takes the place of the original. The latter is regarded as
abandoned and ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The original complaint no longer forms part of
the record.
If petitioner had intended to utilize the original complaint, she should have offered it in evidence. Having
been amended, the original complaint lost its character as a judicial admission, which would have required no proof,
and became merely an extrajudicial admission of which as evidence, required its formal offer. Contrary to
petitioners submission, therefore, there can be no estoppel by extrajudicial admission in the original complaint, for
the failure to offer it in evidence.
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Teehankee, Separate Opinion: Such admission did not cease to be a judicial admission simply because respondents
subsequently deleted the same in their amended complaint. The original complaint, although replaced by an
amended complaint, does not cease to be part of the judicial record, not having been expunged therefrom.
CIR VS. PETRON CORPORATION

The exception provided in Rule 129, Section 4 is that an admission may be

contradicted only by a showing that it was made through a palpable mistake, or
that no such admission was made. In this case, however, exception to the rule
does not exist
Facts:
Petron, a Board of Investment (BOI)-registered enterprise, was an assignee of several Tax Credit
Certificates (TCCs) fromvarious BOI-registered enterprises for the taxable years 1995-1998. Petron subsequently
utilized said TCCs to pay its excise taxes for said taxable years. The TCCs had a Liability Clause which provided:
Both the TRANSFEROR and the TRANSFEREE shall be jointly and severally liable for any fraudulent act
or violationof the pertinent laws, rules and regulations relating to the transfer of this TAX CREDIT CERTIFICATE.
Sometime in 1999, a post-audit of said TCCs was conducted by the DOF. The TCCs and the TDMs were
cancelled by reason of fraud. The DOF found that said TCCs were fraudulently obtained by the transferors and
subsequently the same was fraudulently transferredto Petron. Thus, On January 30, 2002, The CIR issued an
assessment against Petron for deficiency excise taxes for the taxable years1995 to 1998 based on the ground that the
TCCs utilized by petitioner in its payment of excise taxes have been cancelled by the DOFfor having been
fraudulently issued and transferred. Subsequently, petron filed a protest letter regarding said assessment.
In 2002, the CIR served a Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy on petitioner to enforce payment of the tax
deficiencies. Construing the Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy as the final adverse decision of the BIR on its protest
of the assessment, Petron filed a petition before the CTA contending that the assignment/transfer of the TCCs to
petitioner by the TCC holders was submitted to, examined and approved by the concerned government agencies
which processed the assignment in accordance with law and revenue regulations and that the assessment and
collection of alleged excise tax deficiencies sought to be collected by the BIR against petitioner through the January
30, 2002 letter are already barred by prescription.
The CTA Second Division ruled for the CIR. Petron appealed the decision to the CTA En banc which, in
turn, reversed the CTA 2nd Division decision, based on the following on the ground that Petron was considered an
innocent transferee of the subject TCCs and may not be prejudiced by a re-assessment of excise tax liabilities that
respondent has already settled, when due, with the use of the TCCs.
Issue:
P a g e 37 o f 285
EVIDENCE

Whether or not the stipulations of facts by the CIR amounts to an admission as well as the parties in
stipulations of facts in pre-trial considered as judicial admission?
Ruling:
This stipulation of fact by the CIR amounts to an admission and, having been made by the parties in a
stipulation of facts at pre-trial, is treated as a judicial admission. Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a
judicial admission requires no proof. The Court cannot lightly set it aside, especially when the opposing party relies
upon it and accordingly dispenses with further proof of the fact already admitted. The exception provided in Rule
129, Section 4 is that an admission may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made through a palpable
mistake, or that no such admission was made. In this case, however, exception to the rule does not exist.
We agree with the pronouncement of the CTA En Banc that Petron has not been shown or proven to have
participated in the alleged fraudulent acts involved in the transfer and utilization of the subject TCCs. Petron had the
right to rely on the joint stipulation that absolved it from any participation in the alleged fraud pertaining to the
issuance and procurement of the subject TCCs. The joint stipulation made by the parties consequently obviated the
opportunity of the CIR to present evidence on this matter, as no proof is required for an admission made by a party
in the course of the proceedings. Thus, the CIR cannot now be allowed to change its stand and renege on that
admission.
REAL AND DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE

RULE 130; SEC. 1; SEC. 2
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SECTION 1.Object as evidence. Objects as evidence are those addressed to the senses of the
court. When an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed
by the court.
SECTION 2.Documentary evidence. Documents as evidence consist of writings or any
material containing letters, words, numbers, figures, symbols or other modes of written
expressions offered as proof of their contents.
CASES:
People vs. Bardaje,
Sison vs. People,
Adamczuk vs. Holloway,
State of Washington vs. Tatum
People vs. Climaco
People vs. Cardenas
G.R. No. L-29271 August 29, 1980

G.R. Nos. 108280-83 November 16, 1995
13 A.2d 2 (1940)
360 P.2d 754 (1961)
G.R. No. 199403
G.R. No. 190342
PEOPLE VS. BARDAJE

G.R. No. L-29271 August 29, 1980
By : Go, Myka
Physical evidence is of the highest order and speaks more eloquently than
witnesses put together. The old healed laceration in the hymen, according to
the testimony of the physician, would have occurred two weeks or even 1 month
before. This shows that Marcelina and Adelino had amorous relationship
Facts:
Marcelina Cuizon, a 14 year old girl, filed a complaint against Adelino Bardaje and five others in Samar,
accusing them of the crime of rape. The incident happened from December 14 to December 17. Adelino was
arrested on December 17 and signed an alleged confession admitting that he kidnapped and molested Marcelina. The
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fiscal filed an information accusing Adelino and others the crime of Rape with Illegal Detention. Before
arraignment, the information was amended to include that Marcelina was deprived of liberty for three days. After the
trial, Adelino was found guilty of Forcible Abduction with Rape with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and
aid of armed men.
Adelinos version is that they are sweethearts who eloped as planned during the said period. He admitted
having carnal knowledge of her but denied that he raped her. On the morning of December 17 th, two soldiers
accompanied by Marcelinas father, apprehended him, physically abused him, and made him sign a document - an
extrajudicial confession, implicating 5 other persons even though its not true.
Also, the medical certificate of Marcelina was presented in court as evidence stating that there were no
evidence of external injuries on the vulva or any part of the body and the presence of old lacerations.
Issue:
W/N Adelino Bardajes guilt was sufficiently established beyond reasonable doubt based on the testimonial
and documentary evidence presented.
Ruling:
No, Adelino Bardajes guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt. The court found Marcelinas
charge highly dubious and inherently improbable.
The medical findings showed that "no evidence of external injuries was found around the vulva or any part
of the body" of Marcelina, which the court finds strange because she was allegedly "dragged" slapped" into
unconsciousness, "wrestled" with, and criminally abused. Physical evidence is of the highest order and speaks more
eloquently than witnesses put together. The old healed laceration in the hymen, according to the testimony of the
physician, would have occurred two weeks or even 1 month before. This shows that Marcelina and Adelino had
amorous relationship.
Marcelinas admission that she was taken to a small one-room hut shared with a woman and two children
and where she was ravished seems to be highly improbable. The same is true for the second hut where she was
brought to.
With regard to Adelinos extrajudicial confession, the court states "an extrajudicial confession made by an
accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. Corpus
delicti is proved when the evidence on record shows that the crime prosecuted had been committed. Adelino was
acquitted.
SISON VS. PEOPLE

G.R. Nos. 108280-83 November 16, 1995
By : Go, Myka
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The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be
identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances
under which they were produced. The correctness of the photograph as a faithful
representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony
of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after which the court can
admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy
Facts:
A rally was scheduled by Marcos loyalists at Luneta. Although they failed to get a permit, they continued
with their scheduled demonstration. Two police officers approached their group and asked for their permit. Failing to
present any, they were asked to disperse in 10 minutes. The loyalists asked for 30 minutes before they disperse but
the officers refused. The refusal prompted the people on both sides to attack each other. A few hours later, a celebrity
who is a Marcos supporter was arrested because she was chanting her support for the loyalists while running around
Luneta. Once again, the loyalist started to attack Coryist and those who were wearing yellow.
Salcedo was wearing a yellow shirt at that time so he was chased, attacked, and failed to escape the mobthe incident was witnessed by a vendor Banculo. Eventually, Sumilang was able to extricate Salcedo, however, the
mauling continued until he lost consciousness and was rushed to the hospital by Sumilang. The first hospital refused
his admission and later he was brought to PGH were he died upon arrival.
Charges were filed against several people with the help of Banculo and Sumilang. Some of the accused
presented their alibis and some didnt testify. The trial court found 5 of them guilty of murder qualified by treachery.
Issue/s:
1. W/N the CA erred in sustaining the testimonies of Sumilang and Banculo.
2. W/N the CA erred in giving evidentiary weight to some of the exhibits [joint affidavit & photos of the
mauling incident] because of lack of proper identification of the person who took them.
Ruling:
1. The CA didnt make a mistake in considering the testimonies of Sumilang and Banculo. There is no
proof that their testimonies surfaced due to the reward. In fact, Sumilangs report was made 2 hours after the
incident. Baculossubmission of 3 sworn statements were done because of the inclusion of people identified as
accused for the case. Sumilangs character during the entire trial was not undesirable-his being evasive is insufficient
to cause the discrediting of his testimony.
2. The CA didnt make a mistake in admitting the evidence of photographs. The rule in this jurisdiction is
that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the photographer as to its production and
testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being
a correct representation or reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in
portraying the scene at the time of the crime. The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify
the pictures he has taken. The correctness of the photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can
be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after
which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. Photographs, therefore, can be identified by
the photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy.
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Also, the use of the photographs by some of the accused to prove their non-participation is an admission of
the accuracy or exactness of the pictures.
ADAMCZUK VS. HOLLOWAY

13 A.2d 2 (1940)
By : Go, Myka
A photograph may be put in evidence if relevant to the issue and if verified. It does not
have to be verified by the taker. Its verification depends on the competency of the
verifying witness and as to that the trial judge must in the first instance decide, subject to
reversal for substantial error. IT MUST BE VERIFIE
Facts:
Jack J. Adamczuk filed an action in trespass against Elmer Holloway for personal injuries and property
damage due to a car collision. The jury ruled in favor of Holloway and Cohen. Adamczuk motion for new trial was
denied.
When a photograph was shown identifying the locus of the accident, Adamczuk was able to identify the
roads and building in the area stating that the "the conditions represented by that picture truly represent the
conditions of the crossing at the time of this accident except for the fact of daylight or dark." However, on crossexamination he stated that he did not know who took the picture, when it was taken, at what distance it was from the
intersection, and that he has no experience in photography. An objection was made and the court sustained the
objection to the introduction of the picture. The same picture was offered 2 times more during the trial, however, the
court sustained the objection because Adamczuk was not able to procure the original taker of the photograph and
establish it in a legal way with the right of cross-examination to defendants' counsel of the photographer.
Issue:
W/N the court erred in refusing to admit in evidence some photographs about of the locus of the accident
and the approach to it on Highway Route 6.
Ruling:
No, the court didnt err in refusing the photograph in evidence. In this case Adamczuk had sufficient time to
procure the original taker of this photograph and present him to be cross-examined by the defendants, however, he
failed to do so.
The rule is well settled that a photograph may be put in evidence if relevant to the issue and if verified. It
does not have to be verified by the taker. Its verification depends on the competency of the verifying witness and as
to that the trial judge must in the first instance decide, subject to reversal for substantial error.
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A photograph can falsify just as much and no more than the human being who takes it or verifies it. If no
witness has thus attached his credit to the photograph, then it should not come in at all, any more than an anonymous
letter should be received as testimony. The map or photograph must first, to be admissible, be made a part of some
qualified person's testimony. Someone must stand forth as its testimonial sponsor; in other words, it must be
verified.
STATE OF WASHINGTON VS. TATUM

360 P.2d 754 (1961)
By : Marcelo, MJ
The quantum of authentication required by the courts before a photograph may be

admissible in evidence was stated thus: that some witness, not necessarily the
photographer, be able to give some indication as to when, where and under what
circumstances the photograph was taken, and the photograph accurately portray the
subject or subjects illustrated.
Facts:
William Tousin received monthly welfare checks from the state of Washington. In February of 1960,
Tousin did not receive his check which was normally mailed to him. It was discovered that Tousins check had been
taken by Ralph Tatum who subsequently forged an endorsement on the check to his name and cashed the same at a
food store.
A criminal case was subsequently brought against Tatum for first degree forgery. During the trial, Caroline
Pentecost, an employee of the store, testified that, although she could not recall the specific transaction involving
Tatum, the initials appearing on the back of the check were hers.
She explained that whenever a check was presented to her for payment at the store, she had been instructed
by the manager to initial it and then to insert it into a regiscope machine. The machine was designed to
simultaneously photograph both the check and the person facing the machine. The Regiscope film of the transaction
was then sent to the Regiscope distributor to be developed. The processed film showed both the check and the
person of Tatum with the food store in the background. The negative and the print were admitted in evidence and
Tatum was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, Tatum questions the films admission into
evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the Regiscope films were authenticated sufficiently to warrant their admission into
evidence?
Ruling:
YES!
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The quantum of authentication required by the courts before a photograph may be admissible in evidence
was stated thus: that some witness, not necessarily the photographer, be able to give some indication as to when,
where and under what circumstances the photograph was taken, and the photograph accurately portray the subject or
subjects illustrated. The photograph need only be sufficiently accurate to be helpful to the court and the jury.
Witness Pentecost testified that she recognized the background shown in the picture as that of the food
store, and as already mentioned, she testified as to the stores standard procedure of regiscoping each individual
who cashed a check at the store. Also, one Philip Dale testified at length concerning the Regiscope process. The
testimony of these two witnesses taken together amounted to a sufficient authentication to warrant admission of the
photograph into evidence.
The authentication supplied by the testimony summarized above, of course, did not preclude appellant from
attempting to prove that the individual portrayed was someone other than the appellant, that the photograph was
inaccurate in or more respects, the appellant was somewhere else at the moment the photograph was taken, or any
other such defense. But these arguments go to the weight rather than to the admissibility of the exhibits in question.
In our opinion, the Regiscope exhibits, coupled with the other evidence produced by the state, sufficed to establish a
prima facie case of first degree of forgery.
PEOPLE VS. CLIMACO

G.R. No. 199403
By : Marcelo, MJ
When the identity of the dangerous drug recovered from the accused is not the same
dangerous drug presented to the forensic chemist for review and examination, nor the
same dangerous drug presented to the court, the identity of the dangerous drug is
not preserved due to the broken chain of custody
Facts:
Appellant Gomer S. Climaco (Climaco) was found guilty for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act
No. 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) for illegal possession (Criminal Case No. 4911-SPL)
and illegal sale (Criminal Case No. 4912-SPL) of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
PO1 Ignacio was tasked to act as the poseur-buyer and SPO4 Almeda as the overall team leader. The buybust money was prepared, which consist of P500.00 bill and some boodle money. The team was also armed with a
Warrant of Arrest for illegal drugs issued by Judge Pao. The plastic sachet, which was the product of the buy-bust,
and the one recovered from Gomer were turned over to SPO4 TeofiloRoyena, who turned them over to the Office of
the Special Operation Group located at Brgy. Tubigan, Bian, Laguna. The plastic sachet product of the buy-bust
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was marked TR-B, which means TeofiloRoyena and the letter B means Bust. While the plastic sachet recovered
from Gomer was marked TR-R, which means TeofiloRoyena and the letter R means Recovered. PO1 Ignacio
identified the accused GomerClimaco in open court. He likewise identified his sworn statement.
Aside from the testimony of PO1 Alaindelon Ignacio (Ignacio), the following documentary exhibits were
offered for the prosecution: (1) Exhibit A Letter dated 7 September 2004; (2) Exhibit B Chemistry Report
No. D-1102-04; (3) Exhibit C One-half white envelope; (4) Exhibit C-1 Plastic sachet with white crystalline
substance with markings GSC-1; (5) Exhibit C-2 Plastic sachet with white crystalline substance with markings
GSC-2; and (6) Exhibit D Pinanumpaang Salaysay of PO1 Ignacio.
The RTC and the CA found that the elements for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession
of shabu were sufficiently established by the prosecution. The RTC held that Climacos defense of frame-up is
viewed with disfavor as it can be easily concocted. The RTC gave full faith and credit to the testimony of PO1
Ignacio, and declared the police officers who participated in the buy-bust operation were properly performing their
duties because they were not inspired by any improper motive.
Issue:
Whether or not the guilt of Climaco for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu, a
dangerous drug, was proven beyond reasonable doubt
Ruling:
NO!
The prosecution did not explain why the markings of the plastic sachets containing the alleged drugs, which
were submitted to be TR-B and TR-R, became GSC-1 and GSC-2 in the Chemistry Report, Index of
Exhibits and Minutes of the Hearing. In their decisions, the RTC and CA were silent on the change of the
markings. In fact, since the markings are different, the presumption is that the substance in the plastic sachets
marked as TR-B and TR-R is different from the substance in the plastic sachets marked as GSC-1 and GSC2. There is no moral certainty that the substance taken from appellant is the same dangerous drug
submitted to the laboratory and the trial court.
As held in Malillin v. People, to establish guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt in cases involving
dangerous drugs, it is important that the substance illegally possessed in the first place be the same substance offered
in court as exhibit. This chain of custody requirement ensures that unnecessary doubts are removed concerning the
identity of the evidence. When the identity of the dangerous drug recovered from the accused is not the same
dangerous drug presented to the forensic chemist for review and examination, nor the same dangerous drug
presented to the court, the identity of the dangerous drug is not preserved due to the broken chain of custody. With
this, an element in the criminal cases for illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, thecorpus delicti, is
not proven, and the accused must then be acquitted based on reasonable doubt.
For this reason, Climaco must be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt due to the broken chain of
custody over the dangerous drug allegedly recovered from him.
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PEOPLE VS. CARDENAS
G.R. No. 190342
By : Marcelo, MJ
Non-compliance with the procedural requirements under RA 9165 and its IRR relative
to the custody, photographing, and drug-testing of the apprehended persons, is not a
serious flaw that can render void the seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust
operation
Facts:
(DSOD-CIDG) in Camp Crame received a report from its confidential informant regarding the rampant
selling of shabu by a certain Cipriano Cardenas (a.k.a. Ope) at the Payatas Area in Quezon City. Acting on the
information, a team was organized to conduct a buy-bust operation.
PO3 Palacio recovered two (2) other clear plastic sachets from the accuseds right pocket. The three sachets
were marked CC-1, CC-2 and CC-3 CC representing the initials of the accused, Cipriano Cardenas. He
was then brought to Camp Crame, where he was booked and investigated. The plastic sachets recovered from him
were transmitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for analysis upon the request of Police Chief Inspector Ricardo N.
Sto. Domingo, Jr. of the DSODCIDG. The results of the Initial Laboratory Report dated 07 January 2003 showed
that the white crystalline substance contained in the three (3) heat-sealed plastic sachets tested positive for methyl
amphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu, with a total weight of 0.05 gram.
The RTC convicted him of the crime charged, giving credence to the testimonies and pieces of evidence
presented by the prosecution. It ruled that the police operation had followed the normal course of a drug entrapment
operation, and that the arresting officers presented as prosecution witnesses were credible based on their candid and
honest demeanor. The RTC considered as absurd the allegation of the accused that he had been whimsically arrested
by the police officers during the operation. It found as weak and inconceivable his uncorroborated denial of the
charge. CA affirmed in toto the RTCs Decision, which it found to be supported by the facts and law.
Issue:
Whether or not there was compliance with the requirements for the proper custody of seized dangerous
drugs under R.A. 9165.
Ruling:
YES!
In People v. Salonga, we held that it is essential for the prosecution to prove that the prohibited drug
confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit. Its identity must be
established with unwavering exactitude for it to lead to a finding of guilt. Thus, drug enforcement agents and police
officers involved in a buy-bust operation are required by R.A. 9165 and its implementing rules to mark all seized
evidence at the buy-bust scene.
The chain of custody is defined in Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1,Series of
2002, which implements R.A. No. 9165.
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To protect the civil liberties of the innocent, the rule ensures that the prosecutions evidence meets the
stringent standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. We have held, however that substantial compliance with the
procedural aspect of the chain of custody rule does not necessarily render the seized drug items inadmissible.
In People v. Ara, we ruled that R.A. 9165 and its IRR do not require strict compliance with the chain of custody rule.
Briefly stated, non-compliance with the procedural requirements under RA 9165 and its IRR relative to the
custody, photographing, and drug-testing of the apprehended persons, is not a serious flaw that can render void the
seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust operation.
Although we find that the police officers did not strictly comply with the requirements of Section 21,
Article II of the IRR implementing R.A. 9165, the noncompliance did not affect the evidentiary weight of the drugs
seized from the accused, because the chain of custody of the evidence was shown to be unbroken under the
circumstances of the case.
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring about the nonadmissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act
No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with said section, is not of admissibility, but of weight
evidentiary merit or probative value to be given the evidence. The weight to be given by the courts on said
evidence depends on the circumstances obtaining in each case. (Emphasis supplied.)
IV. BEST EVIDENCE RULE

A. Rule 130 Sections 2-8
Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad
faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is
only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office. (2a)
Section 4. Original of document.
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(a) The original of the document is one the contents of which are the subject of inquiry.
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical
contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.
(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at
or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded as originals. (3a)
2. Secondary Evidence
Section 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original document has been lost
or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence
and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy,
or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the
order stated. (4a)
Section 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. If the document
is in the custody or under the control of adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce
it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the
document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss. (5a)
Section 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original
of document is in the custody of public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may
be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. (2a)
Section 8. Party who calls for document not bound to offer it. A party who calls for the
production of a document and inspects the same is not obliged to offer it as evidence. (6a)
Electronic Commerce Act (R.A. 8792)

Section 5. Definition of Terms - For the purposes of this Act, the following terms are defined, as
follows:
(a) "Addressee" refers to a person who is intended by the originator to receive the electronic data
message or electronic document. The term does not include a person acting as an intermediary
with respect to that electronic data message or electronic data document.
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(b) "Computer" refers to any device or apparatus which, by electronic, electro-mechanical, or

magnetic impulse, or by other means, is capable of receiving, recording, transmitting, storing,
processing, retrieving, or producing information, data, figures, symbols or other modes of written
expression according to mathematical and logical rules or of performing any one or more of
these functions.
(c) "Electronic Data Message" refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by
electronic, optical or similar means.
(d) "Information and Communications System" refers to a system intended for and capable of
generating, sending, receiving, storing, or otherwise processing electronic data messages or
electronic documents and includes the computer system or other similar device by or in which
data is recorded or stored and any procedures related to the recording or storage of electronic
data message or electronic document.
(e) "Electronic Signature" refers to any distinctive mark, characteristic and/or sound in electronic
form, representing the identity of a person and attached to or logically associated with the
electronic data message or electronic document or any methodology or procedures employed or
adopted by a person and executed or adopted by such person with the intention of authenticating
or approving an electronic data message or electronic document.
(f) "Electronic Document" refers to information or the representation of information, data,
figures, symbols or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by
which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be prove and
affirmed, which is receive, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically.
(g) "Electronic Key" refers to a secret code which secures and defends sensitive information that
cross over public channels into a form decipherable only with a matching electronic key.
(h) "Intermediary" refers to a person who in behalf of another person and with respect to a
particular electronic document sends, receives and/or stores provides other services in respect of
that electronic data message or electronic document.
(i) "Originator" refers to a person by whom, or on whose behalf, the electronic document
purports to have been created, generated and/or sent. The term does not include a person acting
as an intermediary with respect to that electronic document.
(j) "Service provider" refers to a provider of i. On-line services or network access or the operator of facilities therefor, including entities
offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for online communications,
digital or otherwise, between or among points specified by a user, of electronic documents of the
user's choosing; or
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ii. The necessary technical means by which electronic documents of an originator may be stored
and made accessible to designated or undesignated third party.
Such service providers shall have no authority to modify or alter the content of the electronic
data message or electronic document received or to make any entry therein on behalf of the
originator, addressee or any third party unless specifically authorized to do so, and who shall
retain the electronic document in accordance with the specific request or as necessary for the
purpose of performing the services it was engaged to perform.
Section 6. Legal Recognition of Electronic Data Messages - Information shall not be denied
legal effect, validity or enforceability solely on the grounds that it is in the data message
purporting to give rise to such legal effect, or that it is merely referred to in that electronic data
message.
Section 7. Legal Recognition of Electronic Documents - Electronic documents shall have the
legal effect, validity or enforceability as any other document or legal writing, and
(a) Where the law requires a document to be in writing, that requirement is met by an electronic
document if the said electronic document maintains its integrity and reliability and can be
authenticated so as to be usable for subsequent reference, in that i. The electronic document has remained complete and unaltered, apart from the addition of any
endorsement and any authorized change, or any change which arises in the normal course of
communication, storage and display; and
ii. The electronic document is reliable in the light of the purpose for which it was generated and
in the light of all relevant circumstances.
(b) Paragraph (a) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an obligation or
whether the law simply provides consequences for the document not being presented or retained
in its original from.
(c) Where the law requires that a document be presented or retained in its original form, that
requirement is met by an electronic document if i. There exists a reliable assurance as to the integrity of the document from the time when it was
first generated in its final form; and
ii. That document is capable of being displayed to the person to whom it is to be presented:
Provided, That no provision of this Act shall apply to vary any and all requirements of existing
laws on formalities required in the execution of documents for their validity.
For evidentiary purposes, an electronic document shall be the functional equivalent of a written
document under existing laws.
This Act does not modify any statutory rule relating to admissibility of electronic data massages
or electronic documents, except the rules relating to authentication and best evidence.
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Section 8. Legal Recognition of Electronic Signatures. - An electronic signature on the electronic

document shall be equivalent to the signature of a person on a written document if that signature
is proved by showing that a prescribed procedure, not alterable by the parties interested in the
electronic document, existed under which (a) A method is used to identify the party sought to be bound and to indicate said party's access to
the electronic document necessary for his consent or approval through the electronic signature;
(b) Said method is reliable and appropriate for the purpose for which the electronic document
was generated or communicated, in the light of all circumstances, including any relevant
agreement;
(c) It is necessary for the party sought to be bound, in or order to proceed further with the
transaction, to have executed or provided the electronic signature; and
(d) The other party is authorized and enabled to verify the electronic signature and to make the
decision to proceed with the transaction authenticated by the same.
Section 9. Presumption Relating to Electronic Signatures - In any proceedings involving an
electronic signature,
it shall be presumed that (a) The electronic signature is the signature of the person to whom it correlates; and
(b) The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention of signing or approving
the electronic document unless the person relying on the electronically signed electronic
document knows or has noticed of defects in or unreliability of the signature or reliance on the
electronic signature is not reasonable under the circumstances.
Section 10. Original Documents. (1) Where the law requires information to be presented or retained in its original form, that
requirement is met by an electronic data message or electronic document if;
(a) the integrity of the information from the time when it was first generated in its final form, as
an electronic data message or electronic document is shown by evidence aliunde or otherwise;
and
(b) where it is required that information be resented, that the information is capable of being
displayed to the person to whom it is to be presented.
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(2) Paragraph (1) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an obligation or
whether the law simply provides consequences for the information not being presented or
retained in its original form.
(3) For the purpose of subparagraph (a) of paragraph (1):
(a) the criteria for assessing integrity shall be whether the information has remained complete
and unaltered, apart from the addition of any endorsement and any change which arises in the
normal course of communication, storage and display ; and
(b) the standard of reliability required shall be assessed in the light of purposed for which the
information was generated and in the light of all the relevant circumstances.
Section 11. Authentication of Electronic Data Messages and Electronic Documents. - Until the
Supreme Court by appropriate rules shall have so provided, electronic documents, electronic data
messages and electronic signatures, shall be authenticated by demonstrating, substantiating and
validating a claimed identity of a user, device, or another entity is an information or
communication system, among other ways, as follows;
(a) The electronic signature shall be authenticated by proof than a letter , character, number or
other symbol in electronic form representing the persons named in and attached to or logically
associated with an electronic data message, electronic document, or that the appropriate
methodology or security procedures, when applicable, were employed or adopted by such
person, with the intention of authenticating or approving in an electronic data message or
electronic document;
(b) The electronic data message or electronic document shall be authenticated by proof that an
appropriate security procedure, when applicable was adopted and employed for the purpose of
verifying the originator of an electronic data message and/or electronic document, or detecting
error or alteration in the communication, content or storage of an electronic document or
electronic data message from a specific point, which, using algorithm or codes, identifying words
or numbers, encryptions, answers back or acknowledgement procedures, or similar security
devices.
The supreme court may adopt such other authentication procedures, including the use of
electronic notarization systems as necessary and advisable, as well as the certificate of
authentication on printed or hard copies of the electronic document or electronic data messages
by electronic notaries, service providers and other duly recognized or appointed certification
authorities.
The person seeking to introduce an electronic data message or electronic document in any legal
proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity by evidence capable of supporting a finding
that the electronic data message or electronic document is what the person claims it be.
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In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the integrity of the information and communication
system in which an electronic data message or electronic document is recorded or stored may be
established in any legal proceeding a.) By evidence that at all material times the information and communication system or other
similar device was operating in a manner that did not affect the integrity of the electronic data
message and/or electronic document, and there are no other reasonable grounds to doubt the
integrity of the information and communication system,
b.) By showing that the electronic data message and/or electronic document was recorded or
stored by a party to the proceedings who is adverse in interest to the party using it; or
c.) By showing that the electronic data message and/or electronic document was recorded or
stored in the usual and ordinary course of business by a person who is not a party to the
proceedings and who did not act under the control of the party using the record.
Section 12. Admissibility and Evidential Weight of Electronic Data Message or Electronic
Document. - In any legal proceedings, nothing in the application of the rules on evidence shall
deny the admissibility of an electronic data message or electronic document in evidence (a) On the sole ground that it is in electronic form; or
(b) On the ground that it is not in the standard written form, and the electronic data message or
electronic document meeting, and complying with the requirements under Sections 6 or 7 hereof
shall be the best evidence of the agreement and transaction contained therein.
In assessing the evidential weight of an electronic data message or electronic document, the
reliability of the manner in which it was generated, stored or communicated, the reliability of the
manner in which its originator was identified, and other relevant factors shall be given due
regard.
Section 13. Retention of Electronic Data Message or Electronic Document. - Notwithstanding
any provision of law, rule or regulation to the contrary (a) The requirement in any provision of law that certain documents be retained in their original
form is satisfied by retaining them in the form of an electronic data message or electronic
document which (i) Remains accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference;
(ii) Is retained in the format in which it was generated, sent or received, or in a format which can
be demonstrated to accurately represent the electronic data message or electronic document
generated, sent or received;
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(iii) Enables the identification of its originator and addressee, as well as the determination of the
date and the time it was sent or received.
(b) The requirement referred to in paragraph (a) is satisfied by using the services of a third party,
provided that the conditions set fourth in subparagraph s (i), (ii) and (iii) of paragraph (a) are
met.
Section 14. Proof by Affidavit. - The matters referred to in Section 12, on admissibility and
Section 9, on the presumption of integrity, may be presumed to have been established by an
affidavit given to the best of the deponent's knowledge subject to the rights of parties in interest
as defined in the following section.
Section 15. Cross - Examination.
(1) A deponent of an affidavit referred to in Section 14 that has been introduced in evidence may
be cross-examined as of right by a party to the proceedings who is adverse in interest to the party
who has introduced the affidavit or has caused the affidavit to be introduced.
(2) Any party to the proceedings has the right to cross-examine a person referred to in section 11,
paragraph 4, sub paragraph c.
Rules on Electronic Evidence

RULE 2 DEFINITION OF TERMS AND CONSTRUCTION
SECTION 1. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of these Rules, the following terms are defined,
as follows:
(a) Asymmetric or public cryptosystem means a system capable of generating a secure key
pair, consisting of a private key for creating a digital signature, and a public key for verifying the
digital signature.
(b) Business records include records of any business, institution, association, profession,
occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit, or for legitimate
purposes.
(c) Certificate means an electronic document issued to support a digital signature which
purports to confirm the identity or other significant characteristics of the person who holds a
particular key pair.
(d) Computer refers to any single or interconnected device or apparatus, which, by electronic,
electro-mechanical or magnetic impulse, or by other means with the same function, can receive,
record, transmit, store, process, correlate, analyze, project, retrieve and/or produce information,
data, text, graphics, figures, voice, video, symbols or other modes of expression or perform any
one or more of these functions.
(e) Digital Signature refers to an electronic signature consisting of a transformation of an
electronic document or an electronic data message using an asymmetric or public cryptosystem
such that a person having the initial untransformed electronic document and the signers public
key
can
accurately
determine:
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(i) whether the transformation was created using the private key that corresponds to the signers
public key; and
(ii) whether the initial electronic document had been altered after the transformation was made.
(f) Digitally signed refers to an electronic document or electronic data message bearing a
digital signature verified by the public key listed in a certificate.
(g) Electronic data message refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by
electronic, optical or similar means.
(h) Electronic document refers to information or the representation of information, data,

figures, symbols or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by
which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and
affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored processed, retrieved or produced
electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any print-out or output, readable by
sight or other means, which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic
document. For purposes of these Rules, the term electronic document may be used
interchangeably with electronic data message.
(i) Electronic key refers to a secret code which secures and defends sensitive information that
crosses over public channels into a form decipherable only with a matching electronic key.
(j) Electronic signature" refers to any distinctive mark, characteristics and/or sound in
electronic form. Representing the identity of a person and attached to or logically associated with
the electronic data message or electronic document or any methodology or procedure employed
or adopted by a person and executed or adopted by such person with the intention of
authenticating, signing or approving an electronic data message or electronic document. For
purposes of these Rules, an electronic signature includes digital signatures.
(k) Ephemeral electronic communication refers to telephone conversations, text messages,
chatroom sessions, streaming audio, streaming video, and other electronic forms of
communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.
(l) Information and Communication System refers to a system for generating, sending,
receiving, storing or otherwise processing electronic data messages or electronic documents and
includes the computer system or other similar devices by or in which data are recorded or stored
and any procedure related to the recording or storage of electronic data message or electronic
document.
(m) Key Pair in an asymmetric cryptosystem refers to the private key and its mathematically
related public key such that the latter can verify the digital signature that the former creates.
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(n) Private Key refers to the key of a key pair used to create a digital signature.
(o) Public Key refers to the key of a key pair used to verify a digital signature.
SEC. 2. Construction. These Rules shall be liberally construed to assist the parties in obtaining
a just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination of cases.
The Interpretation of these Rules shall also take into consideration the international origin of
Republic Act No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act.
RULE 3 ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
SECTION 1. Electronic documents as functional equivalent of paper-based documents. Whenever a
rule of evidence refers to the term of writing, document, record, instrument, memorandum or any other
form of writing, such term shall be deemed to include an electronic document as defined in these Rules.
SEC. 2. Admissibility. An electronic document is admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on
admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws and is authenticated in the manner
prescribed by these Rules.
SEC. 3. Privileged communication. The confidential character of a privileged communications is not
solely on the ground that it is in the form of an electronic document
RULE 4 BEST EVIDENCE RULE
SECTION 1. Original of an electronic document. An electronic document shall be regarded as the
equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule if it is a printout or output readable by
sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately.
SEC. 2. Copies as equivalent of the originals. When a document is in two or more copies executed at or
about the same time with identical contents, or is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the
original, or from the same matrix, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical
reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which is accurately reproduces the original, such copies
or duplicates shall be regarded as the equivalent of the original.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, copies or duplicates shall not be admissible to the same extent as the
original if:
(a) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original; or
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(b) in the circumstances it would be unjust or inequitable to admit a copy in lieu of the original .
CASES
Air France vs. Carrascoso
Meyers vs. United States
People vs. Tan
Seiler vs. Lucas Film, Ltd.
People vs. Tandoy
U.S. vs. Gregorio
Pacasum vs. People of the Philippines
The Provincial Fiscal vs. Reyes
Compaia Maritima vs. Allied Free
Villa Rey Transit vs. Ferrer
Michael & Co. vs. Enriquez
De Vera vs. Aguilar
National Power Corporation v. Codilla
Estrada v Desierto
MCC Industrial vs. Sangyong Corporation
18 SCRA 155 (1966)

171 F.2d 800 (1948)
105 Phil. 1242 (1959)
797 F.2d 1504 (1986)
192 SCRA 98 (1990)
17 Phil. 522 (1910)
G.R. No. 180314
55 Phil 522 (1931)
77 SCRA 24
25 SCRA 845, October 29, 1968
33 SCRA 87, December 24, 1915
218 SCRA 603, February 9, 1993
G.R. No. 170491. April 3 2007
G.R. No. 146710-15 April 3 2001
Gr. No. 170633 October 17 2007
AIR FRANCE VS. CARRASCOSO

18 SCRA 155 (1966)
By : Ortiz, Kathleen
When the dialogue happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still
fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. The
utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and
related to the circumstances of the ouster incident
Facts:
Carrascoso, bought a first class ticket to go to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, Plaintiff traveled in first
class but on their stop-over in Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced the plaintiff to vacate his seat in
order to make room for a white man, who, the Manager alleged, had a better right to the seat. After a brief
commotion whereinCarrascoso said he would leave his seat on over his dead body, he gave it up.
The CFI decided in favor of Carrascoso , while the CA affirmed the decision but reduced the award further.
During the trial, one piece of evidence that was admitted was the alleged entry by the purser employed by the
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defendant and testified to by the plaintiff. The alleged notebook entry, read First class passengers was forced to go
to tourist class against his will and that the captain refused to intervene. Defendant charges that such testimony by
Carrascoso is incompetent for being hearsay. It is claimed by Air France that such piece of evidence comes within
the proscription of the Best Evidence rule they are claiming such entry could not have been proven by mere
testimony but by presenting the notebook itself.
Issue:
Whether or not the entry in the notebook is incompetent as evidence?
Ruling:
Yes.
The subject of inquiry is not the entry but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within
the Best Evidence rule. It is admissible. Besides, from a reading of the transcript above mentioned, when the
dialogue happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement
had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are ADMISSIBLE AS PART OF THE RES
GESTAE. For they grow out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant. The
utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the
ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms
part of the res gestae. It is not within the Best Evidence Rule as the entry was made outside the Philippines by the
employee of Air France. It would have been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascosos
testimony. If it were true that no entry was made the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.
MEYERS VS. UNITED STATES

171 F.2d 800 (1948)
By: Ortiz, Kathleen
The best evidence rule applies only when contents of writing are to be proved
which does not obtain in the case at bar. In prosecution for perjured testimony
given before the Senate committee, the testimony by chief counsel of the
senatorial committee as to what witnesses had sworn to was not barred under the
best evidence rule.
Facts:
Meyers, an officer of the US army, organized a Corp. called the Aviation Electric Corp. for the manufacture
of parts & accessories for airplanes & paid into its treasury $500 to cover the authorized capital stock. 224 shares
went to June Ballabu and the remaining shares to David Johnson & Robert Pine. It had orders worth $20,000 from
the Signal Corps of the US Army.Lamarre was made Secretary-treasurer and the 224 shares were transferred to him
& he later became President. At the end of the war, there was reduced demand and led to the dissolution of the corp.
The US Senate created an investigating committee to look into instances of waste, fraud, corruption, excessive
profits during the war. Meyers testified (and so did Lamarre) that:
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1. Meyers was not financially interested/connected with Aviation Electric Corp.

2. A Cadillac automobile was purchased for the corp. & for its use
3. the sum of $10,000, paid by means of Aviation checks for furnishing Meyers apartment was a gift from
Lamarre
Based on this testimony, Meyers was charged and convicted of the charge of subordination for perjury by
the trial court. On appeal, he alleges that the trial court took on a bizarre procedure when it accepted the testimony of
William Rogers who examined his co defendant Lamarre in the Senate investigation and also allowed the
introduction of a stenographic note transcript of Lamarres testimony on the same hearing. This is based on the
theory that the transcript itself was the best evidence of Lamarres testimony before the Senate and there was no
need for Rogers testimony.
Issue:
Whether or not the best evidence rule is applicable
Ruling:
NO. The best evidence rule applies only when contents of writing are to be proved which does not obtain in
the case at bar. In prosecution for perjured testimony given before the Senate committee, the testimony by chief
counsel of the senatorial committee as to what witnesses had sworn to was not barred under the best evidence rule,
and it was not unfair or prejudicial to permit transcript of testimony given before the subcommittee to be introduced
after chief counsel had testified, though counsel testified early in protracted trial and transcript was introduced near
its close, since both methods of proving the perjury were permissible, and prosecution could present its proof in any
order it chose.
Here, there was no attempt to prove the contents of a writing. The issue was what Lamarre had said, not
what the transcript contained. The transcript was evidence of what he had said but it was not the only admissible
evidence concerning it. The testimony of Rogers, chief counsel to the committee, was equally competent and
admissible whether given before or after the transcript was received in evidence. Statements alleged to perjuries may
be proved by any person who heard them, as well as, by the reporter who recorded them in shorthand.
PEOPLE VS. TAN

105 Phil. 1242 (1959)
When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so
that the writing of a contract upon the outside sheet, including the signature of
the party to be charged thereby, produces a facsimile upon the sheets beneath,
such signature being thus reproduced by the same stroke of the pen which made
the surface or exposed the impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded
as duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced in evidence as such
without accounting for the non-production of the others.
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Facts:
Pacita Gonzales and others were charged with the crime of falsification of public documents in their
capacities as public officials and employees. It was alleged that they have made it appear that certain relief supplies
were purchased by Gonzales for distribution to calamity victims in such quantities and at such prices and from such
business establishments or persons as are made to appear in the said public documents, when in truth and in fact, no
such distributions of such relief and supplies as valued and supposedly purchased by said Pacita Gonzales in the
public and official documents had ever been made. The prosecution presented to a witness a booklet of receipts
containing blue invoices of the Metro Drug Corporation. The booklet contained the triplicate copies, and according
to said witness the original invoices were sent to the Manila office of the company, the duplicates to the customers,
so that the triplicate copies remained in the booklet. The witness further testified that in preparing receipts, two
carbons were used between the three sheets, so that the duplicates and the triplicates were filled out by the use of the
carbons. While the witness was testifying, the trial court judge interrupted and said that the triplicates are not
admissible unless it is first proven that the originals were lost and cannot be produced.
Another witness was presented by the prosecution to testify. The witness testified that the original practice
of keeping the original white copies no longer prevails as the originals were given to the customers. After the crossexamination of this last witness, the prosecution again went back to the identification of the triplicate invoice. At this
point, the judge told the prosecutor that the originals must be produced. The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari
with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not triplicates formed by the use of carbon papers are admissible in evidence without
accounting first for the loss of the originals.
Ruling:
The Court said that the admissibility of duplicates or triplicates has long been a settled question. It quoted
with approval the opinion of Moran, a commentator on the Rules of Court. When carbon sheets are inserted between
two or more sheets of writing paper so that the writing of a contract upon the outside sheet, including the signature
of the party to be charged thereby, produces a facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such signature being thus
reproduced by the same stroke of the pen which made the surface or exposed the impression, all of the sheets so
written on are regarded as duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced in evidence as such without
accounting for the non-production of the others.
SEILER VS. LUCAS FILM, LTD.

797 F.2d 1504 (1986)
By : Rodulfo, Francis Harvey
A creative literary work and a photograph whose contents are sought to be

proved are both covered by the best evidence rule. It would be inconsistent to
apply the rule to artwork which is literary or photographic but not to artwork of
other forms.
Facts:
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Lee Seiler, an artist and designer of science fiction creatures and machines brought copyright infringement
action against the producers and creators of the movie The Empire Strikes Back. Seiler claimed that creatures
known as Imperial Walkers infringed his copyright on his own creatures called Garthian Striders. He contended that
he created and published his Garthian Striders in 1976 and 1977 and that George Lucas copied these. Because Seiler
possessed no originals of any work he contended was copied, he sought to introduce secondary evidence in the form
of copies, reconstructions, and the like. He proposed to exhibit his Striders in a blown-up comparison to Lucas
Walkers at opening statement. The district judge held an evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of the
reconstructions of the Striders. Applying the best evidence rule, the court found that Seiler lost or destroyed the
originals in bad faith and consequently no secondary evidence, such as the post-Empire Strikes Back
reconstructions, was admissible. The court granted summary judgment to Lucas after the evidentiary hearing. Seiler
appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not Seilers drawings constituted writings for purposes of the best evidence rule.
Ruling:
YES. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district judge. It held that Seilers drawings were writings within
the meaning of Rule 1001 (1) which defined writings and records as letters, words, or numbers, or their equivalent,
set down by handwriting, typewriting, printing, Photostatting, photographing, magnetic impulse, mechanical or
electronic recording, or other forms of data compilation. According to the Court, Seilers drawings consist not of
letters, words or numbers but of their equivalent.
The Court said that to recognize Seilers works as writings does not run counter to the rules preoccupation
with the centrality of the written word in the world of written legal relations. Comparing Seilers drawings with
Lucas drawings is no different in principle than evaluating a contract and the intent behind it. Seilers works are
writings that affect legal relations; their copyright ability attests to that.
A creative literary work and a photograph whose contents are sought to be proved are both covered by the
best evidence rule. It would be inconsistent to apply the rule to artwork which is literary or photographic but not to
artwork of other forms.
PEOPLE VS. TANDOY

192 SCRA 98 (1990)
The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the
subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document
was actually executed, or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or
surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial
evidence is admissible.
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Facts:
On May 27, 1986, detectives of the Makati Police conducted a buy-bust operation at Solchuaga St.,
Barangay Singkamas, Makati. The target area was a store along the said street, and detective Singayan was to pose
as the buyer. He stood alone near the store waiting for any pusher to approach. Soon, three men approached him.
One of them was Mario Tandoy who said: Pare, gusto mo bang umiskor? Singayan answered yes. The exchange
was made then and theretwo rolls of marijuana for one P10.00 and two P5.00 bills marked ANU (meaning AntiNarcotics Unit). The team then moved in and arrested Tandoy. The marked money and eight foils of marijuana were
found on Tandoys body. An information was filed against Tandoy. The RTC of Makati found him guilty of violating
RA 6425. Tandoy appealed. In his appeal, Tandoy invoked the best evidence rule and questioned the admission by
the trial court of the Xerox copy only of the marked P10.00 bill.
Issue:
Whether or not the Xerox copy of the marked P10.00 bill is excludible under the best evidence rule.
Ruling:
NO. The Supreme Court quoted with approval the Solicitor Generals Comment which refuted the
contention of Tandoy. The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of
inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the
circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial
evidence is admissible. Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose
of establishing its existence and not its contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a Xerox copy thereof, is
therefore admissible without the need of accounting for the original.
U.S. VS. GREGORIO

17 Phil. 522 (1910)
By : Rodulfo, Francis
In the absence of the original document, it is improper to conclude, with only a

copy of the said original in view, that there has been a falsification of a document
which was neither found nor exhibited, because, in such a case, even the
existence of such original may be doubted.
Facts:
In a case filed by Pedro Salazar, as creditor, against EustaquioBalistoy for the payment of a sum of money,
judgment was rendered wherein the debtor was sentenced to pay to the plaintiff P275.92 with interest thereon. For
the execution of the judgment, two rural properties of the debtor were attached. The date for the sale and
adjudication of the attached properties to the highest bidder was set on May 27, 1908. On the 18 th of the same
month, Bernardo Gregorio requested the deputy sheriff to exclude the said realty from the attachment, alleging that
he was the owner of one of the properties levied upon for the reason that he had acquired it by purchase from the
debtor Balistoy in 1905, prior to the filing of the complaint. Bernardo presented to the sheriff a document at the end
of which appears a memorandum which states that EustaquioBalistoy bought the land referred to in the said
document from Luis Balistoy and sold it to Bernardo Gregorio. Subsequently, falsification charges were brought
against Gregorio and Balistoy. The complaint for falsification alleged that the defendants simulated a conveyance of
one of the attached properties in favor of Gregorio. However, the original document setting forth the memorandum
was not presented. Only a copy thereof was produced in court. The trial court found the defendants guilty. They
appealed.
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Issue:
Whether or not in a criminal case for the falsification of a document, the original document alleged to have
been falsified must be produced
Ruling:
YES. The Court reversed the lower court. Defendants were acquitted. In a criminal case for the falsification
of a document, it is indispensable that the judges and the courts have before them the document alleged to have been
simulated, counterfeited, or falsified, in order that they may find, pursuant to the evidence produced at trial, whether
or not the crime of falsification was actually committed; in the absence of the original document, it is improper to
conclude, with only a copy of the said original in view, that there has been a falsification of a document which was
neither found nor exhibited, because, in such a case, even the existence of such original may be doubted.
PACASUM VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 180314
By : Salmani, Aleksanda
The offeror must prove that he has done all in his power to secure the best
evidence by giving notice to the said party to produce the document which may be
in the form of a motion for the production of the original or made in open court in
the presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena ducestecum, provided that the
party in custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the same. When
such party has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to
produce it, or refuses to produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted.
Facts:
The petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with Falsification of Public Documents,
NORMALLAH A. PACASUM, a high ranking public official being the Regional Secretary of the Department of
Tourism in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Cotabato City, while in the performance of her official
functions, committing the offense in relation thereto, taking advantage of her official position, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsified her Employee Clearance submitted to the Office of the Regional
Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, by imitating the signature of Laura Y. Pangilan, the
Supply officer I of the DOT-ARMM, for the purpose of claiming her salary for the months of August and September
2000.
Issue:
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WON Sandiganbayan erred in admitting the photocopy of the allegedly forged Employees Clearance to
prove the contents of the original.
Ruling:
The Sandiganbayan correctly admitted in evidence the photocopy of the Employees Clearance. We agree
when it ruled:
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. The purpose of the rule requiring
the production by the offeror of the best evidence if the prevention of fraud, because if a party is in possession of
such evidence and withholds it and presents inferior or secondary evidence in its place, the presumption is that the
latter evidence is withheld from the court and the adverse party for a fraudulent or devious purpose which its
production would expose and defeat. Hence, as long as the original evidence can be had, the Court should not
receive in evidence that which is substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies, in the absence of any clear showing
that the original has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court. Such photocopies must be disregarded,
being inadmissible evidence and barren of probative weight.
The foregoing rule, however, admits of several exceptions. Under Section 3(b) of Rule 130, secondary
evidence of a writing may be admitted "when the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice." And to warrant the
admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a writing is in the custody or control of the adverse party,
Section 6 of Rule 130 provides as follows:
Sec. 6.When original document is in adverse partys custody or control. If the document is in the custody
or control of the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after
satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the
case of loss.
Thus, the mere fact that the original is in the custody or control of the adverse party against whom it is
offered does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must prove that he has done all in his
power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said party to produce the document which may be in the
form of a motion for the production of the original or made in open court in the presence of the adverse party or via
a subpoena ducestecum, provided that the party in custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the same.
When such party has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it, or refuses to produce it,
secondary evidence may be admitted.
Under the circumstances, since there was proof of the existence of the Employees Clearance as evidenced
by the photocopy thereof, and despite the reasonable notices made by the prosecution to the accused and her
assistant secretary to produce the original of said employees clearance they ignored the notice and refused to
produce the original document, the presentation and admission of the photocopy of the original copy of the
questioned Employees Clearance as secondary evidence to prove the contents thereof was justified.
THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF PAMPANGA VS. REYES

55 Phil 522 (1931)
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The evidence must be relevant, and not hearsay. The copies of the weekly where
the libellous article was published, and its translation, constitute the best
evidence of the libel charged.The newspaper itself is the best evidence of an
article published in it.
Facts:
The provincial fiscal of Pampanga filed two informations for libel against Andres Guevarra. The
informations alleged that the defendant, with malicious intent, published on the weekly paper IngMagumasid an
article intended to impeach the honesty, integrity, and reputation of Clemente Dayrit and of Mariano Nepomuceno.
A joint trial was held of criminal cases Nos. 4501 and 4502. The fiscal attempted to present as evidence for the
prosecution, the aforementioned Exhibits A, B, C, and D, which are copies of the IngMagumasid containing the
libellous article with the innuendo, another article in the vernacular published in the same weekly, and its translation
into Spanish. Counsel for the defendant objected to this evidence, which objection was sustained by the court. The
petitioner contends that the exhibits in question are the best evidence of the libel, the subject matter of the
information, and should therefore be admitted; while the respondents maintain that, inasmuch as the libellous
articles were not quoted in the information, said evidence cannot be admitted without amending the information.
The prosecution asked for an amendment to the information, but the court denied the petition on the ground that it
would impair the rights of the defendant, holding that the omission of the libellous article in the original was fatal to
the prosecution.
Issue:
WON the exhibits should be admitted.
Ruling:
The general rules regarding the admissibility of evidence are applicable to cases of libel or slander. The
evidence must be relevant, and not hearsay. This being so, the rule of procedure which requires the production of the
best evidence, is applicable to the present case. And certainly the copies of the weekly where the libellous article
was published, and its translation, constitute the best evidence of the libel charged. The newspaper itself is the best
evidence of an article published in it.
COMPANIA MARITIMA VS. ALLIED FREE

77 SCRA 24
What applies to this case is the general rule "that an audit made by, or the
testimony of, a private auditor, is inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original
records, books of accounts, reports or the like"
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Facts:
The Compaia Maritima and the Allied Free Workers Union entered into a written contract whereby the
union agreed to perform arrastre and stevedoring work for the consignees vessels at Iligan City. The contract was to
be effective for one month. It was stipulated that the company could revoke the contract before the expiration of the
term if the union failed to render proper service. The contract could be renewed by agreement of the parties.
The issue of whether the company should pay for the stevedoring service became a sore point of contention
between the parties. The union members labored under the impression that they were not being compensated for
their stevedoring service as distinguished from arrastre service. Although the arrastre and stevedoring contract was
disadvantageous to the union, it did not terminate the contract because its members were in dire need of work and
work, which was not adequately compensated, was preferable to having no work at all.
Upon the expiration of the one-month period, the said contract was verbally renewed. The company
allowed the union to continue performing arrastre and stevedoring work.In 1954, Maritima entered into a
stevedoring agreement with the Iligan Stevedoring Association. The union picketed in the wharf for nine days and
prevented Iligan Stevedoring from performing its services. Maritima retaliated by filing an action with the union for
the rescission of the 1952 contract, for injunction against the union workers and for damages. This initiated a
protracted litigation between the two. The amended decision of the trial court rendered among others money
judgment against the union. The appeal made by the union attacked the manner in which the trial court arrived the
sum of 450,000 which Maritima allegedly suffered because of lost freightage, inefficiency in the services of the
union workers, among other causes attributable to the union.
Issue:
WON the trial court erred in awarding to the plaintiff company actual damages, moral damages and
attorneys fees on the ground that the auditors report on which they were based was hearsay.
Ruling:
The company argues that the accountants' reports are admissible in evidence because of the rule that "when
the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great
loss-of time and the fact sought to be established from them is oth the general result of the whole", the original
writings need not be produced (Sec. 2[e], Rule 130, Rules of Court).
That rule cannot be applied in this case because the voluminous character of the records, on which the
accountants' reports were based, was not duly established. It is also a requisite for the application of the rule that the
records and accounts should be made accessible to the adverse party so that the company, of the summary may be
tested on cross-examination.
What applies to this case is the general rule "that an audit made by, or the testimony of, a private auditor, is
inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original records, books of accounts, reports or the like"
That general rule cannot be relaxed in this case because the company failed to make a preliminary showing
as to the difficulty or impossibility attending the production of the records in court and their examination and
analysis as evidence by the court.
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VILLA REY TRANSIT VS. FERRER
25 SCRA 845, October 29, 1968
By : Solomon, Sundae
1.
2.
3.
4.
The requisites for admissibility of secondary evidence when the original is in the
custody of the adverse party are:
opponents possession of the original;
Reasonable notice to opponents possession of the original;
satisfactory proof of existence,
failure or refusal of opponent to produce the original in court.
Facts:
Jose M. Villarama was an operator of a bus transportation, under the business name of Villa Rey Transit,
pursuant to certificates of public convenience granted him by the Public Service Commission which authorized him
to operate thirty two units on various routes or lines from Pangasinan to Manila, and vice-versa. On January 8, 1959,
he sold the aforementioned two certificates of public convenience to the Pangasinan Transportation Company, Inc.
for Php350,000 with the condition, among others, that the seller "shall not for a period of 10 years...apply for any
TPU service identical or competing with the buyer." Barely three months later, a corporation called Villa Rey
Transit, Inc. was organized with Natividad R. Villarama, wife of Jose M. Villarama, was the Treasurer as well. In
less than a month after its registration with the SEC, the corporation bought five certificates of public convenience,
forty nine buses, tools and equipment from one Valentin Fernando. On that same day when the contract of sale was
executed, the parties immediately applied with the PSC for its approval, with a prayer for the issuance of a
provisional authority in favor of the vendee Corporation to operate the service therein involved. On May 19, 1959,
the PSC granted the provisional permit prayed for, upon the condition that "it may be modified or revoked by the
Commission at any time, shall be subject to whatever action that may be taken on the basic application and shall be
valid only during the pendency of said application." Before the PSC could take final action on said application for
approval of sale however, the Sheriff of Manila levied on two of the five certificates of public convenience involved.
This is pursuant to a writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in favor of EusebioFerrer,
a judgment creditor of Fernando. A public sale was then conducted by the Sheriff of the said two certificates of
public convenience and Ferrer was the highest bidder, and a certificate of sale was issued in his name. He eventually
sold the certificates of public convenience to Pantranco. PSC thereafter issued a ruling awarding provisional right to
operate to Pantranco. The Corporation took issue with this ruling and elevated the matter to the Supreme Court
which ruled that it should be the Corporation who must provisionally operate the lines until the dispute on
ownership is settled by the proper court. The Corporation then filed a petition to declare. Thus, Pantranco filed an
appeal contending that the Corporation and Jose Villarama are one and the same, and consequently, the
non.competition clause embodied in the deed of sale entered into by Jose Villarama is also binding to the
Corporation. To prove its contention, Pantranco presented photostatic of the said ledgers and vouchers contending
that it has no evidentiary value as they are merely photocopies of originals and thus are not the best evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the photostatic ledgers and vouchers are admissible
Ruling:
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Yes. Section 5, Rule 130 provides for the requisites for admissibility of secondary evidence when the notice
to opponent to produce the original, (3) satisfactory proof of existence, (4) failure or refusal of opponent to produce
the original in court. In this case, such requisites have been complied with. Villarama has practically admitted the
second and fourth. As to the third, he admitted its previous existence in the files of the Corporation and had even
seen some of them. As to the first, he said that the originals were missing and the Corporation is no longer in
possession of it. However, it is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce secondary evidence to show that the
original is in the actual possession of his adversary. It is enough that the circumstances are such as to indicate that
the writing is in his possession or under his control. Neither is it required that the party entitled to the custody of the
instrument should, on being notified to produce it, admit having it in his possession. Hence, secondary evidence is
admissible where he denies having it in his possession. The party calling for such evidence may introduce a copy
thereof as in the case of loss. For, among the exceptions to the best evidence rule is when the original has been lost,
destroyed or cannot be produced in court in question must be deemed to have been lost, as even the Corporation
admits such loss. Hence, there can be no doubt as to the admissibility in evidence of the said photocopies of
vouchers & ledgers.
MICHAEL & CO. VS. ENRIQUEZ

33 SCRA 87 December 24, 1915
Trial courts do well in refusing at all times to permit the introduction of

incompetent evidence and particularly secondary evidence of the contents of
written instruments unless the facts required by the Code of Civil Procedure as
the conditions precedent for such evidence are clearly shown to exist.
Facts:
The petitioner, E. Michael and Co. claims to be a successor of a sale with a right to repurchase made by
Adriano Enriquez in favor of E. Michael and E. Michael & Co. by virtue of an instrument, duly executed and
delivered to it, transferring property, business and assets of any kind including the land subject of this litigation. It
alleged that the expiration of the right to repurchasethus, the consolidation of ownership in the petitioner
company. During the trial, MCI attempted to prove two things which the trial court prevented it from doing:
(1) the execution and delivery of the conveyance transferring to it the land in question
(2) the fact that the instrument so executed and delivered was lost.
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Although it was conceded that there were questions were questions, however, which were well framed and
whose answers should be allowed, the trial court nevertheless sustained objections to it and the evidence sought to
be adduced was excluded. Thus, when the CFI of Cebu dismissed the case on the ground of lack of cause of action,
the petitioner company filed this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in preventing MCI from proving existence and the delivery of the
conveyance transferring to it the land in question.
Ruling:
No. The Trial Court do well in refusing at all times to permit the introduction of incompetent evidence and
particularly secondary evidence of the contents of written instruments unless the facts required by the Code of Civil
Procedure as the conditions precedent for such evidence are clearly shown to exist. If it has been lost, proof of the
loss must first be made before evidence can be given of its contents. Upon such proof being made, together with
proof of the due execution of the writing, its contents may be proved by a copy or by a recital of its contents in
some. As will be seen in this section, the writing itself must be produced unless it has been lost or destroyed in
which case, before its contents may be proved by other evidence, it must be shown by the party offering secondary
evidence that:
1.) that the document was duly executed and delivered, where delivery is necessary,
2.) that it has been lost or destroyed.
The execution or delivery of the document maybe established by the person or persons, who executed it, by
the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, or by any person who was present and saw it executed and
delivered or who, after its execution and delivery, saw it and recognized the signatures or by a person to whom the
parties to the instruments have previously confessed the execution thereof. The destruction of the instrument may be
proved by any person knowing the fact. The loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss, or by
anyone who has made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the
document or pares of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and
has been unable to find it or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the Court that the
document was indeed lost. If it appears, on an attempt to prove the loss, that the document is in fact in existence,
then the proof of loss or destruction fails and secondary evidence is inadmissible unless section 322 of the Civil code
of Procedure should be applicable. After proper proof of the due execution and delivery and its loss or destruction,
oral evidence maybe given of its contents by any person who signed the document, or who read it, or heard it read
knowing, or it being proved from other sources, that the document so read was the one in question. Such evidence
may also be given by any person who was present when the contents of the document was being talked over
between the parties thereto to such an extent as to give him reasonably full information as to its contents or the
contents maybe proved by any person to whom the parties to the instrument have confessed or stated the contents
thereof[ or by a copy thereof or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document.
DE VERA VS. AGUILAR

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218 SCRA 603, February 9, 1993
Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually

lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the
proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct
order of proof is as follows: (1) existence, (2) execution, (3) loss, (4) contents,
although this order may be changed in the discretion of the court.
Facts:
The petitioners De Vera and respondent Leona, married to respondent Aguilar, are the children and heirs of
the late MarcosaBernabe. During her lifetime, she owned the disputed parcel of land in Camalig, Maycauayan,
Bulacan. Two of the petitioners, Basilio and Felipe, mortgaged said land to Atty. Bordador. When the mortgage
matured, the Aguilar spouses redeemed it from Atty. Bordador and were in turn sold to them by Marcosa, evidenced
by a deed of absolute sale. Thereafter, an OCT was issued in their name. Three years later, the De Veras wrote to the
Aguilar spouses demanding for partition of the disputed land claiming that as children of Marcosa, they were
co.owners of the property. They further claimed that the Aguilar spouses had resold the property to Marcosa. The
Aguilar spouses denied all these allegations by the De Veras. The De Veras filed a suit for reconveyance of the lot
and the trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners after admitting, over the objection of the Aguilar spouses, a
photocopy of an alleged deed of finding that the loss or destruction of the original deed of sale has not been duly
proven by the petitioners rendering the photocopy of the deed of sale as inadmissible in evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners have satisfactorily proven the loss of the original deed of sale so as to allow
the photocopy of the same.
Ruling:
Yes. Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed. But
prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the
instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: (1) existence, (2) execution, (3) loss, (4) contents, although this
order may be changed in the discretion of the court. The sufficiency of proof offered as a predicate for the admission
of an alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the
particular case. A reading of the decision of the trial court shows that it merely ruled on the existence and due
execution of the alleged deed of sale dated April 28, 1959. It failed to look into the facts and circumstances
surrounding the loss or destruction of the original copies of the alleged deed of sale.
In establishing the execution of a document, the same may be established by the person or persons who
executed it, by the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, or by any person who was present and saw
it executed or who, after its execution saw it and recognized the signatures or by a person to whom the parties to the
instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof. The Court agreed with the findings of the trial court that
the petitioners have sufficiently established the due execution of the alleged deed of sale through the testimony of
the notary public. The destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person knowing the fact. The loss may be
shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss, or by anyone who made, in the judgment of the court, a
sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by
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the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it or who has made any other
investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. CODILLA

G.R. No. 170491. April 3 2007
By : Trance, Romak
When the subject of inquiry is the contents of documents, no evidence shall be

admissible other than the original documents themselves, except in certain cases
specifically enumerated therein. Which are:
a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court;
b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the
evidenceis offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice.
c) When the original is a record or other document in the custody of a public
officer;
d) When the original has been recorded in an existing record a certified copy of
which is made evidence by law; and
e) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to
be established from thyem is only the general result of the whole.
Facts:
M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and operated by private respondent bangpai shipping
co. allegedly bumped and damaged petitioners power barge 209 which was then moored at cebu international port.
Petitioner filed before the Cebu RTC a complaint for damages against bangpai shipping co. petitioner filed an
amended complaint impleading wallem shipping inc contending that the later is a ship agent of bangpai. Wallem and
bangpai filed a motion to dismiss which was subsequently denied by the court.
After adducing evidence during the trial of the case, petitioner filed a formal offer of evidence consisting of
Exhibits A to V together with the sub-marked portions thereof. On the other hand, Bangpai and wallen filed their
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respective objections to petitioners formal offer of evidence. The RTC denied the admissions and excluding from
the records Exhibits A,C,D,E,H and its sub-markings I,J,K,L,M,N,O,P. it argued that the petitioner has been given
every opportunity to present the originals of the photocopies of the documents it offered, but it never produced the
originals. Also, the photocopies do not constitute as electronic evidence as the information was not received,
recorded, retrieved or produced electronically. Moreover, it was not authenticated. Finally, the required affidavit to
prove the admissibility and evidentiary weight of the alleged electronic evidence was not executed, much less
presented in evidence. Therefore, the photocopies must be stricken off the records. Aside from being not properly
identified by any competent witness, the loss of the principals was not established by any competent proof.
Petitioner filed a motion to reconsideration, however it was denied. Certiorari was also denied. Hence this petition.
Issues:
1.
2.
Whether or not that photocopies are indeed electronic evidence contemplated in RA 8792 as well as the
Rules on electronic evidence.
Whether or not that the denying of the exhibits are correct.
Ruling:
No. A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal that not
all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be
recorded or produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a persons signature affixed manually be
considered as information electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced.
Hence, the argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts were produced through an electronic process, then
these photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence is obviously an
erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus declared that the offered photocopies are not
tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional
equivalent of their original as decreed in the law. The pieces of documentary evidence by the NAPOCOR were not
properly identified by any competent witness. As correctly pointed out by bangpai, the witness did not have personal
knowledge of and participation in the preparation and making of the pieces of documentary evidence. The pieces of
the documentary evidence were merely photocopies of purported documents or papers. Sec. 3 of rule 130 of the
rules of court states that when the subject of inquiry are the contents of documents no evidence shall be admissible
other that the original documents theme selves except in certain cases specifically enumerated therein. NAPOCOR
has not shown that the non-presentation or non-production of its original pieces of documentary evidence falls under
such exceptions.
Ruling:
Yes. Furthermore, no error can be ascribed to the court a quo in denying admission and excluding from the
records petitioners Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J" and its sub-markings, "K", "L",
"M" and its sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its sub-markings, "Q" and its sub-markings, and
"R". The trial court was correct in rejecting these photocopies as they violate the best evidence rule and are therefore
of no probative value being incompetent pieces of evidence. Before the onset of liberal rules of discovery, and
modern technique of electronic copying, the best evidence rule was designed to guard against incomplete or
fraudulent proof and the introduction of altered copies and the withholding of the originals. 8 But the modern
justification for the rule has expanded from the prevention of fraud to a recognition that writings occupy a central
position in the law.9 The importance of the precise terms of writings in the world of legal relations, the fallibility of
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the human memory as reliable evidence of the terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or incomplete duplicate are the
concerns addressed by the best evidence rule
Additional Information: When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part,
may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated. 11 The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates thereof: (a) the
loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown by
circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of documents; 12 (b) the proponent must prove by a fair
preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c) it
must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the document in the proper
place or places.13 However, in the case at bar, though petitioner insisted in offering the photocopies as documentary
evidence, it failed to establish that such offer was made in accordance with the exceptions as enumerated under the
above quoted rule. Accordingly, we find no error in the Order of the court a quo denying admissibility of the
photocopies offered by petitioner as documentary evidence.
ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO

G.R. No. 146710-15 April 3 2001
By : Trance, Romak
Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the
competency and credibility of some persons other that the witness by whom it is sought to
produce it. There are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross
examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence, and (3) absence of the oath. Not at all hearsay
evidence, however, is inadmissible as evidence. Over the years, a huge body of hearsay evidence
has been admitted by courts due to their relevance, trustworthiness and necessity.
A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires that we further determine whether the
hearsay evidence is one exempted from the rules of exclusion. A more circumspect examination
of our rules of exclusion will show that they do not cover admissions of a party and the Angara
Diary belongs to this class rule on res inter alios acta this rule is expressed in section 28 of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, viz: The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided. The res inter alios acta rule
has several exceptions. One of them is provided in section 29 of Rule 130 with respect
to admissions by a co-partner or agent.
Facts:
The case at bar stemmed from the events that transpired during EDSA II. President Joseph Estrada
pursuant to the calls for resignation, left Malacanang, and pursuant to this, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, then VicePresident under Estradas reign took place. Estrada now goes to the court to contest the legitimacy of Arroyos
Presidency, arguing that he never resigned as President, and hence, hence, claims hence, claims to still be the lawful
President of the Philippines. Among the pieces of evidence offered to prove that Estrada had indeed resigned from
the presidency is the Angara Diary, chronicling the last moments of Estrada in Malacanang.
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Issue:
1. Whether the Angara Diary is inadmissible as hearsay evidence?
Ruling:
1. NO. The Supreme Court held that the Angara diary is not an out-of-court statement but is a part of the
pleadings of the case. Furthermore, the Court noted that the Angara diaries contained direct statements of Estrada
with respect to his proposal for the holding of a snap election, his intent to leave his post by Monday and his
exasperation over the bureaucracy, controversy and red tape. An ANALYSIS of the same leads to the conclusion that
the contents of the diary may be more accurately classified as admissions of a party. Pursuant to Rules of Evidence,
the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
Moreover, the statements cannot be regarded as hearsay evidence because the same can be properly
categorized as independently relevant statements. Independently relevant statements are those which are
Independent from the truth of the statements. Independent relevant statements classified into statements which
consist of the very facts in issue and those which are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue, such as the
statements of a person showing his state of mind or statements of a person from which an inference may be made as
to the state of mind of another. Pursuant to this, it may well be said that the entries in the Angara diary may be
regarded as containing statements regarding the state of mind of Estrada, hence constituting circumstantial evidence
of his intent to resign.
ANALYSIS:
Under the current rules, the decision of the Supreme Court in admitting the Angara Diary is questionable.
By virtue of its decision, does it automatically mean that any document attached to a pleading is already considered
a judicial admission? Moreover, it is noteworthy to mention that the original of the diaries were not presented in
court but merely the copies as reproduced in the newspapers. Despite the fact that the statements in the diary were
made by Angara, they were received by the court as admissions of Estrada.
MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES VS. SANGYONG

Gr. No. 170633 October 17 2007
By : Trance, Romak
The term Electronic Data Message and electronic Document do not include
a facsimile transmission or fax
Facts:
MCC Industrial Sales is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling
stainless steel products. One of its suppliers is the Ssangyong Corporation. The two corporations conducted business
through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions. Ssangyon would send the pro forma invoices
containing the details of the steel product order to MCC. If the latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his
signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to Ssangyong, again by fax. Ssangyong sent by fax a letter addressed
to Gregory Chan, MCC Manager and President of Sanyo Seiki Stainless Steel Corporation, in order to confirm mcc
and sanyoseikis order of 200 metric ton of hot rolled stainless steel under a preferential rate of $1,860 per MT.
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Chan, on behalf of the corporations, assented and affixed his signature on the conforme portion of the letter.
Ssangyong forwarded to MCC a pro forma invoice containing the terms and conditions of the transaction. It stated
that the payment for the ordered steel products would be made through an irrevocable letter of credit. MCC sent
back by fax to Ssangyong the invoice bearing the conformity signature of Chan. Because of the confirmed
transaction, Ssangyong placed the order with its steel manufacturer, Pohang Iron and Steel Corporation, in South
Korea and paid the same in full. Ssangyong informed Sanyo Seiki and MCC, by way of fax transmittal, that it was
ready to ship the stainless steel from Korea to the Philippines. It requested that the opening of the letter of credit be
facilitated. Chan affixed his signature on the fax transmittal and returned the same by fax to Ssangyong. However,
both Sanyo Seiki and MCC failed to open the letter of credit. Thereafter, Ssanyong filed before the RTC a civil
action for damages due to breach of contract against MCC, Sanyo Seiki, and Chan, alleging that the defendants
breached their contract when they refused to open the letter of credit. Defendants filed a demurrer evidence alleging
that Ssangyong failed to present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based.
The RTC admitted the documentary evidence as electronic evidence and ruled in favor of Ssanyong. Upon appeal to
the CA, the latter affirmed the RTC ruling.
Issues:
Whether or not the printout of a facsimile transmission an electronic data message or electronic document
and admissible as such?
Ruling:
No. Although the parties did not raise the question whether the original facsimile transmissions are
"electronic data messages" or "electronic documents" within the context of the Electronic Commerce Act (the
petitioner merely assails as inadmissible evidence the photocopies of the said facsimile transmissions), we deem it
appropriate to determine first whether the said fax transmissions are indeed within the coverage of R.A. No. 8792
before ruling on whether the photocopies thereof are covered by the law. In any case, this Court has ample authority
to go beyond the pleadings when, in the interest of justice or for the promotion of public policy, there is a need to
make its own findings in order to support its conclusions.
Petitioner contends that the photocopies of the pro forma invoices presented by respondent Ssangyong to
prove the perfection of their supposed contract of sale are inadmissible in evidence and do not fall within the ambit
of R.A. No. 8792, because the law merely admits as the best evidence the original fax transmittal. On the other
hand, respondent posits that, from a reading of the law and the Rules on Electronic Evidence, the original facsimile
transmittal of the pro forma invoice is admissible in evidence since it is an electronic document and, therefore, the
best evidence under the law and the Rules. Respondent further claims that the photocopies of these fax transmittals
(specifically ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2) are admissible under the Rules on Evidence because the
respondent sufficiently explained the non-production of the original fax transmittals.
The ruling of the Appellate Court is incorrect. R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent
of a written document for evidentiary purposes. The Rules on Electronic Evidence regards an electronic document as
admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related
laws, and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the said Rules. An electronic document is also the equivalent
of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means,
shown to reflect the data accurately.
Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the functional
equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an "electronic data
message" or an "electronic document.
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We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined under the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile
transmissioncannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the
Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.
Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document," and cannot
be considered as electronic evidence by the Court, with greater reason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission not
electronic evidence. In the present case, therefore, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E" and "F"), which are mere photocopies of the original fax transmittals, are not
electronic evidence, contrary to the position of both the trial and the appellate courts.
Because these documents are mere photocopies, they are simply secondary evidence, admissible only upon
compliance with Rule 130, Section 5, which states, "[w]hen the original document has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability
without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated." Furthermore, the offeror of secondary evidence
must prove the predicates thereof, namely: (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of
the proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of
documents; (b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of
the loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful
search has been made for the document in the proper place or places. It has been held that where the missing
document is the foundation of the action, more strictness in proof is required than where the document is only
collaterally involved.
SECONDARY EVIDENCE
EBREO VS. EBREO
483 SCRA 583
By : Abdulla, Naila
Considering that the annotation of the disputed Deed of Sale in a tax

declaration is not sufficient proof of the transfer of property and inasmuch as the
subject of inquiry is the Deed of Sale, it was incumbent on the petitioners to
adduce in evidence the original or a copy of the deed.
Facts:
Felipe Ebreo died intestate leaving behind as heirs his five children. He left to his children an untitled
parcel of land situated in Barangay Sampaga, Batangas City. Pursuant to the subdivision made by their father Felipe,
the land was divided into six lots identified as Lots A, B, C, D, E and F.
P a g e 76 o f 285
EVIDENCE

The five heirs executed and signed a document where they extrajudicially partitioned the property except
the portion known as Lot No. 9046-F. They agreed that said portion shall remain under the co-ownership of all the
heirs. However, plaintiffs were surprised to discover that such portion of the land was declared for taxation purposes
in the name of defendant Antonio Ebreo. Based on the plaintiffs' recitals, they alleged that they never sold, ceded,
conveyed or transferred their rights, share and co-ownership over Lot 9046-F.
Answering the complaint, the defendants countered that after the execution of the document of partition,
Lot 9046-F was sold by the heirs to Santiago Puyo. By virtue of this sale, the corresponding Real Property Tax
Declaration was transferred in the name of Santiago Puyo as owner. However, the deed of sale evidencing this
transaction was never presented.
Issue:
Whether or not an annotation in a tax declaration of an alleged Deed of Sale sufficiently prove conveyance
of title to a property.
Ruling:
No. The Court held that the tax declarations for Lot 9046-F that were issued in the name of defendant
Antonio Ebreo and that he paid taxes for the land provides no evidentiary value that he was the owner thereof. Tax
declarations are not sufficient evidence to prove possession in the concept of owners.
Considering that the annotation of the disputed Deed of Sale in a tax declaration is not sufficient proof of
the transfer of property and inasmuch as the subject of inquiry is the Deed of Sale, it was incumbent on the
petitioners to adduce in evidence the original or a copy of the deed. In the absence of the said document, the
exhortations of petitioners regarding the existence of said deed of sale must fail.
PAROLE EVIDENCE
Rule 130, Section 9
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
a. An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
P a g e 77 o f 285
EVIDENCE

b. The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties thereto
c. The validity of the written agreement; or
d. The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after
the execution of the written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills. (7a)
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no
authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;
(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the
following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same,
or some note or memorandum, thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by
his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a
secondary evidence of its contents:
(a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making
thereof;
(b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;
(c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to
marry;
(d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a price not less than
five hundred pesos, unless the buyer accept and receive part of such goods and chattels, or the
evidences, or some of them, of such things in action or pay at the time some part of the purchase
money; but when a sale is made by auction and entry is made by the auctioneer in his sales book,
at the time of the sale, of the amount and kind of property sold, terms of sale, price, names of the
purchasers and person on whose account the sale is made, it is a sufficient memorandum;
(e) An agreement of the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real
property or of an interest therein;
(f) A representation as to the credit of a third person.
(3) Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent to a contract.
P a g e 78 o f 285
EVIDENCE

CASES:
Enriquez vs Ramos
6 SCRA 219
Canuto vs Mariano
37 Phil 840
Yu Tek vs. Gonzales
G.R. No. L-9935 February 1, 1915
Land Settlement vs. Garcia Plantation
G.R. No. L-17820 April 24, 1963
MAULINI v. SERRANO
28 PHIL 640 December 16, 1914
PNB v. BENITO SEETO
G.R. No. L-4388 August 13, 1952
WOODHOUSE v. HALILI
G.R. No. L-4811 July 31, 1953
ZACARIAS ROBLES v. HERMANOS
G.R. No. L-26173 July 13, 1927
Lucio R. Cruz vs Court of Appeals,
G.R No. 79962
Lechugas vs. Court of Appeals,
143 SCRA 335 , August 06, 1986
BALDOMERO INCIONG, JR. v. CA
G.R. No. 96405 June 26, 1996
RAFAEL S. ORTAES vs. CA
G.R. No. 107372 January 23, 1997
ROSARIO TEXTILE vs. HOME BANKERS G.R. No. 137232
EDENBERT MADRIGAL vs.CA
G.R. No. 142944. April 15, 2005
ENRIQUEZ VS. RAMOS

6 SCRA 219
By : Abdullah, Naila
When the terms of an agreement had been reduced to writing it is to be

considered as containing all that has been agreed upon and that no evidence
other than the terms there can be admitted between the parties. This rule,
however, only holds true if there is allegation that the agreement does not express
the intent of the parties.
Facts:
Plaintiffs entered into a contract of conditional sale with Pedro del Rosario over a land in QC for P600K,
to be paid within 2 years. Upon a performance bond, Del Rosario was given possession of the land for development
as a subdivision. He also undertook to pay for the subdivision survey, the construction of roads, the installation of
light and water and the payment of whatever income tax may be required. Unable to pay, and to avoid court
litigation, a contract of rescission was entered into. To release the performance bond, Del Rosarios partner, Socorro
Ramos, was allowed to buy 20 of the lots on condition that she assume the payment of P50K as her share in the
construction of roads and other improvements required in the subdivision. A new deed of sale was executed in
consideration of P235,056.00, of which an initial payment of P35,056 was made, the balance secured by a Real
Estate Mortgage over the 20 lots and a interest on a parcel of land in Bulacan. Ramos failed to pay the balance.
Ramos claimed that the contract failed to mention certain important conditions agreed upon, such as the
plaintiffs promise to construct roads in the lands to be subdivided for sale. Such condition was allegedly a
superfluity, there being an ordinance in QC requiring the construction of roads in a subdivision before lots therein
P a g e 79 o f 285
EVIDENCE

could be sold, and said ordinance was deemed part of the contract. Ramos also claims that the true purchase price of
the sale was P185,000.00, not P235,056.00, the difference being the voluntary contribution of Ramos to the cost of
the construction of the roads which plaintiffs allegedly assumed to do.
Issue:
Whether or not the court a quo erred in allowing presentation of parole evidence to prove that a
contemporaneous oral argument was also reached between the parties.
Ruling:
No. The Court held that while it is argued that the court a quo erred in allowing presentation of parole
evidence to prove that a contemporaneous oral agreement was also reached between parties relative to the
construction of the roads for same is in violation of our rule which provides that when the terms of an agreement had
been reduced to writing it is to be considered as containing all that has been agreed upon and that no evidence other
than the terms there can be admitted between the parties (Section 22, Rule 123). This rule, however, only holds true
if there is allegation that the agreement does not express the intent of the parties. If there is and this claim is in issue
in the pleadings, the same may be the subject parole evidence (Idem.). The fact that such failure has been put in
issue in this case is patent in the answer wherein defendant has specifically pleaded that the contract of sale in
question does not express the true intent of the parties with regard to the construction of the roads.
It appearing that plaintiffs have failed to comply with the condition precedent relative to the construction of
the roads in the subdivision in question, it follows that their action is premature as found by the court a quo. The
failure of defendant to pay the realty and income taxes as agreed upon, as well as to register the mortgage with
respect to the Bulacan property, aside from being minor matters, appear sufficiently explained in the brief of
defendant-appellee.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.
CANUTO VS. MARIANO

37 Phil 840
The rule forbidding the admission of parole or extrinsic evidence to alter, vary,
or contradict a written instrument does not apply so as to prohibit the
establishment by parole of an agreement between the parties to a writing, entered
into subsequent to the time when the written instrument was executed,
notwithstanding such agreement may have the effect of adding to, changing,
modifying, or even altogether abrogating the contract of the parties as evidenced
by the writing.
Facts:
EspiridoniaCanuto and Juan Mariano entered into a contract of sale with a right to repurchase over a parcel
of land for P360. Such right of repurchase was to expire on December 4, 1914, one year after. Two days before such
expiration, Canuto begged an extension of tiem to repurchase the land as she would only be able to get the money to
pay Mariano within the end of the month. Mariano agreed to extend it till December 31, as witnessed by
SeverinoPascual. The following Sunday, Canuto went to the house of Mariano, who promised to meet her at the
house of an Atty. Mercado the next afternoon. However, when Canuto went to the meeting place the next day,
Mariano didnt show up. Since then, Mariano has refused to carry out the alleged oral agreement, insisting that the
redemption period as set in the deed of sale.
P a g e 80 o f 285
EVIDENCE

Issue:
1. Whether or not was there an oral agreement extending the redemption period; and
2. Whether or not parole evidence as to such extension is allowed.
Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court held that Mariano had extended the time within which Canuto could repurchase the land
on the condition that she would find the money and make repurchase within the extended period. He cannot be
permitted to repudiate his promise, it appearing that Canuto stood ready to make the payment within the extended
period and was only prevented from doing so by the conduct of Mariano himself.
2. Yes. The Court held that the rule forbidding the admission of parole or extrinsic evidence to alter, vary,
or contradict a written instrument does not apply so as to prohibit the establishment by parole of an agreement
between the parties to a writing, entered into subsequent to the time when the written instrument was executed,
notwithstanding such agreement may have the effect of adding to, changing, modifying, or even altogether
abrogating the contract of the parties as evidenced by the writing. Such parole evidence does not in any way deny
that the original agreement of the parties was that which the writing purports to express, but merely goes to show
that the parties have exercised their right to change or abrogate the same, or to make a new and independent
contract. It is immaterial how soon after the execution of the written contract the parole agreement was made. If it
was in fact subsequent and is otherwise unobjectionable, it may be proved and enforced.
YU-TEK VS. GONZALES

G.R. No. L-9935 February 1, 1915
By : Abutal, Ivydel
While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning

of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract
additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the
writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake.
Facts:
Yu Tek and Co. and Basilio Gonzales entered into a written contract wherein Gonzales obligated himself to
deliver to Yu Tek 600 piculs of sugar of first and second grade within 3 months in consideration of the receipt of the
sum of Php3,000. However, Gonzales failed to carry out his obligation. Yu Tek filed an action against Gonzales,
proving that no sugar had been delivered that it had not been able to recover the Php3,000. Meanwhile, Gonzales
alleges that the parties intended that the sugar was to be secured from the crop which he raised on his plantation, and
that he was unable to fulfill the contract by reason of the almost total failure of his crop. The lower court refused to
admit the parol evidence and ruled in favor of Yu Tek.
Issue:
P a g e 81 o f 285
EVIDENCE

Whether or not the parol evidence should be admitted?
Ruling:
NO. While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of written contracts, it
cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not
mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake.
In the case at bar, it is sought to show that the sugar was to be obtained exclusively from the crop raised by
the defendant. There is no clause in the written contract which even remotely suggests such a condition. Gonzales
undertook to deliver a specified quantity of sugar within a specified time. The contract placed no restriction upon
him in the matter of obtaining the sugar. He was equally at liberty to purchase it on the market or raise it himself. It
may be true that Gonzales owned a plantation and expected to raise the sugar himself, but he did not limit his
obligation to his own crop of sugar. The conclusion is that the condition which the defendant seeks to add to the
contract by parol evidence cannot be considered. The rights of the parties must be determined by the writing itself.
LAND SETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORP VS. GARCIA

G.R. No. L-17820 April 24, 1963
By : Abutal, Ivydel
When the operation of the contract is made to depend upon the occurrence of an
event, which, for that reason is a condition precedent, such may be established by
parol evidence.
Facts:
Land Settlement and Development Corp. (LASEDECO) sold 2 tractors to Garcia Plantation. The payment
of the purchase price was secured by two promissory notes signed by Salud de Gracia. Upon the Plantations failure
to pay such purchase price, LASEDECO filed an action for the collection of P5, 955.30.
The defendants, in their answer, admitted the execution of the two promissory notes, but contended that the
same had been novated by a subsequent agreement contained in a letter (Exh. L) sent by the manager of the Board of
Liquidators of the LASEDECO, giving the defendant Salud C. de Garcia an extension up to May 31, 1957, within
P a g e 82 o f 285
EVIDENCE

which to pay the account, and since the complaint was filed on February 20, 1957, they claimed that the action was
premature and prayed that the complaint be dismissed.
At the trial, when the plaintiff presented the Legal Officer of the Board of Liquidators, to testify on the true
agreement and the intention of the parties at the time the letter (Exh. L for the defendants) was drafted and prepared,
the lower court, upon the objection of the counsel for defendants, ruled out said testimony and prevented the
introduction of evidence under the parol evidence rule (Sec. 22, Rule 123). Plaintiff also intended to present the
writer of the letter, to testify on the same matter, but in view of the ruling of the lower court, it rested its case.
Issue:
Whether the lower court erred in excluding parol evidence, tending to prove the true intention and
agreement of the parties and the existence of a condition precedent, before the extension granted the defendants,
contained in Exhibit L, could become effective?
Ruling:
The parol evidence consisted of the testimony of Attys. Guinto and Kintanar, to the effect that in view of
the plea of defendant Vicente B. Garcia to give the defendants an extension of time to pay their accounts, Atty.
Kintanar gave the defendants up to May 31, 1957, to coincide with their ramie harvest "provided that they will make
a substantial down payment immediately, with the understanding that upon non-payment of the substantial amount,
the extension shall be deemed as not granted and the LASEDECO shall feel free to seek redress in court". That there
was such condition precedent is manifested by the second paragraph of the letter Exhibit L, quoted hereunder:
November 20, 1956
Mrs. Salud de Garcia Tacurong, Cotabato:
Dear Madam:
Please be advised that the Board has granted you an extension up to May 31, 1957, within which to pay your
account.
This matter has been the subject of agreement between your husband and this office.
Resectfully (Sgd.) FILOMENO C, KINTANAR
The subject of agreement alluded to in the second paragraph of the above letter, was the condition to be
complied with or the consideration given for the extension of time, within which the Garcia spouses pay their
account. The lower court should have admitted the parol evidence sought to be introduced to prove the failure of the
document in question to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. When the operation of the contract is
made to depend upon the occurrence of an event, which, for that reason is a condition precedent, such may be
established by parol evidence.
In the case at bar, reference is made of a previous agreement, in the second paragraph of letter Exhibit L,
and although a document is usually to be interpreted in the precise terms in which it is couched, Courts, in the
exercise of sound discretion, may admit evidence of surrounding circumstances, in order to arrive at the true
intention of the parties.
P a g e 83 o f 285
EVIDENCE

MAULINI v. SERRANO
28 PHIL 640 December 16, 1914
By : Abutal, Ivydel
The prohibition against parol evidence is to prevent alteration, change,

modification, or contradiction of the term of a written instrument, admittedly
existing, by the use of some parol evidence except in cases specifically named in
the action. The purpose was to show that the contract of indorsement ever
existed;; that the minds of the parties never met on the terms of such contract that
they never mutually agreed to enter into such contract and that there never
existed a consideration upon which such an agreement could be founded.
Facts:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in favour of the
plaintiff for the sum of P3,000, with interest thereon at the rate of 1 per cent month from September 5, 1912,
together with the costs. The action was brought by the plaintiff upon the contract of indorsement alleged to have
been made in his favor by the defendant upon the following promissory note:
3000 Due 5th of September 1912. We jointly and severally agree to pay to the order of Don Antonio G.
Serrano on or before the 5th day of September, 1912, the sum of three thousand pesos (P3,000) for value received
for commercial operations. Notice and protest renounced. If the sum herein mentioned is not completely paid on the
5th day of September, 1912, this instrument will draw interest at the rate of 1 per cent per month from the date
when due until the date of its complete payment. The makers hereof agree to pay the additional sum of P500 as
attorney's fees in case of failure to pay the note.
Manila, June 5, 1912.
(Sgd.) For Padern, Moreno & Co., by F. Moreno, member of the firm. For
Jose Padem, by F. Moreno, Angel Gimenez
The note was indorsed on the back as follows:
Pay note to the order of Don Fernando Maulini, value received. Manila, June 5, 1912.
(Sgd) A.G. Serrano
Issue:
Whether the evidence is admissible?
Ruling:
Yes. Parol evidence is admissible for the purposes named. The prohibition against parol evidence is to
prevent alteration, change, modification, or contradiction of the term of a written instrument, admittedly existing, by
the use of some parol evidence except in cases specifically named in the action. The case at bar is not one where the
evidence offered varies, alters, modifies, or contradicts the terms of indorsement admittedly existing. The evidence
was not offered for that purpose. The purpose was to show that the contract of indorsement ever existed;; that the
minds of the parties never met on the terms of such contract that they never mutually agreed to enter into such
contract and that there never existed a consideration upon which such an agreement could be founded.
P a g e 84 o f 285
EVIDENCE

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. BENITO SEETO

G.R. No. L-4388 August 13, 1952
By : Balajadia, Nasreen
Any prior or contemporaneous conversation in connection with a note or its

indorsement may be proved by parol evidence.
Facts:
On March 13, 1948, Seeto presented to PNB at Surigao a P5,000 check, payable to cash or bearer, and
drawn by one Gan Yek Kiao against the Cebu branch of the Philippine National Bank of Communications. After
consultation with the bank employees, Seeto made a general and unqualified endorsement of the check, which was
accepted by PNBs agency, which paid Seeto the value of the check therefore. Upon being presented to the drawee
bank for payment, however, the check was dishonored for insufficient funds. PNB deemanded refund from Seeto.
Seeto, however, refused, claiming that at the time of the negotiation of the check, the drawer had sufficient funds in
the drawee bank, and had not PNB delayed in forwarding the check until the drawers fund were exhausted, the
same would have been paid. PNB alleged that Seeto gave assurances that the drawer of the check had sufficient
funds with the bank, and that Seeto had made a general and unqualified indorsement thereon. As evidence, PNB
presented two witnesses at the trial, who testified that the check was cashed due to assurances given by Seeto and
the promise that he would refund the amount paid by PNB should the check be dishonored.
Issue:
Whether parol evidence with respect to the verbal assurances made by Seeto be admitted as evidence?
Ruling:
Yes. Any prior or contemporaneous conversation in connection with a note or its indorsement may be
proved by parol evidence. An extrinsic agreement between indorser and indorsee which cannot be embodied in the
instrument without impairing its credit is provable by parol. If, therefore, the supposed assurances that the drawer
had funds and that the Seeto would refund the amount of the check if the drawer had no funds, were the
considerations or reasons that induced the branch agency of PNB to go out of its ordinary practice of not cashing out
of town checks and accept the check and to pay its face value, the may be proved by parol, provided, of course, that
the assurances or inducements offered would not vary, alter, or destroy the obligations attached by law to the
indorsement. In this case, however, there was no express obligation assumed by Seeto that the drawer would always
have funds, or that he would refund the amount of the check even if there was delay in its presentation. Therefore,
such assurances were discharged by the unreasonable delay in the presentation of the check for payment.
P a g e 85 o f 285
EVIDENCE

CHARLES F. WOODHOUSE v. FORTUNATO F. HALILI

G.R. No. L-4811 July 31, 1953
The purpose of considering the drafts is not to vary, alter, or modify the
agreement, but to discover the intent of the parties thereto and the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the contract.
Facts:
Plaintiff entered into a written agreement with the defendant to the effect that they shall organize a
partnership for the bottling and distribution of soft drinks, plaintiff to act as industrial partner or manager, and the
defendant a capitalist furnishing the capital necessary therefor. The defendant claims that his consent to the
agreement was secured by the representation of plaintiff that he was the owner, or was about to become owner, of an
exclusive bottling franchise, which representation was false. The fraud and false representation were sought to be
proven by means, among others, of the drafts of the agreement prior to the final one, which drafts are presumed to
have already been integrated into the final agreement.
Issue:
Whether those prior drafts excluded from the prohibition of the parol evidence rule
Ruling:
Yes. The purpose of considering the drafts is not to vary, alter, or modify the agreement, but to discover the
intent of the parties thereto and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract. The issue of fact is, did
plaintiff represent to defendant that he had an exclusive franchise? Certainly, his acts or statements prior to the
agreement are essential and relevant to the determination of said issue. The act or statement of the plaintiff was not
sought to be introduced to change or alter the terms of the agreement, but to prove how he induced the defendant to
enter into it - to prove the representations or inducements, or fraud, with which or by which he secured the other
party's consent thereto. These are expressly excluded from the parol evidence rule. Fraud and false representation
are an incident to the creation of a jural act, not to its integration, and are not governed by the rules on integration.
Where parties prohibited from proving said representations or inducements, on the ground that the agreement had
already been entered into, it would be impossible to prove misrepresentation or fraud. The parol evidence rule
expressly allows the evidence to be introduced when the validity of an instrument is put in issue by the pleadings
(sec. 22-a of Rule 123)
ZACARIAS ROBLES v. LIZARRAGA HERMANOS

G.R. No. L-26173 July 13, 1927
The purpose of the parole evidence is to enforce an independent or collateral

agreement constituting an inducement or the making of the sale, or part of the
consideration therefore.
P a g e 86 o f 285
EVIDENCE

Facts:
Anastacia de la Rama, as administratrix of the estate of her husband, leased the hacienda Nahalian to
Zacarias Robles Jr. for six years. Robles Jr., at his expense and without any indemnity at the end of the term, made
various improvements and additions to the plant.
Three years before the lease was to expire, Lizarraga Hermanos, a mercantile partnership, proposed to buy
all of the property belonging to the hacienda. As Robles, Jr., still had over two years inhis lease contract, he was
asked to surrender such last two years and permit Lizarraga Hermanos to take possession as buyer. Lizarraga
Hermanos agreed to pay him the value of all betterments made on the hacienda and to buy from him all that
belonged to him personally on the hacienda. However, no reference of such surrender of Robles rights as lessee,
except in fixing the date when the lease should end, nor of anything said concerning the improvements or property
of a personal nature, was placed in the instrument of conveyance later executed.
Robles, Jr filed a complaint against Lizarraga Hermanos for the recovery of compensationfor improvements
made by him on the hacienda and the value of implements and farming equipment supplied by him, as well as
damages for breach of contract. As evidence, he presented a letter written by Severiano Lizarraga to him, in which a
reference is made to an appraisal and liquidation. Lizarraga Hermanos, however, assailed the admission of the letter
as being prohibited parole evidence.
Issue:
Whether the letter admissible as evidence apart from the instrument of conveyance?
Ruling:
Yes. The purpose of the parole evidence is to enforce an independent or collateral agreement constituting an
inducement or the making of the sale, or part of the consideration therefore. There is no rule of evidence of wider
application than that which declares intrinsic evidence inadmissible either to contradict or vary the terms of a written
contract, such being deemed to supersede all oral negotiations or stipulations concerning its terms and the subject- matter which preceded the execution of the instrument, in the absence of accident, fraud or mistake of fact.
However, such rule does not extend so far as to preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence to show prior or
contemporaneous collateral parole agreements between the parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of
whether or not the written agreement contains any reference to such collateral agreement, and whether the action is
at law or in equity.
In this case, the deed of conveyance purports to transfer to Lizarraga Hermanos only such interests in
certain properties as had come to the conveyors by inheritance, not those which Robles, Jr. had acquired by lease or
purchase, or those that he had placed thereon by way of improvement. The verbal contract established in this case is
therefore clearly independent of the main contract of conveyance, and evidence of such is admissible under the
doctrine above stated. The written contract is complete in itself, the oral agreement is also complete in itself, and it is
a collateral to the written contract, notwithstanding the fact that it deals with related matters.
LUCIO CRUZ VS CA
G.R No. 79962
By : Dauz, Maricel
P a g e 87 o f 285
EVIDENCE

The parole evidence is predicated on the existence of a document embodying the

terms of an agreement. A receipt is not and could have not been intended by the
parties to the sole memorial of their agreement.
Facts:
ConradoSalonga filed a complaint for collection and damages against petitioner Lucio Cruz alleging that in
the course of their business transactions of buying and selling fish, the petitioner borrowed from him an amount of
P35,000, evidenced by receipt. Salonga claimed that of this amount, only P20,000 has been paid. Salonga claimed
that he and Cruz agreed that the latter would grant him an exclusive right to repurchase the harvest of certain
fishponds leased by Cruz in exchange for certain loan accommodation and that pursuant thereto, Salonga delivered
to Cruz various loans totalling P15, 250.00 as evidenced by 4 receipts.
Cruz denied having contracted any loan from Salonga. By way of special defense, he alleged that he was a
leasee of several hectares of a fishpond owned by Yabut and that he entered into an agreement with Salonga
whereby the latter will purchase fish in certain areas in the pond. Cruz admitted having received the amounts
mentioned but he contended that these amounts were not received as loans but for their pakyaw agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in disregarding parole evidence to determine the real transactions of the
parties.
Ruling:
The parole evidence rule is not applicable in this case. Exhibit D does not contain any agreements to
determine the transaction made by the parties. It is only a receipt attesting to the fact that the petitioner received
from the private respondent the amount of 35,000.00.
Even if it were assumed that exhibits D and I are covered by the parole evidence rule, its application by the
CA was improper.
LECHUGAS VS. CA
P a g e 88 o f 285
EVIDENCE

143 SCRA 335 , August 06, 1986
By : Dauz, Maricel
The parol evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by
either party to the litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties to
the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and
does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the
instrument or the relation established thereby.
Facts:
Lechugas filed a complaint for forcible entry with damages against the private respondents, alleging that
the latter by means of force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered their lots. She alleged that they
appropriated the produce thereof for themselves, and refused to surrender the possession of the same despite
demands made by the petitioner.
Victoria Lechugas testified that she bought the land now subject of this litigation from LeonciaLasangue as
evidenced by a public "Deed of Absolute Sale" which plaintiff had caused to be registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds; preparatory to the execution of the deed Exhibit "A", plaintiff had the land segregated from the
bigger portion of 12 hectares owned by LeonciaLasangue by contracting a private land surveyor to survey the land
and establish its boundaries, shape, form and area in accordance with the said plan which was attached to exhibit A.
She also states that she caused the declaration of the said portion of six hectares subject of Exhibit A in her name
beginning the year 1951 under tax declaration No. 7912, paid taxes on the same land, and has taken possession of
the land through her tenants Jesus Leoncio, Roberta Losarita and Simeon Guinta, who shared one-half of the
produce of the riceland with her, while she shouldered some of the expenses in cultivation and seeds, and one-third
share in other crops, like coffee beans, bamboos, coconuts, corn and the like. Defendants called as their first witness
plaintiff herself, to elicit from her the reason why it was that although her vendor was also residing at the
municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, plaintiff did not care to call her to the witness stand to testify regarding the
Identity of the land which plaintiff bought from said vendor ; to which query witness Lechugas countered that she
had tried to call her vendor, but the latter refused, saying that she (Lasangue) had already testified in plaintiff's favor
in the forcible entry case in the Justice of the Peace Court.
Issue:
whether or not COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING PAROL EVIDENCE OVER THE OBJECTION OF
THE PETITIONER IN ORDER TO VARY THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE DEED OF DEFINITE
SALE
Ruling:
The appellate court acted correctly in upholding the trial court's action in admitting the testimony of
LeonciaLasangue. The petitioner claims that LeonciaLasangue was the vendor of the disputed land. The petitioner
denies that LeonciaLasangue sold Lot No. 5522 to her. She alleges that this lot was sold to her by one Leonora
Lasangue, who, however, was never presented as witness in any of the proceedings below by herein petitioner.
As explained by a leading commentator on our Rules of Court, the parol evidence rule does not apply, and
may not properly be invoked by either party to the litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties to the
suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the
instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby.
P a g e 89 o f 285
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It should be noted in the first place, that there is no written instrument between the plaintiff and the
municipality, that is, between the parties to the action; and there is, therefore, no possibility of the question arising as
to the admissibility of parol evidence to vary or contradict the terms of an instrument. The written instrument that is,
the conveyance on which plaintiff bases his action was between the Insular Government and the plaintiff, and not
between the municipality and the plaintiff; and therefore, there can arise, as between the plaintiff and defendant no
question relative to the varying or contradicting the terms of a written instrument between them.
BALDOMERO INCIONG, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 96405 June 26, 1996
By : Dauz, Maricel
The parole evidence rule does not specify that the written agreement needs to be
a public document. What is required is that the agreement be in writing since
written evidence is so much more certain and accurate than that which rests in
fleeting memory only, that it would be unsafe, when parties have expressed the
terms of their contract in writing, to admit weaker evidence to control and vary
the stronger and to show that the parties intended a different contract from that
expressed in the writing signed by them.
Facts:
Inciong incurred liability through a promissory note in the amount of P50,000.00 which he signed with
Naybe and Pantanosas, holding themselves jointly and severally liable to private respondent Philippine Bank of
Communications, Cagayan de Oro City branch. The promissors were not able to pay when the note became due.
PBC made demands but when they were not heeded, PBC filed a complaint for collection against the three obligors.
In his answer, Inciong alleged that he was approached by his friend, Rudy Campos, who told him that he
was a partner of PioTio, the branch manager of PBC in Cagayan de Oro City, in the falcata logs operation business.
Campos persuaded petitioner to act as a "co.maker" with Naybe in a loan in order to buy a chainsaw to contribute to
the partnership. Petitioner allegedly acceded but with the understandingthat he would only be a co.maker for the
loan. Petitioner alleged further that 5 copies of a blank promissory note were brought to him by Campos at his
office. He affixed his signature thereto but in one copy, he indicated that he bound himself only for the amount of
P5,000.00. Thus, it was by trickery, fraud and misrepresentation that he was made liable for the amount of
P50,000.00.
The lower court ruled in favor of PBC noting that the typewritten fgue of 50,000 clearly appears directly
below the signature of the petitioner in the promissory note. Lower court also noted that the petitioner was a holder
of Bachelor of Laws and a labor consultant who was supposed totake due care of his concerns. CA affirmed the
decision of the lower court. Petitioner asserted that since the promissory note is not a public deed with the
formalities prescribed by law but a mere commercial paper which does not bear the signature of attesting witnesses,
parole evidence may overcome the contents of the promissory note.
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Issue:
Whether or notInciong can present parole evidence to prove that he was only liable for P5,000.00 and not
for P50,000.00 as provided in the promissory note?
Ruling:
The parole evidence rule does not specify that the written agreement needs to be a public document. What
is required is that the agreement be in writing since written evidence is so much more certain and accurate than that
which rests in fleeting memory only, that it would be unsafe, when parties have expressed the terms of their contract
in writing, to admit weaker evidence to control and vary the stronger and to show that the parties intended a different
contract from that expressed in the writing signed by them.
Thus, for the parole evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not be in any particular form, or be
signed by both parties. As a general rule, bills, notes and other instruments of a similar nature are not subject to be
varied or contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence. By alleging fraud in his answer, petitioner was actually in the
right direction towards proving that he and his co-makers agreed to a loan of P5,000.00 only considering that, where
a parole contemporaneous agreement was the inducing and moving cause of the written contract, it may be shown
by parole evidence. However, fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence, mere preponderance of
evidence, not even being adequate. Petitioner's attempt to prove fraud must, therefore, fail as it was evidenced only
by his own uncorroborated and, expectedly, self-serving testimony.
RAFAEL S. ORTAES VS. CA

G.R. No. 107372 January 23, 1997
By : Del Mundo, Ma Fe
Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which
speaks of a uniform language. Examining the deeds of sale, we cannot even make
an inference that the sale was subject to any condition. As a contract, it is the law
between the parties.
Facts:
Private respondents sold to petitioner two parcels of land. The private respondents received the payments
for the lots but failed to deliver the titles to petitioner. The latter demanded from the former the delivery of said
titles. Private respondents, however, refused on the ground that the title of the first lot is in the possession of another
person, and petitioner's acquisition of the title of the other lot is subject to certain conditions. Petitioner then sued
private respondents for specific performance before the RTC. In their answer with counterclaim private respondents
merely alleged the existence of the oral conditions which were never reflected in the deeds of sale.
During trial, private respondent Oscar Inocentes orally testified that the sale was subject to the above
conditions, although such conditions were not incorporated in the deeds of sale. Despite petitioner's timely
objections on the ground that the introduction of said oral conditions was barred by the parol evidence rule, the
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lower court nonetheless, admitted them and eventually dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the court a quo.
Issue:
Whether or not the parol evidence being offered in the case is admissible?
Ruling:
The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible. First, private respondents' oral testimony on the
alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on
human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable
unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform language. Thus, under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, as in this case, it is deemed to
contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents
thereof. Considering that the written deeds of sale were the only repository of the truth, whatever is not found in said
instruments must have been waived and abandoned by the parties. Examining the deeds of sale, we cannot even
make an inference that the sale was subject to any condition. As a contract, it is the law between the parties.
Secondly, to buttress their argument, private respondents rely on the case of Land Settlement Development,
Co.vs. Garcia Plantation where the Court ruled that a condition precedent to a contract may be established by parol
evidence. However, the material facts of that case are different from this case. In the former, the contract sought to
be enforced expressly stated that it is subject to an agreement containing the conditions-precedent which were
proven through parol evidence. Whereas, the deeds of sale in this case, made no reference to any pre-conditions or
other agreement. In fact, the sale is denominated as absolute in its own terms.
Third, the parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a
valid instrument, hence, contrary to the rule that:
The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to . . . the terms of a written instrument by testimony
purporting to show that, at or before the signing of the document, other or different terms were orally agreed upon
by the parties. Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, "it cannot serve the
purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in
the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake." No such fraud or mistake exists in this case.
Fourth, the Court disagree with private respondents' argument that their parol evidence is admissible under
the exceptions provided by the Rules, specifically, the alleged failure of the agreement to express the true intent of
the parties. Such exception obtains only in the following instance:
Where the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual intention of the parties
cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument. In such a case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter
of the contract, of the relations of the parties to each other, and of the facts and circumstances surrounding them
when they entered into the contract may be received to enable the court to make a proper, interpretation of the
instrument.
In this case, the deeds of sale are clear, without any ambiguity, mistake or imperfection, much less
obscurity or doubt in the terms thereof.
P a g e 92 o f 285
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ROSARIO TEXTILE vs. HOME BANKERS

G.R. No. 137232 June 29, 2005
Documents must be taken as explaining all the terms of the agreement between
the parties when there appears to be no ambiguity in the language of said
documents nor any failure to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties.
Facts:
Rosario Textile Mills Corporation (RTMC) applied from Home Bankers Savings & Trust Co. for an
Omnibus Credit Line which was approved. Edilberto V. Yujuico signed a Surety Agreement in favor of the bank, in
which he bound himself jointly and severally with RTMC for the payment of all RTMCs indebtedness to the bank.
RTMC availed of the credit line by making numerous drawdowns, each drawdown being covered by a separate
promissory note and trust receipt. RTMC, represented by Yujuico, executed in favor of the bank a total of eleven
promissory notes. RTMC then failed to pay its loans. Hence the bank filed a complaint for sum of money against
RTMC and Yujuico before the RTC.
In their answer, RTMC and Yujuico contend that they should be absolved from liability. They claimed that
although the grant of the credit line and the execution of the suretyship agreement are admitted, the bank gave
assurance that the suretyship agreement was merely a formality under which Yujuico will not be personally liable.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of the bank.CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the suretyship agreement Yujuico signed does not bind him, the same being a mere
formality
Ruling:
The Court rejected Yujuicos contention. The Suretyship Agreement he signed binds him. The terms clearly
show that he agreed to pay the bank jointly and severally with RTMC. The parole evidence rule under Section 9,
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court is in point, thus:
"SEC. 9. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an agreement have been reduced in writing,
it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in
interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of the written agreement if
he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or imperfection in the written agreement;
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(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of
the written agreement.
Under this Rule, the terms of a contract are rendered conclusive upon the parties and evidence aliunde is
not admissible to vary or contradict a complete and enforceable agreement embodied in a document. We have
carefully examined the Suretyship Agreement signed by Yujuico and found no ambiguity therein. Documents must
be taken as explaining all the terms of the agreement between the parties when there appears to be no ambiguity in
the language of said documents nor any failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties.
EDENBERT MADRIGAL VS.CA

G.R. No. 142944. April 15, 2005
Even when a document appears on its face to be a sale, the owner of the property may
prove that the contract is really a loan with mortgage by raising as an issue the fact that
the document does not express the true intent of the parties.
Facts:
Jose and his wife Fermina are the owners of a residential lot with a 2-storey residential house erected
thereon. Jose planned to mortgage the property to the bank but his son Virgilio convinced him not to proceed with
the intended mortgage and to instead assign to him a portion of the same property, assuring his father that the latter
could continue in occupancy of the property and that he will not dispose of the property without his fathers consent
and that the latter could redeem the said property any time he acquires money.
Jose and Fermina executed a "Deed of Absolute Sale", whereunder the couple appeared to have conveyed
to their son Virgilio the house and lot in question for a consideration of P50,000 although the property easily
commands much more at that time. Virgilio then sold the said property to Madrigal without the knowledge of Jose.
Madrigal then asked Jose to vacate the property.
Jose filed against Virgilio and Madrigal the complaint for annulment, redemption and damages with the
RTC. RTC ruled in favor of Jose and Fermina which the CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in receiving parol evidence to establish that the instrument in question
is actually one of equitable mortgage
Ruling:
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The trail court is correct. As ruled in the case of Lustan vs CA, Even when a document appears on its face
to be a sale, the owner of the property may prove that the contract is really a loan with mortgage by raising as an
issue the fact that the document does not express the true intent of the parties. In this case, parol evidence then
becomes competent and admissible to prove that the instrument was in truth and in fact given merely as a security
for the repayment of a loan. And upon proof of the truth of such allegations, the court will enforce the agreement or
understanding in consonance with the true intent of the parties at the time of the execution of the contract".
QUALITY OF WITNESSES
MENTAL INCAPACITY OF IMMATURITY
Rule 120 Sections 20-21
Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in the next succeeding section,
all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make their known perception to others, may be
witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime
unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be ground for disqualification. (18a)
Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. The following
persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such
that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the
facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully. (19a)
P a g e 95 o f 285
EVIDENCE

CASES
People v. De Jesus
People v. Salomon
People v. Mendoza
People v. Macapagal,
129 SCRA 4 (1984)

229 SCRA 402 (1993)
254 SCRA 18 (1996)
G.R.No. 155335, July 14, 2005
PEOPLE VS. DE JESUS

129 SCRA 4
There is no showing that she could not convey her ideas by words or signs.
Clara gave sufficiently intelligible answers. The Court was satisfied that Clara
can perceive and transport in her own way her perceptions. The ruling of the
lower court was affirmed.
Facts: Clara Mina, a feeble-minded single woman of 28, lived with her parents in barrio Amistad, Alicia, Isabela. At
around 2:00 in the afternoon of January 3, 1974, Clara was left in the house when members
Of the household went farming. Rogelio de Jesus, a neighbor, entered Claras house and with the use of
force, raped the feeble-minded woman. Pastora Simon, the mother of Clara, happened to rerun in the house and
caught De Jesus in the act. The latter managed to escape. Simon reported the incident to the police and had her
daughter examined by the municipal health officer. De Jesus subsequently surrendered.
During trial, De Jesus testified in his defense. He claimed that he only admitted to the authorities that he
had sexual intercourse with Clara due to his maltreatment by the jail guards. Clara, on the other hand, testified for
the prosecution and narrated the events leading to her rape albeit with some difficulty because of her mental
condition. Giving great weight to the testimony of Clara, the Circuit Criminal Court of Isabela found De Jesus guilty
of rape. The accused appealed to the Supreme Court challenging the competency of Clara as a witness.
Issue:
Whether the feeble-minded Clara qualifies as a competent witness?
Ruling:
Yes. It is undisputed that Clara is mentally-ill. However, there is no showing that she could not convey her
ideas by words or signs. Clara gave sufficiently intelligible answers. The Court was satisfied that Clara can perceive
and transport in her own way her perceptions. The ruling of the lower court was affirmed.
P a g e 96 o f 285
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PEOPLE VS. SOLOMON
229 SCRA 403
A mental retardate is not for this reason alone disqualified from being a witness.
As in the case of other witnesses, acceptance of his testimony depends on its
nature and credibility or, otherwise put, the quality of his perceptions and the
manner he can make them known to the court.
Facts:
On October 11, 1987, while Sylvia Soria, a 20-year old mental retardate, was walking along the Maharlika
Highway at Casabahan, Gandara, Samar, Alejandro Salomon and Feliciano Conge, who were apparently waiting for
her, accosted her and forcibly took her to the ricefield some ten meters away. There she was raped by Salomon with
Conge's assistance. On her way home, she met her brother Senecio, to whom she related her ordeal. The two of them
reported her rape to their father. That same night, the family walked the three-kilometer distance to the police
station, where Restituto Soria signed a complaint for the rape of his daughter by Salomon and Conge. 1Sylvia was
medically examined at the Gandara General Hospital by Dr. Susan Tanseco
Three days later, Salomon and Feliciano could no longer be found. It was only after a four-month search
that they were arrested in Aguado, Plaser, Masbate, from where, after being detained there for one month, they were
taken back to Samar. 3Following a protracted investigation, an information for rape was filed against them on August
9, 1988, with the Regional Trial Court in Calbayog City.
The two accused flatly denied the charge against them. Conge swore that on the night in question, Sylvia
arrived at the highway and loudly demanded a lamp from the people in Epifanio de Guzman's house. He approached
her and said there was no lamp to spare, whereupon, as he turned his back to leave, she hit him in the neck with a
piece of wood, causing him to stagger. In swift reaction, he caught Sylvia by the waist and pushed her to the ground
and as she lay there exposed (she was not wearing any underwear), he angrily shoved his five fingers into her
vagina. Sylvia cried out at the top of her voice. Fearing that her relatives might come, he withdrew his hands and
immediately left the place.
Issue:
Whether or not the testimony of Sylvia Soria a mental retardate should be admissible as evidence?
Ruling:
YES.A mental retardate is not for this reason alone disqualified from being a witness. As in the case of
other witnesses, acceptance of his testimony depends on its nature and credibility or, otherwise put, the quality of his
perceptions and the manner he can make them known to the court. 16 Thus, in People v. Gerones, 17 the Court
accepted the testimony of a rape victim notwithstanding that she had the mentality of a nine or ten-year old "because
she was able to communicate her ordeal... clearly and consistently."
In the case before us, the trial court noted that although Sylvia's speech was slurred and it was necessary at
times to ask her leading questions, "her testimony was positive, clear, plain, coherent and credible." Her mental
condition did not vitiate her credibility. We also believe, as we have observed often enough in many cases 18that a
woman will not expose herself to the humiliation of a rape trail, with its attendant publicity and the morbid curiosity
it will arouse, unless she has been truly wronged and seeks atonement for her abuse.
P a g e 97 o f 285
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PEOPLE VS. MACAPAGAL

254 SCRA 18
Mental retardation per se does not affect credibility. A mentally retarded may be a
credible witness. The acceptance of his or her testimony depends on the quality of his or
her perceptions and the manner he or she can make them known to the court.
Facts:
One evening in June 1996 at Barangay Manapa, Buenavista, Agusandel Norte. While LigayaSarino was
walking on her way home after she bought kerosene from the nearby store of appellant's father, Jesus Macapal, Sr.,
appellant suddenly appeared and waylaid her. Holding both her arms, appellant dragged her to an isolated grassy
area where he ordered her to lie down. Although she wanted to shout, she froze with fear, appellant having poked a
knife at her abdomen and threatened to kill her if she would shout or resist. Appellant thereafter succeeded in having
sexual intercourse with her.
On December 23, 1996, when the victim visited her sister VilmaSarino Salazar (Vilma), Vilma noticed the
victim's stomach bulging, prompting her to inquire what happened. While the victim initially refused to answer, she
was later prevailed upon to answer upon her (Vilma's ) insistence and assurance that she would not be harmed. The
victim then revealed what their neighbor, herein appellant, did to her. When Vilma asked her when the incident
happened, the victim answered 'when you just left for Manila which was, by Vilma's account, on June 3, 1996.
It if further gathered from the evidence for the prosecution that Dr. Cheryl T. Zalsos, a psychiatrist at the
Northern Mindanao Medical Center who conducted a psychiatric evaluation of the victim on November 25, 1998,
found that 'the patient is suffering from Mental Retardation, mild to moderate . . . characterized by significantly
sub-average intellectual functioning (IQ 70 or below) accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive
functioning, with an onset below the age of 18. And the doctor opined that while the mental capacity of the victim is
comparable to that of a child between 9 to 12 years old, she could testify in court but under closed door and leading
questions should be avoided 'as retarded people may be suggestible and wish to please others.
It is gathered furthermore that when Dr. Benjamin B. Selim, Jr. (Dr. Selim), Medical Officer III of the
Butuan Provincial Hospital, examined the victim on January 13, 1997, he found her to be in a pregnant state and that
her hymen was not intact. On the basis of the ultrasound examination, he opined that she 'had conception probably
third to the last week of June 1996.
Issue:
Whether or not LigayaSarinos testimony is credible being mentally retardate?
Ruling:
Mental retardation per se does not affect credibility. A mentally retarded may be a credible witness. The
acceptance of his or her testimony depends on the quality of his or her perceptions and the manner he or she can
make them known to the court.
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In People v. Munar (131 SCRA 44, 46[1984]), although the complainant therein was a 19-year old female,
with a mental age of a 5-year old, we still held that she was a competent witness. We therein relied on the findings of
the trial court that complainant's answer were intelligible enough to be understood. The complainant therein could
convey her thoughts by words and signs. Furthermore, an examining physician from the National Mental Hospital
was presented in that case who testified that the mental deficiency of the witness did not prevent her from recalling
painful experiences. In People v. Gerones, (193 SCRA 263, 267 [1991]), we found, upon close examination of the
records, that the victim managed to communicate her ordeal to the court clearly and consistently. The trial court
found the victim therein to have the mental capacity of a ten-year old. Hence, we declared that we were convinced
that a ten-year old girl could adequately narrate facts which show that she had been raped. The acceptance of a
mental retardate's testimony, therefore, as in the case of other witnesses, must still depend on its nature and
credibility or, otherwise put, the quality of the person's perceptions and the manner he can make them known to the
court.
In the case at bar, albeit the victim's testimony was tainted with inconsistencies,[36] these are mere
collateral and minor matters which would not compel this Court from discrediting her testimony, given her mental
retardation. In fact, testimonial discrepancies, which could have been caused by the natural fickleness of memory,
tend to strengthen, rather than weaken, credibility as they negate any suspicion of rehearsed testimony and do not
destroy the substance of the victim's testimony.
MARITAL DISQUALIFICATION RULE

Rule 130, Section 22
Section 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their marriage, neither the
husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants. (20a)
CASES
Ordono v, Daquigan,
People v. Castaeda
People v. Francisco
Lezama v. Rodriguez
62 SCRA 270
88 SCRA 562 (1979)
78 Phil. 694 (1947)
23 SCRA 1166 (1968)
P a g e 99 o f 285
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ORDONO VS. DAQUIGAN

62 SCRA 270
When an offense directly attack or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal
relation, it comes within the exception to the statute that one shall not be a witness
against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one
against the other.
Facts:
AvelinoOrdoo was charged in the municipal court of San Gabriel, La Union with having raped his
daughter, Leonora, on October 11, 1970. The verified complaint dated November 7, 1973 was signed by the twenty
four year old victim
In support of that complaint, Catalina BalanonOrdoo, the mother of Leonora, executed a sworn statement
wherein she disclosed that on that same date, October 11th, Leonora had apprised her of the outrage but no
denunciation was filed because AvelinoOrdoo threatened to kill Leonora and Catalina (his daughter and wife,
respectively) if they reported the crime to the police.
Catalina Ordoo in her sworn statement further revealed that her husband had also raped their other
daughter, Rosa, on March 25 and April 7, 1973. He was charged in court with that offense.
The case against AvelinoOrdoo, where Leonora Ordoo was the complainant, was elevated to the Court of
First Instance of La Union, San Fernando, Branch (Criminal Case No. 356). On May 29, 1974 the Fiscal presented
Catalina Ordoo as the second prosecution witness. After she had stated her personal circumstances, the defense
counsel objected to her competency. He invoked the marital disqualification rule found in Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. Counsel claimed that AvelinoOrdoo had not consented expressly or impliedly to his wife's testifying against
him.
The trial court overruled the objection. After the denial of AvelinoOrdoo's motion for the reconsideration
of the adverse ruling, he filed the instant action for certiorari and prohibition. He was allowed to sue in forma
pauperis.
Issue:
The issue is whether the rape committed by the husband against his daughter is a crime committed by him
against his wife within the meaning of the exception found in the marital disqualification rule.
Ruling:
NO.There is a dictum that "where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more
harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony
and tranquility fails. In such a case identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on
that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life which the law
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aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy
home" (People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694, 704).
In the Francisco case, the wife, as a rebuttal witness, was allowed to testify against the husband who was
charged with having killed his son and who testified that it was the wife who killed their son.
We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid down in Cargill vs.
State, wherein the court said:
The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too narrow; and the rule that
any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes within the exception is too broad. The better
rule is that, when an offense directly attack or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the
exception to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime
committed (by) one against the other.
Using the criterion thus judiciously enunciated in the Cargill case, it can be concluded that in the law of
evidence the rape perpetrated by the father against his daughter is a crime committed by him against his wife (the
victim's mother).
PEOPLE VS. CASTANEDA

G.R. No. L-46306 February 27, 1979
By : Go, Myka
In this case, the same principle should be applied because the person who
stands to be prejudiced by the forgery is not a third person but his wife. Also, it
directly and vitally impairs the conjugal relation. By reason of public policy, the
wife should not be disqualified because to do otherwise would set a dangerous
precedent where the husband may conjure as many falsifications as possible with
impunity.
Facts:
Victoria Manaloto filed a complaint against her husband Benjamin Manaloto for Falsification of Public
Documents because Bejamin forged, imitated, and counterfeited the signature of Victoria in a deed of sale of a
property which is part of the conjugal partnership when in fact she did not give her consent to it.
Victoria was called to the witness stand but they moved to disqualify her based on Rule 130, Section 20.
The prosecution argued that this is one of the exceptions since it is a criminal case where a crime is committed by
one against the other but the Judge disqualified her.
Issue:
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W/N this case is an exception to the rule on marital disqualification?

Ruling:
Yes. The Court, citing Ordoo v. Daquiganwhich also cited Cargill v. State, provided the criterion to be
followed in resolving this Issue: when an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal
relation, it comes within the exception
In this case, the same principle should be applied because the person who stands to be prejudiced by the
forgery is not a third person but his wife. Also, it directly and vitally impairs the conjugal relation. By reason of
public policy, the wife should not be disqualified because to do otherwise would set a dangerous precedent where
the husband may conjure as many falsifications as possible with impunity.
PEOPLE VS. FRANCISCO

G.R. No. L-568, July 16, 1947
By : Go, Myka
Objections to the competency of a husband or wife to testify in a criminal

prosecution against the other may be waived as in the case of the other witnesses
generally. Thus, the accused waives his or her privilege by calling the other
spouse as a witness for him or her, thereby making the spouse subject to crossexamination in the usual manner.
Facts:
Juan Francisco was previously arrested and detained for robbery. His request to visit his home with his
guard was granted. His guard allowed Francisco to visit his wife in a room while he waited at the foot of the house.
A few minutes later, the guard heard Franciscos wife screaming, running, and holding her bloodied hand to her
breast. He also found Francisco wounded and lying on the ground together with his dead son who is lying on his
breast. He was charged with the crime of parricide.
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Franciscos affidavit stating that he killed his wife and son because he was tired of his father-in-laws
statements about his shameful condition & that he would order someone to kill him was admitted in evidence. His
affidavit was shown to have been voluntarily made and the testimony of his guard was also given much weight.
Franciscos testimony, however, presents a different version from that written in his affidavit-stating that he
was scared of his guard so he wrote such statements in his affidavit. He also placed the blame on his wife as regards
the death of their son. His wife testified to deny the allegations.
The defense strongly impugns the testimony of his wife based on Rule 123, Section 26 (d)
Issue:
W/N the wife is disqualified to testify.
Ruling:
No. In this case, the wife didnt testify in the direct evidence for the prosecution but under circumstances
presently to be stated. It will be noted that the wife only testified against her husband after the latter, testifying in his
own defense, imputed upon her the killing of their son.
By all rules of justice and reason this gave the prosecution, which had theretofore refrained from presenting
the wife as a witness against her husband, the right to do so, as it did in rebuttal; and the wife herself the right to so
testify, at least, in self-defense, not of course, against being subjected to punishment in that case in which she was
not a defendant but against any or all of various possible consequences which might flow from her silence
The court also mentioned the concept of waiver of incompetency. Objections to the competency of a
husband or wife to testify in a criminal prosecution against the other may be waived as in the case of the other
witnesses generally. Thus, the accused waives his or her privilege by calling the other spouse as a witness for him or
her, thereby making the spouse subject to cross-examination in the usual manner.
In this case, when Francisco said that his wife committed the crime, he couldnt expect the State to stay
silent and not rebut such new matter in his testimony.
LEZAMA VS. RODRIGUEZ

G.R. No. L-25643 June 27, 1968
By : Go, Myka
When the interest of the husband and wife are necessarily interrelated, the wife
or husband may invoke the marital disqualification rule.
Facts:
Jose Dineros filed an action against the decision of the CFI which decided in favor of Lezama. His
complaint alleged that due to Lezamas mismanagement, the company was placed under the receivership of Dineros.
During the receivership, Roque brought an action for collection of the amount he lent to the company. The summons
was not served to the receiver but to Lezama. Dineros claimed that due to collusion between Lezamas, Roque was
able to obtain judgment by default against the company.
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Dineros asked the court to issue a subpoena for PaquitaLezama because he claimed that the loan from
Roque is fictitious and that Paquita was the secretary and the person who knew about the negotiations for the said
loan and is knowledgeable about the records in the company book.
The Lezamas were charged with fraudulent conspiracy.
Issue:
Can a wife be compelled to testify as an adverse party witness concerning her participation in the alleged
fraud without violating Section 20 (b) of Rule 130?
Ruling:
No. The interests of husband and wife in this case are necessarily interrelated. Testimony adverse to the
wife's own interests would tend to show the existence of collusive fraud between the spouses and would then work
havoc upon their common defense that the loan was not fictitious. There is the possibility, too, that the wife, in order
to soften her own guilt, if guilty she is, may unwittingly testify in a manner entirely disparaging to the interests of
the husband.
Because of the unexpensive wording of the rule which provides merely that the wife cannot be examined
"for or against her husband without his consent," it is further argued that "when husband and wife are parties to an
action, there is no reason why either may not be examined as a witness for or against himself or herself alone," and
his or her testimony could operate only against himself or herself.
Even if such view were generally acceptable as an exception to the rule, or even as a separate doctrine, it
would be inapplicable in this case where the main charge is collusive fraud between the spouses and a third person,
and the evident purpose of examination of the wife is to prove that charge.
This rule carries with it two purposes: 1. a disqualification and 2. a privilege not to testify against the other.
DEAD MANS STATUTE

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Section 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. Parties or

assignor of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor
or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound
mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person
of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such
deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind. (20a)
CASES
Guerrero v. St. Claire's Realty & Co. 124 SCRA 553 (1983)
Abraham v. Recto-Kasten
4 SCRA 298 (1962)
Goi v. CA
144 SCRA 222 (1986)
Tongco v. Vianzon
50 Phil. 698 (1927)
Razon v. IAC
207 SCRA 234 (1992)
Londres v. Court of Appeals
December 17, 2002
GUERRERO VS. ST. CLAIRE REALTY

G.R. No. L-58164, September 2, 1983
By : Go, Myka
Dead Mans Rule inapplicable when there is no claim or demand against the
estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero
Facts:
Andres Guerrero owned a parcel of land which he inherited from his father upon his death. He loaned the
land to his sister Cristina Guerrero before Andres died. Cristina became extremely ill, according to the testimony of
Laura, so that they borrowed money from Manual Guerrero. When Cristina died, Manuel computed the amount of
money borrowed and the land in dispute was cadastrally surveyed in his favor. The lone claimant was Andres.
A subsequent sale was executed in favor of St. Claire Realty. The siblings of Andres claimed ownership of
the said lot. Jose Cervantes testified about his knowledge on the nature of the transaction between Cristina and
Manuel-that it wasnt one of sale but of mortgage.
Laura and Jose were sought to be disqualified pursuant to Rule 130, Sec. 20(a)
Issue:
W/N Laura and Jose Cervantes are disqualified to testify based on Rule 130, 20(a) [now Section 22, Rule
130].
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Ruling:
No. In this case, Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes are not parties in the present case, and neither are
they assignors of the parties nor "persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted."
They are mere witnesses by whose testimonies the plaintiffs aimed to establish that it was not Cristina
Guerrero, but Andres Guerrero, who owned the disputed land at the time of its alleged sale to Manuel Guerrero; that
Cristina Guerrero did not really sell but merely mortgaged the property to Manuel Guerrero. The incompetency
contemplated in the provision affects only the persons therein mentioned, and no others, that is, only parties plaintiff
or their assignors, persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted. Mere witnesses who are neither parties plaintiff, nor
their assignors, nor persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, are not included in the prohibition.
Also, it is not a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero. The defendants
Guerreros are not the executors or administrators or representatives of such deceased. They are being sued as
claimants of ownership in their individual capacities of the disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the estate of Manuel
Guerrero. Hence, the inapplicability of the dead mans rule.
"It has been held that statutes providing that a party in interest is incompetent to testify where the adverse
party is dead or insane, must be applied strictly in accordance with their express wording, irrespective of their spirit.
The law uses the word against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person. It should
be noted that after the mention of an executor or administrator the words or other representative follows, which
means that the word representative includes only those who, like the executor or administrator, are sued in their
representative, not personal, capacity. And that is emphasized by the law by using the words against the estate of
such deceased persons, which convey the idea of an estate actually owned by the deceased at the time the case was
brought and that, therefore, it is only his rights that are to be asserted and defendant in the litigation by the person
representing him, not the personal rights of such representative."
ABRAHAM VS. RECTO-KASTEN

4 SCRA 298 January 31, 1962
By : Marcelo, MJ
There was a waiver of the prohibition when the counsel for the administratix
extensively crosse-examined the witnesson the matters subject of the prohibition.
Facts: Juan Ysmael obtained a loan from Alfonso Abraham Sr., and executed a promissory note in favor of the latter.
The note was executed in the presence of Florencia Abraham, Alfonsos wife, who affixed her signature as witness.
A demand was made upon its due date, but Juan Ysmael failed to pay. Alfonso
Abraham and Juan Ysmael later on died with the note still being left unpaid. During the settlement of
Ysmaels estate, FLorencia Abraham together with her sons filed a pleading entitled Reclamation demanding
payment of the amount represented by the note. During the hearing before the commissioner, the counsel of
administratix Priscilla Recto-Kasten interposed a general and continuing objection to the testimony of Florencia
Abraham invoking the dead mans statute. However, after Florenciatestified , the counsel of Ysmael lengthily crossexamined her on the very matters in which he interposed a general objection.
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Issue:
Whether the dead mans statute apply?
Ruling:
Yes, Note that counsel for the administratix did not present evidence to destroy the aleeged genuineness of
the promissory note. As to the issue on the dead mans statute, there was a waiver of the prohibition when the
counsel for the administratix extensively crosse-examined thewitnesson the matters subject of the prohibition. It was
for this reason that the trial judge overruled the continuing object and admitted the testimony of the accused.
Clearly, under the current rules the testimony would have fallen under the Dead Mans Statute and should
be inadmissible. However, as with all other rules, objections to the admissibility of these pieces (testimonial)
evidence may be waived. And in this case, the counsel of the administratix in choosing to cross-examine the
petitioner effectively waived the objection.
The same principle applies under the proposed revised rules. Objections may be waived, However, the
difference lies in that even without the objection and subsequent waiver of such objection, the testimony of
FLorencia Abraham would now have been admissible provided the statement was made upon the personal
knowledge of the deceased person and while his recollection was clear. And as long as there are no circumstances
that would indicate untrustworthiness the statement is admissible.
GONI VS. CA
G.R. No. L-27434 September 23, 1986
By : Marcelo, MJ
A waiver occurs when plaintiff's deposition is taken by the representative of the

estate or when counsel for the representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to
matters occurring during deceased's lifetime.
Facts:
3 haciendas known as San Sebastian, Sarria and DulceNombre de Maria were originally owned by the
CompaniaGeneral de Tabacos de Filipinas [Tabacalera]. Sometime in 1949, Praxedes Villanueva negotiated with
Tabacalera for the purchase of said haciendas. However, as he did not have sufficient funds to pay the price,
Villanueva obtained the consent of Tabacalera to sell Hacienda Sarria to Joaquin Villegas. In this transaction, Gaspar
Vicente stood as guarantor for Villegas in favor of Tabacalera.
Either because the amount realized from the transaction between Villanueva and Villegas still fell short of
the purchase price of the 3 haciendas, or in consideration of the guaranty undertaken by Vicente, Villanueva
contracted or promised to sell to the latter fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda DulceNombrede Maria for the sum of
P13,807. This agreement was reduced to writing and signed by petitioner GenaroGoni as attorney-in-fact of
Villanueva. However, as only the amount of P12,460 was actually needed to complete the purchase price, only the
such amount was debited from Vicentes account.
It is alleged by petitioners that subsequent to the execution of the promise to sell, Villanueva was able to
raise funds by selling another property. He thus went to Vicente for the purpose of rescinding the promise to sell.
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However, as the amount of P12,460 had already been debited from Vicentes account. It was agreed that lots 4 and
13 of the Hacienda DulceNombre de Maria would merely be leased to Vicente for a period of 5 years. Tabacalera
executed a deed of sale covering the 3 haciendas in favor of Villanueva. Fields Nos. 3, 4 and 13 of the Hacienda
DulceNombre de Maria were thereafter registered in the name of Villanueva.
After some time, Villanueva died. Intestate proceedings followed. Among the properties includedin the
inventory submitted to the court were fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda DulceNombre de Maria. Vicente instituted
an action for recovery of property and damages against Goi in his capacity as administrator of the intestate estate of
Villanueva. In his complaint, Vicente sought to recover field no. 3 of the Hacienda DulceNombre de Maria, basing
his entitlement thereto on the promise to sell executed by the late Villanueva in his favor. The CFI rendered a
decision in favor of Vicente. CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether Vicente may testify on matters of fact occurring before the death of Villanueva, which constitutes
a claim or demand upon his estate in violation of the Dead Mans Statute.
Ruling:
Yes, Under ordinary circumstances, Vicente would be disqualified under the Dead Mans Statute.However,
in this case, there was a waiver.
The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the
transaction in question on the part of the surviving party and further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of
equality in regard to the opportunity of giving testimony. It is designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when
death has closed the lips of the party defendant, in order to remove from the surviving party the temptation to
falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims against the deceased.
Such protection, however, was effectively waived when counsel for petitioners cross-examined Vicente. "A
waiver occurs when plaintiff's deposition is taken by the representative of the estate or when counsel for the
representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters occurring during deceased's lifetime. It must further be
observed that petitioners presented a counterclaim against Vicente. When Vicente thus took the witness stand, it was
in a dual capacity as plaintiff in the action for recovery of property and as defendant in the counterclaim for
accounting and surrender of fields nos. 4 and 13. Evidently, as defendant in the counterclaim, he was not
disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of Villanueva, said action not having
been brought against, but by the estate or representatives of the estate/deceased person.
Likewise, under a great majority of statutes, the adverse party is competent to testify to transactions or
communications with the deceased or incompetent person which were made with an agent of such person in cases in
which the agent is still alive and competent to testify. But the testimony of the adverse party must be confined to
those transactions or communications which were had with the agent. The promise to sell under consideration was
signed by petitioner Goi as attorney-in-fact of Villanueva. He was privy to the circumstances surrounding the
execution of such contract and therefore could either confirm or deny any allegations made by private respondent
Vicente with respect to said contract. The inequality or injustice sought to be avoided by the rule, where one of the
parties no longer has the opportunity to either confirm or rebut the testimony of the other because death has
permanently sealed the former's lips, does not actually exist in the case at bar, for the reason that Goi could and did
not negate the binding effect of the promise to sell. Thus, while admitting the existence of the said promise to sell,
Goi testified that the same was subsequently novated into a verbal contract of lease over fields nos. 4 and 13 of the
Hacienda DulceNombre de Maria.
Under the proposed Rules on Evidence, the Dead Mans Statute is moved under the exceptions to the
hearsay rule. Under the proposed rule, a party or assignor of a party or a person in whose behalf the case is
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EVIDENCE

prosecuted may testify on a matter of fact occurring before the death of the deceased person or before the person
became of unsound mind, on any statement of the latter if such statement was made upon the personal knowledge of
the deceased or person of unsound mind at a time when the matter had been recently perceived by him and while his
recollection was clear. If there indicates lack of trustworthiness, such statement shall be inadmissible as hearsay
even if cross examination is made.
LICHUACO v. ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC

G.R. No. L-2016 August 23, 1949
By : Marcelo, MJ
Officers and/or stockholders of a corporation are not disqualified from

testifying, for or against the corporation which is a party to an action upon a
claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person, as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of such deceased person
Facts:
Richard Fitzsimmons was the president and one of the largest stockholders of Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific
Company when the Pacific war broke. He held 1,000 shares of stocks, of which 545 shares had not been fully paid
for, but for which he had executed promissory notes in favor of the company aggregating P245,250, at the rate P450
a share. In 1941, the sum of P64,500 had been credited in his favor on account of the purchase price of the said 545
share of stock out of bonuses and dividends to which he was entitled from the company. Under his agreements with
the company, should he die without having fully paid for the said 545 shares of stock, the company, at its option,
may either reacquire the said 545 shares of stock by returning to his estate the amount applied thereon, or issue in
favor of his estate the corresponding number of the company's shares.
Later on, he died. In the settlement of his estate, the company filed a claim of P63,000 and P868. The
company offered to require the 545 shares sold to the deceased Fitzsimmons upon return to his estate of the amount
of P64,500 paid thereon, and asked the court to authorize the setoff of the amount of its claim of P63,868.67 from
the amount of P64,500 returnable to the estate. To establish the claim of the company, it presented as witness, among
others, Mr. Belden and Mr. Garmezy, vice-president- treasurer and president, respectively, of the claimant company,
to testify on the status of the personal account of the deceased Fitzsimmons with the company. But upon objection of
the administrator, the trial court refused to admit their testimony on that point on the ground that said witnesses were
incompetent under the Dead Mans Statute , they being not only large stockholders and members of the board of
directors but also vice-president-treasurer and president, respectively, of the claimant company.
Issue:
Whether the officers of a corporation which is a party to an action against an executor or administrator of a
deceased person are disqualified from testifying as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such
deceased person?
Ruling:
NO, Inasmuch as section 26(c) of Rule 123 disqualifies only parties or assignors of parties, we are
constrained to hold that the officers and/or stockholders of a corporation are not disqualified from testifying, for or
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against the corporation which is a party to an action upon a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person,
as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person. It resulted that the trial court erred in not
admitting the testimony of Messrs. Belden and Garmezy.
Under the proposed rules on evidence, the Dead Mans Statute is moved under the exceptions to thehearsay
rule. Officers of a corporation which is a party to an action against an executor or administrator of a deceased person
may now testify provided that he will testify on a matter of fact occurring before the death of the deceased person or
before the person became of unsound mind, on any statement of the latter if such statement was made upon the
personal knowledge of the deceased or person of unsound mind at a time when the matter had been recently
perceived by him and while his recollection was clear.
TONGCO VS. VIANZON

G.R. No. 27498 September 20, 1927
The law twice makes use of the word "against." The actions were not brought
"against" the administratrix of the estate, nor were they brought upon claims
"against" the estate. In the cadastral case, the action is one by the administratrix
to enforce demand "by" the estate.
Facts:
MarcelinoTongco and AnastaciaVianzon contracted marriage. The husband later on died, leaving the
Vianzon as his widow. The niece of the deceased, JosefaTongco, was named administratrix of the estate. It appears
that shortly before the death of Marcelino, he had presented claims in a cadastral case in which he had asked for
titles to certain properties in the name of the conjugal partnership consisting of himself and his wife, and that
corresponding decrees for these lots were issued in the name of the conjugal partnership not long after his death.
However, Anastacia, in the same cadastral case, presented a motion for the revision of the decrees. The
cadastral court annulled and set aside its former decision, and issued new certificate of titles to the same lots in favor
of Anastacia as the exclusive owner. The administratrix of the estate began action against Anastacia for the recovery
of specified property and for damages.
Issue:
Whether Anastacia is barred from testifying based on the Dead Mans Statute
Ruling:
No, it is true that by reason of the provisions of the Civil Code the presumption is that all the property of
the spouses is partnership property in the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Tongco asserts that if the testimony of the widow be discarded, as it should be, then the presumption of the Civil
Code, fortified by the unassailable character of Torrens titles, arises, which means that the entire fabric of
Anastacias case is punctured. Tongco relies on the Dead Mans Statute which provides that "Parties or assignors of
parties to an action or proceeding, or persons in whose behalf an action or proceeding is prosecuted, against an
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executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person.. upon a claim or demand against the estate of
such deceased person.. cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased
person . . .."
Tongco is correct in emphasizing that the object and purpose of this statute is to guard against the
temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction is question on the part of the surviving party. She has,
however, neglected the equally important rule that the law was designed to aid in arriving at the truth and was not
designed to suppress the truth.
The law twice makes use of the word "against." The actions were not brought "against" the administratrix
of the estate, nor were they brought upon claims "against" the estate. In the cadastral case, the action is one by the
administratrix to enforce demand "by" the estate. In the property case at bar, the same analogy holds true for the
claim was presented in cadastral proceedings where in one sense there is no plaintiff and there is no defendant.
Under the proposed rules on evidence, the Dead Mans Statute is moved under the exceptions to hearsay
rule. Just like in the current rules, this rule applies only in cases filed against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind.
RAZON vs. IAC

207 SCRA
The
dead mans statute does not apply where the case is filed by the estate.
Besides, cross-examination of the witness is a waiver of the privilege. The
purpose of the law is to "guard against the temptation to give false testimony in
regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party."
Facts:
Sometime in 1962, Enrique Razon organized the E. Razon, Inc. for the purpose of bidding for the arrastre
services in South Harbor, Manila. Shares of stock of the corporation was issued in the name of late Juan T. Chuidian.
Vicente B. Chuidian, as an administrator, filed a complaint against Enrique Razon for the delivery of certificate of
stocks representing the shareholdings of the deceased Juan T. Chuidian in the E. Razon, Inc. with a prayer for an
order to restrain the petitioner from disposing of the said shares of stock. Petitioner alleged that after organizing the
E. Razon, Inc., Enrique Razon distributed shares of stock previously placed in the names of the withdrawing
nominal incorporators to some friends including Juan T. Chuidian.
The main issue in these consolidated petitions centers on the ownership of 1,500 shares of stock in E.
Razon, Inc. covered by Stock Certificate No. 003 issued on April 23, 1966 and registered under the name of Juan T.
Chuidian in the books of the corporation. The lower court declared that Enrique Razon is the owner of the said
shares of stock. IAC/CA however, reversed the trial court's decision and ruled that Juan T. Chuidian, the deceased
father of petitioner Vicente B. Chuidian is the owner of the shares of stock.
Petitioner Enrique Razon assails the appellate court's decision on its alleged misapplication of the dead
man's statute rule under Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
According to him, the "dead man's statute" rule is not applicable to the instant case.
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Moreover, the private respondent, as plaintiff in the case did not object to his oral testimony regarding the
oral agreement between him and the deceased Juan T. Chuidian that the ownership of the shares of stock was
actually vested in the petitioner unless the deceased opted to pay the same; and that the petitioner was subjected to a
rigid cross examination regarding such testimony.
Issue:
Whether or not the dead mans statute rule is applicable?
Ruling:
No, the dead mans statute is not applicable in this case. Testimony is admissible.
The dead mans statute does not apply where the case is filed by the estate. Besides, cross-examination
of the witness is a waiver of the privilege.
Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Section 23 of the Revised Rules on Evidence) States:
Sec. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship The following persons cannot testify as to
matters in which they are interested directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated.
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an
executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a
claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify
as to any matter of fact accruing before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound
mind." (Emphasis supplied)
The purpose of the rule has been explained by this Court in this wise:
The reason for the rule is that if persons having a claim against the estate of the deceased or his properties
were allowed to testify as to the supposed statements made by him (deceased person), many would be tempted to
falsely impute statements to deceased persons as the latter can no longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly
subjecting their properties or rights to false or unscrupulous claims or demands. The purpose of the law is to "guard
against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving
party." (Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698; Go Chi Gun, et al. v. Co Cho, et al., 622 [1955])
The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable to a case against the
administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person. (See Tongco v.
Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698 [1927].
In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of the defendant (petitioner herein)
to the affect that the late Juan Chuidian, (the father of private respondent Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of the
estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of stock in
E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned by the defendant unless the deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same which
never happened. The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to recover shares of
stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian.
It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of the rule. The case
was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate. Furthermore, the
records show that the private respondent never objected to the testimony of the petitioner as regards the true nature
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of his transaction with the late elder Chuidian. The petitioner's testimony was subject to cross-examination by the
private respondent's counsel. Hence, granting that the petitioner's testimony is within the prohibition of Section
20(a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the private respondent is deemed to have waived the rule.
LONDRES VS. COURT OF APPEALS

December 17, 2002
Prohibition applies to a case against the administrator or representative of an

estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person.
Facts:
Petitioners are the surviving children of Filomena and are claiming ownership over Lots 1320 and 1333.
On the other hand, private respondents Consolacion and Elena anchor their right of ownership over Lots
1320 and 1333 on the Absolute Sale executed by Filomena. Filomena sold the two lots in favor of Consolacion and
her husband, Julian Alovera (Julian for brevity). Elena is the daughter of Consolacion and Julian (deceased).
Petitioners filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of contract, damages and just compensation.
Petitioners sought to nullify the Absolute Sale conveying Lots 1320 and 1333 and to recover just compensation from
public respondents DPWH and DOTC. Petitioners alleged that it was only recently that they learned of the claim of
private respondents when Consolacion filed a petition for the judicial reconstitution of the original certificates of
title of Lots 1320 and 1333 with the Capiz Cadastre. [4] Upon further inquiry, petitioners discovered that there exists a
notarized Absolute Sale executed on April 24, 1959 registered only on September 22, 1982 in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Roxas City. The private respondents copy of the Absolute Sale was tampered so that the
second parcel of lot sold, Lot 2034 would read as Lot 1333. However, the Records Management and Archives Office
kept an unaltered copy of the Absolute Sale.
In their Answer, private respondents maintained that they are the legal owners of Lots 1333 and 1320.
Julian purchased the lots from Filomena in good faith and for a valid consideration. Private respondents explained
that Julian was deaf and dumb and as such, was placed in a disadvantageous position compared to Filomena. Julian
had to rely on the representation of other persons in his business transactions. After the sale, Julian and Consolacion
took possession of the lots. Up to now, the spouses successors-in-interest are in possession of the lots in the concept
owners. Private respondents claimed that the alteration in the Absolute Sale was made by Filomena to make it
conform to the description of the lot in the Absolute Sale. Private respondents filed a counterclaim with damages.
Public respondents in their Answer raised the following defenses: (1) they have no capacity to sue and be
sued since they have no corporate personality separate and distinct from the Government; (2) they cannot comply
with their undertaking since ownership over the portions of land is disputed by private respondents and until the
issue of ownership is settled, petitioners have no cause of action against public respondents; and (3) they are not
proper parties since they were not parties to the Absolute Sale sought to be nullified.
On May 28, 1991, the trial court issued its decision upholding the validity of the Absolute Sale and dismiss
the cross-claim. The Court of Appeals sustained the factual findings of the trial court.
Issue:
WON the testimony of Consolacion is not admissible since it violated the Dead Mans Statute.
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Ruling:
Petitioners contend that Consolacions testimony as to how the alteration of the Absolute Sale took place
should have been disregarded since at the time that Consolacion testified, death had already sealed the lips of
Filomena, precluding petitioners from refuting Consolacions version.
The contention is without basis. The Dead Mans Statute then embodied in Section 20 (a) of Rule 130 of
the 1988 Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship. - The following persons cannot testify as to
matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated:
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an
executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a
claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify
as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of
unsound mind;
The foregoing prohibition applies to a case against the administrator or representative of an estate upon a
claim against the estate of the deceased person. [30] The present case was not filed against the administrator of the
estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate since it was the heirs of Filomena who filed the complaint
against private respondents. Even assuming that Consolacions testimony was within the purview of the Dead Mans
Statute, the fact that the counsel of petitioners failed to timely object to the admissibility of Consolacions testimony
is a waiver of the prohibition.[31] The waiver was made more evident when the counsel of petitioners cross-examined
Consolacion.[32] Petitioners cannot now invoke the rule they knowingly waived.
PRIVILEGE COMMUNICATIONS
MARITAL DISQUALIFICATION
Rule 130, Section 24.a
Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons
cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a
crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants;
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CASE
People v. Carlos
47 Phil. 626 (1925)
PEOPLE VS CARLOS
47 Phil 626 (1925)
Where a privileged communication from one spouse to the other comes into the
hands of a third party, whether legally or not, without collusion and voluntary
disclosure on the part of either spouse, the privilege is thereby extinguished and
the communication, if otherwise competent, becomes admissible.
Facts:
On March 3, 1924, Dr. Pablo Sityar, of Mary Chiles Hospital, performed a surgical operation upon Carlos
wife for appendicitis and certain other ailments. She was eventually released from the hospital, but was required to
go several times to Dr. Sityars clinic to dress the wounds caused by the operation. During one of the visits, Carlos
was sent by the doctor to buy some medicine, and while out on such errand, Dr. Sityar outraged his wife. Despite
having been informed of the incident, Carlos went back to the clinic to consult with the doctor regarding some lung
trouble. While confined at the hospital, a letter was sent to him, demanding immediate settlement of his wifes
account for professional services rendered by Dr. Sityar.
Carlos was released from the hospital, but when, one day, he went back to the clinic, he, without any prior
quarrel between him and Dr. Sityar, attacked the latter with a fan-knife and stabbed him twice, killing the doctor. On
trial, Carlos claimed he killed the deceased, but invoked self-defense. Carlos was however convicted for murder, due
to premeditation, upon evidence in the form of a letter allegedly written to Carlos by his wife two days before the
commission of the crime, the letter revealing Carloss wifes fear that Carlos would resort to violence in dealing with
the accused.
Issue:
Can the letter be deemed a privileged communication, hence, not admissible as evidence.
Ruling:
Yes. Where a privileged communication from one spouse to the other comes into the hands of a third party,
whether legally or not, without collusion and voluntary disclosure on the part of either spouse, the privilege is
thereby extinguished and the communication, if otherwise competent, becomes admissible. If said documents of
communications were obtained from the addressee by voluntary delivery, they should still be privileged for
otherwise, the privilege could by collusion be practically nullified for written communications; but if they were
obtained surreptitiously or otherwise without the addressees consent, the privilege should cease.
In this case, the letter should be excluded as such was written by Carloss wife. If she had testified at the
trial, the letter might have been admissible to impeach her testimony. However, she was not put on the witness stand,
hence, the letter was not offered for the purpose of impeaching such testimony. If Carlos, by virtue of an answer or
by other means, had indicated his assent to the statements in the letter, such letter might also have been admissible.
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However, such is not the case here, there being no indication of acquiescence or assent on his part. The letter is
therefore nothing but hearsay, and its admission in evidence violates the constitutional right of Carlos in the criminal
case to be confronted with the witnesses for the prosecution and have the opportunity to cross-examine.
Doctrine: Where the spouse did not testify in the witness stand and a communication between the spouses was not
offered as a means of impeaching such testimony, and where the spouse against whom the communication is offered
as evidence does not give his consent, such marital communication is deemed privileged. Hence, it is not admissible
as evidence.
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Rule 130, Section 24.b
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication
made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to,
professional employment, nor can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined,
without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which
has been acquired in such capacity;
CASE
Uy Chico vs Union Life

Regala v. Sandiganbayan
Barton v. Leyte Asphalt & Mineral
Orient Insurance v. Revilla
People v. Sandiganbayan,
Hickman v. Taylor,
Upjohn Company v. U.S.
In re Grand Jury Investigation
U.S. v. McPartlin
U.S. v. Gordon-Nikkar
U.S. vs. Nobles
29 Phil 163
262 SCRA 124 (1996)
46 Phil. 938 (1924)
54 Phil. 919 (1930)
272 SCRA 505 (1997)
329 SCRA 495 (1947)
449 U.S. 383 (1981)
732 F.2d 447 (1983)
595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979)
518 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1975)
422 US 225 (1975)
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UY CHICO VS. UNION LIFE

29 Phil 163
When the attorney has faithfully carried out his instructions be delivering the
communication to the third person for whom it was intended and the latter acts
upon it, it cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal sense as a
privileged communication between the attorney and his client.
Facts:
The plaintiff seeks to recover the face value of two insurance policies upon a stock of dry goodsdestroyed
by fire. It appears that the father of the plaintiff died in 1897, at which time he was conductinga business under his
own name, UyLayco. The plaintiff and his brother took over the business andcontinued it under the same name,
"UyLayco." Sometime before the date of the fire, the plaintiffpurchased his brother's interest in the business and
continued to carry on the business under thefather's name. At the time of the fire "UyLayco" was heavily indebted
and subsequent thereto thecreditors of the estate of the plaintiff's father. During the course of these proceedings, the
plaintiff'sattorney surrendered the policies of insurance to the administrator of the estate, who compromised withthe
insurance company for one-half their face value, or P6,000. This money was paid into court and isnow being held by
the sheriff. The plaintiff now brings this action, maintaining that the policies and goodsinsured belonged to him and
not to the estate of his deceased father and alleges that he is not bound bythe compromise effected by the
administrator of his father's estate.
The defendant insurance company sought to show that the plaintiff had agreed to compromisesettlement of
the policies, and for that purpose introduced evidence showing that the plaintiff's attorneyhad surrendered the
policies to the administrator with the understanding that such a compromise was tobe effected. The plaintiff was
asked, while on the witness stand, if he had any objection to his attorney'stestifying concerning the surrender of the
policies, to which he replied in the negative. The attorney wasthen called for that purpose. Whereupon, counsel for
the plaintiff formally withdrew the waiver previouslygiven by the plaintiff and objected to the testimony of the
attorney on the ground that it was privileged.
Counsel, on this appeal, base their argument of the proposition that a waiver of the client's privilege maybe
withdrawn at any time before acted upon.
Issue:
Whether or not the testimony is privileged?
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Ruling:
NO. It will be noted that the evidence in question concerned the dealings of the plaintiff's attorneywith a
third person. Of the very essence of the veil of secrecy which surrounds communications madebetween attorney and
client, is that such communications are not intended for the information of thirdpersons or to be acted upon by them,
put of the purpose of advising the client as to his rights. It isevident that a communication made by a client to his
attorney for the express purpose of its beingcommunicated to a third person is essentially inconsistent with the
confidential relation. When theattorney has faithfully carried out his instructions be delivering the communication to
the third person forwhom it was intended and the latter acts upon it, it cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be
classified in alegal sense as a privileged communication between the attorney and his client. It is plain that such
acommunication, after reaching the party for whom it was intended at least, is a communication between the client
and a third person, and that the attorney simply occupies the role of intermediary or agent.
It is manifest that the objection to the testimony of the plaintiff's attorney as to his authority tocompromise
was properly overruled. The testimony was to the effect that when the attorney delivered thepolicies to the
administrator, he understood that there was a compromise to be effected, and that whenhe informed the plaintiff of
the surrender of the policies for that purpose the plaintiff made no objectionwhatever. The evidence is sufficient to
show that the plaintiff acquiesced in the compromise settlement ofthe policies. Having agreed to the compromise, he
cannot now disavow it and maintain an action for therecovery of their face value.
Under the Proposed Rules of Evidence, the ruling would have been the same. It should be noted that in this
case, the communication was intended to be given in favor of a third person and the lawyer merely between the
lawyer and his client to speak of.
REGALA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

262 SCRA 124
The general rule is however qualified by some important exceptions. 1) Client

identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the clients
name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the
lawyers advice 2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his
identity is privileged. 3) Where the said name would furnish the only link that
would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime,
the clients name is privilege.
Facts:
The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint on July 31, 1987before the
Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission onGood Government
against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the recoveryof alleged ill- gotten wealth,
which includes shares of stocks in the certain corporations.
Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners TeodoroRegala, Edgardo J.Angara, Avelino
V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escuetaand Paraja G. Hayudini, and
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herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of thelaw firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion,
Regala and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter referred to as the ACCRALaw Firm). ACCRA Law Firm performed legal
services for its clients, which included, among others, theorganization and acquisition of business associations
and/or organizations, with the correlative andincidental services where its members acted as incorporators, or
simply, as stockholders. Morespecifically, in the performance of these services, the members of the law firm
delivered to its clientdocuments which substantiate the client's equity holdings, i.e., stock certificates endorsed in
blankrepresenting the shares registered in the client's name, and a blank deed of trust or assignment covering said
shares. In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm acquireinformation relative to
the assets of clients as well as their personal and business circumstances. Asmembers of the ACCRA Law Firm,
petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assistedin the organization and acquisition of the
companies included in the complaint, and in keeping with theoffice practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved insequestration proceedings.
PCGG moved to amend its complaint which excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco as party-defendant
on his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted asnominee/stockholder in the
companies involved.Petitioners ACCRA lawyers moved that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment
tothem (exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded private respondent Roco. In its "Comment,"respondent PCGG
set the following conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, namely: (a) thedisclosure of the identity of its
clients;; (b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-clientrelationship;; and (c) the submission of the
deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its clientscovering their respective shareholdings.
Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned,denying the exclusion of petitioners in the complaint,
for their refusal to comply with the conditionsrequired by respondent PCGG.
The ACCRA lawyers then filed this petition for certiorari invoking the attorney-client privilege.
Issue:
Whether or not the identity of the client is covered by the attorney-client privileged?
Ruling:
YES by Exception premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a
lawyer may notinvoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client. The reasons advanced
for thegeneral rule are well established. First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged
information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood. Second, the privilege begins to exist only after theattorney-client relationship has been established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until thereis a client. Third, the
privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship. Finally, dueprocess considerations require that
the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. party suing or sued is entitled to know against
unknown forces. Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified bysome important
exceptions. 1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing2) Where disclosure would
open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged. 3) Where thesaid name would furnish the only link that
would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict anFrom these conditions, particularly the third, we can
readily deduce that the clients indeedconsulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial
and corporate structure,framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their
professional adviceshareholdings. Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name
wouldobviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists.
Under the Proposed Rules of Evidence, the ruling would have been the same. Nowhere in the
ProposedRules made mention that the name of the client is by exception privileged in character when revealingsuch
name would furnish the prosecution the only link to build its case. Such non-inclusion could meanthat such doctrine
remains as a jurisprudential exception to the general rule that the name of the client isnot a privileged matter. Under
the Current and Proposed Rules, the communications between the counseland his client are privileged with a few
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exceptions. However, in the instant case, such information isgenerally not privileged unless it falls under certain
exceptions.
BARTON VS. LEYTE ASPHALT MINERAL

46 Phil. 938 (1924)
By : Salmani, Aleksandra
The law protects the client from the effect of disclosures made by him to his
attorney in the confidence of the legal relation, but when such a document,
containing admissions of the client, comes to the hand of a third party, and
reaches the adversary, it is admissible in evidence.
Facts:
The plaintiff is a citizen of the United States, resident in the City of Manila, while the defendant is a
corporation organized under the law of the Philippine Islands with its principal office in the City of Cebu, Province
of Cebu, Philippine Islands. Said company appears to be the owner by a valuable deposit of bituminous limestone
and other asphalt products, located on the Island of Leyte and known as the Lucio mine. On April 21, 1920, one
William Anderson, as president and general manager of the defendant company, addressed a letter Exhibit B, to the
plaintiff Barton, authorizing the latter to sell the products of the Lucio mine in the Commonwealth of Australia and
New Zealand upon a scale of prices indicated in said letter.
In the third cause of action stated in the complaint the plaintiff alleges that during the life of the agency
indicated in Exhibit B, he rendered services to the defendant company in the way of advertising and demonstrating
the products of the defendant and expended large sums of money in visiting various parts of the world for the
purpose of carrying on said advertising and demonstrations, in shipping to various parts of the world samples of the
products of the defendant, and in otherwise carrying on advertising work. For these services and expenditures the
plaintiff sought, in said third cause of action, to recover the sum of $16,563.80, United States currency. The court,
however, absolved the defendant from all liability on this cause of action and the plaintiff did not appeal, with the
result that we are not now concerned with this phase of the case. Besides, the authority contained in said Exhibit B
was admittedly superseded by the authority expressed in a later letter, Exhibit A, dated October 1, 1920. This
document bears the approval of the board of directors of the defendant company and was formally accepted by the
plaintiff.
Barton filed an action in the CFI of Manila to recover damages for the alleged breach of contract.Exhibit
14, which was offered in evidence by the defendant, consists of a carbon copy of a letter dated June 13, 1921,
written by the plaintiff to his attorney, Frank B. Ingersoll, Esq., of Manila, and in which plaintiff states, among other
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things, that his profit from the San Francisco contract would have been at the rate of eighty-five cents (gold) per ton.
The authenticity of this city document is admitted, and when it was offered in evidence by the attorney for the
defendant the counsel for the plaintiff announced that he had no objection to the introduction of this carbon copy in
evidence if counsel for the defendant would explain where this copy was secured. Upon this the attorney for the
defendant informed the court that he received the letter from the former attorneys of the defendant without
explanation of the manner in which the document had come into their possession. The trial judge thereupon
excluded the document on the ground that it was a privileged communication between client and attorney.
Issue:
Whether or not Exhibit 14 is privileged communication? NO.
Ruling:
We are of the opinion that this ruling was erroneous; for even supposing that the letter was within the
privilege which protects communications between attorney and client, this privilege was lost when the letter came to
the hands of the adverse party. And it makes no difference how the adversary acquired possession. The law protects
the client from the effect of disclosures made by him to his attorney in the confidence of the legal relation, but when
such a document, containing admissions of the client, comes to the hand of a third party, and reaches the adversary,
it is admissible in evidence.
The law provides subjective freedom for the client by assuring him of exemption from its processes of
disclosure against himself or the attorney or their agents of communication. This much, but not a whit more, is
necessary for the maintenance of the privilege. Since the means of preserving secrecy of communication are entirely
in the client's hands, and since the privilege is a derogation from the general testimonial duty and should be strictly
construed, it would be improper to extend its prohibition to third persons who obtain knowledge of the
communications. One who overhears the communication, whether with or without the client's knowledge, is not
within the protection of the privilege. The same rule ought to apply to one who surreptitiously reads or obtains
possession of a document in original or copy.
Although the precedents are somewhat confusing, the better doctrine is to the effect that when papers are
offered in evidence a court will take no notice of how they were obtained, whether legally or illegally, properly or
improperly nor will it form a collateral issue to try that question.
ORIENTAL INSURANCE VS. REVILLA

54 Phil 919
Contracts between attorneys and clients are inherently personal and private
matters, but they are a constant subject of litigation, and contracts relating to fees
are essentially not of a privileged nature. Privilege primarily refers to
communications from client to attorney, an idea which of course includes
communications from attorney to client relative to privileged matters.
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Facts:
The respondent Teal Motor Co., Inc. is plaintiff in a civil action instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Manilafor the purpose of recovering upon two fire insurance policies issued by the Orient Insurance Company,
aggregating P60,000, upon a stock of merchandise alleged to be of the value of P414,513.56, which, with the
exception of salvage valued at about P50,000, was destroyed by a fire on or about January 6, 1929. In one of the
clauses of the policies sued upon is a stipulation to the effect that all benefit under the policy would be forfeited if, in
case of loss, the claim should be rejected by the insurer and action or suit should not be commenced within three
months after such rejection. In the answer of the Orient Insurance Company, interposed in the civil case mentioned,
it is alleged, by way of defense, that the company rejected the claim on April 15, 1929, that notice of such rejection
was given to the plaintiff by letter on the same day, and that suit was not instituted on the policy until August 3,
1929, which was more than three months after the rejection of the claim.
Plaintiff admitted that the adjusters of the defendant company had, on April 15, 1929, notified the plaintiff
that the Orient Insurance Company would not pay the claim, basing refusal upon alleged incendiarism and fraud on
the part of the plaintiff;; and by way of avoidance, it was alleged in the replication that, after notification of denial of
liability by the insurance company, one E. E. Elser, as representative of the company, expressly requested the
plaintiff to defer judicial action until after the following July 31, stating that three were great possibilities that an
extrajudicial compromise might be arranged in the matter;;and it was further asserted, in the replication, that the
plaintiff had deferred action, relying upon this request.
In course of trial, the witness E. M. Bachrach, president of the Teal Motor Co., Inc., while being examined
in chief by the attorneys for the plaintiff said that he had reported certain conversations to plaintiff's attorneys, and
he added: "I waited for about a week longer and not having heard anything about it, in the meantime, on the 13th of
July, I received a letter from our attorneys, Guevara, Francisco & Recto, urging me to file these cases." Orient
caused the letter to be marked as Exhibit 49 and moved for the reading of the same. Upon being asked about the
other part of the letter, the witness said that the other part contained private matter. The trial judge allowed only the
reading of the part on which Bacharach testified, sustaining Teals objection to the reading of the whole document.
During the cross-examination, Orient tried again to have the whole letter read but to no avail, the judge
declaring that he had already ruled on the matter. Orient procured a subpoena ducestecum to be issued by the clerk
of court requiring the attorneys for the plaintiff to produce in court certain papers including the letter which gave rise
to the present controversy. The court, on motion of the attorneys for the plaintiff, quashed said subpoena.
Issue:
Whether or not the whole letter (Exhibit 49) can be read for the record without violating the attorney- client
privilege? YES.
Ruling:
It was stated in the court by the attorney for the plaintiff, in opposing the introduction of other portions of
the letter in proof, that the other parts were privileged, because they related to the terms of employment between
attorney and client, or to the fee to be paid to the attorney. With respect to this point it is difficult to see how a
contract for fees could be considered privileged. Irrelevant it might, under certain circumstances, certainly be, but
not privileged. Of course contracts between attorneys and clients are inherently personal and private matters, but
they are a constant subject of litigation, and contracts relating to fees are essentially not of privileged nature.
Privilege primarily refers to communications from client to attorney, an idea which of course includes
communications from attorney to client relative to privileged matters.\
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But, even supposing that the matter contained in the letter and withheld from the inspection of the
adversary was originally of a privileged nature, the privilege was waived by the introduction in evidence of part of
the letter. The provision in section 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure making the whole of a declaration,
conversation, or writing admissible when part has been given in evidence by one party, makes no exception as to
privileged matter
*Contracts between attorneys and clients are inherently personal and private matters, but they are a
constant subject of litigation, and contracts relating to fees are essentially not of a privileged nature. But, even
supposing that the matter contained in the letter and withheld from the inspection of the adversary was originally of
a privileged nature, the privilege was waived by the introduction in evidence of part of the letter. The provision in
section 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure making the whole of a declaration, conversation, or writing admissible
when part has been given in evidence by one party, makes no exception as to privileged matter; and the
jurisprudence on the subject does not recognize anyexception.
PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

275 SCRA 505
Having been made for purposes of a future offense, those communications are
outside the pale of the attorney-client privilege. It is well settled that in order that
a communication between a lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be
for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an
unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching.
Facts:
Honrada was the Clerk of Court and Acting Stenographer of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San
Francisco-Bunawan-Rosario in Agusandel Sur. Respondent Paredes was successively the Provincial Attorney of
Agusan del Sur, then Governor of the same province, and is at present a Congressman. Respondent Sansaet was a
practicing attorney who served as counsel for Paredes in several instances pertinent to the criminal charges involved
in the present recourse.
Sometime in 1976, respondent Paredes applied for a free patent, his application was approved and, pursuant to
a free patent granted to him, an original certificate of title was issued in his favor for that lot which is situated in
the poblacion of San Francisco, Agusandel Sur.
In 1985, the Director of Lands filed an action for the cancellation of respondent Paredes patent and certificate
of title since the land had been designated and reserved as a school site in the aforementioned subdivision
survey. The trial court rendered judgment nullifying said patent and title after finding that respondent Paredes had
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obtained the same through fraudulent misrepresentations in his application. Pertinently, respondent Sansaet served
as counsel of Paredes in that civil case.
An information for perjurywas filed against respondent Paredes in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. The
Provincial Fiscal dismissedthe case on the groundof prescription, hence the proceedings were terminated.
Respondent Paredes was likewise represented by respondent Sansaet as counsel.
A criminal case was subsequently filed with the Sandiganbayan charging respondent Paredes with a violation
of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. TeofiloGelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated the perjury and
graft charges against respondent Paredes, sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking the investigation of the three
respondents herein for falsification of public documents. He claimed that respondent Honrada, in conspiracy with
his herein co-respondents, simulated and certified as true copies certain documents purporting to be a notice of
arraignment, dated July 1, 1985, and transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly taken during the arraignment of
Paredes on the perjury charge.
Respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits, but Sansaet subsequently discarded and repudiated the
submissions he had made in his counter-affidavit. Sansaet revealed that Paredes contrived to have the graft case
under preliminary investigation dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by making it that the perjury case had
been dismissed by the trial court after he had been arraigned therein.
For that purpose, the documents which were later filed by respondent Sansaet in the preliminary investigation
were prepared and falsified by his co-respondents in this case in the house of respondent Paredes. To evade
responsibility for his own participation in the scheme, he claimed that he did so upon the instigation and inducement
of respondent Paredes. This was intended to pave the way for his discharge as a government witness in the
consolidated cases, as in fact a motion therefor was filed by the prosecution pursuant to their agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not the projected testimony of Sansaet is barred by the attorney-client privilege? NO
Ruling:
For the application of the attorney-client privilege, however, the period to be considered is the date when the
privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the past
or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future.
In other words, if the client seeks his lawyers advice with respect to a crime that the former has theretofore
committed, he is given the protection of a virtual confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege declares
cannot be broken by the attorney without the clients consent. The same privileged confidentiality, however, does
not attach with regard to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the future and for purposes of
which he seeks the lawyers advice.
Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already committed, made by a party who
committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such, are privileged communications. Contrarily, the unbroken stream of
judicial dicta is to the effect that communications between attorney and client having to do with the
clients contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of
privileges ordinarily existing in reference to communications between attorney and client.
In the present cases, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state witness are the communications
made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of Paredes at the time he and Honrada, either with the
active or passive participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the documents which
were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and culminated in the criminal charges now pending in respondent
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Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the confidential communications thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for
purposes of and in reference to the crime of falsification which had not yet been committed in the past by Paredes
but which he, in confederacy with his present co-respondents, later committed. Having been made for purposes of
a future offense, those communications are outside the pale of the attorney-client privilege.
Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the commission of that crime of falsification which he,
Paredes and Honrada concocted and foisted upon the authorities. It is well settled that in order that a
communication between a lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance
of a lawful end. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching. [26]In fact, it has also
been pointed out to the Court that the prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney and client will not be
permitted under the guise of privilege, and every communication made to an attorney by a client for a criminal
purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under
certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the interest of justice. [27]
It is evident, therefore, that it was error for respondent Sandiganbayan to insist that such unlawful
communications intended for an illegal purpose contrived by conspirators are nonetheless covered by the so-called
mantle of privilege. To prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the genesis of a crime which was later
committed pursuant to a conspiracy, because of the objection thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of the
worst travesties in the rules of evidence and practice in the noble profession of law
HICKMAN VS. TAYLOR

329 SCRA 495
BY: Solomon, Sundae
It suffices to note that the protective cloak of this privilege does not extend to
information which an attorney secures from a witness while acting for his client
in anticipation of litigation. Nor does this privilege concern the memoranda,
briefs, communications, and other writings which reflect an attorney's mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories.
Facts:
On February 7, 1943, the tug "J. M. Taylor" sank while engaged in helping to tow a car float of the
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad across the Delaware River at Philadelphia. The accident was apparently unusual in
nature, the cause of it still being unknown. Five of the nine crew members were drowned. Three days later, the tug
owners and the underwriters employed a law firm, of which respondent Fortenbaugh is a member, to defend them
against potential suits by representatives of the deceased crew members and to sue the railroad for damages to the
tug.
A public hearing was held at which the four survivors were examined. This testimony was recorded and
made available to all interested parties. Shortly thereafter, Fortenbaugh privately interviewed the survivors and took
statements from them with an eye toward the anticipated litigation. Ultimately claims were presented by
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representatives of all five of the deceased; four of the claims, however, were settled without litigation. The fifth
claimant, petitioner herein, brought suit. The tug owners, through Fortenbaugh, answered all of the interrogatories
except No. 38. While admitting that statements of the survivors had been taken, they declined to summarize or set
forth the contents. They did so on the ground that such requests called "for privileged matter obtained in preparation
for litigation," and constituted "an attempt to obtain indirectly counsel's private files." It was claimed that answering
these requests "would involve practically turning over not only the complete files, but also the telephone records
and, almost, the thoughts, of counsel." Upon their refusal, the court adjudged them in contempt and ordered them
imprisoned until they complied. In urging that he has a right to inquire into the materials secured and prepared by
Fortenbaugh, petitioner emphasizes that the deposition-discovery portions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
are designed to enable the parties to discover the true facts, and to compel their disclosure wherever they may be
found. On the premise that the attorney-client privilege is the one involved in this case, petitioner argues that it must
be strictly confined to confidential communications made by a client to his attorney. And, since the materials here in
issue were secured by Fortenbaugh from third persons, rather than from his clients, the tug owners, the conclusion is
reached that these materials are proper subjects for discovery under Rule 26.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the 38th interrogatory is covered by the Attorney-client privilege?
Ruling:
No. Discovery, like all matters of procedure, has ultimate and necessary boundaries. As indicated by Rules
30(b) and (d) and 31(d), limitations inevitably arise when it can be shown that the examination is being conducted in
bad faith or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person subject to the inquiry. And, as Rule 26(b)
provides, further limitations come into existence when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon
the recognized domains of privilege. We also agree that the memoranda, statements, and mental impressions in issue
in this case fall outside the scope of the attorney-client privilege, and hence are not protected from discovery on that
basis. It is unnecessary here to delineate the content and scope of that privilege as recognized in the federal courts.
For present purposes, it suffices to note that the protective cloak of this privilege does not extend to information
which an attorney secures from a witness while acting for his client in anticipation of litigation. Nor does this
privilege concern the memoranda, briefs, communications, and other writings which reflect an attorney's mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories. But the impropriety of invoking that privilege does not provide
an answer to the problem before us. Petitioner has made more than an ordinary request for relevant, non- privileged
facts in the possession of his adversaries or their counsel. He has sought discovery as of right of oral and written
statements of witnesses whose identity is well known and whose availability to petitioner appears unimpaired. Here
is simply an attempt, without purported necessity or justification, to secure written statements, private memoranda,
and personal recollections prepared or formed by an adverse party's counsel in the course of his legal duties. As
such, it falls outside the arena of discovery and contravenes the public policy underlying the orderly prosecution and
defense of legal claims. Not even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted inquiries into the
files and the mental impressions of an attorney.
UPJOHN CO. VS. US

449 YS 383
BY: Solomon, Sundae
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Communications made by a client to its counsel in anticipation of possible

litigation shall be covered by the attorney-client privilege even though the
managers of the parent stateside company were the ones who hired the counsel
and the persons responding to the queries were its foreign employees
Facts:
The Upjohn Pharmaceutical Company discovered that its foreign subsidiaries made questionable payments
to government officials in order to secure government business. The stateside company started an internal
investigation and part of which was sending questionnaires to all foreign managers seeking detailed answers about
any such transactions. Based on a report the company made to the government, the Internal Revenue Service began
an investigation to determine the tax consequences of such payments. The IRS then issued subpoenas in order to
secure the questionnaires, memoranda and notes the counsels of Upjohn made in connection with the investigation.
Issue:
1. Whether or not documents made by the counsels are covered by the attorney client privilege. YES
2. Whether or not the work-product doctrine applies. -YES.
Ruling:
The documents were essentially communications between employees of the clients and their corporate
duties and given to the counsels at the direction of their superiors in order to secure legal advice from counsel.
Despite being on the periphery of the so called control group they are still covered by the privilege because they
possessed the information necessary to prepare for possible litigation. Moreover, they acted under the direction of
the stateside corporate superiors effectively making the foreign managers communications the companys own.
The work-product doctrine applies in this case. The documents subpoenaed reveal the attorneys mental processes in
evaluating the case. The federal rules of civil procedure accords special protection to work-products from disclosure
and Hickman v. Taylor makes it clear that such products cannot be disclosed simply on a showing of substantial need
or inability to obtain the equivalent without undue hardship.
IN RE: GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION NO. 83-235 723

F.2d 447 1983
BY: Solomon, Sundae
The disclosure of the clients identity generally does not enjoy the protection of
the attorney-client privilege save in narrowly construed exceptions.
Facts:
Atty. Durant was found in contempt of court for failing to disclose his clients identity in the suit. His client
was implicated in a chain of theft of IBMs corporation checks. One of the checks was made payable to Durants
firm with the words corporate legal services written on it. Durant argued that the disclosure of the endorser of the
check violated the attorney-client privilege.
Issue:
Whether or not disclosure of the clients identity is covered by the attorney-client privilege.
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Ruling:
The attorney-client privilege is established to promote the freedom of consultation between counsel and
client. As a general rule, the identity of the client is beyond the protection of the attorney-client privilege, most
especially when there is a continuing illegal act or advice is sought in furtherance thereof. This rule admits certain
exceptions.
One of the exceptions is when the disclosure of the identity is material only for the purpose of showing an
acknowledgment of guilt on the part of the accused for the very matter that the legal advice was sought for. Another
would be when so much of the communication had already been disclosed, by other independent sources, that
identification of the client amounts to a disclosure of a confidential information. A third exception is when the
identity of the client serves as the last link in an existing chain of incriminating evidence likely to lead to the clients
indictment. Durant failed to establish the existence of these circumstances which amount to a disclosure of
confidential information.
US VS. MCPARTLIN
595 F.2d 1321 (7th cir. 1979)
By : Trance, Romak
Uninhibited communication among joint parties and their counsel about matters
of common concern is often important to the protection of their interests in
criminal cases it can be necessary to a fair opportunity to defend. Therefore,
waiver is not to be inferred from the disclosure in confidence to a co-party's
attorney for a common purpose.
Facts:
This case is all about the sludge-hauling contract with bribery. The sanitary district is a municipal
corporation with primary responsibility for disposing of sewage from Chicago and surrounding areas. The Sanitary
District operates a sewage treatment plant in Stickney, Illinois. The District announced plans to have the sludge from
its treatment plant be transported to Fulton County, Illinois, about 160 miles southwest of Stickney, and solicited
bids on the project.
Benton acting with knowledge and complicity of Frederick Ingram and through intermediaries Bull and
Weber, bribed Mcpartlin and Janicki to cause the sludge-hauling contract to be awarded to Ingram Corporation and
one of its subsidiaries, and later bribed the same officials to secure favorable treatment under the contract and
modifications of the contracts.
Then legislator McPartlin and the Ingram Corporation entered into a deal wherein the latter would give the
former political contributions amounting to $450,000 so that the company would be awarded a multi-million
dollar contract for the hauling of sewage.
Sometime before the fall of 1974 a federal grand jury commenced an investigation of the events
surrounding the sludge-hauling contract. In May, 1975, the government granted immunity to Benton. The
prosecution relied heavily on testimonies of benton and the contents of a business calendar he kept detailing the
transactions.
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An investigator for ingrams counsel interviewed Mcpartlin with the consent of his counsel for the purpose
of determining whether there was a basis to challenge bentons entries. Ingrams counsel used this in court to which
Mcpartlins counsel objected arguing that they fell under the attorney-client privilege.
Issue:
Whether or not attorney-client privilege is applicable to mcpartlin and his statement must be excluded.
Ruling:
Yes, McPartlin was entitled to the protection of the attorney-client privilege, because his statements were
made in confidence to an attorney for a co-defendant for a common purpose related to both defenses. They were
made in connection with the project of attempting to discredit Benton, a project in which Ingram and McPartlin and
their attorneys were jointly engaged for the benefit of both defendants. Ingram acknowledges that communications
by a client to his own lawyer remain privileged when the lawyer subsequently shares them with co-defendants for
purposes of a common defense. The common-defense rule, which is not as narrow as Ingram contends, has been
recognized in cases spanning more than a century.
Uninhibited communication among joint parties and their counsel about matters of common concern is
often important to the protection of their interests in criminal cases it can be necessary to a fair opportunity to
defend. Therefore, waiver is not to be inferred from the disclosure in confidence to a co-party's attorney for a
common purpose.
In the case at bar, the judge found, as a preliminary question of fact, from the evidence adduced at the
hearing held pursuant to Rule 404(a), Fed.R.Evid., that McPartlin had made the statements to the investigator in
confidence. That finding is not clearly erroneous.
Ingram argues that the co-defendants' defenses must be in all respects compatible if the joint-defense
privilege is to be applicable. The cases do not establish such a limitation and there is no reason to impose it. Rule
503(b)(3) of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, as approved by the Supreme Court, stated that the privilege
applies to communications by a client "to a lawyer representing another in a matter of common interest." The
Advisory Committee's Note to proposed Rule 503(b) makes it clear that the joint-interest privilege is not limited to
situations in which the positions of the parties are compatible in all respects:
US VS. GORDON-NIKKAR
518 F.2d 972 (5th cir. 1975)
By : Trance, Romak
A communication divulged to "strangers" or outsiders can scarcely be

considered a confidential communication between attorney and client. Therefore,
this communication is not protected by the attorney-client privilege
Facts:
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This case is all about a stranger to attorney-client privilege. Appellant, Ana Gordon-Nikkar, was
convicted after a trial by jury on all three counts of an indictment charging her with conspiracy to possess with intent
to distribute approximately four kilograms of cocaine, and the substantive charges of possession with intent to
distribute and distribution of the cocaine. Brenda Marchand was charged as a codefendant with the crimes for which
appellant was convicted. Marchand subsequently pled guilty on Count I of the indictment and testified at trial for the
Government. Prior to entering her plea, Marchand had two meetings in the office of appellant's attorney, Mr.
Estrumsa. On each of these occasions, several of the codefendants were present. Marchand, however, was not a
client of Estrumsa, and it is unclear whether all the other persons in these meetings were Estrumsa's clients. Of the
two conversations related by Marchand, the second was the subject of thorough cross-examination by Estrumsa. The
second conversation involved Estrumsa's alleged recommendation that Marchand leave the country and go to
Venezuela. On redirect, the Government inquired, over defense objection, into the substance of the conversation
during the first meeting. Marchand testified that at this meeting the participants, at Mr. Estrumsa's suggestion,
agreed to give perjured cover-up testimony at trial to the effect that none of them had possessed the cocaine, but
instead merely happened to be at a party where the cocaine was discovered.
Issue:
Whether the statements in attorney Estrumsa's office were protected by the attorney-client privilege.
Ruling:
No. There were at least five persons present at Estrumsa's office on this occasion; at least one of the
persons, Brenda Marchand, and perhaps others, were not clients of Mr. Estrumsa. A communication divulged to
"strangers" or outsiders can scarcely be considered a confidential communication between attorney and client.
Therefore, this communication is not protected by the attorney-client privilege. But even if it appeared that the
communication in question were otherwise privileged (i. e., that the communication was considered confidential
despite the presence of a stranger), the testimony was nonetheless admissible. The conversations in question dealt
with plans to commit perjury so as to hide the criminal activity of appellant and others. It is beyond dispute that the
attorney-client privilege does not extend to communications regarding an intended crime.
A communication divulged to strangers can scarcely be considered a communication between attorney and
client. Even if the communication was intended to be privileged, it would still be outside the ambit of its protection.
The communication dealt with the conspiracy to perjure in court, a continuing illegality explicitly outside of the
privilege. The policy underlying the attorney-client privilege is to promote the administration of justice. Extending
the privilege to the acts intended to frustrate justice would be a perversion of the doctrine.
US VS. NOBLES
422 US (1975)
By : Trance, Romak
The privilege derived from the work-product doctrine is not absolute. Like other
qualified privileges, it may be waived. Here respondent sought to adduce the
testimony of the investigator and contrast his recollection of the contested
statements with that of the prosecution's witnesses. Respondent, by electing to
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present the investigator as a witness, waived the privilege with respect to matters
covered in his testimony.
Facts: This case is all about attorney work-product doctrine. Nobles was charged for and convicted of robbing a
bank. The prosecution presented two witnesses who identified the defendant. In the course of preparing his defense,
an investigator was hired to interview the witnesses and made a written report of the essential parts of the interview.
During the cross-examination of the witnesses, the defense counsel relied on certain statements contained in the
report to impeach the witness testimonies. After certain differences between the testimony and the report were
apparent, the court allowed the witnesses to refer to the written investigation report to verify what they said, all of
this done over the objection of the defendants counsel.During respondent's federal criminal trial, which resulted in a
conviction, defense counsel sought to impeach the credibility of key prosecution witnesses by testimony of a
defense investigator regarding statements previously obtained from the witnesses by the investigator. When the
investigator was called as a witness, the District Court stated that a copy of the investigator's report, inspected and
edited by the court in camera so as to excise references to matters not relevant to such statements, would have to be
submitted to the prosecution for inspection at the completion of the investigator's testimony. When defense counsel
said he did not intend to produce the report, the court ruled that the investigator could not testify about his interviews
with the witnesses.
Issue:
Whether the work-product doctrine applicable in this case.
Ruling:
No. Respondent contends further that the work-product doctrine exempts the investigator's report from
disclosure at trial. While we agree that this doctrine applies to criminal litigation as well as civil, we find its
protection unavailable in this case. The work-product doctrine, recognized by this Court in Hickman v. Taylor,
reflects the strong "public policy underlying the orderly prosecution and defense of legal claims."
The work-product privilege shelters the mental processes of the attorney providing a privileged area within
which he can analyze and prepare his clients case. At its core, the work-product doctrine shelters the mental
processes of the attorney, providing a privileged area within which he can analyze and prepare his client's case. But
the doctrine is an intensely practical one, grounded in the realities of litigation in our adversary system. One of those
realities is that attorneys often must rely on the assistance of investigators and other agents in the compilation of
materials in preparation for trial. It is therefore necessary that the doctrine protect material prepared by agents for the
attorney well as those prepared by the attorney himself. Moreover, the concerns reflected in the work-product
doctrine do not disappear once trial has begun. Disclosure of an attorney's efforts at trial, as surely as disclosure
during pretrial discovery, could disrupt the orderly development and presentation of his case. We need not, however,
undertake here to delineate the scope of the doctrine at trial, for in this instance it is clear that the defense waived
such right as may have existed to invoke its protections. The privilege derived from the work-product doctrine is not
absolute. Like other qualified privileges, it may be waived. Here respondent sought to adduce the testimony of the
investigator and contrast his recollection of the contested statements with that of the prosecution's witnesses.
Respondent, by electing to present the investigator as a witness, waived the privilege with respect to matters covered
in his testimony. Respondent can no more advance the work-product doctrine to sustain a unilateral testimonial use
of work-product materials than he could elect to testify in his own behalf and thereafter assert his Fifth Amendment
privilege to resist cross-examination on matters reasonably related to those brought out in direct examination.
The respondent sought to adduce the testimony of the investigator and contrast his recollection of the
contested statements with that of the prosecution witness. Counsel cannot put forth his work product and use it as
testimony unilaterally in much the same way that a person cannot take the witness stand and then refuse to be
crossed examined on matters he testified on.
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The work-product doctrine is distinct and broader than the attorney client privilege but the privilege derived
from WPD is not absolute.
PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
Rule 130, Section 24.c
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without
the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any
information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity,
which information was necessary to enable him to act in capacity, and which would blacken the
reputation of the patient;
CASES
Lim v. Court of Appeals
Krohn v. Court of Appeals
214 SCRA 273 (1992)

233 SCRA 146 (1994)
LIM VS. COURT OF APPEALS

214 SCRA 273
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The Court held that in order for patient-doctor privilege can be claimed, the following
requisites must concur:
1.Privilege claimed is in a civil case;
2. The person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to
practice medicine;
3.Such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in
his professional capacity; and
4. The information was necessary for him to enable him to act in that capacity.
Facts:
This is a Petition for review on the rule of confidentiality in a patient-doctor relationship. On November 25,
1987, Juan Sim filed with Pangasinan RTC a petition for annulment based on Art 36 of the Family Code, alleging
that Nelly Lim (petitioner) is suffering from schizophrenia before, during and after their marriage, until present.
Sim announced that he will present Dr Lydia Acampado (psychiatrist) as a witness. Petitioner opposed on the
grounds that the testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is privileged since Dr. Acampado had examined
Lim in a professional capacity and had diagnosed her with schizophrenia.
Respondent claimed that Dr Acampado will be presented as expert witness and would not testify on any
information acquired while attending to the petitioner as doctor. Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari and prohibition but was denied on the ground that petitioner failed to establish the confidential
nature of the testimony obtained from Dr Acampado.
Issue:
Whether or not Dr Acampado can be presented as expert witness in testifying schizophrenia in casewhere
petitioner is her client.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court held that in order for patient-doctor privilege can be claimed, the following requisites must
concur:
1.Privilege claimed is in a civil case;
2. The person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine;
3.Such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in hisprofessional capacity;
and
4. The information was necessary for him to enable him to act in that capacity.
These requisites must concur with the 4 fundamental conditions necessary for invoking doctor-patient
confidentiality:
1.The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed
2.Element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of therelation
between the parties;
3.The relation must be one which the opinion of the community ought to be sedulouslyfostered; and
4.The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications mustgreater than the
benefit thereby gain for correct disposal of litigation.
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Dr Acampado was only presented as an expert witness; she did not disclose anything obtained in thecourse
of her examination, interview and treatment of the petitioner. There is nothing specific orconcrete offered to show
that the information obtained from Dr Acampado would blacken the petitioners reputation/character. Lastly, she
makes no claim in any of her proceedings that hercounsel had objected to any questions asked of the witness on the
ground thatit elicited an answerthat would violate the confidentiality privilege.
KROHN VS. COURT OF APPEALS

233 SCRA 146
The person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to
practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who
wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and
clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony
be considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony cannot
have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the
patient and executed the report.
Facts:
On June 14, 1964, Edgar Krohn Jr. andMa. Paz Fernandez were married in SanMarcelino, Manila. In
1971, Paz underwent psychological testing in an effort to ease marital strain. However, the couple separated a few
years after. Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report signed by Dr.Cornelio Banaag and
Baltazar Reyes.
The confidential psychiatric evaluation report is being presented in evidence before the trialcourt in a
petition for annulment of marriage grounded on psychological incapacity. The witnesstestifying on the report is the
husband who initiated the annulment proceedings, not the physicianwho prepared the report.Ma. Paz
Fernandez Krohn, invoking doctor-patient confidentiality, seeksto enjoin her husband from disclosing the contents
of the psychiatric evaluation report.
Petitioner argued pursuant to Sec. 24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, prohibits a physician
fromtestifying on matters which he may have acquired in attending to a patient in a professionalcapacity, more so a
third person testifying on privileged matters between a physician andpatient or from submitting any medical report
prepared by a physician which the latter hasacquired as a result of his confidential and privileged relation with the
patient.
However, the RTC admitted confidential psychiatric report as evidence.Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation of the physician-patient privilege.
Ruling:
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No. The Court held that in the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who wishes to testify on a
document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition.
Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony cannot have the
force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed the report.
Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to the testimony of private respondent on the ground
that it was privileged. In his Manifestation before the trial court dated 10 May 1991, he invoked the rule on
privileged communications but never questioned the testimony as hearsay. It was a fatal mistake. For, in failing to
object to the testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, counsel waived his right to make such objection and,
consequently, the evidence offered may be admitted.
STATE SECRETS
Rule 130, Section 24. e
(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to
communications made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public interest
would suffer by the disclosure. (21a)
CASES
U.S. v. Nixon (A.B.)
Banco Filipino v. Monetary Board
Neri v. Senate Committee,
418 U.S. 683 (1974)

142 SCRA 523 (1986)
G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008
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US VS. NIXON
418 US 683
Presidential communication is protected, however when the communication is

not of a governmental nature, and there is a public interest in those
communications, then the immunity granted by the Constitution does not exist. In
applying the balance test, Presidential communications are indeed protected
generally, but in the instance of a criminal case, the protection cannot remain, for
it would cut deep into the guarantee of due process law and gravely impair the
basic function of the courts.
Facts:
Agents of CREEP broke into Democratic National Headquarters and were caught in the act. It was slowly
uncovered that President Nixon authorized the break-in, as well as several other incidents. Former White House
counsel John Dean named Nixon himself in an ensuing investigation into the cover-up, and impeachment
proceedings were brought against the President.As a result of a grand jury indictment against 7 defendants, most
notably former Attorney General John Mitchell, the President was named as an unindicted co-conspirator and was
ordered by a District Court upon subpoena, to produce certain tapes, memoranda, and other writings related to
specific meetings associated with the scandal.
President released transcripts to some of the tapes and then moved to quash the release of them all together
on grounds of executive privilege. District Court denied motion. The Court took the case before the Court of
Appeals could hear it, and then affirmed the lower court and remanded it for examination of the subpoenaed
documents.
Issue:
Whether or not the Presidents constitutional privilege is absolute.
Ruling:
No. When the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is
based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due
process law in the fair administration of justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the
demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.
The Court has at the very best before this case interpreted the explicit immunity conferred by express
provisions of the Constitution on members of Congress by the Speech and Debate Clause of the Constitution, an
express power. Thus, if the Court were to construe and delineate claims under express powers, then the Court
should have the authority to interpret claims with respect to powers alleged to derive from enumerated powers.
President claims (1) valid need for protection of higher authority and those who advise him; and (2) separation of
powers insulates the President from judicial subpoena in an ongoing criminal investigation.
Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, the Court finds
it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential
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communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the
protection that a district court will be obligated to provide. As for separation of powers, they were not meant to
stand by themselves, as there are cases in which the powers co-mingled with one another.
Presidential communication is protected, however when the communication is not of a governmental
nature, and there is a public interest in those communications, then the immunity granted by the Constitution does
not exist. This is important to the adversarial system we have in this country. There must be a full disclosure of all
of the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. This is essential to the carrying of justice. Both the 5th
amendment (due process) and the 6th amendment (right to face adversaries is part of this carrying of justice.
In applying the balance test, Presidential communications are indeed protected generally, but in the instance
of a criminal case, the protection cannot remain, for it would cut deep into the guarantee of due process law and
gravely impair the basic function of the courts.
Balancing test weighs the importance of the general privilege of confidentiality of Presidential
communications in performance of the President's responsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair
administration of criminal justice.
No court has defined the scope of judicial power specifically related to the enforcement of a subpoena for
confidential Presidential communications for use in a criminal prosecution.
BANCO FILIPINO VS. MONETARY BOARD

142 SCRA 523 (1986)
By : Abutal, Ivydel
Any statute declaring in general terms that official records are confidential
should be liberally construed to have an implied exception for disclosure when
needed in a court of justice. The deliberations may indeed be confidential but not
necessarily absolute and privileged.
Facts:
This case is about the order issued by the RTC Makati in favor of the complainant for the production,
inspection and copying of certain documents which includes copies of tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board
deliberation on the closure of the Banco Filipino. These documents are needed by the complainant for the
comments, objections and exceptions to the conservators report.
The complainant further claimed that based on the case of US vs. Nixon, when the subpoenaed materials
sought for use is only on the generalized interest in confidentiality it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands
of due process of law. Thus, the complainant claimed that they should not be closed without the reports needed to
establish the financial standing of the complainant.
The respondent however argued that the documents subject of the order is considered privilege pursuant to
Section 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act. And the case of US vs. Nixon is not applicable in this case because it is
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not a claim of privilege only on a generalized interest but considered as confidential under rules on evidence as
stated in the Central Bank Act.
Issue:
Whether or not the documents are considered privilege under the rules of evidence?
Ruling:
The documents are no privileged. Any statute declaring in general terms that official records are
confidential should be liberally construed to have an implied exception for disclosure when needed in a court of
justice. The deliberations may indeed be confidential but not necessarily absolute and privileged.
There is no specific provision in the Central Bank Act which prohibits absolutely the courts from
conducting an inquiry on said deliberations when these are relevant or material to a matter subject of a suit pending
before it. The disclosure here is not intended to obtain information for personal gain. There is no indication that the
disclosure would cause detriment to the government, to the bank or to third parties.
The privilege under Section 21, Rule 130 is intended not for the protection of public officers but for the
protection of public interest. Where there is no public interest that would be prejudiced, this invoked rule will not be
applicable. The rule that a public officer cannot be examined as to communications made to him in official
confidence does not apply when there is nothing to show that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure
question. In the present case, respondents have not established that public interest would suffer by the disclosure of
the papers and documents sought by petitioner. Considering that petitioner bank was already closed as of January
1985, any disclosure of the letters, reports, transcripts at this time impose no danger or peril to our economy. On the
contrary, public interests will be best served by the disclosure of the documents.
NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE

G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008
By : Abutal, Ivydel
The bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on

matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Facts:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract
with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National
Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The
Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de
Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the
approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
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Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one
hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to
bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed
President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the
communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be
applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time
that he would appear and give his testimony.
Issue:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?
Ruling:
The communications are covered by executive privilege. The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive
officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among
others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in
any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a
power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations.
Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and
diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers
may enjoy greater confidentiality than others. Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential
communications privilege
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the President or
the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a
showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains important evidence and by the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that
the communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under conversation and correspondence between the
President and public officials necessary in her executive and policy decision-making process and, that the
information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples
Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on
matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a
quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with
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other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are
received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a
close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a
compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of executive privilege violates
the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. We might have
agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to
them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly
manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by
his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III
provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law.
PARENTAL AND FILIAL PRIVILEGE

Section 25. Parental and filial privilege. No person may be compelled to testify against his
parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants. (20a)
Article 215 of Family Code
Art. 215. No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and
grandparents, except when such testimony is indispensable in a crime against the descendant or
by one parent against the other. (315a)
NEWMANS PRIVILEGE
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R.A. 53 as amended by R.A. 1477

Section 1. Without prejudice to his liability under the civil and criminal laws, the publisher,
editor, columnist or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general
circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news-report or information appearing
in said publication which was related in confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter unless
the court or a House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the
security of the State.
Sec. 2. All provisions of law or rules of court inconsistent with this Act are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS

Rule 130, Section 26 and 32
Section 26. Admission of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact may be given in evidence against him. (22)
Section 32. Admission by silence. An act or declaration made in the presence and within the
hearing or observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as
naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so,
may be given in evidence against him. (23a)
CASES
Viacrucis v. CA
44 SCRA 176 (1972)
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Keller & Co. v. COB
People v. Paragsa
People v. Alegre
Griffin v. California
141 SCRA 86 (1986)

84 SCRA 105 (1978)
94 SCRA 109 (1979)
380 U.S. 853 (1965)
VIACRUSIS VS. COURT OF APPEALS

44 SCRA 176 (1972)
By : Abutal, Ivydel
The testimony and the public document constitute declarations of the Costelos
adverse to their interest which is admissible in evidence, pursuant to the rule on
declarations against interests. Such admission may be received in evidence, not
only against the party who made it or his successors interest, but also against
third persons.
Facts:
Private respondents Orais and spouse brought an action to establish their title to a land of about 4hectares in
Leyte. They alleged that it is part of a bigger lot sold to them by its registered owner, Pedro Sanchez, by virtue of a
deed of sale. They sought to recover the land from Viacrucis. Viacrucis claims that the deed of sale was simulated.
The lower court and the appellate court ruled in favor of Orais, considering, among others, the admission of one
Mrs. Costelo. Mrs. Costelo stated that although the land in dispute was physically in the possession of her deceased
husband, they still recognized Orias as the owner of the land. The court also considered the admission of Mr.
Costelo which is in a public document. Viacrucis assails the courts use of the Costelo spouses admissions, claiming
that he cannot be prejudiced by an act or declaration of another.
Issue:
Whether the admission of Mrs. Costelo was binding on Viacrucis?
Ruling:
The testimony and the public document constitute declarations of the Costelos adverse to their
interest which is admissible in evidence, pursuant to the rule on declarations against interests. Viacrucis has no
reason whatsoever to object to the consideration in favor of Orais of said admission, the same having been made in
1936, more than 5 years before Viacrucis predecessors in interest entered the picture. Such admission may be
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received in evidence, not only against the party who made it or his successors interest, but also against third
persons.
EDWARD A. KELLER & CO VS. COB GROUP MARKETING

141 SCRA 86 January 16, 1986
The pieces of documentary evidence (chattel mortgage, settlement of the debt,

letters of Adao and Lorenzo) are sufficient to prove the liability of COB and to
justify the foreclosure of the two mortgages executed by Manahan and Lorenzo.
The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him as an admission of a party.
Facts:
Keller appointed COB Group Marketing as exclusive distributor of its household products in Panay and
Negros. Keller sold on credit its products to COB. As security, one Asuncion Mahan mortgaged her land to Keller.
Lorenzo also mortgaged his land to Keller for another sales on credit agreement. After a couple of years, the board
of directors of COB found out that COB owed Keller more than P179,000. They wanted to settle the obligations.
Hence, Keller and COB, through their President Bax, settled the debt, agreeing, among others, that COB would
chattel mortgage its trucks to Keller. So, COB, through their President Bax, executed the chattel mortgage in favor
of COB. Also, the stockholders of COB, Adao and Lorenzo, wrote a letter to Keller proposing to pay the debt and to
substitute the Manahan mortgage on Adaos lot. COB wanted to foreclose on the mortgages of Manahan and
Lorenzo, but the trial court did not allow it, nullifying the admissions of liability of Bax and actually stating that it
was Keller who owed COB for alleged overpayments.
Issue:
Whether the admissions should be considered?
Ruling:
YES. The pieces of documentary evidence (chattel mortgage, settlement of the debt, letters of Adao and
Lorenzo) are sufficient to prove the liability of COB and to justify the foreclosure of the two mortgagesexecuted by
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Manahan and Lorenzo. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
against him as an admissionof a party. With regard to the admissions of Bax, these are also supported by the
documentary evidence, and binding on COB.
PEOPLE v. PARAGSA
84 SCRA 105 July 20, 1978
The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the

truth of the statements uttered in his presence is applicable in criminal cases.
They must however comply with the following requisites: 1. That one heard and
understood the statement, 2. That he was at liberty to interpose a denial, 3. That
the statement was in respect to some matter affecting his rights or in which he
was then interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer, 4. The facts were within
his knowledge, and 5. That the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his
silence would be material to the issue.
Facts:
This was a case of rape. Mirasol Magallanes, a 12 year old girl, was the alleged victim. Paragsa was the
suspect. Mirasol claimed that Paragsa entered her house with a hunting knife and had intercourse with her. However,
she also stated that Paragsa was not holding on to the knife when he had intercourse with her. In fact, the aunt stated
that Mirasol did not really tell her anything regarding the alleged rape. Paragsa admitted that they had sexual
intercourse, but claimed it was consensual. He claimed that they were sweethearts. This claim was corroborated by
two other witnesses. When Paragsa claimed that they were sweethearts, Mirasol did not do anything and she just
remained quiet.
Issue:
Whether Mirasols silence was an admission of the sweetheart theory?
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Ruling:
YES. Mirasol did not bother at all to rebut the testimony of Paragsa and his witnesses to the effect that the
accused and Mirasol were actually sweethearts and had previous sexual communications.The rule allowing silence
of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth of the statements uttered in his presence is applicable in
criminal cases. They must however comply with the following requisites: 1. That one heard and understood the
statement, 2. That he was at liberty to interpose a denial, 3. That the statement was in respect to some matter
affecting his rights or in which he was then interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer, 4. The facts were within
his knowledge, and 5. That the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence would be material to the
issue.Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the facts asserted by the accused and his witnesses may be safely construed as
an admission of the truth of such assertion. Paragsa was acquitted of rape.
PEOPLE v. ALEGRE
94 SCRA 109 November 7, 1979
The silence of an accused (or in this case, the three appellants) under custody,
or his failure to deny statements by another implicating him in a crime, especially
when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such implications or
accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit confession of his participation in the
commission of the crime.
Facts:
This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo, a 57 year old spinster whose body was found in her home,
which was ransacked. Alegre rented a room in the house of Sajo. One Cudillan was found with the jewelry of Sajo
sometime later. Cudillan executed two extrajudicial statements. In the first, he admitted that he was involved in the
murder of Sajo. In the second, he identified appellants Alegre, Comayas and Medalla. According to the second
statement, Cudillan went near the cell within the Office of the Investigation Section, Secret Service Division, and
identified Ramiro Alegre, Jesus Medalla and Mario Comayas as the persons he referred to as Jesus Medalla, "Rami"
and "Mario" in his declaration. During the trial, Sgt. Isla of the Pasay police testified that when Cudillan identified
the appellants as the perpetrators, they just stared at him and said nothing. Cudillan later repudiated his statements,
claiming they were done in duress. The appellants each had their own alibis. However, the trial court gave credence
to the testimony of Sgt. Isla and stated thatthe appellants should have denied the charges when they were identified.
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Issues:
Whether Cudillans extrajudicial confession binding on the appellants?
Whether the silence of the appellants may be taken against them?
Ruling:
No. On the first issue, the extrajudicial confessions of Cudillan on the basis of which the trial court was
able to reconstruct how Melecio Cudillan committed the crime in question, cannot be used as evidence and are not
competent proof against appellants Ramiro Alegre and Jesus Medalla, under the principle of "res inter alios acta
alteri nocere non debet" there being no independent evidence of conspiracy. As a general rule, the extrajudicial
declaration of an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have probative value against
his co-accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are concerned.
No. On the second issue, the Court stated that he settled rule is that the silence of an accused in criminal
cases, meaning his failure or refusal to testify, may not be taken as evidence against him, and that he may refuse to
answer an incriminating question. It has also been held that while an accused is under custody, his silence may not
be taken as evidence against him as he has a right to remain silent;; his silence when in custody may not be used as
evidence against him, otherwise, his right of silence would be illusory. Hence, the silence of an accused (or in this
case, the three appellants) under custody, or his failure to deny statements by another implicating him in a crime,
especially when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such implications or accusations, cannot be
considered as a tacit confession of his participation in the commission of the crime. Such an inference of
acquiescence drawn from his silence or failure to deny the statement would appear incompatible with the right of an
accused against self-incrimination.
GRIFFIN VS. CALIFORNIA

380 U.S. 609 (1965)
By : Dauz, Maricel
Silence simply stands for the assertion that one cannot be compelled to
incriminate themselves, either by being forced to testify, or by having their own
silence construed against them
Facts:
Petitioner was convicted of First Degree Murder. He chose to invoke his Fifth Amendment Privilege
against self - incrimination and remained silent throughout the trial. At the closing of trial, the court instructed the
jury that it may infer that the defendants silence was a probable indication of guilt. The death penalty was imposed,
and it was upheld by the California Supreme Court. Under a writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
decided to take the case at hand.
Issue:
Whether a jury instruction on the accuseds silence is reversible error.
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Ruling:
Reversed. Writing for the court, Justice Douglas notes that a jury instruction as to the accuseds silence
which instructs the jury to infer that silence was a probable indication of guilt was in violation of the Fifth
Amendment rights of the defendant. To break this down further, the holding indicates that an inference as to ones
silence nullifies the reason for taking the silence to begin with.
While this opinion can come across as complex, it simply stands for the assertion that one cannot be
compelled to incriminate themselves, either by being forced to testify, or by having their own silence construed
against them.
RES INTER ALIOS ACTA

Section 28. Admission by third party. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided. (25a)
CASES
People v. Alegre
People v. Raquel
94 SCRA 109 (1979)

265 SCRA 248 (1996)
PEOPLE VS ALEGRE
94 SCRA 109 (1979)
By : Dauz, Maricel
As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although

deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have probative value against
his co-accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are
concerned.
Facts:
The case arose from the death of AdelinaSajoa spinster, 57 years old, whose body was found in her
bathroom inside her house. Her bedroom was in "shambles," evidently indicating that it was ransacked.Appellant
Ramiro Alegre, who was then living with relatives in one of the rented rooms on the ground floor of the victim's
house, was taken to the Pasay City police headquarters for investigation in connection with the case, but was later
released that same day for lack of any evidence implicating him in the crime.MelecioCudillan was apprehended in
Tacloban City, Leyte, in the act of pawning a bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken from the victim. In
explaining how he came into possession of the stolen pieces of jewelry, he admitted his participation in the killing
and robbery of AdlinaSajo. This appears in his extrajudicial confession before the police authorities of Tacloban.
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This was his first extrajudicial admission. Second admission was made in Pasay wherein he named his companions
in the killing; Alegre, Medalla and Comaya.
The prosecution presented SGT. Marianao Isla of the Pasay City Police who testified that when he was
investigating Cudillan, he pointed out Alegre, Medalla and Comaya and said nothing.
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged silence of the accused when allegedly pointed to by Cudillan as his companions
in the commission of the crime, is an admission of guilt.
Ruling:
No, the silence of an accused or his refusal to testify may not be taken in evidence against him, and that he
may refuse to refuse to answer an incriminating question.
While an accused is in custody, his silence may not be taken in evidence again him as he has right to
remain silent, his silence when in custody may not be used as evidence against him. Thus, silence of an accused
under custody, or his failure to deny statements by another implicating him a crime; especially when such accused is
neither asked to comment or reply to such implications or accusations; cannot be considered a tacit confession of his
participation in a commission of the crime. Such an inference of acquiescence drawn from silence or failure to deny
the statement would appear incompatible with the right of an accused against self- incrimination.
PEOPLE VS. RAQUEL

G.R. No. 119005 December 2, 1996
By : Dauz, Maricel
Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation without the

assistance of counsel are inadmissible and cannot be considered in the
adjudication of the case. While the right to counsel may be waived, such waiver
must be made with the assistance of counsel. An extrajudicial confession is
binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused.
Facts:
The accused-appellants Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel, as well as accused Amado Ponce, guilty of the
crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, On midnight of July
4, 1986, tragedy visited the peaceful lives of spouses Juliet and AgapitoGambalan, Jr. Thinking of a neighbor in
need, Agapito attended to the person knocking at the backdoor of their kitchen. Much to his surprise, heavily armed
men emerged at the door, declared a hold-up and fired their guns at him. George Jovillano responded to Juliet's plea
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for help. He reported the incident to the police. The police came and found one of the perpetrators of the crime
wounded and lying at about 8 meters from the victim's house. He was identified as Amado Ponce. Even the victim
cannot identify if it was the accused who entered their house.
Trial court rendered judgment against the accused.
Issue:
whether or not the extrajudicial admission made by Ponce against the other accused should be admissible
on court.
Ruling:
The defense submits a lone assignment of error, i.e., that the trial court erred in convicting accused Sabas
Raquel and Valeriano Raquel of the crime charged, despite absence of evidence positively implicating them as the
perpetrators of the crime.
If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on the latter's extrajudicial
statements, it is elementary that the same are hearsay as against said accused. That is exactly the situation, and the
disadvantaged plight of appellants, in the case at bar.
The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against
his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts
are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only
be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized
strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as
evidence against him.
Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel are
inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of the case. While the right to counsel may be waived,
such waiver must be made with the assistance of counsel.
EXCEPTIONS TO RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE

Section 28. Admission by third party. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided. (25a)
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Mahlandt v. Wild Canid
CASES
588 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 198)
DANIEL JOSEPH MAHLANDT v WILD CANID SURVIVAL

588 F.2d 626 (1978)
Statements made by an employee against his employer are admissible against

the latter, where the statements while in employ and where they concerned a
matter within the scope of his employment
Facts
Daniel Mahlandt, 3 years old, was seen by his neighbor lying on his back within the enclosure, with a wolf
(named Sophie) straddling him. The wolf's face was near Daniel's face, but the distance was so great that he could
not see what the wolf was doing, and did not see any biting. He also saw Clarke Poos ran towards the wolf and
Daniel.Shopie was given to the Wild Canid Survival and Research Center, Inc. Sophie was supposed to be kept at
the Tyson Research Center, but Kenneth Poos, as Director of Education for the Wild Canid Survival and Research
Center, Inc., had been keeping her at his home and was chained at his fence when the incident happened.
No witness saw or knew how Daniel was injured. Daniels mother says that Clarke Poos ran to her after
learning of the incident and told her, "a wolf got Danny and he is dying." Clarke denies that statement. Mr. Poos, the
defendant, then went to Washington University to inform Owen Sexton, President of Wild Canid Survival and
Research Center, Inc., of the incident. Mr. Sexton was not in his office so Mr. Poos left the following note on his
door:
Owen, would call me at home, 727-5080? Sophie bit a child that came in our back yard. All has been taken
care of. I need to convey what happened to you. (Exhibit 11)
Denial of admission of this note is one of the issues on appeal.
Later that day, Mr. Poos found Mr. Sexton at the Tyson Research Center and told him what had happened.
Denial of plaintiff's offer to prove that Mr. Poos told Mr. Sexton that, "Sophie had bit a child that day," is the second
issue on appeal.
Issues:
Denial of admission of this note is one of the issues on appeal.
Denial of plaintiff's offer to prove that Mr. Poos told Mr. Sexton that, "Sophie had bit a child that day," is
the second issue on appeal
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Ruling:
The jury brought in a verdict for the defense.
The trial judge's rationale for excluding the note, and the statement was the same in each case. He reasoned
that Mr. Poos did not have any personal knowledge of the facts, and accordingly, the two admissions were based on
hearsay.
The Federal Rules of Evidence became effective in July 1975 (180 days after passage of the Act). Thus, at
this time, there is very little case law to rely upon for resolution of the problems of interpretation.
The relevant rule here is:
Rule 801. Definitions.
. . . (d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if
. . . (2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is
. . . (A) his own statement, in either his individual or representative capacity or
(B) a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth, or
(C) a statement by a person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the subject, or
(D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment,
made during the existence of the relationship, . . . .
The statement in the note pinned on the door is not hearsay, and is admissible against Mr. Poos. It was his
own statement, and as such was clearly different from the reported statement of another.
Are these statements admissible against Wild Canid Survival and Research Center, Inc.? They were made
by Mr. Poos when he was an agent or servant of the Wild Canid Survival and Research Center, Inc., and they
concerned a matter within the scope of his agency, or employment, i. e., his custody of Sophie, and were made
during the existence of that relationship.
The notes of the Advisory Committee on the Proposed Rules pointed out that Mr. Poos was not authorized
or directed to make a statement on the matter by anyone. But Mr. Poos had actual physical custody of Sophie. His
conclusions, his opinions, were obviously accepted as a basis for action by his principal.
CO-CONSPIRATORS STATEMENTS
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Section 30. Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of declaration. (27)
CASES
People v. Cabrera
People v. Yatco
People v. Chaw Yaw Shun
People v. Serrano
People v. Bulan,
57 SCRA 715 (1974)

97 Phil. 941 (1955)
23 SCRA 127 (1968)
105 Phil. 531 (1959)
G.R. No. 143404, June 8, 2005
PEOPLE vs. CABRERA

G.R. No. L-37398 June 28, 1974
In the absence of any other evidence to prove the existence of an alleged

conspiracy, extra-judicial statements and admissions of an individual cannot be
taken as evidence against an alleged co-conspirator
An extrajudicial statement made by a co-accused is, by itself, insufficient to
convict an accused of a crime charged because said statement is inadmissible
since they were made not during the existence of the conspiracy but after the said
conspiracy had already ceased and when the co-accused was already in the
custody of the police.
Facts:
At about 11:00 in the evening of January 17, 1972, Police Sgt. Mario Tanfelix of Valenzuela, Bulacan,
while on a patrol duty received an instruction from his superior Lt. Carlos Palomares to proceed immediately to Jose
Reyes Memorial Hospital at Manila to investigate an abandoned person who was found at the North Diversion Road
suffering from stab wounds. This abandoned and wounded person was identified as Luis de la Cruz. He gave an ante
mortem statement. In the ante-mortem statement the deceased named defendant Rosario Cabrera as the person who
hired his jeep but did not know the names of the three men who stabbed him and took his money and jeep.
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In the morning of January 18, 1972, defendant Rosario Cabrera was arrested. On January 20, 1972 she
executed an extra-judicial confession. She pointed Conrado Villanueva as the mastermind of the robbery. She merely
hired the jeep upon instruction of appellant but the robbery and the killing of the deceased were done by appellant
and his two unidentified companions.
Defendant Rosario Cabrera and appellant Conrado Villanueva did not take the witness stand. Neither did
they present any evidence. On the basis of the evidence adduced by the prosecution together with their respective
cross-examination and objections to some of the exhibits, particularly appellants objection to defendant Cabrera's
extra-judicial confession.
The only evidence that would support the judgment of conviction of appellant Villanueva was the extrajudicial confession of his co-accused Rosario Cabrera which was read into the record over the continuing objection
of appellant's counsel. Appellant reiterated his objection when the said extra-judicial confession was being offered in
evidence. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the extrajudicial statement made by Cabrera is admissible as evidence against the other coconspirators.
Ruling:
No. The Court held that the extrajudicial statement of accused Cabrera does point to appellant as the
mastermind and perpetrator, together with two persons whose identities are still unknown, of the killing of the
deceased Luis dela Cruz and the taking of the jeep he was driving. But said statement is obviously inadmissible
against appellant, who made timely objection thereto.
There is no question that Cabrera's inculpatory statements were made by her during the investigation
conducted by the Valenzuela police on January 20, 1972, two days after the date of the incident in question. For this
reason alone, that is, that said statement was not made during the existence of the alleged conspiracy between her
and appellant, but after said supposed conspiracy had already ceased and when she was already in the hands of the
authorities, Section 27 of Rule 130 cannot be availed of. Said provision reads:
Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration.
There being no other evidence against appellant, We have no alternative but to reverse the judgment
appealed from and to acquit him, as prayed for by his counsel as well as counsel for the People.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the judgment of the lower court is reversed, appellant Conrado Villanueva is
acquitted, and his immediate release from confinement is ordered, unless he is lawfully held for another case, with
costs de oficio.
P a g e 153 o f 285
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PEOPLE vs YATCO
97 Phil 941
The rule regarding statements made by a co-conspirator refers to statements

made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprises and in
furtherance of its object and not to a confession made long after the conspiracy
had been brought to an end.
Under the rule on multiple admissibility of evidence, the confession of a co-accused may be inadmissible against his co-accused for being hearsay but may
nevertheless be admissible against the declarants own guilt.
Facts:
In amended information filed by the City Attorney of Quezon City on March 22, 1955, Juan Consunji,
Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity is still unknown, were charged with having conspired together in
the murder of one Jose Ramos. During the progress of the trial on May 18, 1955, while the prosecution was
questioning one of its witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of the National Bureau of Investigation, in connection with the
making of a certain extra-judicial confession (allegedly made before him) by defendant Juan Consunji to the
witness, counsel for the other defendant Alfonso Panganiban interposed a general objection to any evidence on such
confession on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the other accused Panganiban.
The lower court ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to, but on an altogether different ground: that the
prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of defendants Juan Consunji and Alfonso
Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without prior proof of such conspiracy by a number of definite acts,
conditions, and circumstances.
Issue:
Whether or not the confession made is admissible as evidence.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court held that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the complete
exclusion of the prosecution's evidence on the alleged confessions of the accused Juan Consunji at the stage of the
trial when the ruling was made.
Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's confession may not be competent as
against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them without the
conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as
evidence of the declarant's own guilt, and should have been admitted as such.
Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful
enterprises("during its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long
after the conspiracy had been brought to an end.
Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove conspiracy between the two accused,
nor as evidence against both of them. In fact, the alleged confessions (both in writing and in tape recordings) had not
yet even been identified (the presentation of Atty. Xavier was precisely for the purpose of identifying the
confessions), much less formally offered in evidence. The prosecution might still be able to adduce other proof of
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conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban before their confessions are formally offered in evidence. Assuming,
therefore, that section 12 of Rule 123 also applies to the confessions in question,it was premature for the respondent
Court to exclude them completely on the ground that there was no prior proof of conspiracy.
We see no need for the present to discuss the question of the admissibility of the individual extrajudicial
confessions of two or more accused for the purpose of establishing conspiracy between them through the identity of
the confessions in essential details. After all, the confessions are not before us and have not even been formally
offered in evidence for any purpose. Suffice it to say that the lower Court should have allowed such confessions to
be given in evidence at least as against the parties who made them, and admit the same conditionally to establish
conspiracy, in order to give the prosecution a chance to get into the record all the relevant evidence at its disposal to
prove the charges. At any rate, in the final determination and consideration of the case, the trial Court should be able
to distinguish the admissible from the inadmissible, and reject what, under the rules of evidence, should be excluded.
There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where questions arise as to admissibility
of evidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the erroneous acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the People can no longer appeal.
Wherefore, the order excluding the confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban is
annulled and set aside and the Court below is directed to proceed with the trial in accordance with law and this
opinion. Costs against respondents Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban.So ordered.
PEOPLE vs CHAW YAW SHUN

23 SCRA 127
The Conspiracy must be proved by independent evidence other than the

confession. The admissibility of a confession by one accused against the other in
the same case, must relate to statements made by one conspirator during the
pendency of the unlawful enterprise (or during its existence) and in furtherance of
its objects, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy
had been brought to an end. Conspiracy must be real and not presumptive. It must
be proved as the crime itself, independent from the confession.
Facts:
At about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of July 15, 1959, the lifeless body of Hector Crisostomo, then an
officer of the Presidential Fact Finding Committee charged with the apprehension of dollar smugglers, was found in
his Borgward sedan car at Lias Road, Marilao, Bulacan.Examination of the corpse revealed that the deceased
suffered three gunshot wounds on the head. The cause of death was shock, severe, secondary to multiple gunshot
wounds on the head.
Suspecting that Alvarez may have something to do with the killing, the authorities picked him up for
questioning. Alvarez was taken to the Criminal Investigation Section of the PC for fingerprinting and paraffin test
for gun powder residue. The result of the test, as contained in the report of Crispin Garcia, chief chemistry section of
the PC, showed the presence of gun powder residue on both hands of Alvarez. A complaint for murder was filed by
Capt. Rafael Yapdiangco of the PC before the Justice of the Peace Court of Malolos, Bulacan, against Victorio
Alvarez and two John Does. Immediately after his arrest, Alvarez was investigated. He made a tape-recorded
P a g e 155 o f 285
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statement before Lt. Bautista and Major Santiago of the CIS at Camp Crame, admitting that he alone shot and killed
Crisostomo near Manga Avenue, Manila.
On August 20, 1959, Alvarez executed a handwritten statement in narrative form before the CIS in the
office of the PC Alabang headquarters. In this statement, he affirmed that a certain Johnny was the one who shot and
killed Crisostomo in Marilao, Bulacan. On the same day, Alvarez made another statement in the form of questions
and answers repeating substantially the facts contained in his handwritten statement. Still on the next day, Alvarez
executed another statement before Capt. Rafael Yapdiangco of the PC, wherein Alvarez again admitted that he was
the only one who shot and killed Crisostomo at barrio Lias, Marilao, Bulacan. In this statement, Alvarez gave a
detailed narration of the participation of George Chua in the commission of the crime.
Issue:
Whether or not the confession of an alleged co-conspirator in a killing is admissible.
Ruling:
No. The Court held that conspiracy must be proved by independent evidence other than the confession. The
admissibility of a confession by one accused against the other in the same case, must relate to statements made by
one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprise (or during its existence) and in furtherance of its
objects, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end.
Conspiracy must be real and not presumptive. It must be proved as the crime itself, independent from the
confession. But in the case at bar, the trial court admitted the conflicting confession of Alvarez which are not
binding on the appellant for being hearsay, aside from having been repudiated by Alvarez himself during the trial.
There is, therefore, no inter-locking confession so to say, for there being no independent evidence establishing an
overt act of appellant Chua connected to the crime, conspiracy must necessarily be discarded.
PEOPLE VS. SERRANO

105 Phil. 531 (1959)
By : Abutal, Ivydel
The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration," applies only
to extra-judicial acts or declaration, but not to testimony given on the stand at the
trial, where the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.
And while the testimony of accomplices or confederates in crime is always subject
to grave suspicion, "coming as it does from a polluted source," and should be
received with great caution and doubtingly examined, it is nevertheless
admissible and competent.
Facts:
In the evening of 16 October 1950, Eulogio Serrano told Cenon Serrano alias Piping and company that they
should neutralize Pablo Navarro because he had been prompting people to call on Senator Pablo Angeles David and
testify on the Maliwalu massacre. Eulogio instructed them to wait for Pablo in the town of Bacolor, lure him to
P a g e 156 o f 285
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barrio Dolores and kill him. The next day, they all waited for Pablo at the gambling casino and Chinese stores in the
town of Bacolor where Pablo used to hang around but Pablo did not show up. They finally succeeded in making
contact with Pablo on 20 October when he arrived at the gambling casino. Cenon asked Pablo for some drinks and
suggested that they should go to San Fernando for a "good time," to which Pablo agreed. Before reaching San
Fernando, Cenon suggested that they should instead proceed to Angeles for the "good time" which Pablo approved.
Upon reaching a small road near the schoolhouse of barrio San Isidro, Cenon told the driver to proceed to barrio
Dolores. There, the group tied, interrogated, shot, and then buried Pablo.
All the members of the group were tried for the murder of Pablo. One of them however, Anastacio Reyes,
was discharged as an accused and testified as a witness for the prosecution. The statements of Anastacio were
admitted by the Court which ruled against all the accused. The group now contends that the statements of Anastacio
cannot be admitted against them. They opine that it must appear and be shown by evidence other than the admission
itself that the conspiracy actually existed and that the person who is to be bound by the admission was a privy to the
conspiracy.
Issue:
Whether the statements of Anastacio may be admitted against Serrano and the others?
Ruling:
The contention does not merit serious consideration, because the rule that "The act or declaration of a
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator
after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration," applies only to extra-judicial acts or
declaration, but not to testimony given on the stand at the trial, where the defendant has the opportunity to crossexamine the declarant. And while the testimony of accomplices or confederates in crime is always subject to grave
suspicion, "coming as it does from a polluted source," and should be received with great caution and doubtingly
examined, it is nevertheless admissible and competent.
The trial court did not err in convicting the appellants. For lack of sufficient number of votes to impose the
death penalty, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the proportionate costs against the appellants.
P a g e 157 o f 285
EVIDENCE

PEOPLE VS. BULAN

G.R. No. 143404, June 8, 2005
By : Abutal, Ivydel
Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy; it may be established by acts of

the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime charged, from
which it may be logically inferred the existence of a common purpose to commit
the same. The prosecution must prove conspiracy by the same quantum of
evidence as the felony charged itself.
Once conspiracy is established, it is unnecessary to prove who among the
conspirators inflicted the fatal injury. If conspiracy is proved, all the conspirators
are criminally liable for the crime charged and proved. The act of one is the act
of all.
Facts:
Jose Bulan and his sons, Allan and Estemson, were charged with murder. The appellants allegedly were
waiting outside the dance hall near the gate when Edwin Solo brought the victim towards them, onto the street. Jose
held the victim by the right shoulder, while Allan held him by the left. Estemson suddenly appeared from behind the
victim and stabbed the latter at the back with a small bolo.
The appellants denied the allegation and instead pointed at their allegedly co-conspirator Estemson. Jose
Bulans defense was that he was with Mayor Idanan of Caramoran during the incident but he confessed that it was
Estemson who stabbed the victim. Allan Bulan likewise denied the allegations although he admitted the he and the
victim had an altercation inside the dance hall and he eventually went home. He further claimed that while in store
of one Valentin Talion, he was hit by the victim and his companions evidenced by the medical certificate.
The trial court rendered judgment convicting the accused of murder as accomplices.
Issue:
Whether or not the conspiracy was established as to admit the declaration of the appellants against
Estemson?
Ruling:
Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy; it may be established by acts of the accused before, during
and after the commission of the crime charged, from which it may be logically inferred the existence of a common
purpose to commit the same. The prosecution must prove conspiracy by the same quantum of evidence as the felony
charged itself. Indeed, proof of previous agreement among the malefactors to commit the crime is not essential to
prove conspiracy. It is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim; what is
primordial is that all the participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate a
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common purpose or design to bring out the victims death. Once conspiracy is established, it is unnecessary to prove
who among the conspirators inflicted the fatal injury. If conspiracy is proved, all the conspirators are criminally
liable for the crime charged and proved. The act of one is the act of all.
Considering the foregoing, the Court affirms the finding of the CA that the appellants are guilty as
principals by direct participation in the killing of Alberto Mariano. The crime committed by the appellants is murder
qualified by treachery. Although there was an altercation between Estemson and the victim shortly before the latter
was stabbed, treachery nevertheless attended the commission of the crime.
ADMISSION BY PRIVIES
Section 31. Admission by privies. Where one derives title to property from another, the act,
declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is
evidence against the former. (28)
CASES
Alpuerto v. Pastor
City of Manila v. Del Rosario
38 Phil. 785 (1918)

5 Phil. 227 (1905)
ALPUERTO VS. PASTOR

38 Phil. 785 (1918)
By : Abutal, Ivydel
Concerning
the meaning of the expression privies, Manresa has his tiny to say
The said word denotes the idea of succession, not only by right of heirship and
testamentary legacy, but also that of succession by singular title, derived from
acts inter vivos and for special purposes;; hence, an assignee of a credit, and one
subrogated to it, et., will be privies;; in short, he, who, by succession is placed in
the position of one of those who contracted the juridical relation and executed the
private document and appears to be substituting him in his personal rights and
obligations, isa a privy.
P a g e 159 o f 285
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Facts:
The three parcels of land involved in this case formerly belonged to Juan Llenos. Plaintiff Eladio Alpuerto
(Lienoss-in-law) petitioned the lower court to make a declaration against the defendant Jose Perez Pastor, to the
effect that the plaintiff is the owner of the said lands by virtue of a contract of sale with right of repurchase executed
by Lienos in his (palintiffs ) favor. Defendant Pastor alleged that the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief sought
because the transaction by which the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief sought because the transaction by which
the plaintiff claims to have acquired title was simulated and fictitious and that the supposed conveyance was effected
for the purpose of defrauding the defendant as creditor of Llenos. The contract of sale with right of repurchase
executed (not notarized) by the parties, Llenos and Alpuerto purports on its face to have been executed on July 3,
1912;; but it was not acknowledged before a notary public until December 3, 1914. It appears that at the time of the
supposed sale to Alpuerto, there was a pending case for collection of a considerable sum of money, in which Pastor
was plaintiff and Llenos was defendant where on January 27, 1913, or about six months after the sale took place,
judgment in the collection case was rendered in favor of Pastor, with the properties being levied upon. Despite
Alpuertos objection on the ground that he owned the property, the sheriff proceeded with the public sale and the
property was sold to Pastor.
Issue:
Whether or not the subsequent purchaser is a privy or successor in interest of Alpuerto who is bound by the
previous conveyance?
Ruling:
According to Article 1225 of the Civil Code, a private document legally recognized shall have, with regard
to those who signed it and their privies (causa habientes), the same force as a public instrument. The expression
legally recognized means recognized or acknowledge by the person or persons executing the document.
Concerning the meaning of the meaning of the expression privies, Manresa has his tiny to say The said
word denotes the idea of succession, not only by right of heirship and testamentary legacy, but also that of
succession by singular title, derived from acts inter vivos and for special purposes;; hence, an assignee of a credit,
and one subrogated to it, et., will be privies;; in short, he, who, by succession is placed in the position of one of those
who contracted the juridical relation and executed the private document and appears to be substituting him in his
personal rights and obligations, isa a privy. Thus, Pastor, the purchaser at public sale must be considered a privy or
successor in interest of the execution debtor and is bound by the instrument, which conveyed the property to
Alpuerto - and this from the date of the execution of that instrument as a private document. Nevertheless,
circumstances show that the sale made by Llenos to Alpuerto was one in fraud of creditors;; the deed of sale with
right of repurchase must therefore be annulled and the property delivered to defendant, Pastor.
CITY OF MANILA v. DEL ROSARIO

5 Phil. 227 (1905)
P a g e 160 o f 285
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The act of a predecessor to a land is not binding on the successor if the

acts/declarations made by the predecessor acknowledging ownership or offering
to purchase the property from a third party were made before the predecessor
held title to the land
Facts:
This is an action to recover the possession of 2 lots located in Calles Clavel and Barcelona. The lower court
entered judgment in favor of plaintiff, City of Manila. During the trial, the defendant moved for the dismissal of the
case on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish the allegation in the complaint. This was however
overruled.
Plaintiff presented as evidence the petition presented by Lorenzo del Rosario to the mayor of Manila and
the letter written by him to the municipal board of Manila. Lorenzo admitted the authenticity of both documents
which contain an offer to the municipality of manila to purchase the land on Calle Clavel. He admitted also that he
signed the document on the misapprehension that the land belonged to the city, but that he had been subsequently
informed by some of the city officials that the land belonged to Cipriano Roco y Vera. Lorenzo del Rosario signed
the first document before he acquired from Cipriano Roco y Vera, the ownership of the land referred to therein, the
second document being signed after he had transferred the land to the defendant Jacinto del Rosario, who took
possession of the same and had it registered.
Issue:
Whether the statements of Lorenzo del Rosario made in the documents presented are binding on defendant?
Ruling:
No. They are not binding upon defendant because under section 278 of the code of civil procedure: where
one derives title to real property from another, the declaration, act or omission of the latter, inrelation to the property,
is evidence against the former only when made while the latter holds title. In this case, the statements in the
documents were made prior to Lorenzos holding the title. Thus, the defendant had a perfect right to ask for the
dismissal of the case on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish the allegations in the complaint.
CONFESSIONS
Article III, Section 17, 1987 Constitution
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Rule 130, Secttion 33
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Section 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.
(29a)
Rule 115(e)
(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself.
CASES
People v. Compil
People v. Wong Chuen Ming
People v. Alegre
People v. Yip Wai Ming
People v. Maqueda
Parker v. Randolph
244 SCRA 135 (1995)

256 SCRA 182 (1996)
94 SCRA 109 (1979)
264 SCRA 224 (1996)
242 SCRA 565 (1995)
442 U.S. 62 (1979)
PEOPLE v. COMPIL
244 SCRA 135 (1995)
Admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of

counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel
are flawed under the Constitution and as such they cannot be admitted.
Even if counsel arrives prior to the actual signing of the statement, his absence
during the making but presence during the signing will not cure the defect.
Facts:
Just before midnight of October 23, 1987, robbers struck MJ Furnitures in Sta. Cruz, Manila, which
doubled as the dwelling of its proprietors, the spouses Manuel and Mary Jay. The intruders made their way through
the window grills they detached on the second floor where the bedroom of the Jays were located. Two of the robbers
herded the 2 maids of the owners into the bathroom.
In the investigation, Jessie Bartoleme, a furniture worker in MJ Furnitures, told operatives of the WPD that
just before the incident that evening while with his girlfriend Linda Hermoso inside an owner-type jeepney parked
near the store, he saw his co-workers Marlo Compil, Baltazar Mabini and Jose Jacale go to the back of the furniture
shop. Linda confirmed the information of Bartolome to the police who also learned that the trio who were all from
Samar failed to report to work the day after the incident, and that Baltazar Mabini was planning to go to Tayabas,
Quezon to be the baptismal godfather to his sisters child.
Thus, the WPD agents together with Tomas Jay, brother of deceased, and Jenelyn Valle went to the parish
church in Tayabas to look for Mabini. From there they proceeded to the house of Lopez who informed them that
Mabini and his companions already left the day before, except Compil who stayed behind.
P a g e 162 o f 285
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After being positively identified by Jenelyn as one of the workers, Compil was immediately frisked and
placed under arrest. According to Jenelyn, Compil turned pale, became speechless and was trembling. However,
after regaining his composure and upon being interrogated, Compil readily admittedhis guilt and point to the
arresting officers the perpetrators of the heist from a picture of the baptism of the child of Mabinis sister. On the
way back to Manila, he was again questioned. He confessed that shortly before midnight of 23 October he was with
the group that robbed MJ Furnitures. He divulged to the police officers who his companions were and his
participation as a lookout. The day following his arrest, Compil after conferring with a CLAO lawyer Claroz and in
the presence of his sister, brother and brother-in law, executed a sworn statement before Cpl. Balanay of the WPD
admitting his participation. During arraignment, Compil entered a plea of not guilty and after the prosecution had
rested, filed a demurrer to evidence instead of adducing evidence. The RTC denied his demurrer and instead found
him guilty of robbery.
Issue
Whether Compils extrajudicial confession may be admitted?
Ruling:
No. Admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel although later
reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are flawed under the Constitution and as such they cannot
be admitted. Here, it is evident that Compil was immediately subjected to an interrogation upon his arrest in the
house of Rey Lopez in Tayabas. He was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he was further questioned.
And while on their way to Manila, the arresting agents again elicited incriminating information. In all three
instances, he confessed to the commission of the crime and admitted his participation. In all those instances, he was
not assisted by counsel.
The belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day even if prior to the actual signing of the
uncounseled confession does not cure the defect for the investigators were already able to extract incriminatory
statements from accused Compil. The operative act, it has been stressed, is when the police investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who has been taken
into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory
statements, and not the signing by the suspect of his supposed extrajudicial confession.
Nevertheless, the court ruled that while the extrajudicial confessions of Compil cannot be admitted into
evidence, there still other sufficient factual circumstances to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt as such his
conviction was still sustained by the Court.
PEOPLE VS. WONG CHUEN MING

256 SCRA 182 (1996)
The signatures of the accued on the boxes, as well as on the plastic bags
containing shabu are inadmissible in evidence. The accused were never
informed of their fundamental rights during the entire time that they were under
investigation. Specifically, they were not informed of their Miranda rights. By
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affixing their signatures on the boxes and on the plastic bags, accused in effect
made a tacit admission of the crime charged for mere possession of shabu is
punished by law. These signatures of accused are tantamount to an uncounselled
extra-judicial confession which is not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights
Facts:
Appellants Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung are both British (Hongkong) nationals, who together
with 9 other Malaysian nationals, were charged with unlawfully transporting into the country shabu. All of the
accused pleaded not guilty at their arraignments. All of them arrived in Manila as a tour group arranged by Select
Tours International Co., Ltd. Accused Cheung, an employee of Select Tours, acted as their tour guide. After passing
through and obtaining clearance from immigration officers at NAIA, the tour group went to the baggage claim area
to retrieve their respective checked-in baggages. They placed the same in one pushcart and proceeded to Express
Lane 5 which at that time was manned by customs examiner Gomez. He testified that he instructed the tour group to
place their baggages on the examiners table for inspection. They were directed to hold on to their respective
baggages while they wait for their turn to be examined. Gomez, in the course of examination found brown colored
boxes (marked Alpen Cereals) similar in size to powdered milk boxes in the 3 consecutive baggages that he
inspected. He thus became suspicious and decided to open one of the boxes with his cutter. Inside, was a plastic bag
containing white crystalline substance. Alarmed, Gomez called Appraiser Palala and Duty Collector Bonifacio.
Bonifacio testified that upon learning about the boxes, she immediately ordered the tour group to get their baggages
and proceed to district collectors office. Inside he found a total of thirty boxes Alpen cereals containing the
substance. As Gomez pulled out these boxes from their respective baggages, he bundled the boxes by putting
masking tape around them and handed them over to Bonifacio. Upon receipt of this bundles, Bonifacio called out
the names of the accused as listed in the passengers manifest and ordered them to sign on the masking tape placed
on the boxes allegedly recovered from their respective baggages.
Capt. Francisco testified that when he conducted a field test shortly after all the boxes were recovered, the
test showed that the substance was indeed shabu. Capt. Francisco immediately informed the 11 accused that they
were under arrest. Thereafter, all of them, as well as the boxes which were placed inside a big box, were brought to
Camp Crame. There the accused were asked to identify their signatures on the boxes and after having identified
were made again to sign on the plastic bags containing the white crystalline substance. The trial court found all the
accused guilty of violating the DangerousDrugs Act of 1997. Ming and Cheung now appeals the judgment.
Issue:
Whether the guilt of appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt?
Ruling:
No. The signatures of the accued on the boxes, as well as on the plastic bags containing shabu are
inadmissible in evidence. The accused were never informed of their fundamental rights during the entire time that
they were under investigation. Specifically, they were not informed of their Miranda rights. By affixing their
signatures on the boxes and on the plastic bags, accused in effect made a tacit admission of the crime charged for
mere possession of shabu is punished by law. These signatures of accused are tantamount to an uncounselled extrajudicial confession which is not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights. They are therefore inadmissible as evidence for any
admission wrung from the accused in violation of their constitutional rights is inadmissible against them. The fact
that all accused are foreign nationals does not preclude application of the exclusionary rule because the
constitutional guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights are given and extended to all persons, both aliens and
citizens.
P a g e 164 o f 285
EVIDENCE

PEOPLE VS. ALEGRE

94 SCRA 109 (1979)
By : Dauz, Maricel
While an accused is in custody, his silence may not be taken in evidence against
him as he has a right to remain silent; his silence when in custody may not be
used as evidence against him, otherwise, his right of silence would be illusory.
Facts:
The case arose from the death of AdelinaSajoa spinster, 57 years old, whose body was found in her
bathroom inside her house. Her bedroom was in "shambles," evidently indicating that it was ransacked.Appellant
Ramiro Alegre, who was then living with relatives in one of the rented rooms on the ground floor of the victim's
house, was taken to the Pasay City police headquarters for investigation in connection with the case, but was later
released that same day for lack of any evidence implicating him in the crime.MelecioCudillan was apprehended in
Tacloban City, Leyte, in the act of pawning a bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken from the victim. In
explaining how he came into possession of the stolen pieces of jewelry, he admitted his participation in the killing
and robbery of AdlinaSajo. This appears in his extrajudicial confession before the police authorities of Tacloban.
This was his first extrajudicial admission. Second admission was made in Pasay wherein he named his companions
in the killing; Alegre, Medalla and Comaya.
The prosecution presented SGT. Marianao Isla of the Pasay City Police who testified that when he was
investigating Cudillan, he pointed out Alegre, Medalla and Comaya and said nothing.
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged silence of the accused when allegedly pointed to by Cudillan as his companions
in the commission of the crime, is an admission of guilt.
Ruling:
No, the silence of an accused or his refusal to testify may not be taken in evidence against him, and that he
may refuse to refuse to answer an incriminating question.
While an accused is in custody, his silence may not be taken in evidence again him as he has right to
remain silent, his silence when in custody may not be used as evidence against him. Thus, silence of an accused
under custody, or his failure to deny statements by another implicating him a crime; especially when such accused is
neither asked to comment or reply to such implications or accusations; cannot be considered a tacit confession of his
participation in a commission of the crime. Such an inference of acquiescence drawn from silence or failure to deny
the statement would appear incompatible with the right of an accused against self- incrimination.
PEOPLE vs. YIP WAI MING

P a g e 165 o f 285
EVIDENCE

264 SCRA 224 (1996)
By : Dauz, Maricel
Any confession, including a re-enactment without admonition of the right to

silence and to counsel, and without counsel chosen by the accused is inadmissible
in evidence.
Facts:
The case involves a crime of murder. Accused-appellant Yip Wai Ming and victim Lam Po Chun, both
Hongkong nationals, came to Manila on vacation on July 10, 1993. The two were engaged to be married. Hardly a
day had passed when Lam Po Chun was brutally beaten up and strangled to death in their hotel room. On the day of
the killing, July 11, 1993, Yip Wai Ming, was touring Metro Manila with Filipino welcomers while Lam Po Chun
was left in the hotel room allegedly because she had a headache and was not feeling well enough to do the sights.
Information was lodged against Yip Wai Ming for the slaying of the victim. RTC rendered a decision and
find the accused guilty of murder. There was no witness on the actual killing of the victim but only circumstantial
evidence. The evidence upon which the prosecution convinced the trial court of accused-appellants guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is the testimony of CarizaDestresa, she heard a noise which sounds like a heated argument between
a man and a woman coming from the room occupied by appellant and Lam Po Chun. The heated discussions lasted
for 30 minutes and thereafter subsided. Prior to the death of the victim, her brother, Lam Chi Keung, learned that her
life was insured with the Insurance Companywith appellant as the beneficiary. The premium paid for the insurance
was more than the monthly salary of the deceased as an insurance underwriter in Hongkong.
Issue:
whether or not the confessions of Yip Wai Ming made during the custodial investigations, as to his guilt of
the crime of murder charged against him, is admissible in evidence?
Ruling:
No, Yip Wai Ming was arrested two days after the killing. There was no warrant of arrest. Officer
Yanquiling testified that there was no warrant of arrest and arrested the accused based on circumstantial evidence.
Accused-appellant stated that five police officers at the police station beat him up. They asked him to undress,
forced him to lie down on a bench, sat on his stomach, placed a handkerchief over his face, and poured water and
beer over his face. When he could no longer bear the pain, he admitted the crime charged, participated in a reenactment, and signed an extrajudicial statement. All the while, he was not informed of his right to remain silent nor
did he have counsel of his choice to assist him in confessing the crime.the Constitution provides that (3) Any
confession or admission obtained in violation of this section or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible against
him. Section 17, Article III provides: No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any
confession, including a re-enactment without admonition of the right to silence and to counsel, and without counsel
chosen by the accused is inadmissible in evidence (People vs. Duero, 104 SCRA 379 [1981]).
Most of the circumstantial evidence in this case came from the investigation conducted by Officer
Alejandro Yanquiling or from the prodding by him of various witnesses. The desire of a police officer to solve a
high profile crime which could mean a promotion or additional medals and commendations is admirable. However,
an investigator must pursue various leads and hypotheses instead of singlemindedly pursuing one suspect and
limiting his investigation to that one possibility, excluding various other probabilities. The killing of a tourist is a
blot on the peace and order situation in the Philippines and must be solved. It is not enough to solve a crime. The
truth is more important and justice must be rendered.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant
Yip Wai Ming is acquitted of the charge of murder on grounds of reasonable doubt and his immediate release from
custody is ordered unless he is being held on other legal grounds.
P a g e 166 o f 285
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PEOPLE vs. MAQUEDA

241 SCRA 565
By : Dauz, Maricel
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt. On the other hand, the term

admission is usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which
do not directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or of the criminal intent to commit
the offense charged.
The rights of an accused are not confined to the period prior to the filing of information
but are available at that stage when a person is under investigation for the commission of
an offense. These rights are available to a person at any time before arraignment
whenever he is investigated for the commission of an offense.
Facts:
Britisher Horace William Barker, a consultant of the World Bank, and his Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza,
lived in Tuba, Benguet. On August 27.1991, in the, sanctity of their own home, Horace was brutally slain and
Teresita badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery. Two household helpers of the victims identified
Salvamante (a former houseboy of the victims) and Maqueda as the robbers. Mike Tabayan and his friend also saw
the two accused a kilometer away from the house of the victims that same morning, when the two accused asked
them for directions. The prosecution presented Mike Tabayanstated that they were resting in a waiting shed beside
the Asin road at Aguyad, Tuba, Benguet, which is only a kilometer away from the house of the Barkers.Maqueda
was then arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon. He was taken to Calauag, Quezon where he signed a
SinumpaangSalaysay wherein he narrated his participation in the crime. According to SPO3 Molleno, he informed
Maqueda of his constitutional rights before he signed such document. Afterwards he was brought to the Benguet
Provincial Jail. While he was under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail. He stated therein that "he is
willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty
among the accused in this case.
Maqueda also admitted his involvement in the commission of the robbery to Prosecutor Zarate and to
Salvosa.
Issue:
Whether or Not the trial court was correct in holding that the SinumpaanSalaysay is admissible as evidence.
Ruling:
No. The SinumpaangSalaysay is inadmissible because it was in clear violation of the constitutional rights
of the accused. First, he was not informed of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. Second, he cannot be
compelled to be a witness against himself. At the time of the confession, the accused was already facing charges in
court. He no longer had the right to remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to refuse to be a witness and not
to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal. And yet, despite his knowing fully well that a case
had already been filed in court, he still confessed when he did not have to do so.
P a g e 167 o f 285
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The contention of the trial court that the accused is not entitled to such rights anymore because the
information has been filed and awarrant of arrest has been issued already, is untenable. The exercise of the rights to
remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section 12(1) of the Bill of Rights are not confined to
that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or information but are available at that stage when a person is
"under investigation for the commission of an offense."
Pursuant to Section 12(3) of the Bill of Rights therefore, such extra-judicial admission is inadmissible as
evidence. As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa, the trial
court admitted their testimony thereon only to prove the tenor of their conversation but not to prove the truth of
theadmission because such testimony was objected to as hearsay. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to
Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a
state witness; and as to the other admission, it was given to a private person therefore admissible.
PARKER v. RANDOLPH
44 U.S. 62 May 29, 1979
The Confrontation Clause does not bar admission into evidence of every
relevant extrajudicial statement by a nontestifying declarant simply because it in
some way incriminates the defendant. And an instruction directing the jury to
consider a codefendant's extrajudicial statement only against its source is
generally sufficient to avoid offending the implicated defendant's confrontation
right.
The court may admit into evidence interlocking confessions of co-defenants/accused even without giving the accused an opportunity to cross-examine his co-defendant. The rule however is different when a co-defendant does
not confess. In such cases, the co-defendant must be given an opportunity to
cross- examine the confessant if and when such person takes the witness stand.
P a g e 168 o f 285
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Facst:
Respondents Randolph, Pickens and Hamilton were convicted, after a joint trial in a Tennessee court, of
murder of Douglas, a professional gambler, committed during the commission of a robbery.
During a game of chance between Douglas and R. Wood, the former kept winning prompting Wood to
grow suspicious. After several lost games, R. Wood was convinced that he was being cheated. He approached his
brother, J. Wood, and they decided to relieve Douglas of all his ill-gotten wealth by staging a robbery in an
upcoming game. The Wood brothers enlisted the help of Respondents to carry out the robbery. During the game,
Douglas armed himself with a pistol and a shotgun. In response, J. Wood pulled a pistol on Douglas. He later on
gave said gun to R. Wood and left to tell respondents to move in on the game. However, even before respondents
could arrive, Douglas reached for his pistol and was shot and killed by R. Wood. When the police came, respondents
were apprehended and they confessed their involvement in the crime.
None of the respondents took the witness stand, and their oral confessions, found by the trial court to have
been freely and voluntarily given, were admitted into evidence through police officers' testimony. Respondent
Pickens' written confession was also admitted into evidence over his objection that it had been obtained in violation
of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona. The trial court instructed the jury that each confession could be used only
against the defendant who gave it and could not be considered as evidence of a codefendant's guilt. They were
convicted by the trial court. However, the Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed their convictions on the ground that
that admission of their confessions at the joint trial violated this Court's decision in Bruton v. United States.
Ultimately, the Tennessee Supreme Courtupheld the convictions, holding that admission of respondents' confessions
did not violate the rule of Bruton v. United States, which held that a defendant's rights under the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment were violated by the admission, at a joint trial, of the confession of a codefendant
who did not take the stand. It ruled that in this case, the "interlocking inculpatory confessions" of respondents
Randolph, Pickens, and Hamilton, "clearly demonstrated the involvement of each, as to crucial facts such as time,
location, felonious activity, and awareness of the overall plan or scheme." Respondents subsequently obtained writs
of habeas corpus in a Federal District Court, which held that respondents' rights under Bruton had been violated, and
that introduction of respondent Pickens' written confession had violated his rights under Miranda. The Court of
Appeals affirmed.
Issue:
Whether the admission of interlocking confessions with proper limiting instructions conforms to the
requirements of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution?
Ruling:
YES. Bruton recognized that admission at a joint trial of the incriminating extrajudicial statements of nontestifying codefendant can have "devastating" consequences to a non-confessing defendant, adding "substantial,
perhaps even critical, weight to the Government's case." Such statements go to the jury untested by crossexamination and, indeed, perhaps unanswered altogether unless the defendant waives his Fifth Amendment privilege
and takes the stand. The prejudicial impact of a codefendant's confession upon an incriminated defendant who has,
insofar as the jury is concerned, maintained his innocence from the beginning is simply too great in such cases to be
cured by a limiting instruction. The same cannot be said, however, when the defendant's own confession .."probably
the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him," .. is properly introduced at trial. The
defendant is "the most knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of information about his past conduct," and one
can scarcely imagine evidence more damaging to his defense than his own admission of guilt. Thus, the
incriminating statements of a codefendant will seldom, if ever, be of the "devastating" character referred to in Bruton
when the incriminated defendant has admitted his own guilt. The right protected by Bruton ..the "constitutional right
of cross.examination," .. has far less practical value to a defendant who has confessed to the crime than to one who
has consistently maintained his innocence. Successfully impeaching a codefendant's confession on
P a g e 169 o f 285
EVIDENCE

cross.examination would likely yield small advantage to the defendant whose own admission of guilt stands before
the jury unchallenged. Nor does the natural "motivation to shift blame onto others," recognized by the Bruton Court
to render the incriminating statements of codefendants "inevitably suspect," require application of the Bruton rule
when the incriminated defendant has corroborated his codefendant's statements by heaping blame onto himself.
The right of confrontation conferred by the Sixth Amendment is a safeguard to ensure the fairness and
accuracy of criminal trials, and its reach cannot be divorced from the system of trial by jury contemplated by the
Constitution. A crucial assumption underlying that system is that juries will follow the instructions given them by
the trial judge. Were this not so, it would be pointless for a trial court to instruct a jury, and even more pointless for
an appellate court to reverse a criminal conviction because the jury was improperly instructed. The Confrontation
Clause has never been held to bar the admission into evidence of every relevant extrajudicial statement made by a
nontestifying declarant simply because it in some way incriminates the defendant. And an instruction directing the
jury to consider a codefendant's extrajudicial statement only against its source has been found sufficient to avoid
offending the confrontation right of the implicated defendant in numerous decisions of this Court.
When, as in Bruton, the confessing codefendant has chosen not to take the stand and the implicated
defendant has made no extrajudicial admission of guilt, limiting instructions cannot be accepted as adequate to
safeguard the defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause. Under such circumstances, the "practical and
human limitations of the jury system,"Bruton v. United States, supraat, override the theoretically sound premise that
a jury will follow the trial court's instructions. But when the defendant's own confession is properly before the jury,
we believe that the constitutional scales tip the other way. The possible prejudice resulting from the failure of the
jury to follow the trial court's instructions is not so "devastating" or "vital" to the confessing defendant to require
departure from the general rule allowing admission of evidence with limiting instructions.
CONDUCT AS AN EVIDENCE
Rule 130, Sections 34-35; 51
Section 34. Similar acts as evidence. Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at
one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another
time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge; identity, plan, system,
scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like. (48a)
P a g e 170 o f 285
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Section 35. Unaccepted offer. An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money or to
deliver a written instrument or specific personal property is, if rejected without valid cause,
equivalent to the actual production and tender of the money, instrument, or property. (49a)
Section 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions:
(a) In Criminal Cases:
(1) The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait
involved in the offense charged.
(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral character which is
pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to
establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged.
(b) In Civil Cases:
Evidence of the moral character of a party in civil case is admissible only when pertinent
to the issue of character involved in the case.
(c) In the case provided for in Rule 132, Section 14, (46a, 47a)
Section 14. Evidence of good character of witness. Evidence of the good character of a
witness is not admissible until such character has been impeached. (17)
U.S. v. Pineda
People vs. Irang
People v. Soliman
People v. Babiera
U.S. v. Mercado
People v. Umbana,
CASES
37 Phil. 457 (1918)
64 Phil. 285 (1937)
53 O.G. 8083 (1957)
52 Phil. 97 (1928)
26 Phil. 127 (1913)
402 SCRA 415
UNITED STATES v. PINEDA-MORENO

37 Phil. 457 (1918)
Although the testimony in substance relates to similar acts of negligence of the

accused at other times. It is admissible where the purpose is to ascertain
defendants knowledge and intent and to fix his negligence. If the defendant has
more than one occasion, performed similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly
excluded, negligence is intensified and fraudulent intent may even be
established.
Facts:
P a g e 171 o f 285
EVIDENCE

Santiago Pineda is a registered pharmacist and owner of a drug store in Manila. One Feliciano Santos,
having some sick horses, presented to the said drug store a copy of a prescription, which on other occasions Santos
had given to his horses with good results. Santos, under the belief that he had purchased potassium chlorate, put two
of the packages in water and gave the doses to two of his sick horses. The two horses died shortly afterwards.
Santos, took the remaining packages to Bureau of Science for examination. Drs. Pena and Darjuan of the Bureau
found that the packages contained not potassium chlorate but barium chlorate.
The two also went to Pineda and asked for potassium chlorate but was given barium chlorate. (Barium
chlorate is poison, potassium chlorate is not.) Dr. Buencamino, a veterinarian, performed an autopsy on the horses
and found that the death was due to poisoning.
Issue:
Whether the court may admit the testimony of Dr. Pena and Dr. Darjuan as to their purchase of potassium
chlorate which turned out to be poison?
Ruling:
Yes. Although the testimony in substance relates to similar acts of negligence of the accused at other times.
It is admissible where the purpose is to ascertain defendants knowledge and intent and to fix his negligence. If the
defendant has more than one occasion, performed similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly excluded,
negligence is intensified and fraudulent intent may even be established.
On the trial of a criminal case where the question relates to the tendency of a certain testimony to throw
light upon a particular fact, or to explain the conduct of a particular person, there is certain discretion on the part of
the trial judge, which a court of error will not interfere with, unless it manifestly appear that the testimony has no
legitimate bearing upon the question at issue, and is calculated to prejudice the accused. Evidence is admissible in a
criminal action, which tends to show motive, althoughit tends to prove the commission of another offense by the
defendant.
PEOPLE v. BENJAMIN IRANG

64 Phil. 285 (1937)
While evidence of another crime is generally not admissible in another

prosecution, it is admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where it tends to
identify the defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to show
his presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time charged or
when it is evidence of a circumstance connected with the crime.
P a g e 172 o f 285
EVIDENCE

Facts:
Benjamin Irang appeals the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of robbery with homicide. On November 2, 1935, between 7 and 8
pm, seven individuals with white stripes upon their faces, two of whom were armed with guns and two with bolos
went to the house of spouses Perfecto Melotonoes and Maximiniana Vicente.
Perfecto was attacked with bolos and died thereafter. The wife, who was struck in the face with the butt of a
gun, regained consciousness and saw her husband already dead. Maximiniana, gave money and jewelry to one of the
assailants, which she remembers to have pockmarks and a scar on his eyelid. That same night, the house of Juana
dela Cruz was assaulted by malefactors. All of the assailants had white stripes upon their faces and dela Cruz noticed
one of them had pockmarks and scar on the left eyelid and was dressed in a maong0colored suit.
With the description made by Maximiniana, the police arrested and presented a group of suspects.
Benjamin Irang was identified by Maximiniana to be the one who struck her. Irang was also identified by dela Cruz.
It was alleged that the accused made an affidavit in Tagalog wherein he admitted participation in the robbery after
being coerced by a certain Fidel Estrella. The accused denied executing the affidavit, and said that the contents
thereof are not true and that he was maltreated by the soldiers.
Accused raised as his defense alibi, saying that at the time of the commission of the crime, he was in his
rice field.
Issue:
Whether Irang was identified as one of perpetrators? YES.
Ruling:
The victim gave a description of one of the assailants, and on that basis, police presented appellant three
groups of persons. In the third group presented, the victim pointed at the accused as her assailant. Testimony of dela
Cruz indirectly corroborates Maximinianas testimony that the man of the same description was the one who went to
her house and demanded delivery of her money and jewelry. While evidence of another crime, as a general rule, is
not admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where it tends to
identify defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged or tends to show his presence at the scene of the crime at
the time charged, or when it is evidence of a circumstance connected with a crime.
The court also found that the aforementioned testimonies were corroborated by the admission of the
accused in his affidavit, which the Court found to have been made under oath. The affidavit cannot be considered to
have been made involuntary, therefore, it is admissible against the person making it. Consequently, the defense of
alibi cannot stand as it was contradicted by the testimony of dela Cruz and the accused-appellants own admission.
J. Letrel: Dissent; Justice Letrel was not convinced that appellant has been satisfactorily identified. The
widow referred to the appellant as a man with pockmarks, however a month later, she testified that she recognized
him besides by a scar on his left eyelid. A scar identifies a man more effectively than mere pockmarks. And J. Letrel
does not know why it took the witness one month to discover this important descriptive detail. Moreover, the
assailants were in disguise when they committed the crime. This makes identification difficult, if not impossible and
probably account for the fact that the widow made no reference to the appellants scar in beginning.
P a g e 173 o f 285
EVIDENCE

PEOPLE V SOLIMAN
53 O.G. 8083
While
good or bad character may be availed of as an aid to determine the

probability or improbability of the commission of an offense (Section 15, Rule
123), such is not necessary in crime of murder where the killing is committed
through treachery premeditation. The proof of such character may only be
allowed in homicide cases to show "that it has produced a reasonable belief of
imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a
prompt defensive action was necessary."
Facts:
In the morning of April 29, 1955, at about 2 o'clock, while Ernesto Basa was sleeping in a pushcart placed
along the sidewalk of Sto. Cristo Street near the southeast corner of that street and Azcarraga, Manila, and Ernesto
Balaktaw was also sleeping on a box situated near the pushcart, with their heads opposite each other, Balaktaw was
awakened when someone kicked his hand. Upon awakening, Balaktaw saw Sofronio Palin proceed toward the head
of Ernesto Basa and hold the latter by the shoulder at which moment his companion Geronimo, Soliman approached
Ernesto Basa and stabbed him many times with a balisong. Thereafter, the assailants ran away.
Balaktaw took Basa to a calesa and proceeded to a police outpost at the corner of Azcarraga and Elcano
Streets and reported the incident to Patrolman Tolentino. The patrolman boarded the calesa and directed the driver to
proceed to Mary Johnston Hospital. From there, the three transferred to an ambulance and proceeded to the North
General Hospital where Basa was treated, but he expired in the morning of the same day. At 4 o'clock in the
afternoon, Dr. Mariano Lara, Chief Medical Examiner of the Manila Police Department, made an autopsy of the
deceased and found that the cause of death is as follows: "Profuse exsanguinating hemorrhage (only 850 cc.
recovered) and shock due to multiple (7) stab wounds, two (2) being fatal, piercing the pyloric portion of the
stomach, duodenum, jejunum, hepatic flexure of colon and right kidney."
Appellant Soliman testified that prior to the present incident, or on April 21, 1955, the deceased tried to
borrow his pushcart and, as he was not able to lend it to him, the deceased boxed him and as a consequence, he
suffered physical injuries; that incident was settled amicably on the same day by the companions of the deceased;
that on another occasion the beat up Soliman with an iron pipe and the latter had to undergo medical treatment; that
in the night of April 29, 1955, after he had eaten in Folgueras St., he proceeded to a truck by the United Bus Line of
which he was a watchman; that while he was passing Sto. Cristo Street, the deceased called him and asked for a
drink; that he told the deceased he had no money, but the deceased forced him to give him money and even boxed
him; that because the deceased had three companions, he pulled out his knife and upon seeing this, the three
companions ran away; that he and the deceased fought in the course of which he stabbed him; that while they were
fighting, one Sofronio Palin came and separated them; and that when they were separated Palin advised him to
surrender to the police, so he went home and asked his brothers to accompany him to the Meisic Station.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in not allowing appelants to prove that the deceased had a violent,
quarrelsome or provocative character.
Ruling:
NO. While good or bad character may be availed of as an aid to determine the probability or improbability
of the commission of an offense (Section 15, Rule 123), such is not necessary in crime of murder where the killing is
P a g e 174 o f 285
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committed through treachery premeditation. The proof of such character may only be allowed in homicide cases to
show "that it has produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable
conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary." (Moran Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed, Vol. 3,
126.) This rule does not apply to cases of murder.
PEOPLE V BABIERA
52 Phil 97
While it is true that when the defense of the accused is that he acted in selfdefense, he may prove the deceased to have been of a quarrelsome, provoking and
irascible disposition, the proof must be of his general reputation in the community
and not of isolated and specific acts.
Facts:
Justo Babiera was the owner of two parcels of land situated in the municipality of Oton, Province of Iloilo,
Philippine Islands. On October 19, 1922 Justo Babiera executed a contract of sale with the right of repurchase in
favor of BasilioCopreros whereby he sold the two parcels of land to the latter for the sum of P124 with the condition
that if the vendor did not repurchase them on or before August 1, 1923, the sale would become absolute and
irrevocable (Exhibit F). The period for repurchase having expired, BasilioCopreros took possession of said two
parcels of land, and on March 24, 1927, made application to the registrar of deeds for the Province of Iloilo for the
registration of the consolidation of his title to said parcels. On the 26th of the said month, BasilioCopreros leased
said parcels to SeverinoHaro, municipal president of Oton (Exhibit G and G-1). In view of this, on March 31, 1927,
Justo Babiera filed a complaint against BasilioCopreros in the justice of the peace court of Oton for the recovery of
the possession of said two parcels of land. The complaint having been dismissed on April 19, 1927 on the ground
that it did not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. On several occasions, Justo Babiera confronted
FerminBruces, the person plowing the lands for Haro, threatheningBruces and Haro.On August 21, 1927,
SeverinoHaro, as usual, went to visit his land in the barrio of Bita, accompanied by Gregorio Torrija, Benito Carreon
and Pedro Tauro. On arriving there FerminBruces, his copartner on shares, told him that the day before he had found
Clemente Babiera's cow grazing on that land. It happened at that moment Clemente Babiera and Dominga Bores
were passing by. SeverinoHaro then informed Clemente Babiera of what his cow had done on the former's land and
told him to take better care of his cow in future and not to let it run loose.
In the evening, Haro and his companions were making their way back to town using a torch, as it was
already dark. Haro was walking ahead, while Pedro Tauro followed behind carrying the torch, followed by Gregorio
Torrija and Benito Carreon. Suddenly, Babiera sprang from the cogon grass and struck Haro with a bolo. On turning
his head to see who had attacked him SeverinoHaro received another bolo blow in the forehead near the right
eyebrow. In trying to defend himself with his hand he was wounded between the index finger and the thumb. He
then tried to grasp his assailant but did not succeed and he fell to the ground. Then Justo Babiera appeared and
placing himself upon SeverinoHaro's stomach, held the latter's hands. Later, Dominga Bores appeared on the scene
and held both knees of the wounded man. When Justo Babiera arrived, a voice was heard saying: "Hold him, papa,"
and at the same time, SeverinoHaro's voice was heard saying: "Help! help!" Pedro Tauro wished to come near in
order to help SeverinoHaro, but Clemente Babiera raised his bolo in the air and kept on brandishing it to warn
everybody off. Pedro Tauro, in fear, stepped back, dropping the torch he carried. Not far from there were also
Buenaventura Gabalfin and Gregorio Paycol, who threatened to kill SeverinoHaro's companions if they helped him.
After the torch had been extinguished they heard a voice which they recognized as SeverinoHaro's saying: "Uncle
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Justo, have patience with me, for I have done no wrong." Then they heard another voice, that of Dominga Bores,
which said: "Here is the revolver; let us return." Before the assailants left two or three revolver shots were heard.
When SeverinoHaro's companions saw that their assailants had already departed, they drew near to where Severino
lay stretched out to see what had happened to him. SeverinoHaro told them not to fear for he did not feel as if he
were going to die, and calling his copartner on shares, FerminBruces, directed him to bring a cot and take him to
town. Pedro Tauro and Gregorio Torrija did as SeverinoHaro wished, and on arriving at the barrio of Santa Monica,
they by chance came upon a truck in which were some policemen. They place the wounded man in the same truck
and took him to Saint Paul's Hospital in the City of Iloilo. When SeverinoHaro was taken to the town he did not
have his revolver and the cartridge belt, without the holster, was found by Gregorio Torrija near where the incident
took place.
On the same morning, August 22, 1927, and in the same hospital, SeverinoHaro made a sworn statement
before the deputy fiscal, Edmundo S. Piccio (Exhibit I), relating the occurrence and mentioning the persons who
were present. This sworn statement was ratified by him before the same deputy fiscal on the 27th of the said month
and year when he had given up all hope of recovery.
Issue:
Whether there is sufficient evidence to hold the appelants guilty
Ruling:
YES. It has been contended by the defense that the defendant-appellant, Clemente Babiera, only acted in
defense of his life and property, having been obliged to resort to arms on seeing his life endangered, contending that
the provocation consisted in that after SeverinoHaro had agreed to an indemnity of P2 for the damage caused, the
latter wanted to take Clemente Babiera's cow to the town, and that the attack consisted in that MargaritoMediavilla
gave him a bolo blow on the little finger of the right hand, and that SeverinoHaro threatened him with his revolver
and fired several shots at him. Examined in the light of the ordinary conduct of men, SeverinoHaro's alleged
attitude, in having tried to take Clemente Babiera's cow after having agreed to accept P2 for the damages, and
having ordered that the animal be returned to its owner, is highly illogical, and not a scintilla of evidence has been
presented to explain this change of determination, as unexpected as it is unreasonable.
With respect to the allegation that MargaritoMediavilla and SeverinoHaro began the attack, inasmuch as it
has not been proved that they were the instigators, it cannot be conceived that they committed said unlawful
aggression, for he who has no reason to provoke, has no reason to attack unlawfully. The defense also attempted to
prove that SeverinoHaro was of a quarrelsome disposition, provoking, irascible, and fond of starting quarrels in the
municipality of Oton, but the trial judge would not permit it. While it is true that when the defense of the accused is
that he acted in self-defense, he may prove the deceased to have been of a quarrelsome, provoking and irascible
disposition, the proof must be of his general reputation in the community and not of isolated and specific acts
(Underhill Criminal Evidence, par. 325, p.570), such as the accused Clemente Babiera tried to prove, and hence the
lower court did not err in not admitting such proof. But even if it had been proved by competent evidence that the
deceased was of such a disposition, nevertheless, it would not have been sufficient to overthrow the conclusive proof
that it was the said accused who treacherously attacked the deceased.
US V MERCADO
26 Phil 127
A witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been called,
except by showing a) that he has made contradictory statements or b) that his
general reputation for truth, honesty or integrity is bad.
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Facts:
These defendants were charged with the crime of coaccion (coercion) for using force and violence on the
person of Claro Mercado to prevent him from rendering aid to Maria Mateo, who was being maltreated by Santiago
Mercado. During the trial, Santiago Mercado was presented as a witness. He was asked how many times he had
been convicted for assault. Tomas Mercado objected on the ground that the question was impertinent. The judge
overruled the objection on the ground that the character of the witness has an intimate relation with the facts being
investigated.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in allowing the question to impugn the witness credibility.
Ruling:
YES. Generally speaking, a witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been called,
except by showing (a) that he has made contradictory statements: or (b) by showing that his general reputation for
the truth, honesty, or integrity is bad. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.) The question to which the defendant objected neither
attempted to show that the witness had made contradictory statements nor that his general reputation for truth,
honesty, or integrity was bad. While you cannot impeach the credibility of a witness, except by showing that he has
made contradictory statements or that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, yet, nevertheless,
you may show by an examination of the witness himself or from the record of the judgment, that he has been
convicted of a high crime. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.) In the present case, the other offense to which the question above
related was not a high crime, as that term is generally used, and we assume that the phrase "high crime," as used in
section 342, is used in its ordinary signification. High crimes are generally defined as such immoral and unlawful
acts as are nearly allied and equal in guilt to felonies. We believe that the objection to the above question was
properly interposed and should have been sustained. The question now arises, did the admission of the question
prejudice the rights of the defendants? If there was proof enough adduced during the trial of the cause, excluding the
particular proof brought out by this question to show that the defendants are guilty of the crime.then the question
and answer and the ruling of the court upon the same did not affect prejudicially the interests of the defendants.
Errors committed by the trial court, which are not prejudicial to the rights of the parties, should be disregarded by
the court. In our opinion the evidence clearly shows that the witness committed the assault to which reference is
made in the complaint in the present cause. Whether he had committed other assaults or not was a matter of no
importance in the present action. The admission or rejection, therefore, of the proof to which such question related
could in no way prejudice the rights of the defendants.
PEOPLE VS UMBANA
G.R. Nos. 146862-64. April 30, 2003
By : Go, Myka
Even the testimony adduced by the defense portraying Cheril as a disrespectful and
wayward child does not detract from her credibility as a witness narrating her ordeal in
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the hands of her father. Moral character is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction
of persons accused of rape, as even prostitutes can be the victims of rape. Moreover, we
recognize that a rape victims testimony against her father is entitled to great weight,
since reverence and respect for elders is deeply ingrained in Filipino children and is
recognized by law.
Facts:
This case is an automatic review of the decision of the RTC of Lianga, Surigaodel Sur finding
GaudencioUmbaa guilty of three counts of rape of his daughter Cheril L. Umbaa.
Three information were filed against GaudencioUmbaa charging him with rape of Cheril on three separate
days. Gaudencio Umbaa and Lilia Lonzaga are the parents of Cheril L. Umbaa and Glenn Umbaa. In 1992,
Gaudencio and Lilia separated. Cheril stayed with Lilia and Glenn stayed with Gaudencio. After some time,
arrangements were made for Cheril and Glenn to study in Manila with the assistance of Gaudencios niece. Glenn
was able to go to Manila, however, Cheril wasnt able to because of lack of money. As a result, she stayed with her
father.
The prosecution presented Cherils testimony stating that her father raped her at 1:00AM in the morning of
September 3, 4, and 5, 1999. Her father entered her room every 1:00AM, raped her, and threatened her not to tell
anyone about the incident. She was able to tell her cousin about it but she wasnt able to do anything because of her
fear and lack of money to leave the house. Eventually, she left and stayed with Lilia who learned about the incidents
and finally put it on blotter with the police.
Gaudencio presented his alibi and the testimonies of several persons corroborating his story.The defense
portrayed Cheril as a wayward child. Gerardo, one of the witnesses, said that Cheril had a different character, that
she was the type to fight back or "retort." They also showed that Cheril shamed Gaudencio because she left the
house at night and returned home only in the morning. Gaudencio contends that Cherils testimony is incredible and
that Cheril and Lilia have the propensity of concocting stories. Also, Cheril had the motive to file false charges
against him because she harbored ill-feelings towards him for years.
Issue:
W/N the conduct of a witness is admissible as character evidence.
Ruling:
No. Even the testimony adduced by the defense portraying Cheril as a disrespectful and wayward child
does not detract from her credibility as a witness narrating her ordeal in the hands of her father. Moral character is
immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of persons accused of rape, as even prostitutes can be the victims of
rape. Moreover, we recognize that a rape victims testimony against her father is entitled to great weight, since
reverence and respect for elders is deeply ingrained in Filipino children and is recognized by law.
Under the threat of the knife and the shock of being violated by her own father, even a grown-up like Cheril
cannot be expected to put up a fight. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is
exercised upon the victim and she submits herself against her will to the rapists lust because of fear for life and
personal safety.
Cherils manner of answering the questions during the trial. shows that Cheril understood the severity of
her charges and that its consequences could be irreversible. Notwithstanding the possibility that her imputations
could lead to her fathers death, Cheril did not waver in her desire to have the transgressions against her vindicated.
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It would be the height of depravity for a young woman to concoct a story that would put her own father for most of
his remaining life in jail, if not to death, and drag herself and her family to a lifetime of shame. AFFIRMED.
HEARSAY RULE
TESTIMONIAL KNOWLEGDE
Section 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. A
witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which
are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. (30a)
CASES
People v. Brioso
People v. Cusi
People v. Gaddi
Leake v. Hagert
U.S. v. Zenni
Estrada vs. Desierto
People vs. Quidato
37 SCRA 336 (1971)

14 SCRA 944 (1965)
170 SCRA 649 (1989)
175 N.W.2d 675 (1970)
492 F. Supp. 464 (1980)
356 SCRA 108 (2001)
297 SCRA 1 (1998)
PEOPLE VS JUAN BRIOSO

G.R. No. L-28482. January 30, 1971
P a g e 179 o f 285
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By : Go, Myka
Affidavits are generally rejected in a judicial proceeding as hearsay, unless the

affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.
Facts:
Brioso and Taeza were charged with the murder of Daria.
One evening, while the spouses Tumalip were at home, Brioso and Taeza snuck into their neighborhood
carrying guns. A neighbor of the spouses, so she peeked into a crack on her wall and saw Brioso pass by carrying a
gun. She looked into it further and saw Brioso fire the gun into the wall of Darias house. Two shots were heard and
after, Silvinos moans and Susanas cries for help were heard too.
The testimony was uncorroborated and contradictory.
Issue:
W/N the court erred in relying on the on the physical identity the accused.
Ruling:
No. The observsations of the wtiness does not necessarily mean that he was not actually armed or carrying
a gun on his person and shot the victims. Even Brioso specifically said that he knew of no reason why she should
testify against him. Hence, her statement that she came to court only to tell the truth should be believed.
The witness also stated that she was hard of hearing and could not understand some of the questions; thus,
the alleged inconsistencies in her testimony do not detract from the "positive and straight-forward" dentification of
the accused as the ones who were seen at the scene of the crime and who actually shot Daria.
PEOPLE VS. CUSI

G.R. No. L-20986. August 14, 1965
By : Go, Myka
The testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person is

hearsay and is inadmissible if offered to prove the truth of the facts stated therein.
However, such may be admitted if intended only to establish the fact that such
statement was made or the tenor of such statement.
Facts:
5 people were charged with robbery in band with homicide. Sgt. Bao in an extrajudicial confession made
to him by Puesca admitting his participation in the commission of the offense and mentioned the names of the other
persons involved. The prosecution asked Sgt. Bao to mention the names and the counsel for Macalinao, Gustilo
and Dairo objected on the ground of hearsay.
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The judge allowed the witness to answer the question and name his co-conspirators except those who had
raised the objection.
Issue:
W/N the hearsay rule is applicable in this case.
Ruling:
No. In the case at bar where the purpose of the prosecuting officer is only to establish the fact that the
accused had mentioned to the witness the names of those who conspired with.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.NERIO GADDI

G.R. No. 74065 February 27, 1989
A statement is not hearsay if it is offered for the purpose of proving that the fact
or assertion was made by the declarant, and not to prove the truth of the
declaration.
Facts:
Gaddi was charged with murder for the death of Navarro. Judge handed down a verdict of guilt. On appeal
to this Court, Gaddi assigns error of giving credence to the testimony of Guzman. Guzman testified Gaddi and the
victim Esguerra drinking gin the afternoon. Morning of the following day, appellant told Guzman that he killed his
drinking partner Esguerra and dumped his body in a toilet pit. Guzman went to the police and reported what
appellant told him.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Ernesto Guzman.
Ruling:
The Court finds the instant appeal unmeritorious.
Proof that a person confessed to the commission of a crime can be presented in evidence without violating
the hearsay rule [Section 30, Rule 130] which only prohibits testimonies as to those facts which he merely learned
from other persons.
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ALLENLEAKE VS CHARLOTTE HAGERT

Civil No. 8569 175 N.W.2d 675 (1970)
Field notes of an investigator will not be admitted into evidence if the person
who gave the statement does not testify in open court, pursuant to the Hearsay
Rule.
Facts:
Allen alleges that Charlotte negligently and carelessly drove her automobile into the rear of the plow being
towed by a tractor which Leake was operating, causing injuries to Leake and damages to his plow and tractor.
Charlotte admitted that the collision occurred, but denied that the collision was proximately caused by her
negligence in the operation of her motor vehicle, and she alleged that the sole and proximate cause of the collision
was the negligence of the plaintiff.
Gross, investigator, stated that, while he was making his investigation, he talked to Allen Leake's son, who
told him that the lens in the small light had been missing from its frame for some time prior to the accident
Issue:
Whether or not shoulda have been permitted to give testimony which was hearsay;
Ruling:
Leake contends that the field notes contained hearsay evidence and were self-serving declarations. The
hearsay evidence contained in the field notes consisted of a summary of what Allen Leake's son told Edward Gross
with regard to the red lens being out for some time. The trial court erred in admitting of such hearsay evidence, but
because other competent testimony as to the same fact was admitted by other evidence, as found in the field notes,
Leake contends that none of the field notes should have been admitted into evidence because such notes
were self-serving declarations of the witness, who testified at the trial. In the case at bar, the field notes of Edward
Gross did not contain any facts on conclusions, but only notations as to damages to the vehicles.. Accordingly, we
conclude that it was not prejudicial error for the trial court to admit the field notes of Gross into evidence.
UNITED STATES VS ZENNI

492 F. Supp. 464 (1980)
To be hearsay an assertion must be made. They were not made to prove that the
place they were calling from was a bookmaking establishment, but simply made to
place bets.
P a g e 182 o f 285
EVIDENCE

Facts:
During a lawful search for evidence of illegal bookmaking activity, conducted pursuant toa valid search
warrant, law enforcement answered the phone several times. They seek to introduceevidence that individuals who
called during that time placed bets, and thus believed that thepremises was used for such purposes, and was thus
likely used for such a purpose.
Issue:
Whether implied assertions are hearsay?
Ruling:
NO. To be hearsay an assertion must be made, and in this case the statements made by thegamblers on the
telephone were non assertive verbal conduct. They were not made to prove thatthe place they were calling was a
bookmaking establishment, but simply made to place bets.
Discussion. The dangers inherent in hearsay do not exist in the context of nonassertive verbalconduct, or
implied assertions. The declarants veracity is not at issue, and so one of the reasonsthat it is so important to have an
out of court declarant available for cross examination is notpresent. The statement was not made to show the truth or
falsity of something, and so the veracityis not in issue.
ESTRADA VS DESIERTO; ARROYO

297 SCRA 1 (1998)
Classes of hearsay:
1.Those statements which are the very facts in issue,
2. Those statements which are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue.
o The second class includes the following: Statement of a person showing his state
of mind; Statement of a person showing his physical condition; Statement of a
person to infer a state of mind of another person; Statements which may identify
the date, place and person in question; Statements to show a lack of credibility of
a witness.
Facts:
In as case of bribetaking, illegalgambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada On
November 13. January 16, 2001 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging
evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecutionpanel
walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA
Shrine.
P a g e 183 o f 285
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Estrada called for a snap election to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14,
2001. He added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was
vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned his post. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the
presence of thecrowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace.
Erap, after his fall, filed petition to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further
proceedings in cases filed against him until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment confirming
Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge
the duties of his office.
Issues:
Whether or not the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.
Ruling:
No. Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the
judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against Estrada were still
undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect on the
judge and that the prosecutor should be more concerned withjustice and less with prosecution.
EXCEPTIONS:
DYING DECLARATIONS RULE
Section 37. Dying declaration. The declaration of a dying person, made under the
consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the
subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death. (31a)
CASES
People v. Laquinon
People v. Sabio 02 SCRA
People v. Salison
People v. Ador
135 SCRA 91 (1985)

218 (1981)
253 SCRA 758 (1996)
G.R. Nos. 140538-39, June 14, 2004
P a g e 184 o f 285
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PEOPLE VS LAUINON
135 SCRA 91 (1985)
The dying declaration is not admissible as an ante-mortem declaration since the

deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not. The deceased did not
believe himself "at the point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct,
which is the sole basis for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to
the hearsay rule."
Facts:
Accused Gregorio Laquinon was charged with the crime of murder in the Court of First Instance of Davao
del Sur for the killing of Pablo Remonde. Laquinon was impleaded based on the statement (dying declaration) of
Remonde that was revealed to Buat.The accused-appellant argues that the foregoing statement is inadmissible in
evidence as an ante-mortem declaration because it was not executed under a consciousness of an impending death;
and that the deceased was not a competent witness.
Issue:
Whether or not the testimony of the deceased is a dying declaration and is considered admissible evidence.
Ruling:
The dying declaration of the deceased Pablo Remonde is not admissible as an ante-mortem declaration
since the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not. The declaration fails to show that the deceased
believed himself in extremist, "at the point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct, which is the sole basis
for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule."
However, the said statement may be admitted as part of the res gestae since the statement was made
immediately after the incident and the deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time to concoct a charge against
the accused.
PEOPLE VS SABIO
G.R. No. L-26193, January 27, 1981
By : Go, Myka
P a g e 185 o f 285
EVIDENCE

The admission of dying declarations has always been strictly limited to

homicide or murder as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of
death
That death did not ensue till three days after the declaration was made will not
alter its probative force since it is the belief in impending death and not the rapid
succession of death, that renders the dying declaration admissible
Facts:
Sabio, a 13 year old, was charged with Robbery with Homicide for robbing and causing the death of
Espina, an 80 year old owner of a sari-sari store. Catalino was found on the second floor of his house and wounded
on the forehead. He died because of it 3 days later.
The prosecutions witness able to ask Catalino some questions about the person who hacked him and
Catalino was able to say that Only Sabio is responsible for my death. The statement was thumb marked by the
victim in his own blood.
The defense questioned the admissibility of the ante-mortem statement where, in fact, the victim had hopes
of recovery for his first word to Semilla was for the latter to fetch the police.
Issue:
whether or not the effect hope of life will render ante-mortem statements inadmissible.
Ruling:
No.The seriousness of the injury on the victims forehead which had affected the brain and was profusely
bleeding; the victims inability to speak until his head was raised; the spontaneous answer of the victim that "only
PapuSabio is responsible for my death" ; and his subsequent demise from the direct effects of the wound on his
forehead, strengthen the conclusion that the victim must have known that his end was inevitable. That death did not
ensue till three days after the declaration was made will not alter its probative force since it is not indispensable that
a declarant expires immediately thereafter. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death
in point of fact, that renders the dying declaration admissible.
However, as regards the crime of robbery, the dying declaration of the victim which points to the accused
as the one slashed and robbed him cannot be admitted to establish the factor of robbery. The admission of dying
declarations has always been strictly limited to criminal prosecutions for homicide or murder as evidence of the
cause and surrounding circumstances of death.
WHEREFORE, we find the accused, RodulfoSabio alias "Papu", guilty of the crime of Homicide and
hereby sentence him to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum, to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal as maximum; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, CatalinoEspina, in the amount of
P12,000.00; and to pay the costs.
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EVIDENCE

PEOPLE VS SALISON
G.R. No. 115690, February 20, 1996
By : Go, Myka
The declaration can be translated into English or Pilipino as it is already

admitted in evidence and forms part of the record.
Facts:
Salison, together with 3 co-accused, mauled and pummeled Valmoria who eventually died because of his
injuries. The prosecution presented 7 witnesses, a picture of pieces of wood used in the mauling, a written
declaration of the victim after the incident, and a written agreement between the parents of Salison and the victim.
Valmoria asked the purok leader to write down his declaration regarding the incident. Salison argued that
the written statement is inadmissible as evidence since it was in the Cebuano and was not accompanied with a
translation in English or Pilipino.
Issue:
W/N a written dying declaration without an English or Pilipino translation is admissible.
Ruling:
Yes. The records do not disclose that the defense offered any objection to the admission of the declaration.
Thus, the defense waived whatever infirmity the document had at the time of its submission as evidence. The
declaration can be translated into English or Pilipino as it is already admitted in evidence and forms part of the
record.
Note: They are not rendered inadmissible as they may even be communicated by means of signs. There
was, therefore, no prejudice caused to appellant and no reversible error was committed by that lapse of the trial
court.
Appellants argument regarding the inadmissibility of the declaration on a mere technicality would mean the loss of
a vital piece of evidence that could yield the true facts and give retributive justice in the murder of Valmoria.
PEOPLE VS ADOR
G.R. NOS. 140538-39, June 14, 2004
By : Go, Myka
A dying declaration must identify with certainty the assailant. Otherwise, it

loses its significance.
Facts:
Six persons, all with the surname Ador, were charged with the murder of Cuya and Chavezin two separate
information. The witnesses said that they found Chavez shot and holding his intestines in because they were already
spilling out. Meanwhile, Cuya was already dead at about a meter away from him. Mercy Beria shook Chavez and
she heard him say tinambangan kami na Ador (We were ambushed by the Adors).
P a g e 187 o f 285
EVIDENCE

Diosdado III and Godofredo questioned the admission of the supposed dying declaration of the victim
because it did not point to any of them in particular.
Issue:
W/N the dying declaration relied upon for the conviction of the appellants reliable and significant.
Ruling:
No. While a dying declaration may be admissible in evidence, it must identify with certainty the
assailant.Otherwise, it loses its significance.
In this case, the only direct evidence introduced by the prosecution is the testimony of Mercy Beria, that
she heard Rodolfo Ompong Chavez say tinambangan kami naAdor (We were ambushed by the Adors) .Sad to say,
no specific name was ever mentioned by the witness.Neither was she able to tell how many (persons) Adors were
involved.This testimony if it will be given credence may inculpate any person with the family name Ador as
assailant.The prosecution therefore was not able to establish with moral certainty as to who of the Adors were
perpetrators of the offense x xxx Paraffin tests are not conclusive evidence that indeed a person has fired a gun.
The decision of the trial court finding Diosdado III and Godofredo guilty beyong reasonable doubt of two
(2) counts of murder and imposing on them the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accused-appellants Godofredo B. Ador and Diosdado B. Ador III are ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt
and their IMMEDIATE RELEASE is hereby ORDERED unless they are being held for some other legal cause.
DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST

Section 38. Declaration against interest. The declaration made by a person deceased, or
unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact is asserted in the declaration was
at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his
position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in
evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons. (32a)
CASES
People v. Majuri
96 SCRA 472 (1980)
People v. Toledo
51 Phil. 825 (1928)
Fuentes v. CA
253 SCRA 430 (1996)
Heirs of Miguel Franco v. CAG.R. No. 123924, December 11, 2003
P a g e 188 o f 285
EVIDENCE

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MAJURI

G.R.No. L-38833 March 12, 1980
By : Marcelo, MJ
It
was a confirmation of the maxim semper praesumitur matrimonio and the

presumption "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage".
Facts:
This is a parricide case against accused Aling, who allegedly stabbed his wife Norija, in the chest. Norija
was brought to the hospital but later on died of the stabs she received. AirolAling was investigated by the police. He
declared that he killed his wife because e he was informed in prison by his relatives that his wife was living with
another man and fooling around with other men. He and the deceased had five children. He alluded in his testimony
to his father-inlaw.
Issue:
Whether Airol is liable for parricide even without evidence introduced to prove marriage?
Ruling:
YES, The testimony of the accused that he was married to the deceased was an admission against his penal
interest. It was a confirmation of the maxim semper praesumiturmatrimonio and the presumption "that a man and
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage".
He and the deceased had five children. He alluded in his testimony to his father-in-law. That implies that
the deceased was his lawful wife. The fact that he bitterly resented her infidelity, her failure to visit him in prison
and her neglect of their children are other circumstances confirmatory of their marital status.
The fact that he escaped from confinement in order to kill his wife shows a high degree of perversity and
incorrigibility His being a non-Christian cannot serve to extenuate the heinousness of his offense. He understood the
gravity of his crime because he had attained some education. He reached first year high school and he used to be a
checker in a stevedoring firm. However, he was sentenced only to reclusion perpetua, not the death penalty because
of lack of one vote from the justices.
In this case, applying the proposed Rules of Evidence, he outcome would still the same because aside from
the declaration by Airol that he killed his wife, which is an exception to the hearsay rule, being against the
declarants interest, it is also coupled with disputable presumption that the person claiming that he is married to the
woman, the latter not disputing, would create a presumption that they are legally married.
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PEOPLE v. EUGENIO TOLEDO
G.R. No. L-28655 August 6, 1928
By : Marcelo, MJ
But they are not rendered inadmissible by the mere fact that the declarant is
unavailable, - something else is necessary. One fact which will satisfy this
necessity is that the declaration is or was against the declarant's interest, and this
is because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own
detriment.
Where, however, the declarant is dead or has disappeared, his previous
statements, out of court, if not inadmissible on other grounds, are the best
evidence.
Facts:
Holgado and Morales had disputes about the occupation of certain land . The argument was renewed, and
they agreed to fight. They did engage in a bolo duel with a fatal result for Filomeno Morales, who was killed almost
instantly. Sisenando Holgado was also seriously wounded but was able to proceed to a neighboring house. From
there Sisenando Holgado was taken to the municipal building where he made a sworn authenticated statement before
the municipal president, in which he declared that only he and Filomeno Morales fought and that there was nobody
else around. About one month later, Sisenando Holgado died from the wounds received in the fight. The disputable
point is whether the accused Eugenio Toledo intervened in the quarrel and dealt a mortal blow to Filomeno Morales
based on testimony of Justina, the querida of Morales, who testified to the presence and participation of Toledo.
Issue:
1. Is the exhibit (exhibit 1) considered hearsay? Is it admissible as evidence?
Ruling:
1. YES. Exhibit 1 should have been admitted in evidence as part of the res gestae, and that giving iteffect,
in relation with the other evidence, the accused has not been proved guilty. Exhibit 1 was made by
SisenandoHolgado on the same morning that the fight occurred and without the interval of sufficient time for
reflection. The declaration of SisenandoHolgado fulfilled the test of the facts talking through the party and not the
party talking about the facts. There was such a correlation between the statement and the fact of which it forms part
as strongly tends to negative the suggestion of fabrication or a suspicion of afterthought. The nature and
circumstances of the statement do not disclose intrinsic evidence of premeditation as revealed in a long, coherent,
closely connected story. The modern tendency is toward the extension of the rule admitting spontaneous declarations
to meet the needs of justice when other evidence of the same fact cannot be procured.
Hearsay evidence, with a few well recognized exceptions, it has been said on high authority, is excluded by
courts in the United States that adhere to the principles of the common law. One universally recognized exception
concerns the admission of dying declarations. Another exception permits the reception, under certain circumstances,
of declarations of third parties made contrary to their own pecuniary or proprietary interest. But the general rule is
stated to be that the declarations of a person other than accused confessing or tending to show that he committed the
crime are not competent for accused on account of the hearsay doctrine.
The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is that theextrajudicial and
unsworn statement of another is not the best method of serving this purpose. In other words, the great possibility of
the fabrication of falsehoods, and the inability to prove their untruth, requires that the doors be closed to such
P a g e 190 o f 285
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evidence. So long therefore as a declarant is available as a witness, his extrajudicial statement should not be heard.
Where, however, the declarant is dead or has disappeared, his previous statements, out of court, if not inadmissible
on other grounds, are the best evidence. But they are not rendered inadmissible by the mere fact that the declarant is
unavailable, - something else is necessary. One fact which will satisfy this necessity is that the declaration is or was
against the declarant's interest, and this is because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own
detriment.
Here the declarant is deceased and his statements were made under oath. They also read in such a way as to
ring with the truth. When SisenandoHolgado declared "When we fought, there was nobody present," it was at the
end of just such a rambling statement as a wounded man would be expected to make. When SisenandoHolgado
declared "I met one of my workers named Eugenio Toledo, who accompanied me to the house of
DalmacioManlisic," he did so in response to a question by the municipal president. Exhibit 1 should have been
received not as conclusive evidence of innocence, but as evidence to be taken into consideration in connection with
the other proven facts.
FUENTES, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 111692 February 9, 1996
By : Marcelo, MJ
To admit declarations against interest as exceptions to the hearsay rule:

a. the declarant must not be able to testify due to death, mental incapacity or
physical incompetence rather than mere absence from the courts;
b. the declaration must concern a matter of fact cognizable by the declarant;
c. the circumstances render it improbable that a motive to falsify exists
Facts:
Malaspina and his 3 friends were attending a benefit dancer. Appellant Fuentas called Malaspina, put his
arm around the latters shoulder, and said: Before, I saw you with your long hair, but now you have short hair. He
then stabbed the latter with a hunting knife and fled. Before Malaspina gave in, he muttered that Fuentes, Jr. was the
culprit. His defense was that of mistaken identity. He claimed that it was Zolio Fuentes Jr. alias Jonie who was the
perpetrator.
Issue:
Whether Alejandro Fuentes was indeed positively identified as the killer of Malaspina?
Ruling:
YES, the alleged declaration against interest attributed to Zoilo is inadmissible in evidence as an exception
to hearsay. It has not been demonstrated that Zoilo is unable to testify. There is no showing that he is dead, mentally
incapacitated or physically incompetent. His mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto
unavailable under the Rules. The records show that the defense did not exert any serious effort to produce Zoilo as a
witness. An innocent declaration by the real culprit should be admissible as evidence. But this can be open to abuse
P a g e 191 o f 285
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- as when the extrajudicial statement is not even authenticated, thereby increasing the probability of its fabrication.
For this case, at least, the prudent course is its exclusion.
HEIRS OF MIGUEL FRANCO vs. CA

G.R. No. 123924. December 11, 2003
By : Marcelo, MJ
A statement of fact in a verified petition and an accompanying silence about any

contrary fact may be appreciated in more than one contexta declaration against
interest and a judicial admission combined; A declaration against interest is the
best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute; A
judicial admission binds the person who makes the same, and absent any showing
that this was made thru palpable mistake, no amount of rationalization can offset
it.
Facts:
Quintin died intestate. His brother, Miguel filed a Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration praying
that he be appointed as administrator of Quintins estate.
This Petition was opposed by the sister of the decedent, on the ground of unfitness oraying fir her own appointment.
Miguel was appointed.
The RTC found that the General Power of Administration evinced an existing trust relation between Quintin and
his brother Miguel, with Quintin as the signatory thereof acknowledging that he was holding half of the property
titled in his name in trust for Miguel.
Both parties motions for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals. While asserting that the
transfer and registration of one-half of the subject property in the name of Miguel was not done through fraud or in
bad faith, they point out that at no time did the respondents question the execution or genuineness of the General
Power of Administration which purportedly admits of the existence of a trust relation between Quintin and Miguel.
They also claim that the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate the recognition which Quintin had accorded to the
rights and interest of Miguel.
Issue:
Whether the execution or genuineness of the General Power of Administration which purportedly admits
of the existence of a trust relation between Quintin and Miguel
Ruling:
YES, While he explicitly declared that the subject property belonged to Quintin, at the same time he was
remarkably silent about his claim that he acquired one-half thereof during the lifetime of Quintin. He asserted his
claim to the subject property quite belatedly, i.e., four years after he stated under oath and in a court pleading that it
belonged in its entirety to his brother. Thus, the statement and the accompanying silence may be appreciated in
more than one context. It is a declaration against interest and a judicial admission combined.
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A declaration against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute.In
the same vein, a judicial admission binds the person who makes the same, and absent any showing that this was
made thru palpable mistake, no amount of rationalization can offset it.
In the case at bar, there is no showing of palpable mistake on the part of Miguel when he made the admission.
In his Motion to Admit Amended Petition, he merely alleged inadvertence in failing to state his claim of coownership. Yet no evidence was adduced to prove the alleged inadvertence. And even assuming there was indeed
such a mistake, Miguel had ample opportunity to make the rectification in the initial stages of the intestate
proceedings.
Bearing on the weight of the combined declaration against interest and judicial admission is the assumption,
arising from his duty as special administrator of the estate of Quintin, that he had full knowledge of the status and
extent of the property holdings of the decedent.
PEDIGREE
Section 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or
unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage,
may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship
between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word
"pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the
places where these fast occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree. (33a)
CASES
P a g e 193 o f 285
EVIDENCE

Gravador v. Mamigo
People v. Alegado
Tison v. CA
20 SCRA 742 (1967)

201 SCRA 37 (1991)
276 SCRA 582 (1997)
GRAVADOR vs. MAMIGO

20 SCRA 742
While a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he may
nevertheless testify as to his age which he learned from his parents and relatives
and his testimony in such case is an assertion of a family tradition
Facts:
Petitioner Pedro Gravador was the principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School in when he was advised
by the then, Superintendent of Schools Angel Salazar, Jr., through the respondent Supervisor Teodulfo E. Dayao, of
his separation from the service on the ground that he had reached the compulsory retirement age of 65, showing his
pre-war records including his Employees Record Card.
It was found based on the said records that he was born on November 26, 1897. As of this date, therefore,
he is now 66 years, 8 months, and 22 days old. Unless he can show valid proof in the form of a baptismal or birth
certificate that he is below sixty-five years of age today.
Petitioner wrote the Director of Public Schools, protesting his forced retirement on the ground that the date
of his birth is not November 26, 1897 but December 11, 1901. The petitioner also wrote to the Division
Superintendents of Schools, reiterating his claim that he had not reached the age of 65 and enclosing some papers in
support thereof.
Then he filed this suit for quo warranto, mandamus and damages in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Oriental. After the respondents filed their answer, the trial court concluded that the petitioner was born on December
11, 1901 accordingly granted his petition. Immediate execution was ordered, as a result of which the petitioner was
reinstated.
Issue:
WON the trial court was correct in admitting the pre-war record as substantial evidence in determining the
petitioners age.
Ruling:
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses the offended party herself and her maternal grandfather,
Cornelio Villarosa, as to the fact that the victim was born on September 5, 1976 do not constitute hearsay evidence
P a g e 194 o f 285
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as claimed by the accused-appellant but rather fall under the exceptions to the hearsay rule as provided under
sections 39 and 40 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Under Sec. 40 of the said rule, it is provided in
part that;
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regading pedigree. The reputation or tradition existing in a
family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any of its members, may be received in evidence if
the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity.
The word pedigree under Section 39 of the same Rule includes relationship, family genealogy, birth,
marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred and the names of the relatives.
In the present case, the applicability of Rule 130, Section 39 of the Revised Rules on Evidence to prove the
victim's age is beyond question. The said provision contains three requisites for its admissibility, namely: (1) that
there is controversy in respect to the pedigree of any of the members of a family; (2) that the reputation or tradition
of the pedigree of the person concerned existed previous to the controversy; and (3) that the witness testifying to the
reputation or tradition regarding the pedigree of the person must be a member of the family of said person. All these
preconditions are obtaining in the case at bar considering that the date of birth of the rape victim is being put in
issue; that the declaration of the victim's grandfather relating to tradition (sending a child to school upon reaching
the age of seven) existed long before the rape case was filed; and that the witness testifying to the said tradition is
the maternal grandfather of the rape victim.
PEOPLE VS. ALEGADO

201 SCRA 742
1.
2.
3.
Pedigree under Section 39 has three requisites for its admissibility:

there is controversy in respect to the pedigree of any member of the family;
the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the person concerned existed prior
to the controversy; and
the witness testifying to the reputation or tradition is a member of the family of
the said person.
Although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he
may testify as to his age as he learned it from his parents and relatives and his
testimony in such case is an assertion of a family tradition.
P a g e 195 o f 285
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Facts:
The accused appellant stands charged and convicted of two counts of rape by the The accused was
allegedly raped VILLAROSA, a girl below twelve (12) years of age. The accused-appellant contends that the
offended party's actual age at the time of the alleged incidents of rape was not established with certainty; hence, it
was error on the part of the trial court to convict the accused-appellant of statutory rape.
Issue:
WON the testimony of a witness and the of the witness is evidence on family tradition which is admissible
as an exception to hearsay.
Ruling:
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses the offended party herself and her maternal grandfather,
Cornelio Villarosa, as to the fact that the victim was born on September 5, 1976 do not constitute hearsay evidence
as claimed by the accused-appellant but rather fall under the exceptions to the hearsay rule as provided under
sections 39 and 40 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Under Sec. 40 of the said rule, it is provided in
part that;
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regading pedigree. The reputation or tradition existing in a
family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any of its members, may be received in evidence if
the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity.
The word pedigree under Section 39 of the same Rule includes relationship, family genealogy, birth,
marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred and the names of the relatives. In the
present case, the applicability of Rule 130, Section 39 of the Revised Rules on Evidence to prove the victim's age is
beyond question. The said provision contains three requisites for its admissibility, namely: (1) that there is
controversy in respect to the pedigree of any of the members of a family; (2) that the reputation or tradition of the
pedigree of the person concerned existed previous to the controversy; and (3) that the witness testifying to the
reputation or tradition regarding the pedigree of the person must be a member of the family of said person. All these
preconditions are obtaining in the case at bar considering that the date of birth of the rape victim is being put in
issue; that the declaration of the victim's grandfather relating to tradition (sending a child to school upon reaching
the age of seven) existed long before the rape case was filed; and that the witness testifying to the said tradition is
the maternal grandfather of the rape victim.
TISON VS. CA
276 SCRA 582
Where a party claims a right to the part of the estate of the declarant, the
declaration of the latter that the former is her niece is admissible and constitutes
sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no
other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason that such declaration is rendered
competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure
of justice.
Facts:
This is a case of an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land and an apartment. Teodora Guerrero died
and left a parcel of land and an apartment. Her husband Martin Guerrero adjudicates the said land to him and
consequently sold to Teodora Domingo. The nephews and nieces Tison et al seek to inherit by right of representation
P a g e 196 o f 285
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from the property disputed property presenting documentary evidence to prove filial relation. The respondent
contended that the documents/evidence presented is inadmissible for being hearsay since the affiants were never
presented for cross-examination.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence presented is hearsay evidence and is inadmissible.
Ruling:
The evidence submitted does not conform to the rules on their admissibility; however the same may be
admitted by reason of private respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were
being offered in evidence. It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible
document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is
merely a privilege which the party may waive.
The primary proof that was considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is the
testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in
1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration about
pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related
to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the
declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of
the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.
FAMILY TRADITION
Section 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. The reputation or tradition
existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its
members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the
family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or
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EVIDENCE

charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of
pedigree. (34a)
CASE
Ferrer v. de Ynchausti
38 Phil. 905 (1918)
FERRER VS. DE YNCHAUSTI

38 Phil 905
1.
2.
3.
4.
Requisites for admissibility of acts or declarations about pedigree, family

reputation or tradition:
that the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is subject to inquiry;
that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and
that the declaration be made ante litem moam
Facts:
The plaintiffs seek for the partition of the estate of the deceased Isabel Gonzalez and to recover the part of
the inheritance corresponding to their mother Rosa Matilde in her succession to the said deceased. The plaintiffs
further alleged that Rosa Matilde is a legitimate daughter of Isabel Gonzalez with her first husband Ramon
Viademonte Sr. thus has a legal right to claim as an heir.
However the defendants refuse to deliver their corresponding share on the ground that their mother Rosa is
not a natural child of the deceased but only a protge, thus it follows that her children as well as his privies have no
right to a part of the hereditary property of Isabel Gonzales. Defendant presented evidences to support their
allegation which includes the day-book.
Counsel for plaintiff objected to the admission in evidence of the day-book alleging that the said entry has
not been proven that it was made at the same time that those events occurred; that the witness who identified it did
not see Ramon Jr. in the act of making the said entries; that the writing contained in the book, being a mere
memorandum of an interested party, cannot be admitted at the trial.
Issue:
Whether or not the writing in the day-book can be admitted as evidence?
Ruling:
P a g e 198 o f 285
EVIDENCE

Supreme Court invoked the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that evidence may be given upon trial
of monuments and inscription in public places as evidence of common reputation; and entries in family bibles or
other family books or charts; engravings on rings; family portraits and the like, as evidence of pedigree.
The law does not require that the entries in the said booklet be made at the same time as the occurrence of
those events; hence, the written memorandum in the same is not subject to the defect attributed to it. The witness
Joaquin Inchausti declared affirmatively that the memorandum under consideration has been written in the
handwriting of his brother Ramon Viademonte, whose handwriting he was familiar with, and the testimony of this
witness contains some reference to a member of the family, now dead, and concerning the family genealogy of the
same.
COMMON REPUTATION
Section 41. Common reputation. Common reputation existing previous to the controversy,
respecting facts of public or general interest more than thirty years old, or respecting marriage or
moral character, may be given in evidence. Monuments and inscriptions in public places may be
received as evidence of common reputation. (35)
CASE
City of Manila v. Del Rosario
5 Phil 227(1905)
CITY OF MANILA VS DEL ROSARIO

5 Phil 227
Testimony does not constitute common reputation unless such is equivalent to

universal reputation.
Facts:
This is an action to recover possession of two parcels of land located in Tondoagainst occupant
Jacinto Del Rosario. The plaintiff introduced both documentary and oral evidence, which consisted of the
testimony several witnesses and the city attorney. Villegas testified that the land in question was formerly included
P a g e 199 o f 285
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in the Gran Divisoria, and that all the land included in it belonged to the city. This particular testimony is
at variance with the testimonies of Wilson and Timoteo who testified that the land belonged to the Central
Government, and not the city. His testimony was based on what he had learned from the oldest residents of that
section of the city and was introduced by the City of Manila apparently for the purpose of proving that the city was
generally considered the owner of the land drawing from this fact the presumption of actual ownership.
Issue:
Whether or not the testimony of Villegas is admissible as proof of Common Reputation.
Ruling:
NO. Villegas testimony is mere hearsay. Since his testimony consisted of what he had learned from
some of the old residents, it was hearsay as to the court because those who said it were not even
produced in court. Such testimony does not constitute common reputation as referred to, because such should be
equivalent to universal reputation.The testimony of Villegas is insufficient to establish the presumption referred
herein. Furthermore, this witness stated that the land in CalleAzcarraga had been partitioned between the
municipality and the Central Government, share and share alike, and that the latter (not the city), retained
Calles Gabriel de Rivera and Barcelona, which are precisely the streets on which the property at bar is situated.
RES GESTAE
Section 42. Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a starting occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances
thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an
equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of
the res gestae. (36a)
CASE
People v. Lungayan
People v. Putian
People v. Tolentino
162 SCRA 100 (1988)

74 SCRA 133 (1976)
218 SCRA 337 (1993)
PEOPLE VS LUNGAYAN
162 SCRA 100
Res Gestae requires that the statement be spontaneous and made at a time when
there was no opportunity to concoct or develop a story.
Facts:
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Agripina Juan Vda. De Garzota, a 52 year old widow, charged the accused the barangay captain of rape.
After the alleged rape, she reached home at around midnight and one of her daughters asked her what happened.
Agripina then revealed that the accused abused her and when pressed for details, she just said that she will tell
everything in the morning, and thereafter reported the incident.
By way of rebuttal during appeal, the accused emphasized the failure of the prosecution to establish involuntariness
on the part of the victim.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in admitting the revalation of to the daughter part of the res gestae?
Ruling:
YES. The RTC erred in considering the revelation as part of res gestae. The court stressed that in order for
the statement to be part of the res gestae, it must not only be spontaneous but also be made at a timewhen there was
no opportunity to concoct or develop a story. As the Court observed, she did not go homeimmediately after the
incident. She took a walk instead and spent some time thinking of what to do next.She had enough time to make a
decision on what will be the nature of her story.
PEOPLE V PUTIAN
74 SCRA 133
Although a declaration does not appear to have been made by the declarant
under the expectation of a certain and impending death, and for this reason, is
not admissible as a dying declaration, such declaration can fall squarely in the
rule on res gestae.
Facts:
Guillermo Putian appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, finding
him guilty of the murder of Teodulo Panimdim.
The prosecution presented only two witnesses: (1) The doctor who treated the victim (2) the policeman who
arrested the accused and seized from him the dagger allegedly used in the stabbing and who took down the victim's
ante-mortem statement Identifying "Guirmo" Putian as his assailant.
The defense presented only one witness. He testified that appellant Putian was in the dance hall when the
victim was stabbed outside that hall.
Putian admits that while Panimdim was attending a dance at Barrio Tabo-o, Panimdim was stabbed in the
left groin. As a result of that assault, Panimdim died five days later at the provincial hospital.
P a g e 201 o f 285
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According to the prosecution, Patrolman Arturo Yap was passing Barrio Tabo-o, he noticed a commotion at
the back of the dance hall in that barrio. Yap investigated Putian.
ISSUE:
WON the statement of Panimdim is a dying declaration or a part of the res gestae.
Ruling:
The res gestae rule embraces (a) spontaneous exclamations and (b) verbal acts. The trial court admitted
Panimdim's statement as a spontaneous statement made after the commission of a felony.
A declaration made by a person immediately after being wounded, pointing out or naming his assailant, may be
considered as part of the res gestae and is admissible in evidence. A statement was given sometime after the stabbing
while the declarant was undergoing treatment at a medical clinic, where he had no time to concoct a falsehood or to
fabricate a malicious charge against the accused and no motive has been shown as to why he would frame-up the
accused would render the statement admissible as a part of the res gestae
PEOPLE V TOLENTINO
218 SCRA 337
Requisites for res gestae:

1. That the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence ;
2. that the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise;
3. and that the statements made must concern the occurrence in question and their
immediately attending circumstances.
Facts:
Adelaida Lingad left her niece, Grace Paule and her three (3) children at home to attend the wake of her
uncle. The children were the only ones left at home.
In the afternoon, accused Tala, Tolentino, Matawaran and an unknown person whose face was covered entered
the house of Lingad by forcibly breaking the window grill of the comfort room and demanded to know from the
children where their mother hid her money.
After Tolentino took the P4,000.00, he stabbed Grace Paule with a scythe while the other three (3) accused held
the three (3) other children who were then stabbed one after the other by Tolentino. During the stabbing incident,
Grace Paule lost consciousness but was able to regain it back after about five (5) minutes and shouted for help. Her
mother and grandmother, who lived nearby, heard her and immediately proceeded to said house but the four (4)
accused had already left.
Adelaida, upon reaching Geraldine, who was lying at the porch, she asked her the identities of the person
responsible for stabbing them with the latter answering "Bong-Bong" and also mentioning the names of Tala and
Matawaran.
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Grace Paule was the only surviving victim. She positively identified the three (3) accused because accused
Manolito Tolentino is her uncle as well as her barriomate and accused-appellant Carlito Tala is a relative of her
mother while accused Rodolfo Matawaran is the "barkada" of accused-appellant Tala.
Issue:
WON the court erred in admitting the statement of Geraldine.
Ruling:
The trial court had correctly applied the principle of res gestae, namely: (1) that the principal act, the res
gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) that the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise; and (3) that the statements made must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances 11which are all present in the case at bar as Geraldine had named accused-appellant as one of the
perpetrators in the commission of the crime immediately after the occurrence of the
stabbing incident.
ENTRIES IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS

Section 43. Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the time of transactions
to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the
facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in
his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty. (37a)
CASES
Palmer v. Hoffman
Philamlife v. Capital Assurance (CA)
318 U.S. 109 (1943)

72 O.G. 3941
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EVIDENCE

PALMER V HOFFMAN
318 US 109
The act which allows the admission of business entries refers only to records
kept in the regular course of business and not those kept in the regular course of
conduct related to business.
Facts:
Mrs. Palmer was hit and killed. Mr. Palmer sued the train company for negligence. Palmer alleged that the
train did not ring its bell, blow its whistle, or have its lights on as were required by law. At trial, the train company
(represented by Hoffman) attempted to introduce a transcript of statement the train conductor had with the Mass
Public Utilities Commission (a normal part of any train accident investigation).Palmer objected on the grounds that
the out of court statement was hearsay. Hoffman argued that the statement was an exception to hearsay because it
was an official business record and made in the regular course of business.
Issue:
Whether or not the statement made by the conductor of the train was made in the regular course of
business.
Ruling:
The US Supreme Court found that the phrase in the regular course of business referred to timetables,
accounting and other normal business activities. The train conductors statement was not a record made for the
systematic conduct of a business as a business. While an accident report may affect the business, it is not typical of
entries made systematically or as a matter of routine to record events, occurrences or transactions. Basically, the fact
that a company records its employees version of their accidents does not put those statements in the class of records
made in the regular course of business. The conductors statement was not made for business purposes, it was
made to prove the truth of the conductors version of events and assist the company in avoiding tort liability. The
primary usage of such statement is in litigating, not in railroading.
The Supreme Court of the United States ruled that an accident report created by a railroad company which
was prepared in anticipation of a lawsuit by the victim was inadmissible, because it was not prepared in the regular
course of business. Railroad travel, and not litigation, was the primary business of the railroad, and therefore the
report was not considered sufficiently reliable to be admitted into evidence.
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PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE v. CAPITAL ASSURANCE

72 O.G. 3941 March 7, 1975
Sec. 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court may not be invoked in order to justify the
admission of a statement of account identified by a witness whose office made the
entries thereof but who has no personal knowledge about how the account had
arisen or of the transactions to which the entries refer.
Facts:
The Galang spouses were the agents of Philamgen for the collection of premium payments. Certain
payments were not remitted by the spouses.
As a result, the spouses, together with Capital Assurance, agreed that Capital Assurance and the spouses agreed to
pay jointly and severally the unremitted premium payments to Philamgen.
Consequently, Philamgen filed a collection suit, but only as against Capital Assurance.
Capital Assurance argued that Philamgen failed to prove the existence of the additional accounts incurred
by the Galang spouses. On the other hand, Philamgen argued that it was able to establish the same by virtue of the
testimony of its Accounts Control Office Chief, who testified on a statement of account which showed the spouses
indebtedness.
Issue:.
Whether Philamgen has satisfactorily proven that the Galang spouses incurred additional accounts arising
from premium payments that were unremitted.
Ruling:
No. The statement of account is inadmissible; before entries in the course of business may be received, it
must be shown that they were made by a person who was in a position to know the facts therein stated. It also
requires that the entries must have been made by a person deceased, outside of the Philippines, or unable to testify.
Accounts Control Office Chief, did not have personal nor was he deceased, outside of the Philippines, or
unable to testify so that the entries made could be received in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. The
entries in question being so far removed from the exceptions to the hearsay rule, cannot and should not substitute for
a witnesss personal knowledge of the transactions sought to be established.
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OFFICIAL RECORDS
Section 44. Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of
his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. (38)
CASES
Caltex v. Africa
16 SCRA 448 (1966)
People v. Leones
117 SCRA 382 (1982)
Manalo v. Robles Trans. Co., Inc.
99 Phil. 729 (1956)
People v. Cabuang
217 SCRA 675 (1993)
People v. Gabriel
253 SCRA 84 (1996)
Dela Cruz v. Sison, G.
R. No. 163770, February 17, 2005
CALTEX V. AFRICA
16 SCRA 448 March 30, 1966
Police reports in the course of duty, on the basis of his own personal
observation of the facts reported, may properly be considered as an exception to
the hearsay rule.
P a g e 206 o f 285
EVIDENCE

Facts:
The petitioner spouses filed an action for damages against Caltex and Boquiran, an agaent of Caltex.
Negligence was attributed on the part of the both of them as the cause of the fire. The suit resulted from a fire that
broke out in the gasoline station while fuel was being transferred from the truck into the underground tank. The fire
destroyed a number of houses and other properties, including that of the petitioner spouses. The petitioners offered
in evidence two reports, a Police Department Report and a Fire Department Report, to bolster their claim against the
respondents.
Petitioners contend that the reports in themselves, that is, without further testimonial evidence on their
contents, fall within the scope of entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer
of the Philippines, or by a person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated.
Issue:
Whether not the reports in question constitute an exception to the hearsay rule?
Ruling:
No. The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. The facts therein stated were
not acquired by the reporting officers through official information, not having been given by the informants
pursuant to any duty to do so.
There are three requisites for admissibility as Official Records:
1) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do;
2) made in the performance of his duties,
3) upon sufficient personal knowledge.
The material facts recited in the reports as to the cause and circumstances of the fire were not within the
personal knowledge of the officers who conducted the investigation. To qualify statements as official information
acquired by the officers who prepared the reports, the persons who made the statements not only must have personal
knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty to give such statements for record.
PEOPLE v. LEONES
117 SCRA 382 September 30, 1982
A medical certificate prepared by a government hospital doctor, even if he/she

was not presented as witness, is admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated and is an exception to the hearsay rule.
Facts:
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Irene Dulay was a salesgirl employed in the store of spouses Leones. On a certain day when Dulay
suffered from a headache. Dulay filed a criminal complaint against Joseph alleging that, with the help of his sister,
he successfully had carnal knowledge of her. According to Dulay, she was made to take 3 tablets that made her feel
dizzy which the siblings claimed were aspirins. She was found without her panties on and was immediately taken to
the hospital for examination. The accused denied the allegation of Dulay arguing that he was at the beach resort with
his family at the time the alleged act happened. The trial court found the accused guilty of having raped Dulay.
Issue:
Whether or not the guilt of Joseph Leones proven beyond reasonable doubt. (?)
Ruling:
There are a number of significant facts from the recorded evidence of the prosecution which materially and
substantially debunked and derailed the theory of Dulay. The lacerations on the hymen of Dulay would not have
been regarded as healing on the same day when the rape against her was committed. It would have been recorded
as laceration fresh. It was also found that Dulay was having her menstrual period on the day of the alleged rape.
MANALO VS. ROBLES TRANSPORTATION

99 Phil 729 (1956)
By : Trance, Romak
A sheriffs return is an official statement by a public official in the performance

of his duty specially enjoined by law and forming part of official records and is
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The sheriff making the return
need not testify in court as to the facts stated in his entry.
Facts:
this case is all about the subsidiary liability of RTCI in case of solvency of Hernandez A taxicab owned
and operated by defendant appellant company. The taxi driven by Edgardo Hrenandez collided with a passanger
truck. Which causes physical injuries which resulted to death of Armando Manalo
Hernandez found guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence and sentenced to one year prision
correctional, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of 3000, in the case of insolvency to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay costs. Edgardo Hernandez served out his sentence but failed to pay the
indemnity. Two writs of execution were issued against him to satisfy the amount of the indemnity, but both writs
were returned unsatisfied by the sheriff who certified that property, real or personal in Hernandez" name could be
found.
Plaintiffs Emilio Manalo and his wife Clara Salvador, father and mother respectively of Armando filed the
present action against the Company to enforce its subsidiary liability, pursuant to Articles 102 and 103 of the
Revised Penal Code.
P a g e 208 o f 285
EVIDENCE

The trial court rendered judgment sentencing the defendant Company to pay to plaintiffs damages in the
amount P3,000 with interest at 12 per cent per annum from November 14, 1952, plus P600 for attorney's fee and
expenses for litigation, with cost. As aforesaid, the Company is appealing from this decision.
To prove their case, the petitioners introduced a copy of thedecision in the criminal case convicting
Hernandez of homicide through reckless imprudence, the writs ofexecution to enforce the civil liability, and the
returns of the sheriff showing that the 2writs of executionwere not satisfied because of the insolvency of Hernandez,
the sheriff being unable to locate any propertyin his name. The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and held
Robles Trans liable to pay the indemnity.
Robles transport appealed arguing that the evidence presented was inadmissible. It claimed that in
admitting as evidence the sheriffs return of the writ of execution to prove the insolvency of Hernandez without
requiring said officilas appearance in court, deprived it of its opportunity to cross-examine said sheriff.
Issue:
Whether the sheriff returns is admissible as evidence.
Ruling:
Yes, A sheriff's return is an official statement made by a public official in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by the law and forming part of official records, and is prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. (Rule 39, section 11 and Rule 123, section 35, Rules of Court.) The sheriff's making the return need not
testify in court as to the facts stated in his entry. The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it
presumes they will discharge their several trust with accuracy and fidelity; and therefore, whatever acts they do in
discharge of their public duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken of their public duty may be given in
evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of caution as the nature and circumstances of each a case
may appear to require.
PEOPLE VS CABUANG
217 s 675 (1993)
By : Trance, Romak
Entries in a police blotter, though regularly done in the course of performance

of official duty, are not conclusive proof of the truth of such entries. They are only
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated since they would be incomplete or
inaccurate.
Facts:
this case is all about robbery with rape and homicide. On 14 October 1988, at around 11 o'clock at night,
Evelyn De Vera and her cousin Maria Victoria Parana, both 19 years of age, having come from a house of a common
friend, one Mia Colisao, were walking home along an uninhabited place in Barangay Buenlag I of Bayambang,
Pangasinan. Suddenly, from out of the rice paddies along the road, Modesto Cabuang emerged with a flashlight and
asked them where they were going. Evelyn became very anxious and started walking faster. Upon the other hand,
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Maria Victoria started talking to Modesto. When Evelyn was about ten (10) feet ahead of the two, she looked back
and saw Modesto turn and shift his flashlight to the rear, illuminating the figure of Nardo Matabang, who had also
suddenly appeared behind them from the rice fields alongside the road. Modesto then put off and pocketed his
flashlight, grabbed Maria Victoria and covered her mouth. Nardo Matabang in turn pursued Evelyn, who had started
to run away. She ran and ran until she entered the yard of a house along the road and hid in the shadows of the plants
and shrubs inside the yard where she could not seen by Nardo, but from where she could see him. After some time,
having lost sight of Evelyn, Nardo went back and rejoined Modesto. Before she went home, she witnessed her
cousin being taken away by the accused in a tricycle. Evelyn did not tell anyone about the incident that night. The
next day, Maria was found dead naked with stab wounds. During police investigation, Evelyn executed a sworn
statement where she identified 2 suspects namely Modesto and Nardo. On the basis of the evidence found by the
police during their investigation and on evelyns sworn statement which she repeated in substantially identical terms
before the trial court. Modesto and nardo were convicted of the crime of robbery with rape and homicide. The
accused appealed arguing that the trial court erred in finding that Evelyn de Vera had positively identified them as
the assailants of Maria. They point to an entry in a police blotter which stated that the assailant were still
unidentified although the entry was made after evelyn was questioned by the police.
Issue:
Whether evely de vera completely identified the assailant and her sworn statement can be used as evidence
in this case.
Ruling:
Yes. Upon receiving the report that a dead body was found in Barangay Buenlag I, members of the
Bayambang Police Station immediately proceeded to the reported crime scene on the morning of 15 October 1988.
The police investigator, Pfc. Elegio Lopez, who initially questioned witness De Vera that morning, noticed that she
was in a state of shock. He accordingly chose to defer further questioning until the afternoon of the same day when
Evelyn had calmed down sufficiently to be able to give a sworn statement to the police. Thus, there was the initial
report prepared and recorded in the police blotter at around 11 o'clock in the morning, stating that the assailants were
still unidentified; there was, upon the other hand, Evelyn de Vera's sworn statement made and completed in the
afternoon of the same day, where she revealed the identifies of the men she had seen the night before and who she
believed were responsible for the rape and death of her cousin Maria Victoria.
The failure of Evelyn to specify the accused-appellants as the doers of the horrific rape, killing and robbery
of Maria Victoria the first time she was questioned by the police, does not adversely affect her credibility. It is firmly
settled case law that the delay of a witness in revealing to the police authority what he or she may know about a
crime does not, by itself, render the witness' testimony unworthy of belief. Evelyn de Vera was clearly traumatized,
in a state of shock, upon finding out that her cousin who had been with her just the night before, was brutally raped
and killed. She could not then and there clearly and calmly recount the events she had experienced and witnessed
that dreadful night in a logical sequence. The few hours delay which lapsed from the time the entry in the police
blotter was made, up to the time Evelyn gave her sworn statement on the afternoon of the same day, did not have the
effect of eroding the intrinsic credibility and strength of that statement. It may be noted that significantly longer
delays in informing investigating officers of what witnesses had seen, have been held understandable by this Court
and as not, in themselves, destructive of the otherwise credible character of such testimony, especially where the
witnesses' fear of possible retaliation from the accused could not be dismissed as merely fanciful.
It remains only to note that entries in a police blotter, though regularly done in the course of performance of
official duty are not conclusive proof of the truth of such entries. In People v. Santito, Jr., this Court held that entries
in official records like a police blotter are only prima facie evidence of the facts therein set out, since the entries in
the police blotter could well be incomplete or inaccurate. Testimony given in open court during the trial is
commonly much more lengthy and detailed than the brief entries made in the police blotter and the trial court cannot
base its findings on a police report merely, but must necessarily consider all other evidence gathered in the course of
the police investigation and presented in court. In the case at bar, we conclude that prosecution witness Evelyn de
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Vera did positively and clearly identify Modesto Cabuang and Nardo Matabang as among those who had raped and
killed and robbed the hapless Maria Victoria Parana.
PEOPLE VS. GABRIEL

Gr. No. L-107735, Feb 1 1996
By : Trance, Romak
For entries in official record to be admissible in evidence three (3) requisites

must concur: (a) The entry was made by a police officer or by another person
specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) It was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties or by such other person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law; and, (c) The public officer or other person had
sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by
him personally or through official information.
Facts: this case is all about fistfight in pier 14 at North Harbor along Marcos Road, Manila
A fistfight ensued between Jaime Tonog on one hand and the accused Ricardo San Gabriel together with
"Ramon Doe" on the other. The fight was eventually broken up when onlookers pacified the protagonists. Ricardo
and Ramon then hastened towards Marcos Road but in no time were back with bladed weapons. They approached
Tonog surreptitiously, surrounded him and simultaneously stabbed him in the stomach and at the back, after which
the assailants ran towards the highway leaving Tonog behind on the ground. During the trial, the accused leans
heavily on the Advance Information Sheet 6 prepared by Pat. Steve Casimiro which did not mention him at all and
named only "Ramon Doe" as the principal suspect .However, the court still convicted him for murder.
Issue:
Whether the advance information sheet presented is admissible as evidence.
Ruling:
No. Entries in official records, as in the case of a police blotter, are only prima facie evidence of the Facts
therein stated. They are not conclusive. The entry in the police blotter is not necessarily entitled to full credit for it
could be incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from either partial suggestions or for want of suggestions or
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inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances
necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all that pertain
to the subject. It is understandable that the testimony during the trial would be more lengthy and detailed than the
matters stated in the police blotter. Significantly, the Advance Information Sheet was never formally offered by the
defense during the proceedings in the court below. Hence any reliance by the accused on the document must fail
since the court cannot consider any evidence which has not been formally offered. Entries in official records made in
the performance of his duty by a public officer or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. But to be admissible in evidence three (3) requisites must
concur: (a) The entry was made by a police officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so;; (b) It
was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties or by such other person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law; and, (c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information. The Advance Information
Sheet does not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule, hence, inadmissible. The public officer who prepared the
document had no sufficient and personal knowledge of the stabbing incident. Any information possessed by him was
acquired from Camba, the alleged eye witness who reported the crime to the police, which therefore could not be
categorized as official information because in order to be classified as such the persons who made the statements not
only must have personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty to give such statements for the record.
DELA CRUZ vs. SISON

G.R. No. 163770 February 17, 2005
By : Dalang, Phiels
The rule that documents acknowledged before notaries public are public
documents which are admissible in evidence without necessity of preliminary
proof as to their authenticity and due execution. They have in their favor the
presumption of regularity, and to contradict the same, there must be evidence that
is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. The burden of proof to
overcome the presumption of due execution of a notarial document lies on the one
contesting the same. Petitioner failed to discharge this burden.
Facts:
Epifania claimed that sometime in 1992, she discovered that her rice land has been transferred and
registered in the name of her nephew, Eduardo C. Sison, without her knowledge and consent, purportedly on the
strength of a Deed of Sale she executed on November 24, 1989. She filed a complaint to declare the deed of sale null
and void. She alleged that Eduardo tricked her into signing the Deed of Sale, by inserting the deed among the
documents she signed pertaining to the transfer of her residential land, house and camarin, in favor of Demetrio, her
foster child and the brother of Eduardo. Eduardo and Eufemia Sison, denied that they employed fraud or trickery in
the execution of the Deed of Sale. They claimed that they purchased the property from Epifania for P20,000.00.
They averred that Epifania could not have been deceived into signing the Deed of Absolute Sale because it was duly
notarized before Notary Public Maximo V. Cuesta, Jr.; and they have complied with all requisites for its registration,
as evidenced by the Investigation Report by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Affidavit of
Seller/Transferor, Affidavit of Buyer/Transferee, Certification issued by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
(PARO), Letter for the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Certificate Authorizing Payment of Capital Gains Tax, and the
payment of the registration fees. Some of these documents even bore the signature of Epifania. The trial court found
that Eduardo deceived Epifania into signing the assailed deed by interspersing the same with the documents
executed by the latter in favor of her foster son, Demetrio Sison. Court of Appeals declared that Epifanias allegation
of trickery and fraud in the execution of the questioned deed of sale, was bare and unsupported. It did not constitute
the required convincing proof as would overcome the presumption that a private document duly acknowledged
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before a notary public is a public instrument which will also serve as evidence of the fact which gave rise to its
execution as well as its date.
Issue:
Whether or not the deed of sale signed and acknowledged by Epifinia before notary public is prima facie
evevidenc of its execution?
Ruling:
The questioned deed of sale was duly notarized. It is a settled rule that one who denies the due execution of
a deed where ones signature appears has the burden of proving that, contrary to the recital in the jurat, one never
appeared before the notary public and acknowledged the deed to be a voluntary act. Epifania never claimed her
signatures as forgeries. In fact, Epifania never questioned the deed of sale in favor of Demetrio, accepting it as a
valid and binding document. It is only with respect to the deed of sale in favor of Eduardo that she denies knowledge
of affixing her signature. Unfortunately, for both parties, the notary public, Atty. Maximo V. Cuesta, Jr. before whom
they appeared, died prior to the filing of the case.
Hence, we apply the rule that documents acknowledged before notaries public are public documents which
are admissible in evidence without necessity of preliminary proof as to their authenticity and due execution. They
have in their favor the presumption of regularity, and to contradict the same, there must be evidence that is clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant. The burden of proof to overcome the presumption of due execution
of a notarial document lies on the one contesting the same. Petitioner failed to discharge this burden.
Significantly, it must also be mentioned that the appellee also contemporaneously executed a notarized
"Affidavit of Seller/Transferor", acknowledging that she has sold 1.45 hectares of her OLT retention area to
appellant Eduardo Sison. Said instrument is also a public document, to overcome which appellee failed also to
adduce convincing evidence. Then there is the certification or clearance issued by the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Office for purposes of registration of the lot in the name of the defendants-appellants. The Revenue District Officer
Dante Canullas also approved the transfer to appellant when he issued a certificate authorizing registration. There is
even the letter of the appellee to the Secreatry of Agrarian Reform that the area from which she sold a portion to
Eduardo came from her retention limit under PD 27. The obvious purpose of her letter was to facilitate the transfer
to Eduardo.
The testimony of Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer Erlinda Lomibao demonstrates the intent of Epifania
to sell her land to the former. According to Lomibao, both Epifania and Eduardo appeared before her twice, to
facilitate the issuance of the clearance over the transfer of the property. The DAR visitors logbook showed the
names and signatures of both parties written one after the other.
COMMERCIAL LISTS
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Section 45. Commercial lists and the like. Evidence of statements of matters of interest to
persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published
compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that
compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and
relied upon by them therein. (39)
CASES
State v. Lungsford
PNOC Shipping v. CA
400 A.2d 843 (1979)

299 SCRA 402 (1999)
STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. LAWRENCE LUNGSFORD

400 A.2d 843
By : Dalang, Phiels
To satisfy the threshold the judge must be convinced that the compilation is
published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally
considered useful and reliable. If these conditions are met, statements from the
compilation are admissible to prove the truth of the relevant matter stated.
The business record exception is predicated not only on the circumstance that
the record itself is kept in the usual course of the business but also on the
circumstance that the recorded information is obtained by the recorder from a
declarant having a "business" duty to communicate it truthfully.
Facts:
Lungsford was arrested upon being found in possession of a 1968 Plymouth Road Runner two-door
hardtop. The State alleged that the Road Runner was stolen on January 8, 1975 from James Wilton. The State was
unable to produce Wilton at trial to identify the vehicle or testify that it was stolen. In order to attempt to prove its
case the State was required to rely on the NATB ( National Automobile Theft Bureau) factory-trace information to
establish that the car in defendant's possession when he was arrested was the car reported stolen by Wilton. A car
may be traced through any of the distinguishing numbers placed in the car at the point of production. In this case,
because the VIN, in the opinion of Detective Walsh of Newark's auto theft squad, did not appear to have been
factory-installed, the police requested the NATB to factory-trace the car through the factory order number. The
P a g e 214 o f 285
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NATB information led the police to the Wilton car-theft incident report through the not quite perfect matchup with
the Division of Motor Vehicles' VIN information. Defendant testified at trial that he purchased the car from James
Law of Hillside in January 1973. Although he had a title and registration he could not corroborate the purchase. Both
sides attempted to locate Law but were unsuccessful. Defendant's appellate claims emphasize the hearsay nature of
certain evidence admitted at trial over his objection.
Issue:
Whetheror not the NATB process of tracing the identity of a car is admissible in evidence?
Ruling:
The NATB procedures for tracing the identification of motor vehicles could properly be held by a trial court
to be evidential in criminal case if compliance with the rule that states "Evidence of a statement of matters of interest
to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is
admissible to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if the compilation is published for use by persons
engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them..
To satisfy the threshold the judge must be convinced that the compilation is published for use by persons
engaged in that occupation and is generally considered useful and reliable. If these conditions are met, statements
from the compilation are admissible to prove the truth of the relevant matter stated. The rationale of the Rule is that
the use of such materials is necessary because it is too difficult to call to the witness stand those who have
participated in their preparation or compilation. The trustworthiness requirement is satisfied by the requirement that
a finding be made by the judge that the material is regularly published for use by persons in a given occupation who
rely on it. There is no motive to falsify;; on the contrary, there is every reason to be accurate and precise since the
success of a business depends on accuracy and reliability.
The information before the trial court in the instant case concerning the modus operandi of the NATB was
inadequate to permit admissibility under the rule If the conditions of admissibility under the rule had been
established and the judge had been satisfied at a hearing that the proffer was sufficiently trustworthy, based on the
method of compilation and industry reliance, the evidence would have been properly admissible. The report and the
reference in the supplement were admitted by the trial court pursuant to the "Business Entries" exception to the
hearsay rule which states: A writing offered as a Memorandum or record of acts, conditions or events, is admissible
to prove the facts stated therein if the writing or the record upon which it is based was made in the regular course of
a business, at or about the time of the act, condition or event recorded, and if the sources of information from which
it was made and the method and circumstances of its preparation were such as to justify its admission.
The State established that after reasonable inquiry the owner of the allegedly stolen car, James Wilton,
could not be located for trial. The report and supplement contained the information that Wilton allegedly gave to the
police immediately after he realized his car was stolen. This was the only evidence in the case establishing that
Wilton's car had been stolen. This hearsay of Wilton was inadmissible under the business records exception. While
police records may qualify as business records for certain purposes and in certain respects, they are nevertheless not
vehicles by which substantive evidential status may be conferred upon the otherwise hearsay declarations of a victim
of or witness to a crime, accident or other occurrence. If the declarant is not available to testify and if the statement
is not admissible under some other exception to the hearsay rule, such as excited utterance or dying declaration, then
admissibility cannot be predicated exclusively upon the circumstance that the statement was made to a police officer
who paraphrased its content in his report.
The reason for this conclusion lies in the essential rationale of the business records exception which was
"founded upon the twin principles of reliability and necessity." But it is clear that one of the critical circumstances
importing reliability is the fact that the informant whose declaration is so recorded is under a duty, in the context of
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the activity in which the record is made, to make an honest and truthful report. Thus, the business record exception
is predicated not only on the circumstance that the record itself is kept in the usual course of the business but also on
the circumstance that the recorded information is obtained by the recorder from a declarant having a "business" duty
to communicate it truthfully. Both of these criteria, namely, the recording of the information in the usual course of
the business activity and the providing of that information by a declarant whose duty it is to supply it truthfully, must
be met before the trial judge is free to exercise his discretion in admitting or excluding the business entry based upon
his ultimate evaluation of its reliability. Here, the second of these criteria was not met.
PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION vs. CA

G.R. No. 107518. October 8, 1998
By : Dalang, Phiels
A document is a commercial list if: (1) it is a statement of matters of interest to

persons engaged in an occupation; (2) such statement is contained in a list,
register, periodical or other published compilation; (3) said compilation is
published for the use of persons engaged in that occupation, and (4) it is
generally used and relied upon by persons in the same occupation.
Facts:
When M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation(Fishing
Corp.), was navigating the waters near Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila
when it collided with the vessel Petroparcel which at the time was owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation
(LSC). After investigation was conducted by the Board of Marine Inquiry a decision finding the Petroparcel at fault
was rendered. Based on this finding, Fishing Corp. sued the LSC and the Petroparcel captain, Edgardo Doruelo
praying for an award of P692,680.00, allegedly representing the value of the fishing nets, boat equipment and
cargoes of M/V Maria Efigenia XV, with interest at the legal rate plus 25% thereof as attorneys fees. The Fishing
Corp. amended the complaint to include the value of the hull. PNOC acquired LSC thus making him a party to the
case. During the trial, Fishing Corp. presented evidence consisting of the testimony of its general manager and sole
witness, Edilberto del Rosario testifying on the cargo carried by the vessel at the time it collided and the damages
they suffered because of the collision. They also presented documentary evidence which includes quotations of
prices for the construction of the broken parts of the vessel. The lower court noted that petitioner only presented
Lorenzo Lazaro, senior estimator at PNOC Dockyard & Engineering Corporation, as sole witness and it did not
bother at all to offer any documentary evidence to support its position. Lazaro testified that the price quotations
submitted by private respondent were excessive and that as an expert witness, he used the quotations of his
suppliers in making his estimates. However, he failed to present such quotations of prices from his suppliers, saying
that he could not produce a breakdown of the costs of his estimates as it was a sort of secret scheme". The appellate
court found that petitioner ironically situated itself in an inconsistent posture by the fact that its own witness,
admittedly an expert one, heavily relies on the very same pieces of evidence (price quotations) appellant has so
vigorously objected to as inadmissible evidence.
Issue:
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Whether or not the price quotations may be admitted in evidence?
Ruling:
To enable an injured party to recover actual or compensatory damages, he is required to prove the actual
amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence
available. The burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence would be presented on either
side. He must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence which means that the evidence, as a whole,
adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. In other words, damages cannot be presumed and courts, in
making an award must point out specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or
actual damages are borne.
In this case, actual damages were proven through the sole testimony of private respondents general
manager and certain pieces of documentary evidence. Noticeably, petitioner did not object to the exhibits in terms of
the time index for valuation of the lost goods and equipment. In objecting to the same pieces of evidence, petitioner
commented that these were not duly authenticated and that the Del Rosario did not have personal knowledge on the
contents of the writings and neither was he an expert on the subjects thereof.
Price quotations are ordinary private writings which under the Revised Rules of Court should have been
proffered along with the testimony of the authors thereof. Del Rosario could not have testified on the veracity of the
contents of the writings even though he was the seasoned owner of a fishing fleet because he was not the one who
issued the price quotations. Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a witness can testify
only to those facts that he knows of his personal knowledge.
The price quotations presented as exhibits partake of the nature of hearsay evidence considering that the
persons who issued them were not presented as witnesses. Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if
its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another person
who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless the
proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule. On this point, we
believe that the exhibits do not fall under any of the exceptions provided under Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130.
Under Section 45 of the aforesaid Rule, a document is a commercial list if: (1) it is a statement of matters
of interest to persons engaged in an occupation; (2) such statement is contained in a list, register, periodical or other
published compilation; (3) said compilation is published for the use of persons engaged in that occupation, and (4)
it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the same occupation.
Based on the above requisites, the price quotations are not commercial lists for these do not belong to the
category of other published compilations under Section 45. The exhibits mentioned are mere price quotations issued
personally to Del Rosario who requested for them from dealers of equipment similar to the ones lost at the collision
of the two vessels. These are not published in any list, register, periodical or other compilation on the relevant
subject matter. Neither are these market reports or quotations within the purview of commercial lists as these are not
standard handbooks or periodicals, containing data of everyday professional need and relied upon in the work of the
occupation. These are simply letters responding to the queries of Del Rosario. To be sure, letters and telegrams are
admissible in evidence but these are, however, subject to the general principles of evidence and to various rules
relating to documentary evidence. The letter was not admissible in evidence as a commercial list even though the
clerk of the dealer testified that he had written the letter in due course of business upon instructions of the dealer.
Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letter renders its contents suspect. As
earlier stated, hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value. Accordingly, as stated at the
outset, damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay evidence.
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LEARNED TREATIES
Section 46. Learned treatises. A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of
history, law, science, or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if
the court takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies, that the writer of the
statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as
expert in the subject. (40a)
PRIOR TESTIMONY RULE
Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. The testimony or deposition of a
witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against
the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him. (41a)
CASES
Tan v. CA
Ohio v. Roberts
20 SCRA 54 (1967)
448 U.S. 56 (1980)
CARMELITA TAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-22793 May 16, 1967
By : Dalang, Phiels
Subsequent failure or refusal to appear at the second trial or hostility since

testifying at the first trial does not amount to inability to testify, but such inability
proceeding from a grave cause, almost amounting to death, as when the witness is
old and has lost the power of speech.
Facts:
Petitioners, thru their mother Celestina Daldo as guardian ad litem, sued respondent Tan in the CFI for
acknowledgment and support. Celestina Daldo - after petitioners had already presented oral and documentary
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evidence and were about to rest their case - moved to dismiss the foregoing civil case upon the ground that the
parties had come to an amicable settlement, and prayed that the same be dismissed with prejudice and without
recourse of appeal. She also subscribed before the clerk of the CFI to an affidavit categorically stating that
respondent Francisco Tan "is not the father of my said minor children named Carmelita and Rodolfo (herein
petitioners) but another person whose name I cannot divulge";; and that she prepared said affidavit precisely "to
record what is true and to correct what misinterpretation may arise in the future". The CFI granted the motion and
dismissed the case. More than a year after the case was dismissed, petitioners, this time thru their maternal
grandfather Servillano Daldo as guardian ad litem, commenced the present action before the Juvenile & Domestic
Relations Court for acknowledgment and support, involving the same parties, cause of action and subject matter.
The judge rendered judgment declaring that "the present case is res judicata by reason of the dismissal with
prejudice of the previous case and that, even on the merits, plaintiffs have not made out their case with sufficient
evidence," and dismissed the complaint, without costs. On MR, the court reconsider its decision, and declares the
minors Carmelita and Rodolfo Tan to be the illegitimate children of the defendant Francisco Tan alias and orders the
defendant to support said minors. On appeal, the decision was reversed.
Issue:
Whether or not the testimonies of the witnesses in the former trial within the coverage of the rule of
admissibility?
Ruling:
The controlling statute is Section 37, Rule 123 of the 1940 Rules of Court, now Section 41, Rule 130,:
SEC. 41. Testimony at a former trial. The testimony of a witness deceased or out of the Philippines, or
unable to testify, given in a former case between the same parties, relating to the same matter, the adverse party
having had an opportunity to cross-examine him, may be given in evidence.
Concededly, the witnesses at the former trial were subpoenaed by the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court
a number of times. These witnesses did not appear to testify.These witnesses are not dead. They are not outside of
the Philippines. Can they be categorized as witnesses of the class unable to testify? The Court of Appeals, construing
this term, held that "subsequent failure or refusal to appear thereat [second trial] or hostility since testifying at the
first trial does not amount to inability to testify, but such inability proceeding from a grave cause, almost amounting
to death, as when the witness is old and has lost the power of speech. (Griffith vs. Sauls, 77 Tex 630, 14 S.W. 230,
231; section 37 of Rule 123, Rules of Court)."
Here, the witnesses in question were available. Only, they refused to testify. No other person that prevented
them from testifying, is cited. Certainly, they do not come within the legal purview of those unable to testify.
Besides in the situation here presented, petitioners are not at all bereft of remedy. They could have urged
the court to have said witnesses arrested, punished for contempt. 1 After all, these remedies are in the statute books to
help litigants in the prosecution of their cases. Petitioners failed to avail of these remedies, went ahead and
submitted their case.
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OHIO VS ROBERTS
448 US 56 (1980)
By : Dizon, May
When a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the

Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. A
witness is unavailable for purposes of the exception to the confrontation
requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to
obtain his presence at trial.
Facts:
Defendant, Herschel Roberts, charged with forgery and fraud, stayed in the apartment of Anita Isaacs and
used checks and credit cards under the name of Bernard Isaacs (father of Anita). Anita said that she did allow the
defendant to stay but did not give permission to use the credit cards and checks. During the trial, Anita, despite being
subpoenaed several times was not able to attend the hearings. The prosecution tried to admit into evidence
preliminary hearing testimony but Roberts contend that it violates the confrontation clause and the court found in
favor of Roberts.
Issue:
Whether the preliminary hearing testimony by an unavailable witness is admissible?
Ruling:
YES. The admission of the preliminary hearing testimony does not violate the confrontation clause. The
witness was unavailable and the prosecution, in good faith, made all possible method to locate the witness. Even
then the witness made several indication of the reliability of her account during the hearing. The court found that
one could infer reliability in cases where the evidences falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, but even in
other cases, if particularized guarantees of trustworthiness can be shown, the evidence would be admitted.
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OPINION RULE
Rule 130, Section 48-50
Section 48. General rule. The opinion of witness is not admissible, except as indicated in the
following sections. (42)
Section 49. Opinion of expert witness. The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training which he shown to posses, may be received in evidence.
(43a)
Section 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is
given, may be received in evidence regarding
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or
appearance of a person. (44a)
CASES
Dilag & Co. v. Merced
U.S. v. Trono
People v. Adoviso
State v. Garver
U.S. v. Stifel
Daubert v. Merrell Dow
United States v. Bonds
45 O.G. 5536 (1949)

3 Phil. 213 (1904)
309 SCRA 1 (1999)
225 P.2d 771 (1950)
433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970)
113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993)
12 F.3d 540 (1993)
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DILAG & CO. VS MERCED
45 O.G. 5536 (1949)
By : Dizon, May
Generally speaking, any person who by study or experience has acquired

particular knowledge or experience may be allowed to give in evidence his
opinion upon matters of technical knowledge and skill relating to such business
or employment.
Facts:
Dilag &Co. filed a case for the theft of a truck bought from International Harvester Company against.
During the Japanese occupation the truck was stolen. After liberation Dilag saw the truck parked outside a
reaturant. Dilag had it seized and filed complaint of theft against Merced. Merced claimed that he bought the truck
in good faith and he relied on the copy of the certificate of registration. Dilag presented Jose Aguilar of the Bureau
of Public works on the fact of tampering of the motor vehicle number The court ruled in favor of Dilag and ordered
Merced to pay damages. Merced assailed the competency of the testimony of Jose Aguilar.
Issue:
Whether Jose Aguilar of the Bureau of Public Works was qualified as an expert witness to prove the alleged
tampering of the motor number?
RULING:
YES. There is no precise requirement as to the mode in which skill or experience shall have been acquired.
Scientific study and training are not always essential to the competency of a witness as an expert. A witness may be
competent to testify as an expert although his knowledge his knowledge was acquired through the medium of
practical experience rather than scientific study and research. Education as a mode of acquiring competency is now
recognized under the proposed rules of evidence.
US VS TRONO
3 PHIL 213 (1904)
By : Dizon, May
Expert testimony constitutes evidence worthy of meriting consideration,

although not exclusive, on questions of a professional character. Courts, however,
are not bound to submit their findings necessarily to such testimony; they are free
to weigh them, and they can give or refuse to give them any value as proof, or
they can even counterbalance such evidence with the other elements of conviction
which may have been adduced during the trial.
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Facts:
The deceased, Benito Perez, Policarpio Guevarra, and Felipe Bautista, were arrested in their respective
houses by the defendants Valentin Trono, subinspector of the municipal police of the town of Hagonoy,
accompanied by Jose and Agustin who were municipal policemen and Maximo Angeles. The deceased and his
companions were suspected of the theft of a revolver belonging to Maximo Angeles. The three were taken to a place
called Sapang-Angelo and there were beaten and illtreated. They were then brought to the municipal building of the
town where Benito Perez who has suffered much of the beatings were complaining of severe pain and was not able
to properly walk. Nothing was adduced from the investigation of the theft, the three were subsequently released
from custody. Benito Perez died the next morning. An investigation ensued and the defense contends that the death
of Benito Perez was not due to the wounds inflicted during the beatings, but to a serious illness, from which the
deceased had been suffering for a long time, basing such allegation on the certificate and testimony of the physician,
Don Andres Icasiano. The trial court convicted the accused of murder. The defendants appealed the decisions,
relying on the testimony of the expert witness.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in not giving credence to the expert testimony?
RULING:
NO. The testimony of expert witnesses, although meriting attention, is not conclusive upon the courts, but
is to be weighed and its probative value determined in connection with other proofs adduced. In the case there are to
be found sufficient data which show in a conclusive manner the seriousness of the wounds inflicted upon Perez
which caused his death.
PEOPLE VS ADOVISO
309 SCRA 1 (1999)
By : Dizon, May
As with other jurisdictions, the Philippines also rejects the results of polygraph
tests as evidence of establish the guilty or innocence of a person for the reason
that polygraph has not as yet attained scientific acceptance as a reliable and
ascertaining truth or deception.
Facts:
In the evening of February 18, 1990, Emeterio Vasquez was preparing coffee as his wife Anastacia was
about to sleep. Their grandson Rufino had already gone to sleep. A few moments later gunshots were heard and
Emeterio and Rufino were shot. Bonifacio, son of the spouses Vasquez, who lived nearby heard the gunshots and
went outside with his son Elmer to investigate.
From the investigation, it was revealed that Bonifacio vividly saw the incident and recognized Adoviso as
one of the perpetrators of the crime. Bonifacio was not able to immediately identify him to the police, because of
fear since the perpetrators were known to be CAFGUs. Adoviso questioned whether he was properly identified by
the two eyewitnesses and also offered the testimony of Ernesto Lucena, polygraph examiner.
P a g e 223 o f 285
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The trial court found Adoviso guilty

Adoviso appealed with the contention that the trial court rendered decision on the basis of mere conjectures
and speculations, and that the negative result if the polygraph test should be given weight to tilt the scales of justice
in his favour.
Issue:
Whether or not Adovisos contention was correct?
Ruling:
NO. The eyewitness Bonifacio sufficiently explained why he was unable to immediately identify Adoviso.
Bonifacio was afraid of the Adovison since the latter was a member of the CAFGU and, as such, was provided with
a gun. The general rule is that witnesses react to a crime in different ways. There is no standard form of human
behavioural response to a strange, starling and frightful event, and there is no standard rule by which witnesses to a
crime must react.
A polygraph is an electromechanical instrument that simultaneously measure and records certain
physiological changes in the body and are believed to be involuntary caused by an examinees conscious attempt to
deceive the questioner. However, our courts does not vests much faith and credit to a lie detector test as it is not
conclusive for the reason that is has not as yet attained scientific acceptance as a reliable and accurate means of
ascertaining truth or deception.
STATE VS. GARVER

225 P.2d 771 December 19, 1950
By : Marcelo, MJ
Generally, a lay witness may testify only to facts and not to opinions or
conclusions, but may be permitted to use so-called short hand descriptions, in
reality opinions, in presenting to court their impressions of the general physical
condition of a person.
Facts:
Robert Garver met his accomplices Norman Andrus and Leland Marshall in tavern in downtown Portland,
and proposed that they rob one Ancell Abbott, who was a janitor in the Fred Meyer Store. Garver claimed to have
information that Abbott would be leaving the store late in the evening carrying about $5,000 in a shopping bag.
Acting upon Garvers suggestion, Andrus and Marshall stole an automobile, secured two guns, and rejoined Garver
at about nine oclock in the evening in the vicinity of the store. Garver armed himself with one of the guns. They
waited until Abbott appeared carrying the shopping bag, and followed him several blocks in the stolen automobile.
Andrus remained in the car while the other two got out and held up Abbott with guns in hand. The defendant Garver
shot Abbott three times. The three fled, carrying with them the shopping bag, which, as it turned out, contained no
money but only some clothes.
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Garver raised the defense of insanity. It was shown during the trial that Garver was admitted twice in
mental institutions, namely Veterans Hospital at Roseburg, Oregon and Oregon State Hospital, as a mentally
diseased person. A provisional diagnosis of psychoneurosis hysteria was made. Later while on parole, at his
mothers request, he was examined by Dr. Gerhard B. Haugen, a Psychiatrist. Dr. Haugen reported that the basic
pattern present in Psychopathic Inferiority. In addition to Dr. Haugens testimony, the defense also presented the
testimony of Garvers mother, Mrs. Mitchell, and lay testimonies of others tending to show the defendants chronic
condition of mental abnormality.
Mrs. Mitchell related to the jury the history of her son from infancy to the day of the alleged crimeincluding his illnesses, both mental and physical; his hospitalizations;;his moral delinquencies;;and his crimes,
whatever throw light on his mental condition. She used the expression in such terrible shape and physically ill.
The Court struck these phrases on the theory they were opinions and conclusions of the witness. Garver was later
convicted of murder by the lower court.
Issue:
Whether Mrs. Mitchell can testify as to the mental condition of the defendant Garver?
Ruling:
YES, The general rule is that a lay witness may testify only to facts and not to opinions or conclusions. But
lay witnesses are frequently permitted to use so-called short hand descriptions, in reality opinions, in presenting to
the court their impression of the general physical condition of a person. The court has held it proper in a personal
injury case to permit laymen, who were intimately acquainted with the plaintiff prior to her injury and observed her
condition thereafter, to testify that her health and general physical condition had materially changed for the worse. It
leaves the witness free to speak his ordinary language, unbewildered by admonitions from the judge to testify to
facts, when all the while the witness is sure in his own mind that he is testifying to facts. The jury understands that
what the witness means, and the right of cross-examination removes the likelihood of harm to the other side. Too
strict adherence to the opinion rule is undesirable.
UNITED STATES VS. STIFEL

433 F.2d 431 October 29, 1870
By : Marcelo, MJ
On questions of science, skill, or trade, or others of like kind, persons of skill,

sometimes called experts, may not only testify to facts, but are permitted to give
their opinions in evidence.
Facts:
Appellant Orville Stifel was indicted for murdering Daniel Ronec by sending him a bomb through the
United States mails. The bomb exploded when Ronec opened the package containing it. Records that Stifel and one
Cheryl Jones, who was engaged to Ronec at the time of the latters murder had previously during 1965 and 1966 had
a somewhat tempestuous romance which she sought to end inthe fall of 1966. Subsequently, Stifel wrote Jones two
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letters which contained language jury could have regarded as threats. In 1967, Jones became engaged to Ronec and
their wedding was set for 1968. Stifellearned of both these facts from Jones. It was only a few weeks before the
wedding day that Ronecaskilled by the explosion. A postman had just delivered a package addressed to him
consisting of a mailing tube with a screw- on top. The explosion tore open Ronecs abdomen and tore off his arms.
Prosecutions evidence bore primarily upon Stifels possible motive for sending the bomb, upon his
capability in relation to fashioning it, and upon the availability to him of the materials, being an employee of Procter
& Gamble, from which government evidence sought to establish that the bomb and bomb package were made. The
prosecution also introduced the expert testimony of one James Scott, a chemist and microanalyst attached to the
Identification Bureau of the Post Office Department Inspection Services. He testified pertaining to his study of
various fragments of the bomb package by the method of neutron activation analysis. By this means, Scott sought to
establish whether the pieces of cardboard, vinyl tape, metal top, and paper gummed label were or could have been
from the same manufacturer and same batches as similar items found in the Procter & Gamble inventory. Employing
neutron activation analysis, Scott testified that in his opinion the mailing label, the cardboard tube fragments, vinyl
tape fragments and metal cap were of the same elemental composition as their Proctor and Gamble counterpart
and within reasonable scientific certainty they were of the same type and same manufacturer.
The appellant contends that the neutron activation analysis test results and Scotts opinion testimony
derived therefrom were inadmissible because the test is too new and unreliable and has not yet been generally
accepted by scientists in its particular field. The lower court, however, admitted the testimony and, upon which,
convicted Stifel.
Issue:
Whether the lower court erred in admitting the testimony of Scott?
RULING:
NO. On questions of science, skill, or trade, or others of like kind, persons of skill, sometimes
calledexperts, may not only testify to facts, but are permitted to give their opinions in evidence. Whether a witness is
shown to be qualified or not as an expert is a preliminary question to b determined in the first place by the court;;
and the rule is, that if the court admits the testimony, then it is for the jury to decide whether any weight is to be
given to the testimony.
In Frye v. United States, the court held that: : Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the
evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduction from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is
made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
The decision as to whether the state of technology in this field was such as to render testimony based on
neutron activation analysis admissible was, of course, a decision for the judge. Any disputes about the technique
employed by the governments expert or the results of his test went to the quality of the evidence and were for
consideration by the jury.
The decision may change if decided in the Philippine courts depending on whether the neutron activation
analysis test will pass the relevance and reliability test under the Daubertcase. The Frye test is no longer controlling
since it was already repealed by the Federal Rules of Evidence. The decision will be the same if decided under the
proposed Rules of Evidence since no change was introduced with respect to the rule on admissibility of the opinion
of a witness.
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DAUBERT VS. MERELL DOW

509 U.S. 579 June 28, 1993
By : Marcelo, MJ
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the trial judge must ensure that any and
all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant but reliable.
Facts:
Petitioners Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller are minor children born with serious birth defects. They and
their parents sued respondent in California state court, alleging that the birth defects had been caused by the
mothers ingestion of Bendectin, a prescription anti nausea drug marketed by Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. After
extensive discovery, respondent moved for summary judgment, contending that Bendectin does not cause birth
defects in humans and that petitioners would be unable to come forward with any admissible evidence that it does.
In support of its motion, respondent submitted an affidavit of Steven H. Lamm, physician and epidemiologist, who
is a well-credentialed expert on the risks from exposure to various chemical substances. Doctor Lamm stated that he
had reviewed all the literature on Bendectin and human birth defects-more than 30 published studies involving over
130,000 patients. No study had found Bendectin to be a human teratogen (i.e., a substance capable of causing
malformations in fetuses). On the basis of this review, Doctor Lamm concluded that maternal use of Bendectin
during the first trimester of pregnancy has not been shown to be a risk factor for human birth defects.
Petitioners responded to respondent's motion with the testimony of eight experts of their own, each of
whom also possessed impressive credentials. These experts had concluded that Bendectin can cause birth defects.
Their conclusions were based upon in vitro (test tube) and in vivo (live animals) studies that found a link
between Bendectin and malformations, and pharmacological studies of the chemical structure of Bendectin that
purported to show similarities between the structure of the drug and that of other substances known to cause birth
defects.
The District Court granted respondents motion for summary judgment. The court stated that the scientific
evidence is admissible only if the principle upon which it is based is sufficiently established to have general
acceptance in the field to which it belongs. The court concluded that petitioners evidence did not meet this
standard, and that the expert opinion which is not based on epidemiological evidence is not admissible to establish
causation.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Citing Frye v. United States, the court
stated that expert opinion based on a scientific technique is inadmissible unless the technique is generally accepted
as reliable in the scientific community. The court declared that expert opinion based on a methodology that diverges
significantly from the procedures accepted by recognized authorities in the fieldcannot be shown to be generally
accepted as a reliable technique.
P a g e 227 o f 285
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Issue:
Whether the general acceptance test is the proper standard for admitting expert testimony
Ruling:
NO. The Federal Rules of Evidence, not Frye, provides the standard for admitting expert scientific
testimony in a federal trial. Frye's general acceptance test was superseded by the Rules subsequent adoption. The
Rules occupy the field, and, although the common law of evidence may serve as an aid to their application,
respondent's assertion that they somehow assimilated Frye is unconvincing. Nothing in the Rules as a whole or in
the text and drafting history of Rule 702, which specifically governs expert testimony, gives any indication that
general acceptance is a necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence. Moreover, such a rigid
standard would be at odds with the Rules' liberal thrust and their general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers
to opinion testimony.
The Rules place appropriate limits on the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence by assigning to
the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the
task at hand. The reliability standard is established by the requirement that an expert testimony pertain to
scientificknowledge since the adjective scientific implies a grounding in sciences method and procedures,
while the word knowledge connotes a body of known facts or of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as true
on good grounds.
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony under Rule 702, the trial judge, must make a preliminary
assessment of whether the testimony's underlying reasoning or methodology is scientifically valid and properly can
be applied to the facts at issue. Many considerations will bear on the inquiry,including whether the theory or
technique in question can be tested, whether it has been subjected topeer review and publication, its known or
potential error rate and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling its operation, and whether it has
attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific community. The inquiry is a flexible one, and its focus
must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate. The appropriate means by
which evidence based on valid principles may be challenged is through cross-examination, presentation of contrary
evidence,and careful instruction on the burden of proof, rather than wholesale exclusion under an uncompromising
general acceptance standard.
UNITED STATES v BONDS

12 F. 3d 540
By : Romano, Esmerada
Standard for admission of expert scientific testimony requires determination of

whether it is relevant and reliable, with relevance requirement stemming from
applicable rules requirements that testimony assist trier of fact to understand
evidence or determine a fact at issue, and with reliability requirement being based
on rules requirement that subject of expert testimony be scientific knowledge
and this entails preliminary assessment of whether reasoning or methodology
underlying testimony is scientifically valid and whether the reasoning and
methodology can properly be applied to facts at issue
P a g e 228 o f 285
EVIDENCE

Facts:
David Hartlaub as gunned down in his van as he topped at a bank near the Sundusky Mall I Ohio, where he
planned to make at night deposit of cash from the music store he helped manage. The killers apparently had no
interest in robbery. Three individuals Wayne Yee, Mark Verdi and John Ray Bonds- were indicted in connection
with the crime, tried, and convicted of conspiracy and federal firearms offenses. At the trail, the Governments
theory for the shooting was that the gunmen, members of the Hells Angels motorcycles gang, had mistaken
Hartlaub's yellow van for an identical van driven by a local member of a rival motorcycle gang, the outlaws, whom
the gunmen allegedly planned to hit' in retaliation for the shooting of a Hell's Angels member by an outlaw the
previous year Illinois.
The police later found the gateway van abandoned with its engine still running and the lights still on. The
gun used in the shooting, a MAC-11 9-mm semi-automatic pistol fitted with a homemade silencer. Both the gun and
the van carpet were splattered with blood. Serology test showed that a showed that the blood was not harlaub's, but
rare splattered blood, which only appear in about 1% of caucasian males, matched those found in Bond's Blood.
Most of the blood in the van had dripped between the front seats; shortly after the murder, Bonds wore his right arm
in a sling, and it was later established that he had serious ricochet wound which evidently bled between the seats as
he drove the van that night.
Agents prepared an affidavit seeking to obtain a search warrant for blood and hair samples from Bonds.
The federal magistrate judge of Toledo issued a warrant based on the finding of probable cause. The agents seized
the samples from Bonds. This samples were the basis for evidence that the DNA in Bonds's blood matched the
DNA from the Blood found in the back seat of the van. All three defendants were eventually tried and convicted.
The defendants question the judgment. They contended that the testimony about the DNA evidence was not based
on principles generally accepted in the scientific community (frye test).
Issue:
Whether or not the DNA evidence was properly admitted as evidence?
Ruling:
The supreme Court in Daubert vs Merell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. has already rejected fyre's general
acceptance test as the exclusive test and has redefined the standard for the admission of expert scientific testimony.
The Supreme Court found that Fyre test was superseded by the Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which make expert
testimony admissible if the scientific or specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact and if the witness is
qualified as an expert. The Court explained that the trial Judge must ensure that the scientific testimony is not only
relevant but reliable.
Finally, the Court said that when reviewed in light of the four Daubert factors (testing, peer review, rate of
error, and general acceptance), the underlying principles and methodology used the FBI to declare matches and
make statistical probabilities are scientifically valid. The methodology was valid in that it resulted from the sound
and cogent reasoning, and was well-grounded or justifiable and applicable to the Matter at hand. Thus, the
methodology clearly had a grounding in the methods and procedures of science and was based on more than
subjective belief or unsupported speculation. The evidence that Bonds DNA matched at least to some extent the
DNA found in the crime scene sample was clearly is relevant to whether defendants Bonds was present in the
victim's van on the night of murder.
P a g e 229 o f 285
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PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE:
JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
Rule 132, Sections 1-18
Section 1. Examination to be done in open court. The examination of witnesses presented in a
trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is
incapacitated to speak, or the questions calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the
witness shall be given orally. (1a)
Section 2. Proceedings to be recorded. The entire proceedings of a trial or hearing, including
the questions propounded to a witness and his answers thereto, the statements made by the judge
or any of the parties, counsel, or witnesses with reference to the case, shall be recorded by means
of shorthand or stenotype or by other means of recording found suitable by the court.
P a g e 230 o f 285
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A transcript of the record of the proceedings made by the official stenographer,

stenotypist or recorder and certified as correct by him shall be deemed prima facie a correct
statement of such proceedings. (2a)
Section 3. Rights and obligations of a witness. A witness must answer questions, although his
answer may tend to establish a claim against him. However, it is the right of a witness:
(1) To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting questions, and from harsh or
insulting demeanor;
(2) Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice require;
(3) Not to be examined except only as to matters pertinent to the issue;
(4) Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him to a penalty for an offense
unless otherwise provided by law; or
(5) Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade his reputation, unless it to be the
very fact at issue or to a fact from which the fact in issue would be presumed. But a witness must
answer to the fact of his previous final conviction for an offense. (3a, 19a)
Section 4. Order in the examination of an individual witness. The order in which the
individual witness may be examined is as follows;
(a) Direct examination by the proponent;
(b) Cross-examination by the opponent;
(c) Re-direct examination by the proponent;
(d) Re-cross-examination by the opponent. (4)
Section 5. Direct examination. Direct examination is the examination-in-chief of a witness by
the party presenting him on the facts relevant to the issue. (5a)
Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. Upon the termination of the direct
examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to many matters stated
in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his
accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all
important facts bearing upon the issue. (8a)
P a g e 231 o f 285
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Section 7. Re-direct examination; its purpose and extent. After the cross-examination of the
witness has been concluded, he may be re-examined by the party calling him, to explain or
supplement his answers given during the cross-examination. On re-direct-examination, questions
on matters not dealt with during the cross-examination, may be allowed by the court in its
discretion. (12)
Section 8. Re-cross-examination. Upon the conclusion of the re-direct examination, the
adverse party may re-cross-examine the witness on matters stated in his re-direct examination,
and also on such other matters as may be allowed by the court in its discretion. (13)
Section 9. Recalling witness. After the examination of a witness by both sides has been
concluded, the witness cannot be recalled without leave of the court. The court will grant or
withhold leave in its discretion, as the interests of justice may require. (14)
Section 10. Leading and misleading questions. A question which suggests to the witness the
answer which the examining party desires is a leading question. It is not allowed, except:
(a) On cross examination;
(b) On preliminary matters;
(c) When there is a difficulty is getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who
is ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is of feeble mind, or a deaf-mute;
(d) Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or
(e) Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a
public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party.
A misleading question is one which assumes as true a fact not yet testified to by the
witness, or contrary to that which he has previously stated. It is not allowed. (5a, 6a, and 8a)
Section 11. Impeachment of adverse party's witness. A witness may be impeached by the
party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general
reputation for truth, honestly, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times
P a g e 232 o f 285
EVIDENCE

statements inconsistent with his present, testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful
acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the witness, or the record of the
judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense. (15)
Section 12. Party may not impeach his own witness. Except with respect to witnesses referred
to in paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 10, the party producing a witness is not allowed to
impeach his credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon
adequate showing of his adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having misled
the party into calling him to the witness stand.
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an adverse party, may
be impeached by the party presenting him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse
party, except by evidence of his bad character. He may also be impeached and cross-examined by
the adverse party, but such cross-examination must only be on the subject matter of his
examination-in-chief. (6a, 7a)
Section 13. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements. Before a witness
can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his
present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and
places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so,
allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before
any question is put to him concerning them. (16)
Section 14. Evidence of good character of witness. Evidence of the good character of a
witness is not admissible until such character has been impeached. (17)
Section 15. Exclusion and separation of witnesses. On any trial or hearing, the judge may
exclude from the court any witness not at the time under examination, so that he may not hear
the testimony of other witnesses. The judge may also cause witnesses to be kept separate and to
be prevented from conversing with one another until all shall have been examined. (18)
P a g e 233 o f 285
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Section 16. When witness may refer to memorandum. A witness may be allowed to refresh his
memory respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded by himself or under his direction at the time
when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his
memory and knew that the same was correctly written or recorded; but in such case the writing or record
must be produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross examine the
witness upon it, and may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such writing or record,
though he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or record
correctly stated the transaction when made; but such evidence must be received with caution. (10a)
Section 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the remainder, the remainder
admissible. When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence by
one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a detached act,
declaration, conversation, writin g or record is given in evidence, any other act, declaration,
conversation, writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence.
(11a)
Section 18. Right to respect writing shown to witness. Whenever a writing is shown to a
witness, it may be inspected by the adverse party. (9a)
LEADING QUESTIONS:
STATE vs SCOTT
149 P2d 152
Even though the question may call for a yes or no answer, it is not leading for
that reason unless it is so worded that by permitting the witness to answer the yes
or no, he would be testifying in the language of the interrogator rather than his
own.
Facts:
Jack Scott was tried before a jury upon a charge that he had a carnal knowledge with a female, which he
know to be only fourteen years of age. A verdict of guilty was returned and from a judgment entered, this appeal has
been taken.
Issue:
Whether or not it was error for the trial court to allow leading question to be asked of the complaining
witness, and consequently for the jury to consider it?
P a g e 234 o f 285
EVIDENCE

Ruling:
The question claimed by the appellant to have been leading in character are what are known as alternative
forms of questions. The alternative form of question, which states whether or not you said... is free from this
defect of form because both the affirmative and negative answer are presented for the witness choice. Nevertheless,
such a question may become leading, in so far as it rehearses lengthy details, which the witness might not otherwise
have mentioned and thus supplies him with full suggestion which he incorporates without any effort, by the simple
answer.
IMPEACHING ONES OWN WITNESS
BECKER VS. EISEHSTODT

158 A. 2d 706
If a witness is called on the part of the plaintiff who swears what is palpably
false, it would be extremely hard for the plaintiffs case should for that reason be
sacrificed. The court knows no rule of law by which the truth is on such an
occasion to be shut out and justice to be perverted. A party must not be obliged to
receive everything which a witness called by him may swear to, If his witness has
been false or mistaken in his testimony, he may prove the truth by the testimony of
others.
Facts:
Arlene Becker went to see Lester Eisenstodt, a physician and surgeon, because she wanted to have the
shape of her nose changed to eliminate a bump. Arlene, accompanied by her mother went back to the doctor's office
to undergo post-operative treatment. Eisentodt took a pledget of a cotton and with a tweezer dipped in into one of
the bottles standing on the tray. Hen then pushed the cotton all the way up Arlene's nostrils. Later on, arlene
P a g e 235 o f 285
EVIDENCE

complained of pain as her mother notice something silvery liquid ran down arlene's nose and upper lips were
swollen, the flesh raw and skin was coming off.
During the trial, Becker's counsel presented Eisenstodt as witness, and asked him if he inserted a cotton
saturated with a 10% solution of cocaine on Arlene's nostrils during the post operative treatment.
Eisenstodt
answered positively. Later on, two medical experts were also presented as witness. A demonstration was then
made to the jury regarding the application of the said solution.
The trial court dismissed the case on the ground that there was no prima facie evidence of negligence and
that the plaintiff called the defendant as his own witness, hence they are bound by his testimony because a party by
calling a witness, represents him to be worthy of some credit, and is therefore bound by his testimony.
Issue:
Whether or not a party by calling a witness, represents him to be worthy of some credit, and is therefore
bound by his testimony?
Ruling:
According to Wigmore, the notion that a party is morally bound by what is witness says no longer finds
defenders. If a witness is called on the part of the plaintiff who swears what is palpably false, it would be extremely
hard if the plaintiff's case should for that reason be sacrificed. The Court knows of no rule of law by which the truth
is on such an occasion to be shut out and justice to be perverted. A party must not be obliged to receive everything
which a witness called by him may swear to, if his witness has been false or mistaken in his testimony, he may prove
the truth by the testimony of others.
Therefore, the case was reversed and remanded for trial taking into account the testimony of the two expert
witnesses concerning the use of the 10% cocaine solution that impeaches the testimony of the defendant.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
EMILIO DE LA PAZ JR. v. IAC

G.R. No. 71537 September 17, 1987
By : Marcelo, MJ
The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a

judicial litigation, is fundamental right which is part of due process. Until such
cross-examination has been finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be
considered as complete and may not be allowed to form part of the evidence to be
considered by the court in deciding the case. But the right to cross-examine is a
personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting
to a renunciation of the said right.
Facts:
P a g e 236 o f 285
EVIDENCE

Loreto de la Paz filed a complaint against petitioners for a judicial declaration of ownership of a land
registered in the name of Ponciano de la Paz, alleging that the land was among the properties adjudicated to her and
her mother as a result of a partition submitted by the heirs of Ponciano de la Paz. On the other hand, petitioners
claimed that the land was not accounted for in the probate proceedings of Ponciano de la Paz, but is actually
community property of the parties.
Loreto took the witness stand and was last on cross-examined, but it was not completed. Petitioners
counsel asked for the postponement for the continuation of the cross-examination twice, which was granted by the
court. On the scheduled hearing set for cross-examination, the petitioners counsel failed to appear. The Petitioners
counsel resumed his repeatedly postponed cross-examination of Loreto. The cross-examination was however, cut
short and rescheduled again on the motion of petitioners counsel. Unfortunately, Loreto died. At the resumption of
the trial, petitioners moved to strike off the record the entire testimony of Loreto, which was denied.
Issue:
Whether the testimony of Loreto should be stricken off the record due to lack of cross-examination of the
adverse parties?
Ruling:
NO, the right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation,
isfundamental right which is part of due process. Until such cross-examination has been finished, the testimony of
the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not be allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered
by the court in deciding the case. But the right to cross-examine is a personal one which may be waived expressly or
impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the said right.
In the case at bar, the petitioners failure to crossexamine Loreto is due to its own fault of
repeatedlypostponing the cross-examination and failing to appear during scheduled hearings. Under these
circumstances, the Court ruled that the petitioners had waived their right to cross-examine Loreto. Through their
own fault, they lost their right to cross-examine Loreto. Her testimony stands.
The case was decided properly under the current rules of evidence because the right of the petitioner
tocross-examine Loreto is impliedly waived due to its own actions of repeatedly postponing the cross- examinations.
If the case were to be decided under the proposed revised rules of evidence, the decision will still be the same
because the provision on cross-examination was not changed.
FULGADO v. COURT OF APPEALS

181 SCRA 81 February 12, 1990
By : Marcelo, MJ
The right to cross-examine is a personal right which may be forfeited by failure

of a party to avail of the ample opportunity given him. Where the failure to obtain
cross-examination was imputable to the cross-examiners fault, the lack of cross-examination is no longer a ground for exclusion according to the general
principle that an opportunity, though waived, will suffice.
P a g e 237 o f 285
EVIDENCE

Facts:
RupertoFulgado filed a case against the defendants for the annulment of certain contracts of sale and
partition with accounting. After several deferments, the pre-trial conference was set. However,the defendants and
their counsel failed to appear on the said date. Hence, they were declared in default and RupertoFulgado was
allowed to present his evidence ex parte. The defendants filed a motion to lift the order of default but such motion
was denied by the trial court. The defendants then filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, who ruled in their
favor, lifted the order of default, and remanded the case to the trial court.
The case was again set for hearing. Unfortunately, the presiding judge went on official leave andthe hearing
was postponed anew. RupertoFulgado died, and his sole witness, Jose Fulgado, which was presented ex parte,
migrated to the United States. When the hearing resumed, the defendants moved to strike the testimonies of
RupertoFulgado and Jose Fulgado off the record on the ground that they were deprived of their right to cross- examine. The counsel for Fulgado opposed the motion but the trial court ruled in favor of the defendants and
ordered the testimonies of RupertoFulgado and Jose Fulgadobestricken off the record. Since the plaintiff had no
more witnesses to present, apart from Ruperto and Jose, the trial court dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the ruling of the lower court. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the testimonies of the deceased, RupertoFulgado, and his witness, Jose Fulgado, should be
stricken off the record?
Ruling:
NO, the right to cross-examine is a personal right which may be forfeited by failure of a party to avail of
the ample opportunity given him. Where the failure to obtain cross-examination was imputable to the cross-examiners fault, the lack of cross-examination is no longer a ground for exclusion according to the general principle
that an opportunity, though waived, will suffice.
In the case at bar, the defendants had enough opportunity to cross-examine RupertoFulgado before his
death, and Jose Fulgado, before his migration. Despite their knowledge of RupertoFulgados failing health and Jose
Fulgados imminent travel, the defendants did not move swiftly to cross-examine the said plaintiff and his witness.
As a matter of fact, it took them more than one year from the finality of the judgment of the Court of Appeals lifting
the order of default before they asked the trial court to resume the hearing of the case. Further, the tasked of
recalling a witness for cross-examination is in law, imposed on the party who wishes to exercise the said right
because of the fact that it is a personal right and can be waived. In addition, even though Jose Fulgado is out of the
country, the defendants should have resorted to the various modes of discovery to cross-examine Jose. Defendants
even disclosed the fact that they had knowledge that Jose was in the country for a visit and yet they did not exert any
effort to have him subpoenaed. The acts of the defendants constitute a waiver of their right to cross-examine. The
Court ordered the trial court to reinstate the case and allow the direct testimonies of RupertoFulgadoand Jose
Fulgado to remain in the record.
The case was decided properly under the current rules of evidence because the right of the defendants to
cross-examine Ruperto and Jose Fulgado is impliedly waived due to its failure to cross-examine them immediately.
If the case were to be decided under the proposed revised rules of evidence, the decision will still be the same
because the provision on cross-examination was not changed.
P a g e 238 o f 285
EVIDENCE

CAPITOL SUBDIVISION v. PROVINCE OF NEGROS
52 O.G. 4672 July 31, 1956
By : Marcelo, MJ
The adverse party may, on cross- examination, elicits from the plaintiffs witness
all important facts bearing on the issue and which are not taken up in the witness
direct examination.
Facts:
The Provincial Hospital of Occidental Negros was erected on a parcel of land in Bacolod, whose ownership
is claimed by the Province of Negros Occidental by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Donation executed in its favor by
Jose Benares, as a result of expropriation proceedings. Although the transfer certificate of title had not been issued to
the province, the parcel of land stood in the records of the assessment office as the property of the province and
enjoyed exemption from realty tax.
Capitol Subdivisions Inc. claims to be the owner of the land and instituted an action in the Court of First
Instance against the province for recovery of the possession of the said land and collection of reasonable rents for its
use. Capitol Subdivisions Inc. alleged that the lot was foreclosed by the Philippine National Bank from Jose Benares
due to the failure of the latter to pay his debts to the former. Later on, PNB signed a contract with Carlos Benares
wherein the latter would purchase the lot. Carlos Benares assigned his rights to the said contract to Capitol
Subdivisions, Inc. and the plaintiff, after full payment of the purchase price, obtained a deed of absolute sale from
PNB and as a result, it was issued a transfer of certificate of title for the lot.
The Province of Negros Occidental put up the defense that it had acquired the lot from Jose Benares
through an expropriation proceeding, which was amicably settled by the parties thereby resulting to the execution of
a deed of absolute sale and donation in favor of the province. However, all the records of the expropriation
proceeding were totally destroyed during World War II. The province further alleged that Capitol Subdivisions Inc.
had constructive notice of the expropriation proceedings, hence not an innocent purchaser. Furthermore, the
controlling stockholder, president and general manager of Capitol Subdvisions, Inc. Mr. Alfredo Montelibano, also
have knowledge of those facts. Mr. Montelibanos incumbency as mayor of Bacolod, the city was contributing a
large sum annually for the support, operation, and maintenance of the hospital.
During the trial, Mr. Montelibano testified that Capitol Subdivisions Inc. had no knowledge of the
expropriation proceedings nor the Deed of Sale with Donation at the time it bought the land. The Province of Negros
Occidental failed to cross-examine Mr. Montelibano on matters due to Capitol Subdivisions objection an the trial
court sustained the objections. The trial court ruled in favor of Capitol Subdivisions Inc. on the ground that Mr.
Montelibanowas on the witness stand as a witness for Capitol Subdivisions Inc., hence the province cannot cross examine him on any matter that would elicit all important facts bearing on the issue which was not taken up in the
direct examination of the said witness.
Issue:
Whether the Province may elicit all important facts on matters which were not taken in the direct
examination of the witness for Capitol Subdivisions Inc., during cross-examination?
Ruling:
YES, The adverse party may, on cross-examination, elicit from the plaintiffs witness all important facts
bearing on the issue and which were not taken up in the witness direct examination. Chief Justice Moran stated that
the adverse party may cross-examine a witness for the purpose of eliciting all important facts bearing upon the issue.
P a g e 239 o f 285
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Hence, a party may cross-examine a witness on matters not embraced in hisdirect examination, but it does not mean
that a party by doing so is making the witness his own. The Court set-aside the decision of the trial court and
remanded that case to the court of origin for further proceedings.
US vs. MARSHALL
762 F. 2d 419
By : Ortiz, Katheen
The cross-examination of a witness as to the inadmissible evidence, or the

introduction by the ruling's opponent of rebutting evidence, does not waive the
vitality of his continuing objection, for the party is entitled to rely upon the trial
judge's ruling as the law of the case, without waiving his rights under the
continuing objection to question subsequently on appeal the admission of any
evidence of the nature specifically objected to by him initially.
Facts:
Defendant Marshall was convicted of the offense charged, the theft of a lawn mower of a value in excess
of $100, which was the property of the United States. The lawn mower was allegedly stolen from the Four Seasons
Retail Store of the Army and Air Force Exchange Service, the defendant Marshall was supervisor (assistant
manager) of that store, where he had worked for about ten years. The other principal actor in the evidentiary facts
was Lee, the manager of the entire post exchange.
The incident upon which the criminal charge was based arose during an end-of-summer promotional sale of
"Lawn Boy" lawn mowers by the Four Seasons store from August 24 Athrough September 8, 1983. These large lawn
mowers, ordinarily retailing at $449, were to be sold at $335.95, in order to clear them from the premises over the
winter.
Lee saw the driver, whom he testified he recognized as the defendant Marshall, alight and lift one by one
two large boxes from the rear of the van and place them in the carport. The van then drove off. Lee drove up to the
driveway and recognized the writing on one of the boxes as showing that it was a "Lawn Boy" packing box; the
other box, although apparently (when lifted by the driver) lighter in weight, seemed similar to the first, although Lee
was unable to decipher any wording on it.
When Lee returned to work on Tuesday, September 6, after Labor Day, he made discreet inquiries in order
to ascertain the explanation for the activities seen that day. Finding no explanation, he finally, nine days later, called
the defendant Marshall in to ask why he had been to Frederick Street. Marshall replied that he had never been there
or in that locality, although he had been away from the store premises at another location in Shreveport from shortly
after 10:00 a.m. until about 11:00 a.m. that morning.
At the trial, the government did not introduce any evidence as to who had received the boxes at the
Frederick Street residence, nor did it attempt to prove that the boxes, one of which was marked "Lawn Boy,"
actually did contain lawn mowers. Instead, it relied upon the following circumstantial evidence and upon the
testimony of Ms. Terri Stanlin, an investigator, who testified that, on the basis of her review of the records of the
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post exchange store, three lawn mowers were unaccounted for and missing during the period of Four Seasons'
promotional sale.
To counter the government's case Marshall also relies upon his cross-examination of the government
investigator (Ms. Sandlin) and of a government witness.
Issue:
Whether or not the cross-examination relied upon in determining how many lawn mowers had been sold
was correct?
Ruling:
Admitted over defense objection, the convincing and positive testimony of this witness, an investigator for
an agency of the United States (with what weight that status might confer), was that the store records showed at least
three lawn mowers were unaccounted for. Nevertheless, as our recitation above indicates, her positive conclusory
opinion as to the number of lawn mowers missing was based upon a flawed methodology. For a starting figure of
lawn mowers on hand, she had relied upon a hearsay "correction" of the actual store record; in determining the
number of lawn mowers sold during the period, she had relied upon cash register tapes that were incomplete for the
period in question (with the missing tapes quite possibly indicating other lawn mower sales that would make up the
shortage she found).
Our basic holding is that reversible error occurred because, over defense objection, the trial court permitted
a non-expert witness to give prejudicial hearsay testimony as to the contents of documents that were not themselves
introduced into evidence, which documents, moreover, could not have been introduced without prior authentication,
including a query into their trustworthiness for the purpose for which introduced. We detailed in Part VI, supra, the
unreliability of the testimony thus erroneously admitted only in order to illustrate that, by failing to apply the rules
of evidence at issue, not only was their letter ignored but also their functional purpose as designed to assure
trustworthiness of the evidence of this nature to be received, as well as to afford a fair opportunity to the opponent of
the introduction of the evidence to prevent the trier of fact from being contaminated by unreliable prejudicial
testimony.
We note also that Bitner, the custodian of the records, was not called by the government to authenticate the
business records of Four Seasons as to the lawn mowers, and that from the cross-examination of him by Marshall, it
is doubtful that his testimony would have shown that the records used by Ms. Stanlin to deduce that any lawn
mowers were missing met the authentication threshold that, for the purposes noted (if they had been offered by the
government), "the method or circumstances of preparation indicate ... trustworthiness." Id.
IMPEACHMENT BY BIAS
US vs. ABEL
469 U.S. 45
By : Ortiz, Katheen
Bias is a term used in the common laws of evidence to describe the

relationship between a party and a witness which might lead the witness to slant,
unconsciously or otherwise, his testimony in favor of or against a party. Bias may
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be induced by a witness' like, dislike, or fear of a party, or by the witness' selfinterest.

Proof of bias is almost always relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and
weigher of credibility, has historically been entitled to assess all evidence which
might bear on the accuracy and truth of a witness' testimony.
Facts.
Respondent was charged with robbing a bank with two other men. One of the men, Ehle, testified at
Respondents trial to implicate him in the robbery. Respondent then called Mills to testify that while in prison, Ehle
confided to him that he would falsely implicate Respondent in order to receive favorable treatment. To rebut the
credibility of Mills, Ehle was called back to the stand to testify that he, Mills and Respondent belonged to an Aryan
gang that swore to perjure themselves to help a fellow gang member. The trial court allowed the testimony, and
Respondent was convicted. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, citing the prejudicial nature of the
testimony.
Issue.
The issue is whether prejudicial testimony that implicates Respondent with a prison gang is admissible
because it is probative to the bias of a witness.
Ruling:
The prejudicial testimony is admissible because it is highly probative of the bias of Respondents witness.
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not directly address impeachment for bias, but the history of the Rules Advisory
Committee mention bias as a concern that is encompassed by the Rules.
Discussion.
Whether evidence is too prejudicial or not relevant enough varies case-by-case. In this instance the
testimony was considered very relevant and was able to override the prejudicial tone that implicated Respondent
with a prison gang. The Court will often refer to common-law prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules in order to
justify the scope of their interpretations, as they did here to allow impeachment for bias.
US vs. HARVEY
547 F.2d 720
By : Ortiz, Katheen
Bias of a witness is not collateral issue and extrinsic evidence is admissible to

prove that witness has motive to testify falsely.
Facts:
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Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction after a jury trial in which a verdict of guilty was found as
to each of the two counts of the indictment, the first charging the appellant with bank robbery and the second with
bank larceny.
On the afternoon of April 22, 1975, the Main-High branch of the Marine Midland Bank-Western was
robbed by a man dressed as a woman. Mrs. Florida Strickland, a teller at the bank, described the robber as a medium
complexioned black male in his early twenties, 5'11 to 6' in height, 160 lbs., slender build with broad shoulders, five
o'clock shadow and a prominent Adam's apple. According to Mrs. Strickland, the robber was wearing a straighthaired wig pulled back into a bun, a blue denim hat, which did not obstruct a full view of the robber's face, gold wire
framed dark glasses, lipstick, rouge, a dark coat, and was carrying a 10 wide red print cloth shoulder bag.
Mrs. Strickland was not able to make a positive identification of the robber, and much of the evidence
against appellant at the trial consisted of her description of the robber's personal features and bank surveillance
photos which the jury was asked to compare to appellant.
The sole identification witness at the trial was a Priscilla Martin who testified that on the afternoon of April
22, while passing by on a bus, she observed a man she identified as appellant walk down the steps of the Salvation
Army and touch one of the two doors of the Main-High branch of the Marine Midland Bank. Mrs. Martin described
the man as wearing red pants, a black coat, black platform shoes and a black floppy hat whose brim obstructed a
view of his face from the nose up. She described his hair style as a frizzled bush, "an afro," but could not say
whether it was a wig. Mrs. Martin stated that the man was not wearing glasses and that she could not recall lipstick
but did remember seeing rouge.
Mrs. Martin had been acquainted with appellant for a number of years. She testified that she knew the
appellant for nineteen years and at one time had lived in the same house with him. On cross-examination, defense
counsel questioned Mrs. Martin on whether she had ever had any trouble with appellant or ever had any arguments
or disagreements with him, and specifically whether she ever accused appellant of fathering her child and then
failing to support this child. Mrs. Martin denied these charges.
Following Mrs. Martin's testimony, appellant sought to introduce testimony of Mrs. Harvey which would
have shown that Mrs. Harvey was a long-time acquaintance of Mrs. Martin, and that while Mrs. Harvey was on duty
as a nurse in a Buffalo hospital, she encountered Mrs. Martin, who was there for treatment of a broken leg. Mrs.
Harvey would have testified that during this encounter Mrs. Martin accused appellant of fathering her child and
refusing to support it and that Mrs. Martin further explained that when her husband learned of this he beat her and
broke her leg, necessitating the hospital treatment. The trial judge refused this proffer of testimony, considering it
"collateral" and inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 613(b). It is this ruling which appellant maintains was
error and which requires our consideration.
Issue:
Whether the trial court committed reversible error in excluding evidence proffered by the defendant as to
possible bias on the part of the government's chief identification witness.
Ruling:
The law is well settled in this Circuit, as in others, that bias of a witness is not a collateral issue and
extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove that a witness has a motive to testify falsely. The law of evidence has long
recognized that a cross-examiner is not required to "take the answer" of a witness concerning possible bias, but may
proffer extrinsic evidence, including the testimony of other witnesses, to prove the facts showing a bias in favor of
or against a party. Special treatment is accorded evidence which is probative of a special motive to lie "for if
believed it colors every bit of testimony given by the witness whose motives are bared. This Circuit follows the rule,
applicable in a number of other Circuits, that a proper foundation must be laid before extrinsic evidence of bias may
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be introduced. Prior to the proffer of extrinsic evidence, a witness must be provided an opportunity to explain the
circumstances suggesting bias.
We now must consider whether the trial court's error in refusing to admit the testimony of Mrs. Harvey was
so prejudicial as to require reversal of appellant's conviction. The right to "place the witness in his proper setting and
put the weight of his testimony and his credibility to a test" is an essential safeguard to a fair trial. Exercise of this
right is particularly crucial where the witness offers damaging identification testimony, for in the absence of
independent contrary evidence, a defendant must rely upon impeachment of the witness's credibility. The record
reveals that appellant's conviction rests on the testimony of Mrs. Strickland as to a description of the robber, bank
surveillance photos which the jury had an opportunity to review and compare to appellant's appearance, and the
identification of Mrs. Martin. We are not convinced that Mrs. Martin's testimony was an insignificant part of the
case against appellant and therefore find that denial of the opportunity to raise a reasonable doubt as to identification
by showing possible bias was prejudicial to appellant's right to a fair trial.
Accordingly, we reverse appellant's conviction and remand for a new trial.
IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT
VILLALON VS. IAC

GR 73751 September 4, 1986
The defense tool sanctioned by Sections 15 and 16 of Rule 132 is that witnesses
have given conflicting testimonies, which are inconsistent with their present
testimony and which would accordingly cast a doubt on their credibility.
Facts:
A civil case for annulment of a deed of sale, among others, was filed by Neval et al against Atty. Villalon.
Previously, Neval et al also filed a disbarment proceeding against Atty. Villalon. During the trial of the civil case,
Atty. Villalon introduced in evidence some of Neval et als testimonies in the disbarment proceeding which were
allegedly inconsistent with their testimonies in the civil case for the purpose of impeaching their testimonies. The
trial court granted the Motion to Strike filed by Neval et al on the ground that its admission would violate the
confidentiality of disbarment proceedings; and that the same cannot be waived.
Issue:
WON the attorney subject of disbarment proceeding may waive his right to its confidentiality and thus
present the inconsistent testimonies therein in a civil case.
Ruling:
AFFIRMATIVE. By issuing its Order to strike, the Trial Court deprived petitioners of their right to
impeach the credibility of their adverse parties witnesses (granted under Secs. 15 & 16 of R. 132) by proving that
on former occasions they had made statements inconsistent with the statements made during the trial, despite the
fact that such statements are material to the issues in the Civil Case. The subject matter involved in the disbarment
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proceedings i.e., the alleged falsification of the deed of absolute sale in petitioners favor, is the same issue raised in
the Civil Case wherein the annulment of the said deed of absolute sale is sought.
While proceedings against attorneys should, indeed, be private and confidential except for the final order
which shall be made public, that confidentiality is a privileged/ right which may be waived by the very lawyer in
whom and for the protection of whose personal and professional reputation it is vested, pursuant to the general
principle that rights may be waived unless the waiver is contrary to public policy, among others.In fact, the Court
also notes that even private respondents counsel touched on some matters testified to by NEVAL in the disbarment
proceedings and which were the subject of cross examination.
PEOPLE VS. RESABAL

50 Phil 780
The apparent contradictions which may be noted in the declarations made

during preliminary investigation and the testimony before the court may not be
used to impeach the credibility of the witness because the witness was not given
ample opportunity, by reading to him of his declarations during the preliminary
investigation, to explain the discrepancies. The mere presentation of the
transcript showing the prior testimony, without said declaration having been read
to the witness while he testified in court, is no ground for impeaching his
testimony.
Facts:
The appellant is one of the herein accused and was convicted by the CFI Cavite of the crime of robbery in
band with homicide. The penalty imposed upon the herein appellant is that of cadenaperpetua. At midnight on May
28, 1925,appellant and seven other persons approached the house of the spouses Galicano Ortega and Juana Garcia
and ordered the man who was in the house to come out. Galicanohid under the house. One of the assailants focused
his flashlight and as they saw Galicano, whom they had ordered to come out, they pushed him out and as soon as he
was out they fired a shot at him killing him, later forcing his wife Juana Garcia to stand by his body while they all
went upstairs in the house and opened a trunk and appropriated P6.50.
It was proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the herein appellant was one of those assailants. He admitted
it in his extrajudicial statement Exhibit C, the admissibility of which as evidence is impugned by the defense. But it
sufficiently appears that the admissions contained in said document were voluntarily and spontaneously made. The
torture alleged by the defense to have been employed as a means of obtaining said admissions has not been proven.
That EribertoCalle, the herein appellant, was the one who fired the shot that killed Galicano has not been
sufficiently proven because that point only appears in the extrajudicial declarations of his co-accused, later denied
by them at the trial of the case; but the conspiracy revealed by the concerted and joint action of these accused having
been proven, each and every one is liable for the criminal acts committed by the members in the band.
Issue:
1. Whether or not, the statements made by the witness should be admitted
.
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2. Whether or not, the mere presentation of a declaration should be a ground for impeaching the credibility
of the witness.
Ruling:
1. Yes. The mere fact of having been excluded from the information to be used as witness for the
government does not prevent a witness from telling the truth, especially in the absence of proof showing the interest
he might possibly have in testifying against the accused.
2. No. The mere presentation of a declaration, without the same having been read to the witness while he
testified in the Court of First Instance is no ground for impeaching his credibility.
U.S. VS. WEBSTER

734 F.2d 1191
When an object is relevant to a fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or

viewed by the court. In this case, the object need not have been presented before
the court because it was irrelevant to the fact in issue, because it could not be
connected in any way to the defendant, and the jury in the case was already
informed of such fact.
Facts.
Defendant, Webster, was convicted of aiding an abetting in a bank robbery and for receiving stolen funds.
He was sentenced to nine years. The prosecution had the co-defendant, King, testify against the Defendant.
However, King gave testimony that exculpated the Defendant. The prosecution was allowed to introduce prior
inconsistent statements by King that were incriminating against the Defendant. The court instructed the jury that it
could consider the statements only as impeachment evidence. Defendant appeals contending that the prosecution
should not have been able to use the out of court statements by King.
Issue.
Was it improper to allow the out of court statement by King to be admitted?
Held.
Justice Posner issued the opinion for the United States Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in affirming the
conviction and holding that he impeachment evidence was not used to place otherwise inadmissible evidence before
the jury because the prosecution did not know that the co-defendant would not give useful evidence.
Discussion.
In the case, the Court of Appeals found that prosecution acted in good faith in putting the co-defendant on
the stand. Thus, the evidence was not offered to intentionally place inadmissible evidence before the jury. The
prosecution first sought to question the co-defendant out of the presence of the jury to find out what information, if
any, he would offer. Defendants counsel objected and the questioning was not allowed.
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IMPEACHMENT BY OTHER MEANS
MOSLEY v COMMONWEALTH
420 SWSd 679 (1976)
Proffered testimony of clinical psychologist as to mental condition of

prosecuting witness at time of alleged rape was relevant and competent in rape
prosecution and should have been received, not in extenuation of rape, but for its
bearing upon question of weight to be accorded to prosecuting witness' testimony,
and exclusion of the psychologist's testimony constituted prejudicial error.
Although, generally, a witness may be impeached only as specified by the rules
of civil procedure, the modern trend is to permit the jury to consider expert
testimony in the field of mental disorders and relax the rule in sex offense cases.
Facts:
Appellant was convicted of the crime of rape and sentenced to ten years' servitude in the state penitentiary.
The sole ground for reversal of the conviction is that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of James Gay, a
psychologist, concerning the mental condition of the prosecuting witness at the time of the alleged rape
The record reflects that for several months prior to the date of the alleged offense, Geraldine Eden, the
prosecuting witness, had been staying in the home of Elihu Asher where she was employed as a full-time baby-sitter.
Geraldine, who is 27 years of age, testified that the Ashers had left their residence to go bowling. Appellant, an
acquaintance of Geraldine and a relative of Asher entered the Asher home for the purpose of staying overnight.
Geraldine stated that after the Asher children went to bed, appellant tried to make love to her and when she resisted
his amorous advances he forcibly tied her hands behind her back, pushed her down on a couch, removed her
underclothing and raped her.
Appellant urges that the court erred in refusing to permit the jury to consider, for the purpose of impeaching
Geraldine's credibility, the testimony of Doctor Gay concerning Geraldine's mental condition. Doctor Gay, who is in
charge of the treatment of Geraldine's mental disorder, testified, by way of avowal out of the presence of the jury,
that Geraldine had entered a state hospital for mental treatment during October 1961. At that time she was
complaining that her father and brothers had molested her sexually during her adolescence. She was discharged from
the hospital in January 1962 and readmitted for treatment on a voluntary basis during 1964. She has been treated by
Doctor Gay since September 1965.
While Doctor Gay believed that Geraldine was in a state of remission at the time of the alleged rape, it was
his opinion that she is schizophrenic and is an immature individual.
Issue:
WON the testimony of Dr. Gay should be admitted into evidence.
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Ruling:
It is our opinion that the proffered testimony of Doctor Gay was relevant and competent and should have
been received, not in extenuation of rape, but for its bearing upon the question of the weight to be accorded
Geraldine's testimony. For this reason the court should admonish the jury that the expert testimony should be
considered by it only for the purpose of affecting the credibility of this witness, if it does so.
Generally a witness may be impeached only as specified in our Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the
modern trend is to permit the jury to consider expert testimony in the field of *681 mental disorders and relax the
rule in sex offense cases. McCormick in his treatise on Evidence, Section 45 at page 99, observes:
"* * * Naturally, the use of psychiatric testimony as to mental disorders and defects suggests itself as a
potential aid in determining the credibility of crucial witnesses in any kind of litigation. In one type of case, namely
that of sex offenses, the indispensible value of this kind of testimony has been urged by Wigmore, and other
commentators, and such testimony has been widely received by the courts. * * *."
"* * * It is always open to a defendant to challenge the credibility of the witnesses offered by the
prosecution who testify against him. * * *. "What could be more effective for the purpose than to impeach the
mentality or the intellectual grasp of the witness? If his interest, bias, indelicate way of life, insobriety and general
bad reputation in the community may be shown as bearing upon his unworthiness of belief, why not his imbecility,
want of understanding, or moronic comprehension, which go more directly to the point? * * *."
COLES v HARSH
276 P 248 (1929)
When questioning a witness about a prior inconsistent statement, the statement

must be shared with the witness so he may deny or explain it.
Facts:
Coles (plaintiff) brought suit against Harsch (defendant), claiming that he had maliciously alienated the
affections of Coless wife by improper attentions shown to her, specifically by wrestling with her on many
occasions.Defendant was initially married to Plaintiffs sister and hung out in the same social circles as Plaintiff.
One activity of the social circle was the wrestling of men with each others wives. Plaintiff introduced evidence that
Defendants attention to Plaintiffs wife was beyond the norm for their circle, and it led to the divorce of Plaintiff
and his wife, whom Defendant married shortly thereafter.
Harsch brought James Thompson as a witness and he testified that the Harschs conduct toward Mrs. Coles
was no different than his conduct toward his other women friends. On cross-examination of Thompson, Coles asked
only if Thompson recalled talking to Coles about a picnic Thompson had gone on. Thompson testified that he did
not recall the conversation. Later in the trial, to impeach Thompsons credibility, Coles testified that Thompson had
in fact told him that at the picnic in question, the conduct of the defendant and Mrs. Coles with each other was
disgraceful. The trial court allowed Coless testimony about Thompsons statement at the picnic and found in
favor of Coles. Harsch objected on the grounds that the testimony was hearsay. Coles argued that the testimony was
meant to impeach the credibility of Harsch as a witness, not to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Harsch argued
that Coles never asked Thompson about the incident while cross-examining him, and therefore it was improper to
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introduce Coles' testimony to impeach Thompson. The Trial Judge allowed the testimony to be admitted and found
for Coles and awarded $17.5k in damages. Harsch appealed.
Issue:
whether a proper foundation was laid for Plaintiffs impeachment of a defense witness.
Ruling:
The foundation was not proper and was irreversible error. The witness was only asked whether he
remembered a conversation without any additional foundation.The Court found that the exclusion of evidence to
further demonstrate the wrestling activities was no error or harmless error. The court reasoned that a juror would
typically understand that the conduct would inflate the likelihood that Defendant and the wife would bond. The
court held that Plaintiff cannot question Defendant on a collateral matter just to catch Defendant in a lie. Further the
admission of affidavits was not admissible. Furthermore, Oregon Supreme Court looked to Oregon State rules of
evidence and found that in order to introduce a prior statement impeaching a witness, you must ask the witness
about the alleged prior statement during cross-examination, and give them the opportunity to explain the prior
statement. Therefore, when questioning a witness about a prior inconsistent statement, the statement must be shared
with the witness so he may deny or explain it.
US v MEDICAL THERAPY SERVICES

583 F 2d 36 (2d Cir.1978)
A witness may always be impeached by proof of a prior conviction if the crime

involved dishonesty or false statement i.e. crimes such as perjury or
subornation of perjury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, or false
pretense, or any other offense in the nature of crimenfalsi, the commission of
which involves some element of deceit, untruthfulness or falsification bearing on
the accused's propensity to testify truthfully.
There is a vast difference between putting that witness' veracity in issue by
eliciting the impeaching facts and merely revealing the witness' background.
Indeed, even in jurisdictions where a party may not discredit his own witness, it
has been held that the fact of prior convictions may be brought out on direct
examination for non-impeachment purposes.
When such convictions are used for impeachment purposes, as they were on
cross-examination here, we think that the door is opened to evidence in support of
truthfulness.
Facts:
Stanley Berman, Defendant, and his company, Medical Therapy Sciences, was convicted of filing false
Medicare claims. Defendant double billed for the same patients and charge for equipment and supplies either not
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needed or not delivered. Barbara Russell, a friend and employee of Defendant, testified for the government.
Defendant contends that the prosecution should not have been allowed to call character witnesses for Russell. The
government brought out prior convictions of Russell on direct examination arguing that they were anticipating
impeachment by Defendant.
Issue:
Did the trial judge improperly allow the character witnesses to testify to bolster Russells credibility?
Ruling:
Justice Moore issued the opinion for the United States Second Court of Appeals in affirming the conviction
and holding it was within the trial courts discretion to allow the character witnesses testimony. The government is
allowed to bring out the impeachment facts when it anticipates the defense will do as well. Further, it notes that it is
important that the trial court maintain discretion to determine whether the witnesss veracity for truthfulness is being
attached on cross-examination.Character evidence may be used to support a witness only after the character of the
witness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence.
Rule 608 itself contains no limitation that precludes a party from offering character evidenceunder
circumstances where it anticipates impeachment. Rather, the event that triggers the applicability of the Rule is
attack on the witness' veracity. Under the Federal Rules, a party may impeach his own witness. However, putting
that witness' veracity in issue through eliciting impeaching facts should be distinguished from merely revealing the
witness' background. Indeed, even in jurisdictions where a party may not discredit his own witness, it has been held
that the fact of prior convictions may be brought out on direct examination for non-impeachment purposes. The
Supreme Court held that the trial judge has the discretion to permit the use of character witnesses. His proximity to
the situation allows him to make the determination of when, and by whom, an attack is made. Were the rule to be
otherwise, a party would have to choose between revealing, on direct, the background of a witness and its right to
use character evidence if the witness' veracity is subsequently impugned.
The cross examination of Russell included sharp questioning about her prior convictions for fraudulent
activities (i.e. obtaining amphetamines), and her character was also attacked by "specific act" evidence, namely,
allegations that she had embezzled money and stolen patients from Berman's company. Berman argues that such
evidence bore solely on her bias against him, and as such did not constitute an attack on character.
However, the Court did not agree. Evidence of corrupt conduct on the part of a witness should be regarded
as an attack on his truthfulness warranting supportive evidence. Certainly, the embezzlement and theft of which
Russell was accused can be said to fall within the category of corrupt conduct, within the contemplation of Rule
608(a). Thus, the Court held that decision to permit the character evidence must be affirmed. However, discretion in
this area must be exercised with caution so that the jury's attention is not diverted from the main issues to be tried.
Not every cross examination should trigger theauthority of Rule 608(a)s provision for supporting character
evidence. As the attack on this case went even beyond cross examination, and since Berman's guilt was
established not solely by Russell's testimony but also by other supporting evidence, conviction is affirmed.
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NEWTON v. STATE
127 A. 123 (1924)
In impeachment of witness by showing previous conviction of crime, counsel

should ask witness the question directly, and not by indirect question, as to
whether he had not given same testimony during previous trial at which he had
been convicted.
Facts:
Emory M. Newton appeals his conviction for the offense of criminal conspiracy to defraud existing and
prospective customers of common-law trust operating blind pools. It is charged that coconspirators, Gillespie and
Dickey, as public accountants, gave fictitious value to certain stock when making audit of the Union Finance
Company. In their audit, they stated that the company was solvent and capable, and that shares were valued at 50
cents a share, though originally bought at 20 cents a share.
The relevant issue in this case involves the action of the court in permitting certain questions to be asked in
the cross-examination of Harold R. Dickey, Jr., a witness for the defense.
In the cross-examination, he was asked:
You testified concerning these transactions in the case of the state against Dickey and the state against
Gillespie, giving then the same explanations that you have given us here, did you not? He was directed over
objection to answer that question, and the following discussion took place:
A. Well, I can't remember exactly all that I said in the last case.
Q. Now, don't split hairs with me. Did you testify in this same way in the trial of your own case?
A. Practically.
Q. And you were convicted were you not?
Q. (By Mr. Leach). Go on and answer me? You were convicted in your trial before Judge Gorter and Judge
Stanton, were you not?
In answer to the last question the witness replied that he had been so convicted.
Issue:
Whether such manner of questioning and the answers elicited therefrom are admissible? -NO.
Ruling:
This method of cross-examining the witness was held by the court to be highly objectionable. If the
purpose of the examiner was to impeach the credibility of the witness by showing that he had been convicted of
crime, he should have asked him that question directly; or, if he had intended to show that he had in some other case
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sworn to statements contrary to his testimony in the instant case, he could have been asked whether he had made
such conflicting statements.
However, these questions had no such object. In addition to intimidating the witness, their only apparent
purpose was to bring to the attention of the jury the fact that Dickey had made in his own case when he was tried for
the same crime, the same statement as that to which he testified in this case, and that the three judges before whom
he was tried discredited that statement and convicted him. The obvious purpose was to induce the jury to believe
that, as the testimony of the witness as given before them had already been discredited by three judges sitting in the
same court in another case, therefore they should discredit it in this case. This is a wholly unwarranted conclusion
unsupported by any authority. Case is remanded for new trial.
STATE v. OSWALT
31 P.2d 617 (1963)
A witness cannot be impeached upon matters collateral to the principal issues

being tried. The purpose of the rule is basically two-fold: (1) avoidance of undue
confusion of issues, and (2) prevention of unfair advantage over a witness
unprepared to answer concerning matters unrelated or remote to the issues at
hand. The test of collateralness is: Could the fact, as to which error is predicated,
have been shown in evidence for any purpose independently of the
contradiction?
Facts:
Two armed men entered the King Country Residence of Frank Goodell in Seattle, on July 14, 1961. As one
stood on guard over a number of people at the home, the other man took Goodell to a Tradewell store, forced him to
open the safe and turn over the money. Oswalt was identified as one of the two men.
Oswalts defense was alibi. He called on August Ardiss testified that Oswalt was a regular patron at his
restaurant. At the time of the alleged offense, it was impossible for Oswalt to be in Seattle, as he had accompanied a
restaurant employee to work, assisted in a part of her work, and escorted her home.
On crossexamination, Ardiss was asked whether Oswalt had been in everyday for the past few months or
missed occasional periods of 3-4 days. Ardiss replied that to the best of his knowledge, Oswalt was there every day.
In rebuttal, a police detective was permitted to testify, over the objection of the defense. The detective answered that
he talked to Oswalt on June 12, 1961 in Seattle and that Oswalt had told him that he had arrived in Seattle a couple
of days before the detective talked with him, and that Oswalt came from Portland. Oswalt was convicted of armed
robbery and first-degree burglary.
On appeal, Oswalt contends that the trial court erred in admitting the rebuttal testimony of the detective,
which constituted impeachment on a collateral matter. The State contends that such testimony is admissible not only
because it challenges the credibility of Ardiss but also establishes Oswalts presence in Seattle preparatory to the
offense.
P a g e 252 o f 285
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Issue:
Whether the defendant Oswalts whereabouts a month before the commission of the crime is irrelevant and
collateral matter, and is thus inadmissible to impeach Ardiss testimony. YES
Ruling:
The detectives impeaching testimony is inadmissible. While relevant and probative evidence of
preparations by an accused for the commission of a crime is admissible, the state's argument requires us to speculate
that the defendant could not readily commute between Portland and Seattle, and that his presence in Seattle and
acquisition of adhesive tape, upon an isolated occasion a month before the offense in question, constituted
significant evidence of planning and preparation for the offense in question, the particular mechanics of which are
unrevealed by the record. This we decline to do.
It is an established rule that a witness cannot be impeached upon maters collateral to the principal issue
being tried. The purpose of the rule is two-fold:
(1) to avoid undue confusion of issues;; and
(2) to prevent unfair advantage over a witness unprepared to answer concerning matters unrelated or remote
to the issues at hand.
The TEST for collateralness is: could the fact, as to which error is predicated, have been shown in evidence
for any purpose independently of the contradiction?
Applying this test to the present case, it can be seen that the impeaching testimony of the detective was
upon matters collateral to the principal issue being tried. The sole issue being raised by Oswalts defense of alibi,
through Ardiss testimony was whether or not Oswalt could have been in Seattle at the time of the offense on July
14, 1961. Oswalt did not contend or seek to prove by this witness that he had not been in Seattle before such date.
Thus, for the purpose of impeaching this witness, whether or not Oswalt was in Seattle one month before July 14
was irrelevant and collateral. While a cross-examiner is within the sound discretion of the trial court, permitted to
inquire into collateral matters testing the credibility of the witness, he does so at the risk of being concluded by the
answers given. Thus, the court erred in admitting the questioned testimony.
REFRESHING RECOLLECTION
P a g e 253 o f 285
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STATE V. PEOPLE
319 SE2d 177 (1984)
Given the problems inherent in the hypnotic process, such as the enhanced
suggestibility of the subject, his tendency to confabulate when there are gaps in
his recollection, his increased confidence in the truthfulness and accuracy of his
post-hypnotic recall which may preclude effective cross-examination, and the
inability of either experts or the subject to distinguish between memory and
confabulation, hypnotically refreshed testimony is simply too unreliable to be
used as evidence in a judicial setting. Adopting a series of procedural safeguards
would not be effective in combating the dangers we see in hypnotically refreshed
testimony. We hold, therefore, that hypnotically refreshed testimony is
inadmissible in judicial proceedings.Our rule of inadmissibility does not,
however, render all testimony of a previously hypnotized witness inadmissible. A
person who has been hypnotized may testify as to facts which he related before
the hypnotic session. The hypnotized witness may not testify to any fact not
related by the witness before the hypnotic session.
Facts:
Bruce Crocket Miller was arrested on March 27, 1981 for armed robbery unrelated to this case. Pursuant to
a plea agreement, he gave police a statement concerning the armed robbery of the Borden Chemical Plant, in
Fayetteville, North Carolina which he had privy to, last May 26, 1980 (which was never introduced in Peoples trial
nor included in the record of appeal). In connivance with several others, they had succeeded in taking several
buckets of almost pure silver, used by the plant in its production of formaldehyde, which was worth over $90,000.
Miller testified against a Robert Peele, the third man in the robbery of the chemical plant. Miller outlined,
in considerable detail, the planning and robbery of the plant. He related that Elmer Leroy Peoples, the defendant in
this case, was the one who recruited him into the heist and that after their first meeting they met several other times
to plan the robbery. After consummating the robbery in the chemical plant, they sold the silver and the proceeds
divided among them.
An eyewitness to the robbery, a shift supervisor whom the perpetrators forced to open the building, named
Peoples as one of the robbers. He was arrested on April 29, 1981. On October 8, 1981, Detective S.C Sessoms, Jr. of
the Fayetteville Police Department, having undergone a two-week training course at the North Carolina Justice
Academy, conducted a hypnotic session with Miller so that he may remember details of the robbery which he would
not otherwise remember in an ordinary state. Before hypnotizing Miller, Sessoms read none of Millers statements
concerning the case.
Miller was successfully hypnotized, which lasted for about an hour, and in that state, related facts
corresponding to his subsequent testimony. Miller also testified that he did not believe he had been hypnotized.
Peoples was convicted.
P a g e 254 o f 285
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Issue:
Whether the testimony of a witness who undergoes hypnosis before testifying to refresh his recollection is
admissible. - NO.
Ruling:
The court has ruled that a witness hypnotically refreshed testimony and video recording of the hypnotic
session was inadmissible, expressly overruling the doctrine laid down in State vs. McQueen.
State vs. McQueen held that the effect of prior hypnosis goes only to the weight and credibility, not the
admissibility of a witness testimony. The court observed that hypnosis, as a tool to refresh or restore memory, was
inherently problematic.
Hypnosis involves more than the mere retrieval of stored or suppressed information. What often seems to
be recalled is in reality a process through which information received after an event is transformed by the subjects
mind into a memory of that event. Essentially, the apparent recollection of a hypnotized subject may actually be a
view, which he has created subconsciously. Such a situation raises a question as to the reliability or the potential
accuracy or recall stimulated by hypnosis. The possibility that a persons testimony might be the result of suggestion
from another person presents a firm indictment of the reliability of such testimony.
The process of hypnosis also tends to enhance the subjects confidence in his memory, whether genuine or
invented. When the subject leaves the hypnotic session, he remembers not only the content of his new but forgets
its source -that he acquired it during the hypnotic session. In short, hypnosis not only irrevocably mask whether a
subjects recall induced by it is true, it also creates a barrier to the ascertainment of its truthfulness through crossexamination -the method normally relied upon in the courtroom to determine truthfulness.
Thus, McQueen should be overruled in so far as it permits the admission of hypnotically refreshed
testimony. Give the problems inherent in hypnotically refreshed testimony, it is simply too unreliable to be used as
evidence in a judicial setting.
RECALLING WITNESSES
PEOPLE vs. MATEO DEL CASTILLO
P a g e 255 o f 285
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G.R. No. L-16941 October 29, 1968
By : Trance, Romak
The court may grant or withhold leave to recall a witness, in its discretion, and
as the interests of justice may require.
Where there are circumstances tending to show insidious attempts to tamper
with the witnesses for the prosecution and would only encourage the perversion
of the truth and make a mockery of the proceedings, the judge is correct in
denying leave to recall a witness.
Facts:
In the afternoon of February 27, 1956, Mrs. Elvira Taada de Principe, a young, prominent patron of
Gumaca, Quezon, a member of the rich, well known Principe family, was kidnapped by a band of Hukbalahaps,
headed by one Commander Pepe Alcantara. She was detained for 18 days in the Huk lairs deep in the mountains of
the Bondoc Peninsula, and was released only upon payment of a ransom of P50,000.00. Estrada vehemently denied
that he was in connivance with the Huks by showing that he could not have been in Barrio Biga, nor conferred with
Lt. Alcantara at the place in February,1956, because he never left the town of Gumaca during the said month, but
once when he went to Lucena City to renewthe plates of his trucks. He sought to destroy the credibility of the
witnesses for the prosecution. He tried hard to convince the trial court that a man of his stature and character an
elective official of social prominence and with substantial income, and commended by a ranking PC officer for "his
exploits and undertakings" as an "informer" of the Army could not have been in league with the Huks in the
mountains, and propose to them a neighbor and family friend as an object of the heinous crime of kidnapping for
ransom. In support of this defense, there was also an attempt to put back on the stand, prosecution witness Ceribo in
order that he could explain why he testified falsely when he testified for the prosecution. However, this was
disallowed by the trial court. Having failed to convince the trial court of his innocence, Estrada now appeals.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in disallowing the defense the right to call back witness Ceribo, thereby
denying Estrada of due process?
Ruling:
No. Appellant charges that the trial court had abused its discretion when it denied the defense the right to
call back witness Ceribo who, it is claimed, was then ready to retract his previous testimony for the prosecution, and
then testify for the defense. This, it is pointed out, was a denial of herein appellant'sright to due process. The Court
cannot agree.Section 14, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that the court may grant orwithhold
leave to recall a witness, in its discretion, as the interests of justice may require. We believe thatit was the better part
of discretion and caution on the part of the trial court to have denied as it did, therequest of the defense to recall
Ceribo. The record is loaded with circumstances tending to show insidiousattempts, too obvious to be overlooked, to
tamper with the witnesses for the prosecution. Under thecircumstances, to allow such a procedure would only
encourage the perversion of truth and make a mockery of court proceedings.
We have to sustain the finding of the court below that herein appellant is guilty of the crime imputed to him
in this case. There could be no question that appellant had knowledge of the criminal intention of Lt. Alcantara and
his men to kidnap somebody from Gumaca for ransom. It seems, however, that they had no definite person in mind
in the beginning. So much so, that they had to call for herein appellant, a councilor and prominent citizen of the
P a g e 256 o f 285
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place, for his cooperation in the matter of selecting and pointing to the prospective victim. Appellant suggested the
Principes as the most suitable object of their criminal design, pinpointing Elvira, wife of one of the Principes, as the
ideal victim, with the explanation that the Principe family would not meet with any difficulty in producing the
ransom money for her release. Lt. Alcantara and his men became convinced of appellant's suggestion and reasoning,
and then and there they decided to kidnap Elvira Taada Principe. The Huk leader told appellant that he (appellant)
would be informed accordingly when the kidnapping was to be effected and the latter answered that Lt. Alcantara
could count upon him all the time. Appellant knew, and must have realized the frightful consequences of being
kidnapped by the Huks. He was not unaware of previous other kidnappings of prominent citizens in the Bondoc
Peninsula the kidnapping of Ex-Mayor Yumul of Lopez, of Wee King of Catanauan, of the Barrettos of Gumaca,
and of De Leon of Catanauan which had invariably resulted in either the loss of honor of the victims, payment of
huge amounts for ransom by their families, or the horrible deaths of the victims. With that knowledge, nevertheless,
herein appellant agreed and conspired with Lt. Alcantara and his men in the kidnapping of Elvira Taada Principe,
who was not only detained by Lt. Alcantara and his men in the mountains for eighteen (18) days, but was only
released after the payment of a P50,000.00 ransom. These circumstances, to the mind of the Court, altogether show
that appellant enjoyed such ascendancy of the mind over that of Lt. Alcantara to the extent that his suggestion was
the efficacious inducement which led the latter and his men to proceed with the criminal design, thus making herein
appellant a principal by inducement. However, for failure to obtain the necessary number of votes to affirm the death
sentence in the decision appealed from, the penalty next lower should be imposed.
VICTORIA MILLING VS. ONG SU

79 Scra 207 (1977)
By : Trance, Romak
If a witness who has already testified and who has been cross-examined extensively
about his citizenship, alien certificate of registration and the other name being
used (an alias) and the only purpose for the recall on rebuttal was to determine if
such witness had the authority to use the alias, the court may refuse to admit such
witness on recall.
Facts:
Victorias Milling Company, Inc., a domestic corporation and engaged in the manufacture and sale of
refined granulated sugar is the owner of the trademark "VICTORIAS" and d design Ong Su is engaged in the
repacking and sale of refine sugar and is the owner of the trademark "VALENTINE" and design. The petitioner
allied that its trademark "Victorias" and diamond design has distinctive of its sugar long before the respondent used
its trademark; that the registration of "Valentine" and design has caused and will cause great damage to petitioner by
reason of mistake, confusion, or deception among the purchasers because it is similar to its "Victorias" trademark;
that registration was fraudulently obtained by Ong Su and that "Valentine" falsely suggests a connection with Saint
Valentine or with an institution or belief connected therewith.
The petition was denied since the alleged infringing trademark of ong su did not actually infringes
victoriass trademark. Victorias pleadings relied heavily on diamond designed of the logo which in itself did not
constitute infringement since common geometric shapes and color patterns are not in themselves patentable.
P a g e 257 o f 285
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Moreover, the case was unfair competition case of which the director of patents had no jurisdiction. Hence this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the recalling of witness under the rules of court has been violated by not allowing the
defendant as witness in the rebuttal.
Ruling:
No. The refusal of the Director of Patents to allow respondent Ong Su and witness Emesto Duran to testify
on rebuttal is not a reversible effort. The only purpose of the petitioner in proposing to call Ong Su as a witness on
rebuttal is to ask the latter if he had judicial authority to use the alias 'Mariano'. Ang It appears, however, that the
counsel of petitioner had already extensively cross-examined Ong Su as to a citizenship, alien certificate of
registration and the other name Mariano Ang. It seems immaterial whether or not Ong Su has judicial authority to
use Mariano Ang as an alias. There is evidence that even before the last World War, the trademark 'Valentine' and
design had been used under the name of either Ong Su or Mariano Ang. The petitioner sought to present Emesto T.
Duran as rebuttal witness to prove that there was confusion among consumers or buyers of sugar caused by the
alleged sorority of the "Victorias" and "Valentine" trademarks. The presentation of Emesto T. Duran as rebuttal
witness was objected to by counsel of the respondent on the ground that the evidence sought to be elicited from
Duran did not directly contradict the testimony of witness Chicane The objection was sustained by the hearing
officer whose ruling was subsequently confer by the Director of Patents. The proposed testimony of Emesto T.
Duran that in February 1963 he went to Arangue market and bought one bag of sugar which he thought was
"Victorias" and when he went home he found out that the sugar was marked "Valentine" is not sufficient evidence
that the two trademarks are so similar that buyers of sugar are confused. The words "Victorias" and "Valentine" are
not similar in spelling and do not have a similar sound when pronounced. Even the diamond designs are different.
The diamond design of the trademark "Valentine" has protruding fines at the comers. Even an illiterate person can
see the difference between the two diamond designs. There is no evidence that the respondent Ong Su had obtained
the registration of his trademark "Valentine" and design by means of fraud. The said trademark was registered in the
Philippines Patent Office before the petitioner registered its trademark. The record and evidence show that Ong Su
had also used in his business the name Mariano Ang. Hence the licenses and permits in the name of Ong Su and/or
Mariano Ang were correctly admitted as evidence.
PEOPLE VS. RIVERA

200 SCRA 786 (1991)
By : Trance, Romak
The discretion of a judge to exercise discretion in recalling witnesses must rely

on something more than the bare assertion of the need to propound additional
questions is essential before the court's discretion may rightfully be exercised to
grant or deny recall. There must be a satisfactory showing of some concrete,
substantial ground for the recall.
P a g e 258 o f 285
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A Judge cannot strike out testimony of a witness who did not show up under
recall especially when if the defense did not file a motion to strike such testimony
from the records and most importantly if the defense had already crossed
examined and re-cross examined such witness.
Facts:
Wilfredo sembrano charged for the crime of arson against the owner of the I love you restaurant and sauna
bath. Among the witness presented is Benjamin lee, a room boy of the said restaurant. Lee testified on direct
examination at the hearing of December 8, 1987. His testimony was essentially that Sembrano had run out of the
VIP room where the fire had started and refused to heed his (Lee's) call to stop. Lee took the witness stand again on
April 26, 1987 during which he was cross-examined by defense counsel, gave additional evidence on redirect
examination, was again questioned on recross-examination by the same defense counsel, and thereafter allowed to
step down.
The prosecution completed presentation of its evidence-in-chief in due course. But before it could rest its
case, and two (2) months or so after Benjamin Lee had completed his testimony, the defendant's original counsel,
Benjamin Formoso, withdrew his appearance and was substituted by another attorney, Eduardo S. Rodriguez. The
latter then filed a motion to recall Benjamin lee for futher examination on the ground that there are some essential
question that did not ask by the defense counsel who conducted the cross examination. The court granted the
motion. But since the witness could nolonger be located, the lower court struck out the entire testimony of Benjamin
Lee, reasoning that it was not the fault of the defense that Benjamin Lee could no longer be located. From this the
prosecution filed the present petition on certiorari against the order of the judge. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not that the recalling of witness provided by the rules has been violated by sriking out the
testimony of Benjamin lee for lack of further examination.
Ruling:
Yes. There is no doubt that a Trial Court has discretion to grant leave for the recall of a witness. This is
clear from a reading of Section 9, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended, 9 viz.:
SEC. 9. Recalling witness. After the examination of a witness by both sides has been concluded, the
witness cannot be recalled without leave of the court. The court will grant or withhold leave in its discretion, as the
interests of justice may require.
But obviously that discretion may not be exercised in a vacuum, as it were, entirely, isolated from a
particular set of attendant circumstances. The discretion to recall a witness is not properly invoked or exercisable by
an applicant's mere general statement that there is a need to recall a witness "in the interest of justice," or "in order to
afford a party full opportunity to present his case," or that, as here, "there seems to be many points and questions
that should have been asked" in the earlier interrogation. To regard expressed generalities such as these as sufficient
ground for recall of witnesses would make the recall of witness no longer discretionary but ministerial. Something
more than the bare assertion of the need to propound additional questions is essential before the Court's discretion
may rightfully be exercised to grant or deny recall. There must be a satisfactory showing of some concrete,
substantial ground for the recall. There must be a satisfactory showing on the movant's part, for instance, that
particularly identified material points were not covered in the cross-examination, or that particularly described vital
documents were not presented to the witness whose recall is prayed for, or that the cross-examination was conducted
P a g e 259 o f 285
EVIDENCE

in so inept a manner as to result in a virtual absence thereof. Absent such particulars, to repeat, there would be no
foundation for a trial court to authorize the recall of any witness. In the case at bar, the respondent Trial Court
granted the defendant's motion for recall on nothing more than said movant's general claim that certain questions
unspecified, it must be stressed had to be asked. In doing so, it acted without basis, exercised power whimsically
or capriciously, and gravely abused its discretion. So, too, the respondent Court acted whimsically, capriciously, and
oppressively, in other words, gravely abused its discretion, in ordering the striking out of the entire testimony of
Benjamin Lee after it appeared that he could no longer be found and produced for further examination. In the first
place, the Court acted unilaterally, without any motion to this effect by the defense and thus without according the
prosecution a prior opportunity to show why the striking out should not be decreed. More importantly, the striking
out was directed without any showing whatever by the defense of the indispensability of further cross-examination,
what it was that would have been elicited by further cross-examination rendering valueless all that the witness had
previously stated. It should be stressed that Lee was subjected both to cross-examination and recross-examination by
former counsel of the accused Sembrano. Obviously the latter was satisfied that there had been sufficient crossexamination of the witness. Absence of cross-examination may not therefore be invoked as ground to strike out
Lee's testimony (as being hearsay). And there is no showing whatever in this case that it was the prosecution that
placed the witness beyond the reach of the Court, much less of the expected nature or tenor of his additional
testimony which, because not presented, would necessarily cause the evidence earlier given by Lee to become
hearsay or otherwise incompetent, and therefore, amenable to being stricken from the record.
EXCLUSION OF WITNESSES
PEOPLE v. SANDAL
54 PHIL 883 September 5, 1930
By : Dalang, Phiels
If the Court gives the order that certain witnesses should not be present during
the hearing, and despite that order such witness was present, his testimony should
be excluded unless the proponent of the witness show cause that such statement
affected the cause of the proponent.
P a g e 260 o f 285
EVIDENCE

Facts:
This case was a murder case committed by four moro persons against a certain Eleno Lamorena. The
following facts of record explain the motive of the assault: When Tomas Permites went to Manila to look after
certain matters he left Eleno in charge of his interests in Monungan. While Permites was in Manila, the appellants
caused some injuries to his carabaos, as a result of which Eleno had a dispute with them. Eleno sent word of what
had happened to Permites in Manila, and when the latter returned to Monungan, he verified the facts and filed a
complaint against the appellants. Eleno was to be the principal witness, and the defendants knew it. They denied the
facts set forth and attempted to prove an alibi. They were convicted. They then appealed their case, stating that the
lower court failed to admit the testimony of a witness for the defense.
Issue:
Whether or not court's refusal to admit certain witness for defense is valid?
Ruling:
An assignment of error alleged by the appellants in this instance deals with the trial court's refusal to admit
a certain witness presented by the defense. The court took this stand for the reason that this witness had been present
during the hearing notwithstanding the court's order that all witnesses leave the court room. Under such
circumstances it lies within the court's discretion to admit or reject the testimony of the witness. And although we
are of opinion that the court below should have admitted the testimony of this witness, especially when he stated that
he did not hear what the other witnesses testified, yet there is nothing to show that this error has affected the
appellants' defense. There is nothing to show what this witness would have testified if admitted, and so it cannot be
held that his failure to testify has materially affected the appellants' defences.
STATE v. BISHOP
492 P2d 509 (1971)
By : Dalang, Phiels
When one party moves to exclude witnesses and the other party voices no
objection, the motion should always be granted. But when the motion is opposed,
the trial courts discretion comes into place. Judicial discretion is to be exercised
in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not
defeat the ends of justice. The trial court must weigh the good cause shown.
Facts:
Bishop was convicted of sale and possession of dangerous drugs. The question on appeal is whether the
trial court erred in refusing to grant a request for the exclusion of witnesses. When the case was called for trial,
P a g e 261 o f 285
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defense counsel requested all witnesses be excluded. During the brief discussion that followed, the prosecutor stated
that most of his witnesses were police officers. Counsel for the defendant argued his client would be prejudiced by
allowing the officers to remain. The only advantage for them being in the courtroom is to hear the cross examination
by defense counsel, to determine what the theory of the defense is in this case, and to determine these things instead
of coming in on the questions cold. The trial judge denied the motion and explained that for him, it is highly
desirable from the public standpoint that officers have an opportunity to learn what it is about their police practices
that is being questioned, and to give careful thought to their own practices. The judge further explained that some of
the police officers were involved in motions to suppress in "this group of cases" and should be allowed to see the
trials "that involve the efforts that they've made."
Issue:
Whether or not the witnesses should be included on the grounds of educational experience and for them to
be able to see the fruits of their labor?
Ruling:
If either party requires it, the judge may exclude from the courtroom any witness of the adverse party not
at the time under examination, so that he may not hear the testimony of other witnesses. State v. Wilson and State v.
EDE suggest that a motion to exclude normally should be granted. In Ede the court interpreted the statute not as
permissive, but, rather, as directory in form. The practice of excluding witnesses from the courtroom except while
each is testifying is to be strongly recommended, particularly where the testimony of the witnesses is in any measure
cumulative or corroborative. The exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom during trial is a time-honored practice
designed to prevent the shaping of testimony by hearing what other witnesses say.
When one party moves to exclude witnesses and the other party voices no objection, the motion should
always be granted. When the motion is opposed, the trial court's discretion comes into play. In this context, as
others, judicial discretion does not mean that the question of whether to exclude witnesses is left to the trial court's
whim or grace. Instead, judicial discretion is to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner
to subserve and not defeat the ends of justice. Specifically, the trial court must weigh the "good cause shown," for
not excluding witnesses against the policy favoring exclusion.
Thus, if the record contains some showing of good cause for not excluding the witnesses, and if the trial
court made a reasonable choice between the good cause shown and the policy favoring exclusion, its decision will
not be disturbed on appeal. But if the record contains no reason for not excluding witnesses, or an insufficient
reason, then the trial court has abused its discretion.
In the case at bar, we find the reasons advanced by the trial court to explain its refusal to exclude to be
inadequate. As noted above, the trial court wanted the police officers who would be witnesses to be able to view the
trial as an educational experience, and wanted them to be able to see the fruits of their labors. These reasons, while
undoubtedly salutary as an educational device, were not relevant to the purpose of the trial namely, the
determination of whether the defendant was guilty of the crime charged. Balanced against the danger that the
witnesses' memories might be confused by other testimony, and the other reasons for the rule of sequestration, the
reasons advanced by the court were insufficient.
P a g e 262 o f 285
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AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF OF DOCUMENTS

Rule 132 Sections 19-33
Section 19. Classes of Documents. For the purpose of their presentation evidence, documents
are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign
country;
(b) Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to the
entered therein.
All other writings are private. (20a)
Section 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
(21a)
P a g e 263 o f 285
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Section 21. When evidence of authenticity of private document not necessary. Where a private
document is more than thirty years old, is produced from the custody in which it would naturally
be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of
suspicion, no other evidence of its authenticity need be given. (22a)
Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. The handwriting of a person may be
proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen
the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or
been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence
respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court,
with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered,
or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (23a)
Section 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact
which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter. (24a)
Section 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph
(a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (25a)
Section 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a
correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be
under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court
having a seal, under the seal of such court. (26a)
P a g e 264 o f 285
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Section 26. Irremovability of public record. Any public record, an official copy of which is
admissible in evidence, must not be removed from the office in which it is kept, except upon
order of a court where the inspection of the record is essential to the just determination of a
pending case. (27a)
Section 27. Public record of a private document. An authorized public record of a private
document may be proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal
custodian of the record, with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody. (28a)
Section 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having the
custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search no record or entry of a
specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as
above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or
entry. (29)
Section 29. How judicial record impeached. Any judicial record may be impeached by
evidence of: (a) want of jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer, (b) collusion between the
parties, or (c) fraud in the party offering the record, in respect to the proceedings. (30a)
Section 30. Proof of notarial documents. Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and
certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate
of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document
involved. (31a)
Section 31. Alteration in document, how to explain. The party producing a document as
genuine which has been altered and appears to have been altered after its execution, in a part
material to the question in dispute, must account for the alteration. He may show that the
alteration was made by another, without his concurrence, or was made with the consent of the
parties affected by it, or was otherwise properly or innocent made, or that the alteration did not
change the meaning or language of the instrument. If he fails to do that, the document shall not
be admissible in evidence. (32a)
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Section 32. Seal. There shall be no difference between sealed and unsealed private documents
insofar as their admissibility as evidence is concerned. (33a)
Section 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial language. Documents written in an
unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into
English or Filipino. To avoid interruption of proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to
have such translation prepared before trial. (34a)
E-Commerce Act Sections 5-15
Rules on Electronic Evidence Rules 5-6, 9 and 11
CASES
Bunag v. CA
Heirs of Lacsa v. CA
Bartolome v. IAC
Pacific Asia Overseas v. NLRC
Zalamea v. Court of Appeals
People v. Monleon
Salison v. People
People vs. Lazaro
People v. Burgos
IBM Phils., Inc. v. NLRC
158 SCRA 299 (1988)

197 SCRA 234 (1991)
183 SCRA 102 (1990)
161 SCRA 122 (1988)
228 SCRA 23 (1993)
74 SCRA 263 (1976)
253 SCRA 758 (1996)
317 SCRA 435 (1999)
200 SCRA 67 (1991)
305 SCRA 592 (1999)
BUNAG v. CA
158 SCRA 299
By : Dalang, Phiels
The validity and authenticity of the execution of an unnotarized deed of absolute

sale must be proven, more so if such was signed by a mere thumbmark and that
there were no instrumental witnesses.
Facts:
The plantiff, Francisco Bunag testified that the property in question was originally owned by his father
Apolonio Bunag Aguas. His father allowed Jose Bautista Santiago, a nephew-in-law, to build a house on said lot on
condition that he would pay for the land taxes as compensation for the use of the land. On the other hand, the
defendant, Bruno Bautista, testified that he is the owner of the land in question by virtue of a deed of sale,
thumbmarked by Apolonio Bunag; that Bunag first offered it for sale to his brother Jose Bautista, but as the latter
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had no money, he referred the matter to his father; that after he was contacted in Baguio by his father, he sent the
P100.00 as consideration of the sale and so the sale was consummated between his father and Bunag; that he came
down from Baguio and had the house repaired and he stayed there with his family until liberation when they left the
house and allowed his sister Estrudes Bautista to live therein; that the property is declared in his name and he denies
that her sister Estrudes requested Apolonio Bunag to allow her to stay on the property as her sister had a house of
her own then. Brigida Bautista testified that her brother bought the said property from Apolonio Bunag and that she
was present when Bunag affixed his thumbmark on the document; that aside from this deed, there were other
documents supporting the sale as the note containing the consideration and the parties. The trial court decided in
favor of Bautista the plaintiff. CA ruled otherwise declaring due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale based
on the testimony of Brigida Bautista.
Issue:
Whether or not the thumb-marked, non-notarized and non-witnessed deed of sale of a parcel of
unregistered land can be excluded as evidence?
Ruling:
It must be emphasized that the deed of sale was not acknowledged before a notary public and neither are
there any signatures in the blank spaces for the signatures of attesting witnesses. The document is typewritten in
English and over the similarly typewritten words "APOLONIO BUNIAG" is a thumbprint. The deed of sale is not
notarized and is, therefore, a private writing whose due execution and authenticity must be proved before it can be
received in evidence.
Before any private writing may be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved
either:
(a) By anyone who saw the writing executed;
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or
(c) By a subscribing witness.
The testimony of Brigida Bautista has to be received with caution, coming as it does from a sister of the
defendants. The circumstances other alleged presence during the "execution" of the deed of sale was not related.
Neither does she give any light as to whether Apolonio Bunag understood the document. It should be noted that the
deed was written in English. Since it appears that said document was merely thumb-marked, it could reasonably be
inferred that Apolonio Bunag, the supposed vendor, was illiterate. Under the stances, the minimum proof necessary
to establish due authenticity should, in the least, include evidence that the document was duly read, explained and
translated to Apolonio Bunag. Unfortunately, no such evidence was presented. Another fact which compels this
Court to proceed with caution is the fact that there are no instrumental witnesses in the document. The mischief that
lurks behind accepting at face value a document that is merely thumb-marked. Without any witnesses to it, and not
acknowledged before a notary public could be one of the reasons behind the requirement of the rules on evidence
that a private writing must be shown to be duly executed and authenticated. The probative value of the testimony of
Brigida Bautista, who did not furnish us with any details surrounding the execution of the deed coming as it does
from a person whose partisanship can not, and should not, be overlook, fags short from the minimum requirements
of credibility. Indeed it has been said that the testimony of an eye-witness as to the execution of a private document
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must be positive. He must state that the document was actually executed by the person whose name is subscribed
thereto. It is not sufficient if he states in a general manner that such person made the writing. More so if the
document was merely thumb-marked.
The Court sustains and adopts the trial court's findings and its conclusion that private respondents have
failed to prove the due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale.
The due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale, not having been satisfactorily proven, such private
document should be excluded.
HEIRS OF LACSA VS CA
197 SCRA 234 (1991)
By : Dizon, May
The requirements for the application of the ancient document rule is that the
document must be:
1. at least 30yrs old;
2. is produced from the custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and
3. unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion. Also, when the copy
of a document is certified as an exact copy by a public office in which the original
is located, said copy is considered as compliant with the 2nd requirement
mentioned above.
Facts:
This is an action for recovery of possession with damages and ,preliminary injunction filed by the
petitioners, the heirs of Demetria Lacsa, against Aurelio Songco and John Doe based on the principal allegations that
petitioners are heirs of deceased Lacsa who, during her lifetime, was the owner of a certain parcel of land. The
private respondents allege that the petitioners Original Certificate of Title was merely a reconstituted copy upon
petitioners expedient claim that the owners duplicate copy had been missing when the truth is that Certificate of
title had long been cancelled by virtue of a sale and transfer of ownership to Limpin and Guevarra which was in turn
transferred to Inocencio Songco who bought the land later on. The court ruled in favor of the private respondents by
virtue of their inheritance from theor deceased father Inocencio Songco. Petitioners contend that the court
wrongfully applied the :ancient document rule, since the documents presented as evidence by private respondents
doesnot bear the signature of the alleged parties.
Issue:
Whether or not the ancient document rule was properly applied?
Ruling:
YES. Under the ancient document rule, for a private ancient document to be exempt from proof of due
execution and authenticity, it is not enough that it be more than thirty years ols; it is also necessary that the following
requirements are fulfilled; 1.) that it is produced form a custody in which naturally be found if genuine. 2.) that it is
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unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion. The second requirement refers to the extrinsic quality
of the document itself. The lack of signatures on the first pages, cannot be held to detract from the fact that the
documents in question, which were certified as copies of the originals on file with the Register of Deeds of
Pampanga, are genuine and free from any blemish or circumstance of suspicion.
BARTOLOME VS IAC
183 SCRA 102 (1990)
By : Dizon, May
The requirements for the application of the ancient document rule is that the
document must be:
1. at least 30yrs old;
2. is produced from the custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and
3. unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion.
Facts:
Lot No. 11165 was first declared as his property by Epitacio Batara. It was entrusted to his cousin Doroteo
Bartolome, who owns a lot southof Epitacios property. The property is now the subject of the dispute between
Resurreccion, daughter of Epitacio, and Ursula Cid, widow of the son of Doroteo Bartolome. Ursula Cid presented
documents alleging that it is the deed of sale of the lot in question. The Intermediate Appellate court ruled in favour
of Ursula Cid based on the deeds of sale which it considered ancient documents under Section 22. Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether the deed of sale presented by Cid considered ancient document?
Ruling:
NO. The first two requirements in Section 22 were met. It appearing that it was executed in 1917, it was
more than thirty years old when it was offered in evidence in 1983. It was presented in court by the proper custodian
thereof who is an heir of the person who would naturally keep it. However the document lost a page which
nonetheless affected its authenticity. It allegedly bears the signature of the vendor of the portion of the lot in question
and therefore contains vital proof of the voluntary transmission of rights over the subject of the sale.
PACIFIC ASIA OVERSEAS VS NLRC

161 SCRA 122 (1988)
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By : Dizon, May
A copy of a decision of a foreign court sought to be enforced in the Philippines

must be attested of the legal custodian of the original with a certificate from the
Philippine embassy and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Documents written in an unofficial language must be accompanied by a
translation into English of Filipino made by an official court interpreter, an
interpreter competent in both languages whose identity is revealed, or a
translator agreed upon by the parties. The translation may also be one sworn to
by translator as an accurate translation of the original or the translation may be
agreed upon by the parties as a true and faithful one.
Facts:
Private respondent Teodoro Rances was engaged by petitioner PASCOR as radio operator of a vessel
belonging to Pascors foreign principal, the Gulf-East Hip Management Limited. Rances failed to get along with his
co-workers and was being transferred from one workplace to the next. The foreign principal terminated the services
of private respondent. Petitioner filed a complaint against the private respondent for acts unbecoming a marine
officer and for character assassination with the POEA. Private respondent denied the charges and in the complaint
demanded an amount which a court in Dubai had awarded in his favor against petitioners foreign principal.
As evidence of the foreign award, private respondent submitted an original copy of the decision of the
Dubai court written in Arabic script and language, with a copy of an English translation by an unidentified translator
and a copy of the transmittal letter signed by one Mohd.
Issues:
1. Whether the copy of the Dubai decision was properly authenticated?
2. Whether the translation was effective?
Ruling:
POEA had no jurisdiction over cases for the enforcement of foreign judgments. Such a claim must be
brought before the courts. As to the first issue the answer is no. Respondent Rances failed to submit any attestation
issued by the Dubai official having legal custody of the original of the decision of the Dubai court that the copy
presented by said respondent is a faithful copy of the original decision, which attestation must furthermo0re be
authenticated by a Philippine Consular officer having jurisdiction in Dubai.
As to the second issue the answer is no. The English translation is defective. Section 34 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court requires that documents written in a non-official language (like Arabic)shall not be admitted
as evidence unless accompanied by a translation into English or Spanish or Filipino. The English translation
submitted by respondent is not sworn to as an accurate translation of the original decision in Arabic. Neither has that
translation been agreed upon by the parties as a true and faithful one.
ZALAMEA v. COURT OF APPEALS

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228 SCRA 23 (1993)
Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy

attested by the officers having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy,
and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate
may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.
Facts:
Zalamea and his wife and daughter purchased, in Manila, three tickets 3 for a flight from NewYork to Los
Angeles on TransWorld Airlines. While in NY, Zalamea received confirmations of their reserved flights. However,
when they checked-in at the airport, they were placed on the wait-list because all the seats were already taken. Mr.
Zalamea was allowed to board because he was holding the full-fare ticket of his daughter. On the other hand, Mrs.
and daughter Zalamea were not allowed to board. The two were constrained to purchase 2 different tickets on an
American Airlines flight which cost them $918. Upon arrival in the Philippines, Zalamea filed an action for breach
of contract of carriage. The Regional Trial Court awarded actual and moral damages. The Court of Appeals deleted
award of moral damages because there was no bad faith. The Supreme Court modifies and award actual, moral,
exemplary damages. TWA asserted that they are not in bad faith in not allowing the Zalameas to board despite their
confirmed tickets because the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking.
TWA solely relied on the testimony of its customer service agent to prove the existence of such law.
Issue:
Whether the U.S. Law allegedly allowing overbooking was proven?
Ruling:
No. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts may take judicial notice of them. Like any
other fact, they must be alleged and proved. TWA cannot solely rely on the testimony of its customer service agent.
Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officers having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The
certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. Existing jurisprudence states that overbooking amounts to bad
faith, entitling the passengers to an award of moral damages. And even if US law allows overbooking, TWA is in
bad faith in not informing its passengers that despite their confirmed seats there is a possibility that they will not be
able to board.
PEOPLE v. MONLEON
74 SCRA 263
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Affidavits written entirely in local dialects must be accompanied by a translation

for it to be admitted in court.
Facts:
Monleon was charged with parricide. He was accused of killing his wife by squeezing her neck, pressing
her head againsta post, and kicking her in the abdomen while he was in a drunken stupor. After his wifes death,
Monleon thumb marked a confession, written entirely in Cebuano and sworn to before the town mayor. During trial,
Monloen denied that he inflicted violence on his wife. He also said that some persons threatened to kill him if he did
not affix his thumbmark to his confession, which he said he merely signed because one Lt. Bongo asked him to sign
it so that the latter would take care of Monleons children. His son, Marciano, also executed an affidavit which was
entirely in Cebuano. This affidavit implicated Monleon for the death of his wife. This affidavit was admitted by the
court over the objection of Monleon. Monleon argues that the trial court erred in admitting the confession and
affidavit of the son.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the extrajudicial confession should be given weight?
2. Whether or not the affidavit, written entirely in Cebuano, was admissible?
Ruling:
On the first issue, the Court found that the extrajudicial was corroborated by evidence of the corpus delicti.
Moreover, the Court found that the confession was voluntarily executed by the accused.
On the second issue, the Court stated the trial court erred in admitting the affidavit since it was not
accompanied with the corresponding translation. The Rules of Court provides that documents written in an
unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English, [Spanish]
or the national language.
However, due to the overwhelming evidence against Monleon, he was still found guilty. However, the
Court issued a certification to the Chief Executive recommending that his penalty be reduced.
PEOPLE v. SALISON
253 SCRA 758
If a party does not object to the admission of a document written in an unofficial

language which does not have a corresponding translation, then the objection is
waived, and the said document is admissible in evidence.
Facts:
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Salison, along with his co-accused, was charged with the murder of Valmoria. The evidence revealed that
the Valmoria was mauled to death by the 4 accused. He was hit on the rear part of his head with wood. Feeling he
was close to death, Valmoria went to the house of the purok leader and wrote down a dying declaration wherein he
identified the accused. He died 3 days later. This declaration was written entirely in Cebuano. Salison brings this as
an error by the trial court;; however, he did not object to its admission in evidence during trail.
Issue:
Whether or not the declaration should be admitted?
Ruling:
Yes. The records do not disclose that the defense offered any objection to the admission of the declaration.
Thus, the defense waived whatever infirmity the document had at the time of its submission as evidence.
Moreover, while it is true that the Rules does not allow the admission of documents in an unofficial
language without a translation, the Court believed that the interest of justice would be preserved since no objection
was made and that the parties, judicial authorities, and the personnel concerned appeared to be familiar with or
knowledgeable with Cebuano anyway. Also, the written declaration was duly presented and the person who reduced
the declaration in writing was thoroughly questioned by the court, the prosecutor, and cross-examined by the defense
counsel. More importantly, everything written in the declaration of the victim was confirmed by the eyewitnesses.
PEOPLE v. LAZARO
317 SCRA 435 (1999)
Official records made in the performance of duty by a public officer of the

Philippines or by a person in performance of a duty specifically enjoined by law
are prima facie evidence of facts stated. A written statement signed by the officer
having custody of official record or by his deputy that after diligent search no
record or entry of specified tenor is found to exist in records of his office
accompanied by certification is admissible as evidence that records of office
contains no such record or entry.
Facts:
Apolinar Lazaro, while driving a yellow Toyota Tamaraw jeep, was stopped by P/Sgt. Bonnets attention
was caught by bystarnders who were shouting that said vehicle had a bloodied passenger. Bonnet instructed Lazaro
to follow mobile patrol to Bicol Regional Hospital. Pol. Maj. Tuazon, who got a tip by a phone call regarding the
incident, was waiting for them in the hospital. Tuazon, knowing that driver was armed, ordered driver to step out of
jeep. He saw that the driver had a handgun tucked in his waist. Driver pulled out handgun from its holster & dropped
it at the back of drivers seat. Tuazon pulled out Lazaro out of the vehicle and got hold of gun which was a .38
revolver containing 6 empty shells. Lazaro did not respond when he was asked why he had a gun and whether he
had license to possess such. Lazaro was later on brought to police headquarters and the gun was turned over to
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investigator. Supt. Antonio Sierra, Chief of Firearms & Explosives Office (FEO) at Camp Crame issued a
certification that Lazaro was not a licensed or registered firearm holder of any kind or caliber.
Lazaro claims that on the day of incident, he had a drinking spree with his nephew Manolo Lazaro &
Ricardo Ronquillo in Camarines Sur. They left the place at around 3 pm. While traveling, Manolo stopped the jeep
to urinate. Lazaro then saw Ricardo draw a gun and point it at him. Lazaro and Ricardo then grappled for possession
of gun. After some time, Lazaro realized that Manolo was hit and he was asking his uncle to bring him to hospital.
He could not do anything because he was still grappling with Ricardo. When Ricardo weakened and stopped
moving, he then brought Manolo to hospital. He left Ricardo who later on died. He claims that he does not know if
gun found in his possession was the same gun he was grappling with Ricardo. He further claimed that he and
Ricardo fell from the jeep and he cannot recall who was holding gun when it was fired. Thus claiming that shooting
of Ricardo was an accident. Prosecution presented Dr. Jurados testimony claiming that based on the autopsy,
injuries were not inflicted accidentally since more than one shot was inflicted on victim.
Issue:
1. Whether the elements of illegal possession of firearms was proven by the prosecution? Whether the
certification from Firearms & Explosives Section Chief is admissible?
2. Whether Lazaro should only be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms?
Ruling:
The existence of firearm is beyond dispute because it is recovered from the Tamaraw andconfirmed by
Tuazons testimony. Further, the fact that the accused who possessed the gun does not have corresponding permit to
possess the same is confirmed by the certification from Firearms and Explosives Section Chief.
The certification from Firearms & Explosives Section Chief is admissible as evidence since its a public
document procured in the line of duty. The fiscal himself witnessed its signing. The official who issued it is the
proper custodian of records of firearms in the Philippines. Under Rule 130, Sec. 44, Rules of Court, official
records made in performance of public duty by a public officer of the Philippines or by a person in the performance
of a duty specifically enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of facts stated. A written statement signed by the
officer having custody of official record or by his deputy that after diligent search no record or entry of specified
tenor is found to exist in records of his office accompanied by certification is admissible as evidence that records of
office contains no such record or entry.
In the case at bar, the Certification issued by the Commanding Officer of the PNP Firearm and Explosive
Office, which is the repository of all records regarding firearms in the Philippines is competent and admissible
evidence to prove that the accused Lazaro was not a licensed holder or possessor of a firearm of any kind or caliber.
Indeed, the certificate of a custodian that he has diligently searched for a document or an entry of a specified tenor
and has been unable to find it should be sufficient evidence of its non-existence in his office as though he made such
testimony on the stand.
The Court cited the cases of People vs. Molina & People vs. Feloteo which held that illegal possession of
firearm will only be an aggravating circumstance and no longer punishable as a separate offense. The amendments
of Republic Act 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997, while the crime in the case at bar is committed on May 5, 1991.
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Although penal laws generally have prospective application, retroactivity is allowed if such would be advantageous
to accused. Hence, the amendment that the use of unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance in a murder
case, should be applied to Lazaro. In the case at bar, homicide and illegal possession of firearms were tried
separately. By virtue of retroactivity, this is no longer possible. Lazaro is acquitted of illegal possession of firearms.
PEOPLE VS. BURGOS

200 SCRA 67
By : Romano, Esmeralda
The lack of confidence in the prosecution witness should not in any way affect
the integrity of the diskettes or the right of the prosecution to show the contents of
the diskettes.
Facts:
An information for violation of Republic Act no. 1700 was filed against Deduro et. al., by the City
Prosecutor of Cebu. No bail was recommended on the ground that the offense charged was non-bailable and the
respondents were allegedly leaders of the Communist Party of the Philippines.
Private respondents filed their petitions for temporary release on bail pending trial. Such petitions were
opposed except for that of Catalina Paras because she was then pregnant. While the prosecution was still presenting
evidence, Judge Burgos issued the assailed order fixing bail for five of the eight respondents. Furthermore, Judge
Burgos disallowed the prosecution's request for its witness, Eulogio Llego, a computer programmer, to print out in
open court the materials encoded in certain diskettes seized from private respondents by virtue of a search warrant.
Judge Burgos reasoned out that the contents of the said diskettes could have been manipulated which would be
prejudicial to the rights of the accused, because the prosecution has possession prior to the hearing of the diskettes.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Burgos committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the prosecution witness
form holding an actual demonstration in court of the contents of the diskettes seized from private
respondents? ---YES.
Ruling:
There was neither testimonial nor physical evidence to support the conclusion of Judge Burgos that the
diskettes might have been tampered with or their contents altered in order to secure the conviction of the accused.
The mere facts that the diskettes had been in possession of the prosecution does not necessarily imply that it had
altered or tampered with the evidence to suit its prosecutorial objective. The presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty prevails in the absence of evidence to contrary.
The judge's apprehension that the evidence might have been tampered with could be relieved by
designating a competent person agreeable to both parties who can perform the task of printing out the contents of the
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said diskettes. The lack of confidence in the prosecution witness should not in any way affect the integrity of the
diskettes or the right of the prosecution to show the contents of the diskettes.
IBM PHILIPPINESN vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 117221. April 13, 1999
The decisions of the Supreme Court, while adhering to a liberal view in the
conduct of proceedings before administrative agencies, have nonetheless
consistently required some proof of authenticity or reliability as condition for the
admission of documents.
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the decision,[1] dated April 15, 1994, of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) finding private respondent to have been illegally dismissed and ordering his
reinstatement and the payment of his wages from August 1991 until he is reinstated.
Petitioner IBM Philippines, Inc. (IBM) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of selling
computers and computer services. Petitioners Virgilio L. Pea and Victor V. Reyes were ranking officers of IBM
during the period pertinent to this case.
On April 1, 1975, private respondent Angel D. Israel commenced employment with IBM as Office Products
Customer Engineer. For the next sixteen (16) years, he occupied two other positions in the company, received
numerous awards, and represented the company in various seminars and conferences in and out of the country.
On February 1, 1990, private respondent was assigned to the team supervised by petitioner Reyes.
On June 27, 1991, petitioner Reyes handed a letter to private respondent informing the latter that his
employment in the company was to be terminated effective July 31, 1991 on the ground of habitual tardiness and
absenteeism
Alleging that his dismissal was without just cause and due process, private respondent filed a complaint
with the Arbitration Branch of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on July 18, 1991.
In his position paper filed on September 6, 1991, he claimed that he was not given the opportunity to be
heard and that he was summarily dismissed from employment based on charges which had not been duly proven.
Petitioners denied private respondents claims. It was alleged that several conferences were held by the
management with private respondent because of the latters unsatisfactory performance in the company and he was
given sufficient warning and opportunity to reform and improve his attitude toward attendance, but to their regret,
he never did. It was alleged that private respondent was constantly told of his poor attendance record and
inefficiency through the companys internal electronic mail (e-mail) system. According to petitioners, this system
allows paperless or telematiccommunication among IBM personnel in the company offices here and abroad. An
employee is assigned a User ID and the corresponding password is provided by the employee himself and,
theoretically, known only to him. Employees are then expected to turn on their computers everyday, log in to the
system by keying in their respective IDs and passwords in order to access and read the messages sent to and stored
in the computer system. To reply, an employee types in or encodes his message-response and sends the same to the
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intended recipient, also via the computer system. The system automatically records the time and date each message
was sent and received, including the identification of the sender and receiver thereof. All messages are recorded
and stored in computer disks .
Private respondent appealed to the NLRC which, on April 15, 1994, reversed the labor arbiters decision and found
private respondents dismissal illegal. The NLRC ruled: (1) that the computer print-outs which petitioners presented
in evidence to prove that private respondents office attendance was poor were insufficient to show that the latter
was guilty of habitual absences and tardiness; and (2) that private respondent was not heard in his defense before the
issuance of the final notice of dismissal.
Issue:
petitioner sought to prove that private respondent was sufficiently notified of the charges against him and
was guilty thereof because of his failure to deny the said charges.
Ruling:
The supreme Court applied the ruling in Uichico v. NLRC: which states as follows ...
xxxxx
It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the
technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases. However, this procedural rule should not be construed as a
license to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules. While the rules of evidence prevailing in the courts of
law or equity are not controlling in proceedings before the NLRC, the evidence presented before it must at least
have a modicum of admissibility for it to be given some probative value. The Statement of Profit and Losses
submitted by Crispa, Inc. to prove its alleged losses, without the accompanying signature of a certified public
accountant or audited by an independent auditor, are nothing but self-serving documents which ought to be treated
as a mere scrap of paper devoid of any probative value. Xxxx
Hence, in the case at bar, the computer print-outs, which constitute the only evidence of petitioners, afford
no assurance of their authenticity because they are unsigned. The decisions of this Court, while adhering to a
liberal view in the conduct of proceedings before administrative agencies, have nonetheless consistently required
some proof of authenticity or reliability as condition for the admission of documents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the NLRC, dated April 15, 1994, is hereby
AFFIRMED.
INTERPACIFIC TRANSIT VS. AVILES

G.R. NO. 86062, June 06, 1990
Objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it was formally

offered, and notwhen the particular document is marked is identified and marked
as an exhibit.
P a g e 277 o f 285
EVIDENCE

Facts:
This case hinges on the proper interpretation and application of the rules on the admissibility of
documentary evidence. Petitioner is the employer of respondents. Petitioner alleges that respondent (Aviles),
being then sub-agents of Interpacific, and as such enjoying its trust and confidence, collected from its various
clients' payments for airway bills which, instead of remitting it to their principal, they unlawfully converted to their
own personal use and benefit.
At the trial, the prosecution (Interpacific) introduced photocopies of the airway bills supposedly received
by the accused for which they had not rendered proper accounting. This was done in, the course of the direct
examination of one of the prosecution witnesses. The defense objected to their presentation, invoking the best
evidence rule. The prosecution said it would submit the original airway bills in due time. Upon such undertaking,
the trial court allowed the marking of the said documents. However, contrary to its promise, the prosecution did
submit the original airway bills nor did it prove their loss to justify their substitution with secondary evidence.
Nevertheless, when the certified photocopies of the said bills formally were offered, in evidence, the defense
interposed no objection.
The RTC acquitted the accused. The RTC held that the certified photocopies of the airway by were not
admissible under the rule that there can be no evidence of a writing the content of which is the subject of inquiry
other than the writing itself. Loss of the originals had not been proved to justify the exception to the rule as one of
the prosecution witness had testified that they were still in the ITI bodega. Neither had it been shown that the
originals had been recorded in an existing record a certified copy of which is made evidence by law. Because the
accused was acquitted, petitioner seeks to press the civil liability of the respondents, on the ground that the dismissal
of the criminal action did not abate the civil claim for the recovery of the amount.
Issue:
Whether or not the objection of the defense to the photocopies of the airway bill is in accordance with the
law?
Ruling:
In the case at bar, the photocopies of the airway bills were objected to by the private respondents as
secondary evidence only when they were being identified for marking by the prosecution. They were nevertheless
marked as exhibits upon the promise that the original airway bills would be submitted later.
It is true that the
original were never produced. Yet, notwithstanding this omission, the defense did not object when the exhibits as
previously marked were formally offered in evidence.
And these did not object when the exhibits as previously
marked were formally offered in evidence. And these were subsequently admitted by the trial court. The time for
objecting the evidence is when the same is offered. The objection of the defense to the photocopies of the airway
bill while they were being identified and marked as exhibits did not constitute the objection it should have made
when the exhibits were formally offered in evidence by the prosecution. No valid and timely objection was made at
that time.
DELOS REYES V. IAC

P a g e 278 o f 285
EVIDENCE

G.R. NO. 74768, AUGUST 11, 1989
By : Paulino, Eleonor
Formal offer of evidence is hardly applicable in summary proceedings where no

full-blown trial is held in the interest of a speedy administration of justice.
Facts:
Delos Reyes obtained a loan in the amount of 3,000 from the Rural Bank of Bauan which is secured by a
real estate mortgage. Being unable to pay the loan, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and was sold to Sps.
Ylagan on April 29, 1976 . The sale was registered in RD of Batangas on May 4, 1977.
Sps, Ylangan moved to eject Delos Reyes from the subject property. On her answer, Delos Reyes raised the
defense of irregularity on the auction and sale of the property thus, sought the dismissal of the complaint.
While the case is still pending, Delos Reyes wrote a letter addressed to the Sheriff of Batangas and tendered
the amount of 4,925.00 plus interest as redemption price for the land on April 26, 1978. The Sheriff then on his reply
refused to accept the tendered amount on the ground that the redemption period had already expired.
The trial court and the CA decided in favor of Sps. Ylagan stating that the redemption period had already
prescribed because the first tendered payment was insufficient.
During the appealed decision on the Supreme Court, the Sps. Ylagan contends the admission of Delos
Reyes letter and tender of payment to the Sheriff of the Court.
Issue:
Whether or Not the letter of Reyes tendering the price to the Sheriff and the latters response may be taken
into account of timelines of the redemption being not formally offered as evidence.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court ruled that the Sec. 35, Rule 132 of the Rules of court that while the subject provision must
be strictly implemented during ordinary proceedings, the policy is hardly applicable in summary proceedings where
no full blown trial is held in the interest of speedy administration of justice.
In this case, the Court noted that the letters were formally submitted by Delos Reyes when it was submitted
during the hearing on Delos Reyes motion to dismiss where both counsels of the parties are present. In fact, Judge
Relova took cognizance of the letters in his order. Further, Sps. Ylangan never questioned the admissibility of the
letters during their hearing on May 9, 1978 when the letters were presented. They only did so when the case was
already on appeal.
Lastly, based on the rule on summary procedure, the decision of the judge must be based on the pleadings,
depositions, admissions of affidavits and documents on file with the court after presumably examining the
authenticity and credibility of the evidence before him.
P a g e 279 o f 285
EVIDENCE

PEOPLE vs YATCO
97 Phil 940
The right to object is a mere privilege which the parties may waive; and if the
ground for objection is known and not reasonably made, the objection is deemed
waived and the Court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the
evidence.
Facts:
In an amended information filed by the City Attorney of Quezon City on March 22, 1955, Juan Consunji,
Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity is still unknown, were charged with having conspired together in
the murder of one Jose Ramos. During the progress of the trial on May 18, 1955, while the prosecution was
questioning one of its witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of the National Bureau of Investigation, in connection with the
making of a certain extra-judicial confession (allegedly made before him) by defendant Juan Consunji to the
witness, counsel for the other defendant Alfonso Panganiban interposed a general objection to any evidence on such
confession on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the other accused Panganiban.
The lower court ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to, but on an altogether different ground: that the
prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of defendants Juan Consunji and Alfonso
Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without prior proof of such conspiracy by a number of definite acts,
conditions, and circumstances.
Issue:
Whether or not the confession made is admissible as evidence.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court held that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the complete
exclusion of the prosecution's evidence on the alleged confessions of the accused Juan Consunji at the stage of the
trial when the ruling was made.
Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's confession may not be competent as
against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them without the
conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as
evidence of the declarant's own guilt, and should have been admitted as such.
Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful
enterprises("during its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long
after the conspiracy had been brought to an end.
Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove conspiracy between the two accused,
nor as evidence against both of them. In fact, the alleged confessions (both in writing and in tape recordings) had not
yet even been identified (the presentation of Atty. Xavier was precisely for the purpose of identifying the
confessions), much less formally offered in evidence. The prosecution might still be able to adduce other proof of
conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban before their confessions are formally offered in evidence. Assuming,
therefore, that section 12 of Rule 123 also applies to the confessions in question,it was premature for the respondent
Court to exclude them completely on the ground that there was no prior proof of conspiracy.
P a g e 280 o f 285
EVIDENCE

We see no need for the present to discuss the question of the admissibility of the individual extrajudicial
confessions of two or more accused for the purpose of establishing conspiracy between them through the identity of
the confessions in essential details. After all, the confessions are not before us and have not even been formally
offered in evidence for any purpose. Suffice it to say that the lower Court should have allowed such confessions to
be given in evidence at least as against the parties who made them, and admit the same conditionally to establish
conspiracy, in order to give the prosecution a chance to get into the record all the relevant evidence at its disposal to
prove the charges. At any rate, in the final determination and consideration of the case, the trial Court should be able
to distinguish the admissible from the inadmissible, and reject what, under the rules of evidence, should be excluded.
There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where questions arise as to admissibility
of evidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the erroneous acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the People can no longer appeal.
Wherefore, the order excluding the confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban is
annulled and set aside and the Court below is directed to proceed with the trial in accordance with law and this
opinion. Costs against respondents Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban.So ordered.
PHILAMGEN AND TIP V. SWEETLINES INC. ET AL.

GR. NO. 87343, AUGUST 5, 1992
Judicial admissions, verbal or written made by the parties in the pleadings or in

the court of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive no
evidence being required to prove the same, and cannot be contradicted unless
shown to have been made through palpable mistake or that no such admission
was made.
Facts:
The vessel SS VISHVA YASH belonging to or operated by SCI Line took on board 2 consignments of
cargoes for shipment from LA to Manila and Davao covered by bills of landing issued by SCI Line. The cargoes
were insured by Tagum Plastics and PHILMGEN. For the purpose of transshipment from Manila to Davao, SCI
Line used M/V Sweet Love owned and operated by Sweet Lines. The cargoes were comingled with similar cargoes
belonging to Evergreen Plantation. When the shipments were discharged, it was discovered that there were damages,
losses and shortages on the cargoes covered by bills of lading.
SLI failed to adduce any evidence in support of their ground of prescription and that the bills of lading said
to contain the shortened periods for filing and for instituting a court action against the carrier were never offered in
evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the bills of lading may be considered as evidence though not formally offered.
P a g e 281 o f 285
EVIDENCE

Ruling:
Yes. Although the bills of lading were not offered in evidence, the litigation obviously revolves on such
bills of lading which are practically the documents or contracts sued upon, hence they are inevitably involved and
their provisions cannot be disregarded in the determination of the relative rights of the parties thereto.
The bills of lading can be categorized as actionable documents which under the Rules must be properly
pleaded either as causes of action or defenses, and the genuineness and due execution of which are deemed admitted
unless specifically denied under oath by the adverse party.
PHILAMGENs failure to specifically deny the existence, much less the genuineness and due execution of
the instruments in question amounts to an admission. Judicial admissions, verbal or written made by the parties in
the pleadings or in the court of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive no evidence being
required to prove the same, and cannot be contradicted unless shown to have been made through palpable mistake or
that no such admission was made. Moreover, when the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are deemed
admitted because of the adverse partys failure to make a specific verified denial thereof, the instrument need not to
be presented formally in evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact.
CATUIRA v. CA,
G.R. NO. 105813, SEPTEMBER 12, 1994
The new rule would require the testimony of a witness to offer it at the time the
witness is called to testify. This is the best time to offer the testimony so that the
court's time will not be wasted. Since it can right away rule on whether the
testimony is not necessary because it is irrelevant or immaterial.
Facts:
On June 8 1990, 2 informations for estafa were filed against Catuira for having issued 2 checks for payment
to Ocampo, however, when the same was encashed it was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. After the
prosecution presented their evidence, Catuira filed a Motion to Dismiss by way of Demurrer to Evidence. Catuira
contended that the testimony of Ocampo was inadmissible in evidence since it was not properly introduced when she
was called to testify as mandated in Sec. 35, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Catuira also argued that
even if the testimony of Ocampo was considered, the evidence of the prosecution still failed to prove that the checks
were issued in payment of an obligation. However, the motion was denied for lack of merit and the motion to
reconsider was likewise denied.
On appeal, Catuira contended that shecould not have waived her right to object to the admissibility of the
testimony of private respondent since the rule requires that it must be done only at the time such testimony is
presented and the records plainly show that the opportunity for petitioner to object only came when the prosecution
attempted, albeit belatedly, to offer the testimony after it has rested its case.
P a g e 282 o f 285
EVIDENCE

Issue:
Whether or not the testimony of Ocampo should be considered admissible as evidence in accordance with
Sec. 35, Rule 132 of Revised Rules on Evidence.
Ruling:
The petition is devoid of merit. The reason for requiring that evidence be formally introduced is to enable
the court to rule intelligently upon the objection to the questions which have been asked. 7 As a general rule, the
proponent must show its relevancy, materiality and competency. Where the proponent offers evidence deemed by
counsel of the adverse party to be inadmissible for any reason, the latter has the right to object. But such right is a
mere privilege which can be waived. Necessarily, the objection must be made at the earliest opportunity, lest silence
when there is opportunity to speak may operate as a waiver of objections.
Thus, while it is true that the prosecution failed to offer the questioned testimony when private respondent
was called to the witness stand, petitioner waived this procedural error by failing to object at the appropriate time,
i.e., when the ground for objection became reasonably apparent the moment private respondent was called to testify
without any prior offer having been made by the proponent. Most apt is the observation of the appellate court:
While it is true that the prosecution failed to offer in evidence the testimony of the complaining witness
upon calling her to testify and that it was only after her testimony and after the petitioner moved that it be stricken
that the offer was made, the respondent Court did not gravely err in not dismissing the case against the petitioner on
the ground invoked. For, she should have objected to the testimony of the complaining witness when it was not first
offered upon calling her and should not have waited in ambush after she had already finished testifying. By so doing
she did not save the time of the Court in hearing the testimony of the witness that after all according to her was
inadmissible. And for her failure to make known her objection at the proper time, the procedural error or defect was
waived.
Indeed, the rationale behind Sec. 34, Rule 132, is manifest in the minutes of the Revision of Rules
Committee. 10 Thus The new rule would require the testimony of a witness to offer it at the time the witness is called
to testify. This is the best time to offer the testimony so that the court's time will not be wasted. Since it can right
away rule on whether the testimony is not necessary because it is irrelevant or immaterial.
VDA. DE ONATE v. CA
G.R. No. 116149, NOVEMBER 23, 1995
evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court
provided the following requirements are present, viz.: first, the same must have
been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have
been incorporated in the records of the case
Facts:
Taguba bought a parcel of land from Vda. De Onate in 1976 for 5,000 payable in 4 installments. Taguba
successfully paid her obligation however, after full payment, Vda. De Onate failed to reduce their contract in
writing. On December 30, 1976 Taguba died. On her death, the heirs of taguba inisiated a case against Vda. De
Onate seeking the execution of a public document of sale in favor of Taguba and her heirs in which Vda. De Onate
refused to do so.
P a g e 283 o f 285
EVIDENCE

The trial court on its decision ruled in favor of Taguba. On appeal, Vda. De Onate contented the recognition
of the trial court to Tagubas evidence particularly Exhibits F, F-1, F-2 and F-3 which had been marked but
was never formally offered as required by the Rules of Court.
On sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals still admitted the evidence for having complied with the
requisites of for admission; that the evidence must be duly identified by testimony duly recorded and it must be
incorporated in the records of the case.
Issue:
Whether or Not the documents marked as exhibits but not formally offered should be recognized by the
Court.
Ruling:
Yes. While the provision of the Rules of court states that for the evidence to be considered, the same must
be formally offered. Corollarily, the mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does
not mean that it is formally offered as part of the evidence. In Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, 10 the Court made a
distinction between identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer as an exhibit. The first is done in the
course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit while the second is done only
when the party rests its case and not before. A party, therefore, may opt to formally offer his evidence if he believes
that it will advance his cause or not to do so at all. In the event he chooses to do the latter, the trial court is not
authorized by the Rules to consider the same.
However, in People v. Napat-a 11 citing People v. Mate, 12 the Court relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed
evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following requirements
are present, viz.: first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same
must have been incorporated in the records of the case.
In the case at bench, the Court finds that the requisites were fully satisfied. The pieces of evidence in
question were identified in her testimony which was duly recorded. Likewise, the pieces of evidence are duly
attached and incorporated and made integral part thereof.
P a g e 284 o f 285
EVIDENCE

CONTRIBUTORS
Abdullah, Naila
Abutal, Ivydel
Balajadia, Nasreen Love Joy
Ceballos, Robert
Dalang, Phiels Veneel
Dauz, Maricel
Del Mundo, Ma. Fe
Dizon, May Maureen
Fernandez, Antonino
Go, Myka
Marcelo, Mark Joseph
Ortiz, Kathleen
Paulino, Eleonor
Rodulfo, Francis
Romano, Esmeralda
Salmani, Shaira
Solomon, Sundae
Trance, Romak
P a g e 285 o f 285

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EVIDENCE

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216 SCRA 25 (1993)

REYES VS. COURT OF APPEALS

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365 P.2d 448 (1961)

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EXCLUSIONARY RULES UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

SECTION 12, ARTICLE III

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STATUTORY RULES OF EXCLUSION

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APPROVED, September 9, 1955.

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145 SCRA 112 (1986)

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19 SCRA 413 (1967)

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