Professional Documents
Culture Documents
No. 12-2294
MOULAYE ABDEL CAMARA,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Howard, Circuit Judges.
been ordered removed to Guinea and has foregone the opportunity for
voluntary departure.
future
personal
injury
to
him
rising
to
the
level
of
persecution.
His
claim
of
persecution
was
based
on
his
future
First, he
argues that the IJ and the BIA erred in finding that it would be
reasonable for him to relocate internally, away from his family and
home village in Guinea, to avoid any personal injury.
Second, he
FGM
to
his
daughters,
should
they
return
with
him,
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emotional harm.
has
been
foreclosed
by
the
BIA,
in
reasonable
We deny
his petition.
I.
Camara is a native of Senegal and a citizen of Guinea.
He entered the United States on May 1, 1999, as a visitor, with
permission to remain for five months.
The
-3-
As to WOR,
she found that Camara had not been threatened in the past and had
not
established
the
probability
of
future
persecution
on
protected ground. More specifically, she found that Camara had not
shown that his United States citizen daughters would be forced to
return with him to Guinea if he was removed.
that any threat posed by his family and fellow tribespeople could
be avoided through relocation within Guinea, a course of action
that
would
be
circumstances.
reasonable
to
expect
him
to
follow
under
the
In addition, the
Board agreed with the IJ that the evidence on the record did not
support
finding
that
relocation
within
Guinea
would
be
unreasonable.
Finally, the BIA held that, insofar as Camara's claim was
predicated upon a fear of his daughters being subjected to FGM, the
-5-
Romilus v.
Matovu
"Under this
2009); see also Holder v. Martnez Gutirrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011, 2017
(2012) ("[The BIA's] position prevails if it is a reasonable
construction of the statute, whether or not it is the only possible
interpretation or even the one a court might think best." (citing
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843-844 & n.11 (1984))); INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415,
425 (1999) ("[J]udicial deference to the Executive Branch is
especially appropriate in the immigration context . . . .").
To qualify for WOR, "[t]he burden of proof is on the
applicant . . . to establish that his or her life or freedom would
be threatened in the proposed country of removal on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion."
U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(A).
-7-
grounds.
FGM within Guinea is "nearly universal," the IJ and in turn the BIA
erred in finding that internal relocation had not been shown to be
unreasonable.3
First, the evidence in the record does not clearly establish that
any harm would be inflicted upon the parents who oppose FGM in
Guinea, or that it would rise to the level of persecution of those
parents.
indicates only that "parents who do not have their daughter cut
might be considered neglectful."
As the IJ
Moreover,
both parties on the matter, and we have been informed that Camara's
wife was granted cancellation as well as permanent residence on
October 2, 2012.
States.4
Camara also argues that the IJ and the BIA erred in
failing to consider whether the threat of FGM to his daughters
constituted a threat of "direct" persecution5 to him in the form of
psychological injury.
two defects.
24 I. & N. Dec.
at 278; see also Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 516 (2009)
("[T]he BIA is entitled to deference in interpreting ambiguous
provisions of the [immigration statutory scheme].").
This court has recognized the authority of that holding.
See, e.g., Mariko v. Holder, 632 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing
In re A-K- and holding scheme does not permit relief for parent on
basis of threat of FGM to child); Kechichian v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d
15, 22 (1st Cir. 2008) (observing that In re A-K- "foreclose[s]"
the
parent,
to
FGM
is
not
in
itself
basis
for
581 F.3d 231, 241-43 (5th Cir. 2009) (denial of WOR); Gumaneh v.
Mukasey, 535 F.3d 785, 788-90 (8th Cir. 2008) (denial of WOR);
Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 614-18 (7th Cir. 2003) (denial of
CAT relief).
Camara invokes Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634 (6th Cir.
2004), as contrary precedent. See id. at 640-42 (affording refugee
status to parent based on fear of child being subjected to FGM).
Abay preceded In re A-K-, and did not have the benefit of the BIA's
reasoning in that case.
22 (quoting Niang v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 505, 512 (4th Cir. 2007)).
Camara argues that In re A-K- dealt only with theories of
"derivative" persecution, whereas the persecution that he theorizes
is "direct."
Not so.
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"derivative"
persecution
(not
cognizable).
Thus,
the
BIA