Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Before
Torruella, Baldock,* and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.
sued
the
Corps,
alleging
that,
during
She thereafter
her
transitory
I.
Background
applied
unsuccessfully
to
be
States
Specifically,
Constitution,
she
alleged
and
that,
claim
after
under
meeting
state
the
law.
minimum
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all claims that she could have brought against the Corps.
Rodrguez-Vives began working for the Corps on March 2,
2009. After being ordered to work at several different stations by
various supervisors, she was assigned permanently to a fire station
in Coamo where she claims she was subjected to a series of abuses
that gave rise to this lawsuit.
"constantly said in front of [her] that he did not know why he had
to end up stuck with her in his [s]tation" and "commented on
various [occasions] that [she] was incompetent, dumb, inept, [and]
that she did things backward."
Vives was cooking at the station the sergeant threw the pans she
was
using
in
the
trash.
On
August
18,
2009,
the
sergeant
After Rodrguez-Vives
complained about this conduct her captain held a meeting with the
sergeant,
but
the
sergeant
continued
to
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engage
in
the
same
Sergeant saw her in the parking lot of the Coamo station and
accelerated his car, showering her with dust.
During Rodrguez-Vives's time at the Coamo fire station
the only duties given to her were cooking, cleaning, and keeping
the station's journal.
shared among all firefighters" but in the Coamo station they were
not.
Vives
psychological
suffered
"severe
damages"
that
required
treatment.
On December 22, 2009, Rodrguez-Vives filed a complaint
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging under
Title VII that she had been discriminated against on account of her
sex and retaliated against for her earlier lawsuit.
She received
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Rodrguez-Vives timely
that
she
had
not
sufficiently
alleged
that
she
had
argues
that
Rodrguez-Vives
is
really
Pointing to the
district
to
court's
retention
of
jurisdiction
enforce
the
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See
545
limitations
U.S.
409,
context
419
that
(2005)
cause
(noting
of
in
action
the
statute
of
for
retaliation
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No reasonable person
Jones v.
See Gardner-Denver,
whether
the
restrictions
were
retaliatory.
The
role
in
parrying
the
other
allegations
of
retaliatory
-8-
The district
A complaint
need not allege every fact necessary to win at trial, but need only
include sufficient facts to make it "'plausible on its face.'"
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
A complaint "must
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plausibility
standard
"too
mechanically"
and
fail
to
read
that the Corps's refusal to hire her due to her sex violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.
The
Specifically, it
being
left
undefined
by
the
statute,
In Title VII,
carries
its
Nashville
&
Davidson
Cnty.,
555
U.S.
271,
276
(2009)
far
paradigmatic
short
act
of
of
filing
Title
retaliation
is
VII
claims.
firing
an
Indeed,
the
employee
for
Corps
concedes
that
the
2005
suit
"alleged
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42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1).
The
The opposition
for which she alleges she was punished therefore fell well within
the scope of the conduct that Congress sought to protect from
retaliation, whether or not she referred to Title VII (or exhausted
her Title VII remedies) in voicing that opposition.2
2.
The district court also found that the actions RodrguezVives alleged the Corps directed at her could not plausibly be seen
as materially adverse. Again, we disagree. In a retaliation case,
a plaintiff need only "show that a reasonable employee would have
found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this
context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination."3
Burlington
Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Rodrguez-Vives's allegations
about her superiors' conduct are sufficient to state a claim
consistent with this standard of material adversity.
A reasonable
person might well decide that it is not worth suing to obtain such
employment if she knew that, once she obtained it, she would be
subjected to the actions alleged in the complaint.
The actions about which Rodrguez-Vives complains fall
into two categories.
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2008) (quoting Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 68), and thus "fall
outside
the
scope
of
the
anti-discrimination
laws."
Id.
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employee
from
weekly
training
lunch
that
contributes
reasonable
discrimination.").
employee
from
complaining
about
she was assigned to cook and clean rather than to perform the same
jobs as others in the station, depending on the surrounding facts,
might make plausible a finding that there was an adverse employment
action.
which
were
not
"more
difficult,
less
prestigious,
or
"Although a plaintiff
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case."
Rodrguez-Vives.
Rather,
Rodrguez-Vives
may
proceed
to
discovery because she has alleged sufficient facts to make the noninnocent
explanation
of
these
facts
plausible.
See
Similarly, the
Corps's apparently uncontested assertion that it hired RodrguezVives as a firefighter after she filed this lawsuit does not
require us to reject her description of events occurring prior to
that hiring.
Nor,
contrary
to
the
district
court's
suggestion,
1, 10 (1st Cir. 2011) ("[A] court may not insist on the allegation
of specific facts that would be necessary to prove the claim at
trial." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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We have held
was satisfied.
See
But this is only the case where the bareness of the factual
Id.
Here, in contrast,
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons we vacate the district court's
order dismissing Rodrguez-Vives's complaint and we remand this
case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
We award no costs.
So ordered.
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