LABOR LAW

NORKIS VS. BUAT

NOVEMBER 17, 2013 ~ LEAVE A COMMENT

NORKIS DISTRIBUTORS, INC. AND ALEX D. BUAT, Petitioners,

vs DELFIN S. DESCALLAR, Respondent.
G.R. No. 185255, March 14, 2012
FACTS:
Respondent Delfin S. Descallar was assigned at the Iligan City
Branch of petitioner Norkis Distributors, Inc., a distributor of Yamaha
motorcycles. He became a regular employee and was promoted as
Branch Manager. He acted as branch administrator and had
supervision and control of all the employees. Respondent was also
responsible for sales and collection
In a memorandum, petitioners required respondent to explain in
writing within 48 hrs why he should not be penalized or terminated
for being absent without official leave (AWOL) or rendering undertime service on certain dates. Respondent explained that he
reported to the office on those dates, but he either went to the bank
or followed-up on prospects. As he was still within city limits, he did
not file any official leave or travel record.
Norkis conducted an investigation. Finding that respondent was not
able to prove that he was really in the branch or on official travel,
petitioners suspended him for 15 days without pay. According to
petitioners, respondent admitted during the investigation that he
used company time for his personal affairs, but only for a few hours
and not the whole day.
While respondent was still suspended, Norkis also found that
Respondent committed some inappropriate and irregular acts such

as unexplained low performance of his branch, missing funds,

unauthorized disbursement of funds, irregular transactions.
Petitioners terminated respondents services for loss of trust and
confidence and gross inefficiency. Respondent filed a complaint for
illegal suspension and illegal dismissal. LA favored respondent.
Petitioners appealed to NLRC. NLRC reversed the LAs decision and
found respondent to have been validly dismissed. The NLRC,
however, upheld the LAs finding that petitioners are liable to
respondent for unpaid wages. Respondent filed MR. It was denied so
he filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. CA reinstated with
modification the decision of the LA. Respondent filed a motion for
clarification as to the awards of separation pay and back wages
while petitioners filed MR. CA issued a Resolution stating that as
regards respondents motion for clarification, the separation pay and
back wages shall be reckoned from the time respondent was illegally
suspended until finality of its earlier Decision. The CA likewise
denied petitioners MR. Hence, petitioners filed the present petition.
ISSUE:
Was the failure of respondent to reach his monthly sales quota a
valid basis for loss of trust and confidence?
RULING:
NO. Loss of trust and confidence as a ground for termination of an
employee under Article 282 of the Labor Code requires that the
breach of trust be willful, meaning it must be done intentionally,
knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse. The basic
premise for dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence is that the
employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence. It is
the breach of this trust that results in the employers loss of
confidence in the employee.

Here, there is no question that as petitioners Branch Manager in

Iligan City, respondent was holding a position of trust and
confidence. He was responsible for the administration of the branch,
and exercised supervision and control over all the employees. He
was also incharge of sales and collection.
In termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to
show that the dismissal is for a just and valid cause and failure to do
so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal. The
quantum of proof required in determining the legality of an
employees dismissal is only substantial evidence. CA correctly held
that petitioners failed to discharge this burden.
Failure to reach the monthly sales quota cannot be considered an
intentional and unjustified act of respondent amounting to a willful
breach of trust on his part that would call for his termination based
on loss of confidence. This is not the willful breach of trust and
confidence contemplated in Article 282(c) of the Labor Code. Low
sales performance could be attributed to several factors which are
beyond respondents control. To be a valid ground for an employees
dismissal, loss of trust and confidence must be based on a willful
breach. To repeat, a breach is willful if it is done intentionally,
knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse.
Petitioners having failed to establish by substantial evidence any
valid ground for terminating respondents services, we uphold the
finding of the Labor Arbiter and the CA that respondent was illegally
dismissed.
An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: back
wages and reinstatement. The two reliefs provided are separate and

distinct. In instances where reinstatement is no longer feasible

because of strained relations between the employee and the
employer, separation pay is granted. The normal consequences of
respondents illegal dismissal, then, are reinstatement without loss
of seniority rights, and payment of back wages computed from the
time compensation was withheld from him up to the date of actual
reinstatement. Where reinstatement is no longer viable as an option,
separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of
service should be awarded as an alternative. The payment of
separation pay is in addition to payment of back wages.
The CA merely clarified the period of payment of back wages and
separation pay up to the finality of its decision modifying the LAs
decision. In view of the modification of monetary awards in the
Labor Arbiters decision, the time frame for the payment of back
wages and separation pay is accordingly modified to the finality of
the CA decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
from Atty. Daan^^

PRUDENTIAL VS. MAURICIO

NOVEMBER 17, 2013 ~ LEAVE A COMMENT

PRUDENTIAL BANK (now Bank of the Philippine Islands),

Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO S.A. MAURICIO substituted by his
legal heirs, MARIA FE, VOLTAIRE, ANTONIO, JR., ANTONILO,
EARL JOHN, and FRANCISCO ROBERTO all surnamed
MAURICIO, Respondent. G.R. No. 183350; January 18, 2012
FACTS:

Respondent Mauricio was the Branch Manager of Prudential Banks

Magallanes Branch in Makati City when he was dismissed from
employment.
Spouses Marcelo and Corazon Cruz (Spouses Cruz) opened a dollar
savings account (FXSD No. 221-6) with an initial cash deposit of
US$500.00, in the Banks Magallanes Branch. At that time, Mauricio
was already its Branch Manager. Spouses Cruz also executed Deeds
of Real Estate Mortgage over their properties in San Juan in favor of
the bank.
An audit investigation was conducted in the Magallanes Branch. The
reports of the audit team showed that from March 1991 to August
1991, credits to FXSD No. 221-6 consisted mostly of dollar check
deposits composed of U.S. Treasury Warrants (USTWs), U.S. Postal
Money Orders, Travellers Express and Amexco Money Orders.
Despite the fact that Spouses Cruz were not the payees of said
instruments and neither of them endorsed the same, Mauricio
allowed immediate withdrawals against them. Most of the proceeds
of the encashments were then deposited to a peso savings account,
S/A No. 3396, also in the name of the Spouses Cruz.
The dollar checks were eventually returned by their drawee banks
for having forged endorsements, alterations to the stated amounts,
or being drawn against insufficient funds, among other reasons.
Allegedly, upon receipt of the returned checks at the Magallanes
Branch, Mauricio debited FXSD No. 221-6, but such debits were
made against the uncollected deposits of the Spouses Cruz. Some of
the returned checks and USTWs were lodged to accounts receivable
because the balance of FXSD No. 221-6 was not sufficient to cover
the returned checks. Simultaneously, cash withdrawals were allowed

even if S/A No. 3396 did not have sufficient balance to cover the
withdrawals at the time they were made.
Mauricio was directed to report for work at the Head Office
immediately. The Prudential Bank President issued a Memorandum
to Mauricio furnishing him with a copy of the audit teams report and
directing him to report in writing within 72 hours from receipt of the
memorandum why the bank should not institute an action against
him. The report showed that the bank was exposed to losses
amounting to $774,561.58.
While the investigation against Mauricio was ongoing, as conducted
by a Hearing Committee, the property subject of the Deeds of Real
Estate Mortgage executed by the Spouses Cruz was extrajudicially
foreclosed by the Bank for. Spouses Cruz, however, sought the
annulment and/or declaration of nullity of foreclosure in a complaint
or civil case filed with RTC- Makati.
The Bank claimed that it sent the proper demand letters to the
Spouses but to no avail. Thus, it was constrained to foreclose the
mortgaged property extrajudicially for the settlement of the
obligations of the Spouses Cruz including the returned USTWs,
checks and drafts. Later, while the investigation against Mauricio
was still ongoing, the Bank filed an Amended Answer to implead
Mauricio in its counterclaim in the case filed by the Spouses against
the former, contending that he conspired and confederated with the
Spouses Cruz to commit the fraud.
The Hearing Committee of the Bank found that there was sufficient
evidence to hold Mauricio guilty of the charges against him. The
Board of Directors issued Resolution considering the

recommendation of the Hearing Committee and the Board found

Antonio S.A. Mauricio to have violated Bank policies and regulations
and committed imprudent acts prejudicial to the interests of the
Bank, resulting in monetary loss to the Bank and giving rise to loss
of trust and confidence. The services of Mr. Mauricio was terminated
and that his retirement benefits was forfeited.
Mauricio filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal with
prayer for back wages, retirement and provident benefits, vacation
and sick leave credits, and actual, moral and exemplary damages,
plus attorneys fees. While the illegal dismissal complaint was
pending, the Makati RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the Spouses
Cruz and Mauricio. It was affirmed by the CA and Supreme Court.
On the other hand, LA rendered a Decision holding that the Bank
was justified in terminating Mauricios employment. The LA ruled
that even if Mauricio, as branch manager, was clothed with
discretion, he gravely abused it to the detriment and prejudice of
the Bank and that he was afforded procedural due process before he
was dismissed. However, LA ordered the bank to pay Mauricio his
13th month pay and sick leaves earned and reimburse him his
actual contributions to the provident fund, all with legal interest at
12% per annum from date of the decision until actual payment
and/or finality of the decision.
Mauricio filed a partial appeal of the LAs decision with the NLRC,
which, however, affirmed the LAs decision. On appeal, CA set aside
the NLRC decision and ruled in favor of Mauricio. Bank filed the
instant petition.
ISSUE:

Whether the acts of Mauricio with respect to the accounts of

Spouses Cruz can be considered as grounds for his termination due
to loss of trust and confidence.
RULING:
Civil and labor cases require different quanta of proof the former
requiring preponderance of evidence while the latter only calls for
substantial evidence. Despite the dissimilarity, this does not spell
closing our eyes to facts conclusively determined in one proceeding
when the determination of the very same facts are crucial in
resolving the issues in another proceeding pursuant to the doctrine
of res judicata.
The present labor case is closely related to the civil case that was
decided with finality. In the civil case, the Banks counterclaim for
actual and exemplary damages against Mauricio was grounded on
his alleged violations of office policies when he allowed the
encashment and/or withdrawal prior to clearing of numerous USTWs
and dollar checks and allegedly tried concealing from the Bank the
fact that said instruments were returned.
The RTC in the civil case ruled:
Further, this court finds that PRUDENTIALs branch manager
MAURICIOs act of allowing SPOUSES CRUZ to immediately withdraw
the instruments is well within his functions as a branch manager. A
person occupying such position exercises a certain degree of
discretion with respect to the accommodations extended to certain
valued clients such as herein SPOUSES CRUZ. Having been
recommended by the legal counsel himself of PRUDENTIAL and in
view of the fact that they have substantial deposit with the same

bank, it cannot be doubted that SPOUSES CRUZ were valued

clients.
The court also holds that MAURICIO was not in anyway prompted by
any malicious motive in approving the encashment and/or
withdrawal.
The acts and omissions alleged by the Bank in the civil case as basis
of its counterclaim against Mauricio, are the very same acts and
omissions which were used as grounds to terminate his
employment. Mauricio cannot be held to have abused the discretion
he was clothed with absent some semblance of parameters. In the
absence of such guidelines, the validity of Mauricios acts can be
tested by determining whether they were justified under the
circumstances. In exercising his discretion to allow the questioned
withdrawals, Mauricio took into consideration the fact that the
Spouses Cruz have substantial deposit and security, and enjoyed a
favorable credit standing with the Bank. No malice can be inferred
from Mauricios acts who tried to collect from the Spouses Cruz and
reported all the transactions to the head office; in fact, the Bank
never called his attention to any irregularity in the transactions but
even continued to credit the account of the spouses for the value of
the returned checks. Under the circumstances, Mauricio indeed fully
considered the interest of his employer before approving the
questioned transactions.
For a dismissal based on loss of trust and confidence to be valid, the
breach of trust must be willful, meaning it must be done
intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse.
Loss of trust and confidence stems from a breach of trust founded

on dishonest, deceitful or fraudulent act. This is obviously not the

case here.
Office Order No. 1596, one of the office orders allegedly violated by
Mauricio, provides:
Approving officers shall exercise extreme caution in allowing
deposit of, encashment or withdrawals against foreign and out-oftown checks. Refund to the bank of the amount involved shall be the
personal responsibility and accountability of the officer who
authorized the deposit or encashment over the counter when the
check should be returned by the drawee bank for any reason
whatsoever.
The above company directive is an explicit admission that Mauricio
was clothed with such discretion to enter into the questioned
transactions as well as a forewarning that in case the foreign and
out-of-town checks were returned for whatever reason, the
approving officer, in this case, Mauricio, shall be personally
responsible and accountable. personal responsibility and
accountability could only mean the reimbursement of the value of
any dishonored check but does not mean termination of the
approving officers employment for breaching the banks trust and
confidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
From Atty. Daan^^

COLEGIO VS. VILLAS

NOVEMBER 17, 2013 ~ LEAVE A COMMENT

G.R. No. 137795 March 26, 2003

COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN CALAMBA, petitioner,
vs.
BELEN P. VILLAS, respondent.
FACTS: respondent Belen Villas was employed by the petitioner
School as high school teacher in September 1985. On May 15, 1995,
she applied for a study leave for six months, from June to December
31, 1995. In a letter dated June 2, 1995, Mrs. Angelina Quiatchon,
principal of the high school department, told Villas that her request
for study leave was granted for one school year subject to the
following conditions:
1. The requested study leave takes effect on June 5, 1995 and ends
on March 31, 1996;
2. The requested study leave involves no remuneration on the part
of the School;
3. The documents that justify the requested study leave should be
submitted upon return on April 1, 1996;
4. Faculty Manual Section 40 Special Provisions on the Granting of
Leave of Absence should be observed:
a. Once proven beyond reasonable doubt during the period of the
approved leave of absence that the faculty member shall engage
himself in employment outside the institution, the administration
shall regard the faculty member on leave as resigned;
b. The maximum length of leave of absence that may be applied for
by the faculty member and granted by administration is twelve (12)
months. If, at the lapse of the period, the faculty member fails to
return for work, the administration shall regard the faculty member
as resigned.

RESPONDENT ALLEGED: that she intended to utilize the first

semester of her study leave to finish her masteral degree at the
Philippine Womens University (PWU). Unfortunately, it did not push
through so she took up an Old Testament course in a school of
religion and at the same time utilized her free hours selling
insurance and cookware to augment her familys income. However,
during the second semester of her study leave, she studied and
passed 12 units of education subjects at the Golden Gate Colleges in
Batangas City. In response to the letters sent her by petitioner to
justify her study leave, she submitted a certification from Golden
Gate Colleges and a letter explaining why she took up an Old
Testament course instead of enrolling in her masteral class during
the first semester.
President and Rector of the School, Fr. Ramonclaro G. Mendez, O. P.,
wrote her, stating that her failure to enroll during the first semester
was a violation of the conditions of the study leave and that the
reasons she advanced for failure to enroll during the first semester
were not acceptable and thus:
In the first place, prudence dictates that you should have
ascertained first that you are still eligible to study at PWU to finish
your masteral degree before applying and securing the approval of
your leave by the School. In the second place, you should have
informed the School at once that you could not enroll in the first
semester so that your leave could have been adjusted for only onehalf (1/2) year. Thirdly, your engaging in some part-time business
instead of studying in the first semester of your leave is sufficient
justification for the School to consider you as resigned under the
Faculty Manual. And lastly, your failure to study in the first semester
of your study leave without informing the School beforehand

constitutes deception, to say the least, which is not a good example

to the other teachers.
Voluntary Arbitrator Mayuga who found that respondent was illegally
dismissed. MR denied. CA affirmed, Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: whether or not respondents alleged violation of the
conditions of the study grant constituted serious misconduct which
justified her termination from petitioner School.
HELD: NO
Under the Labor Code, there are twin requirements to justify a valid
dismissal from employment: (a) the dismissal must be for any of the
causes provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code (substantive
aspect) and (b) the employee must be given an opportunity to be
heard and to defend himself (procedural aspect).7 The procedural
aspect requires that the employee be given two written notices
before she is terminated consisting of a notice which apprises the
employee of the particular acts/omissions for which the dismissal is
sought and the subsequent notice which informs the employee of
the employers decision to dismiss him.
In the case at bar, the requirements for both substantive and
procedural aspects were not satisfied.
petitioner School argues that the conduct of respondent breached
not only the provisions of the study grant (which was a contractual
obligation) but also the Faculty Manual. Respondent was thus guilty
of serious misconduct which was a ground for termination.
Misconduct is improper or wrongful conduct. It is the transgression
of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent

and not mere error of judgment.9 Under Article 282 of the Labor
Code, the misconduct, to be a just cause for termination, must be
serious. This implies that it must be of such grave and aggravated
character and not merely trivial or unimportant.
The alleged infractions of the respondent could hardly be considered
serious misconduct:
1. Her alleged failure to report for work EXACTLY on April 1, 1996
(respondent reported on May 15, 1996) is not equivalent to failure
to return for work, a sanctionable offense under the Faculty Manual.
Although we give credence to petitioners argument that a private
high school teacher still has work at the end of the schoolyear to
assist in the graduation preparations and in the beginning of the
school year to assist in the enrollment such tasks cannot be
considered a teachers main duties, the failure to perform which
would be tantamount to dereliction of duty or abandonment.
2. With regard to her alleged failure to enroll during the first
semester, although we agree with the President and Rector, Fr.
Mendez, that respondent should have first ascertained whether she
was still eligible to study at the PWU before applying for a study
leave,17 such lapse was more of an error in judgment rather than an
act of serious misconduct. If respondent intended to use her study
leave for other unauthorized purposes, as petitioner would like us to
believe, she would not have enrolled at the Golden Gate Colleges
during the second semester. Yet she did, as borne out by the
certification18 prepared by the Registrar of Golden Gate Colleges.
3. Respondent did not violate the prohibition on engaging in
employment outside the school as specified in her study leave grant

and as provided in the Faculty Manual. Section 40 (a) of the Manual.

The prohibition against outside employment was enacted to prevent
the teacher from using the study leave period for unsanctioned
purposes since the School pays the teacher while pursuing further
studies. That rationale was not violated by respondent for the
reason that her part-time activity of selling insurance and cookware
could not have prevented her in any way from studying and, more
importantly, she was not being paid by the School while on leave.
How did the school expect her and her family to survive without any
income for one whole year?
Petitioner also failed to comply with the procedural requirements for
a valid dismissal. Petitioner failed to give respondent the first notice
which should have informed the latter of the formers intention to
dismiss her. Petitioner argues that it complied with this requirement
as there were several exchanges of communication between the
School and respondent regarding the cause of her termination.
However, we find that these letters did not apprise respondent that
her dismissal was being sought by petitioner School as said letters
only required respondent to submit proof of enrollment.
PETITION DENIED.
________________________
NOTES:
Examples of serious misconduct justifying termination, as held in
some of our decisions, include: sexual harassment (the managers
act of fondling the hands, massaging the shoulder and caressing the
nape of a secretary);11 fighting within company premises;12
uttering obscene, insulting or offensive words against a superior;13
misrepresenting that a student is his nephew and pressuring and

intimidating a co-teacher to change that students failing grade to

passing.
respondent is not entitled to the six-month study leave and
vacation pay, the same was expressly waived by complainant when
she signed conforme to the letter dated June 2, 1995 approving her
study leave which states among others, to wit: 2. The requested
study leave involves no remuneration on the part of the school
from Atty. Bayani^^

VICENTE VS. CA
NOVEMBER 17, 2013 ~ LEAVE A COMMENT

G.R. No. 175988 August 24, 2007

MA. FININA E. VICENTE, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Former Seventeenth Division
and CINDERELLA MARKETING CORPORATION, Respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Finina E. Vicente was employed by respondent
Cinderella Marketing Corporation (Cinderella) as Management
Coordinator in January 1990. Prior to her resignation in February
2000, she held the position of Consignment Operations Manager
with a salary of P27,000.00 a month.5 She was tasked with the
oversight, supervision and management of the Consignment
Department dealing directly with Cinderellas consignors.
Petitioner alleged that it has been a practice among the employees
of Cinderella to obtain cash advances by charging the amount from
the net sales of Cinderellas suppliers/consignors. Request for cash
advances are approved by Mr. TECSON (AVP-Finance).

After some time, one of Cinderellas suppliers complained about the

unauthorized deductions from the net sales due them. Accordingly,
an investigation was conducted and upon initial review of
respondents business records, it appears that petitioner was among
those involved in the irregular and fraudulent preparation and
encashment of respondents corporate checks amounting to at least
P500,000.00.
Petitioner alleged that Mr. Tecson demanded her resignation on
several occasions. On February 15, 2000, Mr. Tecson allegedly told
her MAG-RESIGN KANA AGAD KASI MAIIPIT KAMI, in the presence
of Lizz Villafuerte, the Accounting Manager.9 As a result of this
alleged force and intimidation, petitioner tendered her resignation
letter.
Three (3) years after her resignation, petitioner filed a complaint
against Cinderella alleging that her severance from employment
was involuntary amounting to constructive dismissal. Cinderella
denied the charge of constructive dismissal.
LA ruled in favour of petitioner; NLRC affirmed. MR denied;
CA reversed on stating that, totality of evidence on record showed
that petitioner voluntarily resigned from her employment; that the
subsequent acts of petitioner belie the claim of constructive
dismissal; that after the alleged forced resignation, petitioner
attended the meetings concerning her involvement in the
anomalous transactions and even arranged for the settlement of her
consequent liabilities as may be determined during the
investigation; that the belated filing of the complaint militates
against petitioner because it is hardly expected from an aggrieved

employee to wait three years before instituting the case. MR

denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON petitioner was constructively dismissed by Cinderella
(or was there voluntary resignation on the part of petitioner?)
HELD: NO, respondent voluntarily resigned.
In termination cases, burden of proof rests upon the employer to
show that the dismissal is for a just and valid cause and failure to do
so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal.19 In
Mobile Protective & Detective Agency v. Ompad, the Court ruled that
should an employer interpose the defense of resignation, as in the
present case, it is still incumbent upon respondent company to
prove that the employee voluntarily resigned.
From the totality of evidence on record, it was clearly demonstrated
that respondent Cinderella has sufficiently discharged its burden to
prove that petitioners resignation was voluntary. In voluntary
resignation, the employee is compelled by personal reason(s) to
disassociate himself from employment. It is done with the intention
of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act
of abandonment.21 To determine whether the employee indeed
intended to relinquish such employment, the act of the employee
before and after the alleged resignation must be considered.
Petitioner relinquished her position when she submitted the letters
ofresignation.The resignation letter submitted on February 15, 2000
confirmed the earlier resignation letter she submitted on February 7,
2000. The resignation letter contained words of gratitude which can
hardly come from an employee forced to resign.
A careful scrutiny of the said letter shows that it bears the signature
of petitioner (contrary to what the LA stated). More importantly,

petitioner admitted having submitted the said letter, albeit, due to

an alleged intimidation.
Subsequently, petitioner stopped reporting for work although she
met with the officers of the corporation to settle her accountabilities
but never raised the alleged intimidation employed on her. Also,
though the complaint was filed within the 4-year prescriptive period,
its belated filing supports the contention of respondent that it was a
mere afterthought.24 Taken together, these circumstances are
substantial proof that petitioners resignation was voluntary.
Having submitted a resignation letter, it is then incumbent upon her
to prove that the resignation was not voluntary but was actually a
case of constructive dismissal with clear, positive, and
convincing evidence.26 Petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of
constructive dismissal.
Bare allegations of constructive dismissal, when uncorroborated by
the evidence on record, cannot be given credence.
In St. Michael Academy v. National Labor Relations Commission,28
we ruled that mere allegations of threat or force do not constitute
substantial evidence to support a finding of forced resignation. We
enumerated the requisites for intimidation to vitiate consent as
follows:
(1) that the intimidation caused the consent to be given; (2) that the
threatened act be unjust or unlawful; (3) that the threat be real or
serious, there being evident disproportion between the evil and the
resistance which all men can offer, leading to the choice of doing the
act which is forced on the person to do as the lesser evil; and (4)
that it produces a well-grounded fear from the fact that the person
from whom it comes has the necessary means or ability to inflict the
threatened injury to his person or property. x x x

None of the above requisites was established by petitioner. Neither

can we consider the conduct of audits and other internal
investigations as a form of harassment against petitioner. Said
investigation was legitimate and justified
Moreover, we note that petitioner is holding a managerial position
with a salary of P27,000.00 a month. Hence, she is not an ordinary
employee with limited understanding such that she would be easily
maneuvered or coerced to resign against her will.
PETITION DENIED.
__________
NOTES:
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required is
substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla of
evidence, but such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
from Atty. Bayani^^

BARCENAS VS. NLRC

NOVEMBER 17, 2013 ~ LEAVE A COMMENT

G.R. No. 87210 July 16, 1990

FILOMENA BARCENAS, petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), Rev.
SIM DEE the present Head Monk of the Manila Buddha
Temple, MANUEL CHUA, in his capacity as the President and
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Poh Toh Buddhist

Association of the Philippines, Inc., and in his private

capacity,respondents.
FACTS: The Buddhist Temple has hired petitioner who speaks the
Chinese language as secretary and interpreter. The head monk,
Chua Se Su, had sexual relations with petitioner, which resulted to
the latter giving birth to a child. In May, 1982, of five months before
giving birth to the alleged son of Su on October 12, 1982, petitioner
was sent home to Bicol. Upon the death of Su in July, 1983,
complainant remained and continued in her job. In 1985, respondent
Manuel Chua (Chua, for short) was elected President and Chairman
of the Board of the Poh Toh Buddhist Association of the Philippines,
Inc. and Rev. Sim Dee for short) was elected Head Buddhist Priest.
Thereafter, Chua and Dee discontinued payment of her monthly
allowance and the additional P500.00 allowance effective 1983.
Petitioner and her son were evicted forcibly from their quarters in
the temple by six police officers. She was brought first to the Police
precinct in Tondo and then brought to Aloha Hotel where she was
compelled to sign a written undertaking not to return to the
Buddhist temple in consideration of the sum of P10,000.00.
Petitioner refused and Chua shouted threats against her and her
son. Her personal belongings including assorted jewelries were
never returned by respondent Chua.
Chua alleges that she was never an employee of the temple, but
only attended to the personal needs of the former head monk,
hence was co-terminus with such.
LA ruled in favour of the petitioner. NLRC reversed.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is an employee of the temple
HELD:
Petitioner is an employee of the temple as secretary and interpreter.

Moreover, the work that petitioner performed in the temple could

not be categorized as mere domestic work. We find that petitioner,
being proficient in the Chinese language, attended to the visitors,
mostly Chinese, who came to pray or seek advice before Buddha for
personal or business problems; arranged meetings between these
visitors and Su and supervised the preparation of the food for the
temple visitors; acted as tourist guide of foreign visitors; acted as
liaison with some goverment offices; and made the payment for the
temples Meralco, MWSS and PLDT bills. Indeed, these tasks may not
be deemed activities of a household helper. They were essential and
important to the operation and religious functions of the temple.
In spite of this finding, her status as a regular employee ended upon
her return to Bicol in May, 1982 to await the birth of her love-child
allegedly by Su. The records do not show that petitioner filed any
leave from work or that a leave was granted her. Neither did she
return to work after the birth of her child on October 12, 1982,
whom she named Robert Chua alias Chua Sim Tiong. The NLRC
found that it was only in July, 1983 after Su died that she went back
to the Manila Buddhist Temple. Petitioners pleadings failed to rebut
this finding. Clearly, her return could not be deemed as a
resumption of her old position which she had already abandoned.
Thus, her return to the temple was no longer as an employee but
rather as Sus mistress who is bent on protecting the proprietary and
hereditary rights of her son and nephew. Finally, while petitioner
contends that she continued to work in the temple after Su died,
there is, however, no proof that she was re-hired by the new Head
Monk.
from Atty. Renes^^

BACSIN VS. WAHIMAN

NOVEMBER 17, 2013 ~ LEAVE A COMMENT

G.R. No. 146053, April 30, 2008

DIOSCORO F. BACSIN, petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO O. WAHIMAN, respondent.
FACTS: Petitioner is a public school teacher of Pandan Elementary
School. Respondent Eduardo O. Wahiman is the father of AAA, an
elementary school student of the petitioner.
AAA claimed that on August 16, 1995, petitioner asked her to be at
his office to do an errand. Once inside, she saw him get a folder
from one of the cartons on the floor near his table, and place it on
his table. He then asked her to come closer, and when she did, held
her hand, then touched and fondled her breast. She stated that he
fondled her breast five times, and that she felt afraid. A classmate of
hers, one Vincent B. Sorrabas, claiming to have witnessed the
incident, testified that the fondling incident did happen just as AAA
related it.
In his defense, petitioner claimed that the touching incident
happened by accident, just as he was handing AAA a lesson book.6
He further stated that the incident happened in about two or three
seconds, and that the girl left his office without any complaint.
CSC found petitioner guilty of Grave Misconduct (Acts of Sexual
Harassment), and dismissed him from the service. Specifically, the
CSC found the petitioner to have committed an act constituting
sexual harassment, as defined in Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. (RA)
7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.

CA determined that the issue revolved around petitioners right to

due process, and based on its finding that petitioner had the
opportunity to be heard, found that there was no violation of that
right. The CA ruled that, even if petitioner was formally charged with
disgraceful and immoral conduct and misconduct, the CSC found
that the allegations and evidence sufficiently proved petitioners
guilt of grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal from the service.
Petitioner argues that the CSC cannot validly adjudge him guilty of
an offense, such as Grave Misconduct (Acts of Sexual
Harassment), different from that specified in the formal charge
which was Misconduct. He further argues that the offense of
Misconduct does not include the graver offense of Grave
Misconduct.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of Sexual Harassment
HELD: The formal charge, while not specifically mentioning RA
7877, The Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, imputes on the
petitioner acts covered and penalized by said law.
Contrary to the argument of petitioner, the demand of a sexual
favor need not be explicit or stated. In Domingo v. Rayala, it was
held, It is true that this provision calls for a demand, request or
requirement of a sexual favor. But it is not necessary that the
demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in
a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with
equal certitude, from the acts of the offender.
The CSC found, as did the CA, that even without an explicit demand
from petitioner his act of mashing the breast of AAA was sufficient to
constitute sexual harassment. Moreover, under Section 3 (b) (4) of
RA 7877, sexual harassment in an education or training environment
is committed (w)hen the sexual advances result in an intimidating,

hostile or offensive environment for the student, trainee or

apprentice. AAA even testified that she felt fear at the time
petitioner touched her.
In grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to
violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule must
be manifest.14 The act of petitioner of fondling one of his students
is against a law, RA 7877, and is doubtless inexcusable. The
particular act of petitioner cannot in any way be construed as a case
of simple misconduct.
He is dismissed from service
Petitioner was not denied due process of law, contrary to his claims.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or,
as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain
ones side or an opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. It is clear that petitioner was
sufficiently informed of the basis of the charge against him, which
was his act of improperly touching one of his students. Thus
informed, he defended himself from such charge. The failure to
designate the offense specifically and with precision is of no
moment in this administrative case.
from Atty. Renes^^

YRASUEGUI VS. PAL

NOVEMBER 17, 2013 ~ LEAVE A COMMENT

G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008

ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners,

vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
FACTS: THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international
flight steward who was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to
the weight standards of the airline company.
The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from
147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as
mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual of PAL.
In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted PAL to send
him to an extended vacation until November 1985. He was allowed
to return to work once he lost all the excess weight. But the problem
recurred. He again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988
to February 1989.
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal
weight, petitioner remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was
informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded until such
time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards.
Again, he was directed to report every two weeks for weight checks,
which he failed to comply with.
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated
refusal to report for weight check would be dealt with accordingly.
He was given another set of weight check dates, which he did not
report to.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of
Administrative Charge for violation of company standards on weight
requirements. Petitioner insists that he is being discriminated as
those similarly situated were not treated the same.

On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due
to his inability to attain his ideal weight, and considering the
utmost leniency extended to him which spanned a period covering
a total of almost five (5) years, his services were considered
terminated effective immediately.
LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL are
reasonable in view of the nature of the job of petitioner. However,
the weight standards need not be complied with under pain of
dismissal since his weight did not hamper the performance of his
duties.
NLRC affirmed.
CA: the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner was
legally dismissed because he repeatedly failed to meet the
prescribed weight standards. It is obvious that the issue of
discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of
escaping the result of his dismissal for being overweight.
ISSUE: WON he was validly dismissed.
HELD: YES
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other
conclusion than that they constitute a continuing qualification of an
employee in order to keep the job. The dismissal of the employee
would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against
petitioners claims that obesity is a disease. That he was able to
reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible
for him to lose weight given the proper attitude, determination, and

self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on December

8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that [t]he issue is could I bring
my weight down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is
yes. I can do it now.
Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed
the assistance of the company physician, per the advice of PAL.
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the
context of his work as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause
under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal
from the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is
nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, [v]oluntariness
basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to the
employee without any external force influencing or controlling his
actions. This element runs through all just causes under Article 282,
whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission.
Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered
voluntary although it lacks the element of intent found in Article
282(a), (c), and (d).
NOTES:
The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide
occupational qualification defense. Employment in particular jobs
may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or
national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or
national origin is an actual qualification for performing the job. The
qualification is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).
In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used
because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid provided it reflects an

inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job

performance.
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed
itself to safely transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it
must necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly the cabin
flight deck crew who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards
of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline upon
its employees.
The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight
standards for cabin crew is flight safety.
Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the
employee as an act of social justice or based on equity. This is so
because his dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it
reflective of his moral character.
from Atty. Renes^^

SABEROLA VS. SUAREZ

NOVEMBER 17, 2013 ~ LEAVE A COMMENT

G.R. No. 151227 July 14, 2008

GREGORIO S. SABEROLA, Petitioner,
vs.
RONALD SUAREZ and RAYMUNDO LIRASAN, JR.,
Respondents.
FACTS: Case is for illegal dismissal with money claims filed by
respondents against petitioner. Latter is the owner and manager of
G.S. Saberola Electrical Services, a firm engaged in the construction
business specializing in installing electrical devices in subdivision

homes and in commercial and non-commercial buildings.

Respondents were employed by petitioner as electricians. They
worked from Monday to Saturday and, occasionally, on Sundays,
with a daily wage of P110.00.
Petitioner averred that respondents were part-time project
employees and were employed only when there were electrical jobs
to be done in a particular housing unit contracted by petitioner. He
maintained that the services of respondents as project employees
were coterminous with each project. As project employees, the time
of rendition of their services was not fixed. Thus, there was no
practical way of determining the appropriate compensation of the
value of respondents accomplishment, as their work assignment
varied depending on the needs of a specific project.
LABOR ARBITER: they are project employees, not entitled to benefits
NLRC: affirmed, but said they were illegally dismissed
CA: affirmed
ISSUE: What is their status? And were they illegally dismissed?
HELD: Project employees (BUT were illegally dismissed)
Petitioner, as an electrical contractor, depends for his business on
the contracts that he is able to obtain from real estate developers
and builders of buildings. Thus, the work provided by petitioner
depends on the availability of such contracts or projects. The
duration of the employment of his work force is not permanent but
coterminous with the projects to which the workers are assigned.
Viewed in this context, the respondents are considered as project
employees of petitioner.

A project employee is one whose employment has been fixed for a

specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of
which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the
employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal
in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
However, respondents, even if working as project employees, enjoy
security of tenure.
Nonetheless, when a project employee is dismissed, such dismissal
must still comply with the substantive and procedural requirements
of due process. Termination of his employment must be for a lawful
cause and must be done in a manner which affords him the proper
notice and hearing.
A project employee must be furnished a written notice of his
impending dismissal and must be given the opportunity to dispute
the legality of his removal. In termination cases, the burden of proof
rests on the employer to show that the dismissal was for a just or
authorized cause. Employers who hire project employees are
mandated to state and prove the actual basis for the employees
dismissal once its veracity is challenged.
Petitioner failed to present any evidence to disprove the claim of
illegal dismissal. No evidence was presented by petitioner to show
the termination of the project which would justify the cessation of
the work of respondents. Neither was there proof that petitioner
complied with the substantive and procedural requirements of due
process.
from Atty. Renes^^

RBC VS. BALUYOT

NOVEMBER 17, 2013 ~ LEAVE A COMMENT

G.R. No. 172670, January 20, 2009

RBC CABLE MASTER SYSTEM AND/OR EVELYN CINENSE,
Petitioners,
vs.
MARCIAL BALUYOT, Respondent.
FACTS: Herein petitioner RBC Cable Master System (petitioner RBC)
is a cable firm engaged in the business of providing home cable
service. Sometime in March 1996, petitioner RBC hired herein
private respondent Marcial Baluyot as a Lineman.
In the middle part of the year 2000, private respondent learned that
his outstanding loan from cash advances accumulated to
P18,000.00. The cash advances he made [were] pursuant to a long
time practice for the employees of petitioner RBC to advance
amounts of money in the form of cash vales with the condition that
the same be deducted from their monthly salaries on a staggered or
periodic basis. Respondent alleged that he delivered his motorcycle
as a security for said loans. But petitioner avers that such
motorcycle was actually leased, which lease only ceased when
respondent no longer owned said vehicle because of non-payment
of its financing.
On February 1, 2001, when private respondent reported for work, he
was informed that no blank official receipts could be issued to him
for his collection job for that day or for a month because he is being
suspended. Thus, for one month, he did not report for work and
when he reported back to duty, he was told by petitioner RBC that
he is now out of job and is considered terminated.

Petitioner RBC denied dismissing private respondent by contending

that it was private respondent who abandoned his work when,
sometime in March 2001, he left without any notice and never
returned back for work. They also alleged that respondent
committed several infractions such as misappropriations and
falsification of documents.
LABOR ARBITER ruled that private respondent abandoned his job
and committed acts of dishonesty such as theft of company funds
and property.
NLRC ruled that private respondent did not abandon his job but was
illegally dismissed.
ISSUE: WON respondent was illegally dismissed
HELD: YES
After respondent was punished with suspension by
petitioners, he was admitted back to work on the condition
that he will not repeat the same violations and he will pay
back the sums he owed. This proved that petitioners had
condoned the infractions previously committed by the
respondent.
To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur:
(1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason, and
(2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship, with the second element as the more
determinative factor and being manifested by some overt
acts. Mere absence is not sufficient. The employer has the
burden of proof to show a deliberate and unjustified refusal

of the employee to resume his employment without any

intention of returning.
In the case at bar, the charge of abandonment is belied by
the following circumstances: First, the high improbability of
private respondent to intentionally abandon his work
considering that he had already served a penalty of
suspension for his infractions and violations as well as the
petitioners tacit condonation of the infractions he
committed, by permitting him to go back to work and by
asking him to execute a promissory note. It is incongruent to
human nature, that after having ironed things out with his
employer, an employee would just not report for work for no
apparent reason. Secondly, there was no proof that
petitioner sent private respondent a notice of termination
on the ground of abandonment, if indeed it is true that he
really failed to go back to work. Section 2, Rule XVI, Book V,
Rules and regulations implementing the Labor Code provides
that any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall
furnish him a written notice stating the particular act or
omission constituting the ground for his dismissal. In cases
of abandonment of work, the notice shall be served at the
workers last known address. For this reason, We are
constrained to give credence to private respondents
assertion that he attempted to report back to work but he
was just asked to leave as he was considered terminated.
And lastly, private respondents filing of a case for illegal
dismissal with the labor arbiter negates abandonment. As
held by the Supreme Court, a charge of abandonment is
totally inconsistent with the immediate filing of a complaint

for illegal dismissal, more so when it includes a prayer for

reinstatement.
Finally, an employee who is illegally dismissed is entitled to
the twin reliefs of full backwages and reinstatement. If
reinstatement is not viable, separation pay is awarded to
the employee. In awarding separation pay to an illegally
dismissed employee, in lieu of reinstatement, the amount to
be awarded shall be equivalent to one (1) month salary for
every year of service.
from Atty. Renes^^

LEYTE GEOTHERMAL VS. PNOC

NOVEMBER 17, 2013 ~ LEAVE A COMMENT

G.R. No. 170351, March 30, 2011

LEYTE GEOTHERMAL POWER PROGRESSIVE EMPLOYEES
UNION ALU TUCP, Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OIL COMPANY ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
FACTS: Respondent is a GOCC while petitioner is a legitimate
labor organization. Among [respondents] geothermal
projects is the Leyte Geothermal Power Project located at
the Greater Tongonan Geothermal Reservation in Leyte.
Thus, the [respondent] hired and employed hundreds of
employees on a contractual basis, whereby, their
employment was only good up to the completion or
termination of the project and would automatically expire
upon the completion of such project.

Majority of the employees hired by [respondent] in its Leyte

Geothermal Power Projects had become members of
petitioner. In view of that circumstance, the petitioner
demands from the [respondent] for recognition of it as the
collective bargaining agent of said employees and for a CBA
negotiation with it. However, the [respondent] did not heed
such demands of the petitioner. Sometime in 1998 when the
project was about to be completed, the [respondent]
proceeded to serve Notices of Termination of Employment
upon the employees who are members of the petitioner.
On December 28, 1998, the petitioner filed a Notice of Strike
with DOLE against the [respondent] on the ground of
purported commission by the latter of unfair labor practice
for refusal to bargain collectively, union busting and mass
termination. On the same day, the petitioner declared a
strike and staged such strike.
Secretary of Labor intervened and ordered all workers to
return to work. However, petitioner did not abide.
NLRC: ruled that the employees are PROJECT EMPLOYEES,
and the strike as ILLEGAL
Petitioner Union contends that its officers and members
performed activities that were usually necessary and
desirable to respondents usual business.
ISSUE: WON they are project employees
HELD: They are PROJECT EMPLOYEES
Article 280 of the Labor Code contemplates four (4) kinds of
employees:

(a) regular employees or those who have been engaged to

perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable
in the usual business or trade of the employer;
(b) project employees or those whose employment has
been fixed for a specific project or undertaking[,] the
completion or termination of which has been determined at
the time of the engagement of the employee;
(c) seasonal employees or those who work or perform
services which are seasonal in nature, and the employment
is for the duration of the season; and
(d) casual employees or those who are not regular, project,
or seasonal employees.
Jurisprudence has added a fifth kind a fixed-term
employee.
By entering into such a contract, an employee is deemed to
understand that his employment is coterminous with the
project. He may not expect to be employed continuously
beyond the completion of the project. It is of judicial notice
that project employees engaged for manual services or
those for special skills like those of carpenters or masons,
are, as a rule, unschooled. However, this fact alone is not a
valid reason for bestowing special treatment on them or for
invalidating a contract of employment. Project employment
contracts are not lopsided agreements in favor of only one
party thereto. The employers interest is equally important
as that of the employee[s] for theirs is the interest that
propels economic activity. While it may be true that it is the

employer who drafts project employment contracts with its

business interest as overriding consideration, such contracts
do not, of necessity, prejudice the employee. Neither is the
employee left helpless by a prejudicial employment contract.
After all, under the law, the interest of the worker is
paramount.
Unions own admission, both parties had executed the
contracts freely and voluntarily without force, duress or acts
tending to vitiate the worker[s] consent. Thus, we see no
reason not to honor and give effect to the terms and
conditions stipulated therein.
The litmus test to determine whether an individual is a
project employee lies in setting a fixed period of
employment involving a specific undertaking which
completion or termination has been determined at the time
of the particular employees engagement.
NOTES:
WHAT IS A PROJECT? In the realm of business and industry,
we note that project could refer to one or the other of at
least two (2) distinguishable types of activities. Firstly, a
project could refer to a particular job or undertaking that is
within the regular or usual business of the employer
company, but which is distinct and separate, and identifiable
as such, from the other undertakings of the company. Such
job or undertaking begins and ends at determined or
determinable times. The typical example of this first type of
project is a particular construction job or project of a

construction company. A construction company ordinarily

carries out two or more [distinct] identifiable construction
projects: e.g., a twenty-five-storey hotel in Makati; a
residential condominium building in Baguio City; and a
domestic air terminal in Iloilo City. Employees who are hired
for the carrying out of one of these separate projects, the
scope and duration of which has been determined and made
known to the employees at the time of employment, are
properly treated as project employees, and their services
may be lawfully terminated at completion of the project.
The term project could also refer to, secondly, a particular
job or undertaking that is not within the regular business of
the corporation. Such a job or undertaking must also be
identifiably separate and distinct from the ordinary or
regular business operations of the employer. The job or
undertaking also begins and ends at determined or
determinable times.
from Atty. Renes^^