A.M. No. RTJ-08-2131.

November
22, 2010.*
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 05-2241RTJ)
LORNA M. VILLANUEVA,
complainant, vs. JUDGE
APOLINARIO M. BUAYA,
respondent.
Administrative Law; Judges;
Desistance; Administrative actions
cannot depend on the will or pleasure
of the complainant who may, for
reasons of his own, accept and
condone what is otherwise detestable;
Desistance cannot divest the Court of
its jurisdiction to investigate and
decide the complaint against the
respondent.The complainants
desistance is likewise not legally
significant. We reiterate the settled
rule that administrative actions cannot
depend on the will or pleasure of the
complainant who may, for reasons of
his own, accept and condone what is
otherwise detestable. Neither can the
Court be bound by the unilateral act of
the complainant in a matter relating to
its disciplinary power. Desistance
cannot divest the Court of its
jurisdiction to investigate and decide
the complaint against the respondent.
Where public interest is at stake and
the Court can act on the propriety and
legality of the conduct of judiciary
officials and employees, the Court
shall act irrespective of any
intervening private arrangements
between the parties.

Same; Same; Judges are called upon

to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules, to be conversant
with the basic law, and to maintain the
desired professional competence.On
many occasions, we have impressed
upon judges that they owe it to the
public and the legal profession to
know the very law they are supposed
to apply in a given controversy. They
are called upon to exhibit more than
just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules, to be
conversant with the basic law, and to
maintain the desired professional
competence.
Same; Same; Rules outlining the
duties of a judge in case an
application for bail is filed.Basco v.
Rapatalo, 269 SCRA 220 (1997), laid
down the rules outlining the duties of
a judge in case an application for bail
is filed: (1) Notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or
require him to submit his
recommendation x x x; (2) Conduct a
hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its
discretion x x x; (3) Decide whether
the evidence of guilt of the accused is
strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution x x x;
[and] (4) If the guilt of the accused is
not strong, discharge the accused

upon the approval of the [bail bond]. x

x x Otherwise, petition should be
denied.
Same; Same; Under the present Rules
of Court, notice and hearing are
required whether bail is a matter of
right or discretion.In the present
case, Judge Buaya granted the exparte motion to grant bail on the same
day that it was filed by the accused.
He did this without the required notice
and hearing. He justified his action on
the ex-parte motion by arguing that
the offense charged against the
accused was a bailable offense; a
hearing was no longer required since
bail was a matter of right. Under the
present Rules of Court, however,
notice and hearing are required
whether bail is a matter of right or
discretion. Likewise, jurisprudence is
replete with decisions on the
procedural necessity of a hearing,
whether summary or otherwise,
relative to the grant of bail, especially
in cases involving offenses punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, where bail is a matter
of discretion.
Same; Same; Reliance on a previous
order granting bail does not justify the
absence of a hearing in a subsequent
petition for bail.Judge Buaya firmly
relied on the previous order of the
investigating MTC judge who,
according to him, correctly fixed the
amount of bail. Thus, conducting a bail
hearing on the ex-parte motion was no
1

longer necessary. Even assuming,

however, that the previous order of
the investigating MTC judge was
correct in granting bail to the accused,
reliance on a previous order granting
bail does not justify the absence of a
hearing in a subsequent petition for
bail.
Same; Same; A judge owes the public
and the Court the duty to be proficient
in the law and is expected to keep
abreast of laws and prevailing
jurisprudence.One who accepts the
exalted position of a judge owes the
public and the Court the duty to
maintain professional competence at
all times. When a judge displays an
utter lack of familiarity with the rules,
he erodes the confidence of the public
in the courts. A judge owes the public
and the Court the duty to be proficient
in the law and is expected to keep
abreast of laws and prevailing
jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by
a judge can easily be the mainspring
of injustice.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the
Supreme Court. Gross Ignorance of the
Law and Abuse of Authority.
The facts are stated in the opinion
of the Court.
BRION,J.:
In a verified affidavit-complaint1 dated
March 15, 2005,complainant Lorna M.
Villanueva, assisted by her father

Pantaleon Villanueva, charged

respondent Acting Presiding Judge
Apolinario M. Buaya of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17, of
Palompon, Leyte, with Gross Ignorance
of the Law and Abuse of Authority.
In an affidavit-complaint executed on
June 5, 2004,2 Villanueva accused
then Vice-Mayor Constantino S. Tupa
of Palompon, Leyte, (of the crime of
Qualified Seduction. She later filed
another complaint against the same
accused for violation of Section 5,
paragraph (b), Article III of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7610 (otherwise known
as the Special Protection of Children
against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act)3 with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Palompon, Leyte.
MTC Judge Delia Noel-Bertulfo
forwarded the case to the Office of the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor after
finding probable cause for two counts
of violation of Section 5, para
graph (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610,
allegedly committed on October 29,
2002 and December 16, 2002. Judge
Noel-Bertulfo allowed Tupa to post bail
in the amount of one hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) for
each case.
On September 27, 2004, Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Prudencio O.
Borgueta, Jr. issued a Joint Resolution
on Review,4 recommending the filing
of two separate informations for

violation of Section 5(b) in relation

with Section 31,5 of R.A. No. 7610
against the accused. He likewise
recommended the cancellation of the
bail bond of P100,000.00 (per case)
posted by Tupa as, under Section 31,
Article XII of R.A. No. 7610, if the
offender is a public officer or
employee, the penalty provided in
Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 76106
is imposed in the maximum period,
i.e., reclusion perpetua. Thus, bail is
not a matter of right. He also added
that the cancellation of the bail bond
was all the more appropriate since
there was strong evidence of guilt
against the accused based on
Villanuevas affidavit-complaint and
her material declarations during the
preliminary investigation. The accused
did not refute these declarations and,
in fact, even admitted the alleged
sexual acts in his counter-affidavit and
through his statements during the
clarificatory hearing.
Based on the above recommendation,
the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte filed
two separate Informations7 for
violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of
R.A. No. 7610, in relation with Section
31, Article XII of the same law, against
Tupa before RTC, Branch 17, of
Palompon, Leyte. No bail was
recommended in both cases.
Judge Eric F. Menchavez, then
Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 17,
of Palompon, Leyte, issued a warrant
for the arrest of Tupa.8 However, the
2

warrant was not served because Tupa

went into hiding and could not be
located. Meanwhile, Judge Menchavez
was reassigned to the RTC in Cebu
City. This led to the designation of
Judge Apolinario M. Buaya as Acting
Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 17
on December 8, 2004.
On the very same day (December 8,
2004), Tupa allegedly surrendered
voluntarily to SPO2 Charito Daau of
the Ormoc City Police Station and filed
with the RTC, Branch 17 an Urgent ExParte Motion to Grant Bail (ex-parte
motion).9 Tupa argued that the
Prosecutor, in recommending the
denial of bail, erred in considering the
special aggravating circumstance
provided in Section 31, Article XII of
R.A. No. 7610 in the computation of
the penalty to be used as basis in
determining his right to bail. Citing
People of the Philippines v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,10 Tupa
contended that for purposes of the
right to bail, the criterion to determine
whether the offense charged is a
capital offense is the penalty provided
by the law, regardless of the attendant
circumstances.
In an Order11 issued on the same day
the ex-parte motion was filed, without
hearing and without notice to the
prosecution, Judge Buaya granted the
ex-parte motion and ordered the
release of Tupa on bail.

On December 16, 2004, Villanueva

moved to reconsider the order
granting the ex-parte motion. She
argued that an application for bail
should be heard and cannot be
contained in a mere ex-parte motion.
Judge Buaya noted that Villanuevas
motion for reconsideration was
submitted by the private prosecutor
without the conformity of the public
prosecutor, as required under the
Rules on Criminal Procedure. Without
acting on the merits of the said
motion, Judge Buaya issued an order
allowing the accused to submit his
comment or opposition within ten
days; thereafter, the matter would be
submitted for resolution.
Judge Buayas differing treatment of
the ex-parte motion and her motion
for reconsideration apparently irked
Villanueva, prompting her to file the
present administrative complaint
against the RTC judge. She observed
the seeming bias and unfairness of
Judge Buayas orders when he granted
the ex-parte motion without the
required notice and hearing; on the
other hand, he did not act on her
motion for reconsideration because it
was not in the proper form, but
allowed the accused to comment on
her motion.
In an Indorsement dated May 4,
2005,12 then Court Administrator
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. required Judge
Buaya to comment on the
administrative complaint filed against

him. The Court Administrator likewise

required the Judge to explain why no
disciplinary action should be taken
against him for violation of his
professional responsibility as a lawyer,
pursuant to the Courts En Banc
Resolution dated September 17, 2002
in A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC.13
Judge Buaya vehemently denied the
charges against him in his
Comment.14 He argued that the crime
charged against Tupa was a bailable
offense; when bail is a matter of right,
no hearing of the motion to grant bail
is required. Thus, he stood by his order
granting the accused temporary
liberty, through bail, without a
hearing. His assailed order, reiterated
in his comment, held that a hearing
would be superfluous and unnecessary
given the peculiar and special
circumstances attendant to the case.
During the preliminary examination,
the investigating judge already passed
upon and fixed the amount of bail for
the temporary liberty of the accused.
In fact, the accused had availed of and
exercised his constitutional right to
bail by posting the necessary bond. In
his view, the prosecution, in canceling
the bail bond in its joint resolution for
review, acted to the prejudice of the
accuseds paramount right to liberty.
Judge Buaya, therefore, asked for the
dismissal of the present administrative
complaint for lack of merit.
Villanueva filed a Reply15 contending
that Judge Buayas assailed order on
the ex-parte motion was contrary to
3

the Rules of Court requirement that a

motion to grant bail must be set for
hearing to afford the State and the
prosecutor their day in court. She
further accused Judge Buaya of being
manifestly partial as evidenced by the
two temporary restraining orders
(TROs) he issued in favor of the
accused in another case for quo
warranto,16 then pending before the
RTC, Branch 17. She observed that the
first TRO read more like a decision on
the merits even though the case had
not yet reached the pre-trial stage.
The second TRO, on the other hand,
was allegedly issued without a hearing
and was antedated.
Prior to the Office of the Court
Administrators (OCAs) action on the
administrative complaint, the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No.
00449,17 rendered its decision18 on
the bail issue, granting the petition for
certiorari and prohibition filed by
Villanueva, thus annulling and setting
aside Judge Buayas order granting
bail to Tupa. Villanueva furnished the
OCA with a copy of the CA decision.
On May 9, 2008, then Court
Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao
further evaluated the merits of the
case and opined that the issue of
whether or not bail was a matter of
right in the present case is judicial in
nature. She preferred not to resolve
the administrative complaint based on
the CA decision (which found the
offense non-bailable) since the

decision was not yet final and

executory at that time. However, she
found Judge Buayas precipitate haste
in granting the accused bail to be
unjust. She reasoned out that since
there was doubt on whether the
offense was bailable, basic
considerations of fair play should have
compelled Judge Buaya, at the
minimum, to consult with the
prosecution and the other judge (who
issued the warrant of arrest) on the
reason for not recommending bail.
Court Administrator Elepao,
therefore, recommended that the
present administrative complaint be
re-docketed as a regular
administrative case and that Judge
Buaya, for lack of prudence, be
reprimanded, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts
in the future would be dealt with more
severely.
By Resolution of July 9, 2008,19 this
Court required the parties to manifest,
within ten days from notice, whether
they were submitting the matter for
resolution on the basis of the
pleadings filed.
In his Manifestation,20 Judge Buaya
maintained his position that the
offense at issue is a bailable offense,
therefore, bail is a matter of right and
a hearing is not required. He further
alleged that the investigating
prosecutor (who recommended that no
bail should be granted to Tupa) was
pressured to reverse the investigating
MTC judges recommendation for bail

during the preliminary investigation

stage. The prosecutor allegedly asked
for a transfer of assignment from
Palompon, Leyte to Tacloban, but his
request was denied, prompting him to
resign and work in a private bank.
As added proof of the lack of merit of
the present administrative case filed
against him, Judge Buaya furnished
this Court with the Affidavit of
Desistance and Declaration Against
Interest21 executed by Villanueva,
together with the Transcript of
Stenographic Notes22 of her October
11, 2007 testimony before Presiding
Judge Celso L. Mantua of the RTC,
Branch 17, of Palompon, Leyte. In both
documents, Villanueva retracted her
accusations against Tupa and totally
denied the occurrence of the alleged
acts of lasciviousness committed
against her by the accused. Judge
Buaya alleged that Villanueva was
merely used by certain political figures
in their locality, and was pressured to
file the criminal cases against their
former vice-mayor and the present
administrative case against him.
The Courts Ruling
As a preliminary matter, we cannot
give any weight to Judge Buayas
unsubstantiated allegation that the
prosecutor who had recommended
bail was only pressured to make his
recommendation. This allegation,
aside from being unsubstantiated, is
totally irrelevant to the case whose
4

issue is the propriety of the action of

the judge in granting bail ex-parte,
not the action of the prosecutor in
recommending that no bail be
granted.
The complainants desistance is
likewise not legally significant. We
reiterate the settled rule that
administrative actions cannot depend
on the will or pleasure of the
complainant who may, for reasons of
his own, accept and condone what is
otherwise detestable. Neither can the
Court be bound by the unilateral act of
the complainant in a matter relating to
its disciplinary power. Desistance
cannot divest the Court of its
jurisdiction to investigate and decide
the complaint against the respondent.
Where public interest is at stake and
the Court can act on the propriety and
legality of the conduct of judiciary
officials and employees, the Court
shall act irrespective of any
intervening private arrangements
between the parties.23
On many occasions, we have
impressed upon judges that they owe
it to the public and the legal
profession to know the very law they
are supposed to apply in a given
controversy.24 They are called upon to
exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules, to be conversant
with the basic law, and to maintain the
desired professional competence.25

With the numerous cases already

decided on the matter of bail, we feel
justified to expect judges to diligently
discharge their duties on the grant or
denial of applications for bail. Basco v.
Rapatalo26 laid down the rules
outlining the duties of a judge in case
an application for bail is filed:
(1)Notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or
require him to submit his
recommendation x x x;
(2)Conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses
to present evidence to show that the
guilt of the accused is strong for the
purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its discretion xxx;
(3)Decide whether the evidence of
guilt of the accused is strong based on
the summary of evidence of the
prosecution x x x; [and]
(4)If the guilt of the accused is not
strong, discharge the accused upon
the approval of the [bail bond]. x x x
Otherwise, petition should be denied.
In the present case, Judge Buaya
granted the ex-parte motion to grant
bail on the same day that it was filed
by the accused. He did this without
the required notice and hearing. He
justified his action on the ex-parte
motion by arguing that the offense
charged against the accused was a

bailable offense; a hearing was no

longer required since bail was a
matter of right. Under the present
Rules of Court, however, notice and
hearing are required whether bail is a
matter of right or discretion.27
Likewise, jurisprudence is replete with
decisions on the procedural necessity
of a hearing, whether summary or
otherwise, relative to the grant of bail,
especially in cases involving offenses
punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, where
bail is a matter of discretion.
Judge Buaya further argued that in
granting the ex-parte motion, he was
merely correcting a reversible error.
Believing that the offense committed
was bailable in nature, he opined that
when the investigating prosecutor
revoked the bail already posted by the
accused, the prosecutor gravely
violated the accuseds constitutional
right to bail. Judge Buaya firmly relied
on the previous order of the
investigating MTC judge who,
according to him, correctly fixed the
amount of bail. Thus, conducting a bail
hearing on the ex-parte motion was no
longer necessary. Even assuming,
however, that the previous order of
the investigating MTC judge was
correct in granting bail to the accused,
reliance on a previous order granting
bail does not justify the absence of a
hearing in a subsequent petition for
bail.29
The Court has always stressed the
indispensable nature of a bail hearing
5

in petitions for bail. Where bail is a

matter of discretion, the grant or the
denial of bail hinges on the issue of
whether or not the evidence on the
guilt of the accused is strong and the
determination of whether or not the
evidence is strong is a matter of
judicial discretion which remains with
the judge. In order for the judge to
properly exercise this discretion, he
must first conduct a hearing to
determine whether the evidence of
guilt is strong.30 This discretion lies
not in the determination of whether or
not a hearing should be held, but in
the appreciation and evaluation of the
weight of the prosecutions evidence
of guilt against the accused.
In any event, whether bail is a matter
of right or discretion, a hearing for a
petition for bail is required in order for
the court to consider the guidelines
set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court in fixing the amount of
bail.31 This Court has repeatedly held
in past cases that even if the
prosecution fails to adduce evidence
in opposition to an application for bail
of an accused, the court may still
require the prosecution to answer
questions in order to ascertain, not
only the strength of the States
evidence, but also the adequacy of the
amount of bail. 32
One who accepts the exalted position
of a judge owes the public and the
Court the duty to maintain
professional competence at all

times.33 When a judge displays an

utter lack of
familiarity with the rules, he erodes
the confidence of the public in the
courts. A judge owes the public and
the Court the duty to be proficient in
the law and is expected to keep
abreast of laws and prevailing
jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by
a judge can easily be the mainspring
of injustice.34
WHEREFORE, we find respondent
Acting Presiding Judge Apolinario M.
Buaya of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 17, of Palompon, Leyte, GUILTY
of Gross Ignorance of the Law and
Grave Abuse of Authority, and is
hereby FINED Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00), with a WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts
in the future shall merit a more serious
penalty.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales (Chairperson),
Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Sereno, JJ.,
concur.
Acting Presiding Judge Apolinario M.
Buaya meted with P20,000 fine for
gross ignorance of the law and grave
abuse of authority, with warning
against repetition of similar acts.
Note.When the law is so simple and
elementary, lack of conversance
therewith constitutes gross ignorance
of the law. (Crisologo vs. Daray, 562

SCRA 382 [2008]) Villanueva vs.

Buaya, 635 SCRA 472, A.M. No. RTJ-082131 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 05-2241RTJ) November 22, 2010

No. L-69401. June 23, 1987.*

RIZAL ALIH, NASIM ALIH, AISAN
ALIH, MIJAL ALIH, OMAR ALIH,
EDRIS MUKSAN, MULSIDI
WARADIL, BILLY ASMAD, RAMSID
ASALI, BANDING USMAN,
ANGGANG HADANI, WARMIKHAN
HAPA, GABRAL JIKIRI, ALLAN TAN,
MUJAHIRIN MARAJUKI, KENNEDY
GONZALES, URDUJA ALIH, MERLA
ALIH, and NURAISA ALIH VDA DE
FEROLINO, petitioners, vs. MAJOR
GENERAL DELFIN C. CASTRO, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDER
SOUTHCOM AND REGIONAL
UNIFIED COMMAND, REGION IX,
ZAMBOANGA CITY, COLONEL
ERNESTO CALUPIG, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS COMMANDING
OFFICER OF THE SPECIAL FORCES
GROUP (AIRBORNE) AND
INTERNAL DEFENSE COMMAND,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS IDC
MAJOR ARNOLD BLANCO IN HIS
CAPACITY AS COMMANDING
OFFICER OF THE PHILIPPINE
MARINES AND 1ST LIEUTENANT
DARWIN GUERRA IN HIS CAPACITY
AS ACTS SUPERVISOR, INTERNAL
DEFENSE COMMAND, ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
6

Constitutional Law; Nature of the

Constitution; Superior orders in case
at bar cannot countermand the
Constitution: Fact that petitioners were
suspected of the Climaco killing did
not excuse the constitutional
shortcuts.Superior orders cannot,
of course, countermand the
Constitution. The fact that the
petitioners were suspected of the
Climaco killing did not excuse the
constitutional short-cuts the
respondents took. As eloquently
affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Ex parte Milligan: The Constitution is
a law for rulers and people, equally in
war and in peace, and covers with the
shield of its protection all classes of
men, at all times and under all
circumstances. No doctrine, involving
more pernicious consequences, was
ever invented by the wit of man than
that any of its provisions can be
suspended during any of the great
exigencies of government.
Same; Rights of accused; Guaranty
against unreasonable searches and
seizures, non-observance of, not
justified as there was no state of
hostility in Zamboanga City.The
precarious state of lawlessness in
Zamboanga City at the time in
question certainly did not excuse the
non-observance of the constitutional
guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizures. There was no
state of hostilities in the area to
justify, assuming it could, the

repressions committed therein against

the petitioners.
Same; Same; Same; Presumption of
innocence; As mere suspects of Mayor
Climacos killing at the time of the
zona or military operation, they
were presumed innocent and not
guilty.The record does not disclose
that the petitioners were wanted
criminals or fugitives from justice. At
the time of the zona, they were
merely suspected of the mayors
slaying and had not in fact even been
investigated for it. As mere suspects,
they were presumed innocent and not
guilty as summarily pronounced by the
military.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Due
Process; Protection of the Constitution
covers both innocent and the guilty;
Lacking the shield of innocence, the
guilty need the armor of the
Constitution to protect them, not from
a deserved sentence, but from
arbitrary punishment; Every person is
entitled to due process, including the
basest criminal.Indeed, even if it
were assumed for the sake of
argument that they were guilty, they
would not have been any less entitled
to the protection of the Constitution,
which covers both the innocent and
the guilty. This is not to stay, of
course, that the Constitution coddles
criminals. What it does simply signify
is that, lacking the shield of innocence,
the guilty need the armor of the
Constitution, to protect them, not from

a deserved sentence, but from

arbitrary punishment. Every person is
entitled to due process. It is no
exaggeration that the basest criminal,
ranged against the rest of the people
who would condemn him outright, is
still, under the Bill of Rights, a majority
of one.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Raid
without search warrant; Constitutional
precept that civilian authority is at all
times supreme over the military,
defied in case at bar when the military
proceeded to make the raid without a
search warrant.In acting as they did,
they also defied the precept that
civilian authority is at all times
supreme over the military so clearly
proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution. In
the instant case, the respondents
simply by-passed the civil courts,
which had the authority to determine
whether or not there was probable
cause to search the petitioners
premises. Instead, they proceeded to
make the raid without a search
warrant on their own unauthorized
determination of the petitioner s guilt.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
Urgency of raid cannot be pleaded as
an excuse due to lack of search
warrant as it was in fact not urgent;
Absolute absence of reason why the
orderly processes required by the
Constitution were disregarded in case
at bar.The respondents cannot even
plead the urgency of the raid because
it was in fact not urgent. They knew
7

where the petitioners were. They had

every opportunity to get a search
warrant before making the raid, If they
were worried that the weapons inside
the compound would be spirited away,
they could have surrounded the
premises in the meantime, as a
preventive measure. There was
absolutely no reason at all why they
should disregard the orderly processes
required by the Constitution and
instead insist on arbitrarily forcing
their way into the petitioners
premises with all the menace of a
military invasion.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
Search and seizure made although
incidental to a legal arrest, not valid;
Reason.Conceding that the search
was truly warrantless, might not the
search and seizure be nonetheless
considered valid because it was
incidental to a legal arrest? Surely not,
If all the law-enforcement authorities
have to do is force their way into any
house and then pick up anything they
see there on the ground that the
occupants are resisting arrest, then we
might as well delete the Bill of Rights
as a fussy redundancy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
Prohibition that one cannot just force
his way into any mans house on the
illegal orders of a superior; Ancient
rule that a mans house is his castle.
When the respondents could have
easily obtained a search warrant from
any of the TEN civil courts then open

and functioning in Zamboanga City,

they instead simply barged into the
beleaguered premises on the verbal
order of their superior officers. One
cannot just force his way into any
mans house on the illegal orders of a
superior, however lofty his
rank. Indeed, even the humblest hovel
is protected from official intrusion
because of the ancient rule, revered in
all free regimes, that a man s house is
his castle.
Same; Same; Same; Criminal
Procedure; Arrest not in connection
with a crime about to be committed,
being committed, or just committed
under Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court; Personal knowledge required of
the officer who makes the arrest under
Rule 113.If the arrest was made
under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules
of Court in connection with a crime
about to be committed, being
committed, or just committed, what
was that crime? There is no allegation
in the record of such a justification.
Parenthetically, it may be observed
that under the Revised Rule 113,
Section 5(b), the officer making the
arrest must have personal knowledge
of the ground therefor as stressed in
the recent case of People v. Burgos.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence,
admissibility of; Search on petitioners
premises being violative of the
Constitution, all firearms and
ammunition taken from the raided
compound are inadmissible in

evidence in any of the proceedings

against the petitioner; Pending
determination of the legality of the
articles, they shall remain in custodia
legis subject to court disposition.If
follows that as the search of the
petitioners premises was violative of
the Constitution, all the firearms and
ammunition taken from the raided
compound are inadmissible in
evidence in any of the proceedings
against the petitioners. These articles
are fruits of the poisonous tree. As
Judge Learned Hand observed, Only
in case the prosecution which itself
controls the seizing officials, knows
that it cannot profit by their wrong,
will the wrong be repressed. Pending
determination of the legality of such
articles, however, they shall remain in
custodia legis, subject to such
appropriate disposition as the
corresponding courts may decide,
Same; Same; Same; Right against selfincrimination applies to testimonial
compulsion only.The objection to the
photographing, fingerprinting and
paraffin-testing of the petitioners
deserves slight comment. The
prohibition against self-incrimination
applies to testimonial compulsion only.
As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v.
United States, The prohibition of
compelling a man in a criminal court
to be witness against himself is a
prohibition of the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, not an
8

exclusion of his body as evidence

when it may be material.
PETITION to review the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga
City, Br. 14. Amin, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of
the Court.
CRUZ, J.:
On November 25, 1984, a contingent
of more than two hundred Philippine
marines and elements of the home
defense forces raided the compound
occupied by the petitioners at Gov.
Alvarez street, Zamboanga City, in
search of loose firearms, ammunition
and other explosives.1
The military operation was commonly
known and dreaded as a zona, which
was not unlike the feared practice of
the kempeitai during the Japanese
Occupation of rounding up the people
in a locality, arresting the persons
fingered by a hooded informer, and
executing them outright (although the
last part is not included in the modern
refinement).
The initial reaction of the people inside
the compound was to resist the
invasion with a burst of gunfire. No
one was hurt as presumably the
purpose was merely to warn the
intruders and deter them from
entering. Unfortunately, as might be
expected in incidents like this, the

situation aggravated soon enough.

The soldiers returned fire and a bloody
shoot-out ensued, resulting in a
number of casualties.2
The besieged compound surrendered
the following morning, and sixteen
male occupants were arrested, later to
be fingerprinted, paraffin-tested and
photographed over their objection.
The military also inventoried and
confiscated nine M16 rifles, one M14
rifle, nine rifle grenades, and several
rounds of ammunition found in the
premises.3
On December 21,1984, the petitioners
came to this Court in a petition for
prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction and restraining
order. Their purpose was to recover
the articles seized from them, to
prevent these from being used as
evidence against them, and to
challenge their fingerprinting,
photographing and paraffin-testing as
violative of their right against selfincrimination.4
The Court, treating the petition as an
injunction suit with a prayer for the
return of the articles alleged to have
been illegally seized, referred it for
hearing to Judge Omar U. Amin of the
regional trial court, Zamboanga City.5
After receiving the testimonial and
documentary evidence of the parties,
he submitted the report and
recommendations on which this
opinion is based.6

The petitioners demand the return of

the arms and ammunition on the
ground that they were taken without a
search warrant as required by the Bill
of Rights. This is confirmed by the said
report and in fact admitted by the
respondents, but with avoidance.7
Article IV, Section 3, of the 1973
Constitution, which was in force at the
time of the incident in question,
provided as follows:
Sec. 3. The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose
shall not be violated, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such
other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be
seized.
It was also declared in Article IV,
Section 4(2) that
Sec. 4(2) Any evidence obtained in
violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
9

The respondents, while admitting the

absence of the required search
warrant, sought to justify their act on
the

state of hostilities in the area to

justify, assuming it could, the
repressions committed therein against
the petitioners.

ground that they were acting under

superior orders.8 There was also the
suggestion that the measure was
necessary because of the aggravation
of the peace and order problem
generated by the assassination of
Mayor Cesar Climaco.9

It is so easy to say that the petitioners

were outlaws and deserved the
arbitrary treatment they received to
take them into custody; but that is a
cynical argument. It is also fallacious.
Its obvious flaw lies in the conclusion
that the petitioners were
unquestionably guilty on the strength
alone of unsubstantiated reports that
they were stockpiling weapons.

Superior orders cannot, of course,

countermand the Constitution. The
fact that the petitioners were
suspected of the Climaco killing did
not excuse the constitutional shortcuts the respondents took. As
eloquently affirmed by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan:10
The Constitution is a law for rulers
and people, equally in war and in
peace, and covers with the shield of
its protection all classes of men, at all
times and under all circumstances. No
doctrine, involving more pernicious
consequences, was ever invented by
the wit of man than that any of its
provisions can be suspended during
any of the great exigencies of
government.
The precarious state of lawlessness in
Zamboanga City at the time in
question certainly did not excuse the
nonobservance of the constitutional
guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizures. There was no

The record does not disclose that the

petitioners were wanted criminals or
fugitives from justice. At the time of
the zona, they were merely
suspected of the mayors slaying and
had not in fact even been investigated
for it. As mere suspects, they were
presumed innocent and not guilty as
summarily pronounced by the military.
Indeed, even if were assumed for the
sake of argument that they were
guilty, they would not have been any
less entitled to the protection of the
Constitution, which covers both the
innocent and the guilty. This is not to
say, of course, that the Constitution
coddles criminals. What it does simply
signify is that, lacking the shield of
innocence, the guilty need the armor
of the Constitution, to protect them,
not from a deserved sentence, but
from arbitrary punishment. Every
person is entitled to due process. It is

no exaggeration that the basest

criminal, ranged against the rest of
the people who would condemn him
outright, is still, under the Bill of
Rights, a majority of one.
If the respondents did not actually
disdain the Constitution when they
made their illegal raid, they certainly
gave every appearance of doing so.
This is truly regrettable for it was
incumbent on them, especially during
those tense and tindery times, to
encourage rather than undermine
respect for the law, which it was their
duty to uphold.
In acting as they did, they also defied
the precept that civilian authority is
at all times supreme over the military
so clearly proclaimed in the 1973
Constitution.11 In the instant case, the
respondents simply by-passed the civil
courts, which had the authority to
determine whether or not there was
probable cause to search the
petitioners premises. Instead, they
proceeded to make the raid without a
search warrant on their own
unauthorized determination of the
petitioners guilt.
The respondents cannot even plead
the urgency of the raid because it was
in fact not urgent. They knew where
the petitioners were. They had every
opportunity to get a search warrant
before making the raid. If they were
worried that the weapons inside the
compound would be spirited away,
10

they could have surrounded the

premises in the meantime, as a
preventive measure. There was
absolutely no reason at all why they
should disregard the orderly processes
required by the Constitution and
instead insist on arbitrarily forcing
their way into the petitioners
premises with all the menace of a
military invasion.
Conceding that the search was truly
warrantless, might not
the search and seizure be nonetheless
considered valid because it was
incidental to a legal arrest? Surely not.
If all the lawenforcement authorities
have to do is force their way into any
house and then pick up anything they
see there on the ground that the
occupants are resisting arrest, then we
might as well delete the Bill of Rights
as a fussy redundancy.
When the respondents could have
easily obtained a search warrant from
any of the TEN civil courts then open
and functioning in Zamboanga City,12
they instead simply barged into the
beleaguered premises on the verbal
order of their superior officers. One
cannot just force his way into any
mans house on the illegal orders of a
superior, however lofty his rank.
Indeed, even the humblest hovel is
protected from official intrusion
because of the ancient rule, revered in
all free regimes, that a mans house is
his castle.

It may be frail; its roof may shake;

the wind may enter; the rain may
enter. But the King of England may not
enter. All the forces of the Crown dare
not cross the threshold of the ruined
tenement.13
If the arrest was made under Rule 113,
Section 5, of the Rules of Court in
connection with a crime about to be
committed, being committed, or just
committed, what was that crime?
There is no allegation in the record of
such a justification. Parenthetically, it
may be observed that under the
Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the
officer making the arrest must have
personal knowledge of the ground
therefor as stressed in the recent case
of People v. Burgos.14
If follows that as the search of the
petitioners premises was violative of
the Constitution, all the firearms and
ammunition taken from the raided
compound are inadmissible in
evidence in any of the proceedings
against the petitioners. These articles
are fruits of the poisonous tree.15 As
Judge Learned Hand observed, Only
in case the prosecution which itself
controls the seizing officials, knows
that it cannot profit by their wrong,
will the wrong be repressed.16
Pending determination of the legality
of such articles, however, they shall
remain in custodia legis, subject to
such appropriate disposition as the
corresponding courts may decide.17

The objection to the photographing,

fingerprinting and paraffin-testing of
the petitioners deserves slight
comment. The prohibition against selfincrimination applies to testimonial
compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put
it in Holt v. United States,18 The
prohibition of compelling a man in a
criminal court to be a witness against
himself is a prohibition of the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, not an
exclusion of his body as evidence
when it may be material.
The fearful days of hamleting,
salvaging, zona and other dreaded
operations should remain in the past,
banished with the secret marshals and
their covert license to kill without trial.
We must be done with lawlessness in
the name of law enforcement. Those
who are supposed to uphold the law
must not be the first to violate it. As
Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee
stressed in his concurring opinion in
Lacanilao v. De Leon,19 It is time that
the martial law regimes legacy of the
law of force be discarded and that
there be a return to the force and rule
of law.
All of us must exert efforts to make
our country truly free and democratic,
where every individual is entitled to
the full protection of the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights can stand as a
stolid sentinel for all, the innocent as
well as the guilty, including the basest
of criminals.
11

WHEREFORE, the search of the

petitioners premises on November 25,
1984, is hereby declared ILLEGAL and
all the articles seized as a result
thereof are inadmissible in evidence
against the petitioners in any
proceedings. However, the said
articles shall remain in custodia legis
pending the outcome of
the criminal cases that have been or
may later be filed against the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED. Alih vs. Castro, 151
SCRA 279, No. L-69401 June 23, 1987
No. L-59378. February 11, 1986.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee, vs. NELIA
NICANDRO y VELARMA, accusedappellant.
Criminal Law; Evidence; Prohibited
Drugs; Prosecutions evidence leaves
much to be desired as its sole
eyewitness is not certain whether he
saw that marijuana was actually sold
by the ac-cused.Pat. Joves was not
certain as to what he saw. At first, he
said that after the police informant
had paid appellant, the latter handed
to the former one small plastic bag
containing suspected marijuana
leaves. Then he corrected himself by
saying: I think it was four sticks of
marijuana cigarettes sir. It is not a
plastic bag sir. It is probable that Pat.
Joves really did not see either the
alleged delivery of the marijuana

cigarettes or the supposed payment

therefor. After all, according to him,
the transaction was effected
secretly. On the other hand, if the
sale was made within the view of Pat.
Joves and his companions, there would
have been no need for them to wait
for a signal from the police informant
to indicate that the transaction had
been completed, before closing in and
arresting appellant.
Constitutional Law; Criminal
Procedure; Evidence; The duty to
inform a suspect of his constitutional
rights should not be a mere
ceremonial exercise; The police officer
must explain their practical effects.
When the Constitution requires a
person under investigation to be
informed of his right to remain silent
and to counsel, it must be presumed
to contemplate the transmission of
meaningful information rather than
just the ceremonial and perfunctory
recitation
of an abstract constitutional principle.
As a rule, therefor, it would not be
sufficient for a police officer just to
repeat to the person under
investigation the provisions of Section
20, Article IV of the Constitution. He is
not only duty-bound to tell the person
the rights to which the latter is
entitled; he must also explain their
effects in practical terms, e.g., what
the person under interrogation may or
may not do, and in a language the
subject fairly understands. (See People
vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312; People vs.

Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2.) In other words,

the right of a person under
interrogation to be informed implies
a correlative obligation on the part of
the police investigator to explain, and
contemplates an effective
communication that results in
understanding what is conveyed.
Short of this, there is a denial of the
right, as it cannot truly be said that
the person has been informed of his
rights. Now, since the right to be
informed implies comprehension, the
degree of explanation required will
necessary vary, depending upon the
education, intelligence and other
relevant personal circumstances of the
person under investigation. Suffice it
to say that a simpler and more lucid
explanation is needed where the
subject is unlettered.
Same; Same; Same; Waiver of right
against self-incrimination is not
effective unless made knowingly and
intelligently.Like other constitutional
rights, the right against selfincrimination, including the right of a
person under investigation to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right, may be
waived. To be valid, however, a waiver
of the right must not only be
voluntary; it must be made knowingly
and intelligently (People vs. Caguioa,
supra), which presupposes an
awareness or understanding of what is
being waived. It stands to reason that
where the right has not been
adequately explained and there are
12

serious doubts as to whether the

person interrogated knew and
understood his relevant constitutional
rights when he answered the
questions, it is idle to talk of waiver of
rights.
Same; Same; Same; The fiscal has the
duty to adduce evidence that there
was compliance with the duties of an
interrogating officer.As it is the
obligation of the investigating officer
to inform a person under investigation
of his right to remain silent and to
counsel, so it is the duty of the
prosecution to affirmatively establish
compliance by the investigating officer
with his said obligation. Absent such
affirmative showing, the admission or
confession made by a person under
investigation cannot be admitted in
evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same.Thus, in
People vs. Ramos, supra, the Court
ruled that the verbal admission of the
accused during
custodial investigation was
inadmissible, although he had been
apprised of his constitutional rights to
silence and to counsel, for the reason
that the prosecution failed to show
that those rights were explained to
him, such that it could not be said that
the apprisal was sufficiently
manifested and intelligently
understood by the accused.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, Br. VIII.

The facts are stated in the opinion of

the Court.
PLANA, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of
the then Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch VIII, convicting the
accused Nelia Nicandro y Velarma of
violation of Section 4, Article II, in
relation to Section 2(e), (f), (l), (m),
and (o), Article I, of Republic Act 6425,
as amended (Dangerous Drugs Act),
upon an information which reads:
That on or about November 6, 1981,
in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, not having been
authorized by law to sell, deliver, give
away to another or distribute any
prohibited drug, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly sell
or offer for sale four (4) sticks of
marijuana cigarettes, marijuana
flowering tops wrapped in a piece of
newspaper, one (1) roach marijuana
cigarette and marijuana seeds and
ashes contained in a white plastic bag,
which are prohibited drugs.
The Peoples version of the facts is as
follows:
Not long before November 6, 1981,
the Drug Enforcement Unit of Police
Station No. 5, Western Police District,
Metropolitan Police Force, Manila,
received complaints from concerned
citizens regarding the illegal sale of

prohibited drugs by one alias Nel in

the Com-modore Pension House at
Arquiza Street, Ermita, Manila (p. 4,
tsn, Dec. 8, 1981). It was also
informed that the use of prohibited
drugs in said place was rampant (pp.
3, 18-19, tsn, ibid.).
Responding to said complaints and
reports, Cpl. Salvador Gui-tan and Pfc.
Romeo Joves of the Drug Enforcement
Unit of said Police Station No. 5 placed
the Commodore Pension House and its
surroundings under surveillance for
about a week (pp. 4-5, tsn, ibid.). After
the complaints and reports were
verified to be true, an entrapment with
the confidential informant acting as
the buyer of marijuana was organized.
(pp. 5-6, 29-30, tsn, ibid.).
At about 9:00 p.m. on November 6,
1981, the police team formed to carry
out the entrapment plan was alerted
of the presence of the drug pusher,
alias Nel, at room 301 of the
Commodore Pension House, selling
marijuana to drug users (pp. 6, 32-33,
tsn, ibid). Immediately Cpl. Salvador
Guitan, Pat. Proceso Federes, Pat.
Aurora Gomez and Pfc. Romeo Joves
proceeded to the said Com-modore
Pension House and met the female
confidential informant at the corner of
Arquiza Street and M.H. del Pilar
Street, Ermita, Manila (pp. 6, 23, 33,
tsn, Dec. 8, 1981; pp. 15-16, tsn. Dec.
9, 1981). Pfc. Joves gave the informant
two (2) P5.00 bills, marked Exhibits
D and E, with his initial thereon,
13

marked Exhibits D-1, and E-1

(Exhs. D, D-1, E and E-1, pp. 34, Folio of Exhs.; pp. 6, 8, 35, tsn, Dec.
8, 1981; p. 16, tsn, Dec. 9, 1981).
They instructed her to follow them to
the Commodore Pension House (p. 33,
tsn, Dec. 8, 1981).
Following later, the informant went to
room 301 of the Com-modore Pension
House (p. 6, tsn, Dec. 8, 1981; p. 17,
tsn, Dec. 9, 1981). Upon a given
signal, she knocked on the door of the
room. Ap-pellant Nelia Nicandro y
Velarma, alias Nel, opened the door
(p. 6, tsn, Dec. 8, 1981). The informant
asked to buy some marijuana cigarette
and gave appellant the two (2) marked
P5.00 bills (p. 6, tsn, Dec. 8, 1981; p.
17, tsn, Dec. 9, 1981). Thereupon, the
appellant delivered to informant four
(4) sticks of marijuana cigarette (pp. 7,
25, tsn; Dec 8, 1981; p. 8, tsn; Dec. 9,
1981).

Upon being investigated and after

having been duly apprised of her
constitutional rights, appellant orally
admitted having sold the four (4)
sticks of marijuana cigarettes and the
ownership of the marijuana flowering
tops taken from her pocket, but
refused to reduce her confession to
writing (pp. 12-13, tsn; Dec. 8, 1981. x
x x (Peoples Brief, pp. 3-6, 8.)

A
The accused in turn handed one small
plastic bag containing suspected
marijuana leaves. I beg to correct sir. I
think it was four sticks of marijuana
cigarettes sir. It is not a plastic bag sir.
Q

To support the charges, the

prosecution relied principally on Pat.
Joves, who testified that he saw the
accused sell marijuana cigarettes to
the unnamed police informant, which
allegedly the accused verbally
admitted when she was under
custodial investigation. Pat. Joves
declared:
Q

Immediately the police team closed

in and nabbed appellant (p. 7, tsn,
Dec. 8, 1981; p. 17, tsn, Dec. 9, 1981).
Pat. Gomez frisked ap-pellant and got
from the right front pocket of her
pants the two (2) marked P5.00 bills
(Exhs. D & E) and from the left
pocket of her pants marijuana
flowering tops wrapped in a piece of
newspaper (pp. 8-9, 12, 34, tsn, Dec 8,
1981; pp. 9-10, 17-19, tsn. Dec. 9,
1981). Ap-pellant tried to escape by
entering her rented room 301 but was
immediately collared (pp. 8-9, tsn,
Dec. 9, 1981).

After your confidential informant have

handed the two P5.00 bills to the
accused, what happened next?

Where were you when the informant

handed the two P5.00 bills to the
accused?
A
We were hidden within the vicinity of
Room 301 sir.

What did you do when you saw the

accused hand over to the confidential
informant the four sticks of cigarettes
containing marijuana?
A
When we saw the accused handed the
four sticks of suspected marijuana
cigarettes to our confidential
informant, and after a pre-arranged
signal was given by the confidential
informant that the accused had
already sold her the marijuana
cigarettes, we immediately nabbed
said suspect and at the same time we
identified ourselves as police officers.
(TSN, Dec. 8, 1981, p. 7.)

Q
xxx
14

leaves which was conf iscated from

her possession.

Q
You also conducted the investigation
of this accused and confiscation of the
articles of the crime?

Did you place that in writing?

There were other persons passing by

or walking in the place from where we
were posted sir.

Yes, sir.

The accused refused to place her

statement in writing, sir. (Ibid., pp.
12-13.)
xxx

In fact, there were several or many

persons in that place because there is
a lodging house Pat. Joves when you
posted yourselves there? There were
several persons present there?

How did you conduct the

investigation?

CROSS EXAMINATION

The first thing I did was I informed the

accused of her constitutional rights.

And who were your companions in

apprehending the accused?

There are several persons present but

they are just passing by or walking
towards their rooms, sir.
Q

What next?
A

I was with Police Cpl. Salvador Guitan,

Pat. Federis and Policewoman Aurora
Gomez, sir.
Q

Then I questioned her about the

marijuana cigarettes and leaves that
were confiscated and also the marked
money and she verbally admitted that
she sold the four sticks of suspected
marijuana cigarettes and possession
andownership of the other marijuana

When you posted yourselves and

other companions at the third floor of
Commodore Pensione House, were
there any other persons present in the
premises, Pat. Joves?

And you want this Court to believe

that in spite of the presence of these
people walking and passing to the
place where you made the
apprehension, you want this Court
tobelieve that the accused was then
selling the alleged marij uana sticks?
WITNESS:

15

Please repeat the questions?

A

informant were four sticks of

marijuana cigarettes?

ATTY. CARINGAL:
A
Q
You want the Court to believe that the
accused was selling the prohibited
drug in public because according to
you there were several persons
present then?
A

The accused sold marijuana cigarettes

also in a way that she will not be
noticed by other persons sir.
295
VOL. 141, FEBRUARY 11, 1986
295
People vs. Nicandro

There were several persons passing by

sir at that place.

Q
You testified a while ago Pat. Joves
that you have seen the accused
handing a plastic bag to your
confidential inf ormant. How big is that
plastic bag?

How were you able to say that the

things handed by the accused to your
confidential informant were four sticks
of marijuana cigarettes when you have
just said that the transactions was
done secretly?
A

A
It was not a plastic bag, sir but four
sticks of marijuana cigarettes, sir.

She was handing the marijuana

cigarette secretly, sir.
Q

Q
Do you want to impress this Honorable
Court that the accused was selling this
marijuana cigarette in the open?

We saw and observed that the

accused handed sticks of suspected
marijuana cigarettes and we also have
a prearranged signal from the
confidential informant that the
marijuana was already sold by the
accused, sir. (Ibid., pp. 23-25.)

How were you able to say and how

were you able to determine that the
things handed to your confidential

Policewoman Aurora Gomez also

testified but her testimony was limited
to events subsequent to the alleged
sale of marijuana cigarettes. She did
not witness the sale. (TSN, Dec. 9,
1981, pp. 17-18, 21.) Neither did Cpl.
Guitan or Pat. Federis.
After trial, the trial court convicted the
accused as aforesaid and imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and a
fine of P20,000.00.
In the instant appeal, defendantappellant has assigned the following
errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR
VIOLATION OF SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE
II IN RELATION TO SECTION 2(e), (1),
(f) and (o), ARTICLE 1, R.A. 6425, AS
AMENDED BY P.D. NO. 44 AND
FURTHER AMENDED BY P.D. NO. 1675.
16

II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE TO THE
TESTIMONIES OF ALL POLICE
OFFICERS WHICH ARE HEARSAY.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
ADMITTING PROSECUTION EVIDENCE
WHICH WERE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION
OF ACCUSED CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS.
IV
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE
ACCUSED MORE PARTICULARLY THE
RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION AND TO
CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESS AGAINST
HER HAS BEEN VIOLATED.
Numerous factors combine to make
the appeal meritorious. The
prosecution evidence leaves much to
be desired. It is at best uncertain
whether any prosecution witness
really saw the alleged sale of
marijuana cigarettes. Patrolman Joves
allegedly was an eyewitness. He
testified that he saw the ap-pellant sell
marijuana cigarettes to the police
informant, as the transaction took
place openly just outside room 301, in
the presence of several persons
passing by or walking in the place.
But when his attention was called to
the improbability that an illegal

merchandise would openly be sold, he

qualified his story by saying that
appellant handed the marijuana
cigarettes to appellant secretly.
Pat. Joves was not certain as to what
he saw. At first, he said that after the
police informant had paid appellant,
the latter handed to the former one
small plastic bag containing suspected
marijuana leaves. Then he corrected
himself by saying: I think it was four
sticks of marijuana cigarettes sir. It is
not a plastic bag sir.
It is probable that Pat. Joves really did
not see either the alleged delivery of
the marijuana cigarettes or the
supposed payment therefor. After all,
according to him, the transaction was
effected secretly. On the other hand,
if the sale was made within the view of
Pat. Joves and his companions, there
would have been no need for them to
wait for a signal from the police
informant to indicate that the
transaction had been completed,
before closing in and arresting
appellant.
With the testimony of Pat. Joves
seriously placed in doubt, there is not
much left of the prosecution evidence.
Note that the police informant was not
presented as a witness, prompting the
accused to invoke with reason the
presumption that evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if
produced. [Rules of Court, Rule 131,
Sec. 5(e).]

In convicting the appellant, the trial

court relied partly on her alleged oral
admission during custodial
investigation, as testified to by Pat.
Joves. This reliance is assailed as
violative of Section 20 of Article IV of
the Constitution which reads:
No person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself. Any person
under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have
the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such
right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means
which vitiates the free will shall be
used against him. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section
shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The above provision is an expanded
version of the guarantee against selfincrimination, formally incorporating
the doctrine in the landmark American
case of Miranda vs. Arizona
x x x Our holding will be spelled out
with some specificity in the pages
which follow, but briefly stated, it is
this: the prosecution may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless
it demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination. By
custodial interrogation, we mean
questioning initiated by law
17

enforcement officers after a person

has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way. As for
the procedural safeguards to be
employed, unless other fully effective
means are devised to inform accused
persons of their right of silence and to
assure a continuous opportunity to
exercise it, the following measures are
required. Prior to any questioning, the
person must be warned that he has a
right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make may be used
as evidence against him, and that he
has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed.
The defendant may waive effectuation of those rights, provided the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly
and intelligently. If, however, he
indicates in any manner and at any
stage of the process that he wishes to
consult with an attorney before
speaking, there can be no questioning.
Likewise, if the individual is alone and
indicates in any manner that he does
not wish to be interrogated, the police
may not question him. The mere fact
that he may have answered some
questions or volunteered some
statements on his own does not
deprive him of the right to refrain from
answering any further inquiries until
he has consulted with an attorney and
thereafter consents to be questioned.
[384 U.S. 436, 444-445. Incidentally,
the Miranda doctrine rests on just one
broad guarantee in the U.S.
Constitution, i.e., that no person shall

be compelled in any criminal case to

be a witness against himself. (Fifth
Amendment.)]
When the Constitution requires a
person under investigation to be
informed of his right to remain silent
and to counsel, it must be presumed
to contemplate the transmission of
meaningful information rather than
just the ceremonial and perfunctory
recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle. As a rule, therefor, it would
not be sufficient for a police officer
just to repeat to the person under
investigation the provisions of Section
20, Article IV of the Constitution. He is
not only duty-bound to tell the person
the rights to which the latter is
entitled; he must also explain their
effects in practical terms, e.g., what
the person under interrogation may or
may not do, and in a language the
subject fairly understands. (See People
vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312; People vs.
Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2.) In other words,
the right of a person under
interrogation to be informed implies
a correlative obligation on the part of
the police investigator to explain, and
contemplates an effective
communication that results in
understanding what is conveyed.
Short of this, there is a denial of the
right, as it cannot truly be said that
the person has been informed of his
rights. Now, since the right to be
informed implies comprehension, the
degree of explanation required will
necessary vary, depending upon the

education, intelligence and other

relevant personal circumstances of the
person under investigation. Suffice it
to say that a simpler and more lucid
explanation is needed where the
subject is unlettered.
Thus, in the cited case of People vs.
Ramos, this Court said:
In the case at bar, appellant has only
finished Grade VI, which means that
he is not adequately educated to
understand fairly and fully the
significance of his constitutional rights
to silence and to counsel. As
mandated, it is not enough that the
police investigator merely informs him
of his constitutional rights to silence
and to counsel, and then taking his
statements down, the interrogating officer must have patience in explaining
these rights to him. The records do not
reveal that these requirements have
been fully complied with, nor was
there any showing that appellant has
been represented by counsel during
custodial investigation. In consonance
with Section 20 of the Bill of Rights
which states that any confession
obtained in violation of this section
shall be inadmissible in evidence, We
hold that the verbal admissions of
appellant during custodial
investigation may not be taken in
evidence against him. (pp. 321-322.)
Like other constitutional rights, the
right against self-incrimination,
including the right of a person under
18

investigation to remain silent and to

counsel, and to be informed of such
right, may be waived. To be valid,
however, a waiver of the right must
not only be voluntary; it must be made
knowingly and intelligently (People vs.
Caguioa, supra), which presupposes
an awareness or understanding of
what is being waived. It stands to
reason that where the right has not
been adequately explained and there
are serious doubts as to whether the
person interrogated knew and
understood his relevant constitutional
rights when he answered the
questions, it is idle to talk of waiver of
rights.
Going to the instant case, Pat. Joves
testified that he conducted the
custodial investigation of appellant. As
to the manner of investigation, he
tersely testified:
Q
How did you conduct the
investigation?
A
The first thing I did was I informed the
accused of her constitutional rights.
Q
What next?

A
Then I questioned her about the
marijuana cigarettes and leaves that
were confiscated and also the marked
money and she verbally admitted that
she sold the four sticks of suspected
marijuana cigarettes and possession
and ownership of the other marijuana
leaves which was conf iscated from
her possession. (TSN, December 8,
1981, pp. 12-13.)
According to Pat. Joves, he informed
appellant of her constitutional rights
when she was under custodial
investigation. What specific rights he
mentioned to appellant, he did not
say.
Neither did he state the manner in
which the appellant was advised of her
constitutional rights so as to make her
understand them. This is particularly
significant in the instant case because
appellant is illiterate and cannot be
expected to be able to grasp the
significance of her right to silence and
to counsel upon merely hearing an
abstract statement thereof.
As it is the obligation of the
investigating officer to inform a person
under investigation of his right to
remain silent and to counsel, so it is
the duty of the prosecution to
affirmatively establish compliance by
the investigating officer with his said
obligation. Absent such affirmative

showing, the admission or confession

made by a person under investigation
cannot be admitted in evidence. As
broadly stated in the Miranda case and
quoted with approval by the then
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in
People vs. Caguioa, supra,
. . . the prosecution may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial
investigation of the defendant unless
it demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination.
(95 SCRA 2, 9. Emphasis supplied.)
The reason is not difficult to see. A
constitutional guarantee should be
liberally construed with a view to
promoting its object.
x x x Where rights secured by the
Constitution are involved, there can be
no rule making or legislation which
would abrogate them.
x

In dealing with custodial

interrogation, we will not presume that
a defendant has been effectively
apprised of his rights and that his
privilege against self-incrimination has
been adequately safeguarded on a
record that does not show that any
warnings have been given or that any
effective alternative has been
employed. Nor can a knowing and
intelligent waiver of these rights be
19

assumed on a silent record. x x x

(Miranda case, 384 U.S. 436, 491, 498499.)
Thus, in People vs. Ramos, supra, the
Court ruled that the verbal admission
of the accused during custodial
investigation was inadmissible,
although he had been apprised of his
constitutional rights to silence and to
counsel, for the reason that the
prosecution failed to show that those
rights were explained to him, such
that it could not be said that the
appraisal was sufficiently manifested
and intelligently understood by the
accused.
Similarly, in People vs. Caguioa, the
Court sustained the rejection by the
trial court of the extrajudicial
admission made by the accused
during custodial investigation, there
being no snowing by the prosecution
that there was sufficient compliance
with the constitutional duty to inform
the accused of his rights to silence and
to counsel, without which there could
be no intelligent waiver of said rights.
In said case, the accuseda native of
Samarwas interrogated in Tagalog.
The prosecution did not show that the
accuseds acquaintance with Tagalog
was such that he could fully
understand the questions posed to
him.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is

reversed and set aside, and the
appellant is hereby acquitted on the
basis of reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED. People vs. Nicandro,
141 SCRA 289, No. L-59378 February
11, 1986

RIGHT TO BAIL
1. Pantilo vs Canoy

All considered, we hold that the guilt

of appellant has not been established
beyond reasonable doubt.

application, respondent judge

verbally granted bail to Melgazo
this is a clear deviation from the
procedure laid down in Sec. 17 of
Rule 114.Sec. 17, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure allows that any person in
custody who is not yet charged in
court may apply for bail with any
court in the province, city or
municipality where he is held. In
the case at bar, Melgazo did not
file any application or petition for
the grant of bail with the Surigao
City RTC, Branch 29. Despite the
absence of any written application,
respondent judge verbally granted
bail to Melgazo. This is a clear
deviation from the procedure laid
down in Sec. 17 of Rule 114.
Same; Same; Same; Despite the
noblest of reasons, the Rules of
Court may not be ignored at will
and at random to the prejudice of
the rights of another.As regards
the insistence of Judge Canoy that
such may be considered as
constructive bail, there is no such
species of bail under the Rules.
Despite the noblest of reasons, the
Rules of Court may not be ignored
at will and at random to the
prejudice of the rights of another.
Pantilo 111 vs. Canoy, 642 SCRA
301, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2262 February
9, 2011

Administrative Law; Judges; Bail;

Despite the absence of any written
20

2. People vs Cabral
Criminal Procedure; Bail; The
grant or denial of an application
for bail is dependent on whether
the evidence of guilt is strong
which the lower court should
determine in a hearing called
for the purpose.In this case,
accused-respondent was being
charged with rape qualified by
the use of a deadly weapon
punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. As such, bail
is discretionary and not a
matter of right. The grant or
denial of an application for bail
is, therefore, dependent on
whether the evidence of guilt is
strong which the lower court
should determine in a hearing
called for the purpose. The
determination of whether the
evidence of guilt is strong, in
this regard, is a matter of
judicial discretion. While the
lower court would never be
deprived of its mandated
prerogative to exercise judicial
discretion, this Court would
unhesitatingly reverse the trial
courts findings if found to be
laced with grave abuse of
discretion.
Same; Same; Even though there
is a reasonable doubt as to the
guilt of accused, if on an

examination of the entire record

the presumption is great that
accused is guilty of a capital
offense, bail should be refused.
By judicial discretion, the law
mandates the determination of
whether proof is evident or the
presumption of guilt is strong.
Proof evident or Evident
proof in this connection has
been held to mean clear, strong
evidence which leads a wellguarded dispassionate
judgment to the conclusion that
the offense has been committed
as charged, that accused is the
guilty agent, and that he will
probably be punished capitally if
the law is administered.
Presumption great exists
when the circumstances
testified to are such that the
inference of guilt naturally to be
drawn therefrom is strong,
clear, and convincing to an
unbiased judgment and
excludes all reasonable
probability of any other
conclusion. Even though there is
a reasonable doubt as to the
guilt of accused, if on an
examination of the entire record
the presumption is great that
accused is guilty of a capital
offense, bail should be refused.
Same; Same; It must be
remembered that the discretion
to be exercised in granting or
denying bail, according to Basco

v. Rapatalo is not absolute nor

beyond control.It is thus
indicative from the above
observations that the lower
court abused its discretion and
showed manifest bias in favor of
accused-respondent in
determining which
circumstances are to be
considered in supporting its
decision as to the guilt of
accused-respondent. In this
regard, it must be remembered
that the discretion to be
exercised in granting or denying
bail, according to Basco v.
Rapatalo is not absolute nor
beyond control. It must be
sound, and exercised within
reasonable bounds. Judicial
discretion, by its very nature,
involves the exercise of the
judges individual opinion. It is
because of its very nature that
the law has wisely provided that
its exercise be guided by wellknown rules which, while
allowing the judge rational
latitude for the operation of his
own individual views, prevent
them from getting out of
control. An uncontrolled or
uncontrollable discretion on the
part of a judge is a misnomer. It
is a fallacy. Lord Mansfield,
speaking of the discretion to be
exercised in granting or denying
bail said: But discretion when
applied to a court of justice,
means sound discretion guided
21

by law. It must be governed by

rule, not by rumour; it must not
be arbitrary, vague and fanciful;
but legal and regular.
Same; Same; No bail
recommendation constitutes
clear and strong evidence of
guilt of the accused.Lending
credence to petitioners case is
the fact that after the conduct
of two (2) preliminary
investigations, no bail was
recommended in the
information. Ac
cording to Baylon v. Sison, such
recommendation constitutes
clear and strong evidence of
guilt of the accused.
Same; Same; Jurisprudential
guidelines in the exercise of
discretion.Aside from the
apparent abuse of discretion in
determining which
circumstances and pieces of
evidence are to be considered,
the lower court also did not
strictly comply with
jurisprudential guidelines in the
exercise of discretion. As
reiterated in Carpio v.
Maglalang, discretion is guided
by: first, the applicable
provisions of the Constitution
and the statutes; second, by the
rules which this Court may
promulgate; and third, by those
principles of equity and justice

that are deemed to be part of

the laws of the land.
Same; Same; Duties of a judge
in case an application for bail is
filed.Recently, this Court laid
down the following rules in
Basco v. Judge Rapatalo which
outlined the duties of a judge in
case an application for bail is
filed: (1) Notify the prosecutor
of the hearing of the application
for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation; (2)
Conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to
show that the guilt of the
accused is strong for the
purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its discretion; (3)
Decide whether the evidence of
guilt of the accused is strong
based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
(Italics supplied) (4) If the guilt
of the accused is not strong,
discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond.
Otherwise, petition should be
denied.
VITUG, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Criminal Procedure; Bail; When
the judge views the evidence of
guilt in such a capital offense
not to be strong, the grant of
bail becomes a matter of sound

discretion on his part.In an

indictment for a capital offense,
the accused is not entitled to
bail when the evidence of guilt
is strong, and it is the duty of
the judge to hear the parties
and to make an intelligent
assessment of the evidence
presented. When the judge
views the evidence of guilt in
such a capital offense not to be
strong, the grant of bail
becomes a matter of sound
discretion on his part.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; The
extraordinary remedies under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are
not open when the question is
whether the trial judge has
erred in the exercise of sound
discretion
The extraordinary remedies
under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court are not open when the
question is whether the trial
judge has erred in the exercise
of sound discretion. These
special reliefs are available only
when the judge has committed
grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in his decision or
order such as by arbitrarily
ignoring the evidence or
completely acting on bias and
whim. Even assuming that the
judge has erred in his judgment,
so long as grave abuse of
22

discretion is not evident in his

action, the aforesaid
exceptional remedies are not
warranted. People vs. Cabral,
303 SCRA 361, G.R. No. 131909
February 18, 1999
3. Villanueva vs Buaya
4. Yap vs CA
Criminal Procedure; Bail; Imposing bail
in an excessive amount could render
meaningless the right to bail.The
prohibition against requiring excessive
bail is enshrined in the Constitution.
The obvious rationale, as declared in
the leading case of De la Camara vs.
Enage, is that imposing bail in an
excessive amount could render
meaningless the right to bail. Thus, in
Villaseor vs. Abano, this Court made
the pronouncement that it will not
hesitate to exercise its supervisory
powers over lower courts should the
latter, after holding the accused
entitled to bail, effectively deny the
same by imposing a prohibitory sum
or exacting unreasonable conditions.
Same; Same; Factors to be considered
in the setting of the amount of bail.
At the same time, Section 9, Rule 114
of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure advises courts to consider
the following factors in the setting of
the amount of bail: (a) Financial ability
of the accused to give bail; (b) Nature
and circumstances of the offense; (c)
Penalty for the offense charged; (d)

Character and reputation of the

accused; (e) Age and health of the
accused; (f) Weight of the evidence
against the accused; (g) Probability of
the accused appearing at the trial; (h)
Forfeiture of other bail; (i) The fact
that the accused was a fugitive from
justice when arrested; and (j)
Pendency of other cases where the
accused is on bail.
Same; Same; Court finds that the
setting of the amount at
P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable,
excessive, and constitutes an effective
denial of petitioners right to bail.
Under the circumstances of this case,
we find that appropriate conditions
have been imposed in the bail bond to
ensure against the risk of flight,
particularly, the combination of the
holddeparture order and the
requirement that petitioner inform the
court of any change of residence and
of his whereabouts. Although an
increase in the amount of bail while
the case is on appeal may be
meritorious, we find that the setting of
the amount at P5,500,000.00 is
unreasonable, excessive, and
constitutes an effective denial of
petitioners right to bail.
Same; Same; The amount should be
high enough to assure the presence of
the accused when required but no
higher than is reasonably calculated to
fulfill this purpose.The purpose for
bail is to guarantee the appearance of
the accused at the trial, or whenever

so required by the court. The amount

should be high enough to assure the
presence of the accused when
required but no higher than is
reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose. To fix bail at an amount
equivalent to the civil liability of which
petitioner is charged (in this case,
P5,500,000.00) is to permit the
impression that the amount paid as
bail is an exaction of the civil liability
that accused is charged of; this we
cannot allow because bail is not
intended as a punishment, nor as a
satisfaction of civil liability which
should necessarily await the judgment
of the appellate court.
Same; Same; Courts are advised that
they must not only be aware but
should also consider the Bail Bond
Guide due to its significance in the
administration of criminal justice.
True, the Court has held that the Bail
Bond Guide, a circular of the
Department of Justice for the guidance
of state prosecutors, although
technically not binding upon the
courts, merits attention, being in a
sense an expression of policy of the
Executive Branch, through the
Department of Justice, in the
enforcement of criminal laws. Thus,
courts are advised that they must not
only be aware but should also consider
the Bail Bond Guide due to its
significance in the administration of
criminal justice. This notwithstanding,
the Court is not precluded from
imposing in petitioners case an
23

amount higher than P40,000.00

(based on the Bail Bond Guide) where
it perceives that an appropriate
increase is dictated by the
circumstances.
Same; Same; Discretion to extend bail
during the course of the appeal should
be exercised with grave caution and
for strong reasons, considering that
the accused had been in fact
convicted by the trial court.It
militates emphasis that petitioner is
seeking bail on appeal. Section 5, Rule
114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure is clear that although the
grant of bail on appeal in non-capital
offenses is discretionary, when the
penalty imposed on the convicted
accused exceeds six years and
circumstances exist that point to the
probability of flight if released on bail,
then the accused must be denied bail,
or his bail previously granted should
be cancelled. In the same vein, the
Court has held that the discretion to
extend bail during the course of the
appeal should be exercised with grave
caution and for strong reasons,
considering that the accused had been
in fact convicted by the trial court.
Yap, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 358 SCRA
564, G.R. No. 141529 June 6, 2001

5. Leviste vs Almeda
Judgments; Moot and Academic
Issues; Waiver; Waiver on the

part of the accused must be

distinguished from mootness of
the petition, for in the present
case, petitioner did not, by his
active participation in the trial,
waive his stated objections.
The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) later argued that
the present petition had been
rendered moot since the
presentation of evidence,
wherein petitioner actively
participated, had been
concluded. Waiver on the part
of the accused must be
distinguished from mootness of
the petition, for in the present
case, petitioner did not, by his
active participation in the trial,
waive his stated objections.
Criminal Procedure;
Arraignment; Bail; Waiver; An
accused, in applying for bail,
does not waive his right to
challenge the regularity of the
reinvestigation of the charge
against him, the validity of the
admission of the Amended
Information, and the legality of
his arrest under the Amended
Information, where he
vigorously raised them prior to
his arraignment; The principle
that the accused is precluded
after arraignment from
questioning the illegal arrest or
the lack of or irregular
preliminary investigation
applies only if he voluntarily

enters his plea and participates

during trial, without previously
invoking his objections thereto.
Section 26, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court provides: SEC.
26. Bail not a bar to objections
on illegal arrest, lack of or
irregular preliminary
investigation.An application
for or admission to bail shall not
bar the accused from
challenging the validity of his
arrest or the legality of the
warrant issued therefor, or from
assailing the regularity or
questioning the absence of a
preliminary investigation of the
charge against him, provided
that he raises them before
entering his plea. The court
shall resolve the matter as early
as practicable but not later than
the start of the trial of the case.
By applying for bail, petitioner
did not waive his right to
challenge the regularity of the
reinvestigation of the charge
against him, the validity of the
admission of the Amended
Information, and the legality of
his arrest under the Amended
Information, as he vigorously
raised them prior to his
arraignment. During the
arraignment on March 21, 2007,
petitioner refused to enter his
plea since the issues he raised
were still pending resolution by
the appellate court, thus
prompting the trial court to
24

enter a plea of not guilty for

him. The principle that the
accused is precluded after
arraignment from questioning
the illegal arrest or the lack of
or irregular preliminary
investigation applies only if he
voluntarily enters his plea and
participates during trial, without
previously invoking his
objections thereto. There must
be clear and convincing proof
that petitioner had an actual
intention to relinquish his right
to question the existence of
probable cause. When the only
proof of intention rests on what
a party does, his act should be
so manifestly consistent with,
and indicative of, an intent to
voluntarily and unequivocally
relinquish the particular right
that no other explanation of his
conduct is possible.
Same; Same; Same; Same;
Injunction; The non-issuance of
an injunctive relief only means
that the appellate court did not
preliminarily find any exception
to the long-standing doctrine
that injunction will not lie to
enjoin a criminal prosecution.
Whatever delay arising from
petitioners availment of
remedies against the trial
courts Orders cannot be
imputed to petitioner to operate
as a valid waiver on his part.
Neither can the non-issuance of

a writ of preliminary injunction

be deemed as a voluntary
relinquishment of petitioners
principal prayer. The nonissuance of such injunctive relief
only means that the appellate
court did not preliminarily find
any exception to the longstanding doctrine that
injunction will not lie to enjoin a
criminal prosecution.
Consequently, the trial of the
case took its course.
Same; Same; Same; Moot and
Academic Issues; Words and
Phrases; A moot and academic
case is one that ceases to
present a justiciable controversy
by virtue of supervening events,
so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or
value; The judgment convicting
petitioner of homicide under the
Amended Information for
murder operates as a
supervening event that mooted
the present petition; Instead,
however, of denying the petition
outright on the ground of
mootness, the Court proceeds
to resolve the legal issues in
order to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench,
bar and publicin the present
case, there is compelling reason
to clarify the remedies available
before and after the filing of an
information in cases subject of
inquest.A moot and academic

case is one that ceases to

present a justiciable controversy
by virtue of supervening events,
so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or
value. The judgment convicting
petitioner of homicide under the
Amended Information for
murder operates as a
supervening event that mooted
the present petition. Assuming
that there is ground to annul
the finding of probable cause
for murder, there is no practical
use or value in abrogating the
concluded proceedings and
retrying the case under the
original Information for
homicide just to arrive, more
likely or even definitely, at the
same conviction of homicide.
Mootness would have also set in
had petitioner been convicted of
murder, for proof beyond
reasonable doubt, which is
much higher than probable
cause, would have been
established in that instance.
Instead, however, of denying
the petition outright on the
ground of mootness, the Court
proceeds to resolve the legal
issues in order to formulate
controlling principles to guide
the bench, bar and public. In
the present case, there is
compelling reason to clarify the
remedies available before and
after the filing of an information
in cases subject of inquest.
25

Same; Preliminary Investigation;

Inquest; Words and Phrases;
Inquest is defined as an
informal and summary
investigation conducted by a
public prosecutor in criminal
cases involving persons
arrested and detained without
the benefit of a warrant of
arrest issued by the court for
the purpose of determining
whether said persons should
remain under custody and
correspondingly be charged in
court.A preliminary
investigation is required before
the filing of a complaint or
information for an offense
where the penalty prescribed by
law is at least four years, two
months and one day without
regard to fine. As an exception,
the rules provide that there is
no need for a preliminary
investigation in cases of a lawful
arrest without a warrant
involving such type of offense,
so long as an inquest, where
available, has been conducted.
Inquest is defined as an
informal and summary
investigation conducted by a
public prosecutor in criminal
cases involving persons
arrested and detained without
the benefit of a warrant of
arrest issued by the court for
the purpose of determining
whether said persons should

remain under custody and

correspondingly be charged in
court.
Same; Same; Same; Before the
filing of complaint or
information in court, the private
complainant may proceed in
coordinating with the arresting
officer and the inquest officer
during the latters conduct of
inquest, while the arrested
person has the option to avail of
a 15-day preliminary
investigation, provided he duly
signs a waiver of any objection
against delay in his delivery to
the proper judicial authorities
under Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code; The accelerated
process of inquest, owing to its
summary nature and the
attendant risk of running
against Article 125, ends with
either the prompt filing of an
information in court or the
immediate release of the
arrested personthe rules on
inquest do not provide for a
motion for reconsideration.It
is imperative to first take a
closer look at the predicament
of both the arrested person and
the private complainant during
the brief period of inquest, to
grasp the respective remedies
available to them before and
after the filing of a complaint or
information in court. BEFORE
THE FILING OF COMPLAINT OR

INFORMATION IN COURT, the

private complainant may
proceed in coordinating with the
arresting officer and the inquest
officer during the latters
conduct of inquest. Meanwhile,
the arrested person has the
option to avail of a 15-day
preliminary investigation,
provided he duly signs a waiver
of any objection against delay in
his delivery to the proper
judicial authorities under Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code.
For obvious reasons, this
remedy is not available to the
private complainant since he
cannot waive what he does not
have. The benefit of the
provisions of Article 125, which
requires the filing of a complaint
or information with the proper
judicial authorities within the
applicable period, belongs to
the arrested person. The
accelerated process of inquest,
owing to its summary nature
and the attendant risk of
running against Article 125,
ends with either the prompt
filing of an information in court
or the immediate release of the
arrested person. Notably, the
rules on inquest do not provide
for a motion for reconsideration.
Same; Same; Same; In cases
subject of inquest, the private
party should first avail of a
preliminary investigation or
26

reinvestigation, if any, before

elevating the matter to the
Department of Justice (DOJ)
Secretary.Contrary to
petitioners position that private
complainant should have
appealed to the DOJ Secretary,
such remedy is not immediately
available in cases subject of
inquest. Noteworthy is the
proviso that the appeal to the
DOJ Secretary is by petition by
a proper party under such rules
as the Department of
Justice may prescribe. The rule
referred to is the 2000 National
Prosecution Service Rule on
Appeal, Section 1 of which
provides that the Rule shall
apply to appeals from
resolutions x x x in cases
subject of preliminary
investigation/ reinvestigation.
In cases subject of inquest,
therefore, the private party
should first avail of a
preliminary investigation or
reinvestigation, if any, before
elevating the matter to the DOJ
Secretary. In case the inquest
proceedings yield no probable
cause, the private complainant
may pursue the case through
the regular course of a
preliminary investigation.
Same; Same; Reinvestigation;
Once a complaint or information
is filed in court, the accused is
provided with another

opportunity to ask for a

preliminary investigation within
five days from the time he
learns of its filing, while a
private complainant can move
for reinvestigation in cases he is
allowed to intervene by counsel
in the criminal action and is
granted the authority to
prosecute, with the conformity
of the public prosecutor.ONCE
A COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION
IS FILED IN COURT, the rules yet
provide the accused with
another opportunity to ask for a
preliminary investigation within
five days from the time he
learns of its filing. The Rules of
Court and the New Rules on
Inquest are silent, however, on
whether the private
complainant could invoke, as
respondent heirs of the victim
did in the present case, a
similar right to ask for a
reinvestigation. The Court holds
that the private complainant
can move for reinvestigation,
subject to and in light of the
ensuing disquisition. All criminal
actions commenced by a
complaint or information shall
be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the
public prosecutor. The private
complainant in a criminal case
is merely a witness and not a
party to the case and cannot, by
himself, ask for the
reinvestigation of the case after

the information had been filed

in court, the proper party for
that being the public prosecutor
who has the control of the
prosecution of the case. Thus, in
cases where the private
complainant is allowed to
intervene by counsel in the
criminal action, and is granted
the authority to prosecute, the
private complainant, by counsel
and with the conformity of the
public prosecutor, can file a
motion for reinvestigation.
Same; Same; Same;
Amendment of Information; An
information which is void ab
initio cannot be amended to
obviate a ground for quashal;
An amendment which operates
to vest jurisdiction upon the trial
court is likewise impermissible.
Before the accused enters a
plea, a formal or substantial
amendment of the complaint or
information may be made
without leave of court. After the
entry of a plea, only a formal
amendment may be made but
with leave of court and only if it
does not prejudice the rights of
the accused. After arraignment,
a substantial amendment is
proscribed except if the same is
beneficial to the accused. It
must be clarified though that
not all defects in an information
are curable by amendment prior
to entry of plea. An information
27

which is void ab initio cannot be

amended to obviate a ground
for quashal. An amendment
which operates to vest
jurisdiction upon the trial court
is likewise impermissible.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Any
remedial measure springing
from the reinvestigationbe it a
complete disposition or an
intermediate modification of the
chargeis eventually addressed
to the sound discretion of the
trial court, which must make an
independent evaluation or
assessment of the merits of the
case.Considering the general
rule that an information may be
amended even in substance and
even without leave of court at
any time before entry of plea,
does it mean that the conduct
of a reinvestigation at that
stage is a mere superfluity? It is
not. Any remedial measure
springing from the
reinvestigationbe it a
complete disposition or an
intermediate modification of the
chargeis eventually addressed
to the sound discretion of the
trial court, which must make an
independent evaluation or
assessment of the merits of the
case. Since the trial court would
ultimately make the
determination on the proposed
course of action, it is for the
prosecution to consider whether

a reinvestigation is necessary to
adduce and review the evidence
for purposes of buttressing the
appropriate motion to be filed in
court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Due
process of law demands that no
substantial amendment of an
information may be admitted
without conducting another or a
new preliminary investigation.
Reinvestigation is required in
cases involving a substantial
amendment of the information.
Due process of law demands
that no substantial amendment
of an information may be
admitted without conducting
another or a new preliminary
investigation. In Matalam v. The
2nd Division of the
Sandiganbayan, 455 SCRA 736
(2005), the Court ruled that a
substantial amendment in an
information entitles an accused
to another preliminary
investigation, unless the
amended information contains a
charge related to or is included
in the original Information.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The
amendment of the Information
from homicide to murder is a
substantial amendment which
would make it not just a right
but a duty of the prosecution to
ask for a preliminary
investigation.The question to

be resolved is whether the

amendment of the Information
from homicide to murder is
considered a substantial
amendment, which would make
it not just a right but a duty of
the prosecution to ask for a
preliminary investigation. The
Court answers in the
affirmative. A substantial
amendment consists of the
recital of facts constituting the
offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction
of the court. All other matters
are merely of form. The
following have been held to be
mere formal amendments: (1)
new allegations which relate
only to the range of the penalty
that the court might impose in
the event of conviction; (2) an
amendment which does not
charge another offense different
or distinct from that charged in
the original one; (3) additional
allegations which do not alter
the prosecutions theory of the
case so as to cause surprise to
the accused and affect the form
of defense he has or will
assume; (4) an amendment
which does not adversely affect
any substantial right of the
accused; and (5) an amendment
that merely adds specifications
to eliminate vagueness in the
information and not to introduce
new and material facts, and
merely states with additional
28

precision something which is

already contained in the original
information and which adds
nothing essential for conviction
for the crime charged. The test
as to whether a defendant is
prejudiced by the amendment is
whether a defense under the
information as it originally stood
would be available after the
amendment is made, and
whether any evidence
defendant might have would be
equally applicable to the
information in the one form as
in the other. An amendment to
an information which does not
change the nature of the crime
alleged therein does not affect
the essence of the offense or
cause surprise or deprive the
accused of an opportunity to
meet the new averment had
each been held to be one of
form and not of substance.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The
mere fact that the two charges
are related does not necessarily
or automatically deprive the
accused of his right to another
preliminary investigation.
Matalam adds that the mere
fact that the two charges are
related does not necessarily or
automatically deprive the
accused of his right to another
preliminary investigation.
Notatu dignum is the fact that
both the original Information

and the amended Information in

Matalam were similarly charging
the accused with violation of
Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
Same; Same; Same; Same;
Words and Phrases; There is no
substantial distinction between
a preliminary investigation and
a reinvestigation since both are
conducted in the same manner
and for the same objective of
determining whether there
exists sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been
committed and the respondent
is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial.
Considering that another or a
new preliminary investigation is
required, the fact that what was
conducted in the present case
was a reinvestigation does not
invalidate the substantial
amendment of the Information.
There is no substantial
distinction between a
preliminary investigation and a
reinvestigation since both are
conducted in the same manner
and for the same objective of
determining whether there
exists sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been
committed and the respondent
is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial. What is

essential is that petitioner was

placed on guard to defend
himself from the charge of
murder after the claimed
circumstances were made
known to him as early as the
first motion.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The
rules do not even require, as a
condition sine qua non to the
validity of a preliminary
investigation, the presence of
the respondent as long as
efforts to reach him were made
and an opportunity to
controvert the complainants
evidence was accorded him.
Petitioner did not, however,
make much of the opportunity
to present countervailing
evidence on the proposed
amended charge. Despite notice
of hearing, petitioner opted to
merely observe the proceedings
and declined to actively
participate, even with extreme
caution, in the reinvestigation.
Mercado v. Court of Appeals,
245 SCRA 594 (1995) states
that the rules do not even
require, as a condition sine qua
non to the validity of a
preliminary investigation, the
presence of the respondent as
long as efforts to reach him
were made and an opportunity
to controvert the complainants
evidence was accorded him.
29

Same; Same; Judges; Bias and

Partiality; The pace in resolving
incidents of the case is not per
se an indication of bias.
Regarding petitioners
protestations of haste, suffice to
state that the pace in resolving
incidents of the case is not per
se an indication of bias. In
Santos-Concio v. Department of
Justice, 543 SCRA 70 (2008), the
Court held: Speed in the
conduct of proceedings by a
judicial or quasi-judicial officer
cannot per se be instantly
attributed to an injudicious
performance of functions. For
ones prompt dispatch may be
anothers undue haste. The
orderly administration of justice
remains as the paramount and
constant consideration, with
particular regard of the
circumstances peculiar to each
case. The presumption of
regularity includes the public
officers official actuations in all
phases of work. Consistent with
such presumption, it was
incumbent upon petitioners to
present contradictory evidence
other than a mere tallying of
days or numerical calculation.
This, petitioners failed to
discharge. The swift completion
of the Investigating Panels
initial task cannot be relegated
as shoddy or shady without

discounting the presumably

regular performance of not just
one but five state prosecutors.
Same; Same; There is a
hierarchy of officials in the
prosecutory arm of the
executive branch headed by the
Secretary of Justice who is
vested with the prerogative to
appoint a special prosecutor or
designate an acting prosecutor
to handle a particular case,
which broad power of control
has been recognized by
jurisprudence.There is no
ground for petitioners
protestations against the DOJ
Secretarys sudden designation
of Senior State Prosecutor
Emmanuel Velasco as Acting
City Prosecutor of Makati City
for the present case and the
latters conformity to the motion
for reinvestigation. In granting
the reinvestigation, Judge
Alameda cannot choose the
public prosecutor who will
conduct the reinvestigation or
preliminary investigation. There
is a hierarchy of officials in the
prosecutory arm of the
executive branch headed by the
Secretary of Justice who is
vested with the prerogative to
appoint a special prosecutor or
designate an acting prosecutor
to handle a particular case,
which broad power of control

has been recognized by

jurisprudence.
Same; Same; Quantum of Proof;
The standard of strong evidence
of guilt which is sufficient to
deny bail to an accused is
markedly higher than the
standard of judicial probable
cause which is sufficient to
initiate a criminal case.That
the evidence of guilt was not
strong as subsequently
assessed in the bail hearings
does not affect the prior
determination of probable cause
because, as the appellate court
correctly stated, the standard of
strong evidence of guilt which is
sufficient to deny bail to an
accused is markedly higher than
the standard of judicial probable
cause which is sufficient to
initiate a criminal case.
Same; Same; Probable Cause;
There are two kinds of
determination of probable
cause: executive and judicial;
The executive determination of
probable cause is one made
during preliminary
investigation; The judicial
determination of probable cause
is one made by the judge to
ascertain whether a warrant of
arrest should be issued against
the accused.There are two
kinds of determination of
probable cause: executive and
30

judicial. The executive

determination of probable cause
is one made during preliminary
investigation. It is a function
that properly pertains to the
public prosecutor who is given a
broad discretion to determine
whether probable cause exists
and to charge those whom he
believes to have committed the
crime as defined by law and
thus should be held for trial.
Otherwise stated, such official
has the quasi-judicial authority
to determine whether or not a
criminal case must be filed in
court. Whether that function
has been correctly discharged
by the public prosecutor, i.e.,
whether he has made a correct
ascertainment of the existence
of probable cause in a case, is a
matter that the trial court itself
does not and may not be
compelled to pass upon. The
judicial determination of
probable cause is one made by
the judge to ascertain whether
a warrant of arrest should be
issued against the accused. The
judge must satisfy himself that
based on the evidence
submitted, there is necessity for
placing the accused under
custody in order not to frustrate
the ends of justice. If the judge
finds no probable cause, the
judge cannot be forced to issue
the arrest warrant. Paragraph
(a), Section 5, Rule 112 of the

Rules of Court outlines the

procedure to be followed by the
RTC.
Same; Same; Same; Judicial
Determination of Probable
Cause; To move the court to
conduct a judicial determination
of probable cause is a mere
superfluity, for with or without
such motion, the judge is dutybound to personally evaluate
the resolution of the public
prosecutor and the supporting
evidence.To move the court to
conduct a judicial determination
of probable cause is a mere
superfluity, for with or without
such motion, the judge is dutybound to personally evaluate
the resolution of the public
prosecutor and the supporting
evidence. In fact, the task of the
presiding judge when the
Information is filed with the
court is first and foremost to
determine the existence or nonexistence of probable cause for
the arrest of the accused. What
the Constitution underscores is
the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause.
But the judge is not required to
personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine
and procedure, he shall (1)
personally evaluate the report

and the supporting documents

submitted by the prosecutor
regarding the existence of
probable cause, and on the
basis thereof, he may already
make a personal determination
of the existence of probable
cause; and (2) if he is not
satisfied that probable cause
exists, he may disregard the
prosecutors report and require
the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid
him in arriving at a conclusion
as to the existence of probable
cause. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Same; Same; Same; The
accused cannot, as a matter of
right, insist on a hearing for
judicial determination of
probable cause.The rules do
not require cases to be set for
hearing to determine probable
cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest of the accused
before any warrant may be
issued. Petitioner thus cannot,
as a matter of right, insist on a
hearing for judicial
determination of probable
cause. Certainly, petitioner
cannot determine beforehand
how cursory or exhaustive the
[judges] examination of the
records should be [since t]he
extent of the judges
examination depends on the
exercise of his sound discretion
31

as the circumstances of the

case require. In one case, the
Court emphatically stated: The
periods provided in the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure are
mandatory, and as such, the
judge must determine the
presence or absence of
probable cause within such
periods. The Sandiganbayans
determination of probable cause
is made ex parte and is
summary in nature, not
adversarial. The Judge should
not be stymied and distracted
from his determination of
probable cause by needless
motions for determination of
probable cause filed by the
accused. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Same; Preliminary Investigation;
Reinvestigation; It is not
material that no new matter or
evidence was presented during
the reinvestigation of the case
reinvestigation, as the word
itself implies, is merely a repeat
investigation of the case which
is simply a chance for the
prosecutor to review and reevaluate its findings and the
evidence already submitted.
Petitioner proceeds to discuss at
length evidentiary matters,
arguing that no circumstances
exist that would qualify the
crime from homicide to murder.
The allegation of lack of

substantial or material new

evidence deserves no credence,
because new pieces of evidence
are not prerequisites for a valid
conduct of reinvestigation. It is
not material that no new matter
or evidence was presented
during the reinvestigation of the
case. It should be stressed that
reinvestigation, as the word
itself implies, is merely a repeat
investigation of the case. New
matters or evidence are not
prerequisites for a
reinvestigation, which is simply
a chance for the prosecutor to
review and re-evaluate its
findings and the evidence
already submitted.
Certiorari; Although it is
possible that error may be
committed in the discharge of
lawful functions, this does not
render the act amenable to
correction and annulment by
the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari, absent any showing
of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of
jurisdiction.Under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be raised
in, and be subject of, a petition
for review on certiorari since
this Court is not a trier of facts.
The Court cannot thus review
the evidence adduced by the
parties on the issue of the
absence or presence of

probable cause, as there exists

no exceptional circumstances to
warrant a factual review. In a
petition for certiorari, like that
filed by petitioner before the
appellate court, the jurisdiction
of the court is narrow in scope.
It is limited to resolving only
errors of jurisdiction. It is not to
stray at will and resolve
questions and issues beyond its
competence, such as an error of
judgment. The courts duty in
the pertinent case is confined to
determining whether the
executive and judicial
determination of probable cause
was done without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion. Although it
is possible that error may be
committed in the discharge of
lawful functions, this does not
render the act amenable to
correction and annulment by
the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari, absent any showing
of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of
jurisdiction. Leviste vs.
Alameda, 626
6. Cortes vs Catral
Criminal Law; Right to Bail;
Words and Phrases;
Presumption of Innocence;
Bail, Defined; Bail is awarded
to the accused to honor the
presumption of innocence until
32

his guilt is proven beyond

reasonable doubt, and to enable
him to prepare his defense
without being subject to
punishment prior to conviction.
Bail is the security required by
the court and given by the
accused to ensure that the
accused appears before the
proper court at the scheduled
time and place to answer the
charges brought against him or
her. It is awarded to the
accused to honor the
presumption of innocence until
his guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt, and to enable
him to prepare his defense
without being subject to
punishment prior to conviction.
Same; Same; Whether bail is a
matter of right or of discretion,
reasonable notice of hearing is
required to be given to the
prosecutor or fiscal or at least
he must be asked for his
recommendation.Bail should
be fixed according to the
circumstances of each case. The
amount fixed should be
sufficient to ensure the
presence of the accused at the
trial yet reasonable enough to
comply with the constitutional
provision that bail should not be
excessive. Therefore, whether
bail is a matter of right or of
discretion, reasonable notice of
hearing is required to be given

to the prosecutor or fiscal or at

least he must be asked for his
recommendation because in
fixing the amount of bail, the
judge is required to take into
account a number of factors
such as the applicants
character and reputation,
forfeiture of other bonds or
whether he is a fugitive from
justice.
Same; Same; Words and
Phrases; A summary hearing
means such brief and speedy
method of receiving and
considering the evidence of
guilt as is practicable and
consistent with the purpose of
hearing which is merely to
determine the weight of
evidence for purposes of bail.
A summary hearing means such
brief and speedy method of
receiving and considering the
evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with
the purpose of hearing which is
merely to determine the weight
of evidence for purposes of bail.
On such hearing, the court does
not sit to try the merits or to
enter into any nice inquiry as to
the weight that ought to be
allowed to the evidence for or
against the accused, nor will it
speculate on the outcome of the
trial or on what further evidence
may be therein offered or
admitted. The course of inquiry

may be left to the discretion of

the court which may confine
itself to receiving such evidence
as has reference to substantial
matters, avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the
examination and cross
examination.
Same; Same; Judges; The judge
is mandated to conduct a
hearing even in cases where the
prosecution chooses to just file
a comment or leaves the
application of bail to the sound
discretion of the court.In the
recent case of Inocencio Basco
v. Judge Leo M. Rapatalo, this
Court ruled that x x x the judge
is mandated to conduct a
hearing even in cases where the
prosecution chooses to just file
a comment or leave the
application of bail to the sound
discretion of the court. A
hearing is likewise required if
the prosecution refuses to
adduce evidence in opposition
to the application to grant and
fix bail. The importance of a
hearing has been emphasized in
not a few cases wherein the
court ruled that, even if the
prosecution refuses to adduce
evidence or fails to interpose an
objection to the motion for
bail, it is still mandatory for the
court to conduct a hearing or
ask searching questions from
which it may infer the strength
33

of the evidence of guilt, or the

lack of it against the accused.
Same; Same; Same; Inasmuch
as the determination of whether
or not the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong is
a matter of judicial discretion, it
may rightly be exercised only
after the evidence is submitted
to the court at the hearing.
The reason for this is plain.
Inasmuch as the determination
of whether or not the evidence
of guilt against the accused is
strong is a matter of judicial
discretion, it may rightly be
exercised only after the
evidence is submitted to the
court at the hearing. Since the
discretion is directed to the
weight of evidence and since
evidence cannot properly be
weighed if not duly exhibited or
produced before the court, it is
obvious that a proper exercise
of judicial discretion requires
that the evidence of guilt be
submitted to the court, the
petitioner having the right of
cross examination and to
introduce evidence in his own
rebuttal.
Same; Same; Same; The courts
order granting or refusing bail
must contain a summary of the
evidence for the prosecution,
otherwise the order may be
invalidated because the

summary of the evidence for

the prosecution which contains
the judges evaluation of the
evidence may be considered as
an aspect of procedural due
process for both the prosecution
and the defense.Worth noting,
too, is the fact that the order
granting the application, as well
as the reduction for bail in the
aforecited cases, did not contain
a summary of the evidence
presented by the prosecution. In
Criminal Case No. 07-874,
respondent only arrived at the
conclusion that the evidence
was not so strong to warrant the
fixation of said amount and the
observation that: When the
hearing of this petition was
called, some legal skirmishes
arose between the Prosecutor
and the Defense Counsel, after
which, the prosecutor out of
humanitarian reason yielded
and manifested that he is
amenable that the accused be
admitted to bail in the amount
of P200,000.00 in Criminal
Case No. 08-866. Well settled in
a number of cases is the rule
that the courts order granting
or refusing bail must contain a
summary of the evidence for
the prosecution, otherwise the
order granting or denying bail
may be invalidated because the
summary of the evidence for
the prosecution which contains
the judges evaluation of the

evidence may be considered as

an aspect of procedural due
process for both the prosecution
and the defense.
Same; Same; The right to bail
can only be availed of by a
person who is in custody of the
law or otherwise deprived of his
liberty and it would be
premature, not to say
incongruous, to file a petition
for bail for someone whose
freedom has yet to be curtailed.
The procedural lapse of
respondent judge is aggravated
by the fact that even though the
accused in Criminal Case No.
07-874, People v. Ahmed
Duerme, have yet to be
arrested, respondent already
fixed bail in the sum of
P200,000.00. Respondent
evidently knew that the accused
were still at large as he even
had to direct their arrest in the
same order where he
simultaneously granted them
bail. At this juncture, there is a
need to reiterate the basic
principle that the right to bail
can only be availed of by a
person who is in custody of the
law or otherwise deprived of his
liberty and it would be
premature, not to say
incongruous, to file a petition
for bail for someone whose
freedom has yet to be curtailed.
34

Same; Same; As long as in

fixing the amount of bail the
court is guided by the purpose
for which bail is required, that
is, to secure the appearance of
the accused to answer charges
brought against him, the
decision of the court to grant
bail in the sum it deems
appropriate will not be
interfered with.In Criminal
Case No. 08-915 for homicide
filed against accused Nilo de
Rivera, complainant alleges that
the amount of P14,800.00
granted by respondent as
bailbond of the accused is too
low. Respondent judge stresses
that the amount was
recommended by the
prosecutor and not motu proprio
by the trial court. Respondent
added that the amount of bail
was appropriate inasmuch as it
was fixed in accordance with
the guidelines set forth in
Section 9 of Administrative
Circular 12-94. As long as in
fixing the amount of bail, the
court is guided by the purpose
for which bail is required, that
is, to secure the appearance of
the accused to answer charges
brought against him, the
decision of the court to grant
bail in the sum it deems
appropriate will not be
interfered with.

Same; Same; Judges; Gross

Ignorance; A judge is guilty of
gross ignorance of the law if he
grants bail in a murder case
without conducting the requisite
hearing.In sum, we find
respondent Judge Segundo B.
Catral guilty of gross ignorance
of the law for having granted
bail to the accused in Criminal
Cases Nos. 07-874 and 08-866
without having conducted the
requisite hearing. It is indeed
surprising, not to say, alarming,
that the Court should be
besieged with a number of
administrative cases filed
against erring judges involving
bail. After all, there is no dearth
of jurisprudence on the basic
principles involving bail. As a
matter of fact, the Court itself,
through its Philippine Judicial
Academy, has been including
lectures on the subject in the
regular seminars conducted for
judges.
Same; Same; Same; Duties of
Judge in Bail Applications.Be
that as it may, we reiterate the
following duties of the trial
judge in case an application for
bail is filed: 1. In all cases,
whether bail is a matter of right
or of discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require
him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18,

Rule 114 of the Rules of Court

as amended); 2. Where bail is a
matter of discretion, conduct a
hearing of the application for
bail regardless of whether or not
the prosecution refuses to
present evidence to show that
the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise
its sound discretion (Sections 7
and 8); 3. Decide whether the
guilt of the accused is strong
based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution; 4.
If the guilt of the accused is not
strong, discharge the accused
upon the approval of the
bailbond (Section 19).
Otherwise, the petition should
be denied.
Same; Same; Same; Faith in the
administration of justice can
only be engendered if litigants
are convinced that the
members of the Bench cannot
justly be charged with a
deficiency in their grasp of legal
principles.With such succinct
but clear rules now incorporated
in the Rules of Court, trial
judges are enjoined to study
them well and be guided
accordingly. Admittedly, judges
cannot be held to account for
an erroneous decision rendered
in good faith, but this defense is
much too frequently cited even
if not applicable. A number of
35

cases on bail having already

been decided, this Court
justifiably expects judges to
discharge their duties
assiduously. For a judge is called
upon to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules; it
is imperative that he be
conversant with basic legal
principles. Faith in the
administration of justice can
only be engendered if litigants
are convinced that the
members of the Bench cannot
justly be charged with a
deficiency in their grasp of legal
principles. Cortes vs. Catral, 279
SCRA 1, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1387
September 10, 1997
7. Marzan-Gelacio vs Flores
Judges; Gross Ignorance of the
Law; It is imperative that judges
be conversant with basic legal
principlesjudges owe it to the
public and to the legal
profession to know the law they
are supposed to apply to a
given controversy.The
foregoing findings and
disquisitions of the OCA are well
taken. It is imperative that
judges be conversant with basic
legal principles. Indeed, the
Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins
judges to be faithful to the law
and maintain professional
competence. Respondent

judge owes it to the public and

to the legal profession to know
the law he is supposed to apply
to a given controversy.

accused upon the approval of

the bail bond (Section 19,
supra). Otherwise, the petition
should be denied.

Same; Bail; The duties of judges

in case an application for bail is
filed have been clearly and
repeatedly spelled out during
seminars conducted by the
Philippine Judicial Academy.
The following duties of judges in
case an application for bail is
filed have been clearly and
repeatedly spelled out during
seminars conducted by the
Philippine Judicial Academy, to
wit: 1. In all cases whether bail
is a matter of right or discretion,
notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for
bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
as amended); 2. Where bail is a
matter of discretion, conduct a
hearing of the application for
bail regardless of whether or not
the prosecution refuses to
present evidence to show that
the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise
its sound discretion; (Sections 7
and 8, supra) 3. Decide whether
the guilt of the accused is
strong based on the summary
of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is
not strong, discharge the

Same; Same; Utmost diligence

is required of trial judges in
granting bail especially in cases
where bail is not a matter of
right; A responsible judge must
not be swayed by the mere
representations of the parties
he should look into the real and
hard facts of the case.The
procedural necessity of a
hearing relative to the grant of
bail can not be dispensed with
especially in this case where the
accused is charged with a
capital offense. Utmost
diligence is required of trial
judges in granting bail
especially in cases where bail is
not a matter of right. Certain
procedures must be followed in
order that the accused would be
present during trial. As a
responsible, judge, respondent
must not be swayed by the
mere representations of the
parties; instead, he should look
into the real and hard facts of
the case.
Same; Same; To do away with
the requisite bail hearing,
especially in those cases where
the applicant is charged with a
capital offense is to dispense
with this time-tested safeguard
36

against arbitrariness; It must

always be remembered that
imperative justice requires the
proper observance of
indispensable technicalities
precisely designed to ensure its
proper dispensation.To do
away with the requisite bail
hearing, especially in those
cases where the applicant is
charged with a capital offense
is to dispense with this timetested safeguard against
arbitrariness. It must always be
remembered that imperative
justice requires the proper
observance of indispensable
technicalities precisely designed
to ensure its proper
dispensation. In this regard, it
needs be stressed that the
grant or the denial of bail in
capital offenses hinges on the
issue of whether or not the
evidence of guilt of the accused
is strong and the determination
of whether or not the evidence
is strong is a matter of judicial
discretion which remains with
the judge.
Same; Same; Judicial discretion,
by its very nature, involves the
exercise of the judges
individual opinion and the law
has wisely provided that its
exercise be guided by wellknown rules which, while
allowing the judge rational
latitude for the operation of his

own individual views, prevent

them from getting out of
control.It must be pointed out
in this regard that [J]udicial
discretion, by its very nature,
involves the exercise of the
judges individual opinion and
the law has wisely provided that
its exercise be guided by
wellknown rules which, while
allowing the judge rational
latitude for the operation of his
own individual views, prevent
them from getting out of
control. In other words, judicial
discretion is not unbridled but
must be supported by a finding
of the facts relied upon to form
an opinion on the issue before
the court.
Same; Same; The courts order
granting or refusing bail must
contain a summary of the
evidence for the prosecution
followed by its conclusion
whether or not the evidence of
guilt is strong; The summary of
evidence may be considered as
an aspect of judicial due
process for both the prosecution
and the defense.In numerous
cases we repeatedly ruled that
the courts order granting or
refusing bail must contain a
summary of the evidence for
the prosecution followed by its
conclusion whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong.
Indeed, the summary of

evidence for the prosecution

which contains the judges
evaluation of the evidence may
be considered as an aspect of
judicial due process for both the
prosecution and the defense.
Nowhere is such summary to be
found in the assailed orders of
respondent judge.
Same; Same; If the prosecution
refuses to adduce evidence or
fails to interpose an objection to
the motion for bail, it is still
mandatory for the court to
conduct a hearing or ask
searching and clarificatory
questions.With clear-cut
procedural guidelines on bail
now incorporated in the Rules of
Court, judges have been
enjoined to study them well and
be guided accordingly.
Concededly, judges cannot be
faulted for honest lapses in
judgment but this defense has
become shopworn from
overuse. To reiterate, although
the Provincial Prosecutor had
interposed no objection to the
grant of bail to the accused,
respondent judge should have
set the application or petition
for bail for hearing. If the
prosecution refuses to adduce
evidence or fails to interpose an
objection to the motion for bail,
it is still mandatory for the court
to conduct a hearing or ask
searching and clarificatory
37

questions. For even the failure

of the prosecution to interpose
an objection to the grant of bail
to the accused will not justify
such grant without a hearing.
Same; Same; Gross Ignorance
of the Law; The failure of the
judge to conduct the hearing
required prior to the grant of
bail in capital offenses is
inexcusable and reflects gross
ignorance of the law and a
cavalier disregard of its
requirement.As pointedly
stated in Bantuas v.
Pangadapun [T]o grant an
application for bail and fix the
amount thereof without a
hearing duly called for the
purpose of determining whether
the evidence of guilt is strong
constitutes ignorance or
incompetence whose grossness
cannot be excused by a claim of
good faith or excusable
negligence. Furthermore, the
Court has held that the failure
of the judge to conduct the
hearing required prior to the
grant of bail in capital offenses
is inexcusable and reflects gross
ignorance of the law and a
cavalier disregard of its requirement. , 334 SCRA 1, A.M.
No. RTJ-99-1488 June 20, 2000

RIGHT AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION

1.Standard Chartered Bank vs
Senate Committee on Banks
Legislature; Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation; Judgments; Central to the
Courts ruling in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA
767 (1991)that the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee was without any
constitutional mooring to conduct the
legislative investigationwas the
Courts dete rmination that the
intended inquiry was not in aid of
legislation.It is true that in Bengzon,
the Court declared that the issue to be
investigated was one over which
jurisdiction had already been acquired
by the Sandiganbayan, and to
Standard Chartered Bank (Philippine
Branch) vs. Senate Committee on
Banks, Financial Institutions and
Currencies
allow the [Senate Blue Ribbon]
Committee to investigate the matter
would create the possibility of
conflicting judgments; and that the
inquiry into the same justiciable
controversy would be an
encroachment on the exclusive
domain of judicial jurisdiction that had
set in much earlier. To the extent that,
in the case at bench, there are a
number of cases already pending in
various courts and administrative
bodies involving the petitioners,

relative to the alleged sale of

unregistered foreign securities, there
is a resemblance between this case
and Bengzon. However, the similarity
ends there. Central to the Courts
ruling in Bengzonthat the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee was without
any constitutional mooring to conduct
the legislative investigationwas the
Courts determination that the
intended inquiry was not in aid of
legislation. The Court found that the
speech of Senator Enrile, which sought
such investigation contained no
suggestion of any contemplated
legislation; it merely called upon the
Senate to look into possible violations
of Section 5, Republic Act No. 3019.
Same; Same; Separation of Powers;
The mere filing of a criminal or an
administrative complaint before a
court or a quasi-judicial body should
not automatically bar the conduct of
legislative investigationthe exercise
of sovereign legislative authority, of
which the power of legislative inquiry
is an essential component, cannot be
made subordinate to a criminal or an
administrative investigation. The
mere filing of a criminal or an
administrative complaint before a
court or a quasi-judicial body should
not automatically bar the conduct of
legislative investigation. Otherwise, it
would be extremely easy to subvert
any intended inquiry by Congress
through the convenient ploy of
instituting a criminal or an
administrative complaint. Surely, the
38

exercise of sovereign legislative

authority, of which the power of
legislative inquiry is an essential
component, cannot be made
subordinate to a criminal or an
administrative investigation. As
succinctly stated in the landmark case
Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 (1950)
[T]he power of inquirywith process
to enforce itis an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is
intended to affect or change; and
where the legislative body does not
itself possess the requisite information
which is not infrequently true
recourse must be had to others who
possess it.
Standard Chartered Bank (Philippine
Branch) vs. Senate Committee on
Banks, Financial Institutions and
Currencies
Same; Same; Same; Contempt; The
exercise by Congress or by any of its
committees of the power to punish
contempt is based on the principle of
self-preservationas the branch of the
government vested with the legislative
power, independently of the judicial
branch, it can assert its authority and
punish contumacious acts against it.
The exercise by Congress or by any of
its committees of the power to punish
contempt is based on the principle of
self-preservation. As the branch of the

government vested with the legislative

power, independently of the judicial
branch, it can assert its authority and
punish contumacious acts against it.
Such power is sui generis, as it
attaches not to the discharge of
legislative functions per se, but to the
sovereign character of the legislature
as one of the three independent and
coordinate branches of government. In
this case, petitioners imputation that
the investigation was in aid of
collection is a direct challenge
against the authority of the Senate
Committee, as it ascribes ill motive to
the latter. In this light, we find the
contempt citation against the
petitioners reasonable and justified.
Same; Same; Contempt; It is axiomatic
that the power of legislative
investigation includes the power to
compel the attendance of witnesses,
and corollary to the power to compel
the attendance of witnesses is the
power to ensure that said witnesses
would be available to testify in the
legislative investigation.It is
axiomatic that the power of legislative
investigation includes the power to
compel the attendance of witnesses.
Corollary to the power to compel the
attendance of witnesses is the power
to ensure that said witnesses would be
available to testify in the legislative
investigation. In the case at bench,
considering that most of the officers of
SCBPhilippines are not Filipino
nationals who may easily evade the
compulsive character of respondents

summons by leaving the country, it

was reasonable for the respondent to
request the assistance of the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation to
prevent said witnesses from evading
the inquiry and defeating its purpose.
In any event, no HDO was issued by a
court. The BID instead included them
only in the Watch List, which had the
effect of merely delaying petitioners
intended travel abroad for five (5)
days, provided no HDO is issued
against them.
Same; Same; Same; Right to Privac y;
Right to Information; Rational Basis
Relationship Test; While it is true that
Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution, guarantees respect for
the rights of persons Standard
Chartered Bank (Philippine Branch) vs.
Senate Committee on Banks, Financial
Institutions and Currencies
affected by the legislative
investigation, not every invocation of
the right to privacy should be allowed
to thwart a legitimate congressional
inquiry; The right of the people to
access information on matters of
public concern generally prevails over
the right to privacy of ordinary
financial transactions; Under the
rational basis relationship test, there is
no infringement of the individuals
right to privacy where the requirement
to disclose information is for a valid
purpose, such as, to ensure that the
government agencies involved in
regulating banking transactions
39

adequately protect the public who

invest in foreign securities.With
respect to the right of privacy which
petitioners claim respondent has
violated, suffice it to state that privacy
is not an absolute right. While it is true
that Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution, guarantees respect for
the rights of persons affected by the
legislative investigation, not every
invocation of the right to privacy
should be allowed to thwart a
legitimate congressional inquiry. In
Sabio v. Gordon, 504 SCRA 704 (2006),
we have held that the right of the
people to access information on
matters of public concern generally
prevails over the right to privacy of
ordinary financial transactions. In that
case, we declared that the right to
privacy is not absolute where there is
an overriding compelling state
interest. Employing the rational basis
relationship test, as laid down in Morfe
v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1968), there is
no infringement of the individuals
right to privacy as the requirement to
disclosure information is for a valid
purpose, in this case, to ensure that
the government agencies involved in
regulating banking transactions
adequately protect the public who
invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to
state that this purpose constitutes a
reason compelling enough to proceed
with the assailed legislative
investigation.
Same; Same; Same; Right against SelfIncrimination; Witnesses; The right of

the accused against self-incrimination

is extended in administrative
investigations that partake of the
nature of or are analogous to criminal
proceedingsthe privilege has
consistently been held to extend to all
proceedings sanctioned by law; and to
all cases in which punishment is
sought to be visited upon a witness,
whether a party or not.As regards
the issue of self-incrimination, the
petitioners, officers of SCB-Philippines,
are not being indicted as accused in a
criminal proceeding. They were
summoned by respondent merely as
resource persons, or as witnesses, in a
legislative inquiry. As distinguished by
this Court[An] accused occupies a
different tier of protection from an
ordinary witness. Whereas an
Standard Chartered Bank (Philippine
Branch) vs. Senate Committee on
Banks, Financial Institutions and
Currencies
ordinary witness may be compelled to
take the witness stand and claim the
privilege as each question requiring an
incriminating answer is shot at him, an
accused may altogether refuse to take
the witness stand and refuse to
answer any and all questions.
Concededly, this right of the accused
against self-incrimination is extended
to respondents in administrative
investigations that partake of the
nature of or are analogous to criminal
proceedings. The privilege has
consistently been held to extend to all
proceedings sanctioned by law; and to

all cases in which punishment is

sought to be visited upon a witness,
whether a party or not. However, in
this case, petitioners neither stand as
accused in a criminal case nor will
they be subjected by the respondent
to any penalty by reason of their
testimonies. Hence, they cannot
altogether decline appearing before
respondent, although they may invoke
the privilege when a question calling
for an incriminating answer is
propounded.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
Separation of Powers; It may be
conceded that Congress is without
authority to compel disclosures for the
purpose of aiding the prosecution of
pending suits but the authority of that
body, directly or through its
Committees, to require pertinent
disclosures in aid of its own
constitutional power is not abridged
because the information sought to be
elicited may also be of use in such
suits; The prosecution of offenders by
the prosecutorial agencies and the
trial before the courts is for the
punishment of persons who transgress
the law while the intent of legislative
inquiries, on the other hand, is to
arrive at a policy determination, which
may or may not be enacted into law.
Petitioners argument, that the
investigation before respondent may
result in a recommendation for their
prosecution by the appropriate
government agencies, such as the
Department of Justice or the Office of
40

the Ombudsman, does not persuade.

As held in Sinclair v. United States,
279 U.S. 263, 73 L ed. 692, 698 (1928)
It may be conceded that Congress is
without authority to compel
disclosures for the purpose of aiding
the prosecution of pending suits; but
the authority of that body, directly or
through its Committees, to require
pertinent disclosures in aid of its own
constitutional power is not abridged
because the information sought to be
elicited may also be of use in such
suits. x x x It is plain that investigation
of the matters involved in suits
brought or to be commenced under
the Senate resolution directing the
institution of suits for the cancellation
of the leases might directly aid in
respect of legislative action. The
prosecution of offenders by the
prosecutorial Standard Chartered Bank
(Philippine Branch) vs. Senate
Committee on Banks, Financial
Institutions and Currencies
agencies and the trial before the
courts is for the punishment of
persons who transgress the law. The
intent of legislative inquiries, on the
other hand, is to arrive at a policy
determination, which may or may not
be enacted into law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
Same; Except only when the Congress
and/or its Committees exercises the
power to punish for contempt, it
cannot penalize violators even if there
is overwhelming evidence of criminal

culpabilityit can only recommend

measures to address or remedy
whatever irregularities may be
unearthed during the investigation,
although it may include in its Report a
recommendation for the criminal
indictment of persons who may
appear liable.Except only when it
exercises the power to punish for
contempt, the respondent, as with the
other Committees of the Senate or of
the House of Representatives, cannot
penalize violators even if there is
overwhelming evidence of criminal
culpability. Other than proposing or
initiating amendatory or remedial
legislation, respondent can only
recommend measures to address or
remedy whatever irregularities may be
unearthed during the investigation,
although it may include in its Report a
recommendation for the criminal
indictment of persons who may
appear liable. At best, the
recommendation, along with the
evidence, contained in such a Report
would be persuasive, but it is still up
to the prosecutorial agencies and the
courts to determine the liabilities of
the offender. Standard Chartered Bank
(Philippine Branch) vs. Senate
Committee on Banks, Financial
Institutions and Currencies, 541 SCRA
456, G.R. No. 167173 December 27,
2007

2. People vs Bagsala
Constitutional law; Bill of rights; Rights
against self-incrimination.The
Constitution in its Bill of Rights
explicitly guarantees: "No person shall
be compelled to be a witness against
himself." There is thus a safeguard
against the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts. It does not bar, as
Justice Tuason pointed out, the
conviction of an accused "on a
voluntary extrajudicial statement."
Certainly, however, where the
confession is involuntary, being due to
maltreatment or induced by fear or
intimidation, there is a violation of this
constitutional provision. Any form of
coercion whether physical, mental, or
emotional thus stamps it with
inadmissibility. What is essential for its
validity is that it proceeds from the
free will of the person confessing.
Same; Laws on right against selfincrimination.This is the prevailing
principle even prior to the
Constitution. Both under the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and the Philippine
Autonomy Act of 1916 as well as a
statute enacted in 1903, there is the
requirement that a confession to be
received as evidence must be shown
to be freely and voluntarily made and
not the result of violence, intimidation,
threat, menace, or promise or offer of
reward or leniency.
Same; Reasons.Why it should be
thus was explained in an early leading
41

case: Involuntary confessions are

rejected by
all courtsby some on the ground that
a confession so obtained is unreliable;
and by some on the grounds of
humanitarian principles which abhor
all forms of torture or unfairness
toward the accused in criminal
proceedings. But either theory arrives
at the same goal. Such a confession is
not legal evidence and must be
rejected. If the accused satisfactorily
shows that it was made involuntarily,
the confession stands discredited in
the eyes of the law and is as a thing
which never existed. Such a thought
finds expression in an even earlier
decision, United States v. Navarro, 3
Phil. 143, promulgated in 1904. Thus:
"The provision that no one is bound to
criminate himself is older than the
Government of the United States. At
an early day it became a part of the
common law of England. It was
established on the grounds of public
policy and humanityof policy,
because if the party were required to
testify, it would place the witness
under the strongest temptation to
commit the crime of perjury, and of
humanity, because it would prevent
the extorting of confessions by
duress."
Same; Effect on sentence rendered.
It is no surprise then that where there
was ample basis in a habeas corpus
proceeding for petitioner's contention
as to the signature on his confessions
in the eight cases where he did plead

guilty being due to his desire to avoid

any further torture or maltreatment,
this Court, through Justice Perfecto
reached this conclusion: "The facts
proved by petitioner convince us that
the sentences rendered in the eight
cases in question are null and void and
should not be given any effect." As a
result, the release from confinement of
petitioner was ordered. The constant
course of decisions of this honorable
Tribunal, true to the meaning of the
selfincrimination clause, forbids the
admission of any confession obtained
under such circumstances. It would be
to render nugatory a valuable
constitutional right if judges of the
courts of first instance display less
than full sensitivity to its command. A
conviction resting on such proof, and
such proof alone, certainly cannot be
allowed to stand.
Same; Use of involuntary confessions
banned.It is unfortunate that the
lower court failed to abide by the
authoritative doctrines that ban the
use of involuntary confessions in
accordance with the constitutional
provision against self-incrimination
which, in the language of Justice
Sanchez, should be "mandatory",
being "a valuable and substantive
right". It is likewise timely to impress
anew on police officials that the
imperative requirements of truth and
of humanity condemn the utilization of
force and violence to extract
confessions from unwilling victims.
Crime must be punished and the guilty

must not be allowed to escape. A

desirable end cannot, however, be
attained by unconstitutional means.
There should be less than f ull respect
for the law if in the process of
enforcing it lawless methods are
employed. Once again, then, this
Court is called upon to manifest in the
strongest language possible its
abhorrence for the employment of
force to compel a person to sign a
statement acknowledging guilt, A
decent regard for the dignity that
attaches to every human being as
such will be satisfied with nothing less.
Remedial law; Evidence; Alibi is a
weak defense.The appellant's main
defense in exculpation is alibi. It must
be stressed at the outset that alibi is
one of the weakest defenses that can
be resorted to by an accused,
especially if there is direct testimony
of an eyewitness duly corroborated by
that of another, not only because it is
inherently weak and unreliable but
also because of the ease of fabricating
evidence of alibi and the diff iculty of
checking or rebutting it. People v.
Estrada, L-26103, January 17, 1968,
22 SCRA 111 was cited in support of
such a view. Thus: "No jurisprudence
in criminal cases is more settled than
the rule that alibi is the weakest of all
defenses and that the same should be
rejected when the identity of the
accused has been sufficiently and
positively established by eyewitnesses
to the crime. Such should be the rule,
for as a defense, alibi is easy to
42

concoct, enough to prove that

defendant was somewhere else when
the crime was committed, but he
must, like wise, demonstrate that it
was physically impossible for him to
have been at the scene of the crime at
the time."
Same; Inadmissibility of confession
does not justify reversal when guilt
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The guilt of the accused having been
demonstrated beyond reasonable
doubt, the inadmissibility of the
confession extorted from appellant
could not justify a reversal of his
conviction. People vs. Bagasala, 39
SCRA 236, No. L-26182 May 31, 1971
3. US vs Tan Teng
1.Rape; "Abusos Deshonestos."Held:
Under the facts stated in the opinion,
that the defendant is guilty of the
crime of "abusos deshonestos" and
that the crime was committed in the
house of the offended party, and that
therefore the maximum penalty of the
law of six years of prisin correccional
and the costs should be imposed.
2.Id.; Admissibility of Evidence; Right
of Accused.At the time of the arrest
of the defendant he was apparently
suffering from some private disorder. A
portion of the substance was taken
and scientifically examined, with the
result that such substance showed
that he was actually suffering from the
venereal disease known as gonorrhea.

The result of the scientific examination

was offered in evidence, during the
trial of the cause. The defendant
objected to the admissibility of such
evidence upon the ground that it was
requiring him to give testimony
against himself. The objection was
overruled upon the ground that "the
accused was not compelled to make
any admission or answer any
questions, and the mere fact that an
object found upon his person was
examined seems no more to infringe
the rule invoked, than would the
introduction of stolen property taken
from the person of a thief."
The substance was taken from the
body of the defendant without his
objection. The examination of the
substance was made by competent
medical authority and the result
showed that the defendant was
suffering from said disease. Such
evidence was clearly admissible. The
prohibition against compelling a man
in a criminal cause to be a witness
against himself is a prohibition against
physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, and not an
exclusion of his body as evidence,
when it may be material. The
prohibition contained in the Philippine
Bill (sec. 5) that a person shall not be
compelled to be a witness against
himself, is simply a prohibition against
legal process to extract from the
defendant's own lips, against his will,
an admission of his guilt. United States

vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil., 145, No. 7081

September 7, 1912

4. Alih vs Castro
5. People vs Codilla
Criminal Law; Appeal; It is a judicial
dictum that where the accused
escapes from custody or jumps bail
during the pendency of his appeal, the
appellate court has the discretion to
either postpone the resolution of his
case until his recapture or to dismiss
the appeal.During the pendency of
this appeal, after it was proven that
appellant Rolando Codilla escaped
from the Ormoc City Jail on July 27,
1991, the Court issued a resolution on
April 6, 1992 dismissing his appeal
pursuant to Section 8, Rule 124 of the
Rules of Court which provides, inter
alia, that (t)he court may also, upon
motion of the appellee or on its own
motion, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or
confinement or flees to a foreign
country during the pendency of the
appeal. It is a judicial dictum that
where the accused escapes from
custody or jumps bail during the
pendency of his appeal, the appellate
court has the discretion to either
postpone the resolution of his case
until his recapture or to dismiss the
appeal.
Same; Same; Same; If an accusedappellant escapes or refuses to
43

surrender to the proper authorities, he

is deemed to have abandoned his
appeal and so his appeal should be
dismissed.From the foregoing, it is
not clear whether Lucaas died or
merely escaped and is now in hiding.
At any rate, in either case, his appeal
will have to be dismissed and declared
abandoned. If he has indeed escaped,
he is deemed to have abandoned his
appeal in line with our pronouncement
in People vs. Quiritan, et al., to the
effect that if an accused-appellant
escapes or refuses to surrender to the
proper authorities, he is deemed to
have abandoned his appeal, and so his
appeal should be dismissed. Moreover,
he is guilty of evasion of service of
sentence under Article 158 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Same; Arrest; Any objection involving
a warrant of arrest or the procedure in
the acquisition by the court of
jurisdiction over the person of an
accused must be made before he
enters his plea otherwise the objection
is deemed waived.This appellant
starts his defense by challenging his
warrantless arrest and detention for
two days without any charges being
filed against him. We have of
necessity to reject this argument for
the simple reason that he is estopped
from questioning the legality of his
arrest. Any objection involving a
warrant of arrest or the procedure in
the acquisition by the court of
jurisdiction over the person of an
accused must be made before he

enters his plea, otherwise the

objection is deemed waived.
Same; Same; Same; Any irregularity
attendant to his arrest, if any, was
cured when he voluntarily submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the trial
court by entering a plea of not guilty
and participating in the trial.Besides,
this issue is being raised for the first
time by appellant before this Court. He
did not move for the quashal of the
information before the trial court on
this ground. Hence, any irregularity
attendant to his arrest, if any, was
cured when he voluntarily submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the trial
court by entering a plea of not guilty
and participating in the trial.
Same; Evidence; Credibility of
Witnesses; On the matter of credibility
of witnesses the findings of the trial
court are generally accorded great
weight and respect if not conclusive
effect.After considering the factual
findings on which the impugned
decision is based, we do not descry
any cogent reason to depart from the
holding of the lower court. As has
often been emphasized, on the matter
of credibility of witnesses the findings
of the trial court are generally
accorded great weight and respect, if
not conclusive effect, because it has
the opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses while
testifying. Such findings may only be
disturbed on appeal if there is any
showing that the trial court overlooked

some material or substantial fact

which if given consideration will alter
the assailed decision and, as we have
just stated, we do not find any such
arbitrary oversight or omission by the
court below.
Same; Same; Rape; It is well settled
that the force or violence required in
rape cases is relative, when applied, it
need not be overpowering or
irresistible.Considering her tender
age, the force and intimidation
exerted upon her suffice to constitute
that requisite element of rape. It is
well settled that the force or violence
required in rape cases is relative;
when applied, it need not be
overpowering or irresistible. It need
but be present, and so long as it
brings about the desired result, all
considerations of whether it was more
or less irresistible are beside the point.
Same; Same; Same; Intimidation must
be viewed in the light of the victims
perception and judgment at the time
of the commission of the crime and
not by any hard and fast rule.So it
must likewise be for intimidation,
which is addressed to the mind of the
victim and is, therefore, subjective.
Intimidation must be viewed in the
light of the victims perception and
judgment at the time of the
commission of the crime and not by
any hard and fast rule; it is therefore
enough that it produces fearfear
that if the victim does not yield to the
lecherous demands of the accused,
44

something would happen to her at

that moment or even thereafter, as
when she is threatened with death if
she reports the incident. Intimidation
includes the moral kind, as the fear
caused by threatening the girl with a
knife.
Same; Same; Same; Rape can be
committed even in places where
people congregate, in parks, along the
roadside, within school premises and
even inside a house where there are
other occupants.It is likewise of no
moment that the rape occurred with
the complainants parents, brothers
and sisters just sleeping in the nearby
room. It is not impossible nor
incredible for her family members to
be in deep slumber and not be
awakened while the sexual assault
was being committed. As we have
repeatedly pointed out, rape can be
committed even in places where
people congregate: in parks, along the
roadside, within school premises and
even inside a house where there are
other occupants. Lust is no respecter
of time or place.
Same; Same; Same; Considering the
inbred modesty and antipathy of a
Filipina to the airing in public of things
that affect her honor, it is hard to
conceive that the complainant would
assume and admit the ignominy she
had undergone if it were not true.We
are convinced, in line with our
previous rulings which we now repeat,
that what motivated complainant to

come out in the open is her desire to

obtain justice. It is unthinkable that a
rural-bred and minor victim like her
would endure the embarrassment and
humiliation of a public disclosure that
she had been ravished, allow an
examination of her private parts, and
undergo the ordeal and expense of a
court proceeding if her story is a lie.
Considering the inbred modesty and
antipathy of a Filipina to the airing in
public of things that affect her honor,
it is hard to conceive that the
complainant would assume and admit
the ignominy she had undergone if it
were not true.
Same; Same; Same; Aggravating
Circumstance; Aggravating
circumstances of nocturnity and
dwelling can be considered as long as
it is proved even if not alleged in the
information.We rule that the court a
quo erred in not appreciating the
aggravating circumstances of
nocturnity and dwelling. Nighttime,
according to Viada, is that period of
darkness beginning at the end of dusk
and ending at dawn. Our Civil Code
defines nights as from sunset to
sunrise. When the rapes were
committed at 3:00 A.M. on May 24,
1990, it was still nighttime, and this
aggravating circumstance can be
considered as long as it is proved,
even if not alleged in the information.
Same; Same; Same; Qualifying
Circumstances; The use of a deadly
weapon which is considered as a

qualifying circumstance in the crime of

rape is likewise to be appreciated to
constitute the offenses charged in
these cases into what are
jurisprudentially referred to as
qualified rape.The use of a deadly
weapon which is considered as a
qualifying circumstance in the crime of
rape is likewise to be appreciated to
constitute the offenses charged in
these cases into what are
jurisprudential referred to as qualified
rapes, such circumstance being
alleged in each of the complaints in
these cases and it being
uncontroverted that herein appellant
was armed with a pointed bolo,
appellant Codilla with a bolo and a
handgun, while appellant Lucaas
used a handgun, to realize their
criminal objectives. Nevertheless, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed
by the trial court on appellants shall
remain because of the constitutional
proscription against the imposition of
the death penalty until the restoration
thereof by congressional flat.
Same; Constitutional Law; Right
against self-incrimination; Essentially
the right is meant to avoid and
prohibit positively the repetition and
recurrence of the certainly inhuman
procedure of compelling a person, in a
criminal or any other case, to furnish
the missing evidence necessary for his
conviction.The right against selfincrimination has been defined as a
protection against testimonial
compulsion. It prohibits the use of
45

physical or moral compulsion to extort

communications from the accused, not
an exclusion of his body as evidence
when it may be material. Essentially,
the right is meant to avoid and
prohibit positively the repetition and
recurrence of the certainly inhuman
procedure of compelling a person, in a
criminal or any other case, to furnish
the missing evidence necessary for his
conviction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An act
whether testimonial or passive that
would amount to disclosure of
incriminatory facts is covered by the
inhibition of the Constitution.With
the passage of time, this has been
extended to any evidence
communicative in nature acquired
under circumstances of duress. An
act, whether testimonial or passive,
that would amount to disclosure of
incriminatory facts is covered by the
inhibition of the Constitution. This
should be distinguished,
parenthetically, from mechanical acts
the accused is made to execute which
are not meant to unearth undisclosed
facts but to ascertain physical
attributes determinate by simple
observation, like requiring him to take
part in a police line-up. People vs.
Codilla, 224 SCRA 104, G.R. Nos.
100720-23 June 30, 1993
8. People vs Ventura
Criminal Law; Aggravating
Circumstances; Evident Premeditation;

The essence of evident premeditation

is that the execution of the criminal
act must be preceded by cool thought
and reflection upon the resolution to
carry out the criminal intent during a
space of time sufficient to arrive at a
calm judgment.The essence of
evident premeditation is that the
execution of the criminal act must be
preceded by cool thought and
reflection upon the resolution to carry
out the criminal intent during a space
of time sufficient to arrive at a calm
judgment. For it to be appreciated, the
following must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt: (1) the time when
the accused determined to commit the
crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating
that the accused clung to his
determination; and (3) sufficient lapse
of time between such determination
and execution to allow him to reflect
upon the circumstances of his act.
Same; Same; Same; Unless shown to
be customary, appellants act of
arming themselves with a gun and
knife constitutes direct evidence of a
careful and deliberate plan to carry
out a killing.Undoubtedly, the
accounts of appellants evince not only
their resolve to kill Jaime, but the calm
and methodical manner by which they
sought to carry out his murder. As
pointed out by the Solicitor General,
unless shown to be customary,
appellants act of arming themselves
with a gun and a knife constitutes
direct evidence of a careful and
deliberate plan to carry out a killing.

Same; Constitutional Law; Right

Against Self-Incrimination; While
appellants could not have been
compelled to be witnesses against
themselves, they waived this right by
voluntarily taking the witness stand.
That evident premeditation was
established through the testimonies of
appellants and not by those of the
prosecution witnesses is of no
moment. While appellants could not
have been compelled to be witnesses
against themselves, they waived this
right by voluntarily taking the witness
stand. Consequently, they were
subject to cross-examination on
matters covered by their direct
examination. Their admissions before
the trial court constitute relevant and
competent evidence which the trial
court correctly appreciated against
them.
Same; Justifying Circumstances;
Defense of a Relative; Unlawful
Aggression; Unlawful aggression is
primary and indispensable requisite
without which defense of a relative,
whether complete or otherwise,
cannot
be validly invoked.To successfully
claim that he acted in defense of a
relative, the accused must prove the
concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) unlawful aggression on
the part of the person killed or injured;
(2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel the
unlawful aggression; and (3) the
46

person defending the relative had no

part in provoking the assailant, should
any provocation have been given by
the relative attacked. Of these, the
requisite of unlawful aggression is
primary and indispensable without
which defense of relative, whether
complete or otherwise, cannot be
validly invoked. Not one of the
foregoing requisites of defense of a
relative is present. From all accounts,
it was appellants who initiated the
unlawful aggression, and it was the
victim Jaime who acted in self defense.
Hence, neither the justifying
circumstance of defense of a relative
nor the special mitigating
circumstance of incomplete defense of
a relative may be appreciated in
appellant Flores favor.
Same; Aggravating Circumstances;
Conspiracy; Where conspiracy has
been adequately proven, all the
conspirators are liable as co-principals
regardless of the extent and character
of their participation because, in
contemplation of law, the act of one is
the act of all.There is a conspiracy
when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it.
Where conspiracy has been
adequately proven, as in these cases,
all the conspirators are liable as coprincipals regardless of the extent and
character of their participation
because, in contemplation of law, the
act of one is the act of all. By stabbing

Jaime Bocateja pursuant to their preconceived plot, appellants

commenced the commission of
murder directly by overt acts. Despite
their efforts, however, they failed to
inflict a mortal wound on Jaime, hence,
their liability only for attempted
murder.
Same; Same; Abuse of Superior
Strength; To take advantage of
superior strength means to purposely
use excessive force out of proportion
to the means of defense available to
the person attacked.To take
advantage of superior strength means
to purposely use excessive force out of
proportion to the means of defense
available to the person attacked. The
appreciation of this aggravating
circumstance depends on the age, size
and strength of the parties, and is
considered whenever there is a
notorious inequality of forces between
the victim and the aggressor,
assuming a superiority of strength
notoriously advantageous to the
aggressor, which is selected or taken
advantage of by him in the
commission of the crime.
Same; Same; Same; Abuse of
superiority is determined by the
excess of the aggressors natural
strength over that of the victim,
considering the momentary position of
both and the employment of means
weakening the defense, although not
annulling it.Unlike in treachery,
where the victim is not given the

opportunity to defend himself or repel

the aggression,
taking advantage of superior strength
does not mean that the victim was
completely defenseless. Abuse of
superiority is determined by the
excess of the aggressors natural
strength over that of the victim,
considering the momentary position of
both and the employment of means
weakening the defense, although not
annulling it. Hence, the fact that
Aileen attempted to fend off the attack
on her and her husband by throwing
nearby objects, such as an electric
cord, at appellant Flores does not
automatically negate the possibility
that the latter was able to take
advantage of his superior strength.
Same; Same; Same; An attack made
by a man with a deadly weapon upon
an unarmed and defenseless woman
constitutes the circumstances of
abuse of that superiority which his sex
and the weapon used in the act
afforded him, and from which the
woman was unable to defend herself.
This Court in a very long line of
cases has consistently held that an
attack made by a man with a deadly
weapon upon an unarmed and
defenseless woman constitutes the
circumstance of abuse of that
superiority which his sex and the
weapon used in the act afforded him,
and from which the woman was
unable to defend herself. Thus, in
People v. Molas, where the accused
was convicted of murder for stabbing
47

to death two women and an eight year

old boy, this Court discoursed: While
treachery was not appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance against Molas,
the killing of the three victims was
raised to murder by the presence of
the qualifying circumstance of abuse
of superior strength. There was abuse
of superior strength when Molas
inflicted several mortal wounds upon
Soledad. Molas, besides being younger
and stronger, was armed with a
weapon which he used in seriously
wounding her. That circumstance was
also present when he hacked eightyear old Abelaro and also Dulcesima
who, besides being a woman of lesser
strength was unarmed.
Same; Justifying Circumstances; SelfDefense; One claiming self-defense
must prove by clear and convincing
evidence both unlawful aggression on
the part of the person killed or injured
and reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel
the unlawful aggression. As a third
requisite, he must also prove lack of
sufficient provocation on his part.As
for appellant Flores claim of selfdefense, it cannot be sustained. As in
defense of a relative, one claiming self
defense must prove by clear and
convincing evidence both unlawful
aggression on the part of the person
killed or injured and reasonable
necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression. As a third requisite, he
must also prove lack of sufficient

provocation on his part. None of these

requisites was shown to be present.
Same; Aggravating Circumstances;
Evident Premeditation; Jurisprudence
is to the effect that evident
premeditation may be considered as
present, even if a person other than
the intended victim was killed, if it is
shown that the conspirators were
determined to kill not only the
intended victim but also anyone who
may help him put a violent resistance.
The trial court, citing People v.
Dueno, did not consider evident
premeditation as having aggravated
the killing of Aileen since she was not
the intended victim of appellants
conspiracy. Upon further scrutiny,
however, this Court finds that this
aggravating circumstance should have
been appreciated in connection with
Aileens murder. Jurisprudence is to
the effect that evident premeditation
may be considered as present, even if
a person other than the intended
victim was killed, if it is shown that the
conspirators were determined to kill
not only the intended victim but also
anyone who may help him put a
violent resistance.
Same; Same; Conspiracy; Coconspirators are liable for such other
crimes which could be foreseen and
are the natural and logical
consequences of the conspiracy.
While appellants original objective
may have only been the killing of
Jaime, the trial court correctly held

both of them responsible for the

murder of Aileen. Co-conspirators are
liable for such other crimes which
could be foreseen and are the natural
and logical consequences of the
conspiracy.
Same; Same; Dwelling; Dwelling is
considered aggravating because of the
sanctity of privacy that the law
accords to human abode.Dwelling is
considered aggravating because of the
sanctity of privacy that the law
accords to human abode. Thus, it has
been said that the commission of the
crime in anothers dwelling shows
greater perversity in the accused and
produces greater alarm. Here, dwelling
was correctly appreciated since the
crimes were committed in the place of
abode of the victims who had not
given immediate provocation.
Same; Same; Nocturnity; In
determining nocturnity, two tests are
employed in the alternative: (1) the
objective test, under which nighttime
is aggravating because the darkness
facilitated the commission of the
offense; and (2) the subjective test,
under which nighttime is aggravating
because the darkness was purposely
sought by the offender.In
determining nocturnity, two tests are
employed in the alternative: (1) the
objective test, under which nighttime
is aggravating because the darkness
facilitated the commission of the
offense; and (2) the subjective test,
under which nighttime is aggravating
48

because the darkness was purposely

sought by the offender. Applying these
tests to the established factual
circumstances, this Court concludes
that nocturnity was correctly
appreciated in connection with both
crimes. While the bedroom where the
crimes occurred was well-lit, the
evidence shows that, in furtherance of
their murderous intent, appellants
deliberately took advantage of
nighttime, as well as the fact that the
household members were asleep, in
order to gain entry into the Bocateja
residence. Indeed, their own testimony
indicates that while they were already
outside the Bocateja house at around
11:00 p.m., they purposely waited until 2:00 a.m. before
breaking into the residence so as not
to call the attention of the Bocatejas
and/or their neighbors. It is thus clear
that appellants deliberately took
advantage of the darkness of the
night, not to mention the fact that the
Bocatejas were fast asleep, to conceal
their actions and to facilitate and
insure that their entry into the victims
home would be undetected.
Same; Justifying Circumstances;
Passion and Obfuscation; While
jealousy may give rise to passion or
obfuscation, for the appreciation of
this mitigating circumstance it is
necessary that the act which produced
the obfuscation was not far removed
from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during
which the perpetrator might recover

his normal equanimity.While

jealousy may give rise to passion or
obfuscation, for the appreciation of
this mitigating circumstance it is
necessary that the act which produced
the obfuscation was not far removed
from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during
which the perpetrator might recover
his normal equanimity. In the same
vein, while immediate vindication
should be construed as proximate
vindication in accordance with the
controlling Spanish text of the Revised
Penal Code, still this mitigating
circumstance cannot be considered
where sufficient time elapsed for the
accused to regain his composure.
People vs. Ventura, 433 SCRA 389,
G.R. Nos. 148145-46 July 5, 2004
9. People vs Nicandro
10.
People vs Betonio
Criminal Law; Constitutional Law;
Presumption of Innocence; The
constitutional presumption of
innocence guarantees that no person
shall be convicted unless the
prosecution proves his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.The Constitution
mandates that (i)n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved, x x x. This constitutional
presumption of innocence guarantees
that no person shall be convicted
unless the prosecution proves his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. By proof
beyond reasonable doubt is not meant

such a degree of proof as, excluding

possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty. Moral certainty only is
required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. Moral certainty is
a certainty that convinces and
satisfies the reason and conscience of
those who are to act upon it x x x.
Same; Same; Same; Rape; Principles
in the Review of Rape Cases.In order
to faithfully observe the foregoing
constitutional guarantee, the Court
formulated the following principles in
reviewing rape cases: (1) an
accusation of rape, while easy to
make, is difficult to prove and even
harder for the person accused, though
innocent, to disprove; (2) rape, by its
very nature, would involve only two
persons; hence, the testimony of the
complainant should be scrutinized
with the greatest caution; (3) the
evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merits, and will
not be allowed to draw strength from
the weakness of the defenses
evidence.
Same; Rape; It is well-entrenched that
the trial court is in the best position to
assess the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies, because of its
unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses firsthand and note their
demeanor, conduct and attitude under
grilling examination.It is clear that
the review of this case primarily
involves an appreciation of questions
49

of fact and requires a thorough

evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses, most specially of the
complainant-victim. In this connection,
it is well-entrenched that the trial
court is in the best position to assess
the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies, because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses
firsthand and note their demeanor,
conduct and attitude under grilling
examination. These are the most
significant factors in evaluating the
sincerity of witnesses and in
unearthing the truth, especially in the
face of conflicting testimonies.
Through its observations during the
entire proceedings, the trial court can
be expected to determine, with
reasonable discretion, whose
testimony to accept and which witness
to disbelieve. Verily, findings of the
trial court on such matters will not be
disturbed on appeal unless some facts
or circumstances of weight have been
overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted so as to materially
affect the disposition of the case.
Same; Same; It is highly unlikely that a
simple barrio lass barely in her teens,
innocent and nave to the ways of the
world, would accuse a close relative of
so serious a crime as rape if this was
not the plain truth or if her motive was
not purely to bring the perpetrator of
her violation to justice.After a
meticulous scrutiny of the records, this
Court finds no error in the trial courts
grant of full weight and credence to

the testimonies of Loreta Betonio and

the other prosecution witnesses.
Loretas testimony that her uncle
sexually assaulted her without her
consent was straightforward,
unwavering and clear. We note that
Loreta is a simple barrio lass barely in
her teens, innocent and nave to the
ways of the world. It is highly unlikely
that she would accuse appellant, a
close relative, of so serious a crime as
rape if this was not the plain truth or if
her motive was not purely to bring the
perpetrator of her violation to justice.
We see no reason to withhold
credence from Loretas testimony that
she was the victim of sexual abuse by
her uncle Sergio Betonio. We hold that
the court a quo did not overlook or
misunderstand any material facts that
may alter appellants conviction. Thus,
we accord to the assailed decision the
respect and binding effect that it
deserves. Indeed, the presumption of
innocence in appellants favor has
been sufficiently overcome.
Same; Same; A love relationship, even
if true, will not necessarily rule out
force.Contrary to appellants claim
of an illicit but voluntary love affair,
the records show clearly that
Appellant Sergio intimidated her and
instilled fear in her heart. Being an
affirmative defense, the allegation of a
love affair needed proof. Up to the
end, however, such claim remained
unsubstantiated. Appellant did not
present any token of the alleged
relationship like love notes, mementos

or pictures. The other defense

witnesses did not even mention it.
Such bare allegation of the defense,
not to mention its utter lack of proof,
is incredulous. We find it hard to
understand how such a relationship
could exculpate a person from the
rape of a terrified young child. Indeed,
a love relationship, even if true, will
not necessarily rule out force.
Same; Same; A freshly broken hymen
is not an essential element of rape.
Puerile is the defenses insistence that
the alleged rape on April 28, 1991
could not have happened because
there was no sperm or substantial
injury on her private organ indicating
forced sexual intercourse. It is
hornbook doctrine that x x x lack of
lacerated wounds does not negate
sexual intercourse. Moreover, the fact
that hymenal lacerations were found
to be healed round edge and no
spermatozoa was found does not
necessarily negate rape. A freshly
broken hymen is not an essential
element of rape. For that matter, the
medical examination of the victim in
crimes against chastity is not an
indispensable element for the
successful prosecution of the crime, as
her testimony alone, if credible, is
sufficient to convict the accused.
Same; Same; Damages; Grant of an
indemnity of P50,000.00 to rape victim
needs no proof other than the
conviction of the accused for the rape
proved.We note, however, that the
50

trial court erred in awarding

P50,000.00 as moral damages. We
scoured the records for proof to
support such award but found none.
Hence, we shall delete it. We,
however, grant the victim an
indemnity of P50,000.00, which needs
no proof other than the conviction of
the accused for the rape proved. We
also affirm the claim of P3,000.00 for
actual damages, since proof therefor
was duly shown.
11.
People vs Mejia
Courts; Consolidations and Joint Trials;
Criminal Proceedings; Criminal cases
which are irretrievably linked with or
related to one another, arose out of
the same incident, are founded on the
same factual milieu, and would be
proved by testimonies of the same
witnesses, should be consolidated and
jointly tried in one branch of the court.
Before we go any further, remarks
on some procedural matters are in
order. The crimes charged in the
informations filed before the LARON
court and CASTILLO court are
irretrievably linked with or related to
one another. They arose out of the
same incident, are founded on the
same factual milieu, and would be
proved by testimonies of the same
witnesses. The three cases then
should have been consolidated and
jointly tried in one branch of the RTC of
Dagupan City. What were jointly tried
were only the cases for murder and
frustrated murder.

Same; Same; The purpose or object of

consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of
suits, guard against oppression or
abuse, prevent delay, clear congested
dockets, simplify the work of the trial
court, and save unnecessary cost or
expense; in short, the attainment of
justice with the least expense and
vexation to the parties litigants.The
purpose or object of consolidation is to
avoid multiplicity of suits, guard
against oppression or abuse, prevent
delay, clear congested dockets,
simplify the work of the trial court, and
save unnecessary cost or expense; in
short, the attainment of justice with
the least expense and vexation to the
parties litigants. In Raymundo v. Elipe,
we held that that although
consolidation of several cases
involving the same parties and the
same subject matter is one addressed
to the sound discretion of the trial
court, joint hearing becomes a matter
of duty if two or more cases are tried
before the same judge, or even filed
with the different branches of the
same court, provided one of such
cases has not been partially tried.
Same; Same; Evidence; Presumption
of Innocence; Where two criminal
cases which should have been
consolidated are separately tried in
different courts, the appellate judicial
minds and mental processes must be
kept away from the pitfalls of forming
impressions in light of the totality of
the testimonies in both courts, for the
rules of evidence and the

constitutional presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused
dictate that the appeals in the cases
before the two trial courts be resolved
solely on the basis of the evidence
presented before such courts,
respectively.This failure to
consolidate the three cases at the trial
court level could contribute some
difficulty in the appreciation of the
evidence. The principal witnesses of
the parties testified in all the three
cases. Yet, the assessment of their
testimony and credibility in the LARON
court must not be influenced by their
testimonies in the case before the
CASTILLO court, and vice versa. In the
LARON court, prosecution witness
Catugas was unclear in some details of
the incident, but clear in the CASTILLO
court. Upon the other hand, there
were details he disclosed in one of the
courts which were not given in the
other court. The same observation
may be had on the testimonies of the
appellants before both courts. As one
reads the transcripts of the
testimonies of these witnesses in both
cases, it would be quite difficult to
avoid forming impressions in light of
the totality of their testimonies in both
courts. Our minds and mental
processes must be kept away from the
pitfalls of such impressions, for the
rules on evidence and the
constitutional presumption of
innocence in favor of the appellants
dictate that we resolve the appeals in
the cases before the LARON court and
the case before the CASTILLO court
51

solely on the basis of the evidence

presented before such courts,
respectively.
Criminal Law; Complex Crimes;
Qualified Carnapping or Carnapping in
Aggravated Form; Considering the
phraseology of amended Section 14 of
R.A. No. 6539, the carnapping and the
killing (or the rape) may be considered
as a single or indivisible crime or a
special complex crime which,
however, is not covered by Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code.Three
amendments have thus been made,
viz: (1) the change of the penalty of
life imprisonment to reclusion
perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape,
and (3) the change of the phrase in
the commission of the carnapping to
in the course of the commission of
the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof. The latter makes clear the
intention of the law to make the
offense a special complex crime, by
way of analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1
to 4 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code on robbery with violence against
or intimidation of persons. As such,
the killing (or the rape) merely
qualifies the crime of carnapping
which for lack of specific nomenclature
may be known as qualified carnapping
or carnapping in an aggravated form.
In short, considering the phraseology
of the amended Section 14, the
carnapping and the killing (or the
rape) may be considered as a single or
indivisible crime or a special complex
crime which, however, is not covered

by Article 48 of the Revised Penal

Code.
Same; Same; Same; Whether it is
homicide or murder which is
committed in the course of
carnapping or on the occasion thereof
makes no difference insofar as the
penalty is concernedthe homicide or
murder cannot be treated as a
separate offense, but should only be
considered to qualify the crime of
carnapping.Since Section 14 of R.A.
No. 6539 uses the words IS KILLED,
no distinction must be made between
homicide and murder. Whether it is
one or the other which is committed
in the course of carnapping or on the
occasion thereof makes no difference
insofar as the penalty is concerned. It
follows then that the killing of the
driver, Teofilo Landinginwhether it
be homicide or murdercannot be
treated as a separate offense, but
should only be considered to qualify
the crime of carnapping.
Same; Same; Same; The words IS
KILLED in the last clause of Section
14 of R.A. No. 6539, as amended,
refers only to the consummated felony
of either murder or homicide, and if
attempted or frustrated murder or
homicide is committed, then it must
be deemed to fall under the clause
when the carnapping is committed by
means of violence against or
intimidation of any person.But do
the words IS KILLED in the last
clause of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539,

as amended, include the crime of

frustrated murder or homicide? Put a
little differently, does murder or
homicide in its frustrated stage also
qualify carnapping if it is committed
in the course of the commission of
the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof? The answer must be in the
negative in light of the use in said
Section 14 of the words IS KILLED.
The unmistakable import thereof is
that it refers only to the consummated
felony of either murder or homicide. If
attempted or frustrated murder or
homicide is committed in the course
of the commission of the carnapping
or on the occasion thereof, then it
must be deemed to fall under the
clause (of Section 14) when the
carnapping is committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of any
person.
Same; Constitutional Law;
Presumption of Innocence; Enshrined
in the Bill of Rights is the right of the
accused to be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, and to
overcome the presumption, nothing
but proof beyond reasonable doubt
must be established by the
prosecution.Enshrined in the Bill of
Rights is the right of the accused to be
presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved. To overcome the
presumption, nothing but proof
beyond reasonable doubt must be
established by the prosecution. Save
in certain circumstances as where, for
instance, the accused admits the
52

commission of the acts alleged to

constitute a crime but interposes
justifying circumstances, the burden is
never shifted to the accused or
diminished by the weakness of his
defense. Indeed, unless the
prosecution successfully discharges
that burden, the accused need not
even offer evidence in his behalf.
Same; Same; Same; In our jurisdiction,
accusation is not synonymous with
guilt; if the prosecution fails to
discharge the burden of proving the
guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, then it is not only
the accuseds right to be freedit is,
even more, the courts constitutional
duty to acquit him.In our jurisdiction
accusation is not synonymous with
guilt. The freedom of the accused is
forfeit only if the requisite quantum of
proof necessary for conviction be in
existence. This, of course, requires the
most careful scrutiny of the evidence
for the State, both oral and
documentary, independent of
whatever defense is offered by the
accused. Every circumstance favoring
the accuseds innocence must be duly
taken into account. The proof against
the accused must survive the test of
reason. Strongest suspicion must not
be permitted to sway judgment. The
conscience must be satisfied that on
the accused could be laid the
responsibility for the offense charged.
If the prosecution fails to discharge the
burden, then it is not only the
accuseds right to be freed; it is, even

more, the courts constitutional duty

to acquit him.
Same; Police Blotters; Entries in the
police blotters should not be given
undue significance or probative value,
for they are normally incomplete and
inaccurate sometimes from either
partial suggestion or for want of
suggestion or inquiries.
Unfortunately, the CASTILLO court
relied heavily on the entries in the
police blotters of the police stations of
Sual and Sta. Barbara. The silence of
the entries on what the appellants had
declared in court is not conclusive
evidence that they did not report the
incident to the police authorities. They
had no participation in the preparation
of the entries. Entries in the police
blotters should not be given undue
significance or probative value, for
they are normally incomplete and
inaccurate sometimes from either
partial suggestion of for want of
suggestion or inquiries. The entries in
question are sadly wanting in material
particulars. At the very most, they
only recorded the impression that the
appellants were suspects.
Same; Evidence; Compromise; An offer
to pay or the payment of medical,
hospital or other expenses occasioned
by an injury is not admissible in
evidence as proof of civil or criminal
liability for the injury.The LARON
court gave credence to the version of
the prosecution and even took the
incident as offer of compromise, which

may be considered an implied

admission of guilt. Said court
misapplied Section 27 of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court. There is no
evidence whatsoever that any of the
appellants authorized his parents to
approach Catugas or knew the matter
of payment of P80,000. Moreover, if
one were to believe the explanation of
Catugas that the amount of P80,000
represented the expenses he incurred
for his hospitalization and medical
bills, then the offer to reimburse it is
not admissible in evidence as proof of
criminal liability pursuant to the last
paragraph of Section 27 of Rule 130.
People vs. Mejia, 275 SCRA 127, G.R.
Nos. 118940-41 and G.R. No. 119407
July 7, 1997
12.

People vs Pagaura

Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act;

Evidence; The Supreme Court finds it
rather foolish that one who peddles
illegal drugs would boldly and
unashamedly present his wares to
total strangers lest he be caught in
flagrante when, as has been
demonstrated in similar cases, such
nefarious deals are carried on with
utmost secrecy or whispers to avoid
detection; Although declarations of
law enforcers are accorded weight,
their testimonies, to be worthy as
evidence, must themselves be
credible and not suspect.The
testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses not only appears to be
improbable but also incredible. We find
53

it rather foolish that one who peddles

illegal drugs, would boldly and
unashamedly present his wares to
total strangers lest he be caught in
flagrante when as has been
demonstrated in similar cases, such
nefarious deals are carried on with
utmost secrecy or whispers to avoid
detection. Yet, the three policemen
persuaded the lower court that this
was what transpired at the wharf area
in Ozamiz City the day they arrested
the accusedappellant. They all
declared that it was accused-appellant
who approached them to seek their
assistance in buying a ticket and who
even voluntarily opened his bag
without the slightest prodding to prove
that he was in possession of marijuana
leaves. There was no showing,
however, that the marijuana, object
of the sale (arrest), was presented in
court to support the allegation of the
prosecution that accused-appellant
was engaged in the sale of marijuana.
Although declarations of law enforcers
are accorded weight, their
testimonies, to be worthy as evidence,
must themselves be credible and not
suspect.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law;
Custodial Investigation; Right to
Counsel; Even granting that the
accused was allegedly a drug pusher,
he would still be entitled to his basic
constitutional rights.Accusedappellant was made to sign a waiver
without the assistance of a lawyer.
Although there was one Atty. Durias

present, there was no showing that he

explained to the accused-appellant the
contents and purpose of the paper.
Accused-appellant testified that
he did not know what it was about and
he merely signed thereon because he
was threatened by Sgt. Atacador and
Sgt. Amerkhan. These allegations were
never rebutted by the two policemen.
There was likewise no proof that
accused-appellant was assisted by a.
lawyer during the interrogation. Thus,
even granting that accusedappellant
was allegedly a drug pusher, he would
still be entitled to his basic
constitutional rights.
Same; Same; Same; Judicial Notice;
The Supreme Court is aware that in
some instances law enforcers resort to
the practice of planting evidence to
extract information or even to harass
civilians.The court must be extra
vigilant in trying drug cases lest an
innocent person is made to suffer the
unusually severe penalties for drug
offenses. We are aware that in some
instances law enforcers resort to the
practice of planting evidence to
extract information or even to harass
civilians.
Same; Same; Same; Presumption of
Innocence; Presumption of Regularity;
The presumption that regular duty was
performed by the arresting officers
could not prevail over the
constitutional presumption of
innocence of the accused.Hence, the

presumption that regular duty was

performed by the arresting officers
could not prevail over the
constitutional presumption of the
innocence of the accused.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In
our criminal justice system, the
overriding consideration is not
whether the court doubts the
innocence of the accused but whether
it entertains a reasonable doubt as to
his guilt; The presumption of regularity
of performance of official duty cannot,
by itself, constitute proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.In our
criminal justice system, the overriding
consideration is not whether the court
doubts the innocence of the accused
but whether it entertains a reasonable
doubt as to his guilt. It is therefore,
incumbent upon the prosecution to
prove that the accused is indeed guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. The
presumption of regularity of
performance of official duty cannot, by
itself, constitute proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Same; Same; Same; Same; If the
inculpatory facts and circumstances
are capable of two (2) or more
explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other consistent with
his guilt, then the evidence does not
fulfill the test of moral certainty and is
not sufficient to support a conviction.
Clearly, the guilt of the accusedappellant was not proven beyond
54

reasonable doubt measured by the

required moral certainty of conviction.
The evidence presented by the
prosecution was not enough to
overcome the presumption of
innocence as constitutionally ordained.
Thus, in People vs. Parayno, we ruled
emphatically thatIf the inculpatory
facts and circumstances are capable
of two (2) or more explanations, one
which is consistent with the innocence
of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of
moral certainty and is not sufficient to
support a conviction (24 SCRA 3)."
People vs. Pagaura, 267 SCRA 17, G.R.
No. 95352 January 28, 1997

13.

People vs Godoy

Criminal Law; Rape; By the very

nature of the crime of rape, conviction
or acquittal depends almost entirely
on the credibility of the complainants
testimony because of the fact that
usually only the participants can
testify as to its occurrence.A rape
charge is a serious matter with
pernicious consequences. It exposes
both the accused and the accuser to
humiliation, fear and anxieties, not to
mention the stigma of shame that
both have to bear for the rest of their
lives. By the very nature of the crime

of rape, conviction or acquittal

depends almost entirely on the
credibility of the complainants
testimony because of the fact that
usually only the participants can
testify as to its occurrence.
Same; Same; Three guiding principles
in the appellate review of the evidence
in a prosecution for the crime of rape.
There are three well-known
principles that guide an appellate
court in reviewing the evidence
presented in a prosecution for the
crime of rape. These are: (1) while
rape is a most detestable crime, and
ought to be severely and impartially
punished, it must be borne in mind
that it is an accusation easy to be
made, hard to be proved, but harder
to be defended by the party accused,
though innocent; (2) that in view of
the intrinsic nature of the crime of
rape where only two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution; and (3) that the
evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merits and
cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for
the defense.
Same; Same; Presumption of
Innocence; Where the inculpatory
facts and circumstances are capable
of two or more explanations one of
which is consistent with the innocence
of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, then the

evidence is not sufficient to support a

conviction.Doctrinally, where the
inculpatory facts and circumstances
are capable of two or more
explanations one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other consistent with
his guilt, then the evidence does not
fulfill the test of moral certainty and is
not sufficient to support a conviction.
Same; Same; Flight; It is not the
natural tendency of a man to remain
for long by the side of the woman he
had raped, and in public in a highly
populated area at thatit is to be
expected that the one who is guilty of
a crime would want to dissociate
himself from the person of his victim,
the scene of the crime, and from all
other things and circumstances
related to the offense.It was further
alleged by complainant that after her
alleged ravishment, she put on her
panty and then appellant openly
accompanied her all the way to the
gate of the house where they
eventually parted ways. This is
inconceivable. It is not the natural
tendency of a man to remain for long
by the side of the woman he had
raped, and in public in a highly
populated area at that. Given the
stealth that accompanies it and the
anxiety to end further exposure at the
scene, the logical post-incident
impulse of the felon is to distance
himself from his victim as far and as
soon as practicable, to avoid discovery
and apprehension. It is to be expected
55

that one who is guilty of a crime would

want to dissociate himself from the
person of his victim, the scene of the
crime, and from all other things and
circumstances related to the offense
which could possibly implicate him or
give rise to even the slightest
suspicion as to his guilt. Verily, the
guilty flee where no man pursueth.

cannot be said as to the alleged use of

force. It has been held that such
corroborative evidence is not
considered sufficient, since proof of
facts constituting one principal
element of the crime is not
corroborative proof of facts necessary
to constitute another equally
important element of the crime.

Same; Same; Evidence; In rape

committed through forcible means,
the testimony of the complainant must
be corroborated by physical evidence
showing use of force.Further, rather
than substantiating the prosecutions
aforesaid theory and the supposed
date of commission of rape, the
finding that there were no evident
signs of extra-genital injuries tends,
instead, to lend more credence to
appellants claim of voluntary coition
on a later date and the absence of a
struggle or the lack of employment of
physical force. In rape of the nature
alleged in this case, we repeat, the
testimony of the complainant must be
corroborated by physical evidence
showing use of force.

Same; Same; Same; The general rule

that the rape victims panty and
blood-stained dress are not essential
and need not be presented holds true
only if there exist other corroborative
evidence sufficiently and convincingly
proving the rape charge beyond
reasonable doubt.There is a rule that
the rape victims panty and bloodstained dress are not essential, and
need not be presented, as they are not
indispensable evidence to prove rape.
We incline to the view, however, that
this general rule holds true only if
there exist other corroborative
evidence sufficiently and convincingly
proving the rape charge beyond
reasonable doubt. The rule should go
the other way where, as in the present
case, the testimony of complainant is
inherently weak and no other physical
evidence has been presented to
bolster the charge of sexual abuse
except for medical report which, as
earlier discussed, even negated the
existence of one of the essential
elements of the crime. We cannot,
therefore, escape the irresistible
conclusion that the deliberate nonpresentation of complainants blood-

Same; Same; Same; Proof of facts

constituting one principal element of
the crime is not corroborative proof of
facts necessary to constitute another
equally important element of the
crime.Even granting ex gratia
argumenti that the medical report and
the laceration corroborated
complainants assertion that there was
sexual intercourse, of course the same

stained skirt, if it did exist, should

vigorously militate against the
prosecutions cause.
Same; Same; Same; Judges; Rape is a
very emotional word and the natural
human reactions to it are categorical,
but judges, being interpreters of the
law and dispensers of justice, must
look at a rape charge without those
proclivities and deal with it with
extreme caution and circumspection
they must free themselves of the
natural tendency to be overprotective
of every woman decrying her having
been sexually abused.Rape is a very
emotional word, and the natural
human reactions to it are categorical:
admiration and sympathy for the
courageous female publicly seeking
retribution for her outrageous
violation, and condemnation of the
rapist. However, being interpreters of
the law and dispensers of justice,
judges must look at a rape charge
without those proclivities, and deal
with it with extreme caution and
circumspection. Judges must free
themselves of the natural tendency to
be overprotective of every woman
decrying her having been sexually
abused, and demanding punishment
for the abuser. While they ought to be
cognizant of the anguish and
humiliation the rape victim goes
through as she demands justice,
judges should equally bear in mind
that their responsibility is to render
justice based on the law.
56

Same; Same; Same; Witnesses;

Exceptions to the general rule that the
Supreme Court desists from disturbing
the conclusions of the trial court on
the credibility of witnesses.The rule,
therefore, that this Court generally
desists from disturbing the conclusions
of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses will not apply where the
evidence of record fails to support or
substantiate the lower courts findings
of fact and conclusions; or where the
lower court overlooked certain facts of
substance and value that, if
considered, would affect the outcome
of the case; or where the disputed
decision is based on a
misapprehension of facts.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The
technique in deciphering testimony is
not to solely concentrate on isolated
parts of that testimony.The
technique in deciphering testimony is
not to solely concentrate on isolated
parts of that testimony. The correct
meaning of the testimony can often be
ascertained only upon a perusal of the
entire testimony. Everything stated by
the witness has to be considered in
relation to what else has been stated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In rape
cases, the testimony of the offended
party must not be accepted with
precipitate credulity.In the case at
bar, the challenged decision definitely
leaves much to be desired. The court
below made no serious effort to
dispassionately or impartially consider

the totality of the evidence for the

prosecution in spite of the teaching in
various rulings that in rape cases, the
testimony of the offended party must
not be accepted with precipitate
credulity. In finding that the crime of
rape was committed, the lower court
took into account only that portion of
the testimony of complainant
regarding the January 21, 1994
incident and conveniently deleted the
rest.
Taken singly, there would be reason to
believe that she was indeed raped.
But if we are to consider the other
portions of her testimony concerning
the events which transpired
thereafter, which unfortunately the
court a quo wittingly or unwittingly
failed or declined to appreciate, the
actual truth could have been readily
exposed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial
Notice; The Supreme Court is not
unaware that in rape cases, the claim
of the complainant of having been
threatened appears to be a common
testimonial expedient and facesaving
subterfuge.She claims that appellant
always carried a knife, but it was
never explained how she was
threatened with the same in such a
manner that she was allegedly always
cowed into giving in to his
innumerable sexual demands. We are
not unaware that in rape cases, this
claim that complainant now advances

appears to be a common testimonial

expedient and face-saving subterfuge.
Same; Same; Same; Same;
Sweetheart Theory; While the
sweetheart theory does not often
gain favor with the Supreme Court,
such is not always the case if the hard
fact is that the accused and the
supposed victim are, in truth,
intimately related except that, as is
usual in most cases, either the
relationship is illicit or the victims
parents are against it.The main
defense proffered by appellant is that
he and complainant were sweethearts.
While the sweetheart theory does
not often gain favor with this Court,
such is not always the case if the hard
fact is that the accused and the
supposed victim are, in truth,
intimately related except that, as is
usual in most cases, either the
relationship is illicit or the victims
parents are against it. It is not
improbable that in some instances,
when the relationship is uncovered,
the alleged victim or her parents for
that matter would rather take the risk
of instituting a criminal action in the
hope that the court would take the
cudgels for them than for the woman
to admit to her own acts of
indiscretion. And this, as the records
reveal, is precisely what happened to
appellant.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Denials;
Mere denials are self-serving negative
evidencethey cannot obtain
57

evidentiary weight greater than the

declarations of credible disinterested
witnesses.The positive allegations of
appellant that he was having an
intimate relationship with
complainant, which were substantially
corroborated by several witnesses,
were never successfully confuted. The
rebuttal testimony of complainant
merely consisted of bare, unexplained
denials of the positive, definite,
consistent and detailed assertions of
appellant. Mere denials are selfserving negative evidence. They
cannot obtain evidentiary weight
greater than the declarations of
credible disinterested witnesses.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The rule of
falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not
mandatory, and neither is it a positive
rule of law nor an inflexible one.
Thus, the trial courts hasty
pontification that appellants
testimony is improbable, ridiculous,
nonsensical and incredible is highly
uncalled for. The rule of falsus in uno,
falsus in omnibus is not mandatory. It
is not a positive rule of law and is not
an inflexible one. It does not apply
where there is sufficient corroboration
on many grounds of the testimony and
the supposed inconsistencies arise
merely from a desire of the witness to
exculpate himself although not
completely.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Expert
Witnesses; Handwriting Experts;
Resort to questioned document

examiners, more familiarly called

handwriting experts, is not mandatory,
and while probably useful, they are
not indispensable in examining or
comparing handwriting.
Wellentrenched by now is the rule that
resort to questioned document
examiners, more familiarly called
handwriting experts, is not mandatory.
Handwriting experts, while probably
useful, are not indispensable in
examining or comparing handwriting.
This is so since under Section 22, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, the
handwriting of a person may be
proved by any witness who believes it
to be the handwriting of such person,
because he has seen the person write,
or has seen writing purporting to be
his upon which the witness has acted
or been charged, and has thus
acquired knowledge of the handwriting
of such person. The said section
further provides that evidence
respecting the handwriting may also
be given by a comparison, made by
the witness or the court, with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the
party against whom the evidence is
offered or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge.
Same; Same; Same; Compromise; In
criminal cases, while an offer of
compromise is generally admissible as
evidence against the party making it,
the accused may show that the offer
was not made under a consciousness
of guilt but merely to avoid the
inconvenience of imprisonment or for

some other reason which would justify

a claim that the offer was not in truth
an admission of guilt or an attempt to
avoid the legal consequences which
would ordinarily ensue therefrom.
The prosecution insists that the offer
of compromise made by appellant is
deemed to be an admission of guilt.
This inference does not arise in the
instant case. In criminal cases, an
offer of compromise is generally
admissible as evidence against the
party making it. It is a legal maxim,
which assuredly constitutes one of the
bases of the right to penalize, that in
the matter of public crimes which
directly affect the public interest, no
compromise whatever may be entered
into as regards the penal action. It has
long been held, however, that in such
cases the
accused is permitted to show that the
offer was not made under a
consciousness of guilt, but merely to
avoid the inconvenience of
imprisonment or for some other
reason which would justify a claim by
the accused that the offer to
compromise was not in truth an
admission of his guilt or an attempt to
avoid the legal consequences which
would ordinarily ensue therefrom.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the
accused was not present at the time
the offer for monetary consideration
was made, such offer of compromise
would not save the day for the
prosecution.It has been held that
58

where the accused was not present at

the time the offer for monetary
consideration was made, such offer of
compromise would not save the day
for the prosecution. In another case,
this Court ruled that no implied
admission can be drawn from the
efforts to arrive at a settlement
outside the court, where the accused
did not take part in any of the
negotiations and the effort to settle
the case was in accordance with the
established tribal customs, that is,
Muslim practices and traditions, in an
effort to prevent further deterioration
of the relations between the parties.
Same; Same; Same; Affidavits of
Desistance; While an affidavit of
desistance by the complainant is not
looked upon with favor, it may,
however, create serious doubts as to
the liability of the accused.
Generally, an affidavit of desistance by
the complainant is not looked upon
with favor. It may, however, create
serious doubts as to the liability of
appellant, especially if it corroborates
appellants explanation about the
filing of criminal charges.
Same; Same; Judicial Notice; The
Supreme Court takes judicial
cognizance of the fact that in rural
areas in the Philippines, young ladies
are strictly required to act with
circumspection and prudence, and
that great caution is observed so that
their reputations shall remain
untainted.The Court takes judicial

cognizance of the fact that in rural

areas in the Philippines, young ladies
are strictly required to act with
circumspection and prudence. Great
caution is observed so that their
reputations shall remain untainted.
Any breath of scandal which brings
dishonor to their character humiliates
their entire families. It could precisely
be that complainants mother wanted
to save face in the community where
everybody knows everybody else, and
in an effort to conceal her daughters
indiscretion and escape the wagging
tongues of their small rural
community, she had to weave the
scenario of this rape drama.

presumption, and then determine

which should be regarded as the more
important and entitled to prevail over
the other. It must, however, be
remembered that the existence of a
presumption indicating guilt does not
in itself destroy the presumption
against innocence unless the
inculpating presumption, together with
all of the evidence, or the lack of any
evidence or explanation, is sufficient
to overcome the presumption of
innocence by proving the defendants
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until
the defendants guilt is shown in this
manner, the presumption of innocence
continues.

Same; Same; Constitutional Law;

Presumption of Innocence; Hierarchy
of Presumptions; Where presumptions
conflict, one tending to demonstrate
the guilt of the accused and another
his innocence, it becomes necessary
to examine the basis for each
presumption and to determine what
logical or social basis exists for each
presumption, and then determine
which should be regarded as the more
important and entitled to prevail over
the other.It frequently happens that
in a particular case two or more
presumptions are involved. Sometimes
the presumptions conflict, one tending
to demonstrate the guilt of the
accused and the other his innocence.
In such case, it is necessary to
examine the basis for each
presumption and determine what
logical or social basis exists for each

Same; Same; Same; Same; Rationale

for the Presumption of Guilt in Rape
Cases.The rationale for the
presumption of guilt in rape cases has
been explained in this wise: In rape
cases especially, much credence is
accorded the testimony of the
complaining witness, on the theory
that she will not choose to accuse her
attacker at all and subject herself to
the stigma and indignities her
accusation will entail unless she is
telling the truth.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The
presumption of innocence is founded
upon the first principles of justice and
is not a mere form but a substantial
part of the lawit is not overcome by
mere suspicion or conjecture, a
probability that the defendant
committed the crime, nor the fact that
59

he had the opportunity to do so.The

presumption of innocence, on the
other hand, is founded upon the first
principles of justice, and is not a mere
form but a substantial part of the law.
It is not overcome by mere suspicion
or conjecture; a probability that the
defendant committed the crime; nor
by the fact that he had the opportunity
to do so. Its purpose is to balance the
scales in what would otherwise be an
uneven contest between the lone
individual pitted against the People
and all the resources at their
command. Its inexorable mandate is
that, for all the authority and influence
of the prosecution, the accused must
be acquitted and set free if his guilt
cannot be proved beyond the whisper
of a doubt. This is in consonance with
the rule that conflicts in evidence
must be resolved upon the theory of
innocence rather than upon a theory
of guilt when it is possible to do so.
Same; Kidnapping; For kidnapping to
exist, there must be indubitable proof
that the actual intent of the malefactor
was to deprive the offended party of
her liberty.It is basic that for
kidnapping to exist, there must be
indubitable proof that the actual intent
of the malefactor was to deprive the
offended party of her liberty. In the
present charge for that crime, such
intent has not at all been established
by the prosecution. Prescinding from
the fact that the Taha spouses
desisted from pursuing this charge
which they themselves instituted,

several grave and irreconcilable

inconsistencies bedevil the
prosecutions evidence thereon and
cast serious doubts on the guilt of
appellant, as hereunder explained.
Same; Same; Motive; While it is true,
as a rule, that the motive of the
accused in a criminal case is
immaterial and, not being an element
of a crime, it does not have to be
proved, where, however, the evidence
is weak without any motive being
disclosed by the evidence, the guilt of
the accused becomes open to a
reasonable doubt and acquittal is in
order.We agree with appellants
contention that the prosecution failed
to prove any motive on his part for the
commission of the crime charged. In
one case, this Court rejected the
kidnapping charge where there was
not the slightest hint of a motive for
the crime. It is true that, as a rule, the
motive of the accused in a criminal
case is immaterial and, not being an
element of a crime, it does not have to
be proved. Where, however, the
evidence is weak, without any motive
being disclosed by the evidence, the
guilt of the accused becomes open to
a reasonable doubt and, hence, an
acquittal is in order. Nowhere in the
testimony of either the complainant or
her mother can any ill motive of a
criminal nature be reasonably drawn.
What actually transpired was an
elopement or a lovers tryst, immoral
though it may be.

Same; Judges; Evidence; The exclusion

of evidence based on a judges
preposterous reasoning founded on a
mere surmise or speculation,
strengthens and reinforces the
Supreme Courts impression of an
apparently whimsical exercise of
discretion by the trial court.As a
closing note, we are bewildered by the
trial courts refusal to admit in
evidence the bag of clothes belonging
to complainant which was presented
and duly identified by the defense, on
its announced supposition that the
clothes could have easily been bought
from a department store. Such
preposterous reasoning founded on a
mere surmise or speculation, aside
from the fact that on rebuttal the
prosecution did not even seek to elicit
an explanation or clarification from
complainant about said clothes,
strengthens and reinforces our
impression of an apparently whimsical
exercise of discretion by the court
below. Matters which could have been
easily verified were thus cavalierly
dismissed and supplanted by a
conjecture, and on such inferential
basis a conclusion was then drawn by
said court.
Same; Same; Same; The practice of
excluding evidence on doubtful
objections to its materiality or
technical objections to the form of the
questions should be avoided.We
accordingly deem it necessary to
reiterate an early and highly regarded
disquisition of this Court against the
60

practice of excluding evidence in the

erroneous manner adopted by the trial
court: It has been observed that
justice is most effectively and
expeditiously administered where
trivial objections to the admission of
proof are received with least favor. The
practice of excluding evidence on
doubtful objections to its materiality or
technical objections to the form of the
questions should be avoided. In a case
of any intricacy it is impossible for a
judge of first instance, in the early
stages of the development of the
proof, to know with any certainty
whether the testimony is relevant or
not; and where there is no indication
of bad faith on the part of the attorney
offering the evidence, the court may
as a rule safely accept the testimony
upon the statement of the attorney
that the proof offered will be
connected later. Moreover, it must be
remembered that in the heat of the
battle over which he presides, a judge
of first instance may possibly fall into
error in judging the relevancy of proof
where a fair and logical connection is
in fact shown. When such a mistake is
made and the proof is erroneously
ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon
appeal, often finds itself embarrassed
and possibly unable to correct the
effects of the error without returning
the case for a new trial, a step which
this court is always very loath to take.
Same; Penalties; Death Penalty; If
capital punishment is justified, it
serves as a deterrent but if

injudiciously imposed, it generates

resentment.At any rate, despite that
procedural lapse, we find in the
records of these cases sufficient and
substantial evidence which warrant
and demand the acquittal of appellant.
Apropos thereto, we take this
opportunity to repeat this age-old
observation and experience of
mankind on the penological and
societal effect of capital punishment: If
it is justified, it serves as a deterrent;
if injudiciously imposed, it generates
resentment.
Same; Same; Same; Statutes;
Statutory Construction; R.A. 7659 took
effect on December 31, 1993, not on
January 1, 1994 as is sometimes
misinterpreted.Finally, we are
constrained to reiterate here that
Republic Act No. 7659 which
reimposed the death penalty on
certain heinous crimes took effect on
December 31, 1993, that is, fifteen
days after its publication in the
December 16, 1993 issues of the
Manila Bulletin, Philippine Star, Malaya
and Philippine Times Journal, and not
on January 1, 1994 as is sometimes
misinterpreted. People vs. Godoy, 250
SCRA 676, G.R. Nos. 115908-09
December 6, 1995
14.

People vs Agulay

Criminal Law; Presumption of

Innocence; The presumption of
innocence of an accused in a criminal
case is a basic constitutional principle,

fleshed out by procedural rules which

place on the prosecution the burden of
proving that an accused is guilty of the
offense charged by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.The law presumes
that an accused in a criminal
prosecution is innocent until the
contrary is proved. The presumption of
innocence of an accused in a criminal
case is a basic constitutional principle,
fleshed out by procedural rules which
place on the prosecution the burden of
proving that an accused is guilty of the
offense charged by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Whether the degree
of proof has been met is largely left for
the trial courts to determine.
Consistent with the rulings of this
Court, it is a fundamental and settled
rule that factual findings of the trial
court and its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses and its
conclusions anchored on its findings
are accorded by the appellate court
high respect, if not conclusive effect,
more so when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, as in this case. The exception
is when it is established that the trial
court ignored, overlooked,
misconstrued or misinterpreted cogent
facts and circumstances which, if
considered, will change the outcome
of the case. Considering that what is
at stake here is the liberty of accusedappellant, we have carefully reviewed
and evaluated the records of the RTC
and the Court of Appeals. On
evaluation of the records, this Court
finds no justification to deviate from
the lower courts findings and
61

conclusion that accused-appellant was

arrested in flagrante delicto selling
shabu.
Same; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal
Sale of Drugs; Elements.In order to
successfully prosecute an accused for
illegal sale of drugs, the prosecution
must be able to prove the following
elements: (1) identities of the buyer
and seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment
therefor.
Same; Same; Same; Buy-Bust
Operations; Searches and Seizures;
Warrants of Arrest; Exceptions; Words
and Phrases; It is a well-established
rule that an arrest made after an
entrapment operation does not require
a warrant inasmuch as it is considered
a valid warrantless arrest; In a buybust operation, the idea to commit a
crime originates from the offender,
without anybody inducing or prodding
him to commit the offense.Accusedappellant contends his arrest was
illegal, making the sachets of shabu
allegedly recovered from him
inadmissible in evidence. Accusedappellants claim is devoid of merit for
it is a well-established rule that an
arrest made after an entrapment
operation does not require a warrant
inasmuch as it is considered a valid
warrantless arrest, in line with the
provisions of Rule 113, Section 5(a) of
the Revised Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant;

when lawful.A peace officer or a

private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person: (a) When, in his
presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense.
A buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment which in recent years has
been accepted as a valid and effective
mode of apprehending drug pushers.
In a buy-bust operation, the idea to
commit a crime originates from the
offender, without anybody inducing or
prodding him to commit the offense. If
carried out with due regard for
constitutional and legal safeguards, a
buy-bust operation deserves judicial
sanction. There are eight (8) instances
when a warrantless search and seizure
is valid, to wit: (1) consented
searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful
arrest; (3) searches of vessels and
aircraft for violation of immigration,
customs, and drug laws; (4) searches
of moving vehicles; (5) searches of
automobiles at borders or constructive
borders; (6) where the prohibited
articles are in plain view; (7)
searches of buildings and premises to
enforce fire, sanitary, and building
regulations; and (8) stop and frisk
operations.
Same; Same; Same; Chain of Custody
Rule; The prosecutions failure to
submit in evidence the required
physical inventory and photograph of
the evidence confiscated pursuant to
Section 21, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165 will not discharge the

accused from his crimenoncompliance with said section is not

fatal and will not render an accuseds
arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible.The defense contends
there is a clear doubt on whether the
specimens examined by the chemist
and eventually presented in court
were the same specimens recovered
from accused-appellant. The
prosecutions failure to submit in
evidence the required physical
inventory and photograph of the
evidence confiscated pursuant to
Section 21, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165 will not discharge accusedappellant from his crime. Noncompliance with said section is not
fatal and will not render an accuseds
arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible. In People v. Del Monte,
552 SCRA 627 (2008), this Court held
that what is of utmost importance is
the preservation of the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in
the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. In the
instant case, we find the integrity of
the drugs seized intact, and there is
no doubt that the three sachets of
drugs seized from accused-appellant
were the same ones examined for
chemical analysis, and that the
crystalline substance contained
therein was later on determined to be
positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu).
62

Same; Same; Same; Frame-Up; Like

the defense of alibi, frame-up is an
allegation that can easily be
concoctedfor this claim to prosper,
the defense must adduce clear and
convincing evidence to overcome the
presumption of regularity of official
acts of government officials.
Accused-appellants allegation that he
is a victim of a frame-up, which has
been held as a shop-worn defense of
those accused in drug-related cases, is
viewed by the Court with disfavor. Like
the defense of alibi, frame-up is an
allegation that can easily be
concocted. For this claim to prosper,
the defense must adduce clear and
convincing evidence to overcome the
presumption of regularity of official
acts of government officials. Absent
any proof of motive to falsely accuse
him of such a grave offense, the
presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty and the
findings of the trial court with respect
to the credibility of witnesses shall
prevail over that of the accusedappellant.
Same; Same; Same; Buy-Bust
Operations; Chain of Custody Rule;
The objective test in buy-bust
operations demands that the details of
the purported transaction must be
clearly and adequately shown, which
must start from the initial contact
between the poseur-buyer and the
pusher, the offer to purchase, the
promise or payment of the

consideration until the consummation

of the sale by the delivery of the
illegal drug subject of the sale.The
testimony of accused-appellants
brother, Benjamin Agulay, is not
convincing. Being accused-appellants
brother, we find him to be unreliable.
Suffice it to say that, having been
given by a relative of the accusedappellant, his testimony should be
received with caution. On this premise,
this Court has laid down the
objective test in scrutinizing buybust operations. In People v. Doria,
301 SCRA 668 (1999), we said: We
therefore stress that the objective
test in buy-bust operations demands
that the details of the purported
transaction must be clearly and
adequately shown. This must start
from the initial contact between the
poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer
to purchase, the promise or payment
of the consideration until the
consummation of the sale by the
delivery of the illegal drug subject of
the sale. The manner by which the
initial contact was made, whether or
not through an informant, the offer to
purchase the drug, the payment of the
buy-bust money, and the delivery of
the illegal drug, whether to the
informant alone or the police officer,
must be the subject of strict scrutiny
by courts to insure that law-abiding
citizens are not unlawfully induced to
commit an offense. x x x.
Brion,J., Dissenting Opinion:

Criminal Law; Presumption of

Innocence; Words and Phrases;
Contrary proof, in constitutional terms,
is proof beyond reasonable doubt that
the prosecution must adduce evidence
showing that a crime has been
committed as charged, and that the
accused committed the crime.That
no person shall be denied the right to
life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor be denied the
equal protection of the laws stands at
the first section of Article III (the Bill of
Rights) of the Philippine Constitution
because it is the most basic. In
criminal proceedings, the due process
requirement is so zealously guarded
that over and above what Article III,
Section 1 provides, the framers of the
Constitution still saw it necessary to
provide under Section 14 of the same
Article that No person shall be held to
answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law. Section 14
particularizes its protection by
specifying under its paragraph (2) the
rights that an accused shall enjoy,
foremost among them the right to be
presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved. Contrary proof, in
constitutional terms, is proof beyond
reasonable doubt that the prosecution
must adduce evidence showing that a
crime has been committed as
charged, and that the accused
committed the crime. It is only upon
such proof that the burden of evidence
shifts to the accused who is then given
his or her chance to adduce evidence
63

to show that no crime was committed;

or that circumstances exist to justify the commission
of the act charged; or that somebody
else committed the crime; or that
reasonable doubt exists on whether a
crime has been committed or that the
accused committed the crime. An
accused is only convicted if he fails in
all these.
Same; Dangerous Drugs; Buy-Bust
Operations; A police buy-bust
operation, because of the built-in
danger for abuse that it carries, is
governed by a specific procedure with
respect to the seizure and custody of
drugs.A police buy-bust operation,
because of the built-in danger for
abuse that it carries, is governed by a
specific procedure with respect to the
seizure and custody of drugs. In
People v. Tan, 348 SCRA 116 (2000),
we recognized that by the very
nature of anti-narcotics operations, the
need for entrapment procedures, the
use of shady characters as informants,
the ease with which sticks of
marijuana or grams of heroin can be
planted in pockets of or hands of
unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the
secrecy that inevitably shrouds all
drug deals, the possibility of abuse is
great. Thus, courts have been
exhorted to be extra vigilant in trying
drug cases lest an innocent person is
made to suffer the unusually severe
penalties for drug offenses.

Same; Same; Same; Chain of Custody

Rule; As a method of authenticating
evidence, the chain of custody rule
requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be; While
testimony about a perfect chain is not
always the standard because it is
almost always impossible to obtain, an
unbroken chain of custody becomes
indispensable and essential when the
item of real evidence is not distinctive
and is not readily identifiable, or when
its condition at the time of testing or
trial is critical, or when a witness has
failed to observe its uniqueness.In
the recent case of Malillin v. People,
553 SCRA 619 (2008), the Court
explained the importance of
establishing the chain of custody of
the confiscated drugs, to wit: As a
method of authenticating evidence,
the chain of custody rule requires that
the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims
it to be. It would include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the
time it is offered into evidence, in such
a way that every person who touched
the exhibit would describe how and
from whom it was received, where it
was and
what happened to it while in the
witness possession, the condition in
which it was received and the

condition in which it was delivered to

the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the
precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition
of the item and no opportunity for
someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same. While
testimony about a perfect chain is not
always the standard because it is
almost always impossible to obtain, an
unbroken chain of custody becomes
indispensable and essential when the
item of real evidence is not distinctive
and is not readily identifiable, or when
its condition at the time of testing or
trial is critical, or when a witness has
failed to observe its uniqueness. The
same standard likewise obtains in case
the evidence is susceptible to
alteration, tampering, contamination
and even substitution and exchange.
In other words, the exhibits level of
susceptibility to fungibility, alteration
or tamperingwithout regard to
whether the same is advertent or
otherwise notdictates the level of
strictness in the application of the
chain of custody rule.
Same; Same; Same; Presumptions;
The presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty cannot by
itself overcome the presumption of
innocence nor constitute proof beyond
reasonable doubt.As explained in
the case of People v. Santos, 536 SCRA
489 (2007), the presumption of
regularity in the performance of
official duty cannot by itself overcome
64

the presumption of innocence nor

constitute proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Moreover, .. As the Court ruled
in People v. Ambrosio, 382 SCRA 419
(2002): The presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duty
cannot be used as basis for affirming
accused-appellants conviction
because, [f]irst, the presumption is
precisely just thata mere
presumption. Once challenged by
evidence, as in this case, . . . [it]
cannot be regarded as binding truth.
Second, the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official functions
cannot preponderate over the
presumption of innocence that prevails
if not overthrown by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
Same; Same; Same; Same; One effect
of the failure to comply with the
procedure required by Section 21,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 is to negate
the presumption that official duties
have been regularly performed by the
police officers; Without credible
evidence showing
the existence of the prohibited drug
that had been the subject matter of
the illegal transaction, there can be no
crime committed.As painstakingly
shown above from the prism of the
prosecutions own evidence, the police
failed to regularly discharge its duties
in the conduct of the buy-bust
operations, particularly in the handling
of the items seized. There is a wide
gap in the prosecutions evidence that
cannot but have an effect on the case

as a whole, even if it does not result in

the inadmissibility of the evidence.
One such effect of the failure to
comply with the procedure required by
Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,
as we held in Lopez v. People, 553
SCRA 619 (2008), is to negate the
presumption that official duties have
been regularly performed by the police
officers. Any taint of irregularity
affects the whole performance and
should make the presumption
unavailable. There can be no ifs and
buts regarding this consequence
considering the effect of the
evidentiary presumption of regularity
on the constitutional presumption of
innocence. Another effect, as we held
in Valdez v. People, 538 SCRA 611
(2007), is to create a doubt on the
existence of corpus delicti, i.e., on the
issue of whether a crime had indeed
been committed. Without credible
evidence showing the existence of the
prohibited drug that had been the
subject matter of the illegal
transaction, there can be no crime
committed.
Chico-Nazario,J., Reply to Dissenting
Opinion:
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs; BuyBust Operations; Chain of Custody
Rule; Presumption of Regularity; In
several cases decided by the Court,
failure by the buy-bust team to comply
with the procedure in Section 21(a),
Article II of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of Republic Act No.

9165 did not prevent the presumption

of regularity in the performance of
duty from applying.The dissent
agreed with accused-appellants
assertion that the police operatives
failed to comply with the proper
procedure in the custody of the seized
drugs. It premised that noncompliance with the procedure in
Section 21(a), Article II of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations
of Republic Act No. 9165 creates an
irregularity and overcomes the
presumption of regularity accorded
police authorities in the performance
of their official duties. This assumption
is without merit. First, it must be made
clear that in several cases decided by
the Court, failure by the buy-bust team
to comply with said section did not
prevent the presumption of regularity
in the performance of duty from
applying. Second, even prior to the
enactment of R.A. 9165, the
requirements contained in Section
21(a) were already there per
Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No.
3, Series of 1979. Despite the
presence of such regulation and its
non-compliance by the buy-bust team,
the Court still applied such
presumption.
Same; Same; Witnesses; Not all
people who came into contact with the
seized drugs are required to testify in
court.The dissent maintains that the
chain of custody rule would include
testimony about every link in the
chain, from the moment the item was
65

picked up to the time it is offered into

evidence x x x. This means that all
persons who came into contact with
the seized drugs should testify in
court; otherwise, the unbroken chain
of custody would not be established. I
disagree. Not all people who came into
contact with the seized drugs are
required to testify in court. There is
nothing in the New Drugs Law or in
any rule implementing the same that
imposes such a requirement. As long
as the chain of custody of the seized
substance was clearly established not
to have been broken and that the
prosecution did not fail to identify
properly the drugs seized, it is not
indispensable that each and every
person who came into possession of
the drugs should take the witness
stand. In People v. Zeng Hua Dian, 432
SCRA 25 (2004).
Same; Same; Same; Unless compelling
reasons are shown otherwise, the
Supreme Court, not being a trier of
facts itself, relies in good part on the
assessment and evaluation by the trial
court of the evidence, particularly the
attestations of witnesses, presented to
it.Prosecutions involving illegal drugs
depend largely on the credibility of the
police officers who conduct the buybust operation. In cases involving
violations of the Dangerous Drugs
Law, appellate courts tend to heavily

rely upon the trial court in assessing

the credibility of witnesses, as it had
the unique opportunity, denied to the
appellate courts, to observe the
witnesses and to note their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude under direct and
cross-examination. This Court, not
being a trier of facts itself, relies in
good part on the assessment and
evaluation by the trial court of the
evidence, particularly the attestations
of the witnesses, presented to it. Thus,
this Court will not interfere with the
trial courts assessment of the
credibility of witnesses considering
there is nothing on record that shows
some fact or circumstance of weight
and influence which the trial court has
overlooked, misappreciated, or
misinterpreted. Unless compelling
reasons are shown otherwise, this
Court, not being a trier of facts itself,
relies in good part on the assessment
and evaluation by the trial court of the
evidence, particularly the attestations
of witnesses, presented to it. As this
Court has held in a long line of cases,
the trial court is in a better position to
decide the question, having heard the
witnesses themselves and observed
their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial.

and credit shall be accorded them.

The dissent likewise argues that the
ponencia cannot impose on the
defense the burden of proving that the
police had an improper motive in
charging him because of the absence
of the presumption of regularity. We
find this untenable. It is settled that if
the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses are not impugned, full faith
and credit shall be accorded them.
One impugns the testimony of
witnesses during cross-examination.
Did the defense satisfactorily impugn
the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses when he said that he was a
victim of hulidap and that the
policemen were extorting money from
him? Said declaration is definitely not
sufficient to impugn the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses. His mere
say so that he was victimized without
clear and convincing evidence to
support such claim does not suffice. If
what he claims was indeed committed
by the policemen, he should have
sued or charged them. This, he did not
do. Such inaction runs counter to the
normal human conduct and behavior
of one who feels truly aggrieved by
the act complained of. People vs.
Agulay, 566 SCRA 571, G.R. No.
181747 September 26, 2008

Same; Same; Same; It is settled that if

the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses are not impugned, full faith

66