23. People v.

Ortega
G.R. No. 116736 July 24, 1997
Lessons Applicable: Indeterminate Sentence Law
Laws Applicable: Art. 4 RPC
FACTS:
October 15, 1992 5:30 pm: Andre Mar Masangkay (courting
Raquel Ortega), Ariel Caranto, Romeo Ortega, Roberto San Andres,
Searfin, Boyet and Diosdado Quitlong were having a drinking spree
with gin and finger foods.
October 15, 1992 11:00 pm: Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel
Garcia who were already drank joined them.
October 16, 1992 midnight: Andre answering a call of nature went
to the back portion of the house and Benjamin followed him.
Suddenly, they heard a shout from Andre Dont, help me! (Huwag,
tulungan ninyo ako!)
Diosdado and Ariel ran and saw Benjamin on top of Andre who
was lying down being stabbed. Ariel got Benjamin Ortega, Sr.,
Benjamins father while Diosdado called Romeo to pacify his brother.
Romeo, Benjamin and Manuel lifted Andre from the canal and
dropped him in the well. They dropped stones to Andres body to
weigh the body down. Romeo warned Diosdado not to tell anybody
what he saw. He agreed so he was allowed to go home. But, his
conscience bothered him so he told his mother, reported it to the
police and accompanied them to the crime scene.
NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ludivico J. Lagat:
o cause of death is drowning with multiple stab wounds,
contributory
o 13 stab wounds
o stab wound on the upper left shoulder, near the upper left armpit
and left chest wall- front
o stab wound on the back left side of the body and the stab wound
on the back right portion of the body back
Manuel Garcia alibi
o He was asked to go home by his wife to fetched his mother-in-law
who performed a ritual called tawas on his sick daughter and stayed
home after
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. story
o After Masangkay left, he left to urinate and he saw Andre peeking
through the room of his sister Raquel. Then, Andre approached him
to ask where his sister was. When he answered he didnt know, Andre
punched him so he bled and fell to the ground. Andre drew a knife and
stabbed him, hitting him on the left arm, thereby immobilizing him.
Andre then gripped his neck with his left arm and threatened to kill
him. Unable to move, Ortega shouted for help. Quitlong came,
seized the knife and stabbed Andre 10 times with it. Andre then ran
towards the direction of the well. Then, he tended his wound in the
lips and armpit and slept.
RTC: Benjamin and Manuel through conspiracy and the taking

advantage of superior strength committed murder

ISSUE: W/N Benjamin and Manuel should be liable for murder.
HELD: NO. PARTLY GRANTED. Benjamin is guilty only of
homicide. Manuel deserves acquittal
If Ortegas version of the assault was true, he should have
immediately reported the matter to the police authorities. If Ortegas
version of the assault was true, he should have immediately reported
the matter to the police authorities. It is incredible that Diosdado
would stab Andre 10 times successively, completely ignoring
Benjamin who was grappling with Masangkay and that Andre was
choking him while being stabbed.
Abuse of superior strength requires deliberate intent on the part of
the accused to take advantage of such superiority none shown
o Andre was a 6-footer, whereas Ortega, Jr. was only 54
Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal
liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.
o The essential requisites
1. the intended act is felonious assisting Benjamin by carrying the
body to the well
2. the resulting act is likewise a felony - concealing the body of the
crime to prevent its discovery
3. the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the
actors wrongful acts (praeter intentionem) still alive and was
drowned to death
a person may be convicted of homicide although he had no
original intent to kill
Garcia is a brother-in-law of Benjamin
o Exempt by Article 20 of RPC
ART. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. -The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon
those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants,
descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or
relatives by affinity within the same degrees with the single exception
of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next
preceding article.
The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal under Article 249
of the Revised Penal Code, which is imposable in its medium period,
absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, as in the case of
Appellant Ortega. Because he is entitled to the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be one degree
lower, that is, prision mayor.
24. Urbano v. IAC
Facts:

On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his
ricefield. He found the place where he stored palay flooded with water
coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano went to the elevated portion to see
what happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting
grass. Javier admitted that he was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel
ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo, and again on
the leg with the back of the bolo. On October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier
had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the medical expenses of
Javier. On November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he
had lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found the condition to be caused
by tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound in his palm. He died the
following day. Urbano was charged with homicide and was found guilty
both by the trial court and on appeal by the Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a
motion for new trial based on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain who
stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals
on November 5. The motion was denied; hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of
the latters death
Held:
A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the
final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that
the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act
or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom."
If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by
tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should
have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms
of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than
14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should
have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from
the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's
wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed
him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been
infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the
circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected
by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and
logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And
since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused
caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable
doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that
the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later
or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The
infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus
may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the
petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the
be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the
condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible,
if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though
such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If
no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause,
such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent
act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in
injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause."

25. People of the Philippines vs Francisco Abarca

53 SCRA 742 Criminal Law Crimes Against Persons Article 247
Death Inflicted Under Exceptional Circumstances
One day in 1984, Francisco Abarca, through a peephole, caught his wife
having sexual intercourse with one Khingsley Paul Koh inside the Abarca
residence. The two also caught Abarca looking at them and so Koh grabbed
his pistol and thereafter Abarca fled. One hour later, Abarca, armed with an
armalite, went to the gambling place where Koh usually stays and then and
there shot Koh multiple times. Koh died instantaneously. However, two
more persons were shot in the adjacent room. These two other persons
survived due to timely medical intervention.
Eventually after trial, Abarca was convicted of the complex crime of murder
with frustrated double murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment of conviction is correct.
HELD: No. Abarca is entitled to the provisions of Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides:
Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or

both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them
any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married
person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with
another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this case.
Even though one hour had already lapsed from the time Abarca caught his
wife with Koh and the time he killed Koh, the killing was still the direct byproduct of Abarcas rage. Therefore, Abarca is not liable for the death of
Koh.
However, Abarca is still liable for the injuries he caused to the two other
persons he shot in the adjacent room but his liability shall not be for
frustrated murder. In the first place, Abarca has no intent to kill the other two
persons injured. He was not also committing a crime when he was firing his
gun at Koh it being under Art. 247. Abarca was however negligent because
he did not exercise all precaution to make sure no one else will be hurt. As
such, he shall be liable for less serious physical injuries through simple
negligence for the injuries suffered by the two other persons who were in the
adjacent room when the incident happened.
26. Bataclan vs. Medina
FACTS:
Medina is the owner and operator of a bus. This bus, on Sept. 13, 1952
around 2:00AM somewhere in Imus, Cavite, crashed and fell into a ditch.
Apparently, its front tire burst, zig-zagged and turned turtle into the ditch.
Bataclan was one of the 18 passengers. Most of the passengers were able to
get out, but Bataclan and 3 others were trapped. It appears that the bus
drivers and the passengers who already got out did not try to help Bataclan
et al get out, instead, about 10 of the locals in the area came to their aid, they
were carrying a burning torch for illumination, but then a fierce fire started
and engulfed the bus and killed Bataclan et al. It appears that there was a gas
leak from the bus and it caught fire from the torch the would-be rescuers
were using.
The heirs of Bataclan sued Medina.
The trial court found that there was a breach of a contract of carriage where
Medina undertook to take Bataclan to his destination safely. The trial court
also found that there was negligence on the part of Medina since at the time
of the blow-out, the bus was speeding. There is no question that under the
circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to what
degree. The trial court argued that Medina is only liable for the injuries
suffered by Bataclan and not by his death, the proximate cause of which was
the fire, which was not caused by Medina.
ISSUE: Whether or not it was the negligence of Medina, owner of the bus
company, which was the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan.

HELD:
Yes. In this case, the proximate cause of the death was the overturning of the
bus, because of the overturning, it leaked gas which is not unnatural or
unexpected. The locals coming to the aid of the trapped passengers was most
likely because the driver and the conductor went out looking for help. It is
only natural that the would-be rescuers bring with them a torch because it
was 2:30AM and the place was unlit. The fire could also be attributed to the
bus driver and conductor because he should have known, from the
circumstances, and because he should have been able to smell gasoline and
therefore he should have warned the rescuers not to bring the torch. Said
negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal
provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
27. People vs. Ulep
Facts: Macario Ulep, accused, elbowed her wife on her breast,
upon being drunk and uttering indecent words. Subsequently, the victim
vommited and then went to bed. The accused then left for the fields and
upon returning home, found his wife dead. He immediately reported this
death to their barrio captain. Medical reports show that the
victim's cause of death is due to cardiac arrest and primary shock.
Issue: WON the accused is criminally liable for the death of his wife.
Held: Yes. Even though a blow with the fist or a kick does not cause any
external wound, it may easily produce inflammation of the spleen and
peritonitis and cause death, and even though the victim may have been
previously affected by some internal malady, yet if the blow with the fist or
foot accelerated death, he who caused such acceleration is
responsible for the death as the result of an injury willfully and
unlawfully inflicted. There is that clear and categorical showing that
on the appellant fell the blame for these in human acts on his wife. He
should answer for her tragic death. Though, the appellant presented a
witness to prove that sometime, his wife was pinned down by a sack of
rice and the side portion of a bullcart and was attended to by a
town quack doctor called an arbularyo. This witness said that two ribs on
each side of the chest were
fractured, without stating which particular ribs were so affected. However, it
was being held that even if the victim is suffering from an internal
ailment, liver or heart disease, or tuberculosis, if the blow delivered
by the accused
a. is the efficient cause of death0 or
b. accelerated his death or
c. is the proximate cause of death, then there is criminal liability
Apropos to all these is that time-respected doctrine:
He who is the cause of the cause is the c a u s e o f t h e e v i l c a u s e d . 3
T h i s i s t h e r a t i o n a l e i n Ar t i c l e 4 o f t h e R e v i s e d P e n a l

Code which provides that criminal liability shall be

i n c u r r e d b y a p e r s o n c o m m i t t i n g a f e l o n y ( d e l i t o ) although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
28. PEOPLE VS BINDOY
G.R. NO. L-34665 August 28, 1931
FACTS: Appeal from a judgement of the CFI of Occidental Misamis, for
appelant was stenced to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased with the amount of P1,000. The crime
charged against the accused is homicide.
In the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a disturbance arose in a tuba wineshop.
Donato Bindoy offered some tuba to Faustino Paca's wife Tibay. She refused
because she already have one, but Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did
not accept. Pacas stepped in to defend his wife, attempting to take away
from Bindoy the bolo he carried. Emigdio Omamdam who came to the wine
shop to see what;s happening, instead got stabbed in the chest by Bindoy.
This happened when Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas,
wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand towards the left behind the
accused and with such violence that the point of the bolo reached
Omamdam's chest who was then behind Bindoy.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not Bindoy is criminally liable?
HELD: Corroborated by Gaudencio Cenas of the testimony of the accused,
Pacas and Bindoy were actually for the possession of the bolo. When Pacas
let go of the bolo, Bindoy had pulled so violently that it flew towards his left
side, at the very moment when Emigdio Omamdam came up and who was
therefore hit in the chest without Bindoy seeing him. Bindoy alleges that it
was caused accidentally and without malicious intent because he was only
defending his possession of the bolo which Pacas was trying to wrench away
from him and his conduct was perfectly lawful. The Court therefore
acquitted Bindoy based on the facts stated.
29. People vs Gona
30. G.R. No. L-25459
August 10, 1926
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAMON MABUG-AT, defendant-appellant. (Walay Digest)
Vicente Sotto for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros imposed upon Ramon
Mabug-at the penalty of twelve years and one day cadena temporal, with the
accessories of the law, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P700
and to pay the costs, for the crime of frustrated murder.

The appellant appealed from this judgment, making two assignments of

error as committed by the trial court, to wit:
1. In holding that the crime committed is frustrated murder, and
2. In not giving any credit to the evidence presented by the defense, finding
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The evidence of the prosecution shows that the accused and Juana Buralo
was sweethearts. Juana had been jealous of the accused on account of the
latter having frequently visited the house of one Carmen. Their relations
were such that the accused invited Juana to take a walk on the afternoon of
August 9, 1925. Juana refused him, later sending him a note of excuse. On
the third day, or the night of August 11th, the accused went to the threshold
of Cirilo Banyan's house where Juana Buralo had gone to take part in some
devotion. There the accused, revolver in hand, requested Francisco Abellon
to ask Juana to come downstairs and as Abellon refused to do so, the
accused said: "If you do not want to go upstairs, I will get Juana and if
anyone tries to defend her I will kill him."
The accused waited until Juana and her niece Perfecta Buralo came
downstairs, when they went in the direction of their house. The accused,
who was seen by the two girls, followed them without saying a word. It is
only a short distance from the house where the devotion took place to that of
the offended party, the houses being adjacent. As the two girls were going
upstairs, the accused, while standing at the foot of the stairway, fired a shot
from his revolver which wounded Perfecta Buralo, the bullet passing
through a part of her neck, having entered the posterior region thereof and
coming out through the left eye, which was completely destroyed. Due to
proper medical attention, Perfecta Buralo did not die and is on e of the
witnesses who testified at the trial of this case.
The defense, without abandoning its allegation that the accused is not
responsible for the crime, contends that the crime proven is not frustrated
murder but the discharge of a firearm, with injuries, it not having been
proven that it was the accused's intention to kill.
The relations existing between the accused and Juana Buralo, his
disappointment at her not accepting his invitation to take a walk, the fact that
the accused, revolver in hand, went to look for Juana Buralo at the house
where the devotion was being held, later following her to her house, and
especially having aimed at her person--the head--are facts which, in our
opinion, permit of no other conclusion than that, in firing the shot, it was the
accused's intention to kill.
In the decision of this court in the case of United States vs. Montenegro (15
Phil., 1), it was held:
We do not doubt that there may be cases wherein the discharge of a firearm
at another is not in itselfsufficient to sustain a finding of the intention to kill,
and there are many cases in the books wherein the attendant circumstances
conclusively establish that on discharging a firearm at another the actor was
not in fact animated by the intent to kill. But, in seeking to ascertain the
intention with which a specific act is committed, it is always proper and
necessary to look not merely to the act itself but to all the attendant
circumstances so far as they are developed by the evidence; and where, as in
the case at bar, a revolver is twice discharged point-blank at the body of

another, and the shots directed at the most vital parts of the body, it needs
but little additional evidence to establish the intent to kill beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The fact that a person received the shot which was intended for another, does
not alter his criminal liability. (Art. 1, par. 3, Penal Code.)
The circumstances qualifying the murder alleged in the complaint are
evidence premeditation and treachery. Even when there is sufficient proof of
premeditation (which we do not believe has been sufficiently established),
yet, it cannot be considered as a qualifying circumstance in the present case,
because the person whom the accused intended to kill was not Perfecta
Buralo, who was hit by the bullet, but her aunt Juana Buralo. Had evident
premeditation been proven, and there being no other qualifying circumstance
of frustrated murder present in this case, the acts should be held to be
frustrated homicide and punished with the maximum degree of the penalty
prescribed by law. (Question 2, p. 28, 1890 ed., Viada's Penal Code.) But,
the fact is that treachery was proven and must be taken into consideration in
this case, because the accused fired at Perfecta Buralo, employing means
which tended to insure the execution of the crime without running any risk
himself from anyone who might attempt to defend the said offended party.
The treachery which, according to the evidence, would have attended the
crime had the bullet hit Juana Buralo was present in this case because the
offended party Perfecta Buralo and Juana were going upstairs with their
backs towards the accused when he fired his revolver. The Supreme Court of
Spain, in a decision of May 7, 1885 (Viada, do., pp. 29, 30), in holding a
crime to be murder and not homicide, stated the following:
Considering that, according to the concept of treachery as it is explained in
article 10 of the Civil code dealing with said circumstance, it is evident that
in firing the gun which Alejandro Sola was carrying which caused the death
of Nazario Iigo, he employed means which tended to insure the
commission of the crime without any risk to himself arising from any
defense that might be made by the offended party, for neither the wounded
party Bartolome Lobejano, at whom the shot was aimed in order to kill him
so that he might not testify as to the assault committed upon him shortly
before, as held by the trial court, was not in a position to defend himself in
any way, nor could Nazario Iigo become aware of any attack so unjustified,
rapid and unforeseen; considering, further, that the purely accidental
circumstance that as a result of the shot a person other than the one intended
was killed, does not modify, in the instant case, the elements constituting the
crime of murder qualified by the treachery with which Alejandro Sola acted,
whether with respect to the wounded Bartolome Lobejano or to the deceased
Nazario Iigo, for which reason the rules of article 65 are not applicable
herein, the culprit not having, in fact, committed a crime different from that
which he intended, taking into consideration the substantial and intrinsical
meaning thereof, etc.
Although the case just cited refers to the crime of consummated murder, the
doctrine sustained therein is applicable to the case at bar so far as the
concurrence of treachery as a qualifying circumstance is concerned.
The crime now before us is frustrated murder, the accused having intended
to kill and performed all the acts of execution, which would have produced

the crime of murder but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of his will. (Art. 3, Penal Code.)
We find no merit in the first assignment of error.
In regard to the second, it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts
enumerated above constitute the crime of frustrated murder.
With the exception of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, we find no
other aggravating circumstance.
The judgment appealed from being in accordance with the law and the facts
proven, the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts costs against the
appellant. So ordered.
31. People vs. Cagoco
32. Intod v. CA
G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992
Lessons Applicable:
Laws Applicable:
FACTS:
February 4, 1979: Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and
Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house and asked him to go
with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, they had a
meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he wanted
Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that
Mandaya should accompany them. Otherwise, he would also be killed.
February 4, 1979 10:00 pm: All of them armed arrived at Palangpangan's
house and fired at Palangpangan's bedroom but there was no one in the
room.
RTC: convicted Intod of attempted murder based on the testimony of the
witness
ISSUE: W/N Intod is guilty attempted murder since it is an impossible crime
under Art. 4 (2)
HELD: YES. petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent
Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby
MODIFIED. sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay
the costs
Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. Criminal Responsibility
shall be incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against
persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night

he and his companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently
impossible.
The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in
the offender his formidability to punish criminal tendencies in Art. 4(2)
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed,
would not amount to a crime
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where
1. the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of
the law
2. there is intention to perform the physical act
3. there is a performance of the intended physical act
4. the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a
crime
o Ex: The impossibility of killing a person already dead
Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to
the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended
crime this case
o Ex: man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the
intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty
United States: where the offense sought to be committed is factually
impossible or accomplishment - attempt to commit a crime; legally
impossible of accomplishment - cannot be held liable for any crime
33. People v. Domasian
G.R. No. 95322 March 1, 1993
Lessons Applicable:
Laws Applicable: Art. 4
FACTS:
March 11, 1982 morning: While Enrico was walking with Tirso Ferreras,
his classmate, along Roque street in the poblacion of Lopez, Quezon, he was
approached by Pablito Domasian who requested his assistance in getting his
father's signature on a medical certificate. Enrico agreed to help and rode
with the man in a tricycle to Calantipayan, where he waited outside while
the man went into a building to get the certificate. Enrico became
apprehensive and started to cry when, instead of taking him to the hospital,
the man flagged a minibus and forced him inside, holding him firmly all the
while. The man told him to stop crying or he would not be returned to his
father. When they alighted at Gumaca, they took another tricycle, this time
bound for the municipal building from where they walked to the market.
Here the man talked to a jeepney driver and handed him an envelope
addressed to Dr. Enrique Agra, the boy's father. The two then boarded a
tricycle headed for San Vicente. As Enrico was crying and being firmly
held, Alexander Grate, the tricycle driver became suspicious and asked
Domasian about his relationship with the boy who told him they were
brothers. Their physical differences and the wide gap between their ages
made Grate doubt so he immediately reported the matter to two barangay
tanods when his passengers alighted from the tricycle. Grate and the tanods
went after the two and saw the man dragging the boy. Noticing that they

were being pursued, Domasian was able to escape, leaving Enrico behind.
Enrico was on his way home in a passenger jeep when he met his parents,
who were riding in the hospital ambulance and already looking for him.
At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's return, Agra
received an envelope containing a ransom note. The note demanded P1
million for the release of Enrico and warned that otherwise the boy would be
killed. Agra thought the handwriting in the note was familiar. After
comparing it with some records in the hospital, he gave the note to the
police, which referred it to the NBI for examination
March 11, 1982 1:45 pm: Agra received an envelope containing a ransom
note demanding P1 million otherwise Enrico will be killed. . Agra thought
the handwriting in the note was familiar so he referred it to the NBI for
examination and it turned out to be Dr. Samson Tans signature.
Domasian and Tan were subsequently charged with the crime of
kidnapping with serious illegal detention in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon
o Domasians alibi: at the time of the incident he was watching a mahjong
game in a friend's house and later went to an optical clinic with his wife for
the refraction of his eyeglasses
o Dr. Tans alibi: he was in Manila
Enrico, Tirso Ferreras and Grate all pointed Domasian.
RTC: Domasian and Tan guilty as charged and sentenced them to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and all accessory penalties
Appealed
ISSUE: W/N Domasian and Tan is guilty of kidnapping kidnapping with
serious illegal detention
HELD: YES. appealed decision is AFFIRMED
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention may consist not only
in placing a person in an enclosure but also in detaining him or depriving
him in any manner of his liberty
Tan claims that the lower court erred in not finding that the sending of
the ransom note was an impossible crime which he says is not punishable.
Tan conveniently forgets the first paragraphs of the same article, which
clearly applies to him, thus:
Art. 4. Criminal liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended.
Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping with
serious illegal detention had already been committed. The act cannot be
considered an impossible crime because there was no inherent improbability
of its accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or ineffective
means. The sending of the ransom note would have had the effect only of
increasing the penalty to death under the last paragraph of Article 267
although this too would not have been possible under the new Constitution.
On the issue of conspiracy, we note first that it exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and

decide to commit it, whether they act through physical volition of one or all,
proceeding severally or collectively. These acts were complementary to each
other and geared toward the attainment of the common ultimate objective,
viz., to extort the ransom of P1 million in exchange for Enrico's life.
The motive for the offense is not difficult to discover. According to Agra,
Tan approached him 6 days before the incident happened and requested a
loan of at least P15,000.00. Agra said he had no funds at that moment and
Tan did not believe him, angrily saying that Agra could even raise a million
pesos if he really wanted to help.
34. G.R. No. 162540
July 13, 2009
GEMMA T. JACINTO,
Petitionervs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent PERALTA,
A petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto
seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appealsaffirming
petitioner's conviction of the crime of Qualified Theft, and its Resolution
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Facts:
Baby Aquino handed petitioner Gemma Jacinto a Banco De Oro (BDO)
Check in the amount of P10,000.00. The check was payment for Baby
Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and petitioner was then the
collector of Mega Foam. Somehow, the check was deposited in the Land
Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle; the
latter is the sister of petitioner and the former pricing, merchandising and
inventory clerk of Mega Foam. Later, Rowena Ricablanca, another
employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from an employee of
Land Bank, who was looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call
was to inform Capitle that the subject BDO check deposited in his account
had been dishonored. Ricablanca then called and relayed the message
through accused Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega Foam,
because the Capitles did not have a phone; but they could be reached
through Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee of Jacqueline Capitle
at Mega Foam. Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from
Baby Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquino to replace the
check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and
divide it equally into four: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and
Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega Foam's accountant,
reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.
Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to
confirm that the latter indeed handed petitioner a BDO check for P10,000.00
as payment for her purchases from Mega Foam. Baby Aquino further
testified that petitioner Jacinto also called her on the phone to tell her that
the BDO check bounced. Verification from company records showed that
petitioner never remitted the subject check to Mega Foam. However, Baby
Aquino said that she had already paid Mega Foam P10,000.00 cash as
replacement for the dishonored check. Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the

National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an entrapment

operation with its agents. Ten pieces of P1,000.00 bills provided by
Dyhengco were marked and dusted with fluorescent powder by the
NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given to Ricablanca, who was tasked to
pretend that she was going along with Valencia's plan. Ricablanca,
petitioner, her husband, and Valencia then boarded petitioner's jeep and went
on to Baby Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca alighted from the jeep and
entered the premises of Baby Aquino, pretending that she was getting cash
from Baby Aquino. However, the cash she actually brought out from the
premises was theP10,000.00 marked money previously given to her by
Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the money and upon returning to the jeep,
gave P5,000.00 each to Valencia and petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner and
Valencia were arrested by NBI agents, who had been watching the whole
time. A case was filed against the three accused, Jacinto, Valencia and
Capitle. RTC rendered its Decision finding them
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT
and sentenced each imprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS, FIVE
(5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS, as minimum
, to SIX(6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS,
as maximum.The three appealed to the CA and the decision of the trial
court was MODIFIED, in that:(a) the sentence against accused Gemma
Jacinto stands; (b) the sentence against accused Anita Valencia is reduced to
4 months arresto mayor medium, and (c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is
acquitted. Hence, the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari filed by petitioner alone,
Issue:
Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft.
Held:
As may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal
Code, the personal property subject of the theft must have some value,
as the intention of the accused is to gain from the thing stolen
. This is further bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides that the
penalty to be imposed on the accused is dependent on the value of the thing
stolen. In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging
to Mega Foam, but the same was apparently without value, as it was
subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether the crime of
qualified theft was actually produced. The Court must resolve the issue
in the negative.
Intod v. Court of Appeals
is highly instructive and applicable to the present case. In
Intod (see doctrines laid out in Intod)
, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual
impossibility,i.e., a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the
intention to steal the latter's wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is
empty. Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of
factual impossibility given in Intod. In this case, petitioner performed all the
acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against

property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act

of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to
gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced,
she would have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully
hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check
being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the
crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned
out to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored,
and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of
said dishonored check. The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving
the P5,000.00 marked money, which she thought was the cash replacement
for the dishonored check, is of no moment. The Court held in
Valenzuela v. People that under the definition of theft in Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code there is only one operative act of execution by the actor
involved in theft the taking of personal property of another.
As of the time that petitioner took possession of the check meant for
Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of
theft, had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this case
. Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino to give cash as replacement
for the check was hatched only after the check had been dishonored by the
drawee bank .Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's
act of receiving the cash replacement should not be considered as a
continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that petitioner was caught
receiving the marked money was merely corroborating evidence to
strengthen proof of her intent to gain. Moreover, the fact that petitioner
further planned to have the dishonored check replaced with cash by its issuer
is a different and separate fraudulent scheme. Unfortunately, since said
scheme was not included or covered by the allegations in the Information,
the Court cannot pronounce judgment on the accused; otherwise, it would
violate the due process clause of the Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent
scheme could have been another possible source of criminal liability.IN
VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals, are MODIFIED.Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is
found GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as defined and penalized in
Articles 4,paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code,
respectively. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six(6) months of
arrresto mayor , and to pay the costs.
35. People vs Trinidad
Facts:
Trinidad is accused of 2 counts of murder & 1 count frustrated murder.
Accused is a member of INP in Nasipit. Crime occurred in Butuan between
El Rio & Agfa while they were in a fierra bound for Davao. Trinidad shot &
killed Soriano & Laron while he shot and injured Tan.
Issue:
Whether or not conviction is proper?

Held:
The Court affirmed. Trinidad is convicted of murder and attempted murder.
Trinidads alibi is weak and overridden by Tan and Commendadors
positive identification. Though some discrepancies in testimonies are found,
these are trivial. Distance between Trinidad & the 2 deceased is immaterial.
What is important is that he shot them. Tanhas seen no ill motive to
falsifiable testify against Trinidad. It is attempted and not frustrated murder
because he failed to execute all acts due to the moving vehicle because it
shielded Tans body. Moreover, his wound was not fatal thus not sufficient
tocause death (People v. Pilones)

Philippines
vs.
169
SCRA
51
Facts:
1989
accused
of
2
counts
&
1
count
of
murder
frustrated
Accused
is
murder.
a
Nasipit.
Crime
occurred
between
El
in
Rio
Butuan
&
Agfa
while
they
bound
Trinidad
for
shot
Davao.
&
killed
Laron
Soriano
while
he
&
and
shot
injured
Tan.
not
conviction
is
Held:
proper?
affirmed.
Trinidad
murder
is
convicted
and
of
Though
discrepancies
testimonies
are
in
found,
trivial.
these
Distance
are
deceased
immaterial.
is
What
that
important
he
shot
them.
is
Tan
has
to
testify
falsifiable
against
Trinidad.
It
and
is
he
execute
failed
all
acts
due
moving
to
vehicle
the
because
it
body.
his
wound
Moreover,
was
not
fatal
sufficient
thus
to
not
cause
Pilones)
attempted
Trinidads
murder.
overridden
by
Tan
Commendadors
identification.
positive
Facts:
accused
counts
of
of
murder
2
&
frustrated
1
count
murder.
Accused
is
a
Nasipit.
occurred
Crime
in
Butuan
between
Agfa
while
El
they
Rio
&
bound
for
Davao.
Trinidad
killed
Soriano
shot
&
&
Laron
shot
while
he
and
injured
Tan.
36. People vs Velasco

37. People vs Pancho

38. People vs Lamahang

Facts: Aurelio Lamahang was caught opening with an iron bar a wall of a
store of cheap goods in Fuentes St. Iloilo. He broke one board and was
unfastening another when a patrolling police caught him. Owners of the
store were sleeping inside store as it was early dawn. Convicted of attempt
of robbery.
Issue: WON crime is attempted robbery?
Held: No. Attempted trespass to dwelling. Attempt should have logical
relation to a particular and concrete offense which would lead directly to
consummation. Necessary to establish unavoidable connection & logical &
natural relation of cause and effect. Important to show clear intent to commit
crime. In case at bar, we can only infer that his intent was to enter by force,
other inferences are not justified by facts. Groizard: infer only from nature of
acts executed. Acts susceptible of double interpretation cant furnish ground
for themselves. Mind should not directly infer intent. Spain SC: necessary
that objectives established or acts themselves obviously disclose criminal
objective.
39. Valenzuela vs. People
G.R. No. 160188. June 21, 2007
FACTS:
While a security guard was manning his post at the open parking area of a
supermarket, he saw the accused, Aristotel Valenzuela, hauling a push cart
loaded with cases of detergent and unloaded them where his co-accused,
Jovy Calderon, was waiting. Valenzuela then returned inside the
supermarket, and later emerged with more cartons of detergent. Thereafter,
Valenzuela hailed a taxi and started loading the cartons inside. As the taxi
was about to leave, the security guard asked Valenzuela for the receipt of the

merchandize. The accused reacted by fleeing on foot, but were subsequently

apprehended at the scene. The trial court convicted both Valenzuela and
Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. Valenzuela appealed before the
Court of Appeals, arguing that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft
since he was not able to freely dispose of the articles stolen. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision, thus the Petition for Review was
filed before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of theft has a frustrated stage.
HELD:
No. Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a felony is
consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present. In the crime of theft, the following elements
should be present: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said
property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain;
(4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the
taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation
of persons or force upon things. The Court held that theft is produced when
there is deprivation of personal property by one with intent to gain. Thus, it
is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely dispose the
property stolen since he has already committed all the acts of execution and
the deprivation from the owner has already ensued from such acts.
Therefore, theft cannot have a frustrated stage, and can only be attempted or
consummated.
40. People vs Eria
Facts: Julian Eria charged of raping 3 yrs & 11 mo. old child. Doubt on
whether actual penetration occurred. Physical exam showed slight
inflammation of exterior parts of organ indicating effort to enter vagina.
Mom found childs organ covered with sticky substance
Issue: WON crime is consummated?
Held: No. Frustrated only
1.
Possible for mans organ to enter labia of a 3 years and 8 months old
child (Kennedy v. State)
2.
No conclusive evidence of penetration so give accused benefit of the
doubt. Frustrated.
41. People v. Orita
G.R. No. 88724 April 3, 1990
FACTS:
March 20, 1983 Early Morning: Cristina S. Abayan, 19-year old
freshman student at the St. Joseph's College, arrived at her boarding house
after her classmates brought her home from a party. She knocked at the door

of her boarding house when a frequent visitor of another boarder held her
and poked a knife to her neck. Despite pleading for her release, he ordered
her to go upstairs with him. Since the door which led to the 1st floor was
locked from the inside, they used the back door to the second floor. With his
left arm wrapped around her neck and his right hand poking a "balisong" to
her neck, he dragged her up the stairs. When they reached the second floor,
he commanded herwith the knife poked at her neck, to look for a room. They
entered Abayan's room. He then pushed her hitting her head on the wall.
With one hand holding the knife, he undressed himself. He then ordered her
to take off her clothes. Scared, she took off her T-shirt, bra, pants and panty.
He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He made her
hold his penis and insert it in her vagina. Still poked with a knife, she did as
told but since she kept moving, only a portion of his penis entered her. He
then laid down on his back and commanded her to mount him. Still only a
small part of his penis was inserted into her vagina. When he had both his
hands flat on the floor. She dashed out to the next room and locked herself
in. When he pursued her and climbed the partition, she ran to another room
then another then she jumped out through a window.
Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, 18 meters in front of the
boarding house and knocked on the door. When there was no answer, she ran
around the building and knocked on the back door. When the policemen
who were inside the building opened the door, they found her naked sitting
on the stairs crying. Pat. Donceras, took off his jacket and wrapped it around
her. Pat. Donceras and two other policemen rushed to the boarding house
where they heard and saw somebody running away but failed to apprehend
him due to darkness. She was taken to Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital
where she was physically examined.
Her vulva had no abrasions or discharges.
RTC: frustrated rape
ISSUE: W/N there is frustrated rape.
HELD: NO. RTC MODIFIED. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the
victim in the amount of P30,000
Correlating Art. 335 and Art. 6, there is no debate that the attempted and
consummated stages apply to the crime of rape.
Requisites of a frustrated felony are:
o (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony
o (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the
perpetrator's will
attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a
foreign force or agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to
the moment when he has performed all of the acts which should produce the
crime as a consequence, which acts it is his intention to perform
o If he has performed all of the acts which should result in the
consummation of the crime and voluntarily desists from proceeding further,
it can not be an attempt.

 in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge
of his victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all
the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished. Any
penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the
labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration
of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is
attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ
The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted
even on the sole basis of the victim's testimony if credible. Dr. Zamora did
not rule out penetration of the genital organ of the victim.
42. People v Campuhan 2000Facts:
On 25 April 1996, at around 4p.m., Ma. Corazon Pamintuhan, the mother of
four year old Crysthel Pamintuhan, went down to the second floor of their
house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her two children. At the ground
floor, she met Primo who was then filling smallplastic bags with water to be
frozen into ice in the freezer located atthe second floor; Primo was the helper
of Corazons brother; As Corazon was busy preparing the drinks, she heard
one of her daughters cry Ayoko, ayoko! prompting Corazon to rush
upstairs;
Thereupon, she saw Primo inside her childrens room kneeling before
Chrysthel whose pajamas or jogging pants and panty were
already removed, while his short pants were down to his knees;
According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into
Chrysthels vagina;
She cursed and boxed the accused several times; He evaded and pulled up
his pants; he pushed her when she tried to block his path; Corazon then run
out for help; Her brother, cousin and an uncle chased Primo and eventually
held him at the back of their compound until they decided to turn him over
to the barangay officials; Physical examination of the victim yielded
negative results: No evident sign of extra genital physical injury was noted
by the medico-legal officer; Chrysthels hymen was intact and her its
orifice was only 0.5cm in diameter;
In Primos defence, he maintained his innocence
. He assailed the charge as a mere scheme of Corazon who allegedly bore an
ill will against him for his refusal to run an errand. He says Chrysthel was in
a playing mood and wanted to ride his back when she suddenly pulled him
down causing both of them fall to the floor. it was in this fallen position
when Corazon chance upon them The trial court convicted the accused of
statutory rape, sentenced him the penalty of death.
ISSUE: W/N it was a consummated statutory rape
HELD: NO. MODIFIED. guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to
an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years four (4) months and ten (10)
days of prision mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten (10)
months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum.

Costs de oficio.
People v. De la Pea: labia majora must be entered for rape to be
consummated
Primo's kneeling position rendered an unbridled observation impossible
Crysthel made a categorical statement denying penetration but her
vocabulary is yet as underdeveloped
Corazon narrated that Primo had to hold his penis with his right hand,
thus showing that he had yet to attain an erection to be able to penetrate his
victim
the possibility of Primo's penis having breached Crysthel's vagina is
belied by the child's own assertion that she resisted Primo's advances by
putting her legs close together and that she did not feel any intense pain but
just felt "not happy" about what Primo did to her. Thus, she only shouted
"Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko, aray ko!
no medical basis to hold that there was sexual contact between the
accused and the victim
43. People vs. Gutierrez
G.R. No. 188602, February 4, 2010
Murder, Self-defense
Facts:
On August 15, 2003, five (5) separate Informations for murder,
frustrated murder and three (3) counts of attempted murder were filed
against appellant.
When arraigned, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, entered
a plea of not guilty to the charges. Trial on the merits then ensued.
Not finding credence in appellant's claim of self-defense, the RTC convicted
him of murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder on three (3) counts.
Appellant assails the trial court and the CA for giving credence to the
prosecutions evidence. He admits having killed Regis and wounding Dalit,
but insists that he did so in self-defense.
Issue: Did the accused act in self-defense?
Ruling: No. Self-defense is an affirmative allegation and offers exculpation
from liability for crimes only if satisfactorily proved. It requires (a) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means
employed by the accused to repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on
his part.
In People of the Philippines v. Bienvenido Mara, we explained:
One who admits killing or fatally injuring another in the name of self-

defense bears the burden of proving: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
claiming self-defense. By invoking self-defense, the burden is placed on the
accused to prove its elements clearly and convincingly. While all three
elements must concur, self-defense relies first and foremost on proof of
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression is
proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded.
In this case, appellant utterly failed to discharge the burden of proving
unlawful aggression. His version of the events was uncorroborated, and his
testimony was found to be less credible by the trial court. On the other hand,
the surviving victims were unanimous that appellant suddenly fired at them,
without any provocation on their part. The credibility of the prosecution
witnesses had been weighed by the trial court, and it found their testimonies
to be more convincing. As a rule, the appellate court gives full weight and
respect to the determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses,
since the trial judge has the best opportunity to observe their demeanor.
While this rule admits of exceptions, none of such exceptions obtains in this
case.
In Razon v. People, we held:
Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by
independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by
itself. Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted and
the accused claiming self-defense must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.
The trial court and the CA cannot, therefore, be faulted for rejecting
appellants plea of self-defense.
This Court also agrees with the trial court in appreciating treachery as a
qualifying circumstance. The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack by the aggressor on unsuspecting victims, depriving the
latter of any real chance to defend themselves, thereby ensuring its
commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest
provocation on the part of the victims.
The pieces of evidence gleaned by the trial court, the facts, are enough to
show that treachery was employed by appellant. The attack was sudden, as
testified to by the witnesses, and unexpected. Provocation on the part of the
victims was not proven, and appellants testimony that the victims were
about to attack him cannot be given credence. The victims had no inkling
that an attack was forthcoming and had no opportunity to mount a defense.
Thus, treachery was correctly appreciated as a circumstance to qualify the
crime to murder.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, the

penalty imposed for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death.

There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposed
on appellant is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 223 of
the RPC. The prison term imposed by the trial court in Criminal Case No.
03-3639 is correct.
We also affirm the CA ruling that appellant is guilty of attempted murder,
not of frustrated murder, in Criminal Case No. 03-3640 for the injury
sustained by Dalit. No convincing proof was offered to show that the wound
inflicted on Dalit was fatal and would have caused his death had medical
help not been provided. It is well settled that where the wounds inflicted on
the victim are not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted
murder, as the accused had not performed all the acts of execution that
would have brought about the victim's death.

Philippines
vs.
169
SCRA
51
Facts:
1989
2testimonies
counts
of
murder
&
1
murder.
count
Accused
is
a
Nasipit.
occurred
Crime
in
Butuan
Agfa
while
El
they
Rio
&
bound
for
Davao.
Soriano
&
shot
Laron
&wound
killed
while
injured
he
shot
Tan.
conviction
ishas
Held:
proper?
Trinidad
is
convicted
of
murder
and
murder.
Trinidads
overridden
and
Commendadors
by
Tan
identification.
positive
Though
in
found,
these
are
are
trivial.
between
Distance
deceased
is
immaterial.
important
is
What
that
he
isall
shot
them.
Tan
falsifiable
against
Trinidad.
testify
It
is
attempted
frustrated
and
not
failed
to
execute
acts
moving
due
vehicle
to
the
because
it
Moreover,
was
not
fatal
his
thus
cause
not
sufficient
to
Pilones)