Acquisitive Prescription (Ordinary Or Extraordinary)

Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring (or losing)

ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in
the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely,
that the possession should be in the concept of an owner,
public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse.
Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in
good faith and with just title for 10 years. Without good faith
and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be
extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted
adverse possession for 30 years.
Thus, for ordinary acquisitive prescription to set in,
possession must be for at least 10 years, in good faith and
with just title.
Possession is "in good faith" when there is a reasonable
belief that the person from whom the thing is received has
been the owner thereof and could thereby transmit his
ownership.
There is "just title" when the adverse claimant comes into
possession of the property through any of the modes
recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other
real rights, but the grantor is neither the owner nor in a
position to transmit the right.
[Spouses Aguirre vs Villanueva, G.R. No. 169898, October
27, 2006]

Indefeasibility Of Torrens Title

Statutory Basis
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, provides:
Sec. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent
purchaser for value. The decree of registration shall not
be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or
other disability of any person adversely, affected thereby,
nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person,
including the government and the branches thereof,
deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such
adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud,
to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for
reopening and review of the decree of registration not later
than one year from and after the date of the entry of such
decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be
entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for
value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose
rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase innocent
purchaser for value or an equivalent phrase occurs in this
Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee,
mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Character of Indefeasibility attaches to

Certificate Title issued under Administrative
Proceeding
An original certificate of title issued by the Register of
Deeds under an administrative proceeding is as
indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under judicial
proceedings. [see Datu Sampaco substituted by
Macabando vs Lantud, G.R. No. 163551, July 18, 2011
citing Ybaez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
68291, March 6, 1991]

Character of Indefeasibility attaches to Title

issued under a Grant of Land Patent

Once a patent is registered and the corresponding

certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of
public domain and becomes private property over which the
Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction. A
public land patent, when registered in the corresponding
Register of Deeds, is a veritable Torrens title, and becomes
as indefeasible upon the expiration of one (1) year from the
date of issuance thereof. Said title, like one issued pursuant
to a judicial decree, is subject to review within one (1) year
from the date of the issuance of the patent. This rule is
embodied in Section 103 of PD 1529, which provides that:
Section 103. Certificates of title pursuant to patents.
Whenever public land is by the Government alienated,
granted or conveyed to any person, the same shall be
brought forthwith under the operation of this Decree. x x
x After due registration and issuance of the certificate of
title, such land shall be deemed to be registered land to all
intents and purposes under this Decree.
[see Wee vs Mardo, G.R. No. 202414, June 4, 2014,
citing Republic vs. Umali, G.R. No. 80687, April 10,
1989]

Indefeasibility of Title does not apply to Titles

secure by Fraud and Misrepresentation
However, the Court has ruled that indefeasibility of title
does not attach to titles secured by fraud and
misrepresentation. [Datu Sampaco substituted by
Macabando vs Lantud, G.R. No. 163551, July 18, 2011
citing Republic v. Mangotara, G.R. No. 170375, July 7,
2010]
The indefeasibility of titles under the Torrens System could
be claimed only if a previous valid title to the same parcel of
land does not exist. Where issuance of the title was
attended by fraud, the same cannot vest in the titled owner
any valid legal title to the land covered by it; and the person
in whose name the title was issued cannot transmit the
same, for he has no true title thereto. This ruling is a mere
affirmation of the recognized principle that a certificate is
not conclusive evidence of title if it is shown that the same
land had already been registered and an earlier certificate
for the same land is in existence. [Register of Deeds vs
Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. L-17641, January 30,
1965]

Effect of Indefeasibility Certificate of Title

not subject to Collateral Attack
An application for registration of a parcel of land already
covered by a Torrens title is actually a collateral attack, not
permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens
title. [Wee vs Mardo, G.R. No. 202414, June 4, 2014
citing Carvajal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 98328,
October 9, 1997]
A Torrens title is irrevocable and its validity can only be
challenged in a direct proceeding. The purpose of adopting
a Torrens System in our jurisdiction is to guarantee the
integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once
the claim of ownership is established and recognized. This
is to avoid any possible conflicts of title that may arise by
giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the
Torrens title and dispense with the need of inquiring further
as to the ownership of the property. Hence, a Torrens
certificate of title is indefeasible and binding upon the whole
world unless it is nullified by a court of competent
jurisdiction in a direct proceeding for cancellation of
title. [Cagatao vs. Almonte, G.R. No. 174004 October 9,

2013]

Remedy is to file a Separate Action to Recover

the Property (Action for Reconveyance)
Registration, however, does not deprive an aggrieved party
of a remedy in law. What cannot be collaterally attacked is
the certificate of title and not the title or ownership which is
represented by such certificate. Ownership is different from
a certificate of title. The fact that a person was able to
secure a title in his name did not operate to vest ownership
upon him of the subject land. Registration of a piece of land
under the Torrens System does not create or vest title,
because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A
certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title
over the particular property described therein. It cannot be
used to protect a usurper from the true owner; nor can it be
used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither does it
permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others. Its
issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose
the possibility that the real property may be co-owned with
persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held
in trust for another person by the registered owner.
The remedy [is] to file a separate proceeding, [i.e.]
an action for specific performance [and/or] an action for
reconveyance of the property. [One] can also file an action
for rescission.
Reconveyance is based on Section 55 of Act No. 496, as
amended by Act No. 3322, which states that in all cases of
registration procured by fraud the owner may pursue all his
legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such
fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights of any
innocent holder for value of a certificate of title. It is an
actionin personam available to a person whose property
has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in
anothers name. It does not seek to set aside the decree
but, respecting it as incontrovertible and no longer open to
review, seeks to transfer or reconvey the land from the
registered owner to the rightful owner. Reconveyance is
always available as long as the property has not passed to
an innocent third person for value
[see Wee vs Mardo, G.R. No. 202414, June 4, 2014]

One year prescriptive period does not apply

when person questioning title is in
possession of the property (Quieting of Title)
The one-year prescriptive period, however, does not apply
when the person seeking annulment of title or
reconveyance is in possession of the lot. This is because
the action partakes of a suit to quiet title which is
imprescriptible. In David v. Malay, we held that a person in
actual possession of a piece of land under claim of
ownership may wait until his possession is disturbed or his
title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right,
and his undisturbed possession gives him the continuing
right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party
and its effect on his title. [Datu Sampaco substituted by
Macabando vs Lantud, G.R. No. 163551, July 18, 2011]

Certificate Of Title, Best Evidence Of Ownership

The Torrens title is conclusive evidence with respect to the
ownership of the land described therein, and other matters
which can be litigated and decided in land registration
proceedings.

Tax declarations and tax receipts cannot prevail over a

certificate of title which is an incontrovertible proof of
ownership. An original certificate of title issued by the
Register of Deeds under an administrative proceeding is as
indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under judicial
proceedings.
However, indefeasibility of title does not attach to titles
secured by fraud and misrepresentation.
A Torrens title has three attributes:
1.
a Torrens title is the best evidence of ownership
over registered land and, unless annulled in an
appropriate proceeding, the title is conclusive on the
issue of ownership;
2.
a Torrens title is incontrovertible and indefeasible
upon the expiration of one year from the date of the
entry of the decree of registration; and
3.
a Torrens title is not subject to collateral attack.
[Macabando vs Lantud, G.R. No. 163551, July 18, 2011]
However, it is worth pointing out that what cannot be
collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title
itself. The certificate referred to is that document issued by
the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the
title referred to by law means ownership which is, more
often than not, represented by that document. Title as a
concept of ownership should not be confused with the
certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although
both are interchangeably used.
[Lacbayan vs Samoy, G.R. No. 165427, March 21, 2011]

Donation Inter Vivos

Donation inter vivos
Whether a donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends
upon the nature of the disposition made. 'Did the donor
intend to transfer the ownership of the property donated
upon the execution of the donation? If this is so, as
reflected from the provisions contained in the donation, then
it is inter vivos; otherwise, it is merely mortis causa, or
made to take effect after death [Reyes vs. Mosqueda,
G.R. No. 45262, July 23, 1990]

Terms of the deed, not the caption, are

controlling
It is a rule consistently followed by the courts that it is the
body of the document of donation and the statements
contained therein, and not the title that should be
considered in ascertaining the intention of the
donor. [Concepcion v. Concepcion, G.R. No. L-4225,
August 25, 1952]
Neither the designation mortis causa, nor the provision that
a donation is "to take effect at the death of the donor", is a
controlling criterion in defining the true nature of
donations [Laureta vs. Mata, G.R. No. 19740, March 22,
1923]
That the document is captioned "Donation Mortis Causa" is
not controlling. If a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this
character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it
[as] mortis causa. [Del Rosario vs. Ferrer, G.R. No.
187056, September 20, 2010]
In Laureta vs. Mata [G.R. No. 19740, March 22, 1923] the
donation was being made as a reward for services
rendered and being rendered, and as a token of affection
for the donee; the phrase 'mortis causa' was used; the
donee to take possession of the property donated only after

the death of the donor; the donee was under obligation to

defray the expenses incident to the celebration of the
anniversary of the donor's death, including church fees. The
donation in both cases were duly accepted. In said case,
the Court held that the donation was in praesenti and not a
gift in futuro." In other words,the donation was made in
consideration not of the death of the donor but of the
affection to the donee. The donation was inter vivos and
not mortis causa. The conditions imposed did not argue
against the nature of the donation
Similarly, in Reyes vs Mosqueda [G.R. Nos. 45262, July
23, 1990], the Court ruled that the so-called 'donation
Mortis causa' is really a donation inter vivos. The donation
was executed by the donor in favor of his sister out of love
and affection as well as a recognition of the personal
services rendered by the donee to the donor. The transfer
of ownership over the properties donated to the donee was
immediate and independent of the death of the donor. The
provision as regards the reservation of properties for the
donor's subsistence in relation to the other provisions of the
deed of donation confirms the intention of the donor to give
naked ownership of the properties to the donee immediately
after the execution of the deed of donation.

Irrevocability
In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 106755,
February 1, 2002] the Court held that "irrevocability" is a
quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of
conveyances mortis causa, where "revocability" is precisely
the essence of the act.
Reservations made by donor that do not negate
irrevocable character

Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by

the surviving spouse." The intent to make the donation
irrevocable becomes even clearer by the proviso that a
surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the
donation. Consequently, the donation was treated as a
donation inter vivos.
In Gestopa v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 111904,
October 5, 2000] the Court held that the prohibition to
alienate does not necessarily defeat the inter vivos
character of the donation. It even highlights the fact that
what remains with the donor is the right of usufruct and no
longer the naked title of ownership over the property
donated.
In Cuevas v. Cuevas [G.R. No. L-8327, December 14,
1955], the donor reserved to herself "the right of
possession, cultivation, harvesting and other rights and
attributes of ownership while I am not deprived of life by the
Almighty". Notwithstanding such reservation, the Court held
that the decisive proof that the donation is operative inter
vivos lies in a subsequent phrase in the deed to the effect
that the donor will not dispose or take away the property
"because I reserve it for him (the donee) when I die." By
these words the donor expressly renounced the right to
freely dispose of the property in favor of another (a right
essential to full ownership) and manifested the irrevocability
of the conveyance of the naked title to the property in favor
of the donee. Such irrevocability is characteristic of
donations inter vivos, because it is incompatible with the
idea of a disposition post mortem. The deed was a valid
donation inter vivos, with reservation of beneficial title
during the lifetime of the donor.

Delivery to take effect upon death of donor

In Del Rosario v. Ferrer [G.R. No. 187056, September 20,

2010] the donors reserved the "right, ownership,
possession, and administration of the property" and made
the donation operative upon their death. The court held that
such reservation (reddendum) in the context of an
irrevocable donation simply means that the donors parted
with their naked title, maintaining only beneficial ownership
of the donated property while they lived. In the said case,
the donors plainly said that it is "our will that this Donation
.

In the case of Joya vs. Tiongco [G.R. No. 47068, April 8,

1941], wherein the donor made the donation of a parcel of
land to the brothers Joya because of her relationship to
them, the donation was held to be inter vivos for the reason
that the death of the donor was not the consideration of the
donation but only a suspensive condition, and that the mere
fact that the property donated was not to be delivered
immediately to the donee but only after death of donor did
render the donation mortis causa

TORRENS TITLE NOT SUBJECT OF PRESCRIPTION

ASUNCION URIETA VDA. DE
AGUILAR, represented by
ORLANDO U. AGUILAR,
Petitioner,
- versus SPOUSES EDERLINA B. ALFARO
and RAUL ALFARO,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 164402

Present:
CORONA, C. J., Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.
Promulgated:
July 5, 2010

It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of indefeasible title to property in favor of the person in whose name the title appears.
It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described therein.[25] It is also settled that the titleholder is entitled
to all the attributes of ownership of the property, including possession. [26] Thus, in Arambulo v. Gungab,[27] this Court declared that the
age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.
[24]

In the present case, there is no dispute that petitioner is the holder of a Torrens title over the entire Lot 83. Respondents have
only their notarized but unregistered Kasulatan sa Bilihan to support their claim of ownership. Thus, even if respondents proof of
ownership has in its favor a juris tantum presumption of authenticity and due execution, the same cannot prevail over
petitioners Torrens title. This has been our consistent ruling which we recently reiterated in Pascual v. Coronel,[28] viz:

Even if we sustain the petitioners arguments and rule that the deeds of sale are valid contracts, it would still
not bolster the petitioners case. In a number of cases, the Court had upheld the registered owners superior right to
possess the property. In Co v. Militar, the Court was confronted with a similar issue of which between the certificate of
title and an unregistered deed of sale should be given more probative weight in resolving the issue of who has the
better right to possess. There, the Court held that the court a quo correctly relied on the transfer certificate of title in
the name of petitioner, as opposed to the unregistered title in the name of respondents. The Court stressed therein
that the Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to
guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and
recognized.
Likewise, in the recent case of Umpoc v. Mercado, the Court declared that the trial court did not err in giving
more probative weight to the TCT in the name of the decedent vis--vis the contested unregistered Deed of
Sale. Later in Arambulo v. Gungab, the Court held that the registered owner is preferred to possess the property
subject of the unlawful detainer case. The age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is
entitled to possession thereof. (Citations omitted.)
As the titleholder, therefore, petitioner is preferred to possess the entire Lot 83. Besides, there are telltale signs which cast
doubt on the genuineness of the Kasulatan. To cite a few:
1.
2.

The date of its execution unbelievably coincides with the date the buyer, Anastacia, died;
Despite its alleged execution on April 17, 1973, respondents brought up the Kasulatan only when petitioner asked
them to vacate the disputed premises. Prior thereto, they neither asserted their rights thereunder nor registered the same
with the proper Registry of Deeds;

3.

The lawyer who notarized the Kasulatan sa Bilihan, as well as the witnesses thereto, was not presented in court;
and,

4.

The District Land Officer who signed OCT No. P-9354 by authority of the President is a public officer who has in his
favor the presumption of regularity in issuing said title.

Torrens certificate of title cannot be the subject of collateral attack.

Moreover, respondents attack on the validity of petitioners title by claiming that their mother became the true owner of the
southern portion of Lot 83 even before the issuance of OCT No. P-9354 constitutes as a collateral attack on said title. It is an attack
incidental to their quest to defend their possession of the property in an accion publiciana, not in a direct action whose main objective is
to impugn the validity of the judgment granting the title. [29] This cannot be allowed. Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, a certificate of title cannot be the subject of collateral attack. Thus:
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
A collateral attack transpires when, in another action to obtain a different relief and as an incident to the present action, an
attack is made against the judgment granting the title. [30] This manner of attack is to be distinguished from a direct attack against a
judgment granting the title, through an action whose main objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such judgment if
not yet implemented, or to seek recovery if the property titled under the judgment had been disposed of. [31] Thus, in Magay v.
Estiandan,[32] therein plaintiff-appellee filed an accion publiciana. In his defense, defendant-appellant alleged among others that plaintiffappellees Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2004 was issued under anomalous circumstances. When the case reached this Court, we
rejected defendant-appellants defense on the ground that the issue on the validity of said title can only be raised in an action expressly
instituted for that purpose. Also, in Co v. Court of Appeals[33] we arrived at the same conclusion and elaborated as follows:
In their reply dated September 1990, petitioners argue that the issues of fraud and ownership raised in their
so-called compulsory counterclaim partake of the nature of an independent complaint which they may pursue for the
purpose of assailing the validity of the transfer certificate of title of private respondents. That theory will not prosper.
While a counterclaim may be filed with a subject matter or for a relief different from those in the basic
complaint in the case, it does not follow that such counterclaim is in the nature of a separate and independent action in
itself. In fact, its allowance in the action is subject to explicit conditions, as above set forth, particularly in its required
relation to the subject matter of opposing partys claim. Failing in that respect, it cannot even be filed and pursued as
an altogether different and original action.
It is evident that the objective of such claim is to nullify the title of private respondents to the property in
question, which thereby challenges the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. This is apparently a
collateral attack which is not permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title. It is well settled that
a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue on the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently
issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Hence, whether or not petitioners have
the right to claim ownership of the land in question is beyond the province of the instant proceeding. That should be
threshed out in a proper action.

G.R. No. 86787 May 8, 1992

MILAGROS TUMULAK BISHOP, JUANA PANGILINAN, EMILIO MAXIMO, ANITA PANGILINAN, MAGDALENA
ROSETE, MANUEL DACUT, RECTO DIESTA, VIRGINIA NOVICIO, and LINDA BONILLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES MANUEL AND JESUSA SALANG, respondents.

On the first ground, the Court notes that the private respondents' title is traceable to an Original Certificate of Title issued
way back in 1910 or eighty-two years ago. That certificate is now incontrovertible and conclusive against the whole world.
The resumption of regularity applies to the issuance of that certificate. This presumption covers the finding that the land
subject of the certificate was private in nature and therefore registrable under the Torrens system.
To sustain an action for annulment of a Torrens certificate for being void ab initio, it must be shown that the registration court
had not acquired jurisdiction over the case and that there was actual fraud in securing the title. 3Neither of these
requirements has been established by the petitioners. All they submitted was the certification of the Bureau of Forestry that
the land in question was alienable and disposable public land. The trial court was correct in ruling that this deserved scant
consideration for lack of legal basis. To be sure, a certification from an administrative body cannot prevail against court
decision declaring the land to be registrable.
Significantly, it does not appear in the record that the Director of Forestry, or any other representative of the Government for
that matter, entered any opposition to the land registration proceedings that led to the issuance of the Original Certificate of
Title. No less importantly, an action to invalidate a certificate of title on the ground of fraud prescribes after the expiration of
one (1) year from the entry of the decree of registration 4 and cannot now be resorted to by the petitioners at this late hour.
And collaterally at that.
The strange theory submitted by the petitioners that the owner of registered land must also possess it does not merit serious
attention. The non-presentation by the private respondents of their tax declarations on the land is no indication that they
have never acquired ownership thereof or have lost it by such omission.
The second ground must also be rejected.
As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to eject any person illegally occupying their
property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were aware of the petitioners' occupation of the
property, and regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their
property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by
laches.
In urging laches against the private respondents for not protesting their long and continuous occupancy of the lots in
question, the petitioners are in effect contending that they have acquired the said lots by acquisitive prescription. It is an
elementary principle that the owner of a land registered under the Torrens system cannot lose it by prescription.
( Sec. 47 of PD 1529; Natalia Realty Corp. v. Vallez, supra; Umbay v. Alecha, 135 SCRA 427; Barcelona, et al. v.
Barcelona, et al., 100 Phil. 251.) 5
As the Court observed in the early case Legarda v. Saleeby: 6
The real purpose of the Torrens system of land registration is to quite title to land; to put a stop forever to
any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration in the
certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that
once the title was registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of
the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land.
Applied consistently these many years, this doctrine has been burnished bright with use and has long become a settled rule
of law.
In light of the observations already made, it is obvious that the petitioners cannot invoke the status of builders in good faith
to preserve their claimed rights to the constructions they have made on the lots in dispute.
A builder in good faith is one who is unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at the time he builds on it. 7 This definition
cannot apply to the petitioners because they knew at the very outset that they had no right at all to occupy the subject lots.
The petitioners have consistently insisted that the lots were part of the public domain and even submitted a certification to
that effect from the Bureau of Forestry. The land was in fact registered under the Torrens system and such registration was
constructive notice to the whole world, including the petitioners. Apparently, the petitioners did not take the trouble of
checking such registration. At any rate, the point is that, whether the land be public or private, the petitioners knew they had

no right to occupy it and build on it. The Court of Appeals was correct in calling them squatters for having entered, without
permission or authority, land that did not belong to them.
In urging reversal of the trial court and the respondent court, the petitioners are asking us to overturn long established
doctrines guaranteeing the integrity of the Torrens system and the indefeasibility of titles issued thereunder for the protection
and peace of mind of the registered owner against illegal encroachments upon his property. We are not disposed to take
this drastic step on the basis alone of their feeble arguments.

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1529

AMENDING AND CODIFYING THE LAWS RELATIVE TO REGISTRATION OF PROPERTY AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

Section 47. Registered land not subject to prescriptions. No title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered
owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession

As stated by Justice Johnson in the 1915 case of Legarda vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 the real purpose of the Torrens system
is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its legality. "Once a title is registered, the owner may rest
secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the 'mirador de sucasa', to avoid the possibility
of losing his land."

Adverse, notorious and continuous possession under a claim of ownership for the period fixed by law is ineffective against a
Torrens title (Tuason vs. Bolaos, 95 Phil. 106; 111; Vda. de Recinto vs. Inciong, L-26083, May 31, 1977, 77 SCRA 196;
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, L-23480, September 11, 1979,93 SCRA 146).

Title to land can no longer be acquired by prescription after a Torrens title has been issued for it (Dimson vs. Rural Progress
Administration, 90 Phil. 714, 717; Fernandez vs. Aboratigue, L-25313, December 28, 1970, 36 SCRA 476).
The right to recover possession of registered land is imprescriptible because possession is a mere consequence of
ownership (Atun vs. Nunez, 97 Phil. 762; Manlapas and Tolentino vs. Llorente, 48 Phil. 298, 308; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs.
Aguirre, 117 Phil. 110, 113-114).

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

HEIRS OF JOSE MALIGASO, SR., namely,

ANTONIO MALIGASO, CARMELO MALIGASO and
JOSE MALIGASO, JR.,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 182716

Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
BRION
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

- versus -

SPOUSES SIMON D. ENCINAS and

ESPERANZA E. ENCINAS,
Respondents.

Promulgated:

June 20, 2012

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DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court of the Decision[1] dated November 26,
2007 and Resolution[2] dated April 28, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64775. The CA
reversed and set aside the Decision [3] dated April 2, 2001
of Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, which affirmed the Decision[4] dated
August 22, 2000 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Sorsogon, Sorsogon dismissing the Spouses Simon D.
Encinas and Esperanza E. Encinas (respondents)
complaint for unlawful detainer.
Respondents are the registered owners of Lot No.
3517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sorsogon, which has an
area of 2,867 square meters and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4773.[5] The subject matter
of this controversy is a portion of Lot No. 3517 with an
area of 980 square meters, which the Heirs of Jose
Maligaso, Sr. (petitioners) continue to occupy despite
having received two (2) notices to vacate from the
respondents.
Lot No. 3517 was previously covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 543, which was issued in the
name of Maria Maligaso Ramos (Maria), the petitioners
aunt, on February 7, 1929. Sometime in May 1965, Maria
sold Lot No. 3517 to Virginia Escurel (Virginia). Three (3)
years later, on April 5, 1968, Virginiasold Lot No. 3517 to
the respondents, resulting to the cancellation of OCT No.
543 and issuance of TCT No. T-4773.[6]
On March 16, 1998 and June 19, 1998
or approximately thirty (30) years from the time they
purchased Lot No. 3517, the respondents issued two (2)
demand letters to the petitioners, asking them to vacate
the contested area within thirty (30) days from notice.
[7]
The petitioners refused to leave, claiming that the
subject area was the share of their father, Jose Maligaso,
Sr. (Jose, Sr.), in their grandparents estate. Thus, the
respondents filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
against them with the MTC, alleging that the petitioners
occupation is by mere tolerance and had become illegal
following their refusal to vacate the property despite being
demanded to do so twice.
The petitioners, in their defense, denied that their
possession of the disputed area was by mere tolerance
and claimed title thereto on the basis of their fathers
successional rights. That the petitioners occupation
remained undisturbed for more than thirty (30) years and
the respondents failure to detail and specify the
petitioners supposedly tolerated possession suggest that
they and their predecessors-in-interest are aware of their
claim over the subject area. The petitioners also attacked

the validity of OCT No. 543 and TCT No. T-4773, alleging
that it was thru fraud that Maria was able to register Lot
No. 3517, including the disputed area, under her
name. The petitioners likewise moved for the dismissal of
the complaint, claiming that the allegations therein
indicate that it was actually an action for
reconveyance. Further, laches had already set in view of
the respondents failure to assail their possession for
more than thirty (30) years.[8]
In an August 22, 2000 Decision, [9] the dispositive
portion of which is quoted below, the MTC dismissed the
respondents complaint.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered
1.

Dismissing
case;

2.

Adjudicating
the
possessory rights over the
litigated
portion
to
the
defendants;

3.

Ordering the Register of

Deeds to cause the annotation
of the equitable title of
defendants, who are entitled to
their
fathers
rightful
inheritance which is part of the
property in plaintiffs TCT No.
T-4773
as
a
lien
or
encumbrance;

4.

Ordering the plaintiffs to

pay defendants the amount of
[P]10,000.00 as attorneys fees;
and

5.

the

instant

The cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.[10]
The MTC gave more weight to the petitioners
possession of the contested area than the respondents
title as the former is founded on Jose Sr.s successional
rights and even held that the registration of Lot No. 3517
in Marias name created a trust in Jose Sr.s favor insofar
as the disputed portion is concerned. The MTC also held
that the respondents are barred by laches from pursuing
their cause of action against the petitioners given their
inaction for more than thirty (30) years despite being fully
aware of the petitioners adverse possession and claim
over the subject property.

The RTC dismissed the respondents appeal and

affirmed the MTCs Decision dated August 22, 2000. In a
Decision[11] dated April 2, 2001, the RTC found the
respondents allegations relative to the petitioners merely
tolerated possession of the subject area to be wanting.
The RTC also concluded, albeit implicitly, that the
petitioners possession is a necessary consequence of
their title as evidenced by their occupation in the concept
of an owner for a significant period of time. The
dispositive portion thereof states:
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered, the appealed decision
is AFFIRMED with the modification that
the annotations and the payment of
attorney[]s fees as ordered by the
Court a quo be deleted. The instant
appeal is DISMISSED, for lack of merit.[12]
Consequently, the respondents filed with the CA a
petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court. This was given due course and the RTCs
Decision dated April 2, 2001 was reversed and set
aside. In its Decision[13] dated November 26, 2007, the
CA had a different view and rationalized the grant of
possession to the respondents as follows:
The rule is well-entrenched that a
person who has a Torrens title over the
property is entitled to the possession
thereof. In like manner, prior physical
possession by the plaintiff is not
necessary in unlawful detainer cases as
the same is only required in forcible entry
cases. Moreover, the allegations in the
answer of [the] defendant as to the nullity
of plaintiffs title is unavailing and has no
place in an unlawful detainer suit since
the issue of the validity of a Torrens title
can only be assailed in an action
expressly
instituted
for
that
purpose. This
may
be
gleaned
from Spouses Apostol vs. Court of
Appeals and Spouses Emmanuel,
where the Supreme Court held that:
xxx
In the case at bench, petitioners
are the registered owners of Lot No. 3517
and, as a consequence of such, are
entitled to the material and physical
possession thereof. Thus, both the MTC
and RTC erred in ruling that respondents
prior physical possession and actual
possession of the 980-square meter
disputed portion of Lot No. 3517 should
prevail over petitioners Torrenstitle over
the said property. Such pronouncement
contravenes the law and settled
jurisprudence on the matter.[14] (Citation
omitted)
The CA denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration in its Resolution dated April 28, 2008. [15]
As earlier intimated, the petitioners anchor their
possession of the subject property on their fathers right
thereto as one of his parents heirs. The petitioners insist
on the nullity of the respondents title, TCT No. T-4773, as
the inclusion of the contested area in its coverage was
never intended. The petitioners accuse Maria of fraud for

having registered Lot No. 3517 in her name, including the

portion that their father allegedly inherited from his
parents, thus, reneging on her promise to cause the
registration of such portion in his name. It was their father
who had a legitimate claim over the subject area and
Maria never acquired any right thereto. Therefore,
respondents purchase of Lot No. 3517 did not include the
portion occupied by the petitioners, who succeeded to
Jose Sr.s rights thereto.
On the other hand, the respondents cause of
action is based on their ownership of Lot No. 3517, which
is evidenced by TCT No. T-4773, and on their claim that
they merely tolerated the petitioners occupation
thereof. According to the respondents, their being
registered owners of Lot No. 3517, including the portion
possessed by the petitioners, entitles them to the
possession thereof and their right to recovery can never
be barred by laches. They also maintain that the
petitioners cannot collaterally attack their title to the
subject property.
The point of inquiry is whether the respondents
have the right to evict the petitioners from the subject
property and this should be resolved in the respondents
favor. Between the petitioners unsubstantiated selfserving claim that their father inherited the contested
portion of Lot No. 3517 and the respondents Torrens title,
the latter must prevail. The respondents title over such
area is evidence of their ownership thereof. That a
certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible
and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein and that a person
who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to the
possession
thereof[16] are
fundamental
principles
observed in this jurisdiction. Alternatively put, the
respondents title and that of their predecessors-ininterest give rise to the reasonable presumption that the
petitioners have no right over the subject area and that
their stay therein was merely tolerated. The petitioners
failed to overcome this presumption, being inadequately
armed by a narration that yearns for proof and
corroboration. The petitioners harped that the subject
area was their fathers share in his parents estate but the
absence of any evidence that such property was indeed
adjudicated to their father impresses that their claim of
ownership is nothing but a mere afterthought. In fact, Lot
No. 3517 was already registered in Marias name when
Jose Sr. built the house where the petitioners are now
presently residing. It is rather specious that Jose Sr.
chose inaction despite Marias failure to cause the
registration of the subject area in his name and would be
contented with a bungalow that is erected on a property
that is supposedly his but registered in anothers name.
That there is allegedly an unwritten agreement between
Maria and Virginia that Jose Sr.s and the petitioners
possession of the subject area would remain undisturbed
was never proven, hence, cannot be the basis for their
claim of ownership. Rather than proving that Jose Sr. and
the petitioners have a right over the disputed portion of
Lot No. 3517, their possession uncoupled with affirmative
action to question the titles of Maria and the respondents
show that the latter merely tolerated their stay.
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are
summary proceedings designed to provide for an
expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the
right to the possession of the property involved. The
avowed objective of actions for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer, which have purposely been made summary in
nature, is to provide a peaceful, speedy and expeditious
means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of
property from unjustly continuing his possession for a
long time, thereby ensuring the maintenance of peace
and order in the community.[17] The said objectives can

only be achieved by according the proceedings a

summary nature. However, its being summary poses a
limitation on the nature of issues that can be determined
and fully ventilated. It is for this reason that the
proceedings are concentrated on the issue on
possession. Thus, whether the petitioners have a better
right to the contested area and whether fraud attended
the issuance of Marias title over Lot No. 3517 are issues
that are outside the jurisdiction and competence of a trial
court in actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry.
This is in addition to the long-standing rule that
a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked, to which an
ejectment proceeding, is not an exception.
In Soriente v. Estate of the Late Arsenio E.
Concepcion,[18] a similar allegation possession of the
property in dispute since time immemorial was met with
rebuke as such possession, for whatever length of time,
cannot prevail over a Torrens title, the validity of which is
presumed and immune to any collateral attack.
In this case, the trial court found
that respondent owns the property on the
basis of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
12892, which was issued in the name of
Arsenio E. Concepcion, x x x married to
Nenita L. Songco. It is a settled rule that
the person who has a Torrens title over a
land
is
entitled
to
possession
thereof. Hence, as the registered owner
of the subject property, respondent is
preferred to possess it.

It is not disputed that at the core

of this controversy is a parcel of land
registered under the Torrens system. In
a long line of cases, we have consistently
ruled that lands covered by a title cannot
be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. So it is that in Natalia Realty
Corporation vs. Vallez, et al., we held that
a claim of acquisitive prescription is
baseless when the land involved is a
registered land because of Article 1126 of
the Civil Code, in relation to Act 496
(now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529).
xxxx
Petitioners would take exception
from the above settled rule by arguing
that
FETA
as
well
as
its
predecessor[-]in[-]interest, Don Dionisio
M. Fabella, are guilty of laches and
should, therefore, be already precluded
from asserting their right as against them,
invoking, in this regard, the rulings of this
Court to the effect that while a registered
land may not be acquired by prescription,
yet, by virtue of the registered owners
inaction and neglect, his right to recover
the possession thereof may have been
converted into a stale demand.

The validity of respondents

certificate of title cannot be attacked by
petitioner
in
this
case
for
ejectment. Under
Section
48
of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, a
certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
modified or cancelled, except in a direct
proceeding
for
that
purpose
in
accordance with law. The issue of the
validity of the title of the respondents can
only be assailed in an action expressly
instituted for that purpose. Whether or
not petitioner has the right to claim
ownership over the property is beyond
the power of the trial court to determine in
an action
for unlawful detainer.
[19]
(Citations omitted)
In Salandanan,[20] the prohibition against
collateral attack of a Torrens title was reiterated:

Neither will the sheer lapse of time legitimize the

petitioners refusal to vacate the subject area or bar the
respondents from gaining possession thereof. As ruled
in Spouses Ragudo v. Fabella Estate Tenants
Association, Inc.,[22] laches does not operate to deprive
the registered owner of a parcel of land of his right to
recover possession thereof:

While, at a blush, there is

apparent merit in petitioners posture, a
closer look at our jurisprudence negates
their submission.

the

In Malison, the Court emphasized

that when [a] property is registered under
the Torrens system, the registered
owners title to the property is presumed
and cannot be collaterally attacked,
especially in a mere action for unlawful
detainer. In this particular action where
petitioners alleged ownership cannot be
established,
coupled
with
the
presumption that respondents title to the
property is legal, then the lower courts
are correct in ruling that respondents are
the ones entitled to possession of the
subject premises.[21] (Citation omitted)
Given the foregoing, the petitioners attempt to
remain in possession by casting a cloud on the
respondents title cannot prosper.

To start with, the lower court

found that petitioners possession of the
subject lot was merely at the tolerance of
its
former
lawful
owner. In
this
connection, Bishop
vs.
Court
of
Appeals teaches that if the claimants
possession of the land is merely tolerated
by its lawful owner, the latters right to
recover possession is never barred by
laches.
As
registered
owners of the lots in
question, the private
respondents have a right
to eject any person
illegally occupying their
property. This right is
imprescriptible. Even if it
be supposed that they
were aware of the
petitioners occupation of
the
property,
and
regardless of the length
of that possession, the
lawful owners have a
right to demand the
return of their property at
any time as long as the

possession
was
unauthorized or merely
tolerated, if at all. This
right is never barred by
laches.[23] (Citations
omitted)
It is, in fact, the petitioners who are guilty of
laches. Petitioners, who claimed that Maria fraudulently
registered the subject area inherited by their father, did
not lift a finger to question the validity of OCT No. 543,
which was issued in 1929. Petitioners waited for the lapse
of a substantial period of time and if not for the
respondents demands to vacate, they would not have
bothered to assert their fathers supposed successional
rights. The petitioners inaction is contrary to the posture
taken by a reasonably diligent person whose rights have
supposedly been trampled upon and the pretense of

ignorance does not provide justification or refuge. Maria

was able to register Lot No. 3517 in her name as early as
1929 and respondents acquired title in April 5, 1968 and
knowledge of these events is imputed to the petitioners
by the fact of registration.
In fine, this Court finds no cogent reason to
reverse and set aside the findings and conclusions of the
CA.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is DENIED and the Decision dated November 26, 2007
and Resolution dated April 28, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals
in
CA-G.R.
SP
No.
64775
are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
.