Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Dionisio
22 SCRA 1299
FACTS: On or about the 19th day of August, 1962, in Manila City, Rosauro Dionisio, a person
who is not duly authorized in any capacity by the Games and Amusement Board to conduct a
horse race, did then and there willfully and unlawfully offer, arranhge and collect bets for the
Special Daily Double Race being then conducted at the Sta. Ana Racing Club at Makati and for
that purpose has in possession the cash amount of P8.50, one Nueva Era Racing Program,
dated August 19, 1962, one list of bets, one ballpen and one booklet of Daily Double receipt. He
was thereby charged in violation of Republic Act No. 3063.
ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty applied to his offense infringes the Constitutional provision
that Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted. (Art III
Sec. 1 clause 19, of the Constitution of the Phils)
RULING: Neither fines nor imprisonment constitute in themselves cruel and unusual
punishment, for the Constitutional structure has been interpreted as referring to penalties that
are inhumane and barbarous, or shocking to the conscience and fines or imprisonment are
definitely not in this category. Nor does mere severity constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
SERAFIN VS. LINDAYAG [67 SCRA 166; ADM. MATTER. NO. 297-MJ; 30 SEPT 1975]
Facts: Plaintiff failed to pay a simple indebtedness for P1500 Carmelito Mendoza, then
municipal secretary and his wife Corazon Mendoza and therefore an estafa case was filed
against
her.
Complainant
admitted
complaint.
Now
complainant
filed
case
against respondent Judge for not dismissing the case and issuing a warrant of arrest as it falls
on the category of a simple indebtedness, since elements of estafa are not present. Further she
contended that no person should be imprisoned for non-payment of a loan of a sum of money.
Two months after respondentdismissed plaintiffs case. (Judge here committed gross ignorance
of
law.
Even
if
complainant
desisted
case
was
pursued.)
Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation committed by the judge when it ordered the
imprisonment
of plaintiff for
non-payment
of
debt?
Held: Yes. Since plaintiff did not commit any offense as, his debt is considered a simple loan
granted by her friends to her. There is no collateral or security because complainant was an old
friend of the spouses who lent the money and that when they wrote her a letter of demand she
promised to pay them and said that if she failed to keep her promise, they could get her
valuable things at her home. Under the Constitution she is protected. Judge therefore in
admitting such a "criminal complaint" that was plainly civil in aspects from the very face of the
complaint and the "evidence" presented, and issuing on the same day the warrant of arrestupon
his
utterly
baseless
finding
"that
failed
the
accused
to
perform
is
probably
his
guilty
duties
of the
properly.
PEOPLE VS. BALISACAN [17 SCRA 1119; G.R. NO. L-26376; 31 AUG 1966]
Sunday,
February
15,
2009
Posted
by Coffeeholic
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Writes
Facts: Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the CFI of Ilocos Norte. Upon being
arraigned, he entered into a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted y counsel. At his counsel
de officio, he was allowed to present evidence and consequently testified that he stabbed the
deceased in self-defense. In addition, he stated that he surrendered himself voluntarily to the
police authorities. On the basis of the testimony of the accused, he was acquitted. Thus,
the prosecution appealed.
Issue: Whether
or
Not
the
appeal
placed
the
accused
in double
jeopardy.
Held: The Supreme Court held that it is settled that the existence of plea is an essential
requisite to double jeopardy. The accused had first entered a plea of guilty but however testified
that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony had the effect of vacating his plea of
guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead a new charge, or at least direct that
a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. Therefore, there has been no
standing of plea during the judgment of acquittal, so there can be no double jeopardy with
respect to the appeal herein.
PAULIN VS. GIMENEZ [217 SCRA 386; G.R. NO. 103323; 21 JAN 1993]
Sunday,
February
15,
2009
Posted
by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Respondent and Brgy Capt. Mabuyo, while in a jeep, were smothered with dust when
they were overtaken by the vehicle owned by Petitioner Spouses. Irked by such, Mabuyo
followed the vehicle until the latter entered the gate of an establishment. He inquired the nearby
security guard for the identity of the owner of the vehicle. Later that day, while engaged in his
duties, petitioners allegedly pointed their guns at him. Thus, he immediately ordered
his subordinate to call the police and block road to prevent the petitioners escape. Upon the
arrival of the police, petitioners put their guns down and were immediately apprehended.
A complaint grave threats was filed against the petitioners (Criminal Case No. 5204). It was
dismissed by the court acting on the motion of the petitioners. Mabuyo filed a MOR thus the
dismissal was reversed. Thereafter, petitioners filed for certiorari, prohibition, damages, with
relief of preliminary injunction and the issuance of a TRO (CEB-9207). Petition is dismissed for
lack of merit and for being a prohibited pleading and ordered to proceed with the trial of the
case.
Hence,
this
instant petition.
Issues:
(1)
Whether
or
Not
the
dismissal
of
5204
was
a judgment of
acquittal.
(2) Whether or Not the judge ignored petitioners right against double jeopardy by dismissing
CEB-9207.
Held: For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the case must be without the express
consent of the accused. Where the dismissal was ordered upon motion or with the express
assent of the accused, he has deemed to have waived his protection against double jeopardy.
In the case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion of the petitioners. Double jeopardy
thus
did
not
attach.
Furthermore, such dismissal is not considered as an acquittal. The latter is always based on
merit that shows that the defendant is beyond reasonable doubt not guilty. While the former, in
the case at bar, terminated the proceedings because no finding was made as to the guilt or
innocence
of
the
petitioners.
The lower court did not violate the rule when it set aside the order of dismissal for
the reception of further evidence by the prosecution because it merely corrected its error when it
prematurely terminated and dismissed the case without giving the prosecution the right to
complete thepresentation of its evidence. The rule on summary procedure was correctlyapplied.
FACTS: Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of Section 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended.
During the arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. After the
prosecution rested its case, counsel for private respondent verbally manifested in open court that
private respondent was willing to change his former plea of not guilty to that of guilty to the lesser
offense of violation of Section 17, R.A. No. 6425.
Respondent Judge issued an order directing private respondent to secure the consent of the
prosecutor to the change of plea.
The prosecutor filed his Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense.
Accused filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave of Court to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense,
alleging that the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not fix a specific period within which an accused
is allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Respondent judge granted accuseds motion and
convicted him guilty beyond reasonable-doubt of the crime of violation of Section 17, Republic Act
No. 6425 thus this instant petition for review.
Counsel for the private respondent maintains that the private respondents change of plea and his
conviction to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, RA No. 6425 as amended is no longer
open to review otherwise his constitutional right against double jeopardy will be violated.
ISSUE: W/N accused can invoke double jeopardy?
HELD: NO. The right against double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of
the Rules of Court applies in cases where both the fiscal and the offended party consent to
the private respondents change of plea. Since this is not the situation here, the private
respondent cannot claim this privilege. Instead, the more pertinent and applicable provision is that
found in Section 7, Rule 117 which states:
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense
which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of
the following instances:
(a) . . . ;
(b) . . . ;
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the Fiscal and of the
offended party;
Under this rule, the private respondent could still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation
of Section 16 of RA 6425 as amended because of the lack of consent of the Fiscal who also
represents the offended party, i.e., the state. More importantly, the trial courts approval of his change
of plea was irregular and improper.
PEOPLE VS. RELOVA [149 SCRA 292; G.R. NO.L45129; 6 MAR 1987]
Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
FACTS:
Philippines seeks to set aside the orders of Respondent Judge Hon. Relova
quashing an information for theft filed against Mr. Opulencia on the ground of
double jeopardy and denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.. On
Feb.1 1975, Batangas police together with personnel of BatangasElectric
Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of
Batangas to search and examine the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice
Plant owned by one Manuel Opulencia. They discovered electric wiring devices
have
authority
from
the
violation
of
Batangas
Ordinance
regarding
unauthorized
electrical
electrical
devices
without
the
approval
and
Issue:
jeopardy as defense to the second offense charged against him by the assistant
fiscal of Batangas on the ground of theft of electricity punishable by a statute
against
Held: Yes,
the
Revised
Penal
Code.
Issue: Whether or Not it would be violative of the constitutional guarantee against an ex post facto
law.
Held: The court finds no merit in the petitioners contention that RA 3019 as amended by Batas
Pambansa Blg 195, which includes the crime of estafa through falsification of Public Documents as
among crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension from public office
pending action in court, is a penal provision which violates the constitutional prohibition against the
enactment of ex post facto law. Accdg to the RPC suspension from employment and public office
during trial shall not be considered as a penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not a result of a
judicial proceeding. In fact, if acquitted the official who is suspended shall be entitled to
reinstatement and the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. And does
not violate the constitutional provision against ex post facto law.
The claim of the petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is currently occupying a
position diffren tfrom that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision clearly
states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under RA 3019 for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or
property or whatever stage of execution and mode of participation shall be suspended from office.
The use of the word office applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding and not
only the particular office under which he was charged.