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Explosives detection systems-a review
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Explosives Detection Systems (EDS) for Aviation Security:

A Review
Sameer Singh and Maneesha Singh

PANN Research
Department of Computer Science
University of Exeter
Exeter EX4 4PT, UK
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Address for Correspondence:
Dr. Sameer Singh, Department of Computer Science, School of Engineering and Computer Science,
Harrison Building, University of Exeter, Exeter, EX4 4QF, UK

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List of Figures
Figure 1. Some example images of the conventional x-ray of luggage at airports
Figure 2. The role of the effective atomic number and density in separating explosives from other
materials

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A Review
Abstract
The detection of explosives and illicit material for the purposes of aviation security is an important
area for preventing terrorism and smuggling. A number of different methods of explosive detection
have been developed in the past that can detect such material from a very small up to a very large
quantity. For the purposes of aviation security, the checks are performed on passengers, their carry
on luggage, checked baggage, and cargo containers. Similar technology is used in post-offices for
detecting dangerous substances in mail. In this paper we review some of these technologies and in
particular discuss the application of computers for the analysis of data and images generated from
security equipment.
Keywords : explosives, security, screening, signal processing, pattern recognition

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A Review
1. Aviation security
The aviation security programmes are based on three principles (Polski, 1994): i) Every reasonable
effort should be made to deny the terrorist access to civil aviation facilities; ii) In the event that the
terrorist penetrate the first line of defence, they should encounter a system of explosives -weapons
detection devices and procedures that will prevent further penetration into aviation facilities; and iii)
If a device evades the step two, then the aircraft structure and systems must be hardened to the
maximum extent feasible to negate a blast and minimise damage providing a higher probability of
survivability of passengers and property. The first line of defence is based on police intelligence to
deny suspected terrorists from using aviation facilities. The second barrier of security inspection is
the most important guard against the carrying of dangerous materials on-board a plane whereas the
third barrier is simply a damage control mechanism. In this paper we discuss the prevention
mechanism- denying explosive materials getting on board a plane through security screening. In
particular, we discuss the various techniques that are available or being researched to detect
explosives and drugs. In addition, we also discuss the research into signal processing of data
collected from different methods especially using pattern recognition and image processing
techniques.
The large number of airline bombings shows the real threat to the air passenger travel. From 1985 to
1997, eight commercial aircrafts were lost or damaged due to suspected terrorist bombings and
about 1100 people died in these tragedies (Novakoff, 1992). The following incidents were caused as
a result of explosions within aircrafts.

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1. On June 23, 1985, Air India Boeing 747 crashed into the sea as a result of the explosion in the
cargo hold.
2. On November 29, 1987, Korean Air flight 858 was destroyed in flight from an explosive device
inside the cabin.
3. On December 21, 1988, PanAm flight 103 was destroyed by a twelve ounce bomb hidden in a
portable radio over Lockerbie, Scotland.
4. On September 19, 1989 a UTA flight was destroyed over the Sahara from an explosion in the
forward cargo component of a DC-10 aircraft.
5. On November 27, 1989, an Avianca Boeing 727 was destroyed by an explosive device in the
cabin.
6. On July 17, 1984, an Alas Chiricanas Airline EMB-110 crashed from a bomb explosion in the
cabin during a flight from Colon City to Panama City.
7. On December 11, 1994 a Philippine Airlines Boeing 727 was attacked in flight from a bomb
explosion in the cabin.
8. On July 9, 1997, an explosive device in the passenger cabin detonated on a Transporte Aereo
Mercosur Fokker 100 during the flight.
In addition, on the morning of September 11, 2001, in a mission allegedly masterminded by AlQaida network, terrorists hijacked four commercial US airplanes. The hijackers crashed two of the
planes into the 110-story twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, destroying the
towers; another into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.; and the fourth plane into a field in Stony
Creek Township, Pennsylvania. Nearly 3500 people died as a result of this attack.
As a result of serious breaches of security in the recent past, research into advanced screening
equipment and associated technologies has become a priority. Of most concern is detecting
explosives in both checked and early-on baggage (Morvan, 1991). Other techniques relate to
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monitoring passengers for weapons as they transit the terminal building, especially crowds gathered
at the metal detectors and X-ray machines. As the technology has become smarter at detecting
illegal objects, so have the methods to disguise such material. Following the September 11th attack,
Dillingham(2001)s testimony was provided before the Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, US Senate to discuss security concerns with: i) aviation-related computer systems;
ii) airport access controls and iii) passenger and carry-on luggage screening including how the USA
differs with other countries.
This committee had earlier reported in the year 2000 that there were several weaknesses found with
screeners in tests in the USA. In 1987, screeners missed 20 percent of potentially dangerous objects
and recent tests approximating real threats showed that the performance degrades even further. The
main problem is because of less experienced staff, large turnover because of low wages, limited
benefits, and repetitive nature of the work. In addition, the amount of work at airports makes it
impossible to check every bag (over 2 million passengers and their bags must be checked per day in
USA alone).
Air carriers can use their own employees to conduct screening activities but mostly they hire
security companies to perform screening.In the USA, Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) monitors
the performance of screeners by periodically testing them with FAA special agents posing as
passengers. Two important reasons explain why screeners fail: rapid screener turnover and
inadequate attention to human factors. From May 1998 to April 1999, screener turnover averaged
126 percent in 19 major airports in the USA, 200 percent at 5 airports and one with a turnover of
416 percent. This is attributed to low wages and minimal benefits for screeners. Generally screeners
are paid at the minimal wage with a starting salary of $6.00 per hour or less- actually wages at fast
food restaurants are much higher. The demands of the job also affect performance. The duties are
repetitive and too little attention is given to factors such as: a) improving individuals aptitudes for
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effectively performing screener duties; b) the sufficiency of the training provided to screeners and
how well they comprehend it; and c) the monotony of the job and distractions that reduce screeners
vigilance. FAA has been recommended to use threat-projection systems that place images of
dangerous objects on the monitors of x-ray machines to keep scanners alert and monitor their
performance- and a certification program to make screening companies accountable for the training
and performance of the screeners that they employ. The threat projection systems are useful as they
monitor screener performance, and help train them to identify more difficult objects for the future.
It is expected that FAA will deploy this technology in airports by 2003 and also more FAA security
screeners will be used.
Dillingham (2001) also compares the differences in screening between USA and five other
countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Netherlands and UK). The main conclusions were: a)
Screening operations in most countries, Belgium, Netherlands and UK, were more stringent, where
they routinely touch or pat down passengers in response to metal detector alarms. In these countries
only ticketed passengers go through the screening checkpoints thereby reducing the number of
people checked. Also countries such as UK and Belgium have higher police presence at airports. ii)
Screener qualifications are more intensive. For example, Belgium requires that screeners be
citizens, France requires them to be EC citizens, Netherlands requires them to be a resident for at
least 5 years. Also the amount of training is more in some European countries. For example, FAA
requires only 12 hours of classroom training but Belgium, Canada, France and the Netherlands
require more. France requires 60 hours of training and Belgium requires at least 40 hours of training
with an additional 16 to 24 hours for each activity. iii) Screeners get more benefits in other
countries. In Netherlands they get a minimum of $7.50 (30% higher than fast food shop wages in
that country), in Belgium they get $14 per hour. The turnover rates in these countries are 50% or
lower in these countries. iv) The screening responsibility rests with airport authority or with the
government. The airports can in turn hire screening companies to perform security checks. Out of
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102 countries with international airports, except for Canada and Bermuda, every other country
places screening responsibility with the airport or government. From these findings, it is clear that
much more needs to be done both on research and on training of personnel.
There is no doubt that security screening provides a barrier in the fight against terrorism and
smuggling. The recent tragedies have provided a new impetus for renewed and more intensive
research in the area of using computers and advanced security screening equipment for human and
luggage checking. In this review we present recent technologies in this vital area. This paper is laid
out as follows. First we discuss the security screening technologies used at airports and those under
research. The issues related to the use of computers for security screening and the training of
screeners is discussed next. Finally, we discuss some of the research issues for the future of aviation
security, in particular the automation of the screening process.
2. Security screening technologies

Security screening technologies are used to either inspect passengers or their luggage. Screening of
people walking through portals requires sophisticated technology. A screening solution must not
only be accurate, but also publicly acceptable. In terms of what should be reported by a screening
system and its performance characteristics, certain guidelines have been set by aviation authority
(Greenlee, 1991). In particular, the screening equipment should report the following (Navarro et al.,
1996):
i) Type of illicit material
ii) The minimum quantity (mass)
iii) The object shape (bulk, sheet, thickness, etc.)
iv) The location of the illicit material in the bag

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Hallowell (2001) discusses a number of research issues related to screening airline passengers. It is
quite common for explosives, weapons or drugs to be concealed with the passenger. Unfortunately,
a number of technologies that can be used for scanning luggage can not be used for screening
passengers for health reasons. While strip-searching is one of the best methods, it is not always
possible to search everywhere. Popular methods to date include walk-through metal detectors, metal
detector hand wands and pat down searches. An ideal portal would be able to screen a person for
weapons, drugs or explosives in real time without impeding the traffic flow. The current research on
portal development focuses on: i) enhancing the efficiency of metal detectors in portals; ii)
development of position discrimination capability of concealed weapons; and iii) expansion of
portal detection capabilities to include explosives and/or drugs. The emerging technologies are
based on either imaging or trace detection. Imaging technologies can see through the clothing and
produce an image of the human body and concealed items underneath. The images can be
manipulated for improving their quality to assist human operators. Some examples of imaging
technologies used include x-ray systems, millemeter wave systems, and dielectric portal
development (microwave). Anomaly detectors can be used to give information on the presence of
an object, its size and location without producing an image. Trace detection, on the other hand,
samples air or material from the clothing or bodies of people to perform a chemical analysis of the
sample to detect target substance. Trace detection technologies include ion mobility spectrometry,
chemiluminescence, electron capture detection, electrochemistry and olfaction.
For luggage inspection, the two major subprograms in the aviation security are bulk detection and
vapour detection. Unlike bulk detection that aim to detect large quantities of explosives, vapour
detectors look for very small quantities, less than a microgram. Hydrogen, Nitrogen, Carbon and
Oxygen are the main components in an explosive. Even a small quantity of vapours escaping from
these explosives in small qua ntities can be detected using techniques including ion mobility,
electron capture, mass spectroscopy, olfaction, bio-technology and surface acoustic waves.
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In order to detect contraband, it is important to understand their characteristics. Gozani(1994) lists

the properties that are of greatest interest in identifying both drugs and explosives. For example,
drugs have following constituents: carbon (high), oxygen (low), chlorine (moderate), and density
(moderate). On the other hand for explosives we get: carbon (moderate), nitrogen (high/moderate),
oxygen (very high/high) and density (very high) (Fainberg, 1992). Nitrogen based explosives, rich
in nitrogen (bonding agent) and oxygen (oxidising agent), are commonly used due to their high
power. The explosives also contain carbon and sometimes hydrogen as fuel. Usually, explosive
devices consist of two main components: an explosive agent and a detonating system. The blasting
material consists primarily of inorganic nitrates and carbonaceous fuels and the detona tors are made
of metallic tubes or shells with an initiating explosive. In the case of plastic explosives, they can
self-detonate due to their unstable nature. There are more than one hundred types of military and
civilian explosives and around twenty commonly used drugs. A number of explosive characteristics
can be used for their detection (Hussein and Walker, 1998).
i) Geometry: The presence a metallic detonator and associated wires can be detected using image
shape analysis.
ii) Material density: Explosive material is more dense than most organic material but not as dense
as metals.
iii) Elemental composition: It was originally proposed that the presence of high concentrations of
nitrogen is necessary to indicate the presence of a nitrogen based explosive. However it has been
realised that multi-element analysis is the best way to lower false alarm rates. Its presence combined
with high oxygen concentration can be used to determine explosives. Some explosives can be
picked up by analysing high concentrations of chlorine. Also narcotics such as heroine or cocaine
are in chloride form. Narcotics are poor in nitrogen and oxygen but rich in carbon and hydrogen.
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Their density is not much different from other organic material and vapour emission analysis can be
used to detect them.
iv) Vapour emissions: Nitrogen can be detected in a vapour sample.
There are a number of methods used in the detection of explosives in airport luggage including xray techniques including scatter, dual energy and transmission imaging, x-ray based computed
tomography (Roder, 1991), vapour detection (Chutjian and Darrach, 1996), quadrupole resonance
analysis (Rayner et al., 1996), and nuclear techniques (Gozani, 1991). The following sections detail
a number of technologies used for explosives detection. Considering the overwhelming use of x-ray
and neutron technology for aviation security, our review presents them in more detail. In our
discussion we assume that the luggage can be imaged thoroughly- for a review of techniques where
luggage is available from only one side, e.g. an unattended bag against the wall, please see Hussein
and Walker(1998).
2.1 Bulk detection systems

A number of techniques based on x-rays, gamma rays, electromagnetic field, and millimeter waves
have been employed for detecting weapons and explosives (Bouisset, 1994). The techniques for
explosive detection are detailed below.
2.1.1 X-ray based screening

The physical principles of x-ray interactions can be used to interpret the results to deduce the type
of materials present (Schafer et al., 1991). X-ray detection methods are the most common means to
inspect luggage at the airport for the following reasons: i) x-ray technology can help provide
information on the object density d and the effective atomic number Zeff . The effective atomic
number is the estimate of the hypothetical single element that will give the same x-ray attenuation
as the substance being evaluated. Theoretically, an objects material type can be uniquely
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determined using its density and Zeff (Eilbert and Krug, 1992); ii) x-ray technology has been
developed for over a century; iii) x-ray technology is safer to human beings and contents inside the
luggage than for example nuclear magnetic resonance; iv) x-ray physics is well understood; and v)
they are less expensive and easy to operate than neutron based methods.
The following are important considerations for the deployment of x-ray technology at airports
(Fultz, 1996).
i)
The devices vary in their ability to detect types, quantities and shapes of explosives.
Nowadays explosives can be hidden and modified in a variety of ways so a simple analysis
of shape or type is not very productive.
ii)
Explosive detection devices typically produce a number of false alarms that must be
resolved either by human intervention or technical means. Given that there are millions of
bags processed every day, even modest false alarm rates could lead to thousands of items
requiring additional security.
iii)
The devices depend on human operators to resolve alarms. It can require for the operators to
either inspect computer images more closely or actually hand search the item. The higher
the false alarm rate, the more the system depends on human operators. This has
consequences fo r operator training.
iv)
Laboratory test performances of several equipment is much better than their real life
performances. For example, the FAA certified CTX5000 did not perform as well in
operational testing at two airports (Fultz, 1996).
A number of different x-ray techniques are used for security screening. Amongst the most popular
methods are conventional transmission imaging, dual energy x-ray, scatter imaging and 3D
imaging. The principles behind these methods are described below.
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Conventional transmission x-ray
X-ray technology is extensively used in the aviation industry for contraband detection (Murray et
al., 1997). In standard transmission x-ray, the equipment measures how many x-ray photons were
removed from an illuminating beam at each location of the bag. It does not matter how the x-ray is
removed from the pencil beam. Hence, the atomic cross-section determines the attenuation at any
location in the transmission image and is the total x-ray interactive cross section- the sum of the
photoelectric and the scattering cross-section. Conventional x-ray screening systems measure the
attenuated x-ray energy after it has passed through a scanned object (Kramers, 1923).
The standard airport hand-baggage scanner has a fan shaped or scanning x-ray beam whose
absorption is measured by a line of detectors, and a high quality image derived from the degree of
absorption is produced. These devices can not distinguish between a thin sheet of strong absorber
and a thick slab of weak absorber. Figure 1 shows some example images.
Dual energy x-ray

Early security systems used high energy x-ray for the detection of weapons. At higher energy
levels, over 100 kV, the absorbed energy depends primarily on the density of the material. The
higher the density, the more ene rgy is absorbed by the object and therefore the darker the image.
Objects such as metal or weapons would appear very dark in the transmission image. However, the
problem of an explosive object behind a denser material remained unsolved. In order to resolve the
problem, luggage is scanned at two energy levels (lower energy around 80 kV). At lower energies
the absorption depends mainly on the effective atomic number as well as the thickness of the
material. The higher energy view suffers less absorption. While areas of heavy metal are dark in
both views, areas of light elements are darker in lower energy view. Light elements such as carbon,
nitrogen and oxygen can be detected by comparing both views. A system that uses two x-ray energy
levels is called a dual energy system (multienergy systems are essentially the same as above except
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that they have a single x-ray tube that transmits a broad spectrum of energies and different detectors
are used to select specific energy regions). Several techniques exist for the collection of multienergy images, including varying the input energy of the x-ray source (Europ Scan, 1996), filtering
the energy at the x-ray sensor (Eilbert and Krug, 1992) and using multiple sensors with different
spectral responses (Michette and Buckley, 1993).
Some commercial systems at airports feature dual-energy analysis to estimate the atomic numbers
of the materials in luggage bags (Krug and Stein, 1991; Eilbert and Krug, 1992). For a single energy
system, a thin, high Z (atomic number) material will have the same attenuation as a thick, low Z
material. However, in a dual energy system, the measurements obtained at different energies can
separate these two cases. The dual-energy method applied to a simple object yields an area density
that in turn gives a measure of density and thickness by using a priori information between atomic
number and density. The main limitation of the method is that the real density of objects is poorly
known for real luggage items and the system only generates an estimate of atomic number, i.e.
effective atomic number.
Using dual-energy transmission technology, information related to Zeff is obtained. Organic

material (low Z ) can theoretically be distinguished from inorganic materials and metals (high Z ).
It should be remembered that x-ray intensities for each object are not only related to its material
composition which reflects the intrinsic property, but also some extrinsic parameters such as
position, orientation and thickness. In the realworld, simple dual-energy analysis which is better
than single energy, can be easily confused without the knowledge of material density (see Figure 2).
Several approaches for its effective use in complex images have been pursued including
transmission plus scattering and computed tomography (Grodzins, 1991) so that information on the
effective atomic number as well as the density is available. The false alarm rate of dual-energy
systems are roughly 20% (Strecker, 1998).
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One of the limitations of the dual energy systems is that unless they are combined with volume
imaging, e.g. CT or stereoscopic imaging, they only provide an indication of the effective atomic
number as an integrated effect throughout the scanned object. Even when used with volume
imaging, the sensitivity and specificity are low and at best only allow materials to be characterised
broadly as inorganic or organic. Another problem encountered with dual-energy sys tems is that the
computation of Zeff depends on the material and objects that it overlaps- called background
overlapping effect. One of the algorithms developed to tackle this problem by Krug et al.(1994) and
Krug and Stein(1996) calculates a characteristic value K MAT for each illicit material from the
attenuation coefficients. The algorithm examines each image pixel in turn whose corresponding
characteristic value is calculated as KTB . If K MAT = KTB , then a counter is incremented. If the
counter exceeds a threshold then the pixel comes from an illicit material. This algorithm however
does not work very well and a better method is proposed by Krug et al.(1997). In this method, two
images of low and high energy x-ray beams are obtained with no reference material present. Then
two images with the reference material are obtained. On the basis of these four images, a measure
k is calculated as the ratio of the attenuation coefficients and a new image is generated by
calculating new pixel values on the basis of k . The new image is different from the original image
because the objects that have the same Zeff as reference material are no longer present.
Scatter Imaging
Explosives are typically mixed with common harmless materials, which makes their detection very
difficult. Two characteristics of plastic explosives make them unique in terms of their interaction
with the x-rays. First, they consist of elements having low atomic numbers. Second, they have a
physical density that is 30-50% higher than common plastics and about five to eight times higher
than typical packed clothing (Annis et al., 1992). While dual-energy methods attempt to exp loit the
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first of these characteristics, a scatter image exploits both the low Z and high density
characteristics of plastic explosives. This makes the scatter imaging techniques more specific.
Scatter imaging has been proposed by a number of studies as an effective way of luggage inspection
(Grodzins, 1991; Schafer et al., 1991; Annis et al., 1992; Hussein et al., 1998). Image data is
collected from scattered x-ray energy that is reflected back towards the x-ray source or scattered xray energy that passed forward through the scanned object, called the back scattering and forward
scattering images respectively. For scatter images, each location along the pencil beam in the
objects adds to the amount of scatter seen in scatter image. The amount depends on the number of
x-ray photons reaching the location, the electron density at that location, the scattering crosssection, and attenuation that the scattered photons undergo while exiting the bag. In this way, two
different materials with the same transmission characteristics would still produce two very different
sets of scatter images (e.g. aluminium and plastic).
The transmitted beam produces a typical x-ray image showing the absorption of heavy metals. In
addition, the backscatter signal intensity depends on how much of the transmitted beam has been
absorbed, how much is backscattered, and how many backscattered x-rays reach the backscatter
detectors. The backscatter signal depends on the competition between photoelectric absorption and
Compton scattering. The photoelectric cross-section increases with the atomic number of the object
Z while the Compton cross section is relatively independent of the atomic number. Hence, the
resulting backscatter signal favours low Z elements of high density, such as plastic explosives and
provides a direct measure of the density of elements with low atomic number. Backscatter
information has been used for explosives detection. A system based on the flying spot technology
was built as a prototype by Swift(1997a, 1997b) for the inspection of vehicles and cargo.
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Image scatter can be characterised as coherent (elastic) or incoherent (inelastic or Compton
scattering). Forward scatter in the region of 3-10 degree contains predominantly coherently
scattered photons and at large angles the scattered beam is dominated by incoherently scattered
photons. Measurements of both of these is quite useful. Coherent scatter leads to diffraction effects
whose intensity gives information on atomic number and physical density. Incoherent scatters
intensity is dependent on density and hence both of these techniques can be combine to isolate
atomic number information. An advantage of using scatter techniques is that their measurements
depend on particular volumes within an object and hence allow a form of volume imaging. Scatter
methods are highly specific and localised allowing detection of sheet explosives (Luggar et al.,
1997b). Details of coherent and incoherent x-ray scatter are available in Speller(2001).
The position of an object relative to x-ray source and the detector has a strong influence on the
detected forward and backward scatter signals resulting in an input error to the classification
system. Forward and backward scatter systems measure the incoherent scattering effect. A single
energy system using back scatter images for explosives was developed by the American Science
and Engineering (Schafer et al., 1991). The flying spot technology developed by American Science
and Engineering in 1996, can obtain very high quality scatter images (see Arvanitis, 1997 for
details). This eliminates the need for an expensive sensor array by using a concentrated beam of xrays and a few large photo-multipliers for detection. The primary source of information is back
scatter images where forward scatter images are included as an option. With good transmission and
scatter qualities, materials characterisation is greatly improved. This technology has been shown to
perform well on car and truck (cargo) where explosives can be present in large quantities (Schafer
and Swift, 1993); airport luggage presents a more serious problem with small quantities of
explosives. None of the implemented systems has fully explored the high quality forward and
backward scatter images provided using the flying-spot technology for automated explosives
detection. Since this technology is cheaper and faster than CT, the analysis of scatter images could
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lead to a smarter system. In addition, dual energy transmission technology can be combined with
scatter technology to improve results (Drayer et al., 1998).
Coherent scattering has been used in a number of studies considering its advantages over dual
energy and CAT scanners. Strecker et al.(1993) investigated high energy (30 keV to 100 keV)
Coherent X-ray Scattering-CXRS (see Harding and Shreiber(1999) for more details of the
technology). The study deals with an alternative approach to x-ray diffraction, x-ray scatter. The
measured diffraction patterns contain material specific information. This information is used as a
fingerprint to identify explosives. Strecker(1995) researched CXRS methods for the detection of
explosives. The main criteria for the acceptance will be: a) classification performance in terms of
detection rate vs. false alarm rate; b) inspection time or throughput of the system. Three areas that
need to be improved for the advancement of CSRS are: a) the total photon flux in the scatter
spectrum, which determines its noise; b) the mixing of substance of interest with others; and c) the
attenuation of primary and scatter reduction. The results of the experiments in this study showed
near 100% detection rates and less than 1 percent false alarm rate. Speller et al. (1993) study x-ray
scattering at low angles. X-ray scattering at low angles shows diffraction effects that can be used to
characterise materials. This technique is successful in finding explosives that may be shielded by
other matter. This paper details the important features of scattering that can be used as unique
signatures. Luggar et al. (1993) study the elastic scattered photons for the rapid identification of
material with low atomic number. Luggar et al.(1995) developed a low angle x-ray scattering
machine called the Sheet Explosive X-ray Imager (SEXI). The optimisation of the geometry for
such a system in terms of scatter angle, collimation and x-ray distribution are discussed in Luggar et
al.(1997a). This system attempts to detect minimum amounts of explosive material in an item of
luggage in the range of 150cc and 300cc. The low attenuation in conventional x-ray system through
explosives yields little natural contrast. SEXI identifies materials with image molecular structure
and differentiates between explosive materials and other objects. SEXI can be used in conjunction
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with normal x-ray systems with little disruption to security procedures. Low level x-rays have also
been used with digital image processing for explosives detection by Smith(1991). The new
technology is called Subambient Explosive Computer Utilised Refelected Energy (SECURE) which
uses a range of image processing algorithms before the image is presented to the operator. Strecker
(1998) describes the use of elastic x-ray scatter for the purposes of automatic detection of
explosives. A recent prototype was produced by Philips for Hamburg airport (Hnatnicky, 1997).
The in-elastic or compton scatter radiation provides a measure of the number of electrons involved
in the scatter process. However, in the case of elastic scatter, material testing is strongly oriented in
the forward direction due to its short wavelength. In this case the polychromatic bremsstrahlung
spectrum of the x-ray tube serves as a source and the scatter radiation is measured at a small fixed
angle using an energy resolving detectors. The resulting scatter spectra provide information on the
crystallographic structure of the scattering materials. For security application, the scatter spectra of
dangerous substances are stored in a library and retrieved for comparison and automatic detection of
suspicious material. The trials at Hamburg airport show a false alarm rate of 1%.
Blaffert(1995) tried to prove that peak detection and spectra identification techniques developed for
x-ray diffraction and IR spectroscopy can be used for explosives detection provided that good
quality noise filters are used to clean the spectra to a reasonable level. Similarly Jupp et al.(1998,
2000) used angular dispersive x-ray diffraction to provide chemically specific detection of
explosives from benign materials using characteristic Bragg features seen in coherently scattered Xrays. To implement this technique in a prototype screening system, a detector has been designed
which, when coupled with the appropriate analysis algorithm, provides chemically specific material
identification.
Even though the x-ray technology is the preferred method of explosives screening, it is by no means
the best option. It continues to be preferred as it is safer to humans and luggage, cheap to buy and
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operate, and it is well understood. However, one of the main disadvantage of using x-ray
technology is the high false alarm rate (when the system alarms frequently on harmless objects).
There are several reasons for these false alarms:
i)
Some materials are non-separable to systems based on x-attenuation methods designed to

distinguish material based on their physical density and effective atomic number. This is
because several materials possess similar attenuation profiles as explosives. For example in
the ( Zeff , d ) domain, some plastics and rubbers fall in the black powder area, and the
others fall in the smokeless powder area (Krauss and Hughes, 1996). This can lead to
plastics and rubber substances causing false alarms.
ii)
The characterisation for a certain material may spread into a wider range in feature space
due to the method actually used. In a simple setting, most explosives can be separated from
harmless materials using two-dimensional information ( Zeff , d ). However, in order to
accurately determine these two parameters one needs to know exact material composition,
weight fractions, and geometry information for all objects in the luggage. It is not possible
to get this information using dual-energy luggage x-ray system to date. Hence, some
extrinsic parameters such as thickness and orientation of the material would negatively
affect the material characterisation.
iii)
The error and uncertainty change the statistical distribution of classes; this has a negative
effect on object classification.
Related techniques
A number of recent studies have investigated novel x-ray technologies for security screening.
Bjorkholm and Wang(1992b) detail an improved x-ray detector such that maximum possible
information about physical characteristics of the objects can be gained. Z-scan is an x-ray system
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that gives two views with dual energy. By scanning objects from orthogonal angles, organic
materials in the object are turned into 3D models. The model is then divided into regions that are
searched for explosives using density information. Any threat objects are highlighted. The system
can work at a rate of ten pieces per minute and the system is currently used at Heathrow airport.
A new x-ray detection system is described by Bernbach and Vey(1992). An L-shaped x-ray beam is
used to eliminate blind-spots. For detection, x-rays are converted to visible light that is detected
using photo-diodes. The object has to be moved through the beam for complete scanning. The
system can scan 10 pieces per minute.
Shi(2000) introduces a new model of prototype x-ray scanning system developed at Virginia Tech.
In addition, an algorithm is developed to correct the non- uniformity of transmission detectors in the
prototype scanning system. The x-ray source output is not monochromatic which leads to the
problem of spectrum overlap and output signal imbalance between high and low energy levels
which degrades the performance of the dual energy x-ray sensing. A copper filter is introduced and
a numerical optimisation method to remove thickness effects of objects has been developed to
improve the system performance.
Armstrong et al.(1993) detail how materials can be characterised based on the interaction of x-ray
and gamma ray radiation using a high intensity monochromatic source. The design and properties of
the new fluorescent x-ray tube are described. The tube generates a quasi- monochromatic output.
The output is compared with those of radioisotope sources in terms of purity, stability and radiance
and it is shown that the new technology is a good method for materials characterisation.
The SYCOSCAN developed by Schlumberger is a radioscopic control system developed based on

x-ray detection using Multiwire Proportional Chamber (MWPC) technology (Sunderman et al.,
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1993). This study presents the working principle behind this equipment and compares it to
conventional scintillator/photodiode combinations.
Direct imaging of explosives using a nitrogen camera has been suggested by Knapp et al.(2000).
The basic idea is to capture images of nitrogen concentrations on the basis of which robust
screening technology can be developed. It is well known that when high energy photons interact
with chemical elements in an explosive they generate unique signatures that can be used for
identification. When a high intensity pulse of high-energy photons from an accelerator source is
flashed on an object, a variety of isotopes are produced, almost all of which decay with half lives of
seconds or longer. However, if nitrogen, carbon or oxygen are present, radioisotopes decay very
quickly with very short half- lives of the order of 10 to 20 ms. On the basis of this principle, images
are generated that given an indication of the presence of nitrogen that can be analysed by the
operator.
A novel technique has been developed by Habiger et al.(1991) for detecting explosives using RF
linac. The patented EXDEP technology uses an intense x-ray beam to photo-activate the nitrogen
component present in most explosives.
Activated nitrogen decays emitting a positron that
annihilates and produces two photons that are detected. The EXDEP technique measures the
nitrogen concentration on a matter per unit volume basis together with three dimensional
tomography (CTX) scanner that measures the physical density. The determination of whether or not
there is an explosive present is based on two factors: (i) the count rate for each volume element and
(ii) the number of volume elements that have the appropriate count rate. The probability of
detection for the EXDEP/CTX system should be over 99% with a false alarm probability
substantially less than 1%.
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3D x-ray imaging
3D image modelling can lead to an improved explosives detection system (Kitzinger and Cheung,
1996). Evans et al. (1998) describe four types of three-dimensional transmission x-ray imaging that
is appropriate for security screening. This includes:
a) Computed tomography (Schmidt, 1989): Computed tomography initially developed for 3D

medical imaging applications has been applied for luggage screening (Roder, 1991; Roder and
Stebler, 1992; Shreve et al., 1992; Smith and Krall, 1996). The x-ray transmission through an
object is a function of its effective atomic number, density and thickness. For a given x-ray path,
the linear attenuation coefficient is the sum of attenuation coefficients of each element in the
path and CT produces cross-section images of the object by reconstructing the x-ray attenuation
coefficients matrix. These cross-section images can be used to ge nerate 3D images of the
objects. The final aim is to determine the objects density and effective atomic number. This is
achieved in the following manner. First, in the volume rendered image, the reconstruction
algorithm determines the attenuation coefficient for each volume element. Second, given the
knowledge of the volume element dimension from the scanning equipment geometry, the
attenuation coefficient is mapped as a direct function of the atomic number and density. This
gives two unknown quantities and by taking measurements at two different energies, it leaves
two equations with two unknowns that are solved for atomic number and density. Thus, the
volume elements can be mapped according to Zeff and density, and the correlation of these
variables can provide both feature and material discrimination (Dolan et al., 1991).
The CT system is based on the principle of synchronous movement of the object/source and xray detector. The system produces images as a result of intensity summation recorded over a
period of time in which the objects overlying and underlying the planes of interest cause
blurring on the film. The CT methodology generates a stack of contiguous slice images or
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tomograms that help 3D image reconstruction to produce volumetric views of the object. The
objects can be viewed as solid or transparent models (Robinson et al.,, 1995) that are enhanced
using depth cues such as hidden surface removal, perspective transformation, rotation and
depth-weighted shading. This technology is now available for security screening (Roder, 1991;
Heiskanen et al., 1995) but the operational cost remains quite high.
For security applications, the CT system first produces an x-ray scan similar to the conventional
airport x-ray scanner. An automated inspection algorithm determines the locations within the
baggage where the absorption indicates a suspicious area. Cross-section CT slices are then used
to determine the density, texture, mass and shape of the object. Since the CT scan produces
cross-section slices, it can identify objects that are surrounded by other objects and hidden. The
operator can also make further slices to real other object properties.
CT requires of the order of 100 views from a 1024 element linear x-ray detector to produce a
1000x1000 pixel slice image of the object under consideration. The technology requires high
signal to noise ratio and hence very high x-ray source levels. As a result, the high level of
radiation requires substantial radiation screening. In addition, in order to achieve a high spatial
resolution, the helical-scan CT system needs high rotational speed, e.g. for an object moving at
0.25 m/s requires the x-ray sensor to rotate at 15,000 rpm to achieve an axial resolution of 1
mm. CTX5000 is the only FAA approved system based on CT technique which was developed
by InVision Technologies and has been installed in a number of airports in the USA. Heiskanen
and Roder(1997) discuss what can be gained from the experience of such technology in the realworld since its implementation.
b) Multi-source/sensor imaging: In this technology, a number of different x-ray sources and

sensors are used. For example Benjamin and Prakoonwit(1997) discuss the use of 15 fan-beam
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sources. The main difficulty with this approach is the high system cost, and high complexity of
themechanical equipment and difficulty in collimation alignment.
c) Twin orthogonal views: Bjorkholm and Wang(1992b) generate two orthogonal views using a
pair of x-ray sources and linear arrays.
d) Stereoscopic tomography: Evans, Robinson and Godber (1998) illustrate a 3-D image modelling
technique utilising line-scan x-ray equipment called stereoscopic tomography (Robinson,
1997). The resultant images have similar properties to volume rendered x-ray computed
tomography system. Earlier research by these researchers with HM Customs and Excise in the
UK was based on line-scan technology (Robinson 1987; Evans, 1993). More recent work with
Police Scientific Development Branch in UK is based on dual-energy line scanners which
provide materials identification capability. The current research focuses on the automatic
extraction of three-dimensional information from the stereoscopic pair of images. In some
respects this data can be compared with the x-ray CT. The main difference is that in the case of
CT, each slice of information is called a tomogram whereas in stereoscopic imaging it is called
a depth plane. The main advantage they cite for the stereoscopic system is that CT systems are
data hungry and require several views for image reconstruction, whereas stereoscopic system
uses the geometric relationship between a pair of perspective images in order to represent the 3D image data.
Evans, Robinson and Bentley (1997) and Evans, Robinson and Godber (1998) describe how this
works. The raw image data is produced in the form of a left and right perspective image. These
are acquired within 5 seconds and stored in 1024x648 digital format. The folded array sensor
modules utilise linear arrays consisting of a pair of discrete fib re-optic cables to optically couple
the low and high energy signals produced by the scintillation process directly onto the faceplate
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of a three stage intensified coupled device camera (ICCD). The 2D images are formed by
cyclically storing the individual signal outputs of each fibre optic via the ICCD in digital
memory. The image is therefore accumulated strip by strip over a time interval determined by
the scan frequency of the scintillation signals and the translation speed of the object. A three
dimensional modelling stage using these images then generates the final images to be viewed.
The identification of depth planes or slices in stereoscopic images is presented in Robinson et
al.(1995).
Evans, Robinson and Godber (1998) argue the case for the 3D ana lysis as for image
interpretation, 2D view can not generate physiological cues. According to Okoshi(1976), an
observer has up to a total of ten cues for depth perception including psychological cues
(occlusion, shadows and shading, linear perspective, text ure gradient, retinal image size and
arial perspective), and physiological cues (binocular parallax, monocular movement parallax,
accommodation and convergence). The psychological cues can be induced from the two
dimensional image but the physiological cues can not be. A fully operational prototype of
stereoscopic system has been constructed for Police Scientific Development Branch, UK.
Recently, Evans and Hon (2002) extended the stereoscopic system by introducing the concept of
motion parallax in addition to binocular parallax as a powerful depth cue to better interpret 3D
images.
At present, each of the above discussed x-ray technology is used separately however there is a
strong case for using a combination of systems, e.g. multi-sensor x-ray approach us ing data fusion
techniques (Abbot et al., 1996; Conners et al., 1996a, 1996b; Krug and Stein, 1996). For example,
Zou(1998) details a system that uses both dual-energy and scatter technology such that this
information is derived from the object simultaneously. In this study a quantity R that is related to
Z eff (effective atomic number), and a quantity L that is density related are used together by
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identifying illicit objects in the R L plane. Using this technique, illicit materials can be separated
from metal, inorganic materials, and other harmless organic materials. Since practical x-ray sources
are polychromatic rather than ideally monochromatic, Monte Carlo N Particle (MNCP) simulations
can be used to study the relationship between R and Z eff (Xie, 1995). Tumer et al.(1997) detail
how the use of two different 3D imaging techniques simultaneously can be used for screening. In
their study they use three dimensional images based on neutrons and gamma rays simulatenously.
2.1.2 Laser based explosives detection

Haley and Hallowell(2000) describe explosive detection using lasers. This technique involves the
use of laser- generated infrared radiation to scan the surface of objects. The interaction of the laser
radiation with any residual explosive on the surface of the object will initiate "micro" bursts. The
resulting light generated by these bursts can be detected and is characteristic of the explosive
involved. Temporal and spectral analyses of the emitted light reveal unique signal patterns that are
used to differentiate the "micro" bursts. The results are preliminary, however, the technique offers
the potential for detecting explosives in near-real time. Thus, the technique could be used to scan
carry-on baggage as the individual pieces of luggage travel on the X-ray system's conveyer belt.
2.1.3 Nuclear based explosives detection

Nuclear based explosive detection techniques use neutrons instead of photons and have been shown
to generate better results however at a higher cost and slow speed. The main modes of analysis
include Thermal Neutron Analysis (TNA), Fast Neutron Analysis (FNA), Pulsed Fast Neutron
Analysis (PFNA), Pulsed Fast Thermal Neutron Analysis (PFTNA) and Nuclear Resonance
Absorption (NRA) of gamma rays. A review of detecting explosive material using nuclear radiation
is available in Hussein(1992) and Gozani(1997) and the basic principle is explained in
Speller(2001).
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a) Thermal Neutron Analysis (TNA)
The main aim of this analysis is to identify nitrogen in explosives. A neutron striking a nucleus
is absorbed with a certain probability and the process is accompanied by the emission of gamma
rays with the energy that is characteristics of the nucleus. The type of element present can be
inferred from the analysis of neutron radiation for gamma ray intensity and energy. The luggage
is moved through a bath of thermal (slow) neutrons generated by a radioactive source. The
capture of neutrons in nitrogen results in a high-energy gamma ray. The signals from gammaray detectors are analysed to generate a spatial distribution for nitrogen. The current TNA
equipment have been designed to detect a limited range of plastic explosives, with the ability to
detect nitrogen but not oxygen or carbon; although hydrogen, chlorine and some other elements
could be detected to enhance the performance. One of the main difficulty is the systems
inability to differentiate between nitrogen in explosives and the nitrogen background from
innocent materials, thereby leading to a high false alarm rate. Also, the sensitivity (probability
of detection for a given quantity of explosives) is limited. In addition, the equipment can very
expensive ($.75 to $1.0 million).
Using thermal neutrons, tomographic images can be reconstructed that have been shown to
perform better than x-ray tomography. Da Silva and Crispim(2001) conduct an experiment with
lead and iron tubes with phantom inserts. For x-ray tomography, cocaine and explosives
detection was not possible, since lead and iron possess high linear attenuation coefficients for
photons at high energy levels. As such, dense materials like iron or lead, at photon energies of
120keV, give rise to low penetration power and can not be inspected using tomography with xrays and thus can not be used for detecting explosives or drugs. However, the images
reconstructed using thermal neutrons clearly show cocaine and explosive samples concealed by
iron and lead.
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Thermal neutron analysis was originally developed to find concealed explosives for the airline
industry in 1980s but it is currently being used for a number of other applications. Brown and
Gozani(1997) discuss the use of TNA for the detection of drugs in passenger luggage, detection
of explosives and drugs in small packages, detection of liquid explosives in bottles, detection of
buried landmines and unexploded ordnance.
b) Fast Neutron Analysis (FNA)

This technique is an improvement on TNA using high energy neutrons. The use of high energy
neutrons results in gamma rays at different energies, characteristics of the elements, that can be
detected and distinguished. Common explosives display a unique range of nitrogen density to
oxygen density. FNA is able to measure these two quantities as well as carbon and hydrogen
density, which allows is to be more sensitive and produces less number of false alarms. On the
other hand the main shortcoming is that fast high-energy neutrons create a significant
background in gamma-ray detectors, making it difficult to extract the information.
c) Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis (PFNA)

The concept behind PFNA is similar to that of FNA except that a pulsed beam of neutrons is
utilised. A focussed collimated beam is passed through the object and the gamma rays emitted at
certain energies are analysed. The method uses penetrating neutrons at lower energies than
FNA. The gamma rays are detected by scintillators that provide gamma-ray energy information.
The neutron beam profile provides the 2D position information required to determine the spatial
distribution. The third dimension, derived by timing and image reconstruction, constitutes a
major improvement over the basic FNA technique. The main advantage of using PFNA is that it
unambiguously determines the elemental composition of explosives and the spatial location of
these elemental concentrations. The main challenges in developing PFNA into a practical
system is the tedious process of constructing a practical, collimated, pulsed energetic neutron
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beam that makes the operation safe and operationally acceptable and cost effective. This
technology is still in research stage. Recently Brown et al.(1997) describe a cargo inspection
system based on this principle aimed at screening five trucks per hour.
d) Pulsed Fast Thermal Neutron Analysis (PFTNA)

This technique provides a bulk analysis of the chemical present. Compared to PFNA which uses
2 nanoseconds pulsing, PFTNA uses 10 microseconds pulsing and has the main advantage of
being portable. PFTNA allows the neutrons to be moderated and it can provide thermal neutron
information like TNA but in addition it also measures fast neutron reactions (C, O and N) and
its advantage over PFNA is that it can measure thermal neutron capture gamma rays. A detailed
discussion is available in Vourvopoulos and Womble (2001) and Womble et al. (1995). Also,
Womble et al.(2001) recently discussed the current status of the PELAN portable detection
system that woks on this principle.
e) Nuclear Resonance Absorption (NRA) of Gamma Rays

This technique is derived from the narrow state of excitation energy in Nitrogen atom resulting
in a sharp resonance of the cross section for the reaction 14 N ( y, p )13C producing a proton and
a carbon nucleus. The gamma ray transition state from the ground state of nitrogen atom to the
excited state is extraordinarily large. The gamma rays of exactly the resonant energy are
therefore very strongly absorbed by ordinary nitrogen nuclei, thus providing a unique and clear
signature of the presence of nitrogen, as opposed to other elements. The inverse reaction
(protons on the target of 13C nuclei) can be used to generate the probing beam of gamma rays,
resulting in gamma rays of just the right energy. The effective size of the source of these gamma
rays can be made very small, allowing an imaging capability. This technique has been
demonstrated to work extremely well on detecting nitrogen. Since the signature is unique
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(gamma rays are very penetrating), the technique works well with shielded explosives. The
main advantage of NRA is its high sensitivity, adequate spatial resolution, and unambiguous
measurement of nitrogen. The main limitation is that it only measures nitrogen and nothing else.
This technology is still in research stage.
A number of studies have used nuclear techniques for the detection of explosives and drugs. Burnett
and McKay(1992) have developed a method for screening liquid explosives in unopened bottles.
The system can detect specific explosives or verify the labelling on the bottle. NMR technology is
used for this with parameters signal amplitude, spin lattice, relaxation time, spin-spin coupling
constant and the diffusion constant. Unique NMR signatures for liquids can be obtained by setting
radiofrequency (RF) pulses to respond to one or more parameters.
Vartsky et al.(1993) devloped an explosive detection system based on nuclear resonance absorption
of gamma rays, 14N. Explosives generally contain nitrogen as a nitrate salt or in organic form. The
relatively high nitrogen density of most explosives can be exploited as a means of distinguishing
them from a host of other materials. The study shows that a high nitrogen region of a suitcase can
be scanned by high energy gamma rays and a measurement can be taken from the transmission
profile of photons.
Seed and Zahrt(1993) develop a resonance-absorption based explosive detection system as a virtual
prototype (on the computer only). The following processes are modelled: RF quadrupole proton
beam, resonant-energy gamma ray production, gamma ray transport through injected objects,
individual detector response, throughput of tomographic detector array and tomographic image
construction.
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Gokhale and Hussein (1995) propose a technique for explosive detection that uses characteristic
variations in the elemental cross-sections with energy to identify explosives. Transmitted neutrons
are analysed by the changes in their energy spectrum. Pattern Recognition techniques are used for
material recognition and identification.
Kirly et al.(2001) describe the use of elastically backscattered neutrons combined with thermal
neutron reflection method for the identification of illicit material by detecting hydrogen, carbon,
nitrogen and oxygen elements. Different materials have different spectra (net spectral yield plotted
against neutron energy) and these different signatures can be distinguished using pattern recognition
techniques.
An excellent summary of the performance abilities of the various neutron based systems built to
date is available in Speller(2001). PFNA shows the least false alarm rate of 5% or less. TNA on the
other hand is the most sensitive of up to 200 grams of material. However it should be noted here
that due to security reasons it is not possible to quote sensitivity results for other techniques.
2.1.4 Electromagnetic detection of metals and weapons

The two major categories of radio- frequency electromagnetic methods used for screening include
inductive methods (used by metal detectors at airports), and reflectometry including dielectrometry
and short-range imaging radar. The first class of methods detect the changes in mutual inductance
caused by additional presence of metal in the portal or detecting eddy currents produced in the
metal within the portal by a radio-frequency pulse. The amount of magnetic field to which public
can be exposed is limited to 1 gauss. Radio reflectometry is the measurement of radio-frequency
electromagnetic (RFEM) waves reflected by an object. Firearms, knives and other metallic weapons
can be detected by low power radar. More recently, millimetre wave radara systems can display
TV- like radar imagery of weapons concealed under clothing. Non- metallic objects also reflect radio
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waves and can be detected and imaged by radio reflectometry- this is called dielectometry and can
be used for explosives detection (Seward, 1991).
Sheen et al. (1992) describe various millimeter wave imaging systems that are capable of detection
through clothing. One of the advantages of these methods over x-ray is that they are not known to
cause any health hazard. High resolution images of concealed weapons can be obtained using two
dimensional holographic scanning. Using the holographic wavefront technique, data is converted
into a high resolution image for inspection by an operator. In order to overcome the drawbacks of
an earlier design, Sheen et al.(1995) developed a circular imaging system that moves around the
target for a complete 360 degrees scan. McMakin et al.(1995) developed a 3-D volumetric
hologram using wideband millimeter imaging. This system allows for higher resolution by showing
contours in the persons body. The person still needs to turn left, right and back to get a complete
scan.
2.2 Vapour detection systems

The following techniques are used for vapour detection systems (Jankowski et al., 1992).
2.2.1 Gas chromatography with chemiluminescence

These devices use gas chromatography to separate a sample of molecules from a carrier gas and to
isolate molecules of different chemical compounds from each other. The samples can be taken with
a portable hand-held collection unit that heats up the sampled surface with infrared lamps and sucks
air from near the surface. The sample is then injected into chromatographic columns, which consist
of thin tubes lined with a material to absorb molecules of interest. Different molecules are dissolved
to different extents and the material with the least affinity for the column substrate goes fastest.
Since different materials are released from the column at different times, mixtures of materials can
be identified. At the termination of the separation process, column contents are heated to pyrolyze
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the explosive compounds into fragments, among them nitric oxide. The chemiluminescent reaction
of nitric oxide with ozone yields photons that are detected using conventional means. This signal is
then analysed by a microprocessor to determine whether it comes from a dangerous substance. The
timing of photon detection is used for this as different compounds have different speeds of
migration through the column. Through a proprietary combination of column lengths and
temperature cycles, plastic explosives can be quickly detected.
2.2.2 Gas chromatography with Electron Capture Detector (GC/ECD)

This technology tests for low volatility, high electro-negativity substances. Similar to the previous
method, this technique also uses the chromatographic column as a first step to separate explosive
molecules from other components in a gas stream. The main difference is the detector. A small
radioactive source ionises a gas mixture to form free electrons that flow towards the anode thereby
creating a constant current. Molecules emerging from the column are mixed with these electrons
and since the explosive molecules are electro- negative, they grab some of the electrons. Fewer
electrons now migrate to the anode and this results in a decreased current. Microprocessors analyse
this change for finding explosives. This technology is quite good at detecting high vapour pressure
compounds but fails to detect plastics and very low volatility materials.
2.2.3 Ion mobility spectrometry (IMS)

The vapours or stream of airborne particles for test are first sampled. Air and explosive molecules
diffuse through a membrane or a filter into a chamber where sealed 63 Ni radioactive source ionises
the sample. At a high frequency (e.g. 50 times a second), small bursts of ions are released into a
separation region by an electronic gating grid. Under the influence of the electric field these ions
drift against the flow of a separation gas. The speed with which the ions move through the tube is a
function of their mass, charge, physical shape and the amount of diffusion. Heavier ions of
explosive compounds travel slowly than lighter ones. The drift region terminates in a collector
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electrode. The position in time and magnitude of the peaks is analysed by the microprocessor to
identify the concentration of the vapour being detected. Previous tests with this technology have
shown that it works well in detecting high vapour pressure explosives but fails on low vapour
pressure materials such as TNT or RDX. A critical review is available in Ewing et al.(2001).
2.2.4 Two stage mass spectrometry (MS/MS- Low pressure glow discharge ionisation)
The main theory behind this technique is that explosive molecules are unique in terms of their
electro-negativity in their propensity to attract and capture an extra electron to become negative
ions. Once ionised, they can be accelerated and analysed by subjecting them to electric and/or
magnetic fields. The mass-to-charge ratios of the ions can be determined by a variety of methods
referred to collectively as mass spectrometry. As a first step, the vapours are sampled into a
chamber with electric current that ionises air and explosive vapours. The ions are injected into the
first mass spectrometer that only contains 1 to 5% of the explosive molecules. By capturing the
output of the first stage mass spectrometer at a given time after injection or at a predetermined
location, usually a slit, the ions with particular mass-to-charge ratios are separated from the mixture.
Large molecules of explosive compounds can be fragmented into smaller pieces. The output of the
first stage is brought into collision with a stream of neutral atoms such as helium and the impact
causes the large molecules to fragment into smaller ions whose masses can be determined by the
second mass spectrometer. Since it is unlikely that more than one kind of molecule will both ionise
to the correct mass-to-charge ratio and break down into proper fragments, this technique is
considered very specific in detecting explosive materials with a very low false alarm rate.
2.2.5 Fluroimmunoassay (Antigen-Antibody reactions as a test technique)

In this technique a continuous flow of vapour is drawn into a preconcentrator at a rate of 2000 litres
per minute and collected in 1 ml of aqueous solvent. The output of the preconcentrator is then taken
to the detection unit (200 microlitre) vial containing immobilised antibodies and fluorescent
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labelled analogs of explosive molecules. The antibody reacts with extreme specificity to only one
particular explosive. If present in the sample, the explosive antigen will displace its fluorescent
labelled analog that is easily detected downstream. Using this method a test takes no more than one
minute and for minimising false alarms two columns can be used in parallel with the second column
containing an irrelevant antibody. A substance that causes an alarm in both columns is obviously
not reacting with the antibody and is a false alarm. The main advantage of this method is that it is
fairly inexpensive, fast and fully automated. However, the antibodies of all material likely to be
encountered are needed.
The advances in screening technologies themselves are not enough for developing robust screening
systems. Recently, it has been realised that an equal amount of effort needs to be put into the
computer analysis of data or images generated by the various techniques. This is important as
computers can help either automate the screening systems or help the understanding of data by
assisting human operators. The investigation of computer based data analysis in the context of
aviation security is very much an open ended research topic as this has not been studied in enough
detail as one might expect. In the next section, we detail two important areas where signal
processing and pattern recognition can make an important contribution. These are computer aided
screening and computer based training of screening personnel.
3. Computer Aided Screening

In this paper we discuss two areas where computer technology is crucial to security screening:
automated detection of explosives (Bjorkholm and Wang, 1992a), and the training of screeners. The
role of computers is likely to become crucial as we move into the age of digital x-ray techniques.
Cowen (1991) describes a number of advantages that digital x-ray technology offers over analog xray. Digital x-ray will allow a range of computer based analysis to take place in real time, e.g.
magnify, enhance, direct attention to image areas, etc. and offer high resolution images for security
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purposes. The digital x-ray technology, though a bit expensive, is already commercially available
and portable x-ray imaging devices for security purposes have been constructed (Yi et al., 1999). In
addition, a lot of data from other devices is now collected digitally making its computer analysis
quicker.
3.1 Automated screening

Computers can be used for signal processing and pattern recognition areas for the following
purposes:
i)
Improvement of data quality: Images viewed by human operators can be enhanced by the
computer so that contraband appears in stark contrast to its surroundings so that humans can
easily detect it.
ii)
Automated detection of dangerous explosives: The methodology will depend on the

modality of gathering data. In the case of images, the system will have to automatically
process such data to enhance its quality, segment objects of interest and then use some
features to characterise the resulting regions. However, if the data for analysis is a one
dimensional signal (spectra), the task involves template matching where test spectra are
matched with known templates. The data could be simply a measurement (a point in ndimensional feature space) that needs to be classified using pattern recognition techniques.
Improvement of data quality is of major importance in most systems. In the case of spectra
matching with neutron based techniques for explosives detection, peak identification and matching
is the most common technique. If the signal is mixed with noise, the peaks may occur with varied
magnitude and false peaks could affect the similarity measure with templates. In a number of
studies, spectra must be cleaned (smoothed) to find the true peaks before any matching with stored
templates is performed (Blaffert, 1995) and signals processed to improve the signal to noise ratio. In
recent research, many more advanced pattern recognition techniques are being used for spectra
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analysis including neural networks (ANCORE TNA system developed by Gozani and associates),
fuzzy logic systems (PELAN developed by Womble and associates) etc. In these approaches,
pattern recognition systems are trained to recognise specific signatures during testing. The
generalisation ability of such learning systems is quoted on test data.
Computers can also be used for modifying the quality of images or data in a form most suited to
human operators for analysis. X-ray images are invariably degraded by errors of approximation due
to discrete nature of the image, x-ray source, detector and electronic device noise. This causes
random changes to the grey levels of the image pixels. The image quality performance specification
for x-ray scanners from the requirements of the U.S. Customs service is detailed by Khan and
Smith(1993). The requirements are stated in terms of resolution, contrast and penetration for the
detection of contraband in parcels, boxes, suitcases, crates and cargo containers.
Noise can create problems with the visual inspection of images or automated image segmentation.
In the case of distinguishing between explosives and other material on the basis of effective atomic
number and density using x-rays, sophisticated classifiers need to be used to learn decision
boundaries from training data. A number of outlier removal methods and noise filtering methods are
useful in this context to improve the quality of training data. Image smoothing and enhancement can
remove the noise improving the quality of the images. A number of filters have been developed for
noise removal and special emphasis has been given in literature to those that preserve the edge
information (Nagao and Matsuyama, 1978). In the case of image analysis, image enhancement
methods can be applied to make the contraband more visible against its background. To achieve
this, one must have a measure of image quality IQ that correlates well with the human visual
system. Only on the basis of such an objective measure, one can rank a number of image
enhancement algorithms for a given image. Even though considerable work has been done on image
quality measures in general, e.g. for digital video, there is hardly any research at developing such
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measures to evaluate image enhancement. Recently, Bovis and Singh(2000) presented three new
measures of how separable tumours and their background were in mammographic x-ray images
based on contrast quantification between tumours and their surroundings. However, extending such
measures to images containing explosives and other items of luggage is quite difficult. This is
because of the large number of objects present in the security x-ray images and lack of homogeneity
in grey levels within the same object (tumours in medical images have a homogeneous structure). In
an ideal situation, a computer based imaging system will automatically select the appropriate
enhancement algorithm on a per image basis such that this improves the quality of the image by at
least 20% on an objective scale that correlates well with the human perception.
Burrows et al.(1995) discuss how the quality of images can be improved for visual inspection.
Specifically they attempt to locate components, such as a detonator, wires and (less successfully)
plastic explosive, which would constitute a bomb. Standard thresholding techniques to extract lead
solder, for example, do not use any spatial information. By using prior knowledge, a number of
contextual techniques have been explored. They use a deblurring algorithm on the image that is
convolved with a blurred point spread function and then deconvolved with a prior encouraging
neighbouring pixels to be alike. The results obtained always seem to improve the visual quality of
images.
In addition to improving the quality of images, attention direction mechanisms are extremely useful
for screening operators. The issues surrounding effective interface designs and pointing
mechanisms have not been fully researched. Security based devices present the overall image or
information to a human operator for decision making. By using software tools to point attention in
the images to certain areas or presenting the most important part of the information only, the
performance of visual inspection can be improved.
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Automated detection of explosives requires that the computer analysis can automatically
differentiate between explosives and harmless substances. As input, the system will have image or
n-dimensional data for analysis. From the images themselves, an n-dimensional vector of features
per object present needs to be derived in order to characterise them. This process will involve image
enhancement, image segmentation, feature extraction and classification. We detail these briefly.
Image enhancement: Most images are corrupted by noise at different levels and of different
distributions. The current x-ray images appear either as grey-scale or if taken with a brown filter,
different shades of brown (light yellow to black). The images are to be enhanced such that the edge
information should not be lost (Nagao and Matsuyama, 1978). The role of the image enhancement
algorithm should be to manipulate the contrast between objects and their background, and to clearly
present the visual structures within objects or associated with them. A variety of simplistic
enhancement algorithms such as histogram equalisation, low pass and high pass filters are not
suited to this and specialist algorithms are needed.
Image segmentation: Before any object can be labelled as suspicious, it must be isolated from all
others. Image segmentation groups pixels into regions that have some form of homogeneity. There
is significant evidence from radiological research in medicine, that conventional image
segmentation algorithms are not suited to images encountered with unimodal distributions as in our
case. A number of suitable image segmentation methods have been designed for x-rays and similar
images (Singh and Bovis, 2001). The quality of image segmentation can be further improved by
using relaxation labelling (Thai, 1991).
A image thresholding method has been used by Paranjape et al.(1998) for the segmentation of x-ray
images. In this method, histogram information of grey levels is used to segment the image.
Thresholding method is only useful where the image contains a few objects and each object is in
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strong contrast to the others. The method is best suited for solid objects but not so much for textile
objects with considerable variation. Boundary based methods are based on the following principle:
the grey level difference of two boundary pixels that belong to two different neighbouring regions is
much larger than the difference between pixels of the same region. Region based methods use
homogeneity in image regions for their segmentation and hybrid methods combine the boundary
and region information for effective segmentation.
Feature extraction: In x-ray images, the image processing part could involve the detection of
objects with specific colour (dark objects have higher density and a higher chance of being
explosives) or specific shape (elongated objects can be detonators, weapons such as knives etc.). In
the case of colour analysis, the distribution of grey levels of illicit objects could be modelled and in
test images each pixe l can be evaluated how likely it is that it comes from an illicit object. Shape
analysis can also play an important part (Navarro et al., 1996; Liu, 1997), however it has been
suggested recently that such analysis is only of limited use considering the variety of objects,
schemes to conceal objects and overlapping objects in luggage (Lu, 1999). A summary of state-ofthe art methods on shape analysis is available in Loncaric(1998). Additional cues on depth can be
obtained with performing a 3D image analysis, by studying shape from shading. By observing the
shading effects in grey scale and its texture, cues to the 3D structure of the object can be obtained.
Hardly any work has been done in this area for explosives detection.
Classification: A number of classifiers are available for the discrimination of data from different
classes. In particular, previous studies in the area of explosives detection have used both linear
methods (Shi, 2000) and non- linear methods (e.g. Feather et al., 1992).
A number of stud ies of addressed the issue of automated image analysis. These studies however
only apply very basic image processing and pattern recognition tools. Feather et al. (1992) describe
41

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a computer assisted screening system that involves an image processing stage and an object
classification stage. During the image processing stage, noise is suppressed, image is restored and
distinct regions corresponding to different objects are located. A neural network is used for object
classification based on extracted features from the image.
Reis (1994) describes a two-stage x-ray detection system. In the first stage, a standard luggage
inspection system is used with improved material inspection ability. Only those objects that are
labelled dangerous at the first stage are taken to the second stage that uses x-ray diffraction. This
produces a high degree of reliability with less number of false alarms. On average, one items takes
15 seconds for the complete system. If the article is dangerous after the second stage, an alarm
sounds.
Wilder et al.(1995) uses an x-ray diffraction spectra. Features extracted from these spectra and used
with a neural tree network to recognise explosives. Blaffert(1995) tried to prove that peak detection
and spectra identification techniques developed for x-ray diffraction and IR spectroscopy can be
used for explosive detection. This study used a CXRS luggage scanner to collect spectral data.
The main aim of the study by W. Liu (1997) was to automatically detect elongated objects such as
detonator using Gabor filters, Hough transform and information fusion. This study looks at
determining the size of the detonator by modelling image geometry in terms of the orientation of the
object, angle of x-ray etc. To describe the orientation of the detona tor, a plane perpendicular to the
conveyor and to the x-ray plane that passes through the stationary slit will be used as the reference
plane. In this research, the image of a detonator at orientation of the = 40 o degrees and = 0 has an
image size of 32x23 pixels. The main steps of the detection algorithm include: a) first use three
separate templates to detection the left, middle and right parts of the detonator; b) for all non-zero
pixels in the middle output, Hough transform is used in the middle window to search for all possible
42

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lines; c) fuse the information to detect detonator. The first step of template matching, a suitable
template is required which will be convolved with the image whose output is evaluated using a
normalised cross-correlation measure. The drawbacks of template matching include: a) as the
template is of small size, convolution with the image is very time consuming; b) it is difficult to
distinguish between two objects on the basis of simple template matching alone; c) the method is
very sensitive to the orientation of the detonator. The template is constructed by modelling a mask
that will generate maximum output for cyclindrical objects. This approach was found to be superior
to the use of Gabor filters where the real part was used for blob detection and the imaginary part
was used for edge detection. The threshold for template matching is determined empirically. The
study evaluates the approach for the effects of object overlapping, luggage position, and orientation
variation.
Lu and Conner (1996), Lu and Conners(1998) and Lu(1999) use both the dual energy and the
scatter technology for generating images. Based on the previous work of Zou(1998), illicit materials
can be separated from others using the R L plane, where R is a quantity related to Zeff , and
quantity L is density related. These quantities can only be calculated reliably from the images if the
true grey leve l of image pixels is known. The true grey level of an object can be explained as
follows: when an object of interest is placed in air, and there is no background objects appearing,
the grey level measured is called true grey level for that imaging modality. Lus study develops a
procedure to determine this true grey level to improve the separability of objects in R L plane.
Lu(1999) states: Unfortunately, most existing systems fail to develop very sophisticated imageprocessing systems. In fact most research has ignored the need to find true grey levels.
Lus study also designs an algorithm for spatially registering images. Image registration is
important since in multi-sensing technologies, objects in different imaging modalities need to be
registered before further computation can be done. This study also designs a robust image
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segmentation method for x-ray images based on region and boundary methods. In x-ray images,
objects in a bag can be characterised as textile objects or solid objects. It is not easy to segment
solid objects because textile objects are usually overlapped with solid objects because of their
inherent large gray level variations (Lu and Conners, 1998). Lu (1999) suggests four approaches to
x-ray image segmentation for security applications: thresholding methods, boundary-based
methods, region-based methods and hybrid methods.
3.2 Computer based training and assistance

It is well acknowledged that the amount of training screeners receive is much less than required. A
number of companies provide x-ray interpretation courses. Participants can bring their own x-ray
equipment of make arrangements with the company to provide the equipment. The training is
usually based on portable film based, real-time and cabinet type x-ray systems and it can be
conducted at clients site. Obviously, training courses cost money. For example, for one day, 8 hour
course with up to 8 students the training cost can be between $3000-$5000 including the instructor
fee and travel expenses. The topics covered by these courses which are based on one third lectures
and two thirds hands-on-training include: i) Details of recent domestic and international incidents;
ii) Details of bombs and improvised explosive devices; iii) Information on radiation safety; iv)
Information on he operation of x-ray machines; v) Details of standard operative procedures; vi)
Bomb recognition points; vii) X-ray interpretation; and vii) Suspicious articles procedure.
Unfortunately, such training is not regularly provided to screeners and only a few hours of training
is available considering the high cost. This increases the risk of missing to spot dangerous articles
as these are well concealed and appear in a variety of shapes. In addition, as security screening is
monotonous, keeping concentration is not easy.
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It has been universally accepted that computers can be used in a number of ways to improve the
training of screening personnel. First, computers can be used for generating test pictures that
contain objectionable items to a variety of complexity. These images can be used in isolation for
training purposes or mixed with on-line images to test whether the operator is actively efficient. In
May 1998, FAA announced that it will introduce computer-based security screening training. This
is a module of the Screener Proficiency Evaluation and Reporting System (SPEARS) which has
been developed by FAA to train, evaluate, and monitor the performance of employees who operate
x-ray screening checkpoints. Airlines can use SPEARS to recruit efficient candidates. FAA awarded
Safe Passage International $11 million contract to install the SPEARS computer based training
workstations and train instructors. In the year 2000, FAA along with Rapiscan Security Products
and Perkin Elmer Instruments received the innovation award for generating the threat projection
system (TIP). TIP can randomly project computer generated images of hundreds of guns, knives
and bombs to keep screeners alert and test their skills at detecting dangerous objects. When the
screener detects a threat and pushes the button, TIP flashes a congratulations message and records
the screeners performance. TIP also records missed threat images. The system will help train
screeners and monitor their performance. In July 2000 FAA announced $120 million worth of three
contracts to Rapiscan, PerkinElmer and Heimann Systems to purchase 800 TIP installed x-ray
machines from each vendor. By 2003, all machines with have the TIP ability.
4. Discussion and conclusions

In this paper we have reviewed some of the screening methods to prevent the use of conventional
explosives to threaten aircraft safety. The review of techniques to prevent biological weapons is
outside the scope of this article but presents a real threat. There are several problems why effective
screening to continue to present a challenge for years to come. First, the terrorists are moving
towards non-conventional explosives that are easy to obtain and synthesise at home (Oxley, 1995)
and it makes their detection difficult. Obviously, research effort is needed to tackle such non45

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conventional explosives. Second, because explosive detection systems systems are used to screen
the luggage of foreign nationals, the acceptance criteria must be internationally agreed. This process
is outlined by Murray and Riordon (1995). It has been suggested that from basic research to
implementation of technologies in the real world, it takes roughly 10 years and getting agreement
from various aviation agencies and government further delays this process. Third, not all research
can be translated into commercial products. Approximately 107 pieces of luggage are checked
every year at large international airports such as Heathrow (Speller, 2001). This translates into an
inspection time of 6 seconds per item. Unfortunately the systems that generate the lowest alarm
rates are also the slowest ones and unable to meet the 6 second inspection window criteria. As a
result of this, multi- level screening is becoming more popular and automatic threat recognition
systems are now in demand.
There are a number of factors that will determine the popularity of detection methods:
1. Detectors need to be fast so that the travellers are not inconvenienced and accurate to find any
explosives no matter how well hidden.
2. The number of false alarms should be very low.
3. The explosive material should be visually distinguishable from other material for image- based
methods.
4. The cost of the technology should be low.
5. There should be ways of keeping human operators alert for systems that need them.
Undoubtedly, research must focus on computational signal analysis and pattern recognition
techniques. These techniques must have the required sensitivity and specificity for the task of
detecting explosives. The basic features of several different technologies for explosive and narcotics
detection which are available in commercial devices, from the viewpoint of sensitivity, selectivity,
response time, complexity, cost and health hazards, are listed by Cable(1992). Hyatt et al.(1997)
advocate stringent methods based on probability theory to be applied for performance
46

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characterisation of screening system. Speller(2001) states that in the area of aviation security, much
can be learnt from the experiences of medical computer aided diagnosis (CAD) systems- automated
systems have been produced but none is clinically being used as they do not meet the clinical
requirements. Since most laboratory based research can not be conducted using real explosives, an
area of research is the development of good quality simulants as using real explosives for getting
data for analysis can be dangerous (Eilbert, 1996). Explosive simulants are proper substitutes for
real explosives and inert by nature with accurately controlled physical properties. They can reliably
duplicate characteristics such as density and effective atomic number of the explosives (Spanier and
Kury, 1996). Early simulants were rigid plastics with limited utility. Currently a number of
simulants are in use (see Lu, 1999, for details). In addition to simulants, other test objects are often
also considered for studies such as plastic, aluminium and steel wedges.
We expect that this review will provide a good background to researchers in signal processing,
image analysis and pattern recognition communities about explosives detection systems to
encourage further work from the point of view of signal analysis rather than signal generation. For
several years, the commercial companies and other agencies have thought that better screening
performances are only possible by better quality hardware- with an increased role of computers for
signal processing, there is no doubt that much is to be gained from the computational analysis of
data and images from such hardware.
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_______________________________
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Figure 1. Some example images of the conventional x-ray of luggage at airports
61

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Zeff
Inorganic
materials
Organic
materials
Drugs
Explosives
Density
Figure 2. The role of the effective atomic number and density in separating
explosives from other materials
62

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Explosives detection systems-a review

Explosives Detection Systems (EDS) for Aviation Security:

Sameer Singh and Maneesha Singh

Explosives detection systems-a review

Figure 1. Some example images of the conventional x-ray of luggage at airports

Explosives detection systems-a review

Explosives Detection Systems (EDS) for Aviation Security:

Keywords : explosives, security, screening, signal processing, pattern recognition

Explosives detection systems-a review

Explosives Detection Systems (EDS) for Aviation Security:

Explosives detection systems-a review

Explosives detection systems-a review

Explosives detection systems-a review

Explosives detection systems-a review

2. Security screening technologies

Explosives detection systems-a review

Explosives detection systems-a review

In order to detect contraband, it is important to understand their characteristics. Gozani(1994) lists

Explosives detection systems-a review

2.1 Bulk detection systems

2.1.1 X-ray based screening

Explosives detection systems-a review

Explosives detection systems-a review

Dual energy x-ray

Explosives detection systems-a review

Using dual-energy transmission technology, information related to Zeff is obtained. Organic

Explosives detection systems-a review

Explosives detection systems-a review

Explosives detection systems-a review

Explosives detection systems-a review

Explosives detection systems-a review

Explosives detection systems-a review

Some materials are non-separable to systems based on x-attenuation methods designed to

Explosives detection systems-a review

The SYCOSCAN developed by Schlumberger is a radioscopic control system developed based on

Explosives detection systems-a review

Activated nitrogen decays emitting a positron that

Explosives detection systems-a review

a) Computed tomography (Schmidt, 1989): Computed tomography initially developed for 3D

Explosives detection systems-a review

b) Multi-source/sensor imaging: In this technology, a number of different x-ray sources and

Explosives detection systems-a review

Explosives detection systems-a review

Explosives detection systems-a review

2.1.2 Laser based explosives detection

2.1.3 Nuclear based explosives detection

Explosives detection systems-a review

Explosives detection systems-a review

b) Fast Neutron Analysis (FNA)

c) Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis (PFNA)

Explosives detection systems-a review

d) Pulsed Fast Thermal Neutron Analysis (PFTNA)

e) Nuclear Resonance Absorption (NRA) of Gamma Rays

Explosives detection systems-a review

Explosives detection systems-a review

2.1.4 Electromagnetic detection of metals and weapons

Explosives detection systems-a review

2.2 Vapour detection systems

2.2.1 Gas chromatography with chemiluminescence

Explosives detection systems-a review

2.2.2 Gas chromatography with Electron Capture Detector (GC/ECD)

2.2.3 Ion mobility spectrometry (IMS)