G.R. No. L-15829 December 4, 1967
He consequently ordered Roman Santos on
ROMAN R. SANTOS, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
HON. FLORENCIO MORENO, as Secretary of Public
Works and Communications and JULIAN C. CARGULLO,
respondents-appellants.
Gil R. Carlos and Associates for petitioner-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents-appellants.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
THE APPEAL
The Honorable Secretary of Public Works &
Communications appeals from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila declaring of private ownership
certain creeks situated in barrio San Esteban, Macabebe,
Pampanga.
THE BACKGROUND
The Zobel family of Spain formerly owned vast track of
marshland in the municipality of Macabebe, Pampanga
province. Called Hacienda San Esteban, it was administered
and managed by the Ayala y Cia. From the year 1860 to
about the year 1924 Ayala y Cia., devoted the hacienda to
the planting and cultivation of nipa palms from which it
gathered nipa sap or "tuba." It operated a distillery plant in
barrio San Esteban to turn nipa tuba into potable alcohol
which was in turn manufactured into liquor.
Accessibility through the nipa palms deep into the hacienda
posed as a problem. Ayala y Cia., therefore dug canals
leading towards the hacienda's interior where most of them
interlinked with each other. The canals facilitated the
gathering of tuba and the guarding and patrolling of the
hacienda by security guards called "arundines." By the
gradual process of erosion these canals acquired the
characteristics and dimensions of rivers.
In 1924 Ayala y Cia shifted from the business of alcohol
production to bangus culture. It converted Hacienda San
Esteban from a forest of nipa groves to a web of fishponds.
To do so, it cut down the nipa palm, constructed dikes and
closed the canals criss-crossing the hacienda.
Sometime in 1925 or 1926 Ayala y Cia., sold a portion of
Hacienda San Esteban to Roman Santos who also
transformed the swamp land into a fishpond. In so doing, he
closed and built dikes across Sapang Malauling Maragul,
Quiñorang Silab, Pepangebunan, Bulacus, Nigui and Nasi.
The closing of the man-made canals in Hacienda San
Esteban drew complaints from residents of the surrounding
communities. Claiming that the closing of the canals caused
floods during the rainy season, and that it deprived them of
their means of transportation and fishing grounds, said
residents demanded re-opening of those canals.
Subsequently, Mayor Lazaro Yambao of Macabebe,
accompanied by policemen and some residents went to
Hacienda San Esteban and opened the closure dikes at
Sapang Malauling Maragul Nigui and Quiñorang Silab.
Whereupon, Roman Santos filed Civil Case No. 4488 in the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga which preliminarily
enjoined Mayor Yambao and others from demolishing the
dikes across the canals. The municipal officials of Macabebe
countered by filing a complaint (docketed as Civil Case No.
4527) in the same court. The Pampanga Court of First
Instance rendered judgment in both cases against Roman
Santos who immediately elevated the case to the Supreme
Court.
In the meantime, the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications1 conducted his own investigation and found
that the aforementioned six streams closed by Roman
Santos were natural, floatable and navigable and were
utilized by the public for transportation since time
immemorial.
November 3, 1930 to demolish the dikes across said six
streams. However, on May 8, 1931 the said official revoked
his decision of November 3, 1930 and declared the streams
in question privately owned because they were artificially
constructed. Subsequently, upon authority granted under Act
3982 the Secretary of Commerce and Communications
entered into a contract with Roman Santos whereby the
former recognized the private ownership of Sapang
Malauling Maragul, Quiñorang Silab, Pepangebunan,
Bulacus, Nigui and Nasi and the latter turned over for public
use two artificial canals and bound himself to maintain them
in navigable state. The Provincial Board of Pampanga and
the municipal councils of Macabebe and Masantol objected
to the contract. However, the Secretary of Justice, in his
opinion dated March 6, 1934, upheld its legality. Roman
Santos withdraw his appeals in the Supreme Court.
With respect to the portion of Hacienda San Esteban still
owned by the Zobel family, the municipal authorities of
Macabebe filed in 1930 an administrative complaint, in the
Bureau of Public Works praying for the opening of the dikes
and dams across certain streams in Hacienda San Esteban.
Whereupon, the district engineer of Pampanga and a
representative of the Bureau of Public Works conducted
investigations. In the meantime, the Attorney General, upon
a query from the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications, rendered an opinion dated October 11,
1930 sustaining the latter's power to declare streams as
publicly owned under Sec. 4 of Act 2152, as amended by Act
3208.
On September 29, 1930 the investigator of the Bureau of
Public Works, Eliseo Panopio, submitted his report
recommending the removal of the dikes and dams in
question. And on the basis of said report, the Secretary of
Commerce and Communications rendered his decision on
November 3, 1930 ordering Ayala y Cia., to demolish the
dikes and dams across the streams named therein situated
in Hacienda San Esteban. Ayala y Cia., moved for
reconsideration, questioning the power of the Secretary of
Commerce and Communications to order the demolition of
said dikes.
Days before the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications rendered his aforementioned decision,
Ayala y Cia., thru counsel, made representations with the
Director of Public Works for a compromise agreement. In its
letter dated October 11, 1930, Ayala y Cia., offered to admit
public ownership of the following creeks:
Antipolo, Batasan Teracan, Biuas or Batasan,
Capiz, Carbon, Cutut, Dalayap, Enrique, Iba,
Inaun, Margarita, Malauli or Budbud, Matalaba
Palapat, Palipit Maisao, Panlovenas, Panquitan,
Quinapati, Quiñorang, Bubong or Malauli Malati,
Salop, Sinubli and Vitas.
provided the rest of the streams were declared private.
Acting on said offer, the Director of Public Works instructed
the surveyor in his office, Eliseo Panopio, to proceed to
Pampanga and conduct another investigation.
On January 23, 1931 Panopio submitted his report to the
Director of Public Works recommending that some streams
enumerated therein be declared public and some private on
the ground that they were originally dug by the hacienda
owners. The private streams were:
Agape, Atlong, Cruz, Balanga, Batasan, Batasan
Matlaue, Balibago, Baliti, Bato, Buengco Malati,
Bungalin, Bungo Malati, Bungo Maragui, Buta-
buta, Camastiles, Catlu, Cauayan or Biabas, Cela,
Dampalit, Danlimpu, Dilinquente, Fabian,
Laguzan, Lalap Maburac, Mabutol, Macabacle,
Maragul or Macanduli, Macabacle or Mababo,
Maisac, Malande, Malati, Magasawa, Maniup,
Manulit, Mapanlao, Maisac, Maragul Mariablus
Malate, Masamaral, Mitulid, Nasi, Nigui or
Bulacus, Palipit, Maragul, Pangebonan,
Paumbong, Pasco or Culali, Pilapil, Pinac Malati,
Pinac, Maragul or Macabacle, Quiñorang Silab or
1
 Malauli Maragul, Raymundo, Salamin, Salop
Maisac, Salop Maragul, Sermon and Sinca or
Mabulog.
He therefore recommended revocation of the decision
already mentioned above, dated November 3, 1930 of the
Secretary of Commerce and Communications ordering the
demolition of the dikes closing Malauling Maragul,
Quiñorang, Silab, Pepangebonan, Nigui, Bulacus, Nasi, and
Pinac. On February 13, 1931 the Director of Public Works
concurred in Panopio's report and forwarded the same the
Secretary of Commerce and Communications.
On February 25, 1935 the municipality of Macabebe and the
Zobel family executed an agreement whereby they
recognized the nature of the streams mentioned in Panopio's
report as public or private, depending on the findings in said
report. This agreement was approved by the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications on February 27, 1935
and confirmed the next day by the municipal council of
Macabebe under Resolution No. 36.
A few months later, that is, on June 12, 1935, the then
Secretary of Justice issued an opinion holding that the
contract executed by the Zobel family and the municipality of
Macabebe has no validity for two reasons, namely, (1) the
streams although originally dug by Ayala y Cia., lost their
private nature by prescription inasmuch as the public was
allowed to use them for navigation and fishing, citing
Mercado vs. Municipality of Macabebe, 59 Phil. 592; and (2)
at the time the Secretary of Commerce and Communications
approved the said contract, he had no more power so to do,
because such power under Sec. 2 of Act 2152 was revoked
by the amending Act 4175 which took effect on December 7,
1934.
Despite the above ruling of the Secretary of Justice, the
streams in question remained closed.
In 1939 administrative investigations were again conducted
by various agencies of the Executive branch of our
government culminating in an order of President Manuel
Quezon immediately before the national elections in 1941
requiring the opening of Sapang Macanduling, Maragul
Macabacle, Balbaro and Cansusu. Said streams were again
closed in 1942 allegedly upon order of President Quezon.
THE CASE
Roman Santos acquired in 1940 from the Zobel family a
larger portion of Hacienda San Esteban wherein are located
25 streams which were closed by Ayala y Cia., and are now
the subject matter in the instant controversy.
Eighteen years later, that is in 1958, Congress enacted
Republic Act No. 20562 following a congressional inquiry
which was kindled by a speech delivered by Senator Rogelio
de la Rosa in the Senate. On August 15, 1958 Senator de la
Rosa requested in writing the Secretary of Public Works and
communications to proceed in pursuance of Republic Act
No. 2056 against fishpond owners in the province of
Pampanga who have closed rivers and appropriated them as
fishponds without color of title. On the same day, Benigno
Musni and other residents in the vicinity of Hacienda San
Esteban petitioned the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications to open the following streams:
Balbaro, Batasan Matua, Bunga, Cansusu,
Macabacle, Macanduling, Maragul, Mariablus,
Malate, Matalabang, Maisac, Nigui, Quiñorang
Silab, Sapang Maragul and Sepung Bato.
Thereupon, the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications instructed Julian C. Cargullo to conduct an
investigation on the above named streams.
On October 20, 1958 Musni and his co-petitioners amended
their petition to include other streams. The amended petition
therefore covered the following streams:
Balbaro, Balili, Banawa, Batasan Matua Bato,
Bengco, Bunga, Buta-buta, Camastiles, Cansusu,
Cela, Don Timpo, Mabalanga, Mabutol,
Macabacle, Macabacle qng. Iba, Macanduling,
Maragul, Malauli, Magasawa, Mariablus Malate
Masamaral, Matalabang Maisa, Mariablus,3 Nigui,
Pita, Quiñorang, Silab, Sapang Maragul, Sepung
Bato, Sinag and Tumbong.
On March 2, 4, 10, 30 and 31, and April 1, 1959, the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications rendered
his decisions ordering the opening and restoration of the
channel of all the streams in controversy except Sapang
Malauling, Maragul, Quiñorang, Silab, Nigui Pepangebonan,
Nasi and Bulacus, within 30 days on the ground that said
streams belong to the public domain.
On April 29, 1959, that is, after receipt of the Secretary's
decision dated March 4, 1959, Roman Santos filed a motion
with the Court of First Instance of Man for junction against
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications and
Julian C. Cargullo. As prayed for preliminary injunction was
granted on May 8, 1959. The Secretary of Public Work and
Communications answered and alleged as defense that
venue was improperly laid; that Roman Santos failed to
exhaust administrative remedies; that the contract between
Ayala y Cia., and the Municipality of Macabebe is null and
void; and, that Section 39 of Act 496 excludes public
streams from the operation of the Torrens System.
On April 29 and June 12, 1969, Roman Santos received the
decision of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications dated March 10 and March 30, March 31,
and April 1, 1959. Consequently, on June 24, 1959 he asked
the court to cite in contempt Secretary Florendo Moreno,
Undersecretary M.D. Bautista and Julian Cargullo for issuing
and serving upon him the said decisions despite the
existence of the preliminary injunction. The Solicitor General
opposed the motion alleging that the decisions in question
had long been issued when the petition for injunction was
filed, that they were received after preliminary injunction
issued because they were transmitted through the District
Engineer of Pampanga to Roman Santos; that their issuance
was for Roman Santos' information and guidance; and, that
the motion did not allege that respondents took steps to
enforce the decision. Acting upon said motion, on July 17,
1959, the trial court considered unsatisfactory the
explanation of the Solicitor General but ruled that Secretary
Florencio Moreno, Undersecretary M.D. Bautista and Julian
Cargullo acted in good faith. Hence, they were merely
"admonished to desist from any and further action in this
case, observe the preliminary injunction issued by this Court,
with the stern warning, however, that a repetition of the acts
complained of shall be dealt with severely."
On July 18, 1959 the trial court declared all the streams
under litigation private, and rendered the following judgment:
The Writ of preliminary injunction restraining the
respondent Secretary of Public Works &
Communications from enforcing the decisions of
March 2 And 4, 1959 and all other similar
decisions is hereby made permanent.
The Secretary of Public Works and Communication and
Julian Cargullo appealed to this Court from the order of July
17, 1959 issued in connection with Roman Santos' motion
for contempt and from the decision of the lower court on the
merits of the case.
ISSUES
The issues are: (1) Did Roman Santos exhaust
administrative remedies? (2) Was venue properly laid? (3)
Did the lower court err in conducting a trial de novo of the
case and in admitting evidence not presented during the
administrative proceeding? (4) Do the streams involved in
this case belong to the public domain or to the owner of
Hacienda San Esteban according to law and the evidence
submitted to the Department of Public Works and
Communications?
2
 DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
1. Respondents maintain that Roman Santos resorted to the
courts without first exhausting administrative remedies
available to him, namely, (a) motion for reconsideration of
the decisions of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications; and, (b) appeal to the President of the
Philippines.
Whether a litigant, in exhausting available administrative
remedies, need move for the reconsideration of an
administrative decision before he can turn to the courts for
relief, would largely depend upon the pertinent law,4 the
rules of procedure and the usual practice followed in a
particular office.5
Republic Act No. 2056 does not require the filing of a motion
for reconsideration as a condition precedent to judicial relief.
From the context of the law, the intention of the legislators to
forego a motion for reconsideration manifests itself
clearly.1awphil.net Republic Act No. 2056 underscores the
urgency and summary nature of the proceedings authorized
thereunder. Thus in Section 2 thereof the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications under pain of criminal liability is
duty bound to terminate the proceedings and render his
decision within a period not exceeding 90 days from the filing
of the complaint. Under the same section, the party
respondent concerned is given not than 30 days within which
to comply with the decision of the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, otherwise the removal of the dams
would be done by the Government at the expense of said
party. Congress has precisely provided for a speedy and a
most expeditious proceeding for the removal of illegal
obstructions to rivers and on the basis of such a provision it
would be preposterous to conclude that it had in mind to
require a party to file a motion for reconsideration — an
additional proceeding which would certainly lengthen the
time towards the final settlement of existing controversies.
The logical conclusion is that Congress intended the
decision of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications to be final and executory subject to a timely
review by the courts without going through formal and time
consuming preliminaries.
Moreover, the issues raised during the administrative
proceedings of this case are the same ones submitted to
court for resolution. No new matter was introduced during
the proceeding in the court below which the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications had no opportunity to
correct under his authority.
Furthermore, Roman Santos assailed the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 2056 and the jurisdiction of the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications to order the demolition
of dams across rivers or streams. Those questions are not
within the competence of said Secretary to decide upon a
motion for reconsideration.itc-alf They are purely legal
questions, not administrative in nature, and should properly
be aired before a competent court as was rightly done by
petitioner Roman Santos .
At any rate, there is no showing in the records of this case
that the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
adopted rule of procedure in investigations authorized under
Republic Act No. 2056 which require a party litigant to file a
motion for the reconsideration of the Secretary's decision
before he can appeal to the courts. Roman Santos however
stated in his brief that the practice is not to entertain motions
for reconsideration for the reason that Republic Act No. 2056
does not expressly or impliedly allow the Secretary to grant
the same. Roman Santos' statement is supported by Opinion
No. 61, Series of 1959, dated April 14, 1959 of the Secretary
of Justice.
As to the failure of Roman Santos to appeal from the
decision of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications to the President of the Philippines, suffice it
to state that such appeal could be dispensed with because
said Secretary is the alter ego of the President.itc-alf The
actions of the former are presumed to have the implied
sanction of the latter.6
2. It is contended that if this case were considered as an
ordinary civil action, venue was improperly laid when the
same was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila
for the reason that the case affects the title of a real
property. In fine, the proposition is that since the controversy
dwells on the ownership of or title to the streams located in
Hacienda San Esteban, the case is real action which,
pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 5 of the Rules of Court should
have been filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.
The mere fact that the resolution of the controversy in this
case would wholly rest on the ownership of the streams
involved herein would not necessarily classify it as a real
action. The purpose of this suit is to review the decision of
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications to enjoin
him from enforcing them and to prevent him from making
and issuing similar decisions concerning the stream in
Hacienda San Esteban. The acts of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications are the object of the litigation,
that is, petitioner Roman Santos seeks to control them,
hence, the suit ought to be filed in the Court of First Instance
whose territorial jurisdiction encompasses the place where
the respondent Secretary is found or is holding office. For
the rule is that outside its territorial limits, the court has no
power to enforce its order.7
Section 3 of Rule 5 of the Rules of Court does not apply to
determine venue of this action. Applicable is Sec. 1 the
same rule, which states:
Sec. 1. General rule. — Civil actions in Courts of
First Instance may be commenced and tried where
the defendant any of the defendants residents or
may be found or where the plaintiff or any of the
plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
Accordingly, the Petition for injunction who correctly filed in
the Court of First Instance of Manila. Respondents Secretary
of Public Works and Communications and Julian Cargullo
are found and hold office in the City of Manila.
3. The lower court tried this case de novo. Against this
procedure respondents objected and maintained that the
action, although captioned as an injunction is really a petition
for certiorari to review the decision of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications. Therefore they now contend
that the court should have confined itself to reviewing the
decisions of the respondent Secretary of Public Works and
Communications only on the basis of the evidence
presented in the administrative proceedings. On the other
hand, Roman Santos now, submits that the action is a
proceeding independent and distinct from the administrative
investigation; that, accordingly, the lower court correctly
acted in trying the case anew and rendering judgment upon
evidence adduced during the trial.
Whether the action instituted in the Court of First Instance be
for mandamus, injunction or certiorari is not very material. In
reviewing the decision of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, the Court of First Instance shall confine its
inquiry to the evidence presented during, the administrative
proceedings. Evidence not presented therein shall not be
admitted, and considered by the trial court. As aptly by this
Court speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in a similar
case:
The findings of the Secretary can not be enervated
by new evidence not laid before him, for that
would be tantamount to holding a new
investigation, and to substitute for the discretion
and judgment of the Secretary the discretion and
judgment of the court, to whom the statute had not
entrusted the case. It is immaterial that the present
action should be one for prohibition or injunction
and not one for certiorari; in either event the case
must be resolved upon the evidence submitted to
the Secretary, since a judicial review of executive
decisions does not import a trial de novo, but only
an ascertainment of whether the "executive
findings are not in violation of the Constitution or of
the laws, and are free from fraud or imposition,
3
 and whether they find reasonable support in the
evidence. . . .8
The case at bar, no matter what the parties call it, is in reality
a review of several administrative decisions of the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications. Being so, it was error
for the lower court to conduct a trial de novo. Accordingly, for
purposes of this review, only the evidence presented and
admitted in the administrative investigation will be
considered in our determination of whether on the basis
thereof the decisions of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications were correct.
4. We come to the question whether the streams involved in
this case belong to the public domain or to the owner of
Hacienda San Esteban. If said streams are public, then
Republic Act 2056 applies, if private, then the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications cannot order demolition
of the dikes and dams across them pursuant to his authority
granted by said law.
First, we come to the question of the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 2056. The lower court held Republic Act
No. 2056 constitutional but ruled that it was applied by
respondents unconstitutionally. That is, it held that Roman
Santos was being deprived of his property without due
process of law, for the dikes of his fishponds were ordered
demolished through an administrative, instead of a judicial,
proceeding. This conclusion and rationalization of the lower
court amount in effect to declaring the law unconstitutional,
stated inversely. Note that the law provides for an
expeditious administrative process to determine whether or
not a dam or dike should be declare a public nuisance and
ordered demolished. And to say that such an administrative
process, when put to operation, is unconstitutional is
tantamount to saying that the law itself violates the
Constitution. In Lovina vs. Moreno, supra, We held said law
constitutional. We see no reason here to hold otherwise.
Discussing now the applicability of Republic Act 2056, the
same applies to two types of bodies of water, namely (1)
public navigable rivers, streams, coastal waters, or
waterways and (b) areas declared as communal fishing
grounds, as provided for in Section 1 thereof:
Sec. 1. . . . the construction or building of dams,
dikes or any other works which encroaches into
any public navigable river, stream, coastal waters
and any other navigable public waters or
waterways as well as the construction or building
of dams, dikes or any other works in areas
declared as communal fishing grounds, shall be
ordered removed as public nuisances or as
prohibited constructions as herein provided: . . .
We are not concerned with communal fishing grounds
because the streams here involved have not been so
declared, but with public navigable streams. The question
therefore is: Are the streams in Hacienda San Esteban
which are mentioned in the petition of Benigno Musni and
others, public and navigable?
Respondents contend that said streams are public on the
following grounds:
(1) Hacienda San Esteban was formerly a marshland and
being so, it is not susceptible to appropriation. It therefore
belongs to the State. Respondents rely on Montano vs.
Insular Government, 12 Phil. 572.
(2) The streams in question are natural streams. They are
tributaries of public streams. Cited are the cases of Samson
vs. Dionisio, et al., 11 Phil. 538 and Bautista vs. Alarcon, 23
Phil. 636.
(3) The streams have for their source public rivers, therefore
they cannot be classified as canals.
(4) Assuming the streams were artificially made by Ayala y
Cia., said titleholder lost ownership over them by prescription
when it allowed the public to use them for navigation for a
long time. Respondents cite Mercado vs. Municipal
President of Macabebe, 59 Phil. 592.
(5) Assuming the streams in question are not mentioned as
public in the certificates of title held by Ayala y Cia., over
Hacienda San Esteban, still they cannot be considered as
privately owned for Section 39 of Act 496 expressly excepts
public streams from private ownership.
(6) The Panopio Report, which found the streams in question
of private ownership was nullified by the Secretary of Justice
in his opinion dated June 12, 1935.1awphil.net And, the
contract between Ayala y Cia., and the Secretary of
Commerce and Communications agreeing on the ownership
of the streams in question is ultra vires.
The doctrine in Montano vs. Insular Government, supra, that
a marshland which is inundated by the rise of the tides
belongs to the State and is not susceptible to appropriation
by occupation — has no application here inasmuch as in
said case the land subject matter of the litigation was not yet
titled and precisely Isabelo Montano sought title thereon on
the strength of ten years' occupation pursuant to paragraph
6, section 54 of Act 926 of the Philippine Commission.
Whereas, the subject matter in this case — Hacienda San
Esteban — is titled land and private ownership thereof by
Ayala y Cia., has been recognized by the King of Spain and
later by the Philippine Government when the same was
registered under Act 496.
Respondents further cite Bautista vs. Alarcon, 23 Phil. 631,
where the plaintiff sought injunction against the defendants
who allegedly constructed a dam across a public canal
which conveyed water from the Obando River to fishponds
belonging to several persons. The canal was situated within
a public land. In sustaining the injunction granted by the
Court of First Instance, this Court said:
No private persons has right to usurp possession
of a watercourse, branch of a river, or lake of the
public domain and use, unless it shall have been
proved that he constructed the same within in
property of his exclusive ownership, and such
usurpation constitutes a violation of the legal
provisions which explicity exclude such waterways
from the exclusive use or possession of a private
party. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in the above-cited case, a private person may
take possession of a watercourse if he constructed the same
within his property.itc-alf This puts Us into inquiry whether
the streams in question are natural or artificial. In so doing,
We shall examine only the evidence presented before the
Department of Public Works and Communications and
disregard that which was presented for the first time before
the lower court, following our ruling in Lovina vs. Moreno,
supra.
(1) Sapang Macanduling Maragul or Macanduli is presently
enclosed in Fishpond No. 12 of Roman Santos. Its banks
cannot anymore be seen but some traces of them could be
noted by a row of isolated nipa palms. Its water is subject to
the rise and fall of the tides coming from Guagua and
Antipolo Rivers and it is navigable by light watercrafts. Its
inlet is Antipolo River; another dike at its outlet along the
Palapat River.9 It is closed by four dikes: One dike at its inlet
along the Antipolo River; another dike at its cutlet along the
Palatpat River; and, two dikes in between. Then exist
channel at the Palapat River where the fishpond gate lies
has been filled up with dredge spoils from the Pampanga
River Control Project.
(2) Sapang Macabacle is found in Fishpond No. 13. Its
banks are still evident. This stream is about 30 meters wide,
two meters deep and one and one-half to two kilometers
long. Its source is Rio Cansusu. Like Macanduli, its channel
is obstructed by four dikes. One of them was constructed by
the engineers of the Pampanga River Control Project.
4
(3) Sapang Balbaro which is found in Fishpond No. 13, runs
from Canal Enrique near Rio Cansusu to Sapang
Macabacle, a distance of about one-half kilometer. It is
passable by banca. The closures of this stream consist of
two dikes located at each ends on Canal Enrique and
Sapang Macabacle.
(4) Sapang Cansusu is a continuation of the Cansusu River.
The Cansusu River opens at the Guagua River and allegedly
ends at the Palanas River in front of Barrio San Esteban. At
a point near the mouth of Sapang Balbaro, the owners of
Hacienda San Esteban built a canal leading straight to one
end of Barrio San Esteban. They called this canal "Canal
Enrique." And at the point where Canal Enrique joins
Cansusu they built a dike across Cansusu, thus closing this
very portion of the river which extends up to Palanas River
where they built another closure dike. This closed portion,
called "Sapang Cansusu," is now part of Fishpond No. 1.
Sapang Cansusu is half a kilometer long and navigable by
banca.
Appellant's witnesses, Beligno Musni, 41, Macario
Quiambao, 96, Roman Manansala, 55 and Castor
Quiambao, 76, all residents of Barrio San Esteban, testified
that prior to their closure, Sapang Macaduli, Macabacle,
Balbaro and Cansusu were used as passageway and as
fishing grounds; that people transported through them tuba,10
wood and sasa,11 and that the tuba was brought to the
distillery in Barrio San Esteban. Macario Quiambao testified
also that said four streams "were created by God for the
town people"; and that if any digging was done it was only to
deepen the shallow parts to make passage easier.
According to witness Anastacio Quiambao said streams
were navigable, even Yangco's ship "Cababayan" could
pass through. Simplicio Quiambao, 36, and Marcelino
Ocampo, 55, stated on direct examination that before
closure of the above named four streams, people from the
surrounding towns of Guagua, Bacolor, Macabebe, Masantol
and Sexmoan fished and navigated in them.
Against the aforementioned, testimonial evidence Roman
Santos presented the testimony of Nicanor Donarber, 80,
Mariano Guinto, 71, and his own. Donarber, who started
working as an arundin12 testified that Ayala y Cia., dug
Sapang Macanduli, Balbaro and Macabacle; that he worked
also in the construction together with other workers; and,
that as an overseer he inspected their work. Mariano Guinto
testified that he worked for Ayala y Cia., as a tuba gatherer;
that in order to reach remote nipa groves by banca, they
made canals; and, that he was one of the who worked in the
construction of those canals. Roman Santos also testified
that Sapang Macanduli, Macabacle, Balbaro and Cansusu
are artificial canals excavated as far back as 1850 and due
to erosion coupled with the spongy nature of the land, they
acquired the proportion of rivers; that he joined Sapang
Balbaro to Sapang Macabacle because the former was a
dying canal; and that Cansusu River is different from Sapang
Cansusu Witness Domingo Yumang likewise testified that
Sapang Balbaro man-made.
We observe that witnesses positively stated that Sapang
Macanduli, Macabacle and Balbaro were made by the
owners of Hacienda San Esteban. With respect to Sapang
Cansusu none, except Roman Santos himself, testified that
Sapang Cansusu is an artificial canal. It is not one of the
streams found and recommended to be declared private in
the Panopio Report. Sapang Cansusu follows a winding
course different and, distinct from that of a canal such as
that of Canal Enrique which is straight. Moreover, Sapang
Cansusu is a part of Cansusu River, admittedly a public
stream.
(5) Sapang Maragul, Mabalanga and Don Timpo are all part
of Fishpond No. 1. Maragul is 600 meters long and 30 to 35
meters wide. Mabalanga is 250 meters in length and 50
meters in width. Don Timpo is 220 meters long and 20
meters wide. All of them are navigable by banca. Maragul
and Mabalanga open at Guagua River and join each other
inside the hacienda to form one single stream, Sapang Don
Timpo, which leads to the Matalaba River. Maragul,
Mabalanga and Don Timpo, formerly ended inside the
hacienda but later Mabalanga was connected to Don Timpo.
Maragul was connected to Mabalanga and Sapang Cela was
extended to join Maragul.
Witnesses Nicanor Donarber, Mariano Ocampo and Mariano
Guinto testified that Maragul, Mabalanga and Don Timpo are
artificial canals dug by Ayala y Cia., and that they (Donarber
and Mariano Guinto) worked in said excavations.13 Witness
Mariano Guinto clarified that Don Timpo was originally dug
but Mabalanga and Maragul were formerly small non-
navigable streams which were deepened into artificial
navigable canals by Ayala y Cia.14
Exhibit F, which is a map showing the streams and rivers in
Hacienda San Esteban, shows that Maragul, Mabalanga and
Don Timpo are more or less straight. From the big rivers
(Guagua and Matalaba Rivers) they lead deep into the
interior of the hacienda, thus confirming the testimony that
they were built precisely as a means of reaching the interior
of the estate by banca. The weight of evidence, therefore,
indicate that said streams are manmade.
(6) Sapang Bunga, now part of Bunga fishpond, gets its
water from Sapanga Iba and empties at Sta. Cruz River. It is
about 300-400 meters long, 5-6 meters wide and 1-1.60
meters deep.
(7) Sapang Batu is found in Capiz Fishpond. About 300-400
meters long, 4-5 meters wide and 1.50-2.20 meters deep, it
starts at Capiz River and ends at Malauling Maragul. From
Capiz River until it intersects Sapang Nigui the stream is
called Sapang Batu Commencing from Sapang Nigui and up
to its end at Sapang Malauling Maragul, the stream is called
Sapang Batu. Commencing from Sapang Nigui and up to its
end at Sapang Malauling Maragul, the stream is called
Sepong Batu. Sepong Batu is not among those streams
declared in the Panopio Report as private.
(8) Sapang Banawa has one end at Palanas River and the
other at Sapang Macabacle. It is about 300 meters long, 3-4
meters wide and 1.30-1.40 meters deep. Its whole length is
within Fishpond No. 13 of Roman Santos.
(9) Sapang Mabutol is a dead-end stream, that is, it ends
inside the hacienda. It opens along Guagua river. Since its
closure, it has become part of Fishpond No. 1.
(10) Sapang Buta-buta, like Mabutol, dies inside the
hacienda. It connects with Cansusu River and is about 100
meters long, 3-4 meters wide and 1.2-1.5 meters deep. It is
now a part of Fishpond No. 13.
(11) Sapang Masamaral, another stream which opens at
Cansusu River And ends inside the hacienda., is 100-200
meters long, 3-4 meters wide and 1.50-2 meters deep. It
now forms part of Fishpond No. 13.
The uncontradicted testimony of Marcos Guinto is that
Sapang Bunga, Batu, Sepong Batu, Banawa, Mabutol, Buta-
Buta and Masamaral were constructed by Ayala y Cia., to
gain access to the nipa the, interior of the hacienda. This
testimony tallies with the findings in the Panopio Report
which will be discussed herein later. The evidence adduced
in the administrative proceeding conducted before a
representative of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications supports the contention that said streams
are merely canals built by Ayala y Cia., for easy passage
into the hinterland of its hacienda.
(12) Sapang Magasawa consists of two streams running
parallel to each other commencing from Matalaba River and
terminating at Mariablus Rivers. About 600-700 meters long,
4-5 meters wide and 1.5-2 meters deep, these two streams
are navigable by banca. They are enclosed within Fishpond
No. 1.
(13) Sapang Mariablus Malate, about 3-4 meters wide and
250 meters long, is another stream that ends inside the
hacienda and gets its water from Guagua River. It is no part
of Fishpond No. 1.
5
(14) Sapang Matalabang Malate or Maisac opens at Guagua
River and ends at Sapang Cela and Matalabang Maragul.
This stream, which is about 800 meters long and 18 meters
wide, forms part of Fishpond No. 1 of Roman Santos.
(15) Sapang Batasan Matua about 600 meters long, three
meters wide and .80 meters deep at low tide and 1.90
meters deep at high tide crosses the hacienda from
Mariablus River to Cansusu River. It is at present a part of
Fishpond No. 1-A.
(16) Sapang Camastiles, a dead end stream of about 200 to
300 meters in length, gets its water from Biuas River. It is
within Fishpond No. 1.
(17) Sapang Cela is within Fishpond No. 1. Its whole length
situated inside the hacienda, it opens at Sapang Matalabang
Malate or Maisac and ends at Sapang Malungkot. Latter
Cela was extended to connect with Sapang Maragul. It is
about 200 meters long and four meters wide.
Mariano Guinto, 71, testified without contradiction that
Sapang Mariablus Malate and Matalabang Malate were
formerly small and non-navigable streams which were dug
by Ayala y Cia.,15 while Batasan Matua Camastiles,
Magasawa and Cela are original canals made by Ayala y
Cia.,16 that he was one of those who worked in the
construction of said canals; and that it took years to
construct them. All these streams were recommended in the
Panopio Report for declaration as private streams.
(18) Sapang Sinag, 200 meters long, four to five meters
wide, one meter and one and one-half meters deep at low
and high tides, respectively, gets its water from Cutod River
and leads inside the hacienda to connect with Sapang
Atlong Cruz, a stream declared private in the Panopio
Report. It is now inside Fishpond No. 14.
(19) Sapang Balili, also found inside Fishpond No. 14, is
about 200 meters long, three to four meters wide and one
meter deep at low tide. From its mouth at Cutod River it drifts
into the interior of the hacienda and joins Sapang Bengco.17
(20) Sapang Pita is within Fishpond Capiz. It takes water
from Capiz River but dies 250 meters inside the hacienda. It
is about four to five meters wide, and one meter deep at low
tide and 1.50 meters deep at high tide.
(21) Sapang Tumbong, situated inside Capiz Fishpond,
derives its water from Sapang Quiñorang Silab, a stream
declared private by the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, and ends inside the hacienda.18
(22) Sapang Bengco is found within Fishpond No.
14.1awphil.net Two hundred meters long, five meters wide,
and one meter deep at low tide and 1.50 meters deep at
high tide it gets water from Sapang Biabas and connects
with Baliling Maisac.19
According to Marcos Guinto, a witness for Roman Santos,
Sapang Sinag, Balili, Pita Tumbong and Bengco were
excavated a long time ago by Ayala y Cia.; and that they
have a winding course because when they were made the
workers followed the location of the nipa palms.20 On the
other hand, Marcelo Quiambao, testified that Sapang
Tumbong is a natural stream and that the reason he said so
is because the stream was already there as far back as 1910
when he reached the age of ten. No other oral evidence was
presented to contradict the testimony of Marcos Guinto that
the said five streams were artificially made by Ayala y Cia.
To show that the streams involved in this case were used
exclusively by the hacienda personnel and occasionally by
members of their families, Roman Santos introduced the
testimony of Eliseo Panopio, Nicanor Donarber, Blas Gaddi,
Mariano Ocampo, Mariano Guinto, Alejandro Manansala and
himself. The witnesses categorically testified that the public
was prohibited from using the streams as a means of
navigation and that the prohibition was enforced by guards
called arundines.
One and all, the evidence, oral and documentary, presented
by Roman Santos in the administrative proceedings supports
the conclusion of the lower court that the streams involved in
this case were originally man-made canals constructed by
the former owners of Hacienda San Esteban and that said
streams were not held open for public use. This same
conclusion was reached 27 years earlier by an investigator
of the Bureau of Public Works whose report and
recommendations were approved by the Director of Public
Works and submitted to the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications.
As stated, pursuant to Act 2152, as amended by Act 3208,
the Bureau of Public Works and the Department of
Commerce and Communications locked into and settled the
question of whether or not the streams situated within
Hacienda San Esteban are publicly or privately owned. We
refer to the so-called Panopio Report which contains the
findings and recommendations of Eliseo Panopio, a surveyor
in the Bureau of Public Works, who was designated to
conduct formal hearings and investigation. Said report found
the following streams, among others, of private ownership:
Camastiles, Cela Balanga, Bato, Batasan,
Bengco, Buta-buta, Don Timpo, Mabutol,
Macabacle, Macanduli, Malande Malate (Bunga),
Magasawa, Masamaral, Maragul, Mariablus
Malate, Matalaba Malate, Nasi, Nigui,
Pangebonan and Quiñorang Silab
on the ground that —
The preponderance of the probatory facts, . . .,
shows that the rivers, creeks, esteros and canals
listed in (1) have originally been constructed,
deepened, widened, and lengthened by the
owners of the Hacienda San Esteban. That they
have been used as means of communication from
one place to another and to the inner most of the
nipales, exclusively for the employees, colonos
and laborers of the said Hacienda San Esteban.
That they have never been used by the public for
navigation without the express consent of the
owners of the said Hacienda.21
Bases for the above-quoted conclusion were "the reliable
informations gathered from old residents of the locality, from
outsiders, the sworn statements obtained from different
persons not interested in this case and the comparison of
the three plans prepared in 1880, 1906 and 1930.22 The
persons referred to are Martin Isip, Hilarion Lobo, Emigdio
Ignacio, Castor Quiambao, Matias Sunga facio Cruz,
Inocencio Dayrit, Gabriel Manansala, Lope Quiambao,
Marcelino Bustos and Juan Lara .
On February 13, 1931 the Director of Public Works
transmitted the Panopio Report to the Secretary of
Commerce and Communications recommending approval
thereof. Later, on February 27, 1935, Secretary of Public
Works and Communications De las Alas approved the
agreement of Ayala y Cia., and the Municipality of
Macabebe, concerning the ownership of the streams in
Hacienda San Esteban, for being in conformity with said
Panopio Report.
This agreement of Ayala y Cia and the Municipality of
Macabebe which was approved by the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications only on February 27, 1935,
could not however bind the Government because the power
of the Secretary of Public Works and Communication to
enter thereto had been suppressed by the Philppine
Legislature when it enacted Act 4175 which effect on
December 7, 1934.
Nullity of the aforesaid contract would not of course affect
the findings of fact contained in the Panopio Report.
In weighing the evidence presented before the administrative
investigation which culminated in this appeal, respondent
Secretary seemed to have ignored the Panopio Report and
other documentary evidence as well as the testimony of
6
witnesses presented by petitioner but instead gave credence
only to the witnesses of Benigno Musni, et al. Upon review,
however, the lower court, taking into account all the
evidence adduced in the administrative hearing, including
the Panopio Report, as well as those presented for the first
time before it, sustained petitioner's averment that the
streams in question were artificially made, hence of private
ownership. As stated, this conclusion of the lower court
which is in accord with the findings of Panopio as contained
in his report, finds ample support from the evidence
presented and admitted in the administrative investigation.
Accordingly, we see no merit in disturbing the lower court's
findings fact.
We next consider the issue of whether under pertinent laws,
the streams in question are public or private.
We quote Articles 339, 407 and 408 of the Spanish Civil
Code of 1889:
Art. 339. Property of public ownerships is —
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, river banks, shores,
roadsteads, and that of a similar character;
Art. 407. The following are of public ownership:
1. Rivers and their natural channels;
2. Continuous or intermittent waters from springs
or brooks running in their natural channels and the
channels themselves.
3. Waters rising continuously or intermittently on
lands of public ownership;
4. Lakes and ponds formed by nature, on public
lands, and their beds;
5. Rain waters running through ravines or sand
beds, the channels of which are of public
ownership;
6. Subterranean waters on public lands;
7. Waters found within the zone of operation of
public works, even though constructed under
contract;
8. Waters which flow continuously or intermittently
from lands belonging to private persons, to the
State, to provinces, or to towns, from the moment
they leave such lands;
9. The waste waters of fountains, sewers, and
public institutions.
Art. 408. The following are of private ownership:
1. Waters, either continuous or intermittent rising
on private etates, while they run through them;
2. Lakes and ponds and their beds when formed
by nature on such estates;
3. Subterranean waters found therein;
4. Rain water falling thereon as long as their
bounderies.
5. The channels of flowing streams, continuous or
intermittent, formed by rain water, and those of
brooks crossing estates which are not of public
ownership.
The water, bed, banks, and floodgates of a ditch
or aqueduct are deemed to be an integral part of
the estate or building for which the waters are
intended. The owners of estates through or along
the boundaries of which the aqueduct passes can
assert no ownership over it, nor any right to make
use. of it beds or banks, unless they base their
claims on title deed which specify the right or the
ownership claimed.
Articles 71 and 72 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3,
1866 state:
Art. 71. The water-beds of all creeks belong to the
owners of the estates or lands over which they
flow.
Art. 72. The water-beds on public land, of creeks
through which spring waters run, are a part of the
public domain.
The natural water-beds or channels of rivers are
also part of the public domain.
Pursuant to Article 71 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
August 3, 1866, and Article 408(5) of the Spanish Civil Code,
channels of creeks and brooks belong to the owners of
estates over which they flow. The channels, therefore, of the
streams in question which may be classified creeks, belong
to the owners of Hacienda San Esteban.
The said streams, considered as canals, of which they
originally were, are of private ownership in contemplation of
Article 339(l) of the Spanish Civil Code. Under Article 339,
canals constructed by the State and devoted to public use
are of public ownership. Conversely, canals constructed by
private persons within private lands and devoted exclusively
for private use must be of private ownership.
Our attention has been called to the case of Mercado v.
Municipal President of Macabebe, 59 Phil. 592. There the
creek (Batasan-Limasan) involved was originally dug by the
estate's owner who, subsequently allowed said creek to be
used by the public for navigation and fishing purposes for a
period of 22 years. Said this Court through Mr. Justice Diaz:
And even granting that the Batasan-Limasan
creek acquired the proportions which it had, before
it was closed, as a result of excavations made by
laborers of the appellant's predecesor in interest, it
being a fact that, since the time it was opened as a
water route between the Nasi River and Limasan
creek, the owners thereof as well as strangers,
that is, both the residents of the hacienda and
those of other nearby barrios and municipalities,
had been using it not only for their bancas to pass
through but also for fishing purposes, and it being
also a fact that such was the condition of the creek
at least since 1906 until it was closed in 1928, if
the appellant and her predecessors in interest had
acquired any right to the creek in question by
virtue of excavations which they had made
thereon, they had such right through prescription,
inasmuch as they failed to obtain, and in fact they
have not obtained, the necessary authorization to
devote it to their own use to the exclusion of all
others. The use and enjoyment of a creek, as any
other property simceptible of appropriation, may
be acquired or lost through prescription, and the
appellant and her predecessors in interest
certainly lost such right through the said cause,
and they cannot now claim it exclusively for
themselves after the general public had been
openly using the same from 1906 to 1928. . . .
In the cited case, the creek could have been of private
ownership had not its builder lost it by prescription. Applying
7
the principle therein enunciated to the case at bar, the Flores Macapagal, Ocampo and Balbastro for petitioners-
conclusion would be inevitably in favor of private ownership, appellants.
considering that the owners of Hacienda San Esteban held
them for their exclusive use and prohibited the public from
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting
using them.
Assistant Solicitor General Dominador L. Quiroz and
Solicitor Concepcion T. Agapinan for respondents-
It may be noted that in the opinion, mentioned earlier, issued appellees.
on June 12, 1935, the Secretary of Justice answered in the
negative the query of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications whether the latter can declare of private
ownership those streams which "were dug up artificially",
because it was assumed that the streams were used "by the ESGUERRA, J.:p
public as fishing ground and in transporting their commerce
in bancas or in small crafts without the objection of the
Petition for review by certiorari of the judgment of the Court
parties who dug" them. Precisely, Mercado v. Municipality of
of Appeals dated November 17, 1969 in its CA-G.R. 27655-
Macabebe was given application therein. However, the facts,
R which reverses the judgment of the Court of First Instance
as then found by the Bureau of Public Works, do not support
of Pampanga in favor of petitioners-appellants against the
the factual premise that the streams in question were used
Secretary and Undersecretary of Public Works &
by the public "without the objection of the parties who dug"
Communications in the case instituted to annul the order of
them. We cannot therefore take as controlling in determining
November 25, 1958 of respondent Secretary of Public Works
the merits of this the factual premises and the legal
& Communications directing the removal by the petitioners of
conclusion contained in said opinion.
the dikes they had constructed on Lot No. 15856 of the
Register of Deeds of Pampanga, which order was issued
The case at bar should be differentiated from those cases pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056. The
where We held illegal the closing and/or appropriation of dispositive portion of the judgment of reversal of the Court of
rivers or streams by owners of estates through which they Appeals reads as follows:
flow for purposes of converting them into fishponds or other
works.23 In those cases, the watercourses which were
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING
dammed were natural navigable streams and used
CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment
habitually by the public for a long time as a means of
appealed from is hereby reversed, and
navigation. Consequently, they belong to the public domain
another entered: [1] upholding the
either as rivers pursuant to Article 407 (1) of the Spanish
validity of the decision reached by the
Civil Code of 1889 or as property devoted to public use
respondent officials in the administrative
under Article 339 of the same code. Whereas, the streams
case; [2] dissolving the injunction issued
involved in this case were artificially made and devoted to
by the Court below; and [3] cancelling
the exclusive use of the hacienda owner.
the registration of Lot No. 2, the
disputed area, and ordering its
Finally, Sapang Cansusu, being a natural stream and a reconveyance to the public domain. No
continuation of the Cansusu River, admittedly a public costs in this instance.
stream, belongs to the public domain. Its closure therefore
by the predecessors of Roman Santos was illegal.
The background facts are stated by the Court of Appeals as
follows:
The petition for the opening of Sapang Malauling Maragul,
Quiñorang Silab, Nigui, Pepangebunan, Nasi and Bulacus
The spouses Romeo Martinez and
was dismissed by the Secretary of Public Works and
Leonor Suarez, now petitioners-
Communications and the case considered closed. The said
appellees, are the registered owners of
administrative decision has not been questioned in this
two (2) parcels of land located in Lubao,
appeal by either party. Hence, they are deemed excluded
Pampanga, covered by transfer
herein.
certificate of title No. 15856 of the
Register of Deeds of the said province.
All the other streams, being artificial and devoted exclusively Both parcels of land are fishponds. The
for the use of the hacienda owner and his personnel, are property involved in the instant case is
declared of private ownership. Hence, the dams across them the second parcel mentioned in the
should not he ordered demolished as public nuisances. above-named transfer certificate of title.

With respect to the issue of contempt of court on the part of The disputed property was originally
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications and owned by one Paulino Montemayor,
Julian Cargullo for the alleged issuance of a administrative who secured a "titulo real" over it way
decisions ordering demolition of dikes involved in this case back in 1883. After the death of Paulino
after the writ of injunction was granted and served, suffice it Montemayor the said property passed to
to state that the lower court made no finding of contempt of his successors-in-interest, Maria
court. Necessarily, there is no conviction for contempt Montemayor and Donata Montemayor,
reviewable by this Court and any discussion on the matter who in turn, sold it, as well as the first
would be academic. parcel, to a certain Potenciano Garcia.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, Because Potenciano Garcia was
except as to Sapang Cansusu which is hereby declared prevented by the then municipal
public and as to which the judgment of the lower court is president of Lubao, Pedro Beltran, from
reversed. No costs. So ordered. restoring the dikes constructed on the
contested property, the former, on June
22, 1914, filed Civil Case No. 1407 with
G.R. No. L-31271 April 29, 1974
the Court of First Instance against the
said Pedro Beltran to restrain the latter
ROMEO MARTINEZ and LEONOR SUAREZ, spouses, in his official capacity from molesting
petitioners-appellants, him in the possession of said second
vs. parcel, and on even date, applied for a
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY and writ of preliminary injunction, which was
UNDERSECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS & issued against said municipal president.
COMMUNICATIONS, respondents-appellees. The Court, by decision promulgated
June 12, 1916, declared permanent the
preliminary injunction, which, decision,
on appeal, was affirmed by the Supreme

8
 Court on August 21, 1918. From June
22, 1914, the dikes around the property
in question remained closed until a
portion thereof was again opened just
before the outbreak of the Pacific War.
On April 17, 1925. Potenciano Garcia
applied for the registration of both
parcels of land in his name, and the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
sitting as land registration court, granted
the registration over and against the
opposition of the Attorney-General and
the Director of Forestry. Pursuant to the
Court's decision, original certificate of
title No. 14318, covering said parcels 1
and 2 was issued to the spouses
Potenciano Garcia and Lorenza Sioson.
These parcels of land were
subsequently bought by Emilio Cruz de
Dios in whose name transfer certificate
of title No. 1421 was first issued on
November 9, 1925.
Thereafter, the ownership of these
properties changed hands until
eventually they were acquired by the
herein appellee spouses who hold them
by virtue of transfer certificate of title No.
15856.
To avoid any untoward incident, the
disputants agreed to refer the matter to
the Committee on Rivers and Streams,
by then composed of the Honorable
Pedro Tuason, at that time Secretary of
Justice, as chairman, and the Honorable
Salvador Araneta and Vicente Orosa,
Secretary of Agriculture and National
Resources and Secretary of Public
Works and Communications,
respectively, as members. This
committee thereafter appointed a Sub-
Committee to investigate the case and
to conduct an ocular inspection of the
contested property, and on March 11,
1954, said Sub-Committee submitted its
report to the Committee on Rivers and
Streams to the effect that Parcel No. 2
of transfer certificate of title No. 15856
was not a public river but a private
fishpond owned by the herein spouses.
On July 7, 1954, the Committee on
Rivers and Streams rendered its
decision the dispositive part of which
reads:
"In view of the foregoing considerations, the spouses Romeo
Martinez and Leonor Suarez should be restored to the
exclusive possession, use and enjoyment of the creek in
question which forms part of their registered property and
the decision of the courts on the matter be given full force
and effect."
The municipal officials of Lubao, led by Acting Mayor
Mariano Zagad, apparently refused to recognize the above
decision, because on September 1, 1954, the spouses
Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez instituted Civil Case
No. 751 before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
against said Mayor Zagad, praying that the latter be enjoined
from molesting them in their possession of their property and
in the construction of the dikes therein. The writ of
preliminary injunction applied for was issued against the
respondent municipal Mayor, who immediately elevated the
injunction suit for review to the Supreme Court, which
dismissed Mayor Zagad's petition on September 7, 1953.
With this dismissal order herein appellee spouses proceeded
to construct the dikes in the disputed parcel of land.
Some four (4) years later, and while
Civil Case No. 751 was still pending the
Honorable Florencio Moreno, then
Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, ordered another
investigation of the said parcel of land,
directing the appellees herein to remove
the dikes they had constructed, on the
strength of the authority vested in him
by Republic Act No. 2056, approved on
June 13, 1958, entitled "An Act To
Prohibit, Remove and/or Demolish the
Construction of Dams. Dikes, Or Any
Other Walls In Public Navigable Waters,
Or Waterways and In Communal
Fishing Grounds, To Regulate Works in
Such Waters or Waterways And In
Communal Fishing Grounds, And To
Provide Penalties For Its Violation, And
For Other Purposes. 1 The said order
which gave rise to the instant
proceedings, embodied a threat that the
dikes would be demolished should the
herein appellees fail to comply therewith
within thirty (30) days.
The spouses Martinez replied to the
order by commencing on January 2,
1959 the present case, which was
decided in their favor by the lower Court
in a decision dated August 10, 1959, the
dispositive part of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the
Court hereby declares the decision, Exhibit S, rendered by
the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications
null and void; declares the preliminary injunction, hereto for
issued, permanent, and forever enjoining both respondents
from molesting the spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor
Suarez in their possession, use and enjoyment of their
property described in Plan Psu-9992 and referred to in their
petition."
"Without pronouncement as to costs."
"SO ORDERED."
As against this judgment respondent officials of the
Department of Public Works and Communications took the
instant appeal, contending that the lower Court erred:
1. In holding that then Senator Rogelio
de la Rosa, complainant in the
administrative case, is not an interested
party and his letter-complaint dated
August 15, 1958 did not confer
jurisdiction upon the respondent
Undersecretary of Public Works and
Communications to investigate the said
administrative case;
2. In holding that the duty to investigate
encroachments upon public rivers
conferred upon the respondent
Secretary under Republic Act No. 7056
cannot be lawfully delegated by him to
his subordinates;
3. In holding that the investigation
ordered by the respondent Secretary in
this case is illegal on the ground that the
said respondent Secretary has
arrogated unto himself the power, which
he does not possess, of reversing,
making nugatory, and setting aside the
two lawful decisions of the Court
Exhibits K and I, and even annulling
thereby, the one rendered by the
highest Tribunal of the land;
9
 4. In not sustaining respondent's claim
that petitioners have no cause of action
because the property in dispute is a
public river and in holding that the said
claim has no basis in fact and in law;
5. In not passing upon and disposing of
respondent's counterclaim;
6. In not sustaining respondent's claim
that the petition should not have been
entertained on the ground that the
petitioners have not exhausted
administrative remedies; and
7. In holding that the decision of the
respondents is illegal on the ground that
it violates the principles that laws shall
have no retroactive effect unless the
contrary is provided and in holding that
the said Republic Act No. 2056 is
unconstitutional on the ground that
respondents' threat of prosecuting
petitioners under Section 3 thereof for
acts done four years before its
enactment renders the said law ex post
facto.
The Court of Appeals sustained the above-mentioned
assignment of errors committed by the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga and, as previously stated, reversed
the judgment of the latter court. From this reversal this
appeal by certiorari was taken, and before this Court,
petitioners-appellants assigned the following errors allegedly
committed by the Court of Appeals:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN DECLARING IN THE INSTANT
CASE THAT PARCEL NO. 2 OF
TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
NO. 15856 IS A PUBLIC RIVER AND
ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF
ITS REGISTRATION BECAUSE THIS
CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL
ATTACK ON A TORRENS TITLE IN
VIOLATION OF THE LAW AND THE
WELL-SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE
ON THE MATTER.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN REOPENING AND RE-LITIGATING
THE ISSUE AS TO WHETHER OR
NOT LOT NO. 2 OF TRANSFER
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 15856
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
PAMPANGA, IS A PUBLIC RIVER
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT
THIS ISSUE HAS BEEN LONG
RESOLVED AND SETTLED BY THE
LAND REGISTRATION COURT OF
PAMPANGA IN LAND REGISTRATION
PROCEEDING NO. 692 AND IS NOW
RES JUDICATA.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN ORDERING THE CANCELLATION
OF THE REGISTRATION OF LOT NO.
2 OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE NO. 15856 NOTWITHSTANDING
THE FACT THAT THE TORRENS
TITLE COVERING IT HAS BEEN
VESTED IN THE PETITIONERS WHO
ARE THE SEVENTH OF THE
SUCCESSIVE INNOCENT
PURCHASERS THEREOF AND WHO
IN PURCHASING THE SAME RELIED
ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE
PERSONS DEALING WITH
REGISTERED LAND NEED NOT GO
BEHIND THE REGISTER TO
DETERMINE THE CONDITION OF THE
PROPERTY.
The 1st and 2nd assignment of errors, being closely related,
will be taken up together.
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that Lot No. 2 covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15856 of the petitioners-
appellants is a public stream and that said title should be
cancelled and the river covered reverted to public domain, is
assailed by the petitioners-appellants as being a collateral
attack on the indefeasibility of the torrens title originally
issued in 1925 in favor of the petitioners-appellants'
predecessor-in-interest, Potenciano Garcia, which is
violative of the rule of res judicata. It is argued that as the
decree of registration issued by the Land Registration Court
was not re-opened through a petition for review filed within
one (1) year from the entry of the decree of title, the
certificate of title issued pursuant thereto in favor of the
appellants for the land covered thereby is no longer open to
attack under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act (Act
496) and the jurisprudence on the matter established by this
Tribunal. Section 38 of the Land Registration Act cited by
appellants expressly makes a decree of registration, which
ordinarily makes the title absolute and indefeasible, subject
to the exemption stated in Section 39 of the said Act among
which are: "liens, claims or rights arising or existing under
the laws or Constitution of the United States or of the
Philippine Islands which the statute of the Philippine Islands
cannot require to appear of record in the registry."
At the time of the enactment of Section 496, one right
recognized or existing under the law is that provided for in
Article 339 of the old Civil Code which reads as follows:
Property of public ownership is:
1. That destined to the public use, such
as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports,
and bridges constructed by the State,
and banks shores, roadsteads, and that
of a similar character. (Par. 1)
The above-mentioned properties are parts of the public
domain intended for public use, are outside the commerce of
men and, therefore, not subject to private appropriation. ( 3
Manresa, 6th ed. 101-104.)
In Ledesma v. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769, this Court
held:
A simple possession of a certificate of
title under the Torrens system does not
necessarily make the possessor a true
owner of all the property described
therein. If a person obtains title under
the Torrens system which includes by
mistake or oversight, lands which
cannot be registered under the Torrens
system, he does not by virtue of said
certificate alone become the owner of
the land illegally included.
In Mercado v. Municipal President of Macabebe, 59 Phil.
592, it was also said:
It is useless for the appellant now to
allege that she has obtained certificate
of title No. 329 in her favor because the
said certificate does not confer upon her
any right to the creek in question,
inasmuch as the said creek, being of the
public domain, is included among the
various exceptions enumerated in
Section 39 of Act 496 to which the said
certificate is subject by express
provision of the law.
The same ruling was laid down in Director of Lands v.
Roman Catholic Bishop of Zamboanga, 61 Phil. 644, as
regards public plaza.
10
In Dizon, et al. v. Rodriguez, et al., G.R. No. L-20300-01 and
G.R. No. L-20355-56, April 30, 1965, 20 SCRA 704, it was
held that the incontestable and indefeasible character of a
Torrens certificate of title does not operate when the land
covered thereby is not capable of registration.
It is, therefore, clear that the authorities cited by the
appellants as to the conclusiveness and incontestability of a
Torrens certificate of title do not apply here. The Land
Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registerable
properties, such as public navigable rivers which are parts of
the public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the
registration of title in favor of a private applicant. Hence, the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga as
regards the Lot No. 2 of Certificate of Title No. 15856 in the
name of petitioners-appellants may be attacked at any time,
either directly or collaterally, by the State which is not bound
by any prescriptive period provided for by the Statute of
Limitations (Article 1108, par. 4, new Civil Code). The right of
reversion or reconveyance to the State of the public
properties fraudulently registered and which are not capable
of private appropriation or private acquisition does not
prescribe. (Republic v. Ramona Ruiz, et al., G.R. No. L-
23712, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 348; Republic v. Ramos,
G.R. No.
L-15484, January 31, 1963, 7 SCRA 47.)
When it comes to registered properties, the jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Public Works & Communications under
Republic Act 2056 to order the removal or obstruction to
navigation along a public and navigable creek or river
included therein, has been definitely settled and is no longer
open to question (Lovina v. Moreno, G.R. No L-17821,
November 29, 1963, 9 SCRA 557; Taleon v. Secretary of
Public Works & Communications G.R. No. L-24281, May 16,
1961, 20 SCRA 69, 74).
The evidence submitted before the trial court which was
passed upon by the respondent Court of Appeals shows that
Lot No. 2 (Plan Psu 992) of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
15856, is a river of the public domain. The technical
description of both Lots Nos. 1 and 2 appearing in Original
Certificate of Title No. 14318 of the Register of Deeds of
Pampanga, from which the present Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 15856 was derived, confirms the fact that Lot No. 2
embraced in said title is bounded practically on all sides by
rivers. As held by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in
Civil Case No. 1247 for injunction filed by the petitioners'
predecessors-in-interest against the Municipal Mayor of
Lubao and decided in 1916 (Exh. "L"), Lot No. 2 is a branch
of the main river that has been covered with water since time
immemorial and, therefore, part of the public domain. This
finding having been affirmed by the Supreme Court, there is
no longer any doubt that Lot No. 2 of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 15856 of petitioners is a river which is not capable
of private appropriation or acquisition by prescription.
(Palanca v. Com. of the Philippines, 69 Phil. 449; Meneses
v. Com. of the Philippines, 69 Phil. 647). Consequently,
appellants' title does not include said river.
II
As regards the 3rd assignment of error, there is no weight in
the appellants' argument that, being a purchaser for value
and in good faith of Lot No. 2, the nullification of its
registration would be contrary to the law and to the
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court as it would
destroy the stability of the title which is the core of the
system of registration. Appellants cannot be deemed
purchasers for value and in good faith as in the deed of
absolute conveyance executed in their favor, the following
appears:
6. Que la segunda parcela arriba
descrita y mencionada esta actualmente
abierta, sin malecones y excluida de la
primera parcela en virtud de la Orden
Administrative No. 103, tal como fue
enmendada, del pasado regimen o
Gobierno.
7. Que los citados compradores Romeo
Martinez y Leonor Suarez se encargan
de gestionar de las autoridades
correspondientes para que la citada
segunda parcela pueda ser convertida
de nuevo en pesqueria, corriendo a
cuenta y cargo de los mismos todos los
gastos.
8. Que en el caso de que dichos
compradores no pudiesen conseguir
sus propositos de convertir de nuevo en
pesquera la citada segunda parcela, los
aqui vendedores no devolveran ninguna
cantidad de dinero a los referidos
compradores; este es, no se disminuiriat
el precio de esta venta. (Exh. 13-a, p.
52, respondents record of exhibits)
These stipulations were accepted by the petitioners-
appellants in the same conveyance in the following terms:
Romeo Martinez y Leonor Suarez,
mayores de edad, filipinos y residentes
en al Barrio de Julo Municipio de
Malabon, Provincia de Rizal, por la
presente, declaran que estan enterados
del contenido de este documento y lo
aceptan en los precisos terminos en que
arriba uedan consignados. (Exh. 13-a,
ibid)
Before purchasing a parcel of land, it cannot be contended
that the appellants who were the vendees did not know
exactly the condition of the land that they were buying and
the obstacles or restrictions thereon that may be put up by
the government in connection with their project of converting
Lot No. 2 in question into a fishpond. Nevertheless, they
willfully and voluntarily assumed the risks attendant to the
sale of said lot. One who buys something with knowledge of
defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he
acquired it in good faith (Leung Lee v. Strong Machinery Co.,
et al., 37 Phil. 664).
The ruling that a purchaser of a registered property cannot
go beyond the record to make inquiries as to the legality of
the title of the registered owner, but may rely on the registry
to determine if there is no lien or encumbrances over the
same, cannot be availed of as against the law and the
accepted principle that rivers are parts of the public domain
for public use and not capable of private appropriation or
acquisition by prescription.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals appealed from is in accordance with law, and the
same is hereby affirmed with costs against the petitioners-
appellants.
G.R. No. L-3279 March 11, 1908
THE CITY OF MANILA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, ET AL., respondents-
appellants.
Attorney-General Araneta for the Government.
Modesto Reyes for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
On the 11th day of November, 1904, the city of Manila,
through its attorney, filed a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of a certain parcel or tract of
land described by metes and bounds in the first paragraph of
said petition as follows:
A parcel of land situated in Paco, a district of this
city. It is bounded on the north by properties
belonging to Chas. M. Stone, Prudencio de Leon,
11
Asuncion Ventura, Petra Carnero y Garcia,
Evaristo Roxas and brothers, Silvestra Sarmiento,
Evaristo Gonzalez y Valdes, Mariano Vergara,
Bernardo Yalon, Julio Gonzaga, Leoncia Mañalac,
Geronimo Morales, Antonio Bautista, Doroteo
Palacio, and Gualberta de los Reyes; on the south
and on the east by property owned by Miguel
Fabie and brothers, and on the west by properties
belonging to Gualberta de los Reyes and Toribia
Cruz. Beginning at the intersection of the northern
line of Calle Real and the eastern line of Calle
Peñafrancia (new street lines), approved on 21st
December, 1903, and 17th February, 1904,
respectively, by the Municipal Board, thence S. 4
degrees and 8 minutes E., 157.09 meters to the
point marked "0;) thence N., 79 degrees 37
minutes W., 1830 meters along the southern
boundary of the property owned by Evaristo
Gonzalez Valdes and Mariano Vergara to point
No. 1; thence N. 11 degrees 25 minutes E., 6.20
meters along the western boundary of the property
belonging to Mariano Vergara to point No. 2;
thence N. 86 degrees 38 minutes W., 29.60
meters along the southern boundary of the
property owned by Mariano Vergara to point No. 3;
thence N. 4 degrees 14 minutes E., 22.49 meters
along the western boundary of the property of
Mariano Vergara, to point No. 4; thence No. 11
degrees 42 minutes W., 5.71 meters along the
western boundary of the property belonging to
Bernardo Yalon to point No. 5; thence s. 89
degrees 50 minutes W., 78.00 meters to a stone
monument along the southern boundary of the
property owned by Julio Gonzaga, Leoncia
Mañalac, Geronimo Morales, to point No. 6;
thence N. 89 degrees 22 minutes W., 24.17
meters along the southern boundary of the
property belonging to Antonio Bautista, to point
No. 7; thence S. 55 degrees 56 minutes W., 16.81
meters along the southeastern boundary of the
property owned by Doroteo Palacio to point No. 8;
thence N. 86 degrees 49 minutes W., 25.50
meters along the southern boundary of the
properties owned by Doroteo Palacio and
Gualberta de los Reyes to point No. 9; thence S.
15 degrees 30 minutes W., 16.47 meters to a
stone monument, along the eastern boundary of
the property owned by Gualberta de los Reyes
and Toribia Cruz to point No. 10; thence S. 7
degrees 35 minutes W., 14.16 meters along the
eastern boundary of the property owned by Toribia
Cruz to point No. 11; thence S. 75 degrees 39
minutes E., 14.37 meters along the northern
boundary of the property of Miguel Fabie and
brothers to point No. 12; thence N. 88 degrees 3
minutes E., 45.35 meters along the northern
boundary of the property belonging to Miguel
Fabie and brothers to point No. 13; thence S. 89
degrees 11 minutes E., 70.15 meters to a stone
monument to Miguel Fabie and brothers to point
No. 14; thence S. 86 degrees 33 minutes E., 85.07
meters to a stone monument along the northern
boundary of the property of Miguel Fabie and
brothers to point No. 15; thence N. 83 degrees 8
minutes E., 14.49 meters along the northern
boundary of the property owned by Miguel Fabie
and brothers to point no. 16; thence N. 47 degrees
E., 158.35 meters along the northwestern
boundary of Miguel Fabie and brothers to point
No. 17; thence N. 70 degrees 22 minutes W.,
40.74 meters along the southern boundary of the
properties owned by Charles M. Stone, Prudencio
de Leon, and Asuncion Ventura (Looban) to point
No. 18; thence N. 83 degrees 22 minutes W., 7.38
meters along a stone fence and the southern
boundary of the properties belonging to Asuncion
Ventura (Looban) and Petra Garcia to point No.
19; thence S. 30 degrees 34 minutes W., 21.12
meters along a stone fence and the western
boundary of the property owned by Petra Carnero
y Garcia to point No. 20; thence S. 74 degrees 58
minutes W., 8.70 meters along the northern
boundary of the property of Evaristo Roxas and
brothers to point No. 21; thence s. 22 degrees 4
minutes W., 34.75 meters along the eastern
boundary of the property owned by Evaristo Roxas
and brothers to point 22; thence N. 68 degrees 47
minutes W., 26.40 meters along the southern
boundary of the property belonging to Evaristo
Roxas and brothers to point No. 23; thence S. 68
degrees 47 minutes W., 85.61 meters along the
eastern boundary of the properties owned by
Silvestra Sarmiento and Evaristo Gonzalez y
Valdes to point No. 24; thence N. 84 degrees 58
minutes W., 12.85 meters to a stone monument
along the southern boundary of the property
owned by Evaristo Gonzalez Valdes to point No.
25; thence N. 79 degrees 37 minutes W., 11.10
meters along the southern boundary of the
property owned by Evaristo Gonzalez Valdes to
point No. 0, the point of the beginning. Containing
10,472.23 square meters of extension. Bearings
magnetic.
The said city alleged that it was the absolute owner of the
said land; that said land was assessed by the city of Manila
in the sum of $1,780, United States currency; that there
existed no liens of whatever character against said land; that
the land was unoccupied; that the said city obtained title to
the said land by reason of being the successor to all the
rights and actions of the old city of Manila (ayuntamiento de
Manila), to which said property formerly belonged.
To this petition of the petitioner, the Insular Government
presented the following opposition to the registration of said
land:
The Solicitor-General, representing the Insular
Government, appears before the court, and states:
I. That the city of Manila, represented by its
attorney, Modesto Reyes, requests that, in
compliance with the Land Registration Act, a
parcel of land situated in Paco, a district of this
city, of which it claims to be the absolute owner,
and the description of which is specified in the
petition be inscribed in its name.
II. That the land in question is the property of the
Government of the United States under the control
of the Insular Government.
III. That by virtue thereof, the Solicitor-General
opposes the inscription asked for, and requests
the court to deny the petition with the costs.
To this petition of the petitioner one Geronimo Morales also
presented the following opposition to the registration of a
portion of the land described in the second paragraph of said
petition:
Now comes the undersigned before this court and
says:
1. That the city of Manila, by its attorney, Modesto
Reyes, has, in conformity with the provisions of
the Land Registration Act, applied for the
registration of a certain parcel of land located in
the district of Paco, of this city, of which it alleges
sole and absolute ownership, and the description
of which is included in the application.
2. That the plan and description of the said land as
they appear in the petition are incorrect, for there
is included in the same a part of a building lot
belonging to the undersigned, and situated in the
barrio of Rosario of said district, with an area of 84
meters more or less, as will be seen in the plan to
be filed later.
3. Therefore, the undersigned files his opposition
to the registration applied for, as far as it has any
bearing on the building lot of the undersigned
which is included in the plan and description of the
applicant, and this honorable court is requested to
12
 deny the application as far as it relates to the said
building lot, with the costs against the petitioner.
After the presentation of the petition on the part of the said
petitioner, one of the examiners of titles of the Court of Land
Registration made an examination of the title claimed by the
petitioner and made the following report to the judge of the
said court of Land Registration.
The examiner of titles of this judicial district, after
going over the papers in the case of the city,
represented by its attorney, Modesto Reyes,
states that:
1. The application filed by the city of Manila, is not
accompanied by any document relative to its
alleged ownership, but sets forth that said city, as
the successor in rights and interest of the former
ayuntamiento de Manila, is the owner of the land
described in the petition above referred to.
2. In the office of the register of deeds there is no
record of any act or contract opposing the claim of
the applicant; nor does there appear, from the
investigations held, any fact contrary to those
quoted in the application. The present limits of the
land in question may be held as correct.
3. The city of Manila, in order to acquire title to the
land above mentioned, must show the ownership
which the former ayuntamiento had over said land.
OPINION.
Based on the above report, the undersigned is of
the opinion that the title of the city of Manila,
represented by its attorney, Modesto Reyes, is
defective and can not be registered.
Manila, December 7, 1904.
AGUEDO VELARDE.
On the 14th of March, 1905, the cause was duly brought on
for trial and during the trial of said cause the petitioner
attempted to establish by proof the following facts
First. That said land formerly belonged to the old city of
Manila (ayuntamiento de Manila) under the sovereignty of
Spain.
Second. That the present city of Manila is at present the
owner of said land by virtue of being the successor of the old
city of Manila.
Third. That the old city of Manila from the year 1894 until the
change of sovereignty in the Philippine Archipelago had
rented said land, had received rents therefor, and in a
general way had administered the same.
The respondent, the Central Government of the Philippine
Islands, presented no proof whatever in opposition to the
claim of the petitioner, relying the fact that the petitioner was
not entitled to have said land registered, for the following
reasons:
First. That the land in question was public land, belonging to
the Central Government; that the same had never been
granted to any person or corporation or municipality by the
Spanish Government.
Second. That the city of Manila, neither the present nor the
old city, was the owner of said land.
On the 15th day of February, 1906, the judge of the said
court filed his decision by which he denied the registration of
the land claimed by the said Geronimo Morales and granted
the registration of the rest of said described property in favor
of the said city. Against this order allowing the registration of
said tract of land the respondent duly excepted and gave
notice of his intention to appeal.
The Attorney-General, representing the respondent in this
court, made the following assignment of error:
There is nothing in the record which justifies the
conclusion of the judgment of the court below, to
the effect that the land in question is owned by the
city of Manila.
The only proof presented during the trial by the petitioner
which tended in any way to support its claim was that in the
year 1894 and thereafter the old city of Manila
(ayuntamiento de Manila) rented said land and received the
rent therefor, and that the present city of Manila succeeded
to the rights of said old city. No proof was offered by the
plaintiff, documentary or other, to show in any way by what
right said old city exercised this right of control over said
property.
We are of the opinion, and so hold, that the mere renting of
property and receiving the rent therefor can not, of
themselves, in the absence of other proof, support a claim of
ownership of such property.
It has been argued that every pueblo organized by the
Spanish Government in its insular possessions has had
granted to it, as a matter of course, certain lands for public
purposes, such as public commons, pasture lands, etc. Our
attention has not been called to any law or royal decree in
which this contention is supported and we have searched in
vain to find such a provision. Upon the contrary we have
found a royal decree of the — day of — showing that the
people of the pueblo of Dilao (now the barrio of Paco in
which this very land is located) had petitioned for a grant of a
comunal, etc., and which was denied.
One of the earliest provisions of law relating to the rights of
pueblos in the insular possessions of the Spanish
Government is that de las reducciones, y pueblos de indios
(settlements and pueblos of natives) of December 1, 1573,
as amended by that of the 10th of October, 1618, found in
Law VIII, Title III of Book VI of the Recopilacion de las Leyes
de Indias, and which it as follows:
The sites whereon the pueblos and settlements
are to be built must have water facilities, lands,
forests, entrances and exits, lands for cultivation,
and an exido (common, public land) one league
long, wherein the natives may keep their cattle,
without mingling them with those owned by
Spaniards.
This provision of law seems to have been amplified in article
53 of the Ordinances of Good Government, dated February
26, 1768, and extended to the pueblos of the Philippine
Islands by proclamation on the 11th day of September,
1801. This article clearly indicates that these lands should be
designated by the Spanish Government for the use and
benefit de las reducciones, y pueblos de los indios. Said
article 53 is in part as follows:
It is held to be comunal (common public) the
territory of the settlements and pueblos inhabited
by natives, to which, from the time of their
foundation or organization, the necessary lands
were alloted in conformity with Law VII, Title III,
Book VI of the Recopilacion de las Leyes de
Indias, etc.
This article 53 clearly indicates the following:
First. That the King continued to be the absolute owner of
said lands;
13
Second. That the pueblos were only given the mere usufruct
of the same;
Third. That the King might at any time annul such grant; and
Fourth. That a designation, of the particular land so granted,
was a necessary prerequisite for the holding of the same for
the purposes indicated, by the said pueblo. (See Autos
Acordados, Vol. I, pp. 29, 48.)
As a further confirmation of the fact that the pueblos of the
Philippine Islands did not have, as a matter of right, a
comunal, etc., unless the same had been expressly granted,
we find the following provision in the royal decree of
February 28, 1883, which is as follows:
On the recommendation of the minister for the
colonies, and in conformity with the opinion
submitted by the council of the state, sitting in
banc, I hereby decree the following:
ARTICLE 1. The legua comunal for the Philippine
Islands, under the provisions of Law VIII, Title III,
Book VI, of the Recopilacion de Indias, as far as
the pueblos already established and those which
may be established thereafter are concerned, shall
be of an area of 20,000 feet, equivalent to a
league of 20 degrees, without regard to the
geometrical figure resulting from the topography of
the locality, or to conditions relating to property
rights over the land itself or over land adjoining the
same.
ART. 2. The pueblos not having said land alloted
to them may apply and obtain the same by means
of the corresponding proceedings.
ART. 3. When the conditions so require, the
pueblos may institute proceedings to obtain an
extension of said comunal land, in order that the
latter may be in keeping with the number of
inhabitants, the number of heads of each pueblo.
Given at the palace, on February 28, 1883.
Following this royal decree we have the superior decreto of
the 1st of August, 1883, relating to the legua comunal, with
the following provisions:
Legua comunal. — In order to comply with and
carry out the provisions of the royal decree of
February 28 of the current year, published in the
Gaceta de Manila on June 28 last, and relating to
the legua comunal, on the recommendation of the
direccion general de administracion civil, I hereby
order that the following regulations be observed:
1. The provincial chiefs shall take special care to
inform the gobernadorcillos of the towns under
their control of the decree relating to the legua
comunal, making them understand that the
superficial extension to be occupied by the same
is that corresponding to a square, the sides of
which measure 20,000 feet, equivalent to a square
league, (de veinte al drado), and that the land
should be uncultivated or untilled.
2. The towns not having said portion of land
assigned may apply for the same to this central
government through the chief of the province or
district, inclosing with the petition a report of the
principalia, stating the said circumstance and as
many particulars as may exist in their archives
regarding the matter.
3. The said documents shall be forwarded to the
direccion general de administracion civil, through
the provincial chief, and the said office, upon the
information from the bureau of forestry, shall
recommend to me what it may deem proper.
4. After the "legua comunal" has been granted by
this Government, the bureau of forestry shall
proceed to the setting up of the boundary marks of
the same, executing a certificate of the land,
which, after being signed by the officer conducting
the proceedings and by the principalia of the town,
will be submitted for my approval through the
direccion general de administracion civil.
5. For the legua comunal uncultivated land will be
selected, whenever possible, which may be in
proper condition for the pasture of cattle and
cultivation of building timber and the necessary
industries to meet the requirements of the
inhabitants.
6. In order to increase the said communal land,
when the requirements of the towns may demand,
it will be necessary to institute new proceedings,
which will be annexed to a statement signed by
the principalia, showing the number of the
inhabitants of the town, the kind and number of the
extension of the lands which, bearing in mind the
local conditions, they may deem necessary to
meet the requirements of the former and
nourishment for the latter.
7. These statements will be forwarded to the
direccion general by the chief of the province,
together with his opinion, in which he will state
whether or not he considers the petition to be
unreasonable.
8. The offices under the department of finance will
furnish the direccion general de administracion
with the necessary documents for verifying the
truth of the declarations made by the principalias
of the towns, regarding the number of the
inhabitants and heads of cattle.
9. The direccion general de administracion civil,
with the report of the bureau of forestry and,
should it be deemed necessary, of the board of
agriculture, shall recommend to me the extension
to be finally marked for the legua comunal.
10. After the area of the land has been determined
by this general government, the bureau of forestry
shall proceed with the appointment and the setting
of marks of the new communal land, a certificate
being executed in the same form as previously
stated.
11. The expenses arising from the proceedings, as
well as those arising from the setting up of
boundary marks of the legua comunal and its final
establishment, must be paid by the town to which
the concession has been granted. (Gazette No.
42, August 11.)
By the royal decree of the 23rd of December, 1870, it was
made necessary by monuments or otherwise to mark the
division lines of the different pueblos of the Philippine
Islands. (Gaceta de Madrid, February 24.)
By the royal order of the 17th of January, 1885, it was
provided that, when a pueblo should show to the
Government of the Philippine Islands that its legua comunal
was insufficient, it might, upon petition, have such lines
increased. (Gaceta de Madrid, March 15, 1885.)
The royal decree of the 19th of May, 1893, relating to the
municipal government (Gaceta de Madrid, May 22, 1893)
contains no provisions with reference to the granting to
pueblos of the legua comunal, etc.
The question of the right of pueblos in the insular
possessions of the Spanish Government to public lands has
come before the Supreme Court of the United States several
14
times in its relation to pueblos in the territory acquired by the
United States from the King of Spain.
In the case of Grisar vs. McDowell (6 Wallace, 363, 373)
Justice Field in discussing this question said:
These laws provided for the assignment to the
pueblos, for their use and the use of their
inhabitants, of land not exceeding in extent 4
square leagues. Such assignment was to be made
by the public authorities of the Government upon
the original establishment of the pueblo, or
afterwards upon the petition of its officers or
inhabitants; and the land to be measured off in a
square or prolonged form, according to the nature
and condition of the country. All lands within the
general limits stated, which had previously
become private property or were required for
public purposes, were reserved and excepted from
the assignment.
Until the lands were thus definitely assigned and
measured off, the right or claim of the pueblo was
an imperfect one. It was a right which the
Government might refuse to recognize at all, or
might recognize in a qualified form; it might be
burdened with conditions, and it might be
restricted to less limits than the 4 square leagues,
which was the usual quantity assigned.
In the case of United States vs. Santa Fe (165 U. S., 707), in
which this same question was involved, Justice White of the
Supreme Court of the United States said:
It can not be doubted that under the law of Spain it
was necessary that the proper authorities should
particularly designate the land to be acquired by
towns or pueblos before a vested right or title to
the use thereof could arise.
Elizondo, in his work entitled Practica Universal Forense
(vol. 5, p. 226), makes the following statement relating to the
question presented here:
There is nothing whatever designated by law as
belonging to towns, other than that which by royal
privilege, custom, or contract between man and
man is granted to them, so that although there be
assigned to the towns at the time of their
constitution territorio or pertinencias, which may
be common to all the residents, without each one
having the right to use them separately, it is a
prerogative reserved to the sovereigns to divided
the terminos of the provinces and towns, assigning
to these the use and enjoyment, but the domain
remaining in the sovereigns themselves.
Chief Justice Fuller, speaking for the court in the case of
United States vs. Sandoval and in the case of Morton vs.
United States (167 U.S., 278, 297), said:
"Under the laws of the Indies, lands not actually
allotted to setters remained the property of the
King, to be disposed of by him or by those on
whom he might confer that power. As Mr. Hall
says (Chap. VII, § 122): "The fee of the lands
embraced within the limits of pueblos continued to
remain in the sovereign, and never in the pueblo
as a corporate body."
The petitioner herein not having presented proof showing
that the land in question had been granted to it by the former
sovereign in these Islands, and not having shown that it was
entitled to said lands by virtue of some law of the present
sovereign of these Islands, the Court of Land Registration
was not empowered to grant the registration of said lands in
favor of said petitioner. The judgment, therefore, of the lower
court is hereby reversed. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-9069 March 31, 1915
THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAVITE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
HILARIA ROJAS and her husband TIUNG SIUKO, alias
SIWA, defendants-appellees.
Attorney-General Villamor for appellant.
J. Y. Pinzon for appellees.
TORRES, J.:
Appeal filed through bill of exceptions by the Attorney-
General, representing the plaintiff municipality of Cavite,
from the judgment of March 27, 1913, whereby the
Honorable Herbert D. Gale, judge, dismissed the complaint
with costs against the plaintiff party, declaring that the said
municipality had no right to require that the defendants
vacate the land in question.
By an instrument dated December 5, 1911, afterwards
amended on March 14, 1912, the provincial fiscal of Cavite,
representing the municipality of that name, filed a complaint
in the Court of First Instance of said province alleging that
the plaintiff municipal corporation, duly organized and
constituted in accordance with Act No. 82, and as the
successor to the rights s aid entity had under the late
Spanish government, and by virtue of Act No. 1039, had
exclusive right, control and administration over the streets,
lanes, plazas, and public places of the municipality of Cavite;
that the defendants, by virtue of a lease secured from the
plaintiff municipality, occupy a parcel of land 93 square
meters in area that forms part o the public plaza known
under the name of Soledad, belonging to the municipality of
Cavite, the defendants having constructed thereon a house,
through payment to the plaintiff for occupation thereof of a
rental of P5,58 a quarter in advance, said defendants being
furthermore obligated to vacate the leased land within sixty
days subsequent to plaintiff's demand to that effect; that the
defendants have been required by the municipality to vacate
and deliver possession of the said land, but more than the
sixty days within which they having done so to date; that the
lease secured from the municipality of Cavite, by virtue
whereof the defendants occupy the land that is the subject
matter of the complaint, is ultra vires and therefore ipso facto
null and void and of no force or effect, for the said land is an
integral portion of a public plaza of public domain and use,
and the municipal council of Cavite has never at any time
had any power or authority to withdraw it from public use,
and to lease it to a private party for his own use, and so the
defendants have never had any right or occupy or to retain
the said land under leasehold, or in any other way, their
occupation of the parcel being furthermore illegal; and
therefore prayed that judgment be rendered declaring that
possession of the sad land lies with the plaintiff and ordering
the defendants to vacate the land and deliver possession
thereof to said plaintiff, with the costs against the
defendants.
The demurrer filed to the foregoing complaint having been
overruled, with exception on the part of the defendants, in
their answer of April 10, 1912, they admitted some of the
allegations contained in the complaint but denied that the
parcel of land which they occupy and to which the complaint
refers forms and integral part of Plaza Soledad, or that the
lease secured by them from the municipality of Cavite was
null and void and ultra vires, stating if they refused to vacate
said land it was because they had acquired the right of
possession thereof. As a special defense they alleged that,
according to the lease, they could only be ordered to vacate
the land leased when the plaintiff municipality might need it
for decoration or other public use, which does not apply in
the present case; and in a cross-complaint they alleged that
on the land which is the subject matter of the complaint the
defendants have erected a house of strong materials,
assessed at P3,000, which was constructed under a license
secured from the plaintiff municipality; that if they should be
ordered to vacate the said land they would suffer damages
to the extent of P3,000, wherefore they prayed that they be
absolved from the complaint, or in the contrary case that the
plaintiff be sentenced to indemnify them in the sum of
P3,000 as damages, and to pay the costs.
15
After hearing of the case, wherein both parties submitted that the said lease is null and void in accordance with the
parol and documentary evidence, the court rendered the provisions of article 1303 of the Civil Code, the defendant
judgment that he been mentioned, whereto counsel for the must restore and deliver possession of the land described in
municipality excepted and in writing asked for a reopening of the complaint to the municipality of Cavite, which in its turn
the case and the holding of a new trial. This motion was must restore to the said defendant all the sums it may have
denied, with exception on the part of the appellant, and the received from her in the nature of rentals just as soon as she
forwarded to the clerk of this court. restores the land improperly leased. For the same reasons
as have been set forth, and as said contract is null and void
in its origin, it can produce no effect and consequently the
It is duly proven in the record that, upon presentation of an
defendant is not entitled to claim that the plaintiff municipality
application by Hilaria Rojas, he municipal council of Cavite
indemnity her for the damages she may suffer by the
by resolution No. 10, dated July 3, 107, Exhibit C, leased to
removal of her house from the said land.
the said Rojas some 70 or 80 square meters of Plaza
Soledad, on condition that she pay rent quarterly in advance
according to the schedule fixed in Ordinance No. 43, land For all the foregoing reasons we must reverse the judgment
within sixty days subsequent to notification to that effect. The appealed from and declare, as we do declare, that the land
record shows (receipts, Exhibit 1) that she has paid the land occupied by Hilaria Rojas forms part of the public plaza
tax on the house erected on the lot. called Soledad, and as the lease of said parcel of land is null
and void, we order the defendant to vacate it and release the
land in question within thirty days, leaving it cleared as it was
The boundary line between the properties of the municipality
before hr occupation. There is no ground for the indemnity
of Cavite and the naval reservation, as fixed in Act No. 1039
sought in the nature of damages, but the municipality must in
of the Philippine Commission, appears in the plan prepared
its turn to the defendant the rentals collected; without finding
by a naval engineer and submitted as evidence by the
as to the costs. So ordered.
plaintiff, Exhibit C of civil case No. 274 of the Cavite court
and registered in this court as No. 9071. According to said
plan, defendant's house is erected on a plat of ground that G.R. No. L-28379 March 27, 1929
forms part of the promenade called Plaza Soledad, and this
was also so proven by the testimony of the plaintiff's
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
witnesses.
applicant-appellant,
vs.
By section 3 of the said Act No. 1039, passed January 12, CONSORCIA CABANGIS, ET AL., claimants-appellees.
1904, the Philippine Commission granted to the municipality
of Cavite all the land included in the tract called Plaza
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellant.
Soledad. In the case of Nicolas vs. Jose (6 Phil. Rep., 589),
Abad Santos, Camus & Delgado for appellees.
wherein the municipality of Cavite, represented by its
president Catalino Nicolas, sought inscription in its name of
the land comprised in the said Palza Soledad, with objection VILLA-REAL, J.:
on the part of Maria Jose et al. who is sought that inscription
be decreed in their name of the parcels of land in this plaza
The Government of the Philippine Islands appeals to this
occupied by them, this court decided that neither the
court from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
municipality nor the objectors were entitled to inscription, for
Manila in cadastral proceeding No. 373 of the Court of First
with respect to the objectors said plaza belonged to the
Instance of Manila, G. L. R. O. Cadastral Record No. 373,
municipality of Cavite and with respect to the latter the said
adjudicating the title and decreeing the registration of lots
Plaza Soledad was not transferable property of that
Nos. 36, 39 and 40, block 3055 of the cadastral survey of the
municipality to be inscribed in its name, because he intention
City of Manila in favor of Consuelo, Consorcia, Elvira and
of Act No. 1039 was that the said plaza and other places
Tomas, surnamed Cabangis, in equal parts, and dismissing
therein enumerated should be kept open for public transit;
the claims presented by the Government of the Philippine
herefore there can be no doubt that the defendant has no
Islands and the City of Manila.
right to continue to occupy the land of the municipality
leased by her, for it is an integral portion of Plaza Soledad,
which if for public use and is reserved for the common In support of its appeal, the appellant assigns the following
benefit. alleged errors as committed by the trial court in its judgment,
to wit:
According to article 344 of the Civil Code: "Property for
public use in provinces and in towns comprises the 1. The lower court erred in not holding
provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, that the lots in question are of the public
and public waters, the promenades, and public works of domain, the same having been gained
general service supported by said towns or provinces." from the sea (Manila Bay) by accession,
by fillings made by the Bureau of Public
Works and by the construction of the
The said Plaza Soledad being a promenade for public use,
break-water (built by the Bureau of
the municipal council of Cavite could not in 1907 withdraw or
Navigation) near the mouth of Vitas
exclude from public use a portion thereof in order to lease it
Estero.
for the sole benefit of the defendant Hilaria Rojas. In leasing
a portion of said plaza or public place to the defendant for
private use the plaintiff municipality exceeded its authority in 2. The lower court erred in holding that
the exercise of its powers by executing a contract over a the lots in question formed part of the
thing of which it could not dispose, nor is it empowered so to big parcel of land belonging to the
do. spouses Maximo Cabangis and Tita
Andres, and in holding that these
spouses and their successors in interest
The Civil Code, articles 1271, prescribes that everything
have been in continuous, public,
which is not outside he commerce of man may be the object
peaceful and uninterrupted possession
of a contract, and plazas and streets are outside of this
of said lots up to the time this case
commerce, as was decided by the supreme court of Spain in
came up.
its decision of February 12, 195, which says: "Communal
things that cannot be soud because they are by their very
nature outside of commerce are those for public use, such 3. The lower court erred in holding that
as the plazas, streets, common lands, rivers, fountains, etc." said lots existed before, but that due to
the current of the Pasig River and to the
action of the big waves in Manila Bay
Therefore, it must be concluded that the contract, Exhibit C,
during the south-west monsoons, the
whereby he municipality of Cavite leased to Hilaria Rojas a
same disappeared.
portion of the Plaza Soledad is null and void and of no force
or effect, because it is contrary to the law and the thing
leased cannot be the object of a contract. On the hyphotesis

16
 4. The lower court erred in adjudicating
the registration of the lands in question
in the name of the appellees, and in
denying the appellant's motion for a new
trial.
A preponderance of the evidence in the record which may
properly be taken into consideration in deciding the case,
proves the following facts:
Lots 36, 39 and 40, block 3035 of cadastral proceeding No.
71 of the City of Manila, G. L. R. O. Record No. 373, were
formerly a part of a large parcel of land belonging to the
predecessor of the herein claimants and appellees. From the
year 1896 said land began to wear away, due to the action
of the waves of Manila Bay, until the year 1901 when the
said lots became completely submerged in water in ordinary
tides, and remained in such a state until 1912 when the
Government undertook the dredging of Vitas Estuary in
order to facilitate navigation, depositing all the sand and silt
taken from the bed of the estuary on the low lands which
were completely covered with water, surrounding that
belonging to the Philippine Manufacturing Company, thereby
slowly and gradually forming the lots, the subject matter of
this proceeding.
Up to the month of February, 1927 nobody had declared lot
39 for the purposes of taxation, and it was only in the year
1926 that Dr. Pedro Gil, in behalf of the claimants and
appellees, declared lot No. 40 for such purpose.
In view of the facts just stated, as proved by a
preponderance of the evidence, the question arises: Who
owns lots 36, 39 and 40 in question?
The claimants-appellees contend that inasmuch as the said
lots once formed a part of a large parcel of land belonging to
their predecessors, whom they succeeded, and their
immediate predecessor in interest, Tomas Cabangis, having
taken possession thereof as soon as they were reclaimed,
giving his permission to some fishermen to dry their fishing
nets and deposit their bancas thereon, said lots belong to
them.
Article 339, subsection 1, of the Civil Code, reads:
Article 339. Property of public ownership
is —
1. That devoted to public use, such as
roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State,
riverbanks, shorts, roadsteads, and that
of a similar character.
xxx xxx xxx
Article 1, case 3, of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866,
provides as follows:
ARTICLE 1. The following are part of
the national domain open to public use:
xxx xxx xxx
3. The Shores. By the shore is
understood that space covered and
uncovered by the movement of the tide.
Its interior or terrestrial limit is the line
reached by the highest equinoctial tides.
Where the tides are not appreciable, the
shore begins on the land side at the line
reached by the sea during ordinary
storms or tempests.
In the case of Aragon vs. Insular Government (19 Phil., 223),
with reference to article 339 of the Civil Code just quoted,
this court said:
We should not be understood, by this decision, to hold that
in a case of gradual encroachment or erosion by the ebb and
flow of the tide, private property may not become 'property of
public ownership,' as defined in article 339 of the code,
where it appears that the owner has to all intents and
purposes abandoned it and permitted it to be totally
destroyed, so as to become a part of the 'playa' (shore of the
seas), 'rada' (roadstead), or the like. . . .
In the Enciclopedia Juridica Espanola, volume XII, page 558,
we read the following:
With relative frequency the opposite
phenomenon occurs; that is, the sea
advances and private properties are
permanently invaded by the waves, and
in this case they become part of the
shore or beach. They then pass to the
public domain, but the owner thus
dispossessed does not retain any right
to the natural products resulting from
their new nature; it is a de facto case of
eminent domain, and not subject to
indemnity.
Now then , when said land was reclaimed, did the claimants-
appellees or their predecessors recover it as their original
property?
As we have seen, the land belonging to the predecessors of
the herein claimants-appellees began to wear way in 1896,
owing to the gradual erosion caused by the ebb and flow of
the tide, until the year 1901, when the waters of Manila Bay
completely submerged a portion of it, included within lots 36,
39 and 40 here in question, remaining thus under water until
reclaimed as a result of certain work done by the
Government in 1912. According to the above-cited
authorities said portion of land, that is, lots 36, 39 and 40,
which was private property, became a part of the public
domain. The predecessors of the herein claimants-appellees
could have protected their land by building a retaining wall,
with the consent of competent authority, in 1896 when the
waters of the sea began to wear it away, in accordance with
the provisions of Article 29 of the aforecited Law of Waters of
August 3, 1866, and their failure to do so until 1901, when a
portion of the same became completely covered by said
waters, remaining thus submerged until 1912, constitutes
abandonment.
Now then: The lots under discussion having been reclaimed
from the seas as a result of certain work done by the
Government, to whom do they belong?
The answer to this question is found in article 5 of the
aforementioned Law of Waters, which is as follows:
ART. 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in
consequence of works constructed by
the State, or by the provinces, pueblos
or private persons, with proper
permission, shall become the property
of the party constructing such works,
unless otherwise provided by the terms
of the grant of authority.
The fact that from 1912 some fishermen had been drying
their fishing nets and depositing their bancas on lots 36, 39
and 40, by permission of Tomas Cabangis, does not confer
on the latter or his successors the ownership of said lots,
because, as they were converted into public land, no private
person could acquire title thereto except in the form and
manner established by the law.
In the case of Buzon vs. Insular Government and City of
Manila (13 Phil., 324), cited by the claimants-appellees, this
court, admitting the findings and holdings of the lower court,
said the following:
17
 If we heed the parol evidence, we find
that the seashore was formerly about
one hundred brazas distant from the
land in question; that, in the course of
time, and by the removal of a
considerable quantity of sand from the
shore at the back of the land for the use
of the street car company in filling in
Calle Cervantes, the sea water in
ordinary tides now covers part of the
land described in the petition.
The fact that certain land, not the bed of
a river or of the sea, is covered by sea
water during the period of ordinary high
tide, is not a reason established by any
law to cause the loss thereof, especially
when, as in the present case, it
becomes covered by water owing to
circumstances entirely independent of
the will of the owner.
In the case of Director of Lands vs. Aguilar (G.R. No.
22034),1 also cited by the claimants-appellees, wherein the
Government adduced no evidence in support of its
contention, the lower court said in part:
The contention of the claimants
Cabangis is to the effect that said lots
are a part of the adjoining land
adjudicated to their deceased father,
Don Tomas Cabangis, which, for over
fifty years had belonged to their
deceased grandmother, Tita Andres,
and that, due to certain improvements
made in Manila Bay, the waters of the
sea covered a large part of the lots
herein claimed.
The Government of the Philippine
Islands also claims the ownership of
said lots, because, at ordinary high tide,
they are covered by the sea.
Upon petition of the parties, the lower
court made an ocular inspection of said
lots on September 12, 1923, and on
said inspection found some light
material houses built thereon, and that
on that occasion the waters of the sea
did not reach the aforesaid lots.
From the evidence adduced at the trial
of this cause, it may be inferred that Tita
Andres, during her lifetime was the
owner of a rather large parcel of land
which was adjudicated by a decree to
her son Tomas Cabangis; the lots now
in question are contiguous to that land
and are covered by the waters of the
sea at extraordinary high tide; some 50
years before the sea did not reach said
strip of land, and on it were constructed,
for the most part, light material houses,
occupied by the tenants of Tita Andres,
to whom they paid rent. Upon her death,
her son Tomas Cabangis succeeded to
the possession, and his children
succeeded him, they being the present
claimants, Consuelo, Jesus, Tomas,
and Consorcia Cabangis.
The Government of the Philippine
Islands did not adduce any evidence in
support of its contention, with the
exception of registry record No. 8147, to
show that the lots here in question were
not excluded from the application
presented in said proceeding.
It will be seen that in the case of Buzon vs. Insular
Government and City of Manila, cited above, the rise of the
waters of the sea that covered the lands there in dispute,
was due not to the action of the tide but to the fact that a
large quantity of sand was taken from the sea at the side of
said land in order to fill in Cervantes Street, and this court
properly held that because of this act, entirely independent
of the will of the owner of said land, the latter could not lose
the ownership thereof, and the mere fact that the waters of
the sea covered it as a result of said act, is not sufficient to
convert it into public land, especially, as the land was high
and appropriate for building purposes.
In the case of the Director of Lands vs. Aguilar also cited by
the claimants-appellees, the Insular Government did not
present any evidence in support of its contention, thus
leaving uncontradicted the evidence adduced by the
claimants Aguilar et al., as to the ownership, possession and
occupation of said lots.
In the instant case the evidence shows that from 1896, the
waves of Manila Bay had been gradually and constantly
washing away the sand that formed the lots here in question,
until 1901, when the sea water completely covered them,
and thus they remained until the year 1912. In the latter year
they were reclaimed from the sea by filling in with sand and
silt extracted from the bed of Vitas Estuary when the
Government dredged said estuary in order to facilitate
navigation. Neither the herein claimants-appellees nor their
predecessors did anything to prevent their destruction.
In conclusion, then, we hold that the lots in question having
disappeared on account of the gradual erosion due to the
ebb and flow of the tide, and having remained in such a state
until they were reclaimed from the sea by the filling in done
by the Government, they are public land. (Aragon vs. Insular
Government, 19 Phil., 223; Francisco vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands, 28 Phil., 505).
By virtue whereof, the judgment appealed from is reversed
and lots Nos. 36, 39 and 40 of cadastral proceeding No. 373
of the City of Manila are held to be public land belonging to
the Government of the United States under the
administration and control of the Government of the
Philippine Islands. So ordered.
G.R. No. L40474 August 29, 1975
CEBU OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. PASCUAL A. BERCILLES Presiding Judge, Branch
XV, 14th Judicial District, and JOSE L. ESPELETA,
Assistant Provincial Fiscal, Province of Cebu,
representing the Solicitor General's Office and the
Bureau of Lands, respondents.
Jose Antonio R Conde for petitioner.
Office of the Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.,
Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez and Trial
Attorney David R. Hilario for respondents. .
CONCEPCION, Jr., J.:
This is a petition for the review of the order of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu dismissing petitioner's application for
registration of title over a parcel of land situated in the City of
Cebu.
The parcel of land sought to be registered was only a portion
of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City. On September 23,
1968, the City Council of Cebu, through Resolution No.
2193, approved on October 3, 1968, declared the terminal
portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City, as an
abandoned road, the same not being included in the City
Development Plan. 1 Subsequently, on December 19, 1968,
the City Council of Cebu passed Resolution No. 2755,
18
authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the land through a to the public trust will be presumed. So
public bidding. 2 Pursuant thereto, the lot was awarded to the the fact that some private interests may
herein petitioner being the highest bidder and on March 3, be served incidentally will not invalidate
1969, the City of Cebu, through the Acting City Mayor, the vacation ordinance.
executed a deed of absolute sale to the herein petitioner for
a total consideration of P10,800.00. 3 By virtue of the
(2) Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's
aforesaid deed of absolute sale, the petitioner filed an
application for registration of title was withdrawn from public
application with the Court of First instance of Cebu to have
use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes
its title to the land registered. 4
patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary
contract.
On June 26, 1974, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu
filed a motion to dismiss the application on the ground that
Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that
the property sought to be registered being a public road
"Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for
intended for public use is considered part of the public
public use or for public service, shall form part of the
domain and therefore outside the commerce of man.
patrimonial property of the State."
Consequently, it cannot be subject to registration by any
private individual. 5
Besides, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu heretofore
quoted, in very clear and unequivocal terms, states that:
After hearing the parties, on October 11, 1974 the trial court
"Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used
issued an order dismissing the petitioner's application for
or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property
registration of title. 6 Hence, the instant petition for review.
belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed."

For the resolution of this case, the petitioner poses the

Accordingly, the withdrawal of the property in question from
following questions:
public use and its subsequent sale to the petitioner is valid.
Hence, the petitioner has a registerable title over the lot in
(1) Does the City Charter of Cebu City question.
(Republic Act No. 3857) under Section
31, paragraph 34, give the City of Cebu
WHEREFORE, the order dated October 11, 1974, rendered
the valid right to declare a road as
by the respondent court in Land Reg. Case No. N-948, LRC
abandoned? and
Rec. No. N-44531 is hereby set aside, and the respondent
court is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of the
(2) Does the declaration of the road, as petitioner's application for registration of title.
abandoned, make it the patrimonial
property of the City of Cebu which may
SO ORDERED.
be the object of a common contract?

G.R. No. L-24950 March 25, 1926

(1) The pertinent portions of the Revised Charter of Cebu
City provides:
Section 31. Legislative Powers. Any
provision of law and executive order to
the contrary notwithstanding, the City
Council shall have the following
legislative powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(34) ...; to close any city road, street or
alley, boulevard, avenue, park or
square. Property thus withdrawn from
public servitude may be used or
conveyed for any purpose for which
other real property belonging to the City
may be lawfully used or conveyed.
From the foregoing, it is undoubtedly clear that the City of
Cebu is empowered to close a city road or street. In the case
of Favis vs. City of Baguio, 7 where the power of the city
Council of Baguio City to close city streets and to vacate or
withdraw the same from public use was similarly assailed,
this court said:
5. So it is, that appellant may not
challenge the city council's act of
withdrawing a strip of Lapu-Lapu Street
at its dead end from public use and
converting the remainder thereof into an
alley. These are acts well within the
ambit of the power to close a city street.
The city council, it would seem to us, is
the authority competent to determine
whether or not a certain property is still
necessary for public use.
Such power to vacate a street or alley is
discretionary. And the discretion will not
ordinarily be controlled or interfered with
by the courts, absent a plain case of
abuse or fraud or collusion. Faithfulness
VIUDA DE TAN TOCO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO, defendant-
appellee.
Arroyo & Evangelista for appellant.
Provincial Fiscal Borromeo Veloso for appelle.
VILLAMOR, J.:
It appears from the record that the widow of Tan Toco had
sued the municipal council of Iloilo for the amount of
P42,966.40, being the purchase price of two strips of land,
one on Calle J. M. Basa consisting of 592 square meters,
and the other on Calle Aldiguer consisting of 59 square
meters, which the municipality of Iloilo had appropriated for
widening said street. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo
sentenced the said municipality to pay the plaintiff the
amount so claimed, plus the interest, and the said judgment
was on appeal affirmed by this court.1
On account of lack of funds the municipality of Iloilo was
unable to pay the said judgment, wherefore plaintiff had a
writ of execution issue against the property of the said
municipality, by virtue of which the sheriff attached two auto
trucks used for street sprinkling, one police patrol
automobile, the police stations on Mabini street, and in Molo
and Mandurriao and the concrete structures, with the
corresponding lots, used as markets by Iloilo, Molo, and
Mandurriao.
After notice of the sale of said property had been made, and
a few days before the sale, the provincial fiscal of Iloilo filed
a motion which the Court of First Instance praying that the
attachment on the said property be dissolved, that the said
attachment be declared null and void as being illegal and
violative of the rights of the defendant municipality.
Plaintiffs counsel objected o the fiscal's motion but the court,
by order of August 12, 1925, declared the attachment levied
upon the aforementioned property of the defendant

19
municipality null and void, thereby dissolving the said
attachment.
From this order the plaintiff has appealed by bill of
exceptions. The fundamental question raised by appellant in
her four assignments of error is whether or not the property
levied upon is exempt from execution.
The municipal law, section 2165 of the Administrative Code,
provides that:
Municipalities are political bodies corporate, and
as such are endowed with the faculties of
municipal corporations, to be exercised by and
through their respective municipal government in
conformity with law.
It shall be competent for them, in their proper
corporate name, to sue and be sued, to contract
and be contracted with, to acquire and hold real
and personal property for municipal purposes, and
generally to exercise the powers hereinafter
specified or otherwise conferred upon them by
law.
For the purposes of the matter here in question, the
Administrative Code does not specify the kind of property
that a municipality may acquire. However, article 343 of the
Civil Code divides the property of provinces and towns
(municipalities) into property for public use and patrimonial
property. According to article 344 of the same Code,
provincial roads and foot-path, squares, streets, fountains
and public waters, drives and public improvements of
general benefit built at the expense of the said towns or
provinces, are property for public use.
All other property possessed by the said towns and
provinces is patrimonial and shall be subject to the
provisions of the Civil Code except as provided by special
laws.
Commenting upon article 344, Mr. Manresa says that "In
accordance with administrative legislation" (Spanish) we
must distinguish, as to the patrimonial property of the towns,
"between that a common benefit and that which is private
property of the town. The first differs from property for public
use in that generally its enjoyment is less, as it is limited to
neighbors or to a group or class thereof; and, furthermore,
such use, more or less general, is not intrinsic with this kind
of property, for by its very nature it may be enjoyed as
though it were private property. The third group, that is,
private property, is used in the name of the town or province
by the entities representing it and, like and private property,
giving a source of revenue."
Such distinction, however, is of little practical importance in
this jurisdiction in view of the different principles underlying
the functions of a municipality under the American rule.
Notwithstanding this, we believe that the principle governing
property of the public domain of the State is applicable to
property for public use of the municipalities as said municipal
is similar in character. The principle is that the property for
public use of the State is not within the commerce of man
and, consequently, is inalienable and not subject to
prescription. Likewise, property for public of the municipality
is not within the commerce of man so long as it is used by
the public and, consequently, said property is also
inalienable.
The American Law is more explicit about this matter as
expounded by Mcquilin in Municipal Corporations, volume 3,
paragraph 1160, where he says that:
States statutes often provide the court houses,
jails and other buildings owned by municipalities
and the lots on which they stand shall be exempt
from attachment and execution. But independent
of express statutory exemption, as a general
proposition, property, real and personal, held by
municipal corporations, in trust for the benefit of
their inhabitants, and used for public purposes, is
exempt.
For example, public buildings, school houses,
streets, squares, parks, wharves, engines and
engine houses, and the like, are not subject to
execution. So city waterworks, and a stock of
liquors carried in a town dispensary, are exempt.
The reason for the exemption is obvious.
Municipal corporations are created for public
purposes and for the good of the citizens in their
aggregate or public capacity. That they may
properly discharge such public functions corporate
property and revenues are essential, and to deny
them these means the very purpose of their
creation would be materially impeded, and in
some instances practically destroy it. Respecting
this subject the Supreme Court of Louisiana
remarked: "On the first view of this question there
is something very repugnant to the moral sense in
the idea that a municipal corporation should
contract debts, and that, having no resources but
the taxes which are due to it, these should not be
subjected by legal process to the satisfaction of its
creditors. This consideration, deduced from the
principles of moral equity has only given way to
the more enlarged contemplation of the great and
paramount interests of public order and the
principles of government."
It is generally held that property owned by a
municipality, where not used for a public purpose
but for quasi private purposes, is subject to
execution on a judgment against the municipality,
and may be sold. This rule applies to shares of
stock owned by a municipal corporation, and the
like. But the mere fact that corporate property held
for public uses is being temporarily used for
private purposes does not make it subject
execution.
If municipal property exempt from execution is
destroyed, the insurance money stands in lieu
thereof and is also exempt.
The members or inhabitants of a municipal
corporation proper are not personally liable for the
debts of the municipality, except that in the New
England States the individual liability of the
inhabitant is generally maintained.
In Corpus Juris, vol 23, page 355, the following is found:
Where property of a municipal or other public
corporation is sough to be subjected to execution
to satisfy judgments recovered against such
corporation, the question as to whether such
property is leviable or not is to be determined by
the usage and purposes for which it is held. The
rule is that property held for public uses, such as
public buildings, streets, squares parks,
promenades, wharves, landing places fire
engines, hose and hose carriages, engine houses,
public markets, hospitals, cemeteries, and
generally everything held for governmental
purposes, is not subject to levy and sale under
execution against such corporation. The rule also
applies to funds in the hands of a public officer.
Likewise it has been held that taxes due to a
municipal corporation or country cannot be seized
under execution by a creditor of such corporation.
But where a municipal corporation or country owns
in its proprietary, as distinguished from its public or
governmental capacity, property not useful or used
for a public purpose but for quasi private
purposes, the general rule is that such property
may be seized and sold under execution against
the corporation, precisely as similar property of
individuals is seized and sold. But property held
for public purposes is not subject to execution
merely because it is temporarily used for private
purposes, although if the public use is wholly
20
 abandoned it becomes subject to execution.
Whether or not property held as public property is
necessary for the public use is a political, rather
than a judicial question.
In the case of City of New Orleans vs. Louisiana
Construction Co., Ltd. (140 U. S., 654; 35 Law. ed., 556), it
was held that a wharf for unloading sugar and molasses,
open to the public, was property for the public use of the City
of New Orleans and was not subject to attachment for the
payment of the debts of the said city.
In that case it was proven that the said wharf was a parcel of
land adjacent to the Mississippi River where all shipments of
sugar and molasses taken to New Orleans were unloaded.
That city leased the said wharf to the Louisiana Construction
Company, Ltd., in order that it might erect warehouses so
that the merchandise upon discharge might not be spoiled
by the elements. The said company was given the privilege
of charging certain fees for storing merchandise in the said
warehouses and the public in general had the right to unload
sugar and molasses there by paying the required fees, 10
per cent of which was turned over to the city treasury.
The United States Supreme Court on an appeal held that the
wharf was public property, that it never ceased to be such in
order to become private property of the city; wherefore the
company could not levy execution upon the wharf in order to
collect the amount of the judgment rendered in favor thereof.
In the case of Klein vs. City of New Orleans (98 U. S., 149;
25 Law. ed., 430), the Supreme Court of the United States
that a public wharf on the banks of the Mississippi River was
public property and not subject to execution for the payment
of a debt of the City of New Orleans where said wharf was
located.
In this case a parcel of land adjacent to the Mississippi
River, which formerly was the shore of the river and which
later enlarged itself by accession, was converted into a wharf
by the city for public use, who charged a certain fee for its
use.
It was held that the land was public property as necessary as
a public street and was not subject to execution on account
of the debts of the city. It was further held that the fees
collected where also exempt from execution because they
were a part of the income of the city.
In the case of Tufexis vs. Olaguera and Municipal Council of
Guinobatan (32 Phil., 654), the question raised was whether
for the payment of a debt to a third person by the
concessionaire of a public market, the said public market
could be attached and sold at public auction. The Supreme
Court held that:
Even though a creditor is unquestionably entitled
to recover out of his debtor's property, yet when
among such property there is included the special
right granted by the Government of usufruct in a
building intended for a public service, and when
this privilege is closely related to a service of a
public character, such right of the creditor to the
collection of a debt owed him by the debtor who
enjoys the said special privilege of usufruct in a
public market is not absolute and may be
exercised only through the action of court of
justice with respect to the profits or revenue
obtained under the special right of usufruct
enjoyed by debtor.
The special concession of the right of usufruct in a
public market cannot be attached like any ordinary
right, because that would be to permit a person
who has contracted with the state or with the
administrative officials thereof to conduct and
manage a service of a public character, to be
substituted, without the knowledge and consent of
the administrative authorities, by one who took no
part in the contract, thus giving rise to the
possibility of the regular course of a public service
being disturbed by the more or less legal action of
a grantee, to the prejudice of the state and the
public interests.
The privilege or franchise granted to a private
person to enjoy the usufruct of a public market
cannot lawfully be attached and sold, and a
creditor of such person can recover his debt only
out of the income or revenue obtained by the
debtor from the enjoyment or usufruct of the said
privilege, in the same manner that the rights of
such creditors of a railroad company can be
exercised and their credit collected only out of the
gross receipts remaining after deduction has been
made therefrom of the operating expenses of the
road. (Law of November 12, 1896, extended to the
overseas provinces by the royal order of August 3,
1886.)
For the reasons contained in the authorities above quoted
we believe that this court would have reached the same
conclusion if the debtor had been municipality of Guinobatan
and the public market had been levied upon by virtue of the
execution.
It is evident that the movable and immovable property of a
municipality, necessary for governmental purpose, may not
be attached and sold for the payment of a judgment against
the municipality. The supreme reason for this rule is the
character of the public use to which such kind of property is
devoted. The necessity for government service justifies that
the property of public of the municipality be exempt from
execution just as it is necessary to exempt certain property
of private individuals in accordance with section 452 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
Even the municipal income, according to the above quoted
authorities, is exempt from levy and execution. In volume 1,
page 467, Municipal Corporations by Dillon we find that:
Municipal corporations are instituted by the
supreme authority of a state for the public good.
They exercise, by delegation from the legislature,
a portion of the sovereign power. The main object
of their creation is to act as administrative
agencies for the state, and to provide for the police
and local government of certain designated civil
divisions of its territory. To this end they are
invested with certain governmental powers and
charged with civil, political, and municipal duties.
To enable them beneficially to exercise these
powers and discharge these duties, they are
clothed with the authority to raise revenues, chiefly
by taxation, and subordinately by other modes as
by licenses, fines, and penalties. The revenue of
the public corporation is the essential means by
which it is enabled to perform its appointed work.
Deprived of its regular and adequate supply of
revenue, such a corporation is practically
destroyed and the ends of its erection thwarted.
Based upon considerations of this character, it is
the settled doctrine of the law that only the public
property but also the taxes and public revenues of
such corporations cannot be seized under
execution against them, either in the treasury or
when in transit to it. Judgments rendered for taxes,
and the proceeds of such judgments in the hands
of officers of the law, are not subject to execution
unless so declared by statute. The doctrine of the
inviolability of the public revenues by the creditor
is maintained, although the corporation is in debt,
and has no means of payment but the taxes which
it is authorized to collect.
Another error assigned by counsel for appellant is the
holding of the court a quo that the proper remedy for
collecting the judgment in favor of the plaintiff was by way or
mandamus.
21
While this question is not necessarily included in the one
which is the subject of this appeal, yet we believe that the
holding of the court, assigned as error by appellant's
counsel, is true when, after a judgment is rendered against a
municipality, it has no property subject to execution. This
doctrine is maintained by Dillon (Municipal Corporations, vol.
4, par. 1507, 5th ed.) based upon the decisions of several
States of the Union upholding the same principle and which
are cited on page 2679 of the aforesaid work. In this sense
this assignment of error, we believe, is groundless.
By virtue of all the foregoing, the judgment appealed from
should be and is hereby affirmed with costs against the
appellant. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-29788 August 30, 1972
RAFAEL S. SALAS, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary; CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, in his capacity as
Governor of the Land Authority; and LORENZO GELLA,
in his capacity as Register of Deeds of Manila,
petitioners-appellants,
vs.
HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge of
Branch XXIII, Court of First Instance of Manila; ANTONIO
J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of the City of
Manila; and the CITY OF MANILA, respondents-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant
Solicitor-General Antonio A. Torres, Solicitor Raul I. Goco
and Magno B. Pablo & Cipriano A. Tan, Legal Staff, Land
Authority for petitioners-appellants.
Gregorio A. Ejercito and Felix C. Chavez for respondents-
appellees.
ESGUERRA, J.:p
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIII, in Civil Case No.
67946, dated September 23, 1968, the dispositive portion of
which is as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders
judgment declaring Republic Act No.
4118 unconstitutional and invalid in that
it deprived the City of Manila of its
property without due process and
payment of just compensation.
Respondent Executive Secretary and
Governor of the Land Authority are
hereby restrained and enjoined from
implementing the provisions of said law.
Respondent Register of Deeds of the
City of Manila is ordered to cancel
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 80876
which he had issued in the name of the
Land Tenure Administration and
reinstate Transfer Certificate of Title No.
22547 in the name of the City of Manila
which he cancelled, if that is feasible, or
issue a new certificate of title for the
same parcel of land in the name of the
City of Manila. 1
The facts necessary for a clear understanding of this case
are as follows:
On February 24, 1919, the 4th Branch of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, acting as a land registration court,
rendered judgment in Case No. 18, G.L.R.O. Record No.
111, declaring the City of Manila the owner in fee simple of a
parcel of land known as Lot No. 1, Block 557 of the
Cadastral Survey of the City of Mani1a, containing an area
of 9,689.8 square meters, more or less. Pursuant to said
judgment the Register of Deeds of Manila on August 21,
1920, issued in favor of the City of Manila, Original
Certificate of Title No. 4329 covering the aforementioned
parcel of land. On various dates in 1924, the City of Manila
sold portions of the aforementioned parcel of land in favor of
Pura Villanueva. As a consequence of the transactions
Original Certificate of Title No. 4329 was cancelled and
transfer certificates of title were issued in favor of Pura
Villanueva for the portions purchased by her. When the last
sale to Pura Villanueva was effected on August 22, 1924,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21974 in the name of the City
of Manila was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 22547 covering the residue
thereof known as Lot 1-B-2-B of Block 557, with an area of
7,490.10 square meters, was issued in the name of the City
of Manila.
On September 21, 1960, the Municipal Board of Manila,
presided by then Vice-Mayor Antono J. Villegas, adopted a
resolution requesting His Excellency, the President of the
Philippines to consider the feasibility of declaring the City
property bounded by Florida, San Andres, and Nebraska
Streets, under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 25545 and
22547, containing a total area of 7,450 square meters as a
patrimonial property of the City of Manila for the purpose of
reselling these lots to the actual occupants thereof. 2
The said resolution of the Municipil Board of the City of
Manila was officially transmitted to the President of the
Philippines by then Vice-Mayor Antonio J. Villegas on
September 21, 1960, with the information that the same
resolution was, on the same date, transmitted to the Senate
and House of Representatives of the Congress of the
Philippines. 3
During the First Session of the Fifth Congress of the
Philippines, House Bill No. 191 was filed in the House of
Representatives by then Congressman Bartolome
Cabangbang seeking to declare the property in question as
patrimonial property of the City of Manila, and for other
purposes. The explanatory note of the Bill gave the grounds
for its enactment, to wit:
In the particular case of the property
subject of this bill, the City of Manila
does not seem to have use thereof as a
public communal property. As a matter
of fact, a resolution was adopted by the
Municipal Board of Manila at its regular
session held on September 21, 1960, to
request the feasibility of declaring the
city property bounded by Florida, San
Andres and Nebraska Streets as a
patrimonial property of the City of Manila
for the purpose of reselling these lots to
the actual occupants thereof. Therefore,
it will be to the best interest of society
that the said property be used in one
way or another. Since this property has
been occupied for a long time by the
present occupants thereof and since
said occupants have expressed their
willingness to buy the said property, it is
but proper that the same be sold to
them. 4
Subsequently, a revised version of the Bill was introduced in
the House of Representatives by Congressmen Manuel
Cases, Antonio Raquiza and Nicanor Yñiguez as House Bill
No. 1453, with the following explanatory note:
The accompanying bill seeks to convert
one (1) parcel of land in the district of
Malate, which is reserved as communal
property into a disposable or alienable
property of the State and to provide its
subdivision and sale to bona fide
occupants or tenants.
This parcel of land in question was
originally an aggregate part of a piece of
land with an area of 9,689.8 square
meters, more or less. ... On September
21, 1960, the Municipal Board of Manila
in its regular session unanimously
22
 adopted a resolution requesting the
President of the Philippines and
Congress of the Philippines the
feasibility of declaring this property into
disposable or alienable property of the
State. There is therefore a precedent
that this parcel of land could be
subdivided and sold to bona fide
occupants. This parcel of land will not
serve any useful public project because
it is bounded on all sides by private
properties which were formerly parts of
this lot in question.
Approval of this bill will implement the
policy of the Administration of land for
the landless and the Fifth Declaration of
Principles of the Constitution, which
states that the promotion of Social
Justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all people should
be the concern of the State. We are
ready and willing to enact legislation
promoting the social and economic well-
being of the people whenever an
opportunity for enacting such kind of
legislation arises.
In view of the foregoing consideration and to insure fairness
and justice to the present bona fide occupants thereof,
approval of this Bill is strongly urged. 5
The Bill having been passed by the House of
Representatives, the same was thereafter sent to the Senate
where it was thoroughly discussed, as evidenced by the
Congressional Records for May 20, 1964, pertinent portion
of which is as follows:
SENATOR FERNANDEZ: Mr.
President, it will be re called that when
the late Mayor Lacson was still alive, we
approved a similar bill. But afterwards,
the late Mayor Lacson came here and
protested against the approval, and the
approval was reconsidered. May I know
whether the defect in the bill which we
approved, has already been eliminated
in this present bill?
SENATOR TOLENTINO: I understand
Mr. President, that that has already
been eliminated and that is why the City
of Manila has no more objection to this
bill.
SENATOR FERNANDEZ: Mr.
President, in view of that manifestation
and considering that Mayor Villegas and
Congressman Albert of the Fourth
District of Manila are in favor of the bill. I
would not want to pretend to know more
what is good for the City of Manila.
SENATOR TOLENTINO: Mr. President,
there being no objection, I move that we
approve this bill on second reading.
PRESIDENT PRO-TEMPORE: The biII
is approved on second reading after
several Senetors said aye and nobody
said nay.
The bill was passed by the Senate, approved by the
President on June 20, 1964, and became Republic Act No.
4118. It reads as follows:
Lot I-B-2-B of Block 557 of the cadastral
survey of the City of Manila, situated in
the District of Malate, City of Manila,
which is reserved as communal
property, is hereby converted into
disposal or alienable land of the State,
to be placed under the disposal of the
Land Tenure Administration. The Land
Tenure Administration shall subdivide
the property into small lots, none of
which shall exceed one hundred and
twenty square meters in area and sell
the same on installment basis to the
tenants or bona fide occupants thereof
and to individuals, in the order
mentioned: Provided, That no down
payment shall be required of tenants or
bona fide occupants who cannot afford
to pay such down payment: Provided,
further, That no person can purchase
more than one lot: Provided,
furthermore, That if the tenant or bona
fide occupant of any given lot is not able
to purchase the same, he shall be given
a lease from month to month until such
time that he is able to purchase the lot:
Provided, still further, That in the event
of lease the rentals which may be
charged shall not exceed eight per cent
per annum of the assessed value of the
property leased: And provided, finally,
That in fixing the price of each lot, which
shall not exceed twenty pesos per
square meter, the cost of subdivision
and survey shall not be included.
Sec. 2. Upon approval of this Act no
ejectment proceedings against any
tenant or bona fide occupant of the
above lots shall be instituted and any
ejectment proceedings pending in court
against any such tenant or bona fide
occupant shall be dismissed upon
motion of the defendant: Provided, That
any demolition order directed against
any tenant or bona fide occupant shall
be lifted.
Sec. 3. Upon approval of this Act, if the
tenant or bona fide occupant is in
arrears in the payment of any rentals,
the amount legally due shall be
liquidated and shall be payable in
twenty-four equal monthly installments
from the date of liquidation.
Sec. 4. No property acquired by virtue of
this Act shall be transferred, sold,
mortgaged, or otherwise disposed of
within a period of five years from the
date full ownership thereof has been
vested in the purchaser without the
consent of the Land Tenure
Administration.
Sec. 5. In the event of the death of the
purchaser prior to the complete payment
of the price of the lot purchased by him,
his widow and children shall succeed in
all his rights and obligations with respect
to his lot.
Sec. 6. The Chairman of the Land
Tenure Administration shall implement
and issue such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this Act.
Sec. 7. The sum of one hundred fifty
thousand pesos is appropriated out of
any funds in the National Treasury not
otherwise appropriated, to carry out the
purposes of this Act.
23
 Sec. 8. All laws or parts of laws
inconsistent with this Act are repealed or
modified accordingly.
Sec. 9. This Act shall take effect upon
its approval.
Approved, June 20, 1964.
To implement the provisions of Republic Act No. 4118, and
pursuant to the request of the occupants of the property
involved, then Deputy Governor Jose V. Yap of the Land
Authority (which succeeded the Land Tenure Administration)
addressed a letter, dated February 18, 1965, to Mayor
Antonio Villegas, furnishing him with a copy of the proposed
subdivision plan of said lot as prepared for the Republic of
the Philippines for resale of the subdivision lots by the Land
Authority to bona fide applicants. 6
On March 2, 1965, the City Mayor of Manila, through his
Executive and Technical Adviser, acknowledged receipt of
the proposed subdivision plan of the property in question
and informed the Land Authority that his office would
interpose no objection to the implementation of said law,
provided that its provisions be strictly complied with. 7
With the above-mentioned written conformity of the City of
Manila for the implementation of Republic Act No. 4118, the
Land Authority, thru then Deputy Governor Jose V. Yap,
requested the City Treasurer of Manila, thru the City Mayor,
for the surrender and delivery to the former of the owner's
duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22547 in order to
obtain title thereto in the name of the Land Authority. The
request was duly granted with the knowledge and consent of
the Office of the City Mayor. 8
With the presentation of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
22547, which had been yielded as above stated by the, City
authorities to the Land Authority, Transfer Certificate of Title
(T.C.T. No. 22547) was cancelled by the Register of Deeds
of Manila and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No.
80876 was issued in the name of the Land Tenure
Administration (now Land Authority) pursuant to the
provisions of Republic Act No.
4118. 9
But due to reasons which do not appear in the record, the
City of Manila made a complete turn-about, for on December
20, 1966, Antonio J. Villegas, in his capacity as the City
Mayor of Manila and the City of Manila as a duly organized
public corporation, brought an action for injunction and/or
prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain, prohibit and
enjoin the herein appellants, particularly the Governor of the
Land Authority and the Register of Deeds of Manila, from
further implementing Republic Act No. 4118, and praying for
the declaration of Republic Act No. 4118 as unconstitutional.
With the foregoing antecedent facts, which are all contained
in the partial stipulation of facts submitted to the trial court
and approved by respondent Judge, the parties waived the
presentation of further evidence and submitted the case for
decision. On September 23, 1968, judgment was rendered
by the trial court declaring Republic Act No. 4118
unconstitutional and invalid on the ground that it deprived the
City of Manila of its property without due process of law and
payment of just compensation. The respondents were
ordered to undo all that had been done to carry out the
provisions of said Act and were restrained from further
implementing the same.
Two issues are presented for determination, on the
resolution of which the decision in this case hinges, to wit:
I. Is the property involved private or
patrimonial property of the City of
Manila?
II. Is Republic Act No. 4118 valid and
not repugnant to the Constitution?
I.
As regards the first issue, appellants maintain that the land
involved is a communal land or "legua comunal" which is a
portion of the public domain owned by the State; that it came
into existence as such when the City of Manila, or any
pueblo or town in the Philippines for that matter, was
founded under the laws of Spain, the former sovereign; that
upon the establishment of a pueblo, the administrative
authority was required to allot and set aside portions of the
public domain for a public plaza, a church site, a site for
public buildings, lands to serve as common pastures and for
streets and roads; that in assigning these lands some lots
were earmarked for strictly public purposes, and ownership
of these lots (for public purposes) immediately passed to the
new municipality; that in the case of common lands or "legua
comunal", there was no such immediate acquisition of
ownership by the pueblo, and the land though administered
thereby, did not automatically become its property in the
absence of an express grant from the Central Government,
and that the reason for this arrangement is that this class of
land was not absolutely needed for the discharge of the
municipality's governmental functions.
It is argued that the parcel of land involved herein has not
been used by the City of Manila for any public purpose and
had not been officially earmarked as a site for the erection of
some public buildings; that this circumstance confirms the
fact that it was originally "communal" land alloted to the City
of Manila by the Central Government not because it was
needed in connection with its organization as a municipality
but simply for the common use of its inhabitants; that the
present City of Manila as successor of the Ayuntamiento de
Manila under the former Spanish sovereign merely enjoys
the usufruct over said land, and its exercise of acts of
ownership by selling parts thereof did not necessarily
convert the land into a patrimonial property of the City of
Manila nor divest the State of its paramount title.
Appellants further argue that a municipal corporation, like a
city is a governmental agent of the State with authority to
govern a limited portion of its territory or to administer purely
local affairs in a given political subdivision, and the extent of
its authority is strictly delimited by the grant of power
conferred by the State; that Congress has the exclusive
power to create, change or destroy municipal corporations;
that even if We admit that legislative control over municipal
corporations is not absolute and even if it is true that the City
of Manila has a registered title over the property in question,
the mere transfer of such land by an act of the legislature
from one class of public land to another, without
compensation, does not invade the vested rights of the City.
Appellants finally argue that Republic Act No. 4118 has
treated the land involved as one reserved for communal use,
and this classification is conclusive upon the courts; that if
the City of Manila feels that this is wrong and its interests
have been thereby prejudiced, the matter should be brought
to the attention of Congress for correction; and that since
Congress, in the exercise of its wide discretionary powers
has seen fit to classify the land in question as communal, the
Courts certainly owe it to a coordinate branch of the
Government to respect such determination and should not
interfere with the enforcement of the law.
Upon the other hand, appellees argue by simply quoting
portions of the appealed decision of the trial court, which
read thus:
The respondents (petitioners-appellants
herein) contend, among other defenses,
that the property in question is
communal property. This contention is,
however, disproved by Original
Certificate of Title No. 4329 issued on
August 21, 1920 in favor of the City of
Manila after the land in question was
registered in the City's favor. The
Torrens Title expressly states that the
City of Manila was the owner in 'fee
simple' of the said land. Under Sec. 38
of the Land Registration Act, as
24
amended, the decree of confirmation
and registration in favor of the City of
Manila ... shall be conclusive upon and
against all persons including the Insular
Government and all the branches
there ... There is nothing in the said
certificate of title indicating that the land
was 'communal' land as contended by
the respondents. The erroneous
assumption by the Municipal Board of
Manila that the land in question was
communal land did not make it so. The
Municipal Board had no authority to do
that.
The respondents, however, contend that
Congress had the power and authority
to declare that the land in question was
'communal' land and the courts have no
power or authority to make a contrary
finding. This contention is not entirely
correct or accurate. Congress has the
power to classify 'land of the public
domain', transfer them from one
classification to another and declare
them disposable or not. Such power
does not, however, extend to properties
which are owned by cities, provinces
and municipalities in their 'patrimonial'
capacity.
Art. 324 of the Civil Code provides that
properties of provinces, cities and
municipalities are divided into properties
for public use and patrimonial property.
Art. 424 of the same code provides that
properties for public use consist of
provincial roads, city streets, municipal
streets, the squares, fountains, public
waters, promenades and public works
for public service paid for by said
province, cities or municipalities. All
other property possessed by any of
them is patrimonial. Tested by this
criterion the Court finds and holds that
the land in question is patrimonial
property of the City of Manila.
Respondents contend that Congress
has declared the land in question to be
'communal' and, therefore, such
designation is conclusive upon the
courts. The Courts holds otherwise.
When a statute is assailed as
unconstitutional the Courts have the
power and authority to inquire into the
question and pass upon it. This has long
ago been settled in Marbury vs.
Madison, 2 L. ed. 60, when the United
States Supreme Court speaking thru
Chief Justice Marshall held:
... If an act of the
legislature,
repugnant to the
constitution, is void,
does it,
notwithstanding its
validity, bind the
courts, and oblige
them to give effect?
It is emphatically
the province and
duty of the judicial
department to say
what the law is ...
So if a law be in
opposition to the
constitution; if both
the law and the
constitution apply to
a particular case, so
that the court must
either decide that
case conformable
to the constitution,
disregarding the
law, the court must
determine which of
these conflicting
rules governs the
case. This is of the
very essence of
unconstitutional
judicial duty.
Appellees finally concluded that when the courts declare a
law unconstitutional it does not mean that the judicial power
is superior to the legislative power. It simply means that the
power of the people is superior to both and that when the will
of the legislature, declared in statutes, stands in opposition
to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges
ought to be governed by the Constitution rather than by the
statutes.
There is one outstanding factor that should be borne in mind
in resolving the character of the land involved, and it is that
the City of Manila, although declared by the Cadastral Court
as owner in fee simple, has not shown by any shred of
evidence in what manner it acquired said land as its private
or patrimonial property. It is true that the City of Manila as
well as its predecessor, the Ayuntamiento de Manila, could
validly acquire property in its corporate or private capacity,
following the accepted doctrine on the dual character —
public and private — of a municipal corporation. And when it
acquires property in its private capacity, it acts like an
ordinary person capable of entering into contracts or making
transactions for the transmission of title or other real rights.
When it comes to acquisition of land, it must have done so
under any of the modes established by law for the
acquisition of ownership and other real rights. In the absence
of a title deed to any land claimed by the City of Manila as its
own, showing that it was acquired with its private or
corporate funds, the presumption is that such land came
from the State upon the creation of the municipality (Unson
vs. Lacson, et al., 100 Phil. 695). Originally the municipality
owned no patrimonial property except those that were
granted by the State not for its public but for private use.
Other properties it owns are acquired in the course of the
exercise of its corporate powers as a juridical entity to which
category a municipal corporation pertains.
Communal lands or "legua comunal" came into existence
when a town or pueblo was established in this country under
the laws of Spain (Law VII, Title III, Book VI, Recopilacion de
las Leyes de Indios). The municipalities of the Philippines
were not entitled, as a matter of right, to any part of the
public domain for use as communal lands. The Spanish law
provided that the usufruct of a portion of the public domain
adjoining municipal territory might be granted by the
Government for communal purposes, upon proper petition,
but, until granted, no rights therein passed to the
municipalities, and, in any event, the ultimate title remained
in the sovereign (City of Manila vs. Insular Government, 10
Phil. 327).
For the establishment, then, of new
pueblos the administrative authority of
the province, in representation of the
Governor General, designated the
territory for their location and extension
and the metes and bounds of the same;
and before alloting the lands among the
new settlers, a special demarcation was
made of the places which were to serve
as the public square of the pueblo, for
the erection of the church, and as sites
for the public buildings, among others,
the municipal building or the casa real,
as well as of the lands whick were to
constitute the common pastures, and
propios of the municipality and the
streets and roads which were to
intersect the new town were laid out, ... .
(Municipality of Catbalogan vs. Director
of Lands, 17 Phil. 216, 220) (Emphasis
supplied)
25
It may, therefore, be laid down as a general rule that
regardless of the source or classification of land in the
possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with
its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such
property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of its
inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary
purposes. It holds such lands subject to the paramount
power of the legislature to dispose of the same, for after all it
owes its creation to it as an agent for the performance of a
part of its public work, the municipality being but a
subdivision or instrumentality thereof for purposes of local
administration. Accordingly, the legal situation is the same
as if the State itself holds the property and puts it to a
different use (2 McQuilin,Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed., p.
197, citing Monagham vs. Armatage, 218 Minn. 27, 15 N. W.
2nd 241).
True it is that the legislative control over a municipal
corporation is not absolute even when it comes to its
property devoted to public use, for such control must not be
exercised to the extent of depriving persons of their property
or rights without due process of law, or in a manner
impairing the obligations of contracts. Nevertheless, when it
comes to property of the municipality which it did not acquire
in its private or corporate capacity with its own funds, the
legislature can transfer its administration and disposition to
an agency of the National Government to be disposed of
according to its discretion. Here it did so in obedience to the
constitutional mandate of promoting social justice to insure
the well-being and economic security of the people.
It has been held that a statute authorizing the transfer of a
Municipal airport to an Airport Commission created by the
legislature, even without compensation to the city, was not
violative of the due process clause of the American Federal
Constitution. The Supreme Court of Minnessota in
Monagham vs. Armatage, supra, said:
... The case is controlled by the further
rule that the legislature, having plenary
control of the local municipality, of its
creation and of all its affairs, has the
right to authorize or direct the
expenditures of money in its treasury,
though raised, for a particular purpose,
for any legitimate municipal purpose, or
to order and direct a distribution thereof
upon a division of the territory into
separate municipalities ... . The local
municipality has no such vested right in
or to its public funds, like that which the
Constitution protects in the individual as
precludes legislative interferences.
People vs. Power, 25 Ill. 187; State
Board (of Education) vs. City, 56 Miss.
518. As remarked by the supreme court
of Maryland in Mayor vs. Sehner, 37
Md. 180: "It is of the essence of such a
corporation, that the government has
the sole right as trustee of the public
interest, at its own good will and
pleasure, to inspect, regulate, control,
and direct the corporation, its funds, and
franchises."
We therefore hold that c.500, in
authorizing the transfer of the use and
possession of the municipal airport to
the commission without compensation
to the city or to the park board, does not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States.
The Congress has dealt with the land involved as one
reserved for communal use (terreno comunal). The act of
classifying State property calls for the exercise of wide
discretionary legislative power and it should not be interfered
with by the courts.
This brings Us to the second question as regards the validity
of Republic Act No. 4118, viewed in the light of Article III,
Sections 1, subsection (1) and (2) of the Constitution which
ordain that no person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law and that no private property shall
be taken for public use without just compensation.
II .
The trial court declared Republic Act No. 4118
unconstitutional for allegedly depriving the City of Manila of
its property without due process of law and without payment
of just compensation. It is now well established that the
presumption is always in favor of the constitutionality of a
law (U S. vs. Ten Yu, 24 Phil. 1; Go Ching, et al. vs.
Dinglasan, et al., 45 O.G. No. 2, pp. 703, 705). To declare a
law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of that law to the
Constitution must be clear and unequivocal, for even if a law
is aimed at the attainment of some public good, no
infringement of constitutional rights is allowed. To strike
down a law there must be a clear showing that what the
fundamental law condemns or prohibits, the statute allows it
to be done (Morfe vs. Mutuc, et al., G.R. No. L-20387, Jan.
31, 1968; 22 SCRA 424). That situation does not obtain in
this case as the law assailed does not in any manner trench
upon the constitution as will hereafter be shown. Republic
Act No. 4118 was intended to implement the social justice
policy of the Constitution and the Government program of
"Land for the Landless". The explanatory note of House Bill
No. 1453 which became Republic Act No. 4118, reads in
part as follows:
Approval of this bill will implement the
policy of the administration of "land for
the landless" and the Fifth Declaration of
Principles of the Constitution which
states that "the promotion of social
justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all people should
be the concern of the State." We are
ready and willing to enact legislation
promoting the social and economic well-
being of the people whenever an
opportunity for enacting such kind of
legislation arises.
The respondent Court held that Republic Act No. 4118, "by
converting the land in question — which is the patrimonial
property of the City of Manila into disposable alienable land
of the State and placing it under the disposal of the Land
Tenure Administration — violates the provisions of Article III
(Secs. 1 and 2) of the Constitution which ordain that "private
property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation, and that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law". In support
thereof reliance is placed on the ruling in Province of
Zamboanga del Norte vs. City of Zamboanga, G.R. No.
2440, March 28, 1968; 22 SCRA 1334, which holds that
Congress cannot deprive a municipality of its private or
patrimonial property without due process of law and without
payment of just compensation since it has no absolute
control thereof. There is no quarrel over this rule if it is
undisputed that the property sought to be taken is in reality a
private or patrimonial property of the municipality or city. But
it would be simply begging the question to classify the land
in question as such. The property, as has been previously
shown, was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own
funds in its private or proprietary capacity. That it has in its
name a registered title is not questioned, but this title should
be deemed to be held in trust for the State as the land
covered thereby was part of the territory of the City of Manila
granted by the sovereign upon its creation. That the National
Government, through the Director of Lands, represented by
the Solicitor General, in the cadastral proceedings did not
contest the claim of the City of Manila that the land is its
property, does not detract from its character as State
property and in no way divests the legislature of its power to
deal with it as such, the state not being bound by the
mistakes and/or negligence of its officers.
One decisive fact that should be noted is that the City of
Manila expressly recognized the paramount title of the State
over said land when by its resolution of September 20, 1960,
the Municipal Board, presided by then Vice-Mayor Antonio
Villegas, requested "His Excellency the President of the
Philippines to consider the feasibility of declaring the city
26
property bounded by Florida, San Andres and Nebraska
Streets, under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 25545 and
25547, containing an area of 7,450 square meters, as
patrimonial property of the City of Manila for the purpose of
reselling these lots to the actual occupants thereof." (See
Annex E, Partial Stipulation of Facts, Civil Case No. 67945,
CFI, Manila, p. 121, Record of the Case) [Emphasis
Supplied]
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby reversed,
and petitioners shall proceed with the free and untrammeled
implementation of Republic Act No. 4118 without any
obstacle from the respondents. Without costs.
DACANAY JR. V. ASISTIO JR.
208 SCRA 404

The alleged patrimonial character of the land under the

ownership of the City of Manila is totally belied by the City's
own official act, which is fatal to its claim since the Congress
did not do as bidden. If it were its patrimonial property why FACTS:
should the City of Manila be requesting the President to
make representation to the legislature to declare it as such An ordinance was issued designated certain city and
so it can be disposed of in favor of the actual occupants? municipal streets, roads, and other public areas for sites of
There could be no more blatant recognition of the fact that public markets. Pursuant to this, licenses were issued to
said land belongs to the State and was simply granted in market stall owners to put up their stalls in certain streets.
usufruct to the City of Manila for municipal purposes. But
Thereafter, the OIC mayor of Caloocan has caused the
since the City did not actually use said land for any
recognized public purpose and allowed it to remain idle and demolition of the stalls, which was upheld by the trial
unoccupied for a long time until it was overrun by squatters, court, saying that the public streets are part of the public
no presumption of State grant of ownership in favor of the dominion and is not open to the commerce of man. Then
City of Manila may be acquiesced in to justify the claim that it there come about a change in administration of the city. The
is its own private or patrimonial property (Municipality of
Tigbauan vs. Director of Lands, 35 Phil. 798; City of Manila next mayor did not continue the demolition of the stalls.
vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 327; Municipality of
Using the trial court’s decision, here now comes petitioner
Luzuriaga vs. Director of Lands, 24 Phil. 193). The
conclusion of the respondent court that Republic Act No. asking for the demolition of the stalls.
4118 converted a patrimonial property of the City of Manila
into a parcel of disposable land of the State and took it away HELD:
from the City without compensation is, therefore, unfounded.
In the last analysis the land in question pertains to the State There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which
and the City of Manila merely acted as trustee for the benefit the private respondent’s market stalls are sought to be
of the people therein for whom the State can legislate in the evicted are public streets. A public street is property for
exercise of its legitimate powers.
public use hence outside the commerce of man. Being
outside the commerce of man, it may not be the
Republic Act No. 4118 was never intended to expropriate the subject of
property involved but merely to confirm its character as
communal land of the State and to make it available for
lease or other contract.
disposition by the National Government: And this was done
at the instance or upon the request of the City of Manila
itself. The subdivision of the land and conveyance of the The right of the public to use the city streets may not be
resulting subdivision lots to the occupants by Congressional bargained away through contract. The interests of the few
authorization does not operate as an exercise of the power should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the
of eminent domain without just compensation in violation of community.
Section 1, subsection (2), Article III of the Constitution, but
simply as a manifestation of its right and power to deal with
state property.
G.R. No. 93654 May 6, 1992
It should be emphasized that the law assailed was enacted
upon formal written petition of the Municipal Board of Manila FRANCISCO U. DACANAY, petitioner,
in the form of a legally approved resolution. The certificate of
title over the property in the name of the City of Manila was
accordingly cancelled and another issued to the Land vs.
Tenure Administration after the voluntary surrender of the
City's duplicate certificate of title by the City Treasurer with MAYOR MACARIO ASISTIO, JR., CITY ENGR. LUCIANO
the knowledge and consent of the City Mayor. To implement SARNE, JR. of Kalookan City, Metro Manila, MILA
the provisions of Republic Act No. 4118, the then Deputy PASTRANA AND/OR RODOLFO TEOFE, STALLHOLDERS
Governor of the Land Authority sent a letter, dated February AND REPRESENTING CO-STALLHOLDERS, respondents.
18, 1965, to the City Mayor furnishing him with a copy of the
"proposed subdivision plan of the said lot as prepared for the
David D. Advincula, Jr. for petitioner.
Republic of the Philippines for subdivision and resale by the
Land Authority to bona fide applicants." On March 2, 1965,
the Mayor of Manila, through his Executive and Technical Juan P. Banaga for private respondents.
Adviser, acknowledged receipt of the subdivision plan and
informed the Land Authority that his Office "will interpose no
objection to the implementation of said law provided that its
provisions are strictly complied with." The foregoing GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
sequence of events, clearly indicate a pattern of regularity
and observance of due process in the reversion of the
May public streets or thoroughfares be leased or licensed to
property to the National Government. All such acts were
done in recognition by the City of Manila of the right and market stallholders by virtue of a city ordinance or resolution
power of the Congress to dispose of the land involved. of the Metro Manila Commission? This issue is posed by the
petitioner, an aggrieved Caloocan City resident who filed a
special civil action of mandamus against the incumbent city
Consequently, the City of Manila was not deprived of
anything it owns, either under the due process clause or mayor and city engineer, to compel these city officials to
under the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution. If it remove the market stalls from certain city streets which the
failed to get from the Congress the concession it sought of aforementioned city officials have designated as flea
having the land involved given to it as its patrimonial markets, and the private respondents (stallholders) to vacate
property, the Courts possess no power to grant that relief. the streets.
Republic Act No. 4118 does not, therefore, suffer from any
constitutional infirmity.

27
On January 5, 1979, MMC Ordinance No. 79-02 was
enacted by the Metropolitan Manila Commission,
designating certain city and municipal streets, roads and
open spaces as sites for flea markets. Pursuant, thereto, the
Caloocan City mayor opened up seven (7) flea markets in
that city. One of those streets was the "Heroes del '96"
where the petitioner lives. Upon application of vendors
Rodolfo Teope, Mila Pastrana, Carmen Barbosa, Merle
Castillo, Bienvenido Menes, Nancy Bugarin, Jose Manuel,
Crisaldo Paguirigan, Alejandro Castron, Ruben Araneta,
Juanita and Rafael Malibaran, and others, the respondents
city mayor and city engineer, issued them licenses to
conduct vending activities on said street.
In 1987, Antonio Martinez, as OIC city mayor of Caloocan
City, caused the demolition of the market stalls on Heroes
del '96, V. Gozon and Gonzales streets. To stop Mayor
Martinez' efforts to clear the city streets, Rodolfo Teope, Mila
Pastrana and other stallowners filed an action for prohibition
against the City of Caloocan, the OIC City Mayor and the
City Engineer and/or their deputies (Civil Case No. C-12921)
in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 122,
praying the court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction
ordering these city officials to discontinue the demolition of
their stalls during the pendency of the action.
The court issued the writ prayed for. However, on December
20, 1987, it dismissed the petition and lifted the writ of
preliminary injunction which it had earlier issued. The trial
court observed that:
A perusal of Ordinance 2, series of 1979 of the Metropolitan
Manila Commission will show on the title itself that it is an
ordinance ––
Authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and/or
municipal streets, roads and open spaces within
Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea market and/or vending
areas, under certain terms and conditions, subject to the
approval of the Metropolitan Manila Commission, and for
other purposes
which is further amplified in Section 2 of the said ordinance,
quoted hereunder:
Sec. 2. The streets, roads and open spaces to be used as
sites for flea markets (tiangge) or vending areas; the design,
measurement or specification of the structures, equipment
and apparatuses to be used or put up; the allowable
distances; the days and time allowed for the conduct of the
businesses and/or activities herein authorized; the rates or
fees or charges to be imposed, levied and collected; the
kinds of merchandise, goods and commodities sold and
services rendered; and other matters and activities related to
the establishment, maintenance and management and
operation of flea markets and vending areas, shall be
determined and prescribed by the mayors of the cities and
municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila where the same are
located, subject to the approval of the Metropolitan Manila
Commission and consistent with the guidelines hereby
prescribed.
Further, it is so provided in the guidelines under the said
Ordinance No. 2 of the MMC that —
Sec. 6. In the establishment, operation, maintenance and
management of flea markets and vending areas, the
following guidelines, among others, shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
(m) That the permittee shall remove the equipment, facilities
and other appurtenances used by him in the conduct of his
business after the close or termination of business hours.
(Emphasis ours; pp. 15-16, Rollo.)
The trial court found that Heroes del '96, Gozon and
Gonzales streets are of public dominion, hence, outside the
commerce of man:
The Heroes del '96 street, V. Gozon street and Gonzales
street, being of public dominion must, therefore, be outside
of the commerce of man. Considering the nature of the
subject premises, the following jurisprudence co/principles
are applicable on the matter:
1) They cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise be the
subject matter of contracts. (Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas,
30 Phil. 602);
2) They cannot be acquired by prescription against the state
(Insular Government vs. Aldecoa, 19 Phil. 505). Even
municipalities can not acquire them for use as communal
lands against the state (City of Manila vs. Insular
Government, 10 Phil. 327);
3) They are not subject to attachment and execution (Tan
Toco vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52);
4) They cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement (2-II
Colin & Capitant 520) (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Phils.,
Vol. II, 1983 Ed. pp. 29-30).
In the aforecited case of Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, it
was held that properties for public use may not be leased to
private individuals. Such a lease is null and void for the
reason that a municipal council cannot withdraw part of the
plaza from public use. If possession has already been given,
the lessee must restore possession by vacating it and the
municipality must thereupon restore to him any sums it may
have collected as rent.
In the case of City of Manila vs. Gerardo Garcia, 19 SCRA
413, the Supreme Court held:
The property being a public one, the Manila Mayors did not
have the authority to give permits, written or oral, to the
squatters, and that the permits granted are therefore
considered null and void.
This doctrine was reiterated in the case of Baguio Citizens
Action Inc. vs. The City Council, 121 SCRA 368, where it
was held that:
An ordinance legalizing the occupancy by squatters of public
land is null and void.
The authority of respondent Municipality of Makati to
demolish the shanties of the petitioner's members is
mandated by
P.D. 772, and Sec. 1 of Letter of Instruction No. 19 orders
certain public officials, one of whom is the Municipal Mayor
to remove all illegal constructions including buildings on and
along esteros and river banks, those along railroad tracks
and those built without permits on public or private property
(Zansibarian Residents Association vs. Mun. of Makati, 135
SCRA 235). The City Engineer is also among those required
to comply with said Letter of Instruction.
The occupation and use of private individuals of sidewalks
and other public places devoted for public use constitute
both public and private nuisances and nuisance per se, and
this applies to even case involving the use or lease of public
places under permits and licenses issued by competent
authority, upon the theory that such holders could not take
advantage of their unlawful permits and license and claim
that the land in question is a part of a public street or a public
place devoted to public use, hence, beyond the commerce of
man. (Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, Vol. II, p. 59, 6th Ed.,
citing Umali vs. Aquino, IC. A. Rep. 339.)
28
From the aforequoted jurisprudence/principles, the Court
opines that defendants have the right to demolish the subject
stalls of the plaintiffs, more so when Section 185, par. 4 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code provides that the City Engineer shall:
(4) . . .
(c) Prevent the encroachment of private buildings and fences
on the streets and public places;
xxx xxx xxx
(j) Inspect and supervise the construction, repair, removal
and safety of private buildings;
xxx xxx xxx
(k) With the previous approval of the City Mayor in each
case, order the removal of materials employed in the
construction or repair of any building or structures made in
violation of law or ordinance, and cause buildings and
structures dangerous to the public to made secure or torn
down;
xxx xxx xxx
Further, the Charter of the City of Caloocan, Republic Act
No. 5502, Art. VII, Sec. 27, par. g, 1 and m, grants the City
Engineer similar powers. (Emphasis supplied; pp. 17-20,
Rollo.)
However, shortly after the decision came out, the city
administration in Caloocan City changed hands. City Mayor
Macario Asistio, Jr., as successor of Mayor Martinez, did not
pursue the latter's policy of clearing and cleaning up the city
streets.
Invoking the trial court's decision in Civil Case No. C-12921,
Francisco U. Dacanay, a concerned citizen, taxpayer and
registered voter of Barangay 74, Zone 7, District II of
Caloocan City, who resides on Heroes del '96 Street, one of
the affected streets, wrote a letter dated March 7, 1988 to
Mayor Asistio, Jr., calling his attention to the illegally-
constructed stalls on Heroes del '96 Street and asked for
their demolition.
Dacanay followed up that letter with another one dated April
7, 1988 addressed to the mayor and the city engineer,
Luciano Sarne, Jr. (who replaced Engineer Arturo Samonte),
inviting their attention to the Regional Trial Court's decision
in Civil Case No. 12921. There was still no response.
Dacanay sought President Corazon C. Aquino's intervention
by writing her a letter on the matter. His letter was referred to
the city mayor for appropriate action. The acting Caloocan
City secretary, Asuncion Manalo, in a letter dated August 1,
1988, informed the Presidential Staff Director that the city
officials were still studying the issue of whether or not to
proceed with the demolition of the market stalls.
Dacanay filed a complaint against Mayor Asistio and
Engineer Sarne (OMB-0-89-0146) in the Office of the
OMBUDSMAN. In their letter-comment dated April 3, 1989,
said city officials explained that in view of the huge number
of stallholders involved, not to mention their dependents, it
would be harsh and inhuman to eject them from the area in
question, for their relocation would not be an easy task.
In reply, Dacanay maintained that respondents have been
derelict in the performance of their duties and through
manifest partiality constituting a violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019, have caused undue injury to the Government and
given unwarranted benefits to the stallholders.
After conducting a preliminary investigation, the
OMBUDSMAN rendered a final evaluation and report on
August 28, 1989, finding that the respondents' inaction is
purely motivated by their perceived moral and social
responsibility toward their constituents, but "the fact remains
that there is an omission of an act which ought to be
performed, in clear violation of Sections 3(e) and (f) of
Republic Act 3019." (pp. 83-84, Rollo.) The OMBUDSMAN
recommended the filing of the corresponding information in
court.
As the stallholders continued to occupy Heroes del '96
Street, through the tolerance of the public respondents, and
in clear violation of the decision it Civil Case No. C-12921,
Dacanay filed the present petition for mandamus on June
19, 1990, praying that the public respondents be ordered to
enforce the final decision in Civil Case No. C-12921 which
upheld the city mayor's authority to order the demolition of
market stalls on V. Gozon, Gonzales and Heroes del '96
Streets and to enforce P.D. No. 772 and other pertinent
laws.
On August 16, 1990, the public respondents, through the
City Legal Officer, filed their Comment' on the petition. The
Office of the Solicitor General asked to be excused from
filing a separate Comment in behalf of the public
respondents. The City Legal Officer alleged that the vending
area was transferred to Heroes del '96 Street to decongest
Malonzo Street, which is comparatively a busier
thoroughfare; that the transfer was made by virtue of
Barangay Resolution No. 30 s'78 dated January 15, 1978;
that while the resolution was awaiting approval by the
Metropolitan Manila Commission, the latter passed
Ordinance No. 79-2, authorizing the use of certain streets
and open spaces as sites for flea markets and/or vending
areas; that pursuant thereto, Acting MMC Mayor Virgilio P.
Robles issued Executive Order No. 135 dated January 10,
1979, ordering the establishment and operation of flea
markets in specified areas and created the Caloocan City
Flea Market Authority as a regulatory body; and that among
the sites chosen and approved by the Metro Manila
Commission, Heroes del '96 Street has considered "most
viable and progressive, lessening unemployment in the city
and servicing the residents with affordable basic
necessities."
The petition for mandamus is meritorious.
There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the
private respondents' market stalls are sought to be evicted
are public streets, as found by the trial court in Civil Case
No. C-12921. A public street is property for public use hence
outside the commerce of man (Arts. 420, 424, Civil Code).
Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the
subject of lease or other contract (Villanueva et al. vs.
Castañeda and Macalino, 15 SCRA 142, citing the
Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, 30 SCRA 602; Espiritu vs.
Municipal Council of Pozorrubio, 102 Phil. 869; and Muyot
vs. De la Fuente, 48 O.G. 4860).
As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the
right to occupy portions of the public street, the City
Government, contrary to law, has been leasing portions of
the streets to them. Such leases or licenses are null and void
for being contrary to law. The right of the public to use the
city streets may not be bargained away through contract.
The interests of a few should not prevail over the good of the
greater number in the community whose health, peace,
safety, good order and general welfare, the respondent city
officials are under legal obligation to protect.
The Executive Order issued by Acting Mayor Robles
authorizing the use of Heroes del '96 Street as a vending
area for stallholders who were granted licenses by the city
government contravenes the general law that reserves city
29
streets and roads for public use. Mayor Robles' Executive
Order may not infringe upon the vested right of the public to
use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve:
i.e., as arteries of travel for vehicles and pedestrians. As
early as 1989, the public respondents bad started to look for
feasible alternative sites for flea markets. They have had
more than ample time to relocate the street vendors.
WHEREFORE, it having been established that the petitioner
and the general public have a legal right to the relief
demanded and that the public respondents have the
corresponding duty, arising from public office, to clear the
city streets and restore them to their specific public purpose
(Enriquez vs. Bidin, 47 SCRA 183; City of Manila vs. Garcia
et al., 19 SCRA, 413 citing Unson vs. Lacson, 100 Phil. 695),
the respondents City Mayor and City Engineer of Caloocan
City or their successors in office are hereby ordered to
immediately enforce and implement the decision in Civil
Case No. C-1292 declaring that Heroes del '96, V. Gozon,
and Gonzales Streets are public streets for public use, and
they are ordered to remove or demolish, or cause to be
removed or demolished, the market stalls occupying said city
streets with utmost dispatch within thirty (30)days from
notice of this decision. This decision is immediately
executory.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-24440 March 28, 1968
THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, SECRETARY OF FINANCE and
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, defendants-
appellants.
Fortugaleza, Lood, Sarmiento, M. T. Yap & Associates for
plaintiff-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for defendants-appellants.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the
Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital
of the then Zamboanga Province. On October 12, 1936,
Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the
Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Sec. 50 of
the Act also provided that —
Buildings and properties which
the province shall abandon upon the
transfer of the capital to another place
will be acquired and paid for by the City
of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by
the Auditor General.
The properties and buildings referred to consisted of
50 lots and some buildings constructed thereon, located in
the City of Zamboanga and covered individually by Torrens
certificates of title in the name of Zamboanga Province. As
far as can be gleaned from the records, 1 said properties
were being utilized as follows —
No. of
Use
Lots
1 ................................................ Capitol Site
3 ................................................ School Site
................................................ Hospital
3
Site
3 ................................................ Leprosarium
................................................ Curuan
1
School
................................................ Trade
1
School
2 ................................................ Burleigh
School
................................................ High School
2
Playground
9 ................................................ Burleighs
................................................ Hydro-
1
Electric Site (Magay)
1 ................................................ San Roque
23 ................................................ vacant
It appears that in 1945, the capital of Zamboanga
Province was transferred to Dipolog. 2 Subsequently, or on
June 16, 1948, Republic Act 286 was approved creating the
municipality of Molave and making it the capital of
Zamboanga Province.
On May 26, 1949, the Appraisal Committee formed by
the Auditor General, pursuant to Commonwealth Act 39,
fixed the value of the properties and buildings in question left
by Zamboanga Province in Zamboanga City at
P1,294,244.00. 3
On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved
dividing the province of Zamboanga into two (2): Zamboanga
del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. As to how the assets and
obligations of the old province were to be divided between
the two new ones, Sec. 6 of that law provided:
Upon the approval of this Act, the funds, assets and other
properties and the obligations of the province of Zamboanga
shall be divided equitably between the Province of
Zamboanga del Norte and the Province of Zamboanga del
Sur by the President of the Philippines, upon the
recommendation of the Auditor General.
Pursuant thereto, the Auditor General, on January 11,
1955, apportioned the assets and obligations of the defunct
Province of Zamboanga as follows: 54.39% for Zamboanga
del Norte and 45.61% for Zamboanga del Sur. Zamboanga
del Norte therefore became entitled to 54.39% of
P1,294,244.00, the total value of the lots and buildings in
question, or P704,220.05 payable by Zamboanga City.
On March 17, 1959, the Executive Secretary, by order
of the President, issued a ruling 4 holding that Zamboanga
del Norte had a vested right as owner (should be co-owner
pro-indiviso) of the properties mentioned in Sec. 50 of
Commonwealth Act 39, and is entitled to the price thereof,
payable by Zamboanga City. This ruling revoked the
previous Cabinet Resolution of July 13, 1951 conveying all
the said 50 lots and buildings thereon to Zamboanga City for
P1.00, effective as of 1945, when the provincial capital of the
then Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog.
The Secretary of Finance then authorized the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to deduct an amount
equal to 25% of the regular internal revenue allotment for the
City of Zamboanga for the quarter ending March 31, 1960,
then for the quarter ending June 30, 1960, and again for the
first quarter of the fiscal year 1960-1961. The deductions, all
aggregating P57,373.46, was credited to the province of
Zamboanga del Norte, in partial payment of the P764,220.05
due it.
However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act 3039 was
approved amending Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39 by
providing that —
All buildings, properties and
assets belonging to the former province
of Zamboanga and located within the
City of Zamboanga are hereby
transferred, free of charge, in favor of
the said City of Zamboanga. (Stressed
for emphasis).
Consequently, the Secretary of Finance, on July 12,
1961, ordered the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to stop
from effecting further payments to Zamboanga del Norte and
to return to Zamboanga City the sum of P57,373.46 taken
30
from it out of the internal revenue allotment of Zamboanga
del Norte. Zamboanga City admits that since the enactment
of Republic Act 3039, P43,030.11 of the P57,373.46 has
already been returned to it.
This constrained plaintiff-appellee Zamboanga del
Norte to file on March 5, 1962, a complaint entitled
"Declaratory Relief with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction" in
the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte against
defendants-appellants Zamboanga City, the Secretary of
Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It was
prayed that: (a) Republic Act 3039 be declared
unconstitutional for depriving plaintiff province of property
without due process and just compensation; (b) Plaintiff's
rights and obligations under said law be declared; (c) The
Secretary of Finance and the Internal Revenue
Commissioner be enjoined from reimbursing the sum of
P57,373.46 to defendant City; and (d) The latter be ordered
to continue paying the balance of P704,220.05 in quarterly
installments of 25% of its internal revenue allotments.
On June 4, 1962, the lower court ordered the issuance
of preliminary injunction as prayed for. After defendants filed
their respective answers, trial was held. On August 12, 1963,
judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is
hereby rendered declaring Republic Act
No. 3039 unconstitutional insofar as it
deprives plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte
of its private properties, consisting of 50
parcels of land and the improvements
thereon under certificates of title
(Exhibits "A" to "A-49") in the name of
the defunct province of Zamboanga;
ordering defendant City of Zamboanga
to pay to the plaintiff the sum of
P704,220.05 payment thereof to be
deducted from its regular quarterly
internal revenue allotment equivalent to
25% thereof every quarter until said
amount shall have been fully paid;
ordering defendant Secretary of Finance
to direct defendant Commissioner of
Internal Revenue to deduct 25% from
the regular quarterly internal revenue
allotment for defendant City of
Zamboanga and to remit the same to
plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte until said
sum of P704,220.05 shall have been
fully paid; ordering plaintiff Zamboanga
del Norte to execute through its proper
officials the corresponding public
instrument deeding to defendant City of
Zamboanga the 50 parcels of land and
the improvements thereon under the
certificates of title (Exhibits "A" to "A-
49") upon payment by the latter of the
aforesaid sum of P704,220.05 in full;
dismissing the counterclaim of
defendant City of Zamboanga; and
declaring permanent the preliminary
mandatory injunction issued on June 8,
1962, pursuant to the order of the Court
dated June 4, 1962. No costs are
assessed against the defendants.
It is SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, but prior to the perfection of
defendants' appeal, plaintiff province filed a motion to
reconsider praying that Zamboanga City be ordered instead
to pay the P704,220.05 in lump sum with 6% interest per
annum. Over defendants' opposition, the lower court granted
plaintiff province's motion.
The defendants then brought the case before Us on
appeal.
Brushing aside the procedural point concerning the
property of declaratory relief filed in the lower court on the
assertion that the law had already been violated and that
plaintiff sought to give it coercive effect, since assuming the
same to be true, the Rules anyway authorize the conversion
of the proceedings to an ordinary action, 5 We proceed to the
more important and principal question of the validity of
Republic Act 3039.
The validity of the law ultimately depends on the
nature of the 50 lots and buildings thereon in question. For,
the matter involved here is the extent of legislative control
over the properties of a municipal corporation, of which a
province is one. The principle itself is simple: If the property
is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal
corporation) in its public and governmental capacity, the
property is public and Congress has absolute control over it.
But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary
capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute
control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due
process and payment of just compensation. 6
The capacity in which the property is held is, however,
dependent on the use to which it is intended and devoted.
Now, which of two norms, i.e., that of the Civil Code or that
obtaining under the law of Municipal Corporations, must be
used in classifying the properties in question?
The Civil Code classification is embodied in its Arts.
423 and 424 which provide:1äwphï1.ñët
ART. 423. The property of
provinces, cities, and municipalities is
divided into property for public use and
patrimonial property.
ART. 424. Property for public use,
in the provinces, cities, and
municipalities, consists of the provincial
roads, city streets, municipal streets, the
squares, fountains, public waters,
promenades, and public works for public
service paid for by said provinces, cities,
or municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of
them is patrimonial and shall be
governed by this Code, without
prejudice to the provisions of special
laws. (Stressed for emphasis).
Applying the above cited norm, all the properties in
question, except the two (2) lots used as High School
playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties
of the former Zamboanga province. Even the capital site, the
hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be
considered patrimonial for they are not for public use. They
would fall under the phrase "public works for public service"
for it has been held that under the ejusdem generis rule,
such public works must be for free and indiscriminate use by
anyone, just like the preceding enumerated properties in the
first paragraph of Art 424. 7 The playgrounds, however, would
fit into this category.
This was the norm applied by the lower court. And it
cannot be said that its actuation was without jurisprudential
precedent for in Municipality of Catbalogan v. Director of
Lands, 8 and in Municipality of Tacloban v. Director of Lands,
9
it was held that the capitol site and the school sites in
municipalities constitute their patrimonial properties. This
result is understandable because, unlike in the classification
regarding State properties, properties for public service in
the municipalities are not classified as public. Assuming then
the Civil Code classification to be the chosen norm, the
lower court must be affirmed except with regard to the two
(2) lots used as playgrounds.
On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining under
the principles constituting the law of Municipal Corporations,
all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted
to public service are deemed public; the rest remain
patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered public, it is
enough that the property be held and, devoted for
31
governmental purposes like local administration, public
education, public health, etc. 10
Supporting jurisprudence are found in the following
cases: (1) HINUNANGAN V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, 11
where it was stated that "... where the municipality has
occupied lands distinctly for public purposes, such as for the
municipal court house, the public school, the public market,
or other necessary municipal building, we will, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, presume a grant from the
States in favor of the municipality; but, as indicated by the
wording, that rule may be invoked only as to property which
is used distinctly for public purposes...." (2) VIUDA DE
TANTOCO V. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO 12 held that
municipal properties necessary for governmental purposes
are public in nature. Thus, the auto trucks used by the
municipality for street sprinkling, the police patrol
automobile, police stations and concrete structures with the
corresponding lots used as markets were declared exempt
from execution and attachment since they were not
patrimonial properties. (3) MUNICIPALITY OF BATANGAS
VS. CANTOS 13 held squarely that a municipal lot which had
always been devoted to school purposes is one dedicated to
public use and is not patrimonial property of a municipality.
Following this classification, Republic Act 3039 is valid
insofar as it affects the lots used as capitol site, school sites
and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites and the high
school playground sites — a total of 24 lots — since these
were held by the former Zamboanga province in its
governmental capacity and therefore are subject to the
absolute control of Congress. Said lots considered as public
property are the following:
We noticed that the eight Burleigh lots above
described are adjoining each other and in turn are between
the two lots wherein the Burleigh schools are built, as per
records appearing herein and in the Bureau of Lands.
Hence, there is sufficient basis for holding that said eight lots
constitute the appurtenant grounds of the Burleigh schools,
and partake of the nature of the same.
Regarding the several buildings existing on the lots
above-mentioned, the records do not disclose whether they
were constructed at the expense of the former Province of
Zamboanga. Considering however the fact that said
buildings must have been erected even before 1936 when
Commonwealth Act 39 was enacted and the further fact that
provinces then had no power to authorize construction of
buildings such as those in the case at bar at their own
expense, 14 it can be assumed that said buildings were
erected by the National Government, using national funds.
Hence, Congress could very well dispose of said buildings in
the same manner that it did with the lots in question.
But even assuming that provincial funds were used,
still the buildings constitute mere accessories to the lands,
which are public in nature, and so, they follow the nature of
said lands, i.e., public. Moreover, said buildings, though
located in the city, will not be for the exclusive use and
benefit of city residents for they could be availed of also by
the provincial residents. The province then — and its
successors-in-interest — are not really deprived of the
benefits thereof.
But Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to deprive
Zamboanga del Norte of its share in the value of the rest of
the 26 remaining lots which are patrimonial properties since
they are not being utilized for distinctly, governmental
purposes. Said lots are:
Moreover, the fact that these 26 lots are registered
strengthens the proposition that they are truly private in
nature. On the other hand, that the 24 lots used for
governmental purposes are also registered is of no
significance since registration cannot convert public property
to private. 16
We are more inclined to uphold this latter view. The
controversy here is more along the domains of the Law of
Municipal Corporations — State vs. Province — than along
that of Civil Law. Moreover, this Court is not inclined to hold
that municipal property held and devoted to public service is
in the same category as ordinary private property. The
consequences are dire. As ordinary private properties, they
can be levied upon and attached. They can even be
acquired thru adverse possession — all these to the
detriment of the local community. Lastly, the classification of
properties other than those for public use in the
municipalities as patrimonial under Art. 424 of the Civil Code
— is "... without prejudice to the provisions of special laws."
For purpose of this article, the principles, obtaining under the
Law of Municipal Corporations can be considered as "special
laws". Hence, the classification of municipal property
devoted for distinctly governmental purposes as public
should prevail over the Civil Code classification in this
particular case.
Defendants' claim that plaintiff and its predecessor-in-
interest are "guilty of laches is without merit. Under
Commonwealth Act 39, Sec. 50, the cause of action in favor
of the defunct Zamboanga Province arose only in 1949 after
the Auditor General fixed the value of the properties in
question. While in 1951, the Cabinet resolved transfer said
properties practically for free to Zamboanga City, a
reconsideration thereof was seasonably sought. In 1952, the
old province was dissolved. As successor-in-interest to more
than half of the properties involved, Zamboanga del Norte
was able to get a reconsideration of the Cabinet Resolution
in 1959. In fact, partial payments were effected subsequently
and it was only after the passage of Republic Act 3039 in
1961 that the present controversy arose. Plaintiff brought
suit in 1962. All the foregoing, negative laches.
It results then that Zamboanga del Norte is still entitled
to collect from the City of Zamboanga the former's 54.39%
share in the 26 properties which are patrimonial in nature,
said share to computed on the basis of the valuation of said
26 properties as contained in Resolution No. 7, dated March
26, 1949, of the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor
General.
Plaintiff's share, however, cannot be paid in lump sum,
except as to the P43,030.11 already returned to defendant
City. The return of said amount to defendant was without
legal basis. Republic Act 3039 took effect only on June 17,
1961 after a partial payment of P57,373.46 had already been
made. Since the law did not provide for retroactivity, it could
not have validly affected a completed act. Hence, the
amount of P43,030.11 should be immediately returned by
defendant City to plaintiff province. The remaining balance, if
any, in the amount of plaintiff's 54.39% share in the 26 lots
should then be paid by defendant City in the same manner
originally adopted by the Secretary of Finance and the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and not in lump sum.
Plaintiff's prayer, particularly pars. 5 and 6, read together
with pars. 10 and 11 of the first cause of action recited in the
complaint 17 clearly shows that the relief sought was merely
the continuance of the quarterly payments from the internal
revenue allotments of defendant City. Art. 1169 of the Civil
Code on reciprocal obligations invoked by plaintiff to justify
lump sum payment is inapplicable since there has been so
far in legal contemplation no complete delivery of the lots in
question. The titles to the registered lots are not yet in the
name of defendant Zamboanga City.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
set aside and another judgment is hereby entered as
follows:.
(1) Defendant Zamboanga City is hereby ordered to
return to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte in lump sum the
amount of P43,030.11 which the former took back from the
latter out of the sum of P57,373.46 previously paid to the
latter; and
(2) Defendants are hereby ordered to effect payments
in favor of plaintiff of whatever balance remains of plaintiff's
54.39% share in the 26 patrimonial properties, after
deducting therefrom the sum of P57,373.46, on the basis of
Resolution No. 7 dated March 26, 1949 of the Appraisal
Committee formed by the Auditor General, by way of
quarterly payments from the allotments of defendant City, in
32
the manner originally adopted by the Secretary of Finance
and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. No costs. So
ordered.
G.R. No. L-12958 May 30, 1960
FAUSTINO IGNACIO, applicant-appellant,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and LAUREANO
VALERIANO, oppositors-appellees.
Acting Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and
Solicitor Crispin V. Bautista for appellee Director of Lands.
Benjamin H. Aquino for appellee Laureano Veleriano.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Faustino Ignacio is appealing the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, dismissing his application for the
registration of a parcel of land.
On January 25, 1950, Ignacio filed an application for the
registration of a parcel of land (mangrove), situated in barrio
Gasac, Navotas, Rizal, with an area of 37,877 square
meters. Later, he amended his application by alleging
among others that he owned the parcel applied for by right of
accretion. To the application, the Director of Lands,
Laureano Valeriano and Domingo Gutierrez filed
oppositions. Gutierrez later withdrew his opposition. The
Director of Lands claimed the parcel applied for as a portion
of the public domain, for the reason that neither the applicant
nor his predecessor-in-interest possessed sufficient title
thereto, not having acquired it either by composition title
from the Spanish government or by possessory information
title under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, and that
he had not possessed the same openly, continuously and
adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership since July
26, 1894. In his turn, Valeriano alleged he was holding the
land by virtue of a permit granted him by the Bureau of
Fisheries, issued on January 13, 1947, and approved by the
President.
It is not disputed that the land applied for adjoins a parcel
owned by the applicant which he had acquired from the
Government by virtue of a free patent title in 1936. It has
also been established that the parcel in question was formed
by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the
Manila Bay which boarders it on the southwest. Applicant
Ignacio claims that he had occupied the land since 1935,
planting it with api-api trees, and that his possession thereof
had been continuous, adverse and public for a period of
twenty years until said possession was distributed by
oppositor Valeriano.
On the other hand, the Director of Lands sought to prove
that the parcel is foreshore land, covered by the ebb and
flow of the tide and, therefore, formed part of the public
domain.
After hearing, the trial court dismissed the application,
holding that the parcel formed part of the public domain. In
his appeal, Ignacio assigns the following errors:
I. The lower court erred in holding that the land in
question, altho an accretion to the land of the
applicant-appellant, does not belong to him but
forms part of the public domain.
II. Granting that the land in question forms part of
the public domain, the lower court nevertheless
erred in not declaring the same to be the
necessary for any public use or purpose and in not
ordering in the present registration proceedings.
III. The lower court erred in not holding that the
land in question now belongs to the applicant-
appellant by virtue of acquisitive prescription, the
said land having ceased to be of the public domain
and became the private or patrimonial property of
the State.
IV. The lower court erred in not holding that the
oppositor Director of Lands is now in estoppel
from claiming the land in question as a land of the
public domain.
Appellant contends that the parcel belongs to him by the law
of accretion, having been formed by gradual deposit by
action of the Manila Bay, and he cites Article 457 of the New
Civil Code (Article 366, Old Civil Code), which provides that:
To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of
rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the
waters.
The article cited is clearly inapplicable because it refers to
accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers, while the
accretion in the present case was caused by action of the
Manila Bay.
Appellant next contends that Articles 1, 4 and 5 of the Law of
Waters are not applicable because they refer to accretions
formed by the sea, and that Manila Bay cannot be
considered as a sea. We find said contention untenable. A
bay is a part of the sea, being a mere indentation of the
same:
Bay. — An opening into the land where the water
is shut in on all sides except at the entrance; an
inlet of the sea; an arm of the sea, distinct from a
river, a bending or curbing of the shore of the sea
or of a lake. 7 C.J. 1013-1014 (Cited in Francisco,
Philippine Law of Waters and Water Rights p. 6)
Moreover, this Tribunal has some cases applied the Law of
Waters on Lands bordering Manila Bay. (See the cases of
Ker & Co. vs. Cauden, 6 Phil., 732, involving a parcel of land
bounded on the sides by Manila Bay, where it was held that
such land formed by the action of the sea is property of the
State; Francisco vs. Government of the P.I., 28 Phil., 505,
involving a land claimed by a private person and subject to
the ebb and flow of the tides of the Manila Bay).
Then the applicant argues that granting that the land in
question formed part of the public domain, having been
gained from the sea, the trial court should have declared the
same no longer necessary for any public use or purpose,
and therefore, became disposable and available for private
ownership. Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 reads
thus:
ART. 4. Lands added to the shores by accretions
and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the
sea, form part of the public domain. When they are
no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are
not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for
the establishment of special industries, or for the
coastguard service, the Government shall declare
them to be the property of the owners of the
estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.
Interpreting Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866, in the
case of Natividad vs. Director of Lands, (CA) 37 Off. Gaz.,
2905, it was there held that:
Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides
that when a portion of the shore is no longer
washed by the waters of the sea and is not
necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the
establishment of special industries, or for
coastguard service, the government shall declare
it to be the property of the owners of the estates
adjacent thereto and as an increment thereof. We
believe that only the executive and possibly the
legislative departments have the authority and the
power to make the declaration that any land so
gained by the sea, is not necessary for purposes
33
 of public utility, or for the establishment of special
industries, on for coast-guard service. If no such
declaration has been made by said departments,
the lot in question forms part of the public domain.
(Natividad vs. Director of Lands, supra.)
The reason for this pronouncement, according to this
Tribunal in the case of Vicente Joven y Monteverde vs.
Director of Lands, 93 Phil., 134, (cited in Velayo's Digest, VI.
I, p. 52).
. . . is undoubtedly that the courts are neither
primarily called upon, nor indeed in a position to
determine whether any public land are to be used
for the purposes specified in Article 4 of the Law of
Waters.
Consequently, until a formal declaration on the part of the
Government, through the executive department or the
Legislature, to the effect that the land in question is no
longer needed for coast guard service, for public use or for
special industries, they continue to be part of the public
domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership.
Appellant next contends that he had acquired the parcel in
question through acquisitive prescription, having possessed
the same for over ten years. In answer, suffice it to say that
land of the public domain is not subject to ordinary
prescription. In the case of Insular Government vs. Aldecoa
& Co., 19 Phil., 505 this Court said:
The occupation or material possession of any land
formed upon the shore by accretion, without
previous permission from the proper authorities,
although the occupant may have held the same as
owner for seventeen years and constructed a
wharf on the land, is illegal and is a mere detainer,
inasmuch as such land is outside of the sphere of
commerce; it pertains to the national domain; it is
intended for public uses and for the benefit of
those who live nearby.
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised in
the appeal.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby
affirmed, with costs.
LAUREL V. GARCIA
187 SCRA 797
FACTS:
The subject Roppongi property is one of the properties
acquired by the Philippines from Japan pursuant to a
Reparations Agreement. The property is where the
Philippine Embassy was once located, before it transferred
to the Nampeidai property. It was decided that the
properties would be
available to sale or disposition. One of the first properties
opened up for public auction was the Roppongi property,
despite numerous oppositions from different sectors.
HELD:
The Roppongi property was acquired together with the
other properties through reparation agreements. They
were assigned to the government sector and that the
Roppongi property was specifically designated under the
agreement to house the Philippine embassy.
It is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown
that the property has become patrimonial. The
respondents have failed to do so.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside
the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its
ownership is a special collective ownership for general
use and payment, in application to the satisfaction of
collective needs, and resides in the social group. The
purpose is not to serve the State as the juridical person but
the citizens; it is intended for the common and public
welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation.
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long
time for actual Embassy service doesn’t automatically
convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion
happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use. A
property continues to be part of the public domain, not
available for private appropriation or ownership until there is
a formal declaration on the part of the government to
withdraw it from being such.
G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990
SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner,
vs.
RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset Privatization
Trust, RAUL MANGLAPUS, as Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, and CATALINO MACARAIG, as Executive
Secretary, respondents.
G.R. No. 92047 July 25, 1990
DIONISIO S. OJEDA, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MACARAIG, JR., ASSETS
PRIVATIZATION TRUST CHAIRMAN RAMON T. GARCIA,
AMBASSADOR RAMON DEL ROSARIO, et al., as
members of the PRINCIPAL AND BIDDING
COMMITTEES ON THE UTILIZATION/DISPOSITION
PETITION OF PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES
IN JAPAN, respondents.
Arturo M. Tolentino for petitioner in 92013.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin
respondents, their representatives and agents from
proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square
meters of land at 306 Roppongi, 5-Chome Minato-ku Tokyo,
Japan scheduled on February 21, 1990. We granted the
prayer for a temporary restraining order effective February
20, 1990. One of the petitioners (in G.R. No. 92047) likewise
prayes for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to
fully disclose to the public the basis of their decision to push
through with the sale of the Roppongi property inspire of
strong public opposition and to explain the proceedings
which effectively prevent the participation of Filipino citizens
and entities in the bidding process.
The oral arguments in G.R. No. 92013, Laurel v. Garcia, et
al. were heard by the Court on March 13, 1990. After G.R.
No. 92047, Ojeda v. Secretary Macaraig, et al. was filed, the
respondents were required to file a comment by the Court's
resolution dated February 22, 1990. The two petitions were
consolidated on March 27, 1990 when the memoranda of the
parties in the Laurel case were deliberated upon.
The Court could not act on these cases immediately
because the respondents filed a motion for an extension of
thirty (30) days to file comment in G.R. No. 92047, followed
by a second motion for an extension of another thirty (30)
days which we granted on May 8, 1990, a third motion for
extension of time granted on May 24, 1990 and a fourth
motion for extension of time which we granted on June 5,
1990 but calling the attention of the respondents to the
length of time the petitions have been pending. After the
34
comment was filed, the petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 asked through Administrative Order No. 3, followed by
for thirty (30) days to file a reply. We noted his motion and Administrative Orders Numbered 3-A, B, C and D.
resolved to decide the two (2) cases.
On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No.
I 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of
separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale,
lease or disposition. The four properties in Japan including
The subject property in this case is one of the four (4)
the Roppongi were specifically mentioned in the first
properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government
"Whereas" clause.
under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan
on May 9, 1956, the other lots being:
Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch
of the government has been pushing, with great vigor, its
(1) The Nampeidai Property at 11-24 Nampeidai-machi,
decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the
Shibuya-ku, Tokyo which has an area of approximately
Roppongi lot. The property has twice been set for bidding at
2,489.96 square meters, and is at present the site of the
a minimum floor price of $225 million. The first bidding was a
Philippine Embassy Chancery;
failure since only one bidder qualified. The second one, after
postponements, has not yet materialized. The last scheduled
(2) The Kobe Commercial Property at 63 Naniwa-cho, Kobe, bidding on February 21, 1990 was restrained by his Court.
with an area of around 764.72 square meters and Later, the rules on bidding were changed such that the $225
categorized as a commercial lot now being used as a million floor price became merely a suggested floor price.
warehouse and parking lot for the consulate staff; and
The Court finds that each of the herein petitions raises
(3) The Kobe Residential Property at 1-980-2 Obanoyama- distinct issues. The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 objects to
cho, Shinohara, Nada-ku, Kobe, a residential lot which is the alienation of the Roppongi property to anyone while the
now vacant. petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 adds as a principal objection the
alleged unjustified bias of the Philippine government in favor
of selling the property to non-Filipino citizens and entities.
The properties and the capital goods and services procured These petitions have been consolidated and are resolved at
from the Japanese government for national development the same time for the objective is the same - to stop the sale
projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people of the Roppongi property.
for their losses in life and property and their suffering during
World War II.
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 raises the following issues:
The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations
valued at $550 million would be payable in twenty (20) years (1) Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be
in accordance with annual schedules of procurements to be alienated by the Philippine Government?; and
fixed by the Philippine and Japanese governments (Article 2,
Reparations Agreement). Rep. Act No. 1789, the
(2) Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have
Reparations Law, prescribes the national policy on
the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property?
procurement and utilization of reparations and development
loans. The procurements are divided into those for use by
the government sector and those for private parties in Petitioner Dionisio Ojeda in G.R. No. 92047, apart from
projects as the then National Economic Council shall questioning the authority of the government to alienate the
determine. Those intended for the private sector shall be Roppongi property assails the constitutionality of Executive
made available by sale to Filipino citizens or to one hundred Order No. 296 in making the property available for sale to
(100%) percent Filipino-owned entities in national non-Filipino citizens and entities. He also questions the
development projects. bidding procedures of the Committee on the Utilization or
Disposition of Philippine Government Properties in Japan for
being discriminatory against Filipino citizens and Filipino-
The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese
owned entities by denying them the right to be informed
government under the Second Year Schedule and listed
about the bidding requirements.
under the heading "Government Sector", through
Reparations Contract No. 300 dated June 27, 1958. The
Roppongi property consists of the land and building "for the II
Chancery of the Philippine Embassy" (Annex M-D to
Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 503). As intended, it became
In G.R. No. 92013, petitioner Laurel asserts that the
the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was
Roppongi property and the related lots were acquired as part
transferred to Nampeidai on July 22, 1976 when the
of the reparations from the Japanese government for
Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due to the failure
diplomatic and consular use by the Philippine government.
of our government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi
Vice-President Laurel states that the Roppongi property is
property has remained undeveloped since that time.
classified as one of public dominion, and not of private
ownership under Article 420 of the Civil Code (See infra).
A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino
by former Philippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez,
The petitioner submits that the Roppongi property comes
to make the property the subject of a lease agreement with a
under "property intended for public service" in paragraph 2 of
Japanese firm - Kajima Corporation — which shall construct
the above provision. He states that being one of public
two (2) buildings in Roppongi and one (1) building in
dominion, no ownership by any one can attach to it, not even
Nampeidai and renovate the present Philippine Chancery in
by the State. The Roppongi and related properties were
Nampeidai. The consideration of the construction would be
acquired for "sites for chancery, diplomatic, and consular
the lease to the foreign corporation of one (1) of the
quarters, buildings and other improvements" (Second Year
buildings to be constructed in Roppongi and the two (2)
Reparations Schedule). The petitioner states that they
buildings in Nampeidai. The other building in Roppongi shall
continue to be intended for a necessary service. They are
then be used as the Philippine Embassy Chancery. At the
held by the State in anticipation of an opportune use. (Citing
end of the lease period, all the three leased buildings shall
3 Manresa 65-66). Hence, it cannot be appropriated, is
be occupied and used by the Philippine government. No
outside the commerce of man, or to put it in more simple
change of ownership or title shall occur. (See Annex "B" to
terms, it cannot be alienated nor be the subject matter of
Reply to Comment) The Philippine government retains the
contracts (Citing Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 Phil. 20
title all throughout the lease period and thereafter. However,
[1915]). Noting the non-use of the Roppongi property at the
the government has not acted favorably on this proposal
moment, the petitioner avers that the same remains property
which is pending approval and ratification between the
of public dominion so long as the government has not used it
parties. Instead, on August 11, 1986, President Aquino
for other purposes nor adopted any measure constituting a
created a committee to study the disposition/utilization of
removal of its original purpose or use.
Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan

35
The respondents, for their part, refute the petitioner's
contention by saying that the subject property is not
governed by our Civil Code but by the laws of Japan where
the property is located. They rely upon the rule of lex situs
which is used in determining the applicable law regarding the
acquisition, transfer and devolution of the title to a property.
They also invoke Opinion No. 21, Series of 1988, dated
January 27, 1988 of the Secretary of Justice which used the
lex situs in explaining the inapplicability of Philippine law
regarding a property situated in Japan.
The respondents add that even assuming for the sake of
argument that the Civil Code is applicable, the Roppongi
property has ceased to become property of public dominion.
It has become patrimonial property because it has not been
used for public service or for diplomatic purposes for over
thirteen (13) years now (Citing Article 422, Civil Code) and
because the intention by the Executive Department and the
Congress to convert it to private use has been manifested by
overt acts, such as, among others: (1) the transfer of the
Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai (2) the issuance of
administrative orders for the possibility of alienating the four
government properties in Japan; (3) the issuance of
Executive Order No. 296; (4) the enactment by the Congress
of Rep. Act No. 6657 [the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law] on June 10, 1988 which contains a provision stating
that funds may be taken from the sale of Philippine
properties in foreign countries; (5) the holding of the public
bidding of the Roppongi property but which failed; (6) the
deferment by the Senate in Resolution No. 55 of the bidding
to a future date; thus an acknowledgment by the Senate of
the government's intention to remove the Roppongi property
from the public service purpose; and (7) the resolution of this
Court dismissing the petition in Ojeda v. Bidding Committee,
et al., G.R. No. 87478 which sought to enjoin the second
bidding of the Roppongi property scheduled on March 30,
1989.
III
In G.R. No. 94047, petitioner Ojeda once more asks this
Court to rule on the constitutionality of Executive Order No.
296. He had earlier filed a petition in G.R. No. 87478 which
the Court dismissed on August 1, 1989. He now avers that
the executive order contravenes the constitutional mandate
to conserve and develop the national patrimony stated in the
Preamble of the 1987 Constitution. It also allegedly violates:
(1) The reservation of the ownership and acquisition of
alienable lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens.
(Sections 2 and 3, Article XII, Constitution; Sections 22 and
23 of Commonwealth Act 141).i•t•c-aüsl
(2) The preference for Filipino citizens in the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony (Section 10, Article VI, Constitution);
(3) The protection given to Filipino enterprises against unfair
competition and trade practices;
(4) The guarantee of the right of the people to information on
all matters of public concern (Section 7, Article III,
Constitution);
(5) The prohibition against the sale to non-Filipino citizens or
entities not wholly owned by Filipino citizens of capital goods
received by the Philippines under the Reparations Act
(Sections 2 and 12 of Rep. Act No. 1789); and
(6) The declaration of the state policy of full public disclosure
of all transactions involving public interest (Section 28,
Article III, Constitution).
Petitioner Ojeda warns that the use of public funds in the
execution of an unconstitutional executive order is a
misapplication of public funds He states that since the details
of the bidding for the Roppongi property were never publicly
disclosed until February 15, 1990 (or a few days before the
scheduled bidding), the bidding guidelines are available only
in Tokyo, and the accomplishment of requirements and the
selection of qualified bidders should be done in Tokyo,
interested Filipino citizens or entities owned by them did not
have the chance to comply with Purchase Offer
Requirements on the Roppongi. Worse, the Roppongi shall
be sold for a minimum price of $225 million from which price
capital gains tax under Japanese law of about 50 to 70% of
the floor price would still be deducted.
IV
The petitioners and respondents in both cases do not
dispute the fact that the Roppongi site and the three related
properties were through reparations agreements, that these
were assigned to the government sector and that the
Roppongi property itself was specifically designated under
the Reparations Agreement to house the Philippine
Embassy.
The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service
is expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the
Reparations Agreement and the corresponding contract of
procurement which bind both the Philippine government and
the Japanese government.
There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it
is convincingly shown that the property has become
patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside
the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership
is a special collective ownership for general use and
enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective
needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is not to
serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is
intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be
the object of appropration. (Taken from 3 Manresa, 66-69;
cited in Tolentino, Commentaries on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, 1963 Edition, Vol. II, p. 26).
The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are:
ART. 419. Property is either of public
dominion or of private ownership.
ART. 420. The following things are
property of public dominion
(1) Those intended for public use, such
as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State,
banks shores roadsteads, and others of
similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State,
without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth.
ART. 421. All other property of the
State, which is not of the character
stated in the preceding article, is
patrimonial property.
The Roppongi property is correctly classified under
paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as property
belonging to the State and intended for some public service.
Has the intention of the government regarding the use of the
property been changed because the lot has been Idle for
some years? Has it become patrimonial?
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long
time for actual Embassy service does not automatically
convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion
happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use
(Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481
[1975]). A property continues to be part of the public domain,
not available for private appropriation or ownership until
36
there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to
withdraw it from being such (Ignacio v. Director of Lands,
108 Phil. 335 [1960]).
The respondents enumerate various pronouncements by
concerned public officials insinuating a change of intention.
We emphasize, however, that an abandonment of the
intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and
to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil
Code must be definite Abandonment cannot be inferred from
the non-use alone specially if the non-use was attributable
not to the government's own deliberate and indubitable will
but to a lack of financial support to repair and improve the
property (See Heirs of Felino Santiago v. Lazaro, 166 SCRA
368 [1988]). Abandonment must be a certain and positive
act based on correct legal premises.
A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in
1976 is not relinquishment of the Roppongi property's
original purpose. Even the failure by the government to
repair the building in Roppongi is not abandonment since as
earlier stated, there simply was a shortage of government
funds. The recent Administrative Orders authorizing a study
of the status and conditions of government properties in
Japan were merely directives for investigation but did not in
any way signify a clear intention to dispose of the properties.
Executive Order No. 296, though its title declares an
"authority to sell", does not have a provision in its text
expressly authorizing the sale of the four properties procured
from Japan for the government sector. The executive order
does not declare that the properties lost their public
character. It merely intends to make the properties available
to foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in case of a sale,
lease or other disposition. It merely eliminates the restriction
under Rep. Act No. 1789 that reparations goods may be sold
only to Filipino citizens and one hundred (100%) percent
Filipino-owned entities. The text of Executive Order No. 296
provides:
Section 1. The provisions of Republic
Act No. 1789, as amended, and of other
laws to the contrary notwithstanding, the
above-mentioned properties can be
made available for sale, lease or any
other manner of disposition to non-
Filipino citizens or to entities owned by
non-Filipino citizens.
Executive Order No. 296 is based on the wrong premise or
assumption that the Roppongi and the three other properties
were earlier converted into alienable real properties. As
earlier stated, Rep. Act No. 1789 differentiates the
procurements for the government sector and the private
sector (Sections 2 and 12, Rep. Act No. 1789). Only the
private sector properties can be sold to end-users who must
be Filipinos or entities owned by Filipinos. It is this nationality
provision which was amended by Executive Order No. 296.
Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657 (the CARP Law) which
provides as one of the sources of funds for its
implementation, the proceeds of the disposition of the
properties of the Government in foreign countries, did not
withdraw the Roppongi property from being classified as one
of public dominion when it mentions Philippine properties
abroad. Section 63 (c) refers to properties which are
alienable and not to those reserved for public use or service.
Rep Act No. 6657, therefore, does not authorize the
Executive Department to sell the Roppongi property. It
merely enumerates possible sources of future funding to
augment (as and when needed) the Agrarian Reform Fund
created under Executive Order No. 299. Obviously any
property outside of the commerce of man cannot be tapped
as a source of funds.
The respondents try to get around the public dominion
character of the Roppongi property by insisting that
Japanese law and not our Civil Code should apply.
It is exceedingly strange why our top government officials, of
all people, should be the ones to insist that in the sale of
extremely valuable government property, Japanese law and
not Philippine law should prevail. The Japanese law - its
coverage and effects, when enacted, and exceptions to its
provision — is not presented to the Court It is simply
asserted that the lex loci rei sitae or Japanese law should
apply without stating what that law provides. It is a ed on
faith that Japanese law would allow the sale.
We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply
when no conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law
situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the
title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to
take and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance,
the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the
interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be
determined (See Salonga, Private International Law, 1981
ed., pp. 377-383); and (2) A foreign law on land ownership
and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic
law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine
which law should apply.
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.
The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or
title. There is no question that the property belongs to the
Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent
officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State.
And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale.
This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs
does not apply.
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice
sheds light on the relevance of the lex situs rule is
misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the
real properties procured through reparations nor the
existence in what body of the authority to sell them. In
discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the
Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which
should determine who can acquire the properties so that the
constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the public
domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned by
Filipinos is inapplicable. We see no point in belaboring
whether or not this opinion is correct. Why should we
discuss who can acquire the Roppongi lot when there is no
showing that it can be sold?
The subsequent approval on October 4, 1988 by President
Aquino of the recommendation by the investigating
committee to sell the Roppongi property was premature or,
at the very least, conditioned on a valid change in the public
character of the Roppongi property. Moreover, the approval
does not have the force and effect of law since the President
already lost her legislative powers. The Congress had
already convened for more than a year.
Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that the
Roppongi property is no longer of public dominion, there is
another obstacle to its sale by the respondents.
There is no law authorizing its conveyance.
Section 79 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917
provides
Section 79 (f ) Conveyances and
contracts to which the Government is a
party. — In cases in which the
Government of the Republic of the
Philippines is a party to any deed or
other instrument conveying the title to
real estate or to any other property the
value of which is in excess of one
hundred thousand pesos, the respective
Department Secretary shall prepare the
necessary papers which, together with
the proper recommendations, shall be
submitted to the Congress of the
Philippines for approval by the same.
Such deed, instrument, or contract shall
be executed and signed by the
President of the Philippines on behalf of
37
 the Government of the Philippines
unless the Government of the
Philippines unless the authority therefor
be expressly vested by law in another
officer. (Emphasis supplied)
The requirement has been retained in Section 48, Book I of
the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292).
SEC. 48. Official Authorized to Convey
Real Property. — Whenever real
property of the Government is
authorized by law to be conveyed, the
deed of conveyance shall be executed
in behalf of the government by the
following:
(1) For property belonging to and titled
in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, by the President, unless the
authority therefor is expressly vested by
law in another officer.
(2) For property belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines but titled in
the name of any political subdivision or
of any corporate agency or
instrumentality, by the executive head of
the agency or instrumentality.
(Emphasis supplied)
It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of
the government on his or her own sole will. Any such
conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law
enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and
legislative concurrence.
Resolution No. 55 of the Senate dated June 8, 1989, asking
for the deferment of the sale of the Roppongi property does
not withdraw the property from public domain much less
authorize its sale. It is a mere resolution; it is not a formal
declaration abandoning the public character of the Roppongi
property. In fact, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
is conducting hearings on Senate Resolution No. 734 which
raises serious policy considerations and calls for a fact-
finding investigation of the circumstances behind the
decision to sell the Philippine government properties in
Japan.
The resolution of this Court in Ojeda v. Bidding Committee,
et al., supra, did not pass upon the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 296. Contrary to respondents'
assertion, we did not uphold the authority of the President to
sell the Roppongi property. The Court stated that the
constitutionality of the executive order was not the real issue
and that resolving the constitutional question was "neither
necessary nor finally determinative of the case." The Court
noted that "[W]hat petitioner ultimately questions is the use
of the proceeds of the disposition of the Roppongi property."
In emphasizing that "the decision of the Executive to dispose
of the Roppongi property to finance the CARP ... cannot be
questioned" in view of Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657,
the Court did not acknowledge the fact that the property
became alienable nor did it indicate that the President was
authorized to dispose of the Roppongi property. The
resolution should be read to mean that in case the Roppongi
property is re-classified to be patrimonial and alienable by
authority of law, the proceeds of a sale may be used for
national economic development projects including the
CARP.
Moreover, the sale in 1989 did not materialize. The petitions
before us question the proposed 1990 sale of the Roppongi
property. We are resolving the issues raised in these
petitions, not the issues raised in 1989.
Having declared a need for a law or formal declaration to
withdraw the Roppongi property from public domain to make
it alienable and a need for legislative authority to allow the
sale of the property, we see no compelling reason to tackle
the constitutional issues raised by petitioner Ojeda.
The Court does not ordinarily pass upon constitutional
questions unless these questions are properly raised in
appropriate cases and their resolution is necessary for the
determination of the case (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56
[1937]). The Court will not pass upon a constitutional
question although properly presented by the record if the
case can be disposed of on some other ground such as the
application of a statute or general law (Siler v. Louisville and
Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, [1909], Railroad Commission
v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 [1941]).
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 states why the Roppongi
property should not be sold:
The Roppongi property is not just like
any piece of property. It was given to the
Filipino people in reparation for the lives
and blood of Filipinos who died and
suffered during the Japanese military
occupation, for the suffering of widows
and orphans who lost their loved ones
and kindred, for the homes and other
properties lost by countless Filipinos
during the war. The Tokyo properties
are a monument to the bravery and
sacrifice of the Filipino people in the
face of an invader; like the monuments
of Rizal, Quezon, and other Filipino
heroes, we do not expect economic or
financial benefits from them. But who
would think of selling these
monuments? Filipino honor and national
dignity dictate that we keep our
properties in Japan as memorials to the
countless Filipinos who died and
suffered. Even if we should become
paupers we should not think of selling
them. For it would be as if we sold the
lives and blood and tears of our
countrymen. (Rollo- G.R. No. 92013,
p.147)
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 also states:
Roppongi is no ordinary property. It is
one ceded by the Japanese government
in atonement for its past belligerence for
the valiant sacrifice of life and limb and
for deaths, physical dislocation and
economic devastation the whole Filipino
people endured in World War II.
It is for what it stands for, and for what it
could never bring back to life, that its
significance today remains undimmed,
inspire of the lapse of 45 years since the
war ended, inspire of the passage of 32
years since the property passed on to
the Philippine government.
Roppongi is a reminder that cannot —
should not — be dissipated ... (Rollo-
92047, p. 9)
It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so
much because of the inflated prices fetched by real property
in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all
Filipinos — veterans and civilians alike. Whether or not the
Roppongi and related properties will eventually be sold is a
policy determination where both the President and Congress
must concur. Considering the properties' importance and
value, the laws on conversion and disposition of property of
public dominion must be faithfully followed.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
petitions are GRANTED. A writ of prohibition is issued
enjoining the respondents from proceeding with the sale of
the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan. The February 20,
1990 Temporary Restraining Order is made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
38
Haystack: Harty v. Victoria, Tarlac (GR 5013, 11 March
1909)
Harty v. Victoria, Tarlac
[G.R. No. 5013. March 11, 1909.]
En Banc, Torres (J): 5 concur
Facts: On 17 January 1908, the representative of Monsignor
Jeremiah J. Harty, archbishop of the Roman Catholic
Church, as the legal administrator of the properties and
rights of the Catholic Church within the archbishopric of
Manila, filed a written complaint in the CFI Tarlac against the
municipality of Victoria, alleging that the parish of the said
town had been and was then the owner of a parcel of land
within the said municipality, known as the plaza of the
church of Victoria; that it had acquired said parcel of land
more than 60 years previously, and had continued to
possess the same ever since up to 1901, in which year the
municipality unlawfully and forcibly seized the said property,
claiming to be entitled thereto and retaining it to the present
day. On 15 June 1908, the trial court rendered judgment,
holding that the parish of Victoria of the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Church, had a better right to the possession of the
land described in the complaint, and sentenced the
Municipality to vacate the same and to pay the costs. To
said judgment the representative of the Municipality
excepted and moved for a new trial on the ground that it was
contrary to the weight of the evidence, and he notified the
court that, if his motion were overruled, he would appeal to
the Supreme Court. The motion for a new trial was
overruled; the Municipality excepted, and presented the
corresponding bill of exceptions which, after receipt of a
copy had been acknowledged by the adverse party, was
approved. On 1 September, the Municipality was ordered to
furnish bond in the sum of P1,000 to insure the fulfillment of
the judgment in the event that it should be totally or partially
affirmed. To said order the Municipality excepted, but
furnished the bond as directed by the court.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment appealed from,
and held that the whole of the land not occupied by the
church of the town of Victoria and its parish house, is a
public plaza of the said town, of public use, and that in
consequence thereof, the Municipality is absolved of the
complaint without any special ruling as to the costs of both
instances.
1. Property of public ownership
Article 339 of the Civil Code provides that "property of public
ownership is (1) that destined to the public use, such as
roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges constructed
by the State, and banks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a
similar character." Further, Article 344 of said code provides
that "property for public use in provinces and in towns
comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares,
streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and
public works of general service supported by the said towns
or provinces."
2. History of the municipality of Victoria, Tarlac;
Customs in creation of new town under the old Laws of
the Indies
The town of Victoria was formerly only a barrio of the town of
Tarlac and known as Canarum. It was converted into a town
in 1855, and named Victoria. To this end they must have laid
out the streets and the plaza of the town, in the center of
which were situated the church and parish house from the
commencement, and at the expiration of about 12 years the
parish of said town was constituted and the priest who was
to perform the office of curate was appointed; that from the
very beginning, the large tract of land that surrounds the
church and the parish house was known as a public plaza,
destined to the use of all the residents of the recently
founded town; public performances and religious
processions were held thereon without hindrance either on
the part of the local authorities or of the curate of said town.
Further, it was a custom observed by all the towns
established administratively in these Islands under the old
Laws of the Indies, that on their creation, a certain amount of
land was always reserved for plazas, commons, and special
and communal property, and as it is unquestionable that the
said large space of land was left vacant in the center of the
town of Victoria when it was constituted as a civil town.
3. The late Tanedo donated the land occupied by the
Church to the church and not to the parish curate
There are good grounds to suppose that the late Vicente
Tanedo donated the land now occupied by the church and
parish house in said municipality for religious purposes, or to
the church, but not to the parish curate, because at the time
there was no curate at the new town of Victoria.
4. Proof lacking if the land Tanedo donated include the
whole large tract constituting the town plaza; Waiver of
rights thereon in favor of the public presumed
It may be true that the father of the witness Casimiro
Tañedo, who owned the space of land where the church and
parish house were erected, had voluntarily donated it to the
Catholic Church but proper proof is lacking that the donation
affirmed by the said Tanedo comprehended the whole of the
large tract which at the present time constitutes the plaza of
the town. Even though all the remaining space of land which
now forms the great plaza of the town of Victoria had been
owned by the said Tanedo, it must be presumed that he
waived his right thereto for the benefit of the townspeople,
since all the residents have enjoyed the free use of said
plaza. It has not been satisfactorily shown that the
municipality or the principales of the town of Victoria had
donated the whole of said land to the curate of Victoria or to
the Catholic Church, nor could it have been so donated, it
being a public plaza destined to public use and was not
private ownership, or patrimony of the town of Victoria, or of
the Province of Tarlac. Certain it is that the Curate has not
proven that the Catholic Church or the parish of Victoria was
the owner or proprietor of the said extensive piece of land
which now forms the public plaza of said town, nor that it
was in possession thereof under the form and conditions
required by law, inasmuch as it has been fully proven that
said plaza has been used without let or hindrance by the
public and the residents of the town of Victoria ever since its
creation.
5. Plazas destined for public use not subject to
prescription
Pursuant to Article 1936 of the Civil Code, plazas, among
other things, destined to the public use are not subject to
prescription.
39
6. Procured trees set out in the plaza does not constitute
an act of private ownership
That both the curates and the gobernadorcillos of the said
town procured fruit trees and plants to be set out in the
plaza, does not constitute an act of private ownership, but
evidences the public use thereof, or perhaps the intention to
improve the and embellish the said plaza for the benefit of
the townspeople.
G.R. No. L-5013 March 11, 1909
JEREMIAH J. HARTY, Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIA, Province of Tarlac,
defendant-appellant.
F. Buencamino for appellant. Hartigan and Rohde for
appellee.
TORRES, J.:
On January 17, 1908, the representative of Mgr. Jeremiah J.
Harty, archbishop of the Roman Catholic Church, as the
legal administrator of all the properties and rights of the
Catholic Church within the archbishopric of Manila, filed a
written complaint in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac
against the municipality of Victoria, alleging that the parish of
the said town had been and was then the owner of a parcel
of land within the said municipality, known as the plaza of
the church of Victoria; that it had acquired said parcel of land
more than sixty years previously, and had continued to
possess the same ever since up to 1901, in which year the
defendant municipality unlawfully and forcibly seized the said
property, claiming to be entitled thereto and retaining it to the
present day. For the purposes of the complaint, a description
of the meters and bounds of the land in question was set
forth in the writing, and plaintiff prayed that, in view of what
was therein set forth, judgment be entered holding that the
said land was the property of the parish of Victoria, of the
Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, and that the defendant be
ordered to vacate the same and to pay the costs of the
action.
The defendant municipality answered the complaint through
its attorney and offered a general denial of all the facts
stated therein, especially of those numbered 4, 5, 6, and 7;
in special defense it alleged that the plaza described in No. 4
of the complaint was founded when the sitio denominated
Canarum, a barrio of the town of Tarlac, was converted into
a civil town in 1855; that the parish of Tarlac was established
many years after the civil town, and that therefore, it neither
had then, nor has now any title to the plaza claimed, and that
the complaint injured the defendant, and for this reason it
prayed that judgment be entered absolving the defendant of
the complaint with costs and damages against the plaintiff.
Evidence was adduced by both parties, and the documents
exhibited, to one of which the plaintiff objected, were made
of record; the trial court rendered judgment on the 15th of
June, 1908, holding that the parish of Victoria of the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Church, had a better right to the
possession of the land described in the complaint, and
sentenced the defendant to vacate the same and to pay the
costs. To said judgment the representative of the defendant
excepted and moved for a new trial on the ground that it was
contrary to the weight of the evidence, and he notified the
court that, if his motion were overruled, he would appeal to
the Supreme Court. The motion for a new trial was
overruled; the defendant excepted, and presented the
corresponding bill of exceptions which, after receipt of a
copy had been acknowledged by the adverse party, was
approved. On the 1st of September last, the appellant was
ordered to furnish bond in the sum of P1,000 to insure the
fulfillment of the judgment in the event that it should be
totally or partially affirmed. To said order the defendant
excepted, but furnished the bond as directed by the court.
In view of the nature of the action brought by the plaintiff
against the municipality of Victoria, Province of Tarlac, the
question that has arisen between the contending parties
consists only in determining who is the owner and proprietor
of the parcel of land that surrounds the parish church of the
said town, and which is called the public plaza of the same.
Article 339 of the Civil Code reads:
Property of public ownership is:
1. That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges constructed by the State,
and banks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar
character.
Article 344 of said code also reads:
Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises
the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets,
fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public
works of general service supported by the said towns or
provinces.
From the evidence presented by both parties it appears that
the town of Victoria, which was formerly only a barrio of the
town of Tarlac and known as Canarum, was converted into a
town in 1855, and named Victoria; to this end they must
have laid out the streets and the plaza of the town, in the
center of which were situated the church and parish house
from the commencement, and at the expiration of about
twelve years the parish of said town was constituted and the
parish who was to perform the office of curate was
appointed; that from the very beginning, the large tract of
land that surrounds the church and the parish house was
known as a public plaza , destined to the use of all the
residents of the recently founded town; public performances
and religious processions were held thereon without
hindrance either on the part of the local authorities or of the
curate of said town.
It must be assumed that the principal residents of the old
barrio, being interested in the conversion of the barrio into a
civil town, arranged in such a way that the barrio, as the
center of the future town which was subsequently called
Victoria, should have streets and a public plaza with its
church and parish house, and also a tribunal or building
destined for the use of the municipality and the local official
at that time called the gobernadorcillo and later on capitán
municipal, as has occurred in the foundation of all the towns
in these Islands, under the old administrative laws.
It may be true that the father of the witness Casimiro
Tañedo, who owned the space of land where the church and
parish house were erected, had voluntarily donated it to the
Catholic Church, the only one known at the time, but proper
proof is lacking that the donation affirmed by the said
Tañedo comprehended the whole of the large tract which at
the present time constitute the plaza of the town.
It was a custom observed by all the towns established
administratively in these Islands under the old Laws of the
Indies, that on their creation, a certain amount of land was
always reserved for plazas , commons, and special and
communal property, and as it is unquestionable that the said
large space of land was left vacant in the center of the town
of Victoria when it was constituted as a civil town, more than
twelve years prior to the appointment of a permanent curate
therein, there are good grounds to suppose that the late
Vicente Tañedo donated the land now occupied by the
church and the parish house in said municipality for religious
purposes, or to the church, but not to the parish curate
because at the time there was no curate at the new town of
Victoria.
Even though all the remaining space of land which now
forms the great plaza of the town of Victoria had been owned
40
by the said Tañedo, it must be presumed that he waived his
right thereto for the benefit of the townspeople, since from
the creation or establishment of the town, down to the
present day, all the residents, including the curate of said
town, have enjoyed the free use of said plaza ; it has not
been satisfactorily shown that the municipality or the
principales of the town of Victoria had donated the whole of
said land to the curate of Victoria or to the Catholic Church,
as alleged, nor could it have been so donated, it being a
public plaza destined to public use and was not of private
ownership, or patrimony of the town of Victoria, or of the
Province of Tarlac.
It should be noted that, among other things, plaza s destined
to the public use are not subject to prescription. (Art. 1936,
Civil Code.)
That both the curates and the gobernadorcillos of the said
town procured fruit trees and plants to be set out in the plaza
, does not constitute an act of private ownership, but
evidences the public use thereof, or perhaps the intention to
improve and embellish the said plaza for the benefit of the
townspeople.
Certain it is that the plaintiff has not proven that the Catholic
Church or the parish of Victoria was the owner or proprietor
of the said extensive piece of land which now forms the
public plaza of said town, nor that it was in possession
thereof under the form and conditions required by law,
inasmuch as it has been fully proven that said plaza has
been used without let or hindrance by the public and the
residents of the town of Victoria ever since its creation. For
the above reasons it is our opinion that the judgment
appealed from should be reversed, and that it should be
held, as we do hereby hold, that the whole of the land not
occupied by the church of the town of Victoria and its parish
house, is a public plaza of the said town, of public use, and
that in consequence thereof, the defendant is absolved of
the complaint without any special ruling as to the costs of
both instances.
G.R. No. L-40851 July 31, 1935
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, applicant-appellee,
vs.
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF ZAMBOANGA,
oppositor-appellant.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF MISAMIS, oppositor-appellee.
Evangelista and Santos for appellant.
Eugenio S. del Rosario for appellee.
IMPERIAL, J.:
In cadastral case No. 2 of Occidental Misamis, G.L.R.O.
Record No. 1210, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Zamboanga
sought the registration in the name of the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Church of four (4) parcels of land, known as lots
Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4, and the improvements thereon, situated
in the center of the town of the municipality of Misamis. The
Director of Lands claimed said properties alleging them to be
of the public domain, having been reserved for parks by
virtue of the Governor-General's Proclamation No. 360,
dated February 7, 1931. The municipality of Misamis
likewise claimed lots No. 1, 2, and 3, and a southwestern
portion of lot No. 4, having an area of 5,539 square meters,
alleging them to be public plazas.
After the necessary hearing wherein the parties presented
their respective evidence, the court rendered judgment
ordering the registration of lot No. 4 with the improvements
thereon in favor of the Roman Catholic Bishop of
Zamboanga and the registration of lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in
favor of the municipality of Misamis, thereby overruling the
claim of the Director of Lands. Only the Roman Catholic
Bishop of Zamboanga appealed.
The four lots are really only one parcel and are bounded on
the four sides thereof by Norte America, Ledesma,
Washington and Commercial streets. These four streets
existed from time immemorial, although with different names.
Said four lots were already in the possession of the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Church some years prior to the year 1789,
and the church, belfry and convert which served as dwelling
for the parish priests were built on lot No. 4. Heretofore its
possession has been quiet, open, public, continuous and
under claim of ownership. The land identified as lot No. 1
always formed part of lot No. 4. The so-called lot No. 2 was
occupied by nobody except the church through its parish
priests, until the local authorities converted it into an
extension of Mabini Street which terminated at Norte
America Street. As to lot No. 3, it has always been in the
possession of the church but it was occupied by two schools
for children of both sexes during the Spanish regime. The
girl's school was destroyed upon the arrival of the Americans
and the other school for boys was destroyed and it ceased to
exist about the year 1915. On one side of this land the
municipal authorities succeeded in erecting a monument of
Rizal, which still stands.
The possession by the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church of
the lands in dispute for a period of about a century and a
half, under the conditions above stated, can mean nothing
more than that said lands were designated by the State itself
to be devoted to the building of the church, belfry and
convent for the purpose of implanting the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Religion and maintaining the cult thereof.
In the case of Barlin vs. Ramirez and Municipality of
Lagonoy (7 Phil., 41 et seq.), this court said:
(2) The municipality of Lagonoy, in its answer,
claims as such, to be the owner of the property. As
we have said before, the evidence shows that it
never was in the physical possession of the
property. But waiving this point and assuming that
the possession of Ramirez, which he alleges in his
answer is the possession of the municipality, gives
the municipality the rights of a possessor, the
question still arises, Who has the better right to the
present possession of the property? The plaintiff,
in 1902, had been in the lawful possession thereof
for more than thirty years and during all that time
its possession had never been questioned or
disturbed. That possession has been taken away
from it and it has the right now to recover the
possession from the persons who have so
deprived it of such possession, unless the latter
can show that they have a better right thereto.
This was the proposition which was discussed and
settled in the case of the Bishop of Cebu vs.
Mangaron, No. 1748 (6 Phil., 286, decided June 1,
1906). That decision holds that as against one
who has been in possession for the length of time
the plaintiff has been in possession, and who has
been deprived of his possession, and who cannot
produce any written evidence of title, the mere fact
that the defendant is in possession does not entitle
the defendant to retain that possession. In order
that he may continue in possession, he must show
a better right thereto.
The evidence in this case does not show that the
municipality has, as such, any right whatever in
the property in question. It has produced no
evidence of ownership. Its claim of ownership is
rested in its brief in this court upon the following
propositions: That the property in question
belonged prior the Treaty of Paris to the Spanish
Government; that by the Treaty of Paris the
ownership thereof passed to the Government of
the United States; that by section 12 of the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, such property was
transferred to the Government of the Philippine
Islands, and that by the circular of that
Government, dated November 11, 1902, the
ownership and the right to the possession of this
property passed to the municipality of Lagonoy. If,
for the purposes of the argument, we should admit
that the other propositions are true, there is no
evidence whatever to support the last proposition,
namely that the Government of the Philippine
Islands has transferred the ownership of this
church to the municipality of Lagonoy. We have
41
 found no circular of the date above referred to.
The one of February 10, 1903, which is probably
the one intended, contains nothing that indicates
any such transfer. As to the municipality of
Lagonoy, therefore, it is very clear that it has
neither title, ownership, nor right to possession.
(3) We have said that it would have no such title or
ownership even admitting that the Spanish
Government was the owner of the property and
that it passed by the Treaty of Paris to the
American Government. But this assumption is not
true. As a matter of law, the Spanish Government
at the time the treaty of peace was signed, was
not the owner of this property, nor of any other
property like it, situated in the Philippine Islands.
It does not admit of doubt that from the earliest
times the parish churches in the Philippine Islands
were built by the Spanish Government. Law 2, title
2, book 1, of the Compilation of the Laws of the
Indies is, in part, as follows:
"Having erected all the churches, cathedrals, and
parish houses of the Spaniards and natives of our
Indian possessions from their discovery at the cost
and expense of our royal treasury, and applied for
their service and maintenance the part of the tithes
belonging to us by apostolic concession according
to the division we have made."
The syllabus of the case of the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Church vs. Municipality of Placer (11 Phil., 315), reads:
ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH PROPERTY;
OWNERSHIP. — On the authority of the
Municipality of Ponce vs. Roman Catholic
Apostolic Church in Porto Rico, decided by the
United States Supreme Court June 1, 1908; Held,
That under the Spanish law heretofore existing in
these Islands and the provisions of the treaty of
Paris, the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church is the
owner of a church building, convent, and
cemetery, and that the municipality wherein the
same are situated has no right of ownership
therein by reason of funds or land contributed for
the foundation or erection thereof.
In the case of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church vs.
Municipalities of Caloocan, Morong and Malabon, of the
Province of Rizal (12 Phil., 639 et seq.), this court in
analyzing the laws governing the temporal properties of the
church in these Islands again stated:
The evidence discloses, beyond peradventure of
doubt, that the plaintiff had been in the quiet and
peaceable possession of the different parcels of
property, with reference to which evidence was
presented, for a period immemorial, until some
time between the years 1896-1899, when they
were molested in their possession and deprived of
the same by some of the defendants. This court
has repeatedly decided that where a person has
been in the long possession or real property and
has been deprived of the possession thereof, he
may recover it as against one in possession,
unless the latter can show a better right thereto.
(Bishop of Cebu vs. Mangaron, 6 Phil., 286; Barlin
vs. Ramirez, 7 Phil, 41; Roman Catholic Apostolic
Church vs. Santos, 7 Phil., 66; City of Manila vs.
Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, 8 Phil., 763;
Roman Catholic Apostolic Church vs. Municipality
of Tarlac, 9 Phil, 450; Roman Catholic Apostolic
Church vs. Certain Municipalities, etc., 10 Phil., 1;
Roman Catholic Apostolic Church vs. Municipality
of Badoc, 10 Phil., 659; Roman Catholic Apostolic
Church vs. Municipality of Cuyapo, 9 Phil., 457;
Roman Catholic Apostolic Church vs. Certain
Municipalities, etc., 9 Phil., 691.)
xxx xxx xxx
In the case of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church vs.
Municipality of Placer (11 Phil., 315), the facts therein being
very analogous to the facts in the present case, this court
followed the said decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States, holding that, under the Spanish law
heretofore existing in these Islands, and the provisions of the
Treaty of Paris, the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church is the
owner of the church buildings, convents, and cemeteries and
the municipalities wherein the same are situated have no
right of ownership therein by reason of funds or lands
contributed for the foundation or erection thereof.
Our attention has not been called to any express
granted or grants of land by the Crown of Spain for
the purposes of the church upon which particular
churches were erected, and it is believed that,
during the early history of the sovereignty of Spain
in the Indies, no such grants can be found, but no
fact is better established in both secular and
ecclesiastical history than the fact that the Crown
of Spain and the Pope always cooperated from the
very earliest history of the possession of the Indies
in the extension of the great benefits offered by
the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church to the Indio,
as well as to the peoples of Europe. If any
difference whatever existed in the efforts thus
made in the great interest which the church took in
the different peoples, it was in favor of the Indio.
Scarcely had the Indies been discovered until the
Pope and the Crown of Spain began to manifest a
deep interest in the religious and educational
welfare of the people of the Indies. (Bula de
Alejandro VI of the 4th of May, 1493; also the Bula
of 16th of December, 1501; Ordenanza 5 (a) por
el Consejo de Las Indias, 1575; law 10, title 1,
book 1 of Laws of the Indias, of the 1st of June,
1574; law 14, title 2, book 1 of the Laws of the
Indias, and many others, the collection of which
may be found in vol. 7 of Legislacion Ultramarina,
p. 476.)
From the reading of these various bulas and royal
decrees and ordenanzas, it will be seen that the
government and the church were constantly
working together for the advancement of the
religious and educational welfare of the Indios.
The government lent its most enthusiastic support
to the efforts that were made by the church in this
regard, even to the extent of paying out of the
public exchequer, funds, together with funds
contributed by the encomenderos and the people
of the pueblos, for the purpose of erecting the
magnificent Catholic churches existing everywhere
throughout the Spanish island possessions. While
the Crown of Spain always reserved a certain
control over the operations of the Catholic Church,
yet no one can doubt that, when these lands were
donated or designated and the church edifices
were erected thereon, it was the intention of the
Crown that such lands and such edifices should
be devoted absolutely to the use of the church. It
is a well-known fact that, when a church edifice of
the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church was once
accepted and dedicated for religious purposes, it
thereafter could never be used for any other
purpose. The Catholic Church certainly had a right
to believe at least that, during the three hundred
years or more that it occupied its churches in the
Philippine Islands, without protest or objection on
the part of the Crown of Spain, the Crown had
intended at least that they should become the
absolute owners of such properties. And no
protest has been called to our attention during a
time immemorial and no protest or objection by the
different pueblos to the right of ownership which
the church has exercised for from two to three
hundred years over the properties upon which the
edifices of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church
were erected. Not only is it believed that the
Crown of Spain intended that the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Church should exercise absolute
dominion over such properties, but under the
treaty of Paris the Government of the United
States obligated itself to protect all such interests.
The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church occupied
42
 the different properties in question in this case for Neither does the existence of a monument of Rizal on said
a time so long that no one in the pueblos could land prove the ownership of the municipality of Misamis, nor
remember when such properties were not can the recent occupation thereof be invoked as a title
occupied and used for the benefit of said church, thereto. It should be interpreted as a tolerated possession in
until about the years 1896-99. The occupancy of accordance with articles 444 and 447 of the Civil Code which
property for from two to three hundred years in no way can be made the basis for the adjudication of a
without protest of any kind whatever from the title.
donors would seem at least two be sufficient time,
in the absence of positive proof to the contrary,
The circumstance that these lands have been reversed for
that such donation was made for the purpose of
park purposes by Proclamation No. 360, dated February 7,
transferring to the donee all rights and interests in
1931, is of no importance. Inasmuch as they were not public
such property.
lands, lands of the public domain or lands particularly
belonging to the Government, but properties of private
Therefore, adhering to and following the decision ownership, they could not be lawfully segregated in order to
of the Supreme Court of the United States in the be converted into public parks.
case of the Municipality of Ponce vs. Roman
Catholic Apostolic Church in Porto Rico (28 Sup.
As stated in the beginning, the court found that lots Nos. 1, 2
Ct. Rep., 737; 6 Off. Gaz., 1213) and the decision
and 3 are public plazas, as claimed by the municipality of
of this court in the case of the Roman Catholic
Misamis, and decreed the registration thereof in the name of
Apostolic Church vs. Municipality of Placer, supra,
the said municipality. This decree is untenable. If they are
we do hereby find that the plaintiff herein is
public plazas they are not susceptible or registration in the
entitled to the right of possession and ownership
name of any branch of the State. (Nicolas vs. Jose, 6 Phil.,
of the following properties:
589; Harty vs. Municipality of Victoria, 13 Phil., 152; 226
U.S., 12; 57 Law. ed., 103.)
La visita de Dampalit;
La visita de Ningan;
For the foregoing considerations, and without the necessity
La visita de Catmon;
of passing upon the various assignments of error of the
La visita de Tinajeros;
appellant separately, the appealed judgment is reversed and
La visita de Maysilo;
it is ordered that the registration of lots Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4
La visita de Matahong;
with the improvements thereof, except the Rizal monument,
La visita de Muson;
be decreed in favor of the Roman Catholic Bishop of
La visita de Julong-Dujat,
Zamboanga, without costs. So ordered.

each situated in barrios of the same names, in the

G.R. No. 69138 May 19, 1992
pueblo of Malabon, Province of Rizal; and also to
the right of possession and ownership of the
cementerio of the pueblo of Morong and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Bureau of Forest
cementerio of Cardona in the pueblo of Morong. Development), petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases
The circumstance that public schools for children of both
Division) and HILARIO P. RAMA, respondents.
sexes were erected on lot No. 3 during the Spanish regime
is not conclusive evidence that the land was segregated
from the great portion thereof designated for the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Church and its cults particularly it we take
into account the fact that primary instruction was then under
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
the direct supervision of the parish priests who received
subsidy from the government.
The decision of the trial court in this case declared the
disputed parcels of land to be forest land and, therefore,
In the case of the Municipality of Nueva Caceres vs. Director
inalienable. The appellate court sustained the factual finding.
of Lands and Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres (24
The issue raised in this petition refers to the propriety of
Phil., 485 et seq.), it was stated:
awarding necessary expenses to the alleged possessor in
good faith with right of retention until the expenses are paid.
Therefore, it will be seen from a reading of the above royal
decrees and regulations governing the primary instruction of
In May 1974, Anselmo Logronio, in his official capacity as
the boys, that boys' schools were under the direction and
officer-in-charge of the Bohol Reforestation Project of the
control of both the church and the state. It was only natural
Bureau of Forest Development, bulldozed portions of two (2)
that the schools of the church should be governed by the
parcels of land which he believed to be forest lands located
general laws regulating primary instruction inasmuch as all
at Talibon, Bohol, occupied the same, and planted mulberry
the schools were under its supervision; and as by throwing
and other trees.
open the school to the public, boys generally would be
instructed in the faith, it was to the advantage of the church
to make its schools as public as possible. Soon thereafter, respondent Hilario P. Rama commenced in
the then Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court of
Bohol, a complaint for recovery of possession, ownership
So, the fact that the Government intervened in the
and damages against Logronio alleging that he is the
administration of the school in no way tends to
absolute owner and possessor of the two (2) parcels of land
show or prove that the church had ceded the
occupied by Logronio. He specifically described the two (2)
building or the lot in question to either the local or
parcels of land as follows:
central government of Spain in the Philippines. On
the contrary, it would have been highly
unreasonable that such should have been the A. A parcel of land, Lot 1, Psu-218360
case, for the church is very jealous of its property beginning at a point marked "1" of Lot 1,
and especially of its educational institutions for the Psu 218360, being N. 41-39 E.,
instruction of the young, and especially of a lot and 15391.24 m. from B.L.L.M. No. 1,
building which faced its cathedral in Nueva Municipality of Carmen, Province of
Caceres and adjoined the same lot on which its Bohol, thence N. 47-35 W., 163.40 m. to
seminary for the instruction of aspirants to the point 2; S. 67-59 W., 173.82 m. to point
priesthood was built. In fact, there is no doubt that 3; N.5-17 E., 250.71 m. to point 4; S. 71-
until the revolution and separation of church and 33 E., 168.51 m. to point 5; S. 82-11 E.,
state, brought about by the advent of American 107.55 m. to point 6; S. 0-45 W., 228.32
sovereignty, the church was in possession of the m. to point 1; point of beginning . . .
school in question, considering it as its own containing an area of FIFTY ONE
exclusive property. THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED AND

43
 TWENTY SIX (51,226) square meters . .
. evidenced by Original Certificate of
Title No. 6148 (Free Patent No. 319750)
Office of the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Bohol . . . also covered by
Tax Dec. No. R-3859 in the name of
Plaintiff . . . assessed at P990.00 . . .
B. A parcel of land (as shown on plant
H-154932, LRC Rec. No.), situated in
the Barrio of Malitbog, Municipality of
Trinidad, Province of Bohol. Bounded on
the H., (sic) along lines 1-2-3 by the
property of Rufino Autida (H-166571),
on the E., along lines 4-5-6-7 by Creek;
on the S., along lines 7-8-9-10, by the
Marinas Creek 4.00 m. wide; on the W.,
along line 10-11 by Public Land (Forest
Zone), and on the N., along lines 11-12-
1 by the property of Angel Jumawan . . .
containing an area of Ninety Six
Thousand Three Hundred Forty Three
(96,343) square meters . . . covered by
Tax Dec. No. R-4019 in the name of
Plaintiff . . . with an assessed value of
Pl,390.00 . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(Record on Appeal, pp. 54-56)
In his answer, Logronio claimed that the two parcels of land
are forest lands and that the questioned acts were
performed by him in the regular and lawful performance of
his duties as officer-in-charge of the Bohol Reforestation
Project of the Bureau of Forest Development. He prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint.
Petitioner Republic filed a motion for leave to intervene
attaching its complaint-in-intervention.
The complaint-in-intervention alleged that Logronio's acts
were authorized by the government through the Director of
the Bureau of Forest Development in connection with the
reforestation program of the government; that the two (2)
subject parcels of land are located within the timberland
Block D, L. C. Project No. 33 of Talibon, Bohol per BF Map
L. C. 686 and, therefore, are forest lands; that the said lands
were never released by the government as alienable and
disposable lands, hence, are not susceptible of disposition or
private appropriation under the provisions of the Public Land
Act (Commonwealth Act No. 41), as amended, nor were the
said parcels of land registered under the provisions of the
Land Registration Law (Act No. 496), as amended. It prayed
that Free Patent No. 319750 covering the forest portion of
the first lot be declared null and void; that the Register of
Deeds be ordered to cancel OCT No. 6148 covering the said
forest portion; that both forest lands be reverted back to the
public domain; and that the complaint against Logronio be
dismissed.
The motion was granted and the complaint-in-intervention
was admitted by the lower court.
Rama, then, filed an answer to the complaint-in-intervention
alleging that the Republic has no cause of action, and is
guilty of estoppel for having caused the issuance of the
certificate of title covering the forest land. He claimed that if
his title is to be cancelled, and he is deprived of ownership
over the parcels of land, he should be paid by the Republic
for all existing improvements plus whatever expenses he has
incurred in connection with the improvement of said lands.
The trial of the case resulted in the following undisputed
facts stated in the decision of the lower court:
xxx xxx xxx
1. On parcel A in the complaint. The
evidence discloses that Lot 1, Psu-
218360, as described in the complaint,
and containing an area of 51,226 square
meters, is one of the two lots covered by
OCT No. 6148 (Free Patent Title No.
319750) in the name of Hilario Piscos
Rama (Exhs. A and A-1) and is,
according to the plaintiff, free from any
liens or encumbrances.
Thus, plaintiff Hilario P. Rama, 42
testified that of the two parcels of land
mentioned in the complaint, one parcel
was covered by title, as shown by a
xerox copy of OCT No. 6148 (Exhs. A
and A-1), and by tax declaration No. R-
3859 (Exh. B); that he secured a
certification from the Office of the
District Forester, Tagbilaran City,
regarding the status of the land covered
by OCT 6148 (Exh. C); that he had a
plan of the land covered by OCT No.
6148 (Exh. D); that in the memorandum
of encumbrances on OCT No. 6148
(Exh. A-1), Entry No. 3382 referred to a
real-estate mortgage executed on 23
November 1967 by Hilario Piscos Rama
and Socorro Regañon in favor of the
Development Bank of the Philippines,
but the obligation was already paid, and
there was a written release of the
mortgage in 1975, which was not yet
registered because when he went to the
Registry of Deeds payment was
required for registering the release and
he did not have money at that time.
As shown in OCT No. 6148 (Exh. A), the
free patent title was given on 13 January
1967, and the certificate of title was
issued on 4 May 1967. Then on 7
November 1967, the Office of the
District Forester, Tagbilaran City, issued
Certification No. 57 (Exh. C) to the effect
"that according to the records of this
Office, there is no pending case as far
as the Bureau of Forestry is concerned,
involving the validity of the title over a
parcel of land containing an area of
10.2450 hectares covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 6148 Free Patent
No. 319750 situated in barrio of
Malitbog, Municipality of Dagohoy,
Province of Bohol issued by the
Register of Deeds of Tagbilaran City on
January 13, 1967 in the name of Hilario
Piscos Rama, Filipino, of legal age,
married to Socorro Riganon, and
resident in Malitbog, Dagohoy, Bohol."
Meantime, on 11 September 1967,
Hipolito Amihan, Forester in Charge of
the Bohol Reforestation Project,
Dagohoy, Bohol, addressed a letter to
the Administrator, Reforestation
Administration, Diliman, Quezon City,
thru the Regional Officer, Cebu City,
(Exh. 8), stating that relative to OCT No.
6148 in the name of Hilario Piscos
Rama —
Upon verification of
the area in question
it is found out that
Lot I in an area of
51,226 sq. m. is
within the area of
Bohol Reforestation
Project, Dagohoy,
Bohol. . . .
and recommending "that Lot No. 1
under PSU-21-8360 with an area of
51,226 sq. m. under Free Patent No.
44
318750 issued in favor of Mr. Hilario
Piscos Rama be cancelled."
On 29 October 1974, Lope D. Reyes,
Assistant OIC, Legal Staff, Bureau of
Forest Development, Diliman, Quezon
City, sent a memorandum to the OIC
Silviculture Division (Exh. 1), requesting
that OCT No. 6148 issued in favor of
Hilario Piscos Rama "be verified as to
whether or not the area is inside a
timberland of alienable or disposable
land." And on 22 November 1974, Primo
P. Andres, Officer in Charge, Silviculture
Division, Bureau of Forest Development,
Diliman, Quezon City, returned by first
endorsement (Exh. 2) the aforesaid
memorandum with the information that
per verification and control —
1. Lot 1, PSU-
218360 is within the
Timberland Block-A
of LC Project No.
33 of Talibon,
Bohol, per BF Map
LC-635, and;
2. Lot 2, PSU-
218360, is within
the Alienable or
Disposable Block-I,
of LC Project 33 of
Talibon, Bohol,
certified as such on
September 7, 1927,
per BF Map LC-
685.
And the Commissioner's Report (Exh. A-
Commissioner) finds
that —
On Lot 1, Psu-
218360 and (sic)
approximate area of
45,826 sq. m.
colored green on
the sketch is inside
the Timberland and
5,400 sq. m. more
or less is in the
Alienable and
Disposable Area.
And the Commissioner, Emmanuel
Maboloc, 38, Junior Geodetic Engineer,
Bureau of Forest Development, Region
VII, Cebu City, testified to this effect,
stating, however, that he did not make
technical descriptions of the portion of
the lot within the Bohol Reforestation
Project and the portion outside it, so
that, if required, he would have to go to
the field again to make such technical
descriptions. (Record on Appeal, pp. 61-
65)
xxx xxx xxx
2. On parcel B in the complaint.— . . .
The land is covered by TD No. R-4019
in the name of plaintiff Hilario Piscos
Rama (Exh. F) and was surveyed for the
Heirs of German Remarata in 1952, as
shown by the technical description (Exh.
G) and plan H-154932 (Exh. H). But the
land is not covered by any certificate of
title.
On 12 March 1968, the Office of the
District Forester, Tagbilaran City, issued
Certification No. 90 (Exh. I) to the effect
"that the parcel of land containing an
approximate area of 9.6345 hectares
situated in Barrio Malitbog, Municipality
of Dagohoy, Province of Bohol,
described in the Tax Declaration
proposed in the name of German
Remarata, a resident of Bo. Malitbog,
Dagohoy, Bohol was verified by a
representative of this Office and was
found to be within the Alienable and
Disposable Block "1", Land
Classification Project No. 33, Talibon,
Bohol, L.C. Map No. 685, certified on
September 7, 1927." And on 4 March
1970, the Office of the District Forester,
City of Tagbilaran, thru Acting District
Forester Pastor O. Ibarra, issued
Certification No. 101 (Exh. J), which is
similarly worded as Certification No. 90
(Exh. I), except that the proposed tax
declaration is in the name of HILARIO
PISCOS RAMA.
But on 15 May 1974, the Office of the
District Forester, City of Tagbilaran, thru
District Forester Pastor O. Ibarra, sent a
letter to Hilario P. Rama (Exh. 4)
informing him "that CERTIFICATION
NO. 101, issued to you on March 4,
1970, by the District Forester of
Tagbilaran City, is hereby revoked on
the ground that after thorough (sic)
investigation by representative of this
Office the parcel of land which you claim
and the subject matter in the above-
mentioned CERTIFICATION NO. 101, is
found to be within the Bohol
Reforestation Project." And on the same
date, a letter to the same effect was
sent by District Forester Ibarra to the
Provincial Assessor, City of Tagbilaran
(Exh. 5).
The Commissioner's Report (Exh. A-
Commissioner) inter alia states:
It was found out
that on lot H-
154932 an
approximate area of
94,719 Sq. M. is
inside Timberland
block A, Project No.
33 a part of Bohol
Reforestation
Project (colored
green on the sketch
plan) and only
approximately
1,624 Sq. M. is
inside the Alienable
and Disposable
area colored orange
on the sketch plan.
Likewise, Commissioner Maboloc
declared that he did not make technical
descriptions of the portion of said lot
within the Bohol Reforestation Project
and the portion outside it. (Record on
Appeal, pp. 66-68)
In view of its findings that the two (2) subject parcels of land
are forest lands, the lower court declared as null and void
the Certificate of Title covering the first lot in the name of
Rama and ordered him to vacate the said parcel "upon being
reimbursed by the intervenor in the sum of SIX THOUSAND
PESOS (P6,000.00) as necessary expenses." As regards
the second parcel of land, the lower court ordered Rama to
vacate the same parcel of land "with right to refund from the
45
intervenor for the necessary expenses in the sum of THREE
THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00), but without rights of
retention." The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered, as follows:
1. Relative to Lot 1, Psu-218360, (parcel
A in the complaint): declaring that
portion thereof indicated in the
Commissioner's Report (Exh. A-
Commissioner) as having an
"approximate area of 45,836 Sq. M. and
shown on the sketch (Exh. B-
Commissioner) as timberland and
therefore part of the public domain
(colored green, Parcel B in said sketch);
declaring null and void Original
Certificate of Title No. 6148 in the name
of HILARIO PISCOS RAMA insofar as it
includes the aforesaid portion; and
ordering the plaintiff to vacate said
portion upon being reimbursed by the
intervenor in the sum of SIX
THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) as
necessary expenses;
2. Relative to the parcel of land shown
on plan H-154932 (parcel B in the
complaint): declaring that the portion
thereof indicated in the Commissioner's
Report (Exh. A-Commissioner) as
having "an approximate area of 94,719
Sq. M." and shown on the sketch (Exh.
B-Commissioner) as timberland and
therefore part of the public domain
(colored green, Parcel A in said sketch);
declaring null and void Tax Declaration
No. R-4019 (Exh. F) insofar as it
includes the aforesaid portion; and
ordering the plaintiff to vacate said
portion, with right to refund from the
intervenor for the necessary expenses
in the sum of THREE THOUSAND
PESOS (P3,000.00), but without right of
retention;
3. Dismissing the complaint as against
defendant Anselmo Logroño, both in his
private and in his official capacity;
4. Dismissing defendant Logroño's
counterclaim; and
5. Ordering the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Bohol to annotate the
judgment relative to Lot 1, Psu-2l8360 at
the back of Original Certificate of Title
No. 6148.
Without pronouncement of costs.
(Record on Appeal, pp. 77-79)
Petitioner Republic appealed the lower court's decision to
the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of
Appeals, insofar as it ordered petitioner Republic to pay
Rama the necessary expenses with the right of retention
over the titled parcel of land.
The appellate court, however, did not only affirm the
questioned decision, but modified it by ruling that as regards
the second parcel which is not covered by any certificate of
title, Rama has also the right of retention until the necessary
expenses awarded to him are paid by petitioner Republic.
A motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant
petition.
In a resolution dated March 27, 1985, the Court gave due
course to the petition. Because of the reorganization of the
Court after the 1986 political upheaval and subsequent
changes caused by retirement of certain Justices, the case
could not be decided until its recent assignment to the
undersigned ponente.
On May 5, 1989, we issued another resolution stating
therein:
Considering the length of time that this
case has remained pending and as a
practical measure to ease the backlog of
this Court, the parties shall, within ten
(10) days from notice, MANIFEST
whether or not they are still interested in
prosecuting this case, or supervening
events have transpired which render this
case moot and academic or otherwise
substantially affect the same. (Rollo, p.
70)
In response to this resolution, the Solicitor General,
representing petitioner Republic, filed on August 4, 1989, a
manifestation stating that he is not aware of any supervening
event that may have transpired which would render the case
moot and academic.
As stated earlier, the only issue in this petition is the
propriety of awarding necessary expenses with right of
retention over the two (2) parcels of land in favor of the
possessor in this case, Rama, until the payment of the
necessary expenses by petitioner Republic on the ground
that Rama is a possessor in good faith as defined in Article
526 of the Civil Code.
In ruling that private respondent Rama, the possessor of the
two forest lands is entitled to payment of necessary
expenses, the appellate court cited the case of Dizon v.
Rodriguez, (13 SCRA 704 [1965]).
The background facts of the Dizon case are as follows:
Hacienda Calatagan owned by Alfonso
and Jacobo Zobel was originally
covered by TCT No. T-722. In 1938, the
Hacienda constructed a pier, called
"Santiago Landing," about 600 meters
long from the shore into the navigable
waters of the Pagaspas Bay, to be used
by vessels loading sugar produced by
the Hacienda sugar mill. When the
sugar mill ceased its operation in 1948,
the owners of the Hacienda converted
the pier into a fishpond dike and built
additional strong dikes enclosing an
area of about 30 hectares (of the Bay)
and converted the same into a fishpond.
The Hacienda owners also enclosed a
similar area of about 37 hectares of the
Bay on the other side of the pier which
was also converted into a fishpond.
In 1949, the Zobels ordered the
subdivision of the Hacienda by ordering
the preparation of the subdivision plan
Psd-27941 wherein fishpond No. 1 (with
30 hectares) was referred to as Lot No.
1 and fishpond No. 2 (with 37 hectares)
was referred to as Lot No. 49. The plan
was approved by the Director of Lands,
and the Register of Deeds issued, from
TCT No. T-722, TCT No. 2739 for lots
49 and 1 in the name of Jacobo Zobel.
In 1950, Jacobo Zobel sold to Antonino
Dizon, et al. Lot 49 for which said
purchasers obtained at first TCT No. T-
2740 and later T-4718, Lot 1, on the
other hand, was purchased by Carlos
Goco, et al., who in turn, sold one-half
46
thereof to Manuel Sy-Juco, et al.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4159
was issued in the names of the Gocos
and Sy-Jucos.
On May 24, 1952, Miguel Tolentino filed
with the Bureau of Fisheries an
application for ordinary fishpond permit
or lease for Lot 49, and an application
for a similar permit, for Lot 1, was filed
by his daughter Clemencia Tolentino.
The Dizons, Sy-Jucos, and Gocos filed
a protest with the Bureau of Fisheries,
claiming the properties to be private
land covered by a certificate of title. This
protest was dismissed by the Director of
Fisheries, on the ground that the areas
applied for are outside the boundaries of
TCT No. T-722 of Hacienda Calatagan.
This ruling was based upon the findings
of the committee created by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to look into the matter, that
Lots 1 and 49 are not originally included
within the boundaries of the hacienda.
On October 1, 1954, the protestants
Dizons, Sy-Jucos, and Gocos filed an
action in the Court of First Instance of
Manila (Civ. Case No. 24237) to restrain
the Director of Fisheries from issuing the
fishpond permits applied for by the
Tolentinos. The court dismissed this
petition for non-exhaustion of
administrative remedy, it appearing that
petitioners had not appealed from the
decision of the Director of Fisheries to
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. On appeal to this Court, the
decision of the lower court was
sustained (G.R. No. 8654, promulgated
April 28, 1956). The protestants then
filed an appeal with the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. This
time, the same was dismissed for being
filed out of time.
On August 16, 1956, the Dizons filed
Civil Case 135 and the Sy-Jucos and
Gocos, Civil Case 136, in the Court of
First Instance of Batangas, to quiet their
titles over Lots 49 and 1. Named
defendants were the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and
applicants Tolentinos. The Republic of
the Philippines was allowed to intervene
in view of the finding by the investigating
committee created by the respondent
Secretary, that the lots were part of the
foreshore area before their conversion
into fishponds by the hacienda-owners.
On January 30, 1958, after due hearing,
the Court of First Instance of Batangas
promulgated a joint decision making the
finding, among others, that the
subdivision plan Psd-27941 was
prepared in disregard of the technical
description stated in TCT No. T-722,
because the surveyor merely followed
the existing shoreline and placed his
monuments on the southwest lateral of
Lot 49, which was the pier abutting into
the sea; and made the conclusion that
Lots 1 and 49 of Psd-27941 were part of
the foreshore lands. As the certificate of
title obtained by petitioners covered
lands not subject to registration, the
same were declared null and void, and
Lots 1 and 49 were declared properties
of the public domain. Petitioners
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
In its decision of October 31, 1961, as
well as the resolution of August 20,
1962, the appellate court adopted the
findings of the lower court, that the lots
in question are part of the foreshore
area and affirmed the ruling cancelling
the titles to plaintiffs. Although in the
decision of October 31, 1961, the Court
of Appeals awarded to applicants
Tolentinos damages in the amount of
P200.00 per hectare from October 1,
1954, when plaintiffs were notified of the
denial of their protest by the Director of
Fisheries, such award was eliminated in
the resolution of August 20, 1962, for
reason that plaintiffs, who relied on the
efficacy of their certificates of title,
cannot be considered possessors in bad
faith until after the legality of their said
titles has been finally determined.
Appellants were thus declared entitled
to retention of the properties until they
are reimbursed by the landowner, the
Republic of the Philippines, of the
necessary expenses made on the lands,
in the sums of P40,000.00 (for Lot 49)
and P25,000.00 (for Lot 1). It is from this
portion of the decision as thus modified
that defendants Tolentinos and the
intervenor Republic of the Philippines
appealed (in G.R. Nos. L-20355-56),
claiming that plaintiffs' possession
became in bad faith when their protest
against the application for lease was
denied by the Director of Fisheries. In
addition, the intervenor contends that
being such possessors in bad faith,
plaintiffs are not entitled to
reimbursement of the expenses made
on the properties. (at pp. 705-708;
Emphasis supplied)
The appellate court's decision was appealed to us by both
the Republic and the Dizons, et al.
We dismissed both appeals.
A comparative study of the present case and the Dizon case
shows different circumstances which make the Dizon case
not applicable to the instant case.
In the present case, the parcel of land titled in the name of
Hilario P. Rama is covered by an original torrens title issued
in Rama's name on May 4, 1967. Earlier, he applied for the
issuance of title based on a patent which was given on
January 13, 1967. The fact that he applied for a patent title
shows a recognition on his part that the parcel is part of the
public domain. True, government officials caused the
issuance of the patent title and the original torrens title
covering the land in Rama's name. However, the well-
entrenched principle is that the State cannot be put in
estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents.
(Republic v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 156 [1985]; and
Republic v. Aquino, 120 SCRA 186 [1983])
Considering that the subject parcel of land is forest land, the
patent and original certificate of title covering the subject
parcel issued to Rama did not confer any validity to his
possession or claim of ownership. (Sunbeam Convenience
Foods, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 443 [1990];
Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 679
[1987]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480 [1987];
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 156 [1985])
The titles are void ab initio. (Heirs of Amunategui v. Director
of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69 [1983]; Republic v. Animas, 56
SCRA 499 [1974]) The titles issued cannot ripen into private
ownership. (Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183
[1968]; Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, supra;
Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra) In effect,
Rama's possession of the parcel from the beginning was
fraudulent and illegal. He was merely a squatter on the
47
parcel. Under these circumstances, we cannot see any Even if the doctrine
reason why Rama should be considered a possessor in of indefeasibility of
good faith as defined in Article 526 of the Civil Code. a Torrens Title were
not thus reconciled,
the result would be
In the Dizon case, however, the occupants of the parcels of
the same,
land which were adjudged as part of these ashore or
considering the
foreshore area and part of the public domain bought the land
third paragraph of
from Alfonso and Jacobo Zobel relying on the original
Art. 526 which
certificate of title covering the parcels. This intervening event
provides that:
constitutes the difference between the Dizon case and the
present case. Dizon, et al. buyers of the foreshore lands
were protected by the principle that an innocent buyer of a Art. 526. . . .
registered land may rely on the torrens title of the seller. In
the absence of anything to excite suspicion, the buyer is not
Mistake upon a
obligated to look beyond the certificate to investigate the title
doubtful or difficult
of the sellers appearing on the face of the certificate.
question of law may
(Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA
be the basis of
735 [1990]; Gonzales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157
good faith.
SCRA 587 [1988]; Philippine National Cooperative Bank v.
Carandang-Villalon, 139 SCRA 570 [1985]); Penullar v.
Philippine National Bank, 120 SCRA 171 [1983]) The legal question
whether plaintiffs-
appellants'
Another distinction between the two (2) cases is in the
possession in good
degree of participation of the parties and the public officials
faith, under their
in the titling of the subject parcels of land. In the present
Torrens Titles
case, respondent Rama was the one who secured a
acquired in good
certificate from the office of the District Forester, Tagbilaran
faith, does not lose
City as regards the status of the parcel of land with his
this character
representations that "he had a plan of the land." It appears,
except in the case
therefore, that it was through the representations of Rama
and from the
that the land was titled in his name. Some months later,
moment their Titles
however, or on November 7, 1967, the Office of the District
are declared null
Forester suspected that the parcel of land thus titled was
and void by the
forest land. Why this angle was not pursued is not shown in
Courts, is a difficult
the records. It, however, negates the good faith of Rama
one. Even the
who actively pursued the titling of the parcel in his name.
members of this
Court were for a
Good faith which entitles the possessors to necessary long time divided,
expenses with right of retention until reimbursement was two to one, on the
explained in the Dizon case: answer. It was only
after several
sessions, where the
On the matter of possession of plaintiffs-
results of
appellants, the ruling of the Court of
exhaustive
Appeals must be upheld. There is no
researches on both
showing that plaintiffs are not
sides were
purchasers in good faith and for value.
thoroughly
As such titleholders, they have reason
discussed, that an
to rely on the indefeasible character of
undivided Court
their certificates.
finally found the
answer given in the
On the issue of good faith of the next preceding
plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals reasoned paragraph. Hence,
out: even if it be
assumed for the
sake of argument
The concept of that the Supreme
possessors in good Court would find
faith given in Art. that the law is not
526 of the Civil as we have stated it
Code and when in the next
said possession preceding
loses this Character paragraph and that
under Art. 528, the plaintiffs-
needs to be appellants made a
reconciled with the mistake in relying
doctrine of thereon, such
indefeasibility of a mistake on a
Torrens Title. Such difficult question of
reconcialiton can law may be the
only be achieved by basis of good faith.
holding that the Hence, their
possessor with a possession in good
Torrens Title is not faith does not lose
aware of any flaw in this character
his Title which except in the case
invalidates it until and from the
his Torrens Title is moment their
declared null and Torrens Titles are
void by final declared null and
judgment of the void by the Courts.
Courts.

Under the circumstances of the case,

especially where the subdivision plan

48
 was originally approved by the Director
of Lands, we are not ready to conclude
that the above reasoning of the Court of
Appeals on this point is a reversible
error. Needless to state, as such
occupants in good faith, plaintiffs have
the right to the retention of the property
until they are reimbursed the necessary
expenses made on the lands.
With respect to the contention of the
Republic of the Philippines that the
order for the reimbursement by it of
such necessary expenses constitutes a
judgment against the government in a
suit not consented to by it, suffice it to
say that the Republic, on its own
initiative, asked and was permitted to
intervene in the case and thereby
submitted itself voluntarily to the
jurisdiction of the court. (at pp. 709-710;
Emphasis supplied)
With the foregoing findings, the appellate court's ruling as
regards the unregistered parcel of land which is to the effect
that Rama is also entitled to necessary expenses with right
of retention until reimbursed of the necessary expenses
must be reversed. His title over the forest land is null and
void for the same reasons. There are no special
circumstances which would warrant the application of the
Dizon case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned
decision and resolution of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court, now Court of Appeals, are SET ASIDE in so far as
they ordered petitioner Republic to pay private respondent
Hilario P. Rama the necessary expenses incurred by him,
with right of retention over the two (2) parcels of land
adjudged as forest lands until reimbursed of the necessary
expenses. The decision of the then Court of First Instance of
Bohol (now Regional Trial Court of Bohol) in Civil Case No.
2613 is MODIFIED in that the portion of the decision which
ordered petitioner Republic to pay private respondent Hilario
P. Rama necessary expenses with right of retention in parcel
number one described in the complaint is DELETED. In all
other respects, the questioned decision and resolution are
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 92161 March 18, 1991
SIMPLICIO BINALAY, PONCIANO GANNABAN,
NICANOR MACUTAY, DOMINGO ROSALES, GREGORIO
ARGONZA, EUSTAQUIO BAUA, FLORENTINO
ROSALES, TEODORO MABBORANG, PATRICIO
MABBORANG and FULGENCIO MORA, petitioners
vs.
GUILLERMO MANALO and COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
Josefin De Alban Law Office for Petitioners.
FELICIANO, J.:p
The late Judge Taccad originally owned a parcel of land
situated in Tumauini, Isabela having an estimated area of
twenty (20) hectares. The western portion of this land
bordering on the Cagayan River has an elevation lower than
that of the eastern portion which borders on the national
road. Through the years, the western portion would
periodically go under the waters of the Cagayan River as
those waters swelled with the coming of the rains. The
submerged portion, however, would re-appear during the dry
season from January to August. It would remain under water
for the rest of the year, that is, from September to December
during the rainy season.
The ownership of the landholding eventually moved from
one person to another. On 9 May 1959, respondent
Guillermo Manalo acquired 8.65 hectares thereof from
Faustina Taccad, daughter of Judge Juan Taccad. The land
sold was described in the Deed of Absolute Sale 1 as
follows:
. . . a parcel of agricultural land in Balug,
Tumauini, Isabela, containing an area of
8.6500 hectares, more or less; bounded
on the North by Francisco Forto on the
East by National Road; on South by
Julian Tumolva and on the West by
Cagayan River; declared for taxation
under Tax Declaration No. 12681 in the
name of Faustina Taccad, and
assessed at P 750.00. . . .
Later in 1964, respondent Manalo purchased another 1.80
hectares from Gregorio Taguba who had earlier acquired the
same from Judge Juan Taccad. The second purchase
brought the total acquisition of respondent Manalo to 10.45
hectares. The second piece of property was more
particularly described as follows:
. . . a piece of agricultural land
consisting of tobacco land, and
containing an area of 18,000 square
meters, more or less, bounded on the
North by Balug Creek; on the South, by
Faustina Taccad (now Guillermo R.
Manalo); on the East, by a Provincial
Road; and on the West, by Cagayan
River assessed at P 440.00, as tax
Declaration No. 3152. . . . 2
During the cadastral survey conducted at Balug, Tumauini,
Isabela on 21 October 1969, the two (2) parcels of land
belonging to respondent Manalo were surveyed and
consolidated into one lot, designated as Lot No. 307, Pls-
964. Lot 307 which contains 4.6489 hectares includes: (a)
the whole of the 1.80 hectares acquired from Gregorio
Taguba; and (b) 2.8489 hectares out of the 8.65 hectares
purchased from Faustina Taccad. As the survey was
conducted on a rainy month, a portion of the land bought
from Faustina Taccad then under water was left unsurveyed
and was not included in Lot 307.
The Sketch Plan 3 submitted during the trial of this case and
which was identified by respondent Manalo shows that the
Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a certain
point to form two (2) branches—the western and the eastern
branches—and then unites at the other end, further north, to
form a narrow strip of land. The eastern branch of the river
cuts through the land of respondent Manalo and is inundated
with water only during the rainy season. The bed of the
eastern branch is the submerged or the unsurveyed portion
of the land belonging to respondent Manalo. For about eight
(8) months of the year when the level of water at the point
where the Cagayan River forks is at its ordinary depth, river
water does not flow into the eastern branch. While this
condition persists, the eastern bed is dry and is susceptible
to cultivation.
Considering that water flowed through the eastern branch of
the Cagayan River when the cadastral survey was
conducted, the elongated strip of land formed by the western
and the eastern branches of the Cagayan River looked very
much like an island. This strip of land was surveyed on 12
December 1969. 4 It was found to have a total area of
22.7209 hectares and was designated as Lot 821 and Lot
822. The area of Lot 822 is 10.8122 hectares while Lot 821
has an area of 11.9087 hectares. Lot 821 is located directly
opposite Lot 307 and is separated from the latter only by the
eastern branch of the Cagayan River during the rainy
season and, during the dry season, by the exposed, dry river
bed, being a portion of the land bought from Faustina
Taccad. Respondent Manalo claims that Lot 821 also
belongs to him by way of accretion to the submerged portion
of the property to which it is adjacent.
49
Petitioners who are in possession of Lot 821, upon the other
hand, insist that they own Lot 821. They occupy the outer
edges of Lot 821 along the river banks, i.e., the fertile
portions on which they plant tobacco and other agricultural
products. They also cultivate the western strip of the
unsurveyed portion during summer. 5 This situation
compelled respondent Manalo to file a case for forcible entry
against petitioners on 20 May 1969. The case was
dismissed by the Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela for
failure of both parties to appear. On 15 December 1972,
respondent Manalo again filed a case for forcible entry
against petitioners. The latter case was similarly dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction by the Municipal Court of Tumauini,
Isabela.
On 24 July 1974, respondent Manalo filed a complaints 6
before the then Court of First Instance of Isabela, Branch 3
for quieting of title, possession and damages against
petitioners. He alleged ownership of the two (2) parcels of
land he bought separately from Faustina Taccad and
Gregorio Taguba for which reason he prayed that judgment
be entered ordering petitioners to vacate the western strip of
the unsurveyed portion. Respondent Manalo likewise prayed
that judgment be entered declaring him as owner of Lot 821
on which he had laid his claim during the survey.
Petitioners filed their answer denying the material allegations
of the complaint. The case was then set for trial for failure of
the parties to reach an amicable agreement or to enter into a
stipulation of facts. 7 On 10 November 1982, the trial court
rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the
foregoing premises, the Court renders
judgment against the defendants and in
favor of the plaintiff and orders:
1. That plaintiff, Guillermo Manalo, is
declared the lawful owner of the land in
question, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of
Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more
particularly described in paragraph 2-b
of the Complaint;
2. That the defendants are hereby
ordered to vacate the premises of the
land in question, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of
Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more
particularly described in paragraph 2-b
of the Complaint;
3. That the defendants are being
restrained from entering the premises of
the land in question, Lot No. 821, Pls-
964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is
more particularly described in paragraph
2-b of the Complaint; and
4. That there is no pronouncement as to
attorney's fees and costs.
SO ORDERED. 8
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which,
however, affirmed the decision of the trial court. They filed a
motion for reconsideration, without success.
While petitioners insist that Lot 821 is part of an island
surrounded by the two (2) branches of the Cagayan River,
the Court of Appeals found otherwise. The Court of Appeals
concurred with the finding of the trial court that Lot 821
cannot be considered separate and distinct from Lot 307
since the eastern branch of the Cagayan River substantially
dries up for the most part of the year such that when this
happens, Lot 821 becomes physically (i.e., by land)
connected with the dried up bed owned by respondent
Manalo. Both courts below in effect rejected the assertion of
petitioners that the depression on the earth's surface which
separates Lot 307 and Lot 821 is, during part of the year, the
bed of the eastern branch of the Cagayan River.
It is a familiar rule that the findings of facts of the trial court
are entitled to great respect, and that they carry even more
weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 9 This is in
recognition of the peculiar advantage on the part of the trial
court of being able to observe first-hand the deportment of
the witnesses while testifying. Jurisprudence is likewise
settled that the Court of Appeals is the final arbiter of
questions of fact. 10 But whether a conclusion drawn from
such findings of facts is correct, is a question of law
cognizable by this Court. 11
In the instant case, the conclusion reached by both courts
below apparently collides with their findings that periodically
at the onset of and during the rainy season, river water flows
through the eastern bed of the Cagayan River. The trial court
held:
The Court believes that the land in
controversy is of the nature and
character of alluvion (Accretion), for it
appears that during the dry season, the
body of water separating the same land
in controversy (Lot No. 821, Pls-964)
and the two (2) parcels of land which the
plaintiff purchased from Gregorio
Taguba and Justina Taccad Cayaba
becomes a marshy land and is only six
(6) inches deep and twelve (12) meters
in width at its widest in the northern tip
(Exhs. "W", "W-l", "W-2", "W-3" and "W-
4"), It has been held by our Supreme
Court that "the owner of the riparian land
which receives the gradual deposits of
alluvion, does not have to make an
express act of possession. The law
does not require it, and the deposit
created by the current of the water
becomes manifest" (Roxas vs. Tuazon,
6 Phil. 408). 12
The Court of Appeals adhered substantially to the conclusion
reached by the trial court, thus:
As found by the trial court, the disputed
property is not an island in the strict
sense of the word since the eastern
portion of the said property claimed by
appellants to be part of the Cagayan
River dries up during summer.
Admittedly, it is the action of the heavy
rains which comes during rainy season
especially from September to November
which increases the water level of the
Cagayan river. As the river becomes
swollen due to heavy rains, the lower
portion of the said strip of land located
at its southernmost point would be
inundated with water. This is where the
water of the Cagayan river gains its
entry. Consequently, if the water level is
high the whole strip of land would be
under water.
In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Colegio de San
Jose, it was held that —
According to the
foregoing definition
of the words
"ordinary" and
"extra-ordinary," the
highest depth of the
waters of Laguna
de Bay during the
dry season is the
ordinary one, and
the highest depth
they attain during
the extra-ordinary
one (sic); inasmuch
as the former is the
one which is
50
 regular, common, The conclusion of this Court that the depressed portion is a
natural, which river bed rests upon evidence of record. Firstly, respondent
occurs always or Manalo admitted in open court that the entire area he bought
most of the time from Gregorio Taguba was included in Lot 307. 15 If the 1.80
during the year, hectares purchased from Gregorio Taguba was included in
while the latter is Lot 307, then the Cagayan River referred to as the western
uncommon, boundary in the Deed of Sale transferring the land from
transcends the Gregorio Taguba to respondent Manalo as well as the Deed
general rule, order of Sale signed by Faustina Taccad, must refer to the dried
and measure, and up bed (during the dry months) or the eastern branch of the
goes beyond that river (during the rainy months). In the Sketch Plan attached
which is the to the records of the case, Lot 307 is separated from the
ordinary depth. If western branch of the Cagayan River by a large tract of land
according to the which includes not only Lot 821 but also what this Court
definition given by characterizes as the eastern branch of the Cagayan River.
Article 74 of the
Law of Waters
Secondly, the pictures identified by respondent Manalo
quoted above, the
during his direct examination depict the depressed portion as
natural bed or basin
a river bed. The pictures, marked as Exhibits "W" to "W-4",
of the lakes is the
were taken in July 1973 or at a time when the eastern bed
ground covered by
becomes visible. 16 Thus, Exhibit "W-2" which according to
their waters when at
respondent Manalo was taken facing the east and Exhibit
their highest
"W-3" which was taken facing the west both show that the
ordinary depth, the
visible, dried up portion has a markedly lower elevation than
natural bed or basin
Lot 307 and Lot 821. It has dike-like slopes on both sides
of Laguna de Bay is
connecting it to Lot 307 and Lot 821 that are vertical upward
the ground covered
and very prominent. This topographic feature is compatible
by its waters when
with the fact that a huge volume of water passes through the
at their highest
eastern bed regularly during the rainy season. In addition,
depth during the dry
petitioner Ponciano Gannaban testified that one had to go
season, that is up to
down what he called a "cliff" from the surveyed portion of the
the northeastern
land of respondent Manalo to the depressed portion. The
boundary of the two
cliff, as related by petitioner Gannaban, has a height of eight
parcels of land in
(8) meters. 17
question.

The records do not show when the Cagayan River began to

We find the foregoing ruling to be
carve its eastern channel on the surface of the earth.
analogous to the case at bar. The
However, Exhibit "E" 18 for the prosecution which was the
highest ordinary level of the waters of
Declaration of Real Property standing in the name of
the Cagayan River is that attained
Faustina Taccad indicates that the eastern bed already
during the dry season which is confined
existed even before the sale to respondent Manalo. The
only on the west side of Lot [821] and
words "old bed" enclosed in parentheses—perhaps written
Lot [822]. This is the natural Cagayan
to make legitimate the claim of private ownership over the
river itself. The small residual of water
submerged portion—is an implied admission of the existence
between Lot [821] and 307 is part of the
of the river bed. In the Declaration of Real Property made by
small stream already in existence when
respondent Manalo, the depressed portion assumed the
the whole of the late Judge Juan
name Rio Muerte de Cagayan. Indeed, the steep dike-like
Taccad's property was still susceptible
slopes on either side of the eastern bed could have been
to cultivation and uneroded. 13
formed only after a prolonged period of time.

The Court is unable to agree with the Court of Appeals that

Now, then, pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code,
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Colegio de San
respondent Manalo did not acquire private ownership of the
Jose 14 is applicable to the present case. That case involved
bed of the eastern branch of the river even if it was included
Laguna de Bay; since Laguna de Bay is a lake, the Court
in the deeds of absolute sale executed by Gregorio Taguba
applied the legal provisions governing the ownership and
and Faustina Taccad in his favor. These vendors could not
use of lakes and their beds and shores, in order to determine
have validly sold land that constituted property of public
the character and ownership of the disputed property.
dominion. Article 420 of the Civil Code states:
Specifically, the Court applied the definition of the natural
bed or basin of lakes found in Article 74 of the Law of Waters
of 3 August 1866. Upon the other hand, what is involved in The following things are property of
the instant case is the eastern bed of the Cagayan River. public dominion:

We believe and so hold that Article 70 of the Law of Waters
of 3 August 1866 is the law applicable to the case at bar:
Art. 70. The natural bed or channel of a
creek or river is the ground covered by
its waters during the highest floods.
(Emphasis supplied)
We note that Article 70 defines the natural bed or
channel of a creek or river as the ground covered
by its waters during the highest floods. The
highest floods in the eastern branch of the
Cagayan River occur with the annual coming of
the rains as the river waters in their onward course
cover the entire depressed portion. Though the
eastern bed substantially dries up for the most part
of the year (i.e., from January to August), we
cannot ignore the periodical swelling of the waters
( i.e., from September to December) causing the
eastern bed to be covered with flowing river
waters.
(1) Those intended for public use, such
as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State,
banks, shores, roadsteads, and others
of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State,
without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth.
(Emphasis supplied)
Although Article 420 speaks only of rivers and banks, "rivers"
is a composite term which includes: (1) the running waters,
(2) the bed, and (3) the banks. 19 Manresa, in commenting
upon Article 339 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 from
which Article 420 of the Philippine Civil Code was taken,
stressed the public ownership of river beds:

51
 La naturaleza especial de los rios, en
punto a su disfrute general, hace que
sea necesario considerar en su relacion
de dominio algo mas que sus aguas
corrientes. En efecto en todo rio es
preciso distinguir 1. esta agua corriente;
2. el alveo o cauce, y 3. las riberas.
Ahora bien: son estas dos ultimas cosas
siempre de dominio publico, como las
aguas?
Realmente no puede imaginarse un rio
sin alveo y sin ribera; de suerte que al
decir el Codigo civil que los rios son de
dominio publico, parece que debe ir
implicito el dominio publico de aquellos
tres elementos que integran el rio. Por
otra parte, en cuanto a los alveos o
cauces tenemos la declaracion del art.
407, num 1, donde dice: son de
dominion publico . . . los rios y sus
cauces naturales; declaracion que
concuerda con lo que dispone el art. 34
de la ley de [Aguas], segun el cual, son
de dominion publico: 1. los alveos o
cauces de los arroyos que no se hallen
comprendidos en el art. 33, y 2. los
alveos o cauces naturales de los rios en
la extension que cubran sus aguas en
las mayores crecidas ordinarias. 20
(Emphasis supplied)
The claim of ownership of respondent Manalo over the
submerged portion is bereft of basis even if it were alleged
and proved that the Cagayan River first began to encroach
on his property after the purchase from Gregorio Taguba
and Faustina Taccad. Article 462 of the Civil Code would
then apply divesting, by operation of law, respondent Manalo
of private ownership over the new river bed. The intrusion of
the eastern branch of the Cagayan River into his landholding
obviously prejudiced respondent Manalo but this is a
common occurrence since estates bordering on rivers are
exposed to floods and other evils produced by the
destructive force of the waters. That loss is compensated by,
inter alia, the right of accretion acknowledged by Article 457
of the Civil Code. 21 It so happened that instead of increasing
the size of Lot 307, the eastern branch of the Cagayan River
had carved a channel on it.
We turn next to the issue of accretion. After examining the
records of the case, the Court considers that there was no
evidence to prove that Lot 821 is an increment to Lot 307
and the bed of the eastern branch of the river. Accretion as a
mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil
Code requires the concurrence of three (3) requisites: (a)
that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; (b) that it be the result of the action of the
waters of the river (or sea); and (c) that the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or
the sea coast). 22 The Court notes that the parcels of land
bought by respondent Manalo border on the eastern branch
of the Cagayan River. Any accretion formed by this eastern
branch which respondent Manalo may claim must be
deposited on or attached to Lot 307. As it is, the claimed
accretion (Lot 821) lies on the bank of the river not adjacent
to Lot 307 but directly opposite Lot 307 across the river.
Assuming (arguendo only) that the Cagayan River referred
to in the Deeds of Sale transferring ownership of the land to
respondent Manalo is the western branch, the decision of
the Court of Appeals and of the trial court are bare of factual
findings to the effect that the land purchased by respondent
Manalo received alluvium from the action of the aver in a
slow and gradual manner. On the contrary, the decision of
the lower court made mention of several floods that caused
the land to reappear making it susceptible to cultivation. A
sudden and forceful action like that of flooding is hardly the
alluvial process contemplated under Article 457 of the Civil
Code. It is the slow and hardly perceptible accumulation of
soil deposits that the law grants to the riparian owner.
Besides, it is important to note that Lot 821 has an area of
11.91 hectares. Lot 821 is the northern portion of the strip of
land having a total area of 22.72 hectares. We find it difficult
to suppose that such a sizable area as Lot 821 resulted from
slow accretion to another lot of almost equal size. The total
landholding purchased by respondent Manalo is 10.45
hectares (8.65 hectares from Faustina Taccad and 1.80
hectares from Gregorio Taguba in 1959 and 1964,
respectively), in fact even smaller than Lot 821 which he
claims by way of accretion. The cadastral survey showing
that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 hectares was conducted in
1969. If respondent Manalo's contention were accepted, it
would mean that in a span of only ten (10) years, he had
more than doubled his landholding by what the Court of
Appeals and the trial court considered as accretion. As
already noted, there are steep vertical dike-like slopes
separating the depressed portion or river bed and Lot 821
and Lot 307. This topography of the land, among other
things, precludes a reasonable conclusion that Lot 821 is an
increment to the depressed portion by reason of the slow
and constant action of the waters of either the western or the
eastern branches of the Cagayan River.
We turn finally to the issue of ownership of Lot 821.
Respondent Manalo's claim over Lot 821 rests on accretion
coupled with alleged prior possession. He alleged that the
parcels of land he bought separately from Gregorio Taguba
and Faustina Taccad were formerly owned by Judge Juan
Taccad who was in possession thereof through his (Judge
Taccad's) tenants. When ownership was transferred to him,
respondent Manalo took over the cultivation of the property
and had it declared for taxation purposes in his name. When
petitioners forcibly entered into his property, he twice
instituted the appropriate action before the Municipal Trial
Court of Tumauini, Isabela. Against respondent Manalo's
allegation of prior possession, petitioners presented tax
declarations standing in their respective names. They
claimed lawful, peaceful and adverse possession of Lot 821
since 1955.
If respondent Manalo had proved prior possession, it was
limited physically to Lot 307 and the depressed portion or the
eastern river bed. The testimony of Dominga Malana who
was a tenant for Justina Taccad did not indicate that she
was also cultivating Lot 821. In fact, the complaints for
forcible entry lodged before the Municipal Trial Court of
Tumauini, Isabela pertained only to Lot 307 and the
depressed portion or river bed and not to Lot 821. In the
same manner, the tax declarations presented by petitioners
conflict with those of respondent Manalo. Under Article 477
of the Civil Code, the plaintiff in an action for quieting of title
must at least have equitable title to or interest in the real
property which is the subject matter of the action. The
evidence of record on this point is less than satisfactory and
the Court feels compelled to refrain from determining the
ownership and possession of Lot 821, adjudging neither
petitioners nor respondent Manalo as owner(s) thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 04892 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Respondent Manalo is hereby declared the owner of Lot
307. The regularly submerged portion or the eastern bed of
the Cagayan River is hereby DECLARED to be property of
public dominion. The ownership of Lot 821 shall be
determined in an appropriate action that may be instituted by
the interested parties inter se. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 134209 January 24, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CELESTINA NAGUIAT, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court is this petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision1
dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
52
CV No. 37001 which affirmed an earlier decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69 in Land
Registration Case No. N-25-1.
The decision under review recites the factual backdrop, as
follows:
This is an application for registration of title to four (4)
parcels of land located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, more
particularly described in the amended application filed by
Celestina Naguiat on 29 December 1989 with the Regional
Trial Court of Zambales, Branch 69. Applicant [herein
respondent] alleges, inter alia, that she is the owner of the
said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from
the LID Corporation which likewise acquired the same from
Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto Monje and
their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession
thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of
her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance
of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest,
legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.
On 29 June 1990, the Republic of the Philippines [herein
petitioner]. . . filed an opposition to the application on the
ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the lands in
question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto; that the
muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do
not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona-
fide acquisition of the lands applied for or of his open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation thereof in the concept of (an) owner; that the
applicant’s claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of
Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of . . .; and
that the parcels of land applied for are part of the public
domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not
subject to private appropriation.
On 15 October 1990, the lower court issued an order of
general default as against the whole world, with the
exception of the Office of the Solicitor General, and
proceeded with the hearing of this registration case.
After she had presented and formally offered her evidence . .
. applicant rested her case. The Solicitor General, thru the
Provincial Prosecutor, interposed no objection to the
admission of the exhibits. Later . . . the Provincial Prosecutor
manifest (sic) that the Government had no evidence to
adduce. 3
In a decision4 dated September 30, 1991, the trial court
rendered judgment for herein respondent Celestina Naguiat,
adjudicating unto her the parcels of land in question and
decreeing the registration thereof in her name, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby
adjudicates the parcels of land situated in Panan, Botolan,
Zambales, appearing on Plan AP-03-003447 containing an
area of 3,131 square meters, appearing on Plan AP-03-
003446 containing an area of 15,322 containing an area of
15,387 square meters to herein applicant Celestina T.
Naguiat, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Rommel
Naguiat and a resident of Angeles City, Pampanga together
with all the improvements existing thereon and orders and
decrees registration in her name in accordance with Act No.
496, Commonwealth Act No. 14, [should be 141] as
amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1529. This
adjudication, however, is subject to the various
easements/reservations provided for under pertinent laws,
presidential decrees and/or presidential letters of instructions
which should be annotated/ projected on the title to be
issued. And once this decision becomes final, let the
corresponding decree of registration be immediately issued.
(Words in bracket added)
With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by
the trial court, petitioner Republic went on appeal to the CA
in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001.
As stated at the outset hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed
decision of May 29, 1998, affirmed that of the trial court, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the Republic’s present recourse on its basic
submission that the CA’s decision "is not in accordance with
law, jurisprudence and the evidence, since respondent has
not established with the required evidence her title in fee
simple or imperfect title in respect of the subject lots which
would warrant their registration under … (P.D. 1529 or
Public Land Act (C.A.) 141." In particular, petitioner Republic
faults the appellate court on its finding respecting the length
of respondent’s occupation of the property subject of her
application for registration and for not considering the fact
that she has not established that the lands in question have
been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and
disposable property.
Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified
and released by positive act of the Government so that they
may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, are not capable of private appropriation.5 As
to these assets, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do
not apply.6 Given this postulate, the principal issue to be
addressed turns on the question of whether or not the areas
in question have ceased to have the status of forest or other
inalienable lands of the public domain.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act7 and the
Constitution8 classifying lands of the public domain into
"agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national
parks," do not necessarily refer to a large tract of wooded
land or an expanse covered by dense growth of trees and
underbrush. As we stated in Heirs of Amunategui 9-
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain
does not lose such classification simply because loggers or
settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass
or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers.
"Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of
the way places. xxx. The classification is merely descriptive
of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. xxx
Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,10 which
embodies the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State – the source of any asserted
right to ownership of land.11 All lands not appearing to be
clearly of private dominion presumptively belong to the
State.12 Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been
reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or
alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the
inalienable public domain.13 Under Section 6 of the Public
Land Act, the prerogative of classifying or reclassifying lands
of the public domain, i.e., from forest or mineral to
agricultural and vice versa, belongs to the Executive Branch
of the government and not the court.14 Needless to stress,
the onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the
presumption that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable or disposable rests with the
applicant.15
In the present case, the CA assumed that the lands in
question are already alienable and disposable. Wrote the
appellate court:
The theory of [petitioner] that the properties in question are
lands of the public domain cannot be sustained as it is
directly against the above doctrine. Said doctrine is a
reaffirmation of the principle established in the earlier cases .
. . that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of
alienable public land for period prescribed by law creates the
legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the
requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of judicial or
other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes
53
private property …. (Word in bracket and underscoring
added.)

The principal reason for the appellate court’s disposition,

finding a registerable title for respondent, is her and her
predecessor-in-interest’s open, continuous and exclusive
occupation of the subject property for more than 30 years.
Prescinding from its above assumption and finding, the
appellate court went on to conclude, citing Director of Lands
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)16 and Herico vs.
DAR,17 among other cases, that, upon the completion of the
requisite period of possession, the lands in question cease
to be public land and become private property.

Director of Lands, Herico and the other cases cited by the

CA are not, however, winning cards for the respondent, for
the simple reason that, in said cases, the disposable and
alienable nature of the land sought to be registered was
established, or, at least, not put in issue. And there lies the
difference.

Here, respondent never presented the required certification

from the proper government agency or official proclamation
reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and
disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification
cannot be assumed. It calls for proof.18 Aside from tax
receipts, respondent submitted in evidence the survey map
and technical descriptions of the lands, which, needless to
state, provided no information respecting the classification of
the property. As the Court has held, however, these
documents are not sufficient to overcome the presumption
that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain.19

It cannot be overemphasized that unwarranted appropriation

of public lands has been a notorious practice resorted to in
land registration cases.20 For this reason, the Court has
made it a point to stress, when appropriate, that
declassification of forest and mineral lands, as the case may
be, and their conversion into alienable and disposable lands
need an express and positive act from the government.21

The foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not

respondent and her predecessor-in-interest have been in
open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of
land in question is now of little moment. For, unclassified
land, as here, cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or
possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner,
however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be
registered as title.22

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the

assailed decision dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, respondent’s application for original
registration of title in Land Registration Case No. N-25-1 of
the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, is
DENIED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

54