Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy JAMES M. EDIE CONSULTING EDITORS Emmanuel Levinas Alphonso Lingis (CONSULTANTS NSLATIONS, Martin Heidegger HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT Translated by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly Indiana University Press BLOOMINGTON & INDIANAPOLISPreparation ofthis book was aided by a grant from the Program for Translations of the ‘National Endowment for the Humanities, an independent federal agen Published in German as Hegels Phinomenolgie des Gites {© 1980 by Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, by Indiana University Press rights reserved the oaly exception to this prohibition Manufactte inthe United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976. Hegels Phenomenology of spn. in phenomenology and extent philosophy) eof Heges Phinomenclogie de Geist, 1 Hoge, Georg Withelm Freeh, 1770-1831 Phinomenslogie des Gestes. 2. Spit. 3. Consciousness 19387-45440 Pen 3 4 852 91 99 89 BB Contents Introduction The Task of the Phenomenology of Spirit as the First Part of the System of Science §. 1. The system of the phenomenology and of the encyclopedia § 2. Hegel's conception of «system of science 2) Philosophy as “the science” 'b) Absolute and relative knowledge. Philosophy as the system of § 3. The significance of the first part ofthe system with regard to the designation of both ofits titles 4) "Science of the Experience of Consciousness” 'b) “Science of the Phenomenology of Spirit” § 4. The inner mission ofthe phenomenology of sprit es the fist part of the system a) Absolute knowledge coming to Preliminary Consideration presupposition of the Phenomenology: Its absolute beginning t= presupposition. The question and the problematic of infinitude in Hegel 1 2 9 9vi Contents FIRST PART Consciouness Chapter One Sense Certainty 5 6, Sense certainty andthe inmediaey te knowledge athe fret necesary cj for who know absolutely vn i) Thedeianenld templation of asa sage o) The inmetiny "Phe being and not essential in sense certainty itself, significance as now and here, and the universal as the essence of the this 4) Language as the expression of what is universal and the singular item which is intended—the ontological difference and dialectic § 7. Mediatedness asthe estence of what is immediate and the dialectical 2) Intention as the estence of sense certainty, The singularity and universality of intending “es 'b) The immediacy of sense certainty as non-differentiation of I and ckject. The demonstrated singular now ints movement toward ral ©) The infinity of absolute knowledge as the being-ublted ofthe fini dialectic. T on tude or fnitude Chapter Two Perception § 8 Consciousness of perception and its object 4) Perception as mediation and transition from sense certainty to understanding b) ‘hat is essential in perception. Thingness asthe unity 10" of properties CS) n 5 81 81 al Contents ©) The exclusive unity of the thing as condition for having properties, ‘The perceptual object's having of properties and the possibility of| deception § 9. The mediating and contradictory character of perception a) The possibility of deception as the ground of the contradiction in perception as taking and reflection bb) The reciprocal distribution of the contradictory one and “also” of the thing to perceiving as taking and reflection ©) The contradiction of the thing in itself —being for itself and being for an other—and the failure of the reflection of perception Chapter Three Force and Understanding $10. The absolute character of cognition a) Absolute cognition as ontotheology 'b) The unity of the contradiction of the thing in its essence as force 6) Finite and absolute cognition—"Appearance and the Supersensi- ble World” $11. The transition from consciousness to sel-consciousness 4) Force and the play of forces. Being-foriself in being-forsanother 'b) The appearance of the play of forces and the unity ofthe law ) The infinity ofthe I. Spirit as A6yOs, I, God, and Sv SECOND PART Self-consciouness $12. Selfconsciousness as the truth ofc oe a) “The Truth of Sel §13. The being of self-consciousness 4) The attainment of the self-being of the self in its independence ) The new concept of being as inhering-in-itself,lfe. Being and time in Hegel—Being and Time GLOSSARY OF GERMAN TERMS 154 7 97 7 101 105 nz m2 16 124 129 129 1B 136 136 MiTRANSLATORS’ FOREWORD. ‘The work presented here is an English translation of Martin Heidegger, Hegels Phiinomenologie des plete Edition)—which cons the University of Freiburg German edited by I Vittorio Klosterman Verlag, ‘The text of this lecture course occupies an important place among Heidegger's writings on Hegel. ‘There are several crucial discussions of The Character of the Text: A Reading. What dist text, setting it apart from a commentary in the u this lecture course Heidegger offers a simple reading of Sections A and B of the Phenomenology of Spirit. If one looks at Heidegger’s reading of Hegel ithout taking into account what actually transpires in it, ized as an interpr careful and meticulous, “the phenomenology of reveals the phenomenology of athinking which gathers itself up ina always self-assured mat “the phenomenology of the Phenomenology of Spirit finds here a reading in which the phenomenology of spirit becomes alive again. That Hei he pi spirit can come to live again independet of Spirit needs to be initiated each terms with the Phenomenology’ is or that one has said about this essential character of this work as a work The simplicity of the reading which is important to bear in mind that this EgyOV (in which the attentive reader participa supplement. A philosophical exists as the Egyov which ‘The priority which Heidegger helps us to understand why the fa ogy of Spirit as a product of Hi luct thus blocking the Egyov (to what is going on), which is summed up in the wordx Translators’ Foreword (the Phenomenology ofS is going on in the te can participate in. The dismisses as periphe iginality of the work as a work of guided by the EoyoV (which is place the work alongside other biographi ness of thinking and questioning. ‘Thus, Heidegger points beyond the of life and work to the work's independent stature as a work of Certainly naive to want to expl 3y going back to the events of He: the Phenomenology of ena before 1807. For Translators! Foreword x understanding what goes on in work, curiosity about Hegel’ life in that the Phenomenology of Spirit as a work that ‘Asa work of thinking, the Phenomenology of phenomenology of 5 midst of the event work of the phenomenology of it not the overriding concern with the phenomenology of ‘mark? The response to this question should come from hich, as the phenomenology of interpretation of the biography?” This quest should be viewed not as a by-product of which colors and tunes the contingencies ané life ‘The independent and integral characte 3f Heidegger's Gesamt tive introduction and a commentary. This is a significant point and has needs to be direct bearing on the character of the present text. Thus, ‘addressed briefly here. with the sug, 5 made in the introduction, then we run the risk of learning later that those suggestions are peripheral, external to the work,vi Translators’ Foreword of those views or suggesto then why not begin with the work the Gesamtausgabe of Heidegger’ introduction or brief commentary. in the freedom in which the work comes forth as a freedom is not preserved when the work is considered tion, suggests a certain way of reading this work, which is certainly not the only sway to read it. Whatever the merits of Derrida’s commentary—and these Phanomenologie des Geistes safeguards the independence of the work of thinking as it occurs in the space of freedom that is necessary for the flourishing of the work itse ‘Translators’ Foreword ssi losophers language manifests new territories of thinking. If we grasp the to think, then we realize that they urgency of what these philosophers w: 1. As already mentioned, the phrase “die Phinomenologie des Geistes” appears in the German edition without ital. Sometimes it refers to Hegel's text and is a title; and som procedure and, moreover, t inction that the German edition—and perhaps even Heidegger him- -did not or did not need to make. (Does the work of thinking