Sachin Nandha V7DMET

Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham

Locke’s Theory of Primary & Secondary Qualities

Locke’s Theory of Primary & Secondary Qualities

In this paper I aim to investigate Locke’s theory of Primary and Secondary qualities.
I will take the following line of investigation in this paper; firstly, I will explain and
attempt to firmly understand exactly what Locke meant by Primary and Secondary
qualities. Secondly, I will discuss some of the core arguments Locke puts forward in
defence of his theory. From which I will launch into a potential critique of his theory,
mainly based on the works of Berkeley and will show why his critique of Locke’s
theory, however valid at points, simply is not sufficient to discard the distinction
altogether. I will end the paper by acknowledging that I have assumed the backdrop
to this whole theory to be true – Locke’s representative theories of perception and so
any investigation into it has been avoided as it is beyond the scope of this
investigation.

Before delving into any arguments for or against Locke’s theory, it is important that I
attempt to clarify exactly what Locke was referring to and what he meant by the terms
Primary and Secondary qualities. In simplistic terms Primary qualities are all those
that are measurable by the mind. For example, shapes, sizes, numbers, motion of
objects, positions etc. are all what Locke calls Primary qualities. Secondary qualities,
according to Locke, are all those things, which are not instantaneously or objectively
measurable by the mind, qualities such as colour, sounds and taste.

To take an example, imagine that I am in a room and I see ten chairs. Each chair is in
a certain specific ‘measurable’ position, it has a certain size and shape and are
stationary. They also exhibit a certain colour, each looks slightly different according
to the light reflected on them, their position in relation to my standing will dictate
what parts of the chairs I can see and what I cannot see and their temperatures will
vary (no matter how little) depending on the level of sunlight they are exposed to.
Here I have described Primary and Secondary qualities. Locke believed that material
things interact with our sense organs and, through them, with our minds in ways that
give rise to those states in us, which we call the having of sensations and perceptions.

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Sachin Nandha V7DMET

Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham

Locke’s Theory of Primary & Secondary Qualities
Locke says that these perceptions and sensations are in our mind caused by the
material objects and their powers. For example, if I see a yellow cube, I see a cube,
which has a shape; definite position in space and it is stationary – hence these are all
primary qualities. I also have the sensation of experiencing yellow – hence this is a
secondary quality. I have a combined idea of a cube and of the colour yellow together
to form an overall idea of a yellow cube. What gave rise to my experiencing yellow?
And what exactly does Locke mean then by ‘powers’ objects posses? The cube
possesses the ‘power’ to produce the sensation of yellow; whenever light reflects of
its surface but it cannot be said that yellow is ‘in’ the cube. The ‘power’ of the cube
to produce yellow is grounded in its atomic structure and the relationship it has with
light as it reflects of its surface. If one were to express this in simplistic terms, it
would be said that Primary qualities are all ‘modifications of matter within the bodies’
and secondary qualities are nothing ‘in’ the object themselves but that every object
has a certain ‘power’ to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities.

Locke’s concept of Primary and Secondary qualities is deeply embedded in his model
of ‘ideas’. Exactly what did Locke mean by the term? Before introducing the
concept of qualities, he first distinguishes between ideas – ‘the word here must be
used in a broad sense – as they are ideas or perceptions in our minds and as they are
modifications of matter in the bodies that cause such perceptions in us, and proposes
to call only the former ideas’. [J.L. Mackie, 1974, Analysis] According to Mackie,
Locke uses a narrow definition of the term ideas; ideas are simply perceptions in the
mind. Lowe [1995] in his commentary of Locke on Human Understanding draws the
following basic schema, which adequately sums up the essay so far:
1. Subject S perceives object O if and only if S has an idea I of O, where S is a
person, O is the external object such as a tree or a house.

Now that we are clear on Locke’s concept of Ideas and his Primary and Secondary
qualities, it is worth considering if he is indeed justified in his beliefs. Locke, when
introducing the distinction picks out what he eventually labels ‘primary qualities’ and
describes them:
‘…as are utterly inseparable from the body, in what estate so ever it be; such
as, in all the alterations…it suffers…it constantly keeps; and such as sense

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Sachin Nandha V7DMET

Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham

Locke’s Theory of Primary & Secondary Qualities
constantly finds in every particle of matter which has bulk enough to be
perceived, and the mind finds inseparable from every particle of matter,
though less than to make itself singly be perceived by our senses.’ [Locke on
Human Understanding, J. W. Yolton, 1965]
Locke’s first point seems to be that when a body is changed or divided, its parts, if
they are big enough to be seen, can still be said to have shape, size and other primary
qualities. Even if the parts become too small for us to perceive, we must still think of
them as having shape, size and so on. It seems that Locke draws on an unfair
comparison between determinate primary qualities and determinate secondary
qualities. The determinate shape, size and so on of a material thing are as alterable as
its determinate colour, in that no matter how one breaks up a material object and no
matter how small it can break down to, it is still thought that it holds some shape, size
and so on. However, it seems equally true that so long as the parts are big enough to
be seen, it or they will still exhibit some colour. Just as a material object will always
be either in motion or rest, so it will also have some temperature, as it will have
colour and so on. It seems strange however that when a thing is broken down to its
sub-atomic levels it can be easily thought to have some size, shape and so on, but not
any colour or temperature. It seems difficult to imagine what a colour of an atom
would be like and yet I can easily imagine its shape and size. Therefore it seems that
if one carries on the distinction to the point where separate particles are no longer
perceivable by the senses, it seems circular to appeal to the fact that the mind will still
give each particle some shape and size, but not, any colour or temperature. If the
mind discriminates in this fashion, then it has already accepted the distinctions
between primary and secondary qualities and hence, this cannot be the evidence upon
which the theory is based. Due to this circular effect, Locke’s first argument for the
distinction is insufficient and so must be discarded.

The second argument that Locke puts forward, one that seems more plausible, is one
where he refers to the causal processes involved in perception. Even though Locke
“waffles” through his discourse, he brings out some strong arguments for the
distinction. Locke according to Mackie [1976] says:
‘…that the sensation effect need not resemble its cause, as we know it does
not when pain is produced by the motion of a piece of steel as it divides our

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Sachin Nandha V7DMET

Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham

Locke’s Theory of Primary & Secondary Qualities
flesh. Similarly, we need light to see the colours; things have no colour in the
dark. But no one, Locke thinks, will suppose that the light produces colours as
qualities of what we call coloured objects’.
Locke seems correct and on secure grounds on this point, indeed it seems far more
plausible that the different surface textures merely reflect different rays of light.

The third argument from Locke draws an analogy between secondary qualities, pain
and nausea. It seems obviously clear that there is nothing like pain or nausea in the
objects that cause them in us. Locke continues down this line to say why should we
suppose that there must be something like colours as we see them, sounds as we hear
them and so on in the objects that produce these sensations in us? There is definitely
some scope here for Locke’s distinction for secondary qualities, in that in virtue of
some basis in an object it has the power to produce in us a sensation whose content is
quite different from that basis. In other words we often have sensations whose
content is very different from that which caused it. This line of reasoning however,
does not give sufficient grounds for supposing that colours, sounds and so on conform
to this pattern whereas, shapes and sizes do not. Indeed it shows that there is room for
something like what Locke calls secondary qualities but fails to show or ground the
line at which Locke distinguishes primary from secondary qualities.

According to Lowe (1995), ‘Locke shows how his theory enables such illusions as our
feeling the same water as hot with one hand but cold with the other’. His theory goes
something like this: if our feelings of warmth and cold arise out of changes in the
motion of tiny nerve cells travelling through our hand, it is easy to see how the
lukewarm water could produce these feelings by speeding up the relevant motions in
the one hand and slowing down those in the other. I feel that this aspect of Locke’s
theory seems feasible, if a little inaccurate but major problems arise out of Locke’s
need to give contrasting examples. He continues to write the remark that ‘figure’ –
that is, shape – ‘never produces the idea of a square in the one hand and of a globe in
the other’. [Yolton, 1965] This remark has led many philosophers to think that
Locke is attempting to say that secondary qualities are prone to illusion but primary
qualities are not. Many philosophers including Berkeley (which I will discuss further-
in the essay) have criticised this notion by giving simple examples of illusion

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Sachin Nandha V7DMET

Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham

Locke’s Theory of Primary & Secondary Qualities
regarding primary qualities such as shape, size and so on and have gone onto say that
there can be no distinction of the type that Locke seems to think.

The arguments that I have discussed so far as Locke’s own, add up to something of a
case for the primary and secondary distinction, but not a very strong one. Locke’s
securest support comes in the form of scientific explanation, which largely came after
Locke’s life, and as a result his theory seems to have had much success. Even though
the scientific community has largely supported Locke’s view many philosophers have
discarded it believing there to be stronger evidence on the other side of the argument
– there is no such distinction as primary and secondary qualities. What are these
objections against Locke’s theory and are they as conclusive as they have been made
out?
There are several arguments directed against Locke’s theory of Primary and
Secondary qualities especially from Berkeley. I have already mentioned Locke’s
example (‘figure’ – that is, shape – ‘never produces the idea of a square in the one
hand and of a globe in the other’) which has led many philosophers especially
Berkeley to think that Locke thought that one could be prone only to illusions of
secondary qualities and not Primary ones. After reading Locke’s essay, it seems that
Berkeley has taken this example out of context and has distorted what Locke was
trying to show. Even if Berkeley had correctly interpreted Locke, his criticism is still
un-important, as Locke’s theory is not dependent on this matter anyhow.

There is a stronger argument against Locke – or so it is often said. It seems that all
qualities (primary and secondary) co-exist or appear as if they are in the same place at
all times. Referring back to the example of the yellow cube, I do not in fact see a
cube and then a sensation of yellow separately; the colour is intrinsically experienced
along with the shape and size. In other words I see and experience the colour and
shape at the same time. Thinking along the same lines it becomes obvious that there is
not a single instance where I experience only a primary quality and not a secondary
one with it, or vice versa. So if this is the actual case then how can Locke remain
justified in his distinction? In short, this type of objection against Locke’s theory
begs the question. It is absolutely true that experience of primary and secondary
qualities occurs simultaneously and so shows that there can be no distinction. But

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Sachin Nandha V7DMET

Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham

Locke’s Theory of Primary & Secondary Qualities
Locke’s aim was to show that the senses cannot be relied upon and so the distinction
was an attempt by Locke to clarify what our senses experience in normal states.
Therefore, to pose an argument which relies on the senses is simply begging the
question if used to discredit Locke as his actual aim was to show the inadequacy of
the senses.

A far more compelling argument against Locke and one that would force Locke to
revise certain aspects of his theory if he were alive seem to gravitate around his notion
that solidity is a primary quality. Is solidity a primary quality, as Locke has said in
his essay? Almost all of the Primary qualities that Locke lists are, in a broad sense,
geometrical ones. Shape, size, texture, motion or rest and number are all only aspects
of, what Yolton [1965] calls ‘spatio-temporal patterning or distribution or
arrangement of stuff’. Each of these are essentially incomplete, there must be
something that occupies some space and not other space. It would be useless to draw
the boundary of a certain shape if there was no difference between what was on the
one side of the boundary and what was on the other. At this point ‘solidity’ enters the
argument. Surely it is solidity that defines any shape. Locke says ‘this is the idea (by
idea he means quality) that belongs to a body, whereby we conceive it to fill space.’
[Locke, ed. Yolton, 1965] Hume in his Treatise, suggests ‘if solidity is just
impenetrability hence the power to exclude other things of the same sort, it cannot do
this job.’ Here, Hume by using ‘it’ refers to Locke’s notion that solidity is a Primary
quality. Locke’s view is that solidity is not only impenetrability or in other words a
power but also the ground of this power, or in other words a primary quality. In
simple terms, Hume is arguing that solidity is neither a primary nor a secondary
quality. The problem that Locke faces is that the quality itself resembles the idea we
have of it. If solidity is the space filling feature, which makes the difference between
body and empty space and enables each body to keep other bodies out, then we do not
have an adequate idea of it, but only the indirect inference of the grounding of a
power which is itself learned from its manifestations. To go back to the example of
the yellow cube may help clarify matters. The cube has a definite shape. Its surface
is composed in such a way that reflected light is perceived by the observer as yellow.
So it can be said that the cube has a certain surface (source of power), which allows
the observer to experience yellow (which is the power). When combined we see the

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Sachin Nandha V7DMET

Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham

Locke’s Theory of Primary & Secondary Qualities
full manifestation of a yellow cube. Can the same be said about solidity? What this
argument leads to is the notion that Locke’s solidity should not have been on either
list, as it is an inferred physical property. Voltage, electrical charge and mass are
other inferred physical properties and are not directly perceived by the senses. As no
inferred physical property can be directly perceived by our senses, so none can be
called primary quality in the sense of an intrinsic feature of material things, which is
also a ‘resemblance’ of some ordinary pre-scientific idea.

As already noted, this does indeed point to a revision needed in Locke’s account of
primary qualities. But this objection still does not show any need to discard the
distinction altogether. It is equally compelling to argue the notion that we need, for a
coherent account of what we perceive some known properties to make the difference
between body and empty space. What is it then that allows us to differentiate between
what’s called ‘space-filling’ properties and empty space? It seems that it cannot be
Locke’s primary qualities. It certainly cannot be physical properties such as solidity
and mass, as we cannot instantly perceive them, then this by default leaves us with
Locke’s secondary qualities. This certainly does look promising. All space-filling
objects have a colour, which is a secondary quality, but is it only colour that allows us
to identify another body? To take an example from Mackie:
‘…if I feel over the surface of a rigid body, say the top, edge and underside of
a table top, not directly with my fingers but with some instrument, such as a
pencil…can I not detect a shape without being aware of any quality that fills
that shape other than the power of impenetrability?’ [Locke, 1976]
Even though impenetrability was only just discarded as a primary quality and pushed
into the realm of physical theory, it does seem like an adequate quality when it comes
to experience. Under Mackie’s example, it does seem clear that it was this power of
impenetrability that distinguished the body from empty space. So it seems that we
have come a full circle and it does seem that solidity the power of which is
impenetrability is indeed some type of Primary quality, hence Locke is justified. Of
course the case still remains that we cannot perceive primary without secondary in
any situation but then this would be begging the question, yet again. Locke whole
theory has been developed to argue the case that we cannot rely upon our senses and
so they must be revised in our minds.

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Sachin Nandha V7DMET

Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham

Locke’s Theory of Primary & Secondary Qualities

This essay has briefly explored Locke’s theory of Primary and Secondary qualities,
through firstly, understanding exactly what it was that Locke meant by Primary and
Secondary qualities. Secondly, have discussed the arguments Locke used to justify
the distinction and pointing out that some were stronger than others and finally to
have explored the criticism facing Locke’s theory. Through this investigation it
seems that Locke did indeed have adequate justification in forwarding his theory on
the basis of a major assumption. This assumption that I have taken consciously
presupposes Locke’s idea of ‘representative theories of perception’, which
distinguishes between the ideas in our minds and any externally real things. While
supposing that our ideas are causally produced by those external things acting upon
our sense organs and through them in to our brains, all the while assuming that we can
speak intelligibly about the resemblances between some of our ideas and those
external realities. It is in the backdrop of this theory that Locke’s theory of Primary
qualities is situated and takes root. Locke believed that it was the Primary qualities of
external objects that gave us some intelligible idea about the external world, while
secondary qualities were the product of the power possessed by the prior. In other
words the primary qualities really are qualities, and are themselves the basis of the
powers to produce the corresponding ideas in our minds, whereas, secondary qualities
are the product of the power whose basis lies in the primary qualities of minute
atomic particles, or in simplistic terms the result of the shape, size and so on, of the
atomic structure of external objects. This theory has been widely criticised by
philosophers but is beyond the scope of this paper – no doubt one for the future.

Even though this backdrop theory of Locke has been taken for granted for the purpose
of this discussion, I feel that it has been at least secured internally within its own
boundaries – that of the theory of Primary and Secondary qualities.

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Sachin Nandha V7DMET

Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham

Locke’s Theory of Primary & Secondary Qualities

Bibliography

1. Lowe, E.J., 1995, Locke on Human Understanding, Routledge Press

2. Mackie, J.L., 1976, Locke’s Anticipation of Kripke, Analysis
3. Yolton, J.W., 1965, Locke on Understanding Human Nature, Oxford
University Press