Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
2009-05- 2010-12-20 Embassy
09RABAT408 SECRET//NOFORN
15 12:12 21:09 Rabat
VZCZCXRO5443
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #0408/01 1351235
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 151235Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0113
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 3198
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 0316
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY 0494
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 0246
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 1634
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0902
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 4595
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 RABAT 000408
SIPDIS
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4
¶B. 08 RABAT 0569 (NOTAL)
----------
Background
----------
5
environment could foster violent tendencies post-release.
With a population of some 60,000, estimates in early 2008
suggested that prison budgets were barely one dollar per
prisoner per day. Prisoners must receive food from family
and friends if they are to eat at a reasonable standard.
Overcrowding can be severe, as shown in some photographs of
prisoners sleeping across the floor of a large cell, packed
like sardines, a condition uncommon, but which may still
exist in some facilities.
6
¶4. (C) In late April 2008, after the escape of nine
Salafists (Islamic radicals) from Kenitra prison, many
convicted of involvement in the 2003 Casablanca bombings,
King Mohammed VI moved responsibility for prison
administration from the MOJ and gave it to the newly created
Directorate under the Prime Minister's Office. The MOJ had
accommodated the growing organized presence of Salafists in
the prisons by granting increasing privileges, and there was
a sense that it had simply lost control. The escape turned
the prison situation into an embarrassment for the GOM and
the King.
------------------------------------------
Benhachem and the King: The New Old Guard
------------------------------------------
7
conditions. The same day, Minister of Justice Radi said that
Benhachem's appointment was part and parcel of a broader
justice sector reform process.
-------------------------
The Prison Administration
-------------------------
8
budget, and once he reestablished security, funds were then
appropriately next allocated for improved food. In addition,
he expedited existing construction and pushed forward plans
for additional new prisons. The recapture (or death) of all
the Salafist escapees, and others as well, allowed scope for
renewed reform and cooperation with the international
community.
--------------------------------------
Personality, Priorities and Assistance
--------------------------------------
¶9. (C) EmbOffs met with Benhachem on June 19, 2008 (Ref B),
and again on March 31, 2009, at the Directorate General for
Prison Administration and Reinsertion (DGAP) headquarters.
In both meetings, they found him direct, charming and
practical, but wary of USG intentions. Benhachem underscored
the ministerial status of the Prison Administration.
Benhachem told EmbOffs that he is in charge of prisoners
while incarcerated and responsible for their reintegration
into society when released, although he had earlier confirmed
that his responsibility ended at the prison gate. The DGAP's
2009 budget includes USD 128 million for general operations
and USD 86 million for capital expenses such as new
construction and renovation. Benhachem told EmbOffs that
this represented a 40 percent increase in funding. In
statements reported in the press, Benhachem said that the new
budget allowed him to increase spending per prisoner USD 50
cents to two dollars per day.
9
security and rehabilitation were his twin and intertwined
priorities. However, he emphasized that he would not
sacrifice security in the name of reform, saying, "I cannot
make progress if I do not control my buildings." On the
security side, Benhachem had very specific thoughts and
highlighted renovation, new construction, and improved
technological ability to scan inmates and packages for
contraband as immediate areas of focus. He said that
establishing closed-circuit-television networks and
electronic monitoring of facilities and inmates was an
important medium-term goal that would leverage his limited
staff and financial resources to greater effect. Benhachem
also expressed a need for better equipment for his staff and
improved training.
10
the DGAP was still tense but improving. He thought Benhachem
seemed to have little respect for the MOJ's former prison
managers.
----------------
The Two Deputies
----------------
------------------
Current Conditions
------------------
11
letters from prisoners or their relatives related to
mistreatment, poor conditions, malnutrition, lack of medical
treatment, sexual assault and violence. The OMP's report
linked 18 deaths directly to substandard conditions and
inmate violence as a result of overcrowding, and reported
greater than 100 inmate deaths overall. The OMP also
strongly criticized poor working conditions for the system's
5,228 guards, most of whom only make USD 240 per month. In
press statements, Abderrahim Jamai, a member of the OMP
board, said that the organization's attempts to raise issues
of concern with Benhachem were rebuffed and their letters to
----------------------------
Status of Islamist Prisoners
----------------------------
12
which advocates for the prisoners as individuals or as a
group. In 2007, a photograph of a police officer beating the
wife of a Salafist prisoner at an Anassir demonstration was
carried by al Qaeda websites, accompanied by threats against
perfidious Moroccan authorities. Benhachem has apparently
dispersed some Salafist prisioners, but most remain
concentrated in a few higher-security prisons.
--------------
Plan of Action
--------------
13
expenditures from less than USD .01 to USD .50 per day.
--------------------------------------------- ------
Pretrial Diversion, Parole and the Justice Ministry
--------------------------------------------- ------
-------------------------
Partners and Other Actors
-------------------------
14
has established Post-Release Coaching Centers designed to
ease the transition to freedom.
-------
Comment
15
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Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
*****************************************
Jackson
16
Reference IDCreated Released Classification Origin
2006-03-29 2010-12-14 Embassy
06RABAT557 CONFIDENTIAL
14:02 12:12 Rabat
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
SIPDIS
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17
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for Reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)
Western Sahara
--------------
¶3. (C) Planas said the GOS was following with great interest
the King's much-anticipated visit to Western Sahara (March
20-25; see ref A). Ambassador Riley noted we were also
following the visit with interest. Planas said Spain's
primary message to Morocco at this point was one he believed
we shared: Morocco should present a credible autonomy plan.
Planas said Spain would need to review the plan before taking
a position on it, but in the meantime the GOS was providing
18
"comfort and support" to the GOM to produce a serious plan.
Planas was somewhat dismissive of the consultation process
with Moroccan political parties, saying he understood the
parties' meetings with Palace advisor Mohamed Moatassim were
"not really an exchange." He said, nevertheless, that
conferences such as that held by the PJD and FC several weeks
ago (Ref B) "were okay." Planas said the Spanish have been
clear with Morocco that the autonomy plan must be concrete
and not conservative. Ambassador Riley said this was a key
US message as well.
¶4. (C) Planas said the reported split within the Polisario
(the so-called Ligne de Martyrs, or Line of Martyrs) was not
significant. These were mostly individuals based in the
Canary Islands. While the split itself was not significant,
Planas believed there was growing frustration in Tindouf, but
it might not be related solely to pressure for negotiation.
Planas noted that the Polisario cause continued to resonate
with Spaniards, who visited Tindouf in large numbers every
year as families back in Spain opened their doors to
5000-10,000 Sahrawis for home stays.
¶5. (C) Planas did not echo GOS concern about the possible
backing off of the Western Sahara conflict by the Security
Council as advocated by UN Envoy Van Walsum; nor he did
express concern about a possible MINURSO drawdown.
Migration
---------
19
some migrants bought "travel packs" (a package of movements
-- by road, car, ship, with a series of handlers at each
phase -- to get one to the desired destination), which from
his information cost thousands of dollars, with no certainty
that one would ever reach the destination.
Islamists
---------
20
Spanish Investment
------------------
Narcotics
---------
******************************************
Riley
21
Reference IDCreated Released Classification Origin
2007-03-19 2010-12-14 Embassy
07RABAT494 CONFIDENTIAL
08:08 12:12 Rabat
VZCZCXYZ0022
OO RUEHWEB
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
Classified By: Classified by Polcouns Craig Karp for reasons 1.4 (b)
an
d (d)
¶1. (C) Spain hosted Polcounselors from U.S., U.K., France and
EU-President Germany for an informal discussion of Western
Sahara developments March 14. In general, participants noted
22
the intensity of Moroccan diplomatic efforts, including
multiple consultations with U.S., France, and Spain. The
energy of the initiative, however, did not appear to be
matched by any apparent breakthrough on the substance of
autonomy that could convince the other side. The broad
outlines of the autonomy plan, which have been universally
briefed, suggested Rabat would retain full control, and did
not go far beyond what was in the 2003 plan. That had been
rejected out of hand by Baker and governments.
¶4. (C) The Spanish host was not happy. For Spain, the Sahara
is now a hot domestic political issue. Last week, in the
joint declaration of the Zapatero visit, they had agreed to a
statement cautiously praising the Moroccan proposals as a
basis for progress. The Algerians then raised the price of
gas exports to Spain by a hefty amount described in the press
as 20 percent. (Comment: This move, possibly worth hundreds
of millions of dollars, may have been in the cards anyway.
End comment.) The Spanish Parliament unanimously (including
Zapatero's own Socialist party) appeared to repudiate this
endorsement by voting for a bill proposed by leftist splinter
23
parties to return to the historical Spanish approach focusing
on self-determination. King Juan Carlos, in Algiers this
week, tried to dodge the issue and was accommodated by
Bouteflika. FM Moratinos, with the King in Algiers,
published an op-ed walking the cat back on the Moroccan
proposals, stressing Spanish rejection of unilateral
solutions, and support for negotiations without
preconditions.
24
¶7. (C) On next steps, the French have advised the GOM to
present their plan first to the UNSYG to include in his
report, and to the April UNSC president, the UK. The U.K.
said they expected to see a Moroccan draft during their UNSC
presidency.
******************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat
******************************************
Riley
25
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
2007-11-02 2010-12-14 Embassy
07RABAT1695 CONFIDENTIAL
17:05 12:12 Rabat
VZCZCXRO6845
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHRB #1695/01 3061742
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021742Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7693
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 3117
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 1203
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3434
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 5830
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 4822
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 3642
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 001695
SIPDIS
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26
afternoon of November 2 that it was recalling its Ambassador
in Madrid for consultations. A senior MFA official we spoke
with expressed exasperation over the development but implied
that the relationship would weather the storm. A Spanish
diplomat told us they had received a similar message of anger
mixed with resignation from their MFA contacts. Despite the
public flash of anger, we doubt the incident will do
sustained damage to the relationship. End summary.
¶2. (SBU) The Moroccan government did not take lying down news
that Spanish King Juan Carlos and Queen Sofia were planning
their first visit to Ceuta and Melilla, the Spanish enclaves
on the Mediterranean coast claimed by Morocco. (We
understand both enclaves will be visited November 5, with no
overnight stop.) Prime Minister El-Fassi late on November 1
expressed "deep regret" at the decision and warned it would
impact the bilateral relationship. Information Minister (and
government spokesman) Khalid Naciri told local media on
November 1 that the GOM rejected the visit and was very
disappointed by the decision. Speaking on pan-Arab
Al-Jazeera TV, Naciri warned "the Spanish government must
understand there are red lines not to be crossed." Moroccan
independent media also had an angry, nationalistic reaction.
The wide circulation Al-Massae criticized the Spanish monarch
for violating tradition and "implementing the occupation" of
the enclaves.
27
break with tradition and conduct the visit, the Spaniard
noted that the King has been under domestic political
pressure on a variety of issues from all sides, particularly
the right wing. This pressure may have prompted the King to
conduct a muscular gesture, he speculated.
¶6. (C) Comment: We assess that the GOM felt it had to react
loudly and publicly to Juan Carlos' visit. Whatever its
intended purpose, the visit was bound to irritate Morocco,
which continues to claim the enclaves. We also assess that
this angry public reaction will not impact the underlying
calculus behind Morocco's robust cooperation with Spain, and
this incident will not cause sustained damage to their
bilateral relationship. End comment.
*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat
*****************************************
Jackson
28
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
2007-11-07 2010-12-14 Embassy
07RABAT1706 CONFIDENTIAL
15:03 12:12 Rabat
VZCZCXRO0477
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHRB #1706/01 3111519
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 071519Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 5834
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7711
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 3119
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 1205
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3441
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 4831
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 3652
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 001706
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29
Summary
-------
-----------------------------
Irked, but Calming the Waters
-----------------------------
30
between the two countries.
------------------------------------
Fired by Memories of the Green March
------------------------------------
inopportune.
----------------------------------
A Calculated Spanish Miscalculation?
----------------------------------
31
¶6. (C) Other Spanish emboffs told us that the Government of
Spain (GOS) knew that King Juan Carlos's visit would lead to
a strong Moroccan reaction, but that Spanish electoral
imperatives played a role in the decision to send him to the
enclaves. The King had been under pressure from separatists
on the one hand and grumbling from the military on the other.
At the same time, Prime Minister Zapatero, who faces
re-election in March 2009, calculated that the domestic
electoral boost he would receive from the king's journey
outweighed the damage it would do to bilateral relations.
Additionally, Madrid believed that Spanish/Moroccan relations
were the strongest they had ever been and that they would
weather the storm. They maintained the visit by Crown Prince
Felipe and Foreign Minister Moratinos on October 30 was
actually an opportunity for Moratinos to give the Fassi
government advance notice and sound out their reaction. At
the time, Moroccan Foreign Minister Fassi-Fihri assured the
Spanish of overall "business as usual." Nevertheless the
strength of the response caught the Spanish diplomats here
off guard. In one initial first consequence, the Moroccan MFA
announced that the annual high-level coordination meeting,
chaired by the two countries' respective Prime Ministers, was
"unlikely to occur."
----------------------
Remember the Melilla
----------------------
-------
Comment
-------
¶8. (C) The strident and visible public reaction was likely
32
exacerbated because the Juan Carlos visit came on the eve of
annual celebrations commemorating the Green March, the date
on which Hassan II sent 20,000 Moroccans into the desert to
"liberate" the Western Sahara from Spain. In Morocco at
least, we note that stirring up nationalistic feelings to
distract from domestic concerns has long been a tactic of the
kingdom's leaders. It was used by both Prime Minister El
Fassi and Fouad Ali El Himma to strengthen their nationalist
and foreign policy credentials. Neither the Prime Minister
nor parliament have had much prior role in foreign affairs, a
preserve of the throne.
*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat
*****************************************
Jackson
33
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
2008-07-22 2010-12-14 Embassy
08RABAT681 CONFIDENTIAL
17:05 12:12 Rabat
VZCZCXRO3552
RR RUEHLA
DE RUEHRB #0681/01 2041720
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 221720Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8875
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 4840
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 1218
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3642
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 6014
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 3778
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 5072
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 9670
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 0005
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 4208
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 000681
SIPDIS
Classified By: PolCouns Craig Karp for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
34
and immigration. Zapatero also met Moroccan Prime Minister
El Fassi followed by a meeting with the press. Publicly, the
two parties never mentioned the Ceuta and Melilla controversy
that sparked widespread demonstrations last year. However,
they reportedly addressed the issue privately, assuring each
other that it would not obstruct relations. The two
neighbors will re-invigorate their bilateral cooperation with
a round of ministerial visits leading up to a meeting of the
Bi-National Commission in Madrid chaired jointly in November
by Prime Ministers El Fassi and Zapatero. End Summary.
GOOD RELATIONS
¶3. (U) Zapatero and Moroccan Prime Minister Abbas El Fassi
held a joint Press Conference following the meeting between
the King and Zapatero. The Spanish Prime Minister stated
that the relations between Morocco and Spain are good and
will always be good. Zapatero highlighted the importance of
strong regional security cooperation.
35
largest economic partner after France.
36
King and PM Zapatero was "extremely good". Spanish diplomats
also told us Zapatero proposed to Mohammad VI mediation to
help improve the Moroccan/Algerian relationship. However,
Mohammad VI responded that, "the time was not right".
COMMENT
9.(SBU) The Spanish/Moroccan relationship remains strong and
positive. The absence of public discussion by the King or
the hotly nationalist El Fassi of the Spanish enclaves is a
sign of the strength of the relationship. Morocco and Spain
have transcended the enclaves issue to concentrate on their
rapidly growing economic ties, managing immigration
(including keeping Sub Saharans out of Spain) and their vital
shared interest in counterterrorism cooperation.
*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat
*****************************************
Riley
37
Reference IDCreated Released Classification Origin
2009-12-18 2010-12-14 Embassy
09RABAT990 CONFIDENTIAL
15:03 12:12 Rabat
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
SIPDIS
Classified By: DCM Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
38
medical supervision at her home. Western Sahara-based
government officials confirm that her arrival took place
without incident, and that a spontaneous gathering of
well-wishers had taken place with no serious security
incidents. After having handled the Haidar case in
disastrous fashion, the GOM finally brought the ordeal to an
end -- and not a moment too soon. However, the case has left
the GOM angry and badly shaken, which will create real
challenges as we look toward the next round of formal UN-led
Manhasset talks. End Summary.
-----------
Home Safely
-----------
39
food under close medical supervision; she is extremely weak,
but "her spirit is extremely strong."
----------------------------------
Supporters Jubilant, Laayoune Calm
----------------------------------
------------------------
Comment: An Ordeal Ended
------------------------
40
stunningly maladroit diplomacy. Local press and our
Laayoune-based Sahrawi contacts have given enormous credit to
the U.S., France and to a lesser extent Spain for pressing
the GOM to find a solution to the problem. GOM officials
have grudgingly acknowledged that the tough -- and consistent
-- messages that Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
Taieb Fassi Fihri heard on his recent travels to Europe and
the U.S. (Ref A) were crucial to the GOM's rather sudden
change of heart. Even the provincial Wali in Laayoune told
PolCouns, "You see, we listen to our friends." This said, we
will need to be mindful that the whole Haidar case has left
the GOM badly shaken; indeed, Moroccan officials' (and, we
suspect, the other parties') anger and distrust, especially
toward Algeria, has reached its highest level in recent
years. As we look to a fifth round of formal UN-led
Manhasset talks, Ambassador Ross, and we, have our work cut
out for us. End Comment.
*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
*****************************************
KAPLAN
41
Reference
Created Released Classification Origin
ID
2008-01-09 2010-12-11 Embassy
08RABAT21 CONFIDENTIAL
06:06 21:09 Rabat
VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB
SIPDIS
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42
Communications and Government Spokesman. Naciri stated that
passing
a revised, more liberal press code was one of his top policy
priorities. He defended, however, the need to maintain prison
sentences in rare cases as a "precaution," arguing in particular that
publication of anything that might be deemed a "provocation"
against
Islam could reinforce fundamentalism and destabilize Moroccan
democracy. He pledged that the Fassi government would not limit
freedom of expression, and described plans to further liberalize the
audiovisual sector. Naciri assured the Ambassador that Morocco was
committed to combating video piracy, recognizing the importance of
the film industry to the Moroccan economy. He also discussed
Government of Morocco (GOM) efforts to promote a moderate
vision of
Islam in Morocco and with Arab communities abroad via a public
television and radio network focused on religion. A former
international visitor program (IVP) participant, Naciri expressed
appreciation for USG efforts to promote professionalism and ethical
journalistic practices in Morocco through training and exchange
programs. End summary.
------------------------------
Promoting Freedom of the Press
------------------------------
¶2. (C) Said Sihida, head of the minister's cabinet, and an aide
joined from the Ministry of Communications (MOC); the PAO and
IO
accompanied the Ambassador. The Ambassador opened by asking
Naciri
for an update on the long-promised revised press code, noting that
its passage was a top USG policy priority. Naciri stated that this
was one of his two top priorities as well (the other being
liberalization of the audiovisual sector - see para 6 below). He
stated that the previous government had hoped to finalize and
introduce it to parliament last year, but the government had run out
of time because of parliamentary elections. Naciri repeated a
familiar refrain that the Ministry of Communications had been
caught
in the middle between the competing interests of the media
community
(which wanted to see the draft further liberalized), and the
43
Ministries of Interior and Justice (which had taken a more
conservative stance). Naciri stated that he had already held
consultations with all the key stakeholders, and was in the process
of collecting final comments.
¶3. (C) Naciri's goal was to reach consensus on a final draft text
that would be more liberal than the existing one, but which would
preserve key "precautions," including prison sentences for a very few
"extreme cases," notably concerning the three red-lines: Islam, the
monarchy and "territorial integrity" (read: Western Sahara).
Journalists had expressed concern that the provisions of the new law
were too vague, but Naciri argued it was not possible to have an
exact recipe for what constituted a transgression. Nevertheless,
"you will see that the new text will be a step forward . . . a very,
very liberal text," he stated, taking into account the views of all
the stakeholders, and in which prisons sentences would be very
limited.
¶4. (C) Naciri stated that application of the law was as important as
the law itself. The new press code should be considered in the
context of a Moroccan Government commitment to openness and
democracy. He noted that prison sentences existed in the French
press code; they were never applied, but were nevertheless
maintained
as a precaution. He stated that fundamentalism was one of the main
political forces confronting the Arab world today; Arab governments
could not allow this phenomenon to be reinforced, and provocations
against Islam, he stated, fed the demagoguery of the fundamentalists.
"We must not allow democracy to be used by those who want to
destabilize it," he stated, which was the underlying reason for the
existence of the red-lines in the press code. Every day, Naciri
stated, there were examples of transgressions of the red-lines in the
press, which the Moroccan Government chose not to prosecute. This
demonstrated that, regardless the text of the press code, the
government was committed politically and philosophically to
permitting the maximum possible freedom of the press; "This
government will not threaten freedom of expression," he averred.
44
and non-governmental watchdog groups evaluated press freedom as
much
by the written law as by its application; this was a reality that
underscored the need for a revised press code. Naciri responded that
the GOM was endeavoring to strike a balance. He reminded the
Ambassador that he was first and foremost a human rights activist,
and that he understood the point of view of such NGOs. "I am
imbued
in the human rights philosophy," he stated, which "does not change
just because I am a minister." (Note: Naciri previously participated
in an international visitor program focused on human rights issues.
End note.)
¶6. (C) Naciri stated that his second priority was the further
liberalization of the audiovisual sector. In this regard, he
expected that the Higher Audiovisual Communications Authority
(HACA)
would be issuing additional licenses for private television and radio
stations this year. He also discussed the planned launch of a
publicly-financed Amazigh (Berber) television channel in the coming
months. Naciri stated that the core team was already in place, with
plans to begin broadcasting six to seven hours per day, but that the
Minister of Finance had not yet approved the expensive budget for
the
project.
-----------------------------------
Video Piracy Bad for Moroccan Image
-----------------------------------
45
related a conversation he had had with a well-known Moroccan
singer,
now living in Europe, who was one of the most popular singers in
Morocco but had sold only ten legitimate copies of his latest CD in
the whole country. He expressed concern that Moroccan artists could
not survive without moving to Europe.
¶8. (C) Naciri stated flatly that Moroccan did not want to be
associated with this sort of piracy. Naciri assured the Ambassador
that the Moroccan security forces were on board regarding the need
to
enforce IPR.
--------------------------------------
Using the Airwaves to Combat Extremism
--------------------------------------
--------------------------------------
Promoting Professionalism in the Media
--------------------------------------
46
¶10. (SBU) IO provided Naciri a briefing on USG efforts to promote
professionalism and the ethical practice of journalism in Morocco.
Over the past ten years, the USG had sponsored the participation of
roughly 100 journalists in a variety of exchange programs in the
U.S., the IO noted, as well as in reporting tours abroad in places
such as Pakistan and Mali. The USG had also provided in-country
training, conducted by American and local experts, on issues ranging
from investigative reporting, to journalistic ethics, to citizen and
electronic journalism. Naciri expressed enthusiasm for these
programs, and hoped to reinforce and expand them.
-------
Comment
-------
Riley
47
Reference IDCreated Released Classification Origin
2008-02-19 2010-12-11 Embassy
08RABAT154 CONFIDENTIAL
17:05 21:09 Rabat
VZCZCXYZ0008
PP RUEHWEB
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).
48
poor constituency he represents. El-Himma asserted that
Morocco's legislature has "all the legal authority it needs"
and complained bitterly about mismanagement of resources and
lack of vision among the parliamentary leadership.
Interestingly, El-Himma declined to engage on issues like
Western Sahara (in which he was intimately engaged as Deputy
Interior Minister) and did not even mention his "All
Democrats Movement," an initiative which has prompted
clamorous speculation in the domestic media about his
political ambitions. End summary.
¶3. (C) El-Himma claimed that Skhour Rhamna was the poorest
district in Morocco and lamented that it had not been
selected as a beneficiary for Millennium Challenge Account
projects, the first of which are being launched in early
¶2008. El-Himma urged that the USG look closely at Skhour
Rhamna as it planned future assistance activities, pledging
that he would make sure the USG received the full cooperation
of all levels of the GOM in such an endeavor. If you invest
in Skhour Rhamna, "we will give you your success story," he
asserted. One potential asset he mentioned was the air base
at Ben Guerir, the former NASA alternate landing site.
49
discovered, to his dismay, that he could not hire even one
staff member of his own choosing. Parliament's entire human
resources budget was already tapped out, with 600 persons on
the staff payroll, of whom "maybe 30 or 40 actually do
something," he complained. He directly criticized former
lower house speaker Abdelouahed Radi (now Minister of
Justice) for having allocated jobs as political party favors
and paybacks rather than on merit. El-Himma also clearly
implied that his relations with Radi's successor, speaker
Mustapha Mansouri, were chilly. (Comment: We had heard this
from independent sources.)
50
¶8. (C) Comment continued: Perhaps most significant in the
conversation was what El-Himma did not say. He ignored the
Ambassador's question on Western Sahara, an issue on which he
worked in the Interior Ministry and as a leader of numerous
diplomatic missions to press Morocco's case in world capitals
and the first Manhasset meeting. El-Himma also declined to
say anything about his leadership of the "All Democrats
Movement" (reftel), an initiative which has provoked
clamorous speculation in the domestic media about his
possible plans to form a new political party that would seem
well placed to steamroll its rivals and transform the
political landscape. Instead, with the Ambassador, El-Himma
clung to his pose as a newly minted parliamentarian who has
come to the capital determined to do something good for his
district.
*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
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*****************************************
Riley
51
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
2008-12-18 2010-12-11 Embassy
08RABAT1169 CONFIDENTIAL
17:05 21:09 Rabat
VZCZCXRO9909
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW
RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #1169/01 3531726
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 181726Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9453
INFO RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0688
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 1619
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0895
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0387
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA PRIORITY 0007
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 0054
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON
DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1100
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RABAT 001169
SIPDIS
52
RABAT 00001169 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).
-------------------------------
Adl: "Stability" and Good Works
-------------------------------
53
stressing, "Our first goal, above all others, is the
stability of Morocco." Both left and right have failed,
leaving only Islam as a model. Within Islam there are
moderates and extremists and, "we have chosen moderation."
He said Adl wanted to work with other groups and political
parties to help pull Morocco out of the political, social and
economic crises it now faces.
--------------------------------------------- -
Repression and Dialogue: An evolving Approach
--------------------------------------------- -
¶6. (C) Arsalane acknowledged that Adl had over the years
maintained informal communication with the Moroccan regime.
This was only rarely direct, and more often one-way and
54
symbolic. He contended that the "undemocratic regime" was
unwilling to engage in a more open and formal dialogue,
maintained political red lines and imposed conditions on
allowing Adl greater scope for activity. "In Morocco we have
the motto: 'God, Nation, King' but in fact the only thing
that matters here is the King."
¶7. (C) When asked about the historic support of Adl for a
Caliphate or Islamic state, Arsalane said this was not Adl's
position, claiming legitimacy and authority comes from the
people and the Ulema. He thus substantiated the major but
largely unremarked turnaround on this basic question by
Sheikh Yassine during an interview this summer with the
Arabic satellite TV channel Hiwar that opened the door to
Adl's potential acceptance of the monarchy -- albeit not in
its current state.
------------------------------
Condemning the Use of Violence
------------------------------
55
attacks against the U.S. Consulate General and other sites in
Casablanca, and other terrorist attacks around the world.
Arsalane responded that Adl in fact had denounced the 2003
Casablanca attacks, all terrorist attacks in Morocco and many
elsewhere.
------------------------------------------
Intra-party dialogue on its Political Role
------------------------------------------
----------------------
Relations with the PJD
----------------------
56
----------------------------
Succession of Sheikh Yassine
----------------------------
¶12. (C) We asked about what would happen after the death of
Adl's charismatic leader, "Sheikh" Ahmed Yassine, reportedly
80 and poor health. Arsalane said that Adl has internal
rules governing succession, which would be decided by an
election of its executive committee (Majlis Ash-Shura).
----------------------------------------
A Message to the New American Government
----------------------------------------
--------------------------------------
The all-Embracing Makhzen opens a door
--------------------------------------
¶14. (C) For its part, the authorities have responded with
some positive signals to Adl,s overtures. While the
newspaper remains banned, there appears to be less tampering
57
with the well-constructed Adl website (www.aljamaa.net in
French and Arabic). Arrests continue but appear to be
diminishing in both frequency and scope. The prosecution of
Nadia Yassine, the Sheikh,s daughter, for verbal assault on
the monarchy continues to be delayed. (Note: Arsalane
described this as equivalent to judicial supervision.) In
another step, earlier in the week Minister of Endowments and
Islamic Affairs Ahmed Toufiq paid a condolence call on the
family of a recently deceased Adl Board member and close
companion of Yassine, whom Toufiq knew long ago in a common
Sufi brotherhood, a visit that likely required palace assent.
-------
Comment
-------
58
with the PJD and its religious counterpart the Movement for
Unity and Reform (MUR).
¶19. (C) Note A: The last time mission has had contact with
Arsalane was before 9/11/2001, and the government protested.
We have heard no such protest so far. We have avoided
contact with Nadia Yassine since her indictment, and have
been in touch only at a lower level.
59
¶21. (U) This cable was drafted by Casablanca PolOff and has
been cleared with the Consulate General.
*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
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*****************************************
Riley
60
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
2009-07-15 2010-12-11 Embassy
09RABAT607 SECRET
10:10 21:09 Rabat
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB
SIPDIS
-------
Summary
-------
61
year, not content with its already impressive and fair electoral
performance, the Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM) of
Fouad Ali El Himma reportedly used extra-political pressure tactics,
including invoking the name of King Mohammed VI, to pressure
other parties into entering pro-PAM mayoral coalitions and
withdrawing from alliances with the Islamist-oriented Party of
Justice and Development (PJD). This resulted was non-PJD led
coalitions in Casablanca, Tangier (PAM-led), and Sale. Most
troubling, the Palace appears to have intervened in several places to
keep the PJD from controlling Morocco's major cities, while allowing
them to run second-tier cites, such as Kenitra and Tetouan. Palace
interference was most blatant in the city of Oujda. There, the
Ministry of Interior-appointed local governor blocked a vote that
would have produced a PJD-led coalition on June 25, allowing the
centrist parties time to pressure coalition allies. National police and
intelligence officials reportedly intimidated PJD coalition supporters
and beat a local PJD leader into a coma. A former Minister, a French
government contact and other sources confirmed Palace complicity
in the pro-PAM/anti-PJD effort. The PAM has sullied its reputation
as a reformist party and bolstered criticism that it is an instrument of
the Palace. The picture as usual is mixed, and palace intervention
appears more anti-PJD than pro-PAM. In Laayoune in the Western
Sahara, the PAM suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of Istiqlal's
Ould er Rachid machine. In total, these machinations may further
erode public support for Morocco,s fledgling democratic processes
and increase sympathy for the PJD. End Summary.
---------------------
PAM: The Palace Party
---------------------
¶2. (SBU) For over two weeks, Morocco has witnessed widespread
media coverage of political party irregularities, corruption and
government interference in the recent city leadership election races.
In contrast with the public June 12 elections for communal councils,
which saw Moroccans electing town council members in a relatively
transparent manner (Ref A), the roughly week-long process for
selecting mayors (in large cities) and communal council presidents (in
small cities and rural areas) has been characterized by multiple
reports of irregularities. Because mayors are selected indirectly from
the pool of recently elected communal council members, which come
from a myriad of over 30 political parties (six of which dominate
62
Moroccan politics), the process comes down to intense negotiations
(with various
incentives and disincentives) to establish majority coalitions in each
city. The ranking member of the leading party in these coalitions
typically becomes the mayor or chief executive. See Paragraph 9 for
new mayoral selection results.
¶3. (C) Several days into this negotiation process, leaders of the self-
described Koran-referent PJD began to complain that the PAM had
been using extra normal pressure tactics, i.e., outside of the normal
petty bribery often associated with the process, to enlist other parties
and their members to support PAM-led coalitions and desert PJD-led
coalitions in key cities. D/PolCouns attended a political debate on
June 29 among party leaders at which PJD leader Benkirane roundly
criticized the PAM for using the extra-normal pressure tactic of
invoking King Mohammed VI's name to underscore His Majesty's
alleged preference for other parties to join PAM-led coalitions and to
thwart PJD-led coalitions in cities like Casablanca, Tangier, and
Oujda. Because PAM party founder, Fouad Ali El Himma is widely
known as "a friend of the King" and the PAM's success has largely
hinged on the perception that he "has the monarch,s ear,"
Benkirane's accusations received thunderous applause from the
crowd, even as the local PAM representative deflected the
accusations as "sour grapes."
63
the two parties initially formed a coalition with RNI taking the
mayor,s slot in exchange for a PJD taking the Vice mayor,s position.
However, the coalition dissolved just before it was to be finalized with
RNI representatives claiming enigmatically to reporters that "they
came under extraordinary pressure" to withdraw from the coalition,
without further elaboration. This coalition was replaced with a PAM-
led coalition, despite the fact that PAM finished fourth in Tangier.
--------------------------------------------- -------
Oujda Mayor,s Race Marred by Government Intervention
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶7. (SBU) PJD, MP, and other elected council members protested
the government's intervention on July 3. Police were called in to
break up the protests, according to the press. During an ensuing
melee, PJD leader Noureddine Benbakr, who would have been
Mayor if the PJD-led coalition had been permitted to stand, suffered
a cerebral hemorrhage and fell into a coma as a result of a blow to
64
his head by security personnel. Other elected council members
suffered less serious injuries, were detained, and later released. Later
that day, a PAM-supported Party Istiqlal (PI)-led coalition secured
the mayoral post for the brother of Transport Minister Hejira. PJD
parliamentary leader Mustapha Ramid, who had come to support
local PJD members in Oujda, was blocked from entering the Oujda
municipal center, according to the press reports.
65
Key:
Constitutional Union UC
Democratic Forces Front FFD
Istiqlal Party PI
Party of Authenticity and Modernity PAM
Party of Justice and Development PJD
Popular Movement Party MP
Progressive Socialist Party PPS
Rally of National Independents RNI
Union of Socialist Forces Party USFP
Workers Party PT
------------------------------------
Normal Irregularities Are Bad Enough
------------------------------------
66
¶12. (U) On July 13 and 14, the Ministry of Interior and the
PAM, respectively,separately refuted any inappropriate and
anti-democratic tactics.
-------
Comment
-------
¶14. (C) PAM success has been blunted a bit by a large number
of legal challenges, at least two of which it has already
lost, including its new star, the young women mayor it had
gotten elected in Marrakesh, who has been ordered to face a
rerun of the election in her district (septel). PAM
officials indicate they will be fighting these challenges in
court and appealing decisions that have gone against them.
67
in order to prepare regional infrastructure for a potential
reopening. The source said the King did not want the PJD to
be able to claim credit for this largesse and the development
it would promote.
¶16. (C) For the PJD, it may have been kept out of running
major cities, both by normal hardball politics and, at least
in Oujda by apparently blatant intervention by security and
domestic intelligence services, denying it the chance
showcase any example of good governance in a high profile
city prior to the 2012 general election. Still, the modern
Islamists of the PJD now run more cites than ever before and
their number of local councilors remains 50 percent above
what it scored last time around. In sum, this is enough of a
blow to frustrate them, but probably not enough to drive them
from the game. The outcome may well erode further public
support for Morocco's democratic processes and future voter
participation. However, while the political season of
cascading regional and upper house elections will continue
run until October, and the legal fights will continue, on the
local level, the public will turn to see how the new mayors
and councils govern. End Comment.
*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
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*****************************************
Jackson
68
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
2009-04- 2010-12-10 Embassy
09RABAT289 SECRET//NOFORN
06 16:04 21:09 Rabat
VZCZCXRO0775
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR
RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW RUEHROV
RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #0289/01 0961646
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 061646Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9927
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 000289
NOFORN
SIPDIS
Classified By: PolCouns Craig Karp for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
69
and its Embassy in Rabat for activities in Mali and Senegal.
Domestically, XXXXXXXXXXXX emphasized that the anti-Shi'a
campaign was aimed at neutralizing possible challenges to
monarchist parties by Islamic groups in upcoming municipal
elections. In addition, King Mohammed VI was seeking to reassert
his position as a religious leader. End Summary.
70
Morocco to lecture and identify promising young religious
students from the Shi'a community for familiarization visits
to, and further training in, Iran.
71
while not enthusiastically endorsing their leadership bid.
Had he sent someone of lower stature, such as the Prime
Minister, it might have been read as a snub, XXXXXXXXXXXX
explained. (Comment: We agree.)
*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
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*****************************************
Jackson
72
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
2009-12- 2010-12-09 Embassy
09RABAT988 SECRET//NOFORN
17 18:06 21:09 Rabat
VZCZCXRO9482
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #0988/01 3511840
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 171840Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0958
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY IMMEDIATE 0009
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU IMMEDIATE 0589
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0450
RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN PRIORITY 0077
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0097
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA PRIORITY 0194
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 1293
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0129
RUEHJL/AMEMBASSY BANJUL PRIORITY 0101
RUEHCO/AMEMBASSY COTONOU PRIORITY 0055
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY 0514
RUEHFN/AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY 0034
RUEHPC/AMEMBASSY LOME PRIORITY 0562
RUEHMV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA PRIORITY 0568
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY 1177
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 000988
SIPDIS
NOFORN
73
RABAT 00000988 001.2 OF 002
¶3. (S) Fassi Fihri also said that the Guinean Defense
Minister, General Sekouba Konate, had told the GOM that he
wished to visit Morocco to meet with Dadis, presumably to
evaluate his ability to govern. The GOM was likely to honor
Konate's request but only after the December 18 release of
the report on the September massacre. However, Fassi Fihri
also expressed pessimism about a Konate-led government,
calling the Konate a drunkard.
74
¶4. (S/NF) Also on December 16, XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOff
that Moroccan doctors are expected imminently to release Dadis
Camara from the hospital, but that there could be long-term health
consequences from the failed December 3 shooting.
XXXXXXXXXXXX
reported that Moroccan officials have not allowed him, Guinean
dignitaries, or the Guinean Ambassador to visit Dadis Camara, but
that he received regular medical updates from an unnamed
Moroccan source who was providing care for the junta leader at the
Mohammed V Military Hospital in Rabat. XXXXXXXXXXXX
said Dadis was alert but was not expected to return fully to his
previous state of health.
75
keep him in Morocco only until the end of December, the
situation in Guinea could become more complicated unless the
international community can persuade Konate and the Economic
Community of West African States to act quickly. End comment.
*****************************************
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*****************************************
KAPLAN
76
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
2009-12- 2010-12- Embassy
09RABAT1009 SECRET//NOFORN
28 18:06 09 21:09 Rabat
VZCZCXRO6632
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #1009/01 3621805
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 281805Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0999
INFO RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY IMMEDIATE 0011
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU IMMEDIATE 0591
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 5209
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0452
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 1175
RUEHDS/USMISSION ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0985
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN PRIORITY 0079
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0099
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA PRIORITY 0196
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0131
RUEHJL/AMEMBASSY BANJUL PRIORITY 0103
RUEHCO/AMEMBASSY COTONOU PRIORITY 0057
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY 0516
RUEHFN/AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY 0036
RUEHPC/AMEMBASSY LOME PRIORITY 0564
RUEHMV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA PRIORITY 0570
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY 1179
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS PRIORITY 0053
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 001009
SIPDIS
NOFORN
77
SUBJECT: GUINEA UPDATE: DADIS CAMARA TO LEAVE
MOROCCO?
78
peaceful solution to the problems in Guinea, Bourita said
Morocco's relations with Guinea and other countries must be
taken into consideration. It is not for Morocco, he said, to
turn Dadis Camara over to the ICC. He added that were a
Security Council resolution forthcoming, it would put the GOM
in a difficult position but would, of course, be binding.
Bourita asked rhetorically whether "out of Guinea" meant "in
Morocco" or that Morocco should help find a third-country
location for Dadis Camara. Bourita stressed that the U.S.
and France should avoid any public request for Morocco to
keep Dadis. Bourita further urged that the U.S. and France
should maintain contact with Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi
Fihri while the Minister is in Tripoli, Libya, for the Arab
Maghreb Union Ministerial, December 28 to 30.
79
GOM's desire to help Guinea. However, with no legal or
medical basis to keep Dadis here and without any country
other than Libya prepared to accept him on a legal or medical
basis, Bourita's suggestion that Dadis be dealt with in
Guinea may be the only viable option. End Comment.
*****************************************
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*****************************************
JACKSON
80
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
2009-12- 2010-12- Embassy
09RABAT1018 SECRET//NOFORN
31 14:02 09 21:09 Rabat
VZCZCXRO9054
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #1018/01 3651455
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 311455Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1009
INFO RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY IMMEDIATE 0013
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU IMMEDIATE 0593
RUEHDS/USMISSION ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0987
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN PRIORITY 0081
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0101
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA PRIORITY 0198
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0133
RUEHJL/AMEMBASSY BANJUL PRIORITY 0105
RUEHCO/AMEMBASSY COTONOU PRIORITY 0059
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY 0518
RUEHFN/AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY 0038
RUEHPC/AMEMBASSY LOME PRIORITY 0566
RUEHMV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA PRIORITY 0572
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY 1181
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0454
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS PRIORITY 0055
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 001018
SIPDIS
NOFORN
81
¶B. RABAT 0988
Classified By: DCM Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
82
¶4. (S/NF) For XXXXXXXXXXXX, Konate's travel to Rabat
allowed him to return to Guinea and report on the basis of his first-
hand knowledge that Dadis was unable to continue in his role as
leader of Guinea, paving the way for Konate to assume power for a
transitional period. Were Konate to attempt to take control without
having undertaken the trip to Rabat to see Dadis, he would have
been perceived as a traitor to Dadis and have no legitimacy before
the Guinean people and army. Konate would then have Cherif and
Claude Pivi, another CNDD leader, arrested, XXXXXXXXXXXX
said.
83
End Comment.
*****************************************
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KAPLAN
84
Reference
Created Released Classification Origin
ID
2010-01-04 2010-12-09 Embassy
10RABAT5 SECRET//NOFORN
16:04 21:09 Rabat
VZCZCXRO0327
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #0005/01 0041658
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 041658Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1017
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0136
RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY 0015
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 3857
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0456
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY 0034
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 000005
SIPDIS
NOFORN
85
(CISMOA) and continued military cooperation. During meetings
with Inspector General Bennani and other Moroccan general
officers, General Ward and the Ambassador requested
overflight clearance for the P-3 (Reftel); asked for an
assessment of the threat posed by AQIM; urged Morocco to keep
Guinean junta leader Dadis Camara in Morocco a long time; and
said he looked forward to returning to sign the ACSA.
General Bennani and his senior staff reacted positively to
the overflight request and said they would examine it in more
detail. They thought Guinean Defense Minister Konate was
weak, and, unlike other senior Moroccan officials, they
downplayed the importance of narcotics transiting Morocco.
End Summary.
--------------------------------------------- ---
Communications Interoperability and Security MOA
--------------------------------------------- ---
86
support for all other agencies, work in Africa.
87
¶7. (S) Turning to regional issues, General Ward asked
General Bennani how he saw the regional threat from Al
Qu,aida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and
narcotics traffickers. Bennani responded that narcotics were
not making their way into Morocco. However, AQIM posed a
serious threat to countries like Mauritania and Mali that
could not counter the terrorists. General Bennani explained
that he was intimately familiar with Mauritania,s geography
and topography and that the country was not capable of
controlling its territory. Brigadier General Abdellah
Hamdoun, the Director of Military Intelligence, offered that
Mali lacked the means to counter AQIM. General Ward then
briefed General Bennani, Air Force Commander Major General
Ahmed Boutaleb and other general officers on the U.S. plan to
gather intelligence about AQIM in Mali and Mauritania and
requested overflight clearance for a U.S. EP-3 aircraft.
General Bennani responded positively, saying it was important
to box in AQIM. General Boutaleb added that the Air Force
and the General Staff would study the overflight request and
respond quickly.
------
Guinea
------
¶8. (S) General Ward next noted that Morocco was hosting some
important guests. General Bennani asked if he was referring
to President Sarkozy or former President Chirac. General
Ward replied he was referring to Guinean junta leader Dadis
Camara and Guinean Minister of National Defense Sekouba
Konate, asking about their conditions. Surprisingly, Bennani
had no information about either and did not even know that
General Konate was in Morocco )- although he had attended
the Moroccan military academy and had strong ties to Moroccan
leaders. General Ward strongly urged that Morocco keep Dadis
Camara as long as possible. General Bennani noted that
Camara was in Morocco on humanitarian terms, and responded
only that many African leaders come to the Mohammed V
Military Hospital in Rabat for free medical care. General
Hamdoun suggested that Konate was weak and might not be fit
to serve as head of state for an extended period.
-------
88
Comment
-------
*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
*****************************************
KAPLAN
89
Reference
Created Released Classification Origin
ID
2010-01-08 2010-12-09 Embassy
10RABAT8 SECRET
11:11 21:09 Rabat
VZCZCXRO3317
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #0008/01 0081117
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 081117Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1026
INFO RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY IMMEDIATE 0018
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0001
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE IMMEDIATE 0657
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU IMMEDIATE 0595
RUEHDS/USMISSION ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0989
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN PRIORITY 0001
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0103
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA PRIORITY 0200
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0139
RUEHJL/AMEMBASSY BANJUL PRIORITY 0107
RUEHCO/AMEMBASSY COTONOU PRIORITY 0061
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY 0520
RUEHFN/AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY 0040
RUEHPC/AMEMBASSY LOME PRIORITY 0568
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY 1183
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0459
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS PRIORITY 0057
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 RABAT 000008
SIPDIS
90
SUBJECT: GUINEA: THE WAY FORWARD
Classified By: Ambassador Samuel L. Kaplan for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).
-----------------------
91
Moroccans Set the Stage
-----------------------
¶5. (S) Fassi Fihri went on to explain that Konate saw the
restructuring of the military as a three-to-five year process
92
expressing French, U.S. and Moroccan support for Konate, French
Presidential Advisor for African Affairs Andre Parant had already
signed it. Fassi Fihri said Konate would "keep it in his pocket" but
needed the written assurance of support.
-------------
The U.S. Role
-------------
------------
Enter Konate
------------
93
credibility to the transition process. A/S Carson noted
there was much international goodwill toward Guinea, and if
the country chose the path toward stability, economic
development, and civilian government, there would be help
along the way.
--------------
Whither Dadis?
--------------
¶10. (S) Carson did not meet with Dadis Camara, but discussed
his health with the Moroccans outside of Konate,s presence.
Fassi Fihri told A/S Carson that he has visited Dadis four
94
times since he was allowed into the country for medical care
(Ref B). According to the FM, Dadis has regained "80
percent" of his faculties, but has difficulty putting more
than five words together without 30-second pauses before the
next phrase or sentence. Fassi Fihri,s conversations with
Dadis had focused mainly on health issues, the FM said, with
Fassi Fihri urging him to fully recover before thinking about
politics and his future. Dadis has, however, expressed the
desire to leave, Fassi Fihri said, and has begun to wonder
why he has not been discharged from the hospital.
¶11. (S) Fassi Fihri and Mansouri suggested that once Konate
made his public pronouncement, Dadis would know he was
finished politically and it would be difficult for him to
return to Guinea. Concerted engagement by Konate with
political forces inside Guinea, and by the U.S. and France
with external forces such as ECOWAS and President Blaise
Compaore, to enlist support for Konate and his leadership
though a transitional period and their positive reaction to a
pronouncement would convince Dadis to go to a third country,
Fassi Fihri said. Konate was explicit that Dadis not be
allowed to return to Guinea and participate in the transition.
--------------
The Road Ahead
--------------
95
path to economic progress and civilian rule. Konate departed
Rabat for Conakry on January 5.
-------
Comment
-------
*****************************************
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KAPLAN
96
Reference
Created Released Classification Origin
ID
2010-01-15 2010-12-09 Embassy
10RABAT22 CONFIDENTIAL
07:07 21:09 Rabat
VZCZCXRO8688
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #0022/01 0150743
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 150743Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1046
INFO RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY 0022
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU PRIORITY 0599
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 0005
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 0107
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0204
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1295
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0143
RUEHJL/AMEMBASSY BANJUL 0111
RUEHCO/AMEMBASSY COTONOU 0065
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 0524
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0005
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0661
RUEHMV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA 0574
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 3862
RUEHPA/AMEMBASSY PRAIA 0011
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0727
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0463
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 0047
RUEHDS/USMISSION ADDIS ABABA
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 000022
SIPDIS
97
SUBJECT: WHY DID MOROCCO SEND DADIS CAMARA TO
BURKINA FASO?
Classified By: DCM Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
98
Blaise Compaore on January 11, wanted Compaore to assume
responsibility as mediator of the Guinean conflict vice
remaining angry that he had not been party to the Rabat
Declaration of January 5. It was the king,s further desire
that Dadis Camara not be in Morocco when the UN Security
Council considered the contents of the United Nations report
on the September massacres in Guinea. Bourita asked for U.S.
support to keep the travel secret from the Government of
Burkina Faso, which he stated was not advised until shortly
before Dadis' arrival of the GOM,s intent to deliver Dadis
Camara to Ouagadougou that day.
¶4. (C) The GOM expressed its intent to reach out to the
Government of Saudi Arabia in support of the U.S. and French
demarches urging Saudi Arabia to accept Dadis Camara for
residency, just as King Mohammed VI had reached out to
Gabonese President Ali Bongo, who declined to host Dadis.
The GOM also reached out to General Sekouba Konate on both
January 12 and 13 to reassure him that Morocco remained
¶5. (C) Comment: The timing of the king,s decision was surprising,
if not entirely unexpected. While not in accord with the spirit of the
99
January 5 declaration, the GOM had always said that it needed a
legal basis to keep Dadis and did not want him in Morocco when the
Security Council considered the report on the massacre. The GOM
remains hopeful that Dadis Camara will not return to Guinea.
Morocco,s willingness to work with the U.S. and France to prevent
Dadis from taking contracted air back to Guinea, bought some time.
Moreover, Morocco remains interested in participating in the
international contact group meeting in Addis Ababa in late January.
End Comment.
*****************************************
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KAPLAN
100
Reference
Created Released Classification Origin
ID
2010-01-20 2010-12-09 Embassy
10RABAT34 CONFIDENTIAL
19:07 21:09 Rabat
VZCZCXRO3319
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #0034/01 0201924
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201924Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1060
INFO RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY 0024
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU PRIORITY 0601
RUEHDS/USMISSION ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0994
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 0007
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 0109
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0206
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0145
RUEHJL/AMEMBASSY BANJUL 0113
RUEHCO/AMEMBASSY COTONOU 0067
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 0526
RUEHFN/AMEMBASSY FREETOWN 0044
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0663
RUEHPC/AMEMBASSY LOME 0572
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 1187
RUEHPA/AMEMBASSY PRAIA 0013
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 0061
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 000034
SIPDIS
101
REF: A. RABAT 0022
¶B. RABAT 0008
Classified By: DCM Robert Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
---------------------------------
Morocco's Messages in Ouagadougou
---------------------------------
102
his interlocutors, Bourita told us. First, he sought to reassure
Compaore that Rabat greatly appreciated his personal
efforts to mediate the Guinea crisis, his close coordination
with Morocco, and Burkina Faso's willingness to receive
Dadis. Alluding to the Moroccan MFA's bitterness over its
perception that Compaore may have torpedoed French, Moroccan
and U.S. efforts to find an African country to accept Dadis
for resettlement -- and apparent Burkinabe anger at Rabat's
abrupt decision to send him by medical plane to Ouagadougou
(Ref A) -- Bourita said that Mansouri also calmed the waters
with Compaore and secured agreement for continued future
cooperation. Finally, Mansouri urged Compaore to "reflect a
bit" on his initial distrust of Konate, and to realize that,
given the circumstances and poor alternatives, he was not
necessarily a bad choice to lead the Guinean transition.
------------------
Don't Rush the ICC
------------------
103
¶6. (C) Looking forward, Bourita warmly welcomed the
opportunity for Morocco to continue working closely with the
U.S. and France on Guinea's transition. The GOM likewise
welcomed the ICC's eventual investigation and likely issuance
of an arrest order for Dadis. However, he cautioned, the GOM
did not wish to see the ICC process result in additional
instability in Guinea. "Camara is unstable, and therefore
dangerous," he said; for this reason, France and the U.S.
should take care not to "rush" the ICC process. Morocco does
not support or accept impunity for Dadis, Bourita emphasized,
but France, the U.S., Morocco and their African partners
"need to move at a rate that is in harmony with one another
and that does not disturb the process." He added that in
addition to Mansouri's message to this effect in Ouagadougou,
the MFA was reiterating it to France, Gabon and Nigeria,
among others. Finally, Bourita said that the GOM looked
forward to receiving an invitation from the African Union to
attend the international contact group on Guinea,s January
26 meeting in Addis Ababa.
*****************************************
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KAPLAN
104
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
2007-07- 2010-12- Embassy
07RABAT1229 SECRET//NOFORN
31 15:03 03 21:09 Rabat
VZCZCXRO7080
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHLH
RUEHPW RUEHROV
DE RUEHRB #1229/01 2121536
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 311536Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3341
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 5741
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 4693
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 3267
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7061
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 001229
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
105
Moroccans affirmed that they highly value security
cooperation and support from the USG as they continue to
confront a substantial and growing terror threat that extends
across North Africa and the Sahel. Townsend also visited
the sites of twin suicide bombings near the U.S.
Consulate-General and the (private) American Language Center
and received a briefing on efforts to augment security for
U.S. buildings and personnel in the city. End summary.
¶5. (S/NF) Townsend asked her hosts about the GOM's approach
106
to monitoring and controlling materials that can be
precursors to explosives. TATP, which was used in the April
attacks in Morocco, is made from readily available
ingredients, she noted. Hammouchi stated that the broad
availability of explosive precursors was a source of
frustration for the GOM. He recalled a case in which a
violent Jihadist had sent his wife on 38 separate trips, in
multiple cities, to buy hydrogen peroxide from pharmacies.
"Our only weapon against this phenomenon is information,"
Hammouchi opined.
107
¶8. (S/NF) Turning to the ideological front in the war on
terror, the security chiefs affirmed that CT disruption and
preemption operations alone were not sufficient to defeat the
enemy. "We have had to become involved in the ideological
battle, even if this isn't our business," Hammouchi stated.
"Unfortunately, political and diplomatic restraints often
limit our ability to act," he added. Citing President Bush,
Townsend affirmed the U.S. belief that the war of words and
ideas is a core theater of battle, but often an area where
Muslim leaders can be more effective than Americans.
108
alert level, but more difficult to bring it back down.
Explaining such decisions to the public was always tricky,
she added. Himma agreed that the relationship between the
security services and the public was crucially important and
merited constant attention. Educating the public about the
nature of the threat and enlisting them as allies is
particularly important he added.
109
tell us what they want." He attributed what he described as
Algerian intransigence to a generational and mind-set gap
between the leaderships of the two countries. Noting that
Algiers was the next stop on her multi-country itinerary,
Townsend said she would encourage the GOA to expand security
cooperation with Morocco and to work hard to realize a
broader rapprochement with its neighbor.
*****************************************
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RILEY
110
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
2008-02-28 2010-12-03 Embassy
08RABAT185 CONFIDENTIAL
16:04 21:09 Rabat
VZCZCXRO9993
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #0185/01 0591608
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281608Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8201
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 4700
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0595
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0096
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 2297
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY 0444
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0705
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 1410
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3534
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 3669
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 4946
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0682
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0274
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 9535
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY 3919
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY 2226
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 1933
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0786
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 000185
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
111
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TAIEB FASSI FIHRI
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).
BILATERAL COOPERATION
---------------------
¶2. (C) Receiving NEA A/S Welch, the Ambassador, DCM and Erin
Yerger, the Executive Assistant to Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs Elliot Abrams, at the
royal palace in Marrakech on February 25, the King thanked
the United States for the excellent cooperation on
counterterrorism, the Millennium Challenge Account and the
Free Trade Agreement. Foreign Minister Fassi Fihri also
attended the audience.
KOSOVO
------
¶3. (C) The King noted that he had just met with the Greek
Foreign Minister, who urged him not to recognize Kosovo. The
King and the Foreign Minister indicated that they intended to
discuss recognition with other Arab leaders at the
112
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Summit in Dakar
in March. Fassi Fihri said the Serbian Foreign Minister has
also requested a meeting.
LEBANON
-------
¶5. (C) Turning to the continuing leadership vacuum in
Lebanon, A/S Welch said that we see three options: 1) to
continue efforts to elect a President by consensus; 2) to
elect a President with 50 percent of the vote plus one; or 3)
to support the Siniora government. Welch indicated that we
increasingly believe the third option affords the best means
to support Lebanon,s institutions. Asked about Arab League
Secretary General Amr Moussa's visit to Beirut, Fassi Fihri
SIPDIS
characterized it as 'a catastrophe.'
113
he understood that the Emir of Kuwait did not plan to attend,
implying that Morocco would be represented at the ministerial
level at best.
IRAN
----
¶7. (C) Ambassador Welch asked if he might say a few words
about Iran and its pursuit of nuclear weapons. The King
responded that he understood that Iran had suspended its
nuclear weapons program. Welch thanked the King for the
opportunity to clarify, declaring that the U.S. intelligence
estimate had been misunderstood and that the reporting on
this issue has been unclear. Welch said that we continued to
believe that Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons; so President
Bush was seeking a middle ground "between the bomb and
bombing," without giving up any option. Diplomatic pressure
is best for now. When the King asked what that middle ground
might look like, Welch said that more Security
Council-approved sanctions loom and that Iran must accept a
diplomatic solution.
ALGERIA
-------
¶8. (C) The conversation then turned to Algeria, and Welch
asked if the GOM had any views on President Abdelaziz
Bouteflika,s plans. The King said he understood that
Bouteflika was amending the Constitution to permit a third
term, and Welch noted wryly that Bouteflika was doing so
without Syrian assistance. The King praised the "frustrated"
Algerian Ambassador in Rabat for his tireless efforts to
improve bilateral relations, stating, &We have no relations
with Algeria, except for limited cooperation on security
issues." In spite of obvious opportunities for cooperation
in agriculture, energy and a host of other areas, President
Bouteflika and his government clearly prefer the status quo.
The King noted that he had even traveled to Algiers to try to
break the impasse, but the GOA continues to insist on the
Western Sahara issue being resolved before proceeding with
other bilateral or regional initiatives.
WESTERN SAHARA
--------------
¶9. (C) The King and Fassi Fihri expressed grave concern
114
about the POLISARIO's stated plans to move people into the
area east of the berm. The King said bluntly that Morocco
could not allow that. Praising the King,s autonomy
initiative, Welch urged the GOM to press ahead with the
Manhasset talks. He said support for Morocco,s position is
growing ever so slowly. Separately, Welch cautioned the
King's intelligence chief against militarization of the
dispute.
MAURITANIA
----------
¶10. (C) Looking at Western Sahara's neighbor Mauritania, the
King stressed that Mauritania needs help and that he will see
the Mauritanian President in Dakar.
AMERICAN SCHOOLS
----------------
¶11. (U) Welch took advantage of a few private minutes with
Fassi Fihri to underscore the need for an agreement on the
status of the American schools in Morocco. Noting that he
had attended the Rabat American School (RAS)as a child, Welch
said if a solution is not found soon that RAS could not
produce more David Welches. Fassi Fihri replied that he had
COMMENT
-------
¶13. (C) Although his face looked puffy, the King appeared
relaxed and rested after four weeks in France. The meeting
115
itself underscored how much U.S. and Moroccan views coincide.
END COMMENT.
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Riley
116
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
2008-03-03 2010-12-03 Embassy
08RABAT194 SECRET
11:11 21:09 Rabat
VZCZCXRO3119
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #0194/01 0631132
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 031132Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8210
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 4703
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0099
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0542
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0672
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2300
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 0447
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0708
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3538
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 5927
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 3672
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 4950
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0685
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3521
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0277
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 9538
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 3923
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH 2229
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1936
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 000194
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
117
REF: A. RABAT 185 (NOTAL)
¶B. RABAT 0178 (NOTAL)
¶C. RABAT 0171 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for reason 1.4 (b, c, and
d).
118
pressure on Lebanon and appeared determined to maintain its
interests in Lebanon at any cost. Prior to the Annapolis
conference, Syria had been relatively quiet vis-a-vis the
Palestinians. However, three or four weeks ago, it hosted
the conference of rejectionists. Damascus has lost the
support of many Arab friends, and the Arab League Summit is
insufficient incentive to achieve better behavior.
¶4. (S) Turning to Israel, Welch said that the good news was
real albeit unseen. He assured Mansouri that the
Israeli-Palestinian talks were addressing all issues and were
making progress. He told Mansouri that the Secretary and
then the President intend to return to the region. More Arab
financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority would be
helpful. Mansouri said that he and Foreign Minister Taieb
Fassi Fihri had met Israeli Foreign Minister Livni and found
her serious.
119
frontier. Meanwhile, Hamas was not using funds it received
from Iran to improve the humanitarian situation. Asked about
the expected transition in Egypt, Mansouri agreed that the
army would not control the next transition. He nonetheless
expected a "monarchical succession."
THE MAGHREB
-----------
¶6. (C) Moving west, Mansouri said Morocco and Libya enjoyed
very good relations and agreed on many regional issues.
Mansouri noted that Libya continues to believe that Saudi
Wahabism is the source of terrorism in the region. Welch
acknowledged that Libyan-U.S. relations are currently
strained due to historical disputes. Mansouri was surprised
when Welch expressed concern about Tunisia. Mansouri said
Morocco is quite concerned about the greed and brittleness of
the Ben Ali regime. Mansouri added that the December
2006/January 2007 events had scared the GOT.
WESTERN SAHARA
--------------
¶8. (C) Mansouri told Welch and party that Algeria's internal
problems did not prevent a solution to the Western Sahara
dispute. He expressed some concern that generational change
in Algiers might complicate a solution, declaring that the
older generation had created the problem and was best placed
to solve it. Mansouri said the GOM is "very worried about
the POLISARIO moving into the area east of the berm."
Ambassador Welch then launched into a long discussion of U.S.
support for Morocco,s autonomy proposal and for a diplomatic
120
solution. Both he and Ambassador Riley cautioned against
military action. Welch said that while nine UNSC members
still do not back Morocco's position, international support
was growing. Mansouri then explained that UN Special Envoy
Peter Van Walsum had expressed some disappointment with U.S.
and international support. Welch said we would look at ways
to publicly support Van Walsum's efforts to achieve a
solution. He added that the POLISARIO would never have an
independent state.
MAURITANIA
----------
¶9. (C) Last but not least, Mansouri expressed deep concern
about the deteriorating security situation in Mauritania and
requested that the USG consider enhanced assistance to
support the new democratic government. Welch said that the
U.S. is providing more assistance both through the Middle
East Partnership Initiative and the Trans-Saharan
Counterterrorism Partnership.
COMMENT
-------
PARTICIPANTS
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DCM Robert P. Jackson Mansouri
RAO Counselor George Gaydos Gen. Abdeljabbar Azaoui
Executive Assistant to
DAPNSA Elliot Abrams
Erin Yerger
NEA Staff Assistant
Kimberly Harrington
¶12. (U) NEA A/S Welch did not have an opportunity to clear
this message.
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Riley
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Reference IDCreated Released Classification Origin
2009-08-17 2010-12-03 Embassy
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Significant voter participation )- despite a Polisario call
for a boycott -- in the June 12 local elections may be a sign
that support for independence is waning although support for
self-government is real. Serious human rights abusers have
been transferred, and respect for human rights in the
territory has greatly improved, reaching the same plane as in
Morocco. However, advocating independence is still a red
line, and the GOM refuses to register pro-Polisario NGOs.
Giving the territory more autonomy, improving
Algerian-Moroccan relations, enhancing regional integration,
building real confidence, and addressing all parties,
propaganda seem essential to resolving the conflict. End
Summary.
124
what the Sahara was costing Morocco. TelQuel claimed that
the GOM has spent 1.2 trillion dirhams on the territory since
1975 and is spending 3 percent of GDP or USD 2.7 billion per
year, including the funds to maintain two-thirds of the Royal
Armed Forces in Western Sahara. (Note: TelQuel faced no
consequences for the article. Even with the relative
expansion of the freedom of the press in Morocco to cover
subjects formerly taboo, this was astonishing. End Note.)
125
was first proposed. The absence of such larger nationalism,
along with the Polisario,s 1970,s war against Mauritania
--the world,s only Sahrawi state -- suggest the conflict is
less nationalist than geopolitical, linked to the much older
dispute between Algeria and Morocco, and hardly boosts the
case for an independent state. End Comment.)
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Who Counts?
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Human Rights: Progress but Continuing Paranoia
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126
long-serving security officials with consistent records as
abusers. Activists and officials confirmed in July 2009 that
more transfers (many by promotion) had recently taken place,
and most well known abusers are reportedly now gone. All
sources report the territory is quiet, with residents hopeful
for some political progress.
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What the People Want
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127
enjoyed the support of the &silent majority8 of these
Sahrawis, particularly during periods of repression.
Development and reduced oppression have reduced this support.
The Sahrawi &silent majority8 in the territory has been
intrigued by the prospect of autonomy and has generally
quietly awaited its development. Recently, a pro-Polisario
activist, when asked, confided to us that he believed that in
a free election held now a majority of voters in the
territory would choose autonomy.
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On the Other Side of the Berm
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Frozen Negotiations
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128
police and some independence for the judiciary, and was
accompanied by a declared willingness to negotiate. It was
also viewed as credible by the international community,
including explicitly Russia and implicitly China, which
nearly universally expressed a willingness to accept this as
a possible outcome, if agreed. Credibility was an issue,
however, among Sahrawis on both sides of the berm, as there
was little confidence, given past Moroccan evasions, that
even if agreed, the GOM would implement the plan. This
credibility gap has narrowed, but only slightly, due to the
improvements in the human rights situation. Credibility is,
therefore, key to winning hearts and minds.
129
relations. King Mohammed VI took note of this and conveyed
through Ross an offer of unconditional, at-any-level and
on-any-subject, bilateral talks. Ross did get Algeria to
agree to go to the &informals8 but only as observers. He
got no response on the bilateral issue, although it is still
early in Bouteflika,s new term. The informal meeting this
month in Vienna has at least re-launched the negotiations.
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Regional Link: Algeria-Morocco Key to Sahara Solution
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Comment
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130
convinced that there will be no agreement if relations with
Algiers do not improve. In response, as of June 2009, the
Moroccans have maintained that their principal goal now is
rapprochement with Algeria, which could be discussed
separately.
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Jackson
131
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
2008-08-04 2010-12-02 Embassy
08RABAT727 SECRET
16:04 21:09 Rabat
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¶1. (C) Summary: The Moroccan Royal Armed Forces (FAR) are
modernizing but remain weighed down by long-standing
problems. King Mohammed VI, who in 1999 inherited a military
in need of professionalization, has implemented some needed
reforms, but much remains to be done. Civilian control, if
ascribed to the person of the King, is complete, but there is
no real Defense Ministry. Outside the FAR, there is only a
small administration. The military remains plagued by
corruption, an inefficient bureaucracy, low levels of
education in the ranks, periodic threats of radicalization of
132
some of its soldiers, political marginalization, and the
deployment of most of its forces in the Western Sahara.
There have been some indications of pending changes in the
leadership. In general, the U.S. and Morocco share a robust
military relationship with prospects for even closer ties in
the future. The health of the relationship is evident by
increased U.S.-Moroccan military training exercises and
Morocco's purchase of sophisticated weapons from the U.S. to
include 24 F-16s this year. We anticipate that the
U.S.-Moroccan military relationship will continue to flourish
but Morocco's ability to absorb its new high-end military
purchases and restrictions on high quality Moroccan
information sharing with our attaches represent two
challenges ahead. This mission-coordinated report draws
heavily on valuable reporting and analysis from the embassy's
military components, the Defense Attache Office and the
Office of Security Cooperation. End Summary.
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All the King's Men
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133
¶3. (C) Over the past decade, Morocco has transitioned from a
conscript to an all-volunteer military force of approximately
218,000 soldiers. Of the three services, the Army is
dominant with approximately 175,000 personnel. There are
approximately 13,000 personnel in the Air Force and 7,800 in
the Navy. Though nominally subordinate within the military
structure but answering directly to the King, the
Gendarmerie, which consists of approximately 22,000
personnel, conducts paramilitary, royal guard, and internal
and border policing missions. Though a few legacy conscripts
remain in the military, professional reforms have made
voluntary military service an attractive career option for
Moroccans with opportunities for a steady income and some
upward mobility. The average military salary for enlisted
soldiers is approximately 2,000 dirhams (USD 270) per month.
An officer's starting salary is approximately 6,000 dirhams
(USD 850) per month. With benefits, such as free housing,
these are reasonably competitive in the Moroccan context.
¶5. (C) King Hassan II and his son, King Mohammed VI, have
maintained the Gendarmerie as a force relatively independent
from the FAR since 1972, in part as a check against a
military coup. While it most visibly serves as a State
Police/Highway Patrol, it has a wide range of units. Its
commander, Lt Gen Benslimane, likely reports in some way
directly to the King. He also leads the Moroccan National
Soccer League, making him a popular figure inside and out of
134
military circles. While there is no direct proof of
Benslimane being involved in corrupt activity, low ranking
Gendarmerie assigned to highway patrols are expected to pay
approximately 4,000 dirhams (USD 540) to their immediate
supervisors with extralegal earnings from motorists above
which they can keep for themselves, according to one credible
anecdote.
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Military Operations Dominated by Western Sahara
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135
¶7. (C) While the border between Morocco and Algeria is
closed, and relations remain cool, we do not believe that
Algeria poses an imminent conventional military threat to
Morocco. Nonetheless, the FAR has contingency plans and
"wargames" in training exercises for a possible Algerian
attack, but the FAR does not have troops deployed along the
border. Instead, the FAR remains stationed in garrisons,
hundreds of kilometers away from the border, from which they
could deploy in the unlikely event of an Algerian incursion
into Morocco. Any confrontation between the two countries
would likely take place through the proxy of the POLISARIO,
which Algeria has supported materially in the past and could
do so again if hostilities between Morocco and the POLISARIO
recommenced.
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Peacekeeping
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Corruption Remains the Single Greatest Challenge
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136
at the highest levels. This may partly reflect a grand
bargain struck by King Hassan II following at least two
nearly successful coups in the 1970's: remain loyal, and you
can profit. (Those whose loyalty was in question were
subject to sometimes decades of harsh imprisonment.)
Credible reports indicate that Lt Gen Benanni is using his
position as the Commander of the Southern Sector to skim
money from military contracts and influence business
decisions. A widely believed rumor has it that he owns large
parts of the fisheries in Western Sahara. Benanni, like many
senior military officers, has a lavish family home that was
likely built with money gleaned from bribes. Leadership
positions in regional sectors are a significant source of
extralegal income for military leaders. There are even
reports of students at Morocco's military academy paying
money to increase their class standings in order to obtain
positions in lucrative military postings. Command in the
southern sector, i.e., Western Sahara, given the predominance
of military activity there, is considered to be the most
lucrative of the sectors in this regard. Because command in
the southern sector is also considered critical to high level
advancement in the FAR, positions there are highly sought
after. Consequently, positions in this sector are often
jealously "guarded" by a number of influential families in
the military. The GOM seems to be looking for ways to stop
corruption, especially among the formative military ranks of
Colonel and below, but not much is being done to stop the
corruption in the general officer ranks.
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Retiring High Level Officers Also a Problem
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137
the morale of mid-level military leaders.
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Radicalization: Under Control But Lingering Menace
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Winds of Change
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¶12. (C) Since the 1970's the military itself has been
perceived as the greatest threat to the throne and internal
security in Morocco, not surprising given Morocco's own
history and the broader context of the coup-ridden Middle
East and Africa. Of late, however, there is a general
138
King's growing confidence is partly signaled by a recent
significant increase in military spending, particularly for
modern hardware, although this is primarily a function of the
GOM's perceived threat from Algeria and the fact that it is
cost prohibitive at a certain point to maintain older
military equipment. The GOM increased the military's
operating budget to more than USD 2 billion in 2007,
significantly more than in previous years. Likewise, the FAR
is undergoing a significant modernization process, paying
over USD 2 billion for 24 F-16 aircraft and over USD 300
million for T-6 training aircraft from the U.S. The GOM has
commercially financed these transactions, thus far, but the
upfront payments have come from the treasury, which has also
committed to cover monthly payments. The King recently
allowed armed military flights north of Ben Guerir (located
approximately 200 kilometers south of Rabat), an act not
permitted in the past due to the King,s desire to keep the
military far away from the Palace in Rabat. The GOM is also
looking to make significant purchases of M-1 Abrams battle
tanks in the future.
--------------------------------
U.S.-Moroccan Military Relations
Strong but Could Be Better
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139
circle, an organization of Military Attaches from various
countries residing in Morocco who elect a president to
discuss issues of collective concern with the FAR. It is
apparent that the Palace continues to tightly control the
FAR's interactions U.S. and other foreign governments.
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AFRICOM Viewed with Caution
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COMMENT
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140
will, therefore, continue to be distanced from policy making
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141
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
2007-10-29 2010-11-30 Embassy
07RABAT1657 CONFIDENTIAL
16:04 21:09 Rabat
VZCZCXRO2178
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHRB #1657/01 3021644
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 291644Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7648
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 3113
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3425
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 5819
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 4809
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 3609
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 001657
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
Classified by DCM Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: French President Sarkozy’s October 22-24 visit to
Morocco was viewed as a success by both sides. During a star-like
visit and speech to the Moroccan parliament, Sarkozy offered the
most explicit French statement to date in support of Morocco’s
autonomy plan as the basis for a negotiated settlement to the Sahara
dispute. Sarkozy also essentially conceded the loss of the sale of
French Rafale fighters to a “better offer” to Morocco for U.S. F-16s.
Sarkozy and entourage completed nearly 3 billion Euros worth of
commercial deals and military sales during the visit, including a
naval frigate. The French Ambassador in Rabat downplayed the
commercial aspects of the trip, instead emphasizing Sarkozy’s
“Mediterranean Union” summit proposal and his support for
Moroccan democratic and economic reforms. The visit received
142
mainly favorable attention in the local media, featuring images of two
heads of state interacting as equal partners and friends. End
summary.
---------------------------------
Leaning Farther Forward on Sahara
---------------------------------
¶2. (C) In an interview with the pro-Palace daily Le Matin just
before his arrival, Sarkozy described Morocco’s autonomy proposal
for the Sahara as “serious and credible.” Addressing a joint session
of parliament in Rabat on October 23, Sarkozy appeared to take
explicit French support for Morocco’s plan a step further, describing
it as “a new element,” in a long deadlocked process, using the USG
formulation that it could “serve as a basis for negotiation in the
search for a reasonable settlement to the Western Sahara issue.”
Sarkozy’s remarks on Sahara appeared to move France closer
toward the Moroccan position, and were embraced as such by most
of the Moroccan press, which characterized the president’s remarks
as a breakthrough for French policy on the Sahara question. (We
understand the Polisario leadership has protested Sarkozy’s
remarks.)
------------------------------------
Mediterranean Union and Other Themes
------------------------------------
¶3. (SBU) During an October 26 briefing, French Ambassador Jean-
Francois Thibault emphasized to the DCM and other members of the
diplomatic corps the excellent atmospherics of the Sarkozy visit while
downplaying its commercial aspects. Thibault stated that Sarkozy
came to underscore French support for Morocco,s democratic
development, reforms not only in the economic realm but also in
human rights, and Morocco,s importance for Europe.
¶4. (SBU) In that context, Thibault spent several minutes describing
the proposed Mediterranean Union Summit in June 2008. While
noting that the union is not intended to replace the Barcelona
Process, he said that the themes would be political, security, energy,
educational and agricultural cooperation. In response to a question,
Thibault opined that the African Union and Arab League would be
invited to send observers as would some European nations that do
not border the Mediterranean.
¶5. (SBU) Queried about international issues, Thibault said there had
been little discussion beyond the public statements about Iran and
the Middle East Peace Process. Amb. Thibault also confirmed that
France and Morocco also signed agreements on extradition, prisoner
transfer, social security, and sanitation.
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Economic Agreements and Military Sales
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¶6. (SBU) Though downplaying the economic issues that received the
greatest coverage in local media, Thibault confirmed that French
companies had completed a “draft” agreement to construct a high-
speed rail line (&train a grande vitesse or TGV8) from Tangier to
Marrakech and from Casablanca to Oujda in three phases. The first
phase would be to provide the engineering, equipment and rolling
stock for the Tangier to Rabat to Casablanca portion; phase two
would extend the line to Marrakech; finally, the TGV would link
Casablanca to Rabat, Meknes, Fes, and, ultimately, Oujda. The
agreement relates to the initial 200-km Tangier-Kenitra portion of
the route, at a cost of 2 billion euros, half of which will go to
¶7. (SBU) The proposal, which has been under study since 2004, was
apparently seized on as a centerpiece for the visit once it became
apparent that Rabat was determined to proceed with purchase of
American F-16 fighters rather than the French Rafale, though the
project is not expected to be commissioned until 2013. Perhaps
chastened by the Rafale experience, the French president told French
attendees at a Moroccan-French economic forum in Marrakech on
the last day of his visit that they cannot rest on their laurels. Instead
they must aggressively outbid and outhustle the competition,
conceding (according to the Moroccan press) that if the French lost
the Rafale aircraft deal, “it is because the Americans made a better
offer.” Responding to a press question Sarkozy proudly defended his
good relations with the U.S.
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Press Coverage - Ecstatic, with Exceptions
------------------------------------------
¶9. (SBU) The visit generated numerous positive images and sound
bytes. During Sarkozy’s address to parliament he called for “a real
partnership without arrogance” - and promised “France will be at
your side” as Morocco moves forward with its economic and political
agenda. These and other sound bytes resonated in numerous
headlines above glowing articles in the Moroccan press, as did images
of Sarkozy affectionately greeting the King, the royal family,
Moroccan officials, and citizens in carefully managed photo-ops.
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146