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 Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
2009-07-28 2010-12-06 Embassy
09AMMAN1689 SECRET
14:02 15:03 Amman
VZCZCXRO8322
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHAM #1689/01 2091427
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 281427Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5609
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001689

SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 07/23/2019

TAGS PGOV, KDEM, SOCI, JO
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN SOCCER GAME HALTED AMIDST
ANTI-REGIME
CHANTS, HOOLIGANISM TOWARD PALESTINIANS

Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Lawrence Mandel for reasons 1.4

(b) and (d).

¶1. (S) Summary: Anti-Palestinian hooliganism and slogans

denigrating the Palestinian origins of both the Queen and the Crown
Prince led to the cancellation of a July 17 soccer game between the
rival Faisali and Wahdat clubs, who traditionally represent the East
Banker and Palestinian communities, respectively. Matches between
the two teams have a long history of violence, but the specific digs at
the royal family marked a new low. The clubs have been fined and
their fans publicly chastised, yet official media reporting and
commentary has been noticeably thin. The game exposed the growing
rift between East Bankers and Palestinians in Jordan. The King’s
silence on the event is noteworthy, as is a reluctance among our
contacts to discuss the issue. End Summary.

Faisali 0, Wahdat 0, PPD (Riot)

-------------------------------

4
¶2. (C) Jordanian police intervened to stop fan violence and the
chanting of anti-regime slogans during a July 17 match between
Amman soccer clubs Faisali and Wahdat in the industrial town of
Zarqa. The unrest began when Faisali fans started to chant slogans
against Palestinian-origin Jordanians, including Queen Rania. Some
Faisali fans threw bottles at Wahdat players and their fans. The
coaches of both teams ordered their players off of the field in the
middle of the game for their own safety, and the remainder of the
match was canceled. (Note: It ended in a scoreless draw. End Note.)

A Storied Rivalry
-----------------

¶3. (U) Faisali and Wahdat serve as the proxy champions of the East
Banker and Palestinian communities, respectively. Faisali, whose
name refers to the Hashemite King Faisal, is controlled by a
prominent tribe (the ‘Udwan) which hails from the East Banker
stronghold of Salt. It is known as the favored team of tribal East
Bankers, even though many of its players are of Palestinian origin.
Since the formation of the Jordanian Football Union (JFU) in 1944,
Faisali has won thirty national championships.

¶4. (C) Wahdat, which takes its name from the large Palestinian
refugee camp on the southern side of Amman, is seen as the favored
team of Palestinian-origin Jordanians. Wahdat has won eleven
national soccer championships since 1944, including the last three.
The club’s current president is Tareq Khoury, a successful
businessman who allegedly bought his seat on the Wahdat board. He
has since leveraged that position into a political career, and was
elected to the Lower House of Parliament in 2007.

Game Over
---------

¶5. (S) Faisali-Wahdat games have a long history of hooliganism and

politically motivated violence. Past matches have been shut down by
the police following riots spurred by offensive slogans shouted by
both sides. Those slogans have over time become a popular
barometer of tensions between East Bankers and Palestinians. The
slogans and cheers on the Faisali side during the July 17 match were
particularly divisive and controversial, as they were directed at
members of the royal family for the first time. Faisali supporters
chanted about the Palestinian origins of Queen Rania with the cheer,

5
“divorce her you father of Hussein, and we’ll marry you to two of
ours.” The newly appointed Crown Prince did not escape comment
either, as he is half Palestinian (and one quarter British) himself.

Official Fallout
----------------

¶6. (SBU) Official reaction to the match was surprisingly pro-forma.

Prince Ali, half-brother to the King and chairman of the Jordanian
Football Union (JFU), issued a statement calling the behavior of
Faisali fans “unacceptable” and “a red line.” In addition to a
relatively meager 5000 JD (USD 7000) fine on Faisali, the JFU
indicated that larger security restrictions would be placed on future
games. Members of parliament also sent a missive to the press
denouncing the chants of Faisali supporters as “contrary to
Jordanian values.” The statement was read by MP and Wahdat
president Tareq Khoury on the floor of parliament. The Faisali club
issued a press release of its own, promising to identify the “outcasts”
among its fans and deal with them accordingly.

Media Silence, Internet Cacophony

AMMAN 00001689 002 OF 002
---------------------------------

¶7. (C) Despite all of the official condemnations of Faisali and its
supporters, none of Jordan’s self-censoring media featured
descriptive news stories about the game and why it was called off.
Columnists and commentators, even those who are usually used to
advance pro-government views, were noticeably silent. The heads of
the Faisali and Wahdat fan clubs were allegedly invited to appear on
Al-Jazeera, but refused in recognition of the sensitivities surrounding
criticism of the royal family.

¶8. (SBU) Internet news sites, however, were full of commentary on

the game and its implications. Many defended the Faisali supporters
as “real” Jordanians fighting against undue Palestinian influence.
Some commentators believe that Prince Ali failed to remain neutral
in the conflict by only chastising Faisali supporters, and called for
Wahdat to receive similar opprobrium.

Comment
-------

6
¶9. (S) There is broad recognition throughout Jordan that the
Faisali-Wahdat incident exposed the uncomfortable gap between
East Bankers and Palestinian-origin Jordanians -- one that most
would rather keep well-hidden for the sake of political stability. The
connection between this rift and the Hashemite monarchy, including
the newly-appointed Crown Prince, makes the incident even more
unsettling. Even our most forthcoming contacts are reluctant to talk
with us about the issue, recognizing that it strikes at the core of
Jordanian identity politics. One contact reluctantly admitted that the
game brought out the “ugly side of Jordanian ultranationalism” and
said that it would be difficult to contain now that it was publicly
expressed. Another pointed to the “increasingly explicit and
provocative” Faisali slogans as proof that status quo-oriented East
Bankers are uncomfortable with the increasing pressures for reform
that will inevitably lessen their near-monopoly on political and social
power.

¶10. (S) The King’s silence on the game and its political implications
is deafening. High level government contacts and members of the
diplomatic community are puzzled by the King’s failure to respond
to a verbal attack on his family that also dips in to Jordanian identity
politics. While he is on “internal vacation” in the southern part of
Jordan, the King’s public exposure has been limited to meetings with
scattered foreign officials. While perhaps unintentional, the King’s
silence has effectively empowered the pro-status quo establishment.
Mandel

7
 Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
2004-02-19 2010-11-29 Embassy
04AMMAN1288 SECRET
20:08 23:11 Amman
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of
the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001288

SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 02/19/2014

TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, IZ, KU, SY, JO
SUBJECT: MUASHER ON PRODUCTIVE KUWAIT MEETING,
PERSISTENT
PROBLEMS WITH SYRIA

REF: KUWAIT 539

Classified By: Amb. Edward W. Gnehm for reasons 1.5 (b) (d)
-------
SUMMARY
-------

¶1. (S) FonMin Muasher told the Ambassador February 18 that the
Iraq neighbors Foreign Ministers meeting in Kuwait had been frank
and productive, with the neighbors arguing strongly for guarantees
of Iraqi unity and the rights of Iraqi minorities. Iraqi FonMin Zebari
responded that Kurds do not want a separate state, but will seek to
preserve some of the independence they have enjoyed for twelve
years. Muasher complained to Zebari that IGC member Ahmed
Chalabi had spoiled two Jordanian bank deals in Iraq. According to
Muasher, Syrian FonMin Sharaa was the only negative voice at the
Kuwait meeting, and is increasingly an irritant in inter-Arab
relations. END SUMMARY
-----------------------------------
PRODUCTIVE FONMIN MEETING IN KUWAIT
-----------------------------------

¶2. (S) Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher described the Iraq

neighboring states Foreign Ministers meeting to the Ambassador and
PolCouns February 18 as “a good honest discussion.” He said that

8
for the first time, Iraqi FonMin Zebari had fully participated in the
discussions. For their part, the neighboring states had told Zebari
that, without a strong Iraqi commitment to unity, Iraqi federalism is
a regional -- not only internal -- issue that affects the interests of
neighboring states. Similarly, the lack of protection of minority rights
in Iraq could cause instability and become a regional issue as well.

¶3. (S) Zebari responded by saying that -- speaking as a Kurd -- there

is no possibility of the creation of a separate Kurdistan, and that
Kurds understand there is no support for the idea in the region.
However, Kurds have been living a semi-independent existence for
twelve years, and will not be willing to give up that status completely.
Accordingly, Zebari reportedly argued, Kurds “need to be
recognized as a special case.” Zebari told the group that Iraqi Shia
want not only to rule Shia areas of Iraq, but all of Iraq.

¶4. (S) Muasher said that Zebari had underscored the desire of the
Iraqi government to cooperate closely and cement good relations
with Jordan, “regardless of the opposition of Ahmed Chalabi.”
Muasher said he told Zebari that Jordan, too, wanted close
cooperation with Iraq, but blamed Chalabi for spoiling deals
negotiated by Jordan’s Arab Bank and Export and Finance Bank
with Iraq banks. Muasher said he would be raising this issue with
senior USG officials on his upcoming trip to Washington.
---------------------
SYRIA THE ODD MAN OUT
---------------------

¶5. (S) In this frank and productive discussion, Muasher commented,

“the Syrians stood out like a sore thumb. Even the Iranians were
positive.” For example, Muasher said, Syrian FonMin Farouq
Sharaa insisted that Syria would not agree to any document that
referred to the November 15 agreement between the CPA and IGC,
“since it was not approved by all members of the Governing
Council.” (Muasher said that Zebari shot back that he doubted that
all policies of the Syrian government were approved by all segments
of Syrian society.) During the meeting, Muasher said that Zebari had
asserted -- without specifics -- that terrorist leader Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi is “moving freely back and forth between Iraq and Syria,”
as are other al-Qaeda operatives. Muasher had the impression that
Zebari might have been exaggerating a bit.
------------------------
SYRIAN “STARK IGNORANCE”

9
------------------------

¶6. (S) Sharaa’s behavior in Kuwait, Muasher said, simply

underscores Syria’s “stark ignorance” of the U.S. and the rest of the
outside world. Bashar al-Asad had told King Abdullah on his recent
visit to Damascus that he was not worried about who would win the
U.S. presidential elections, since even a Democrat could choose to
keep on the senior civilian officials in the current administration.
Similarly, Sharaa had told the Jordanians accompanying the King a
tabloid-like story that showed how out of touch with reality he is:
Sharaa told the group that British Prince Charles would soon be
implicated in a Scottish judicial investigation into Princess Diana’s
death, and was consequently planning a trip to Iraq and Iran “to
seek the support of the Muslim world.” “They just don’t get it,”
Muasher lamented.
-------
COMMENT
-------

¶7. (S) Muasher was enthusiastic about the frank and positive tone of
the Kuwait neighboring states meeting. However, he is focusing more
and more on Syria -- and Farouq Sharaa in particular -- as the cause
of friction in inter-Arab relations and an impediment to progress.

¶8. (U) CPA Baghdad minimize considered.

Visit Embassy Amman’s classified website at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/ or access the site through
the State Department’s SIPRNET home page/
GNEHM

10
 Reference IDCreated Released Classification Origin
2009-04-02 2010-11-28 Embassy
09AMMAN813 SECRET
05:05 18:06 Amman
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAM #0813/01 0920549

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 020549Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4793
S E C R E T AMMAN 000813

SIPDIS

NEA/ELA AND INR/TCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2029

TAGS: PREL PINR IR JO
SUBJECT: WARY OF U.S.-IRAN ENGAGEMENT, JORDAN
OFFERS WORDS
OF CAUTION

REF: A. STATE 25892

¶B. 08 AMMAN 3329
¶C. AMMAN 668
¶D. 08 AMMAN 3189
¶E. 08 AMMAN 2660
¶F. 08 AMMAN 3372

Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft

for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (S) Summary: This cable responds to Ref A request for

evaluations of third-country reactions to possible U.S.
engagement with Iran. Jordan's leaders believe such
engagement would reward regional hardliners while undermining
Arab moderates - without convincing Iran to cease its support
for terrorism, end its nuclear program or drop its hegemonic

11
aspirations. Jordanian officials argue that the best way to
counter Iran's ambitions is to weaken the salience of its
radicalism on the Arab street by fulfilling the promise of a
"two-state solution," resolving other Arab-Israeli disputes,
and making sure that Iraq's political and security
institutions are not overwhelmed by Iranian influence when
the U.S. drawdown is complete. If U.S.-Iran engagement does
proceed in earnest, Jordan hopes to be closely consulted in
advance and for its interests to be taken into account. End
Summary.

Beware the Iranian Tentacles ... and Cut Them Off

--------------------------------------------- ----

¶2. (S) The metaphor most commonly deployed by Jordanian

officials when discussing Iran is of an octopus whose
tentacles reach out insidiously to manipulate, foment, and
undermine the best laid plans of the West and regional
moderates. Iran's tentacles include its allies Qatar and
Syria, Hizballah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Palestinian
territories, an Iraqi government sometimes seen as supplicant
to Tehran, and Shia communities throughout the region. While
Jordanian officials doubt dialogue with the U.S. will
convince Iran to withdraw its "tentacles," they believe they
can be severed if Iran is deprived of hot-button issues that
make it a hero to many on the Arab street, such as its
championing of the Palestinian cause.

¶3. (C) According to the GOJ analysis, Iran's influence

derives from the perception that Tehran is able to "deliver"
while moderates are not. The main failure of moderates as
cited by radicals is ongoing Palestinian suffering and
dispossession despite an international consensus favoring a
viable, independent Palestinian state living peacefully next
to Israel. The MFA's Deputy Director of the Arab and Middle
East Affairs Department, Muwaffaq Ajlouni, put it this way:
"Iran is not welcomed in the Arab world, but it is taking
advantage of helpless people." From Jordan's perspective,
the U.S. would benefit from pressing Israel to proceed to
final status negotiations, which would garner Arab support to
deal with shared security concerns about Iran.

¶4. (S) In Lebanon, the GOJ fears Iran's Hizballah proxy has

12
been given too much rope and could be poised to increase its
political influence during upcoming parliamentary elections.
The King sees the Lebanon-Israel War of 2006 as having
benefited Iran and Hizballah, by allowing a Sunni Arab street
enamored of "resistance" to see past its suspicions of the
Shia. And then-Foreign Minister Salah Al-Bashir in late 2008
described the spring 2009 vote as "when we will know who won
last May," referring to the outcome of the Doha Accords that
put an end to Lebanese infighting. Much like with the
Palestinian issue, Jordanian leaders have argued that the
only way to pull the rug out from under Hizballah - and by
extension their Iranian patrons - would be for Israel to hand
over the disputed Sheba'a Farms to Lebanon. With Hizballah
lacking the "resistance to occupation" rationale for
continued confrontation with Israel, it would lose its raison
d'etre and probably domestic support.

¶5. (S) In Iraq, signs of growing security and political

stability over the past year in particular have served
somewhat to calm Jordanian nerves about Iran's interference.
The King and others have cited indications that Iraqi Prime
Minister Nuri Al-Maliki is showing himself to be a national
rather than a parochial or Iranian-controlled leader. During
the U.S.-Jordan Political Dialogue in November 2008, FM
Bashir noted that the Iraqi government had a "tendency to
appease Iran," but he saw increased Jordanian (and Sunni
Arab) diplomatic engagement with Baghdad as a potential
bulwark against Iran (Ref B). Positive trends
notwithstanding, many of our Jordanian interlocutors stress
that the U.S. should leave Iraq only when it "makes sense,"
and thereby avoid a political and security vacuum that could
be easily filled by Iran (Ref C).

Prepare for Iran to Disappoint

------------------------------

¶6. (S) Jordan's leaders are careful not to be seen as

dictating toward the U.S., but their comments betray a
powerful undercurrent of doubt that the United States knows
how to deal effectively with Iran. Foreign Minister Nasser
Joudeh has suggested the Iranians would be happy to let talks
with the U.S. continue for ten years without moving them

13
forward, believing that they can benefit from perceived
acceptance after years of isolation without paying a price.

¶7. (S) Upper House President Zeid Rifai has predicted that
dialogue with Iran will lead nowhere, arguing that if the
U.S., the EU, and the Arab states agree that under no
circumstances should Iran be allowed to obtain a nuclear
weapon, military force becomes the only option. "Bomb Iran,
or live with an Iranian bomb. Sanctions, carrots, incentives
won't matter," was how he put it to visiting NEA DAS David
Hale in November. While Rifai judged a military strike would
have "catastrophic impact on the region," he nonetheless
thought preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons would
pay enough dividends to make it worth the risks (Ref D).

¶8. (C) Speaking to PolOffs in early February 2009, Director

of the Prime Minister's Political Office Khaled Al-Qadi noted
that the Gaza crisis had allowed Iranian interference in
inter-Arab relations to reach unprecedented levels. He urged
the U.S. to "understand the history," explaining that "after
the Israelis, the Iranians are the smartest. They know where
they are going and what they are doing." He doubted there
would be any diplomatic breakthrough before Iran's June
elections, partly because Iranian pragmatists cannot be
practical due to religious and ideological considerations.
He hoped any dialogue would be aimed at weakening hardliners,
many of whom believe their "Great Satan" rhetoric.

Talk If You Must, But Don't Sell Us Out

---------------------------------------

¶9. (S) If direct U.S.-Iran talks must happen, the Jordanian

leadership insists it not be at the expense of Arab
interests, particularly those of moderates like Jordan,
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority.
Furthermore, they worry that engagement will set off a
stampede of Arab states looking to get ahead of the curve and
reach their own separate peace with Tehran. King Abdullah
counseled Special Envoy George Mitchell in February that
direct U.S. engagement with Iran at this time would just
deepen intra-Arab schisms and that more "countries without a
backbone" would defect to the Iranian camp. The Prime
Ministry's Qadi has assessed that Iran sought to "transform

14
the Israeli-Arab conflict into an Islamic-Israeli conflict"
and that this strategy was already working with Syria and
Qatar. Even more conspiratorially, then-FM Bashir in
September 2008 highlighed Arab fears to a visiting CODEL that
the United States and the West would allow Iran to play a
hegemonic role in Iraq and throughout the region in exchange
for giving up its nuclear program (Ref E).

¶10. (S) Asked late last year whether he advocated engaging

Iran or working against its interests without engagement, the
King told visiting U.S. Senators that U.S. should undertake
both approaches concurrently but that engagement needs to be
done "smartly" by setting benchmarks for behavior (Ref F).
International Affairs Director at the Royal Court Jafar
Hassan on April 1 operationalized Jordan's position as
follows: the U.S. must not only consult its friends in the
region, but declare that it is doing so publicly as a signal
to Iran that the Arabs are full parties to the U.S. policy
review. He called for the U.S. and the Arabs to work
together to determine what deliverables are required from
Iran, what subjects are appropriate for discussion, and also
to set clear redlines. (Note: Hassan said Jordan was trying
to work with its friends in the region to develop a
joint-Arab strategy, but that this has yet to materialize.
End Note.)

¶11. (S) Comment: Believing the U.S. is predisposed toward

engagement with Iran, Jordanian officials have avoided
forthrightly rejecting such overtures, but they remain
anxious that Iran will be the only one to benefit - at their
expense. Given Jordanian skepticism that Iran's regional
ambitions can be reined in, they probably see establishing
benchmarks as a way to keep U.S.-Iranian engagement limited
and short-lived. Re-engagement could trigger a review of
Jordan's relationship with Iran and with Islamic groups like
Hamas, with which Jordan held limited security talks last
year. When asked periodically whether by engaging with
Hamas, Jordan was undermining PA President Mahmoud Abbas,

official interlocutors simply pointed out that Israel meets

with Hamas through Egypt, that Syria and Iran are actively
engaged with Hamas, and that Jordan cannot be disengaged.
End Comment.

15
Visit Amman's Classified Website at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman
Beecroft

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