Baksh V CA 219 SCRA 115

Baksh v CA 219 SCRA 115
Facts:
Gashem Shookat Baksh is an Iranian enrolled in a medical school while Marilou

Gonzales works in the cafeteria of said school. According to Marilou, Gashem courted
and proposed to marry her. Because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she
allowed herself to be deflowered by him. No marriage came hence an action for breach
of promise to marry.
Issue:
Is a breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong?
Is Article 21 of the Civil Code applicable in the case?
Held:
[I]The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions
that would have made it so.
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed
to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate
legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.
Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his
love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the
proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he
had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle
scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept his and to obtain her
consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the
willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential
however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy.
Now, if someone promises or agrees to marry his or her lover, and at the last minute
backs out on the promise, will it constitute as an actionable wrong? The answer is no. But one
can sue for recovery of actual damages, like wedding expenses.
The act of marrying is a personal obligation, therefore legally; a demand for specific
performance is simply out of the question—being tantamount to involuntary servitude. Our laws
do not provide specific reliefs for cases arising purely from a breach of one’s promise to marry
another. Although, there was supposed to be a chapter on breach of promise to marry proposed
by the Code Commission but it was deleted by Congress in enacting the Civil Code apparently
because of lessons from other countries, that the action readily lends itself to abuse by designing
women and unscrupulous men (Congressional Record, vol. IV, No. 79, 14 May 1949, 2352).
However, the Court has allowed moral or exemplary damages not so much on the breach
of promise but of the fraud or deceit and the consequent pain and humiliation suffered. This is
pursuant to Article 21 of the New Civil Code which provides that “any person who wilfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”
In Baksh vs. CA (219 SCRA 115), it was held -
“[T]hat where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a
sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and
that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could
justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise
to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to
her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that
such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs, or public policy.”
G.R. No. L-17396 May 30, 1962

CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee.
Cecilio L. Pe for and in his own behalf as plaintiff-appellant.
Leodegario L. Mogol for defendant-appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Plaintiffs brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover moral,
compensatory, exemplary and corrective damages in the amount of P94,000.00 exclusive of
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
Defendant, after denying some allegations contained in the complaint, set up as a defense that the
facts alleged therein, even if true, do not constitute a valid cause of action.
After trial, the lower court, after finding that defendant had carried on a love affair with one
Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman, being a married man himself, declared that defendant cannot be
held liable for moral damages it appearing that plaintiffs failed to prove that defendant, being
aware of his marital status, deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection. So it
rendered decision dismissing the complaint.1äwphï1.ñët
Plaintiffs brought this case on appeal before this Court on the ground that the issues involved are
purely of law.
The facts as found by the trial court are: Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one
Lolita Pe. At the time of her disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and
unmarried. Defendant is a married man and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette
Factory. He used to stay in the town of Gasan, Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid
occupation. Lolita was staying with her parents in the same town. Defendant was an adopted son
of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's father. Because of such fact and
the similarity in their family name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as
a member of their family. Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the
pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love
with each other and conducted clandestine trysts not only in the town of Gasan but also in Boac
where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. They exchanged love notes with each other the
contents of which reveal not only their infatuation for each other but also the extent to which
they had carried their relationship. The rumors about their love affairs reached the ears of Lolita's
parents sometime, in 1955, and since then defendant was forbidden from going to their house
and from further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against
defendant who is a Chinese national. The affair between defendant and Lolita continued
nonetheless.
Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their residence at 54-
B España Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. After
she left, her brothers and sisters checked up her thing and found that Lolita's clothes were gone.
However, plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece of paper inside Lolita's aparador. Said
note, written on a small slip of paper approximately 4" by 3" in size, was in a handwriting
recognized to be that of defendant's. In English it reads:
Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and that's 13th of this month and we will
have a date on the 14th, that's Monday morning at 10 a.m.
Reply
Love
The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI but up to the
present there is no news or trace of her whereabouts.
The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner which is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the fact that defendant,
being a married man, carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing plaintiffs injury in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. But in spite of the fact that plaintiffs
have clearly established that in illicit affair was carried on between defendant and Lolita which
caused great damage to the name and reputation of plaintiffs who are her parents, brothers and
sisters, the trial court considered their complaint not actionable for the reason that they failed to
prove that defendant deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection Thus, the trial
court said: "In the absence of proof on this point, the court may not presume that it was the
defendant who deliberately induced such relationship. We cannot be unmindful of the
uncertainties and sometimes inexplicable mysteries of the human emotions. It is a possibility that
the defendant and Lolita simply fell in love with each other, not only without any desire on their
part, but also against their better judgment and in full consciousness of what it will bring to both
of them. This is specially so with respect to Lolita, being an unmarried woman, falling in love
with defendant who is a married man."
We disagree with this view. The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's
affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme
or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by
the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach
him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was
allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her
family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not
only in Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors
about their illicit affairs reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from
going to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings
against defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs
with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be
drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever
strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit
relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable
considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's
family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in
Article 21 of the new Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the
plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of
litigations. Costs against appellee.
Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals Case Digest/ Brief G.R. No. L-14628
Hermosisima vs. CA Cse Digest/ Brief (link)
PF: Case filed in Court of First Instance of Cebu which rendered decision in favor of P (soledad).
Lower Court’s decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by increasing compensatory
damages and moral damages.
SF: Soledad Cagigas, a teacher and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than she,
used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of
marriage prior thereto their intimacy developed among them Soledad advised petitioner that she
was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima,
was born. However defendant married one Romanita Perez.
I: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to
marry?
H: When the woman becomes pregnant and subsequently delivers. Although she cannot recover
moral damages for the breach, nevertheless she can recover compensatory damages for medical
and hospitalization expenses as well as attorney’s fees.
R: Because of defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by her
love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control, she being a
woman after all, we hold that said defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore,
moral damages may be recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of
the new Civil Code.
[G.R. No. L-7817. October 31, 1956.]

ALFREDO M. VELAYO, in his capacity as Assignee of the insolvent COMMERCIAL AIR
LINES, INC. (CALI), Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, LTD., Defendant-Appellee, YEK HUA TRADING CORPORATION, PAUL
SYCIP and MABASA & CO., intervenors.
DECISION
FELIX, J.:
Antecedents — The Commercial Air Lines, Inc., which will be hereinafter referred to as CALI,
is a corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with the Philippines laws, with offices
in the City of Manila and previously engaged in air transportation business. The Shell Company
of the P. I., Ltd., which will be designated as the Defendant, is on the other hand, a corporation
organized under the laws of England and duly licensed to do business in the Philippines, with
principal offices at the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank building in the City of Manila.
Since the start of CALI’s operations, its fuel needs were all supplied by the Defendant. Mr.
Desmond Fitzgerald, its Credit Manager who extended credit to CALI, was in charge of the
collection thereof. However, all matters referring to extensions of the term of payment had to be
decided first by Mr. Stephen Crawford and later by Mr. Wildred Wooding, who represented in
this country Defendant’s Board of Directors, the residence of which is in London, England
(Exhs. 4-B and 4-A).
As of August, 1948, the books of the Defendant showed a balance of P170,162.58 in its favor for
goods it sold and delivered to CALI. Even before August 6, 1948, Defendant had reasons to
believe that the financial condition of the CALI was for from being satisfactory. As a matter of
fact, according to Mr. Fitzgerald, CALI’s Douglas C-54 plane, then in California, was offered to
him by Mr. Alfonso Sycip, CALI’s President of the Board of Directors, in partial settlement of
their accounts, which offer was, however, declined by Mr. Crawford, probably because upon
inquiries made by Mr. Fitzgerald sometime before August 6, 1948, for the purpose of preparing
the report for its London office regarding CALI’s indebtedness, Col. Lambert, CALI’s Vice
President and General Manager, answered that the total outstanding liabilities of his corporation
was only P550,000, and the management of Defendant probably assumed that the assets of the
CALI could very well meet said liabilities and were not included to take charge of the sale of
CALI’s said Douglas C-54 plane to collect its credit.
On August 6, 1948, the management of CALI informally convened its principal creditors
(excepting only the insignificant small claims) who were invited to a luncheon that was held
between 12: 00 and 2: 00 o’clock in the afternoon of that day in the Trade and Commerce
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Building at 123 Juan Luna St., Manila, and informed them that CALI was in a state of insolvency
and had to stop operation. The creditors present, or represented at the meeting, were: Mr. A. L. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Bartolini, representing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.; Mr. Quintin Yu, representing chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
Commercial News; Mr. Mark Pringle, representing Smith, Bell & Co. (Lloyds of London);
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary chan
Messrs. Vicente Liwag, C. Dominguez and Pacifico Agcaoili, representing National Airports
roblesvirtualawlibrary
Corporation; Messrs. W. J. Bunnel and Manuel Chan, representing Goodrich International

chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
Rubber Co.; Mr. G. E. Adair, representing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.; Mr. J. T. Chuidian,
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
representing Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian & Quasha; Mr. E. Valera, representing Mabasa & Co.; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary chan
Mr. D. Fitzgerald, representing Shell Co. P.I. Ltd.; and Mr. Alfonso Z. Sycip, representing
roblesvirtualawlibrary chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
himself, Yek Hua Trading Corporation and Paul Sycip (Exhs. NN, JJJ, MM, QQQ, II-4, SS, TT,
UU, VV, WW, XX, YY, ZZ, AAA, BBB, CCC, DDD, EEE, FFF, GGG, and HHH).
The persons present, including Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, signed their names and the names of the
companies they represented on a memorandum pad of the law firm Quisumbing, Sycip, and
Quisumbing (Exhs. VV and VV-1).
In that meeting at noontime of August 6, 1948, out of the 194 creditors in all (Exh. OO) 15 were
listed as principal creditors having big balances (Exh. NN), to wit: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
13th Air Force P12,880.00

Civil Aeronautics Administration 98,127.00
Gibbs, Giibs, Chuidian & Quasha 5,544.90
Goodrich Int’l Rubber Co. 3,142.47
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 1,727.50
Mabasa & Co. 4,867.72
Manila Int’l Airport 55,280.04
Manila Int’l Air Terminal (PAL) 36,163.68
Shell Co. of the Phil., Ltd. 152,641.68
Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd. 45,534.00
Paul Sycip 8,189.33
Mrs. Buenaventura 20,000.00
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 4,911.72
Alfonso Sycip 575,880.83
Yek Hua Trading Corp. 487,871.20
—————
P1,512,762.87
What occurred in that meeting may be summarized as follows: Mr. Alexander Sycip, Secretary chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
of the Board of Directors of the CALI, informed the creditors present that this corporation was
insolvent and had to stop operations. He explained the memorandum agreement executed by the
CALI with the Philippine Air Lines, Inc., on August 4, 1948, regarding the proposed sale to the
latter of the aviation equipments of the former (Exhs. MM and QQQ, par. 1 — memo of
meeting; Exhs. III and PPP — P. Agcaoili’s memorandum dated August 7, 1948, to the
General Manager of the National Airports Corp.). Mr. Alexander Sycip was assisted in the
explanation by CPA Alfredo Velayo of Washington, Sycip & Company, Auditors of the CALI,
who discussed the balance sheets and distributed copies thereof to the creditors present (Exhs.
NN, NN-1 to 7; Exh. JJ — P. Agcaoili’s copy of balance sheet p. 229- 230 t.s.n., Nov. 27,
1951, of the testimony of D. Fitzgerald). The said balance sheet made mention of a C-54 plane in
the United States, the property now involved in this suit. He was likewise assisted in his
explanation by Mr. Curtis L. Lambert, Vice President and General Manager of the CALI, who
described in greater detail the assets of the CALI. There was a general understanding among all
the creditors present on the desirability of consummating the sale in favor of the Philippine Air
Lines Inc. (Exhs. MM and QQQ, par. 2 — Memo of meeting; Exhs. III and PPP, par. 5 — P. chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
Agcoaili’s memorandum dated August 7, 1948, to the General Manager of the National Airports
Corp.; and pp. 299-300 t.s.n., January 15, 1952, of the testimony of Desmond Fitzgerald).
Then followed a discussion on the payment of claims of creditors and the preferences claimed
for the accounts due to the employees, the Government and the National Airports Corporation.
The representatives of the latter Messrs. Vicente H. Liwag, C. Dominguez and Pacifico V.
Agcaoili, contended that their accounts were preferred. The other creditors disputed such
contention of preference (Exhs. MM and QQQ, par. 3 — 0151 Memo of meeting; Exhs. III chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
and PPP, par. 3 — P. Agcaoili’s memorandum dated August 1, 1948, to the General Manager of
the National Airports Corp.; and pp. 247-248 t.s.n., January 10, 1952, of the testimony of D. chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
Fitzgerald). No understanding was reached on this point and it was then generally agreed that the
matter of preference be further studied by a working committee to be formed (Exhs. MM, par. 3
— Memo of meeting). The creditors present agreed to the formation of a working committee to
continue the discussion of the payment of claims and preferences alleged by certain creditors,
and it was further agreed that said working committee would supervise the preservation of the
properties of the corporation while the creditors attempted to come to an understanding as to a
fair distribution of the assets among them (Exhs. MM and QQQ, Memo of meeting). From the
latter exhibit the following is copied:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“4. Certain specific matters such as the amount owing to the Philippine Air Lines, Inc., and the
claims of Smith, Bell vs. Co., (representing Lloyds of London) that its claim should be offset
against the payments which may be due to CALI from insurance claims were not taken up in
detail. It was agreed that these matters together with the general question of what are preferred
claims should be the subject of further discussions, but shall not interfere with the consummation
of the sale in favor of PAL.
“5. The creditors present agreed to the formation of the working committee to supervise the
preservation of the properties of the corporation and agreed further that Mr. Fitzgerald shall
represent the creditors as a whole in this committee. It was understood, however, that all
questions relating to preference of claims can be decided only by the creditors assembled.
“6. It was the sense of the persons present that, if possible, the insolvency court be avoided but
that should the creditors not meet in agreement, then all the profits from the sale will be
submitted to an insolvency court for proper division among the creditors.”
To this working committee, Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, Credit Manager, of the Defendant, Atty.
Agcaoili of the National Airports Corporation and Atty. Alexander Sycip (Exhs. III and PPP, par.
5 — P. Agcaoili’s memorandum dated August 7, 1948, to the General Manager of the National
Airports (Corp.) were appointed. After the creditors present knew the balance sheet and heard the
explanations of the officers of the CALI, it was their unanimous opinion that it would be
advantageous not to present suits against this corporation but to strive for a fair pro-rata division
of its assets (Exh. MM, par 6, Memo of meeting), although the management of the CALI
announced that in case of non-agreement of the creditors on a pro-rata division of the assets, it
would file insolvency proceedings (p. 70, t.s.n., October 22, 1951).
Mr. Fitzgerald did not decline the nomination to form part of said working committee and on
August 9, 1948, the 3 members thereof discussed methods of achieving the objectives of the
committee as decided at the creditors’ meeting, which were to preserve the assets of the CALI
and to study the way of making a fair division of all the assets among the creditors. Atty. Sycip
made an offer to Mr. D. Fitzgerald to name a representative to oversee the preservation of the
assets of the CALI, but Mr. Fitzgerald replied that the creditors could rely on Col. Lambert. Atty.
Pacifico Agcaoili promised to refer the arguments adduced at the second meeting to the General
Manager of the National Airports Corporations and to obtain the advice of the Corporate
Counsel, so the negotiation with respect to the division of assets of the CALI among the creditors
was left pending or under advice when on that very day of the meeting of the working
committee, August 9, 1948, which Mr. Fitzgerald attended, Defendant effected a telegraphic
transfer of its credit against the CALI to the American corporation Shell Oil Company, Inc.,
assigning its credit, amounting to $79,440.00, which was subsequently followed by a deed of
assignment of credit dated August 10, 1948, the credit amounting this time to the sum of
$85,081.29 (Exh. I).
On August 12, 1948, the American corporation Shell Oil Company, Inc., filed a complaint
against the CALI in the Superior Court of the State of California, U.S.A. in and for the County of
San Bernardino, for the collection of an assigned credit of $79,440.00 — Case No. 62576 of said
Court (Exhs. A, E, F, G, H, V, and Z) and a writ of attachment was applied for and issued on the
same date against a C-54 plane (Exhs. B, C, D, Y, W, X, and X-1).
On September 17, 1948, an amended complaint was filed to recover an assigned credit of
$85,081.29 (Exhs. I, K, L, M, Q, R, S, T, U, DD) and a supplemental attachment for a higher
sum was applied for and issued against the C-54 plane, plus miscellaneous personal properties
held by Pacific Overseas Air Lines for the CALI (Exhs. N, O, P, AA, BB, BB-1 and CC) and on
January 5, 1949, a judgment by default was entered by the American court (Exhs. J, EE, FF, GG,
and HH).
Unaware of Defendant’s assignments of credit and attachment suit, the stockholders of CALI
resolved in a special meeting of August 12, 1948, to approve the memorandum agreement of sale
to the Philippine Air Lines, Inc, and noted “that the Board had been trying to reach an agreement
with the creditors of the corporation to prevent insolvency proceedings, but so far no definite
agreement had been reached” (Exh. OO — Minutes of August 12, 1948, stockholders’ meeting).
By the first week of September, 1948, the National Airports Corporation learned of Defendant’s
action in the United States and hastened to file its own complaint with attachment against the
CALI in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Exhs. KKK, LLL, and MMM). The CALI, also
prompted by Defendant’s action in getting the alleged undue preference over the other creditors
by attaching the C-54 plane in the United States, beyond the jurisdiction of the Philippines, filed
on October 7, 1948, a petition for voluntary insolvency. On this date, an order of insolvency was
issued by the court (Exh. JJ) which necessarily stayed the National Airports Corporation’s action
against the CALI and dissolved its attachment (Exh. NNN), thus compelling the National
Airports Corporation to file its claims with the insolvency court (Exh. SS).
By order of October 28, 1948, the Court confirmed the appointment of Mr. Alfredo M. Velayo,
who was unanimously elected by the creditors as Assignee in the proceedings, and ordered him
to qualify as such by taking the oath of office within 5 days from notice and filing a bond in the
sum of P30,000.00 to be approved by the Court conditioned upon the faithful performance of his
duties, and providing further that all funds that the Assignee may collect or receive from the
debtors of the corporation, or from any other source or sources, be deposited in a local bank
(Exh. KK). On November 3, 1948, the clerk of court executed a deed of conveyance in favor of
the Assignee (Alfredo M. Velayo) over all the assets of the CALI (Exh. LL).
The Case. — After properly qualifying as Assignee, Alfredo M. Velayo instituted this case (No.
6966 of the Court of First Instance of Manila) on December 17, 1948, against the Shell Company
of P. I., Ltd., for the purpose of securing from the Court a writ of injunction restraining
Defendant, its agents, servants, attorneys and solicitors from prosecuting in and for the County of
San Bernardino in the Superior Court of the State of California, U.S.A. the aforementioned Civil
Case No. 62576 against the insolvent Commercial Air Lines, Inc., begun by it in the name of the
American corporation Shell Oil Company, Inc., and as an alternative remedy, in case the
purported assignment of Defendant’s alleged credit to the American corporation Shell Oil
Company, Inc., and the attachment issued against CALI in the said Superior Court of California
shall have the effect of defeating the procurement by Plaintiff as Assignee in insolvency of the
above- mentioned airplane, which is the property of the insolvent CALI, situated in the Ontario
International Airport, with in the County of San Bernardino, State of California, U.S.A., that
judgment for damages in double the value of the airplane be awarded in favor of Plaintiff against
Defendant, with costs.
The complaint further prays that upon the filing of a bond executed to the Defendant in an
amount to be fixed by the Court, to the effect that Plaintiff will pay to Defendant all damages the
latter may sustain by reason of the injunction if the Court should finally decide that the Plaintiff
was not entitled thereto, the Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
Defendant, its agent, servants, attorney’s and solicitor, from prosecuting the aforementioned case
No. 62576, the same writ of preliminary injunction to issue without notice to the Defendant it
appearing by verified complaint that the great irreparable injury will result to the Plaintiff-
Appellant before the matter could be on notice. The Plaintiff also prays for such other remedies
that the Court may deem proper in the premises.
On December 20, 1948, the Defendant filed an opposition to the Plaintiff’s petition for the
issuance of a writ of the preliminary injunction, and on December 22, 1948, the Court denied the
same because whether the conveyance of Defendant’s credit was fraudulent or not, the Philippine
court would not be in position to enforce its orders as against the American corporation Shell Oil
Company, Inc., which is outside of the jurisdiction of the Philippines.
Plaintiff having failed to restrain the progress of the attachment suit in the United States by
denial of his application for a writ of preliminary injunction and the consequences on execution
of the C-54 plane in the County of San Bernardino, State of California, U. S. A., he confines his
action to the recovery of damages against the Defendant.
On December 28, 1948, Defendant filed its answer to the complaint, which was amended on
February 3, 1949. In its answer, Defendant, besides denying certain averments of the complaint
alleged, among other reasons, that the assignment of its credit in favor of the Shell Oil Company,
Inc., in the United States was for a valuable consideration and made in accordance with the
established commercial practices, there being no law prohibiting a creditor from assigning his
credit to another; that it had no interest whatsoever in Civil Case No. 62576 instituted in the
Superior Court in the State of California by the Shell Oil Company, Inc., which is a separate and
distinct corporation organized and existing in the State of Virginia and doing business in the
State of California, U. S. A., the Defendant having as its stockholders the Shell Petroleum
Company of London and other persons residing in that City, while the Shell Oil Company Inc.,
of the United State has its principal stockholders the Shell Union Oil Company of the U.S. and
presumably countless American investors inasmuch as its shares of stock are being traded daily
in the New York stock market; that Mr. Fitzgerald, Defendant’s Credit Manager, was merely
invited to a luncheon-meeting at the Trade and Commerce Building in the City of Manila on
August 6, 1948, without knowing the purpose for which it was called; and that Mr. Fitzgerald
could not have officially represented the Defendant at that time because such authority resides on
Mr. Stephen Crawfurd. Defendant, therefore, prays that the complaint be dismissed with costs
against the Plaintiff.
Then Alfonso Sycip, Yek Hua Trading Corporation and Paul Sycip, as well as Mabasa & Co.,
filed, with permission of the Court, their respective complaints in intervention taking the side of
the Plaintiff. These complaints in intervention were timely answered by Defendant which prayed
that they be dismissed.
After proper proceedings and hearing, the Court rendered decision on February 26, 1954,
dismissing the complaint as well as the complaints in intervention, with costs against the
Plaintiff. In view of this outcome, Plaintiff comes to us praying that the judgment of the lower
court be reversed and that the Defendant be ordered to pay him damages in the sum of P660,000
(being double the value of the airplane as established by evidence, i.e., P330,000), with costs,
and for such other remedy as the Court may deem just and equitable in the premises.
The Issues. — Either admission of the parties, or by preponderance of evidence, or by sheer
weight of the circumstance attending the transactions herein involved, We find that the facts
narrated in the preceding statement of the “antecedents” have been sufficiently established, and
the questions at issue submitted to our determination in this instance may be boiled down to the
following propositions: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) Whether or not under the facts of the case, the Defendant Shell Company of the P. I., Ltd.,
taking advantage of its knowledge of the existence of CALI’s airplane C-54 at the Ontario
International Airport within the Country of San Bernardino, State of California, U. S. A.,
(Which knowledge it acquired: first at the informal luncheon-meeting of the principal creditors
of CALI on August 5, 1948, where its Credit Manager, Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, was selected to
form part of the Working Committee to supervise the preservation of CALI’s properties and to
study the way of making a fair division of all the assets among the creditors and thus avoid the
institution of insolvency proceedings in court; and chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
Subsequently, at the meeting of August 9, 1948, when said Mr. Fitzgerald met the other
members of the said Working Committee and heard and discussed the contention of certain
creditors of CALI — on the accounts due the employees, the Government and the National
Airports Corporation — who alleged that their claims were preferred),
acted in bad faith and betrayed the confidence and trust of the other creditors of CALI present in
said meeting by affecting a hasty telegraphic transfer of its credit to the American corporation
Shell Oil Company, Inc., for the sum of $79,440 which was subsequently followed by a deed of
assignment of credit dated August 10, 1948, amounting this time to the sum of $85,081.28 (Exhs.
Z), thus defeating the purpose of the informal meetings of CALI’s principal creditors end
depriving the Plaintiff, as its Assignee, of the means of obtaining said C-54 plane, or the value
thereof, to the detriment and prejudice of the other CALI’s creditors who were consequently
deprived of their share in the distribution of said value; and (2) Whether or not by reason of chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
said betrayal of confidence and trust, Defendant may be made under the law to answer for the
damages prayed by the Plaintiff; and if so, what should be the amount of such damages. chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
DISCUSSION OF THE CONTROVERSY

I. The mere enunciation of the first proposition can lead to no other conclusion than that
Defendant, upon learning the precarious economic situation of CALI and that with all
probability, it could not get much of its outstanding credit because of the preferred claims of
certain other creditors, forgot that “Man does not live by bread alone” and entirely disregarded
all moral inhibitory tenets. So, on the very day its Credit Manager attended the meeting of the
Working Committee on August 9, 1948, it hastily made a telegraphic assignment of its credit
against the CALI to its sister American Corporation, the Shell Oil Company, Inc., and by what is
stated in the preceding pages hereof, We know that were the damaging effects of said assignment
upon the right of other creditors of the CALI to participate in the proceeds of said CALI’s plane
C-54.
Defendants endeavor to extricate itself from any liability caused by such evident misdeed of its
part, alleging that Mr. Fitzgerald had no authority from his principal to commit the latter on any
agreement; chanthat the assignment of its credit in favor of its sister corporation, Shell Oil
Company, Inc., was for a valuable consideration and in accordance with the established
commercial practices; that there is no law prohibiting a creditor from assigning his credit to
another; and that the Shell Oil Company Inc., of the United States is a corporation different
and independent from the Defendant. But all these defenses are entirely immaterial and have no
bearing on the main question at issue in this appeal. Moreover, we might say that Defendant
could not have accomplished the transfer of its credit to its sister corporation if all the Shell
companies throughout the world would not have a sort of union, relation or understanding among
themselves to come to the aid of each other. The telegraphic transfer made without knowledge
and at the back of the other creditors of CALI may be a shrewd and surprise move that enabled
Defendant to collect almost all if not the entire amount of its credit, but the Court of Justice
cannot countenance such attitude at all, and much less from a foreign corporation to the
detriment of our Government and local business.
To justify its actions, Defendant may also claim that Mr. Fitzgerald, based on his feeling of
distrust and apprehension, entertained the conviction that intervenors Alfonso Sycip and Yek
Hua Trading Corporation tried to take undue advantage by infiltrating their credits. But even
assuming for the sake of argument, that these intervenors really resorted to such strategem or
fraudulent device, yet Defendant’s act finds not justification for no misdeed on the part of a
person is cured by any misdeed of another, and it is to be noted that neither Alfonso Z. Sycip, nor
Yek Hua Trading Corporation were the only creditors of CALI, nor even preferred ones, and that
the infiltration of one’s credit is of no sequence if it cannot be proven in the insolvency
proceedings to the satisfaction of the court. Under the circumstances of the case, Defendant’s
transfer of its aforementioned credit would have been justified only if Mr. Fitzgerald had
declined to take part in the Working Committee and frankly and honestly informed the other
creditors present that he had no authority to bind his principal and that the latter was to be left
free to collect its credit from CALI by whatever means his principal deemed wise and were
available to it. But then such information would have immediately dissolved all attempts to come
to an amicable conciliation among the creditors and would have precipitated the filing in court of
CALI’s voluntary insolvency proceedings and nulified the intended transfer of Defendant’s
credit to its above-mentioned sister corporation.
II. We may agree with the trial judge, that the assignment of Defendant’s credit for a valuable
consideration is not violative of the provisions of sections 32 and 70 of the Insolvency Law
(Public Act No. 1956), because the assignment was made since August 9, 1948, the original
complaint in the United States was filed on August 12, 1948, and the writ of attachment issued
on this same date, while CALI filed its petition for insolvency on October 7, 1948. At his Honor
correctly states, said Sections 32 and 70 only contemplate acts and transactions occuring within
30 days prior to the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency and, consequently, all other
acts outside of the 30-day period cannot possibly be considered as coming within the orbit of the
operation. In addition to this, We may add that Article 70 of the Insolvency Law refers to acts of
the debtor (in this case the insolvent CALI) and not of the creditor, the Shell Company of the P.
I. Ltd. But section 70 does not constitute the only provisions of the law pertinent to the matter.
The Insolvency Law also provides the following: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“SEC. 33. The assignee shall have the right to recover all the estate, debt and effects of said
insolvent. If at the time of the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency, an action is
pending in the name of the debtor, for the recovery of a debt or other thing might or ought to
pass to the assignee by the assignment, the assignee shall be allowed to prosecute the action, in
like manner and with life effect as if it had been originally commenced by him. If there are any
rights of action in favor of the insolvency for damages, on any account, for which an action is not
pending the assignee shall have the right to prosecute the same with effect as the insolvent might
have done himself if no proceedings in insolvency had been instituted .” cralaw
It must not be forgotten that in accordance with the spirit of the Insolvency Law and with the
provisions of Chapter V thereof which deal with the powers and duties of a receiver, the assignee
represents the insolvent as well as the creditors in voluntary and involuntary proceedings —
Intestate of Mariano G. Veloso, etc. vs. Vda. de Veloso S. C. — G. R. No. 42454; Hunter, chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
Kerr & Co. vs. Samuel Murray, 48 Phil. 449; Chartered Bank vs. Imperial, 48 Phil. 931;
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary chan
Asia Banking Corporation vs. Herridge, 45 Phil. 527 — (II Tolentino’s Commercial Laws of
the Philippines, 633). See also Section 36 of the Insolvency Law.From the foregoing, We see
that Plaintiff, as Assignee of the Insolvent CALI, had personality and authority to institute this
case for damages, and the only question that remains determination is whether the payment of
damages sought to be recovered from Defendant may be ordered under the Law and the evidence
of record.
IF ANY PERSON, before the assignment is made, having notice of the commencement of the
proceedings in insolvency, or having reason to believe that insolvency proceedings are about to
be commenced, embezzles or disposes of any money, goods, chattels, or effects of the insolvent,
he is chargeable therewith, and liable to an action by the assignee for double the value of the
property sought to be embezzled or disposed of, to be received for the benefit of the insolvent
estate.
The writer of this decision does not entertain any doubt that the Defendant — taking advantage
of his knowledge that insolvency proceedings were to be instituted by CALI if the creditors did
not come to an understanding as to the manner of distribution of the insolvent asset among them,
and believing it most probable that they would not arrive at such understanding as it was really
the case — schemed and effected the transfer of its sister corporation in the United States, where
CALI’s plane C-54 was by that swift and unsuspected operation efficaciously disposed of said
insolvent’s property depriving the latter and the Assignee that was latter appointed, of the
opportunity to recover said plane. In addition to the aforementioned Section 37, Chapter 2 of the
PRELIMINARY TITLE of the Civil Code, dealing on Human Relations, provides the
following: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Art 19. Any person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performances of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith”.
It maybe said that this article only contains a mere declarations of principles and while such
statement may be is essentially correct, yet We find that such declaration is implemented by
Article 21 and sequence of the same Chapter which prescribe the following: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage”.
The Code Commission commenting on this article, says the following: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved (as it was approved), would
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible
for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes.
“But, it may be asked, would this proposed article obliterate the boundary line between morality
and law? The answer is that, in the last analysis, every good law draws its breath of life from
morals, from those principles which are written with words of fire in the conscience of man. If
this premises is admitted, then the proposed rule is a prudent earnest of justice in the face of the
impossibility of enumerating, one by one, all wrongs which cause damages. When it is reflected
that while codes of law and statutes have changed from age to age, the conscience of man has
remained fixed to its ancient moorings, one cannot but feel that it is safe and salutary to
transmute, as far as may be, moral norms into legal rules, thus imparting to every legal system
that enduring quality which ought to be one of its superlative attributes.
“Furthermore, there is no belief of more baneful consequence upon the social order than that a
person may with impunity cause damage to his fellow-men so long as he does not break any law
of the State, though he may be defying the most sacred postulates of morality. What is more, the
victim loses faith in the ability of the government to afford him protection or relief.
“A provision similar to the one under consideration is embodied in article 826 of the German
Civil Code.
“The same observations may be made concerning injurious acts that are contrary to public policy
but are not forbidden by statute. There are countless acts of such character, but have not been
foreseen by the lawmakers. Among these are many business practices that are unfair or
oppressive, and certain acts of landholders and employers affecting their tenants and employees
which contravene the public policy of social justice.
“Another rule is expressed in Article 24 which compels the return of a thing acquired ‘without
just or legal grounds’. This provision embodies the doctrine that no person should unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of another, which has been one of the mainstays of every legal system for
centuries. It is most needful that this ancient principles be clearly and specifically consecrated in
the proposed Civil Code to the end that in cases not foreseen by the lawmaker, no one may
unjustly benefit himself to the prejudice of another. The German Civil Code has a similar
provision (art. 812).” (Report of the Code Commission on the Proposed Civil Code of the
Philippines, p. 40- 41).
From the Civil Code Annotated by Ambrosio Padilla, Vol. I, p. 51, 1956 edition, We also copy
the following: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute law, should be
compensated by damages. Moral damages (Art. 2217) may be recovered (Art. 2219). In Article
20, the liability for damages arises from a willful or negligent act contrary to law. In this article,
the act is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.”
Now, if Article 23 of the Civil Code goes as far as to provide that: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Even if an act or event causing damage to another’s property was not due to the fault or
negligence of the Defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he
was benefited.”
with mere much more reason the Defendant should be liable for indemnity for acts it committed
in bad faith and with betrayal of confidence.
It may be argued that the aforequoted provisions of the Civil Code only came into effect on
August 30, 1950, and that they cannot be applicable to acts that took place in 1948, prior to its
effectivity. But Article 2252 of the Civil Code, though providing that: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by this Code which may be prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation, shall have no retroactive
effect .”
cralaw
implies that when the new provisions of the Code does nor prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the old legislation — and it cannot be alleged that in the case at bar
Defendant had any vested or acquired right to betray the confidence of the insolvent CALI or of
its creditors — said new provisions, like those on Human Relations, can be given retroactive
effect. Moreover, Article 2253 of the Civil Code further provides: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“ But if a right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once,
cralaw
even though the act or event which may give rise thereto may have been done or may have
occurred under the prior legislation, provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any
vested or acquired right, of the same origin.”
and according to Article 2254, “no vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions
which are against the law or which infringe upon the right of others.”
In case of Juan Castro vs. Acro Taxicab Company, (82 Phil., 359; 47 Off. Gaz., [5] 2023), one
of the question at issue was whether or not the provisions of the New Civil Code of the
Philippines on moral damages should be applied to an act of negligence which occurred before
the effectivity of said code, and this Court, through Mr. Justice Briones, sustaining the
affirmative proposition and citing decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1941,
and November 14, 1934, as well as the comment of Mr. Castan, Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Spain, about the revolutionary tendency of Spanish jurisprudence, said the following: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“We conclude, therefore, reaffirming the doctrine laid down in the case of Lilius (59 J. F. 800) in
the sense that indemnity lies for moral and patrimonial damages which include physical and pain
sufferings. With this (doctrine), We effect in this jurisdiction a real symbiosis 1 of the Spanish
and American Laws and, at the same time, We act in consonance with the spirit and progressive
march of time” (translation)
The writer of this decision does not see any reason for not applying the provisions of Section 37
of the Insolvency Law to the case at bar, specially if We take into consideration that the term
“any person” used therein cannot be limited to the officers or employee of the insolvent, as no
such limitation exist in the wording of the section (See also Sec. 38 of the same Act), and that, as
stated before, the Defendant schemed and affected the transfer of its credits (from which it could
derive practically nothing) to its sister corporation in the United States where CALI’s plane C-54
was then situated, succeeding by such swift and unsuspected operation in disposing of said
insolvent’s property by removing it from the possession and ownership of the insolvent.
However, some members of this Court entertain doubt as to the applicability of said section 37
because in their opinion what Defendant in reality disposed of was its own credit and not the
insolvent’s property, although this was practically the effect and result of the scheme. Having in
mind this objection and that the provisions of Article 37 making the person coming within its
purview liable for double the value of the property sought to be disposed of constitute a sort of
penal clause which shall be strictly construed, and considering further that the same result may
be obtained, by applying only the provisions of the Civil Code, the writer of this decision yields
to the objection aforementioned.
Articles 2229, 2232, 2234, 2142, and 2143 of the Civil Code read as follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for
the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.”
“Art. 2232. In contracts quasi-contracts, the Court may award exemplary damages if the
Defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.”
“Art. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the Plaintiff must
show that he is entitled to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages before the court may
consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case
liquidated damages should be upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such
liquidated damages be recovered, nevertheless, before the court may consider the question of
granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the Plaintiff must show that he would
be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for
liquidated damages.”
“Art. 2142. Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of
quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of
another.”
“Art, 2143. The provisions for quasi-contracts in this Chapter do not exclude other quasi-
contracts which may come within the purview of the preceding article.”
In accordance with these quoted provisions of the Civil Code, We hold Defendant liable to pay
to the Plaintiff, for the benefit of the insolvent CALI and its creditors, as compensatory damages
a sum equivalent to the value of the plane at the time aforementioned and another equal sum as
exemplary damages.
There is no clear proof in the record about the real value of CALI’s plane C-54 at the time when
Defendant’s credit was assigned to its sister corporation in the United States.
Judgment
Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is
reversed and Defendant-Appellee-, Shell Company of the Philippine Islands, Ltd., is hereby
sentenced to pay to Plaintiff-Appellant, as Assignee of the insolvent CALI, damages in a sum
double the amount of the value of the insolvent’s airplane C-54 at the time Defendant’s credit
against the CALI was assigned to its sister corporation in the United States, which value shall be
determined in the corresponding incident in the lower court after this decision becomes final.
Costs are taxed against Defendant-Appellee. It is SO ORDERED.
Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L.,
and Endencia, concur.
RESOLUTION
July 30, 1957
FELIX, J.:
Plaintiff-Appellant and intervenors on one hand and Defendant Shell Company of the Philippine
Islands, Ltd., on the other, have filed their respective motions for reconsideration of Our decision
rendered in this case. The motion of Plaintiff Appellant and the intervenors seeks the
reconsideration of said decision in so far as it held that:
“There is no clear proof in the record about the real value of CALI’s plane C-54, at the time
when Defendant’s credit was assigned to its sister corporation in the United States.”
and, upon such holding, it orders that the value of the C-54 plane —
“be determined in the corresponding incident in the lower Court after this decision becomes
final.”
The movants maintain that there is evidence sufficient to support a finding that CALI’s C-54
plane had a fair market value of $165,000 at or about the time Defendant credit was assigned to
its sister corporation in the United States and the plane attached. This motion was opposed by
Defendant-Appellee which was replied by Plaintiff- Appellant with a supplemental motion for
reconsideration, and then retorted with a manifestation and motion of Defendant-Appellant
followed by Defendant’s answer to Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.
After considering the evidence pointed out by said parties in support of their respective
contentions, we are more convinced that the proofs relative to the real value of CALI plane C-54
at the time Defendant’s credit was assigned to its sister corporation in the United States, is not
clear. Hence, Plaintiff-Appellant’s and intervenors’ motion for reconsideration is hereby
overruled.
The main grounds on which Defendant-Appellee bases its motion for reconsideration, as relied
upon in its counsel’s memoranda and oral argument, may be reduced to the following: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) That the Defendant Appellee is not guilty of bad faith, it having done nothing but to protect
legitimately its own interest or credit against the bad faith of its debtor, the insolvent CALI,
under the control of the latter’s President Alfonso Sycip;
(2) That Appellee’s transfer of its credit to its sister corporation in the United States, did not
prejudice the Government, because its claims were fully paid, nor caused any loss or injury to
other creditors, except the entities and groups controlled by Alfonso Z. Sycip;
(3) That Appellee is not liable for exemplary damages because the provisions of the new Civil
Code on the matter are not applicable to this case;
(4) That the Plaintiff-Appellant has no cause of action against Defendant-Appellant and is not
the real party in interest; and
(5) That Plaintiff’s right of action was based and prosecuted in the lower court under the
provisions of the Insolvency Law and consequently that he is stopped from pursuing another
theory and is not entitled to damages under the provisions of the New Civil Code.
I. The facts on which this Court based its conclusion that Defendant corporation acted in bad
faith are plainly and explicitly narrated in the decision. They are not and cannot be denied or
contradicted by said Defendant. On the contrary they are in many respects admitted by the
Defendant and no amount of reasoning can make Us change that conclusion.
II. As pointed out by counsel for Plaintiff, Defendant choses to ignore that besides the claims of
intervenors Alfonso Z. Sycip and Yek Hua Trading Corporation, which counsel for the Shell
says to constitute 10/11 of the approved ordinary claims, there is still 1/11 of the other creditors
whose claims have been also approved by the insolvency Court, in addition to the ordinary
creditors whose claims are yet unapproved by the insolvency Court, amounting to P560,296,32,
and “no good reason suggests itself why these unapproved but pending claims should be taken
into account in considering the prejudice caused all the creditors of the insolvent CALI. As long
as these claims are pending, the contingency exist, that these creditors may recover from the
insolvent estate and when they do, they will suffer to the diminution of CALI’s asset resulting
from the attachment of the plane by Appellee Shell.”
Answering Defendant’s contention that the transfer of its credit to its sister corporation in the
United States did not prejudice the Government or the other creditors of CALI, counsel for
Plaintiff-Appellant has the following to say: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“So far as the claims of the Government are concerned, it is true that they were preferred claims
and have all been paid. But this circumstance cannot erase the fact that the Appellee’s action
jeopardised the Government’s claims as well as the other claims. There was doubt as to the
preferential character of the Government’s claims. Indeed, the preferential character of one of the
Government’s claims necessitated a litigation to establish. Had it been held to be an ordinary
claim, the Government would have suffered as other creditors. But that is neither here nor there; chan
neither the character of the claim nor the identity of the claimant can possibly affect the
application of a principle that no person may profit from his betrayal of a trust.”
And the Appellant continues thus: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Appellee had a credit of P170,000 against the insolvent CALI as of August 1948, which is
assigned to its sister corporation in the United States for P120.000. Hence, Appellee recovered
70% of its credit and immediately upon making the assignment in 1948. More than this, the
stated consideration was fixed by and and between two sister companies. The fact remains that
Appellee’s sister company was enabled to get hold of a C-54 plane worth about P330,000.
“On the other hand, the ordinary creditors who filed their claims against the insolvent CALI had
to wait until November 1956 to get their dividends and only at the rate of 30%, computed as
follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Assets as of October 30, 1956 P668,605.15

Less: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Preferred claims still uncollected,

assignee and attorney’s fees and
other reserves P138,719.56
—————
Amount available for distribution P529,885.59
Divident: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Amount available for distribution P529,885.59

————— = 30%
Total of all ordinary claims approved
and unapproved P1,746,222.33
Had Appellee not assigned its credit in 1948, the insolvent CALI would have realized from the
sale of the plane (which was attached by Appellee) P330,000 representing the fair market value
of the plane at the time of the attachment. Therefore, if this amount of P330,000 is added to the
distributable amount of P529,- 885.59, the share of each of the ordinary creditos would certainly
amount to approximately 1 1/2 times the dividend each of them has received; in other words, chan roblesvirtualawlibrary
each ordinary creditors would received not 30% but approximately 45% of his claim, and
Appellee would recover approximately only 45% and not 70% of its credit.”
And even if the sale of CALI’s plane would not have obtained the sum of P330,000.00, the
proceeds thereof that might be diminished though affecting, no doubt, the calculated dividend of
each of the ordinary creditors, estimated at 45% by reducing it proportionately, such diminution
would at the same time increase the difference between the dividend paid CALI’s ordinary
creditors in November, 1956, and the dividend of 70% secured by Defendant Shell in 1948.
III and IV. That Appellee Shell is not liable for exemplary damages in this case and that
Plaintiff-Appellant has no cause of action against Defendant-Appellee, for he is not the real party
in interest, are matters fully discussed in Our decision and We find no sensible reason for
disturbing the conclusions We reached therein.
V. As to the fifth question raised by counsel for Appellee in the course of his oral argument at
the hearing in the City of Baguio of his motion, i.e., “that Plaintiff’s right of action was based
and prosecuted in the lower court under the provisions of the Insolvency Law and he is,
therefore, stopped from pursuing on appeal another theory under which he might be entitled to
damages in consonance with the provisions of the new Civil Code”, We may invoke the decision
in the case of Dimaliwat vs. Asuncion, 59 Phil., 396, 401. In that decision We said the
following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Vicente Dimaliwat contends that Esperanza Dimaliwat has no right to claim the ownership of
the property in question to the exclusion of the children of the third marriage, under the
foregoing provisions of the Civil Code, because the case was not tried on that theory in the lower
court. We find no merit in that contention. The decision cited are not in point. Articles 968 and
969 of the Civil Code are rules of substantive law, and if they are applicable to the facts of this
case they must be given effect.”
The same thing can be said in the case at bar. Articles 19, 21, 2229, 2232, 2234, 2142 and 2143
of the new Civil Code are rules of substantive law, and if they are applicable to the facts of this
case, which We hold they do, they must be made operative and given effect in this litigation.
xxx xxx xxx
It maybe seen from the foregoing that the above mentioned grounds on which the motion for
reconsideration of the Defendant Shell stand, are not well taken. However, and despite this
finding, We insist to delve in the question of whether the exemplary damages imposed in this
Court upon Defendant Appellee, which the latter’s counsel contends to be inequitable and unfair,
may be modified.
It will be remembered that this case was looked into from the point of view of the provisions of
Section 37 of the Insolvency Law, which reads as follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 37. IF ANY PERSON, before the assignment is made, having notice of the
commencement of the proceedings in insolvency, or having reason to believe that insolvency
proceedings are about to be commenced, embezzles or disposses of any of the money, goods,
chattels, or effects of the insolvent, he is chargeable therewith, and liable to an action by the
assignee for double the value of the property sought to be embezzled or disposed of, to be
received for the benefit of the insolvent estate.
The writer of the decision was then and still is of the opinion that the provisions of this section
were applicable to the case, and accordingly, that Defendant Shell was liable in this action
instituted by the Assignee for double the value of the property disposed of, to be received for the
benefit of the Insolvent estate. However, some of the members of this Court, for the reasons
already stated in the decision, entertained some doubt as to the applicability of said Section 37,
and yielding to their objections the writer of the decision turned his eyes to the provisions of the
new Civil Code, inasmuch as the same result could be achieved. In the case at bar, it cannot be
denied that: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Defendant — taking advantage of his knowledge that insolvency proceedings were to be

instituted by CALI if the creditors did not come to an understanding as to the manner of
distribution of the insolvent assets among them, and believing as most probable that they would
not arrive at such understanding, as it was really the case- schemed and effected the transfer of
its credit to its sister corporation in the United States where CALI’s plane C-54 was and by this
swift and unsuspected operation efficaciously disposed of said insolvent’s property depriving the
latter and the Assignee that was later appointed, of the opportunity to recover said plane.”
These acts of Defendant Shell come squarely within the sanction prescribed by Congress by
similar acts and no reflection can be reasonably cast on Us if in the measure of the exemplary
damages that were to be imposed upon Defendant-Appellee, We were influenced by the
provisions of Section 37 of the Insolvency Law. In this connection it is to be noted that,
according to the Civil Code, exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition of the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages Art. 2229, and that the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved (Art.
2234), for it is left to the sound discretion of the Court.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, a majority of this Court was of the belief that the value of
CALI’s plane C-54, at the time when Defendant’s credit was assigned to its sister corporation in
the United States, might result quite high, and that exemplary damages should not be left to
speculation but properly determined by a certain and fixed amount. So they voted for the
reconsideration of the decision with regard to the amount of exemplary damages which this
Court fixed at P25,000.00.
Because of this attitude of the Court, the dispositive part of our decision rendered in this case is
hereby amended to read as follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is
reversed and Defendant-Appellee, Shell Company of the Philippine Islands Ltd., is hereby
sentenced to pay Plaintiff-Appellant, as Assignee of the insolvent CALI, compensatory damages
in a sum equal to the value of the insolvent’s airplane C-54 at the time Defendant’s credit against
CALI was assigned to its sister corporation in the United States - which shall be determined in
the corresponding incident in the lower Court after this decision becomes final - and exemplary
damages in the sum of P25,000. Costs are taxed against Defendant-Appellee. It is SO
ORDERED.
Parás, C.J., Padilla, Concepcion and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MONTEMAYOR, J., concurring: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We concur, but we feel that the ends of justice would be sufficiently served if the exemplary
damages were reduced to P10,000.
Reyes, Bengzon, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
Endnotes: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. SYMBIOSIS — Biol. The living together in more or less intimate association or even close
union of two dissimilar organisms. In a broad sense the term includes parasitism or antagonistic
or antipathetic symbiosis in which the association is disadvantageous or destructive to one of the
organism, but ordinarily it is used of cases where the association is advantageous, or often
necessary, to one or both, and not harmful to either. (Webster’s New International Dictionary,
2nd Ed., p. 2555)
REPUBLIC VS ORBECIDO
G.R. No. 154380
October 5, 2005
FACTS:
In 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myro Villanueva in Lam-an,
Ozamis City.
In 1986, Orbecido discovered that his wife had had been naturalized as an
American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Orbecido learned from his son that his wife had obtained a
divorce decree and married an American.
Orbecido filed with the Trial Court a petition for “Authority to Remarry”
invoking Article 26 Paragraph 2 of the Family Code, the Court granted the petition.
The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
sought for reconsideration but it was denied by the Trial Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the allegations of the respondent was proven as a fact according
to the rules of evidence.
HELD: Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved. Furthermore, respondent must also show that the
divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there
would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
However, in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are
unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an
American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now
capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of
the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 180764 January 19, 2010
TITUS B. VILLANUEVA, Petitioner,
vs.
EMMA M. ROSQUETA, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the right to recover damages for alleged abuse of right committed by a
superior public officer in preventing a subordinate from doing her assigned task and being
officially recognized for it.
The Facts and the Case
Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta (Rosqueta), formerly Deputy Commissioner of the Revenue
Collection and Monitoring Group of the Bureau of Customs (the Bureau), tendered her courtesy
resignation from that post on January 23, 2001, shortly after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
assumed office. But five months later on June 5, 2001, she withdrew her resignation, claiming
that she enjoyed security of tenure and that she had resigned against her will on orders of her
superior.1
Meantime, on July 13, 2001 President Arroyo appointed Gil Valera (Valera) to respondent
Rosqueta’s position. Challenging such appointment, Rosqueta filed a petition for prohibition,
quo warranto, and injunction against petitioner Titus B. Villanueva (Villanueva), then
Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, and Valera with the Regional Trial Court2
(RTC) of Manila in Civil Case 01-101539. On August 27, 2001 the RTC issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO), enjoining Villanueva and the Finance Secretary3 from implementing
Valera’s appointment. On August 28, 2001 the trial court superseded the TRO with a writ of
preliminary injunction.4
Petitioner Villanueva, Valera, and the Secretary of Finance challenged the injunction order
before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 66070. On September 14, 2001 the CA issued
its own TRO, enjoining the implementation of the RTC’s injunction order. But the TRO lapsed
after 60 days and the CA eventually dismissed the petition before it.
On November 22, 2001 while the preliminary injunction in the quo warranto case was again in
force, petitioner Villanueva issued Customs Memorandum Order 40-2001, authorizing Valera to
exercise the powers and functions of the Deputy Commissioner.
During the Bureau’s celebration of its centennial anniversary in February 2002, its special
Panorama magazine edition featured all the customs deputy commissioners, except respondent
Rosqueta. The souvenir program, authorized by the Bureau’s Steering Committee headed by
petitioner Villanueva to be issued on the occasion, had a space where Rosqueta’s picture was
supposed to be but it instead stated that her position was "under litigation." Meanwhile, the
commemorative billboard displayed at the Bureau’s main gate included Valera’s picture but not
Rosqueta’s.
On February 28, 2002 respondent Rosqueta filed a complaint5 for damages before the RTC of
Quezon City against petitioner Villanueva in Civil Case Q-02-46256, alleging that the latter
maliciously excluded her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia. Further, she claimed that
he prevented her from performing her duties as Deputy Commissioner, withheld her salaries, and
refused to act on her leave applications. Thus, she asked the RTC to award her P1,000,000.00 in
moral damages, P500,000.00 in exemplary damages, and P300,000.00 in attorney’s fees and
costs of suit.
But the RTC dismissed6 respondent Rosqueta’s complaint, stating that petitioner Villanueva
committed no wrong and incurred no omission that entitled her to damages. The RTC found that
Villanueva had validly and legally replaced her as Deputy Commissioner seven months before
the Bureau’s centennial anniversary.
But the CA reversed the RTC’s decision,7 holding instead that petitioner Villanueva’s refusal to
comply with the preliminary injunction order issued in the quo warranto case earned for
Rosqueta the right to recover moral damages from him.8 Citing the abuse of right principle, the
RTC said that Villanueva acted maliciously when he prevented Rosqueta from performing her
duties, deprived her of salaries and leaves, and denied her official recognition as Deputy
Commissioner by excluding her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia. Thus, the
appellate court ordered Villanueva to pay P500,000.00 in moral damages, P200,000.00 in
exemplary damages and P100,000.00 in attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. With the denial
of his motion for reconsideration, Villanueva filed this petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45.
The Issue Presented
The key issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in holding petitioner
Villanueva liable in damages to respondent Rosqueta for ignoring the preliminary injunction
order that the RTC issued in the quo warranto case (Civil Case 01-101539), thus denying her of
the right to do her job as Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau and to be officially recognized as
such public officer.
The Court’s Ruling
Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code,9 a person must, in the
exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acts in bad
faith, with intent to prejudice another. Complementing this principle are Articles 2010 and 2111
of the Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury he suffers because of such abuse
of right or duty.12
Petitioner Villanueva claims that he merely acted on advice of the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) when he allowed Valera to assume the office as Deputy Commissioner since respondent
Rosqueta held the position merely in a temporary capacity and since she lacked the Career
Executive Service eligibility required for the job.
But petitioner Villanueva cannot seek shelter in the alleged advice that the OSG gave him.
Surely, a government official of his rank must know that a preliminary injunction order issued by
a court of law had to be obeyed, especially since the question of Valera’s right to replace
respondent Rosqueta had not yet been properly resolved.
That petitioner Villanueva ignored the injunction shows bad faith and intent to spite Rosqueta
who remained in the eyes of the law the Deputy Commissioner. His exclusion of her from the
centennial anniversary memorabilia was not an honest mistake by any reckoning. Indeed, he
withheld her salary and prevented her from assuming the duties of the position. As the Court said
in Amonoy v. Spouses Gutierrez,13 a party’s refusal to abide by a court order enjoining him
from doing an act, otherwise lawful, constitutes an abuse and an unlawful exercise of
right.1avvphi1
That respondent Rosqueta was later appointed Deputy Commissioner for another division of the
Bureau is immaterial. While such appointment, when accepted, rendered the quo warranto case
moot and academic, it did not have the effect of wiping out the injuries she suffered on account
of petitioner Villanueva’s treatment of her. The damage suit is an independent action.
The CA correctly awarded moral damages to respondent Rosqueta. Such damages may be
awarded when the defendant’s transgression is the immediate cause of the plaintiff’s anguish14
in the cases specified in Article 221915 of the Civil Code.16
Here, respondent Rosqueta’s colleagues and friends testified that she suffered severe anxiety on
account of the speculation over her employment status.17 She had to endure being referred to as
a "squatter" in her workplace. She had to face inquiries from family and friends about her
exclusion from the Bureau’s centennial anniversary memorabilia. She did not have to endure all
these affronts and the angst and depression they produced had Villanueva abided in good faith by
the court’s order in her favor. Clearly, she is entitled to moral damages.
The Court, however, finds the award of P500,000.00 excessive. As it held in Philippine
Commercial International Bank v. Alejandro,18 moral damages are not a bonanza. They are
given to ease the defendant’s grief and suffering. Moral damages should reasonably approximate
the extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done. Here, that would be P200,000.00.
The Court affirms the grant of exemplary damages by way of example or correction for the
public good but, in line with the same reasoning, reduces it to P50,000.00. Finally, the Court
affirms the award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses but reduces it to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated April 30, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV 85931 with MODIFICATION in that petitioner
Titus B. Villanueva is ORDERED to pay respondent Emma M. Rosqueta the sum of
P200,000.00 in moral damages, P50,000.00 in exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 in attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE P. PEREZ
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
4 Records, p. 12. It is hereby ordered by the undersigned Judge of the Regional Trial
Court that until further orders, you, the said respondents and all your attorneys,
representatives, agents and any other persons assisting are hereby enjoined from
implementing or enforcing the appointment of respondent GIL A. VALERA to the
position of Customs Deputy Commissioner for Revenue Collection and Monitoring and
respondent Valera from assuming the said office or exercising its functions until further
orders from this Court.
9 Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
10 Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
11 Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals or good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
12 Carpio v. Valmonte, 481 Phil. 352, 362 (2004).
13 404 Phil. 586, 594 (2001).
14 Art. 2217, Civil Code. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful
act for omission.
15 Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
4) Adultery or concubinage;
5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
6) Illegal search;
7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
8) Malicious prosecution;
9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No.
3 of this Article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the
action mentioned in No. 9 of this Article, in the order named.
16 Carpio v. Valmonte, supra note 12, at 364.
17 Testimony of Wilnora Cawile, TSN, March 5, 2003, pp. 16-18; testimony of
Wilhelmina Faustino, TSN, May 15, 2003, pp. 10-13, 19-25; testimony of John Aclaro,
June 6, 2003, pp. 20-26.
18 G.R. No. 175587, September 21, 2007, 533 SCRA 738, 757-758.
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Principle of abuse of rights
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
GLOBE MACKAY V. CA [176 S 778 (1989)] - While an employer has the right to dismiss an
employee who was involved in anomalous transactions, the right of dismissal should not be
exercised in an abusive manner, such as by making accusations of being a crook, forcing him to
take a forced leave, threatening to file a hundred suits against him. Hence, the employer is liable
for damages.
Art. 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of
moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury. This
article should vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it
is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes.
VELAYO V. SHELL [54 O.G. No. 46 p. 7303 (1956)] - Where the creditors of an insolvent
company entered into a memorandum of agreement as to the manner of disposal of the only asset
of the company the proceeds to be distributed fairly among them, the act of the a member of the
committee to implement such agreement, in assigning its credit to a sister company in the U.S.
which filed a collection suit and attached the plane, constitutes bad faith and a betrayal of
confidence in violation of Art. 19 as implemented by Art. 21.
PNB V. CA [83 S 237 (1978)] - While the Board of Directors of PNB had the power to approve
the lease of the sugar quota allotments of its debtor, its act in unduly refusing to grant such
approval when the terms of the lease were reasonable constitutes a violation of Art. 21 of the
Civil Code.
Baviera: The Board of Directors should have been held liable, not the bank.
BALANE V. YU CHIANG [54 O.G. No. 3, p. 687 (1957)] - Where a man by virtue of a
notarized agreement, convinced the 19-year old daughter of petitioner, to live with him, and later
on left her when she got pregnant, he can be made to recognize his child and is liable for
damages under Art. 21 of the Civil Code for inducing the daughter to live with him in a manner
contrary to morals and good customs.
Under the New Civil Code, it is not necessary that there be a breach of promise of marriage in
order that the plaintiff in an action for acknowledgment of natural child and support may recover
damages. The reason given by the Code Commission is that in case a girl is already of age and
was seduced, no action for Seduction under the RPC would lie, however, the girl and her family
would have suffered incalculable damages, which must be compensated.
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him.
Art. 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to another's property was not due to the fault
or negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event
he was benefitted.
Art. 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage
on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other
handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.
Art. 25. Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display during a period of acute
public want or emergency may be stopped by order of the courts at the instance of any
government or private charitable institution.
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place
of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.
LAGUNZAD V. GONZALES [92 S 476 (1979)] - An agreement whereby a film producer

would pay the heirs and relatives of Moises Padilla a sum of money inorder to depict them in the
movie which he included a love interest angle depicting the mother and a sweetheart, is not a
violation of freedom of expression. While it is true that the film producer purchased the rights to
the book entitled "The Moises Padilla Story," that did not dispense with the need for prior
consent and authority from the deceased's heirs to portray publicly episodes in said deceased's
life and in that of his mother and the members of his family. As held in Schuyler v. Curtis, "a
privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a deceased person to protect his memory, but
the privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings and to prevent a violation
of their own rights in the character and memory of the deceased."
"Being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to
privacy. The right to invade a person's privacy to disseminate public information does not extend
to fictional or novelized representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he or she may
be. In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life story
of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the film because without
it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality."
"The right of freedom of expression, indeed, occupies a preferred position in the hierarchy of
civil liberties. However, it is limited by the clear and present danger rule and the balancing of
interest test. The latter requires the court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the
interplay of interest observable in a given situation. The interests observable in this case are the
right to privacy and freedom of expression. Taking into account the interplay of those interest,
we hold that under the particular circumstances presented, and considering the obligations in the
contract, the validity of such contract must be upheld because the limits of freedom of expression
are reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern."
AYER V. CAPULONG [160 S 865 (1988) En Banc] - Senator Enrile cannot object to his
inclusion in the movie on the EDSA Revolution by invoking his right to privacy. "The right of
privacy or "he right to be let alone" is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a person's
privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the
information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitutes matters of a
public character. Succinctly put, the right of privacy cannot be invoked to resist publication and
dissemination of matters of public interest. The right of priivacy of a "public figure" is
necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen."
As distinguished from Lagunzad v. Gonzales, which involved a film biography necessarily
including at least his immediate family, the subject matter of the move in this case is one of
public concern and does not relate to the individual or public life of Senator Enrile.
Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee
refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for
damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative
action that may be taken.
Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor
through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machinations, or any other unjust, oppressive or
high-handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers
damages.
ARTICLE 2 OF THE CIVIL CODE
TANADA VS. TUVERA, 146 SCRA 446
ISSUE:
To what does the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article of the Civil Code refer to?
Does publication have to be in its entirety?

HELD:
[i]The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other
date, without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that
the usual 15 day period be shortened or extended. An example is the Civil Code whcih did not
become effective after 15 days form its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after
such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."
Publication must be full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of
the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the
number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with secretary
Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette
cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance.
ARTICLE 15 OF THE CIVIL CODE
VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO JR., 139 SCRA 139
FACTS:
[i]Petitioner Alice Reyes (Filipino) and private respondent Richard Upton (American) were
married in Hong Kong. After they divorced in Nevada USA, private respondent filed a suit
against petitioner stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila is conjugal property and the
he be declared to have management over the conjugal partnership.
Petitioner moved for the dismissal because the cause of action is barred by a previous judgment
in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that
he and petitioner had no community property.
Respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy.
ISSUE:
Is respondent estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the
representation he made in the divorce proceedings that they had no community property.
HELD:
[i]It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standard of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to use in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly
exercises jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his
own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligation under Article 109 of the
Civil Code cannot be justified. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to
be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
ARTICLE 19 AND 20 OF THE CIVIL CODE
RCPI VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 143 SCRA 656
FACTS:
A telegram received by plaintiff contained the following message: "Sa iyo walang pakinabang
dumating - ka diyan - wala kang padala dito - kahit ****** mo. A civil case for damages was
then filed against RCPI.
ISSUE:
Is Defendant Corporation liable for damages?
HELD:
[i]The cause of action of the private respondent is based on Arts. 19 and 20 of the New Civil
Code as well as on respondent's breach of contract through the negligence of its own
employees.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of receiving and transmitting

messages. Every time a person transmits a message through the facilities of the petitioner, a
contract is entered into. Upon receipt of the rate or fee fixed, the petitioner undertakes to
transmit the message accurately.
There is no question that in the case at bar, libelous matters were included in the message
transmitted, without the consent or knowledge of the sender. There is a clear breach of contract
by the petitioner in adding extraneous and libelous matters in the message sent to the private
respondent. As a corporation, the petitioner can act only through its employees. Hence the acts
of its employees in receiving and transmitting messages are the acts of the petitioner. To hold
that the petitioner is not liable directly for the acts of its employee in the pursuit of petitioner's
business is to deprive the general public availing of the services of the petitioner an effective
and adequate remedy.
PUGSLEY May 31, 2001 06:24 AM
ARTICLES 19, 20, 21, CIVIL CODE
KOREAN AIRLINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 154 SCRA 211
FACTS:
KAL issued plane tickets to plaintiff bound for Los Angeles, California. Plaintiff checked in 30
minutes before their flight. Notwithstanding this fact, plaintiff was not able to leave because
her seat had been given to another passenger. An action for damages was then filed.
ISSUE:
Is KAL liable for damages?
HELD:
[i]The Supreme Court is satisfied from the findings of the respondent court and of the trial
court that the private respondent was, in the language of the airline industry, "Bumped off."
She had a confirmed ticket. She arrived at the airport on time. However, she was not allowed to
board because her seat had already been given to another passenger. As a result, she suffered
damages for which the petitioner should be held liable.
Is it clear that the petitioner acted in bad faith in violating the private respondent's rights under
their contract of carriage and is therefore liable for the injures she has sustained as a result.
PUGSLEY Jun 1, 2001 12:46 AM
ARTS. 19,20,21 CIVIL CODE
GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE & RADIO CORP., VS. BARRIOS, 119 SCRA 461
FACTS:
Petitioner cable company failed to deliver to respondent spouses, both physicians, a cable
gram from Mercy Hospital, Buffalo, New York, admitting the respondent-wife for a rotating
internship in said hospital, as a consequence of which, she was unable to signify her
acceptance and the position was given to someone else.
An action to recover damages was granted by the court.
ISSUE:
Was the award for damages proper?
HELD:
[i]The SC agrees with the finding of the trial court and the Appellate Court that petitioner was
grossly negligent in having admitted failed to deliver the cablegram, particularly considering
that respondents had received another telegram, identically addressed, delivered to them by
Eastern Extension, another cable company.
The SC also agrees with the finding that such failure cause respondents financial difficulties in
New York, due to loss of earning for approximately 6 months, serious anxiety and sleepless
nights, for which petitioner should be held liable, and which should be corrected for the public
good. A telegraphic company is a public service corporation owing duties to the general public
and is liable to any member of the public to whom it owes a duty for damages proximately
flowing from a violation of that duty.
ARTS. 19, 20, 21, CIVIL CODE
GUITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 139 SCRA 576.
FACTS:
Cesar Haguisan was employed as a security guard. A psychiatric examination was conducted
and the physician who conducted the same found that Haguisan was "psychiatrically unfit for
the job position". Based on this psychiatric report, his services were terminated. The
certification made by petitioner Guita (administrative officer) and issued to Haguisan stated
that "he was employed as security guard from August 21, 1956 up to the date of his separation
after he was found mentally unfit to work."
A suit was then instituted on the allegedly false and derogatory statements regarding
Haguisan's mental state.
ISSUE:
Is petitioner entitled to moral damages?
HELD:
[i]Moral damages may be awarded to compensate one for diverse injuries as mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. It is however not enough that
such injuries have arisen; it is essential that they have sprung from a wrongful act or omission
of the defendant which was the proximate cause thereof.
As to the generality of the statement of mental unfitness to work, suffice it to say that the
certification should be read and construed as a whole. So view, it is clear that the statement can
refer only to unfitness to work as security guard, for it was that position, and no other, from
which Haguisan was separated. The said position was the only subject matter of the
certification.
Petitioner Guita is not guilty of any wrongful act. It follows that he cannot be liable for moral
damages.
PUGSLEY Jun 1, 2001 08:30 PM
ARTICLE 21, CIVIL CODE

BAKSH VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 219 SCRA 115
FACTS:
Gashem Shookat Baksh is an Iranian enrolled in a medical school while Marilou Gonzales
works in the cafeteria of said school. According to Marilou, Gashem courted and proposed to
marry her. Because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be
deflowered by him. No marriage came hence an action for breach of promise to marry.
ISSUE:
Is a breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong?
Is Article 21 of the Civil Code applicable in the case?
HELD:
[i]The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that
would have made it so.
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to
expand the concept of torts or quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.
Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by
a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause
of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention
of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept his and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud
and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
WASSMER VS. VELEZ, 12 SCRA 648
FACTS:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz, following their promise to love, decided to get married. Two days
before their marriage Francisco wrote Beatriz telling her that their marriage had to be
postponed as his mother opposes it. A day before his marriage he sent a telegram informing
her "nothing changed rest assured returning soon". Francisco was never heard from again.
Beatriz sued for damages for breach of promise to marry.
ISSUE:
Is breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong?
HELD:
The extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless
for Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damages.
This is not a case of mere breach to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not
an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and
publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different.
This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the Civil Code.
When a breach to marry is actionable under Article 21 of the Civil Code, moral damages may
be awarded under Article 2219(10) of the said Code. Exemplary damages may also be
awarded under Article 2232 of said Code where it is proven that the defendant clearly acted in
a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.
QUERY:: Even men get walked-out by women on their wedding day, why is it that they never
file a case for damages? :lol:
green grin Jun 2, 2001 02:37 PM
highlight of the wassmer ruling:
As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set
a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different.
ARTICLE 28, CC
LEDESMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 160 SCRA 449
FACTS:
Violeta Delmo was treasurer of an organization formed by students of the West Visayas
College. She extended loans from the funds of the club to some of the students of the school. As
a result, the school president (petitioner) denied her the right to graduate MAGNA CUM
LAUDE despite the order of the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools that she be conferred
such honor.
ISSUE:
Is the school president liable for damages?
HELD:
[i]It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal, which was brought
about by the petitioner's neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral damages are but proper.
The Solicitor- General tried to cover-up the petitioner's deliberate omission to inform Miss
Delmo by stating that it was not the duty of the petitioner to furnish her a copy of the Director's
decision. Granting this to be true, it was nevertheless the petitioner's duty to enforce the said
decision. He could have done so considering that he received the decision XXX and even
though he sent it back with the records of the case, he undoubtedly read the whole of it, which
consisted of only 3 pages. Moreover, the petitioner should have had the decency to meet Mr.
Delmo, the girl's father, and inform the latter, at the very lest of the decision. This, the
petitioner failed to do, and not without the attendant bad faith which the appellate court
correctly pointed out in its decision.
ARTICLE 36, CC
DONATO VS. LUNA, 160 SCRA 441
FACTS:
Paz Abayan filed an information for Bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato. She also filed
with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court a civil action for declaration of nullity of
marriage to petitioner because of a prior marriage of petitioner. In his answer petitioner
claimed that his 2nd marriage was void because is was solemnized without a valid marriage
license and that violence, intimation and undue influence were employed by Paz to obtain his
consent.
Prior to the date set for the trial of the criminal case, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings of the case because the civil action raises a prejudicial question which must first
be determined before the criminal case can proceed.
ISSUE:
Does a criminal case for bigamy suspend the civil case of annulment of marriage on the
ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question?
HELD:
[i]The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. I must be noted that
the issue before the JDRC touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not
determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it
was petitioner's 2nd wife, the herein private respondent Paz Abayan who filed the complaint
for annulment of the 2nd marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit.
He who contracts a 2nd marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy
green grin Jun 5, 2001 09:35 AM
warning to those who wish to contract a second marriage:
be sure to get a JUDICIAL declaration of nullity on your first marriage. this is a court decision
stating that your previous marriage has been annulled, which frees you to get married again.
otherwise you could be charged with bigamy - and it's no fun spending your honeymoon
behind bars. just ask pugsly.
CRIMINAL LAW,CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, EVIDENCE
PEOPLE VS. MANTES,299 SCRA 562
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Domingo Francisco is the husband of victim Erliste Arcilla (burnt beyond
recognition) while the other accused-appellants (Randy Mantes, Jerome Garcia and Jovy
Velasco) are the friends of the former.. The RTC found accused-appellants guilty of the crime
charged (Parricide and Murder) on the basis of the confessions made by them which was not
placed in writing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the uncounselled confessions are admissible in evidence.
HELD:
[i]Well-enshrined in our Constitution is the accused's right to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt. The burden of overcoming this presumption rests
on the prosecution. In the case at bar, there were no eyewitnesses to the commission of the
crime. The conviction of the accused-appellants is based mainly on admissions allegedly made
by them to the police officers at the time of their arrest and while they were under custodial
investigation.
Under rules laid down by the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to
be admissible must satisfy all of the 4 fundamental requirements: 1) the confession must be
voluntary; 2) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent
counsel; 3) the confession must be express; and 4) the confession must be in writing.
It is undisputed in this case that the oral confessions made by accused-appellants during the
investigation by the police officers and on which the trail court relied upon for its judgment of
conviction, 1) were not in writing; 2) were made without the presence of counsel; 3) were
denied on the stand by accused-appellant Domingo Francisco.
Accused-appellants' alleged confessions were thus plainly uncounselled, and since they were
given during custodial investigation, they are inadmissible.
The alleged, oral admissions made by accused-appellants during their arrest and during the
investigation conducted by the police officers in this case are inadmissible for having been
made in blatant violation of Art. 3, Sec 12 of the Constitution. Their alleged oral confession
should all the more be disregarded because they were obtained by police officers who knew
what the constitutional mandate regarding statements given during police investigations is and
what the consequences of its violations are, yet disregarded those requirements.
TERRE VS. TERRE,211 SCRA 6
FACTS:
[i]Complainant Dorothy Terre was married to her first cousin while respondent Jordan Terre is
a member of the Philippine Bar. Notwithstanding his knwoledge that she was married he
courted her and since she was convince by his explanation that her prior marriage was void she
agreed to marry him.
Respondent disappered later complainant found out that Atty. Terre married a certain Helina
Malicdem. She then filed an administrative case for disbarment who . Respodnent Terre
claimsing that he had believed in good faith that his prior marriage with complainant Dorothy
Terre was null and void ab initio and that no action for a judicial declaration of nullity was
necessary.[i]
ISSUE:
Was there was no necessity for a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage?
HELD:
[i]The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense.
In the first place, respondent has not rebutted complainant's evidence as to the basic fact which
underscores that bad faith of respondent Terre. In the second place, the pretended defense is the
same argument by which he inveigled complainant into believing that her prior marriage or
Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly
first cousins to each other), she was free to contract a second marriage with the respondent.
Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument
ran counter to the prevailing case law of the supreme Court which holds that for purposes of
determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage , a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.
Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that respondent held that mistaken belief in good
faith, the same result will follow. For it we are to hold Jordan Terre to his argument, his first
marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second
marriage to Heline Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.

ARTICLE 3 & 4, FAMILY CODE
REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS,236 SCRA 257
FACTS:
Respondent Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony
performed by a City Court Judge of Pasig City and was celebrated without the knowledge of
Castro's parents.
Defendant Cardenas personally attended the procuring of the documents required for the
celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage license.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was
unknown to Castro's parents. They decided to live together when Castro discovered she was
pregnant. The cohabitation lasted only for four months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways.
Desiring to follow her daughter in the U.S, Castro wanted to put in order he marital status
before leaving for the U.S. She then discovered that there was no marriage license issued to
Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage as certified by the Civil Registrar of Pasig,
Metro Manila.
Respondent then filed a petition with the RTC of Quezon City seeking for the judicial
declaration of nullity of her marriage claiming that no marriage license was ever issued to
them prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
The trial court denied the petition holding that the certification was inadequate to establish the
alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between
the parties. It ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is
not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued. On appeal, the decision of
the trial court was reversed.
ISSUE:
Is the marriage valid?
Is there such a thing as a "secret marriage"?
HELD:
[i]At the time of the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing
marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage license shall be
solemnized without a marriage license first issued by the local civil registrar. Being one of the
essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab
initio.
It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of
a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" - a
legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without
the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The
records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas as initially unknown to the
parents of the former.
ARTICLE 4 & 40, FAMILY CODE
ATIENZA VS. BRILLANTES, JR., 243 SCRA 32
FACTS:
Lupo A. Atienza filed a complaint for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety
against Judge Francisco Brillanters, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Br.
20, Manila. Complainant alleged that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro with whom
respondent Judge was cohabiting with. Complainant claimed that respondent is married to one
Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has 5 children. Respondent alleges that while he and Ongkiko
went through a marriage ceremony (1965) before a Nueva Ecija town Mayor, the same was
not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon request of the parents of Ongkiko,
respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila. Again, neither party
applied for a marriage license. Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil
rites in Los Angeles, California in 1991, he believed in all good faith and for all legal intents
and purposes that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.
Respondent also argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to
him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code
of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family
Code.
ISSUE:
Is Article 40 of the Civil Code inapplicable in the case at bar?
Does Brillantes and Ongkiko have a valid marriage?
HELD:
[i]Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the
Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly
true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right
that was impair by the application of Article 40
to his case.
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the
institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who begot him
five children.
Respondent passed the bar Examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in
1963. At the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already
a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any law student would know that a
marriage license is necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity
to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the second time.
His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and
bad faith.
ART. 36, FAMILY CODE(Psychological Incapacity)
CHI MING TSOI VS. COURT OF APPEALS,266 SCRA 324
FACTS:
Private respondent Gina Loi and petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi were married at the Manila
Cathedral on May 22, 1988. Contrary to Gina's expectations that the newlyweds were to enjoy
making love or having sexual intercourse with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept
on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep. No sexual intercourse occurred
during their first night, second, third and fourth night. From May 22, 1988 until March 15,
1989, they slept together in the same room and on the same bed but during this period, there was
no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. A case was then filed to declare the annulment of
the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Gina alleged that Chi Ming was
impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show him his penis (clinically found to be only 3
inches and 1 cm. when erect). Defendant admitted that no sexual contact was ever made and
according to him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always
avoided him and whenever he caressed her private parts she always removed his hands.
ISSUE:
[i]Is the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner a psychological
incapacity ?[i]
HELD:
[i]If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted
refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation
is the basic end of marriage." Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the
integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of
one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity. (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the
"spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court
order. Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest
act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven
self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual
intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation
and ensures the continuation of family relations.
INTOD VS. COURT OF APPEALS,215 SCRA 52
FACTS:
Sulpicio Intod and 3 other men went to Salvador Mandaya’s house to ask him to go
with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. The group had a meeting with
Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed
because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany the
4 men otherwise he would also be killed. At 10:00 p.m. of that same day, Intod and
companions, all armed with firearms arrived at Palangpangan’s house. Thereafter,
petitioner fired at the said room. It turned out the Palangpangan was in another city
and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in
the room when the accused fired. No one was hit by the gunfire. The RTC convicted
Intod of attempted murder. Petitioner Intod seeks a modification of the judgment on
the ground that he is only liable for an impossible crime {Art. 4(2)}. Petitioner
contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his
companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible. On the
other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not
impossible instead the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict
Intod for attempted murder. Respondent likewise alleged that there was intent.
Further, In its Comment to the Petition, respondent pointed out that “xxx. The crime
of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment (Art 4 (2), RPC), but due to a cause of accident other that
petitioner’s and his co-accused’s own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3)
Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that time. Had it not been for this fact,
the crime is possible, m not impossible.
ISSUE:
Is petitioner is liable only for an impossible crime?
HELD:
[i]Under Article 4(2) of the RPC, the act performed by the offender cannot produce
an offense against person or property because: 1) the commission of the offense is
inherently impossible of accomplishment; or 2) the means employed is either a)
inadequate or b) ineffectual.
To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its
nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either 1) legal
impossibility, or 2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order
to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended act, even if complete would not
amount to a crime. Thus: legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances
where 1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the
law; 2) there is intention to perform the physical act; 3) there is a performance of
the intended physical act; and 4) the consequence resulting from the intended act
does not amount to a crime. The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls
in this category.
On the other had, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances

unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the
intended crime. One example is the man who puts his hand in the cot pocket of
another with the intention to steal the latter’s wallet and finds the pocket empty.
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he
thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said
place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.
The factual situation in the case at bar presents a physical impossibility which
render the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an
impossible crime.
ARTICLE 4, FAMILY CODE
COSCA VS. PALYPAYON JR. ,237 SCRA 249
FACTS:
Complainants (Juvy Cosca et al.,) are employees of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur.
Respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon Jr., is the Presiding Judge of the same Court while
Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is the Clerk of Court. An administrative complaint was field with the
Office of the Court Administrator charging respondents , among others, illegal solemnization
of marriage.
Complainants alleged that respondent Judge solemnized 6 marriages even without the
requisite marriage license. As a consequence, their marriage contracts did not reflect any
marriage license number.
The respondent Judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of
solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be
submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony.
Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action of respondent Judge proper.
HELD:
[i]The Family Code pertinently proves that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a
valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares
that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage
void ab initio and that , while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity
of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly , criminally
and administratively liable.
* The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal
marriage, and what we are providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of
respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal responsible. The Revised Penal Code
provides that “priests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities
who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance
with the provisions of the Marriage Law.” This is of course, within the province of the
prosecutorial agencies of the Government.
RESPONDENT JUDGE LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR. IMPOSED A FINE WITH STERN

WARNING xxx
Note: compare with DUMAGTOY case
Miguelito Jun 26, 2001 08:41 PM
Re: ARTICLES 17, 18 AND 19, RPC
Quote:
Originally posted by PUGSLY

QUERY:
1. X stabbed Y. Z saw this and he then boxed Y. What is their criminal liability?
2. X slapped Y. Z saw this and he then stabbed Y. What is their criminal liability?
sori di ko nakita yung instructions hehe
1. X is liable as principal by direct participation. if Z's presence was to ensure the

accomplishement of X's act, Z is liable as principal too. otherwise, Z is not liable except in the
case where Y survived and suffered injuries not caused by X -- as a principal too but for a
different crime.
Z cannot be an accomplice because what he did was after -- not previous or simultaneous --
with X's act. neither is he an accessory.
2. Z is a principal in the stabbing part. X is either a principal or accomplice depending on other

circumstances.
Tama ba? Man, i need to review my crim1! :)
Miguelito Jun 26, 2001 08:52 PM
Quote:
In both cases, A does not incur any criminal liability.
The cases cited are both dealing with MISPRISION OF FELONY, not punishable
under the RPC
CIVIL LAW REVIEW QUIZ
1. H filed for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he never really had any intention
at all to marry W because the main consideration why he entered in such a marriage contract was
only to give a name to the child in W’s womb, which, however, was never born and therefore
clearly proving a failure of consideration warranting the annulment of the same. Will the
annulment be granted? Support your answer.
2. A woman employee of X Company was dismissed from her job pursuant to the company’s
policy, which disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage. As a lawyer,
how will you argue the woman’s case on the basis of the provisions of the Constitution and the
Family Code?
3. The 1989 Constitution contains several provisions designed to protect and preserve the family
and marriage. Among others are the following:
a) That “the state recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as basic social institution.” (Sect 12, Art II);
b) That “the state recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen the solidarity and actively promote its total development” (Sec 1, Art XV);
c) That “marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the state.” (Sec 2, Art XV).
In view of the above constitutional provision highlighting the importance of marriage and family,
is Congress precluded from enacting a law legalizing absolute divorce in this country?
Explain/Support your answer.
4. H, 19 years old, and W, 17 years old were married in a civil weeding with their parents’
consent. Is the marriage valid, violable, or void? Support your answer.
5. Mess, (not “her” real name) is a man trapped in a woman’s body. He had always felt and acted
as a “She” For the past 5 years, Mess has been “living-in” with John (not his real name), who is
as manly as Adam. Mess and John desire to document their relationship and marry each other for
good (or bad?) Armed with a valid married license which they were able to obtain the went to a
judge of the solemnization of their marriage. If you were the judge will you marry Mess and
John? Reason out your answer.
6. Mess and John learned that recently in the Netherlands, people similarly situated had been
legally married. They decided to go to the Netherlands and got married there validly. Is their
marriage, which is valid in Netherlands, valid here? Support your answer.
7. Mars and Helen , Filipinos , of legal age, decided to get married. They applied for and
obtained a valid marriage license from the office of the Local Civil Registrar. A date for the civil
wedding was set. One week, before the wedding day Mars had to leave for abroad on a very
important mission. The prospective spouses agreed to just go on with the civil wedding as
scheduled but instead of Mars, it will be his look-alike friend John who will stand-in for him
during the ceremony. Anyway, they (Mars and Helen) will have a grand church wedding as soon
as Mars comes home. The civil wedding was celebrated as planned with Jim standing-in as the
groom . Is the marriage valid, violable , or void.? Support your answer.
8. Five months later, Mars arrived. As had been agreed upon, he and “his “ wife, Helen, were
married “again: in a grand church ceremony attended by VIP’s , on the basis of the same license
obtained before. Is the church weeding valid, violable, or void? Support your answer.
9. H and W were married in a garden weeding held at the Bell Amphitheater at Camp John Hay,
Baguio City. The marriage was solemnized by Judge X, of the RTC of Makati City, who is a
relative of the groom. Is the marriage valid, violable, or void? Support your answer.
10. “A” seduces the 19- year old daughter of “X”. A promise of marriage either has not been
made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Obviously, a grave moral wrong has
been committed and the girl and her family have suffered incalculable moral damage. Under our
present laws, can the girl bring any action for damages against A? Support your answer.
PEOPLE vs NARVAEZ, 121 SCRA 389 (1983) (Makasiar)
FACTS: At about 2:30 PM on August 22, 1968, Davis Fleischer, Flaviano Rubia and three
other men were fencing the land of George Fleischer, father of Davis, in Maitum, South
Cotabato. They were also chiseling the house of Mamerto Narvaez, who was sleeping in his
house. Narvaez awoke and asked to talk to Fleischer from his window.
Fleischer said, “No, gademit, proceed, go ahead.” Narvaez shot him with a shotgun from the
window, then shot Rubia who was running towards his jeep where a gun was located. Both
died.
Narvaez voluntarily surrendered and claimed defense of his person and of his rights. The Court
of First Instance of South Cotabato convicted him of murder qualified by treachery with the
aggravating circumstance of evident premediation and the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender.
The incident was intertwined with a long legal battle between Narvaez and other settlers in
Cotabato, and Fleischer and Co.
Narvaez had settled in Maitum in 1937. George Fleischer, an American landowner in Negros
Oriental, acquired 300 hectares after the war in a public auction where they were the only
bidders and where settlers protested. After a long legal battle, in 1965, the Court of First
Instance ruled against the settlers. To avoid trouble, Narvaez voluntarily dismantled the house
and store he built in 1947 at a cost of P20,000 and transferred to another house he built in 1962
or 1963 which was near the highway. Narvaez also had his rice mill 15 meters away from the
house.
Although Narvaez joined in another suit in 1966, he signed a lease with Fleischer and Co. in
1967. He never paid the monthly rent of P16 but claimed that the milling jobs he did for Rubia
constituted payment. He claimed he signed the lease to avoid trouble despite the uncertain
ownership.
On June 25, 1968, Davis Fleischer sent Narvaez a letter alleging that he had not paid rent for
six months, and gave him six months until December 31, 1968 to remove his house, ricemill,
bodega and water pumps from the land.
Fleischer and Rubia began fencing on August 21, 1968, and this would have shut off appellant
from his house and rice mill from the highway.
Narvaez appealed the decision.
ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in convicting the defendant despite the fact that he was
acting in defense of his person and of his rights.
HELD: Yes
RATIO: Defense of one’s person or rights is a justifying circumstance, but three prerequisites
must be present.
Unlawful aggression due to the utterance of Fleischer and the invasion of Narvaez’s property
was clear. The pending case regarding ownership was decided only over a year after the
incident, and even then, Fleischer had given Narvaez until the end of the year to leave the land.
Lack of sufficient provocation was clear because Narvaez was asleep in his house, then asked
Fleischer to stop so they could talk.
Firing a shotgun from a window, however, was a disproportionate means of resistance.
Narvaez was thus guilty of two counts of homicide with the special mitigating circumstance of
incomplete defense under Article 13 of the RPC.
Treachery could not be held because the shooting was not a sudden, unprovoked attack.
Premeditation could not be held because the only evidence was the statement of one of
Fleischer’s laborers that he was asked by Narvaez to tell Fleischer that he would break the
latter’s head. There was no direct evidence or more credible witness. Moreover, the appellant
pleaded with the victims to stop and talk.
Voluntary surrender was present, but so was passion and obfuscation because the appellant
awoke to find his house being damaged and his house and business being closed off from him.
Given the long history of the land dispute, the appellant could have momentarily lost all reason
and reached for his shotgun.
Because of the aggravating reaction of the victim and that the actions were intended to
humiliate the appellant who was married to a municipal councilor and enjoyed standing in the
community, civil liability must be modified. The appellant also deserves leniency as his family
never had sufficient means to fight the land accumulation of Fleischer and Co. despite its
already extensive holdings in Central Visayas.
Article 249 of the RPC punishes homicide with reclusion temporal. This is lowered by two
degrees because of incomplete defense, and one degree because of the two mitigating
circumstances and lack of aggravating circumstances.
The sentence was modified to four months of arresto mayor, indemnity of 4,000 pesos for each
group of the heirs of Fleischer and Rubia, no subsidiary imprisonment, and no award for moral
damages and attorney’s fees.
Because Narvaez had been imprisoned for 14 years, he was ordered immediately released.
Decision modified.
(dissent) Abad Santos: Self-defense in the penal code refers to unlawful aggression on persons
and not property.
(dissent): Gutierrez, Jr.: Appellant defended from an attack on his property that was not
coupled with an attack on his person. There should be no special mitigating circumstance of
incomplete defense. The sentence should have been modified to prision mayor and the
defendant should have been ordered released immediately.
Oscar01 Jun 28, 2001 08:03 AM
For the anti-VFA people...
MIQUIABAS vs COMMANDING GENERAL, 80 Phil 267 (1948) (Moran)
FACTS: Jesus Miquiabas was a Filipino citizen employed by the US Army in Clark Air Base
who was court-martialed and sentenced by the US Army after he was caught disposing of army
property in the Port of Manila area. He filed for a writ of habeas corpus.
Under the 1947 Military Bases Agreement, any offense committed by any person within a base
fell under American jurisdiction, unless both parties were Philippine citizens. In addition, all
offenses outside a base by a member of the US armed forces against another member of the
same also fell under American jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WON the offense was committed inside a base and WON a civilian employee is
considered a member of the US armed forces
HELD: No and no.
RATIO: Paragraph 2, Article XXI of the treaty identified the Port of Manila Reservation as
temporary quarters and facilities. Paragraph 3 specified that offenses committed in such
temporary facilities would not be considered as being committed within the base. Thus, the
first condition cited did not hold.
The US Articles of War do not list civilian employees as members of the armed forces.
Nevertheless, the Articles of War should not decide the case; the treaty should be applied.
Although the United States was the offended party, Miquiabas could not be considered a
member of the armed forces under the treaty. Thus, the second condition cited did not hold,
either.
Miquiabas was ordered released immediately, and the court martial was declared null and void
because of lack of jurisdiction.
Petition granted.
(concur) Perfecto: The case shows weakness in the Philippines, and how it submitted to a more
powerful nation. The treaty is unconstitutional because a Filipino citizen could be made subject
to American law on Philippine soil under its conditions.
Oscar01 Jun 28, 2001 08:04 AM
One from Martial Law...
TANADA vs TUVERA, 136 SCRA 27 (1985) (Escolin)
FACTS: Lorenzo Tanada and co-petitioners asked for a writ of mandamus that NUMEROUS
presidential decrees, letters of instruction, general orders, proclamations, executive orders,
letters of implementation and administrative orders of President Ferdinand Marcos be
published in the Official Gazette or wherever promulgated.
They invoked the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern, as recognized by
Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 constitution. The Solicitor General asked that the petition be
dismissed because the petitioners had no legal standing because they were not aggrieved
parties. He also added that the laws cited had their own effectivity dates and did not have to be
published following Article 2 of the Civil Code (“Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided.”).
ISSUE: WON the petitioners had legal standing to make the petition and WON a law can be
enforced WITHOUT publication in the Official Gazette
HELD: Yes and No.
RATIO: The petitioners have legal standing because the right sought to be enforced is a public
right, in fact a constitutional one. If they were disallowed from making the petition, it would be
inconceivable that anyone would, considering that the petition was opposed by Marcos’s
Solicitor General, in fact the lawyer charged to represent the people!
The Solicitor General was correct that the Supreme Court had previously ruled that that the
effectivity dates in laws need not depend on the date of publication, as provided for by Article
2 of the Civil Code. However, this does not mean the laws do not need to be published.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 expressly requires the publication of specific public
documents, including executive orders and proclamations with general applicability (unlike
those applying only to a specific person or class of persons).
Without publication, citizens could not be held liable for ignorance of the law, as explained in
Pesigan vs Angeles. Also, in Peralta vs COMELEC: “Before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.” Informing the public was all
the more important because President Marcos had, unlike any other president in history, had
the power to write laws.
The respondents were ordered to publish all unpublished presidential issuances which were of
general application, or these would be declared not binding.
Petition granted.
OBITER: No further provisions had to be laid down by the court because none of the cited
issuances had been enforced. “Erasing” the past by judicial declaration is not always as easy
because rights may have been vested in people, the laws may have influenced acts, etc.
(concur with reservation) CJ Fernando: Concurred, except to clarify that the Constitution did
not state that laws had to be published in the Official Gazette to be binding. Publication is
elementary fairness, but he disagreed that notice should be published specifically in the
Official Gazette. Because all laws are equal, a later law can legally provide for a different
means of publication other than the Official Gazette as stated in the Civil Code.
(concur) Teehankeee: Emphasized that the Solicitor General’s claim that laws which have no
effectivity date have to be published following the Civil Code. This interpretation violates due
process and the basis for excusing no one from ignorance of the law.
(concur) Melencio-Herrera: Clarified that a decree, once published, should have a date of
effectivity retroactive to one stated within the decree. This would create ex post facto laws
prohibited by the Constitution.
(concur with qualification) Plana: Publication is not required for effectivity under the 1973
Constitution, and neither does Commonwealth Act No. 638 Due process requires that the
public be informed, but not necessarily through the Official Gazette. The Civil Code also
makes provision for a different mode of notice, not just for a different effectivity date.
(concur): Gutierrez, Jr.: Reserved his vote regarding the necessity of publication specifically
being in the Official Gazette.
Eterna Jun 29, 2001 06:26 PM
PRIVILEGE FROM ARREST
PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS,324 SCRA 689
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now
confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on 2 counts and
acts of lasciviousness on 6 counts is pending appeal.
He filed a Motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been
convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
He argues that the sovereign electorate of the 1st District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as
their representative in Congress.
Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a
Congressman.
ISSUE:
Does re-election to a public office gives priority to any other right or interest, including the
police power of the State.
HELD:
The privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by
law.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of
suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation of
its benefits. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having
been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our first task is to ascertain the applicable
law.
We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of Government – executive,
legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty of law. There is an unfortunate
misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment to high government office, by
itself, frees the official from the common restrains of general law. Privilege has to be granted
by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the
requirement of obedience rather than exemption.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, the later customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision of
the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege has always been granted
in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be
extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
implication or equitable considerations.
A Congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal
Code could not claim parliamentary immunity form arrest. He was subject to the same general
laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal. x x x For
offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress’ function to attend sessions is

underscored by Section 16 (2) , Article VI of the Constitution. However, the accused-appellant
has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article
VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman
charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely
authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW
A, 14 yrs. and 6 months old quarelled with B. A killed B. When policemen arrived he
voluntarily surrendered and he pleaded guilty.
Compute for the ISL.
sedfrey Jul 1, 2001 01:47 AM
Quote:

QUERY:
1. What is the legal duration of Reclusion Perpetua?
2. Is it a divisible or an indivisible penalty?
I'm not really sure but:
1. 30 years
2. indivisible.
sedfrey Jul 1, 2001 01:57 AM
my guessed answers for the CIVIL LAW REVIEW QUIZ
1. H filed for the annulment of the same. Will the annulment be granted? Support your answer.
No. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union. it is not subject to stipulation, save that
on property relations.
2. A woman employee of X the basis of the provisions of the Constitution and the Family
Code?
Consti - equal protection clause

family code - mmm...
3. The 1989 Constitution contains several provisions designed to protect and preserve the
family and marriage. Among others are the following:In view of the above constitutional
provision highlighting the importance of marriage and family, is Congress precluded from
enacting a law legalizing absolute divorce in this country? Explain/Support your answer.
Congress can pass a divorce law. marriage is governed not by private stipulation but by law.
Congress has plenary power to pass laws.
4. H, 19 years old, and W, 17 years old were married in a civil weeding with their parents’
consent. Is the marriage valid, violable, or void? Support your answer.
void. There is an absence of an essential requisite, which is legal capacity of the contracting
parties.
5. Mess, (not “her” real name) is aey were able to obtain the went to a judge of the
solemnization of their marriage. If you were the judge will you marry Mess and John? Reason
out your answer.
no. (may partial points ba without reasons? :) )

6. Mess and John learned that recently in the Netherlands, people similarly situated had been
legally married. They decided to go to the Netherlands and got married there validly. Is their
marriage, which is valid in Netherlands, valid here? Support your answer.
No. laws pertaining to family relations and personal status are binding on citizens whether
residing here or abroad.
7. Mars and Helen , Filipinos , of legal age, decided to planned with Jim standing-in as the
groom . Is the marriage valid, violable , or void.? Support your answer.
void. there is absence of a formal requisite, a valid marriage ceremony where contracting
spouses take each other as husband and wife.
8. Five months later, Mars arrived. As had been agreed upon, he and “his “ wife, Helen, were
married “again: in a grand church ceremony attendeSupport your answer.
void. no valid marriage license.
9. H and W were married in a garden weeding held at the Bell Amphitheater at Camp John Ha
Is the marriage valid, violable, or void? Support your answer.
void. judges can solemnize only in their jurisdiction.
10. “A” seduces the 19- year old daughter of “X”. A promise of marriage either has not been
made, or can not be pd and the girl and her family have suffered incalculable moral damage.
Under our present laws, can the girl bring any action for damages against A? Support your
answer.
Under civil laws, none. There was no promise of marriage (and breach of promise to marry is
not an actionable wrong) and no damages, so he can't even be liable under Art. 19-21.
ARTS. 39, 40, FC
DOMINGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 226 SCRA 572
FACTS:
1. Private Respondent Delia Soledad Domingo filed a “Petition of Nullity of Marriage and
Separation of Property” against petitioner Roberto Domingo.
2. Petitioner and private respondent were married on November 29, 1976.
3. Unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Erlinda Dela Paz on April 25, 1969
which marriage is still valid and existing.
4. She came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Dela Paz sued them
for bigamy.
5. Petitioner prayed that a Temporary Restraining Order or a writ of Preliminary Injunction be
issued enjoining Roberto Domingo for exercise any act or administration and ownership over
their properties.
6. She also sought that she be declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired
at the time of their void marriage and such properties be placed under the proper management
and administration of her attorney in fact.
7. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the marriage being void ab initio, the
petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary.
8. The Motion to Dismiss was denied for lack of merit so with a Motion for Reconsideration
thereof.
9. The CA dismissed the petition finding no grave abuse of discretion in the lower court's order
denying petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and
separation of property.
ISSUE:
Is there a necessity for a void marriage to be judicially declared a nullity?
HELD:
A marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact under the Family Code
even for purposes other than remarriage.
A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause
of action or a ground for defense. (Art. 40) Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable
in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgement declaring
the previous marriage void.
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the
protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marriages
again. With a judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who
marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
PUGSLEY Jul 9, 2001 06:17 PM
DECS VS. SAN DIEGO, 180 SCRA 533
FACTS:
1. Private respondent Roberto Rey San Diego graduated from the University of the East with a
BS degree in Zoology.
2. He took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times.
3. When he applied again petitioner rejected him because it contended that under the NMAT
rule: “ a student shall be allowed to take 3 chances to take the NMAT. After three successive
failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.”
4. Private respondent went to the RTC for a petition mandamus invoking his right to academic
freedom and quality education.
5. Respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong declared the challenged order unconstitutional.
6. Respondent Judge held that San Diego has been deprived of his right to pursue a medical
education through an arbitrary exercise of police power.
ISSUE:
Is person who has failed the NMAT three times entitled to take it again.
HELD:
The proper exercise of the police power of the State requires the concurrence of a lawful
subject and a lawful method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is
the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not
infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law
nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The thee-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools
and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to
be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved, and the
closer the line, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to
harness its human resources and to see to it that they are, not dissipated or, no less worse, not
used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common
good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.
The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution also provides that "every
citizen has a right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic requirements. {Art. XIV, Sec.5 (3)}
The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well taken. A
law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Art.
III, Sec 1 of the Constitution.
There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted
and others who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal
protection requires is equality among equals.
BASIC THINGS ONE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT PLUNDER
WHAT IS PLUDER?
Any Public Officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by
affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P 50,000.00).
WHAT IS THE PENALTY FOR PLUNDER?
The penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.

WHAT HAPPENS TO THE ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH /INTERESTS AND OTHER
INCOMES AND ASSETS OF THE PERSON FOUND GUILTY OF PLUNDER?
The same will be forfeited in favor of the State.
WHAT COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND TRY THE CASE OF

PLUNDER?
Prosecution for plunder shall be within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
DOES THE CRIME OF PLUNDER PRESCRIBE?
Yes, the crime prescribes in 20 years.
IF THE CRIME PRESCRIBES, WHAT HAPPENS TO THE ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH

If the crime prescribes, the State still has the right to recover properties unlawfully acquired by
the public officer/s and such act shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.
eponine07 Jul 11, 2001 04:58 AM
ENGRACE NIÑAL vs. NORMA BAYADOG
G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000
Facts: Pepito Niñal and Teodulfa Bellones were married on September 26, 1974, and out of
their marriage was born herein petitioners. Teodulfa died on April 24, 1985, after being shot by
Pepito. On December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Bayadog were married without
any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempted from securing a marriage
license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After his death, his heirs (herein
petitioners) filed a declaration to declare the nullity of his marriage to Norma, alleging that the
said married was void for lack of a marriage license. Norma filed an action to dismiss, stating
that petitioners were not among those who could file an action for annulment of marriage under
the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand Marcos of the RTC in Toledo dismissed the petition after finding that the
Family Code was rather silent on resolving the issues in the case.
Issue:
Is the marriage of Pepito to Norma null and void?
Held:
The Supreme Court first decided on the issue of whether there was a valid marriage between
Pepito and Norma. The SC reiterated that a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage,
the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio. Such requirement stems from the
State's involvement and participation in every marriage, the maintenance of which the public is
interested. Such interest proceeds from the "constitutional mandate that the State recognizes
the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic `autonomous
social institution'." However, there are instances recognized in the law where a marriage
license may be dispensed with. One such instance is found in Article 34 of the Family Code,
formerly Art. 76 of the Civil Code, which refers to the marriage of a man and a woman who
have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least 5 years before the marriage.
It is true that Norma and Pepito were married without a license, working on the assumption
that they had been living together for at least five years without benefit of a marriage.
However, this 5-year period should be considered as the years immediately before the day of
the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity -- meaning
that there is no third party involved at any time within the 5 years -- and continuity -- that is
unbroken. Otherwise, if such period were computed regardless of whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other or not, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common-law relationships and placing them on the same footing
as those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
In this case, it cannot be said that Pepito and Norma had lived together for five years prior to
their wedding day. Only 20 months had elapsed between the time Pepito's first marriage was
dissolved and his marriage to Norma. Even if Pepito and his first wife had been living
separately from each other, they were still married, and his cohabitation with Norma was not
the cohabitation contemplated by law. it should have been in the nature of a perfect union
under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. The
subsistence of the marriage even when there was actual severance of the filial relationship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as
being one as "husband and wife".
:blossom:
p.s. the digest is a bit incomplete. i only put in the most important issue, but there are a couple
of other issues.
eponine07 Jul 16, 2001 05:40 AM
just pushing this to the top....
hey, pugsly! no time no hear (or post)! the other legal beagles (me included) are wondering
where you are. hope you haven't drowned in the cases assigned to you.
keep cool, man. :)
:blossom:
PUGSLEY Jul 19, 2001 12:27 AM
SEC. 19, ART VII, Constitution
TORRES VS. GONZALES,152 SCRA 272
FACTS:
1. Sometime before 1979, petitioner Wilfredo Torres was convicted by the CFI of Manila of 2
counts estafa.
2. These convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
3. The maximum sentence would expire on November 2, 2000.
4. A conditional pardon was granted by the President on condition that petitioner would “not
again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines should this condition be violated, he will
be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law.”
5. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement.
6. In 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole recommended to the President the cancellation of
the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner.
7. Records of the NBI showed a long list of charges had been brought against the petitioner
during the last 20 years. (20 counts of estafa and sedition)
8. Respondent Minister of Justice Neptali Gonzales wrote the President informing her of the
Resolution of the Board recommending the cancellation of the pardon previously granted to
petitioner.
9. The conditional pardon was cancelled and petitioner was arrested and confined in
Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.
10. Hence, this action impugning the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment
claiming that he did not violated his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by
final judgment of the 20 counts of estafa nor of the crime of sedition.
ISSUE:
Is a conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court necessary before the petitioner can be
validly rearrrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon.
HELD:
The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon
are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper
consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial
scrutiny under Section 64 (I) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act
consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of
the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (I) of the
Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is
necessary much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict
may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally
pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for
the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (I) of the Revised
Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
It may be emphasized that what is involved in the instant case is not the prosecution of the
parolee for a subsequent offense in the regular course of administration of the criminal law.
What is involved is rather the ascertainment of whether the convict has breached his
undertaking that he would not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines” for
purposes of reimposition upon him of the remitted portion of his original sentence. The
consequences that the SC here deals with are the consequences of an ascertained breach of the
conditions of a pardon. A convict granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is
recommitted must of course be convicted by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime
or crimes with which he was charged before the criminal penalty for such subsequent
offense(s) can be imposed upon him. Again, since Article 159 of the RPC defines a distinct,
substantive felony, the parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the provisions
thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to
suffer the penalty in Article 159.
DISSENTING: J. Cruz
There is no question that the petitioner is facing a long list of criminal charges, but that
certainly is not the issue. The point is that, as many as such charges may be, none of them so
far has resulted in a final conviction , without which he cannot be recommitted under the
condition of his pardon.
Mere accusation is not synonymous with guilt. A prima facie case only justifies the filing of
the corresponding information, but proof beyond reasonable doubt is still necessary for
conviction. Manifestly, an allegation merely accuses the defendant of a crime; it is the
conviction that makes him a criminal. In other words, a person is considered to have committed
a crime only if he is convicted thereof, and this is done not by his accuser but by the judge.
FAIR OR NOT FAIR
PEOPLE VS. AVECILLA

GR No. 117033, February 15, 2001
FACTS:
1. At 11 p.m. on December 24, 1991, accused-appellant Rafael Avecilla arrived at a basketball
court in Pandacan Manila and for no apparent reason suddenly fired a gun in the air.
2. Minutes later he proceeded to a closed store about four meters away from the court.
3. He initiated an argument with the group of Macario Afable Jr.
4. Afable tried to pacify accused-appellant but the latter placed his left arm around Afable's
neck and shot him pointblank in the abdomen.
5. Afable ran toward an alley and accused-appellant ran after him.
6. A witness saw accused-appellant and Afable grappling for possession of the gun.
7. The Chief Barangay Tanod arrived and was able to wrest the gun from accused-appellant,
who instantly fled the scene of the incident.
Afable was rushed to the Philippine General Hospital where he eventually expired.
8. Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm.
9. The RTC of Manila rendered judgment convicting accused-appellant of the crime and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE:
Was the conviction proper?
HELD:
The records and the evidence show that the elements of the offense of qualified illegal
possession of firearms, defined in the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 1, PD No. 1866, are present in this
case. Specifically, they are:
1. there must be a firearm;
2. the gun was possessed by the accused;
3. the accused had no license from the government; and
4. homicide or murder was committed by the accused with the use of said firearm.
However, the law on illegal possession of firearms has been amended by R.A. No. 8924, which
took effect on July 6, 1994. Sec. 1 provides “xxx If homicide or murder is committed with the
use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.”
It is clear from the foregoing that where murder or homicide results from the use of an
unlicensed firearm, the crime is no longer qualified illegal possession, but murder or homicide ,
as the case maybe. In such case, the use of the unlicensed firearm is not considered as a
separate crime but shall be appreciated as a mere aggravating circumstance. In view of the
amendments introduced by R.A. 8294 to P.D. 1866, separate prosecutions for homicide and
illegal possession are no longer in order. Instead, illegal possession of firearms is merely to be
taken as an aggravating circumstance in the homicide case.
In other words, where murder or homicide was committed the penalty for Illegal Possession of
Firearms is no longer imposable since it becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance.
(PP. VS. MOLINA)
Inasmuch as the amendatory law is favorable to accused-appellant in this case, the same may
be retroactively applied. This new law applied even to violations that occurred prior to its
effectivity as it may be given retroactive effect under Art. 22 of the revised Penal Code.
Neither can accused-appellant be charged with simple illegal possession. As stated above, the
same may only be done where no other crime is committed.
With more reason, accused-appellant can not be convicted of homicide or murder with “the use
of the unlicensed firearm as aggravating,” inasmuch as said felonies are not charged in the
information but merely mention as a result of the use of the unlicensed firearm. Accused-
appellant was not arraigned for homicide or murder. Hence, he cannot be convicted of any of
these crimes without violating his right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation
against him, not to mention his right to due process.
APPEALED DECISION REVERSED. CRIMINAL CASE FOR QUALIFIED ILLEGAL

POSSESSION IS DISMISSED.
SEARCH WARRANT
OLAES VS. PEOPLE, 155 SCRA 486
FACTS:
1. Petitioners Adolfo Olaes and Linda Cruz, charged for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act,
challenged in the SC the admission by respondent Judge (Alicia Santos) of evidence seized by
virtue of an allegedly invalid search warrant and of an extra-judicial confession taken from
them without the assistance of counsel.
2. Petitioners likewise claim that the Search Warrant issued by respondent Judge is
unconstitutional because it does not indicate the specific offense they are supposed to have
committed.
3. According to the, there is no valid finding of probable cause as a justification for the
issuance of the said warrant in conformity with the Bill of Rights.
4. The caption of the Search Warrant states that is was in connection with “Violation of R.A.
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.”
5. The petitioners also faulted the admission of the extra-judicial confessions with they had
given without the assistance or advice of counsel and cited Section 20 of the Bill of Rights of
the 1973 Constitution providing that “any confession obtained in violation of this section shall
be inadmissible in evidence.”
6. In the separate sworn statement take from Olaes and Cruz on September 24, 1982, it appears
that both petitioners were, before being examined, specifically informed of their right to the
assistance of counsel, which would be provided them by the investigating office at their
request.
7. Asked if they understood, they said “Opo” and affixed their signatures opposite their answer.
8. A statement entitled “Pagpapatunay” or Verification, in which they stated inter alia that they
did not need the assistance of counsel, followed this.
ISSUE:
Was the search warrant validly issued?
Are the extra-judicial confessions admissible in evidence?
HELD:
The SC has examined the Search Warrant issued in the instant case and find it does not come
under the strictures of the Stonehill doctrine. In the case cited, there was a bare reference to the
laws in general, without any specification of the particular sections thereof that were alleged to
have been violated out of the hundreds of prohibitions contained in such codifications. There is
no similar ambiguity in the instant case.
***Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no
question at all of the specific offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding
of probable cause. The Search Warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the
particularity of the descriptions to be made of the “place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.”
Even so, their investigation did not conform to the requirements laid down in PP.VS.
GALIT ,where the SC declared:
“At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of
the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the Warrant of Arrest, if any. He shall be
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent that to counsel, and that any statement he
might make could be use against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate
with his lawyer, or relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means – by telephone
if possible – or by letter or messenger . It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to
see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in
the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone in his behalf.
The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down,
whether exculpatory , in whole or in par, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
DE GUZMAN VS. SUBIDO, 120 SCRA 443
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Ernesto De Guzman was appointed patrolman in the Quezon City Police
department by Mayor Norberto Amoranto.
2. He was civil service eligible having taken and passed the civil service patrolman’s
examination.
3. He had also passed the usual character investigation conducted before appointment.
4. Petitioner went through and successfully completed the police training course.
5. Petitioner’s appointment was forwarded to the CSC.
6. After a year after the appointment and with no action on the appointment papers being taken
by respondent commissioner (Abelardo Subido), the respondents City Treasurer and City
Auditor stopped the payment of the petitioner’s salaries.
7. Respondent Commissioner returned the petitioner’s appointment papers, without action
thereon, to the respondent Mayor on the ground that Mr. De Guzman was disqualified for
appointment under R.A. No. 4864, the Police Act of 1966.
8. The finding was based solely on petitioners own answer to a question in the information
sheet: “Have you been accused, indicted, or tried, for the violation of any law, ordinance, or
regulation, before any court or tribunal?”
9. In said question petitioner answered “yes” for jaywalking and violation of another ordinance
requiring a cochero to occupy only the seat intended for a cochero in a calesa.
10. The CFI dismissed the petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction.
11. According to the court, the requirement of “no criminal record” means without any
criminal record and makes no distinction whether an act violates a state law or only a
municipal or city ordinance.
ISSUE:
Should petitioner be disqualified from appointment to the Quezon City Police Force?
HELD:
The requirements for applicants to a policeman’s position may be quite stringent but the basic
policy of attracting the best qualified is not served by automatically excluding any person who
in an absent minded mood or while hurrying to an urgent appointment may unwittingly have
crossed a street or stepped down from the curb in violation of a jaywalking ordinance. The
same thing is true of a person who may have worked his way through college as a cochero and,
who, pitying his horse struggling up an incline or a bridge, leaves his seat to stand aft and
forward to balance the calesa load or who, alone on his way home, sits in the seat intended for
passengers only to be fined for violating an obscure municipal ordinance.
The phrase “criminal record” governing qualifications for appointment could not have been
intended by the Legislature e to automatically cover every violation of a municipal or city
ordinance carrying a sanction of a nominal fine to enforce it. A violation of a municipal
ordinance to qualify as a “crime “ must involve at least a certain degree of evil doing, immoral
conduct, corruption, malice, or want of principles reasonably related to the requirements of the
pubic office.
eponine07: With all due respect, you might want to recompute the legitimes.
GELUZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS,2 SCRA 801
FACTS:
1. Nita Villanueva came to know defendant Dr. Antonio Geluz through her aunt.
2. She became pregnant by her present husband (plaintiff Oscar Lazo) before they were legally
married.
3. To conceal her pregnancy from her parents she had it aborted by defendant.
4. After her marriage with plaintiff shed became pregnant.
5. As she was then employed in the Comelec she found her pregnancy as an inconvenience and
she had it aborted again by defendant.
6. Less than 2 years, later she again became pregnant.
7. She had the fetus aborted anew; plaintiff did not know of, nor gave his consent to the
abortion as he was at that time in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to the
Provincial Board.
8. Plaintiff then filed a complaint in the CFI of Manila for damages.
9. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant Geluz
ordering the latter to pay damages, attorney’s fees and the costs of the suit.
10. On appeal , the CA sustained the award of damages (3 vs. 2)
ISSUE:
Was the award for damages is proper?
HELD:
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages upon the provisions
of the initial paragraph of Art. 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The Court believes
this to be an error, for the said Article, in fixing a minimum award for the death of a person,
does not cover the case of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains
primarily to the one injured, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to the parents or
heirs of an unborn child.
It is unquestionable that the appellant’s act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife,
without medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can
not be to severely condemned; and the consent of the women or that of her husband does not
excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award for damages that
under the circumstances on record have no factual or legal basis.
HEIRS OF DIAZ-LEUS VS. MELVIDA,158 SCRA 21
FACTS:
1. Hernani Melvida was the driver of a Plymouth car, travelling North, while Almario Rosas
was the driver of a Victory Liner Bus travelling South.
2. The Plymouth car and the Victory Liner figured in an accident along the North Expressway.
3. The car was allegedly driven at a fast speed and in a negligent manner causing it to swerve
to the left.
4. The car was then bumped on the rear portion by the Victory Liner bus and dragged about 50
meters off the cemented road.
5. As a result, the passengers of the car namely Dr. Corazon Diaz-Leus and Florencio
Carbilledo died while Mrs. Leonisa Gali suffered serious physical injuries.
6. The drivers of both vehicles were then charged of the crime of Reckless Imprudence
resulting in Double Homicide, Serious and Slight physical Injuries and Damage to Property.
7. Upon arraignment Melvida and Rosas entered a plea of not guilty.
8. The trial court found Accused Hernani Melvida guilty of the offense charged and acquitted
Almario Rosas.
9. The heirs of Dr. Diaz-Leus appealed to the Court of Appeals, only with respect to the civil
aspect.
10. According to the CA, the vehicular accident cannot be attributed to any negligence on the
part of appellee Rosas, that it was a fortuitous event which appellee Rosas could not prevent.
11. The CA also found that “since the appeal on the civil aspect is predicated upon appellee
Rosas’ negligence which does not exist it follows that his acquittal in the criminal case carries
with it the extinction of his civil liability and therefore the offended parties may no longer
appeal and recover damages from said appellee Rosas.”
ISSUE:
Should the trial court be ordered to determine the civil liability of Rosas and subsidiary civil
liability of the owners of the car and the bus in accordance with Article 29 of the Civil Code?
HELD:
The findings of the CA were a complete exoneration of Rosas. Since petitioner’s appeal on the
civil aspect is predicated upon Rosas’ alleged negligence which has been found not to exist, the
SC likewise upon the Court of Appeals’ ruling that Rosas’ acquittal in the criminal case carries
with it the extinction of his civil liability which bars herein petitioner form recovering damages
from Rosas.
Since Rosas is absolved from any act of negligence which in effect prevents further recovery of
any damages, the same is likewise true with respect to his employer Victory Line, Inc. which at
most would have been only subsidiarily liable.
Nor can the spouses Jesus Gali and Leonisa Gali as employers of respondent Hernani Melvida
be subsidiarily liable. *** In order that employers may be held liable under Art 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, the follwing requisites must exist: 1) That an employee has committed a
crime in the discharge of his duties; 2) that said employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his
civil liability; and 3) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry.
The preceding requisites are not present in the case of the Gali spouses. They are not engaged
in any kind of industry . *** Thus, the Gali spouses cannot be held subsidiarily liable. “Where
the defendant is admittedly a private person who has no business or industry, and uses his
automobile for private purposes, he is not also subsidiarily liable to the plaintiff for the
damages to the latter’s car caused by the reckless imprudence of his insolvent driver.
HOPE YOU CAN CHECK THE FOLLOWING CASES:
[b]
HOPE YOU CAN CHECK THE FOLLOWING CASES:
PP. VS. WALPAN LADJAALAM - September 19, 2000

G.R. No.s 136149-51
KING VS. PP December 2, 1999
Oscar01 Jul 30, 2001 04:37 AM
Estrada vs Arroyo
ESTRADA vs ARROYO, GR#146710(2001), 2 Mar 2001
Original action; Puno
ISSUE: WON Arroyo was merely an acting president and WON Estrada enjoys presidential
immunity
HELD: No and no.
RATIO: Section 8, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution states that a president ceases to be
president only in case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation.
(Agabin: He can only be removed by impeachment, and the people did not remove him by
People Power in EDSA II; Arroyo clearly became president under the 1987 Constitution unlike
Cory who was installed by a revolution.)
Estrada resigned as president, as can be interpreted from his statement after he left Malacanang
and the diary of Executive Secretary Angara, “an authoritative window on the state of mind of
the petitioner.” (Agabin: The Court said it used the diary because Angara was the alter-ego of
the president, as a cabinet member.) The events as described by Angara showed that, mindset
prior to Estrada’s departure and during negotitiations, resignation was implied because the
transfer of power was the main problem.
A letter he allegedly sent to the Senate President and Speaker of the House was not mentioned
in his press release during his departure, and “resignation from the presidency cannot be
subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result
of his repudiation by the people.” (Agabin: Court said those letters were mere afterthoughts.)
Moreover, Estrada could not say he could not resign because he had pending cases because a
public officer may resign despite a pending bribery case—service may not be compelled—but
must still face the charges. In addition, cases filed before the Ombudsman were also not acted
upon while he was still the president, and were thus not pending. The impeachment trial had
also broken down when he stepped down. Thus Estrada had no pending administrative charges
at that time.
Now, Section 11, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution states that Congress has the ultimate
authority to determine whether the president is incapable of performing his functions. After
Estrada resigned, both houses filed resolutions expressing support for Arroyo and confirming
Guingona as Vice-President. The recognition of Arroyo as president (and not acting president),
however, is a political question under the discretion of the legislative branch and cannot be
decided by the court without violating the separation of powers. Thus, even if Estrada can
prove that he did not resign, the issue of whether he merely left Malacanang and allowed
Arroyo to act as acting president has already been resolved by Congress recognizing Arroyo as
de jure president.
Thus, Estrada no longer holds immunity from suit. During the deliberations on the 1987
Constitution, Fr. Bernas explained that no explicit provision was included (unlike in the 1973
Constitution) beause “we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that during his tenure,
he is immune from suit.” The theme of the 1987 Constitution that a public office is a public
trust would be devalued if Estrada can claim that a non-sitting president enjoys immunity from
suit for criminal acts commited during his term.
Petition dismissed.
Oscar01 Jul 30, 2001 06:49 AM
MARCOS vs MANGLAPUS
MARCOS vs MANGLAPUS, 177 SCRA 668, 27 Oct 1989

Original action; En Banc
ISSUE: WON the Aquino administration has the power to bar the return of the body of
Ferdinand Marcos from burial.
HELD: Yes
RATIO: The executive power vested in the president of the Philippines has “unstated residual
powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to
comply with her duties.” In Myers v. United States, the US Supreme Court accepted Alexander
Hamilton’s proposition that the executive, unlike Congress, could exercise unstated powers as
long as these were not forbidden in the constitution. (The powers in the 1987 Constitution are
nevertheless different from those in the 1973 Constitution, especially Amendment No. 6 which
specifically granted the power to make law to the president.)
Among the duties of the president is to protect the welfare of the people, and the decision to
bar the return of the Marcoses under the circumstances in 1989 clearly did not constitute a
grave abuse of discretion.
Motion for reconsideration denied for lack of merit.
Isagani Cruz: (dissenting) The death of Marcos was met with only indifference from the
people; he is no longer a threat but a dead body waiting to be buried. Let the body be brought
home and let it be buried to close the issue since it is a “tempest in a teapot.”
Paras: (dissenting) Marcos, though dead, still has rights and so does his family. The threat to
national security remains unproven. Reconciliation will proceed if the motion is granted and
mercy is shown.
Padilla: (dissenting) Marcos’s human right to travel and to die in his country were banned, and
his remaining right to be buried in his homeland should at least be respected. It is the finest
Filipino tradition to show respect to the dead. The threat to national security remains unproven.
Sarmiento: (dissenting) Though I have no eulogies to say for Marcos, I must say that if the
Constitution intended to grant a power, it would say so. The Bill of Rights is a limitation not
only to legislative action but to presidential as well. The threat to national security remains
unproven.
Eterna Aug 27, 2001 02:17 AM
PEOPLS VS. SALARZA, JR

277 SCRA 578
FACTS:
Zareen went with her boyfriend Enrico together with Silverio, Julio and Tonton to attend
a dance. The dance was canceled so they proceeded to a restaurant. They drunk a bottle
of rhum. Zareen did not drink. At 11:00 pm they returned to their cottage where Zareen
drank one beer. After a while she felt tired and slepy so she excused herself and went to
her cottage.
At around 2:00 am of the next day, Zareen woke up when she felt somebody take off her
underwear. The room was dark and Zareen did not stop the man because she thought it
was Enrico and she was half-asleep.
The man removed his briefs and placed himself on top of her, spread her legs and
penetrated her. Later, the man whispered "Zareen, its not Ricky, it's Jun and I love
your." When she heard the words Zareen pushed the man aside. She cried and became
hysterical. She went to the bathroom and washed herself.
ISSUE:
WON fact that Zareen was half-asleep when the accused had intercourse with her is
covered by the phrase "otherwise unconscious" to make the accused liable for rape.
RULING:
Zareen was not deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious when the accused had
intercourse with her. Her lame excuse was that she was half-asleep. However, she
admitted that in the eraly morning of May 1 1994 she woke up to find someone removign
her panty. THuswise, it cannot be said that she was derpived of reason or unconscious.
She knew, hence, was concious when her panties were being pulled does she kenw, hence
was conscious when her legs were being parted to prepare fro the sexual act; she knew,
hence was concious when the man was pulling down his briefs; she kenw, hence was
concsious when the madn mounted her and lusted after her virtue. The sexual act was
done because of Zareen's passivity if not consent.
JUSTICE REGALADO (dissenting):
From both physiological and neurological considerations, a person who is half-asleep and
therfore in a stupor of drowsiness or semi-consciousness, is not capable of giving full,
informred, intelligent and voluntary consent.
A woman who is half-asleep being only half-conscious or in a state of drowsiness hence
not fully conscious; is not capable of completely giving that consent contemplated as valid
in law which would bar a prosecution for rape upon the defense of consensuality in the
sexual act.
JUSTICE DAVIDE JR. (dissenting):
The term "unconsciousness" should not be tested by a mere physical standard, i.e.,
whether one is awakeor asleep, conscious or alert. Rather, inquiry should be made
whether the victim could have given a well informed grant of consent.
In Zareen's case, she was "half-asleep" or drowsy when she was penetrated by the
accused. SHe was not aware at that time of the totality of circumstances-critically, her
partner's identity.
Eterna Sep 5, 2001 06:05 PM
People vs. Quino, 232 SCRA 400
SELF-DEFENSE
When the accused invokes the justifying cicumstances of self-defense, he assumes the burden
of prving with clear and convincing evidence, the justificaiton of his act. Having admitted the
killing, he mus then establishe his claim by clear and convincing proof, relying on the strength
of his own evidence and not on the weakenss of the prosecution, for even if it were weak, it
could not be disbelieved after the accused admitted the killing.
The essentail elements of self-defense are:

a) unlawfull aggression;
b) reasonbale necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.; and
c) lack of sufficient provocatiion on the part of the person defending himself.
ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE
MARCOS VS. MARCOS

October 19, 2000
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Belinda Marcos and respondent Wilson Marcos were married twice: 1) on
September 6, 1982 at the Municipal Court of Pasig; and 2) on May 8, 1983 at the Presidential
Security Command Chapel in Malacañang Park, Manila.
2. Out of their marriage, five children were born.
3. Both petitioner and respondent were in the military service at the time or Marcos’ regime.
4. After the EDSA Revolution, both sought a discharge from the military service.
5. Wilson Marcos left the military service and then engaged in different business ventures that
did not however prosper.
6. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a
consequence , he would hit and beat her.
7. He would even force him to have sex with him despite her weariness.
8. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in
the way he chastised them.
9. A petition for annulment of marriage was then filed on the ground of psychological incapacity.
10. The trial court declared the marriage null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code.
11. The CA reversed holding that psychological incapacity had not been established by the
totality of the evidence presented.
12. The CA ratiocinated that “Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root
cause of the spouses’ psychological incapacity which should be medically or clinically
identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision.
13. Appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation.
ISSUE:
Is there a need for Personal Medical Examination of Respondent?
Was the totality of evidence presented in the case – including the testimonies of petitioner, the
common children, petitioner’s sister and the social worker – enough to sustain a finding that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated?
HELD:
* Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be

established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the
respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for
such declaration.
The SC agrees with the petitioner that the personal or psychological examination of respondent is
not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the
evidence she presented does not show such incapacity. In REPUBLIC VS. CA AND MOLINA
(268 SCRA 198) , the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation of
psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code were laid down by this
Court. ***
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in
SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS ( 240 SCRA 20) : “psychological incapacity must be
characterized by a) gravity, b) juridical antecedence, and c) incurability.” The foregoing
guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be “medically or clinically identified.” What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological
condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.
The SC rules in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed
to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on
his part. There is absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already present at the inception
of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the martial bond
at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibility of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to
71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted
in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. At
best the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for
declaring a marriage void.
PEOPLE VS. AVECILLA

GR No. 117033, February 15, 2001
FACTS:
1. At 11 p.m. on December 24, 1991, accused-appellant Rafael Avecilla arrived at a
basketball court in Pandacan Manila and for no apparent reason suddenly fired a
gun in the air.
2. Minutes later he proceeded to a closed store about four meters away from the
court.
3. He initiated an argument with the group of Macario Afable Jr.
4. Afable tried to pacify accused-appellant but the latter placed his left arm around
Afable's neck and shot him pointblank in the abdomen.
5. Afable ran toward an alley and accused-appellant ran after him.
6. A witness saw accused-appellant and Afable grappling for possession of the gun.
7. The Chief Barangay Tanod arrived and was able to wrest the gun from accused-
appellant, who instantly fled the scene of the incident.
8. Afable was rushed to the Philippine General Hospital where he eventually
expired.
9. Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Qualified Illegal Possession of
Firearm.
10. The RTC of Manila rendered judgment convicting accused-appellant of the crime
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
11. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Was the conviction was proper?
HELD:
The records and the evidence show that the elements of the offense of qualified
illegal possession of firearms, defined in the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 1, PD No. 1866,
are present in this case. Specifically, they are:
1. there must be a firearm;
2. the gun was possessed by the accused;
3. the accused had no license from the government; and
4. homicide or murder was committed by the accused with the use of said firearm.
However, the law on illegal possession of firearms has been amended by R.A. No.
8924, which took effect on July 6, 1994. Sec. 1 provides “xxx If homicide or murder
is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.”
It is clear from the foregoing that where murder or homicide results from the use of
an unlicensed firearm, the crime is no longer qualified illegal possession, but
murder or homicide , as the case maybe. In such case, the use of the unlicensed
firearm is not considered as a separate crime but shall be appreciated as a mere
aggravating circumstance. In view of the amendments introduced by R.A. 8294 to
P.D. 1866, separate prosecutions for homicide and illegal possession are no longer
in order. Instead, illegal possession of firearms is merely to be taken as an
aggravating circumstance in the homicide case.
Thus, in PEOPLE VS. NEPOMUCENO JR. (309 SCRA 466) the SC stated that: “But
pursuant to amendment, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of
murder of homicide is treated as an aggravating circumstance. There, the illegal
possession or use of the unlicensed firearms is no longer separately punished.
With respect to the conviction of accused-appellant for illegal possession of firearms

under PD No. 1866, it was held in the case of PEOPLE VS. MOLINA (242 SCRA 742)
and reiterated in the recent case of PEOPLE VS. VALDEZ (304 SCRA 611) , that in
cases where murder of homicide is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, there can be no separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of
firearms under P.D. No. 1866 in view of the amendments introduced in RA 8294.
Thereunder, the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is simply
considered as an aggravating circumstance in the murder or homicide and no
longer as a separate offense. Furthermore, the penalty for Illegal Possession of
Firearms shall be imposed provided that no other crime is committed. (Sec. 1 of
R.A. No. 8294).
In other words, where murder or homicide was committed the penalty for Illegal
Possession of Firearms is no longer imposable since it becomes merely a special
aggravating circumstance. (PP. VS. MOLINA)
Inasmuch as the amendatory law is favorable to accused-appellant in this case, the

same may be retroactively applied. This new law applied even to violations that
occurred prior to its effectivity as it may be given retroactive effect under Art. 22 of
the revised Penal Code.
Neither can accused-appellant be charged with simple illegal possession. As stated

above, the same may only be done where no other crime is committed.
With more reason, accused-appellant can not be convicted of homicide or murder

with “the use of the unlicensed firearm as aggravating,” inasmuch as said felonies
are not charged in the information but merely mention as a result of the use of the
unlicensed firearm. Accused-appellant was not arraigned for homicide or murder.
Hence, he cannot be convicted of any of these crimes without violating his right to
be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him, not to mention his
right to due process.
[/b]TE VS. COURT OF APPEALS

346 SCRA 327
FACTS:[/b]
1. Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rights on
September 14, 1988.
2. They did not live together after the marriage although they would meet each other regularly.
3. Private gave birth on April 21, 1989 and petitioner stopped visiting her.
4. On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner
contracted a 2nd marriage with a certain Julieta Santella.
5. Private respondent charged petitioner with Bigamy, which was filed in the RTC of Quezon
City.
6. Meanwhile, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action for the annulment of his
marriage to private respondent on the ground that he was forced to marry her.
7. He alleged that private respondent concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of
their marriage and that she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential martial
obligations.
8. Private respondent also filed with the PRC an administrative case against petitioner and
Santella for the revocation of their respective Engineering licenses.
9. After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy, petitioner filed a
demurrer to evidence with leave of court.
10. The trial court in its Order denied petitioner’s Demurrer to Evidence stating that the
Demurrer could not be granted because the prosecution had sufficiently established a prima
facie case against the accused.
11. Petitioner also filed with the Board of the PRC a Motion to suspend the proceedings in
view of the pendency of the civil case for annulment of his marriage and the criminal case for
bigamy.
12. The Board denied the Motion.
13. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
14. The CA affirmed the RTC’s and the Board’s decision.
15. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Did the pendency of a civil case give rise to a prejudicial question in a criminal case for
bigamy.
Can there be a prejudicial question if one of the cases is administrative in nature?
HELD:
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based
but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.. The rationale behind the principle
of suspension a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions.
The CA did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of marriage
filed by petitioner against private respondent did not pose a prejudicial question which would
necessitate that the criminal case for bigamy be suspended until said civil case is terminated.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had
no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for
bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first
marriage be subsisting at the time the 2nd marriage is contracted. Petitioner’s argument that the
nullity of his marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case before the
criminal proceedings could continue, because a declaration that their marriage was void ab
initio would necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is untenable.
The ruling in PEOPLE VS. MENDONZ (95 Phil 843) and PEOPLE VS. ARAGON (100 Phil
1033) cited by petitioner that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a
marriage which is void ab initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule is found in Article 40
of the Family Code, which was already in effect at the time of petitioner’s marriage to private
respondent in September 1988. Said article states that the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void
or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
In LANDICHO VS. RELOVA (22 SCRA 731) the SC held that “Parties to a marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment
of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as
void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption of marriage exits.
Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the
administrative proceeding before the PRC Board. The concept of prejudicial question involves
a civil and a criminal case. The SC previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question where
one case is administrative and the other is civil.
Spungee Feb 14, 2002 03:12 AM
hey pugs =)
great work you have here! you're so chaga! anyways, i hope i could contribute also. want
remedial law cases? hopefully i could post the latest cases.
thanks din for sending me case digests. the consti cases came in handy in my poli class.
hmmm...
well... keep up the good work and i'll text you na lang or see ya here when i have time again, k?
ciao!
PUGSLEY Feb 25, 2002 07:30 AM
CIVIL LAW REVEIW 1
John and Marsha, American citizens of legal age, came to the Philippines and exchanged
marriage vows at the Manila Cathedral. They gave at least two (2) reasons why they decided
thus. Firstly, they believe that church wedding in the Philippines are “sanctified” and secondly,
because absolute divorce, generally is not allowed in the Philippines and therefore there is less
opportunity to “put asunder what God had joined together”, which is of course the idea of
marriage.
Q1: What can you say about the second reason with respect to their situation? (20 pts.)
Five years later, John and Marsha came to realize that the place of celebration of marriage does
not guarantee its success. The spouse of five years obtained a divorce decree in Las Vegas,
Nevada where they are residents.
Q2: Will the divorce decree granted in Las Vegas, Nevada be recognized in the Philippines?
(20 pts.)
Jane, a beautiful 16 year old Texan, decided to marry Juanito, a computer engineering and
native of Baguio. Jane presented to the Local civil Registrar of Baguio City a certificate of
legal capacity to marry, attesting among others, that in Texas, USA, a 16 year old can freely
marry. A valid marriage license was issued and they were married in a simple civil ceremony
solemnized by the City Mayor of Baguio.
Q3: Is the marriage valid, void, voidable? Reason out your answer. (10 pts.)
Suppose the marriage of the above-mentioned parties is held at the US Embassy in Manila,
officiated by the US Consular official.
Q4: Will a validly issued marriage license in the Philippines be required? Reason out your
answer. (10 pts.)
Suppose their marriage (Jane and Juanito mentioned above) is celebrated in Texas, USA where
state law allows 16 year old to marry….
Q5: Will the marriage be considered valid here considering the provisions of “Art. 26, par. 1
FC, which provides,” All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they are solemnized, and valid, there is such, shall also be
valid in the country, except those prohibited under Article 35(1)”? Reason our your answer.
(20 pts.)
Tony and Maria have been living together as husband and wife. Tony cannot marry Maria
because his previous valid marriage was still existing. On the 6th year of their cohabitation,
Tony became a widower. A full year later, Tony and Maria were married without bothering to
obtain a valid marriage license.
Q6: Is their marriage valid, voidable or void? Reason our your answer. (10 pts.)
Q7: Will your answer be the same if from the beginning of their cohabitation Tony had no
legal impediment to marry? Support your answer. (10 pts.)
CRUZ VS. ENRILE

160 SCRA 700
FACTS:
1. 217 political detainees were arrested in the 9-year span of official martial rule and were
committed to the New Bilibid Prison.
2. All stood trial for common crimes before various courts martial; if any of these offense had
any political color, this had never been pleaded nor proved.
3. Of the 217 prisoners, 157 are civilians and only 26 conferred as military personnel.
4. Petitioners urge the Court to declare unconstitutional the establishment of all military
tribunals as well as General Order No. 8 ordaining their creation, and the nullity of all the
proceedings against them before these bodies as a result of which they had been illegally
deprived of their liberty.
5. Their plea is for a grant of a retrial of their respective cases in the civil court, where their
right to due process may be accorded respect.
6. A Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed in the SC claiming the pronouncement of the Cot of
lack of jurisdiction of military tribunals to try cases of civilians even during martial rule.
(OLAGUER et al vs. MILITARY COMMISSION No. 34, 150 SCRA 144) entitled petitioners
to be unconditionally freed from detention.
ISSUE:
Will the 157 petitioner’s be placed twice in jeopardy from a re-trial of their cases?
HELD:
In Olaguer, the Court in no uncertain terms affirmed that – a military commission or tribunal
cannot try and exercise jurisdiction even during the period of martial law, over civilians for
offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and
that nay judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned. For the same reason, the Court’s
pronouncement in AQUINO JR. vs. MILITARY COMMISSION No. 2 (63 SCRA 546) and all
decided cases affirming the same, in so far as they are inconsistent with this pronouncement,
should be deemed abandoned.
Clearly, no right of relief under Olaguer exists in favor of the 26 petitioners who were
admittedly in the military service. Over them the courts martial validly exercised jurisdiction. It
need only be said that these tribunals were created precisely to try and decide cases of military
personnel, and the validity of General Order no. 8 ordaining their creation, although repeatedly
challenged on constitutional grounds, has as many times been upheld by the Court, either
expressly or impliedly. As to these petitioners, the writ is unavailing.
The fact cannot be ignored, however, that crimes appear to have been committed, and these are
accusations against herein petitioner for those offenses. Olaguer cannot and does not operate to
absolve the petitioners of these charges, or establish that the same is baseless, so as to entitle
them to immediate release from detention. It is not to be forgotten that the victims in offenses
ascribed to the petitioner have as much interest as the Sate has to prosecute the alleged authors
of the misdeeds.
No breach of the constitutional prohibition against twice putting an accused in jeopardy of

punishment for the same offense would result from the retrial of the petitioner’s cases, for the
simple reason that the absence of jurisdiction of the courts martial to try and convict the
petitioners prevented the first jeopardy from attaching. Valid previous proceedings are required
in order that the defense of double jeopardy can be raised by the accused in the second
prosecution.
PUGSLEY Mar 13, 2002 07:46 AM
MERCADO VS. MANZANO

307 SCRA 630
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent EDUardo B. Manzano were
candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
2. Private respondent won during said elections.
3. The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen
of the Philippines but of the United States.
4. The 2nd Division of the Comelec granted the petition and ordered the cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under
Sec. 40 (d) the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from
running for any elective position.
5. On August 31, 1998, the Comelec en banc rendered a reversed the ruling of the 2nd Division
and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor.
6. According to the Comelec: a) Eduardo Manzano was born in San Francisco, California,
USA; b) He acquired US citizenship by operation of the US Constitution and laws under the
principle of jus soli; c) He was born also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the
1935 Constitution; d) That upon attaining the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter,
and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US
Citizenship under American Law; e) Under Philippine law, he no longer had US citizenship .
7. Pursuant to the resolution of the Comelec en banc , the Board of Canvassers, on August 31,
1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice-mayor of the City of Makati.
8. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Is Dual allegiance the same as dual citizenship?
Is private respondent is disqualified from holding office of vice-mayor?
HELD:
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when , as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said sates. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person
whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a
sate which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary
act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following
classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle
of jus soli ;
2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country;
3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
In including Section 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional

Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their
countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence , the phrase “dual citizenship” in RA
No. 7160 , Section 40(d) and in RA No. 7854 , Section 20 must be understood as referring to
“dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, by subject to strict
process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it
should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine
citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their
condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a

permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private respondent has, as afar as the law of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have
said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the
fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession
as an artist, and taken part in past election sin this country, leaves no doubt of his election of
Philippine citizenship.
MOSSESGELD VS. COURT OF APPEALS

300 SCRA 464
FACTS:
1. On December 2, 1989, petitioner Marissa Alfaro Mossessgeld gave birth to a baby boy.
2. The presumed father, one Eleazer Calasan, a lawyer, married, signed the birth certificate of
the child as the informant, indicating therein the child’s name as Jonathan Mossessgeld
Calasan.
3. Both the presumed father and the mother accomplished the dorsal side of the certificate of
live birth stating that the information contained therein was true and correct.
4. In addition, lawyer Calasan executed an affidavit admitting paternity of the child.
5. The person in charge of the hospital refused to place the presumed father’s surname as the
child’s surname in the certificate of live birth.
6. Petitioner himself submitted the certificate to the office of the local civil registrar for
registration.
7. The Municipal Treasurer of Mandaluyong, as officer-in-charge of the office of the local civil
registrar, rejected the registration on the basis of Circular No. 4 of the Local Civil Registrar
General, providing that Art. 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate children
born on or after August 3, 199, shall use the surname of their mother.
8. Atty. Calasan filed with the RTC of Pasig a petition for Mandamus to compel the Local
Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong to register the certificate of live birth of his alleged illegitimate
son using his surname.
9. The lower court denied the petition, ruling that illegitimate children must use the surname of
their mothers, regardless of whether or not they had been acknowledged by their fathers in the
record of birth.
10. A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied.
11. On appeal to the CA, the CA affirmed the judgment appealed from.
ISSUE:
Is the use of the father's surname proper?
Does mandamus lies to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register a certificate of live birth of
an illegitimate child using the alleged father’s surname where the latter admitted paternity.
HELD:
Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines, provides that “illegitimate children shall use
the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code.”
This is the rule regardless of whether or not the father admits paternity. Consequently, the
Local Civil Registrar correctly refused to register the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner’s
illegitimate child using the surname of the alleged father, even with the latter’s consent. Of
course, the putative father, though a much married man, may legally adopt his own illegitimate
child. In case of adoption, the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the adopter,
entitled to use his surname.
The Family Code has effectively repealed the provisions of Art. 366 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines giving a natural child acknowledged by both parents the right to use the surname of
the father. The Family Code has limited the classification of children to legitimate and
illegitimate, thereby eliminating the category of acknowledged natural children and natural
children by fiction.
Mandamus does not lie to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register the Certificate of Live
birth of an illegitimate child using the father’s surname, even with the consent of the latter.
Mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of an act prohibited by law.
PEREZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS

255 SCRA 661
FACTS:
1. Private respondent Ray Perez is a doctor of medicine practicing in Cebu while petitioner
Nerissa, his wife is a registered nurse.
2. They were married on December 6, 1986.
3. After six miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, petitioner finally gave
birth to Ray II in NY on July 20, 1992.
4. Petitioner who began work in the US in October 1988, used part of her earnings to build a
modes house in Mandaue City, Cebu.
5. She also sought medical attention for her successive miscarriages in New York.
6. In February 1992, petitioner became a resident alien.
7. Private respondent stayed with her in the US twice and took care of her when she became
pregnant.
8. Unlike his wife, however, he had only a tourist visa and was not employed.
9. In January 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu.
10. After a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to the US.
11. When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray II’s first birthday, the couple was no
longer on good terms.
12. Petitioner did not want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on her husband’s meager
income of P 5,000.00.
13. She longed to be with her only child but her husband was keeping him away from her.
14. On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here , where he could raise his son even as he
practiced his profession.
15. Petitioner was forced to move to her parent’s home in Mandaue.
16. Nerissa filed a petition for Habeas Corpus asking respondent to surrender the custody of
their son to her.
17. The court a quo issued an Order awarding custody of the one year old child to his mother,
citing paragraph 2, of Art. 213 of the Family Code which provides that no child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the Court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise.
18. On appeal, the CA reversed the trial court’s order and awarded custody of the boy to his
father. Holding that granting custody to the boy’s father would be for the child’s best interest
and welfare.
ISSUE:
As between father and mother, who should have rightful custody of a child who bears in his
person both their genes?
HELD:
When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family Code is the applicable
law.
Since the Code does not qualify the word “separation” to mean “legal separation” decreed by a
court, couples who are separated in fact, such *** petitioner and private respondent, are
covered within its terms.
The Revised Rules of Court also contains a similar provision . Rule 99, Section 6 (Adoption
and Custody of Minors). The provisions of law *** mandate that a child under 7 years of age
shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise. The use of the word “shall” in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section
6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.
The general rule that a child under 7 years of age shall not be separated from his mother finds
its raison d' etre in the basic need of a child for his mother’s loving care. Only the most
compelling reasons shall justify the court’s awarding the custody of such a child to someone
other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past the
following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and
parental authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction , maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a
communicable disease.
It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare
and best interest of the child.
HERNANDEZ COURT OF APPEALS

320 SCRA 76
PONENTE: JUSTICE MENDOZA
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario Hernandez were married
in church ceremonies in January 1, 1981.
2. Three children were born to them.
3. In 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC of Tagaytay City, a petition seeking the annulment of
her marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter.
4. She alleged that from the filing of the suit, private respondent failed to perform his
obligation to support the family and contribute to the management of the household, devoting
most of his time engaging in drinking sprees with his friends.
5. She further claimed that private respondent, after they were married, cohabited with another
woman with whom he had an illegitimate child.
6. She also claimed that due to his promiscuity, private respondent endangered here health be
infecting her with a sexually transmitted disease.
7. She averred that private respondent was irresponsible, immature and unprepared for the
duties of a married life.
8. Because private respondent failed to file his answer, the trial court issued an order directing
the assistant provincial prosecutor to conduct an investigation to determine if there was
collusion between the parties.
9. The Prosecutor found no evidence of collusion and recommended that the case be set for
trial.
10. The trial court dismissed the petition for annulment because the circumstances mentioned
by petitioner in support of her claim that private respondent was “psychologically
incapacitated” to marry here are among the grounds cited by the law as valid reasons for the
grant of legal separation – not as grounds for a declaration of nullity of marriages or annulment
thereof.
11. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
12. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
13. The CA cited the ruling in SANTOS VS. CA (240 SCRA 20) holding: “It is clear in the
above law and jurisprudence that the psychological incapacity of a spouse, as ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage, must exist at the time of the celebration of marriage.
Moreso, chronic sexual infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not
grounds per se of psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
Should the marriage of petitioner and private respondent be annulled on the ground of
psychological incapacity?
HELD:
In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed to establish the fact
that at the time they were married, private respondent was suffering from a psychological
defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and
its concomitant responsibilities. As the CA pointed out, no evidence was presented to show
that private respondent was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. It was not
sufficiently proved that private respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties to some
incapacity of a psychological nature, and not mere physical. Petitioner says that at the outset of
their marriage, private respondent showed lack of drive to work for his family. Private
respondent’s parents and petitioner supported him through college. After his schooling,
although he eventually found a job, he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by
his employer and spent the entire amount he received on himself. For a great part of their
marital life, private respondent was out of job and did not have the initiative to look for
another. He indulged in vices and engaged in philandering, and later abandoned his family.
Petitioner concludes that private respondent's condition is incurable, causing the disintegration
of their union and defeating the very objectives of marriage.
However, private respondent’s alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that
these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make private respondent
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due
to private respondent’s youth and self conscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate
court held.
Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of
private respondent’s psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon
petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen
the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
REPUBLIC VS. ABADILLA

302 SCRA 358
FACTS:
1. Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino have been living together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage.
2. During their cohabitation, Luzviminda begot two children, Emerson and Rafael.
3. In the Certificates of Birth of these two children, they were registered with the surname
“Abadilla” and the name of their father was entered as “Herson” Abadilla.
4. Moreover, the entry in the date and place of marriage of the children’s parents appeared as
June 19, 1987 at Dingras, Ilocos Norte.
5. An Amended Petition for Correction/Cancellation of entries was filed by Gerson,
Luzviminda and their two minor children, with the RTC of Laoag, seeking corrections made in
the Certificates of Birth of Emerson and Rafael.
6. During the hearing of the petition, both Gerson and Luzviminda testified that they are not
yet married to each other despite bearing two children.
7. The trial court granted the petition and ordered the corresponding correction.
8. The name of Gerson was corrected and the entry of date of marriage of parents was deleted.
9. The Office of the Solicitor General filed an instant petition for review on certiorari on the
ground that the trial court committed a reversible error when it allowed the deletion of the
“date and place of marriage of parents” from the birth certificates of minors Emerson and
Rafael but failed to order the change of the minor’s surname from “Abadilla” to “Celestino.”
ISSUE:
Should the minor children are allowed to use the surname of their father?
HELD:
There is no dispute that Emerson C. Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla are illegitimate children,
their parents, spouses Gerson and Luzviminda not being married to each other even up to now.
During the birth of Emerson and Rafael, the Family Code was already the governing law.
Thus, as illegitimate children, Emerson and Rafael should bear the surname of their mother,
Luzviminda Celestino. Resultingly, with the correction of the entries in their birth certificates
which deleted the entry in the date and place of marriage of parents, the corresponding
correction with respect to their surname should have also been made and changed to Celestino,
their mother’s surname.
FERNANDEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS

230 SCRA 130
FACTS:
1. Petitioners John Paul Fernandez et al., filed a civil case for support against private
respondent Carlito Fernandez before the RTC of Quezon City.
2. Complaint was dismissed finding that “there is nothing in the material allegations in the
complaint that seeks to compel private respondents to recognize or acknowledge petitioners as
his children” and that there was no sufficient and competent evidence to prove the petitioners’
filiation.
3. Despite this, petitioners filed another action for recognition and support against the private
respondent before another branch of the RTC of Quezon City.
4. The Evidence shows that Violeta Esguerra, single is the mother and guardian ad litem of the
two petitioners Claro Antonio and John Paul, both surnamed Fernandez.
5. Violeta and Carlito met sometime in 1983, at the Meralco Compound tennis court where
Carlito was an employee and a tennis enthusiast.
6. Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of her two sons. She claimed that they started their
illicit sexual relationship 6 months after their first meeting.
7. The tryst resulted in the birth of Claro Antonio of March 31, 1984, and of petitioner John
Paul on February 11, 1985.
8. Violeta further claimed that she did not know that Carlito was married until the birth of her
two children.
9. She averred they were married in civil rites on October 1983 but it was in March 1985 were
she discovered that the marriage license, which they used, was spurious.
10. To bolster their case, petitioners presented the following documents: a) certificates of live
birth, identifying respondent Carlito as their father; b) baptismal certificate of Claro which also
states that his father is respondent Carlito; c)photo of Carlito taken during the baptism of
petitioner Claro; and d) pictures of respondent Carlito and Claro taken at the home of Violeta.
11. Petitioners likewise presented five witnesses.
12. Three witnesses told the court that Violeta had, at different times, introduced the private
respondent to them as her “husband” while the priest Fr. Fernandez testified that Carlito was
the one who presented himself as the father of petitioner Claro during the latter’s baptism.
13. In defense, Carlito denied Violeta’s allegation that he sired the two children.
14. He averred he only served as one of the sponsors in the baptism of petitioner Claro.
15. The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners.
16. On appeal, the decision was set aside and petitioners’ complaint dismissed by the
respondent Court of Appeals.
17. According to the CA, “the proof relied upon by the trial court is inadequate to prove the
private respondent’s paternity and filiation of petitioners.”
18. Petitioner Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE:
Did respondent court err in rejecting as insufficient the documentary evidence offered by
petitioners to prove their filiation.
HELD:
Petitioners can not rely on the photos showing the presence of the private respondent in the
baptism of Claro. These photos are far from proofs that private respondent is the father of
petitioner Claro. As explained by the private respondent, he was in the baptism as one of the
sponsors of petitioner Claro. His testimony was corroborated by one of the witnesses.
The pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing private respondent showing affection to
Claro fall short of the evidence required to prove paternity.
The baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro naming private respondent as his father has scant
evidentiary value. There is no showing that private respondent participated in its preparation.
In MACADANGDANG VS. COURT OF APPEALS (110 SCRA 73), the SC ruled that
while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as
evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not
necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child’s
paternity.
The certificates of live birth of the petitioners identifying private respondent as their father are
not also competent evidence on the issue of their paternity. Again, the records do not show that
private respondent had a hand in the preparation of said certificates. In rejecting these
certificates, the ruling of the respondent court is in accord with the SC’s pronouncement in
ROCES VS. LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR (102 PHIL 1050).
The SC reiterated this rules in BERCILES VS. SYSTEMS (128 SCRA 53), when it held that
“a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father therein indicated is not competent evidence
of paternity.”
PEOPLE VS. DOMINGO

312 SCRA 487
FACTS:
1. Jose Teober Ricafort and his fiancée Susana Loterte were preparing to take a bath in a
nearby well.
2. Jose went ahead as Susana still had to prepare their things.
3. After a short while, Susana followed and when she was barely 20 meters away from the well
she saw Jose being surrounded by accused-appellants Hector, Joselito, Juan and Vicente (all
surnamed Domingo).
4. After saying “Hayop ka, ikaw an nagsaksak san tugang ko.” (You are an animal, you were
the one who stabbed my brother) Hector immediately lunged towards Jose with a fish spear
hitting the latter on the chest.
5. The 4 accused then pounced on him hacking and hitting him on different parts of his body.
6. Jose died as a result.
7. Accused-appellants were then charged with Murder.
8. The trial court found the accused guilty of Homicide.
9. On appeal to the CA, the appellate court found that treachery attended the commission of the
crime.
10. Although it also appreciated the presence of abuse of superior strength and band, it ruled
that these circumstances were absorbed in treachery.
11. Accordingly, it found the four accused-appellants guilty of Murder and not just homicide .
12. The Court sentenced then to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
ISSUE:
Did treachery attend the commission of the crime?
HELD:
The SC disagrees with the appellate court that treachery attended the commission of the crime.
“Treachery may be considered as a qualifying circumstance when the following two conditions
are present: a) the employment of means, methods or manner of execution to ensure the safety
of the malefactor from defenses or retaliatory acts on the part of the victim, and b) the
deliberate adoption by the offender of such means, methods or manner of execution. The
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on
the part of the person attacked.” “It is present when the attack comes without warning, is
sudden and unexpected and the unsuspecting victim is not in a position to parry the assault. It
cannot be presumed,; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as
the killing itself.”
The aforesaid elements are unavailing in the instant case. The records show that Susana had no
knowledge how the attack started. She did not know the manner by which the assailants made
known their presence to Jose. When she arrived at the crime scene, she saw Jose already
surrounded by his attackers. They did not attack him instantly although they left no doubt in
the mind of their victim of their intent to attack as their bolos were already unsheathed and in
full view of their victim when they confronted him.
More importantly, there was a warning from the accused-appellants themselves of the
impending attack as when Hector pronounced, “Hayop ka, ikaw an nagsaksak san tugang ko!”
In effect they have forewarned their victim of the attack. The attack therefore became expected
rather than unexpected. As proof, Jose even tried to parry some of the blows coming from his
assailants as shown by the location of the wounds he suffered. When he parried the blow, his
left had was hit and was completely severed from his body. At this juncture, it bears repeating
that treachery is never to be presumed. Just like the element of a crime, it must be satisfactorily
proved beyond reasonable doubt. Besides, superiority in number does not make the attack
treacherous.
Abuse of superior strength could be appreciated; however, not having been alleged in the
information, it could only be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance. Accused-
appellants enjoyed superiority not only in number but also in arms consisting of bolos and
spear. They took advantage of their combined strength to perpetuate the crime without no harm
forthcoming to themselves.
The felony of homicide carries with it the penalty of Reclusion Temporal. There being one
aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its
maximum period.
yogad Jun 25, 2002 02:02 AM
sos, kailangan ko lang sa office! i just wanna ask what particular law defines the age of
children . thanks!!!!

Quote:
Originally posted by yogad

sos, kailangan ko lang sa office! i just wanna ask what particular law defines the age of
children . thanks!!!!
Can you be more specific about your question?
It isn't clear. :*)
DIZON-PAMINTUAN VS. PEOPLE

234 SCRA 63
FACTS:
1. Teodoro Encarnacion, Undersecretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways
arrived at his residence form the airport and immediately proceeded inside his house.
2. Five unidentified masked-armed persons appeared from the grassy portion of the lot and
poked their guns at his driver and two helpers and were dragged inside the house.
3. The robbers ransacked the house and took away pieces of jewelry and other personal
properties including case.
4. The matter was reported to the police.
5. The WPD asked Teodoro to prepare a list of items of jewelry and other valuables that were
lost.
6. He was later told that some of the lost items were in Chinatown area as tipped by an
informer.
7. His wife was able to recognize the stolen jewelry displayed at the stall being tended by
Norma Dizon-Pamintuan.
8. Norma was arrested, tied and convicted of violating the Anti-Fencing Law.
9. In convicting the petitioner, the trial court ruled that “there is not doubt that the recovered
items were found in the possession of the accused and she was not able to rebut the
presumption (Sec. 5) though the evidence for the prosecution alleged that the stall is owned by
Fredo.
10. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE:
Is accused guilty of the crime charged?
HELD:
Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of PD 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law), is the “act of any person
who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire,
conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item,
object or any thing of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.”
The elements of the crime of fencing are:

1) A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2) The accused , who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of
robbery or theft, buys, receives, possess, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys
and sells, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has
been derived from the proceeds of the said crime;
3) The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of
value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
4) There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
Since Section 5 of PD 1612 expressly provides that “mere possession of any good, article, item
or object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima
facie evidence of fencing,” it follows that the petitioner is presumed to have knowledge of the
fact that the items found in her possession were the proceeds of Robbery or Theft. The
presumption is reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the
established fact of her possession of the proceeds of the crime of Robbery or Theft. This
presumption does not offend the presumption of innocence enshrined in the fundamental law.
DAVID VS. COURT OF APPEALS

250 SCRA 82
PONENTE: JUSTICE MENDOZA
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Daisie David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon Villar, a
businessman.
2. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four children, all grown-up.
3. The relationship between Daisie and Ramon developed into an intimate one, as a result
Christopher J was born to them followed by two more children, both girls.
4. Private respondent’s wife knew of the relationship when Daisie took Christopher J to
Ramon’s house.
5. After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Ramon to his house as they were
eventually accepted by his legal family.
6. In summer 1991, Ramon asked Daisie to allow Christopher J, then 6 years old to go with his
family to Boracay.
7. Daisie agreed, but after the trip Ramon refused to give back the child.
8. Daisie filed a petitioner for Habeas Corpus on behalf of Christopher J.
9. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Daisie, granting rightful custody to the natural
mother.
10. The CA reversed on appeal holding that Habeas Corpus was not proper; the question of
custody of a minor child may be decided in a Habeas Corpus case contemplates a situation
where the parents are married to each other but are separated.
ISSUE:
Is the remedy of Habeas Corpus proper?
HELD:
It is indeed true, as the CA observed that the determination of the right to the custody of minor
children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some
reason separated from each other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other
situation. For example, in the case of SALVANA VS. GAELA (55 PHIL 680), it was held that
the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a
minor daughter even though the latter be in the custody of a third person of her free will
because the parents were compelling her to marry a man against her will.
In the case at bar, Christopher J is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his
father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the
child’s mother. As such pursuant to Article 176 of the family Code, Christopher J is under the
parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority,
is entitled to have custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her
rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to the issuance of the writ of
Habeas Corpus.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering
him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Article 213
of the Family Code, “no child under 7 years of age shall be separated from the mother unless
the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.”
That petitioner receives help from her parents and sister for the support of the three children is
not a point against her. Cooperation , compassion, love and concern for every member of the
family are characteristics of the close family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made it
what it is.
PEOPLE VS. PARAZO

310 SCRA 147
FACTS:
1. Accused-appellant Marlon Parazo was charged and convicted by the RTC of Cabanatuan
City for rape and frustrated homicide.
2. The supreme penalty of death was imposed upon him.
3. On automatic review, the SC affirmed the rape case but modified the sentence as to the
frustrated homicide case.
4. Appellant interposed the Motion for Reconsideration under consideration, bringing to the
attention of the court facts and circumstances, such as the absence of a sign language expert,
which if true would warrant the setting aside of his judgment of conviction.
5. Results of the medical examinations conducted on appellant indicate that appellant is really a
deaf-mute, a mental retardate, whose mental age is only 7 years and 9 months, and with a low
IQ of 60.
ISSUE:
Was the conviction of accused-appellant proper?
HELD:
Records on hand show that appellant was tried below without the benefit of a sign language
expert. The fact that he was “helped and assisted by a person who has been known to him since
1983"” as noted by the trial court of origin and appearing on page 6 of the transcript of
stenographic notes for February 8, 1995, is of no moment, absent any clear showing that
appellant was aided by a competent sign language expert able to fully understand and interpret
the actions and muttering of appellant.
The absence of an interpreter in sign language who could have conveyed to the accused, a
deaf-mute, the full facts of the offense with which he was charged and who could also have
communicate the accused’s own version of the circumstance which led to his implication in the
crime deprived the accused of a full and fair trial and reasonable opportunity to defend himself.
Not even the accused’s final plea of not guilty can excuse these inherently unjust
circumstances.
The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign language and of any other means, whether in
writing or otherwise, to inform the accused of the charges against him denied the accused his
fundamental right to due process of law. The accuracy and fairness of the factual process by
which the guilt or innocence of the accused was determined was not safeguarded. The accused
could not be said to have enjoyed to right to be heard by himself and counsel, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him in the proceedings where his
life and liberty were at stake.
Movant richly deserves a re-arraignment and re-trial, to the end that only upon proof of Guilt
Beyond Reasonable Doubt may he be consigned to the lethal injection chamber.
vertigo Jun 30, 2002 02:20 AM
hey pipol,
im really having a hard time studying NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, can you recommend a
book or something which will be easy to understand. =)
Thanks.
BTW, k yung mga digests mo PUGSLEY, kaya lang, ang hirap hanapin kung saan part na sya
ng thread eh. Pero, otherwise sobrang ok *** =)
ReynangBurgundy Jun 30, 2002 08:32 AM
hi people!
tanong lang po... whats the difference between error in personae and mistake of fact? and can
there be a situation wherein there is both mistake of fact and error in personae. maraming
salamat!
i agree with vertigo...:D your digest are of a great help. kaso nga lang minsan di ko na alam
kung saan class ko siya pwedeng gamitin. :hiya:
nga pala why does labor conflicts have to be decided in favor of the laborers? is because of the
maxim of "those who have less in life must have more in law" coupled with the Constitution's
adovacy for social justice? paki explain please! thanks!
by the way, anybody had d.p. disini for laborI? how is he?mejo na rattle ako sa kanyang
questions e. he doesnt tell you whether or not you got it right. :evil_lol: feeling ko naman, he is
just trying to see if your convinced of your own answer. :redsmile:
Quote:
Originally posted by vertigo

hey pipol,
im really having a hard time studying NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, can you recommend
a book or something which will be easy to understand. =)
Thanks.
BTW, k yung mga digests mo PUGSLEY, kaya lang, ang hirap hanapin kung saan part na
sya ng thread eh. Pero, otherwise sobrang ok *** =)
Try using NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW - Agbayani, I believe its more

comprehendable.
Quote:
Originally posted by ReynangBurgundy

hi people!
i agree with vertigo...:D your digest are of a great help. kaso nga lang minsan di ko na alam
kung saan class ko siya pwedeng gamitin. :hiya:
Most cases I've posted are for the subject PERSONS and FAMILY RELATIONS
The rest are in Criminal Law and Constitutional Law
blue babe Jul 3, 2002 04:55 PM
reynang burgundy:
tamang taman... kakabasa ko lang ng first few articles ng crim kanina for review.
mistake of fact is a MISAPPREHENSION of the circumstances of a given situation. it may be

an exempting circumstance in some cases. IF a person acts in such a way, that had his
PERCEPTION of the FACTS and CIRCUMSTANCES of the situation been correct, his act
would have been lawful, then EVEN IF crime was committed, he would not be criminally
liable.
example: a person hears something rustling outside his door. he gets a baseball bat, shouts out
for the person to identify himself. there is no answer but only more sounds. he hears what
seems to him to be the cocking of a handgun. convinced that the rustling sound is from an
intruder and that cocking sound meant the intruder was going to shoot him, the person then
swings at the "intruder" and mortally wounds the "intruder" who turns out to be his wife. under
these circumstances, there was a mistake of fact. the person so acting believed that there was
an intruder about to harm him. his act would have been lawful if his wife had really been an
intruder, assuming all the elements of self defense were present. but, since there was no
intruder, he mortally wounded his wife. in this case, the mistake of fact acts as an exempting
circumstance.
HOWEVER if the act was unlawful to begin with, then the mistake of fact will not serve to
exempt a person from criminal liability.
a mistake of identity or error in personae would hardly serve to exempt a person from criminal
liability, as long as the act consitutes dolo (fault) . as long as there was clear intent to act in an
unlawful manner, then regardless of the fact that the victim was different from the one intended
by the perpetrator, he shall be liable for the act. example, if a person went to another's house
with intent to kill X, and he insteads shoots Y from the back, thinking it was X he killed, then
he would still be criminally liable for the killing of Y even if he made a mistake in the identity
of his victim.
as for your labor question, just remember that the presumption in favor of labor operates only
in cases of DOUBT. if the situation is clear and the applicable law is likewise clear, the courts
will rule on the basis of such, even if labor will be at the losing end.
yes, this is because of the constitutional mandate protecting labor and the intent of the
legislature to give those who have less in life, more in law. but it was never the intention of the
legislature to coddle labor at the expense of capital. the law was not intended to be oppressive
to either labor or capital.
hope i helped. ;)
mikka:
Sorry for the late reply. I don't check my PM that often.
Anyway, I'm glad of your interest in this thread .
I don't mind you printing the cases. It's for everybody's consumption.
ARTICLE 8, 40, 147 AND 148, FAMILY CODE
CARINO VS. CARINO

GR No. 132529 February 2, 2001
351 SCRA 127
FACTS:
1. During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages.
2. The first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao, with whom he had two
offsprings; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee, with whom
he had no children in their almost 10 year cohabitation starting way back 1982.
3. In 1988, Santiago became ill and bed ridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary
tuberculosis.
4. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his
medical and burial expenses.
5. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance
pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies.
6. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P 146, 000 from MBAI, PCCUI,
NAPOLCOM, and Pag-Ibig; while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P 21,000.00 from
“GSIS life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS.)”
7. Respondent filed a case for collection of sum of money against petitioner praying, inter alia,
that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least ½ of the P 146, 000.00 “death benefits.”
8. Petitioner failed to file her answer prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
9. Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the
subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage
between petitioner and the deceased.
10. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she
became aware of it only at the funeral, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the
wife of the deceased.
11. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized with
the required marriage license.
12. The court ruled in favor or respondent.
13. On appeal, the decision of the Regional trial court was affirmed in toto.
ISSUE:
Who is entitled to half the death benefits?
HELD:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought
to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law,
for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but no limited
to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of a marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination
of the case.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab
initio.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not
fall within the marriage exempt from the license requirement. . A marriage license, therefore,
was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal
that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and,
as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record
of such marriage license.
It is beyond cavil, therefor, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of
the marriage exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared
void ab initio, the “death benefits” would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. ***
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the
deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased
with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first
obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab
initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of
the spouses according to the applicable property regime. Considering that the two marriages
are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal
partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Article 147 and 148 of the
Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.”
ALSO SEE:
DOMINGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS and NINAL VS. BAYADOG
ARTICLE 36, FAMILY CODE
REPUBLIC VS. DAGDAG

GR No. 109975 February 09, 2001
351 SCRA 425
FACTS:
1. On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20
years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija.
2. The marriage certificate was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of on October 20, 1988.
3. Erlinda and Avelino begot two children.
4. The birth certificates were issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija also on October 20, 1988.
5. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation.
6. He would disappear for months, suddenly re-appear for a few months, and then disappear
again.
7. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends
and would return home drunk.
8. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict
physical injuries to her.
9. In October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last that they heard from him.
10. Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail
and remains at large to-date.
11. In July 1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a petition for judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
12. Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo
News, a newspaper of general circulation.
13. On the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared.
14. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law as her only witness.
15. The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991 to
manifest in writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that
should he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision.
16. The Investigating Prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was no
collusion between the parties.
17. However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence.
18. Without waiting for the investigating prosecutor’s manifestation, the trial court declared the
marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36.
19. The investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the
decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest
whether he was presenting controverting evidence.
20. The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
decision on the ground that the same is not in accordance with the evidence and the law.
21. Since the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General appealed
to the CA.
22. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that “Avelino Dagdag is
psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the duties and obligations
of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic,
and a criminal.”
ISSUE:
Did the CA correctly declare the marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code, on the ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity, as he is
emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice?
HELD:
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a
marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of law, on the facts of the case. Each case
must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on “all fours” with another case. The trial judge must
take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible,
avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
In REPUBLIC VS. MOLINA (268 SCRA 198), the Court laid down the GUIDELINES in the
interpretation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the
above-mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline number 2
which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically
proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged
psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive
from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not
even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present
controverting evidence since the trial court’s decision was prematurely rendered.
MARBELLA-BOBIS VS. BOBIS
GR. No. 138509 July 31, 2000
336 SCRA 747
FACTS:
1. In October 1985, private respondent Isagani Bobis contracted a first marriage with one
Maria Dulce Javier.
2. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent
contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 1996 and
allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez.
3. An information for bigamy was filed
4. Sometime, thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage
license.
5. Respondent then filed a Motion to Suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy
invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the
criminal case.
6. The trial court granted the motion to suspend the criminal case.
7. Petitioner filed a Motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
ISSUE:
Does the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
constitutesa prejudicial question to a criminal case for Bigamy?
HELD:
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but so intimate connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused. It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal
action is based, but also that the relocation of the issues raised in the civil action would
necessarily be determinative of the criminal case. Consequently, the defense must involve an
issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its
resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed.
Its two elements are: a) the civil action involves an issue similarly or intimately related to the
issue raised in the criminal action; and b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.
A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the
essential elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that
the prosecution has not yet presented its case.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second
marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party
may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties particularly the
accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or not the first
marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial
declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It should be
remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements concur – two
of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have been valid had
it not been for the existence at the material time of the first marriage.
As ruled in LANDICHO VS. RELOVA (22 SCRA 731), he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the
ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for
concubinage, the SC held the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is
not a prejudicial question (BELTRAN VS. PEOPLE, 334 SCRA 106) . This ruling applies
here by analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.
SUCCESSION
ANDALIS VS. PULGUERAS

59 Phil 643
FACTS:
1. The alleged will of Victor Pulgueras was admitted to probate.
2. The testimony of only one to the attesting witnesses was taken.
3. The testimony was:
a) that the 6 pages of the will were signed on the margin by the testator and two of the
witnesses on January 4, 1931;
b) the remaining three pages were signed by the testator and the three attesting witnesses on
January 11, 1931, and that the third attesting witness then signed the first six pages.
ISSUE:
Was the will executed properly?
HELD:
Such an execution of the will was not in conformity with the law. Under our statute, the
execution of a will is supposed to be one act and cannot be legally effective if the various
participants sign on various days and in various combinations of those present.
SUCCESSION
BAGTAS VS. PAGUIO
22 Phil 227
FACTS:
1. Pioquinto Paguio died on September 28, 1909.
2. For some 14 or 15 years prior to the time of his death, he suffered from a paralysis of the left
side of his body; that a few years prior to his death his hearing became impaired and that he
lost the power of speech.
3. He retained the use of his right hand and was able to write fairly well.
4. Through the medium of signs he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and to other
members of his family.
5. The testator wrote out on several pieces of paper the disposition of his property.
6. The same was in turn delivered to one Señor Marco who transcribed and put them in form.
7. The pieces of paper were then delivered to a lawyer who read them to the testator asking if
they were his dispositions.
8. The testator assented each time with an affirmative movement of his head.
9. The widow of the decedent Juliana Bagtas then sought the probate of the purported last will
and testament of Pioquinto.
10. The CFI of Bataan admitted the same for probate.
11. Isidoro Paguio, a son of the decedent by a former marriage, opposed the probation on the
ground that the testator was not n full enjoyment and use of his mental faculties and was
without mental capacity necessary to execute a valid will.
ISSUE:
Was the will was validly executed?
HELD:
The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well-established, and the
testator in the case at bar never having been adjudged insane by the court of competent
jurisdiction , this presumption continues, and it is therefore incumbent upon the opponents to
overcome this legal presumption by proper evidence. The opponents failed to do this.
The courts have repeatedly held that mere weakness of mind and body , induced by age and
disease does not render a person incapable of making a will. The law does not require that a
person shall continue in the full enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and mental powers
in order to execute a valid will. If such were the legal standard , few indeed would be the
number of wills that could meet such exacting requirements. The authorities, both medical and
legal, are universal in the statement that the question of mental capacity is one of degree, and
that there are many gradations from the highest degree of mental soundness to the lowest
conditions of diseased mentality which are denominated insanity or idiocy.
SUCCESSION
ACOP VS. PIRASO
52 Phil 660
FACTS:
1. The CFI of Benguet denied the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased Piraso
because the will sought to be probated was written in English.
2. Evidence showed that Piraso knew how to speak the Ilocano dialect, although imperfectly,
and could make himself understood in that dialect.
3. Proponent-appellant Sixto Acop alleged that the lower court erred in not holding that the
testator did not know the Ilocano dialect well enough to understand a will drawn up in said
dialect.
ISSUE:
Should the will be probated?
HELD:
The testator is presumed to know the dialect of the locality where he resides, unless there is
proof to the contrary.
In the instant case, not only is it not proven the English is the language of the City of Baguio
where the deceased Piraso lived and where the will was drawn, but the record contains positive
proof that said Piraso knew no other language than the Igorotte dialect, with a smattering of
Ilocano; that is, he did not know the English language in which the will is written.
SUCCESSION
LEANO VS. LEANO

30 Phil 612
FACTS:
1. Cristina Valdes executed a will.
2. She then placed a cross against her name, attached by some other person, in the presence of
the three witnesses whose name are attached to the attesting clause, and that they attested and
subscribed the instrument in her presence and in the presence of each other.
3. Mariano Leaño sought the probate of the will.
4. Arcadio Leaño objected on the ground that the execution of the last will and testament was
not in the manner and form prescribed by law.
5. The trial court denied the probate of the will.
6. Hence this appeal
ISSUE:
Was the will was executed in the manner and form prescribed by law?
HELD:
The placing of the cross opposite her name at the conclusion of the instrument was sufficient
compliance with the requirements of the law, which prescribes that except where wills are
signed by some other person than the testator in the manner and form therein indicated, a valid
will must be signed by the testator.
It is the right of a testator to sign his will by mark, executed anima testandi.
SUCCESSION
IN RE WILL OF TAN DIUCO

45 Phil 807
FACTS:
1. Mamerta Base instituted an action for the probate of the will of Chinaman Tan Duico.
2. The court denied the probate of the will on the ground that said will was not signed by three
instrumental witnesses.
3. The document was signed by Simplicia Sala by order of the testator, whose name is before
the said signature, by reason of the latter’s incapacity on account of his weakness and the
trembling of his hand.
4. The testator also stated that he directed Simplicio Sala to sign it in his name and in the
presence of three witnesses who also signed with him at the bottom of said document, and on
the left margin of each of its three pages correlatively numbered in letter by Simplicio Sala in
the name of the testator Tan Duico and by the three other witnesses.
ISSUE:
Was the will not signed by three instrumental witnesses?
HELD:
In dealing with attestation, the law does not say that the instrumental witnesses must be
different from those who signed the attestation clause, for in the first part of said section, after
speaking of the signature of the testator or the person signing in his place, it adds” and attested
and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each
other,” from which it clearly follows that the same witnesses who signed on the left margin of
each page of the document presented by the testator to them as his will, must be the ones who
should sign the attestation clause, inasmuch as they alone can certify the facts to be stated in
said clause, for having taken a direct part therein, as they saw the testator sign the will, or the
person requested by him to sign all the sheets of the will and affirm that it was signed under his
express direction in the presence of said witnesses and that all the sheets thereof had also been
signed by them in the presence of said testator and of each of them.
YAO KEE VS. GONZALES
167 SCRA 736
FACTS:
1. Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died in Calooocan City where he was then residing
leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines.
2. Private respondents (Aida Sy-Gonzales et al.,) filed a petition for the grant of
letters or administration alleging that they were the children of the deceased with
Asuncion Gillego.
3. Petition was opposed by herein petitioners (Yao Kee et al.,) alleging that they
were the legitimate family.
4. The probate court found that Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee and that
their 3 offsprings were the legitimate children.
5. The court likewise ruled that respondents are the acknowledged illegitimate
offspring of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego.
6. On appeal, the lower court’s decision was set aside declaring petitioners as the
acknowledge natural children of Sy Kiat and Asuncion Gillego.
7. Oppostiors were declared the acknowelged natural children of the deceased since
the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee in China had not been
proven to be valid to the laws of China.
ISSUE:
Was the fact of marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee in China proven as a custom?
HELD:
Custom is defined as “a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly
observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory.” The law
requires that “a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of
evidence. [Article 12, Civil Code] On this score the Court had occasion to state that
“ a local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice
unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other
fact. The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a
foreign custom.
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign
marriage two things must be proven, namely 1) the existence of the foreign law as
a question of fact; and 2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence.
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to
the law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching
(brother) cannot be considered as proof of China’s law or custom on marriage not
only because they are self serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no
showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to
prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in
accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat
cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Kiat
according to the laws of China, they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate
children but only that of acknowledged natural children. petitioners are natural
children, it appearing that at the time of their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were
not disqualified by any impediment to marry one another. [See Art. 269, Civil Code]
And they are acknowledged children of the deceased because of Sy Kiat’s
recognition of Sze Sook Wah and its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen who
are her sisters of the full blood.
Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased’s acknowledged
natural children with Asuncion Gillego , a Filipina with whom he lived for 25 years
without the benefit of marriage. They have in their favor their father’s
acknowledgment, evidence by a compromise agreement entered into by and
between their parents and approved by the CFI wherein Sy Kiat not only
acknowledged them as his children by Asuncion Gillego but likewise made
provisions for their support and future inheritance.
PEOPLE vs. MANANSALA , 273 SCRA 502 (1997)

Mendoza, J.
Facts: This is an appeal from the decision of

RTC-Manila finding Dante Manansala guilty of rape
against his 14-year old daughter, Jennifer Manansala.
On direct examination, she said that she was raped by
her father on 8 occasions from the period Nov 1, 1991
up to Nov 13, 1991 in a taho factory where he was
living.
Held: Reversed on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Ratio:
Incestuous rape is admittedly one of the heinous

crimes. However, the constitutional presumption of
innocence is sedulously observed. For this purpose,
the Court has formulated a set of principles: (1) An
accusation for rape is easy to make, difficult to
prove and even more difficult to disprove; (2) In view
of the intrinsic nature of the crime, where only 2
persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution;
(3) The evidence for the prosecution must stand or
fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from
the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
The declarations made by the principal witness for the
defense, private complainant Jennifer Manansala, is
contradictory to her mother's testimony(Teresita who
was presented as a witness for the prosecution) in
that the latter said Jennifer was with her father in
Tarlac from Nov 1 to 13. Jennnifer was undulating and
wavering on her statements when upon cross-examination
she said that she was raped in Manila by her father on
Nov 1, but was again raped several times in Tarlac
from Nov 2 to 13. She explained that the reason why
she claimed that she had been raped in Manila was
because she was afraid that her complaints will be
dismissed for improper venue. Later she testified that
she was raped in Nov 1 and 2 in Manila, and then raped
in Tarlac on Nov 3 to 8.
The prosecution's evidence is not only shot through

with inconsistencies and contradictions, it is also
improbable. If complainant had been raped on Nov 1,
1991, why did she go with her father to Tarlac on Nov
2 and stayed there with him until Nov 14? She was
supposed to have gone through a harrowing experience
at the hands of her father but the following day and
for 13 more days after that she stayed with him. It is
true that the medico-legal examination conducted on
Nov 17 showed that shw was no longer a virgin and that
she had recent sexual intercourse. But the fact that
she had voluntarily gone with her father to Tarlac
suggests that the crime was not rape, but quite
possibly qualified seduction, considering the age of
complainant (14 at that time of the crime). This is
expecially true because she said that she had been
given money by her father everytime they had an
intercourse.
The fact that she could describe the lurid details of
the sexual act shows that it was not an ordeal that
she went through but a consensual act. One subjected
to sexual torture can hardly be expected to see what
was being done to her. What is clear from
complainant's testimony is that although accused had
had sexual intercourse with her, it was not done by
force or intimidation.
tortvader Aug 3, 2002 04:51 AM
PEOPLE vs. PANIQUE [G.R. No. 125763. October 13, 1999]

Automatic Review of the Decision of the RTC Br. 59, Parañaque
Ponente: V.V. Mendoza
FACTS: Complainant Geraldine, the eldest child of accused Emmanue

Panique by his wife Susana, was born on May 13, 1981. Her mother went
to Hong Kong to work as a domestic helper, leaving her to the care of
accused. Complainant slept in the same bedroom with her sister and
accused, sharing the lower bunk of a double-deck bed with her father
while her sister took the upper bunk. At around 12 midnight of 22 May
1996, while complainant was asleep, accused laid himself on top of
her. When she awoke, she found accused fondling her breasts even as
he inserted his penis into her vagina. All she could do was cry,
because she was afraid of her father whom she knew was hooked on
drugs. She sought help from her uncle, who took her to Pasay to see
her aunt, who sent word to complainant's mother in Hong Kong. When
her mother arrived on 25 May 1996, they went to Camp Crame where she
was examined. An information for rape was filed against accused
alleging -
That on or about the 22nd day of May, 1996, in the Municipality of
Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant Geraldine
Panique against her will and consent. XXX
During arraignment, accused entered a plea of not guilty.
During trial, complainant testified that this was not the first
occasion that he had raped her, having been sexually abused since
March 1993, when she was only 12 years old. On cross-examination,
complainant stated that her sister did not notice anything during the
incident; The medico-legal report shows that complainant is a "non-
virgin"; that there are no external signs of any form of violence;
and that complainant's vaginal and peri-urethral smears are negative
of spermatozoa. Also offered in evidence for the prosecution are the
marriage certificate and complainant's birth certificate. When
accused testified, he admitted that complainant is his daughter and
that he had sexual intercourse with her. The RTC found him guilty of
rape and sentenced him to DEATH and ordered him to pay indemnity
(P50K), moral damages (P50K) and exemplary damages (P50K).
ISSUE: WON accused is guilty of rape
HELD: YES!!!
REASONING: The evidence clearly show that resistance was not present
when accused was on top of her and inserting his penis. She did not
do anything but yielded to the accused. As a matter of fact, after
the sexual intercourse, accused lay beside her and place his legs on
top of her thighs and was touching her breast. Because a woman's most
precious asset is the purity of her womanhood, she will resist to the
last ounce of her strength any attempt to defile it. It is unnatural
and unbelievable that a woman whose honor had just been outraged
would do nothing. In a rape committed by a father against his own
daughter, the former's moral ascendancy and influence over the latter
substitutes for violence or intimidation. That ascendancy or
influence necessarily flows from the father's parental authority.
Abuse of reverence and respect by a father can subjugate his
daughter's will, thereby forcing her to do whatever he wants.
Accused's moral ascendancy over complainant was reinforced by the
fact that since his wife had gone to Hong Kong to work there, accused
alone exercised parental authority over his children. The
overpowering moral influence of accused-appellant as a father took
the place of violence and made his carnal knowledge of his daughter
rape.
The fact that complainant was below 18 years of age at the time of
the commission of the crime and that accused is her ascendant would
have called for the imposition of the death penalty on accused.
However, complainant's minority and relationship to the offender were
NOT alleged in the information. (Incompetent piece of ****!) The
minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender
constitute a special qualifying circumstance which should be alleged
in the information and proved to warrant the imposition of the death
penalty. Hence, the death penalty imposed on him should be reduced to
reclusion perpetua.
RTC correctly awarded an indemnity of P50K in favor of complainant in
line with existing jurisprudence. In addition, complainant should be
paid P50K as moral damages, but the award of exemplary damages is
deleted for lack of basis.
DECISION AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that SENTENCE REDUCED to

RECLUSION PERPETUA.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
MADRIDEJO VS. DE LEON

55 PHIL 1
FACTS:
1. Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez had a child, Domingo de Leon.
2. Eulogio died in 1915 and was survived by his wife and son.
3. During her widowhood, Flaviana lived with Pedro Madridejo.
4. In 1917, a child named Melecio was born to Flaviana and Pedro.
5. In 1920, Flaviana married Pedro in articulo mortis.
6. Flaviana died the following day.
7. Domingo de Leon died in 1928.
8. The court held that Melecio is Domingo’s next of kin and ordered defendants to restore and
deliver the ownership and possession of the property to Melecio.
9. Hence this appeal contending that the court erred in holding the marriage of Flaviana and
Pedro valid.
ISSUE:
Is the marriage of Flaviana and Pedro valid?
HELD:
The mere fact that the parish priest of Siniloan, Laguna, who married Pedro and Flaviana, failed
to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary does not invalidate the
marriage in articulo mortis, it not appearing that the essential requisites required by law for its
validity were lacking in the ceremony, and the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate is
not one of said essential requisites.
PERSONS AND FAMILY (duty of the fiscal:annulment & legal separation)
VALDES VS. RTC, BR. 102, QUEZON CITY

260 SCRA 221
FACTS:
1. Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married in January 5, 1971and the marriage
begot 5 children.
2. In 1992, Antonio Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article
36 of the Family Code.
3. Judgment was rendered declaring the marriage null and void under Article 36 on the ground
of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations.
4. The court also directed petitioner and respondent Gomez to start proceedings on the
liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to
comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same Code.
5. Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50
to 52 of the Family Code.
6. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage.”
7. The trial court made a clarification stating that “considering that Article 147 of the Family
Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts
of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant, will own their
“family home” and all their other properties in equal shares.”
8. On the issue regarding the disputes of the family home, the trial court said that considering
the marriage has already been declared null and void ab initio, pursuant to Article 147, the
property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
9. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied.
10. Hence this petition contending that Articles 50 to 52 should be held controlling.
11. Petitioner argues , among others,
a) that Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are
psychologically incapacitated;
b) Article 50 and 51 in relation to Article 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the
disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio ,
including a marriage void by reasons of psychological incapacity of the spouses.
c) That assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriage declared void ab initio on the
ground of pyshological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article
129.
ISSUE:
Did the court err in applying the law?
HELD:
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of
collusion. Hence, in all cases of annulment, decree of nullity of marriage or legal separation,
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of
preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court can
not declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine
if collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the
application for legal separation or annulment though the presentation of his own evidence, if
his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious or fabricated.
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social
institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a
social institution in which the state is vitally interested. The state can find no stronger anchor
than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral
fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.
The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60 of the
Family Code. For one, petition was not declared in default by the trial court for failure to
answer. Petitioner filed his answer to the complaint and contested the cause of action alleged
by private respondent. He actively participated in the proceedings below by filing several
pleadings and cross-examining the witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal clear that every
stage of the litigation was characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by collusion.
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation
proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that
the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner’s vehement opposition to the annulment
proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no
allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties.
Under these circumstances, the SC is convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting
attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of
the proceedings in the trial court.
PUGSLEY Sep 23, 2002 12:33 AM
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (search warrants)
20TH CENTURY FOX FILM CORP VS. COURT OF APPEALS

164 SCRA 655
FACTS:
1. In a letter-complaint, petitioner through counsel sought the NBI’s assistance in the conduct
of searches and seizures in connection with the latter’s anti film piracy campaign.
2. Specifically, the letter complaint alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila
are engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in video tape from
which constitute a flagrant violation of PD 49 (Decree on the Protection of Intellectual
Property).
3. The NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner
and subsequently filed three applications for search warrants against the video outlets.
4. The master tapes or the film reels of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court
during the application.
5. The lower court issued the desired warrants.
6. Armed with the search warrants, the NBI accompanies by the petitioner’s agents, raided the
video outlets and seized the items described therein.
7. An inventory of the items seized was made and left with the private respondents Eduardo
Barreto, Raul Sagullo and Fortune Ledesma.
8. Private respondents filed a Motion to Lift Search Warrant and Release Seized Properties on
the ground that the NBI and its witnesses misled the court in the finding of probable cause.
9. The lower court lifted the three search warrants issued earlier.
10. The lower court denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner.
11. A petition for certiorari with the CA also proved unavailing.
12. Hence this petition contending that the search warrants were issued after the finding of the
existence of probable cause.
ISSUE:
Was the lifting of the search warrant’s earlier issued proper?
Is the presentation of the master tapes necessary in the application for search warrants?
HELD:
In the case of BURGOS SR., VS. CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP (133 SCRA 800), probable cause
for a valid search was defined “as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.”
This constitutional provision also demands “no less than personal knowledge by the
complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be
justified in order to convince the judge, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the
issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.
The lower court, therefore, lifted the three questioned search warrants in the absence of
probable cause that the private respondents violated PD 49. As found out by the court, the NBI
agents who acted as witnesses did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their
testimony which was the alleged commission of the offense by private respondents. Only the
petitioner’s counsel who was also a witness during the application for the issuance of the
search warrants stated that he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the
private respondents were pirated taped taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner.
The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated film were
copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in their
possession the pirated films. The petitioner’s argument to the effect that the presentation of the
master tapes at the time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely
evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether or not probable cause exists to justify
the issuance of the search warrant is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicated
or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that is owns.
PERSONS AND FAMILY (illegitimate child;civil registry)
REPUBLIC VS. LABRADOR

305 SCRA 438
FACTS:
1. Respondent Gladys Labrador is the sister of Maria Rosario Cañon, currently residing in the
U.S.
2. Maria Rosario had a common relationship with a certain Degoberto Erasmo.
3. During the cohabitation, Mario Rosario begot 2 illegitimate children, one of whom is Sarah
Zita Erasmo.
4. Respondent reported the birth to the Local Civil Registrar.
5. During the registration of the birth of Sarah Zita, Maria Rosario told the Local Civil
Registrar that she was not legally married to the father of Sarah Zita.
6. The Local Civil Registrar erroneously entered the name of the child as Sarah Zita C. Erasmo
instead of Sarah Zita Cañon.
7. Not only that, the name of Maria Rosario was erroneously written as Rosemarie Cañon.
8. Respondent filed with the RTC a Petition for Correction of Entries in the Record of Birth of
Sarah Zita Erasmo, pursuant to Article 176 of the Family Code.
9. The trial court set the case for hearing and also directed the publication of the notice of
hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in Cebu City once a week for 3 consecutive
weeks.
10. The trial court granted respondent’s petition.
11. Petitioner contends that the summary proceedings under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
and Article 412 of the Civil Code may be used only to correct or change clerical or innocuous
errors.
ISSUE:
May a change in the record of birth in a civil registry, which affects the civil status of a person,
be granted in a summary procedure?
Is Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court the proper action to impugn the legitimacy of a
child?
HELD:
Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil status of petitioner and
her children from legitimate to illegitimate, the same cannot be granted except only in an
adversarial proceeding. (LEONOR VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 256 SCRA 69)
Thus, where the effect of a correction of any entry in a civil registry will change the status of a
person form “legitimate “ to “illegitimate,” as in Sarah Zita’s case, the same cannot be granted
in summary proceedings.
In REPUBLIC VS. VALENCIA (141 SCRA 462), the Supreme Court likewise held that
corrections involving the nationality or citizenship of a person were substantial and could not
be effected except in adversarial proceedings.
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical
errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving the nationality or citizenship,
which is undisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted
in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced
and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. The SC adheres to the
principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceedings.
Thus, Valencia requires that a petition for substantial correction or change of entries in the civil
registry should have as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or
claim any interest that would be affected thereby. It further mandates that a full hearing, not
merely a summary proceeding, be conducted.
In the present case, the changes sought by Respondent Labrador were undoubtedly substantial :
First, she sought to have the name appearing on the birth certificate, changed from “Sarah Zita
Erasmo” to “Sarah Zita Cañon” , thereby transforming the filiation of the child from legitimate
to illegitimate. Second, she likewise sought to have the name of Sarah Zita’s mother, which
appeared as “Rosemarie” in the child’s birth record, changed to “Maria Rosario”. Pursuant to
Valencia, an adversarial proceeding is essential in order to fully thresh out the allegations in
respondent’s petition.
Sarah Zita and her purported parents should have been parities to the proceeding. After all, it
would affect her legitimacy, as well as her successional and other rights. In fact, the change
may also embarrass her because of the social stigma that illegitimacy may bring. The rights of
her parents over her and over each other would also be affected. Furthermore, a change of
name would affect not only the mother but possibly creditors, if any. Finally no sufficient legal
explanation has been given why an aunt, who had no appointment as guardian of the minor,
was the party-petitioner.
Indeed, respondent correctly cites Article 176 of the Family Code, which states that
“illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mothers.” But to enforce such provision,
the proper recourse is an adversarial contest. It must be stressed that Rule 108 does not
contemplate an ordinary civil action but a special proceeding. But its nature, this recourse
seeks merely to correct clerical errors, and not to grant or deny substantial rights. To hold
otherwise is tantamount to a denial of due process to third parties and the whole world.
NOTES:
Adversary Proceeding – one having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex
parte application, one in which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other
party, and afforded the latter an opportunity of contest it. (Black’s Law Dictionary)
PUGSLEY Sep 24, 2002 11:44 PM
SALES
INCHAUSTI & CO. VS. CROMWELL

20 Phil 345
FACTS:
1. Plaintiff firm for many years past has been and is now engaged in business of buying and
selling at wholesale hemp.
2. It was customary for it to sell hemp in bales and that in all sales of hemp by the plaintiff firm
no mention is made of baling; but with the tacit understanding, unless otherwise expressly
agreed, that the hemp will be delivered in bales.
3. A charge is then made against the buyers for said baling.
4. Elias Cromwell, the Collector of the Internal Revenue then made a tax assessment upon the
sums received from the sale of baled hemp.
5. Plaintiff paid under protest contending that the tax assessed by the defendant upon the
aggregate of charges made against said purchasers of hemp by the plaintiff is illegal upon the
ground that the said charge does not constitute a part of the selling price of the hemp, but is a
charge made for the services of baling the hemp.
ISSUE:
Is there a contract of sale?
HELD:
The judgment of the court below was right. It is one of the stipulations in the Statement of
Facts that it is customary to sell hemp in bales, and that the price quoted in the market for
hemp per picul is the price for the hemp baled. The fact it that among large dealers like the
plaintiff in this case it is practically impossible to handle hemp without its being baled, and it is
admitted by the Statement of Facts, as well as demonstrated by the documentary proof
introduced in this case, that if the plaintiff sold a quantity of hemp it would be the
understanding, without words, that purchase price would include the cost and expense of
baling.
In other words, it is the fact as stipulated, as well as it would be the fact of necessity, that in all
dealings in hemp in the general market the selling price consist of the value of the hemp loose
plus the cost and expense of petting it into marketable form.
* Under such conditions the cost and expenses of baling the hemp is a part of the purchase
price and subject to a tax imposed by law on the gross amount of sales of the dealers, and is not
a sum paid for work, labor, and materials performed and furnished by the vendor for the
vendee.
The word “price” signifies the sum stipulated or the equivalent of the thing sold and also every
incident taken into consideration for the fixing of the price, put to the debit of the vendee and
agreed to by him.
The distinction between a contract of sale and one for work, labor, and materials is tested by
the inquiry whether the thing transferred is one not in existence and which never would have
existed but for the order of the party desiring to acquire it, or a thing which would have existed
and been the subject of sale to some other person, even if the order has not been given.
It is clear that in the case at bar the hemp was in existence in baled form before the agreements
of sale were made, or, at least, would have been in existence even if none of the individual
sales herein question had been consummated. It would have been baled nevertheless, for sale to
someone else, since, according to the agreed Statement of Facts, it is customary to sell hemp in
bales.
When a person stipulates for the future sale of articles which he is habitually making, and
which at the time are not made or finished, it is essentially a contract of sale and not a contract
for labor. It is otherwise when the article is made pursuant to agreement. Where labor is
employed on the materials of the seller he cannot maintain an action for work and labor. If the
article ordered by the purchaser is exactly such as the plaintiff makes and keeps on hand for
sale to anyone, and no change or modification of it is made at the defendant’s request, it is a
contract of sale, even though it may be entirely made after, and in consequence of, the
defendant’s order for it.
In the case at bar the baling was performed for the general market and was not something done
by the plaintiff which was a result of any peculiar wording of the particular contract between
him and his vendee. It is undoubted that the plaintiff prepared his hemp for the general market.
This would be necessary. One who exposes goods for sale in the market must have them in
marketable form.
PUGSLEY Sep 25, 2002 11:40 AM
CRIMINAL LAW (rape)
PEOPLE VS. DE LEON

319 SCRA 743
FACTS:
1. Accused-appellant Edmundo de Leon was charged with the crime of rape against her
daughter sometime in 1989 before the effectivity of R.A. 7659.
2. Sixteen counts of rape in December 1995 were also filed against accused-appellant in 16
separate informations.
3. The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and imposed upon him the penalty of death.
ISSUE:
Was the guilt of accused-appellant proven beyond reasonable doubt?
HELD:
Each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime so that of the 16 other rape
charged should be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The victim’s testimony was very
generalized and lacked specific details on how each of the alleged 16 rapes were committed.
Her bare statement that she was raped so many time on certain weeks is clearly inadequate and
grossly insufficient to establish the guilt of accused-appellant insofar as the other 16 rapes
charged were concerned.
1wiseguy Sep 25, 2002 11:55 AM
mag review ka na iha instead of surfing the net. the next bar is coming soon!!
justice vitug sige ka
PUGSLEY Sep 25, 2002 04:04 PM
LEONOR VS. COURT OF APPEALS

256 SCRA 69
FACTS:
1. On March 13, 1960, petitioner Virginia Leonor was married to private respondent Mauricio
Leonor Jr. in San Carlos City.
2. Out of the union three children were born.
3. The spouses were separated for a substantial part of their married life.
4. Mauricio resided in Switzerland studying and working while Leonor stayed in the
Philippines working as a nurse.
5. Petitioner filed a civil action in Geneva, Switzerland for separation and alimony.
6. Private respondent counter-sued for divorce.
7. The lower Cantonal Civil Court of Switzerland pronounced the divorce of the spouses but
reserved the liquidation of the matrimonial partnership.
8. The Swiss Court denied alimony to petitioner.
9. Mauricio, for the first time, raised the issued of the alleged non-existence of the marriage.
10. Meanwhile, Virginia learned that the solemnizing officer failed to send a copy of their
marriage contract to the Civil Registrar of San Carlos City.
11. Virginia applied for the later registration of her marriage.
12. The Civil Registrar granted the same.
13. On appeal to the Cantonal Civil Court, Mauricio asked for the cancellation of his marriage
in the Philippines.
14. The higher Cantonal Civil Court granted the petition for alimony.
15. Mauricio elevated the matter on appeal to the Federal Court of Switzerland.
16. The Federal Court affirmed the decision of the higher Cantonal Civil Court.
17. Mauricio filed for the cancellation of the late registration of marriage with the RTC of San
Carlos City.
18. Given as grounds for the cancellation of the late registration of marriage with Virginia was
“due to non-observance of the legal requirement for a valid marriage.”
19. Mauricio’s petition was filed pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
20. The trial court rendered judgment declaring said marriage null and void for being sham and
fictitious.
21. Virginia filed a Notice of Appeal.
22. The trial court issued an order dismissing Virginia’s appeal on the ground that she failed to
file a record on appeal within 30 days and had thus failed to perfect her appeal.
23. Virginia filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with the Court of
Appeals and nullification of both decisions of the trial court for having been issued in excess of
jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion.
24. The CA dismissed the petition insofar as it sought the reversal of the decision of the trial
court, saying that the remedy for said purpose was an appeal, not a special civil action.
25. The appellate court, however, granted the petition insofar as it sought the nullification of
the trial court dismissing the appeal.
26. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial reconsideration asking the CA to annul the
decision of the trial court.
27. The CA denied the motion, stating that the central issued in the special civil action was
only the validity of the trial court’s order denying petitioner’s right to appeal and that said issue
was resolved in petitioner’s favor.
28. Further, it said that the correctness or validity of the trial court’s decision should properly
be resolved in the appeal.
ISSUE:
in disposing of a special proceeding under Rule 108 does the trial court havejurisdiction to
declare the marriage null and void and to order the cancellation of its entry in the Local Civil
Registry?
HELD:
On its face, Rule 108 would appeal to authorize the cancellation of any entry regarding
“marriages” in the civil registry for any reason by the mere filing of a verified petition for the
purpose. However, it is not at simple as it looks. Doctrinally, the only errors that can be
cancelled or corrected under this Rules are typographical errors, not material or substantial
ones like the validity or nullity of marriage.
A clerical error is on which is visible to the eyes of obvious to the understanding; error made
by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing; or some harmless an innocuous
change such as correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the
occupation of the parent.
Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil status of petitioner and
her children from legitimate to illegitimate, the same cannot be granted except only in an
adversarial proceeding.
Clearly and unequivocally, the summary procedure under Rule 108, and for that matter under
Article 412 of the Civil Code, cannot be used by Mauricio to change his and Virginia’s civil
status from married to single and of their three children from legitimate to illegitimate. Neither
does the trial court , under said Rule, have any jurisdiction to declare their marriage null and
void and as a result thereof, to order the local civil registrar to cancel the marriage entry in the
civil registry. Further, the respondent trial judge gravely and seriously abused his discretion in
unceremoniously expanding his very limited jurisdiction under such rule to hear evidence on
such a controversial matter as nullity of marriage under the Civil Code and/or Family Code, a
process that is proper only in ordinary adversarial proceedings under the Rules.
CIVIL LAW (article 222)
VDA. DE MANALO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

349 SCRA 135
FACTS:
1. Troadio Manalo died intestate in Manila on February 14, 1992.
2. He was survived by his wife Pilar and his eleven children.
3. At the time f his death, Troadio left several properties located in Manila and in the province of
Tarlac.
4. Eight of his children, herein respondents, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a
petition for the judicial settlement of the estate of Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of
their brother, Romeo as administrator.
5. The trial court issued an order setting the petition for hearing and directed the publication of
the order for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.
6. It also directed service by registered mail of the said order upon the heirs mentioned in the
petition.
7. On the date set for the hearing for the petition, the trial court issued an order “declaring the
whole world in default, except the government.”
8. The trial court set the reception of evidence of petitioners.
9. However, the order of general default was set aside by the trial court upon motion of herein
petitioners Pilar and the remaining three other children.
10. The trial court issued an order admitting the petition for judicial settlement of estate.
11. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
12. Among their contentions was the absence of earnest efforts towards compromise among
members of the same family; and no certification of non-forum shopping was attached to the
petition.
13. The CA denied the petition so was with a Motion for Reconsideration.
14. Hence this petition averring that the petitioner should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section
1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court on the ground that a condition precedent for filing the claim
has not been complied with as their was failure to comply with the requirement in Article 222 of
the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Is the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate an
ordinary civil action?
Would Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 222 of the Civil Code apply
as a ground for the dismissal of the petition?
HELD:
It is a fundamental rule that, in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the
averment and the character of the relief sought in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar,
shall be controlling. A careful scrutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration,
Settlement and Distribution of Estate belies herein petitioner’s claim that the same is in the
nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts
required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fact of death of
the late Troadio Manalo on February 4, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the
time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within the country
are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate
rest. The petition also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a
tentative list of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate
proceedings. In addition, the reliefs prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as
regard the intention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial
settlement of the estate of their deceased father.
Concededly, the petition contains certain averments which may be typical of an ordinary civil
action. Herein petitioners, as oppositors therein, took advantage of the said defect in the petition
and filed their so-called Opposition thereto which, as observed by the trial court, is actually an
Answer containing admission and denials, special and affirmative defenses and compulsory
counterclaim for actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees and costs in an
apparent effort to make out a case of an ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its dismissal
under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à-vis, Article 222 of the Civil Code.
Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the
Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 22 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the
dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo in as much
as the latter provision is clear enough.
Article 222 is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear form the term “suit” that it
refers to an action by one person or person against another or others in a court of justice in which
the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law afford him for the redress of an injury or the
enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. A civil action is thus an action filed in a court
of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the protection or
redress of a wrong. Besides, an excerpt from the report of the Code Commission to make that
legal provision applicable only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve
members of the same family.
CIVIL CODE (prejudicial question)
PRADO VS. PEOPLE

133 SCRA 602
FACTS:
1. An information for Bigamy was filed in the CFI of Manila against petitioner Virginia Prado.
2. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that Philippine courts have no
jurisdiction over the marriage solemnized in Saigon, as it is outside Philippine territory and
does not fall under any of the exceptions enumerated in Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
3. The trial court denied the dismissal.
4. Petitioner filed in the CFI of Rizal, an action for annulment of her Saigon marriage
contending that her consent thereto was obtained by means of force and intimidation, and that
she never freely cohabited with her second husband, Julio Manalansang.
5. A motion to suspend trial for the existence of a prejudicial question was filed by petitioner in
the Bigamy Case.
6. Respondent Court denied suspension.
7. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating her argument that a prejudicial
question exists.
8. The Motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE:
Does a pending civil suit for annulment of marriage constitutes a prejudicial question in a
bigamy case?
HELD:
For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of
the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites
must be present: 1) the civil case involved facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based; 2) in the resolution of the issue or issues resides in the
civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and 3)
jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.
The foregoing requisites being present in the case at bar, the suspensive effect of a prejudicial
question comes into play. *** Should petitioner be able to establish that her consent to the
second marriage was, indeed, obtained by means of force and intimation, he arc of entering
into marriage with Julio Manalansang would be involuntary, and there can be no conviction for
the crime of bigamy.
And while it may be contended by the Supreme Court, that the mere filing of an Annulment
Case does not automatically give rise to a prejudicial question as to bar trial of a Bigamy Case,
considering the gravity of the charge, petitioner cannot be deprived of her right to prove her
guilt or innocence. The State is not thereby deprived from proceeding with the criminal case in
the event that the Court decrees against petitioner in the Annulment Case.
***COMPARE WITH BELTRAN CASE
mindstate Oct 13, 2002 05:45 PM
Hi Pugsly,
I am not asking you to digest those cases. baka meron ka na pong available na digests ng mga
cases na pi-nost ko. Kahit ano sa mga nandun. I hope you could email them to me at
amhd0220@yahoo.com
I will be waiting online for your reply.
mindstate
PUGSLEY Oct 13, 2002 05:49 PM
CIVIL CODE (prejudicial question)
BELTRAN VS. PEOPLE

334 SCRA 106
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Maynardo Beltran and Charmaiene Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the
Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City.
2. After 24 years of marriage and four children, petitioner filed, in the RTC of Quezon City,
Br. 87, a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
3. In her Answer to said petition, petitioner’s wife alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned
the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting.
4. She then filed a criminal case for concubinage against petitioner and his paramour before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61.
5. Petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to
Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case.
6. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage
posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case.
7. Judge Alden Cervantes denied the motion, so was with a Motion for Reconsideration.
8. Petitioner then went to the RTC of Makati, on certiorari , questioning the Orders issued by
Judge Cervantes.
9. The RTC denied the petition also a Motion for Reconsideration.
10. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Does the declaration of nullity of marriage a prejudicial question in a criminal case for
concubinage?
HELD:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions. It
has two (2) essential elements: a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue raised in the criminal action; and b) the resolution of such issue determines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed.
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage is not a prejudicial
question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal
action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case,
it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
In DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS ( 226 SCRA 572) , the SC ruled that the import of
Article 40 of the Family Code is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable
bases for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is
acceptable.
So, that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not present a
final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of
the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void for
he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a
final judgment declaring his marriage void.
With regard to petitioner’s argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage
should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent
pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.
Analogous to this case is that of LANDICHO VS. RELOVA ( 22 SCRA 731), cited in
DONATO VS. LUNA (160 SCRA 441), where the SC held that: “xxx Assuming that the first
marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material
to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts
and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as
there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted
to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as
void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for
all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of
the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does
not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case of concubinage.
h20proof Oct 13, 2002 06:02 PM
PUGSLEY
ey, i just passed my case digests in persons. THANK YOU SO VERY MUCH pugsley for your
digests, sobrang helpful un. ur really a very kind person to do all that for us. salamat ng sobra!
FROGSTOMP
uy, miss ko na *** class! grabe, nakakamiss *** mga kalokohan. finals week na, craming na
naman tayo. well, break a leg for all of us! ngatz!:D
I'll discard cases (constitutional law, criminal law, and civil law cases) by Wednesday.
For those interested to have a copy of these cases please e-mail me so I could send it to you
before I permanently delete them.
Thanks!!!
mindstate Oct 13, 2002 06:41 PM
Hi there Pugsly,
Got your email. Wala akong masabi kundi super thank you. Anyway, i hope we could build an
archive for the digested cases. Dami ko ring digested cases pero hard copies lahat.
I hope you will also be kind enough to email me the Consti and Crim law cases. At kung
pwede po, cases sa Obligations and Contracts and Torts and Damages. Thank you so much.
God bless you always.
PUGSLEY Oct 18, 2002 07:47 AM
PERSONS AND FAMILY
SILVA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

275 SCRA 604
PONENTE:
Justice Vitug
FACTS:
1. Carlitos Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne Gonzales, an unmarried local actress,
cohabited without the benefit of marriage.
2. They had two children.
3. Not long after, a rift in their relationship surfaced.
4. It began, according to Carlitos, when Suzanne decided to resume her acting career over his
vigorous objection.
5. Suzanne refuted that assertion claiming she never stopped working throughout their
relationship.
6. At any rate, the two eventually parted ways.
7. In 1986, Suzanne refused to allow Carlitos to have the children in his company on
weekends.
8. Carlitos filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the RTC of Quezon City.
9. Suzanne opposed the petition averring that Carlitos often engaged in “gambling and
womanizing” which she feared could affect the moral and social values of the children.
10. The trial court rendered judgment directing Suzanne to allow Carlitos visitorial rights to his
children during Saturday and Sunday, but in no case should he take out the children without the
written consent of the mother.
11. Carlitos appeared somehow satisfied with the judgment for only Suzanne interposed an
appeal.
12. In the meantime, Suzanne got married to a Dutch national.
13. The newlyweds immigrated to Holland with the two children.
14. The CA ruled in favor of Suzanne holding that “ in all questions, regarding the care,
custody, education and property of the children, his welfare shall be the paramount
consideration” not the welfare of the parents.
ISSUE:
Was the order granting visitorial rights proper?
HELD:
Visitation right is the right of access of a non-custodial parent to his or her child or children.
There is nothing conclusive to indicate that these provisions (Article 150, FC; Article 209 in
relation to Article 220; Article II, Section 12, Philippine Constitution) are meant to solely
address themselves to legitimate relationships. Indeed, although in varying degrees, the laws on
support and successional rights, by way of examples, clearly go beyond the legitimate
members of the family and so explicitly encompass illegitimate relationships as well. Then,
too, and most importantly, in the declaration of nullity of marriages, a situation that
presupposes a void or inexistent marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code provides for
appropriate visitation rights to parents who are not given custody of their children.
There is no doubt that in all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare is always the
paramount consideration. The Court shares the view of the Solicitor – General, who has
recommended due course to the petition, that a few hours spent by petitioner with the children,
however, could not all be that detrimental to the children.
SALES;LEGAL ETHICS; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
MACARIOLA VS. ASUNCION

114 SCRA 77
FACTS:
1. Judge Elias Asuncion was the presiding Judge in Civil Case No. 3010 for partition.
2. Among the parties thereto was Bernardita R. Macariola.
3. On June 8, 1863 respondent Judge rendered a decision, which became final for lack of an
appeal.
4. On October 16, 1963 a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which he
approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963, later amended on November 11, 1963.
5. On March 6, 1965, a portion of lot 1184-E, one of the properties subject to partition under
Civil Case No. 3010, was acquired by purchase by respondent Macariola and his wife, who
were major stockholders of Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc.,
6. Bernardita Macariola thus charged Judge Asuncion of the CFI of Leyte, now Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals “with acts unbecoming of a judge.”
7. Macariola alleged that Asuncion violated , among others, Art. 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil
Code and Article 14 of the Code of Commerce.
ISSUE:
Is the actuation of Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of property in a Civil
Case previously handled by him an act unbecoming of a Judge?
HELD:
Article 1491 , par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to the sale or assignment of the
property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. The Supreme
Court held that for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment must take place during the
pendency of the litigation involving the property.
In the case at bar, when respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E,
the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final
because none of the parties filed an appeal within the reglementary period hence, the lot in
question was no longer subject of litigation. Moreover at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965,
respondent’s order date October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963
approving the October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963
decision, had long been final for there was no appeal from said orders.
Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from
the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on
July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs after the finality of the decision in Civil
Case No. 3010.
Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over
one year after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders
approving the project of partition, and not during the pendency of the litigation, there was no
violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United
States to the Republic of the Philippines, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce must be deemed to
have been abrogated because where there is a change of sovereignty , the political laws of the
former sovereign , whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are
automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new
sovereign.
CIVIL LAW (partnership); TAXATION
REYES VS. COMMISIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

24 SCRA 198
FACTS:
1. Petitioners Florencio and Angel Reyes, father and son, purchased a lot and building for P
835,000.00.
2. The amount of P 375,000.00 was paid.
3. The balance of P 460,000.00 was left, which represents the mortgage obligation of the vendors
with the China Banking Corporation, which mortgage obligations were assumed by the vendees.
4. The initial payment of P 375,000.00 was share equally by the petitioners.
5. At the time of the purchase, the building was leased to various tenants, whose rights under the
lease contracts with the original owners, the purchaser, petitioners herein, agreed to respect.
6. Petitioners divided equally the income of operation and maintenance.
7. The gross income from rentals of the building amounted to about P 90,000.00 annually.
8. An assessment was made against petitioners by the CIR.
9. The assessment sought to be reconsidered was futile.
10. On appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, the CTA ruled that petitioners are liable for the
income tax due “from the partnership formed” by petitioners.
11. A Motion for reconsideration filed was denied.
ISSUE:
Are petitioners subject to the tax on corporations provided for in the National Internal Revenue
Code?
HELD:
For purposes of the tax on corporations, the NIRC includes partnerships, with the exception only
of duly registered general co-partnerships. (compania collectivas)
After referring to another section of the NIRC, which explicitly provides that the term
corporations “includes partnerships” and then to Article 1767 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, defining what a contract of partnership is, the opinion goes on to state that “the
essential elements of a partnership are tow, namely: a) an agreement to contribute money,
property or industry to a common fund; and b) intent to divide the profits among the contracting
parties.
The first element is undoubtedly present in the case at bar, for, admittedly, petitioners have
agreed to , and did, contribute money and property to a common fund. Hence, the issue narrows
down to their intent in acting as they did. Upon consideration of all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case, the SC is fully satisfied that their purpose was to engage in real estate
traction for monetary gain and then divide the same among themselves.”

Baksh V CA 219 SCRA 115

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Baksh V CA 219 SCRA 115

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Baksh v CA 219 SCRA 115

Gashem Shookat Baksh is an Iranian enrolled in a medical school while Marilou

Is a breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong?

Is Article 21 of the Civil Code applicable in the case?

G.R. No. L-17396 May 30, 1962

[G.R. No. L-7817. October 31, 1956.]

Corporation; Messrs. W. J. Bunnel and Manuel Chan, representing Goodrich International

13th Air Force P12,880.00

DISCUSSION OF THE CONTROVERSY

Assets as of October 30, 1956 P668,605.15

Preferred claims still uncollected,

Amount available for distribution P529,885.59

“Defendant — taking advantage of his knowledge that insolvency proceedings were to be

MONTEMAYOR, J., concurring: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

LAGUNZAD V. GONZALES [92 S 476 (1979)] - An agreement whereby a film producer

ARTICLE 2 OF THE CIVIL CODE

TANADA VS. TUVERA, 146 SCRA 446

Does publication have to be in its entirety?

ARTICLE 15 OF THE CIVIL CODE

VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO JR., 139 SCRA 139

ARTICLE 19 AND 20 OF THE CIVIL CODE

RCPI VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 143 SCRA 656

Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of receiving and transmitting

ARTICLES 19, 20, 21, CIVIL CODE

KOREAN AIRLINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 154 SCRA 211

PUGSLEY Jun 1, 2001 12:46 AM

ARTS. 19,20,21 CIVIL CODE

PUGSLEY Jun 1, 2001 12:48 AM

ARTS. 19, 20, 21, CIVIL CODE

GUITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 139 SCRA 576.

PUGSLEY Jun 1, 2001 08:30 PM

ARTICLE 21, CIVIL CODE

Is Article 21 of the Civil Code applicable in the case?

PUGSLEY Jun 1, 2001 08:34 PM

ARTICLE 21, CIVIL CODE

WASSMER VS. VELEZ, 12 SCRA 648

green grin Jun 2, 2001 02:37 PM

highlight of the wassmer ruling:

LEDESMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 160 SCRA 449

PUGSLEY Jun 4, 2001 11:26 PM

DONATO VS. LUNA, 160 SCRA 441

warning to those who wish to contract a second marriage:

PUGSLEY Jun 14, 2001 09:08 PM

CRIMINAL LAW,CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, EVIDENCE

PEOPLE VS. MANTES,299 SCRA 562

TERRE VS. TERRE,211 SCRA 6

PUGSLEY Jun 15, 2001 07:31 AM

REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS,236 SCRA 257

Is there such a thing as a "secret marriage"?

PUGSLEY Jun 15, 2001 08:25 PM

ARTICLE 4 & 40, FAMILY CODE

ATIENZA VS. BRILLANTES, JR., 243 SCRA 32

Does Brillantes and Ongkiko have a valid marriage?

ART. 36, FAMILY CODE(Psychological Incapacity)

CHI MING TSOI VS. COURT OF APPEALS,266 SCRA 324

INTOD VS. COURT OF APPEALS,215 SCRA 52

On the other had, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances

ARTICLE 4, FAMILY CODE

COSCA VS. PALYPAYON JR. ,237 SCRA 249

RESPONDENT JUDGE LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR. IMPOSED A FINE WITH STERN

Note: compare with DUMAGTOY case

Miguelito Jun 26, 2001 08:41 PM