Van Dorn vs CA

139 SCRA 139

FACTS:
The petitioner is a Filipino citizen while respondent Romillo is an American
citizen. They married in Hong Kong in 1972 and after their marriage, established a
residence in the Philippines. The parties were divorced in Nevada in 1982 and now,
petitioner is married to Theodore Van Dorn. Respondent Romillo, Jr. Filed a suit
against petitioner in RTC Pasay stating that petitioner’s business in Ermita, Manila is
conjugal property of the parties and that the petitioner ordered to render an
accounting of that business and that the private respondent be declared with a right
to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that the case of the action is barred of the judgment in the divorce
proceeding in the Nevada Court wherein the respondent had acknowledged that he
and the petitioner had no “common property” as of June 11, 1982.

ISSUE:
Whether there is an effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their
alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.

HELD:
It is not necessary to determine the property relations between petitioner
and private respondent after their marriage, whether absolute or relative
community property, complete separation of property or any other regime. The
pivotal fact in this case is that the Nevada divorce of the parties that the Nevada
Court obtained jurisdiction over the petitioner and private respondent.

Wassmer vs. Velez

12 SCRA 648

FACTS:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love,
decided to get married and set Sept. 4, 1954 as the big day. On Sept. 2, 1954, Velez
left a note for his bride-to-be saying that he wants to postpone the marriage as his
mother opposes it and that he is leaving. But the next day, Sept. 3, he sent her a
telegram and told her that nothing has changed, that he is returning and he
apologizes. Thereafter, Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again. Wassmer
sued him for damages. Velez filed no answer and was declared in default.

ISSUE: Is the case at bar a mere breach of promise to marry?

RULING:
Surely, this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere
breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a
wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it
when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably
and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Art. 21 of the NCC which provides that
"any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage."

DECISION: Affirmed.

In re May’s Estate
305 N.Y. 486, 114 N.E.2d 4 (1953).

FACTS:
Ms. May died in 1945. Mr. May objected to Alice, one of six children born from
the marriage of W and H for issuance to her of letters of administration of the estate
of her mother. H claimed to be the husband of W; however, H was W’s uncle. Alice
contends that H is not the surviving husband of W because although their marriage
was legal in Rhode Island, the marriage never had validity in New York where they
were residents until W’s death. W and H were married in Rhode Island at the home
of a Jewish rabbi. They returned to New York two weeks later and lived there from
1913 until W’s death in 1945. Rhode Island laws prohibited the marriage of an uncle
and niece except for couples of the Jewish faith within the degrees of affinity and
consanguinity permitted by their religion. Alice was granted letters of administration
and this appeal resulted. That result was overruled by the Appellate Division and
this appeal resulted.

ISSUE:
Is the legality of a marriage between persons sui juris to be determined by
the law of the place it is celebrated?

HELD:
Yes. The legality of a marriage between persons sui juris is to be determined
by the law of the place it is celebrated. Although our statute declares a marriage
between an uncle and niece to be void, our statute does not state that we cannot
recognize such a relationship that is valid in another state. We should not extend
the statute’s scope to by judicial construction.
DISPOSITION: Affirmed.

Dissenting: Every state has the right to determine the marital status of its residents.
The general rule that a marriage that is valid where solemnized is valid everywhere
does not apply to marriages contrary to the prohibitions of natural law or the
express prohibitions of a statute.

Yao Kee vs. Sy Gonzales

167 scra 736

FACTS:
Sy Kiat, a chines national died in Caloocan City, leaving behind his real
and personal properties in the Philippines worth P 300,000 more or less. Aida Sy-
Gonzales, et. al. filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration claiming
among other things that they are children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego, a
Filipina. The petition was opposed by Yao kee who alleged that she is the lawful wife
of the deceased whom he married in China and that one of her children, Sze Sook
Wah, should be the administrator of the deceased. The CFI decided in favor of Yao
Kee’s petition but was modified and set aside by the court of appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sy Kiat’s marriage to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese
Law and Custom conclusive.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that evidence may prove the fact if marriage
between Sy Kiat and Yao Kee is valid, but it is not sufficient to establish the validity
of said marriage in accordance with Chinese law and custom. A custom must be
proved as a fact according to the rules of evidence and that a local custom as a
source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is
properly established by competent evidence. In the case at bar, petitioners did not
present any competent evidence relative to the law of China on marriage. In the
absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is
the same as that of the Philippines.
The Supreme Court affirmed (all of them were acknowledged as natural
children, hence given equal rights) the decision of the Court of Appelas.
Board of Commissioners vs. Judge De la Rosa
197 scra 853

FACTS:
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian,
was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen
following the citizenship of natural mother Mariana Gatchalian. On June 27, 1961,
Willian, then twelve years old, arrives in Manila from Hongkong together with a
daughter and a son of Santiago. They had with them certificate of registration and
identity issued by the Philippine consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram
bearing the signature of the secretary of foreign affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and
sought admission as Filipino citizens.
On July 6, 1961, the board of special inquiry admitted the Gatchalians as
Filipino citizens and issued an identification certificate to William. The boarf of
commissioners waws directed by the Secretary of Justice to Review all cases where
entry was ed on the ground that the entrant was a Filipino citizen such included the
case of William. As a result of the decision of the board of special inquiry which
recommended for the reversal of the decision of the Board of Commissioners.
Acting commissioner issued an order affirming the decision of the Board of Special
Inquiry.
On August 15, 1990, the Commission on Immigration and Deportatiion
ordered the arrest of William and was released upon posting P 200,000 cash bond.
Thus on the 29th of the same month, he filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
before the RTC of Manila. A motion to dismiss was filed but denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not William Gatchalian is to be declared as a Filipino citizen

HELD:
William Gatchalian is declared as a Filipino Citizen. Having declared the
assailed marriage as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of
his father, a Filipino as legitimate child. Respondent belongs to a class of Filipinos
who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the constitution.
Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee
GR No.18081 March 3, 1922

FACTS:
Cheong Boo, a native of China died in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands on
August 5, 1919 and left property worth nearly P100,000 which is now being claimed
by two parties - (1) Cheong Seng Gee who alleged that he was a legitimate child by
marriag contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Bit in China in 1985, and (2) Mora
Adong who alleged that she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in
Basilan, Philippine Islands and had two daughters with the deceased namely Payang
and Rosalia. The conflicting claims to Cheong Boo’s estate were ventilated in the
lower court that ruled that Cheong Seng Gee failed to sufficiently establish the
Chinese marriage through a mere letter testifying that Cheong Boo and Tan Bit
married each other but that because Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the
Philippine Islands as the son of the deceased, he should share in the estate as a
natural child. With reference to the allegations of Mora Adong and her daughters,
the trial court reached the conclusion that the marriage between Adong and Cheong
Boo had been adequately proved but that under the laws of the Philippine Islands it
could not be held to be a lawful marriage and thus the daughter Payang and Rosalia
would inherit as natural children. The lower court believes that Mohammedan
marriages are not valid under the Philippine Island’s laws this as an Imam as a
solemnizing officer and under Quaranic laws.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the Chinese marriage between Cheong Boo and Tan Dit is
valid. Whether or not the Mohammedan marriage between Cheong Boo and Mora
Adong is valid

HELD:
The Supreme Court found the (1) Chinese marriage not proved and Chinaman
Cheong Seng Gee has only the rights of a natural child while (2) it found the
Mohammedan marriage to be proved and to be valid, thus giving to the widow Mora
Adong and the legitimate children Payang and Rosalia the rights accruing to them
under the law. The Supreme Court held that marriage in this jurisdiction is not only
a civil contract but it is a new relation, an instruction in the maintenance of which
the public is deeply interested. The presumption as to marriage is that every
intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together
in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of counter-presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency
of the law. As to retroactive force, marriage laws is in the nature of a curative
provision intended to safeguard society by legalizing prior marriages. Public policy
should aid acts intended to validate marriages and should retard acts intended to
invalidate marriages. This as for public policy, the courts can properly incline the
scales of their decision in favor of that solution which will most effectively promote
the public policy. That is the true construction which will best carry legislative
intention into effect. Sec. IV of the Marriage law provides that “all marriages
contracted outside the islands, which would be valid by the laws of the country in
which the same were contracted, are valid in these islands. To establish a valid
foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is first necessary to prove
before the courts of the Islands the existence of the foreign law as a question of
fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing
evidence. A Philippine marriage followed by 23 years of uninterrupted marital life,
should not be impugned and discredited, after the death of the husband through an
alleged prior Chinese marriage, “save upon proof so clear, strong and unequivocal
as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of such impediment.” A marriage
alleged to have been contracted in China and proven mainly by a so-called
matrimonial letter held not to be valid in the Philippines.

People vs Dumpo

FACTS:
Moro Hassan and Mora Dupo have been legally married according to the rites
and practice of the Mohammedan religion. Without this marriage being dissolved, it
is alleged that Dumpo contracted another marriage with Moro Sabdapal after which
the two lived together as husband and wife. Dumpo was prosecuted for and
convicted of the crime of bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty with a maximum of eight years, and one day
of prision mayor and minimum of two years, four months and twenty one days of
prision correccional, with costs. From this judgment the accused interposed an
appeal. The records of the case disclose that it has been established by the
defense, without the prosecution having presented any objection nor evidence to
the contrary, that the alleged second marriage of the accused is null and void
according to Mohammedan rites on the ground that her father had not given his
consent thereto.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Hassan and Dupo is valid.

HELD:
We formulate no general statement regarding the requisites necessary for
the validity of a marriage between Moros according to Mohammedan rites. This is a
fact of which no judicial notice may be taken and must be subject to proof in every
particular case. In the case at bar we have the uncontradicted testimony of Tahari,
an Iman or Mohammedan priest authorized to solemnize marriages between
Mohammedans, to the effect that the consent of the bride's father or. in the
absence thereof, that of the chief of the tribe to which she belongs in an
indipensable requisite for the validity of such contracts. If the absence of this
requisite did not make the marriage contract between Mohammedans void, it was
easy for the prosecution to show it by refuting Iman Tahari's testimony inasmuch as
for lack of one there were two other Imans among the State witnesses in this case.
It failed to do so, however, and from such failure we infer that the Iman's testimony
for the defense is in accordance with truth. It is contended that, granting the
absolute necessity of the requisite in question, tacit compliance therewith may be
presumed because it does not appear that Dumpo's father has signified his
opposition to this alleged marriage after he had been informed of its celebration.
But this presumption should not be established over the categorical affirmation of
Moro Jalmani, Dumpo's father, that he did not give his consent to his daughter's
alleged second marriage for the reason that he was not informed thereof and that,
at all events, he would not have given it, knowing that Dumpo's first marriage was
not dissolved.
It is an essential element of the crime of bigamy that the alleged second
marriage, having all the essential requisites, would be valid were it not for the
subsistence of the first marriage. It appearing that the marriage alleged to first
been contracted by the accused with Sabdapal, her former marriage with Hassan
being undissolved, cannot be considered as such, there is no justification to hold her
guilty of the crime charged in the information.
Wherefore, reversing the appealed judgment, the accused is acquitted of the
charges and if she should be in detention her immediate release is ordered, with the
costs of both instances de oficio. So ordered.

Wong Woo Yiu vs Vivo

FACTS:
 In proceedings held before the Board of Special Inquiry sometime in June,
1961, Wong Woo Yiu (petitioner) declared that 1) she came to the Philippines in
1961 for the first time to join her husband Perfecto Blas, a Filipino Citizen, to whom
she was married in Chingkang, China on January 15, 1929, 2) that they had several
children all of whom are not in the Philippines; 3) that their marriage was celebrated
by one Chua Tio, a village leader. On June 28, 1961 the Board of Special Inquiry No.
3 rendered a decision finding petitioner to be legally married to Perfecto Blas, thus
declaring legal her admission into the country. This decision was affirmed by the
Board of Commissioners on July 12, 1961 of which petitioner was duly informed in a
letter sent on the same date by the Secretary of the Board. However, on June 28,
1962, the same Board of Commissioners, but composed entirely of a new set of
members, rendered a new decision contrary to that of the Board of Special Inquiry
No. 3 and ordering petitioner to be excluded from the country, after discrepancies
were found in the statements made by petitioner and her alleged husband during
several investigations conducted by the immigration authorities concerning the
alleged marriage before a village leader in China in 1929, thus concluding that the
petitioner’s claim that she is the lawful wife of Perfecto Blas was without basis in
evidence as it was "bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship."

ISSUE:
Whether or not WONG WOO YIU’s marriage to PERFECTO BLAS is valid in the
Philippines, and her admission into the country is legal.

HELD:
The above revocation of decision cannot be disputed, it finding support in the
record and investigation. Indeed, not only is there no documentary evidence to
support the alleged marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas but the record is
punctured with so many inconsistencies which cannot but lead one to doubt their
veracity concerning the said marriage in China on 1929. Even if we assume,
therefore, that the marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas before a village leader is
valid in China, the same is not one of those authorized in our country. (In order that
a marriage celebrated in the Philippines may be valid it must be solemnized either
by a judge of any court inferior to the Supreme Court, a justice of the peace, or a
priest or minister of the gospel of any denomination duly registered in the Philippine
Library and Museum – Public Act 3412, Section 2) Since our law only recognizes a
marriage celebrated before any of the officers mentioned therein, and a village
leader is not one of them, it is clear that petitioner's marriage cannot be recognized
in this jurisdiction.

Tenchanvez vs. Escaño

FACTS:
Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age exchanged marriage vows to Vicenta
Escaño Mendoza 27 years of age, without the knowledge of her parents, before a
Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares on 24 February 1948. But apparently they
were unable to live together due to certain circumstances. As of June 1948 the
newlyweds were already estranged and living with their separate lives. On 22
August 1950 Vicenta Escaño Mendoza filed a verified complaint for divorce against
Pastor Tenchavez in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and
for the County of Washoe, on the ground of “extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
character.” On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, “final and absolute” was
issued in open court by the said tribunal. In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a
petition with Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter’s marriage to Pastor
Tenchavez. On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her
marriage. And on 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American Russell Leo
Moran, in Nevada. But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño,
her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño whom he charged with having dissuaded
and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections,
and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal,
decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one
million pesos in damages. While on the otherhand parents of Vicenta Escaño filed a
counterclaimed for moral damages.

ISSUES:
1. Was the the lack of ecclesiastical authorization by the solemnizing officer a
ground in declaring the marriage null and void? 2. Was the decision given to Filipino
citizen living abroad by foreign courts apply to Philippine laws? 3. Was the
complaint filed against Vicenta Escaño’s parents sufficient in form whom the
petitioner charged for having been dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining
her husband on the grounds of alienating Vicenta’s affection.

HELD:
1. NO, The chaplain’s alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the
parish priest and the Ordinary, as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil
law. On the basis on Act 3613 of the Philippine legislature which was the marriage
law in force at the time. 2. NO. “It is equally clear from the record that the valid
marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño remained subsisting and
undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce
that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial
District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada. And that both Vicenta Escaño,like
her husband, was a Filipino Citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law, as
provided by Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Wherefore, her marriage
and cohabitation with Leo Moran is technically “intercourse with a person not her
husband” from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles Tenchavez to a decree
of “legal separation under our law,on the basis of adultery” 3. NO, the testimony of
Pastor Tenchavez about the Escaño’s animosity toward him strikes the court to be
merely based on conjecture and exaggeration. In so doing Vicenta’s parents cannot
be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy
motives. As provide by Sec. 529 of the Civil Code. Wherefore Tenchavez, in falsely
charging Vicenta’s aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with having
exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably
caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages.

REPUBLIC VS ORBECIDO
G.R. No. 154380
October 5, 2005

FACTS:
In 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myro Villanueva in Lam-an,
Ozamis City. In 1986, Orbecido discovered that his wife had had been naturalized as
an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Orbecido learned from his son that his wife
had obtained a divorce decree and married an American. Orbecido filed with the
Trial Court a petition for “Authority to Remarry” invoking Article 26 Paragraph 2 of
the Family Code, the Court granted the petition. The Republic, herein petitioner,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought for reconsideration but it was
denied by the Trial Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the allegations of the respondent was proven as a fact
according to the rules of evidence.

HELD:
In the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on
record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his
wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree
and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry.
Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the
aforecited evidence in his favor. ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the
Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution
dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur,
Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera
GR No. 80116

FACTS:
Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino Citizen and Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German National were married on Sept. 7, 1979 in Germany. After about three and
a half years of their marriage, Erich initiated a divorce proceeding against the
Petitioner. On Jan. 5, 1986 the local court of Germany promulgated a decree of
divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. On June 27, 1986,
private respondent filed two complaints for adultery, alleging that while still married
to said respondent, “petitioner” had an affair with certain William Chia and Jesus
Chua.Eventually two Criminal cases were file against the Petitioner: Pp vs Imelda
Pilapil and William Chia under respondent judge (Judge Somera) Pp vs Imelda Pilapil
and James Chua under Judge Cruz Petitioner thereafter, filed a motion for both
criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend proceedings thereon. Judge
Cruz suspended the proceedings. On the other hand, respondent Judge merely reset
the date of arraignment. Again, petitioner before the scheduled date moved for the
cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings. A motion to
quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction however,
denied by the respondent judge.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAD THE LEGAL CAPACITY TO FILE
THE SAID COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE PETITIONER

HELD:
The High Court ordered the Dismissal of the case filed by the private
respondent against the petitioner for lack of jurisdiction and to Set ASIDE
respondent judge’s order to deny petitioner’s motion to quash the case. It was clear
then that prior to the filing of the case by the private respondents, his marriage with
the petitioner had already been dissolved through a decree of divorce. Thus,
declaring that the private respondent had no longer legal capacity for filing the
complaints (no legal standing to commence the adultery). The High Court
emphasized that the status and legal capacity of the complainant to initiate the
action be definitely established (they must exist as of the time the private
respondent commenced the action).

Quita vs Court of Appeals

December 22, 1998
FACTS:
Fe D. Quita, the petitioner, and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married
in the Philippines on May 18, 1941. They got divorce in San Francisco on July 23,
1954. Both of them remarried another person. Arturo remarried Bladina Dandan,
the respondent herewith. They were blessed with six children. On April 16, 1972,
when Arturo died, the trial court was set to declared as to who will be the intestate
heirs. The trial court invoking Tenchavez vs Escano case held that the divorce
acquired by the petitioner is not recognized in our country. Private respondent
stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in
Van Dorn v. Rommillo Jr that aliens who obtain divorce abroad are recognized in the
Philippnes provided they are valid according to their national law. The petitioner
herself answered that she was an American citizen since 1954. Through the hearing
she also stated that Arturo was a Filipino at the time she obtained the divorce.
Implying the she was no longer a Filipino citizen. The Trial court disregarded the
respondent’s statement. The net hereditary estate was ordered in favor the Fe D.
Quita and Ruperto, the brother of Arturo. Blandina and the Padlan children moved
for reconsideration. On February 15, 1988 partial reconsideration was granted
declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one- half of
the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and the other half to Fe Quita. Private
respondent was not declared an heir for her marriage to Arturo was declared void
since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.
Blandina and her children appeal to the Court of Appeals thatthe case was decided
without a hearing in violation of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Blandina’s marriage to Arturo void ab initio. (2) Whether
or not Fe D. Quita be declared the primary beneficiary as surviving spouse of Arturo.

HELD:
No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The citizenship of Fe D.
Quita at the time of their divorce is relevant to this case. The divorce is valid here
since she was already an alien at the time she obtained divorce, and such is valid in
their country’s national law. Thus, Fe D. Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of
Arturo. She cannot be the primary beneficiary or will be recognized as surviving
spouse of Arturo

Whealton v. Whealton
67 Cal.2d 656
FACTS:
Plaintiff, a petty officer on active duty with the United States Navy, married
defendant at Bel Air, Maryland, on June 15, 1964. Thereafter his military duties took
him from place to place on the east coast until he was assigned to the U.S.S.
Repose at the San Francisco Naval Shipyard. He arrived in California on July 14,
1965.plaintiff and defendant lived together for only six or seven weeks on the east
coast. On September 3, 1965, plaintiff filed this action for annulment of the
marriage. Summons was issued and an order for publication of summons was filed
on the same day.publication of the summons was accomplished as prescribed by
law. Defendant received a copy of the summons by mail at her home in Maryland on
September 7, 1965. On September 11, 1965, she wrote the court that she was
having difficulty obtaining legal counsel, but that she wished "it known that it is my
earnest desire and intent to contest this complaint." On [67 Cal.2d 659] October 11,
1965, the court entered her default, heard testimony in support of the complaint,
and entered a judgment annulling the marriage. On October 19, 1965, defendant
made a motion to set aside the default and the judgment by default and to permit
the filing of an answer and a cross-complaint. The motion was denied on November
9, 1965. Defendant contends that the default judgment must be reversed on the
grounds that it was prematurely entered and that the court did not have jurisdiction
of the subject matter.

ISSUE:
Whether court may grant annulment decree even if it acquires only personal
jurisdiction and not the place of celebration nor the place of marital domicile.

HELD:
Jurisdiction to grant annulments has followed an analogous, but somewhat
divergent course. An annulment differs conceptually from a divorce in that a divorce
terminates a legal status, whereas an annulment establishes that a marital status
never existed. The absence of a valid marriage precluded reliance on the divorce
cases in formulating a theory of ex parte jurisdiction in annulment, for no res or
status could be found within the state. The courts, however, did not let jurisdictional
concepts of in personam and in rem dictate results in annulment actions. They
recognized a state's interest in providing a forum for some annulment actions even
though the court lacked personal jurisdiction over one of the parties. The crucial
question, then, is whether there are sufficient factors to justify the court's
exercising ex parte annulment jurisdiction. Although we write on a slate free of
legislative directives regarding annulment, we are bound by constitutional
limitations.
Uggi Lindamand Therkelsen vs Republic
G.R. No. L-21951
November 27, 1964

FACTS:
The petitioners are husband and wife who were married on June 2,
1962, or barely a year ago. The minor sought to be adopted, born on
February 16, 1960, is the natural child of petitioner wife. His father was
Charles Joseph Week, who abandoned mother and child after the latter's
birth. He is said to have gone back to the United States. Except for the legal
impediment hereinafter to be mentioned, the facts before the Court may
warrant the approval of the adoption sought herein. Petitioner husband is a
Danish subject, who has been granted permanent residence in the
Philippines. A former employee of Scandinavian Airlines System, he is now
Manager of M. Y. Travel International Hongkong Ltd., with a monthly salary of
P1,200.00. plus allowances. It does not appear that either petitioner has
been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. On the other hand, the
minor sought to be adopted has been living with them ever since the
marriage of petitioners. Petitioner husband has treated the minor as his son,
and the latter calls him "Daddy." Although the possibility exists that
petitioners may yet have their own children, the adoption at this time, before
any such children are begotten, may strengthen, rather than disrupt, future
domestic relations.

ISSUE:
WON ACQUISITION OF THE CITIZENSHIP OF THE ADOPTER IS
NECESSARY TO GRANT ADOPTION.

HELD:
NO. The adoption was denied solely because the same would not result
in the loss of the minor's Filipino citizenship and the acquisition by him of the
citizenship of his adopter. Unfortunately, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court did not expound the reasons for its opinion; but it is clear that, if
pursued to its logical consequences, the judgment appealed from would
operate to impose a further prerequisite on adoptions by aliens beyond those
required by law. As pointed out by the Solicitor General in his brief, the
present Civil Code in force (Article 335) only disqualifies from being adopters
those aliens that are either(a) non-residents or (b) who are residents but the
Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations with their
government. Outside of these two cases, alienage by itself alone does not
disqualify a foreigner from adopting a person under our law. Petitioners
admittedly do not fall in either class.

Ng Hian vs The Insular Collector of Customs

G.R. No. L-11467
March 15, 1916

FACTS:
On or about the 30th of October, 1915 on the steamship Tian there arrived at
the port of Manila, a woman, Marcosa S. Dy Jiongco, together with two children, Ng
Tio a female of the age of 9 years, and Ng Hian a boy of 16 years of age. That
Marcosa S. Dy Jiongco was married to a Chinaman by the name of Juan Uy Tue. Juan
Uy Tue, before his marriage with Marcosa S. Dy Jiongco, had been married to a
Chinese woman with whom he had some children, the petitioner herein and also
one called Ng Guan. It appears that Ng Guan was residing in the Philippine Islands
at the time of the presentation of the present petition. The Chinese wife of Juan Uy
Tue died while the petitioner herein, Ng Hian, was a very small child. After the death
of his Chinese wife, was legally married to the said Marcosa S. Dy Jiongco. The said
little girl, Ng Tio, of 9 years of age was the daughter of the brother of the said Juan
Uy Tue, born of a Chinese father and mother; that the father of the little girl had
given her to the said Marcosa S. Dy Jiongco. Being the stepmother of the said Ng
Hian, adopted him and was bringing him to the Philippine Islands to study. After the
close of the investigation before the board of special inquiry, during which
examination the foregoing facts were presented, the said board refused the right of
each of said children to enter the Philippine Islands.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the minor children of a deceased resident Chinese merchant
have a right to enter the territory of the Philippine Islands.

HELD:
It is true that the petitioner, Ng Hian, had never been in the Philippine Islands
before. It is also true that the said Marcosa S. Dy Jingco was his stepmother. She
swore positively that she had adopted him. That fact is not denied of record. Until
the fact is denied we must accept it. There is nothing in the record which shows or
tends to show that she had not adopted him in good faith. The question whether or
not Marcosa S. Dy Jiongco could bring Ng Hian into the territory of the Philippine
Islands as her adopted son has been discussed by the Federal Courts of the United
States. Upon the theory, therefore, that Ng Hian had been adopted by his
stepmother, and upon the theory that she has a right to enter territory of the United
States, without objection, we are of the opinion and so hold that Ng Hian has a right
to enter the territory of the Philippine Islands as her adopted son. Therefore the
judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.