“LIBERTY " and =" EQUALITY " A TWO PART INVENTION Ogan Gurel Adams I-31 Moral Reasoning 22 31 October 1983 David Steiner, T.F.Ogan Gurel It would seem that "equality" and "liberty" are the two terms that describe our philosophical conception of justice. Questions such as "do people have a right to free choice?" and " re people to be considered as equals?" underlie the study of each of these ideas respectively. The more interesting question, however, centers on whether people have a right to both liberty and equality and whether these two rights can be respected concurrently and without conflict. An answer to this latter question is posed in an excerpt from Free to Choose by Milton and Rose Friedman. By first appraisal it appears as though the right to liberty and full equality are conflicting concepts; irreconcializble in a moral society. Ronald Dworkin, in Taking Rights Seriously, sees it as a "conflict between the demands of liberty and equality," but he himself proposes a cure for this dilemna. A sense of liberty based on personal preferences as opposed to external preferences would not conflict with equality. Essentially, in reconciling the two, Dworkin modifies his conception of liberty so that a form of liberty more confluent with equal treatment among individuals can be considered.Ogan Gurel -- 2 The Friedmans also propose a reconciliation of equality and liberty on the grounds that an equality of opportunity is the only form of equal consideration among peoples that is in concordance with the right to liberty. The effort to harmonize liberty and equality is thus exerted from the opposite tack in which the concept of equality is rendered more feasible in a libertarian society. Equality of opportunity, then, is seen as the absence of obstructions from the right to choose a career based on relevant differences between peoples. Since these differences are respected between individuals no particular norm is imposed and people are totally free in their right to liberty. In particular, equality of opportunity is considered by the Friedmans to be especially relevant in the economic realm. The institutions of free enterprise, competition, and laissez-faire government are all seen to support the precepts of the equality of opportunity. Furthermore, restricting the forms and processes of these particular institutions is conceived of as a more fundamental restriction on the equality of opportunity. In this way, we can undoubtably conclude that the Friedmans view can be seen as strongly tilted to the Lockean ideal of libertarianism.Ogan Gurel The equality of opportunity is contrasted with the idea of an equality of outcome in which case the benefits and burdens of society are accorded equally between the members of that society, irrespective of the differences that can be construed between them. It is this form of equality that the Friedmans see as diametrically opposed to liberty. In fact any efforts to support such a form of equality result directly (through governemnt intervention) in the comparable reduction of liberties. Specifically, two faults are pointed out in this form of equality: Firstly, it is assumed that some central authority must then determine the fairness and distribution of outcome and secondly there would subsequently be no incentive to work and produce in such a system. Therefore a society based on the equality of outcome can only be run through the use of force or threat. The terror-based states of China, Ruséia and Cambodia are seen as examples of how such a principle of equality could go awry. To justify this position, the Friedmans point out that "unfairness" is a natural state in human society. In light of the many manifest differences between human beings it is thus considered infeasible and, in fact, unjust if the government attempts to rectify the vagaries of an arbitrary nature. Almost as if to finalize this thought, the FriedmansOgan Gurel -- 4 pessimistically remark that "Life is not fair" and compare its course with a chance game of baccarat. Underlying the right to liberty and the equality of opportunity is the unhidered right of free choice. Without explictly saying so, the Friedman views this restatement of the libertarian ethic as revealing the key to the reconciliation of equality and liberty. No doubt, we can oppose the libertarian view by resorting to egalitarian arguments of liberty and equality. It is here that we see that the Friedmans first fault was in their attempt to include a bit of liberal argument in their essay. In fact, in justifying the equivalence of equality and liberty it is stated that " very individual should be regarded as an end in himself." Shades of Kant notwithstanding, however, during the course of the argument, the "unfairness of life" and the rules of the game, so to speak, all bespeak of winners gaining at the expense of losers. These winners, of course, are people fated by their talents to do well in society, while the losers, besides being worse off, provide the relative standard upon which to judge the winners. Indeed, in this manner, people are used as the means to gain an advantage in the game of life, and not as the ends to which the Friedmans originally alluded to. The egalitarian point of view would also argue that the Friedmans take on too broad a conception ofogan Gurel -- 5 of the relevant differences between people. Neither the inheritance of talent, the inheritance of money nor the inheritance of good looking legs are seen as more significant than the other differences between people. Egalitarians would say that because people are to be considered as ends in themselves and members of humanity, no less, some differences are to be thought of as irrelevant to the question of equality of outcome. It is believed that some fundamental rights and needs are excluded from the domain of free choice and must be provided equally to all people. If, however, all differences between people are to be respected, then it is undoubtable that some basic human needs and rights indigeneous to the human race as a whole will be unfulfilled for a number of individuals. The second major concern of the egalitarian philosophy would be that Friedman takes on two narrow a view of individual rights. In the true Lockean philosophy, economic considerations are paramount in questions of distributive justice. Not only are the individual rights to be protected strictly confined to those in relation to economic factors, but also the establishment of procedural structures supporting libertarianism seem to have generated their own rights the obstruction of which is perhaps an even greater offense than the obstruction of individual rights.Ogan Gurel -- 7 in shaping the differing nuances that people exhibit in their talents and abilities. If some of our differences are envirnmentally determined, then why should we be compelled to persist in an environment and culture that promotes differences? Would we not be impelled to iron out those differences and ensure equality with respect to those factors that are externally deterministic and amenable to change by us as a whole? Indeed, if we take the view that all differences are determined by nature then we are not required to equalize them as the Friedmans say but rather are required to respect them in our right to free choice. If however, we take the extreme view that all. differences are determined by our environment and culture then we are equally impelled to guarantee complete equality of outcome as we are able to effect that equality. Since the nature vs. nurture argument is not completely resolved we are best advised in moral arguments not to take the two extremist views presented above but rather to take some middle ground that compromises between the two. In light of this, the obvious conclusion is raised that some equality of outcome is necessary despite the overt differences between people and therefore, in a number of respects, we must as a society ensure equality in this form. Finally, it appears as though the Friedmans are confused in the application of the principle of the equality of opportunity. Because people must be allowedogan Gurel -- 8 freedom of choice a just distribution of societies benefits and burdens based on this free choice is considered completely just. This is exactly the view taken by Professor Nozick in Anarchy, State and Utopia in which he says: "From each as they choose, to each as they are chosen." Thust people should receive benefits and burdens, win or lose, according to decisions which they can be held responsible for. However, in justifying their objections to equality of outcome, the Friedmans' stress the importance of the inviolability of the differences between people. These differences are seen to be beyond attempts by the government to ameliorate or rectify. Yet, if we view these differences as also beyond the control of individuals, manifestations of the vagaries of nature as we pointed out earlier, then free choice has no place in equality. We approach an almost Calvinistic determinism in which we may uphold the equality of opportunity but such an equality is merely a farce and has no meaning. ‘The question is raised as to how just is it to punish those whose differences, of which they have no control, entail some lack of talent with respect to others. The Friedmans describe their ideal system as on in which “people make their own choices +- and bear most of the consequences of their decisions".| But according, to the differences that we envision between people and the idea of equality of opportunity, then| people must alsogan Gurel -- 9 bear the consequences of decisions beyond their free choice. If all decisions were then externally determined, we arrive at the same conclusion that the only form of equality that makes sense is that of the equality of outcome. Of course, our decisions are mediated on grounds between that of totally free choice and no choice and therefore we must consider equality as being partially determined by equality of outcome. We should not punish people for circumstances over which they have no control and in these cases we can justify equality of outcome. The conclusion I have reached then is arrived at by a consensus of the above two arguments and the more general arguments posed by egalitarianism. In short we must consider some individual rights which lead to an equality of outcome as inviolable and must also discount some differences between people as irrelevant in discussions of distributive justice. Furthermore, our differences, because they are partially environmentally and culturally determined should be equliazed in these cases and those differences that are beyond our control should not be construed to justify the conferrence of any benefits and burdens of society. Equality of outcome, then is as ubvious and reasonable a conclusion that can be reached as is an equality of opportunity. Whether this works in cooperation with liberty is antoher matter for discussion.