UNITES STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OBJECTION TO REMOVAL OF PRE-TRIAL PROCEEDINGS/ v. ‘TRIAL OUT OF DISTRICT DANIEL RILEY 1:07-er-189- UNKNOWN COMES NOW, making a special appearance, Danie! Riley, acting ina sovereign capacity, Sui Juris, not Pro Se repeat not Pro Se representing the fiction DANIEL RILEY, and makes this motion, prima facie. In no way can this motion be construed to ‘grant jurisdiction over the defendant, because the defendant's counsel still contends no jurisdiction exist. In no way should this motion be construed to be considered a contract ‘and all rights arc reserved at the common law UCC 1-308 and 1-103.6. 1. The defendant's counsel will argue that the defendant has not and will not consent to any transfer of venue in the above-entitled action. The defendant’s counsel will also argue the defendant has asserted his Sixth Amendment Right to be tried in a district of the alleged offense. This includes all pretrial hearings and the trial. 2, ‘The defendant's counsel will assert the DISTRICT COURT has no jurisdiction to begin with, yet alone changing the venue. 3. The defendant’s counsel will assert 28 USC § 1391 covers venues for DISTRICT COURTS, All venues fall under the civil law not criminal law. The law is very clear that venues are only in the civil realm for DISTRICT COURTS not the criminal realm, which this case is; therefore, this case has an illegal venue. General venue statute was not applicable to criminal proceedings only civil. see United States v Standard Oil Co. (1907, DC Tenn) 154 F 728 4, The defendant’s counsel will assert 28 USC § 1391(c) covers persons as a corporation, [fa person is a corporation, they are subject to personal jurisdiction by the DISTRICT COURTS. The defendant is not a corporation (licensed to do business in several different states), there is no documentation filed with the federal administration with the sovereign Daniel Riley’s signature on it, to have created a corporation in Daniel Riley’s namesake. ‘The fiction DANIEL RILEY was created, unknowingly to the sovereign man Daniel Riley, and deceitfully by the international bankers for this very purpose, to gain jurisdiction over their so-called slaves. 5. The defendant’s counsel will assert that DANIEL RILEY is an illegal fiction created involuntarily against the sovereign Daniel Riley’s knowledge, will, or consent and is, therefore, based on fraud.6. The defendant's counsel will assert that 28 USC § 1631 covers transfer for want of jurisdiction, This again covers civil actions only, not criminal, so this cannot be claimed as a legal reason for the transfer of this action to another district 7. The defendant's counsel will assert 28 USC § 1404 covers change of venue, again this covers only civil actions not criminal so this cannot be a legal reason why the venue ‘was changed. This also states that conseat must be given by all parties. Let it be known that the defendant through his counsel, Daniel Riley, has not and will not give consent to a change of venue. Transfer under 28 USCS 1404 is possible only if venue is proper in original forum and federal jurisdiction exists there. see Asociacion de Pescadores de Vieques, Inc, v United Staies (1979, DC Puerto Rico) 497 F Supp 54 8. The defendant’s counsel will assert 28 USC § 1407 covers mulidistrict litigation, again this covers only civil actions not criminal so this cannot be a legal reason why the venue was changed in this case. This section says all pretrial hearing must be heard in the district where the case originated. Since pretrial hearings have already been heard in another district other then the original one, so this law cannot validate the moving of the venue to another district. This case does not fall under the definition of a multidistriet Titigation as defined by the court in re Mid-Air Collision (1970, Jud Pan Mult Lit) 309 F Supp 621 9. The defendant’s counsel will assert 28 USC § 1412 covers change of venue for cases proceeding under title 11. This case is a proceeding under title 18 so this cannot be a legal reason why the venue in this case was changed. 10. The defendant’s couiisel will assert 28 USC § 636 covers magistrate’s jurisdiction, powers and temporary assignments. The section 636(c) says a magistrate must get consent of the parties before the magistrate can conduct any and all proceedings. Let it be known that the defendant through his counsel, Daniel Riley, has not and will not give consont to a magistrate to conduct any proceedings in the above entitled action. 11. Magistrate may exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 USCS 636(c)(1) only where he is specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by District Court or courts he served and where parties consent without coercion by judge or magistrate to magistrate's authority to hear case and enter judgment, see Alaniz v California Processors, Inc. (1982, CA9 Cal) 690 F.2d 717, 30 BNA FEP Cas 97, 30 CCH EPD 33108 ° The defendant's counsel will assert again his clients Sixth Amendment Right to have his trial, including pretrial proceedings, to be'held in the district of the alleged offense. The defendant's counsel will also assert that his client has the right to be tried by an Article III judge in an Article III court Ne redisk available DATED: October 31, 2007Indigent inmate scDc 266 County Farm Rd Dover NH, 03820 CC: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR NEW HAMPSHIRE, AUSA Robert Kinsella