POLITICAL LAW REVIEW THE WOMEN OF ALEITHEIA
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER SUPPLEMENT FOR 4-D
ARTICLE II - DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND
STATE POLICIES
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to
health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them.
Doctrines
Some provisions of the Health Sector Reform Agenda are
challenged on the ground that they violate 15, 18 of Article II;
Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and
Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the 1987 Constitution,
which directly or indirectly pertain to the duty of the State to
protect and promote the people’s right to health and well-being.
However, these provisions are not self-executory. Tondo
Medical Center Employees v. CA. G.R. No. 167324, July 17,
2007.
TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES V. CA
President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled
“Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of
Health,” which provided for the changes in the roles, functions,
and organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed
executive order, the DOH refocused its mandate from being the
sole provider of health services to being a provider of specific
health services and technical assistance, as a result of the
devolution of basic services to local government units.
Issue: WON EO102 is constitutional?
Held: YES. Petitioners allege that the HSRA should be declared
void, since it runs counter to the aspiration and ideals of the
Filipino people as embodied in the Constitution. They claim that
the HSRA’s policies of fiscal autonomy, income generation, and
revenue enhancement violate Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and
18 of Article II, Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of
Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV of the 1987
Constitution. Such policies allegedly resulted in making
inaccessible free medicine and free medical services. This
contention is unfounded.
As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are
considered self-executing, and do not require future legislation
for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-
executing, the mandate of the fundamental law can be easily
nullified by the inaction of Congress. However, some provisions
have already been categorically declared by this Court as non
self-executing.
In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,
this Court declared that Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II;
Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of the
1987 Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In Tolentino
v. Secretary of Finance, the Court referred to Section 1 of Article
XIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of the Constitution as moral
incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights.
These provisions, which merely lay down a general principle,
are distinguished from other constitutional provisions as non
TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
self-executing and, therefore, cannot give rise to a cause of
action in the courts; they do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights.
Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present
case were taken from Article II of the Constitution -- specifically,
Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 -- the provisions of which
the Court categorically ruled to be non self-executing in the
aforecited case of Tañada v. Angara.
Moreover, the records are devoid of any explanation of how the
HSRA supposedly violated the equal protection and due
process clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of Article III of
the Constitution. There were no allegations of discrimination or
of the lack of due process in connection with the HSRA. Since
they failed to substantiate how these constitutional guarantees
were breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing the
relevance of this provision to the petition, and consequently, in
annulling the HSRA.
In the remaining provisions, Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII
and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV, the State accords
recognition to the protection of working women and the
provision for safe and healthful working conditions; to the
adoption of an integrated and comprehensive approach to
health; to the Filipino family; and to the right of children to
assistance and special protection, including proper care and
nutrition. Like the provisions that were declared as non self-
executory in the cases of Basco v. Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation and Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, they
are mere statements of principles and policies. As such, they
are mere directives addressed to the executive and the
legislative departments. If unheeded, the remedy will not lie with
the courts; but rather, the electorate’s displeasure may be
manifested in their votes.
Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Doctrines
The LTFRB and the DOTC cannot order owners of PUV to use
CNG as an alternative to gasoline. Mandamus is available only
to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a
duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents
LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use
CNG. Henares v. LTFRB, GR 158290, October 23, 2006.
HENARES V. LTFRB
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus
commanding respondents LTFRB and DOTC to require PUVs to
use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.
Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the
bases for their petition for a writ of mandamus to order the
LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, our ruling in
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Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8749
otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999."
Issue: WON LTFRB CAN BE COMPELLED TO REQUIRE
PUVs TO USE CNG THROUGH A WRIT OF MANDAMUS?
Held: NO. Petitioners invoke the provisions of the Constitution
and the Clean Air Act in their prayer for issuance of a writ of
mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to
use CNG as an alternative fuel. Although both are general
mandates that do not specifically enjoin the use of any kind of
fuel, particularly the use of CNG, there is an executive order
implementing a program on the use of CNG by public vehicles.
Executive Order No. 290, entitled Implementing the Natural Gas
Vehicle Program for Public Transport (NGVPPT), took effect on
February 24, 2004. A thorough reading of the executive order
assures us that implementation for a cleaner environment is
being addressed. To a certain extent, the instant petition had
been mooted by the issuance of E.O. No. 290.
Regrettably, however, a writ of mandamus is unavailing.
Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act
specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that
mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order
owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. Further, mandamus will
not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate
branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the
other. The need for future changes in both legislation and its
implementation cannot be preempted by orders from this Court,
especially when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm.
Besides, comity with and courtesy to a coequal branch dictate
that we give sufficient time and leeway for the coequal branches
to address by themselves the environmental problems raised in
this petition.
In the same manner that we have associated the fundamental
right to a balanced and healthful ecology with the twin concepts
of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational
justice" in Oposa, where we upheld the right of future Filipinos
to prevent the destruction of the rainforests, so do we recognize,
in this petition, the right of petitioners and the future generation
to clean air. In Oposa we said that if the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is now explicitly found in the Constitution even
if the right is "assumed to exist from the inception of humankind,
it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers [of the
Constitution] that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing
importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day
would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the
present generation, but also for those to come."
It is the firm belief of this Court that in this case, it is timely to
reaffirm the premium we have placed on the protection of the
environment in the landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as
the statistics are on air pollution, with the present fuels deemed
toxic as they are to the environment, as fatal as these pollutants
are to the health of the citizens, and urgently requiring resort to
drastic measures to reduce air pollutants emitted by motor
vehicles, we must admit in particular that petitioners are unable
to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty on
respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus
compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. It appears
to us that more properly, the legislature should provide first the
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental
problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial
recourse by mandamus is taken.


ARTICLE III - BILL OF RIGHTS
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Doctrines
An EO ordering the closure of bus terminals in the city is an
unreasonable exercise of police power. Moreover, even if the
E.O. were valid, the MMD is the wrong person to carry it out
since this matter has been given by law to DOTC. MMDA v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 170657, August 15, 2007;
Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc., G.R.
No. 148339, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 174, 185.
The PD that orders discontinuance of a pension of a retired
military officer if he becomes a citizen of another country does
not violate equal protection. Parreño v. COA, G.R. 162224 June
7, 2007
MMDA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PGMA issued the E.O. “Providing for the Establishment of
Greater Manila Mass Transport System.” As the E.O. noted, the
primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the
numerous buses plying the streets and the inefficient
connectivity of the different transport modes; and the MMDA
had “recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the
bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila
thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to the
mass transport system to the commuting public through the
provision of mass transport terminal facilities” which plan is
referred to under the E.O. as the Greater Manila Mass
Transport System Project. The E.O. thus designated the MMDA
as the implementing agency for the Project.
Pursuant to the E.O., the Metro Manila Council (MMC), the
governing board and policymaking body of the MMDA, issued
Resolution No. 03-07 series of 2003 expressing full support of
the Project. Recognizing the imperative to integrate the
different transport modes via the establishment of common bus
parking terminal areas, the MMC cited the need to remove the
bus terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro
Manila.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT 179 IS CONSTITUTIONAL?
Held: No, the petition fails. EO179 is null and void for being ultra
vires. Petitioners submit that the real issue concerns the
President’s authority to undertake or to cause the
implementation of the Project. They assert that the authority of
the President is derived from E.O. No. 125, “Reorganizing the
Ministry of Transportation and Communications Defining its
Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes,” her residual
power and/or E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987. They add that the E.O. is also a
valid exercise of the police power.
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EO125 mandated the DOTC to be the primary policy, planning,
programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and
administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks
of transportation and communications. The grant of authority to
the DOTC includes the power to establish and administer
comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and
communications. Further, the Minister (now Secretary) of the
DOTC is vested with the authority and responsibility to exercise
the mandate given to the department. Accordingly, the DOTC
Secretary is authorized to issue such orders, rules, regulations
and other issuances as may be necessary to ensure the
effective implementation of the law. Since, under the law, the
DOTC is authorized to establish and administer programs and
projects for transportation, it follows that the President may
exercise the same power and authority to order the
implementation of the Project, which admittedly is one for
transportation. Such authority springs from the President’s
power of control over all executive departments as well as the
obligation for the faithful execution of the laws under Article VII,
Section 17 of the Constitution. This constitutional provision is
echoed in Section 1, Book III of the Administrative Code of
1987.
The authority of the President to order the implementation of the
Project notwithstanding, the designation of the MMDA as the
implementing agency for the Project may not be sustained. It is
ultra vires, there being no legal basis therefor. By designating
the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the
President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority
conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions,
the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project as
envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly
designated by the President to undertake the Project. It follows
that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of
respondents’ terminals.
Even assuming arguendo that police power was delegated to
the MMDA, its exercise of such power does not satisfy the two
tests of a valid police power measure, viz: (1) the interest of the
public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class,
requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Stated differently,
the police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public
interest and welfare and a reasonable relation must exist
between the purposes and the means.
Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion is a
public concern that needs to be addressed immediately. But
are the means employed appropriate and reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose. Are they not duly
oppressive?
This Court fails to see how the prohibition against the existence
of respondents’ terminals can be considered a reasonable
necessity to ease traffic congestion in the metropolis. On the
contrary, the elimination of respondents’ bus terminals brings
forth the distinct possibility and the equally harrowing reality of
traffic congestion in the common parking areas, a case of
transference from one site to another. Less intrusive measures
such as curbing the proliferation of “colorum” buses, vans and
taxis entering Metro Manila and using the streets for parking
and passenger pick-up points, as respondents suggest, might
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even be more effective in easing the traffic situation. So would
the strict enforcement of traffic rules and the removal of
obstructions from major thoroughfares.
LUCENA TERMINAL, INC. V. JAC LINER, INC.
JAC Liner, Inc. assails City Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778 as
unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the same
constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking
of private property, and a violation of the constitutional
prohibition against monopolies. These ordinances, by granting
an exclusive franchise for twenty five years, renewable for
another twenty five years, to one entity for the construction and
operation of one common bus and jeepney terminal facility in
Lucena City, to be located outside the city proper, were
professedly aimed towards alleviating the traffic congestion
alleged to have been caused by the existence of various bus
and jeepney terminals within the city. Respondent, who had
maintained a terminal within the city, was one of those affected
by the ordinances.
Issue: WHETHER POLICE POWER WAS PROPERLY
EXERCISED WHEN THE SUBJECT ORDINANCES WERE
ENACTED?
Held: NO. The ordinances assailed herein are characterized by
overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to
solve the traffic problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use
of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users
thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly
oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court. What
should have been done was to determine exactly where the
problem lies and then to stop it right there. The true role of
Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority
and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of
the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. A
due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a
more careful formulation of solutions to societal problems.
As for petitioner’s argument that the challenged ordinances
were enacted pursuant to the power of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod to "[r]egulate traffic on all streets and bridges;
prohibit encroachments or obstacles thereon and, when
necessary in the interest of public welfare, authorize the
removal of encroachments and illegal constructions in public
places": Absent any showing, nay allegation, that the terminals
are encroaching upon public roads, they are not obstacles. The
buses which indiscriminately load and unload passengers on
the city streets are. The power then of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod to prohibit encroachments and obstacles does not
extend to terminals.
Neither are terminals public nuisances as petitioner argues. For
their operation is a legitimate business which, by itself, cannot
be said to be injurious to the rights of property, health, or
comfort of the community.
But even assuming that terminals are nuisances due to their
alleged indirect effects upon the flow of traffic, at most they are
nuisance per accidens, not per se. Unless a thing is nuisance
per se, however, it may not be abated via an ordinance, without
judicial proceedings, as was done in the case at bar.
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PARREÑO V. COA
Salvador Parreño served in the AFP for 32 years. In 1982,
petitioner retired, availed, and received payment, of a lump sum
pension equivalent to three years pay. In 1985, he started
receiving his monthly pension. He migrated to Hawaii and
became a naturalized American citizen. In January 2001, the
AFP stopped petitioner’s monthly pension in accordance with
Section 27 of PD1638, providing that a retiree who loses his
Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his
retirement benefits terminated upon loss of Filipino citizenship.
Parreno then requested for reconsideration but the Judge
Advocate General of the AFP denied the request.
He then filed a claim before the COA for the continuance of his
monthly pension. COA denied petitioner’s claim for lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner alleged that the COA has the power and authority to
incidentally rule on the constitutionality of Section 27 of PD
1638, as amended. Petitioner alleged that a direct recourse to
the court would be dismissed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. Petitioner further alleged that since his
monthly pension involves government funds, the reason for the
termination of the pension is subject to COA’s authority and
jurisdiction.
COA denied the motion. It ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies does not apply if the administrative
body has, in the first place, no jurisdiction over the case. COA
also ruled that assuming it has jurisdiction over the claim,
petitioner’s entitlement to the retirement benefits he was
previously receiving must necessarily cease upon the loss of his
Filipino citizenship in accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638,
as amended.
Issue: Whether COA has jurisdiction to rule on the
constitutionality of PD 1638?
Held: NO. Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1445, money claims against the
government shall be filed before the COA. The jurisdiction of the
COA over money claims against the government does not
include the power to rule on the constitutionality or validity of
laws. The 1987 Constitution vests the power of judicial review
or the power to declare unconstitutional a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation in this Court and in all
Regional Trial Courts. Petitioner’s money claim essentially
involved the constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as
amended. Hence, COA did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing petitioner’s money claim.
Petitioner submits that the COA has the authority to order the
restoration of his pension even without ruling on the
constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended.
However, COA effectively denied petitioner’s claim because of
the loss of his Filipino citizenship. Petitioner failed to overcome
the presumption of constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as
amended. Unless the provision is amended or repealed in the
future, the AFP has to apply Section 27 of PD 1638, as
amended.
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Doctrines
Q. EO 420 orders all government agencies and government
owned and controlled corporations to streamline and harmonize
their ID systems. The EO is challenged on the ground that (1) it
requires legislation and (2) it violates the right to privacy.
A. (1) EO 420 applies only to executive entities that issue ID
cards as part of their functions under existing laws. These
government entities have already been issuing ID cards even
prior to EO 420.
(2) EO 420 does not establish a national ID card system. EO
420 does not compel all citizens to have an ID card. EO 420
applies only to government entities that under existing laws are
already collecting data and issuing ID cards as part of their
governmental functions. KMU v. Director General, G.R. No.
167798, April 19, 2006.
NOTE: A private entity may be held liable for illegal search
under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Silahis Internatinal v. Soluta,
G.R. 163087, February 20, 2006.
KMU V. DIRECTOR GENERAL
Under EO 420, the President directs all government agencies
and government-owned and controlled corporations to adopt a
uniform data collection and format for their existing identification
(ID) systems. Petitioners allege that EO 420 is unconstitutional
because it constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by the
executive branch of the government. Furthermore, they allege
that EO 420 infringes on the citizen’s right to privacy.
Issues/Held:
1. WON EO 420 IS A USURPATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER BY THE PRESIDENT.
NO. The President may by executive or administrative order
direct the government entities under the Executive department
to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Under her
constitutional power of control, the President can direct all
government entities, in the exercise of their functions under
existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID
format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility,
and convenience to the public.
Of course, the President’s power of control is limited to the
Executive branch of government and does not extend to the
Judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions.
Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or to the
COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized to issue
voter’s ID cards. This only shows that EO 420 does not
establish a national ID system because legislation is needed to
establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all branches
of government.
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Clearly, EO 420 is well within the constitutional power of the
President to promulgate. The President has not usurped
legislative power in issuing EO 420. EO 420 is an exercise of
Executive power - the President’s constitutional power of control
over the Executive department. EO 420 is also compliance by
the President of the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws
are faithfully executed.
Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or
repeal them. In issuing EO 420, the President did not make,
alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed
existing laws. EO 420 reduces costs, as well as insures
efficiency, reliability, compatibility and user-friendliness in the
implementation of current ID systems of government entities
under existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive
issuance and not an act of legislation.
The act of issuing ID cards and collecting the necessary
personal data for imprinting on the ID card does not require
legislation. Private employers routinely issue ID cards to their
employees. Private and public schools also routinely issue ID
cards to their students. Even private clubs and associations
issue ID cards to their members. The purpose of all these ID
cards is simply to insure the proper identification of a person as
an employee, student, or member of a club. These ID cards,
although imposed as a condition for exercising a privilege, are
voluntary because a person is not compelled to be an
employee, student or member of a club.
What require legislation are three aspects of a government
maintained ID card system. First, when the implementation of
an ID card system requires a special appropriation because
there is no existing appropriation for such purpose. Second,
when the ID card system is compulsory on all branches of
government, including the independent constitutional
commissions, as well as compulsory on all citizens whether they
have a use for the ID card or not. Third, when the ID card
system requires the collection and recording of personal data
beyond what is routinely or usually required for such purpose,
such that the citizen’s right to privacy is infringed.
In the present case, EO 420 does not require any special
appropriation because the existing ID card systems of
government entities covered by EO 420 have the proper
appropriation or funding. EO 420 is not compulsory on all
branches of government and is not compulsory on all citizens.
EO 420 requires a very narrow and focused collection and
recording of personal data while safeguarding the confidentiality
of such data. In fact, the data collected and recorded under EO
420 are far less than the data collected and recorded under the
ID systems existing prior to EO 420.
EO 420 does not establish a national ID card system. EO 420
does not compel all citizens to have an ID card. EO 420 applies
only to government entities that under existing laws are already
collecting data and issuing ID cards as part of their
governmental functions. Every government entity that presently
issues an ID card will still issue its own ID card under its own
name. The only difference is that the ID card will contain only
the five data specified in Section 3 of EO 420, plus the
fingerprint, the agency ID number, and the common reference
number which is needed for cross-verification to ensure integrity
and reliability of identification.
There is nothing legislative about unifying existing ID systems of
all courts within the Judiciary. The same is true for government
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entities under the Executive department. If government entities
under the Executive department decide to unify their existing ID
data collection and ID card issuance systems to achieve
savings, efficiency, compatibility and convenience, such act
does not involve the exercise of any legislative power. Thus, the
issuance of EO 420 does not constitute usurpation of legislative
power.
2. WON EO 420 INFRINGES ON RIGHT TO PRIVACY?
NO. On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity
because it even narrowly limits the data that can be collected,
recorded and shown compared to the existing ID systems of
government entities. EO 420 further provides strict safeguards
to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast to
the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative
safeguards.
The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID
systems by government entities. Some one hundred countries
have compulsory national ID systems, including democracies
such as Spain, France, Germany, Belgium, Greece,
Luxembourg, and Portugal. Other countries which do not have
national ID systems, like the United States, Canada, Australia,
New Zealand, Ireland, the Nordic Countries and Sweden, have
sectoral cards for health, social or other public services. Even
with EO 420, the Philippines will still fall under the countries that
do not have compulsory national ID systems but allow only
sectoral cards for social security, health services, and other
specific purposes.
Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to
privacy. Petitioners cannot show such violation by a mere facial
examination of EO 420 because EO 420 narrowly draws the
data collection, recording and exhibition while prescribing
comprehensive safeguards. Ople v. Torres is not authority to
hold that EO 420 violates the right to privacy because in that
case the assailed executive issuance, broadly drawn and devoid
of safeguards, was annulled solely on the ground that the
subject matter required legislation. As then Associate Justice,
now Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban noted in his
concurring opinion in Ople v. Torres, "The voting is decisive only
on the need for appropriate legislation, and it is only on this
ground that the petition is granted by this Court."
EO 420 applies only to government entities that already
maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant to their regular
functions under existing laws. EO 420 does not grant such
government entities any power that they do not already possess
under existing laws. In contrast, the assailed executive issuance
in Ople v. Torres sought to establish a "National Computerized
Identification Reference System," a national ID system that did
not exist prior to the assailed executive issuance. Obviously, a
national ID card system requires legislation because it creates a
new national data collection and card issuance system where
none existed before.
In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID
system but makes the existing sectoral card systems of
government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and LTO less
costly, more efficient, reliable and user-friendly to the public.
Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under
the President’s constitutional power of control over government
entities in the Executive department, as well as under the
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President’s constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed.
SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL V. SOLUTA
Marijuana was allegedly found in the Union Office by officers of
the Corporation. As a result of the discovery of marijuana, and
after the police conducted an investigation of the incident, a
complaint against the 13 union officers for violation of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. Soluta and his
fellow union officers, together with the union, thereafter filed
before the Manila RTC a Complaint for malicious prosecution
and violation of their constitutional right against illegal search.
Lower court adjudged that there was an illegal search and that
the officers of the Corporation were civilly liable under Article 32
of the Civil Code which provides civil liability for private
individuals who violate the right to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
Issue: WON THERE WAS AN ILLEGAL SEARCH?
Held: YES, hence the petitioners are civilly liable. Petitioners
had, by their own claim, already received reports in late 1987 of
illegal activities allegedly undertaken in the union office and
Maniego conducted surveillance of the union officers. Yet,
petitioners and their companions barged into and searched the
union office without a search warrant, despite ample time for
them to obtain one, and notwithstanding the objection of Babay.
As for petitioners’ contention that property rights justified the
search of the union office, the same does not lie. For
respondents, being the lawful occupants of the office, had the
right to raise the question of validity of the search and seizure.
While it is doctrinal that the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures is a personal right which may be waived expressly
or impliedly, a waiver by implication cannot be presumed. There
must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention to
relinquish it to constitute a waiver thereof.28 There must be
proof of the following: (a) that the right exists; (b) that the person
involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the
existence of such right; and, (c) that the said person had an
actual intention to relinquish the right. In other words, the waiver
must be voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made. The
evidence shows otherwise, however.
Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or
indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights
and liberties of another. Hence, it is not the actor alone who
must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly
responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury
caused to the aggrieved party.30 Such being the case,
petitioners, together with Maniego and Villanueva, the ones who
orchestrated the illegal search, are jointly and severally liable for
actual, moral and exemplary damages to herein individual
respondents in accordance with Article 32, in relation to Article
2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code.
Petitioners cite People v. Marti31 to support their thesis that the
determinants in the validity of the constitutional right against
searches and seizure cannot be invoked against private
individuals. But the ruling of this Court in Marti, a criminal case,
bears on the issue of whether "an act of a private individual,
allegedly in violation of [one’s] constitutional rights, [may] be
invoked against the State." In other words, the issue in that case
was whether the evidence obtained by a private person, acting
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
in a private capacity without the participation of the State, is
admissible. The issue in the present civil case, however, is
whether respondent individual can recover damages for
violation of constitutional rights. As reflected above, Article 32,
in relation to Arts. 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code, allows so.
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances.
Doctrines
Q. Petitioners assail B.P. No. 880, “The Public Assembly Act of
1985,” either in toto or in some parts, as being violative of
the right of assembly and petition. They also assail the
policy of “calibrated preemptive response.”
A. Calibrated preemptive response has been denied by Ermita.
At any rate, it has no place in the constitutional firmament.
As to BP 880, it codifies the JBL Reyes case. But BP’s
order to set up freedom parks must be followed and
implemented within 30 days, otherwise all public parks in
the local unit concerned will be considered freedom parks.
Bayan v Ermita, G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006.
Q. GMA Network aired a telecast by Rey Vidal reporting the
case filed by members of the Medical Board Exams
reporting alleged anomalies in the Medical Board exams.
The report was based on the court pleadings but it was
accompanied by an old file video of doctors in black
armbands parading in front of PGH. Was the video report
libelous?
A. The report based on the content of the complaint was
privileged. The file video did not constitute malice. Malice
means the offender is prompted by ill-will or spite with intent
to injure. GMA Network v. Bustos, G.R. 146848, October
17, 2006.
BAYAN V. ERMITA
Petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in
toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as
well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals
of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR
policy recently announced. B.P. No. 880, "The Public Assembly
Act of 1985," provides:
Sec. 4. Permit when required and when not required. A written permit shall be required
for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place.
However, no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a
freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property, in which case
only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required, or in
the campus of a government-owned and operated educational institution which shall be
subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. Political meetings or
rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered
by this Act.
Sec. 5. Application requirements. All applications for a permit shall comply with the
following guidelines:
(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or
organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and duration
thereof, and place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable
number of persons participating, the transport and the public address systems to
be used.
(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of the applicant under
Section 8 hereof.
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW THE WOMEN OF ALEITHEIA
(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in
whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days
before the scheduled public assembly.
(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the
office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be
posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building.
Sec. 6. Action to be taken on the application.
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a
permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will
create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two
(2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit
shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in
his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be
posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be
deemed to have been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately
inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] within
twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the
terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an
appropriate court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court,
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate
Appellate court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within
forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on
appeal shall be required. A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms
satisfactory to the applicant shall be immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within twenty-four (24)
hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to
the executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.
Sec. 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit. No public assembly with a permit
shall be dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police may
disperse such public assembly as follows:
(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement
contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask
the latter to prevent any possible disturbance;
(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the
participants are thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or at any property
causing damage to such property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement
contingent shall audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the
public assembly will be dispersed;
(c) If the violence or disturbance prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph
should not stop or abate, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent
shall audibly issue a warning to the participants of the public assembly, and after
allowing a reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to
forthwith disperse;
(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public
assembly unless he violates during the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any
provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended;
(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or breach of the peace during the public
assembly shall not constitute a ground for dispersal.
Sec. 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit. When the public assembly is held
without a permit where a permit is required, the said public assembly may be peacefully
dispersed.
Sec. 13. Prohibited acts. The following shall constitute violations of the Act:
(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or organizer
without having first secured that written permit where a permit is required from the
office concerned, or the use of such permit for such purposes in any place other
than those set out in said permit: Provided, however, That no person can be
punished or held criminally liable for participating in or attending an otherwise
peaceful assembly;
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of the
provisions of this Act by the mayor or any other official acting in his behalf;
(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of the
application for a permit by the mayor or any official acting in his behalf;
(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to
peaceful assembly;
(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or
any person to disperse the public assembly;
(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;
(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the
area of activity of the public assembly or on the occasion thereof:
1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm,
pillbox, bomb, and the like;
2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;
3. the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares;
4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;
5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public
assembly by the use of a motor vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems.
STATEMENT OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO
ERMITA – “The rule of calibrated preemptive response is now in
force, in lieu of maximum tolerance. The authorities will not
stand aside while those with ill intent are herding a witting or
unwitting mass of people and inciting them into actions that are
inimical to public order, and the peace of mind of the national
community.”
Petitioners contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a
violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of
which the Philippines is a signatory.
Issue: WON BP 880 IS CONSTITUTIONAL?
Held: YES. B.P. No. 880 was enacted after this Court rendered
its decision in Reyes. The provisions of B.P. No. 880 practically
codify the ruling in Reyes. It is very clear, therefore, that B.P.
No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a
restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of
the assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmeña v. Comelec
where the Court referred to it as a "content-neutral" regulation of
the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies.
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows
that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use
public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it
content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful
causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to
protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and
"influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based,
since they can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the
government for redress of grievances" come from the wording
of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally,
maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all
rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in
the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of
clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health. This is a
recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Not every expression of opinion is a public assembly. The law
refers to "rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or
any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public
place." So it does not cover any and all kinds of gatherings.
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW THE WOMEN OF ALEITHEIA
Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the
right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent
needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive
evils Congress has the right to prevent.
There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the
speech is not relevant to the regulation.
As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a
precise and sufficient standard - the clear and present danger
test stated in Sec. 6(a). The reference to "imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil" in Sec. 6(c) substantially means
the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. As to
whether respondent Mayor has the same power independently
under Republic Act No. 7160 is thus not necessary to resolve in
these proceedings, and was not pursued by the parties in their
arguments.
Finally, for those who cannot wait, Section 15 of the law
provides for an alternative forum through the creation of
freedom parks where no prior permit is needed for peaceful
assembly and petition at any time.
Considering that the existence of such freedom parks is an
essential part of the law’s system of regulation of the people’s
exercise of their right to peacefully assemble and petition, the
Court is constrained to rule that after thirty (30) days from the
finality of this Decision, no prior permit may be required for the
exercise of such right in any public park or plaza of a city or
municipality until that city or municipality shall have complied
with Section 15 of the law. For without such alternative forum, to
deny the permit would in effect be to deny the right. Advance
notices should, however, be given to the authorities to ensure
proper coordination and orderly proceedings.
The Court now comes to the matter of the CPR. As stated
earlier, the Solicitor General has conceded that the use of the
term should now be discontinued, since it does not mean
anything other than the maximum tolerance policy set forth in
B.P. No. 880.
At any rate, the Court rules that in view of the maximum
tolerance mandated by B.P. No. 880, CPR serves no valid
purpose if it means the same thing as maximum tolerance and
is illegal if it means something else. Accordingly, what is to be
followed is and should be that mandated by the law itself,
namely, maximum tolerance, meaning “the highest degree of
restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping
authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the
dispersal of the same.”
The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no
place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a
darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people
and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the
other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as
unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it
merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place
and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious, "maximum
tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The
delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" is
valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound "clear
and present danger" standard.
In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in
safeguarding liberty by giving local governments a deadline of
30 days within which to designate specific freedom parks as
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no such parks
are so identified in accordance with Section 15 of the law, all
public parks and plazas of the municipality or city concerned
shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of
whatever kind shall be required to hold an assembly therein.
The only requirement will be written notices to the police and the
mayor’s office to allow proper coordination and orderly activities.
GMA NETWORK V. BUSTOS
The Board of Medicine of the Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) conducted the physicians’ licensure
examinations. Out of the total 2,835 examinees who took the
examinations, 941 failed. A certain Abello and over 200 other
unsuccessful examinees filed a Petition for Mandamus before
the RTC of Manila to compel the PRC and the board of medical
examiners to re-check and reevaluate the test papers.
As news writer and reporter of petitioner GMA Network, Inc.
assigned to gather news from courts, among other beats, Rey
Vidal covered the filing of the mandamus petition. After securing
a copy of the petition, Vidal composed and narrated the news
coverage for the evening news edition of GMA’s Channel 7
Headline News.
Stung by what they claim to be a false, malicious and one-sided
report filed and narrated by a remorseless reporter, the herein
respondents instituted a damage suit against Vidal and GMA
Network, Inc., then known as the Republic Broadcasting
System, Inc. They added that, as a measure to make a forceful
impact on their audience, the defendants made use of an
unrelated and old footage (showing physicians wearing black
armbands) to make it appear that other doctors were supporting
and sympathizing with the complaining unsuccessful
examinees. According to the plaintiffs, the video footage in
question actually related to a 1982 demonstration staged by
doctors and personnel of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH)
regarding wage and economic dispute with hospital
management. Lower court dismissed the action, but the CA
reversed and ordered respondents to pay damages.
Issues/Held:
(1) WON THE TELEVISED NEWS REPORT IN QUESTION ON
THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS
AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS IS LIBELOUS?
NO. An award of damages under the premises presupposes the
commission of an act amounting to defamatory imputation or
libel, which, in turn, presupposes malice. Libel is the public and
malicious imputation to another of a discreditable act or
condition tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt
of a natural or juridical person. Liability for libel attaches present
the following elements: (a) an allegation or imputation of a
discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication
of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d)
existence of malice.
Malice or ill-will in libel must either be proven (malice in fact) or
may be taken for granted in view of the grossness of the
imputation (malice in law). Malice is a term used to indicate the
fact that the offender is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and
speaks not in response to duty, but merely to injure the
reputation of the person defamed. Malice implies an intention to
do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. It is present when it is shown
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that the author of the libelous or defamatory remarks made the
same with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
as to the truth or falsity thereof.
Conceding hypothetically that some failing specifically against
the respondents had been ascribed in that news telecast, it
bears to stress that not all imputations of some discreditable act
or omission, if there be any, are considered malicious thus
supplying the ground for actionable libel. For, although every
defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, the
presumption does not exist in matters considered privileged. In
fine, the privilege destroys the presumption.
Privileged matters may be absolute or qualified. Absolutely
privileged matters are not actionable regardless of the existence
of malice in fact. In absolutely privileged communications, the
mala or bona fides of the author is of no moment as the
occasion provides an absolute bar to the action. Examples of
these are speeches or debates made by Congressmen or
Senators in the Congress or in any of its committees. On the
other hand, in qualifiedly or conditionally privileged
communications, the freedom from liability for an otherwise
defamatory utterance is conditioned on the absence of express
malice or malice in fact. The second kind of privilege, in fine,
renders the writer or author susceptible to a suit or finding of
libel provided the prosecution established the presence of bad
faith or malice in fact. To this genre belongs "private
communications" and "fair and true report without any
comments or remarks" falling under and described as
exceptions in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code.
To be sure, the enumeration under the aforecited Article 354 is
not an exclusive list of conditional privilege communications as
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the speech and of the
press has expanded the privilege to include fair commentaries
on matters of public interest.
In the case at bench, the news telecast in question clearly falls
under the second kind of privileged matter, the same being the
product of a simple narration of the allegations set forth in the
mandamus petition of examinees Abello, et al., devoid of any
comment or remark. Both the CA and the trial court in fact found
the narration to be without accompanying distortive or
defamatory comments or remarks. What at bottom petitioners
Vidal and GMA Network, Inc., then did was simply to inform the
public of the mandamus petition filed against the respondent
doctors who were admittedly the then chairman and members of
the Board of Medicine. It was clearly within petitioner Vidal’s job
as news writer and reporter assigned to cover government
institutions to keep the public abreast of recent developments
therein. It must be reiterated that the courts a quo had
determined the news report in question to be qualifiedly
privileged communication protected under the 1987
Constitution.
(2) WON INSERTION OF OLD FILM FOOTAGE
CONSTITUTES MALICE TO WARRANT DAMAGES?
NO. Contrary to the CA’s findings, the identifying character-
generated words "file video" appeared to have been
superimposed on screen, doubtless to disabuse the minds of
televiewers of the idea that a particular footage is current. In the
words of the trial court, the phrase "file video" was "indicated on
screen purposely to prevent misrepresentation so as not to
confuse the viewing public." The trial court added the
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
observation that "the use of file footage in TV news reporting is
a standard practice." At any rate, the absence of the
accompanying character-generated words "file video" would not
change the legal situation insofar as the privileged nature of the
audio-video publication complained of is concerned. For, with
the view we take of the state of things, the video footage was
not libel in disguise; standing without accompanying sounds or
voices, it was meaningless, or, at least, conveyed nothing
derogatory in nature.
In all, the Court holds and so rules that the subject news report
was clearly a fair and true report, a simple narration of the
allegations contained in and circumstances surrounding the
filing by the unsuccessful examinees of the petition for
mandamus before the court, and made without malice. Thus, we
find the petitioners entitled to the protection and immunity of the
rule on privileged matters under Article 354 (2) of the Revised
Penal Code. It follows that they too cannot be held liable for
damages sought by the respondents, who, during the period
material, were holding public office.
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters
of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.
Doctrines
Q. Petitioners’ counsel requested public respondent to allow
Atty. Paredes to personally check the records of the
intestate case. Acting on the request, the Officer-In-
Charge/Legal Researcher of the court advised petitioners’
counsel in writing that “per instruction of the Hon. Presiding
Judge, only parties or those with authority from the parties
are allowed to inquire or verify the status of a case pending
in this Court,” and that they may be “allowed to go over the
records of the above-entitled case upon presentation of
written authority from the administratrix.” Correct?
A. Decisions and opinions of a court are, of course, matters of
public concern or interest. Unlike court orders and
decisions, however, pleadings and other documents filed by
parties to a case need not be matters of public concern or
interest. They are filed for the purpose of establishing the
basis upon which the court may issue an order or a
judgment affecting their rights and interests.
In fine, access to court records may be permitted at the
discretion and subject to the supervisory and protective
powers of the court, after considering the actual use or
purpose for which the request for access is based and the
obvious prejudice to any of the parties. Hilado et al vs.
Judge Reyes, G.R. No. 163155, July 21, 2006.
The refusal of the Comelec to reveal the names of the nominees
for party-list seats violates the right of the people to information
on maters of public concern. It also violate the rule on
transparency in II,27. Ba-Ra 7941 v. Comelec, GR 177271, May
4, 2007.
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HILADO ET AL VS. JUDGE REYES
Julita Campos Benedicto, the surviving spouse of the deceased
Roberto S. Benedicto, was appointed Administratrix of the
estate of Benedicto, and letters of administration were thereafter
issued in her favor. Herein petitioners had, during the lifetime of
Benedicto, filed two complaints for damages or collection of
sums of money, against Roberto Benedicto et al. In the initial
inventory of the estate which private respondent submitted in
the case before the Manila RTC, she listed, among other
liabilities of the estate, the claims of petitioners subject of the
above-said Bacolod RTC cases. From January 2002 until
November 2003, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 21 of the
Manila RTC allowed petitioners through counsel Sedigo and
Associates to regularly and periodically examine the records of
the case and to secure certified true copies thereof.
By December 2003, however, Atty. Grace Carmel Paredes, an
associate of petitioners’ counsel, was denied access to the last
folder-record of the case which, according to the court’s clerical
staff, could not be located and was probably inside the
chambers of public respondent for safekeeping.
In their petition, petitioners contend that the records of the case
are public records to which the public has the right to access,
inspect and obtain official copies thereof, recognition of which
right is enjoined under Section 7, Article III of the Constitution
and Section 2, Rule 135 and Section 11, Rule 136 of the Rules
of Court.
Issue: WON the petitioner’s right to information was violated?
Held: Insofar as the right to information relates to judicial
records, the term "judicial record" or "court record" does not only
refer to the orders, judgment or verdict of the courts. It
comprises the official collection of all papers, exhibits and
pleadings filed by the parties, all processes issued and returns
made thereon, appearances, and word-for-word testimony
which took place during the trial and which are in the
possession, custody, or control of the judiciary or of the courts
for purposes of rendering court decisions. It has also been
described to include any paper, letter, map, book, other
document, tape, photograph, film, audio or video recording,
court reporter’s notes, transcript, data compilation, or other
materials, whether in physical or electronic form, made or
received pursuant to law or in connection with the transaction of
any official business by the court, and includes all evidence it
has received in a case.
It bears emphasis that the interest of the public hinges on its
right to transparency in the administration of justice, to the end
that it will serve to enhance the basic fairness of the judicial
proceedings, safeguard the integrity of the fact-finding process,
and foster an informed public discussion of governmental
affairs. Decisions and opinions of a court are of course matters
of public concern or interest for these are the authorized
expositions and interpretations of the laws, binding upon all
citizens, of which every citizen is charged with knowledge.
Justice thus requires that all should have free access to the
opinions of judges and justices, and it would be against sound
public policy to prevent, suppress or keep the earliest
knowledge of these from the public.
Unlike court orders and decisions, however, pleadings and other
documents filed by parties to a case need not be matters of
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
public concern or interest. For they are filed for the purpose of
establishing the basis upon which the court may issue an order
or a judgment affecting their rights and interests.
In thus determining which part or all of the records of a case
may be accessed to, the purpose for which the parties filed
them is to be considered. In intestate proceedings, the heirs file
pleadings and documents for the purpose of establishing their
right to a share of the estate. As for the creditors, their purpose
is to establish their claim to the estate and be paid therefor
before the disposition of the estate. Information regarding the
financial standing of a person at the time of his death and the
manner by which his private estate may ultimately be settled is
not a matter of general, public concern or one in which a citizen
or the public has an interest by which its legal rights or liabilities
maybe affected. Granting unrestricted public access and
publicity to personal financial information may constitute an
unwarranted invasion of privacy to which an individual may have
an interest in limiting its disclosure or dissemination. If the
information sought then is not a matter of public concern or
interest, denial of access thereto does not violate a citizen’s
constitutional right to information.
The accessory right to access public records may, however, be
restricted on a showing of good cause. How "good cause" can
be determined, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in
Republican Company v. Appeals Court teaches: “The public’s
right of access to judicial records, including transcripts,
evidence, memoranda, and court orders, maybe restricted, but
only on a showing of "good cause." "To determine whether good
cause is shown, a judge must balance the rights of the parties
based on the particular facts of each case." In so doing, the
judge "must take into account all relevant factors, including, but
not limited to, the nature of the parties and the controversy, the
type of information and the privacy interests involved, the extent
of community interest, and the reason for the request.” And
even then, the right is subject to inherent supervisory and
protective powers of every court over its own records and files.
In fine, this Court finds the petition for mandamus meritorious,
petitioners being "interested persons" who have a legitimate
reason or purpose for accessing the records of the case.
BA-RA 7941 VS. COMELEC
Atty. Emilio Capulong, Jr. and ex-Senator Jovito R. Salonga, in
their own behalves and as counsels of petitioner Rosales,
forwarded a letter to the Comelec formally requesting action
and definitive decision on Rosales’ earlier plea for information
regarding the names of several party-list nominees. Invoking
their constitutionally-guaranteed right to information, Messrs.
Capulong and Salonga at the same time drew attention to the
banner headline adverted to earlier, with a request for the
Comelec, “collectively or individually, to issue a formal
clarification, either confirming or denying … the banner headline
and the alleged statement of Chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr.
xxx” Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the
issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 under date
April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees’ names
confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales’ basic
disclosure request. In its relevant part, Resolution 07-0724
reads as follows: “RESOLVED, moreover, that the Commission
will disclose/publicize the names of party-list nominees in
connection with the May 14, 2007 Elections only after 3:00 p.m.
10
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW THE WOMEN OF ALEITHEIA FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.

on election day.“ Petitioners commonly seek to compel the

Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of METROBANK V. ASB HOLDINGS
the various party-list groups named in the petitions.
Metrobank is a creditor bank of respondent corporations,
ISSUE: WON COMELEC, BY REFUSING TO REVEAL THE
collectively known as the ASB Group of Companies, owner and
NAMES OF THE NOMINEES OF THE VARIOUS PARTY-
developer of condominium and real estate projects. The loans
LIST GROUPS, HAS VIOLATED THE RIGHT TO
were secured by real estate mortgages.
INFORMATION AND FREE ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS?
ASB Group of Companies filed with the SEC a Petition For
Held: YES. Complementing and going hand in hand with the
Rehabilitation With Prayer For Suspension Of Actions And
right to information is another constitutional provision
Proceedings Against Petitioners, pursuant to Presidential
enunciating the policy of full disclosure and transparency in
Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A, as amended. ASB Group of
Government. We refer to Section 28, Article II of the
Companies submitted to the SEC for its approval a
Constitution reading: “Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions
Rehabilitation Plan, to which Metrobank objected, specifically as
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
to the arrangement concerning the mode of payment by
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
respondents ASB Realty Corporation and ASB Development
interest.”
Corporation of their loan obligations.
The right to information is a public right where the real parties in
The SEC Hearing Panel, finding petitioner bank’s objections
interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise. And for
unreasonable, approved the Rehabilitation Plan. Metrobank
every right of the people recognized as fundamental lies a
then filed with the SEC En Banc a Petition for Certiorari, alleging
corresponding duty on the part of those who govern to respect
that the SEC Hearing Panel, in approving the Rehabilitation
and protect that right. This is the essence of the Bill of Rights in
Plan, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
a constitutional regime. Without a government’s acceptance of
excess of jurisdiction; and praying for the issuance of a
the limitations upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold
temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary
individual liberties, without an acknowledgment on its part of
injunction to enjoin its implementation. Subsequently, the ASB
those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the
Group of Companies filed their Opposition to the petition, to
Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry.
which petitioner bank filed its Reply. SEC En Banc denied
Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to petitioner bank’s Petition for Certiorari and affirmed the SEC
information and its companion right of access to official records Hearing Panel’s approval of the plan. Metrobank assails the
are not absolute. As articulated in Legaspi, the people’s right to respondent’s personality to sue as a legal entity.
know is limited to “matters of public concern” and is further
Issue: WON ASB Group of Companies may sue?
subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. Similarly,
the policy of full disclosure is confined to transactions involving Held: Petitioner bank also argues that "ASB Group of
“public interest” and is subject to reasonable conditions Companies" is merely a generic name used to describe
prescribed by law. Too, there is also the need of preserving a collectively various companies and as such, it is not a legal
measure of confidentiality on some matters, such as military, entity with juridical personality and cannot be a party to a suit.
trade, banking and diplomatic secrets or those affecting national True, "ASB Group of Companies" is merely used in this case as
security. a generic name, for brevity, to collectively describe the various
companies/corporations that filed a Petition For Rehabilitation
If, as in Legaspi, it was the legitimate concern of a citizen to
with the SEC. However, in their petition, all the respondent
know if certain persons employed as sanitarians of a health
corporations are individually named as petitioners, not "ASB
department of a city are civil service eligibles, surely the identity
Group of Companies."
of candidates for a lofty elective public office should be a matter
of highest public concern and interest.
As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use
involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the without just compensation.
party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed
grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of Doctrines
the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups Where the lots taken were not included in the expropriation
subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies. proceeding, the lots should be returned to the rightful owner.
Where lots were taken under a compromise agreement but the
government did not perform its part, the agreement is abrogated
Section 8. The right of the people, including those
and there is obligation on the part of the government to return
employed in the public and private sectors, to form
the property to its owner.
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged. For the unauthorized use of a lot after the Lahug Airport was
abandoned and after plaintiff tendered her repurchase price,
Doctrine and for the illegal encroachment and occupation of another by
A rehabilitation plan approved by statute which merely the government, the government must pay rental.
suspends the actions for claims does not violate the contract
Since land acquisition under either Presidential Decree No. 27
clause. Metrobank v ASB Holdings, GR 166197, February 27,
and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law govern the
2007.
extraordinary method of expropriating private property, the law

JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE. 11

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW THE WOMEN OF ALEITHEIA FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.

must be strictly construed. Faithful compliance with legal The CAMC FTAA grants in favor of CAMC the right of
provisions, especially those which relate to the procedure for possession of the Exploration Contract Area, the full right of
acquisition of expropriated lands should therefore be observed. ingress and egress and the right to occupy the same. It also
Jugalbot v. CA, GR 170346, March 12, 2007. bestows CAMC the right not to be prevented from entry into
private lands by surface owners or occupants thereof when
When the right of way enforced by the state results in making prospecting, exploring and exploiting minerals therein. Is this
adjoining property unusable, just compensation is due. compensable taking for public use?
Republic v. Andaya, G.R. No. 160656, June 15, 2007.
A. Yes. The entry referred to in Section 76 is not just a simple
The general rule in determining “just compensation” in eminent right-of-way which is ordinarily allowed under the provisions
domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of of the Civil Code. Here, the holders of mining rights enter
the complaint. Normally, the time of the taking coincides with private lands for purposes of conducting mining activities
the filing of the complaint for expropriation. such as exploration, extraction and processing of minerals.
All these will definitely oust the owners or occupants of the
The general rule, however, admits of an exception. Simply
affected areas the beneficial ownership of their lands.
stated, the exception finds the application where the owner
Without a doubt, taking occurs once mining operations
would be given undue incremental advantages arising from the
commence. And the mining industry is of great public
use to which the government devotes the property expropriated
interest. Didipio Earth Savers v. DENR, G.R. No. 157882,
-- as for instance, the extension of a main thoroughfare which
March 30, 2006
increased the value of the property after it was taken but before
expropriation petition was filed. NPC v. Lucman Ibrahim, G.R.
Q. Can the establishment of an easement be equivalent to a
No. 168732, June 29, 2007.
taking, even if title does not pass, and therefore require
compensation?
Q. The city authorized the taking of private property to be
A. Yes, as in this case Here the easement of right-of-way is
converted into a sports facility for the benefit of a small
definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain.
community which seeks to have its own sports and
Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the
recreational facility, notwithstanding that there is such a
230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation
recreational facility only a short distance away. Is such
imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an
taking public use?
indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary
A. No. The purpose is not clearly and categorically public.
use. NPC v. San Pedro, G.R. No. 170945, September 26,
Masikip v. Pasig, G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006.
2006.
Q. MIA occupied a piece of private land for the extension of its
NOTE: the exercise of the power of eminent domain by a local
runway but without expropriating it. After lapse of many
government unit is now governed by Section 19 of Republic Act
years the owner seeks compensation and rental. How
7160. For properties under expropriation, the law now requires
much is due?
the deposit of an amount equivalent to fifteen percent (15%) of
A. For purposes of compensation the value of the land should
the fair market value of the property based on its current tax
be based on what it was worth at the time of entry and not
declaration. Knecht v. Municipality of Cainta, G.R. No. 145254,
its value after many years. Beyond the payment for the
July 20, 2006.
value of the land the owner is entitled to legal interest, not
rental. MIAA v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 161836, February 28,
JUGALBOT V. CA
2006.
An Emancipation Patent was issued to Nicolas Jugalbot based
Q. Section 75 of R.A. 7942 reads:
on the latter’s claim that he was the tenant of Lot 2180-C. On a
Easement Rights. - When mining areas are so situated
Certification issued by DAR, the subject property was declared
that for purposes of more convenient mining operations it is
to be tenanted as of 1972 and primarily devoted to rice and
necessary to build, construct or install on the mining areas or
corn. In 1988, the Emancipation Patent was registered and
lands owned, occupied or leased by other persons, such
Nicolas Jugalbot was issued TCT.
infrastructure as roads, railroads, mills, waste dump sites,
tailing ponds, warehouses, staging or storage areas and port Heirs of Virginia A. Roa, herein private respondents, filed before
facilities, tramways, runways, airports, electric transmission, the DARAB a Complaint for Cancellation of Title, Recovery of
telephone or telegraph lines, dams and their normal flood Possession and Damages against Nicolas Jugalbot. DARAB
and catchment areas, sites for water wells, ditches, canals, Provincial Adjudicator dismissed, MR was denied.
new river beds, pipelines, flumes, cuts, shafts, tunnels, or
Petition for review before the CA was filed and granted. The
mills, the contractor, upon payment of just compensation,
appellate court reversed the DARAB Central Office on four
shall be entitled to enter and occupy said mining areas or
grounds: (1) the absence of a tenancy relationship; (2) lack of
lands.
notice to Virginia Roa by the DAR; (3) the area of the property
which was less than one hectare and deemed swampy, rainfed
Section 76 provides:
and kangkong-producing; and (4) the classification of the
Entry into private lands and concession areas –
subject property as residential, outside the coverage of PD27.
Subject to prior notification, holders of mining rights shall not
be prevented from entry into private lands and concession ISSUE: Whether a tenancy relationship exists between
areas by surface owners, occupants, or concessionaires petitioners Heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot, and private respondents,
when conducting mining operations therein.
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE. 12
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW THE WOMEN OF ALEITHEIA
Heirs of Virginia A. Roa, under PD27. Simply stated, are
petitioners de jure tenants of private respondents?
HELD: NO. The petitioners are not de jure tenants of private
respondents under Presidential Decree No. 27 due to the
absence of the essential requisites that establish a tenancy
relationship between them.
Firstly, the taking of subject property was done in violation
of constitutional due process. Virginia A. Roa was denied
due process because the DAR failed to send notice of the
impending land reform coverage to the proper party. The
records show that notices were erroneously addressed and sent
in the name of Pedro N. Roa who was not the owner, hence, not
the proper party in the instant case. The ownership of the
property, as can be gleaned from the records, pertains to
Virginia A. Roa. Notice should have been therefore served on
her, and not Pedro N. Roa.
Secondly, there is no concrete evidence on record sufficient to
establish that Nicolas Jugalbot or the petitioners personally
cultivated the property under question or that there was sharing
of harvests, except for their self-serving statements.
Neither was there any evidence that the landowner, Virginia A.
Roa, freely gave her consent, whether expressly or impliedly, to
establish a tenancy relationship over her paraphernal property.
Thirdly, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a
tenancy relationship. All the requisites must concur in order to
create a tenancy relationship between the parties and the
absence of one or more requisites does not make the alleged
tenant a de facto tenant as contradistinguished from a de jure
tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his
status as a de jure tenant he is not entitled to security of tenure
nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the
Government under existing tenancy laws. The security of tenure
guaranteed by our tenancy laws may be invoked only by tenants
de jure, not by those who are not true and lawful tenants.
Finally, it is readily apparent in this case that the property under
dispute is residential property and not agricultural property.
Zoning Certification clearly shows that the subject property is
located within the Residential 2 District in accordance with
paragraph (b), Section 9, Article IV of Zoning Ordinance No.
880, Series of 1979 issued by the City Planning and
Development Office of Cagayan de Oro City.
REPUBLIC V. ANDAYA
Respondent Ismael Andaya is the registered owner of two
parcels of land in Bading, Butuan City. These properties are
subject to a 60-meter wide perpetual easement for public
highways, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, and other similar works
of the government or public enterprise, at no cost to the
government, except only the value of the improvements existing
thereon that may be affected.
Petitioner Republic negotiated with Andaya to enforce the 60-
meter easement of right-of-way. The negotiations failed so
Republic instituted an action to enforce the easement of right-of-
way or eminent domain. RTC issued a writ of possession and
constituted a Board of Commissioners to determine the just
compensation.
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
The Board then reported that the project would affect a total of
10k sqm of Andaya’s properties, 4k sqm of which will be for the
60-meter easement. The Board also reported that the easement
would diminish the value of the remaining 6k sqms. As a result,
it recommended the payment of consequential damages
amounting to P2.8M for the remaining area.
ISSUE: Is the Republic liable for just compensation if in
enforcing the legal easement of right-of-way on a property, the
remaining area would be rendered unusable and uninhabitable?
HELD: It is undisputed that there is a legal easement of right-of-
way in favor of the Republic. Section 112 of the Public Land Act
provides that lands granted by patent shall be subject to a right-
of-way not exceeding 60 meters in width for public highways,
irrigation ditches, aqueducts, and other similar works of the
government or any public enterprise, free of charge, except only
for the value of the improvements existing thereon that may be
affected.
We are, however, unable to sustain the Republic’s argument
that it is not liable to pay consequential damages if in enforcing
the legal easement on Andaya’s property, the remaining area
would be rendered unusable and uninhabitable. “Taking,” in
the exercise of the power of eminent domain, occurs not
only when the government actually deprives or
dispossesses the property owner of his property or of its
ordinary use, but also when there is a practical destruction
or material impairment of the value of his property. Using
this standard, there was undoubtedly a taking of the remaining
area of Andaya’s property. True, no burden was imposed
thereon and Andaya still retained title and possession of the
property. But, as correctly observed by the Board and affirmed
by the courts a quo, the nature and the effect of the floodwalls
would deprive Andaya of the normal use of the remaining areas.
It would prevent ingress and egress to the property and turn it
into a catch basin for the floodwaters coming from the Agusan
River. For this reason, in our view, Andaya is entitled to
payment of just compensation, which must be neither more nor
less than the monetary equivalent of the land.
Finally, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals and the
trial court that just compensation should be paid only for 5,937
square meters of the total area of 10,380 square meters.
Admittedly, the Republic needs only a 10-meter easement or an
equivalent of 701 square meters. Yet, it is also settled that it is
legally entitled to a 60-meter wide easement or an equivalent of
4,443 square meters. Clearly, although the Republic will use
only 701 square meters, it should not be liable for the 3,742
square meters, which constitute the difference between this
area of 701 square meters and the 4,443 square meters to
which it is fully entitled to use as easement, free of charge
except for damages to affected existing improvements, if any,
under Section 112 of the Public Land Act.
In effect, without such damages alleged and proved, the Republic is
liable for just compensation of only the remaining areas consisting
of 5,937 square meters, with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6%
per annum from the date of the writ of possession or the actual
taking until full payment is made. For the purpose of determining
the final just compensation, the case is remanded to the trial court.
Said court is ordered to make the determination of just
compensation payable to respondent Andaya with deliberate
dispatch.
13
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW THE WOMEN OF ALEITHEIA
The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Butuan City, Branch 33 for the determination of the final just
compensation of the compensable area consisting of 5,937
square meters, with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6% per
annum from the date of the writ of possession or actual taking
until fully paid.
NPC V. LUCMAN IBRAHIM
Ibrahim and his co-heirs claimed that they were owners of
several parcels of land. Sometime in 1978, NAPOCOR, through
alleged stealth and without respondents’ knowledge and prior
consent, took possession of the sub-terrain area of their lands
and constructed therein underground tunnels. The existence of
the tunnels was only discovered in July 1992 by respondents
and then later confirmed by NAPOCOR itself. Respondents
demanded that NAPOCOR pay damages and vacate the sub-
terrain portion of their lands but the latter refused to vacate
much less pay damages.
Disputing respondents’ claim, NAPOCOR claimed that
respondents have no cause of action because they failed to
show proof that they were the owners of the property, and the
tunnels are a government project for the benefit of all and all
private lands are subject to such easement as may be
necessary for the same.
RTC denied plaintiffs’ prayer for NAPOCOR to dismantle the
underground tunnels but ordered defendant to pay to plaintiffs
the fair market value of said 70,000 square meters of land and a
reasonable monthly rental of P0.68 per square meter of the total
area of 48,005 square meters effective from its occupancy of
the foregoing area in 1978.
ISSUE: WON respondents are entitled to just compensation?
HELD: The ownership of land extends to the surface as well as
to the subsoil under it. Petitioner contends that the underground
tunnels in this case constitute an easement upon the property of
respondents which does not involve any loss of title or
possession. The manner in which the easement was created by
petitioner, however, violates the due process rights of
respondents as it was without notice and indemnity to them and
did not go through proper expropriation proceedings. Petitioner
could have, at any time, validly exercised the power of eminent
domain to acquire the easement over respondents’ property as
this power encompasses not only the taking or appropriation of
title to and possession of the expropriated property but likewise
covers even the imposition of a mere burden upon the owner of
the condemned property.
In disregarding this procedure and failing to recognize
respondents’ ownership of the sub-terrain portion, petitioner
took a risk and exposed itself to greater liability with the
passage of time. It must be emphasized that the acquisition of
the easement is not without expense. The underground tunnels
impose limitations on respondents’ use of the property for an
indefinite period and deprive them of its ordinary use. Based
upon the foregoing, respondents are clearly entitled to the
payment of just compensation. Notwithstanding the fact that
petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to pay
not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for
land. This is so because in this case, the nature of the
easement practically deprives the owners of its normal
beneficial use. Respondents, as the owners of the property
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
thus expropriated, are entitled to a just compensation which
should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make
the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property.
The entitlement of respondents to just compensation having
been settled, the issue now is on the manner of computing the
same. In this regard, petitioner claims that the basis for the
computation of the just compensation should be the value of the
property at the time it was taken in 1978.
To allow petitioner to use the date it constructed the tunnels as
the date of valuation would be grossly unfair. First, it did not
enter the land under warrant or color of legal authority or with
intent to expropriate the same. In fact, it did not bother to notify
the owners and wrongly assumed it had the right to dig those
tunnels under their property. Secondly, the “improvements”
introduced by petitioner, namely, the tunnels, in no way
contributed to an increase in the value of the land. The trial
court, therefore, as affirmed by the CA, rightly computed the
valuation of the property as of 1992, when respondents
discovered the construction of the huge underground tunnels
beneath their lands and petitioner confirmed the same and
started negotiations for their purchase but no agreement could
be reached.
As to the amount of the valuation, the RTC and the CA both
used as basis the value of the adjacent property, Lot 1 (the
property involved herein being Lots 2 and 3 of the same
subdivision plan), which was valued at P1,000 per sq. meter as
of 1990. Petitioner has not shown any error on the part of the
CA in reaching such a valuation. Furthermore, these are factual
matters that are not within the ambit of the present review.
MASIKIP V. PASIG
Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a
parcel of land in Pasig City. In a letter, the City of Pasig notified
petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter
portion of her property to be used for the “sports development
and recreational activities” of the residents of Barangay
Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance enacted by the then
Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig.
Petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the intended
expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and
oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient nor
suitable to “provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors
of our community.”
Respondent reiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of
petitioner’s property is “to provide sports and recreational
facilities to its poor residents.”
ISSUES: WON THERE WAS A GENUINE NECESSITY FOR
EXPROPRIATION?
HELD: NO. Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is
limited to the following areas of concern: (a) the adequacy of
the compensation, (b) the necessity of the taking, and (c) the
public use character of the purpose of the taking.
In this case, petitioner contends that respondent City of Pasig
failed to establish a genuine necessity which justifies the
condemnation of her property. While she does not dispute the
intended public purpose, nonetheless, she insists that there
must be a genuine necessity for the proposed use and
purposes. According to petitioner, there is already an
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW THE WOMEN OF ALEITHEIA
established sports development and recreational activity center
at Rainforest Park in Pasig City, fully operational and being
utilized by its residents, including those from Barangay
Caniogan. Respondent does not dispute this. Evidently, there
is no “genuine necessity” to justify the expropriation.
The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily
originates from “the necessity” and the taking must be limited to
such necessity. The very foundation of the right to exercise
eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity
must be of a public character. Moreover, the ascertainment
of the necessity must precede or accompany and not follow, the
taking of the land. The necessity within the rule that the
particular property to be expropriated must be necessary, does
not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical
necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the
public with the least inconvenience and expense to the
condemning party and the property owner consistent with such
benefit.
Applying this standard, we hold that respondent City of Pasig
has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to
expropriate petitioner’s property. Our scrutiny of the records
shows that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay
Council, the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 42 s. 1993
authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended
beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners
Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents
of Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members of the said
Association are desirous of having their own private playground
and recreational facility. Petitioner’s lot is the nearest vacant
space available. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and
categorically public. The necessity has not been shown,
especially considering that there exists an alternative facility for
sports development and community recreation in the area,
which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig
City, including those of Caniogan.
MIAA V. RODRIGUEZ
In the early 70’s, petitioner Manila International Airport Authority
(MIAA), the government-owned and controlled corporation
managing and operating the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
Complex, implemented expansion programs for its runway. This
necessitated the acquisition and occupation of some of the
properties surrounding its premises. Expropriation proceedings
were thus initiated over most of the properties.
In 1996, the MIAA through its then GM, petitioner Francisco
Atayde, received a letter from respondent Joaquin Rodriguez
proposing to sell at P2,350.00 per sqm, one of the lots already
occupied by the expanded runway but assumed as not yet
expropriated by the MIAA. The proposal did not ripen to a deal.
Subsequently, Rodriguez bought the bigger lot a portion of
which was occupied by the runway, as well as all the rights to
claim reasonable rents and damages for the occupation, from its
owner then, Buck Estate, Inc.
In a letter, Rodriguez, through counsel, demanded from the
MIAA full payment for the property and back rentals for 27
years. As he did not reach an agreement with the MIAA,
Rodriguez filed a case for accion reinvindicatoria with
damages. Finding that the MIAA had illegally taken possession
of the property, the trial court ordered defendant to pay plaintiff
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
rental for the property from 1972 to 1998; the purchase price of
the property occupied by it; and exemplary damages.
ISSUE: WHAT POINT IN TIME SHOULD BE THE BASIS FOR
JUST COMPENSATION?
HELD: Where actual taking was made without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings, and the owner sought recovery of
the possession of the property prior to the filing of expropriation
proceedings, the Court has invariably ruled that it is the value of
the property at the time of taking that is controlling for purposes
of compensation.
Undeniably, the MIAA’s illegal occupation for more than 20
years has resulted in pecuniary loss to Rodriguez and his
predecessors-in-interest. Such pecuniary loss entitles him to
adequate compensation in the form of actual or compensatory
damages, which in this case should be the legal interest (6%)
on the value of the land at the time of taking, from said point up
to full payment by the MIAA. This is based on the principle that
interest “runs as a matter of law and follows from the right of the
landowner to be placed in as good position as money can
accomplish, as of the date of the taking.”
The award of interest renders unwarranted the grant of back
rentals as extended by the courts below. In Republic v. Lara, et
al., the Court ruled that the indemnity for rentals is inconsistent
with a property owner’s right to be paid legal interest on the
value of the property, for if the condemnor is to pay the
compensation due to the owners from the time of the actual
taking of their property, the payment of such compensation is
deemed to retroact to the actual taking of the property; and,
hence, there is no basis for claiming rentals from the time of
actual taking.
Petitioners claim that Rodriguez is a buyer in bad faith since
prior to his purchase he was aware of the MIAA’s occupation of
the property and therefore proceeded with the purchase in
anticipation of enormous profits from the subsequent sale to the
MIAA. The point is irrelevant. Regardless of whether or not
Rodriguez acted in bad faith, all that he will be entitled to is the
value of the property at the time of the taking, with legal interest
thereon from that point until full payment of the compensation by
the MIAA. Besides, assuming the question is of any
consequence, the circumstances surrounding Rodriguez’s
purchase may not even amount to bad faith. There is nothing
wrongful or dishonest in expecting to profit from one’s
investment. However, Rodriguez can fault but only himself for
taking an obvious risk in purchasing property already being
used for a public purpose. It was a self-inflicted misfortune
that his investment did not generate the windfall he had
expected. For ostensibly little did he know that he could not
acquire more rights than the previous owners had since the
government taking had taken place earlier.
DIDIPIO EARTH SAVERS V. DENR
President Aquino promulgated EO279 which authorized the
DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals
from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for
contracts of agreements involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation
of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign
proponent.
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW THE WOMEN OF ALEITHEIA
In 1995, then President Ramos signed into law RA7942
otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
DENR Sec. Victor O. Ramos issued DENR AO23, Series of
1995, containing the implementing guidelines of RA7942.
Previously, however, President Ramos executed an FTAA with
AMC over a total land area of 37,000 hectares covering the
provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino. Included in this area
is Barangay Dipidio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya.
In 2001, counsels for petitioners filed a demand letter addressed
to then DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez, for the cancellation
of the CAMC FTAA for the primary reason that Rep. Act No.
7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations DAO 96-40
are unconstitutional. The Office of the Executive Secretary was
also furnished a copy of the said letter. There being no
response to both letters, another letter of the same content
dated 17 June 2002 was sent to President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo. This letter was indorsed to the DENR Secretary and
eventually referred to the Panel of Arbitrators of the Mines and
Geosciences Bureau (MGB), Regional Office No. 02,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, for further action.
ISSUE: WON RA7942 AND THE CAMC FTAA ARE VOID
BECAUSE THEY ALLOW THE UNJUST AND UNLAWFUL
TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT PAYMENT OF JUST
COMPENSATION , IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 9, ARTICLE
III OF THE CONSTITUTION?
HELD: NO.
Taking in Eminent Domain Distinguished from
Regulation in Police Power
According to noted constitutionalist, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ, in
the exercise of its police power regulation, the state restricts the
use of private property, but none of the property interests in the
bundle of rights which constitute ownership is appropriated for
use by or for the benefit of the public. Use of the property by
the owner was limited, but no aspect of the property is used by
or for the public. The deprivation of use can in fact be total and
it will not constitute compensable taking if nobody else acquires
use of the property or any interest therein.
If, however, in the regulation of the use of the property,
somebody else acquires the use or interest thereof, such
restriction constitutes compensable taking. While the power of
eminent domain often results in the appropriation of title to or
possession of property, it need not always be the case. Taking
may include trespass without actual eviction of the owner,
material impairment of the value of the property or prevention of
the ordinary uses for which the property was intended such as
the establishment of an easement.
The CAMC FTAA grants in favor of CAMC the right of
possession of the Exploration Contract Area, the full right of
ingress and egress and the right to occupy the same. It also
bestows CAMC the right not to be prevented from entry into
private lands by surface owners or occupants thereof when
prospecting, exploring and exploiting minerals therein.
While this Court declares that the assailed provision is a taking
provision, this does not mean that it is unconstitutional on the
ground that it allows taking of private property without the
determination of public use and the payment of just
compensation.
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
There is also no basis for the claim that the Mining Law and its
implementing rules and regulations do not provide for just
compensation in expropriating private properties. Section 76 of
Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 provide for
the payment of just compensation: Section 76. xxx Provided,
that any damage to the property of the surface owner, occupant,
or concessionaire as a consequence of such operations shall be
properly compensated as may be provided for in the
implementing rules and regulations. Section 107. Compensation
of the Surface Owner and Occupant- Any damage done to the
property of the surface owners, occupant, or concessionaire
thereof as a consequence of the mining operations or as a
result of the construction or installation of the infrastructure
mentioned in 104 above shall be properly and justly
compensated. Such compensation shall be based on the
agreement entered into between the holder of mining rights and
the surface owner, occupant or concessionaire thereof, where
appropriate, in accordance with P.D. No. 512.
Power of Courts to Determine Just Compensation
The question on the judicial determination of just compensation
has been settled in the case of Export Processing Zone
Authority v. Dulay wherein the court declared that the
determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is
a judicial function. Even as the executive department or the
legislature may make the initial determinations, the same cannot
prevail over the court’s findings.
Implementing Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942, Section 105 of
DAO 96-40 states that holder(s) of mining right(s) shall not be
prevented from entry into its/their contract/mining areas for the
purpose of exploration, development, and/or utilization. That in
cases where surface owners of the lands, occupants or
concessionaires refuse to allow the permit holder or contractor
entry, the latter shall bring the matter before the Panel of
Arbitrators for proper disposition. Section 106 states that
voluntary agreements between the two parties permitting the
mining right holders to enter and use the surface owners’ lands
shall be registered with the Regional Office of the MGB. In
connection with Section 106, Section 107 provides that the
compensation for the damage done to the surface owner,
occupant or concessionaire as a consequence of mining
operations or as a result of the construction or installation of the
infrastructure shall be properly and justly compensated and that
such compensation shall be based on the agreement between
the holder of mining rights and surface owner, occupant or
concessionaire, or where appropriate, in accordance with
Presidential Decree No. 512. In cases where there is
disagreement to the compensation or where there is no
agreement, the matter shall be brought before the Panel of
Arbitrators. Section 206 of the implementing rules and
regulations provides an aggrieved party the remedy to appeal
the decision of the Panel of Arbitrators to the Mines Adjudication
Board, and the latter’s decision may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari.
An examination of the foregoing provisions gives no indication
that the courts are excluded from taking cognizance of
expropriation cases under the mining law. The disagreement
referred to in Section 107 does not involve the exercise of
eminent domain, rather it contemplates of a situation wherein
the permit holders are allowed by the surface owners entry into
the latters’ lands and disagreement ensues as regarding the
proper compensation for the allowed entry and use of the
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW THE WOMEN OF ALEITHEIA
private lands. Noticeably, the provision points to a voluntary
sale or transaction, but not to an involuntary sale.
Although Section 105 confers upon the Panel of Arbitrators the
authority to decide cases where surface owners, occupants,
concessionaires refuse permit holders entry, thus, necessitating
involuntary taking, this does not mean that the determination of
the just compensation by the Panel of Arbitrators or the Mines
Adjudication Board is final and conclusive. The determination is
only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned.
There is nothing wrong with the grant of primary jurisdiction by
the Panel of Arbitrators or the Mines Adjudication Board to
determine in a preliminary matter the reasonable compensation
due the affected landowners or occupants. The original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the courts to decide determination of
just compensation remains intact despite the preliminary
determination made by the administrative agency.
Sufficient Control by the State Over Mining Operations
Petitioners charge that Rep. Act No. 7942, as well as its
Implementing Rules and Regulations, makes it possible for
FTAA contracts to cede over to a fully foreign-owned
corporation full control and management of mining enterprises,
with the result that the State is allegedly reduced to a passive
regulator dependent on submitted plans and reports, with weak
review and audit powers. It has already been held in the case
of La Bugal, that: Overall, considering the provisions of the
statute and the regulations just discussed, we believe that the
State definitely possesses the means by which it can have the
ultimate word in the operation of the enterprise, set directions
and objectives, and detect deviations and noncompliance by the
contractor; likewise, it has the capability to enforce compliance
and to impose sanctions, should the occasion therefor arise. In
other words, the FTAA contractor is not free to do whatever it
pleases and get away with it; on the contrary, it will have to
follow the government line if it wants to stay in the enterprise.
Ineluctably then, RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 vest in the
government more than a sufficient degree of control and
supervision over the conduct of mining operations.
Proper Interpretation of the Constitutional Phrase “Agreements
Involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance
In interpreting the first and fourth paragraphs of Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution, petitioners set forth the argument
that foreign corporations are barred from making decisions on
the conduct of operations and the management of the mining
project.
Again, this issue has already been succinctly passed upon by
this Court in La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos.
In discrediting such argument, the Court ratiocinated: Petitioners
claim that the phrase “agreements x x x involving either
technical or financial assistance” simply means technical
assistance or financial assistance agreements, nothing more
and nothing else. They insist that there is no ambiguity in the
phrase, and that a plain reading of paragraph 4 quoted above
leads to the inescapable conclusion that what a foreign-owned
corporation may enter into with the government is merely an
agreement for either financial or technical assistance only, for
the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils; such a limitation,
they argue, excludes foreign management and operation of a
mining enterprise.
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
The court held: We do not see how applying a strictly literal or
verba legis interpretation of paragraph 4 could inexorably lead
to the conclusions arrived at in the ponencia. First, the drafters’
choice of words -- their use of the phrase agreements x x x
involving either technical or financial assistance -- does not
indicate the intent to exclude other modes of assistance. The
drafters opted to use involving when they could have simply
said agreements for financial or technical assistance, if that was
their intention to begin with. In this case, the limitation would be
very clear and no further debate would ensue. In contrast, the
use of the word “involving” signifies the possibility of the
inclusion of other forms of assistance or activities having to do
with, otherwise related to or compatible with financial or
technical assistance. The word “involving” as used in this
context has three connotations that can be differentiated thus:
one, the sense of “concerning,” “having to do with,” or
“affecting”; two, “entailing,” “requiring,” “implying” or
“necessitating”; and three, “including,” “containing” or
“comprising.”
Plainly, none of the three connotations convey a sense of
exclusivity. Moreover, the word “involving,” when understood in
the sense of “including,” as in including technical or financial
assistance, necessarily implies that there are activities other
than those that are being included. In other words, if an
agreement includes technical or financial assistance, there is
apart from such assistance -- something else already in, and
covered or may be covered by, the said agreement.
In short, it allows for the possibility that matters, other than
those explicitly mentioned, could be made part of the
agreement. Thus, we are now led to the conclusion that the use
of the word “involving” implies that these agreements with
foreign corporations are not limited to mere financial or technical
assistance. The difference in sense becomes very apparent
when we juxtapose “agreements for technical or financial
assistance” against “agreements including technical or financial
assistance.” This much is unalterably clear in a verba legis
approach.
NPC V. SAN PEDRO
For the construction of its San Manuel-San Jose 500 KV
Transmission Line and Tower No. SMJ-389, NPC negotiated
with Maria Mendoza San Pedro, then represented by her son,
Vicente, for an easement of right of way over her property. The
payment voucher for the residential portion of the lot valued at
P6M was then processed. However, the NPC Board of
Directors approved Board Resolution No. 97-246 stating that it
would pay only a lesser amount.
Hence, NPC filed a complaint for eminent domain in the
RTC. According to NPC, in order to construct and maintain its
Northwestern Luzon Transmission Line Project, it was
necessary to acquire several lots in the Municipalities of San
Jose del Monte and Norzagaray, Bulacan for an easement of
right of way in the total area of more or less 35,288.5 sq m.
During the pre-trial, the parties agreed that the only issue for
resolution was the just compensation for the property. The
court appointed a committee of commissioners to ascertain and
recommend to the trial court the just compensation for the
properties. RTC then approved the valuation of just
compensation as found by the board.
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW THE WOMEN OF ALEITHEIA
ISSUE: WON THE LOWER COURT RULING WAS PROPER?
HELD: YES. The constitutional limitation of “just compensation”
is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of
the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller
in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action
and competition or the fair value of the property as between one
who receives, and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of
the actual taking by the government. To determine the just
compensation to be paid to the landowner, the nature and
character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal
criterion.
The commissioners found that the property was located in a
highly-developed area and was accessible through an all-
weather road. The fact that the property had potential for full
development as shown by the existence of building projects in
the vicinity, and the long-term effect of the expropriation on the
lives, comfort and financial condition of petitioners was likewise
considered. The report also took into account the ocular
inspection conducted by the commissioners on May 11, 1999.
The tax declaration of the subject property, the NPC sketch
plan, the location plan, the zoning certificates, the zonal
valuation of the BIR, and the opinion values were also
considered.
On the question as to whether petitioner shall pay only an
easement fee to respondent’s heirs, the following
pronouncement in National Power Corporation v. Aguirre-
Paderanga is enlightening: Indeed, expropriation is not limited to
the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of
title or possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a
restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed
by transmission lines, as in the present case, also falls within
the ambit of the term “expropriation.” In the case at bar, the
easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power
of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the
installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the
limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an
indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary
use.
Similarly, in this case, the commissioners’ observation on the
reported constant loud buzzing and exploding sounds
emanating from the towers and transmission lines, especially on
rainy days; the constant fear on the part of the landowners that
the large transmission lines looming not far above their land and
the huge tower in front of their lot will affect their safety and
health; and the slim chance that no one would be interested to
buy the remaining portions on each side of the residential lot
affected by the project, to the damage of the landowners, both
as to future actual use of the land and financial gains to be
derived therefrom, makes the instant case fall within the ambit
of expropriation.
KNECHT V. MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA
In 1965, Rose Packing Co., Inc. sold 3 parcels of land in Cainta
to United Cigarette Corporation (UCC). The largest parcel was
covered by a TCT while the two other parcels were
unregistered. The TCT was mortgaged to.
When Rose Packing refused to comply with its commitments
under the contract, UCC filed a suit for specific performance and
damages against it and its president, Rene Knecht. RTC
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
decided in favor of UCC. The judgment in favor of UCC,
however, could not be immediately implemented because PCIB,
during the pendency of the case foreclosed on the mortgage.
Rose Packing tried to stop the foreclosure by filing a separate
case but the trial court denied its prayer for TRO or preliminary
injunction. PCIB subsequently purchased the lot in the
foreclosure sale, consolidated its title over the property and had
it registered in its name. Rose Packing questioned the validity of
the foreclosure in the CA but the CA ruled in favor of PCIB.
When the case was elevated to this Court, however, we
invalidated the foreclosure, in effect reverting the title to Rose
Packing.
Interpreting our decision as removing the impediment to the
execution of judgment, UCC moved for the execution of the
1969 decision. RTC ordered the issuance of an alias writ of
execution in favor of UCC. Such issuance is now being
questioned.
In the meantime, Municipality of Cainta filed a complaint for
expropriation against PCIB and Rose Packing. The
expropriation complaint was based on Sangguniang Bayan
Resolution No. 89-020 which sought to purchase the land as the
site of the municipal administration compound and SB
Resolution No. 89-021 which called for the condemnation of
said land if the negotiation for its voluntary sale failed. The
negotiation did fail, hence, the complaint for expropriation.
Rose Packing moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state
a cause of action. Subsequently, Rose Packing filed a
supplemental motion to dismiss alleging that it never received a
formal offer to purchase from the municipality. It also averred
that it could no longer be sued in view of its dissolution in 1986.
It added that the property sought to be expropriated was under
litigation and its expropriation would only complicate matters.
RTC-Antipolo denied Rose Packing’s motion to dismiss the
expropriation case. Trial court issued an order directing the
Municipality of Cainta to deposit 10% of the provisional value of
the property.
Then, RTC-Antipolo issued a condemnation order declaring that
the Municipality of Cainta had the lawful right to expropriate the
property. On the same date, the trial court issued another order
granting the municipality’s motion for a writ of possession.
The present petition is intended to achieve only one thing: to
frustrate the execution of the decision awarding the property to
UCC.
Issue: WON the decision awarding the property to UCC may be
enforced despite the expropriation of the same land?
Held: YES. There is no doubt that the judgment in Civil Case
No. 9165 became final and executory. That this judgment is still
enforceable was decided with finality by this Court in G.R. No.
109385.
We, however, have to correct the erroneous reliance of RTC-
Antipolo on Presidential Decree (PD) 1533 in the expropriation
case of the Municipality of Cainta. Its order dated June 16, 1992
in Civil Case No. 90-1817 mandated the deposit of 10% of the
assessed value of the property.
In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, a 1987 case, we
struck down PD 1533 as unconstitutional. Moreover, the
exercise of the power of eminent domain by a local government
unit is now governed by Section 19 of Republic Act 7160. For
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW THE WOMEN OF ALEITHEIA
properties under expropriation, the law now requires the deposit
of an amount equivalent to fifteen percent (15%) of the fair
market value of the property based on its current tax
declaration.
In conclusion, we once and for all declare that UCC ought to
reap the fruits of the 1969 decision in its favor. Its interest in the
property sought to be expropriated having been clearly
established. Knecht, Inc./Rose Packing was correctly excluded
from the case since its interest in the subject property had
already passed onto UCC.
UCC’s interest likewise prevails over that of PCIB since PCIB’s
foreclosure sale of the same property was already invalidated
with finality by this Court.
Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial
bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied
to any person by reason of poverty.
Doctrines
Q. Petitioners filed a petition for enforcement of foreign
judgment granting compensation for human rights violation
during the Marcos years but were required to file a fee of
P472,000,000.00. The amount was based on the dollar
amount granted by the foreign court. Petitioners appealed
to Section 11.
A. The judge made an incorrect reading of the rules on filing
fees. He calculated on the basis of an amount sought
against an estate not based on a judgments. The Court,
however, decided the case not on the basis of Section 11
(completely ignored) but on the rules for enforcement of
foreign judgment. Mijares v. Ranada, G.R. No. 139325.
April 12, 2005.
MIJARES V. RANADA
The petitioners in this case are prominent victims of human
rights violations during the Marcos regime. The clash has been
for now interrupted by a trial court ruling, seemingly comported
to legal logic, that required the petitioners to pay a whopping
filing fee of over P472M in order that they be able to enforce a
judgment awarded them by a foreign court.
Petitioners invoke Section 11, Article III of the Bill of Rights of
the Constitution, which provides that “Free access to the courts
and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall
not be denied to any person by reason of poverty,” a mandate
which is essentially defeated by the required exorbitant filing
fee. The adjudicated amount of the filing fee, as arrived at by
the RTC, was characterized as indisputably unfair, inequitable,
and unjust.
Issue: WON the respondent Judge erred in dismissing the case
for non-payment of filing fees?
Held: An examination of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court readily
evinces that the respondent judge ignored the clear letter of the
law when he concluded that the filing fee be computed based on
the total sum claimed or the stated value of the property in
litigation. In dismissing the complaint, the respondent judge
relied on Section 7(a), Rule 141 as basis for the computation of
the filing fee of over P472 Million. The relevant question for
purposes of the present petition is whether the action filed with
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
the lower court is a “money claim against an estate not based
on judgment.”
Respondent judge was in clear and serious error when he
concluded that the filing fees should be computed on the basis
of the schematic table of Section 7(a), as the action involved
pertains to a claim against an estate based on judgment.
The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have
established a usage among civilized states by which final
judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are
reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain
conditions that may vary in different countries. This principle
was prominently affirmed in the leading American case of Hilton
v. Guyot and expressly recognized in our jurisprudence
beginning with Ingenholl v. Walter E. Olsen & Co. The
conditions required by the Philippines for recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment were originally contained in
Section 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was taken
from the California Code of Civil Procedure which, in turn, was
derived from the California Act of March 11, 1872. Remarkably,
the procedural rule now outlined in Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure has remained unchanged down to the
last word in nearly a century.
There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an
action in rem and one in personam. For an action in rem, the
foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the
thing, while in an action in personam, the foreign judgment is
presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
However, in both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to
impeachment in our local courts on the grounds of want of
jurisdiction or notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign
judgment is entitled to defend against the enforcement of such
decision in the local forum. It is essential that there should be an
opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the
court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy.
It is clear then that it is usually necessary for an action to be
filed in order to enforce a foreign judgment, even if such
judgment has conclusive effect as in the case of in rem actions,
if only for the purpose of allowing the losing party an opportunity
to challenge the foreign judgment, and in order for the court to
properly determine its efficacy. Consequently, the party
attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the
presumption of its validity.
The rules are silent as to what initiatory procedure must be
undertaken in order to enforce a foreign judgment in the
Philippines. But there is no question that the filing of a civil
complaint is an appropriate measure for such purpose.
The jurisprudential standard in gauging whether the subject
matter of an action is capable of pecuniary estimation is well-
entrenched. The Marcos Estate cites Singsong v. Isabela
Sawmill and Raymundo v. Court of Appeals, which ruled: “[I]n
determining whether an action is one the subject matter of
which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal
courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the
amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is
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something other than the right to recover a sum of money,
where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence
of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such
actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by
courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).”
An examination of Section 19(6), B.P. 129 reveals that the
instant complaint for enforcement of a foreign judgment, even if
capable of pecuniary estimation, would fall under the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Courts, thus negating the fears of the
petitioners. Indeed, an examination of the provision indicates
that it can be relied upon as jurisdictional basis with respect to
actions for enforcement of foreign judgments, provided that no
other court or office is vested jurisdiction over such complaint:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: xxx (6) In all cases not
within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or
body exercising jurisdiction or any court, tribunal, person or
body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Thus, we are comfortable in asserting the obvious, that the
complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one
capable of pecuniary estimation. But at the same time, it is also
an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it
beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. What provision
then governs the proper computation of the filing fees over the
instant complaint? For this case and other similarly situated
instances, we find that it is covered by Section 7(b)(3), involving
as it does, “other actions not involving property.”
Notably, the amount paid as docket fees by the petitioners on
the premise that it was an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation corresponds to the same amount required for “other
actions not involving property.” The petitioners thus paid the
correct amount of filing fees, and it was a grave abuse of
discretion for respondent judge to have applied instead a clearly
inapplicable rule and dismissed the complaint.
Finally, petitioners also invoke Section 11, Article III of the
Constitution, which states that “[F]ree access to the courts and
quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be
denied to any person by reason of poverty.” Since the provision
is among the guarantees ensured by the Bill of Rights, it
certainly gives rise to a demandable right. However, now is not
the occasion to elaborate on the parameters of this
constitutional right. Given our preceding discussion, it is not
necessary to utilize this provision in order to grant the relief
sought by the petitioners. It is axiomatic that the constitutionality
of an act will not be resolved by the courts if the controversy can
be settled on other grounds or unless the resolution thereof is
indispensable for the determination of the case.
Section 12.
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right
to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of
this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for
violations of this section as well as compensation to the
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices,
and their families.
Doctrine
Where the appellant did not voluntarily surrender to the police
but was “invited” by SPO2 Gapas to the police station and was
detained from 11 o’clock in the morning of 22 October 1995 up
to the morning of 23 October 1995 before his alleged
extrajudicial confession was taken appellant should have been
informed of his constitutional rights as he was already
considered a suspect, contrary to the finding of the trial court
that the mandatory constitutional guidelines only attached when
the investigators started to propound questions to
appellant. People v. Rapeza, GR 169431, April 3, 2007.
PEOPLE V. RAPEZA
An unidentified woman went to the Culion Municipal Station and
reported a killing that had taken place in Sitio Cawa-Cawa.
Upon information supplied by a certain Mr. Dela Cruz that
appellant had wanted to confess to the crimes, SPO2 Gapas set
out to look for appellant. He found appellant fishing in Asinan
Island and invited the latter for questioning. Appellant expressed
his willingness to make a confession in the presence of a
lawyer. Appellant was then brought to the police station after
which SPO2 Gapas requested Kagawad Arnel Alcantara to
provide appellant with a lawyer. The following day, appellant
was brought to the house of Atty. Roberto Reyes, the only
available lawyer in the municipality. The typewriter at the police
station was out of order at that time and Atty. Reyes could not
go to the police station as he was suffering from rheumatism. At
the house of Atty. Reyes, in the presence of Vice-Mayor
Emiliano Marasigan of Culion, 2 officials of the Sangguniang
Barangay, SPO2 Cuizon and an interpreter, SPO2 Gapas
proceeded with the custodial investigation of appellant who was
assisted by Atty. Reyes. Appellant was expressly advised that
he was being investigated for the death of Libas and Ganzon.
Appellant mainly contends that the extrajudicial confession upon
which the trial court placed heavy emphasis to find him guilty
suffers from constitutional infirmity as it was extracted in
violation of the due process guidelines. Specifically, he claims
that he affixed his thumbmark through violence and intimidation.
He stresses that he was not informed of his rights during the
time of his detention when he was already considered a suspect
as the police had already received information of his alleged
involvement in the crimes. Neither did a competent and
independent counsel assist him from the time he was detained
until trial began. Assuming Atty. Reyes was indeed designated
as counsel to assist appellant for purposes of the custodial
investigation, said lawyer, however, was not appellant’s
personal choice.
Appellant likewise maintains that although the Sinumpaang
Salaysay states that his rights were read to him, there was no
showing that his rights were explained to him in a way that an
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uneducated person like him could understand. On the
assumption that the confession is admissible, appellant asserts
that the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was
not amply proven as the trial court merely relied on his alleged
confession without presenting any other proof that the
determination to commit the crime was the result of meditation,
calculation, reflection or persistent attempt.
Issue: WON THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL ADMISSION IS VALID
AND ADMISSIBLE?
Held: NO. Appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights
in custodial investigation. A person under custodial investigation
essentially has the right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice and the
Constitution requires that he be informed of such rights. We
note that appellant did not voluntarily surrender to the police but
was "invited" by SPO2 Gapas to the police station. There he
was detained from 11 o clock in the morning of 22 October
1995 up to the morning of 23 October 1995 before his
extrajudicial statement was allegedly taken. At this juncture,
appellant should have been informed of his constitutional rights
as he was already considered a suspect, contrary to the finding
of the trial court that the mandatory constitutional guidelines
only attached when the investigators started to propound
questions to appellant on 23 October 1995 in the house of Atty.
Reyes. Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial
stage when the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular person
as a suspect.
It is stated in the alleged confession that prior to questioning
SPO2 Gapas had informed appellant in Tagalog of his right to
remain silent, that any statement he made could be used in
evidence for or against him, that he has a right to counsel of his
own choice, and that if he cannot afford the services of one, the
police shall provide one for him. However, there is no showing
that appellant had actually understood his rights. He was not
even informed that he may waive such rights only in writing and
in the presence of counsel.
In order to comply with the constitutional mandates, there
should likewise be meaningful communication to and
understanding of his rights by the appellant, as opposed to a
routine, peremptory and meaningless recital thereof. Since
comprehension is the objective, the degree of explanation
required will necessarily depend on the education, intelligence,
and other relevant personal circumstances of the person
undergoing investigation.
In this case, it was established that at the time of the
investigation appellant was illiterate and was not well versed in
Tagalog. This fact should engender a higher degree of scrutiny
in determining whether he understood his rights as allegedly
communicated to him, as well as the contents of his alleged
confession.
The prosecution underscores the presence of an interpreter in
the person of Abad to buttress its claim that appellant was
informed of his rights in the dialect known to him. However, the
presence of an interpreter during the interrogation was not
sufficiently established. Although the confession bears the
signature of Abad, it is uncertain whether he was indeed present
to assist appellant in making the alleged confession.
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
For one thing, SPO2 Cuizon did not mention Abad as one of the
persons present during the interrogation. For another, the
prosecution did not present Abad as witness. Abad would have
been in the best position to prove that he indeed made the
translation from Tagalog to Waray for appellant to understand
what was going on. This significant circumstance lends
credence to appellant’s claim that he had never met Abad.
The extra-judicial confession was allegedly made in Tagalog
when accused-appellant is admittedly not well versed in said
language. Even if the confession was made in the presence of
an interpreter, there is no showing that the rights of a person
under investigation were effectively explained and/or interpreted
to accused-appellant. The interpreter was not even presented in
Court to prove that said rights were translated in a language
understood by accused-appellant.
Moreover, confession was not made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel of appellant’s choice.
Appellant denies that he was ever assisted by a lawyer from the
moment he was arrested until before he was arraigned. On the
other hand, the prosecution admits that appellant was provided
with counsel only when he was questioned at the house of Atty.
Reyes to which appellant was allegedly taken from the police
station.
The constitutional requirement obviously had not been
observed. Settled is the rule that the moment a police officer
tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain
information from a suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be
assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in writing and in
the presence of counsel. Appellant did not make any such
waiver.
Assuming that Atty. Reyes did assist appellant, still there would
be grave doubts as to his competence and independence as
appellant’s counsel for purposes of the custodial investigation.
The meaning of "competent counsel" and the standards therefor
were explained in People v. Deniega as follows: “The lawyer
called to be present during such investigations should be as far
as reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing
questioning. If the lawyer were one furnished in the accused’s
behalf, it is important that he should be competent and
independent, i.e., that he is willing to fully safeguard the
constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one
who would be merely be giving a routine, peremptory and
meaningless recital of the individual’s constitutional rights. In
People v. Basay, this Court stressed that an accused s right to
be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel
"contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather
than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an
abstract constitutional principle."
Ideally therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing
custodial investigation (if the latter could not afford one) "should
be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the latter’s relative
or person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the
court, upon proper petition of the accused or person authorized
by the accused to file such petition." Lawyers engaged by the
police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity
and supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many
areas, the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement
authorities can be symbiotic.
The competent or independent lawyer so engaged should be
present from the beginning to end, i.e., at all stages of the
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interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every
turn of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a
while either to give advice to the accused that he may either
continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview.
The standards of "competent counsel" were not met in this case
given the deficiencies of the evidence for the prosecution.
Although Atty. Reyes signed the confession as appellant’s
counsel and he himself notarized the statement, there is no
evidence on how he assisted appellant. The confession itself
and the testimonies of SPO2 Gapas and SPO2 Cuizon bear no
indication that Atty. Reyes had explained to appellant his
constitutional rights. Atty. Reyes was not even presented in
court to testify thereon whether on direct examination or on
rebuttal. It appears that his participation in the proceeding was
confined to the notarization of appellant’s confession. Such
participation is not the kind of legal assistance that should be
accorded to appellant in legal contemplation.
Furthermore, Atty. Reyes was not appellant’s counsel of choice
but was picked out by the police officers allegedly through the
barangay officials. Appellant’s failure to interpose any objection
to having Atty. Reyes as his counsel cannot be taken as
consent under the prevailing circumstances.
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required.
Doctrines
Q. First, in an extradition case, is prior notice and hearing
required before bail is cancelled? Second, what constitutes
a “special circumstance” to be exempt from the no-bail rule
in extradition cases?
A. Prior notice is not required before issuance of warrant of
arrest. So said Secretary of Justice v. Lantion on
reconsideration. Prospective extraditees are entitled to
notice and hearing only when the case is filed in court and
not during the process of evaluation.
If after his arrest and if the trial court finds that he is not a
flight risk, it grants him bail. The grant of the bail,
presupposes that the co-petitioner has already presented
evidence to prove her right to be on bail, that she is no flight
risk, and the trial court had already exercised its sound
discretion and had already determined that under the
Constitution and laws in force, co-petitioner is entitled to
provisional release. We emphasize that bail may be
granted to a possible extraditee only upon a clear and
convincing showing (1) that he will not be a flight risk or a
danger to the community, and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances, as in this
case. Rodriguez v. Judge, G.R. No. 157977, February
27,2006.
Q. The Court of appeals granted bail to one charged with an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua not on the ground
that the evidence of guilt was not strong, as claimed by the
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
defense, but on humanitarian grounds of old age and
illness. The CA also granted a new trial.
A. The grant of new trial does not negate strong evidence of
guilt as found by the lower court. Humanitarian ground on
the mere say so of illness or old age is not ground for
discretionary grant of bail. This is specially so were there is
a finding on record that the accused may repeat the offense
(pedophilia). People v Fitzgerald, G.R. 149723, October
27, 2006.
In a bail proceeding in non-bailable crimes an accused has the
right to present evidence to contradict evidence of the
prosecution. Santos v. Judge How, A.M/ RTJ-05-1946, January
27, 2007.
The Court (in bail hearings) cannot ignore the following trends in
international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual
person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has
gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now
being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the
corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal
human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty
of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on
the other. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no
justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition
cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the
innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. Gov’t of
Hongkong v Olalia, GR 153675, April 19, 2007.
RODRIGUEZ V. JUDGE
The case stemmed from the petition for extradition filed by the
US government through the Department of Justice (DOJ)
against the petitioners. After their arrest, petitioners applied for
bail which the trial court granted. The bail was set for P1M for
each. Petitioners then posted cash bonds. The US government
moved for reconsideration of the grant of bail, but the motion
was denied by the trial court. Unsatisfied, the US government
filed a petition for certiorari with this Court.
Thereafter, we directed the trial court to resolve the matter of
bail which shall be subject to whatever ruling that this Court may
have in the similar case of Mark Jimenez. In compliance with
our directive, the trial court, without prior notice and hearing,
cancelled the cash bond of the petitioners and ordered the
issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Issue: WON in an extradition case, is prior notice and hearing
required before bail is cancelled?
Held: The issue of prior notice and hearing in extradition cases
is not new. In Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, by a vote of nine
to six, we initially ruled that notice and hearing should be
afforded the extraditee even when a possible extradition is still
being evaluated. The Court, deliberating on a motion for
reconsideration also by a vote of nine to six, qualified and
declared that prospective extraditees are entitled to notice and
hearing only when the case is filed in court and not during the
process of evaluation.
In the later case of Purganan, eight justices concurred that a
possible extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing before
the issuance of a warrant of arrest while six others dissented.
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Now, we are confronted with the question of whether a
prospective extraditee is entitled to notice and hearing before
the cancellation of his or her bail.
The issue has become moot and academic insofar as petitioner
Eduardo Rodriguez is concerned. He is now in the USA facing
the charges against him. But co-petitioner Imelda Gener
Rodriguez is here and stands on a different footing. We agree
that her bail should be restored.
In Purganan, we said that a prospective extraditee is not entitled
to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
because notifying him before his arrest only tips him of his
pending arrest. But this is for cases pending the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, not in a cancellation of a bail that had been
issued after determination that the extraditee is a no-flight risk.
The policy is that a prospective extraditee is arrested and
detained to avoid his flight from justice. On the extraditee lies
the burden of showing that he will not flee once bail is granted. If
after his arrest and if the trial court finds that he is no flight risk,
it grants him bail. The grant of the bail, presupposes that the co-
petitioner has already presented evidence to prove her right to
be on bail, that she is no flight risk, and the trial court had
already exercised its sound discretion and had already
determined that under the Constitution and laws in force, co-
petitioner is entitled to provisional release.
Under these premises, and with the trial court’s knowledge that
in this case, co-petitioner has offered to go on voluntary
extradition; that she and her husband had posted a cash bond
of P1 million each; that her husband had already gone on
voluntary extradition and is presently in the USA undergoing
trial; that the passport of co-petitioner is already in the
possession of the authorities; that she never attempted to flee;
that there is an existing hold-departure order against her; and
that she is now in her sixties, sickly and under medical
treatment, we believe that the benefits of continued temporary
liberty on bail should not be revoked and their grant of bail
should not be cancelled, without the co-petitioner being given
notice and without her being heard why her temporary liberty
should not be discontinued.
We emphasize that bail may be granted to a possible extraditee
only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that he will not be
a flight risk or a danger to the community, and (2) that there
exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.
The trial court’s immediate cancellation of the bail of petitioners
is contrary to our ruling in Purganan, and it had misread and
misapplied our directive therein.
Finally, considering that remanding the case to the court a quo
will only delay the final resolution of the case as in all probability
it would only end up with us again, we will decide if Imelda’s bail
was validly cancelled. In Purganan, we held also that the
grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for the
grant of bail may be considered, under the principle of
reciprocity. Considering that she has not been shown to be a
flight risk nor a danger to the community, she is entitled to
notice and hearing before her bail could be cancelled. Based on
the record, we find that, absent prior notice and hearing, the
bail’s cancellation was in violation of her right to due process.
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
PEOPLE V FITZGERALD
Fitzgerald, an Australian citizen, was charged with violation of
Art. III, Section 5, paragraph (a), subparagraph (5) of RA7610,
when actuated by lust, and by the use of laced drugs
("vitamins") he induced complainant a minor, 13 years of age, to
engage in prostitution by then and there showering said minor
with gifts, clothes and food and thereafter having carnal
knowledge of her in violation of the aforesaid law and to her
damage and prejudice. RTC found him guilty and Fitzgerald
applied for bail which the RTC denied. He appealed to the CA
which affirmed the RTC Decision. He filed a Motion for New
Trial and a Supplement to Accused's Motion for New Trial on
the ground that new and material evidence not previously
available had surfaced. The CA granted the Motion for New
Trial.
The People filed a Motion for Reconsideration while Fitzgerald
filed a Motion to Fix Bail with Manifestation. Both Motions were
denied by the CA. In denying Fitzgerald's bail application, the
CA cited Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which
provides: "Sec. 7. Capital Offense or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. No person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is
strong shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the
criminal procecution." It reasoned that the maximum imposable
penalty in accordance with RA7610 otherwise known as the
Special Protection of Children against Child Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination Act is reclusion perpetua. It held that the
evidence of guilt is strong, hence, his motion for bail was not
granted. It was also held that “With regard to his alleged
physical condition, let it be stressed that accused-appellant is
not precluded from seeking medical attention if the need arises
provided the necessary representations with the proper
authorities are made.”
CA then issued the herein assailed Resolution granting
Fitzgerald's bail application, thus: “While We maintain that the
evidence of guilt is strong, We have taken a second look at
appellant's plea for temporary liberty considering primarily the
fact that appellant is already of old age and is not in the best of
health. Thus, it is this Court's view that appellant be GRANTED
temporary liberty premised not on the grounds stated in his
Motion for Bail but in the higher interest of substantial justice
and considering the new trial granted in this case.“
Issue: WON THE CA ERRED IN GRANTING BAIL?
Held: YES. Implementing Sec. 13, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, Sections 4 and 5, Rule 114 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure set forth substantive and procedural rules
on the disposition of bail applications. Sec. 4 provides that bail
is a matter of right to an accused person in custody for an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, but a matter of discretion on the part of the court,
concerning one facing an accusation for an offense punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the
evidence of his guilt is strong. As for an accused already
convicted and sentenced to imprisonment term exceeding six
years, bail may be denied or revoked based on prosecution
evidence as to the existence of any of the circumstances under
Sec. 5, paragraphs (a) to (e), to wit:
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Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted
upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not
transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of
the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-
bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by
the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to
continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same
bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six
(6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a
showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other
similar circumstances: (a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration; (b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c) That
he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon; (d)
That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review
the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either
case.
It will be recalled that herein respondent was charged with
violation of Section 5, par. (a), sub-paragraph (5), Article III of
R.A. No. 7610, a crime which carries the maximum penalty of
reclusion perpetua. He was later convicted by the RTC for a
lesser crime which carried a sentence of imprisonment for an
indeterminate term of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as
minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal
as maximum.
These circumstances are not altered when the CA granted a
new trial. The CA retained appellate jurisdiction over the case
even as it ordered the remand of the original records thereof to
the RTC for reception of evidence. In retaining appellate
jurisdiction, it set aside only its own September 27, 1999
Decision but left unaltered the May 7, 1996 RTC Decision. The
May 7, 1996 RTC Decision, therefore, remained operative. And
under said Decision, respondent stood sentenced to an
imprisonment term exceeding six years.
It is bad enough that the CA granted bail on grounds other than
those stated in the Motion filed by respondent; it is worse that it
granted bail on the mere claim of the latter's illness. Bail is not a
sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or prisoner needing
medical care outside the prison facility. A mere claim of illness is
not a ground for bail. It may be that the trend now is for courts to
permit bail for prisoners who are seriously sick. There may also
be an existing proposition for the "selective decarceration of
older prisoners" based on findings that recidivism rates
decrease as age increases. But, in this particular case, the CA
made no specific finding that respondent suffers from an ailment
of such gravity that his continued confinement during trial will
permanently impair his health or put his life in danger. It merely
declared respondent not in the best of health even when the
only evidence on record as to the latter's state of health is an
unverified medical certificate stating that, as of August 30, 2000,
respondent's condition required him to "xxx be confined in a
more sterile area xxx." That medical recommendation was even
rebuffed by the CA itself when, in its November 13, 2000
Resolution, it held that the physical condition of respondent
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
does not prevent him from seeking medical attention while
confined in prison.
SANTOS V. JUDGE HOW
Complainants are Barangay officials presently detained without
bail as accused in criminal cases involving the successive
'ambush' incidents against two sons of Manila Assistant City
Prosecutor Domingo I. Orda, Jr.
During trial, Respondent Judge held that he would resolve the
petition for bail on the basis of the evidence presented by the
prosecution. When complainants manifested that they would
present one witness to identify the documents on record,
respondent branded the request as 'misplaced.' He even
rejected outright the request of the defense counsel to make a
tender of proof and instead declared the petition deemed
submitted for resolution, subject to the filing of memorandum by
the parties within five (5) days.
On 29 December 2004, respondent issued an Order denying
bail to the accused. Complainants assail the order for being
based on a one-sentence conclusion that the evidence of guilt is
strong, without any supporting evaluation or consideration of the
issues raised.
In his Comment, respondent professes impartiality in handling
the subject criminal cases. He asserts that he had explained to
the parties that, for purposes of bail hearing, only the
prosecution is required to present evidence since it is not yet a
trial of the main case and the court is only preliminarily tasked to
determine if the evidence of guilt is strong.
Respondent argues that, even granting the accused may be
allowed to present their evidence but the Judge did not allow it,
the disallowance cannot be considered partiality or misconduct.
He claims that he believed in good faith that he would fairly and
correctly resolve the petition for bail by evaluating it based
solely on the evidence of the prosecution; and that allowing both
parties to present their evidence would mean resolving the
merits of the case itself. He contends that if ever he committed
any error, it was an error of judgment committed in good faith for
which complainants have remedies under the Rules.
Issue: WON the acts committed by respondent judge constitute
gross ignorance of the law, manifest partiality and serious
misconduct.
Held: NO. The act of respondent in denying the complainants
the right to present evidence constitutes simple ignorance of the
law; but in the absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper
considerations on the part of the respondent, the penalty of
reprimand recommended by the OCA is just and reasonable.
When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the
burden of showing that the evidence of guilt against the accused
is strong. However, the determination of whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion,
remains with the judge. This discretion, by the very nature of
things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is
submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is
directed to the weight of the evidence and since evidence
cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced
before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial
discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the
court, the petitioner having the right of cross examination and to
introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.
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Records show that during the hearing of the application for bail,
complainants' counsel insisted on presenting their evidence to
disprove the allegations of the prosecution. However,
respondent argued that the prosecution has to establish
evidence against the accused because if he will go to the
defense evidence, there will be no way of stopping it, it will go
through and through, as if, he is already hearing the main case.
This line of argument by respondent is misplaced considering
that what the complainants were asking is for their evidence,
which is already a part of the record, to be presented and
admitted as tender of proof.
The reasons given by respondent that for purposes of bail
hearing, only the prosecution is required to present evidence
since it is not yet a trial of the main case; that the court is only
preliminarily tasked to determine if the evidence of guilt is
strong; and that to allow complainants to present their evidence
would mean resolving the merits of the case itself, are not
plausible. In effect, Respondent deprived the accused of their
right to present rebuttal evidence which to our mind is a clear
violation of their right to due process and equal protection of the
law. It is clear from the foregoing that respondent is remiss in
his responsibility to endeavor at all times to avoid such actions
as would impress upon litigants the disregard of due process.
In this case, respondent's act of cutting short the hearing after
the prosecution presented its evidence, without affording the
defense to adduce evidence in rebuttal together with his outright
denial of complainants’ request to offer proof, is a clear
disregard of the right of the accused to disprove that the
evidence of guilt is strong. It is of no moment that respondent
required complainants to submit their memorandum. What is
significant is that complainants were deprived of their
constitutional right to present evidence during the hearing which
the respondent may intelligently appreciate and evaluate in the
light of the circumstances then obtaining.
Nothing in the records suggests that respondent was motivated
by malice or corrupt motives to deny the application for bail.
Complainants failed to substantiate their other allegations with
competent proof besides their own bare allegations.
Respondent did what he thought was right under the law and
established principles. Hence, respondent could not be held
liable for manifest partiality and serious misconduct. The Court
cannot presume partiality based on the circumstances alleged in
the complaint.
On denying bail based on a one-sentence conclusion that the
evidence of guilt is strong, we agree with the OCA that although
there was no categorical discussion on how the conclusion, that
the evidence of guilt is strong, was reached, the same does not
make it less a reasonable conclusion. The inadequacy of
expression of the questioned Order is outweighed by its
substantial compliance with the requirements for an Order
granting or denying bail.
GOV’T OF HONGKONG V OLALIA
The Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown
Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender
of Accused and Convicted Persons," which took effect on June
20, 1997. Thereafter, Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s
Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong
Court with 3 counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage
as agent." He also faces 7 counts of the offense of conspiracy
to defraud. Warrants of arrest were then issued against him. If
convicted, he faces a jail term of 7 to 14 years for each charge.
Petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with
the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private
respondent. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same
case, a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. RTC
issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there
is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that
private respondent is a high "flight risk." On reconsideration,
private respondent was allowed to post bail. Hong Kong seeks
reversal.
Issue: WON BAIL APPLIES IN EXTRADITION?
Held: YES. In the case of Mark Jimenez (Gov’t of USA v.
Purganan) this court held that the constitutional provision on bail
does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only in
criminal proceedings." The provision in the Constitution stating
that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not
detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is
available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds
application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec.
18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the
constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to
bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It
cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in
extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private
respondent’s case. However, this Court cannot ignore the
following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance
of the individual person in public international law who, in the
20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the
higher value now being given to human rights in the
international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to
observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty
obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of
the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the
law on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy
placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of
human rights. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights are now recognized as
customarily binding upon the members of the international
community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, this Court, in
granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the
Constitution, the principles set forth in that Declaration are part
of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also
adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
which the Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among
the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life,
liberty, and due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of
nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as
well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
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Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of
every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and
due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can
participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to
decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order
their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities
are under obligation to make available to every person under
detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental
right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted
to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the
right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the
various international treaties giving recognition and protection to
human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a
reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive
an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal
proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such
as deportation and quarantine, have likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close
our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence
has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who
are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been
allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the
pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance
the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions
to uphold human rights.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in
this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty
obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the
promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties,
the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the
Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every
individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of PD 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law)
defines "extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the
Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of
foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government
to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed
against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under
the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign
power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one
accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction,
and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to
the demanding state. It is not a criminal proceeding. Even if the
potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not
by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even
though such punishment may follow extradition. It is sui generis,
tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between
different nations. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or
innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil
action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its
object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or
convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from
which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is
characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means
employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the
machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D.
No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the
"immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if
such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further note that
Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to
ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of
the request for extradition;" and that release from provisional
arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the
accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly
administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A
potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged
restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state
following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a
necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of
time of the detention should be reasonable.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to
an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or
her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands
that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition
Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping
with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a
potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process.
More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our
Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the
Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an
extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain
standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice,
now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new
standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence"
should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According
to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond
reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence.
The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing
evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the
orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent
presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to
determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on
the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
Section 14.
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial,
and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance
of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
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behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided,
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear
is unjustifiable.
Doctrine
Where conspiracy is not alleged in the Information, it is
imperative that the prosecution prove direct participation in the
killing of the victim. People v. Galvez, GR157221, Mar 20, 2007.
PEOPLE V. GALVEZ
Information was filed against Galvez, a member of the PNP for
the Murder of Rosalio Enojarda. Despite the fact that the
Information failed to allege conspiracy and the aggravating
circumstances of nocturnity and armed band, the RTC still
convicted Galvez of murder based on conspiracy since Galvez
was seen by two witnesses at the scene of the crime carrying a
firearm together with his unidentified armed companions. The
trial court also held that the offer of Galvez to have the case
settled out of court is an indication of his guilt. Galvez was
further stripped of all the military rank.
Galvez appealed the case to the CA, which affirmed his guilt but
modifying the penalty to be imposed. CA held that the RTC
erred in holding Galvez criminally liable based on conspiracy
when such fact was not alleged in the Information. However, it
still found Galvez guilty of Murder.
Issue: WON GALVEZ SHOULD BE ACQUITTED?
Held: YES. Conspiracy must be alleged in the information in
order that an accused may be held liable for the acts of his co-
accused. In the absence of any averment of conspiracy in the
information, an accused can only be made liable for the acts
committed by him alone and such criminal responsibility is
individual and not collective. Since conspiracy was not alleged
in the Information in this case, it is imperative that the
prosecution prove Galvez’s direct participation in the killing of
the victim. This, the prosecution failed to do.
The CA, in holding Galvez guilty of Murder, gave weight to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Rellios and Perez that
they saw Galvez fire an armalite rifle in their direction on the
night in question. The positive identification of these witnesses,
the CA ruled, has more weight than the negative results of the
paraffin and ballistic tests. We disagree. The prosecution
witnesses never actually saw Galvez shoot the victim.
Time and again, this Court has faithfully observed and given
effect to the constitutional presumption of innocence which can
only be overcome by contrary proof beyond reasonable doubt
one which requires moral certainty, a certainty that convinces
and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act
upon it. As we have so stated in the past - Accusation is not,
according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt, the
prosecution must overthrow the presumption of innocence with
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To meet this standard,
there is need for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the
State, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever
defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and
the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime
had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such
an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is
thus required that every circumstance favoring innocence be
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the
test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to
sway judgment.
When a crime is committed, it is the duty of the prosecution to
prove the identity of the perpetrator of the crime beyond
reasonable doubt for there can be no conviction even if the
commission of the crime is established. Indeed, the State, aside
from showing the existence of a crime, has the burden of
correctly identifying the author of such crime. Both facts must be
proved by the State beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of
its evidence and without solace from the weakness of the
defense.
While the Court agrees that in criminal cases, an offer of
compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an
implied admission of guilt, such principle is not applicable in this
case. Galvez’s supposed offer of compromise was not formally
offered and admitted as evidence during the trial. The victim’s
widow or any prosecution witness did not testify on any offer of
compromise made by Galvez. We have held that when the
evidence on the alleged offer of compromise is amorphous, the
same shall not benefit the prosecution in its case against the
accused.
The Court also recognizes that there may be instances when an
offer of compromise will not amount to an admission of guilt.
Thus, in People v. Godoy, the Court pronounced that: “In
criminal cases, an offer of compromise is generally admissible
as evidence against the party making it. It is a legal maxim,
which assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right to
penalize, that in the matter of public crimes which directly affect
the public interest, no compromise whatever may be entered
into as regards the penal action. It has long been held, however,
that in such cases the accused is permitted to show that the
offer was not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely
to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other
reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer
to compromise was not in truth an admission of guilt or an
attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily
ensue therefrom.”
In this case, the presumption of innocence of Galvez prevails
over the alleged implied admission of guilt. In Godoy, the Court,
in acquitting the accused, explained that: “It frequently happens
that in a particular case two or more presumptions are involved.
Sometimes the presumptions conflict, one tending to
demonstrate the guilt of the accused and the other his
innocence. In such case, it is necessary to examine the basis
for each presumption and determine what logical or social basis
exists for each presumption, and then determine which should
be regarded as the more important and entitled to prevail over
the other. It must, however, be remembered that the existence
of a presumption indicating his guilt does not in itself destroy the
presumption against innocence unless the inculpating
presumption, together with all the evidence, or the lack of any
evidence or explanation, is sufficient to overcome the
presumption of innocence by proving the defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the defendant’s guilt is shown
in this manner, the presumption of innocence continues.”
It is true that a negative finding in a paraffin test is not a
conclusive proof that one has not fired a gun, as held by this
Court in People v. Pagal and People v. Teehankee which were
cited by the CA in its Decision, since it is possible for a person
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to fire a gun and yet bear no traces of nitrate or gunpowder as
when the hands are bathed in perspiration or washed
afterwards. Such principle, however, has no bearing in the
present case. Thus, while it is true that the negative results of
the paraffin and ballistic tests do not conclusively prove that
Galvez did not shoot the victim, the same negative results
cannot be used as circumstantial evidence against Galvez to
prove that he shot Enojarda. To do otherwise would violate the
basic precepts of criminal law which presumes the innocence of
the accused. Every circumstance favoring an accused s
innocence must be duly taken into account, the proof against
him must survive the test of reason, and the strongest suspicion
must not be permitted to sway judgment.
Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
not be suspended except in cases of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it.
Doctrines
It is contended that in his confinement, Major Aquino was not
restricted to his barracks, quarters or tent as mandated by
Article 70 of the Articles of War; rather, he was placed in solitary
confinement in a maximum security detention cell. When
petitioner proceeded to the detention cell, the wife alleged that
she was restricted from visiting her husband. Petitioner asserts
that these are extreme punishments akin to treating Major
Aquino as a convicted criminal.
In Alejano v. Cabuay, lawyers of soldiers and pre-trial detainees
accused of coup d’etat before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
came to this Court bewailing the regulations adopted by the
Chief of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (ISAFP) who had custody over their clients. Therein
petitioners claimed that their constitutional rights were violated
because they were prevented from seeing the detainees—their
clients—at any time of the day or night. They also alleged that
the detainees’ constitutional right to privacy of communication
were violated because ISAFP officials opened and read the
personal letters of some of the detainees. They also challenged,
as unusual and excessive punishment, the presence of the bars
separating the detainees from their visitors and the boarding of
the iron grills in their cells with plywood. In denying the petition,
this Court declared that the fact that the restrictions inherent in
detention intrude into the detainees’ desire to live comfortably
does not convert those restrictions into punishment.
This Court has declared that habeas corpus is not the proper
mode to question conditions of confinement. Moreover, a basic
rule is that once charges have been filed in court, habeas
corpus is no longer available. In re Major Aquino, G.R. No.
174994, August 21, 2007.
IN RE MAJOR AQUINO
Major Aquino, along with several military men allegedly met at
the resthouse of Captain Aldomovar to plot a breach of the
Camp Defense Plan of Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo and to
take over Camp Aquinaldo, as well as the Headquarters of the
Philippine Army. In the wake of the group’s alleged withdrawal
of support from the AFP chain of command and the current
administration of PGMA, Major Aquino was ordered arrested
and confined. On the same day, Lt. Gen. Esperon ordered the
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
Army Inspector General to conduct an investigation to
determine: 1) the circumstances attending Major Aquino’s
alleged withdrawal of support; 2) the veracity of reports anent
the alleged troop movement of some Philippine Military
personnel from their respective stations to Manila to join the
protest march at EDSA with Brigadier General Danilo Lim; and
3) the participation, responsibility and culpability of all Philippine
Military personnel involved, if any. For this purpose, a panel of
investigators was formed. During the investigation, Major
Aquino denied the accusations hurled against him. He
intimated, inter alia, that he had no plan nor did he make any
pronouncement of withdrawing support from the chain of
command, and that he pledged to continue to support the same
and the duly constituted authorities.
The panel of investigators submitted its Investigation Report to
the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. In its report,
the panel of investigators found that the troop movement by
some military personnel from their respective stations to Manila
was illegal, implicating Major Aquino therein. Further, the
panel’s Investigation Report was referred by Lt. Gen. Esperon to
the Judge Advocate General’s Office (JAGO) of the Philippine
Army for review. JAGO found the existence of probable cause
against Major Aquino, among other military officers, for
violations of Article 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a
Gentleman), Article 97 (Disorders and Neglects Prejudicial to
Good Order and Military Discipline), and Article 67 (Attempting
to Begin or Create Mutiny) of the Articles of War.
On the basis of JAGO’s recommendations, Col. Jose R.
Recuenco (Col. Recuenco), then Army Provost Marshal, signed
under oath a charge sheet against Major Aquino, charging the
latter with violations of Article 67 (Attempting to Begin or Create
Mutiny) and Article 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and
Gentleman) of the Articles of War, which was indorsed to the
Chief of Staff of the AFP.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus with the Court of
Appeals, praying that the AFP Chief of Staff and the
Commanding General of the Philippine Army, or whoever are
acting in their place and stead, be directed to immediately
produce the body of Major Aquino and explain forthwith why he
should not be set at liberty without delay. After hearing, the
Court of Appeals rendered a Decision, denying the Petition for
Habeas Corpus. The Court of Appeals held that the remedy of
the writ of habeas corpus is futile because charges had already
been preferred against Major Aquino.
Issue: WON MAJOR AQUINO’S CONFINEMENT IS LEGAL?
Held: YES. As a regular officer of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, Major Aquino falls squarely under Article 2 of the
Articles of War. Consequently, he is subject to the applicable
provisions of the Articles of War and Executive Order No. 178;
or the Manual for Courts-Martial, Philippine Army.
Perforce, we do not find that the Court of Appeals erred in
denying petitioner’s Petition for Habeas Corpus for the person of
Major Aquino. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived
of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled to it. As a general rule, the
writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to
be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under a
process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so. Its
essential object and purpose is to inquire into all manner of
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involuntary restraint and to relieve a person from it if such
restraint is illegal. In the case at bar, Major Aquino stands
charged in court martial proceedings for alleged violations of
Article 67 (Attempting to Begin or Create Mutiny) and Article 96
(Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) of the Articles
of War. The legality of Major Aquino’s restraint having been
settled, the privilege of the writ is unavailing.
We reiterate the pronouncement of this Court in Alejano: The
ruling in this case, however, does not foreclose the right of
detainees and convicted prisoners from petitioning the courts for
the redress of grievances. Regulations and conditions in
detention and prison facilities that violate the Constitutional
rights of the detainees and prisoners will be reviewed by the
courts on a case-by-case basis. The courts could afford
injunctive relief or damages to the detainees and prisoners
subjected to arbitrary and inhumane conditions. However,
habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions of
confinement. The writ of habeas corpus will only lie if what is
challenged is the fact or duration of confinement.
Section 19.
(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither
shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already
imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or
degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee
or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities
under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
Doctrine
Q. Sentenced to death for rape, accused failed to file his
appellant’s brief. The Court of Appeals, exercising its new
power to review death sentences, considered the case
abandoned and dismissed the case. Proper?
A. No. Review of death sentences is mandatory. Neither the
Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court nor the accused
can waive the need for review. People v. Lagua, G.R.
170565, January 31, 2006.
NOTE: Review by the Court of Appeals of the trial court’s
judgment imposing the death penalty is now automatic and
mandatory. It may not be waived by the accused nor by the
Court of Appeals. People v. Lagua, G.R. No. 170565, January
31, 2006.
PEOPLE V. LAGUA
Accused Isidro Flores y Lagua was charged with 181 counts of
rape committed against his minor ward. He pleaded not guilty
when arraigned, and trial ensued. The trial court then rendered
judgment finding accused guilty as charged and imposed the
death penalty on him for each count of rape.
Accused filed a motion for new trial/reconsideration but the
same was denied and the records of the case were ordered
transmitted to the Court of Appeals for its review pursuant to this
Court’s decision in People v. Mateo.
For accused’s failure to file his appellant’s brief despite notice to
his counsel, the Court of Appeals declared his appeal as
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
abandoned and dismissed the case on August 23, 2005.
Thereafter, the appellate court elevated the records of the case
to this Court for automatic review.
Issue: WON the CA erred in dismissing the case of automatic
review?
Held:YES. Except in criminal cases where the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua or death, all appeals to this Court are not a
matter of right but of sound judicial discretion. Conversely,
appeal in criminal cases where the penalty of reclusion perpetua
or death is imposed, is a matter of right. This is specially true in
death penalty cases where a review of the trial court’s judgment
of conviction is automatic and does not depend on the whims of
the death convict. It is mandatory and leaves the reviewing court
without any option.
In recognition of the value of human life and as a way of
ensuring utmost circumspection before imposing death or life
imprisonment, the Court provided an intermediate appeal or
review in favor of the accused. Thus, the Court pronounced in
People v. Mateo: “If only to ensure utmost circumspection
before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and
compelling to provide in these cases a review by the Court of
Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court.
Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to
determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused,
and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone.
A prior determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly,
the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an error of
judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then
render judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the
circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and
elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for
its final disposition.”
Review by the Court of Appeals of the trial court’s judgment
imposing the death penalty is now automatic and mandatory.
Rule 122, Sections 3(d) and 10 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, expressly provides: Sec. 3.
How appeal taken. – “ (d) No notice of appeal is necessary in
cases where the Regional Trial Court imposed the death
penalty. The Court of Appeals shall automatically review the
judgment as provided in Section 10 of this Rule.”
Sec. 10 of Rule 122 provides: “Transmission of records in case
of death penalty. – In all cases where the death penalty is
imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the
Court of Appeals for automatic review and judgment within
twenty days but not earlier than fifteen days from the
promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of a motion for
new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be
forwarded within ten days after the filing thereof by the
stenographic reporter.”
The power to automatically review a decision imposing the
death penalty cannot be waived either by the accused or by the
courts. The fundamental law makes the review of all death
penalty cases mandatory regardless of the wish of the accused
or the will of the court. Neither can it be repudiated by the
accused nor evaded by the court.
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Doctrine/Notes: Court of Appeals shall review cases imposing
capital punishment, such automatic review cannot be waived,
not even by the accused himself.
NOTE: BUT FR. B MENTIONED THAT IN A 2007 CASE, IN
CASES OF RECLUSION PERPETUA AND LIFE SENTENCE,
IT MAY BE WAIVED. (PEOPLE V. ROCHA AND RAMOS)
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by
a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for
the same act.
Doctrines
An order granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence is a
resolution of the case on the merits, and it amounts to an
acquittal. The prosecution can reopen the case only (1) if the
state had been denied due process or (2) the dismissal was a
grave abuse of discretion. People v. Lagua, G.R. No. 170565,
January 31, 2006.
Q. A single act violates four different statutes each requiring
different elements for conviction. Is there double jeopardy if
four charges are filed?
A. No. Since the different statutes require different evidence at
least in one respect, they are not the same offense [unless,
of course, one is necessarily included or necessarily
includes another]. Loney et al v. People, G.R. 153644,
February 10, 2006.
LONEY ET AL V. PEOPLE
Loney, et al. are the corporate officers of Marcopper Mining
Corporation, a corporation engaged in mining in the province of
Marinduque. Marcopper had been storing tailings from its
operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the
pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit
rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at
the tunnel’s end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of or
near the tunnel’s end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had
discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers.
DOJ separately charged petitioners with violation of the Water
Code of the Philippines or PD 1067, the National Pollution
Control Decree of 1976 or PD984, the Philippine Mining Act of
1995 or RA7942, and Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property under the RPC.
Issue: Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except
one should be quashed for duplicity of charges and only the
charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property should stand?
Held: NO. Petitioners contend that they should be charged with
one offense only Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property because (1) all the charges filed against them
"proceed from and are based on a single act or incident of
polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine
tailings" and (2) the charge for violation of Article 365 of the
RPC "absorbs" the other charges since the element of "lack of
necessary or adequate protection, negligence, recklessness
and imprudence" is common among them.
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
The contention has no merit. As early as the start of the last
century, this Court had ruled that a single act or incident might
offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused
for more than one offense. The only limit to this rule is the
Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense." In People v.
Doriquez, we held that two (or more) offenses arising from the
same act are not "the same” : if one provision [of law] requires
proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, x
x x. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of
the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of
them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both
offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some
important act which is not an essential element of the other.”
Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its
elements are present. However, for the limited purpose of
controverting petitioners’ claim that they should be charged with
one offense only, we quote with approval Branch 94 s
comparative analysis of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942, and Article
365 of the RPC showing that in each of these laws on which
petitioners were charged, there is one essential element not
required of the others, thus:
In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to
be established is the dumping of mine tailings into the
Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River System without prior
permit from the authorities concerned. The gravamen of the
offense here is the absence of the proper permit to dump said
mine tailings. This element is not indispensable in the
prosecution for violation of PD 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), [RA]
7942 (Philippine Mining Act) and Art. 365 of the Revised Penal
Code. One can be validly prosecuted for violating the Water
Code even in the absence of actual pollution, or even [if] it has
complied with the terms of its Environmental Compliance
Certificate, or further, even [if] it did take the necessary
precautions to prevent damage to property.
In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be
proved is the existence of actual pollution. The gravamen is the
pollution itself. In the absence of any pollution, the accused
must be exonerated under this law although there was
unauthorized dumping of mine tailings or lack of precaution on
its part to prevent damage to property.
In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that
must be established is the willful violation and gross neglect on
the part of the accused to abide by the terms and conditions of
the Environmental Compliance Certificate, particularly that the
Marcopper should ensure the containment of run-off and silt
materials from reaching the Mogpog and Boac Rivers. If there
was no violation or neglect, and that the accused satisfactorily
proved [sic] that Marcopper had done everything to ensure
containment of the run-off and silt materials, they will not be
liable. It does not follow, however, that they cannot be
prosecuted under the Water Code, Anti-Pollution Law and the
RPC because violation of the Environmental Compliance
Certificate is not an essential element of these laws.
On the other hand, the additional element that must be
established in Art. 365 is the lack of necessary or adequate
precaution, negligence, recklessness and imprudence on the
part of the accused to prevent damage to property. This element
is not required under the previous laws. Unquestionably, it is
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different from dumping of mine tailings without permit, or
causing pollution to the Boac river system, much more from
violation or neglect to abide by the terms of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate. Moreover, the offenses punished by
special law are mala prohibita in contrast with those punished
by the Revised Penal Code which are mala in se.
Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against
petitioners, although based on the same incident, is consistent
with settled doctrine.
On petitioners’ claim that the charge for violation of Article 365
of the RPC "absorbs" the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD
984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se felony
(such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those
violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the
former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa);
what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting
them.
Thus, People v. Relova is no authority for petitioners’ claim
against multiple prosecutions based on a single act not only
because the question of double jeopardy is not at issue here,
but also because, as the Court of Appeals held, petitioners are
being prosecuted for an act or incident punished by four national
statutes and not by an ordinance and a national statute. In
short, petitioners, if ever, fall under the first sentence of Section
21, Article III which prohibits multiple prosecution for the same
offense, and not, as in Relova, for offenses arising from the
same incident.


ARTICLE IV - CITIZENSHIP
Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired
in the manner provided by law.
Q. Does the Philippines allow dual citizenship?
A. Yes. For instance, a Filipino may have dual citizenship if he
is made a citizen of another country by simply operation of
law, eg. If a child of Filipino parents is born in a country
which applies jus soli.
Q. May a Filipino aquire dual citizenship by choice?
A. Yes. R.A. 9225 says: “Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, Filipinos who have lost their natural-born
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired
Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to
the Republic . . .
“Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country
shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.”
Q. Whaat does the oath say?
A. It says: "I _____________________, solemnly swear (or
affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines . . . and I hereby declare that I
recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; . . ."
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
Q. Does this mean “dual allegiance.”
A. The oath is silent about allegiance to a foreign country. But
it does say that the Philippines has “supreme authority.”
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9225
AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE
CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP
PERMANENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 63, AS AMENDED, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.
Section 1. Short Title. — This Act shall be known as the
"Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003."
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the
policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
Sec. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. — Any provision of
law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of
the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country
are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to
the Republic:
"I _________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I
will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines, and I hereby declare that I recognize and
accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose
this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country
shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.
Sec. 4. Derivative Citizenship. — The unmarried child,
whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen
(18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine
citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed
citizens of the Philippines.
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. — Those who
retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act
shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws
of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage
must meet the requirements under Sec. 1, Article V
of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise
known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines
shall meet the qualifications for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing
laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation
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of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe
and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities
prior to their assumption of office: provided, that they
renounce their oath of allegiance to the country
where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the
Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any
public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised
by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public
office in the country of which they are
naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-
commissioned officers in the armed forces of
the country which they are naturalized
citizens.
Sec. 6. Separability Clause. — If any Sec. or provision of this
Act is held unconstitutional or invalid, any other Sec. or
provision not affected thereby shall remain valid and
effective.
Sec. 7. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules
and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 8. Effectivity Clause. — This Act shall take effect after
fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official
Gazette or two (2) newspapers of general circulation.


ARTICLE V - SUFFRAGE
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at
least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in
the Philippines for at least one year, and in the place
wherein they propose to vote, for at least six months
immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property,
or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the
exercise of suffrage.
Doctrines
Q. May an immigrant or permanent resident recognized as
such by the country where he lives vote in a Philippine election.
A. According to R.A. 9189 he may provided that he files an
affidavit “prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring
that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in
the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of
his/her registration under this Act.”
Q. What is the significance of the affidavit?
A. It is an indication that he never intended to abandon his
domicile in the Philippines.
Q. What happens if he never files such affidavit?
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
A. Then he is deemed disqualified to vote for having lost his
domicile in the Philippines.
Q. May a former natural born Filipino citizen who has reacquired
Filipino citizenship under the Dual Citizenship law (9225)
vote?
A. Yes, provided that he or she satisfy the requirements of the
Absentee Voting Law as authorized by the Constitution.
Nicolas-Lewis v Comelec, G.R. No. 162759, August 4,
2006.
Q. May a former natural born Filipino citizen who has
reacquired Filipino citizenship under the Dual Citizenship law
vote even without the required (six month) residence?
A. Yes, provided the person files the affidavit as required in the
Absentee Voting Law as authorized by the Constitution. Lewis v
Comelec, G.R. No. 162759, August 4. 2006.
Q. Who may be repatriated?
A. Under current law only (1) women who lost citizenship by
marriage and (2) those who lost citizenship for political or
economic reasons may be repatriated. Tabasa v. CA, August
29, 2006
Republic Act 9189
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF OVERSEAS
ABSENTEE VOTING BY QUALIFIED CITIZENS OF THE
PHILIPPINES ABROAD, APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Sec. 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are
not otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of
age on the day of elections, may vote for president, vice-
president, senators and party-list representatives.
Sec. 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified from
voting under this Act:
1. Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance
with Philippine laws;
2. Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine
citizenship and who have pledged allegiance to a foreign
country;
3. Those who have committed and are convicted in a final
judgment by a court or tribunal of an offense punishable by
imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, including those
who have committed and been found guilty of Disloyalty as
defined under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code, such
disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or
amnesty; Provided, however, That any person disqualified to
vote under this subsection shall automatically acquire the
right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of
sentence; Provided, further, That the Commission may take
cognizance of final judgments issued by foreign courts or
tribunals only on the basis of reciprocity and subject to the
formalities and processes prescribed by the Rules of Court on
execution of judgments;
4. An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as
such in the host country, unless he/she executes, upon
registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the
Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual
physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than
three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this
Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied
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for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be the
cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or
permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee
Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in
absentia.
5. Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared
insane or incompetent by competent authority in the
Philippines or abroad, as verified by the Philippine embassies,
consulates or foreign service establishments concerned,
unless such competent authority subsequently certifies that
such person is no longer insane or incompetent.
Sec. 24. Prohibited Acts. In addition to the prohibited acts
provided by law, it shall be unlawful:
24.1. For any officer or employee of the Philippine government
to influence or attempt to influence any person covered by
this Act to vote, or not to vote, for a particular candidate.
Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to prohibit free
discussion regarding politics or candidates for public office.
24.2. For any person to deprive any person of any right secured
in this Act, or to give false information as to his/her name,
address, or period of residence for the purposes of
establishing his/her eligibility or ineligibility to register or
vote under this Act; or to conspire with another person for
the purpose of encouraging the giving of false information
in order to establish the eligibility or ineligibility of any
individual to register or vote under this Act; or, to pay, or
offer to pay, or to accept payment either for application to
vote in absentia or for voting;
24.3. For any person to tamper with the ballot, the mail
containing the ballots for overseas absentee voters, the
election returns, including the destruction, mutilation and
manipulation thereof;
24.4. For any person to steal, destroy, conceal, mutilate or alter
any record, document or paper as required for purposes of
this Act;
24.5. For any deputized agent to refuse without justifiable
ground, to serve or continue serving, or to comply with
his/her sworn duties after acceptance of his/her
appointment;
24.6. For any public officer or employee who shall cause the
preparation, printing, distribution of information material, or
post the same in websites without the prior approval of the
Commission;
24.7. For any public officer or employee to cause the transfer,
promotion, extension, recall of any member of the foreign
service corps, including members of the attached agencies,
or otherwise cause the movement of any such member
from his current post or position one (1) year before and
three (3) months after the day of elections, without securing
the prior approval of the Commission;
24.8. For any person who, after being deputized by the
Commission to undertake activities in connection with the
implementation of this Act, shall campaign for or assist, in
whatever manner, candidates in the elections;
24.9. For any person who is not a citizen of the Philippines to
participate, by word or deed, directly or indirectly through
qualified organizations/associations, in any manner and at
any stage of the Philippine political process abroad,
including participation in the campaign and elections.
The provision of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding,
and with due regard to the Principle of Double Criminality, the
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
prohibited acts described in this section are electoral offenses
and punishable in the Philippines.
The penalties imposed under Section 264 of the Omnibus
Election Code, as amended, shall be imposed on any person
found guilty of committing any of the prohibited acts as defined
in this section: Provided, That the penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon any person found guilty
of Section 24.3 hereof without the benefit of the operation of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. If the offender is a public officer or
a candidate, the penalty shall be prision mayor in its maximum
period. In addition, the offender shall be sentenced to suffer
perpetual disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of
the right to vote.
Immigrants and permanent residents who do not resume
residence in the Philippines as stipulated in their affidavit under
Section 5(d) within three (3) years after approval of his/her
registration under this Act and yet vote in the next elections
contrary to the said section, shall be penalized by imprisonment
of not less than one (1) year, and shall be deemed disqualified
as provided in Section 5(c) of this Act. His/her passport shall be
stamped "not allowed to vote".
NICOLAS-LEWIS V COMELEC
Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of
Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 which accords to such
applicants the right of suffrage, among others. Long before the
May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought
registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter" only
to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States
that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs
dated September 23, 2003, they have yet no right to vote in
such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence
requirement prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter,
however, urged the different Philippine posts abroad not to
discontinue their campaign for voter’s registration, as the
residence restriction adverted to would contextually affect
merely certain individuals who would likely be eligible to vote in
future elections.
Issue: WON petitioners and others who might have meanwhile
retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to
R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189?
Held: YES. As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual
citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually
establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first
before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary,
R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that “duals” are most
likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right
of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189.
It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence,
to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who,
save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary
voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.
Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189
and the expansion of the scope of that law with the passage
of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that "duals" may now
exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme
and as overseas absentee voters.
While perhaps not determinative of the issue tendered herein,
we note that the expanded thrust of R.A. 9189 extends also to
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what might be tag as the next generation of "duals". This may
be deduced from the inclusion of the provision on derivative
citizenship in R.A. 9225.
It is very likely that a considerable number of those
unmarried children below eighteen (18) years of age had
never set foot in the Philippines. Now then, if the next
generation of "duals" may nonetheless avail themselves the
right to enjoy full civil and political rights under Section 5 of the
Act, then there is neither no rhyme nor reason why the
petitioners and other present day "duals," provided they meet
the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in
relation to R.A. 9189, be denied the right of suffrage as an
overseas absentee voter. Congress could not have plausibly
intended such absurd situation.
TABASA V. CA
Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. In 1968, when petitioner was seven years old, his
father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen of the
United States. By derivative naturalization (citizenship derived
from that of another as from a person who holds citizenship by
virtue of naturalization), petitioner also acquired American
citizenship. Petitioner arrived in the Philippines in 1995, and was
admitted as a “balikbayan” for one year. Thereafter, petitioner
was arrested and detained by agent Wilson Soluren of the BID,
pursuant to a letter from the Consul General of the US Embassy
that his passport had been revoked by the US State Dept.
Hence, Tabasa became an undocumented and undesirable
alien and summarily deported pursuant to Law and Intelligence
Instructions No. 53 issued by then Commissioner Miriam
Defensor Santiago to effect his deportation.
Petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he had
acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance with
Republic Act No. 8171 (RA 8171), and that because he is now a
Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the
respondent Bureau.
Issue: WON petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine
citizenship under RA 8171. (If there is no valid repatriation, then
he can be summarily deported for his being an undocumented
alien.)
Held: NO. RA 8171, “An Act Providing for the Repatriation of
Filipino Women Who Have Lost Their Philippine Citizenship by
Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born Filipinos,” was enacted
on October 23, 1995. It provides for the repatriation of only two
(2) classes of persons, viz:
Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and
natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor
children, on account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine
citizenship through repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended: Provided, That the applicant is not a:
(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any
association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines
opposing organized government;
(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence,
personal assault, or association for the predominance of their ideas;
(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or
(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious
diseases.
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
To reiterate, the only persons entitled to repatriation under RA
8171 are the following: (a) Filipino women who lost their
Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and (b) Natural-born
Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.
Petitioner theorizes that he could be repatriated under RA 8171
because he is a child of a natural-born Filipino, and that he lost
his Philippine citizenship by derivative naturalization when he
was still a minor. Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege
of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born
Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-
born Filipinos. This means that if a parent who had renounced
his Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons
later decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation will
also benefit his minor children according to the law. This
includes a situation where a former Filipino subsequently had
children while he was a naturalized citizen of a foreign country.
The repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover
his natural-born citizenship and automatically vest Philippine
citizenship on his children of jus sanguinis or blood relationship:
the children acquire the citizenship of their parent(s) who are
natural-born Filipinos. To claim the benefit of RA 8171,
however, the children must be of minor age at the time the
petition for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because
a child does not have the legal capacity for all acts of civil life
much less the capacity to undertake a political act like the
election of citizenship. On their own, the minor children cannot
apply for repatriation or naturalization separately from their
parents.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was a
Filipino at birth. In 1968, while he was still a minor, his father
was naturalized as an American citizen; and by derivative
naturalization, petitioner acquired U.S. citizenship. Petitioner
now wants us to believe that he is entitled to automatic
repatriation as a child of natural-born Filipinos who left the
country due to political or economic necessity. This is absurd.
Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his “repatriation”
on June 13, 1996. The privilege under RA 8171 belongs to
children who are of minor age at the time of the filing of the
petition for repatriation.
Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who left the
country due to political or economic necessity. Clearly, he lost
his Philippine citizenship by operation of law and not due to
political or economic exigencies. It was his father who could
have been motivated by economic or political reasons in
deciding to apply for naturalization. The decision was his
parent’s and not his. The privilege of repatriation under RA
8171 is extended directly to the natural-born Filipinos who could
prove that they acquired citizenship of a foreign country due to
political and economic reasons, and extended indirectly to the
minor children at the time of repatriation.
In sum, petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation
under RA 8171. However, he can possibly reacquire Philippine
citizenship by availing of the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003 (Republic Act No. 9225) by simply taking
an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Petitioner Tabasa, whose passport was cancelled after his
admission into the country, became an undocumented alien
who can be summarily deported. His subsequent “repatriation”
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cannot bar such deportation especially considering that he has
no legal and valid reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.


ARTICLE VI - THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the
extent reserved to the people by the provision on
initiative and referendum.
Doctrine
The Epira Law says: SECTION 34. Universal Charge. — Within
one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, a universal charge to
be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be
imposed on all electricity end-users for the following purposes:
(a) Payment for the stranded debts in excess of the amount
assumed by the National Government and stranded
contract costs of NPC and as well as qualified stranded
contract costs of distribution utilities resulting from the
restructuring of the industry;
(b) Missionary electrification;
(c) The equalization of the taxes and royalties applied to
indigenous or renewable sources of energy vis-à-vis
imported energy fuels;
(d) An environmental charge equivalent to one-fourth of one
centavo per kilowatt-hour (P0.0025/kWh), which shall
accrue to an environmental fund to be used solely for
watershed rehabilitation and management. Said fund
shall be managed by NPC under existing arrangements;
and
(e) A charge to account for all forms of cross-subsidies for a
period not exceeding three (3) years.
The universal charge shall be a non-bypassable charge which
shall be passed on and collected from all end-users on a
monthly basis by the distribution utilities.
The ultimate issues in the case at bar are:
1) Whether or not, the Universal Charge imposed under Sec. 34
of the EPIRA is a tax; and
2) Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power
to tax on the part of the ERC
The conservative and pivotal distinction between these two
powers rests in the purpose for which the charge is made. If
generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is
merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the
primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised
does not make the imposition a tax.
From the aforementioned purposes, it can be gleaned that the
assailed Universal Charge is not a tax, but an exaction in the
exercise of the State's police power. Public welfare is surely
promoted.
Moreover, it is a well-established doctrine that the taxing power
may be used as an implement of police power.
The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its
entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its
essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
standards for delegation. Gerochi v.DENR, G.R. No. 159796,
July 17, 2007
GEROCHI V. DENR
Congress enacted the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of
2001 (EPIRA) on June 8, 2001; on June 26, 2001, it took effect.
National Power Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities Group
(NPC-SPUG) filed with respondent Energy Regulatory
Commission (ERC) a petition for the availment from the
Universal Charge of its share for Missionary Electrification.
NPC filed another petition with ERC, docketed as ERC Case
No. 2002-194, praying that the proposed share from the
Universal Charge for the Environmental charge of P0.0025 per
kilowatt-hour (/kWh), or a total of P119,488,847.59, be approved
for withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund (STF) managed
by respondent Power Sector Assets and Liabilities
Management Group (PSALM) for the rehabilitation and
management of watershed areas.
ERC then issued an Order in ERC Case No. 2002-165
provisionally approving the computed amount of P0.0168/kWh
as the share of the NPC-SPUG from the Universal Charge for
Missionary Electrification and authorizing the National
Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) and Distribution Utilities
to collect the same from its end-users on a monthly basis.
On the basis of the said ERC decisions, respondent Panay
Electric Company, Inc. (PECO) charged petitioner Romeo P.
Gerochi and all other end-users with the Universal Charge as
reflected in their respective electric bills starting from the month
of July 2003.
Issues/Held:
(1) WON the Universal Charge under the EPIRA is a tax?
NO. The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is
unlimited in its range, acknowledging in its very nature no limits,
so that security against its abuse is to be found only in the
responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the
constituency that is to pay it. It is based on the principle that
taxes are the lifeblood of the government, and their prompt and
certain availability is an imperious need. Thus, the theory behind
the exercise of the power to tax emanates from necessity;
without taxes, government cannot fulfill its mandate of
promoting the general welfare and well-being of the people.
On the other hand, police power is the power of the state to
promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of
liberty and property. It is the most pervasive, the least limitable,
and the most demanding of the three fundamental powers of the
State. The justification is found in the Latin maxims salus populi
est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law)
and sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your property
as not to injure the property of others). As an inherent attribute
of sovereignty which virtually extends to all public needs, police
power grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the
State, as parens patriae, gives effect to a host of its regulatory
powers.
We have held that the power to "regulate" means the power to
protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control, with due regard
for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the
utility and of its patrons.
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The conservative and pivotal distinction between these two
powers rests in the purpose for which the charge is made. If
generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is
merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the
primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised
does not make the imposition a tax.
In exacting the assailed Universal Charge through Sec. 34 of
the EPIRA, the State's police power, particularly its regulatory
dimension, is invoked. Such can be deduced from Sec. 34
which enumerates the purposes for which the Universal Charge
is imposed and which can be amply discerned as regulatory in
character.
(2) Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power
to tax on the part of the ERC?
All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of
subordinate legislation is that the regulation be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed
by the law. These requirements are denominated as the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
st
Under the 1 test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it
reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to
nd
enforce it. The 2 test mandates adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the
delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running
riot.
The Court finds that the EPIRA is complete in all its essential
terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards.
As to the second test, provisions of the EPIRA such as, among
others, “to ensure the total electrification of the country and the
quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply of
electric power” and “watershed rehabilitation and management”
meet the requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the
limitations on the ERC’s power to formulate the IRR. These are
sufficient standards.
Section 5.
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-
list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party list. For three consecutive terms
after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled,
as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory.
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census,
the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standards provided in this section.
Doctrine
Q. What is the formula to follow for determining the number of a
additional seats a party is entitled to beyond the first two?
A. We reiterate that the prevailing formula for the computation of
additional seats for party-list winners is the formula stated in the
landmark case of Veterans, viz:
No. of votes of /
Additional seats concerned party No. of additional
for concerned = ------------------------ x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
b first party
PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA V. COMELEC
Section 11(b) and Section 12 of R.A. 7941 (Party-List System
Act) provide that "the parties, organizations, and coalitions
receiving at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one seat each, provided that those
garnering more than 2% of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes…”
Several party-list participants sent queries to COMELEC
regarding the formula to be adopted in computing the additional
seats for the party-list winners in the May 10, 2004 elections. In
response, Comelec issued Resolution 6835, adopting the
simplified formula of "one additional seat per additional two
percent of the total party-list votes."
On the other hand, the following formulas were applied by the
SC in Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC:
- For the party-list candidate garnering the highest number of
votes:
Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of first
----------------------------------------- = party relative to total votes
Total votes for party-list system for the party-list system
- For additional seats of other parties who reached the
required 2% mark:
No. of votes of Concerned party No. of additional
-------------------------------------------- x seats allocated to
No. of votes of first party the first party
Such formula was reiterated in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party vs. COMELEC, et al. and Bayan Muna vs. COMELEC.
But in granting the MR in Bayan Muna v. Comelec, SC adopted
the simplified Comelec formula of 1 additional seat per
additional 2% of the total party-list votes garnered. It declared
BUHAY entitled to 1 additional seat for garnering 4.46%.
Petitioners PM and BUTIL, together with CIBAC, filed a Joint
Motion for Immediate Proclamation with Comelec en banc. They
prayed that they be declared also as entitled to 1 additional seat
each. As basis, they cited the formula used by the Court in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC.
Issue: What formula should be applied in computing for
additional seats for winners in the party-list elections?
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW THE WOMEN OF ALEITHEIA
Held: The formula in the landmark case of Veterans prevails.
Step One. Rank all the participating parties, organizations and
coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number
of votes they each received.
Step Two. Determine the number of seats the first party is
entitled to. Since the distribution is based on proportional
representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other
parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is
entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
st
Apply the following formula to get the number of seats of the 1
party:
Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of
---------------------------------------------- = first party relative to total
Total votes for Party-List System votes for party-list system
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without
rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of the total valid
votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall
be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats
overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal
to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then
the first party shall have one additional or a total of two seats.
And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party
shall not be entitled to any additional seat.
Step Three. Solve for the number of additional seats that the
other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional
representation. The formula is encompassed by the following
complex fraction:
No. of votes of Concerned party No. of additional
-------------------------------------------------- x seats allocated to
No. of votes of first party the first party
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from
the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall
be its Chairman.
Doctrine
Where it is no disputed that respondent has already been
proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of the
House of Representatives the Comelec no longer has
jurisdiction. Vinzons-Chato v. Comelec, GR 172131, April 2,
2007.
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
VINZONS-CHATO V. COMELEC
Petitioner Chato and respondent Renato J. Unico were among
the candidates for the lone congressional district of Camarines
Norte during the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local
elections.
During the canvassing of the election returns before the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Labo (MBC Labo) Chato
raised several objections and pointed to manifest errors or
obvious discrepancies in the election returns.
Her objections were denied, and PBC stated that pre-
proclamation controversy was not allowed for the election of
Members of the House.
Then, PBC proclaimed respondent Unico as representative-
elect of the lone congressional district of Camarines
Norte. Petitioner Chato filed with the COMELEC a Petition
alleging manifest errors.
Comelec initially ordered the suspension of the effects of the
proclamation of respondent Unico. But it afterwards lifted the
said order on the ground that respondent Unico’s proclamation
and taking of oath of office had not only divested the
Commission of any jurisdiction to pass upon his election,
returns, and qualifications, but also automatically conferred
jurisdiction to another electoral tribunal.
In the assailed Resolution dated March 17, 2006, the
COMELEC en banc denied Chato’s MR, ruling that the
Commission already lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the
fact that Unico had already taken his oath.
Issue: WON Comelec committed grave abuse?
Held: NO. It is not disputed that respondent Unico has already
been proclaimed and taken his oath of office. Hence, Comelec
had already lost jurisdiction over Chato’s petition. The issues
raised by petitioner Chato essentially relate to the canvassing of
returns and alleged invalidity of respondent Unico’s
proclamation. These are matters that are best addressed to the
sound judgment and discretion of the HRET. Significantly, the
allegation that respondent Unico’s proclamation is null and void
does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction.
Further, for the Court to take cognizance of petitioner Chato’s
election protest against respondent Unico would be to usurp the
constitutionally mandated functions of the HRET. Petitioner
Chato’s remedy would have been to file an election protest
before the said tribunal, not this petition for certiorari. The
special civil action of certiorari is available only if there is
concurrence of the essential requisites, to wit: (1) the tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and (b) there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law to annul or modify the proceeding. There
must be capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power
for certiorari to prosper.
Doctrine/Notes: Taking of oath (not proclamation) is the
operative act that vests jurisdiction on HRET. If proclaimed but
has not yet taken oath, Comelec still has jurisdiction.
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Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or
any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or
affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.
Doctrine
Q. The following provision is found in Proc. 1 of Cory Aquino
issued in February 1986: ““No member or staff of the
Commission shall be required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance.” Is this still in effect?
A. No. This is incompatible with the power of legislative
investigation, with the character of public office as a public
trust, and with the right to information. It is deemed
repealed by the 1986 Constitution. Sabio v. Gordon, G.R.
174340, October 12, 2006.
SABIO V. GORDON
President Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1, creating the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). Sec.
4(b) of EO1 provides that: “No member or staff of the
Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in
any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance.”
Senator Defensor Santiago introduced Resolution 455,
“directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous
losses incurred by the Phil. Overseas Telecommunications
Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings
Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their
operations by their respective Board of Directors.”
Chief of Staff Inocencio, under authority of Senator Richard J.
Gordon, wrote Chairman Sabio of the PCGG, inviting him to be
one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly
conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. The
purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res.
No. 455.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior
commitment. At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of EO1.
A Subpoena Ad Testificandum was thus issued by the Senate
Committee. Again, Chairman Sabio refused to appear. Senate
thus issued an Order directing its Sergeant-At-Arms to place
Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners under arrest for
contempt Chairman Sabio then filed a petition for habeas
corpus.
Issue: WON Sec4(b) of EO1 is repealed by the Constitution?
Held: YES. The 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of
investigation, not just of Congress, but also of “any of its
committee.” It constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory
power upon the committees and it means that the mechanisms
which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its
investigative function are also available to the committees.
Article VI, Section 21 grants the power of inquiry not only to the
Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of
their respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
of power to the committees. Father Bernas, in his Commentary
on the 1987 Constitution, correctly pointed out its significance:
“It should also be noted that the Constitution explicitly
recognizes the power of investigation not just of Congress but
also of “any of its committees.” This is significant because it
constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the
committees and it means that the means which the Houses can
take in order to effectively perform its investigative function are
also available to the Committees.”
Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21.
Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the
Congress’ power of inquiry. Nowhere in the Constitution is any
provision granting such exemption. Congress’ power of inquiry,
being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly
needed statutes. It even extends “to government agencies
created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the
power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.” PCGG belongs
to this class. Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a
limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of any
constitutional basis.
One important limitation on the Congress’ power of inquiry is
that “the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.” This is just another way of saying
that the power of inquiry must be “subject to the limitations
placed by the Constitution on government action.” As to the right
to privacy, it is not absolute where there is an overriding
compelling state interest. In Morfe v. Mutuc, the Court, in line
with Whalen v. Roe, employed the rational basis relationship
test when it held that there was no infringement of the
individual’s right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure
information is for a valid purpose, i.e., to curtail and minimize
the opportunities for official corruption, maintain a standard of
honesty in public service, and promote morality in public
administration. In Valmonte v. Belmonte, the Court remarked
that as public figures, the Members of the former Batasang
Pambansa enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to
ordinary individuals, and their actions are subject to closer
scrutiny. Taking this into consideration, the Court ruled that the
right of the people to access information on matters of public
concern prevails over the right to privacy of financial
transactions.
Under the present circumstances, the alleged anomalies in the
PHILCOMSAT, PHC and POTC, ranging in millions of pesos,
and the conspiratorial participation of the PCGG and its officials
are compelling reasons for the Senate to exact vital information
from the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings
Corporations, as well as from Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners to aid it in crafting the necessary legislation to
prevent corruption and formulate remedial measures and policy
determination regarding PCGG’s efficacy. There being no
reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of those directors
and officers over the subject covered by Senate Res. No. 455, it
follows that their right to privacy has not been violated by the
Senate Committees.
Anent the right against self-incrimination, it must be emphasized
that this right maybe invoked by the said directors and officers
of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation only when the incriminating
question is being asked, since they have no way of knowing in
advance the nature or effect of the questions to be asked of
them.” That this right may possibly be violated or abused is no
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ground for denying respondent Senate Committees their power
of inquiry. The consolation is that when this power is abused,
such issue may be presented before the courts.
Section 22. The heads of departments may, upon their own
initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the
request of either House, as the rules of each House shall
provide, appear before and be heard by such House on
any matter pertaining to their departments. Written
questions shall be submitted to the President of the
Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at
least three days before their scheduled appearance.
Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions,
but may cover matters related thereto. When the security
of the State or the public interest so requires and the
President so states in writing, the appearance shall be
conducted in executive session.
Doctrine
Q. What is the difference between Section 21 and Section 22?
A. Article VI, Section 21 is about legislative investigations in aid
of legislation. Anyone may be summoned, even department
heads. Section 22 is institutionalization of “oversight function.”
Department secretaries may not be compelled.
But whether in Section 21 or Section 22, executive privilege
may be raised by the President or by authority of the President.
The claim must be specific. The Court ultimately judges
whether there is executive privilege. Executive privilege simply
means the right of the President to withhold information about
some types of information. Only the President has authority by
reason of office to claim executive privilege. Senate v. Ermita,
G.R. No. 169777, April 20. 2006.
SENATE V. ERMITA
In September 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole
issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public
hearing on the railway project of the North Rail Project. The
public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator
Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged
overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract
covering the North Rail Project.
The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security
likewise issued invitations to officials of the AFP on another
matter.
Thereafter, Senate President Drilon received from Executive
Secretary Ermita a letter requesting postponement of the
hearing but Drilon wrote back that it was too late to postpone it.
The President then issued E.O. 464, containing the ff
provisions:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. – In accordance
with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional
provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government,
all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so
states in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.
SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. –
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
(a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is
fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers
under the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995).
Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees shall
not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by
reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the public
interest.
Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the
President and the public officers covered by this executive order, including:
i. Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public
official covered by this executive order;
ii. Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of
national security should not be divulged;
iii. Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of
treaties and executive agreements;
iv. Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings;
v. Matters affecting national security and public order.
(b) Who are covered. – The following are covered by this executive order:
i. Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the
department heads are covered by the executive privilege;
ii. Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such
other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the
executive privilege;
iii. Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or
higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are
covered by the executive privilege;
iv. Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security
Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and
v. Such other officers as may be determined by the President.
SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. – All public officials
enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to
appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of
separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the
rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Hence, Drilon received from Ermita a copy of E.O. 464, and
another letter informing him “that officials of the Executive
Department invited to appear at the hearing will not be able to
attend the same without the consent of the President, pursuant
to E.O. 464” and that “said officials have not secured the
required consent from the President.”
Despite the communications received from Ermita and Gen.
Senga, the investigation scheduled by the Committee on
National Defense and Security pushed through, with only Col.
Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani attending. For defying President
Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before
legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and
Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were
made to face court martial proceedings.
All the petitions pray for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order enjoining respondents from implementing,
enforcing, and observing E.O. 464.
Issue: Whether E.O. 464 is constitutional?
Held: SECTION 1 IS CONSTITUTIONAL. Section 1 of EO 464
specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike
Section 3, require a prior determination by any official whether
they are covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has,
through the challenged order, made the determination that they
are. Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage of department
heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the
department heads’ possession of any information which might
be covered by executive privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to
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Section 3 vis-à-vis Section 2, there is no reference to executive
privilege at all. Rather, the required prior consent under Section
1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on
what has been referred to as the question hour.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how
department heads are implementing the statutes which it has
issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that
of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department
heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of
duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the
separation of powers, states that Congress may only request
their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which
Congress requires their appearance is “in aid of legislation”
under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid
claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that
they are department heads. Only one executive official may be
exempted from this power — the President on whom executive
power is vested, and members of the Supreme Court.
Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of
Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of any reference
to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in
its application to appearances of department heads in the
question hour contemplated in Section 22 of Article VI. The
requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section
1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is
valid on its face.
SECTION 3 AND SECTION 2[B] ARE UNCONSTITUIONAL.
Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated
in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is
broad. It covers all senior officials of executive departments, all
officers of the AFP and the PNP, and all senior national security
officials who, in the judgment of the heads of offices designated
in the same section (i.e. department heads, Chief of Staff of the
AFP, Chief of the PNP, and the National Security Adviser), are
“covered by the executive privilege.”
The enumeration also includes such other officers as may be
determined by the President. In view thereof, whenever an
official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such
invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that
the President, or a head of office authorized by the President,
has determined that the requested information is privileged, and
that the President has not reversed such determination. Such
declaration, however, even without mentioning the term
“executive privilege,” amounts to an implied claim that the
information is being withheld by the executive branch, by
authority of the President, on the basis of executive privilege.
Verily, there is an implied claim of privilege.
By its very nature, the implied claim authorized by Section 3 of
E.O. 464 is not accompanied by any specific allegation of the
basis thereof (e.g., whether the information demanded involves
military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings,
etc.). While Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information
that are covered by the privilege under the challenged order,
Congress is left to speculate as to which among them is being
referred to by the executive. The enumeration is not even
intended to be comprehensive, but a mere statement of what is
included in the phrase “confidential or classified information
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
between the President and the public officers covered by this
executive order.”
Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of
executive privilege, there is no way of determining whether it
falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the
circumstances in which it is made, it should be respected. The
claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to
Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is
merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain
reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with
an announcement that the President has not given her consent.
It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the
withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of
each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of
Congress. In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must
be invalidated.
SECTION 2[A] IS CONSTITUTIONAL. No infirmity, however,
can be imputed to Section 2(a) as it merely provides guidelines,
binding only on the heads of office mentioned in Section 2(b),
on what is covered by executive privilege. It does not purport to
be conclusive on the other branches of government. It may thus
be construed as a mere expression of opinion by the President
regarding the nature and scope of executive privilege.
AS TO WHO MAY INVOKE PRIVILEGE: Petitioners, however,
assert as another ground for invalidating the challenged order
the alleged unlawful delegation of authority to the heads of
offices in Section 2(b). Petitioner Senate of the Philippines
claims that only the President can assert executive privilege to
withhold information from Congress.
Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once
the head of office determines that a certain information is
privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the
President’s authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official
from appearing before Congress, subject only to the express
pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the
appearance of such official. These provisions thus allow the
President to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence.
Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the
exceptional nature of the privilege. In light of this highly
exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to
limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may
of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the
privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary
must state that the authority is “By order of the President,” which
means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege
being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the
highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the
President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such
power. There is even less reason to uphold such authorization
in the instant case where the authorization is not explicit but by
mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is further
invalid on this score.
SECTION 21 SECTION 22
Power of Inquiry Oversight Function
Who may be summoned? Anyone Who may be called? Only members of
except the president and SC justices. the executive branch – department
heads.
Mandatory Mere request by Congress
Excuse: executive privilege Excuse: executive privilege
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ARTICLE VII - EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of
the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any
other office or employment during their tenure. They shall
not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any
other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of
interest in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or
affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall
not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen
or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
Doctrine
Q. The Chief Presidential Legal Counsel has the duty of giving
independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the
heads of various executive departments and agencies and
to review investigations involving heads of executive
departments and agencies, as well as other Presidential
appointees. The PCGG, for its part, is charged with the
responsibility, under the President, of recovering ill-gotten
wealth. May the two offices be held by the same person.
A. No. The two offices are incompatible. Without question, the
PCGG is an agency under the Executive Department.
Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the
review of the CPLC. Public Interest Group v Elma, G. R.
No. 138965, June 30, 2006.
PUBLIC INTEREST GROUP V. ELMA
Magdangal Elma was appointed and took his oath of office as
Chairman of the PCGG. Thereafter, during his tenure as PCGG
Chairman, respondent Elma was appointed as Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel. He took his oath of office but
waived any remuneration that he may receive as CPLC.
Petitioners contend that respondent Elma’s concurrent
appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC contravenes
Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the
1987 Constitution. They also maintain that respondent Elma
was holding incompatible offices.
Art. VII Sec. 13: “The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any
other office or employment during their tenure.”
Art. IX-B. Sec. 7: “No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in
any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. xxx Unless otherwise
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.”
On the other hand, Elma alleges that the strict prohibition
against holding multiple positions provided under Section 13,
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
Article VII applies only to heads of executive departments, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries; it does not cover
other public officials given the rank of Secretary,
Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary.
He also claims that it is Sec.7, par. 2, Article IX-B that should be
applied to the case. This provision would allow a public officer
to hold multiple positions if (1) the law allows the concurrent
appointment of the said official; and (2) the primary functions of
either position allows such concurrent appointment.
Issue: WON the appointments violates the prohibition against
multiple offices in Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, par. 2,
Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution?
Held: YES. In Quimson v. Ozaeta, SC ruled that, “there is no
legal objection to a government official occupying 2 gov’t offices
and performing the functions of both as long as there is no
incompatibility.” The crucial test in determining whether
incompatibility exists between two offices was laid out in People
v. Green - whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the
sense that one office has the right to interfere with the other.
Incompatibility between two offices, is an inconsistency in the
functions of the two. The offices must be subordinate, one over
the other, and they must, per se, have the right to interfere, one
with the other, before they are incompatible at common law.
In this case, an incompatibility exists between the positions of
the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC. The duties of the CPLC
include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the
actions of the heads of various executive departments and
agencies and to review investigations involving heads of
executive departments and agencies, as well as other
Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an
agency under the Executive Department. Thus, the actions of
the PCGG Chairman are subject to the review of the CPLC.
As CPLC, respondent Elma will be required to give his legal
opinion on his own actions as PCGG Chairman and review any
investigation conducted by the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission, which may involve himself as PCGG Chairman. In
such cases, questions on his impartiality will inevitably be
raised. This is the situation that the law seeks to avoid in
imposing the prohibition against holding incompatible offices.
While Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution applies in
general to all elective and appointive officials, Section 13, Article
VII, thereof applies in particular to Cabinet secretaries,
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries. The persons cited in
Article VII are the “Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants.” These terms must be given their common and
general acceptation as referring to the heads of the executive
departments, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries.
Public officials given the rank equivalent to a Secretary,
Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary are not covered by the
prohibition, nor is the Solicitor General affected thereby. Thus,
the strict prohibition under Sec13, Article VII is not applicable to
the PCGG Chairman nor to the CPLC, as neither of them is a
secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary, even if
the former may have the same rank as the latter positions.
In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, the Court
stressed that the language of Section 13, Article VII is a definite
and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple
offices or employment. The Court cautiously allowed only two
exceptions to the rule against multiple offices: (1) those
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provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article
VII, authorizing the Vice-President to become a member of the
Cabinet; or (2) posts occupied by the Executive officials
specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and
as required by the primary functions of said officials’ office. The
Court further qualified that additional duties must not only be
closely related to, but must be required by the official’s primary
functions. Moreover, the additional post must be exercised in
an ex-officio capacity, which “denotes an act done in an official
character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other
appointment or authority than that conferred by the office.”
Thus, it will not suffice that no additional compensation shall be
received by virtue of the second appointment, it is mandatory
that the second post is required by the primary functions of the
first appointment and is exercised in an ex-officio capacity.
Doctrine/Notes: List of officials under Article VII Section 13 is
exclusive.
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized
by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.
Doctrine
Q. May the Board of the Cultural Center of the Philippines be
authorized to fill a vacancy in the Board.
A. No. Section 16 says: “The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards.” It is the chairman who
may be given authority; but even he can appoint only
officers lower in rank, not officers equal in rank with the
appointing authority. Rufino v Endriga, G.R. No. 139554,
July 21, 2006.
RUFINO V ENDRIGA
PD 15 created the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) for
the primary purpose of propagating arts and culture in the
Philippines. PD 15 created a Board of Trustees (“Board”) to
govern the CCP.
After EDSA1, President Aquino asked for the courtesy
resignations of the then incumbent CCP trustees and appointed
new trustees to the Board.
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
Eventually, during the term of President Fidel V. Ramos, the
CCP Board included the Endriga group.
President Estrada then appointed 7 new trustees (the Rufino
group) to the CCP Board to replace the Endriga group. The
Rufino group took their respective oaths of office and
assumed their duties in early January 1999.
Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto questioning
Estrada’s appointment. They alleged that under Section 6(b) of
PD 15, vacancies in the CCP Board “shall be filled by election
by a vote of a majority of the trustees held at the next regular
meeting.” They claimed that it is only when the CCP Board is
entirely vacant may the President fill such vacancies, acting in
consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP. They refused
to accept that the CCP was under the supervision and control of
the President, citing Sec3 of PD 15, which states that the CCP
“shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation.”
The Rufino group asserted that the law could only delegate to
the CCP Board the power to appoint officers lower in rank than
the trustees of the Board. The law may not validly confer on the
CCP trustees the authority to appoint their fellow trustees, for
the latter are of equal rank and not of lower rank.
Issue: WON the president may appoint members of the CCP
board?
Held: YES. The power to appoint is the prerogative of the
President, except in those instances when the Constitution
provides otherwise. Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, the President appoints three groups of officers.
The first group refers to the heads of the Executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
the President by the Constitution. The second group refers to
those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint.
The third group refers to all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. Under
the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked
officers whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President appoints the first group of officers with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President
appoints the second and third groups of officers without the
consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President
appoints the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is
the appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a
department, agency, commission, or board to appoint is
declared unconstitutional. Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15
is found unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the
trustees of the CCP Board because the trustees fall under the
third group of officers.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly intended that
Congress could by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked
officers in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. The clear intent is that inferior or lower in rank officers
are the subordinates of the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards who are vested by law with the power
to appoint. The conclusion is that the officers whom the heads
of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards may appoint
must be of lower rank than those vested by law with the power
to appoint.
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Congress has the discretion to grant to, or withhold from, the
heads of agencies, commissions, or boards the power to
appoint lower-ranked officers. If it so grants, Congress may
impose certain conditions for the exercise of such legislative
delegation, like requiring the recommendation of subordinate
officers or the concurrence of the other members of the
commission or board. This is in contrast to the President’s
power to appoint which is a self-executing power vested by the
Constitution itself and thus not subject to legislative limitations
or conditions. The power to appoint conferred directly by the
Constitution on the Supreme Court en banc and on the
Constitutional Commissions is also self-executing and not
subject to legislative limitations or conditions.
Thus, the Chairman of the CCP Board is the “head” of the CCP
who may be vested by law, under Section 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, with the power to appoint lower-ranked
officers of the CCP. The CCP, being governed by a board, is not
an agency but a board for purposes of Section 16, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution.
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is thus irreconcilably inconsistent
with Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Section
6(b) and (c) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees of the
CCP Board to fill vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing them to
elect their fellow trustees. On the other hand, Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allows heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards to appoint only “officers lower
in rank” than such “heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards.” This excludes a situation where the
appointing officer appoints an officer equal in rank as him.
Thus, insofar as it authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to
elect their co-trustees, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is
unconstitutional because it violates Section 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution.
The CCP is part of the Executive branch. No law can cut off the
President’s control over the CCP in the guise of insulating the
CCP from the President’s influence. By stating that the
“President shall have control of all the executive offices,” the
1987 Constitution empowers the President not only to influence
but even to control all offices in the Executive branch, including
the CCP. Control is far greater than, and subsumes, influence.
Doctrine/Notes: It is the head of the board, not the board itself,
who should appoint officers lower in rank.
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
Doctrine
Q. Is the resolution of the Secretary of Justice directing the
prosecutor to withdraw an information in a criminal case
reviewable by the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the
1997 Rules of Court?
A. No. The DOJ’s act is an exercise of the power of control.
Appeal should first be made to the Office of the President in
order to exhaust administrative remedies. Decision of the
Office of the President may then be appealed. Orosa v.
Roa, GR 14047, July 14, 2006.
The Constitution’s express grant of the power of control to the
President justifies an executive action to carry out
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
reorganization measures under a broad authority of law. Anak
Mindanao v. Executive Sec, G.R. No. 166052 , August 29,
2007.
Executive Order No. 102 reorganizing the health sector is
challenged on the ground that it cannot be done by th President
but should be done by the legislture. This Court has already
ruled in a number of cases that the President may, by executive
or administrative order, direct the reorganization of government
entities under the Executive Department. This is also sanctioned
under the Constitution, as well as other statutes.Section 17,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: “[T]he
president shall have control of all executive departments,
bureaus and offices.” Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of
Executive Order No. 292, also known as the Administrative
Code of 1987. G.R. No. 167324, July 17, 2007. Tondo Medical
Center Employees v. CA. G.R. No. 167324, July 17, 2007.
The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of
the Department of Health under the Constitution and statutory
laws. This authority is an adjunct of his power of control under
Article VII, Sections 1 and 17 of the 1987 Constitution, viz.:
In Canonizado v. Aguirre, we held that reorganization “involves
the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition
thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.” It
alters the existing structure of government offices or units
therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility
between them. While the power to abolish an office is generally
lodged with the legislature, the authority of the President to
reorganize the executive branch, which may include such
abolition, is permissible under our present laws. Malaria
Employees v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 160093, July 31,
2007.
OROSA V. ROA
Orosa, a dentist by profession, charged Roa, also a dentist, with
the crime of libel. The complaint stemmed from an article
entitled “Truth vs. Rumors: Questions against Dr. Orosa” written
by Orosa and published in the March-April 1996 issue of the
Dental Trading Post, a bi-monthly publication of the Dental
Exchange Co., Inc. In gist, the article delved into the possibility
of a father, who happened to be an examiner in a licensure
examination for dentistry where his sons were examinees,
manipulating the examinations or the results thereof to enable
his children to top the same.
Petitioner alleged that the article in question is defamatory as it
besmirched his honor and reputation as a dentist and as the
topnotcher in the dental board examinations held in May 1994.
Respondent denied the accusation, claiming that the article
constitutes a “fair and accurate report on a matter of both public
and social concern.” He averred that the article in question was
not written with malice but with a sincere desire to contribute to
the improvement of the integrity of professional examinations.
After preliminary investigation, Pasig City Prosecutor dismissed
the petitioner's complaint. Orosa appealed to the DOJ. Acting
on the appeal, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño issued a
Resolution setting aside the findings of the City Prosecutor and
directing the latter to file an Information for libel against
respondent. Accordingly, in the RTC of Pasig City, an
Information for libel was filed against respondent.
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Respondent thus appealed to the Secretary of Justice. Then
Justice Secretary Serafin Cuevas reversed the Zuño Resolution
and directed the City Prosecutor of Pasig to withdraw the
Information earlier filed with the RTC. In compliance therewith, a
“Motion to Withdraw Information” was accordingly filed in court
by the Pasig City Prosecution Office.
Petitioner seasonably moved for a reconsideration but his
motion was denied by the Secretary of Justice in his Resolution
of May 12, 1999. Petitioner then went to the CA on a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. However,
the CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the Pasig City
Prosecution Office and the DOJ are not among those quasi-
judicial agencies included in Section 1 of Rule 43 whose final
orders are subject to review by the CA.
Section 1 of Rule 43 provides that: Section 1. Scope.― This Rule shall
apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals, and from
awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial
agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil
Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security
Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology
Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act
No. 6657, Government Service and Insurance System, Employees' Compensation
Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic
Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.
Issues/Held:
1. W/N PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS QUASI-JUDICIAL
IN NATURE.
No. The prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not
exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary
investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means
of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with
a crime and to enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or
information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that
the accused is guilty thereof. While the prosecutor makes that
determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court,
for it is the courts, ultimately that pass judgment on the accused,
not the fiscal prosecutor.
2. W/N THE DECISION OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR AND
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE IS SUBJECT TO REVIEW
OF THE CA.
No. The exclusion of the DOJ from Rule 43 is deliberate being
in consonance with the constitutional power of control lodged in
the President over executive departments, bureaus and offices.
This power of control, which even Congress cannot limit, let
alone withdraw, means the power of the Chief Executive to
review, alter, modify, nullify, or set aside what a subordinate had
done in the performance of their duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter. Being thus under
the control of the President, the Secretary of Justice is subject
to review of the former.
In fine, recourse from the decision of the Secretary of Justice
should be to the President, instead of the CA, under the
established principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
is that if an appeal or remedy obtains or is available within the
administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before
resort can be made to the courts. Immediate recourse to the
court would be premature and precipitate subject to defined
exception, a case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of
action should a party fail to exhaust administrative remedies.
Notably, Section 1 of Rule 43 includes the Office of the
President in the agencies named therein, thereby accentuating
the fact that appeals from rulings of department heads must first
be taken to and resolved by that office before any appellate
recourse may be resorted to.
ANAK MINDANAO V. EXECUTIVE SEC
Petitioners Anak Mindanao Party-List Group (AMIN) and
Mamalo Descendants Organization, Inc. (MDOI) assail the
constitutionality of Executive Order (E.O.) Nos. 364 and 379.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 364
TRANSFORMING THE DAR INTO THE DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORM
SECTION 1. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby transformed into the
Department of Land Reform. It shall be responsible for all land reform in the country,
including agrarian reform, urban land reform, and ancestral domain reform.
SECTION 2. The PCUP is hereby placed under the supervision and control of the
Department of Land Reform. The Chairman of the PCUP shall be ex-officio
Undersecretary of the Department of Land Reform for Urban Land Reform.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 379
AMENDING EO 364 ENTITLED TRANSFORMING THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM INTO THE DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORM
Section 1. Amending Section 3 of Executive Order No. 364. Section 3 of Executive
Order No. 364, dated September 27, 2004 shall now read as follows: “Section 3. The
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall be an attached agency of the
Department of Land Reform.”
Issue: WON placing the Presidential Commission for the Urban
Poor (PCUP) under the supervision and control of the DAR, and
the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) under
the DAR as an attached agency was proper?
Held: YES. AMIN contends that since the DAR, PCUP and
NCIP were created by statutes, they can only be transformed,
merged or attached by statutes, not by mere executive orders.
While AMIN concedes that the executive power is vested in the
President who, as Chief Executive, holds the power of control of
all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices, it posits that
this broad power of control including the power to reorganize is
qualified and limited, for it cannot be exercised in a manner
contrary to law, citing the constitutional duty of the President to
ensure that the laws, including those creating the agencies, be
faithfully executed.
AMIN cites the naming of the PCUP as a presidential
commission to be clearly an extension of the President, and the
creation of the NCIP as an “independent agency under the
Office of the President.” It thus argues that since the legislature
had seen fit to create these agencies at separate times and with
distinct mandates, the President should respect that legislative
disposition.
In fine, AMIN contends that any reorganization of these
administrative agencies should be the subject of a statute.
AMIN’s position fails to impress.
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The Constitution confers, by express provision, the power of
control over executive departments, bureaus and offices in the
President alone. And it lays down a limitation on the legislative
power. The Constitution’s express grant of the power of control
in the President justifies an executive action to carry out
reorganization measures under a broad authority of law.
In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to have
deliberated with full knowledge of all existing laws and
jurisprudence on the subject. It is thus reasonable to conclude
that in passing a statute which places an agency under the
Office of the President, it was in accordance with existing laws
and jurisprudence on the President’s power to reorganize.
In establishing an executive department, bureau or office, the
legislature necessarily ordains an executive agency’s position in
the scheme of administrative structure. Such determination is
primary, but subject to the President’s continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure. As far as bureaus,
agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned,
the power of control may justify the President to deactivate the
functions of a particular office. Or a law may expressly grant the
President the broad authority to carry out reorganization
measures. The Administrative Code of 1987 is one such law:
SEC. 30. Functions of Agencies under the Office of the President.– Agencies under the
Office of the President shall continue to operate and function in accordance with their
respective charters or laws creating them, except as otherwise provided in this Code or
by law.
SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office.– The
President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of the
following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper,
including the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers
System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating,
or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the
President from other Departments and Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department
or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other
departments or agencies.
In carrying out the laws into practical operation, the President is
best equipped to assess whether an executive agency ought to
continue operating in accordance with its charter or the law
creating it. This is not to say that the legislature is incapable of
making a similar assessment and appropriate action within its
plenary power. The Administrative Code of 1987 merely
underscores the need to provide the President with suitable
solutions to situations on hand to meet the exigencies of the
service that may call for the exercise of the power of control.
As thus provided by law, the President may transfer any agency
under the Office of the President to any other department or
agency, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order
to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. Gauged against
these guidelines, the challenged executive orders may not be
said to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion or in
violation of the rule of law.
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
MALARIA EMPLOYEES V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
In question is the validity of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 102, the
law Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the
Department of Health. Then President Joseph E. Estrada issued
E.O. No. 102 pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987, and
the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 1998. E.O. No. 102
provided for structural changes and redirected the functions and
operations of the Department of Health.
Pursuant to such reorganization, certain employees were
affected. Petitioner Malaria Employees and Workers Association
of the Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP) is a union of affected
employees in the Malaria Control Service of the Department of
Health. MEWAP filed a complaint, seeks to nullify Department
Memorandum No. 157, the NOSCA and the Placement List of
Department of Health Personnel and other issuances
implementing E.O. No. 102.
Issue: Whether Executive Order No. 102 is null and void.
Held: NO. The President has the authority to carry out a
reorganization of the Department of Health under the
Constitution and statutory laws. This authority is an adjunct of
his power of control under Article VII, Sections 1 and 17 of the
1987 Constitution.
“The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a
public office is lodged with the legislature. This proceeds from
the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to
destroy. A public office is either created by the Constitution, by
statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the office was
created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the
same legislature that brought it into existence. xxx The
exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or
offices in the executive department are concerned, the
President’s power of control may justify him to inactivate the
functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant him the
broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.”
The President’s power to reorganize the executive branch is
also an exercise of his residual powers under the Administrative
Code, which grants the President broad organization powers to
implement reorganization measures.
The residual powers granted to the President under Section 20,
Title I, Book III are too broad to be construed as having a sole
application to the Office of the President. As correctly stated by
respondents, there is nothing in E.O. No. 292 which provides
that the continuing authority should apply only to the Office of
the President. If such was the intent of the law, the same should
have been expressly stated. To adopt the argument of
petitioners would result to two conflicting provisions in one
statute. It is a basic canon of statutory construction that in
interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part
thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an
integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting
provisions. The rule is that a construction that would render a
provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently
inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible
as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.
Be that as it may, the President must exercise good faith in
carrying out the reorganization of any branch or agency of the
executive department. Reorganization is effected in good faith if
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it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient. R.A. No. 6656 provides for the circumstances which
may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of
civil service employees made as a result of reorganization, to
wit: (a) where there is a significant increase in the number of
positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency
concerned; (b) where an office is abolished and another
performing substantially the same functions is created; (c)
where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms
of status of appointment, performance and merit; (d) where
there is a classification of offices in the department or agency
concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the
same functions as the original offices; and (e) where the
removal violates the order of separation.
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the
President did not commit bad faith in the questioned
reorganization.
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief
of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety
requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days,
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place
the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within
forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in
writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a
vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined
by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist
and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within
twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without
need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the
operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning
of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize
the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to
function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly
connected with, invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or
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FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
detained shall be judicially charged within three days,
otherwise he shall be released.
Doctrine
Q. When the President declares a state of emergency and calls
out the Armed Forces, does such an act give to the
President additional powers?
A. The declaration of a state of emergency is merely a
description of a situation which authorizes her to call out the
Armed Forces to help the police maintain law and order. It
gives no new power to her, nor to the military, nor to the
police. Certainly it does not authorize warrantless arrests
or control of media. David v. Ermita, G.R. No. 171409, May
3, 2006.
Q. May the President as Commander in Chief prevent an Army
General from appearing in a legislative investigation and, if
disobeyed, is the general subject to court martial?
A. The General is subject to court martial and must justify his
disobedience to the President as Commander in Chief.
However, Congress may challenge the President’s order
before the Supreme Court. Gudani v. Senga, G.R. No.
170165, August 15, 2006.
DAVID V. ERMITA
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th
Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo
issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the
Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of
the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which
states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the)
armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity as their
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience
to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally
or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do
hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
She then issued General orders 5 implementing PP 1017,
stating:
NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested
in me under the Constitution as President of the Republic of the Philippines, and
Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation
No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress
acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country;
I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as well as the
officers and men of the AFP and PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless
violence.”
Exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national
emergency and after all these petitions had been filed, the
President lifted PP1017 via Proclamation 1021 which reads:
“NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by law, hereby declare that the state of
national emergency has ceased to exist.”
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Issues/Held:
(1) WHETHER THE SUPREME COURT CAN REVIEW THE
FACTUAL BASES OF PP 1017?
YES. While the Court considered the President’s “calling-out”
power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it
stressed that “this does not prevent an examination of whether
such power was exercised within permissible constitutional
limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion.” As to how the Court may inquire into the
President’s exercise of power, Lansang adopted the test that
“judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not
that the President’s decision is correct,” but that “the President
did not act arbitrarily.” Thus, the standard laid down is not
correctness, but arbitrariness. In Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, this Court further ruled that “it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of
factual basis.” This Petitioners failed to show. A reading of the
Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum
shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance
of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records.
Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their
audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the
military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving
statements from the communist leaders. There was also the
Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the
Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA
and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such
events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is
convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017
calling for military aid.
(2) WON PP1017 AND GO5 ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
The first provision pertains to the President’s calling-out
power. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution grants the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, a “sequence” of graduated
powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the
calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that
“whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may call the
armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion.” Under the calling-out power, the President may
summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless
violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police
action. But every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-
out power is considered illegal or ultra vires.
However, as to the provision in PP1017 which states in
part: “to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees x x x
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction,” this is
unconstitutional. The President is granted only Ordinance
Powers under the Administrative Code of 1987, where she may
issue only executive orders, administrative orders,
proclamations, memorandum orders, memorandum circulars
and general or special orders. She cannot issue decrees similar
to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional
insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate
“decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of
the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that
“the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of
rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s
exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
GUDANI V. SENGA
Petitioners are high-ranking officers of the AFP. They were
invited by Sen. Biazon to appear at a public hearing before the
Senate Committee, concerning the 2004 elections and the Hello
Garci Tape. The Chief of Staff of the AFP then approved their
requests for travel authority.
Then on the evening of 27 September 2005, at around 10:10
p.m., a message was transmitted to the PMA Superintendent
from the office of Gen. Senga, stating that President Arroyo has
instructed that no AFP personnel shall appear before the
congressional hearing without her approval.
The following day, Gen. Senga sent another letter to Sen.
Biazon, this time informing the senator that “no approval has
been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear”
before the hearing scheduled on that day. Nonetheless, both
Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were present as the hearing
started, and they both testified as to the conduct of the 2004
elections.
Both officers were subjected to courts martial for defiance of the
orders.
Issue: WON the President prevent a member of the armed
forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry?
Held: YES, the Court in Senate v. Ermita declared both Section
2(b) and Section 3 void. But the impression may have been left
by Senate that it settled as doctrine, that the President is
prohibited from requiring military personnel from attending
congressional hearings without having first secured prior
presidential consent. That impression is wrong.
We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so,
by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a
consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is
liable under military justice. At the same time, we also hold that
any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it
of a military officer against the consent of the President has
adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any
military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may
be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not
so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order
to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial
orders have the force of the law of the land which the President
has the duty to faithfully execute.
In Senate, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on
executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be
formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of
the President to prevent military officers from testifying before
Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief
Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions
and speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s
prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the
same limitations as in executive privilege.
Doctrine/Notes: Senate v. Ermita ruling was decided based on
executive privilege, but does not apply to military personnel
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(governed by commander-in-chief provision), who must still
seek approval from president.
Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be
valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
Doctrine
Q. President Estrada signed the Treaty on the Internatinal
Criminal Court before he was ousted. But he did not submit
it to the Senate for concurrence. May the Executive
Department be compelled by mandamus to submit it to the
Senate?
A. No. Entering into a treaty is a prerogative solely of the
President. Pimentel v Ermita, G.R. No. 158088, July 6,
2005
PIMENTEL V. ERMITA
The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court.
Philippines signed the Statute on December 28, 2000 through
Charge d’ Affairs Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the UN. Its
provisions, however, require that it be subject to ratification,
acceptance or approval of the signatory states.
Petitioners filed the instant petition to compel the respondents
Executive Secretary and Secretary of Foreign Affairs to transmit
the signed text of the treaty to the Senate of the Philippines for
ratification.
It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty,
under both domestic law and international law, is a function of
the Senate. Moreover, petitioners submit that the Philippines
has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute under treaty law
and customary international law, invoking the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties enjoining the states to refrain
from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty
when they have signed the treaty prior to ratification unless they
have made their intention clear not to become parties thereto.
Issue: Whether the Executive Secretary and the Department of
Foreign Affairs have a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate
the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the
Philippine Mission to the United Nations even without the
signature of the President?
Held: NO. While the President has the sole authority to
negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a
limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all
the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered
into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
provides that “no treaty or international agreement shall be valid
and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.”
In filing this petition, the petitioners interpret Section 21, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution to mean that the power to ratify
treaties belongs to the Senate. We disagree. Petitioners’
arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine
representative with ratification. The signature is primarily
intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and as a
symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is usually performed
by the state’s authorized representative in the diplomatic
mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act by
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
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which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty
concluded by its representative. It is generally held to be an
executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the
government.
Under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the
President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of
the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its
consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within
the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the
Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse
to ratify it.


ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide,
final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of
any treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,
assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in
relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court
is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is
involved.
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other
stations as public interest may require. Such temporary
assignment shall not exceed six months without the
consent of the judge concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a
miscarriage of justice.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance
to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in
accordance with the Civil Service Law.
Doctrines
Q. Rule 67 says that entry into expropriated property may be
made even before full payment provided a deposit is made
of an amount fixed by the court. R.A. 8974 requires full
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payment before entry in public works projects. May
Congress amend Rules of Court.
A. Rule 67 involves both procedural and substantive matter.
Substantive rules are always subject to legislation.
Republic v. Gingoyon, G.R. 166429, February 1, 2006.
NOTE: Review by the Court of Appeals of the trial court’s
judgment imposing the death penalty is now automatic and
mandatory under Rule 122, Sections 3(d) and 10 of the Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, People v. Lagua,
G.R. No. 170565, January 31, 2006.
NOTE: The challenge of Francisco to the Flag Scheme was
dismissed (1) for want of standing and (2) for raising a question
of fact before the Supreme Court. Francisco v. Bayani
Fernando, G.R. No. 166501, November 16, 2006.
A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of
public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. Significantly, a taxpayer need not be a
party to the contract to challenge its validity. Abaya et al v.
Ebdane et al, GR 167919, February 14, 2007.
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution gives this Court the
power to "[p]romulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts." It is within the inherent power of the
Court to suspend its own rules in particular cases in order to do
justice. Lim et al v. CA, G.R. No. 149748, November 16, 2006.
The rule for the review of decisions of lower courts imposing
death or reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment are not the
same. In case the sentence is death, there is automatic review
by the Court of Appeals and ultimately by the Supreme Court.
This is mandatory and neither the accused nor the courts may
waive the right of appeal. In the case of the sentence of
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, however, although the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review them, the review is not
mandatory. Therefore review in these later cases may be
waived and appeal may be withdrawn. People v. Rocha and
Ramos, G.R. No. 173797, August 31, 2007.
REPUBLIC V. GINGOYON
In the Resolution dated 21 January 2004 in Agan v. PIATCO SC
held that PIATCO, as builder of the NAIA 3 facilities, must first
be justly compensated in accordance with law for the
Government to take over the facilities.
The Government was required to first pay PIATCO the amount
of 3.02 Million Pesos before it may acquire physical possession
over the facilities. This directive enjoining payment is in
accordance with Republic Act No. 8974, and under the
mechanism established by the law the amount to be initially paid
is that which is provisionally determined as just compensation.
The provisional character of this payment means that it is not
yet final, yet sufficient under law to entitle the Gov’t to the writ of
possession over the expropriated property.
However, the Government contends in this MR, that Rep. Act
No. 8974 could not repeal Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, since
the deposit of the assessed value is a procedural matter. [It is
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
proposed that Congress cannot pass a law contrary to the rules
of court as established by the SC]
Issue: WON Congress can amend rules of procedure (rules of
court) by passing a law, even when substantive rights are
affected?
Held: YES. This point was already addressed in the Decision,
which noted that the determination of the appropriate standards
for just compensation is a substantive matter well within the
province of the legislature to fix. As held in Fabian v. Desierto, if
the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural, and so
the converse certainly holds that if the rule or provision creates
a right, it should be properly appreciated as substantive in
nature. Indubitably, a matter is substantive when it involves the
creation of rights to be enjoyed by the owner of property to be
expropriated. The right of the owner to receive just
compensation prior to acquisition of possession by the State of
the property is a proprietary right, appropriately classified as a
substantive matter and, thus, within the sole province of the
legislature to legislate on.
It is possible for a substantive matter to be nonetheless
embodied in a rule of procedure, and to a certain extent, Rule
67 does contain matters of substance. Yet the absorption of the
substantive point into a procedural rule does not prevent the
substantive right from being superseded or amended by statute,
for the creation of property rights is a matter for the legislature to
enact on, and not for the courts to decide upon. Indeed, if the
position of the Government is sustained, it could very well lead
to the absurd situation wherein the judicial branch of
government may shield laws with the veneer of irrepealability
simply by absorbing the provisions of law into the rules of
procedure. When the 1987 Constitution restored to the judicial
branch of government the sole prerogative to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it should be
understood that such rules necessarily pertain to points of
procedure, and not points of substantive law.
FRANCISCO V. BAYANI FERNANDO
Petitioner prays for the Prohibition writ to enjoin respondents
Bayani F. Fernando, Chairman of the MMDA and the MMDA
from further implementing its “wet flag scheme” (“Flag
Scheme”). Petitioner contends that the Flag Scheme: (1) has no
legal basis because the MMDA’s governing body, the Metro
Manila Council, did not authorize it; (2) violates the Due Process
Clause because it is a summary punishment for jaywalking; (3)
disregards the Constitutional protection against cruel,
degrading, and inhuman punishment; and (4) violates
“pedestrian rights” as it exposes pedestrians to various potential
hazards.
Issue: WON the SC should take cognizance?
Held: NO. The petition ultimately calls for a factual
determination of whether the Flag Scheme is a reasonable
enforcement of anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar
enactments. This Court is not a trier of facts. The petition
proffers mere surmises and speculations on the potential
hazards of the Flag Scheme. This Court cannot determine the
reasonableness of the Flag Scheme based on mere surmises
and speculations.
Petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when he
filed this petition directly with us. This Court’s jurisdiction to
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issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus, while concurrent with the Regional Trial
Courts and the Court of Appeals, does not give litigants
unrestrained freedom of choice of forum from which to seek
such relief. We relax this rule only in exceptional and
compelling circumstances. This is not the case here.
ABAYA ET AL V. EBDANE ET AL
The CPI project is one of the four packages comprising the
project for the rehabilitation of the Catanduanes Circumferential
Road. The project is between the Japan Bank for International
Cooperation (JBIC) and the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines. The Exchange of Notes provided that the loans to
be extended by the Government of Japan to the Philippines
consisted of two loans.
Subsequently, the DPWH, as the government agency tasked to
implement the project, caused the publication of the “Invitation
to Prequalify and to Bid” for the implementation of the CP I
project. DPWH, with the approval of then Acting Secretary
Soriquez, issued the assailed Resolution recommending the
award in favor of private respondent China Road & Bridge
Corporation. A Contract of Agreement was entered into by and
between the DPWH and private respondent China Road &
Bridge Corporation for the implementation of the CP I project.
Petitioner Plaridel M. Abaya claims that he filed the instant
petition as a taxpayer, former lawmaker, and a Filipino citizen.
Petitioner Plaridel C. Garcia likewise claims that he filed the suit
as a taxpayer, former military officer, and a Filipino citizen.
Issue: WON petitioners have locus standi?
Held: YES, as a taxpayer’s suit. Petitioners assert that they
have standing or locus standi to file the instant petition. They
claim that as taxpayers and concerned citizens, they have the
right and duty to question the expenditure of public funds on
illegal acts.
According to the public respondents, a taxpayer’s locus standi
was recognized in the following cases: (a) where a tax measure
is assailed as unconstitutional; (b) where there is a question of
validity of election laws; (c) where legislators questioned the
validity of any official action upon the claim that it infringes on
their prerogatives as legislators; (d) where there is a claim of
illegal disbursement or wastage of public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law; (e) where it
involves the right of members of the Senate or House of
Representatives to question the validity of a presidential veto or
condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bill; or (f)
where it involves an invalid law, which when enforced will put
the petitioner in imminent danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result thereof, or that he has been or is about to be
denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or
that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute complained of. None of the above
considerations allegedly obtains in the present case.
The prevailing doctrine in taxpayer’s suits is to allow taxpayers
to question contracts entered into by the national government or
government- owned or controlled corporations allegedly in
contravention of law. A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there
is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law. Significantly, a taxpayer need
not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity.
In the present case, the petitioners are suing as taxpayers.
They have sufficiently demonstrated that, notwithstanding the
fact that the CP I project is primarily financed from loans
obtained by the government from the JBIC, nonetheless,
taxpayers’ money would be or is being spent on the project
considering that the Philippine Government is required to
allocate a peso-counterpart therefor. The public respondents
themselves admit that appropriations for these foreign-assisted
projects in the GAA are composed of the loan proceeds and the
peso-counterpart. The counterpart funds, the Solicitor General
explains, refer to the component of the project cost to be
financed from government-appropriated funds, as part of the
government’s commitment in the implementation of the project.
Hence, the petitioners correctly asserted their standing since a
part of the funds being utilized in the implementation of the CP I
project partakes of taxpayers’ money.
LIM ET AL V. CA
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the
Court of Appeals, in relation to a labor case. Said petition was
dismissed outright in the CA's assailed Resolution, based on the
following grounds:
(1) The Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
are signed by counsel and not by the petitioner[s] which
is in violation of the Supreme Court [r]uling in Escorpizo
v. University of Baguio (306 SCRA 497);
(2) Petitioner[s'] counsel, in the Verification as to Material
Dates, only alleged the date of receipt of the December
11, 2000 NLRC Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration but failed to allege the date of receipt of
the June 6, 2000 NLRC Resolution;
(3) The IBP Official Receipt Number as well as the date of its
issuance to petitioner[s'] counsel are not current, in
violation of the SC En Banc Resolution dated September
26, 2000 in Bar Matter No. 287; and
(4) The petition does not contain a written explanation on the
mode of service as required under Section 11, Rule 13 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration on May 10,
2001 which was likewise denied for being filed out of time.
Private respondents belabor the fact that petitioners filed their
petition for certiorari with the CA: a) with its verification and
certification of non-forum shopping signed by counsel instead of
the parties; b) without a statement of the date of receipt of the
June 6, 2000 NLRC Resolution; c) with their counsel's IBP
Official Receipt Number being outdated; and d) without a written
explanation on the mode of service as required under Section
11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Private
respondents point out that petitioners' motion for
reconsideration with the CA was filed 27 days after the last day
for filing the same. Private respondent M&S also questions
petitioners' resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court with this Court. It contends that the proper
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remedy with this Court from the resolution of the CA is an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.
Issue: WON THE CASE SHOULD BE GIVEN DUE COURSE?
Held: YES. It is within the inherent power of the Court to
suspend its own rules in particular cases in order to do justice.
In Kathy-O Enterprises v. NLRC, the Court held: When proper,
no serious impediment bars the allowance of tardy appeals
under the Rules of Court, in recognition of this Court's inherent
power to suspend adjective rules. It is a different matter,
however, when the period to appeal is provided by statute, as in
labor cases. For obvious reasons, this Court cannot ordinarily
suspend the statute's operation. x x x Nevertheless, if only to be
able to dispense substantial justice, strict observance of the
period to appeal may not be exacted. Thus, in Firestone Tire
and Rubber Co. of the Philippines v. Lariosa, an appeal in a
labor dispute was given due course despite the lapse of 14 days
from notice of the decision, due to the fact that the Notice of
Decision received by Lariosa's lawyer advised the parties that
the appeal could be taken to the NLRC within 10 "working" days
— not calendar days — from notice of the decision. For the
same reason was the appeal in Chong Guan Trading v. NLRC
allowed. While in City Fair Corporation v. NLRC, we ruled that
the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
entertained an appeal filed 1 day late considering that the "facts
and circumstances of the case warrant liberality considering the
amount and the issue involved." In the same case, the Court
likewise explained that the underlying purpose behind the
principle that the perfection of an appeal within the statutory or
reglementary period is not only mandatory, but jurisdictional,
and failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and
executory is to prevent needless delay -- a circumstance which
would allow the employer to wear out the efforts and meager
resources of the worker to the point that the latter is constrained
to settle for less than what is due him.
In the case at bar, applying the Rules strictly would result in the
pernicious delay sought to be avoided. At stake is the
protection of the rights of almost a hundred employees to the
satisfaction of a judgment that has become final and executory
in a decision rendered by us more than 7 years ago. A scheme
to thwart the execution of our final and executory decision is
extant in the records. Moreover, barring the instant petition on
technical grounds would leave the workers without recourse
since the subject real properties were levied due to the
insufficiency of judgment debtor CTCI's money and personal
properties to satisfy the decision sought to be executed.
Petitioners' resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is
proper considering that petitioners are assailing the resolutions
of the CA dismissing their petition outright. Ordinarily, the
proper recourse of an aggrieved party from a decision of the CA
is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. However, if the error alleged is one of jurisdiction, or
the act complained of was perpetrated by a court with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules.
Be that as it may, in view of the pendency of this case for more
than a decade and the delay in its execution for more than
seven (7) years, we shall treat the instant case as an appeal
under Rule 45 and resolve the petition on the merits considering
that the entire records of the case have been elevated to us.
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
PEOPLE V. ROCHA AND RAMOS
Trumpeta, Cenita and herein accused-appellants Rocha and
Ramos were found guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide,
and imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. They appealed to this court, which pursuant to the
Decision of this Court in People v. Mateo, was transferred to the
Court of Appeals. CA affirmed the conviction. Thereafter, Rocha
and Ramos, through the Public Attorney’s Office, appealed the
Decision of the Court of Appeals to this Court.
Rocha, having been detained for more than 17 years, filed a
Motion to Withdraw Appeal, stating that he intends to apply for
parole. He also manifested that his co-accused on this case,
Romeo Trumpeta and Estaquio Cenita, had already withdrawn
their appeal. Ramos followed suit and filed his own
Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Appeal. He likewise
manifested that he had already served 14 years in prison and
that all his other co-accused had already withdrawn their
appeal, and applied for executive clemency to avail himself of
parole.
Issue: WON the Motions to Withdraw Appeal of accused-
appellants Rocha and Ramos should be granted.
Held: YES. The confusion in the case at bar seems to stem from
the effects of the Decision of this Court in People v. Mateo. In
Mateo, as quoted by plaintiff-appellee, it was stated that “[w]hile
the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the
Supreme Court of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it
proscribed an intermediate review.” A closer study of Mateo,
however, reveals that the inclusion in the foregoing statement of
cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua and life
imprisonment was only for the purpose of including these cases
within the ambit of the intermediate review of the Court of
Appeals: “[this] Court now deems it wise and compelling to
provide in these cases [cases where the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death] review by the
Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme
Court.”
We had not intended to pronounce in Mateo that cases where
the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
are subject to the mandatory review of this Court. In Mateo,
these cases were grouped together with death penalty cases
because, prior to Mateo, it was this Court which had jurisdiction
to directly review reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment and
death penalty cases alike. The mode of review, however, was
different. Reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment cases were
brought before this Court via a notice of appeal, while death
penalty cases were reviewed by this Court on automatic review.
Thus, the erstwhile Rule 122, Sections 3 and 10, provided as
follows:
SEC. 3. How appeal taken.—
(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the
Regional Trial Court is reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or where a lesser
penalty is imposed but for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose
out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the
penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed, shall be by
filing a notice of appeal in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section.
SEC. 10. Transmission of records in case of death penalty.— In all cases where the
death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the
Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment within five (5) days after the fifteenth
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(15) day following the promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of a motion for
new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten (10) days
after the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter.
After the promulgation of Mateo on 7 June 2004, this Court
promptly caused the amendment of the foregoing provisions,
but retained the distinction of requiring a notice of appeal for
reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment cases and
automatically reviewing death penalty cases. Thus, Rule 122,
Sections 3 and 10, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (which
took effect on 15 October 2004), now provides:
SEC. 3. How appeal taken.—
(c)The appeal in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is imposed but for
offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the same
occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed, shall be by notice of appeal in
accordance with paragraph (a) of this Rule.
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the Regional Trial Court imposed
the death penalty. The Court of Appeals automatically review the Judgment provided
in section 10 of this Rule.
SEC. 10. Transmission of records in case of death penalty.— In all cases where the
death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the Court
of Appeals for automatic review and judgment within twenty days but not earlier than
fifteen days from the promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of a motion for
new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten (10) days
after the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter.
Neither does the Constitution require a mandatory review by this
Court of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment. The constitutional provision quoted in
Mateo merely gives this Court jurisdiction over such cases:
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct
appellate review over all criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or
lower but involving offenses committed on the same occasion or
arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more
serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds
justification in the 1987 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5.
In this provision, only paragraphs (1) and (2) speak of
jurisdiction over cases. However, this Constitutional provision
does not enumerate cases involving mandatory review. Indeed,
it would almost be silly to claim that this Court is mandatorily
required to review all cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower
court is in issue. Instead, the significance of the enumeration of
this Court’s jurisdiction in paragraphs (1) and (2) is that while
Section 2 of the same Article VIII of the Constitution gives to
Congress the power to define, prescribe and apportion the
jurisdiction of various courts, it denies to Congress the power to
deprive this Court of jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
Section 5.
Since the case of accused-appellants is not subject to the
mandatory review of this Court, the rule that neither the accused
nor the courts can waive a mandatory review is not applicable.
Consequently, accused-appellants’ separate motions to
withdraw appeal may be validly granted.
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
Section 7.
(1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme
Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the
Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and
must have been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a
lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the
Philippines.
(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of
judges of lower courts, but no person may be
appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the
Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.
(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence.
Doctrine
Before Gregory Ong can accept appointment to the Supreme
Court he must correct the entry in his birth certificagte saying he
is an alien. Kilosbayan v. Ermita, G.R. No. 177721, July 3,
2007.
It behooves every prospective appointee to the Judiciary to
apprise the appointing authority of every matter bearing on his
fitness for judicial office, including such circumstances as may
reflect on his integrity and probity. These are qualifications
specifically required of appointees to the Judiciary by Sec. 7(3),
Article VIII of the Constitution.
In this case, Judge Quitain failed to disclose that he had been
administratively charged and dismissed from the service for
grave misconduct per A.O. No. 183 dated April 10, 1995 by no
less than the former President of the Philippines. He insists that
on November 26, 2001 or before he filed with the JBC his
verified PDS in support of his application for RTC Judge, he had
no knowledge of A.O. No. 183; and that he was denied due
process. He further argues that since all the criminal cases filed
against him were dismissed on August 2, 1995 and July 17,
2000, and considering the fact that he resigned from office, his
administrative case had become moot and academic. In re JBC
v. Judge Quitain, JBC No. 013, August 22, 2007.
KILOSBAYAN V. ERMITA
Executive Secretary Ermita announced an appointment in favor
of Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court. Petitioners objected, claiming that respondent Ong is a
Chinese citizen, and that his own birth certificate indicates his
Chinese citizenship.
As to his citizenship, respondent Ong traces his ancestral lines
to one Maria Santos, who was allegedly a Filipino citizen who
married Chan Kin, a Chinese citizen; that they had a son, Juan
Santos; that Chan Kin died in China, as a result of which Maria
Santos reverted to her Filipino citizenship; that at that time Juan
Santos was a minor; that Juan Santos thereby also became a
Filipino citizen; that respondent Ong’s mother, Dy Guiok Santos,
is the daughter of the spouses Juan Santos and Sy Siok Hian, a
Chinese citizen; that, respondent’s mother was a Filipino citizen
at birth; that Dy Guiok Santos later married a Chinese citizen,
Eugenio Ong Han Seng, thereby becoming a Chinese citizen;
that when respondent Ong was 11. his father, Han Seng, was
naturalized, and as a result he, his brothers and sisters, and his
mother were included in the naturalization.
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Respondent Ong subsequently obtained from the Bureau of
Immigration and the DOJ a certification and an identification that
he is a natural-born Filipino citizen under Article IV, Sections 1
and 2 of the Constitution, since his mother was a Filipino citizen
when he was born.
Issue: WON respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen?
Held: In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, Ong
alleged that he is qualified to be admitted because, he is a
Filipino citizen; and that he is a Filipino citizen because his
father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a Chinese citizen, was
naturalized in 1964 when he, respondent Ong, was a minor of
11 years and thus he, too, thereby became a Filipino citizen.
His birth certificate states that he was a Chinese citizen at birth
and that his mother, Dy Guiok Santos, was a Chinese citizen
and his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was also a Chinese
citizen.
It is clear that from the records, respondent Ong is a naturalized
Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his
natural-born status by the BOI and the DOJ cannot amend the
final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and
his mother were naturalized along with his father.
No substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil register
can be made without a judicial order, and, under the law, a
change in citizenship status is a substantial change. Substantial
corrections to the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded
in the civil registry should, therefore, be effected through a
petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The issues herein entail factual assertions that need to be
threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the
existing records on his birth and citizenship. Until this is done,
respondent Ong cannot accept an appointment to this Court,
and may be prevented by injunction from doing so.
IN RE JBC V. JUDGE QUITAIN
Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of
the Davao RTC. The Office of the Court Administrator received
confidential information that administrative and criminal charges
were filed against Judge Quitain in his capacity as then
Assistant Regional Director, National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM), as a result of which he was dismissed from the
service per Administrative Order.
In the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) submitted to the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC), Judge Quitain declared that there were five
criminal cases filed against him before the Sandiganbayan,
which were all dismissed. No administrative case was disclosed
by Judge Qutain in his PDS.
To confirm the veracity of the information, then Deputy Court
Administrator requested from the Sandiganbayan certified
copies of the Orders dismissing the criminal cases. Letters were
also sent to the NAPOLCOM requesting for certified true copies
of documents relative to the administrative complaints filed
against Judge Quitain, particularly AO183, dismissing him from
the service. Likewise, DCA required Judge Quitain to explain
the alleged misrepresentation and deception he committed
before the JBC.
NAPOLCOM furnished the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) a copy of A.O. No. 183 showing that respondent Judge
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
was indeed dismissed from the service for Grave Misconduct for
falsifying or altering the amounts reflected in disbursement
vouchers in support of his claim for reimbursement of expenses.
Judge Quitain denied having committed any misrepresentation
before the JBC. He alleged that during his interview, the
members thereof only inquired about the status of the criminal
cases filed by the NAPOLCOM before the Sandiganbayan, and
not about the administrative case simultaneously filed against
him. He also alleged that he never received from the Office of
the President an official copy of A.O. No. 183 dismissing him
from the service.
Respondent explained that during the investigation of his
administrative case by the NAPOLCOM Ad Hoc Committee, one
of its members suggested to him that if he resigns from the
government service, he will no longer be prosecuted; that
following such suggestion, he tendered his irrevocable
resignation from NAPOLCOM which was immediately accepted
by the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Governments; that he did not disclose the case in his PDS
because he was of the “honest belief” that he had no more
pending administrative case by reason of his resignation; that
his resignation “amounted to an automatic dismissal” of his
administrative case considering that “the issues raised therein
became moot and academic”; and that had he known that he
would be dismissed from the service, he should not have
applied for the position of a judge since he knew he would never
be appointed.
As borne out by the records, Judge Quitain deliberately did not
disclose the fact that he was dismissed from the government
service. At the time he filled up and submitted his Personal
Data Sheet with the Judicial and Bar Council, he had full
knowledge of the subject administrative case, as well as
Administrative Order No. 183 dismissing him from the
government service.
Issue: WON Quitain should be dismissed?
Held: YES. It behooves every prospective appointee to the
Judiciary to apprise the appointing authority of every matter
bearing on his fitness for judicial office, including such
circumstances as may reflect on his integrity and probity. These
are qualifications specifically required of appointees to the
Judiciary by Sec. 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution.
In this case, Judge Quitain failed to disclose that he was
administratively charged and dismissed from the service for
grave misconduct per A.O. No. 183 dated April 10, 1995 by no
less than the former President of the Philippines. He insists that
on November 26, 2001 or before he filed with the JBC his
verified PDS in support of his application for RTC Judge, he had
no knowledge of A.O. No. 183; and that he was denied due
process. He further argues that since all the criminal cases filed
against him were dismissed on August 2, 1995 and July 17,
2000, and considering the fact that he resigned from office, his
administrative case had become moot and academic.
Respondent’s contentions utterly lack merit.
No amount of explanation or justification can erase the fact that
Judge Quitain was dismissed from the service and that he
deliberately withheld this information. His insistence that he had
no knowledge of A.O. No. 183 is belied by the newspaper items
published relative to his dismissal. Neither can we give
credence to the contention that he was denied due process.
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The documents submitted by the NAPOLCOM to the OCA
reveal that Commissioner Alexis C. Canonizado, Chairman Ad
Hoc Committee, sent him summons informing him that an
administrative complaint had been filed against him and
required him to file an answer. Then on March 29, 1993,
respondent, through his counsel, Atty. Pedro Castillo, filed an
Answer. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity
to explain one’s side or opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. Where opportunity to be
heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is
accorded, there is no denial of due process. Furthermore, as we
have earlier mentioned and which Judge Quitain ought to
know, cessation from office by his resignation does not warrant
the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him
while he was still in the service nor does it render said
administrative case moot and academic. Judge Quitain was
removed from office after investigation and was found guilty of
grave misconduct. His dismissal from the service is a clear proof
of his lack of the required qualifications to be a member of the
Bench.
More importantly, it is clear that Judge Quitain deliberately
misled the JBC in his bid to gain an exalted position in the
Judiciary. Thus, we find respondent guilty of dishonesty.
“Dishonesty” means “disposition to lie, cheat or defraud;
unworthiness; lack of integrity.”
By his concealment of his previous dismissal from the public
service, which the Judicial and Bar Council would have taken
into consideration in acting on his application, Judge Cube
committed an act of dishonesty that rendered him unfit to be
appointed to, and to remain now in, the Judiciary he has
tarnished with his falsehood.
WHEREFORE, Judge Enrique A. Cube of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila is DISMISSED with prejudice to his
reappointment to any position in the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits. This decision is immediately
executory.
We cannot overemphasize the need for honesty and integrity on
the part of all those who are in the service of the Judiciary. We
have often stressed that the conduct required of court
personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk of court,
must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the
heavy burden of responsibility as to let them be free from any
suspicion that may taint the Judiciary. We condemn, and will
never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of
all those involved in the administration of justice, which would
violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even
just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.


JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
ARTICLE IX
A. COMMON PROVISIONS
Section 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Their approved annual appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.
Doctrine
NOTE: The obligation of the Department of Budget Department
to automatically release amounts appropriated for offices with
fiscal autonomy means that DBM may not retain a portion of the
amount or program. Civil Service Commission v Department of
Budget, G.R. No. 158791, February 10, 2006.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. DEPT. OF BUDGET
The DBM assails this Court’s interpretation of Article IX (A)
Section 5 of the Constitution and Sections 62, 63, and 64 of the
FY 2002 General Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 9162). It claims
that the constitutional mandate to automatically and regularly
release funds does not preclude the implementation of a cash
payment schedule for all agencies, including those belonging to
the constitutional fiscal autonomous group (CFAG).
The schedule was explained as thus: Ideally, the Notice of Cash
Allocation (NCA) should cover in full the monthly allotment of
the agency. The reality, however, is that every national budget
is based on revenue projections, and that there is an ever
present risk that these revenue targets are not met in full during
the course of the budget year. It thus becomes imperative for
the Executive Department, through the DBM, to manage the
release of funds through implementation of cash payment
schedules. For instance, if collections for a given month meet
the monthly revenue target, then the NCA for that month shall
cover 100% of the allotment. If, however, collections do not
meet the monthly revenue target, then the NCA to be released
may not cover 100% of the allotment. Add a few more
variables, such as amount of deficit and total disbursement of
agencies, then one gets a cash payment schedule that varies
on a monthly basis.
Issue: WON the cash payment schedule violates fiscal
autonomy?
Held:YES, because the DBM is given undue discretion in
releasing the funds of the CFAG. The Court finds that the DBM,
in fact, exercised discretion denied it by the constitutional
mandate to automatically release such funds. Understandably,
a shortfall in revenue in a given year would constrain the DBM
not to release the total amount appropriated by the GAA for the
government as a whole during that year. However, the DBM is
certainly not compelled by such circumstance to proportionately
reduce the funds appropriated for each and every agency.
Given a revenue shortfall, it is still very possible for the DBM to
release the full amount appropriated for the agencies with fiscal
autonomy, especially since, as noted in the Decision, the total
appropriation for such agencies in recent years does not even
reach 3% of the national budget. That the full amount is, in
fact, not fully released during a given fiscal year is plainly due to
a policy decision of the DBM. Such a decision, whether it goes
by the label of “cash payment schedule” or any other term,
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW THE WOMEN OF ALEITHEIA
cannot be reconciled with the constitutional mandate that the
release to these agencies should be automatic.
B. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Section 8. No elective or appointive public officer or
employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor
accept without the consent of the Congress, any present,
emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign
government.
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as
additional, double, or indirect compensation.
Doctrine
Q. The compensation allocated for Directors of Water Districts is
only per diem. May they be given bonuses?
A. No. Bonuses would violate the rule against additional
compensation. Cabili v. CSC, G.R. No. 156503, June 22, 2006.
CABILI V. CSC
Local Water Utilities Administration Employees Association for
Progress (LEAP) filed a complaint before the CSC against
Camilo P. Cabili and Antonio R. De Vera, Chairman of the
Board of Trustees and Administrator, respectively, of the Local
Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). The complaint prayed
for investigation on the validity of the multiple directorship of
LWUA Deputy Administrator Rodolfo de Jesus and his
entitlement to per diems, representation and transportation
allowance (RATA), discretionary fund, and other extraordinary
and miscellaneous expenses (EME) from the Olongapo City
Water District where he was designated as member of the
board of directors. He received these monetary benefits in
addition to his compensation as Deputy Administrator of LWUA.
CSC ruled that it is illegal for any LWUA officer or employee
who sits as a member of the board of directors of a water district
to receive any additional or indirect compensation. The CSC
relied on Section 8, Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution which
states that “No elective or appointive public officer or employee
shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation,
unless specifically authorized by law.”
Issue: WON CSC can rule on compensation matters of water
district personnel?
Held: YES. We affirm the CSC’s jurisdiction in promulgating
policies on compensation matters of water district personnel.
We held in De Jesus v. CSC, viz: “The present case involves
the acts of LWUA officials who are concurrently designated as
members of the boards of directors of water districts. This Court
has consistently ruled that water districts are government-
owned and controlled corporations with original charters, since
they have been created pursuant to PD 198. Hence, they are
under the jurisdiction of the CSC.”
On the issue of compensation and other monetary benefits, we
rule that all allowances and benefits, other than per diems, are
prohibited to directors of water districts. The compensation of
directors of water districts is governed by Section 13 of P.D. No.
198, as amended. ection 13 of P.D. No. 198 specifies per diem
as the compensation of members of the board of directors of
water districts. It even limits the total amount of per diems they
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
are allowed to receive each month. Above all, Section 13
expressly states that they shall receive no compensation other
than the specified per diems. The prohibition cannot be any
clearer. Thus, both De Jesus and Baybay hold that P.D. No.
198 authorizes the directors of water districts to receive only per
diems, and no other compensation or allowance in whatever
form.
Doctrine/Notes: CSC has jurisdiction over matters of
compensation of water district personnel, especially when the
case involves violations of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713).
Settled is the rule that when a law confers jurisdiction, all the
incidental powers necessary for its effective exercise are
included in the conferment.
C. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the
following powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of
all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving
elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of
general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay
officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the
Commission on election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices shall be final,
executory, and not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all
questions affecting elections, including determination
of the number and location of polling places,
appointment of election officials and inspectors, and
registration of voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law
enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, including the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties,
organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program
of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the
Commission on Elections. Religious denominations
and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to
achieve their goals through violence or unlawful
means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this
Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign
government shall likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments
and their agencies to political parties, organizations,
coalitions, or candidates related to elections, constitute
interference in national affairs, and, when accepted,
shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of
their registration with the Commission, in addition to
other penalties that may be prescribed by law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative,
petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters;
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investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to
minimize election spending, including limitation of
places where propaganda materials shall be posted,
and to prevent and penalize all forms of election
frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance
candidacies.
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer
or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any
other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of,
or disobedience to, its directive, order, or decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress, a
comprehensive report on the conduct of each election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
Doctrine
NOTE: The general rule is that the proclamation of a
congressional candidate divests COMELEC of jurisdiction in
favor of the HRET – unless the proclamation was invalid. Planas
v Comelec, G.R. No. 167594, March 10, 2006.
IX,C,02
The Court considered and acted on the following issues.
Whether the Comelec has jurisdiction over the Drilon petition in
Comelec Case asking for invalidatin of election of Atienza?
(Yes, 7-6)
Whether the Daza amendment to the Liberal party Constitution
was validly ratified? (9-5, Yes)
Whether the Comelec had jurisdiction to order the Liberal Party
to hold elections of its officers? (Academic)
Liberal Party (Drilon) v. Comelec, GR 174992, April 17, 2007.
IX,C,02(1)
The Comelec cannot be compelled to hold a third barangay
special election. For the reasons given, there was no abuse of
discretion. Macacua v. Comelec, GR 175390, May 8, 2007.
IX,C,02(2)
The Comelec has the power to review decisions of municipal
courts on municipal election contests. And when it does so, the
entire case is not opened as happens in appleas on criminal
cases. Manzala v. Comelec, GR 176211m May 8, 2007.
IX,C,03
Q. May the Comelec en banc decide an election case still
pending before a division?
A. No. Election contests are first decided in division. Muñoz v
Comelec, G.R. 170678, JULY 17, 2006.
The rule is that a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution,
order, or ruling of a COMELEC Division shall be elevated to the
COMELEC En Banc. However, a motion to reconsider an
interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division shall be resolved by
the division which issued the interlocutory order, except when
all the members of the division decide to refer the matter to the
COMELEC En Banc. Soriano et al v Comelec, GR 164496-505,
April 2, 2007.
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
While automatic elevation of a case erroneously filed with the
Division to En Banc is not provided in the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, such action is not prohibited. Mutilan v Comelec,
G.R. 1712468, April 2, 2007.
PLANAS V COMELEC
Planas and Cabochan filed their respective certificates of
rd
candidacy for representative of the 3 District of QC. Cabochan
filed her certificate of candidacy on Jan. 5, 2004, notarized on
the same date by Atty. Fernandez whose commission as Notary
Public was “Until December 31, 2003.”
Ramil Cortiguerra, a registered voter of QC, filed before the
COMELEC a “Petition to Deny Due Course and/or Cancellation
of the Certificate of Candidacy of Congressional Candidate
Cabochan.” Cabochan withdrew her COC and Matias Defensor,
Jr. filed his in substitution of Cabochan.
Comelec en banc in a minute resolution, gave due course to,
among other things, the certificate of candidacy of Cabochan
and that of Defensor. In the meantime, elections were held.
Planas filed with the QC Board of Canvassers a Petition for
Suspension of Canvassing of Votes in favor of Defensor.
COMELEC First Division then granted Cortiguerra’s petition and
accordingly denied due course and cancelled Cabochan’s
Certificate of Candidacy and declared invalid Defensor’s
substitution for her.
Planas’ counsel submitted to the QC Board of Canvassers a
copy of the Resolution of the COMELEC First Division on
Cortiguerras’s petition and moved that the votes in favor of
Defensor be no longer read. His motion was, denied on the
ground that there was yet no order from the COMELEC Central
Office disqualifying Defensor.
Defensor was proclaimed as the winning candidate for the
congressional seat of the Third District of Quezon City.
Issue: Whether COMELEC was divested of its jurisdiction by
virtue of Defensor’s proclamation and assumption of office as
member of the House of Representatives?
Held: The general rule is that the proclamation of a
congressional candidate divests COMELEC of jurisdiction in
favor of the HRET. This rule, however, is not without exception.
As held in Mutuc v. Comelec: “It is indeed true that after
proclamation the usual remedy of any party aggrieved in an
election is to be found in an election protest. But that is so only
on the assumption that there has been a valid proclamation.
Where as in the case at bar the proclamation itself is illegal, the
assumption of office cannot in any way affect the basic issues. “
In the case at bar, at the time of the proclamation of Defensor
who garnered the highest number of votes, the Division
Resolution invalidating his certificate of candidacy was not yet
final, hence, he had at that point in time remained qualified.
Therefore, his proclamation was valid or legal.
Following Mutuc then, as at the time of Defensor’s proclamation
the denial of his COC due course was not yet final, his
proclamation was valid or legal and as he in fact had taken his
oath of office and assumed his duties as representative, the
COMELEC had been effectively divested of jurisdiction over the
case.
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LIBERAL PARTY (DRILON) V. COMELEC
The Court considered and acted on the following issues:
1. Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the Drilon
petition in COMELEC Case SPP No. 06-002;
2. Whether the Daza-Drilon amendments to the Salonga
Liberal Party Constitution were validly ratified; and
3. Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction to order the Liberal
Party to hold the election of its officers.
On the first issue, the Court voted 7-6 that the COMELEC has
jurisdiction over the Drilon petition. On the second issue, the
Court voted 9-5 that the Daza-Drilon amendments were validly
ratified. In view of the voting on the second issue, the third
issue has become academic.
MACACUA V. COMELEC
Petitioner Alimudin A. Macacua and private respondent Mike A.
Fermin were candidates for Kabuntalan, Maguindanao Mayor in
the May 2004 local elections. The Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Kabuntalan proclaimed Fermin as winner.
COMELEC, however, annulled the proclamation due to the
failure of clustered polling precincts to function. Thus, the
COMELEC scheduled a special election in such clustered
precincts.
In the special election, Macacua was proclaimed as the winning
candidate for Mayor. Fermin challenged the special election due
to alleged procedural infirmities. COMELEC nullified the special
election. Macacua’s proclamation was set aside and Vice
Mayor-elect temporarily assumed the mayoralty post.
nd
COMELEC scheduled a 2 special election. It was peaceful
and orderly at the onset. However, at about 1:45 p.m., the
election was disrupted when two persons, in the queue where
the voters’ verification was being made, engaged in a heated
argument and began pushing each other. They were later
pacified. But before the special election could be concluded at
3pm, Chairman Suan-Radam stopped the election upon the
advice of P/S Supt. Lumala Gunting, head of the PNP
contingent, that armed elements were seen in the vicinity of the
barangay. There were still 31 voters lined up to vote in the
precinct when the election was stopped.
Per canvass, petitioner obtained 136 votes, while private
respondent garnered 39 votes. When the election results were
added, petitioner and private respondent got 2,208 votes each,
ending in a tie.
The SMBOC notified the parties concerned that a Special Public
Hearing would be held to break the tie pursuant to Sec. 240 of
the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner filed with the COMELEC
en banc an Extremely Urgent Omnibus Motion to hold in
abeyance the hearing, which was granted.
Despite the Order, the Special Public Hearing pushed through
and the SMBOC proclaimed private respondent as the duly
elected Mayor. Petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion to
nullify the proclamation of private respondent.
COMELEC en banc issued an Order, which annulled the
proceedings of the Special Public Hearing and set aside the
proclamation of private respondent.
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
Thereafter, Comelec issued a Resolution denying or dismissing
with finality any and all motions for the holding/conduct of a third
and/or another special election in Barangay Guiawa for the
position of Mayor of Kabuntalan, Maguindano in view of the
failure of the second special election held thereat on 6 May
2006. ACCORDINGLY, the hiatus created by this decision in the
herein contested position shall be filled in accordance with the
provisions of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code.
Issue: Whether or not the Public Respondent COMELEC [en
banc] committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in promulgating the questioned Resolution
on November 20, 2006, disallowing the holding of a third
Special Election for lack of funds?
Held: NO, the COMELEC en banc’s decision not to hold a third
special election in Barangay Guiawa for the position of Mayor of
Kabuntalan, Maguindanao cannot be characterized as
capricious, whimsical or arbitrary since it was based on the
following considerations: (1) lack of available funds for holding
another special election in Barangay Guiawa; (2) the
anomalies that transpired during the regular and two special
elections which all resulted in failure of election do not inspire
assurance that the will of the voters in the area will be upheld
in another special election; and (3) the next regular elections
scheduled on May 14, 2007 is close-by.
The COMELEC en banc enunciated that it would be impractical
in terms of time, effort and money to declare the holding of a
third special election in Barangay Guiawa, and it would be
disadvantageous to the government, specifically to the
Commission.
The decision of the COMELEC en banc should not be taken as
an abdication of its duty to conduct elections, but a judgment
call by the Commission based on lack of available funds to hold
another special election, the peculiar circumstances of this
case, and the fast approaching regular elections on May 14,
2007 that would render the result of another special election
moot.
Based on the foregoing, the COMELEC en banc did not gravely
abuse its discretion in issuing the Resolution dated November
20, 2006, denying petitioner’s motion to hold a third special
election in Barangay Guiawa for the position of Mayor of
Kabuntalan, Maguindanao.
MANZALA V. COMELEC
Petitioner Manzala and private respondent Monton were
mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of Magdiwang,
Romblon, during the May 10, 2004 National and Local
Elections. On May 13, 2004, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers proclaimed Monton as the duly elected Municipal
Mayor.
Manzala filed an election protest with the RTC of Romblon for
fraud, serious irregularities, and willful violation of the Omnibus
Election Code. A revision of ballots was later conducted. In its
decision, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner,
annulling the previous proclamation of Monton.
On appeal, Former Second Division of the COMELEC reversed
and set aside the decision of the trial court. It found that Monton
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obtained 2,560 votes, or a margin of 17 votes, over Manzala’s
2,543 votes. Manzala’s MR was denied.
Consequently, COMELEC en banc directed the implementation
of the writ of execution ordering Manzala to cease and desist
from discharging the powers and functions of the Office of the
Municipal Mayor of Magdiwang, Romblon; to relinquish and
vacate the post in favor of Monton.
Issue: WON Comelec’s reversal of the RTC was proper?
Held: YES. Section 2 (2) of Article IX-C of the Consti provides
COMELEC with quasi-judicial power to exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and
city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving
elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by
trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Decisions, final orders, or
rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective
municipal & barangay offices shall be final, executory, and
unappealable.
Clearly, from the decision of the trial court, the COMELEC
exercises appellate jurisdiction to review, revise, modify, or even
reverse and set aside the decision of the former and substitute it
with its own decision. In the exercise of its adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial powers, the Constitution also mandates the
COMELEC to hear and decide cases first by division and upon
motion for reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc. Election
cases cannot be treated in a similar manner as criminal cases
where, upon appeal from a conviction by the trial court, the
whole case is thrown open for review and the appellate court
can resolve issues which are not even set forth in the
pleadings.
Moreover, the appreciation of the contested ballots and election
documents involves a question of fact best left to the
determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked
with the supervision of elections all over the country.
COMELEC is the constitutional commission vested with the
exclusive original jurisdiction over election contests involving
regional, provincial and city officials, as well as appellate
jurisdiction over election protests involving elective municipal
and barangay officials. Consequently, in the absence of grave
abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law,
the factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered
by the said Commission on matters falling within its competence
shall not be interfered with by this Court.
MUÑOZ V COMELEC
Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for mayor of
Camalig, Albay in the May 10, 2004 election. At 6pm of May 10,
2004, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) convened and
canvassed the election returns. Lawyers of private respondent
objected to the inclusion of the 26 ERs.
MBC denied the objections and ruled to include the objected
ERs. Private respondent appealed to the COMELEC and was
docketed as SPC No. 04-087 and raffled to the COMELEC First
Division.
Despite the pendency of the appeal, petitioner was proclaimed
on May 19, 2004 by the MBC as the winning candidate for
mayor of Camalig, Albay.
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
Private respondent filed with the COMELEC a petition to annul
the proclamation of the petitioner for being premature and
illegal. The case was docketed as SPC No. 04-124 and raffled
to the COMELEC First Division.
COMELEC First Division rendered a Resolution in SPC No. 04-
124 granting the petition to annul the proclamation. Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit by the
COMELEC En Banc.
Issue: WON the proclamation of petitioner was valid?
Held: NO, COMELEC First Division correctly annulled the
proclamation of the petitioner. Time and again, this Court has
given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is with
authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was
illegally made. At the time the proclamation was made, the
COMELEC First Division had not yet resolved SPC No. 04-087.
Pursuant to Section 36(i) of COMELEC Resolution No. 6669,
which finds basis in Section 20(i) of RA7166, the MBC should
not have proclaimed petitioner as the winning candidate absent
the authorization from the COMELEC. Any proclamation made
under such circumstances is void ab initio.
We likewise do not agree with petitioner’s contention that the
proclamation was valid as the contested ERs will not affect the
results of the election. Section 20(i) of R.A. No. 7166 reads:
”Sec. 20. Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election
Returns. – (i) The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any
candidate as winner unless authorized by the Commission after
the latter has ruled on the objections brought to it on appeal by
the losing party. Any proclamation made in violation hereof
shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not
adversely affect the results of the election.”
The phrase “results of the election” is not statutorily defined.
However, it had been jurisprudentially explained: “The net result
of the election in the rest of the precincts in a given
constituency, such that if the margin of a leading candidate over
that of his closest rival in the latter precincts is less than the total
number of votes in the precinct where there was failure of
election, then such failure would certainly affect “the result of the
election.” In the case at bar, petitioner obtained a margin of 762
votes over respondent based on the canvass of the uncontested
ERs whereas the total number of votes is 5,178, higher than the
762-lead of the petitioner over private respondent. Clearly, the
results of the election would be adversely affected by the
uncanvassed returns.
SORIANO ET AL V COMELEC
Petitioners and private respondents were candidates for City
Council for the First and Second Districts of Muntinlupa City in
the 10 May 2004 elections.
After the elections, the Muntinlupa City Board of Canvassers
proclaimed private respondents as the duly elected Councilors
of the Muntinlupa City Council. Petitioners individually and
separately filed election protest cases against private
respondents, contesting the results of the elections in all the 603
precincts of the First District and the 521 precincts of the
Second District of Muntinlupa City.
COMELEC First Division issued two identical orders. The first
order directed petitioners (protestants) to deposit P454,020
each to the COMELEC Cash Division to defray expenses under
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Section 8, Rule 20 of the COMELEC Rules, in the revision of
603 protested precincts in the First District of Muntinlupa City.
The order also directed respondents (protestees) to deposit
P454,020 each to the COMELEC Cash Division in the revision
of 603 counter-protested precincts in the First District of
Muntinlupa City.
The second order directed petitioners (protestants) to deposit
P408,990 each to the COMELEC Cash Division in the revision
of 521 protested precincts in the Second District of Muntinlupa.
The order also directed respondents (protestees) to deposit
P408,990 each to the COMELEC Cash Division in the revision
nd
of 521 counter-protested precincts in the 2 District of
Muntinlupa.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Orders dated
26 June 2004. The COMELEC First Division denied the motion.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order. Petitioners alleged that the Orders
dated 26 June 2004 of the COMELEC First Division were issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Petitioners maintain that the cash deposit of P454,020 to defray
the expenses for the revision of the ballots for the First District
of Muntinlupa should be paid jointly by all the protestants for the
First District and that to require them to pay P454,020 each
constitutes grave abuse of discretion. In the same manner, the
cash deposit of P408,990 to defray the expenses for the
revision of the ballots for the Second District of Muntinlupa
should be paid jointly by all the protestants for the Second
District and that to require them to pay P408,990 each
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Issue: Whether a writ of certiorari will lie in this case?
Held: NO. The rule is that a motion to reconsider a decision,
resolution, order, or ruling of a COMELEC Division shall be
elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. However, a motion to
reconsider an interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division shall
be resolved by the division which issued the interlocutory order,
except when all the members of the division decide to refer the
matter to the COMELEC En Banc.
Also, the general rule is that a decision or an order of a
COMELEC Division cannot be elevated directly to this Court
through a special civil action for certiorari. Furthermore, a
motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a
COMELEC Division shall be elevated to the COMELEC En
Banc. However, a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order of
a COMELEC Division shall be resolved by the division which
issued the interlocutory order, except when all the members of
the division decide to refer the matter to the COMELEC En
Banc.
Thus, in general, interlocutory orders of a COMELEC Division
are not appealable, nor can they be proper subject of a petition
for certiorari. To rule otherwise would not only delay the
disposition of cases but would also unnecessarily clog the Court
docket and unduly burden the Court. This does not mean that
the aggrieved party is without recourse if a COMELEC Division
denies the motion for reconsideration. The aggrieved party can
still assign as error the interlocutory order if in the course of the
proceedings he decides to appeal the main case to the
COMELEC En Banc. The exception enunciated in Kho and
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
Repol is when the interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division is
a patent nullity because of absence of jurisdiction to issue the
interlocutory order, as where a COMELEC Division issued a
temporary restraining order without a time limit, which is the
Repol case, or where a COMELEC Division admitted an answer
with counter-protest which was filed beyond the reglementary
period, which is the Kho case.
It is the decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC En Banc that,
in accordance with Section 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution, may
be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.” The exception
provided in Kho and Repol is unavailing in this case because
unlike in Kho and Repol, the assailed interlocutory orders of the
COMELEC First Division in this case are not a patent nullity.
The assailed orders in this case involve the interpretation of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Neither will the Rosal case
apply because in that case the petition for certiorari questioning
the interlocutory orders of the COMELEC Second Division and
the petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the Resolution
of the COMELEC En Banc on the main case were already
consolidated.
The Court also notes that the COMELEC First Division has
already issued an Order dismissing the protests and counter-
protests for failure of the protestants and protestees to pay the
required cash deposits. Thus, we have this peculiar situation
where the interlocutory order of the COMELEC First Division is
pending before this Court but the main case has already been
dismissed by the COMELEC First Division. This situation is
precisely what we are trying to avoid by insisting on strict
compliance of the rule that an interlocutory order cannot by
itself be the subject of an appeal or a petition for certiorari.
MUTILAN V COMELEC
Mutilan and private respondent Ampatuan were candidates for
Governor during the election of regional officials held on 8
August 2005 in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM). Private respondent was proclaimed as the duly
elected Governor of the ARMM.
Petitioner filed an Electoral Protest and/or Petition to Annul the
Elections. He contested the results of the elections in
Maguindanao, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, and Sulu on the ground that
no actual election was conducted in the precincts in these
provinces. Petitioner alleged that the voters did not actually vote
and that the ballots were filled up by non-registered voters.
Petitioner also contested the results in 7 municipalities in Lanao
del Sur where massive substitute voting allegedly took place.
COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition. The Division
stated that during the initial hearing of the case, petitioner’s
counsel admitted that the petition was not an election protest
but one for annulment of elections and sought for elevation of
the case to the Comelec En Banc. The COMELEC Second
Division ruled that jurisdiction over petitions for annulment of
elections is vested in the COMELEC En Banc. However, the
elevation of the case to the COMELEC En Banc is not
sanctioned by the rules or by jurisprudence. Thus, the
COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction. Comelec En Banc affirmed upon MR.
Issue: Whether the COMELEC Second Division acted in excess
of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the petition to
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annul elections and in not elevating the petition to the
COMELEC En Banc.
Held: The COMELEC Second Division is Not Prohibited from
Elevating the Petition to the COMELEC En Banc. Under Section
3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, all election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies, must be heard and
decided by a division of the COMELEC.
The COMELEC Second Division ruled that automatic elevation
of the case to the En Banc is not sanctioned by the rules or by
jurisprudence. Petitioner argues that the COMELEC Second
Division should have elevated the petition to the COMELEC En
Banc instead of dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
We agree with petitioner. While automatic elevation of a case
erroneously filed with the Division to En Banc is not provided in
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, such action is not
prohibited. Section 4, Rule 2 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure provides: “Means to Effect Jurisdiction. - All auxiliary
writs, processes and other means necessary to carry into effect
its powers or jurisdiction may be employed by the Commission;
and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such
power or jurisdiction is not specifically provided for by law or
these rules, any suitable process or proceeding may be
adopted.”
Hence, there is nothing in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure to
prevent the COMELEC Second Division from referring the
petition to annul the elections to the COMELEC En Banc.
Nevertheless, the petition must still fail. In his Electoral Protest
and/or Petition to Annul the Elections, petitioner alleged that no
actual election was conducted in the contested areas. Petitioner
further alleged that the voters did not actually vote and the
ballots were filled up by non-registered voters. Petitioner also
alleged massive disenfranchisement and substitute voting.
Petitioner argued that the irregularities warrant the annulment
and setting aside of the elections in the contested areas.
There are three instances where a failure of elections may be
declared, thus:
(a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the
date fixed on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;
(b) the election in any polling place has been suspended
before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting
on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or
other analogous causes; or
(c) after the voting and during the preparation and
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect
on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or
other analogous causes.
In all three instances, there is a resulting failure to elect. In the
first instance, the election has not been held. In the second
instance, the election has been suspended. In the third
instance, the preparation and the transmission of the election
returns give rise to the consequent failure to elect; the third
instance is interpreted to mean that nobody emerged as a
winner.
None of the three instances is present in this case. In this case,
the elections took place. In fact, private respondent was
proclaimed the winner. Petitioner contests the results of the
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elections on the grounds of massive disenfranchisement,
substitute voting, and farcical and statistically improbable
results. Petitioner alleges that no actual election was conducted
because the voters did not actually vote and the ballots were
filled up by non-registered voters.
D. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Section 1.
(1) There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a
Chairman and two Commissioners, who shall be natural-
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, Certified
Public Accountants with not less than ten years of
auditing experience, or members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years, and must not have been candidates for
any elective position in the elections immediately
preceding their appointment. At no time shall all
Members of the Commission belong to the same
profession.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the
Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one
Commissioner for five years, and the other
Commissioner for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no
case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
Doctrines
COA can settle money claims based on laws. But if a money
claim is denied by a law, COA has no authority to pass
judgment on the constitutionality of the law. Parreño v. COA,
G.R. 162224 June 7, 2007
NOTE: The obligation of the Department of Budget to
automatically release amounts appropriated for offices with
fiscal autonomy means that DBM may not retain a portion of the
amount. CSC v. DBM, G.R. No. 158791, February 10, 2006.
When the law says that money generated by a school may be
used for “other programs/projects of the university or college,” it
is not authorization for giving additional or double
compensation. Benguet State U v. Colting, G.R. No. 169637,
June 8, 2007.
PARREÑO V. COA
Salvador Parreño served in the AFP for 32 years. In 1982,
petitioner retired, availed, and received payment, of a lump sum
pension equivalent to three years pay. In 1985, he started
receiving his monthly pension.
Petitioner migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized
American citizen. In January 2001, the AFP stopped petitioner’s
monthly pension in accordance with Section 27 of PD1638,
providing that a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be
removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits
terminated upon loss of Filipino citizenship. Petitioner
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requested for recon-sideration but the Judge Advocate General
of the AFP denied the request.
Petitioner filed a claim before the COA for the continuance of his
monthly pension. COA denied petitioner’s claim for lack of
jurisdiction.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner alleged
that the COA has the power and authority to incidentally rule on
the constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended.
Petitioner alleged that a direct recourse to the court would be
dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Petitioner further alleged that since his monthly pension involves
government funds, the reason for the termination of the pension
is subject to COA’s authority and jurisdiction.
COA denied the motion. It ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies does not apply if the administrative
body has, in the first place, no jurisdiction over the case. COA
also ruled that assuming it has jurisdiction over the claim,
petitioner’s entitlement to the retirement benefits he was
previously receiving must necessarily cease upon the loss of his
Filipino citizenship in accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638,
as amended.
Issue: Whether COA has jurisdiction to rule on the
constitutionality of PD 1638?
Held: NO. Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1445, money claims against the
government shall be filed before the COA. The jurisdiction of the
COA over money claims against the government does not
include the power to rule on the constitutionality or validity of
laws. The 1987 Constitution vests the power of judicial review
or the power to declare unconstitutional a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation in this Court and in all
Regional Trial Courts. Petitioner’s money claim essentially
involved the constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as
amended. Hence, COA did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing petitioner’s money claim.
Petitioner submits that the COA has the authority to order the
restoration of his pension even without ruling on the
constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended.
However, COA effectively denied petitioner’s claim because of
the loss of his Filipino citizenship. Petitioner failed to overcome
the presumption of constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as
amended. Unless the provision is amended or repealed in the
future, the AFP has to apply Section 27 of PD 1638, as
amended.
CSC V. DBM
The DBM assails this Court’s interpretation of Article IX (A)
Section 5 of the Constitution and Sections 62, 63, and 64 of the
FY 2002 General Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 9162). It claims
that the constitutional mandate to automatically and regularly
release funds does not preclude the implementation of a cash
payment schedule for all agencies, including those belonging to
the constitutional fiscal autonomous group (CFAG).
The schedule was explained as thus: Ideally, the Notice of Cash
Allocation (NCA) should cover in full the monthly allotment of
the agency. The reality, however, is that every national budget
is based on revenue projections, and that there is an ever
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present risk that these revenue targets are not met in full during
the course of the budget year. It thus becomes imperative for
the Executive Department, through the DBM, to manage the
release of funds through implementation of cash payment
schedules. For instance, if collections for a given month meet
the monthly revenue target, then the NCA for that month shall
cover 100% of the allotment. If, however, collections do not
meet the monthly revenue target, then the NCA to be released
may not cover 100% of the allotment. Add a few more
variables, such as amount of deficit and total disbursement of
agencies, then one gets a cash payment schedule that varies
on a monthly basis.
Issue: WON the cash payment schedule violates fiscal
autonomy?
Held:YES, because the DBM is given undue discretion in
releasing the funds of the CFAG. The Court finds that the DBM,
in fact, exercised discretion denied it by the constitutional
mandate to automatically release such funds. Understandably,
a shortfall in revenue in a given year would constrain the DBM
not to release the total amount appropriated by the GAA for the
government as a whole during that year. However, the DBM is
certainly not compelled by such circumstance to proportionately
reduce the funds appropriated for each and every agency.
Given a revenue shortfall, it is still very possible for the DBM to
release the full amount appropriated for the agencies with fiscal
autonomy, especially since, as noted in the Decision, the total
appropriation for such agencies in recent years does not even
reach 3% of the national budget. That the full amount is, in
fact, not fully released during a given fiscal year is plainly due to
a policy decision of the DBM. Such a decision, whether it goes
by the label of “cash payment schedule” or any other term,
cannot be reconciled with the constitutional mandate that the
release to these agencies should be automatic.
Doctrine/Notes: Automatic release in the Constitution means
FULL release.
BENGUET STATE U V. COLTING
Congress passed Ra8292, or the Higher Education
Modernization Act of 1997. Pursuant to Section 4 (d) of the said
law, the Board of Regents of BSU passed and approved Board
Resolution 794, granting rice subsidy and health care allowance
to BSU’s employees. The sums were taken from the income
derived from the operations of BSU and were given to the
employees at different periods in 1998.
The grant of this rice subsidy and health care allowance in the
total amount of P4,350,000.00 was disallowed in audit under
Notice of Disallowance 99-001-STF(98), stating that RA8292
does not provide for the grant of said allowance to employees
and officials of the university.
BSU requested the lifting of the disallowance with the COA
Regional Office but it was denied in COA-CAR Decision No.
2000-3 dated January 26, 2000. Citing Section 55 (2) of R.A.
No. 8522 or the General Appropriation Act of 1998, it held that a
non-existent item, project, activity, purpose, or object of
expenditure cannot be funded by augmentation from savings or
by the use of appropriations. It further held that the grant
of said allowances lacked statutory basis, transgressed
the constitutional proscription on additional, double, or indirect
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compensation and ran counter to the provisions of the Salary
Standardization Law.
BSU thereafter filed a petition for review of Decision No. 2000-3
with the COA, which petition was denied in Decision No. 2003-
112. A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied.
Issue: WON COA erred in disallowing the rice subsidy and
health care?
Held: NO. It bears noting that what was filed before this Court is
a petition captioned as a Petition for Review on Certiorari. We
point out that a petition for review on certiorari is not the proper
mode by which the COA’s decisions are reviewed by this Court.
Under Rule 64, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
a judgment or final order of the COA may be brought by an
aggrieved party to this Court on certiorari under Rule 65. Thus,
it is only through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 that the
COA's decisions may be reviewed and nullified by us on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion or lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
What is clear from Section 4 (d) of R.A. No. 8292 cited by BSU
as legal basis of its claim as well as from its implementing rules
is that income generated by the university may be disbursed by
its Governing Board for “instruction, research, extension, or
other programs/projects of the university or colleges.”
BSU theorizes that the phrase “other programs/projects of the
university or college” in Section 4 (d) covers all projects and
programs of the university, including those designed to uplift
the economic plight of the employees. It is not limited to those
programs which the university may specifically undertake in
pursuance of its primary objective to achieve quality education,
contrary to the interpretation of the COA. We disagree.
Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where a statute
describes things of a particular class or kind accompanied by
words of a generic character, the generic word will usually be
limited to things of a similar nature with those particularly
enumerated, unless there be something in the context of the
statute which would repel such inference. The COA correctly
ruled that the “other programs/projects” under R.A. No. 8292
and its Implementing Rules should be of the same nature as
instruction, research, and extension. In BSU's case, the
disbursements were for rice subsidy and health care allowances
which are, in no way, intended for academic programs similar
to instruction, research, or extension. Section 4 (d) cannot,
therefore, be relied upon by BSU as the legal basis for the grant
of the allowances.
Furthermore, a reading of the entire provision supports the
COA’s interpretation that the authority given to the Governing
Board of state universities and colleges is not plenary and
absolute. It is clear in Section 4 that the powers of the
Governing Board are subject to limitations. This belies BSU's
claim of plenary and absolute authority.
Neither can BSU find solace in the academic freedom clause of
the Constitution. Academic freedom as adverted to in the
Constitution and in R.A. No. 8292 only encompasses the
freedom of the institution of higher learning to determine for
itself, on academic grounds, who may teach, what may be
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
study. The guaranteed academic freedom does not grant an
institution of higher learning unbridled authority to disburse its
funds and grant additional benefits sans statutory basis.
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Unfortunately for BSU, it failed to present any sound legal basis
that would justify the grant of these additional benefits to its
employees.


ARTICLE X - LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power
to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes,
fees and charges subject to such guidelines and
limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with
the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and
charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
governments.
Doctrines
Q. Summarize the interplay of the inherent power of Congress
to tax and the constitutionally delegated power of local
governments to tax.
A. Local governments no longer receive its power to tax from
Congress. The Constitution has given it to them. However,
Congress retains its inherent and superior power. Thus
Congress can give tax exemptions which local
governments must follow.
Historically, after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution, the Local Government Code withdrew
previously granted exemptions. Because of this, local
governments were able to tax previously exempted
subjects. Subsequently, however, Congress restored tax
exemptions in some cases. This subsequent law prevails.
Quezon City v Bayantel, G.R. No. 162015, March 6, 2006.
Q. Are the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA exempt from
real estate tax under existing laws.
A. They are. First, MIAA is not a government-owned or
controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the National
Government and is thus exempt from local taxation.
Second, the real properties of MIAA are owned by the
Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from real
estate tax. Manila International Airport v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. 155650, July 20, 2006.
The inherent taxing power of Congress can limit the
constitutionally delegated taxing power of local
governments. Digital v Pangasinan, GR 152534, February 23,
2007.
QUEZON CITY V. BAYANTEL
Bayantel is a legislative franchise holder under RA32594 to
establish and operate radio stations for domestic
telecommunications, radiophone, broadcasting and telecasting.
Section 14 of its franchise states:
“(a) The grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes on its real estate, buildings and
personal property, exclusive of the franchise, as other persons or corporations are now
or hereafter may be required by law to pay. (b) The grantee shall further pay to the
Treasurer of the Philippines each year, within ten days after the audit and approval of
the accounts as prescribed in this Act, one and one-half per centum of all gross receipts
from the business transacted under this franchise by the said grantee.”
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Under the LGC or RA7160 -
SEC. 232. Power to Levy Real Property Tax. A province or city or a municipality within
the Metropolitan Manila Area may levy an annual ad valorem tax on real property such
as land, building, machinery and other improvements not hereinafter specifically
exempted.
SEC. 234 - Exemptions from Real Property Tax. The following are exempted from
payment of the real property tax:
Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax previously
granted to, or enjoyed by, all persons, whether natural or juridical, including
government-owned-or-controlled corporations is hereby withdrawn upon effectivity of
this Code.
Barely few months after the LGC took effect, Congress enacted
RA7633, amending Bayantel’s original franchise. It stated:
“SEC. 11. The grantee, its successors or assigns shall be liable to pay the same taxes
on their real estate, buildings and personal property, exclusive of this franchise, as other
persons or corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay. In addition
thereto, the grantee, its successors or assigns shall pay a franchise tax equivalent to
three percent (3%) of all gross receipts of the telephone or other telecommunications
businesses transacted under this franchise by the grantee, its successors or assigns
and the said percentage shall be in lieu of all taxes on this franchise or earnings thereof.
Provided, That the grantee, its successors or assigns shall continue to be liable for
income taxes payable under Title II of the National Internal Revenue Code.”
In 1993, the government of Quezon City, pursuant to the taxing
power vested on local government units by Section 5, Article X
of the 1987 Constitution, in relation to Section 232 of the LGC,
enacted a City Ordinance otherwise known as the Quezon City
Revenue Code, imposing a real property tax on all real
properties in Quezon City, and, reiterating the withdrawal of
exemption from real property tax under Section 234 of the LGC.
Furthermore, much like the LGC, the QCRC, under its Section
230, withdrew tax exemption privileges in general.
Meanwhile, RA7925, otherwise known as the "Public
Telecommunications Policy Act of the Philippines," envisaged to
level the playing field among telecommunications companies,
took effect. Section 23 of the Act provides:
“SEC. 23. Equality of Treatment in the Telecommunications Industry. Any advantage,
favor, privilege, exemption, or immunity granted under existing franchises, or may
hereafter be granted, shall ipso facto become part of previously granted
telecommunications franchises and shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally
to the grantees of such franchises: Provided, however, That the foregoing shall neither
apply to nor affect provisions of telecommunications franchises concerning territory
covered by the franchise, the life span of the franchise, or the type of service authorized
by the franchise.”
Issue: Whether or not Bayantel’s real properties in Quezon City
are exempt from real property taxes under its legislative
franchise?
Held: YES. Bayantel’s franchise being national in character, the
"exemption" thus granted under Section 14 of RA3259 applies
to all its real or personal properties found anywhere within the
Philippine archipelago.
However, with the LGC’s taking effect on January 1, 1992,
Bayantel’s "exemption" from real estate taxes for properties of
whatever kind located within the Metro Manila area was, by
force of Section 234 of the Code, expressly withdrawn. But, not
long thereafter, however, or on July 20, 1992, Congress passed
RA7633 amending Bayantel’s original franchise. Worthy of note
is that Section 11 of RA7633 is a virtual re-enacment of the tax
provision, i.e., Section 14 of Bayantel’s original franchise under
RA3259. Stated otherwise, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 3259
which was deemed impliedly repealed by Section 234 of the
LGC was expressly revived under Section 14 of RA7633. In
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concrete terms, the realty tax exemption heretofore enjoyed by
Bayantel under its original franchise, but subsequently
withdrawn by force of Section 234 of the LGC, has been
restored by Section 14 of RA7633.
The Court has taken stock of the fact that by virtue of Section 5,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution, local governments are
empowered to levy taxes. And pursuant to this constitutional
empowerment, juxtaposed with Section 2329 of the LGC, the
Quezon City government enacted in 1993 its local Revenue
Code, imposing real property tax on all real properties found
within its territorial jurisdiction. And as earlier stated, the City’s
Revenue Code, just like the LGC, expressly withdrew, under
Section 230 thereof, supra, all tax exemption privileges in
general.
This thus raises the question of whether or not the City’s
Revenue Code pursuant to which the city treasurer of Quezon
City levied real property taxes against Bayantel’s real properties
located within the City effectively withdrew the tax exemption
enjoyed by Bayantel under its franchise, as amended.
Bayantel answers the poser in the negative arguing that once
again it is only "liable to pay the same taxes, as any other
persons or corporations on all its real or personal properties,
exclusive of its franchise." Bayantel’s posture is well-taken.
While the system of local government taxation has changed with
the onset of the 1987 Constitution, the power of local
government units to tax is still limited.
Clearly then, while a new slant on the subject of local taxation
now prevails in the sense that the former doctrine of local
government units’ delegated power to tax had been effectively
modified with Article X, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution now
in place, .the basic doctrine on local taxation remains essentially
the same. For as the Court stressed in Mactan, "the power to
tax is [still] primarily vested in the Congress."
This new perspective is best articulated by Fr. Joaquin G.
Bernas, S.J., himself a Commissioner of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission which crafted the 1987 Constitution, thus:
What is the effect of Section 5 on the fiscal position of municipal
corporations? Section 5 does not change the doctrine that
municipal corporations do not possess inherent powers of
taxation. What it does is to confer municipal corporations a
general power to levy taxes and otherwise create sources of
revenue. They no longer have to wait for a statutory grant of
these powers. The power of the legislative authority relative to
the fiscal powers of local governments has been reduced to the
authority to impose limitations on municipal powers. Moreover,
these limitations must be "consistent with the basic policy of
local autonomy." The important legal effect of Section 5 is thus
to reverse the principle that doubts are resolved against
municipal corporations. Henceforth, in interpreting statutory
provisions on municipal fiscal powers, doubts will be resolved in
favor of municipal corporations. It is understood, however, that
taxes imposed by local government must be for a public
purpose, uniform within a locality, must not be confiscatory, and
must be within the jurisdiction of the local unit to pass.
In net effect, the controversy presently before the Court
involves, at bottom, a clash between the inherent taxing power
of the legislature, which necessarily includes the power to
exempt, and the local government’s delegated power to tax
under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution.
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Indeed, the grant of taxing powers to local government units
under the Constitution and the LGC does not affect the power of
Congress to grant exemptions to certain persons, pursuant to a
declared national policy. The legal effect of the constitutional
grant to local governments simply means that in interpreting
statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, doubts must be
resolved in favor of municipal corporations.
As we see it, then, the issue in this case no longer dwells on
whether Congress has the power to exempt Bayantel’s
properties from realty taxes by its enactment of RA7633 which
amended Bayantel’s original franchise. The more decisive
question turns on whether Congress actually did exempt
Bayantel’s properties at all by virtue of Section 11 of RA7633.
Admittedly, RA7633 was enacted subsequent to the LGC.
Perfectly aware that the LGC has already withdrawn Bayantel’s
former exemption from realty taxes, Congress opted to pass
RA7633 using, under Section 11 thereof, exactly the same
defining phrase "exclusive of this franchise" which was the basis
for Bayantel’s exemption from realty taxes prior to the LGC. In
plain language, Section 11 of RA 7633 states that "the grantee,
its successors or assigns shall be liable to pay the same taxes
on their real estate, buildings and personal property, exclusive
of this franchise, as other persons or corporations are now or
hereafter may be required by law to pay." The Court views this
subsequent piece of legislation as an express and real intention
on the part of Congress to once again remove from the LGC’s
delegated taxing power, all of the franchisee’s (Bayantel’s)
properties that are actually, directly and exclusively used in the
pursuit of its franchise.
MIAA V. CA
Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates
the NAIA Complex in Parañaque City under EO903, otherwise
known as the Revised Charter of the Manila International Airport
Authority. As operator of the international airport, MIAA
administers the land, improvements and equipment within the
NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA
approximately 600 hectares of land, including the runways and
buildings ("Airport Lands and Buildings") then under the Bureau
of Air Transportation. The MIAA Charter further provides that no
portion of the land transferred to MIAA shall be disposed of
through sale or any other mode unless specifically approved by
the President of the Philippines.
The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC)
issued Opinion 061, stating that the Local Government Code of
1991 withdrew the exemption from real estate tax granted to
MIAA under Section 21 of the MIAA Charter. Thus, MIAA
negotiated with respondent City of Parañaque to pay the real
estate tax imposed by the City. MIAA then paid some of the real
estate tax already due.
However, MIAA became delinquent and the City of Parañaque,
through its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants
of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the
City of Parañaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport
Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax
delinquency. MIAA thus sought a clarification of OGCC Opinion
No. 061.
OGCC issued Opinion No. 147 clarifying OGCC Opinion No.
061. The OGCC pointed out that Section 206 of the Local
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Government Code requires persons exempt from real estate tax
to show proof of exemption. The OGCC opined that Section 21
of the MIAA Charter is the proof that MIAA is exempt from real
estate tax.
MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition for
prohibition and injunction, with prayer for preliminary injunction
or temporary restraining order. The petition sought to restrain
the City of Parañaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying
against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and
Buildings. CA dismissed the petition.
Issue: WON the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are
exempt from real estate tax under existing laws?
Held: YES. We rule that MIAA’s Airport Lands and Buildings are
exempt from real estate tax imposed by local governments.
First, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation
but an instrumentality of the National Government and thus
exempt from local taxation. Second, the real properties of MIAA
are owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt
from real estate tax.
There is no dispute that a government-owned or controlled
corporation is not exempt from real estate tax. However, MIAA
is not a government-owned or controlled corporation.
A government-owned or controlled corporation must be
"organized as a stock or non-stock corporation." MIAA is not
organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. MIAA is not a
stock corporation because it has no capital stock divided into
shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares. Under its
Charter, MIAA does not have capital stock that is divided into
shares. MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has
no members. Section 87 of the Corporation Code defines a non-
stock corporation as "one where no part of its income is
distributable as dividends to its members, trustees or officers." A
non-stock corporation must have members. Even if we assume
that the Government is considered as the sole member of MIAA,
this will not make MIAA a non-stock corporation. Non-stock
corporations cannot distribute any part of their income to their
members. Section 11 of the MIAA Charter mandates MIAA to
remit 20% of its annual gross operating income to the National
Treasury. This prevents MIAA from qualifying as a non-stock
corporation.
Since MIAA is neither a stock nor a non-stock corporation, MIAA
does not qualify as a government-owned or controlled
corporation. What then is the legal status of MIAA within the
National Government?
MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate
powers to perform efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is
like any other government instrumentality, the only difference is
that MIAA is vested with corporate powers. Section 2(10) of the
Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code defines a
government "instrumentality" as follows:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. (10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the
National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with
special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
charter.
When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate
powers, the instrumentality does not become a corporation.
Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock
or non-stock corporation, it remains a government
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instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also

corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental DIGITAL V. PANGASINAN
powers of eminent domain, police authority and the levying of
fees and charges. At the same time, MIAA exercises "all the Section 137 of the Local Government Code, in principle,
powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as withdrew any exemption from the payment of a tax on
these powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this businesses enjoying a franchise. Expressly, it authorized local
Executive Order." governments to impose a franchise tax on businesses enjoying
a franchise within its territorial jurisdiction. Section 232 likewise
Likewise, when the law makes a government instrumentality
authorizes the imposition of an ad valorem tax on real property
operationally autonomous, the instrumentality remains part of
by the local government of a province, city or municipality within
the National Government machinery although not integrated
the Metropolitan Manila Area wherein the land, building,
with the department framework. The MIAA Charter expressly
machinery and other improvement not thereinafter specifically
states that transforming MIAA into a "separate and autonomous
exempted.
body" will make its operation more "financially viable."
Petitioner DIGITEL was granted, under Provincial Ordinance
A government instrumentality like MIAA falls under Section
No. 18-92, a provincial franchise to install, maintain and operate
133(o) of the Local Government Code, which states: “SEC. 133.
a telecommunications system within the territorial jurisdiction of
Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local
respondent Province of Pangasinan. Under the said provincial
Government Units. Unless otherwise provided herein, the
franchise, the grantee is required to pay franchise and real
exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities,
property taxes.
and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following: (o)
Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, Pursuant to the mandate of Sections 137 and 232 of the Local
its agencies and instrumentalities and local government units.” Government Code, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
respondent Province of Pangasinan enacted Provincial Tax
Section 133(o) recognizes the basic principle that local
Ordinance No. 1, entitled "The Real Property Tax Ordinance of
governments cannot tax the national government, which
1992." Section 4 thereof imposed a real property tax on real
historically merely delegated to local governments the power to
properties located within the territorial jurisdiction of the
tax. While the 1987 Constitution now includes taxation as one of
province. The particular provision, however, technically
the powers of local governments, local governments may only
expanded the application of Sec. 6 of the provincial franchise of
exercise such power "subject to such guidelines and limitations
petitioner DIGITEL to include machineries and other
as the Congress may provide."
improvements, not thereinafter exempted.
When local governments invoke the power to tax on national
Thereafter, Provincial Tax Ordinance No. 4, otherwise known as
government instrumentalities, such power is construed strictly
"The Pangasinan Franchising Ordinance of 1993," was similarly
against local governments. The rule is that a tax is never
ratified. Sections 4, 5 and 6 thereof, positively imposed a
presumed and there must be clear language in the law imposing
franchise tax on businesses enjoying a franchise within the
the tax. Any doubt whether a person, article or activity is taxable
territorial jurisdiction of respondent Province of Pangasinan.
is resolved against taxation. This rule applies with greater force
when local governments seek to tax national government Petitioner DIGITEL was then granted by RA7678, a legislative
instrumentalities. franchise authorizing the grantee to install, operate and maintain
telecommunications systems, this time, throughout the
Another rule is that a tax exemption is strictly construed against
Philippines. Under its legislative franchise, particularly Sec. 5
the taxpayer claiming the exemption. However, when Congress
thereof, petitioner DIGITEL became liable for the payment of a
grants an exemption to a national government instrumentality
franchise tax "as may be prescribed by law of all gross receipts
from local taxation, such exemption is construed liberally in
of the telephone or other telecommunications businesses
favor of the national government instrumentality.
transacted under it by the grantee,"8 as well as real property tax
There is, moreover, no point in national and local governments "on its real estate, and buildings "exclusive of this franchise."
taxing each other, unless a sound and compelling policy
Later, Pangasinan, in its examination of its record found that
requires such transfer of public funds from one government
petitioner DIGITEL had a franchise tax deficiency.
pocket to another.
In the interregnum, Congress passed RA7925, otherwise known
There is also no reason for local governments to tax national
as "The Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the
government instrumentalities for rendering essential public
Philippines." Section 23 of this law entitled Equality of
services to inhabitants of local governments. The only exception
Treatment in the Telecommunications Industry, provided for the
is when the legislature clearly intended to tax government
ipso facto application to any previously granted
instrumentalities for the delivery of essential public services for
telecommunications franchises of any advantage, favor,
sound and compelling policy considerations. There must be
privilege, exemption or immunity granted under existing
express language in the law empowering local governments to
franchises, or those still to be granted, to be accorded
tax national government instrumentalities. Any doubt whether
immediately and unconditionally to earlier grantees.
such power exists is resolved against local governments.
Issue: WON DIGITEL’s real properties found within the territorial
jurisdiction of respondent Province of Pangasinan are exempt
from the payment of real property taxes by virtue of the phrase
"exclusive of this franchise" found in Section 5 of its legislative
franchise?

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW THE WOMEN OF ALEITHEIA
Held: YES. However, it is with the caveat that such exemption
solely applies to those real properties actually, directly and
exclusively used by the grantee in its franchise.
The present issue actually boils down to a dispute between the
inherent taxing power of Congress and the delegated authority
to tax of the local government borne by the 1987 Constitution.
We already sustained the power of Congress to grant
exemptions over and above the power of the local
government s delegated taxing authority notwithstanding the
source of such power.
Indeed, the grant of taxing powers to local government units
under the Constitution and the LGC does not affect the power of
Congress to grant exemptions to certain persons, pursuant to a
declared national policy. The legal effect of the constitutional
grant to local governments simply means that in interpreting
statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, doubts must be
resolved in favor of municipal corporations.
Succinctly put, had the Congress of the Philippines intended to
tax each and every real property of petitioner DIGITEL,
regardless of whether or not it is used in the business or
operation of its franchise, it would not have incorporated a
qualifying phrase, which such manifestation admittedly is. And,
to our minds, "the issue in this case no longer dwells on whether
Congress has the power to exempt" petitioner DIGITEL’s
properties from realty taxes by its enactment of RA7678 which
contains the phrase "exclusive of this franchise," in the face of
the mandate of the Local Government Code. The more pertinent
issue to consider is whether or not, by passing RA7678,
Congress intended to exempt petitioner DIGITEL’s real
properties actually, directly and exclusively used by the grantee
in its franchise.
The fact that Republic Act No. 7678 was a later piece of
legislation can be taken to mean that Congress, knowing fully
well that the Local Government Code had already withdrawn
exemptions from real property taxes, chose to restore such
immunity even to a limited degree.
In view of the unequivocal intent of Congress to exempt from
real property tax those real properties actually, directly and
exclusively used by petitioner DIGITEL in the pursuit of its
franchise, respondent Province of Pangasinan can only levy real
property tax on the remaining real properties of the grantee
located within its territorial jurisdiction not part of the above-
stated classification. Said exemption, however, merely applies
from the time of the effectivity of petitioner DIGITEL’s legislative
franchise and not a moment sooner.
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
Doctrine
Q. After serving a full third year term, Alegre was declared to
have been invalidly elected to his third term. Should that
term be counted for purposes of the three term limit?
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
A. Yes. The decision declaring him not elected is of no
practical consequence because he has already served.
Ong v. Alegre, G.R. No. 163295, January 23, 2006.
The fact that a person served as Mayor for a whole term even if
he had been declared not elected, such fact does not interrupt
that running of three consecutive terms, as in Ong v. Alegre.
Rivera III v. Morales, GR 167591, May 9, 2007.
ONG V. ALEGRE
In the May 1998 elections, Alegre and Ong opposed each other,
with the latter being subsequently proclaimed by COMELEC
winner in that contest. Alegre subsequently filed an election
protest. RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor in that
1998 mayoralty contest, albeit the decision came out only on
July 4, 2001, when Ong had fully served the 1998-2001
mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to serve the
2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the municipality of San
Vicente.
Now, private respondent Alegre and petitioner Ong were once
again candidates for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in
the 2004 elections. Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial
Office a Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy of Ong. The petition to disqualify was
predicated on the three-consecutive term rule, Ong having,
according to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May
2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed office as mayor
and discharged the duties thereof for 3 consecutive full terms
corresponding to those elections.
Comelec denied the petition. Undaunted, Alegre filed a timely
motion for reconsideration. COMELEC en banc issued a
resolution reversing and thereby (a) declaring Ong "as
disqualified to run for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in
the 2004 elections"; (b) ordering the deletion of Ong’s name
from the official list of candidates; and (c) directing the
concerned board of election inspectors not to count the votes
cast in his favor.
Issue: WON petitioner Francis Ong’s assumption of office as
Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the mayoralty term
1998 to 2001 should be considered as full service for the
purpose of the three-term limit rule.
Held: YES, he is thus barred from running again as he falls
under the three-term limit rule. For the three-term limit for
elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or
requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has
been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local
government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3)
consecutive terms.
With the view we take of the case, the disqualifying requisites
are present herein, thus effectively barring petitioner Francis
from running for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the
May 10, 2004 elections. There can be no dispute about
petitioner Francis Ong having been duly elected mayor of that
municipality in the May 1995 and again in the May 2001
elections and serving the July 1, 1995- June 30, 1998 and the
July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in full. The herein controversy
revolves around the 1998-2001 mayoral term, albeit there can
also be no quibbling that Francis ran for mayor of the same
municipality in the May 1998 elections and actually served the
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1998-2001 mayoral term by virtue of a proclamation initially
declaring him mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente.
The question that begs to be addressed, therefore, is whether or
not Francis Ong’s assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, may be
considered as one full term service in the context of the
consecutive three-term limit rule.
We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis,
"service for the full term", and should be counted as a full term
served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the
constitutional and statutory provisions, supra, barring local
elective officials from being elected and serving for more than
three consecutive term for the same position.
It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in Election
Protest Case No. 6850,17 that it was Francis Ong’s opponent
(Alegre) who "won" in the 1998 mayoralty race and, therefore,
was the legally elected mayor of San Vicente. However, that
disposition, it must be stressed, was without practical and legal
use and value, having been promulgated after the term of the
contested office has expired. Petitioner Francis contention that
he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby
as his proclamation was under protest did not make him less
than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal
Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor
in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of
office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from
start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for
a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.
The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not
hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean that Alegre
would under the three-term rule - be considered as having
served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral
protest ruling, when another actually served such term pursuant
to a proclamation made in due course after an election.
RIVERA III V. MORALES
In the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections,
respondent Marino "Boking" Morales ran as candidate for mayor
of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term commencing July 1, 2004
to June 30, 2007. Prior thereto or on January 5, 2004, he filed
his Certificate of Candidacy.
On January 10, 2004, Attys. Venancio Q. Rivera and
Normandick De Guzman, petitioners, filed with the Second
Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition
to cancel respondent Morales’ Certificate of Candidacy on the
ground that he was elected and had served three previous
consecutive terms as mayor of Mabalacat.
In his answer to the petition, respondent Morales admitted that
he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term commencing
July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998 (first term) and July 1, 2001 to
June 30, 2004 (third term), but he served the second term from
July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 only as a "caretaker of the office"
or as a "de facto officer" because of the following reasons: (a)
He was not validly elected for the second term 1998 to 2001
since his proclamation as mayor was declared void by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 57, Angeles City in its
Decision dated April 2, 2001 in Election Protest Case (EPC) No.
98-131. The Decision became final and executory on August 6,
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
2001; and (b) He was preventively suspended by the
Ombudsman in an anti-graft case from January 16, 1999 to July
15, 1999.
COMELEC Second Division rendered its Resolution finding
respondent Morales disqualified to run for the position of
municipal mayor on the ground that he had already served 3
consecutive terms. Accordingly, his Certificate of Candidacy
was cancelled.
On May 24, 2004, after respondent Morales was proclaimed the
duly elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term commencing July
1, 2004 to June 30, 2007, petitioner Anthony Dee, also a
candidate for mayor, filed with the RTC a petition for quo
warranto against the said respondent. Petitioner alleged that
respondent Morales, having served as mayor for three
consecutive terms, is ineligible to run for another term or fourth
term.
In his answer, respondent Morales raised the following
defenses: (a) He was not validly elected for the term 1998 to
2001 since the RTC, Branch 57, Angeles City declared in its
Decision that his proclamation as mayor of Mabalacat was void.
Petitioner Dee was then proclaimed the duly elected mayor; and
(b) He was preventively suspended for six months by the
Ombudsman, during the same term in an anti-graft case, an
interruption in the continuity of his service as municipal mayor of
Mabalacat.
In its Decision RTC dismissed petitioner Dee’s petition for quo
warranto on the ground that respondent Morales did not serve
the three-term limit since he was not the duly elected mayor of
Mabalacat, but petitioner Dee in the May 1998 elections for the
term 1998 to 2001.
It is undisputed that respondent Morales was elected to the
position of mayor of Mabalacat for the following consecutive
terms:
a) July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998
b) July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001
c) July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004
d) July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007
Issue: WON the Morales’ 2nd term from 1998 to 2001 may be
considered as fully served?
Held: YES. Here, respondent Morales was elected for the term
July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He
served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the
entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the
electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him
(respondent) as mayor. To reiterate, as held in Ong v. Alegre,
such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving
the full term.
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution can not be more clear
and explicit: “The term of the office of elected local officials x x
x, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms.”
Upon the other hand, Section 43 (b) of R.A. No. 7160 (the Local
Government Code) clearly provides: “No local official shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms in the same position.”
Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has
been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break since
July 1, 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will
have been mayor of Mabalacat for 12 continuous years.
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Respondent Morales maintains that he served his second term
(1998 to 2001) only as a "caretaker of the office" or as a "de
facto officer." Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated
and its purpose defeated when an official serves in the same
position for three consecutive terms. Whether as "caretaker" or
"de facto" officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the
prerequisites of the office which enables him "to stay on
indefinitely". Respondent Morales should be promptly ousted
from the position of mayor of Mabalacat.


ARTICLE XI - ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Section 6. The officials and employees of the Office of the
Ombudsman, other than the Deputies, shall be appointed
by the Ombudsman, according to the Civil Service Law.
Doctrine
Under the Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is an
independent body. As a guaranty of this independence, the
Ombudsman has the power to appoint all officials and
employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, except his
deputies. This power necessarily includes the power of setting,
prescribing and administering the standards for the officials and
personnel of the Office.
To further ensure its independence, the Ombudsman has been
vested with the power of administrative control and supervision
of the Office. This includes the authority to organize such
directorates for administration and allied services as may be
necessary for the effective discharge of the functions of the
Office, as well as to prescribe and approve its position structure
and staffing pattern. Necessarily, it also includes the authority to
determine and establish the qualifications, duties, functions and
responsibilities of the various directorates and allied services of
the Office. This must be so if the constitutional intent to
establish an independent Office of the Ombudsman is to remain
meaningful and significant. The Civil Service Commission has
no power over this. Ombudsman v. CSC, G.R. No. 162215,
July 30, 1007.
OMBUDSMAN V. CSC
This controversy traces its roots to Ombudsman Simeon V.
Marcelo’s lette to the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
requesting the approval of the amendment of qualification
standards for Director II positions in the Central Administrative
Service and Finance and Management Service of the Office of
the Ombudsman.
Acting thereon, the CSC issued Opinion No. 44, s. 2004,
disapproving the request. The Office of the Ombudsman,
claiming that its constitutional and statutory powers were unduly
curtailed, now seeks to set aside and nullify CSC Opinion No.
44, s. 2004 via this petition for certiorari.
The Office of the Ombudsman asserts that its specific, exclusive
and discretionary constitutional and statutory power as an
independent constitutional body to administer and supervise its
own officials and personnel, including the authority to administer
competitive examinations and prescribe reasonable qualification
standards for its own officials, cannot be curtailed by the general
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
power of the CSC to administer the civil service system. Any
unwarranted and unreasonable restriction on its discretionary
authority, such as what the CSC did when it issued Opinion No.
44, s. 2004, is constitutionally and legally infirm.
Issue: WON the Ombudsman may provide the qualifications for
its own personnel, independent from the CSC?
Held: YES. The CSC’s opinion that the Director II positions in
the Central Administrative Service and the Finance and
Management Service of the Office of the Ombudsman are
covered by the CES is wrong. The CES covers presidential
appointees only.
Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is the appointing
authority for all officials and employees of the Office of the
Ombudsman, except the Deputy Ombudsmen. Thus, a person
occupying the position of Director II in the Central Administrative
Service or Finance and Management Service of the Office of the
Ombudsman is appointed by the Ombudsman, not by the
President. As such, he is neither embraced in the CES nor does
he need to possess CES eligibility.
To classify the positions of Director II in the Central
Administrative Service and the Finance and Management
Service of the Office of the Ombudsman as covered by the CES
and require appointees thereto to acquire CES or CSE eligibility
before acquiring security of tenure will lead to unconstitutional
and unlawful consequences. It will result either in (1) vesting the
appointing power for said position in the President, in violation
of the Constitution or (2) including in the CES a position not held
by a presidential appointee, contrary to the Administrative Code.
Section 6, Article XI of the Constitution provides: “Sec. 6. The
officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, other
than the Deputies, shall be appointed by the Ombudsman
according to the Civil Service Law.” This is complemented by
RA[13] 6770, otherwise known as “The Ombudsman Act of
1989.” Section 11 thereof states: “Sec. 11. Structural
Organization. – The authority and responsibility for the exercise
of the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman and for the
discharge of its power and functions shall be vested in the
Ombudsman, who shall have supervision and control of the said
Office. xxx (1) The Office of the Ombudsman may organize
such directorates for administration and allied services as may
be necessary for the effective discharge of its functions. xxx
Those appointed as directors or heads shall have the rank and
salary of line bureau directors. Xxx (5) The position structure
and staffing pattern of the Office of the Ombudsman, including
the Office of the Special Prosecutor, shall be approved and
prescribed by the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman shall appoint
all officers and employees of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, in accordance with the civil service law, rules and
regulations.”
Under the Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is an
independent body. As a guaranty of this independence, the
Ombudsman has the power to appoint all officials and
employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, except his
deputies. This power necessarily includes the power of setting,
prescribing and administering the standards for the officials and
personnel of the Office.
To further ensure its independence, the Ombudsman has been
vested with the power of administrative control and supervision
of the Office. This includes the authority to organize such
directorates for administration and allied services as may be
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW THE WOMEN OF ALEITHEIA
necessary for the effective discharge of the functions of the
Office, as well as to prescribe and approve its position structure
and staffing pattern. Necessarily, it also includes the authority to
determine and establish the qualifications, duties, functions and
responsibilities of the various directorates and allied services of
the Office. This must be so if the constitutional intent to
establish an independent Office of the Ombudsman is to remain
meaningful and significant.
Qualification standards are used as guides in appointment and
other personnel actions, in determining training needs and as
aid in the inspection and audit of the personnel work programs.
They are intimately connected to the power to appoint as well as
to the power of administrative supervision. Thus, as a corollary
to the Ombudsman’s appointing and supervisory powers, he
possesses the authority to establish reasonable qualification
standards for the personnel of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as
protectors of the people, shall act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public
officials or employees of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall,
in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the
action taken and the result thereof.
Doctrine
The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over disciplinary cases
against government employees, which includes public school
teachers, is vested by no less than Section 12, Article XI of the
Constitution. However, Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 4670,
otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers, provides that it must first go to a committee appointed
by the Secretary of Education. Ombudsman v. Estandarte, GR
168670, April 13, 2007.
OMBUDSMAN V. ESTANDARTE
People’s Graftwatch, through its Chairman, Dr. Patricio Y. Tan,
referred to the Office of the Ombudsman, for immediate
investigation, a complaint of the Faculty Club and Department
Heads of the Ramon Torres National High School against Heidi
Estandarte, the school principal. The complaint consisted of 33
allegations of improprieties ranging from illegal handling of
school funds, irregular financial transactions, perjury, and abuse
of authority. However, the complaint was not subscribed and
sworn to by the complainant, and not supported by the sworn
statements of witnesses. The complaint also lacked a statement
of non-forum shopping as required.
The Ombudsman forwarded the complaint to the DECS and the
Commission on Audit (COA) for appropriate action pursuant to
Section 15(2) of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the
Ombudsman Act of 1989. DECS-Region VI found that the
complaint did not comply with the formalities under EO292,
otherwise known as The Administrative Code of 1987. Thus, it
dismissed the complaint, without prejudice to the filing of an
appropriate one.
Undaunted, the Faculty Club filed a formal complaint, sworn and
subscribed to by the complainants, with DECS-Region VI.
However, in a letter, the said office dismissed the complaint
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outright for lack of verification and certification against forum
shopping.
DECS-Region VI received the requisite verification and
certification. This case was entitled "Faculty and Department
Heads of the Ramon Torres National High School, Bago City v.
Heidi Estandarte."
(After so many procedural matters), the CA held that the
Ombudsman (Visayas) acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
when it took over the case after it issued a memorandum
considering the case closed and terminated and after
jurisdiction had already been vested in the Special Investigating
Committee. Such act violates the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Once jurisdiction is acquired by or attached to a proper
investigative body or agency, such jurisdiction continues until
the termination of the case. Citing Fabella v. Court of Appeals
and Emin v. de Leon, the CA held that Rep. Act No. 4670
specifically covers and governs administrative proceedings
involving public school teachers, and jurisdiction over such
cases is originally and exclusively lodged with the Investigating
Committee created pursuant to Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 4670.
The appellate court further held that, assuming the Ombudsman
(Visayas) has jurisdiction, the assailed decision and order would
have to be set aside because Estandarte was denied her right
to substantive and procedural due process. It pointed out that
she was denied the right to a formal investigation and the
opportunity to be heard. Following the Court’s ruling in Tapiador
v. Office of the Ombudsman, the CA held that the Ombudsman
(Visayas) has no authority to directly impose the penalty of
dismissal on those who are the subject of its investigation
because its power is merely recommendatory.
Issue: WON Ombudsman had jurisdiction?
Held: YES, but even if we hold that the Ombudsman (Visayas)
had concurrent jurisdiction over the administrative case, we
would still sustain the DECS’ authority to decide the
administrative case. The Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers, provides that it must first go to a committee appointed
by the Secretary of Education
The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over disciplinary cases
against government employees, which includes public school
teachers, is vested by no less than Section 12, Article XI of the
Constitution which states: “Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his
Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or
employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify
the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.”
In a case of recent vintage, the Court held that the Ombudsman
has full administrative disciplinary authority over public officials
and employees of the government, thus: “All these provisions in
Republic Act No. 6770 taken together reveal the manifest intent
of the lawmakers to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full
administrative disciplinary authority. These provisions cover the
entire gamut of administrative adjudication which entails the
authority to, inter alia, receive complaints, conduct
investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its rules of
procedure, summon witnesses and require the production of
documents, place under preventive suspension public officers
and employees pending an investigation, determine the
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appropriate penalty imposable on erring public officers or
employees as warranted by the evidence, and necessarily,
impose the said penalty.”
However, Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 4670, otherwise known as
the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, provides that:
“Section 9. Administrative Charges. Administrative charges
against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee
composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the
Division or a duly authorized representative who would at least
have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher
belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its
absence, any existing provincial or national teacher’s
organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be
designated by the Director of Public Schools. The committee
shall submit its findings, and recommendations to the Director of
Public Schools within thirty days from the termination of the
hearings: Provided, however, That, where the school
superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the
members of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary
of Education.”
Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides
that the Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary
authority over all elective and appointive officials of the
Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies, including members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries except over officials who may be removed by
impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
However, in Fabella v. Court of Appeals, it was held that R.A.
No. 4670, the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers,
specifically covers and governs administrative proceedings
involving public school teachers.
Undoubtedly, the DECS-Region VI first assumed jurisdiction
over the administrative complaint against the respondent. It
should be recalled that when People’s Graftwatch forwarded the
complaint to the Ombudsman (Visayas), the latter treated it as a
request for assistance and referred it to the DECS-Region VI
and COA for appropriate action. After it had resolved to upgrade
the matter to an administrative case, the Ombudsman decided
not to take cognizance of the same and refer it, instead, to the
DECS-Region VI pursuant to Section 23(2) of R.A. 6770.
We do not agree with petitioner’s contention that it could
assume jurisdiction over the administrative case after the
DECS-Region VI had voluntarily relinquished its jurisdiction over
the same in favor of the petitioner. Jurisdiction is a matter of
law. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of
the parties but continues until the case is terminated. When the
complainants filed their formal complaint with the DECS-Region
VI, jurisdiction was vested on the latter. It cannot now be
transferred to petitioner upon the instance of the complainants,
even with the acquiescence of the DECS and petitioner.
Considering that the respondent is a public school teacher who
is covered by the provisions of Rep. Act No. 4670, the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers, the DECS-Region VI is in a
better position to decide the matter. Moreover, the DECS has
already commenced proceedings over the administrative case
by constituting the Special Investigating Committee pursuant to
Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 4670.
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person,
any act or omission of any public official, employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public
official or employee of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well
as of any government-owned or controlled corporation
with original charter, to perform and expedite any act
or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct
any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action
against a public official or employee at fault, and
recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance
therewith.
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case,
and subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to
contracts or transactions entered into by his office
involving the disbursement or use of public funds or
properties, and report any irregularity to the
Commission on Audit for appropriate action.
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and
information necessary in the discharge of its
responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent
records and documents.
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when
circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape,
mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the
Government and make recommendations for their
elimination and the observance of high standards of
ethics and efficiency.
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such
other powers or perform such functions or duties as
may be provided by law.
Doctrine
Q. What is the scope of the investigatory power of the
Ombudsman?
A. Based on Secton 13, the Office of the Ombudsman exercises
jurisdiction over public officials/ employees of GOCCs with
original charters. This being so, it can only investigate and
prosecute acts or omissions of the officials/employees of
government corporations. Therefore, although the government
later on acquired the controlling interest in PAL, the fact remains
that the latter did not have an “original charter” and its
officers/employees could not be investigated and/or prosecuted
by the Ombudsman. Khan, Jr v Ombudsman, G.R. No. 125296,
July 20. 2006.
We see no reason to deviate from these rulings. They are
consistent with our earlier observation that unlike the “classical
Ombudsman model” whose function is merely to “receive and
process the people’s complaints against corrupt and abusive
government personnel,” the Philippine Ombudsman — as
protector of the people, is armed with the power to prosecute
erring public officers and employees, giving him an active role in
the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and
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such other offenses that may be committed by such officers and
employees. The legislature has vested him with broad powers
to enable him to implement his own actions. Ombudsman v. CA,
G.R. No. 167844, November 22, 2006.
The finding of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83356
that there is sufficient evidence of respondent Farida T. Lucero’s
guilt for dishonesty is AFFIRMED. However, the appellate
court’s declaration that the Ombudsman has no power to order
her removal or dismissal from office is SET ASIDE.
Consequently, the decision of the Ombudsman dismissing
respondent Lucero is AFFIRMED. Ombudsman v. Lucero, G.R.
No. 168718, November 24, 2006.
Q. Does the Ombudsman have the power to impose the penalty
of suspension?
A. Yes. The enumeration of the powers of the Ombudsman in
the Constitution is not exclusive. Congress may add additional
powers. In conjunction therewith, Section 19 of Republic Act No.
6770 grants to the Ombudsman fuller authority. Ombudsman v.
CA, G.R. No. 160675, June 16, 2006.
Q. May the Special Prosecutor file an information without
authority from the Ombudsman?
A. No. Republic Act No. 6770, by conferring upon the
Ombudsman the power to prosecute, likewise grants to the
Ombudsman the power to authorize the filing of
informations. A delegated authority to prosecute was also
given to the Deputy Ombudsman, but no such delegation
exists to the Special Prosecutor. Nor is there an implied
delegation. The doctrine of qualified political agency
governing the relation between department secretaries and
the President does not apply to the relation between the
Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor. The Special
Prosecutor prosecutes only when authorized by the
Ombudsman. Perez v. Sandigabayan, G.R. No. 166062,
September 26, 2006.
The powers of the Ombudsman are found in Article XI of the
1987 Constitution, which states in part that the Ombudsman
shall “exercise such other powers or performs such functions or
duties as may be provided by law.” This refers to Sections 15,
21, and 25 of Republic Act No. 6770 (RA 6770), otherwise
known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
While Section 15(3) of RA 6770 states that the Ombudsman has
the power to “recommend x x x removal, suspension, demotion
x x x” of government officials and employees, the same Section
15(3) also states that the Ombudsman in the alternative may
“enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21” of
RA 6770. The word “or” in Section 15(3) before the phrase
“enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21”
grants the Ombudsman this alternative power.
Section 21 of RA 6770 vests in the Ombudsman “disciplinary
authority over all elective and appointive officials of the
Government,” except impeachable officers, members of
Congress, and the Judiciary. And under Section 25 of RA
6770, the Ombudsman may impose in administrative
proceedings the “penalty ranging from suspension without pay
for one year to dismissal with forfeiture of benefits or a fine
ranging from five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to twice the
amount malversed, illegally taken or lost, or both at the
discretion of the Ombudsman x x x.”
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
Clearly, under RA 6770 the Ombudsman has the power to
impose directly administrative penalty on public officials or
employees. Hence, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
petitioner has no power to impose directly administrative
penalties on public officials or employees. Ombudsman v. CA,
G.R. No. 168079, July 17, 2007.
NOTE: But according to Local Government Code, elective
officials may be dismissed only by the proper court.
Ombudsman has rule making power. The finality and execution
of decisions of the Ombudsman are governed by Rules the
Ombudsman is authorized to promulgate. Buencamino v. CA,
GR 175895,April 4, 2007.
KHAN, JR V OMBUDSMAN
Private respondents Rosauro Torralba and Celestino Bandala
charged petitioners before the Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas)
for violation of RA 3019. In their complaint, private respondents
accused petitioners of using their positions in PAL to secure a
contract for Synergy Services Corporation, a corporation
engaged in hauling and janitorial services in which they were
shareholders.
Petitioners filed an omnibus motion to dismiss the complaint on
the following grounds: (1) the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction
over them since PAL was a private entity and (2) they were not
public officers, hence, outside the application of RA 3019.
Issue: WON Ombudsman has jurisdiction?
Held: NO. Based on Article XI Section 13(2) of the Constitution,
the Office of the Ombudsman exercises jurisdiction over public
officials/ employees of GOCCs with original charters. This being
so, it can only investigate and prosecute acts or omissions of
the officials/employees of government corporations. Therefore,
although the government later on acquired the controlling
interest in PAL, the fact remains that the latter did not have an
"original charter" and its officers/employees could not be
investigated and/or prosecuted by the Ombudsman.
OMBUDSMAN V. CA
Respondent Santos belonged to the clerical staff of the Director
of LTFRB Region VII, Mandaue City, Cebu. In November 1998,
respondent was designated as concurrent acting “Special
Collection/Disbursing Officer.” COA audited respondent’s cash
and accounts. After inspecting respondent’s records, the COA’s
examining auditors noted a shortage of P34k in respondent’s
accounts. Although respondent acknowledged the shortage, she
failed to explain the same. Respondent remitted the missing
amount. COA required respondent to explain the discrepancy.
Instead of explaining, respondent merely confirmed the cash
shortage.
COA charged respondent in the Office of the Ombudsman,
Visayas (“Ombudsman Visayas”) with Dishonesty. In her
counter-affidavit, respondent claimed that the missing funds
comprised her collections for 11 June 1999. Respondent stated
that during the auditing on 21 June 1999, she kept the
collections, which allegedly included two fake P500 bills, in her
vault. Respondent explained, for the first time, that she did not
turn over the collections to the COA auditors because of the
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fake bills. Respondent added that had the COA auditors asked,
she would have produced the funds.
In its Decision dated 28 October 2002, the Ombudsman Visayas
found respondent guilty as charged and dismissed her from
service.
In its Decision dated 31 January 2005, the Court of Appeals,
while finding respondent liable for “malversation of funds,”
lowered respondent’s administrative offense to Neglect of Duty
due to attendant “mitigating circumstances.” Further, the Court
of Appeals sustained respondent’s contention on the
Ombudsman’s powers and held that the latter’s “jurisdiction and
authority in administrative cases is only recommendatory.”
Thus, the Court of Appeals “recommended” to the LTFRB
respondent’s suspension from service for six months.
Issue: WON the Ombudsman had authority to directly impose a
penalty in the admin case?
Held: YES. Giving a literal interpretation to the word
“recommend” in the provisions concerning the functions of the
Ombudsman, the Court of Appeals concluded that petitioner
could do no more. This is error.
In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, we rejected such interpretation
as unduly restrictive and not “consistent with the wisdom and
spirit behind the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman.”
Instead, we held that “[b]y stating x x x that the Ombudsman
‘recommends’ the action to be taken against an erring officer or
employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in RA 6770
intended [only] that the implementation of the order be coursed
through the proper officer.”
In our recent ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of
Appeals, we reiterated Ledesma and expounded that taken
together, the relevant provisions of RA 6770 vested petitioner
with “full administrative disciplinary authority” including the
power to “determine the appropriate penalty imposable on erring
public officers or employees as warranted by the evidence, and,
necessarily, impose the said penalty.”
OMBUDSMAN V. LUCERO
Petitioner Farida T. Lucero was appointed as Clerk II of the
Land Transportation Office, Regional Office No. VII, and was
assigned at the Chief Finance Division in order to augment the
personnel complement thereat. In a Memorandum which was
issued by Regional Director Isabelo K. Apor, she was likewise
directed to assist the Regional Cashier in collecting and
receiving miscellaneous fees/revenues.
Then OIC-Regional Director Porferio I. Mendoza of the LTO,
Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City requested COA to conduct
an audit in the Cash Section of the Operations Division of their
office in order to determine the extent of malversation of funds
just discovered covering the period from November 18, 1999 up
to September 30, 2000.
An audit was conducted, revealing Petitioner to have issued
sixty-nine (69) altered miscellaneous receipts. Thereafter, an
administrative case for dishonesty was filed against the
Petitioner in the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas).
On July 20, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas)
rendered its Decision finding the Petitioner guilty of dishonesty.
Issue: WON Ombudsman has authority?
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
Held: YES. We agree with the ratiocination of public
respondents. Several reasons militate against a literal
interpretation of the subject constitutional provision. Firstly, a
cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the main point of the
case was the failure of the complainant therein to present
substantial evidence to prove the charges of the administrative
case. The statement that made reference to the power of the
Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter dictum and, as it is
unsupported by sufficient explanation, is susceptible to varying
interpretations, as what precisely is before us in this case.
Hence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of this Court
nor is it safe from judicial examination.
The issue raised in this Court has already been resolved in
Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals. In that case, the
Court declared that in the exercise of its administrative
disciplinary authority under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution and RA6770, the Office of the Ombudsman is
empowered not merely to recommend, but to impose the
penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault.
The legislative history of RA6770 bears out the conclusion that
the Office of the Ombudsman was intended to possess full
administrative disciplinary authority, including the power to
impose penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee. The
lawmakers envisioned the Office of the Ombudsman to be “an
activist watchman,” not merely a passive one.
OMBUDSMAN V. CA
Joan and Thomas Corominas, and Maria Constancia
Corominas-Lim filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a
criminal complaint for violation of Article 281 (Other Forms of
Trespass) of the Revised Penal Code against herein Arregadas,
et al, all employees of the DENR. The same criminal complaint
was also treated by the Office of the Ombudsman as an
administrative complaint for abuse of authority and misconduct.
It was alleged that the above-named DENR employees
conspired to enter the parcel of land owned by the Corominas
family without seeking permission from the latter or their
representative and despite the big "NO TRESPASSING" sign
attached to the perimeter fences enclosing the said property.
By way of refutation, respondents alleged that they entered the
Corominas landholding pursuant to the Order of the RTC of
Cebu City, involving a complaint for annulment and cancellation
of title.
Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal complaint for
lack of probable cause. However, in the administrative case, the
Office of the Ombudsman rendered the Decision finding that,
except for Arregadas, the other named DENR employees are
guilty of simple misconduct and imposed on them the penalty of
suspension for one month.
Issue: WON Ombudsman had authority?
Held: In Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman, the Court
recognized that the foregoing enumeration is not exclusive and
that the framers of the Constitution had given Congress the
leeway to prescribe, by subsequent legislation, additional
powers to the Ombudsman. Congress thus enacted Republic
Act No. 6770 to provide for the functional and structural
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organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. It substantially
reiterates the constitutional provisions relating to the Office of
the Ombudsman.
The authority of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative
investigations is beyond cavil. It is mandated by no less than
Section 13(1), Article XI of the Constitution. In conjunction
therewith, Section 19 of RA6770 grants to the Ombudsman the
authority to act on all administrative complaints.
Section 2230 thereof vests in the Office of the Ombudsman the
power to investigate any serious misconduct in the office
allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for
the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if
warranted. Such power, likewise, includes the investigation of
private persons who conspire with public officers and
employees. Section 2331 requires that the administrative
investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman shall
be in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with
due process. The Office of the Ombudsman is, however, given
the option to refer certain complaints to the proper disciplinary
authority for the institution of appropriate administrative
proceedings against erring public officers or employees.
Still in connection with their administrative disciplinary authority,
the Ombudsman and his deputies are expressly given the
power to preventively suspend public officials and employees
facing administrative charges in accordance with Sec.24 of
RA6770.
Under PD807, the penalties that may be imposed by the
disciplining authority in administrative disciplinary cases are
removal from the service, transfer, demotion in rank, suspension
for not more than one year without pay, fine in an amount not
exceeding six months salary, or reprimand.
Findings of facts by the Office of the Ombudsman when
supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order,
directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month’s salary
shall be final and unappealable.
All these provisions in RA6770 taken together reveal the
manifest intent of the lawmakers to bestow on the Office of the
Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority. These
provisions cover the entire gamut of administrative adjudication
which entails the authority to, inter alia, receive complaints,
conduct investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its
rules of procedure, summon witnesses and require the
production of documents, place under preventive suspension
public officers and employees pending an investigation,
determine the appropriate penalty imposable on erring public
officers or employees as warranted by the evidence, and,
necessarily, impose the said penalty.
Clearly, the Philippine Ombudsman departs from the classical
Ombudsman model whose function is merely to receive and
process the people’s complaints against corrupt and abusive
government personnel. The Philippine Ombudsman, as
protector of the people, is armed with the power to prosecute
erring public officers and employees, giving him an active role in
the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and
such other offenses that may be committed by such officers and
employees. The legislature has vested him with broad powers to
enable him to implement his own actions.
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
PEREZ V. SANDIGABAYAN
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman filed charges of violation of
RA 3019 against petitioners, Mayor Salvador M. Perez, and
Municipal Treasurer Juanita Apostol for buying a personal
computer through their own canvassing. It was alleged that the
acquisition clearly indicated that the public officials involved
gave the supplier, unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence by paying much more than the
prevailing price for a comparable computer set in the market,
and against the rules of procurement.
In filing the information, the Special Prosecutor had not prior
authority or approval of the Ombudsman, and such filing was in
fact against the latter’s instructions.
Issue: WON Special Prosecutor may file the Amended
Information without authority from or the approval of the
Honorable Ombudsman, and against the latter’s specific
instruction?
Held: NO. When one considers that by express mandate of
paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, the
Ombudsman may “exercise such other powers or perform
functions or duties as may be provided by law,” it is indubitable
then that Congress has the power to place the Office of the
Special Prosecutor under the Office of the Ombudsman, as was
done in the Ombudsman Act. In the same vein, Congress may
remove some of the powers granted to the Tanodbayan by P.D.
No. 1630 and transfer them to the Ombudsman; or grant the
Office of the Special Prosecutor such other powers and
functions and duties as Congress may deem fit and wise. This
Congress did through the passage of R.A No. 6770.
RA6770, by conferring upon the Ombudsman the power to
prosecute, likewise grants to the Ombudsman the power to
authorize the filing of informations. As to the Special
Prosecutor, respondent People invokes the aforesaid authority
of the Ombudsman in Section 15(10) to delegate his powers,
and claim that there was a general delegation of the authority to
approve the filing of informations in Office Order No. 03-97,
series of 2003 (dated 15 September 2003), and Office Order
No. 40-05, series of 2005 (dated 4 April 2005).
Contrary to the contention of respondent People, the delegation
of the power to authorize the filing of informations under Office
Order No. 40-05 was only made to Deputy Ombudsmen, and
not to the Special Prosecutor. All that was delegated to the
Special Prosecutor was the discretional authority to review and
modify the Deputy Ombudsmen-authorized information, but
even this is subject to the condition that such modification must
be “without departing from, or varying in any way, the contents
of the basic Resolution, Order or Decision.” Even the title of
Office Order No. 40-05 betray the contention of delegation to
the Special Prosecutor: “DELEGATION OF FINAL APPROVING
AUTHORITY TO THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON,
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR VISAYAS AND DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN FOR MINDANAO.”
There being no express delegation of the power to prosecute,
we are constrained to go back to our main query: Is there an
implied delegation of the power to prosecute under Republic Act
No. 6770, such that Special Prosecutors are presumed to have
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been delegated such power, in the absence of a prohibition from
the Ombudsman?
Springing from the power of control is the doctrine of qualified
political agency, wherein the acts of a subordinate bears the
implied approval of his superior, unless actually disapproved by
the latter. Thus, taken with the powers of control and
supervision, the acts of Department Secretaries in the
performance of their duties are presumed to be the act of the
President, unless and until the President alters, modifies, or
nullifies the same. By arguing that “[w]hat is important is that
the amended Information has not been withdrawn, and or
recalled by the Honorable Ombudsman, [a] clear showing that
the latter acknowledged/upheld the act of the Special
Prosecutor in signing the Amended Information,” respondent
People claims that the doctrine of qualified political agency
should be applied as well to the relationship between the
Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor.
After serious reflection, we have decided to sustain the
contention of the government in this case on the broad
proposition, albeit not suggested, that under the presidential
type of government which we have adopted and considering the
departmental organization established and continued in force by
paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive,
and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by
the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of
the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive
are performed by and through the executive departments, and
the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
While we do not underestimate the quantity of work in the hands
of the Office of the Ombudsman, the same simply does not
measure up to the workload of the Office of the President as to
necessitate having the Special Prosecutor as an alter ego of the
Ombudsman. In any case, the Office of the Ombudsman could
very well make a general delegation of powers to the Special
Prosecutor, if it is so desired. An examination of the office
orders issued by the Ombudsman, however, reveal that there
had been no such intention to make a general delegation.
Indeed, a statute granting powers to an agency created by the
Constitution should be liberally construed for the advancement
of the purposes and objectives for which it was created. Yet, the
Ombudsman would be severely hampered from exercising his
power of control if we are to allow the Special Prosecutor to
authorize the filing of informations in the first instance. This is
because while the Ombudsman has full discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the
Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with said court, it
is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman, which
has full control of the case so much so that the informations
may not be dismissed, without the approval of the said court.
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
OMBUDSMAN V. CA
Respondents were charged and found guilty by the
Ombdusman of neglect of duty for apparent shortages in
collections. On appeal, CA affirmed but held that Ombudsman
had no power to impose directly sanctions against government
officials and employees who are subject of its investigation.
Issue: WON Ombudsman has the power to impose directly
administrative penalties on public officials or employees?
Held: YES. The Court upholds the Office of the Ombudsman’s
power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion,
fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee
found to be at fault, in the exercise of its administrative
disciplinary authority. The exercise of such power is well
founded in the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770.
The legislative history of RA6770 bears out the conclusion that
the Office of the Ombudsman was intended to possess full
administrative disciplinary authority, including the power to
impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to
be at fault. The lawmakers envisioned the Office of the
Ombudsman to be “an activist watchman,” not merely a passive
one.
While Section 15(3) of RA 6770 states that the Ombudsman has
the power to “recommend x x x removal, suspension, demotion
x x x” of government officials and employees, the same Section
15(3) also states that the Ombudsman in the alternative may
“enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21” of
RA 6770. The word “or” in Section 15(3) before the phrase
“enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21”
grants the Ombudsman this alternative power.
Section 21 of RA 6770 vests in the Ombudsman “disciplinary
authority over all elective and appointive officials of the
Government,” except impeachable officers, members of
Congress, and the Judiciary. And under Section 25 of RA
6770, the Ombudsman may impose in administrative
proceedings the “penalty ranging from suspension without pay
for one year to dismissal with forfeiture of benefits or a fine
ranging from five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to twice the
amount malversed, illegally taken or lost, or both at the
discretion of the Ombudsman.”
Clearly, under RA 6770 the Ombudsman has the power to
impose directly administrative penalty on public officials or
employees. Hence, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
petitioner has no power to impose directly administrative
penalties on public officials or employees.
BUENCAMINO V. CA
Petitioners were charged of Graft and Corruption for demanding
payment (without official receipt) of a "pass way" fee or a
regulatory fee of P1,000.00 for every delivery truck that passes
the territorial jurisdiction of San Miguel, Bulacan. Ombudsman
declared petitioner administratively liable.
Petitioner filed a petition for review with application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction in the CA, praying that the Ombudsman
be enjoined from implementing its Decision during the pendency
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of his appeal. CA issued a TRO but subsequently denied the
application for preliminary injunction.
Petitioner alleges that in denying his application for a
preliminary injunction, the Court of Appeals gravely abused its
discretion; that pursuant to Section 7, Rule III of Administrative
Order No. 07, the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman
suspending him from office is not immediately executory; and
that in enforcing its Decision suspending him from the service
during the pendency of his appeal, the Office of the
Ombudsman violated Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act.
Ombudsman countered that the Court of Appeals did not
gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the assailed Resolutions;
and that the cases cited by petitioner are not applicable to this
case, the same having been overturned by the ruling of this
Court in "In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon.
Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of DPW;" and that Section 7,
Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 has been amended by
Administrative Order No. 17, thus: “this Honorable Court
emphatically declared that Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman was already
amended by Administrative Order No. 17 wherein the pertinent
provision on the execution of the Ombudsman’s decision
pending appeal is now similar to Section 47 of the "Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service" that is,
decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately executory even
pending appeal.”
Issue: WON the Ombudsman may promulgate its own rules
providing that its decisions are immediately executory?
Held: YES. Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07,
relied upon by petitioner, provides: “Sec. 7. Finality of Decision.
Where the respondent is absolved of the charge and in case of
conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine
not equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final
and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become
final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by
the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition
for certiorari, shall have been filed by him as prescribed in
Section 27 of R.A. 6770.”
In interpreting the above provision, this Court held that "only
orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
in administrative cases imposing the penalties of public censure,
reprimand or suspension of not more than one month or a fine
not equivalent to one month salary shall be final and
unappealable hence, immediately executory. In all other
disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed is other than
public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one
month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the law
gives the respondent the right to appeal. In these cases, the
order, directive or decision becomes final and executory only
after the lapse of the period to appeal if no appeal is perfected,
or after the denial of the appeal from the said order, directive or
decision. It is only then that execution shall perforce issue as a
matter of right. The fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties
the right to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with
it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the
essential nature of these judgments as being appealable would
be rendered nugatory."
However, as aptly stated by the Office of the Ombudsman in its
comment, Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 has
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
been amended by Administrative Order No. 17, thus: “Sec. 7.
Finality and execution of decision. - Where the respondent is
absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the
penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of
not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month
salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealabe.
In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of
Appeals on a verified petition for review under the requirements
and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the
Decision or Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.”
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In
case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent
wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under
preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such
other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the
suspension or removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases shall be executed as a matter of course. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly
enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or failure by
any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the
Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or
censure shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said
officer.
Clearly, considering that an appeal under Administrative Order
No. 17, the amendatory rule, shall not stop the Decision of the
Office of the Ombudsman from being executory, we hold that
the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioner’s application for injunctive relief.
It bears stressing at this point that Section 13(8), Article XI of
the Constitution authorizes the Office of the Ombudsman to
promulgate its own rules, thus: “Section 13. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and
duties: xxx (8) Promulgate its own rules of procedure and
exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties
as may be provided by law.”
In turn, Section 18 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides:
“Section 18. Rules of Procedure. (1) The Office of the
Ombudsman shall promulgate its rules of procedure for the
effective exercise or performance of its powers, functions and
duties.” Furthermore, under Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770, the
Office of the Ombudsman has the power to amend or modify its
rules as the interest of justice may require.


ARTICLE XII - NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
Section 1. The goals of the national economy are a more
equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and
wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and
services produced by the nation for the benefit of the
people; and an expanding productivity as the key to
raising the quality of life for all, especially the under-
privileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full
employment based on sound agricultural development
and agrarian reform, through industries that make full
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and efficient use of human and natural resources, and
which are competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino
enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade
practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the
economy and all regions of the country shall be given
optimum opportunity to develop. Private enterprises,
including corporations, cooperatives, and similar
collective organizations, shall be encouraged to broaden
the base of their ownership.
Doctrines
Q. How are forest reserves converted into non-forest reserve?
A. Unlike Proclamation No. 369, Commonwealth Act No. 137
vests solely in the President, with the concurrence of the
National Assembly, the power to withdraw forest reserves
found to be more valuable for their mineral contents than
for the purpose for which the reservation was made and
convert the same into non-forest reserves. A similar
provision can also be found in Presidential Decree No. 463
dated 17 May 1974, with the modifications that (1) the
declaration by the President no longer requires the
concurrence of the National Assembly and the DENR
Secretary merely exercises the power to recommend to the
President which forest reservations are to be withdrawn
from the coverage thereof. Apex Mining v. Southeast
Mindanao Gold, G.R. No. 152613 & No. 152628, June 23,
2006.
APEX MINING V. SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD
In 1931, Governor General Dwight F. Davis issued Proclamation
No. 369, establishing the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest
Reserve consisting of approximately 1,927,400 hectares. DENR
secretary issued DAO No. 66, declaring 729 hectares of the
areas covered by the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve as
non-forest land open to small-scale mining operations.
Issue: WON DENR Secretary has authority to issue DAO66?
Held: NO. The Court of Appeals theorizes that DAO No. 66 was
issued beyond the power of the DENR Secretary since the
power to withdraw lands from forest reserves and to declare the
same as an area open for mining operation resides in the
President.
Under Proclamation No. 369 dated 27 February 1931, the
power to convert forest reserves as non-forest reserves is
vested with the DENR Secretary. Proclamation No. 369 partly
states: “From this reserve shall be considered automatically
excluded all areas which had already been certified and which
in the future may be proclaimed as classified and certified lands
and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.”
However, a subsequent law, Commonwealth Act No. 137,
otherwise known as “The Mining Act” which was approved on 7
November 1936 provides: “Sec. 14. Lands within reservations
for purposes other than mining, which, after such reservation is
made, are found to be more valuable for their mineral contents
than for the purpose for which the reservation was made, may
be withdrawn from such reservations by the President with the
concurrence of the National Assembly, and thereupon such
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
lands shall revert to the public domain and be subject to
disposition under the provisions of this Act.”
Unlike Proclamation No. 369, Commonwealth Act No. 137 vests
solely in the President, with the concurrence of the National
Assembly, the power to withdraw forest reserves found to be
more valuable for their mineral contents than for the purpose for
which the reservation was made and convert the same into non-
forest reserves. A similar provision can also be found in
Presidential Decree No. 463 dated 17 May 1974, with the
modifications that (1) the declaration by the President no longer
requires the concurrence of the National Assembly and (2) the
DENR Secretary merely exercises the power to recommend to
the President which forest reservations are to be withdrawn
from the coverage thereof. Section 8 of Presidential Decree No.
463 reads: “SEC. 8. Exploration and Exploitation of Reserved
Lands. – When lands within reservations, which have been
established for purposes other than mining, are found to be
more valuable for their mineral contents, they may, upon
recommendation of the Secretary be withdrawn from such
reservation by the President and established as a mineral
reservation.”
Against the backdrop of the applicable statutes which govern
the issuance of DAO No. 66, this Court is constrained to rule
that said administrative order was issued not in accordance with
the laws. Inescapably, DAO No. 66, declaring 729 hectares of
the areas covered by the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest
Reserve as non-forest land open to small-scale mining
operations, is null and void as, verily, the DENR Secretary has
no power to convert forest reserves into non-forest reserves.
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned
by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all
other natural resources shall not be alienated. The
exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision
of the State. The State may directly undertake such
activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint
venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-
five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
and under such terms and conditions as may be provided
by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water
supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be the
measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth
in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment
exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale
utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as
well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to
subsistence fishermen and fish- workers in rivers, lakes,
bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with
foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or
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financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and
other mineral oils according to the general terms and
conditions provided by law, based on real contributions
to the economic growth and general welfare of the
country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the
development and use of local scientific and technical
resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every
contract entered into in accordance with this provision,
within thirty days from its execution.
Doctrine
Q. X is in possession of patented land which the government
claims to be part of the forest domain. In such a situation,
the action to be taken by government is an action for
reversion on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation.
Who has the burden of proof?
A. The government. Fraud and misrepresentation is never
presumed. In applying the regalian doctrine the paramount
values of fairness and due process must be observed.
Saad-Agro Industries vs. Republic, G.R. No. 152570,
September 27, 2006.
SAAD-AGRO INDUSTRIES VS. REPUBLIC
Orcullo applied and was issued a free patent over a parcel of
land. Orcullo subsequently sold the land to SAAD Agro
Industries Inc. Thereafter, the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Solicitor General, filed a complaint for annulment of
title and reversion of the lot covered by the Free Patent and the
reversion of such to the mass of the public domain, on the
ground that the issuance of the said free patent was irregular
and erroneous, following the discovery that the lot is allegedly
part of the timberland and forest reserve of Sibonga, Cebu.
RTC dismissed the complaint, finding that respondent failed to
show that the subject lot is part of the timberland or forest
reserve or that it has been classified as such before the
issuance of the free patent and the original title. According to
the trial court, the issuance of the free patent and title was
regular and in order, and must be accorded full faith.
Considering the validity of the free patent and the OCT,
petitioner’s purchase of the property was also declared legal
and valid.
On appeal, CA reversed, holding that the timber or forest lands,
to which the subject lot belongs, are not subject to private
ownership, unless these are first classified as agricultural lands.
Thus, absent any declassification of the subject lot from forest to
alienable and disposable land for agricultural purposes, the
officers erred in approving Orcullo’s free patent application and
in issuing the OCT; hence, title to the lot must be cancelled.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals invalidated the sale of the
lot to petitioner.
Petitioner asserts that respondent failed to show that the subject
lot is inside the timberland block, thereby casting doubt on the
accuracy of the survey conducted by the Bureau of Forestry and
the opinions of DENR officers. Since respondent is the original
plaintiff in the reversion case, the burden is on it to prove that
subject lot is part of the timberland block, petitioner adds.
Issue: WON the government has the burden of proof that the lot
is part of timberland?
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
Held: YES. It has been held that a complaint for reversion
involves a serious controversy, involving a question of fraud and
misrepresentation committed against the government and it is
aimed at the return of the disputed portion of the public domain.
It seeks to cancel the original certificate of registration, and
nullify the original certificate of title, including the transfer
certificate of title of the successors-in-interest because the same
were all procured through fraud and misrepresentation. Thus,
the State, as the party alleging the fraud and misrepresentation
that attended the application of the free patent, bears that
burden of proof. Fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for
cancellation of patent and annulment of title, should never be
presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence, mere preponderance of evidence not even being
adequate.
It is but judicious to require the Government, in an action for
reversion, to show the details attending the issuance of title over
the alleged inalienable land and explain why such issuance has
deprived the State of the claimed property.
In concluding that the subject parcel of land falls within the
timberland or forest reserve, the Court of Appeals relied on the
testimony of Isabelo R. Montejo that as it had remained
unclassified until 1980 and consequently became an
unclassified forest zone, it was incapable of private
appropriation.
In one case, the SC held that although it is not disputed that the
aforesaid Land Classification Project No. 3, classifying the 22-
hectare area as timberland, was certified by the Director of
Lands only on December 22, 1924, whereas the possession
thereof by private respondents and their predecessor-in-interest
commenced as early as 1909. While the Government has the
right to classify portions of public land, the primary right of a
private individual who possessed and cultivated the land in good
faith much prior to such classification must be recognized and
should not be prejudiced by after-events which could not have
been anticipated. Thus, We have held that the Government, in
the first instance may, by reservation, decide for itself what
portions of public land shall be considered forestry land, unless
private interests have intervened before such reservation is
made.
Obviously, private interests have intervened before classification
was made pursuant to P.D. No. 705. Not only has Orcullo by
herself and through her predecessors-in-interest cultivated and
possessed the subject lot since 1930, a free patent was also
awarded to her and a title issued in her name as early as 1971.
In fact, it appears that the issuance of the free patent and
certificate of title was regular and in order. Orcullo complied
with the requisites for the acquisition of free patent provided
under Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act), as
certified by the Director of Lands and approved by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
The Regalian doctrine is well-enshrined not only in the present
Constitution, but also in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. The
Court has always recognized and upheld the Regalian doctrine
as the basic foundation of the State's property regime.
Nevertheless, in applying this doctrine, we must not lose sight of
the fact that in every claim or right by the Government against
one of its citizens, the paramount considerations of fairness and
due process must be observed. Respondent in this case failed
to show that the subject lot is part of timberland or forest reserve
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it adverted to. In the face of the uncontroverted status of Free
Patent No. 473408 and OCT No. 0-6667 as valid and regular
issuances, respondent’s insistence on the classification of the
lot as part of the forest reserve must be rejected.
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national
parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be
further classified by law according to the uses to which
they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public
domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private
corporations or associations may not hold such alienable
lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period
not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more
than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand
hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease
not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more
than twelve hectares thereof, by purchase, homestead, or
grant.
Taking into account the requirements of
conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to
the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall
determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain
which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and
the conditions therefor.
Doctrines
Q. Can an unclassified forested area be acquired by continuous
possession?
A. No because it is inalienable. Republic v. Naguiat, G.R. No.
134209. January 24, 2006.
The prerogative of classifying public lands pertains to
administrative agencies which have been specially tasked by
statutes to do so and the courts will not interfere on matters
which are addressed to the sound discretion of government
and/or quasi-judicial agencies entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under their special technical knowledge and
training. Republic v. Mendoza, GR 153727. March 28, 2007.
Reclaimed lands are alienable after being classified as such.
The reclaimed land in this case are alienable because they had
been declared alienable by presidential proclamation. When
President Aquino issued MO 415 conveying the land covered by
the Smokey Mountain Dumpsite is to the National Housing
Authority as well as the area to be reclaimed across R-10, the
coneyance implicitly carried with it the declaration that said
lands are alienable and disposable. Otherwise, the NHA cannot
effectively use them in its housing and resettlement project.
President Ramos made similar conveyances to the NHA.
Apropos the requisite law categorizing reclaimed land as
alienable or disposable, we find that RA 6957 as amended by
RA 7718 provides ample authority for the classification of
reclaimed land.
While RA 6957 as modified by RA 7718 does not expressly
declare that the reclaimed lands that shall serve as payment to
the project proponent have become alienable and disposable
lands and opened for disposition; nonetheless, this conclusion is
necessarily implied, for how else can the land be used as the
enabling component for the Project if such classification is not
deemed made?
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FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
We ruled in PEA that “alienable lands of public domain must be
transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities
not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these lands can
become private or patrimonial lands (emphasis supplied).” To
lands reclaimed by PEA or through a contract with a private
person or entity, such reclaimed lands still remain alienable
lands of public domain which can be transferred only to Filipino
citizens but not to a private corporation. This is because PEA
under PD 1084 and EO 525 is tasked to hold and dispose of
alienable lands of public domain and it is only when it is
transferred to Filipino citizens that it becomes patrimonial
property.
On the other hand, the NHA is a government agency not tasked
to dispose of public lands under its charter—The Revised
Administrative Code of 1987. The NHA is an “end-user agency”
authorized by law to administer and dispose of reclaimed lands.
The moment titles over reclaimed lands based on the special
patents are transferred to the NHA by the Register of Deeds,
they are automatically converted to patrimonial properties of the
State which can be sold to Filipino citizens and private
corporations, 60% of which are owned by Filipinos. The reason
is obvious: if the reclaimed land is not converted to patrimonial
land once transferred to NHA, then it would be useless to
transfer it to the NHA since it cannot legally transfer or alienate
lands of public domain. More importantly, it cannot attain its
avowed purposes and goals since it can only transfer
patrimonial lands to qualified beneficiaries and prospective
buyers to raise funds for the SMDRP.
From the foregoing considerations, we find that the 79-hectare
reclaimed land has been declared alienable and disposable land
of the public domain; and in the hands of NHA, it has been
reclassified as patrimonial property. Chavez v. NHA, G.R. No.
164527, August 15, 2007.
REPUBLIC V. NAGUIAT
Naguiat applied for registration of a parcel of land, alleging that
she is the owner of the said land having acquired them by
purchase from the LID Corporation which likewise acquired the
same from Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto
Monje and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in
possession thereof for more than 30 years; and that to the best
of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance
of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest,
legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.
Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor
her predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
lands; that the applicant’s claim of ownership in fee simple on
the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of;
and that the parcels of land applied for are part of the public
domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject
to private appropriation.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of Naguiat, adjudicating unto
her the parcels of land in question and decreeing the
registration thereof in her name. CA affirmed.
Issue: WON an unclassified forested area be acquired by
continuous possession?
Held: NO. Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless
declassified and released by positive act of the Government so
that they may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of
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the public domain, are not capable of private appropriation. As
to these assets, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do
not apply. Given this postulate, the principal issue to be
addressed turns on the question of whether or not the areas in
question have ceased to have the status of forest or other
inalienable lands of the public domain.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the
Constitution classifying lands of the public domain into
"agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks,"
do not necessarily refer to a large tract of wooded land or an
expanse covered by dense growth of trees and underbrush. As
we stated in Heirs of Amunategui – “A forested area classified
as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it
of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may
actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. xxx. The classification is
merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not
have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.”
Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, which embodies
the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to
the State the source of any asserted right to ownership of
land. All lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion
presumptively belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State
remain part of the inalienable public domain. Under Section 6 of
the Public Land Act, the prerogative of classifying or
reclassifying lands of the public domain, i.e., from forest or
mineral to agricultural and vice versa, belongs to the Executive
Branch of the government and not the court. Needless to stress,
the onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the
presumption that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable or disposable rests with the applicant.
Here, respondent never presented the required certification from
the proper government agency or official proclamation
reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and disposable.
Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed. It calls for proof. Aside from tax receipts, respondent
submitted in evidence the survey map and technical
descriptions of the lands, which, needless to state, provided no
information respecting the classification of the property. As the
Court has held, however, these documents are not sufficient to
overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered
forms part of the public domain.
It cannot be overemphasized that unwarranted appropriation of
public lands has been a notorious practice resorted to in land
registration cases. For this reason, the Court has made it a point
to stress, when appropriate, that declassification of forest and
mineral lands, as the case may be, and their conversion into
alienable and disposable lands need an express and positive
act from the government.
REPUBLIC V. MENDOZA
Democrito T. Mendoza, Sr. was accorded Ordinary Fishpond
Permit for an area within Silot Bay, which was previously leased
by his father who waived the leasehold rights in his favor.
Meanwhile, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued a
Memorandum addressed to the Secretary of Agriculture and
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
Natural Resources, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of
the Development Bank of the Philippines, the Undersecretary of
Natural Resources, and the Directors of the Bureaus of Fishery,
Forestry, and Lands, respectively, thereby constituting a
continuing committee to accomplish the following:
1. Identify the exact locations and area of these 700,000 hectares of fishpond areas on
or before February 28, 1967. x x x.
2. Within the month of March 1967, all these fishpond areas shall be released by the
Bureau of Forestry to the Bureau of Lands as alienable and disposable, but subject
to the disposal of the Bureau of Fisheries for fishpond purposes.
Thereafter, Mendoza, Sr. filed an application for sales patent to
purchase the area covered by Ordinary Fishpond Permit. Then
Acting Director of Forestry Jose Viado issued a Letter
Certification addressed to the Director of Lands, stating that the
land in Silot is within the Timberland Block, but since it has been
certified as available for fishpond development and is thus no
longer needed for forest purposes, the same was certified and
released as Alienable or Disposable for fishpond purposes only
pursuant to the directive of the President, subject ti certain
conditions.
In compliance with the process for sales patent application,
Democrito Mendoza, Sr. secured and submitted separate
certifications from concerned government. Subsequently,
notices of sale were published.
In the interim, Presidential Decree No. 43, Providing for the
Accelerated Development of the Fishery Industry of the
Philippines, was issued, whereupon all public lands, such as
tidal swamps, mangrove and other swamps, marshes, ponds
and streams within public lands, including public lands left dry
during the lowest low tide and covered by water during the
highest tide; and which are not needed for forestry purposes
were declared available for fishpond purposes and automatically
transferred to the Bureau of Fisheries for its administration and
disposition.
A day before the scheduled auction sale of the disputed
property, then Liloan Mayor Cesar Bugtai filed a letter-protest
with the Director of Lands objecting to the proposed sale of the
property. According to Mayor Bugtai, the area was intended for
development by the local government as a tourist attraction.
Despite said opposition by the municipal mayor, the District
Land Office of Cebu City proceeded with the scheduled auction
sale, wherein Democrito Mendoza, Sr. was declared winner,
being the sole bidder thereat.
In the meantime, the 1973 Constitution came into force,
providing that the purchase of lands of the public dominion was
limited to 24 hectares per individual. However, despite such, the
application for patent was granted.
Issue: WON the issuance of the patent was proper?
Held: YES. Under Opinion No. 64, series of 1973, it has been
held that "even sales application already awarded are not to be
exempted from constitutional injunction regarding the acquisition
of public lands for the reason that other requirements have still
to be satisfied before a patent may be issued". In the case of
the abovementioned application, while the land covered thereby
was sold at public auction in which the applicant is the
successful bidder and has been considerably improved and
developed, no formal award has up to now been issued by this
Office. In other words, the applicant may be considered not
having acquired vested rights over the land applied for prior to
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the advent of the New Constitution which will entitle him to
exemption from the constitutional limitation.
From the abovequoted Opinion, it can be deduced that had it
not been for circumstance beyond the applicant’s control, i.e.,
the adoption of the 1973 Constitution during the pendency of the
sales patent application of Democrito T. Mendoza, Sr., there
would not have been any obstacle for its approval by the Office
of the President. Hence, taking into account the fact that
Democrito T. Mendoza, Sr. had complied with all the necessary
requirements for the issuance of sales patent covering the
disputed area, then Acting Director of the Bureau of Lands
Ramon N. Casanova recommended the approval of said
application in the spirit of justice and equity.
It is worth noting that in order to conform to the prohibitions
imposed by the 1973 Constitution which limits the purchase of
lands of the public dominion to 24 hectares per individual,
Democrito Mendoza, Sr., subdivided the property in question
into four, each comprising an area not more than 24 hectares,
and assigned his rights over three parts to his three children.
Accordingly, Democrito Mendoza, Sr. amended his sales patent
application while his three children filed their own applications
for their respective parts. The area applied for in each of the
Mendozas’ sales patent applications were, by then, well-within
the constitutional limitation. Such subdivision of the area
originally applied for by Democrito Mendoza, Sr. was made with
the full knowledge and the subsequent approval of all the
appropriate government authorities. There is nothing to suggest
that it was done illicitly or fraudulently. That the subdivision was
executed overtly actually establish the good faith of the
Mendozas to comply with the Constitutional and statutory
provisions on sales patent applications.
In the absence of any evidence of fraud or violation of law, the
title of the Mendozas over the disputed property has now
become indefeasible, even as against the petitioner Republic.
While the general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel
by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents, like all general
rules, this is also subject to exceptions. We recognized such
exceptions in Republic v. Court of Appeals, to wit – “The general
rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes
or errors of its officials or agents. However, like all general rules,
this is also subject to exceptions, viz: Estoppels against the
public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in
rare and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where
they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy
adopted to protect the public. They must be applied with
circumspection and should be applied only in those special
cases where the interests of justice clearly require it.
Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal
dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play
an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations x
x x the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against
public authorities as well as against private individuals."
In the Petition at bar, the Mendozas were given clearances and
certifications on the lack of objections to their sales patent
applications by the Director of Forestry, Provincial Engineer of
Cebu, the District Engineer of Cebu, the Municipal Council of
Liloan, Cebu, and the Commissioner of Customs, and the
Secretary of Public Works and Highways. Subsequently, their
sales patent applications were approved by the Director of the
Bureau of Lands, the Secretary of the Department of Natural
Resources, and the President of the Republic. Based on their
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
patents, the Mendozas were able to acquire original certificates
of tile from the Registry of Deeds. Without any allegation and
evidence that these government officials committed any
mistake, error or irregularity in the approval of the sales patent
applications and issuance of the certificates of title in the name
of the Mendozas, then their acts in relation thereto estop the
Republic from questioning the validity of the said sales patents
and the certificates of title.
Finally, it should be borne in mind that that the contested areas
and titles thereto had already passed on to third parties who
acquired the same from the Mendozas in good faith and for
value. When the Mendozas’ sales patents were registered, they
were brought under the operation of Presidential Decree No.
11529, otherwise know as the Land Registration Decree.
CHAVEZ V. NHA
Pres. Aquino issued Memorandum Order 161 approving and
directing the implementation of the Comprehensive and
Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan. The
Metro Manila Commission, in coordination with various
government agencies, was tasked as the lead agency to
implement the Plan as formulated by the Pres’l Task Force on
Waste Management created by Memorandum Circular 39.
A day after, MO 161-A was issued, containing the guidelines
which prescribed the functions and responsibilities of 15 various
government departments and offices tasked to implement the
Plan. Respondent NHA was ordered to “conduct feasibility
studies and develop low-cost housing projects at the dumpsite
and absorb scavengers in NHA resettlement/low-cost housing
projects.” On the other hand, the DENR was tasked to “review
and evaluate proposed projects under the Plan with regard to
their environmental impact, conduct regular monitoring of
activities of the Plan to ensure compliance with environmental
standards and assist DOH in the conduct of the study on
hospital waste management.”
Pursuant to MO 161-A, NHA prepared the feasibility studies of
the Smokey Mountain low-cost housing project which resulted in
the formulation of the “Smokey Mountain Development Plan and
Reclamation of the Area Across R-10” or the Smokey Mountain
Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP; the Project).
The Project aimed to convert the Smokey Mountain dumpsite
into a habitable housing project, inclusive of the reclamation of
the area across R-10, adjacent to the Smokey Mountain as the
enabling component of the project. Once finalized, the Plan was
submitted to President Aquino for her approval, which was
granted.
Issue: WON the reclaimed foreshore and submerged parcels of
land are inalienable public lands which are beyond the
commerce of man?
Held: NO, they are alienable once declared by the government
as such. Secs. 2 and 3, Art. XII of the Constitution declare that
all natural resources are owned by the State and they cannot be
alienated except for alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain. One of the State’s natural resources are lands of
public domain which include reclaimed lands.
Petitioner contends that for these reclaimed lands to be
alienable, there must be a law or presidential proclamation
officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable and
disposable and open to disposition or concession. Absent such
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law or proclamation, the reclaimed lands cannot be the enabling
component or consideration to be paid to RBI as these are
beyond the commerce of man. We are not convinced of
petitioner’s postulation.
The reclaimed lands across R-10 were classified alienable and
disposable lands of public domain of the State for the following
reasons, viz: First, there were 3 presidential proclamations
classifying the reclaimed lands across R-10 as alienable or
disposable hence open to disposition or concession. Secondly,
Special Patents issued by the DENR anchored on
Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 issued by President Ramos,
without doubt, classified the reclaimed areas as alienable and
disposable. Admittedly, it cannot be said that MO 415,
Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 are explicit declarations that the
lands to be reclaimed are classified as alienable and
disposable. We find however that such conclusion is derived
and implicit from the authority given to the NHA to transfer the
reclaimed lands to qualified beneficiaries.
The query is, when did the declaration take effect? It did so only
after the special patents covering the reclaimed areas were
issued. It is only on such date that the reclaimed lands became
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. This is in
line with the ruling in PEA where said issue was clarified and
stressed: PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino’s actual
issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom Islands, is
equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom
Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
PD No. 1085 and President Aquino’s issuance of a land patent
also constitute a declaration that the Freedom Islands are no
longer needed for public service. The Freedom Islands are thus
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open to
disposition or concession to qualified parties.
Thus, MO 415 and Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 cumulatively
and jointly taken together with Special Patent Nos. 3591, 3592,
and 3598 more than satisfy the requirement in PEA that “[t]here
must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying
these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to
disposition or concession.”
Apropos the requisite law categorizing reclaimed land as
alienable or disposable, we find that RA 6957 as amended by
RA 7718 provides ample authority for the classification of
reclaimed land in the SMDRP for the repayment scheme of the
BOT project as alienable and disposable lands of public
domain. Sec. 6 of RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 provides:
“For the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of
any infrastructure projects undertaken through the build-
operate-and transfer arrangement or any of its variations
pursuant to the provisions of this Act, the project proponent x x x
may likewise be repaid in the form of a share in the revenue of
the project or other non-monetary payments, such as, but not
limited to, the grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed
land, subject to the constitutional requirements with respect to
the ownership of the land.”
While RA 6957 as modified by RA 7718 does not expressly
declare that the reclaimed lands that shall serve as payment to
the project proponent have become alienable and disposable
lands and opened for disposition; nonetheless, this conclusion is
necessarily implied, for how else can the land be used as the
enabling component for the Project if such classification is not
deemed made?
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
It may be argued that the grant of authority to sell public lands,
pursuant to PEA, does not convert alienable lands of public
domain into private or patrimonial lands. We ruled in PEA that
“alienable lands of public domain must be transferred to
qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked to
dispose of public lands, before these lands can become private
or patrimonial lands.” To lands reclaimed by PEA or through a
contract with a private person or entity, such reclaimed lands
still remain alienable lands of public domain which can be
transferred only to Filipino citizens but not to a private
corporation. This is because PEA under PD 1084 and EO 525
is tasked to hold and dispose of alienable lands of public
domain and it is only when it is transferred to Filipino citizens
that it becomes patrimonial property. On the other hand, the
NHA is a government agency not tasked to dispose of public
lands under its charter—The Revised Administrative Code of
1987. The NHA is an “end-user agency” authorized by law to
administer and dispose of reclaimed lands. The moment titles
over reclaimed lands based on the special patents are
transferred to the NHA by the Register of Deeds, they are
automatically converted to patrimonial properties of the State
which can be sold to Filipino citizens and private corporations,
60% of which are owned by Filipinos. The reason is obvious: if
the reclaimed land is not converted to patrimonial land once
transferred to NHA, then it would be useless to transfer it to the
NHA since it cannot legally transfer or alienate lands of public
domain. More importantly, it cannot attain its avowed purposes
and goals since it can only transfer patrimonial lands to qualified
beneficiaries and prospective buyers to raise funds for the
SMDRP.
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Q. Maria, a Filipina, married Klaus, a German, in Germany.
Later they settled in the Philippines. Klaus sold the
property in Germany which he had inherited and with the
proceeds he bought a lot in Antipolo but, knowing that he
could not acquire land in the Philippines, registered it in the
name of Maria. With the rest of the money he constructed
a house. Upon the dissolution of the community of property
Klaus does not claim ownership of the land but
reimbursement in equity on the theory that Maria merely
held the property in trust. Can he?
A. No. To claim equity he must come with clean hands. Klaus
knew he was violating the law when he purchased the land.
Muller v Muller, G.R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006.
MULLER V. MULLER
The issue for resolution is whether respondent is entitled to
reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition of the
Antipolo property.
Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and
expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to this Court. He
declared that he had the Antipolo property titled in the name of
petitioner because of the said prohibition. His attempt at
subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property
cannot be sustained. Thus, in the instant case, respondent
cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is
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clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite
the constitutional prohibition.
Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as
opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on
respondent’s part. To allow reimbursement would in effect
permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is
not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by law.
As expressly held in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate
Court:”Finally, the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of
residential land. Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution
ordains that, “Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain.” Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of
course, charged with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus,
assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be
purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever
over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to
acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely,
he knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was
null and void. In any event, he had and has no capacity or
personality to question the subsequent sale of the same
property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely
exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal
property. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect
controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property
were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien
husband a not insubstantial interest and right over land, as he
would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition.
This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.”
As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own
money to purchase the property cannot, and will not, at this
stage of the proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even
if it were a fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make
the acquisition, the considerations just set out to militate, on
high constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding
the property so acquired, or any part thereof. And whether in
such an event, he may recover from his wife any share of the
money used for the purchase or charge her with unauthorized
disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is not now inquired
into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise.
Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations organized under the laws of
the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital
is owned by such citizens; nor shall such franchise,
certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for
a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such
franchise or right be granted except under the condition
that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal
by the Congress when the common good so requires. The
State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities
by the general public. The participation of foreign investors
in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall
be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all
the executive and managing officers of such corporation or
association must be citizens of the Philippines.
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
Doctrine
Water Districts are public utilities covered by XII, 11.
Metropolitan Cebu Water v. Adala, G.R. No. 168914, July 4,
2007.
METROPOLITAN CEBU WATER V. ADALA
Respondent filed an application with the NWRB for the issuance
of a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) to operate and
maintain waterworks system in sitios San Vicente, Fatima, and
Sambag in Barangay Bulacao, Cebu City. In its Opposition,
petitioner prayed for the denial of respondent’s application on
the following grounds: (1) petitioner’s Board of Directors had not
consented to the issuance of the franchise applied for, such
consent being a mandatory condition pursuant to P.D. 198, (2)
the proposed waterworks would interfere with petitioner’s water
supply which it has the right to protect, and (3) the water needs
of the residents in the subject area was already being well
served by petitioner.
Issue: WON the term franchise as used in Section 47 of PD198,
means a franchise granted by Congress through legislation only
or does it also include in its meaning a certificate of public
convenience issued by the National Water Resources Board for
the maintenance of waterworks system or water supply service?
Held: Petitioner contends that “franchise” should be broadly
interpreted, such that the prohibition against its grant to other
entities without the consent of the district’s board of directors
extends to the issuance of CPCs. A contrary reading, petitioner
adds, would result in absurd consequences, for it would mean
that Congress’ power to grant franchises for the operation of
waterworks systems cannot be exercised without the consent of
water districts.
Petitioner’s position that an overly strict construction of the term
“franchise” as used in Section 47 of P.D. 198 would lead to an
absurd result impresses. If franchises, in this context, were
strictly understood to mean an authorization issuing directly
from the legislature, it would follow that, while Congress cannot
issue franchises for operating waterworks systems without the
water district’s consent, the NWRB may keep on issuing CPCs
authorizing the very same act even without such consent. In
effect, not only would the NWRB be subject to less constraints
than Congress in issuing franchises. The exclusive character of
the franchise provided for by Section 47 would be illusory.
Nonetheless, while the prohibition in Section 47 of P.D. 198
applies to the issuance of CPCs for the reasons discussed
above, the same provision must be deemed void ab initio for
being irreconcilable with Article XIV Section 5 of the 1973
Constitution which was ratified on January 17, 1973 – the
constitution in force when P.D. 198 was issued on May 25,
1973. Thus, Section 5 of Art. XIV of the 1973 Constitution
reads: “SECTION 5. No franchise, certificate, or any other form
of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least
sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be
exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years.
Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except
under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment,
alteration, or repeal by the Batasang Pambansa when the public
interest so requires. The State shall encourage equity
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participation in public utilities by the general public. The
participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any
public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate
share in the capital thereof.” This provision has been
substantially reproduced in Article XII Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution, including the prohibition against exclusive
franchises.
In view of the purposes for which they are established, water
districts fall under the term “public utility” as defined in the case
of National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals: A “public
utility” is a business or service engaged in regularly supplying
the public with some commodity or service of public
consequence such as electricity, gas, water, transportation,
telephone or telegraph service.
It bears noting, moreover, that as early as 1933, the Court held
that a particular water district – the Metropolitan Water District –
is a public utility.
Since Section 47 of P.D. 198, which vests an “exclusive
franchise” upon public utilities, is clearly repugnant to Article
XIV, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution, it is unconstitutional and
may not, therefore, be relied upon by petitioner in support of its
opposition against respondent’s application for CPC and the
subsequent grant thereof by the NWRB.
Section 17. In times of national emergency, when the public
interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency
and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily
take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public interest.
Doctrine
Q. When the President declares a state of emergency, does
she acquire the power to take over the operation of public
utilities?
A. No. Article XII, Section 17 must be read with Article VI,
Section 23. Section 17 gives the power to the State not to
the President. The President acquires emergency powers
when given to her by Congress in a state of emergency
declared by Congress. Obiter in David v. Ermita, G.R. No.
171409, May 3, 2006.
DAVID V. ERMITA
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th
Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo
issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the
Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of
the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which
states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the)
armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity as their
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience
to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally
or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do
hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
She then issued General orders 5 implementing PP 1017,
stating:
NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers
vested in me under the Constitution as President of the Republic of the Philippines, and
Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress
acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country;
I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as well as the
officers and men of the AFP and PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless
violence.”
Exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national
emergency and after all these petitions had been filed, the
President lifted PP1017 via Proclamation 1021 which reads:
“NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by law, hereby declare that the state of
national emergency has ceased to exist.”
Issue: Whether the President can take over private businesses?
Held: A distinction must be drawn between the President’s
authority to declare “a state of national emergency” and to
exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII
grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate
constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second,
manifold constitutional issues arise.
President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of
a state of national emergency even in the absence of a
Congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency
powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility
or business affected with public interest, is a different matter.
This requires a delegation from Congress.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency
powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI
authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President.
Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it.
However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be
possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its
powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow
Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject
to certain conditions, thus: (1) There must be a war or other
emergency; (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only;
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the
Congress may prescribe; and (4) The emergency powers must
be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of
the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private
business affected with public interest is just another facet of the
emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus,
when Section 17 states that the “the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest,” it
refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the
President may exercise such power is dependent on whether
Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing
the reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII,
invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules
that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the
emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of
any privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone
can declare a state of national emergency, however, without
legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned
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public utility or business affected with public interest. The
President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances
exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine
when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise,
without legislation, the President has no power to point out the
types of businesses affected with public interest that should be
taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to
exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII
in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by
Congress.
Section 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies
when the public interest so requires. No combinations in
restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.
Doctrine
Contracts requiring exclusivity are not per se void. Each
contract must be viewed vis-à-vis all the circumstances
surrounding such agreement in deciding whether a restrictive
practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable
restraint on competition. Avon v. Luna, G. R. No. 153674,
December 20, 2006.
Digest
AVON V. LUNA
Respondent Luna has been working for Beautifont, Inc. since
1972, which later became Avon Cosmetics, Inc. (Avon). By
virtue of the execution of the aforequoted Supervisors
Agreement, respondent Luna became part of the independent
sales force of petitioner Avon.
Sometime in the latter part of 1988, respondent Luna was
invited by a former Avon employee who was then currently a
Sales Manager of Sandré Philippines, Inc., a domestic
corporation engaged in direct selling of vitamins and other food
supplements, to sell said products. Respondent Luna apparently
accepted the invitation as she then became a Group Franchise
Director of Sandré Philippines, Inc. concurrently with being a
Group Supervisor of petitioner Avon. As Group Franchise
Director, respondent Luna began selling and/or promoting
Sandré products to other Avon employees and friends.
In a letter, petitioner Avon notified respondent Luna of the
termination or cancellation of her Supervisor’s Agreement with
petitioner Avon. Aggrieved, respondent Luna filed a complaint
for damages before the RTC. RTC rendered judgment in favor
of respondent Luna.
Issue: WON THE CA COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN
DECLARING THAT THE SUPERVISOR S AGREEMENT
EXECUTED BETWEEN AVON AND RESPONDENT LUNA AS
NULL AND VOID FOR BEING AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY?
Held: At the crux of the issue is the validity of paragraph 5 of the
Supervisor’s Agreement, viz: “The Company and the Supervisor
mutually agree: xxx 5) That the Supervisor shall sell or offer to
sell, display or promote only and exclusively products sold by
the Company.” In business parlance, this is commonly termed
as the "exclusivity clause." This is defined as agreements which
prohibit the obligor from engaging in "business" in competition
with the obligee. This exclusivity clause is more often the
subject of critical scrutiny when it is perceived to collide with the
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
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Constitutional proscription against "reasonable restraint of trade
or occupation." The pertinent provision of the Constitution is
quoted hereunder. Section 19 of Article XII of the 1987
Constitution is relevant.
First off, restraint of trade or occupation embraces acts,
contracts, agreements or combinations which restrict
competition or obstruct due course of trade. Now to the basics.
From the wordings of the Constitution, truly then, what is
brought about to lay the test on whether a given agreement
constitutes an unlawful machination or combination in restraint
of trade is whether under the particular circumstances of the
case and the nature of the particular contract involved, such
contract is, or is not, against public interest.
Thus, restrictions upon trade may be upheld when not contrary
to public welfare and not greater than is necessary to afford a
fair and reasonable protection to the party in whose favor it is
imposed. Even contracts which prohibit an employee from
engaging in business in competition with the employer are not
necessarily void for being in restraint of trade.
In sum, contracts requiring exclusivity are not per se void. Each
contract must be viewed vis-à-vis all the circumstances
surrounding such agreement in deciding whether a restrictive
practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable
restraint on competition.
The question that now crops up is this, when is a restraint in
trade unreasonable? Authorities are one in declaring that a
restraint in trade is unreasonable when it is contrary to public
policy or public welfare. Plainly put, public policy is that principle
of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do
that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against
the public good. As applied to contracts, in the absence of
express legislation or constitutional prohibition, a court, in order
to declare a contract void as against public policy, must find that
the contract as to the consideration or thing to be done, has a
tendency to injure the public, is against the public good, or
contravenes some established interests of society, or is
inconsistent with sound policy and good morals, or tends clearly
to undermine the security of individual rights, whether of
personal liability or of private property.
From another perspective, the main objection to exclusive
dealing is its tendency to foreclose existing competitors or new
entrants from competition in the covered portion of the relevant
market during the term of the agreement. Only those
arrangements whose probable effect is to foreclose competition
in a substantial share of the line of commerce affected can be
considered as void for being against public policy. The
foreclosure effect, if any, depends on the market share involved.
The relevant market for this purpose includes the full range of
selling opportunities reasonably open to rivals, namely, all the
product and geographic sales they may readily compete for,
using easily convertible plants and marketing organizations.
Applying the preceding principles to the case at bar, there is
nothing invalid or contrary to public policy either in the
objectives sought to be attained by paragraph 5, i.e., the
exclusivity clause, in prohibiting respondent Luna, and all other
Avon supervisors, from selling products other than those
manufactured by petitioner Avon. We quote with approval the
determination of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Board of
Trade of Chicago v. U.S. that "the question to be determined is
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
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perhaps thereby promotes competition, or whether it is such as
may suppress or even destroy competition."
Such prohibition is neither directed to eliminate the competition
like Sandré Phils., Inc. nor foreclose new entrants to the market.
In its Memorandum, it admits that the reason for such exclusion
is to safeguard the network that it has cultivated through the
years. Admittedly, both companies employ the direct selling
method in order to peddle their products. By direct selling,
petitioner Avon and Sandre, the manufacturer, forego the use of
a middleman in selling their products, thus, controlling the price
by which they are to be sold. The limitation does not affect the
public at all. It is only a means by which petitioner Avon is able
to protect its investment.
It was not by chance that Sandré Philippines, Inc. made
respondent Luna one of its Group Franchise Directors. It doesn’t
take a genius to realize that by making her an important part of
its distribution arm, Sandré Philippines, Inc., a newly formed
direct-selling business, would be saving time, effort and money
as it will no longer have to recruit, train and motivate supervisors
and dealers. Respondent Luna, who learned the tricks of the
trade from petitioner Avon, will do it for them. This is tantamount
to unjust enrichment. Worse, the goodwill established by
petitioner Avon among its loyal customers will be taken
advantaged of by Sandre Philippines, Inc. It is not so hard to
imagine the scenario wherein the sale of Sandré products by
Avon dealers will engender a belief in the minds of loyal Avon
customers that the product that they are buying had been
manufactured by Avon. In other words, they will be misled into
thinking that the Sandré products are in fact Avon products.
From the foregoing, it cannot be said that the purpose of the
subject exclusivity clause is to foreclose the competition, that is,
the entrance of Sandré products in to the market. Therefore, it
cannot be considered void for being against public policy. How
can the protection of one s property be violative of public
policy? Sandré Philippines, Inc. is still very much free to
distribute its products in the market but it must do so at its own
expense. The exclusivity clause does not in any way limit its
selling opportunities, just the undue use of the resources of
petitioner Avon.
It has been argued that the Supervisor’s Agreement is in the
nature of a contract of adhesion; but just because it is does not
necessarily mean that it is void. A contract of adhesion is so-
called because its terms are prepared by only one party while
the other party merely affixes his signature signifying his
adhesion thereto. Such contract is just as binding as ordinary
contracts. "It is true that we have, on occasion, struck down
such contracts as void when the weaker party is imposed upon
in dealing with the dominant bargaining party and is reduced to
the alternative of taking it or leaving it, completely deprived of
the opportunity to bargain on equal footing. Nevertheless,
contracts of adhesion are not invalid per se and they are not
entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in
reality free to reject it entirely, if he adheres, he gives his
consent." In the case at bar, there was no indication that
respondent Luna was forced to sign the subject agreement.
Being of age, financially stable and with vast business
experience, she is presumed to have acted with due care and to
have signed the assailed contract with full knowledge of its
import. Under the premises, it would be difficult to assume that
she was morally abused. She was free to reject the agreement if
she wanted to.


JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
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ARTICLE XIII - SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the
commitment to create economic opportunities based on
freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
Doctrine
A retirement plan imposing automatic retirement after 35 years
of service before the statutory retirement age of 65 is valid if
voluntarily entered into by the employee. Jaculbe v. Silliman U,
GR 156934, March 16,2007.
Digest
JACULBE V. SILLIMAN U.
Respondent, through its Human Resources Development
Office, informed petitioner that she was approaching her 35th
year of service with the university and was due for automatic
retirement on November 18, 1993, at which time she would be
57 years old. This was pursuant to respondent’s retirement plan
for its employees which provided that its members could be
automatically retired "upon reaching the age of 65 or after 35
years of uninterrupted service to the university."
Petitioner filed a complaint in the NLRC for "termination of
service with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order."
Thereafter, respondent compulsorily retired petitioner.
Issue: did respondent’s retirement plan imposing automatic
retirement after 35 years of service contravene the security of
tenure clause in the 1987 Constitution and the Labor Code?
Held: NO. Retirement plans allowing employers to retire
employees who are less than the compulsory retirement age of
65 are not per se repugnant to the constitutional guaranty of
security of tenure. Article 287 of the Labor Code provides: “ART.
287. Retirement - Any employee may be retired upon reaching
the retirement age established in the collective bargaining
agreement or other applicable employment contract.” By its
express language, the Labor Code permits employers and
employees to fix the applicable retirement age at below 60
years.
However, after reviewing the assailed decision together with the
rules and regulations of respondent’s retirement plan, we find
that the plan runs afoul of the constitutional guaranty of security
of tenure contained in Article XIII, also known as the provision
on Social Justice and Human Rights.
The CA held: “The records disclose that the private respondents
Retirement Plan has been in effect for more than 30 years. The
said plan is deemed integrated into the employment contract
between private respondent and its employees as evidenced by
the latter’s voluntary contribution through monthly salary
deductions. Previous retirees have already enjoyed the benefits
of the retirement plan, and ever since the said plan was
effected, no questions or disagreement have been raised, until
the same was made to apply to the petitioner.” The problem with
this line of reasoning is that a perusal of the rules and
regulations of the plan shows that participation therein was not
voluntary at all.
From the language of the retirement plan rules, the compulsory
nature of both membership in and contribution to the plan
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debunked the CA’s theory that petitioner’s "voluntary
contributions" were evidence of her willing participation therein.
It was through no voluntary act of her own that petitioner
became a member of the plan. In fact, the only way she could
have ceased to be a member thereof was if she stopped
working for respondent altogether. Furthermore, in the rule on
contributions, the repeated use of the word "shall" ineluctably
pointed to the conclusion that employees had no choice but to
contribute to the plan (even when they were on leave).
According to the assailed decision, respondent’s retirement plan
"ha(d) been in effect for more than 30 years." What was not
pointed out, however, was that the retirement plan came into
being in 1970 or 12 years after petitioner started working for
respondent. In short, it was not part of the terms of employment
to which petitioner agreed when she started working for
respondent. Neither did it become part of those terms shortly
thereafter, as the CA would have us believe.
Retirement is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a
voluntary agreement between the employer and the employee
whereby the latter, after reaching a certain age agrees to sever
his or her employment with the former. In Pantranco North
Express, Inc. v. NLRC, to which both the CA and respondent
refer, the imposition of a retirement age below the compulsory
age of 65 was deemed acceptable because this was part of the
CBA between the employer and the employees. The consent of
the employees, as represented by their bargaining unit, to be
retired even before the statutory retirement age of 65 was laid
out clearly in black and white and was therefore in accord with
Article 287.
In this case, neither the CA nor the respondent cited any
agreement, collective or otherwise, to justify the latter’s
imposition of the early retirement age in its retirement plan,
opting instead to harp on petitioner’s alleged "voluntary"
contributions to the plan, which was simply untrue. The truth
was that petitioner had no choice but to participate in the plan,
given that the only way she could refrain from doing so was to
resign or lose her job. It is axiomatic that employer and
employee do not stand on equal footing, a situation which often
causes an employee to act out of need instead of any genuine
acquiescence to the employer. This was clearly just such an
instance.
As already stated, an employer is free to impose a retirement
age less than 65 for as long as it has the employees’ consent.
Stated conversely, employees are free to accept the employer’s
offer to lower the retirement age if they feel they can get a better
deal with the retirement plan presented by the employer. Thus,
having terminated petitioner solely on the basis of a provision of
a retirement plan which was not freely assented to by her,
respondent was guilty of illegal dismissal.


LABOR
Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor,
local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
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peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of
tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They
shall also participate in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared
responsibility between workers and employers and the
preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes,
including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual
compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between
workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its
just share in the fruits of production and the right of
enterprises to reasonable returns to investments, and to
expansion and growth.
Doctrine
Q. Does the policy of the employer banning spouses from
working in the same company violate the rights of the
employee under the Constitution and the Labor Code or is it
a valid exercise of management prerogative?
A. We employ the standard of reasonableness of the company
policy which is parallel to the bona fide occupational
qualification requirement. In the recent case of Duncan
Association of Detailman-PTGWO and Pedro Tecson v.
Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc., we held that Glaxo had a
right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas,
marketing strategies and other confidential programs and
information from competitors. We considered the prohibition
against personal or marital relationships with employees of
competitor companies upon Glaxo’s employees reasonable
under the circumstances because relationships of that
nature might compromise the interests of Glaxo. We do not
find a reasonable business necessity in the case at bar.
Petitioners’ sole contention that “the company did not just
want to have two (2) or more of its employees related
between the third degree by affinity and/or consanguinity” is
lame. Star Corporation v. Ongsitco, G.R. No. 164774, April
12, 2006.
STAR CORPORATION V. ONGSITCO
Whether the policy of the employer banning spouses from
working in the same company violates the rights of the
employee under the Constitution and the Labor Code or is a
valid exercise of management prerogative.
Issue: WON the policy/regulation is violative of the constitutional
rights towards marriage and the family of employees and of
Article 136 of the Labor Code?
Held: YES. Respondents submit that their dismissal violates the
above provision. Petitioners allege that its policy "may appear to
be contrary to Article 136 of the Labor Code" but it assumes a
new meaning if read together with the first paragraph of the rule.
The rule does not require the woman employee to resign. The
employee spouses have the right to choose who between them
should resign. Further, they are free to marry persons other than
co-employees. Hence, it is not the marital status of the
employee, per se, that is being discriminated. It is only intended
to carry out its no-employment-for-relatives-within-the-third-
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degree-policy which is within the ambit of the prerogatives of
management.
It is true that the policy of petitioners prohibiting close relatives
from working in the same company takes the nature of an anti-
nepotism employment policy. Companies adopt these policies to
prevent the hiring of unqualified persons based on their status
as a relative, rather than upon their ability. These policies focus
upon the potential employment problems arising from the
perception of favoritism exhibited towards relatives.
With more women entering the workforce, employers are also
enacting employment policies specifically prohibiting spouses
from working for the same company. We note that two types of
employment policies involve spouses: policies banning only
spouses from working in the same company (no-spouse
employment policies), and those banning all immediate family
members, including spouses, from working in the same
company (anti-nepotism employment policies).
We note that since the finding of a bona fide occupational
qualification justifies an employer’s no-spouse rule, the
exception is interpreted strictly and narrowly by these state
courts. There must be a compelling business necessity for
which no alternative exists other than the discriminatory
practice. To justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the
employer must prove two factors: (1) that the employment
qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of
the job involved; and, (2) that there is a factual basis for
believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the
qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of
the job.
The concept of a bona fide occupational qualification is not
foreign in our jurisdiction. We employ the standard of
reasonableness of the company policy which is parallel to the
bona fide occupational qualification requirement. In the recent
case of Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO and Pedro
Tecson v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc., we passed on the
validity of the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its
employees from marrying employees of any competitor
company. We held that Glaxo has a right to guard its trade
secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other
confidential programs and information from competitors. We
considered the prohibition against personal or marital
relationships with employees of competitor companies upon
Glaxo’s employees reasonable under the circumstances
because relationships of that nature might compromise the
interests of Glaxo. In laying down the assailed company policy,
we recognized that Glaxo only aims to protect its interests
against the possibility that a competitor company will gain
access to its secrets and procedures.
The requirement that a company policy must be reasonable
under the circumstances to qualify as a valid exercise of
management prerogative was also at issue in the 1997 case of
Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company v. NLRC. In said
case, the employee was dismissed in violation of petitioner’s
policy of disqualifying from work any woman worker who
contracts marriage. We held that the company policy violates
the right against discrimination afforded all women workers
under Article 136 of the Labor Code, but established a
permissible exception, viz.: “[A] requirement that a woman
employee must remain unmarried could be justified as a "bona
fide occupational qualification," or BFOQ, where the particular
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requirements of the job would justify the same, but not on the
ground of a general principle, such as the desirability of
spreading work in the workplace. A requirement of that nature
would be valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably
necessary for satisfactory job performance.”
The cases of Duncan and PT&T instruct us that the requirement
of reasonableness must be clearly established to uphold the
questioned employment policy. The employer has the burden to
prove the existence of a reasonable business necessity. The
burden was successfully discharged in Duncan but not in PT&T.
We do not find a reasonable business necessity in the case at
bar. Petitioners’ sole contention that "the company did not just
want to have two (2) or more of its employees related between
the third degree by affinity and/or consanguinity" is lame. That
the second paragraph was meant to give teeth to the first
paragraph of the questioned rule is evidently not the valid
reasonable business necessity required by the law.
It is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were
hired after they were found fit for the job, but were asked to
resign when they married a co-employee. Petitioners failed to
show how the marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine
Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of the Repacking
Section, could be detrimental to its business operations. Neither
did petitioners explain how this detriment will happen in the case
of Wilfreda Comia, then a Production Helper in the Selecting
Department, who married Howard Comia, then a helper in the
cutter-machine. The policy is premised on the mere fear that
employees married to each other will be less efficient. If we
uphold the questioned rule without valid justification, the
employer can create policies based on an unproven
presumption of a perceived danger at the expense of an
employee’s right to security of tenure.


AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM
Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian
reform program founded on the right of farmers and
regular farmworkers who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof.
To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the
just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such
priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress
may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to
the payment of just compensation. In determining
retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small
landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for
voluntary land-sharing.
Doctrines
What lands are outside the coverage of CARL?
A. Lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the
coverage of CARL. These include lands previously
converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of
CARL by government agencies other than respondent
DAR. In its Revised Rules and Regulations Governing
Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural
Uses, DAR itself defined "agricultural land" thus —
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x x x Agricultural lands refers to those devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and not
classified as mineral or forest by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its
predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and
zoning ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding
competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential,
commercial or industrial use.
[The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
confirm this limitation. “Agricultural lands” are only those
lands which are “arable and suitable agricultural lands” and
“do not include commercial, industrial and residential
lands.” ] Remman Enterprises v. C.A.,G.R. No. 132073,
September 26, 2006
The challenge in this case was decided mainly by referring to
the earlier Small Landowners case as stare decisis.
Confederation of Sugar Producers v. DAR. GR 169514, March
30, 2007.
REMMAN ENTERPRISES V. C.A.
REMMAN is a private domestic corporation engaged in the
business of developing subdivisions. On 17 August 1995,
REMMAN filed with the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), through the Socialized Housing One-Stop
Processing Center (SHOPC), an application for exemption from
the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) over 17 parcels of land with a total land area of 46.9180
hectares located at Bo. San Jose, Dasmariñas, Cavite.
Issue: Whether the subject parcels of land are exempted from
the coverage of the CARP.
Held: Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise referred to as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), was enacted as
a piece of social legislation pursuant to the policy of the State to
pursue a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. It became
effective on 15 June 1988. Section 4 thereof, specifies the
lands covered by the CARP, thus:
SECTION 4. Scope – The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229,
including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for
agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall
be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account
ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by
law, the specific limits of the public domain;
(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as determined by
Congress in the preceding paragraph;
(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture;
and
(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural
products raised or that can be raised thereon.
The exemption and exclusions of Republic Act No. 6657 are
contained in Section 10 thereof, viz:
SECTION 10. Exemptions and Exclusions – Lands actually, directly and exclusively
used and found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestration, fish
sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves, national defense,
school sites and campuses including experimental farm stations operated by public or
private schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot
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production centers, church sites and convents appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and
Islamic centers appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal
colonies and penal farms actually worked by the inmates, government and private
research and quarantine centers and all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and
over, except those already developed shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.
In the main, REMMAN hinges its application for exemption on
the ground that the subject lands had ceased to be agricultural
lands by virtue of the zoning classification by the Sangguniang
Bayan of Dasmariñas, Cavite, and approved by the HSRC,
specifying them as residential.
As emphasized, the reclassification of lands to non-agricultural
cannot be applied to defeat vested rights of tenant-farmers
under Presidential Decree No. 27. In the case at bar, it appears
on record that petitioners in were issued their respective
emancipation patents on various dates. However, as was noted
by the DAR Secretary in his Order of 5 June 1996, there is a
pending action involving the subject parcels of land. The same
action similarly involves the annulment of the Certificates of
Land Transfer (CLT) and the emancipation patents issued to
Eduardo Adriano.
At any rate, DARAB Case No. IV-Ca. 0087-92, involves, inter
alia, the validity of the emancipation patents issued to tenant-
farmers, Eduardo Adriano, et al., who are the petitioners in G.R.
No. 132361, and the private respondents in G.R. No. 132073.
Inasmuch as the consolidated petitions before us raise the
question of the exemption of the subject parcels of land from
CARP, which parcels of land are similarly covered by existing
emancipation patents, it behooves this Court to hold in
abeyance the judgment on the propriety of the exemption
sought by REMMAN, until after the issue as to the validity of the
emancipation patents (which precisely cover most of the subject
parcels of land) has been conclusively and finally determined.
The issues are inextricably linked. We cannot decide on the
question of exemption without causing a preemption on the
question of the validity of the aforesaid emancipation patents.
To ensure that our judgment on REMMAN’s application for
exemption is complete, the parties, and especially, the tenant-
farmers, Eduardo Adriano, et al., must be afforded due
opportunity to ventilate their defenses in support of the
emancipation patents issued in their names in the proceedings
before the DARAB, in particular, DARAB Case No. IV-Ca. 0087-
92. This is especially significant in light of the principles and
policies behind the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
Indeed, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6657, pronounces in no
uncertain terms that the welfare of the landless farmers and
farmworkers will receive the highest consideration to promote
social justice and to move the nation toward sound rural
development and industrialization, and the establishment of
owner cultivatorship of economic-size farms as the basis of
Philippine agriculture.
CONFEDERATION OF SUGAR PRODUCERS V. DAR
Confederation of Sugar Producers Association, Inc., et al. It
seeks, inter alia, to enjoin the Department of Agrarian Reform,
the Land Bank of the Philippines, and the Land Registration
Authority from "subjecting the sugarcane farms of Petitioner
Planters to eminent domain or compulsory acquisition without
filing the necessary expropriation proceedings pursuant to the
provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and/or without the
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application or conformity of a majority of the regular
farmworkers on said farms."
The petitioners assail the Court s Decision in Association of
Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform which affirmed the constitutionality of RA 6657.
They describe the Decision as a "riddle wrapped in an enigma."
They refer to pronouncements made therein that are allegedly
inconsistent with its conclusion, i.e., affirming the validity of RA
6657, including paragraphs (d), (e) and (f) of Section 16. For
example, while the Decision, citing EPZA, pronounced that "[t]o
be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function
addressed to the courts of justice and may not be usurped by
any other branch or official of the government" and that "the
determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless
accepted by all parties concerned," these pronouncements are
allegedly irreconcilable with paragraphs (d) and (e) which allow
the DAR, through summary administrative proceeding, "to take
immediate possession of the land" and cause "the cancellation
of the certificate of title of the landowner."
Issue: WON RA6657 is constitutional?
Held: YES. The validity of Section 16, including paragraphs (d),
(e) and (f), of RA 6657, which sets forth the manner of
acquisition of private agricultural lands and ascertainment of just
compensation, has already been affirmed in Association of
Small Landowners.
Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for
it to make a deposit upon its taking possession of the
condemned property, as "the compensation is a public charge,
the good faith of the public is pledged for its payment, and all
the resources of taxation may be employed in raising the
amount."
A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show that it
does not suffer from the arbitrariness that rendered the
challenged decrees constitutionally objectionable. Although the
proceedings are described as summary, the landowner and
other interested parties are nevertheless allowed an opportunity
to submit evidence on the real value of the property. But more
importantly, the determination of the just compensation by the
DAR is not by any means final and conclusive upon the
landowner or any other interested party, for Section(f) clearly
provides: “(f) Any party who disagrees with the decision may
bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation.”
The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless
accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts of
justice will still have the right to review with finality the said
determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial
function.
On the matter of when transfer of possession and ownership of
the land to the Government is reckoned, Association of Small
Landowners instructs: “The CARP Law, for its part, conditions
the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the
government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding
payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash
or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also
remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is
contemplated either.”
The foregoing disquisition is binding and applicable to the
present case following the salutary doctrine of stare decisis et
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
non quieta movere which means "to adhere to precedents, and
not to unsettle things which are established." Under the
doctrine, when the Supreme Court has once laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will
adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where
facts are substantially the same; regardless of whether the
parties and property are the same. The doctrine of stare decisis
is based upon the legal principle or rule involved and not upon
the judgment which results therefrom. In this particular sense
stare decisis differs from res judicata which is based upon the
judgment.


URBAN LAND REFORM AND HOUSING
Section 9. The State shall, by law, and for the common
good, undertake, in cooperation with the private sector, a
continuing program of urban land reform and housing
which will make available at affordable cost, decent
housing and basic services to under-privileged and
homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement
areas. It shall also promote adequate employment
opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of
such program the State shall respect the rights of small
property owners.
Section 10. Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be
evicted nor their dwelling demolished, except in
accordance with law and in a just and humane manner.
No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be
undertaken without adequate consultation with them and
the communities where they are to be relocated.
Doctrine
The due process guarantee cannot be invoked when no vested
right has been acquired. The period during which petitioners
occupied the lots, no matter how long, did not vest them with
any right to claim ownership since it is a fundamental principle
of law that acts of possessory character executed by virtue of
license or tolerance of the owner, no matter how long, do not
start the running of the period of acquisitive prescription. It
bears recalling that BATAHAI was formed precisely to enable
the Bagong Tanyag settlers, including petitioners, to purchase
the lots they were occupying.
The invocation of Article XIII, 9 & 10, does not help petitioners.
Petitioners’ obstinancy in not complying with the BATAHAI and
NHMFC requirements had delayed the release of the loan to
BATAHAI to the detriment of the other BATAHAI members who,
like petitioners, are also urban poor dwellers but who complied
with the requirements and even agreed to be relocated in case
the construction of roads for the common interest required the
demolition of their houses or structures. To grant the petition
would, instead of promoting, defeat social justice. Espinocilla et
al. v Bagong Homeowners, G.R. No. 151019, August 9, 2007.
ESPINOCILLA ET AL. V BAGONG HOMEOWNERS
Respondent corporation, the Bagong Tanyag Homeowners’
Association, Inc. (BATAHAI), was in 1989 incorporated to
enable the occupants of the land owned by Fortune
Development Corporation, Guillermo Tantuco, and Daniel
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Ignacio and located in Bagong Tanyag, Taguig to purchase the
respective lots they were occupying under the Community
Mortgage Program (CMP) of the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Under the CMP, BATAHAI could obtain a loan from NHMFC to
purchase the land from its owners and subdivide it among its
member-beneficiaries, subject to the supervision and guidance
of the National Housing Administration (NHA). In turn, each
member-beneficiary would pay amortizations of the loan to
BATAHAI.
The BATAHAI Code of Policies (the Code) named as first
priority beneficiaries the owners of houses or structures that
were part of the census survey conducted in October 1984 in
Bagong Tanyag and who were members of BATAHAI. The
Code named as second priority beneficiaries members of
BATAHAI who were part of the census survey as lessees or
rent-free occupants (“nangungupahan na may bayad, nakikitira,
o nakikisama”) of houses or structures in Bagong Tanyag.
Under the Code, each beneficiary is entitled to only one lot, that
on which his or her house or structure stands. Petitioners,
however, wanted to claim the vacant lots adjacent to theirs on
which vacant lots they planted crops or put up fences and other
improvements.
For failure to comply with the requirements, their applications
were denied and they were removed from the list of prospective
beneficiaries.
Issue: WON the CA erred in not declaring the act of the
respondents as contrary to the express mandate of Article XIII,
Section 9 and 10 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines and
the laws passed in relation thereto, particularly Republic Act No.
7279?
Held: Petitioners invoke Article XIII and the social justice
provisions of the Constitution. The invocation does not help their
cause. Petitioners’ obstinancy in not complying with the
BATAHAI and NHMFC requirements had delayed the release of
the loan to BATAHAI to the detriment of the other BATAHAI
members who, like petitioners, are also urban poor dwellers but
who complied with the requirements and even agreed to be
relocated in case the construction of roads for the common
interest required the demolition of their houses or structures. To
grant the petition would, instead of promoting, defeat social
justice.


HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 17.
(1) There is hereby created an independent office called the
Commission on Human Rights.
(2) The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and
four Members who must be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members
of the Bar. The term of office and other qualifications
and disabilities of the Members of the Commission
shall be provided by law.
(3) Until this Commission is constituted, the existing
Presidential Committee on Human Rights shall
continue to exercise its present functions and powers.
(4) The approved annual appropriations of the Commission
shall be automatically and regularly released.
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
Doctrine
Q. Does the Commission on Human Rights enjoy fiscal
autonomy?
A. No. Fiscal autonomy is given only to Commissions found in
Article IX. The Commission on Human Rights is not of the
same rank. CHR Employees v CHR, G.R. No. 155336,
July 21, 2006. (NOTE: But see Section 17(4).)
CHR EMPLOYEES V CHR
Congress passed the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It
provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional
Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The last portion of Article
XXXIII covers the appropriations of the CHR, authorizing the
same to formulate and implement the organizational structures
of their respective offices to fix and determine the salaries,
allowances and other benefits of their respective personnel and
whenever public interest so requires, make adjustments in the
personnel services itemization including, but not limited to, the
transfer of item or creation of new positions in their respective
offices: PROVIDED, That officers and employees whose
positions are affected by such reorganization or adjustments
shall be granted retirement gratuities and separation pay in
accordance with existing laws, which shall be payable from any
unexpanded balance of, or savings in the appropriations of their
respective offices.
By virtue of such law, the CHR issued its own scheme,
upgrading and augmenting the commensurate amount
generated from savings under Personal Services. Annexed to
said resolution is the proposed creation of ten additional plantilla
positions. CHR then issued Resolution No. A98-055 providing
for the upgrading or raising of salary grade of some positions in
the Commission.
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading
scheme to the Department of Budget and Management [DBM]
with a request for its approval, but the DBM secretary Benjamin
Diokno denied the request.
It was further held that “being a member of the fiscal autonomy
group does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify,
upgrade, and create positions without approval of the DBM.
While the members of the Group are authorized to formulate
and implement the organizational structures of their respective
offices and determine the compensation of their personnel, such
authority is not absolute and must be exercised within the
parameters of the Unified Position Classification and
Compensation System established under RA 6758 more
popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law. We
therefore reiterate our previous stand on the matter.”
In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed personnel
modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region Office,
through a memorandum recommended to the CSC-Central
Office that the subject appointments be rejected owing to the
DBM’s disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner Commission on Human
Rights Employees’ Association [CHREA], in representation of
the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-
Central office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-
Regional Office. CHREA stood its ground in saying that the
DBM is the only agency with appropriate authority mandated by
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law to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and
upgrading, as well as creation of positions.
Issue: Does the Commission on Human Rights enjoy fiscal
autonomy?
Held: NO. Constitutional commissions are granted fiscal
autonomy by the 1987 Constitution in Article IX, Part A, Section
5, a provision applied in common to all constitutional
commissions. The Office of the Ombudsman enjoys fiscal
autonomy by virtue of Article XI, Section 14, of the 1987
Constitution.
Each of the afore-quoted provisions consists of two sentences
stating that: (1) The government entity shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy; and (2) its approved annual appropriation shall be
automatically and regularly released. The respondent anchors
its claim to fiscal autonomy on the fourth paragraph of Article
XIII, Section 17, according to wit: “(4) The approved annual
appropriations of the Commission shall be automatically and
regularly released.”
As compared to the previously quoted Article VIII, Section 3;
Article IX, Part A, Section 5; and Article XI, Section 14 of the
1987 Constitution on the Judiciary, the constitutional
commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman, respectively,
Article XIII, Section 17(4) on the Commission of Human Rights
(CHR) evidently does not contain the first sentence on the
express grant of fiscal autonomy, and reproduces only the
second sentence on the automatic and regular release of its
approved annual appropriations. Question now arises as to the
significance of such a difference in the way the said provisions
are worded.
To settle this ambiguity, a perusal of the records of the
Constitutional Commission (ConCom) is enlightening. After
reviewing the deliberations of the ConCom on Article XIII,
Section 17(4), of the 1987 Constitution, in its entirety, not just
bits and pieces thereof, this Court is convinced that the
ConCom had intended to grant to the respondent the privilege
of having its approved annual appropriations automatically and
regularly released, but nothing more. While it may be conceded
that the automatic and regular release of approved annual
appropriations is an aspect of fiscal autonomy, it is just one of
many others.
This Court has already defined the scope and extent of fiscal
autonomy in the case of Bengzon v. Drilon, as follows- “As
envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by
the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on
Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the
Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to
allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch
that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to
levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not
exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation
and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse
such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in
the course of the discharge of their functions. Fiscal autonomy
means freedom from outside control.”
The foregoing excerpt sufficiently elucidates that the grant of
fiscal autonomy is more extensive than the mere automatic and
regular release of approved annual appropriations of the
government entity. It is also worth stressing herein that in
Bengzon v. Drilon, this Court, ruling En Banc, only recognized
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary; the constitutional
commissions, namely, the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Audit, and the Commission on Elections; and
the Office of the Ombudsman. Respondent is conspicuously left
out of the enumeration.
On the main issue of whether or not the approval by the DBM is
a condition precedent to the enactment of an upgrading,
reclassification, creation and collapsing of plantilla positions in
the CHR, this Court staunchly holds that as prescinding from the
legal and jurisprudential yardsticks discussed in length in the
assailed Decision, the imprimatur of the DBM must first be
sought prior to implementation of any reclassification or
upgrading of positions in government.
Regardless of whether or not respondent enjoys fiscal
autonomy, this Court shares the stance of the DBM that the
grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices
must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary Standardization Law.
This Court is of the same mind with the DBM on its standpoint,
thus: “Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not
vest the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and
create positions without approval of the DBM. While the
members of the Group are authorized to formulate and
implement the organizational structures of their respective
offices and determine the compensation of their personnel, such
authority is not absolute and must be exercised within the
parameters of the Unified Position Classification and
Compensation System established under RA 6758 more
popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law.”


ARTICLE XIV - EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS
EDUCATION
Section 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of
all citizens to quality education at all levels, and shall take
appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.
Doctrine
The Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of
state protection to marriage as a social institution and the
foundation of the family. It remains the province of the
legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe
the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever
socio-political influences it deems proper. While it may appear
that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is
reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such
action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage,
not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is.
Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV
need not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken
into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.
Antonio v Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10.
ANTONIO V REYES
Petitioner and respondent married in 1990. Petitioner filed a
petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and
void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the
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Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at
the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to
the present.
As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological
incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied
about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things, to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, and
instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only
confessed the truth about the boy s parentage when petitioner learned about it from
other sources after their marriage.
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and
kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred.
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo
Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology,
when she was neither.
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold
Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed
her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a
luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented
an invitation to that effect but petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of
Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place.
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those
names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her
as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2 million.
Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the
letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels. He likewise realized
that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when he
discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold.
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip
to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public
market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer. She spent
lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people on
false pretexts.
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his
officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual
behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but
since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991.
Taking exception to the appellate court’s pronouncement,
petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He contends herein
that the evidence conclusively establish respondent’s
psychological incapacity.
Held: Now is also opportune time to comment on another
common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this
Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have
favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution,
which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino
family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected
by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the
family and the constitutional protection accorded to the
institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of
state protection to marriage as a social institution and the
foundation of the family. It remains the province of the
legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe
the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever
socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course
to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres
to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
also falls on the legislature to put into operation the
constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family.
This has been accomplished at present through the enactment
of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family,
spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the
limitations that affect married and family life, as well as
prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for
legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a
petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional
mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely
enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally
ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances
warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only
constitutional considerations to be taken into account in
resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.


ARTICLE XVI - GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 6. The State shall establish and maintain one police
force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in
character, to be administered and controlled by a national
police commission. The authority of local executives over
the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by
law.
Doctrines
From the foregoing, it appears clear to us that the INP was
never, as posited by the petitioners, abolished or terminated out
of existence by R.A. No. 6975. For sure, nowhere in R.A. No.
6975 does the words “abolish” or “terminate” appear in
reference to the INP. Instead, what the law provides is for the
“absorption,” “transfer,” and/or “merger” of the INP, as well as
the other offices comprising the PC-INP, with the PNP. To
“abolish” is to do away with, to annul, abrogate or destroy
completely; to “absorb” is to assimilate, incorporate or to take in.
“Merge” means to cause to combine or unite to become legally
absorbed or extinguished by merger while “transfer” denotes
movement from one position to another. Clearly, “abolition”
cannot be equated with “absorption.”
With the conclusion herein reached that the INP was not in fact
abolished but was merely transformed to become the PNP,
members of the INP which include the herein respondents
are, therefore, not excluded from availing themselves of the
retirement benefits accorded to PNP retirees under Sections 74
and 75 of R.A. No. 6975, as amended by R.A. No. 8551. It may
be that respondents were no longer in the government service
at the time of the enactment of R.A. No. 6975. This fact,
however, without more, would not pose as an impediment to the
respondents’ entitlement to the new retirement scheme set forth
under the aforecited sections. Department of Budget v. Manila’s
Finest, GTR 169466, May 9, 2007.
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET V. MANILA’S FINEST
PD765 was issued constituting the Integrated National Police
(INP) to be composed of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) as
the nucleus and the integrated police forces as components
thereof. Complementing P.D. No. 765 was P.D. No. 1184 issued
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to professionalize the INP and promote career development
therein.
RA6975, referred to as PNP Law, was enacted. Under Section
23 of said law, the PNP would initially consist of the members of
the INP, created under P.D. No. 765, as well as the officers and
enlisted personnel of the PC.
Later, RA6975 was amended by R.A. No. 8551, otherwise
known as the "PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE REFORM AND
REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1998." Among other things, the
amendatory law reengineered the retirement scheme in the
police organization. Relevantly, PNP personnel, under the new
law, stood to collect more retirement benefits than what INP
members of equivalent rank, who had retired under the INP
Law, received.
Hence, all INP retirees filed a petition for declaratory relief. The
petition alleged in gist that INP retirees were equally situated as
the PNP retirees but whose retirement benefits prior to the
enactment of R.A. No. 6975, as amended by R.A. No. 8551,
were unconscionably and arbitrarily excepted from the higher
rates and adjusted benefits accorded to the PNP retirees.
RTC held that the INP Retirees entitled to the same or identical
retirement benefits and such other benefits being granted,
accorded and bestowed upon the PNP Retirees under the PNP
Law (RA No. 6975, as amended).
Issue: WON CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF
THE TRIAL COURT NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IT IS
CONTRARY TO LAW AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.
Held: NO. In the main, it is petitioners’ posture that R.A. No.
6975 clearly abolished the INP and created in its stead a new
police force, the PNP. Prescinding therefrom, petitioners
contend that since the PNP is an organization entirely different
from the INP, it follows that INP retirees never became PNP
members. Ergo, they cannot avail themselves of the retirement
benefits accorded to PNP members under R.A. No. 6975 and its
amendatory law, R.A. No. 8551.
The INP was never, as posited by the petitioners, abolished or
terminated out of existence by R.A. No. 6975. For sure,
nowhere in R.A. No. 6975 does the words "abolish" or
"terminate" appear in reference to the INP. Instead, what the
law provides is for the "absorption," "transfer," and/or "merger"
of the INP, as well as the other offices comprising the PC-INP,
with the PNP. To "abolish" is to do away with, to annul, abrogate
or destroy completely; to "absorb" is to assimilate, incorporate
or to take in. "Merge" means to cause to combine or unite to
become legally absorbed or extinguished by merger while
"transfer" denotes movement from one position to another.
Clearly, "abolition" cannot be equated with "absorption."
True it is that Section 90 of R.A. No. 6975 speaks of the INP
"[ceasing] to exist" upon the effectivity of the law. It ought to be
stressed, however, that such cessation is but the logical
consequence of the INP being absorbed by the PNP. Far from
being abolished then, the INP, at the most, was merely
transformed to become the PNP, minus of course its military
character and complexion.
By removing the police force from under the control and
supervision of military officers, the bill seeks to restore and
underscore the civilian character of police work - an otherwise
universal concept that was muddled up by the martial law years.
JEN LAYGO 4D 2007 TRUTH. HONOR. EXCELLENCE.
FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.
Indeed, were the legislative intent was for the INP’s abolition
such that nothing would be left of it, the word "abolish" or what
passes for it could have easily found its way into the very text of
the law itself, what with the abundant use of the word during the
legislative deliberations. But as can be gleaned from said
deliberations, the lawmakers’ concern centered on the fact that
if the entire PC-INP corps join the PNP, then the PC-INP will
necessarily be abolished, for who then would be its members?
Of more consequence, the lawmakers were one in saying that
there should never be two national police agencies at the same
time.
With the conclusion herein reached that the INP was not in fact
abolished but was merely transformed to become the PNP,
members of the INP which include the herein respondents are,
therefore, not excluded from availing themselves of the
retirement benefits accorded to PNP retirees under Sections 74
and 75 of R.A. No. 6975, as amended by R.A. No. 8551. It may
be that respondents were no longer in the government service
at the time of the enactment of R.A. No. 6975. This fact,
however, without more, would not pose as an impediment to the
respondents’ entitlement to the new retirement scheme set forth
under the aforecited sections. As correctly ratiocinated by the
CA to which we are in full accord:
For sure, R.A. No. 6975 was not a retroactive statute since it did
not impose a new obligation to pay the INP retirees the
difference between what they received when they retired and
what would now be due to them after R.A. No. 6975 was
enacted. Even so, that did not render the RTC’s interpretation of
R.A. No. 6975 any less valid. The [respondents’] retirement prior
to the passage of R.A. No. 6975 did not exclude them from the
benefits provided by R.A. No. 6975, as amended by R.A. No.
8551, since their membership in the INP was an antecedent fact
that nonetheless allowed them to avail themselves of the
benefits of the subsequent laws. R.A. No. 6975 considered
them as PNP members, always referring to their membership
and service in the INP in providing for their retirement benefits.


ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise
be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum
of the registered voters therein. No amendment under
this section shall be authorized within five years
following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener
than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation
of the exercise of this right.
Doctrine
There is as yet no law authorizing constitutional amendment by
initiative and referendum. Even if there were, the authenticity of
the signatures still have to be verified. Lambino v. Comelec,
G.R. No. 174153October 25, 2006. Puno dissents. Affirmed in
Resolution, November 2, 2006.
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LAMBINO V. COMELEC
"Lambino Group," with other groups and individuals,
commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to
change the 1987 Constitution. The Group filed a petition with
the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative
petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of Republic
Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
Issue: Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies
with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments
to the Constitution through a people's initiative.
Held: NO. The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with
the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a
people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit
Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based
alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply with the
basic requirements of the Constitution. For following the Court's
ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to
the Commision on Elections.
The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly
explain the meaning of an amendment "directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition.” Clearly, the framers of
the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the
people "before" they sign such proposal. The framers plainly
stated that "before they sign there is already a draft shown to
them." The framers also "envisioned" that the people should
sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must
"prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on
its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential
elements must be present. First, the people must author and
thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can
sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the
proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the
proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express
their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition.
Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a
petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written
on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the
petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an
assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to
the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments
before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the
time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of
signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments
before signing.
The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed the concept of
people's initiative from the United States where various State
constitutions incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all States
which allow initiative petitions, the unbending requirement is that
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the people must first see the full text of the proposed
amendments before they sign to signify their assent, and that
the people must sign on an initiative petition that contains the
full text of the proposed amendments.
Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of
signing of the nature and effect of that which is proposed" and
failure to do so is "deceptive and misleading" which renders the
initiative void.
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly
state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed
amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our
Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the
relevant American jurisprudence on people's initiative. In
particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people must
first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they
sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such
full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the
Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes
as valid, requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as
signatories."
The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to
an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In
contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose
both amendments and revisions to the Constitution.
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of
amending the Constitution. The first mode is through Congress
upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is
through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a
people's initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes,
applies to "[A]ny amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution."
In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode,
applies only to "[A]mendments to this Constitution." This
distinction was intentional as shown by the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission. The framers of the Constitution
intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between "amendment"
and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers intended, and
wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may
propose revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended, and
wrote, that a people's initiative may propose only amendments
to the Constitution. Where the intent and language of the
Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to
propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot
propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose
amendments.
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a
people's initiative can only propose amendments to the
Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to
amendments. There can be no deviation from the
constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A
popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million signatures,
cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes prescribed in
the Constitution itself.
The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute
an amendment or revision of the Constitution? If the Lambino
Group's initiative constitutes a revision, then the present petition
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should be dismissed for being outside the scope of Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an
amendment and a revision of a constitution. One of the earliest
cases that recognized the distinction described the fundamental
difference in this manner: “[T]he very term "constitution" implies
an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the
provisions contained therein for its revision indicate the will of
the people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as
well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a
like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the
significance of the term "amendment" implies such an addition
or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect
an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was
framed.”
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in
the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of
powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also
revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the
constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions
of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly
refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without
altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects
several provisions of the constitution, while amendment
generally affects only the specific provision being amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but
not revisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution,
courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and
the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the
proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change
directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the
deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions." The
court examines only the number of provisions affected and does
not consider the degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the
proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is
whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes
in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a
revision." Whether there is an alteration in the structure of
government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in
the nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change in
its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its
Branches." A change in the nature of the basic governmental
plan also includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form
of government and the system of check and balances."
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino
Group's initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment.
Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes
overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article
VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the
entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter
substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to
parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the
Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of
government in the present Constitution are reduced into two.
This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift
from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the
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Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a
radical change in the structure of government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of
Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus
constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition
alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-
and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of
the Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a
Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system,
involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the
abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a
revision, not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the
Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is readily apparent that
the changes will radically alter the framework of government as
set forth in the Constitution.
Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the
Constitutional Commission, writes: “An amendment envisages
an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions.
The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve
specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to
meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may
have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In
revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan
contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of
provisions of the document which have over-all implications for
the entire document, to determine how and to what extent they
should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch from the
presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a
revision because of its over-all impact on the entire
constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral
system to a unicameral system be because of its effect on other
important provisions of the Constitution.”
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or
several provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body with
recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A
revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but
also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered.
Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like
constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to
undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow
people's initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable
deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only
amendments and not revisions.
The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed
Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions is not between a provision
in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and a provision in the
proposed changes. The inconsistency is between a provision in
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the "Parliamentary
system of government," and the inconsistency shall be resolved
in favor of a "unicameral parliamentary form of government."
DISSENTING OPINION - PUNO, J.:
• The doctrine of stare decisis does not bar the reexamination
of Santiago.
• A reexamination of R.A. 6735 will show that it is sufficient to
implement the people's initiative.
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o First. The text of R.A. 6735 is replete with references to

the right of the people to initiate changes to the
Constitution.
o Second. The legislative history of R.A. 6735 also reveals
the clear intent of the lawmakers to use it as the
instrument to implement people's initiative.
o Third. The sponsorship speeches by the authors of R.A.
6735 similarly demonstrate beyond doubt this intent. In
his sponsorship remarks, the late Senator Raul Roco
(then a Member of the House of Representatives)
emphasized the intent to make initiative as a mode
whereby the people can propose amendments to the
Constitution.
• The proposed constitutional changes, albeit substantial, are
mere amendments and can be undertaken through people's
initiative.
• The argument that the people through initiative cannot
propose substantial amendments to change the Constitution
turns sovereignty on its head. At the very least, the
submission constricts the democratic space for the exercise
of the direct sovereignty of the people. It also denigrates the
sovereign people who they claim can only be trusted with the
power to propose "simple" but not "substantial" amendments
to the Constitution. According to Sinco, the concept of
sovereignty should be strictly understood in its legal meaning
as it was originally developed in law. Legal sovereignty, he
explained, is "the possession of unlimited power to make
laws. Its possessor is the legal sovereign. It implies the
absence of any other party endowed with legally superior
powers and privileges. It is not subject to law 'for it is the
author and source of law.' Legal sovereignty is thus the
equivalent of legal omnipotence."
• At the very least, the power to propose substantial
amendments to the Constitution is shared with the people.
We should accord the most benign treatment to the sovereign
power of the people to propose substantial amendments to
the Constitution especially when the proposed amendments
will adversely affect the interest of some members of
Congress. A contrary approach will suborn the public weal to
private interest and worse, will enable Congress (the
delegate) to frustrate the power of the people to determine
their destiny (the principal).
• All told, the teaching of the ages is that constitutional clauses
acknowledging the right of the people to exercise initiative
and referendum are liberally and generously construed in
favor of the people. Initiative and referendum powers must be
broadly construed to maintain maximum power in the people.
We followed this orientation in Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority v. Commission on Elections. There is not an iota of
reason to depart from it.


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