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    17 views192 pages

    Arm Strong, D

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    of 192
    (International Library of Philosophy and Scientific Method . } ‘A MATERIALIST THEORY OF THE MIND EDITOR: THD HONDERICI ADVISORY EDITOR: BERNARD WILLIAMS A Gaaloge of bok aledy pub nthe Ita iy of Py ad Sa Mead wit oud othe et af hylan bo by D. M. ARMSTRONG Pr dP tien Snr @ LONDON ROUTLEDGE & KEGAN PAUL NEW YORK : HUMANITIES PRESS POLL First published 1$é8 by Rowtledge & Kegan Peal Lit. Broadsay Hae, 66-74 Carter Lane London, B.Cag Printed in Great Britain ‘by Richard Clay (Te Chaucer Press), Ltd. Bangers Safle © DM, Armstrong 1966 No part of this book may be reproduced in ay form witout permiison fron ‘the publisher, except forthe quotation Of brie posage in riticiom SBI 7100 36347 or ms Father sd Mother A CONTENTS \CKNOWLEDGEMENTS INTRODUCTION Parr One: Thomas oF Mixp A CLASSIFICATION OF THEORIES OF MIND DUALISM TL. Ceticism of ‘Bundle’ Dualiem TL Criticism of Cartesian Dualism IIT Difficulties for any Dualist theory ‘THE ATTRIBUTE THEORY ‘A DIFFICULTY FOR ANY NON-MATERIALIST THEORY OF MIND BEHAVIOURISM a<2 5 and ae. Preliminary Behaviourism aod the mental concepts (Ceticism of Behaviousism CENTRAL-STATE THEORY {she theory teal paradoxical? "Toe ony messed apt demands alas formate 2 fete icy Gormuae, and an answer dheched Views of Place aod Smart The compe of mend pate Discario betwen our view so Behaviours: Se anu of depose pages ty 5 8 4 ” 6 7 6 B B ” Contents VII The identication of mind and brain Base 89 VII Objecrions outstanding answered TX The nature of consciousness X The alleged indubitabiley of consciousness XI Unconscious mental processes XII_ Further objections to our theory XIN Advantages of the theory Parr Two: Tae Concer oF Mixp ‘THE WILL (1) T Tatroductory IT Purposive activity as activity witha mental use II Ryle’s Tainite egress TV. The natute of purpose activi V._The immediate acts of the will VI Means and ends VI Intending and trying VIL Desires we do not act from TX Wants and wishes X_ Deliberating and deciding XI Mental actions XII Belief and the will ‘IIT Need all actions be purposive? THE WILL () T Motives TI Pleasure and pain TI The emotions KNOWLEDGE AND INFERENCE 1 Phito's problem TI The nature of non-inferential knowledge TIT The narore of inferring IV’ Inferential knowledge 'V_ Further considesations shout knowledge PERCEPTION AND BELIEF Perception as acquiring of belief TI The role ofthe sense-organs TIT Belief is dispositional, but perception is an event 3 ny un ny 29 Br wn m 15 1” 187 187 189 198 208 209 a5 8 Contents, IV’ Perception without belief Page 26 'V. Perceiving things and perceiving that 7 VI Perception and causality 39 VIL Unconscious perception at VENT ‘Small perceptions" Be TX Immediate and mediate perception 33 X_ The nature of sense-impressions 336 XI Perception and knowledge 37 XII The nature ofthe physical world 339 PERCEPTION AND BEHAVIOUR 245 1 1 ™ v v vt THE I 1 m 1 0 ‘The manifeseation of perception in behaviour 245 Perception 2 mere necessary condition of dis- criminatory behaviour a8 ‘What is discriminatory behaviour? 30 Difference in perceptions without diference ia behaviour 6 ‘The intentionality of perception 360 Perceptual illusion 265 SECONDARY QUALITIES 270 "The problem of the secondary qualities a0 A priori objections to identifying. secondary ‘qualities with physical properties an ‘Empirical objections to identifying secondary ‘qualities with physial properties MENTAL IMAGES Preliminary investigations ‘The nature of meatal images Dreams m BODILY SENSATIONS 0 am wv v vi van va ‘Tactual and bodily perception Bodily sensations and bodily feelings ‘Transitive’ bodlly sensations Problems about ‘intransitive’ sensations “Intransitive’ sensations snd reactions “Totsanstive” sensations as bodily perceptions Intensity of sensations and intensity of reaction Bodily felings 5 6 7 Contents INTROSPECTION 2 1 Recaption ee Ir Towrospection st iner sense: objections a8 TT Inerospecion and behaviour An TV Mental sates and the mind 336 BELIEF_AND THOUGHT 339 T Belch 3 1 Thinking oa Parr Tune: Tins Navore oF Mis IDENTIFICATION OF THE MENTAL WITH THE PHYSICAL as INDEX 367 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS PROFESSOR J. J.C. SMART converted me tothe view, e- fended inthis hooky that ment states ae nothing bt physical ste of the brain Fe in his tan has acknowledged the influence ‘OF, T. Place In the book I make certain crits of tome of the views that Start and Pace ave put forward in pent Bat for the most pare Tebnccive myself only to being ova tp inthe asgamen to which they have devote itl tention: the secouat ofthe comer of mind. My itlctal debt o them remains pro- found. Profesor CB, Mari, now my colleague a Sydney Univer: St made me aware ofthe cnt role played by the concept ‘fev in at account ofthe etl concepts. Previowsl had Sssigned the cental place to the notion of poston, conceived ofa Ryle conceives them in Th Con of nd. My change of ‘ew on this question was a curing pint in my conception of Phlosopticlpochology andy hough Mann oes no accept Bysclit account ofthe mind T owe him no less than Toe Smart and Place, “The following have read vatious drafts of al or some of the rans an have heped me pestly with erica sed com toent:Dr Belo, Profesors A.G. N. Flew, D. A. T, Gasking D.M. Mellum, J. 1- Mackie, B Medlin, G.C. Ned, J. JC. Sar, Mr. D.C Stove and Dr. W. A. Sechting. Other chow” eles rem ex. ned in pail For 2 mumber of sopgertions, at once ingeniows and Profound, (© Profesor MJ Devscer Ihave lant rest deat fom students a1 Yale, Melbourne, Spéoey snd Stanford Univers in the ‘course presenting to them portions of te material i this book Acknowledgements (My shanks are also due to Roswitha Duly for typing the mani- nt have indeed rine so mach valuable lp fom so many petsons hit I eannot be certain that Lam responsi or 6 ertor that the book may contain. ve i DMA Universit of Sydney INTRODUCTION WHAT isa man? One sbvious thing to say is that he fea ceria sort of material object. A man’s ody fonction in amore complex and curious way than any other knowa material object, natural ‘tical, But isa material objet. The question then arses: Ts ‘man nothing but his material body ? Can we give a compete Ac: count of man in purely physical tems?” In the pas, there seemed fo be reo rest objections to giving a prey physieal account of man. In Uhe fst place, mn had a Property which he shared with animals and plats but which ‘ordinary mata objects lacked: he was aie. Could life be noth- ing but a purely physi property? Inthe second place, man had 8 property which he saced with many animals, but with noching clte in the physical world: he had a mind. He percrived, fet thought and had purposes. Could mentality be nothing but 4 potely physieal property? Tncreasing scentfe kaowledge bas largely answered the Get objection. Its now very probable even not cern, that ie isa Putely physico-chemical phenomenon. We do aot aed to post Tie ‘vegetative souls’ or "ital eatelechies to explain fe What of the second objection? More and more psychologists and neuto- physiologist explicitly or imple acep the view tats fa 8 ‘mental processes ate concerned, there iso need to porate 209 {hing but purely physi proses in man's central nervous tem: If we take the word “mind” to mean “tht in which mental Processes occu or ‘that which has mental stat thea we can put this view briefly and aot too misleadingly as: the mind ie nothing butthebrin If scent progeesssstais this View, seems that, sman is nothing but a matenal object having none but physical Proper. Introduction ‘Most pilozopbers, however, believe that there are conchutive seasons for tejecting euch a physicalist theory of mind. That is the occasion for wating this book. Itis writen by a philosopher, snd weitten primarily for philosophers. Its object is to show that there are 20 good philosophieal easaas for denying that mental processes ate purely physieal proceses in the central nervous 57$- tem and $0, by implication, that there are no good philosophical reasons for denying that man is nothing but a material object. “does not attempt to prove the tuth ofthis phycais thesis about the mind. The proof must come, if ic does come, from science: from neurophysiology in paricuae, Allie attempts t0 show is that there are no valid philosophical of logical reasons for rejecting the identification of mind and beain, Like Joha Locke, 1 conceive my task eegatively. Tam an underlabourer carting 2Way rubbish from che path along which I conecive, 0 guess, that scien- fife progres lies For this reason, the importance of this work for psychology, if any, is manly indirect. To vary Locke's metaphor, what Tam do- ing is eying to protect those psychologists Who explicitly of im plicily identify mind and brain against a harassing action on theit flank, a harassment, peshape, that some of them do not rake very seriously anyway. Ifthere i anything I say that i of asistance to ‘peychologist in dealing withthe logical problems involved in the ‘consideration of our ordinary mental concept, I shall be happy. But this will be an intellectual bonus over end above what <00- czive to be the special importance of this work for paychology. ‘The fist five chapters consider and ertcize what I take to be ‘he important alternatives to an identification of mind and brain. I regard the dificlties that bese these alternatives asa most com- polling reson for believing that my own theory is on the right track. Nevertheless, some readers may wish o omit these chapters inan already long book. Although a few references are made back ‘© the early chapters in the later course ofthe work, readers should have no great dificult if dhey begin ax Chapter 6 T should also warn that some of the things Tsay in the fst ive chapters are provisional, This aries because, if the position sketched in Chapter 6 is correct, ceria old positions and old arguments concerning mind and body appear in a sew light. Part One THEORIES OF MIND rz A CLASSIFICATION OF THEORIES OF MIND THERE are many possible ways of clescifying theories of mind. ‘The classification to be pur forward here is based upon different conceptions of the relationship of mind to bay. Some theories of mind and body try to reduce body to mind or some property of mind. Such theories may be called Mental theories. Thos according to Hegel and his followers, the Absolute ‘ealss, che whole material world is really mental or spictal ia ‘nature, litle as ie may appear so. According to Leibniz, material ‘objects are colonies of rudimentary souls. These are hh mentalist theories. It may be plausibly argued that Bishop Berkeley and his philosophical descendants the Phenomenslists, who hold that physical objects are constructions out of ‘ideas’ or ense-impees- sions, are putting forward mentalist cheotes of matter. Tn oppositi to these mentalist theories, we have Materialist theories which try to reduce mind to body oF to some property of body. Berween mentalist and materialist theories we find two sorts of compromise theories. In the first place, there are Dusit theories which teat nind and matter a two independent sorts of ‘thing. Tn the second place, we have theories like Spinoza's, which treat mind and matter as diferent attributes of the same under lying stuf, or Newre! Moniz, which holds that mind and matter ate diferent arrangements of 3 single sort of stuf. However, if we comider the edition of modera analytical a 5 Theorie of Mind philosophy, within which this book is written, we fd that many ‘of these views are not living intellectual options, Some analytical philosophers have accepted Phenomenalism. But most have taken fhe common sease view that physical objects are not mental in nature, nor ae they attributes of, nor constructions out of, some, thing neutral in nature. For this feason, the only theories of mind and body that I will actually examine inthis fest part ofthe book are those that accept the ieducibly physical nature of physical things. I have two reasons for ignoring, Phenomenalism. Ta the {rst place, its intellectual credit has been shaken in eecat years In the second place, T have already said what [have to say in ctticism of Phenomenalism in Perception and the Phyiel World Routledge, 1961, Chs. and 6). ‘Having inthis way limited the field of theories to be examined, 4 new classification is tequited for those theories that remain. We ‘may distinguish between Duslir theories of mind and body, Attribute toeories and Materialist theses. ‘A Dualist theory is one that holds chat mind and body are d= inc things. For a Dualist a man is a compound objeee 2 material thing—his body—somehow related to @ non-material thing, Ot things—his mind. There are cwo main types of Dualis theory. in the frst place, we have Carttian Dualism. For the Castesan Dualise the mind is a sigdé son-material or spiritual substance tomehow related to the body. Although the term ‘Cartesan” fefers to Descartes, and we find his view of the mind and body expounded by Descartes in his Sivth Meditaian, the term, as Tose js not to be restricted to the exact theory put forward by Descartes. It isto be applied to any view that holds that a persa’t ‘mind isa single, continuing, non-material substance in some way related to the body. (Since this isthe first time thatthe term ‘substance’ has been used inthis work, and since it wll be used frequently inthe furare, it wil be convenient to say a word about the notion of substance hte, Locke conceived of substance asthe unknowable subststam of objects, Those who came after him often scjected the doctsine (of such a substratem, but the unforcunate effect was not to revise Locke's conception of substance, but to give the whole notion Of substance 4 bad odour. But when {present the Cartesian view #8 the view that the mind isa non-material substance, Ido not regutd the Cactesians as necessarily committed to a dovtuiae of ana" 6 A Classification of Theories of Mind \nowable meatal subst. understand by aubstanc nothing ‘ore ha thing tat sly pond xe) Inthe cond fc, we hve what eed Bune Das jum, te term und” ecoing Hames notorious description of the mind at unl of pcos “Ths form of Duals Charceiaaly ames on of eecton om th iets of Car tein Duan, When the gest Epica plesopher, Dad Hu ese ov ale a tt he could sem no coeiing tel pindpe within hms. ISedncnton of the moar Of the i io is Trt 9f Haman News Be Pu, See 6 heaps Fos my past, when fem mos itatl into what cll ya, 1 siwaps somble on tome patil pceion or ote of feat ot {eid igh or shoe, lve o hated pai or peso T ever cao sccm tine without a peteption, and ever at buerve ny thing tat the pereption (p 25%. Selby Diggs, Oxford Univesity Pres, 88). mei arguing here that here tno conning object in the metal sphere coresponding to the boy inthe phy sphere Nobody ever observer such spiral principle within msl, ‘ie eran oh son orm rea ‘tsuneo thought advo on Soe Beale De ‘Etats the ind obes screson of son physical prices ot ita dance from hough rested eo, the body " ‘Aiciough Bund’ Daan is lot Unked with Huse's same, ti sot abolstely cee wheter of ot Hume himsel ws "Bundle Dual His view ofthe mind crcly Ss our deli tin, butte legimat to doubt whether he holds a Meese theory of the body. For sometines he ses fo hold view ¢& pls object sini oth of Bekeley making them nothing Ettourpecepions ‘ot them. Tis would imply tas mind ad odes fe bh onstrated from perceptions. However, a ober Sines He's view seems to be let adil and lone comn Sense, Then he ks aif aman were amatrial hing somehow Sted to a bundle of non-materal tenes pescepaone or ex perience, “is another important way of casiying Dualit theories whch cus acon he Sten berwemn Cota aa Band 7 Theories of Mind Daalism, This clasication is based on the particular nature ofthe relationship thought to hold between the pind aed the body: it the ditnction between Intractiont and Parle theonce ‘The diference Getween Interacionist sad Parallel theories smay be brought out by consideing the eats relations beswess (0) 4 0m and its thermostats (i) «room and et ermometen A {oom adits rma act upon each ote. A fseinte espe, ture of the room brings sbout changes in the thermos the changes in the thermostat in tara alee the room, binging back its temperature coa certain level. If ths Aton and reaction dot ‘occur the thermostat would noe be acting as thermovat, ‘Phe Dalit who isan Ineractionist thinks of body snd nied are lated like room and thermostat. The body ets on the ind the sind reacts back on the body, ‘On the other hand, although a oom sets pon its Hermemeti, 4 sein the temperacze ofthe room causing aren the merce, ofthe thermometer, the thermometer does ot tere tack ope {he room, (le fet it does ao to very smal extent but we poy ‘ignore this point) Ith thermometer afected the tempera the room, a8 a thermostat does, it would be no wie sy term meter. Now the Dualist who isa Parallels tale of body aed mind ss related ike room and thermometer. The body hee oath ind bu he i's incapable of racing ack oh Bait any vay al ‘There isa sill more extreme form of Pailelism according t0 which noc only isthe mind incpableo cng on te aie Body is alan incapable of acting on the mind. Instead shop a {vo parallel series ike the two nls ofa rallay line cro pet: fectly synchtonized clocks. However, Ido nos propece to does Sider this form of Paaleiso explicit. My reason do ot think tha its seriously considered by prerene-dnycighers Here ‘we concem ourselves oaly with those theories of Mind sod Baty ‘hich ar living options forthe thought of ose un Teis sometimes argved that if we scents Unifornny theory of

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