Great Debates in Philosophy Consciousness Personal density : Sydney Shoemaker and Richard Swinburne and Causality Consciousness and Causality D.M_ Armstrong and Norman Maleate A Debate on the Nature of Mind bh D. M. Armstrong and Norman Malcolm Basil Blackwell©D.M. Armstrongand Norman Malcol First published 1984 Basil Blackwell Publisher Limited 1b Cowley Road, Oxford OX 4 J, England Alleights reserved. Except forthe quotation of short passagesfor the purposes ol criticism and review, no pan ofthis publication may be reproduced, stored inaetreval system, or transmitted, inany form ‘orby any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording ot bothertise, without the prior emission ofthe polisher Except the United States of America, thisbook ie sold subject othe condition thatit shall pt, by way of rade or therwise,belent ‘sold, hired out, o othersiac eircuated without the publisher's prior nany form of binding or eover other than that in which tis 1d and withouta similar condition including thi condition being impened on the subeequent purchaser. eign Library Cataloguingin Publication Data Anmateong, D. M. ‘Conacinsnensan causa. {Grea debatesin pila) E Mind and body Intellect, [Title 1, Malcolm, Norman 11 182 Dit “Typeset at The Spartan Pres Ltd, Lymington, Hants rimedin Great Britain by Pitman Pree Uk ath Contents Consciousness and Causality NORMAN MALCOLM + Consciousness 2 Thesubjective character of experience 3 The causal theory of mind 44 Conclusion ‘Conesiousiens and Causality 1 Introductory 2 Indefence of inner sense 3 Indefence ofthe eausal theory of mind 14 Qualivies Norman Malcolm's Reply D. M, Armstrong's Reply Index 6 100 103 105 108 437 169 103 205 219Great Debates in Philosophy Since the time of Socrates, dialogue has been a powerful means ‘of philosophical exploration and expasitian. By presenting important current issues in philosophy in the form of a debate, this new series attempts to capture the flavour of philosophical argument and to convey the excitement generated by the interplay of ideas. ‘There will normally be more than two sides to any argument, and for any two ‘opponents’ there will be points of agreement as ‘well as points of disagreement. ‘The debate will not, therefore, necessarily cover every aspect of the chosen topic, nor will i present artificially polarized arguments, ‘The aim is to provide, ina thought-provoking format, a series of clear, accessible and concise introductions to a variety of subjects, ranging Irom formal logic to contemporary ethical isques. The series will be of interest to scholars, students and general readers alike, since ‘each book brings together two outstanding philosophers to throw light on a topic of current controversy. ‘The first essay states a particular position and the second essay counters it, The firs author's rejoinder i again anawered in the second author's reply. If the resulting book gives rise in sts turn to further discussion, argument and debate among ite readers it will have achieved its purpose Consciousness and Causality NORMAN MALCOLM,Acknowledgements 1am grateful tothe members of : of my seminars at King’s Cllege London, and at the University College af Suamee a de academic yea 981-82, for ther great help in ow dccvcions the taps of the present esayT an ope to Dan Rashid, ham Dilman, Ma we Dan - Marina Barabas, and Dewi 1 Consciousness ‘There is a grammatical difference between two uses of the word ‘conscious’. In one use this word requires an object: one is said to be conscious of something, o to be conscious shat so-and-so. One can be said to be conscious ofa strange odour, of the stifling heat, of a friend's ironical smile; and one can also be said to be conscious that there is strange odour in the hhouse, that the room is stifling hot, that one’s friend is smiling ironically. ‘The expessions ‘conscious of’ and ‘conscious that are generally replaceable by ‘aware of and ‘aveare tha’. Being conscious of something or that so-and-so, I shall call the ‘transitive’ use of the word ‘conscious’; and I shall speak of “transitive conseiousness’ ‘There is another use of the word ‘conscious’ in which it does not take an object. If we think that a person who was kuiocked ‘unconscious has regained consciousness, we can say, ‘He is conscious’, without needing to add an ‘of or a‘tha’. This use, in which someone esa be said to be conscious or unconscious fout court, 1 shall call the ‘intransitive’ use of the word ‘conscious’, and shall speak of ‘intransitive consciousness’. It ‘may be noted that when ‘conscious’ is used intransitively it ‘cannot be replaced by ‘aware’: tobe aware’ always to be aware of or that Transitive consciousness “Transitive consciousnessis consciousness for that: conscious nce in this ense requires an abject. Teng disputed question ist what is the relation of consciousness to the objects of Consciousness? Ina famous early paper entted “The Relat tiom of Idealism" GE. Moore attacked the doctrine, held by tome idealists that esse is peri. Moore understood this doctrine to amount 0 the claim that whatever 1, is exper: ‘nced.* Apparently this meant that nothing that isan object of Consciousness cn existexceptar an object of consciousness In 5G. E Moone, Php Sadi, Harcourt Brace & C19224 Norman Matcolm is discussion Moore concentrated on what he called ‘sen sations’ or ‘ideas’, He spoke of "the sensation of blue’ and ‘the sensation of green’. He said that although these are different sensations they have something in common that he called ‘consciousness’. That in respect to which the wa sensations differed, he called a difference in the ‘objects’ of conscio ness. Moace said: ‘We have then in every sensation two distinet elements, one which I call consciousness, and another which I call the abject of consciousness." Moore went on to say: “The true analysis of a sensation of idea is as follows. ‘The clemem that is cneaman to them all, and which U have called ‘consciousness, realy consciousness. A sensation iy i reality, 2 case of "kaowing’ or ‘being aware of or experiencing! sometting. When we know that the sensation of blue exists, the face we know i that there exists an awareness of Bhi." ‘Moore said that awareness of or consciousness of something “s, involved equally inthe analysis of exery experience—feom the ‘merest sensation to the most developed perception of reflex: jon’ He went on to make an assertion that pertains to my present topic. He said that this awareness or consciousness ‘ie and must be in all cases of such a nature that its object, when. ‘we are avvare ot, i precisely what it would be, if we were not aware (of it)" This assertion of Moore's was a biow aimed at the doctrine of esse is percipi. This latter doctrine is certainly extravagant if it implies that chairs and mountains do not, of cannot, exist except when they are objects of consciousness But did not Moore go too far in the other direction? Objects of consciousness inciade bodily sensations, such as pains and aches: for we can say, ‘as I reached the summit I became conscious of a pain in my back’. Is a pain in one's back something of such a nature that, as Moare aséerted. when one is avare of i presly what would be fone were mot Armstrong on conciasnes, Hore eating th cating this question we may note that David Armetcong has adopted view of the ‘Woop. pan, bi Consciousness § nature of consciousness, which isin a certain way sitar to the siew that Moore took in his ‘Refutation’. Int Materiativs “Theory of the Mind Armstrong says: 1 suggest that consciousness is no more than awareness {perentian) of inner mental sites by te person whose states I this Hs 30, Oven conesionsness i sim) they a¥e. further mental state, a state “directed! towards the orginal wou cm om hin pm thtArmeone ng he Fw foe Rarer srs han Moore id For Sige a hay tha spec aon a sean bigeclor ofa fer, ete vce a rt ater, But eiference ne So en eran akc 0 Faeyr craatrongieview Tovant coconsider. AmstTOng S895 Lo af swarm of mcs Lets consider the mechanics analogue of awareness of 0 town mental sates: dhe seanaing by # mechanism of it own {cena sates [tis clear that the operation of seanning nd the “TRaation seamed must be distinct existences’ « « Now what Teawom ie tere weil that awareness ofits own states inthe Caer of says a apritual substance, sib ies eis logical Stereo that fa elscaning device a mechan: Why should the substitution of spicitual for material substance abolish the need for 3 distinction berween object and subject F ‘hat [can see no way’ to prove that there USE DE "a acuna in oy argument But it 2 view 1 take 16 that pain and inet enstences. If, & Fale snus ad such a parlllse, which seems clear that the mati awareness of pain are “earerse of pain fat Teast logically possible” First, the Several things in this passage may be noted. ‘assumption that the “logical structure’ of human awa consciousness is the same as that of a self-ecunning device i? 1D. M Armstrong, ters Pry Mind, Ree Ren ereaterened 9 7A) Ste. ST tbe.6 Norman Malcolm mechanism i surprising. 1 will come back in a moment 12 txamine this analogy. ond, the dstintion between 5 Fil substance” and ‘motel absence’ em ree erie Te thoukd not dsract ut: te concept of consciousness etal pplics to tan beings wheter og ot they ae pinta Ormatria Third the place's false awareness of pai feredenteal,Probgbly tis supposed to mean the sme “one's having a mistaken belief that one icin pa’. Bun the meaning of this expresion is sho uncenain, since the mod lief mot usd Hike that in ordinary Heat se don speak of anyone's ether sieving’ oot believing that Bee Pain. Foor, vhe meaning of ‘distinct entences not transparent neverthelen, thers iso doubt that Aston, then he sys that pan and awarence of pan are iinet Cninencesmeany both that 4 person cold have “a fe fares fp and ai tha «pan cul De np wrth Being aware of As The lair pont cae the following remarks dees ee AA feeling of pain’ is simply a sensation of pain. Now we can have a sensation of pain and be perfectly unaware of having it. So there can be a Teeing of pam that we are unawave of feeling: unconscious pain” $0, on Armstrong’ view, there is a great a logic between put and awarencss of pa, ae between dg and dhgrollars: jst a8 one could Yave 2 do wibout doe Cellar, or a dog-collar withovt dog, 10 100% woukl be penser «few en aot ing wae of eling aite and also to be aware of feng pan without feeling pain. ae Te Has fundamental at we cannot cannot investigate the relation between the concept of pain an the concept of frien nen we vad ot of tw painetons and awarencseloctions are actully crmployed rel hfe Wea we do thi it wil be Evident that thre sot the ‘aia separ Between the concept of pan and te coe cept of awarenens oF conscious, that Arron’ teary requires. For example suppene tan an tout ago sos soe Consciousness 7 Pine of severe pain in your shoulder. T night ow ask you {ny ofthe following questions Are you still in pain? Do you still have pain? Do you still eel pai? Are you still aware of Because ofthe different wording of these Cour sentences & at ing ed otk that they must have dierent aoe ten everyday ie there would be no difernee in eri taken. Your answer of Yes'wouldhavetessmme ot cuncqsnce nal four exes: kee for an answer a ot eetue you might ave answered eset, You ok gt have said The pin stl there Bu sno as ad 2 a an nscios of pain doesn't qouble 3 we Iuka on have pain but i ott 2s severe = vreetpaaly “These thee epics, despite their