ie ee ees 6~IS-Because prudential truth 1s.conditioned’by the reo- titude of the appetite, and because this rectitude 4g guaranteed only by the moral virtues, the history of phi- losophy, abounds with positions and doctrines which attempt to emancipate reason from its dependance on the appetite ee to practical truth in order to sidestep that difficulty viiich each on expériences tn hinself. . This attempt is aimed more especially at political activity, and this ve can readily understand, since poli- teal action directly concerns, the common good. To main tain that prudential truth in political matters 1s condi- Moned by the rectitude of the appetite of the politidan implies that the judgent of the politidan as such depends, not only on his right disposition tovards the good of the community, but, at the same tine, on his disposition towards any good in action; that the good politioun must ‘bea good man; and that this is an egcential condition of the very truth of his action, Wow, 4f there were a means of deternining, by reason alone, a proximate rule which, on the one hand would qua~ rentee truth in political action, and vhich, onthe other hand, would free the attainment or the maintenance of the conmon good from all dependance on the condition of the appetite of the one acting, 1t seems that the comuon good would be better assured.