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UNITES STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEMAND FOR A. SPEEDY TRIAL OR v. DISMISS INDICTMENT DANIEL RILEY, ROBERT WOLFFE, 1:07-cr-189-GZS CIRINO GONZALES, JASON GERHARDT COMES NOW, making a special appearance, Daniel Riley, acting in.a sovereign capacity, Sui Juris, not Pro Se repeat not Pro Se representing the fiction DANIEL RILEY, and makes this motion, prima facie. In no way can this motion be construed to grant jurisdiction over the defendant, because the defendants counsel still contends no jurisdiction exist, In no way should this motion be construed to be considered a contract ‘and all rights are reserved at the common law UCC 1-308 and 1-103.6 without prejudice. 1. The defendant's counsel asserts his clients 6th Amendment right to a speedy trial and demands his unafinable rights. The defendant does not wish to waive his right to a speedy trial and asserts his right to such. The defendant asserts the 6” ‘Amendment restriction on the Federal Administration according to 18 USC § 3161 2. Letthe record show the defendant (DANIEL RILEY) was ready for trial ‘on November 6, 2007. The defendant is being prejudiced with more pre-trial publicity, emotional stress, anxiety, further damage to his reputation, and his ability to geta fair impartial jury are being diminished, as well as damage to his ability to eama living due to the further collapse of the defendant’s business. 3. The defendant has not filed any motions to stop the speedy trial clock, ‘which began on September 12, 2007, the day the defendant was indicted, “Defendant's right to specdy trial based on Sixth Amendment is triggered by his indictment if it procedes his arrest.” United States v Carter (1979, CAS Fla) 603 F.2d 1204. “Length of delay for speedy trial purposes is measured from earlier of date of indictment or arrest.” Cain v Smith (1982, CA6 Ky) 686 F.2d 37 4. Congress passed the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, which put time limitations on the executive branch to bring a case from arraignment to trial. These time constraints were put in place to uphold Americans’ 6" Amendment right and to a “speedy trial.” 18 USC § 3161(0)(1) gave 70 days as the time to bring a case from arraignment to trial. The dcfendant will argue that his 6" Amendment right has been violated because 93 days (and counting) have passed since arraignment with no trial. The trial is scheduled for January 28, 2008 putting the time from arraignment to trial at 137days, just about twice the legal limit; therefore, the defendant has been deprived of his 6" Amendment right. The court should dismiss the indictment on these grounds pursuant to 18 USC § 3162(2) sanction of dismissal and local rule chapter 12 § 1.3 because 18 USC § 3161(¢)(1) has been violated and a continuance should have never been granted because of the violation of local rule chapter 12 § 10.2 Speedy Trial Act (18 USCS 3161 et seq.) was designed to implement and enforce Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial and to insure uniformity of speedy trial concept throughout nation. United States v Jones (1985, ED Pa) 602 F Supp 1045 6 On October 24, 2007 (11 days before trial) the Federal Administration through Arnold Huftalen motioned for a continuance up to 120 days, stating 18 USC 3161(b)(8)(b). The reasons stated in his motion were a) because the case was “complex”, ») the defendant has numerous motions pending, and c) the defendant has not had adequate time to prepare his defense. 7. The defendant believes the continuance was granted, the defendant having never received no such order from the court to that effect, but will assume the continuance was granted because the dofendent was ready but was not brought to trial on November 6, 2007 as scheduled, now gives the following reasons why the court made an error in granting this continuance; a ‘The Federal Administration said the case was “complex” on October 24, 2007 (11 days before trial) and the court agreed. LOCAL RULES OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, chapter 12 Criminal Rules 10.2 state that a complex case should be determined at arraignment by the court and a status conference must be set up within 14 days of the arraignment to schedule pre-trial filing dates. This case was never declared “complex” at arraignment and the status conference was never scheduled. This rule was violated by the federal administration, and the court, by the court agreeing just before trial that the case ‘was complex when the court knew of the nature of the case in the first place, and should have been declared complex at arraignment, therefore causing unnecessary delays and putting prejudicial conditions on the defendant, thus hampering his chance for a fair trial and a speedy one. b. The defendant did have numerous sui juris pleadings pending at the time of the continuance request, but all those pleading were struck from the record and never were considered by the court, therefore that argument is moot. Note: one of those motions struck was a demand for a speedy trial, ¢. Tho third and final reason given to gront a request was that the Federal Administration was looking out for the defendant's best interest, and wanted to give him adequate time to prepare his defense. The Federal Administration hes no idea ‘what is best for this defendant. The defendant was prepared for trial on November 6, 2007 and was ready to prove his innocence. Let us remember the Federal Administration is trying to put this defendant in a cage for 50 years, so how can they be concerned as to what is best for me, therefore the Federal Administration's non-obligated concern for me is nothing more than a ruse. 8 The Federal Administration is delaying this case to go on a “fishing expedition” to see if more demands can be filed against the defendant, not to better prosecute the demands already filed. They are also delaying this case to further leak prejudicial information to the press to further taint the possible jury pool. 9. The court should have never allowed a continuance and should dismiss the indictment on the following grounds, pursuant to 18 USC § 3162(2) sanction of dismissal, and local rule chapter 12 § 1.3 relief from failure to comply, because 18 USC § 3161(c)(1) has not been complied with, and also failure to comply with local rule chapter 12 § 10.2. This has caused the defendant to be deprived of his 6 Amendment Right to a speedy trial because the federal Administration is not following the definition of a speedy trial as defined by Congress and also his 5 Amendment Right of due process has been deprived because the Federal Administration is not following the prescribed due process authorized by law. 10. Defendant, sui juris, request a hearing in accordance to this motion. _e Vi b jel Riley (su Indigent inmeté scpc ~ 266 County Farm Rd Dover NH, 03820 All Rights Reserved Without Prejudice DATED: December 17, 2007 CC: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR NEW HAMPSHIRE AUSA Robert Kinsella David Bownes Stanley Norkunas Paul Garrity

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