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Malayan Law Journal Reports/1982/Volume 2/LETCHEMY ARUMUGAN v N ANNAMALAY - [1982] 2 MLJ 198 - 2 April 1982 4 pages [1982] 2 MLJ 198

LETCHEMY ARUMUGAN v N ANNAMALAY

OCJ SEREMBAN WONG KIM FATT JC CIVIL SUIT NO 251 OF 1978 8 December 1981, 9 December 1981, 2 April 1982 Contract -- Sale of land -- Fraudulent misrepresentation -- Rescission -- Claim for damages and interest -Defendant counter-claiming for specific performance and damages -- Contracts Act 1950 (Revised 1974), ss 16 & 17 -- Specific Relief Act, 1950 (Revised 1974), ss 27 & 37 -- Evidence Act, 1950, s 111 -- National Land Code, 417 In this action the plaintiff, an illiterate Indian woman rubber tapper, claimed against the defendant a declaration and rescission of an agreement of sale dated January 7, 1977 and other documents executed by her, on the ground of false or fraudulent misrepresentation on the defendant's part relating to her land Lot 736, District of Port Dickson. She also claimed damages and interest. The defendant, a housing developer, denied the claim and counter-claimed for specific performance and damages. The parties listed six issues for determination by the court. 1982 2 MLJ 198 at 199 The plaintiff sought to prove that the defendant with the aid of his advocate and solicitor had taken unfair advantage of her ignorance. The defendant had fraudulently misrepresented to her that she had to sign some documents, which were in the English language, for the loan she took from him and for the discharge of charge. She executed these documents not knowing she was in fact signing a sale agreement relating to her land and three other agreements for the purchase of 3 sub-lots in her own land. The defendant, however, contended that the documents in question were properly witnessed by his solicitor who had explained them to the plaintiff. Held, allowing the claim and dismissing the counterclaim: (1) (2) (3) (4) the plaintiff had proved fraudulent misrepresentation, the truth of which the defendant did not believe in. The six issues must be answered in favour of the plaintiff; the agreement of January 7, 1977 relating to the sale of the land and the 3 agreements to the 3 sub-lots must be rescinded; the plaintiff is entitled to damages for her losses arising out of the fraudulent misrepresentation by the defendant; the defendant must not benefit from his fraudulent misrepresentation, and specific performance and damages claimed by him must be refused.

Observations on the duty of an advocate and solicitor in a transaction. Cases referred to Lloyds Bank v Bundy [1974] 3 All ER 757 765 Re Craig [1970] 2 All ER 390 393

Doyle v Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd [1969] 2 QB 158 CA; [1969] 2 All ER 119 CIVIL SUIT

AKJ D'Cruz for the plaintiff. John Fernandez for the defendant. WONG KIM FATT JC In this action, the plaintiff in her statement of claim claims against the defendant a declaration that any document signed by her purported to be a sale agreement in favour of the defendant to be void and not binding on her; rescission and return of purported sale agreement dated January 7, 1977 and other documents and the issue document of title E.M.R. 1406; damages and other incidental reliefs on the ground of fraudulent misrepresentation on the part of the defendant. The subject matter of the dispute is a piece of land Lot 736, measuring 5 acres 1 rood 19 poles, held under E.M.R. 1406, Mukim of Linggi, District of Port Dickson, State of Negeri Sembilan ("the land"), and registered in the name of the plaintiff as proprietor. At the commencement of the trial, the parties had agreed in writing that there were six issues for decision as follows:

"(1) Whether the document executed by the plaintiff on January 7, 1977, purportedly a sale and purchase agreement in respect of land held under E.M.R.1406 for Lot 736, Mukim of Linggi, Port Dickson, was executed freely and voluntarily by the plaintiff. (2) Whether the defendant induced the plaintiff to execute the document referred to in (1) herein as a result of misrepresentation by the defendant to the plaintiff as alleged in paragraph 6 of the statement of claim. (3) Whether the said document should be declared null and void and consequently the alleged sale and purchase agreement should be rescinded. (4) Whether the plaintiff gave to one Subramaniam s/o Maruthan on December 25, 1976 an option for the sale of land referred to in paragraph one (1) of the statement of claim. (5) Whether the plaintiff received the sum of $14,100 from the defendant as referred to in paragraph 5 of the statement of claim. (6) Whether the defendant is entitled to specific performance of the alleged sale of the land in question by the plaintiff."

The plaintiff at the trial gave evidence on her own behalf in Tamil. She said that she had known the defendant since he was 14 or 15 years old. The issue document of title to the land was in a pawnshop because its proprietor, whom she referred to as Soo Kee, lent her money.It transpired that she had charged the land to him to secure a loan of which a sum of $6,500 was still owing at the material time. She seemed to express the hope that if someone paid this sum of money, she would get the title back and sell the land. After meeting the plaintiff in her house, the defendant returned two days later with a cheque for her to pay Soo Kee to discharge the charge. She did not know how to cash the cheque. On the advice of the defendant, she later met him at the Seremban old market. She went to his office, where he told her she must sign some documents since he was paying the money to Soo Kee; otherwise the defendant could not change the title to her sole name, meaning discharge of the charge. She said she signed some documents by her thumb print, thinking that they were for the loan she took from the defendant and for discharge of the charge. She said she did not enter into an agreement on January 7, 1977 to sell the land to the defendant for $32,000. She did not have the intention to sell the land, and neither had she given the option to anyone to sell the land. She said on that day she received from the defendant $6,500, not $14,100. She paid the sum of $6,500 to Soo Kee. As proof, she produced a receipt dated January 7, 1977 for $25 (Exhibit P1) which she paid to the chargee's solicitors as legal costs for

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discharge of the charge. The plaintiff then gave the document of title to a person sent by the defendant, who told her the title would be returned to her as soon as the discharge had been registered.As events turned out, the plaintiff had not been given the document of title. She made a police report (Exhibit P4) at Linggi on May 3, 1978 soon after discovering that the rubber trees on the land were being felled by the defendant. On cross-examination she said she did not report the fraud to the police because she had instructed her solicitors to handle the matter after she discovered the trees were being felled. On being questioned as to why she had taken one year and four months to see her solicitors, she replied that she trusted the defendant, but when she saw the trees being felled, she lost confidence in him. She did not complain to the Bar Council because she did not know of its existence. The defendant called as his first and most important witness one Mr. Coelho, an advocate and solicitor who is not now practising under his own name. In his examination-in-chief, he stated that he met the plaintiff in the defendant's office. He testified that the agreement dated January 7, 1977 (Exhibit D5) was executed by the plaintiff in his presence. The sum of $14,100 was paid by the defendant partly in cash and partly by the sale of three pieces of proposed sub-lots in the same piece of land owned by the plaintiff, who he said executed the three agreements relating to the three sub-lots (Exhibits D9, D10 and D12) 1982 2 MLJ 198 at 200 simultaneously with the execution of the sale agreement of January 7, 1977 ("the agreement"). Coelho stated in evidence that present at the signing were the plaintiff, her daughter, her son-in-law, the defendant, and some of his employees. He also stated that the statutory form of transfer (Exhibit D7) and adjudication form (Exhibit D8) were also executed by the plaintiff that day in his presence and that he explained the contents of the documents to the plaintiff. He was satisfied that the parties understood the nature of the documents. More material facts were revealed through a cross-examination of Coelho. It appeared that his signature on the agreement was executed in different inks and he admitted that he did not write the wrongly-spelt word 'witnes' on the left lower corner of the agreement. No date was typewritten on the agreement. On being questioned by the court, he frankly admitted that it was not normal to have a land transaction done on the letter head of his legal firm. The agreement on the letter head reads as follows:
"Sale and Purchase of Land held Under E.M.R. 140 Lot 736 Mukim of Linggi, Port Dickson, N.S. 1, Letchumy d/o Arumugam (I/C No. 3059093) acknowledge receipt from Syarikat of No. 13, (1st Floor), Birch Road, Seremban, the sum of $14,100.00 being deposit and part payment of the purchase price of my Land held under E.M.R. 1406 Lot 736 Mukim of Linggi, Port Dickson comprising 5a. 19p. The balance of the purchase namely $17,900.00 would be paid to me on the said land being registered in favour of Syarikat Revathy their nominee or nominees. R. T. P. LETCHUMY D/O ARUMUGAM (I/C No. 3059093) We Syarikat Revathy of No. 13, (1st Floor), Birch Road, Seremban, confirm and agree to the above. WITNESS SYARIKAT REVATHY Sd: COELHO Peguambela & Peguamcara Kuala Lumpur 25/1/77 2/3/77 Sd: N. ANNAMALAY Managing Director 7/1/77

11/4/77".

It transpired that the agreement (D5) was a duplicate copy of the original (Exhibit P14). Coelho stated categorically that he was certain that the original copy of the agreement would also bear his signature as an attesting witness, but when the original (P14) was shown to him, he was at a total loss as to why it did not bear his signature. He also could not tell whether the agreement (D5) was signed at a later date. He stated that on the day in question, i.e. January 7, 1977, the discharge of charge duly executed by the chargee was handed to him. He then prepared the transfer and the adjudication form at the defendant's office, where the plaintiff signed three documents. Coelho then handed these documents and the issue document of title to the defendant, for whom he acted as solicitor, on the defendant's undertaking to present them for registration, which could not be effected because, Coelho said, there was a caveat entered by the plaintiff. He had not received the balance of the purchase price from the defendant for the credit of the plaintiff's account, and he did not explain the danger of such a course to the plaintiff. On examination of the transfer purported to be executed by the plaintiff under her thumb impression and under the hand of the defendant (both witnessed by Coelho), I find it crystal clear that the transfer itself was stated to be executed on December 24, 1977, not on January 7, 1977, as alleged by Coelho earlier. The transfer was not stamped and was never presented for registration. Coelho admitted in his cross-examination that the plaintiff did not suppress the fact of the charge. To contradict himself in no uncertain terms, he in his letter dated June 6, 1978, after he had taken delivery of the discharge of charge and the issue document of title, had, if I may say so euphemistically, the professional courage to write (in reply to the allegation of fraudulent misrepresentation made in the letter dated May 29, 1978 from the plaintiff's solicitors) to the plaintiff's solicitors a letter dated June 6, 1978, (Exhibit P3), in the following terms as the true position:
"Your client with intent to defraud our client collected from him a sum of $6,500.00 for the sale of the said land when she knew or ought to have known that the land in question was charged to Mr. Lai Soo Kee. We are now instructed by our client to give your client notice, which we hereby do, that unless your client produces the title deed within seven (7) days from date hereof free from the charge and execute a memorandum of transfer in favour of our client pursuant to the agreement dated January 7, 1977 our instructions are to apply to the court for specific performance of the contract."

The threat of action for specific performance was never carried out. On the second day of hearing, the defendant recalled Coelho, who then said he could not recollect what really happened. He said he wrote the date "7.1.77", which was in different ink from that used for his signature. On cross-examination he said he was not the typist and therefore did not have the date typed. He then said that the original (P14) of the agreement (D5) did not contain his signature. He had no choice but to admit that if the transfer was not dated January 7, 1977, it could not have been signed on that date. The transfer bearing his signature as attesting witness was dated December 24, 1977, not January 7, 1977. He had no explanation for the material contradiction in his evidence. It may be noted that the adjudication form for stamp duty purposes alleged to be signed by the plaintiff was also dated December 24, 1977.It is obvious that he was trying his very best to explain away the part he played and the unenviable predicament he was in. He had done so in an unsatisfactory and unbelievable way. It grieves me to say that I am unable to accept the evidence of an advocate and solicitor. Coelho should not have rendered his professional services to his client the defendant in his scheme to acquire the land for his personal benefit regardless of the plaintiff's interest. As an advocate and solicitor he had not maintained, to say the least, his professional independence. The defendant in his examination-in-chief said he had known the plaintiff for 30 years, and she told him that she was unable to pay Soo Kee and she wanted to sell the land. The relevant documents were signed between 2 and 2.30 pm. The option (Exhibit D6) was written by one Alvar in Tamil. The plaintiff did not sign the option as she could not write in Tamil. The defendant said she was in a hurry and took the original (P14) of the agreement (D5) away.Coelho had left his rubber stamp in his car and when 1982 2 MLJ 198 at 201 he returned with it, the plaintiff had already left. The defendant had told the plaintiff to come and collect her money. The sum of $14,100 was made up of $6,500 in cash and the balance the sale price of the three sublots in the land. The plaintiff, he said, demanded the balance of the price three or four days after signing the

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agreement. There was a private caveat registered against the land. He instructed Coelho to date the transfer on December 24, 1977. But Coelho never said anything to that effect. Under cross-examination, the defendant said he was a housing developer but had no licence. He had applied for one. He said he was calling as witness one Muniandy but not Kamachi, the daughter of the plaintiff. He admitted that he altered the date in the option from 10.1.76 to 10.1.77. He said the plaintiff came at 1.30 p.m. and signed the documents between 2 and 2.30 p.m. He also said she left at 5 p.m., not knowing that this would clearly contradict his own evidence earlier that she was in a hurry to go home. He did not know if the agreement (D5) was an agreement or not, and he said the three agreements on the sub-lots were prepared on the same day. Three days after signing the agreement, the plaintiff demanded payment and he thought there would be trouble. He was very certain that on January 7, 1977, the issue document of title, transfer and discharge of charge were in the custody of his solicitor. The defendant agreed that from January 1977 the plaintiff had been disputing the land transaction. She had sought legal assistance and also the help of an Indian State Assemblyman. He did not present the transfer as he thought it unsafe to do so since the plaintiff was demanding payment from him.All these clearly impressed me that the defendant had an uneasy mind and guilty feeling after what had transpired on January 7, 1977. He nevertheless gave instructions to his solicitors to demand the document of title from the plaintiff, knowing that it was in his possession. I find that the defendant is not a credible witness. The evidence of the land broker Subramaniam (DW3) did not assist the defendant in any way. He, like the two previous defence witnesses, said the plaintiff signed all the documents in the presence of Coelho on January 7, 1977. He said the plaintiff's daughter signed the option in his favour on behalf of the plaintiff. He had some interest in connection with the land, at least in the form of brokerage commission. After observing the demeanour of this witness, I have no hesitation to reject his evidence. Although he was in the defendant's office the whole afternoon on the day in question he did not know what had transpired between the plaintiff and the defendant. He would choose to be ignorant when he sensed that what he was going to say was not favourable to the defendant. Subramaniam said that the plaintiff was in the defendant's office from 1.30 p.m. to 5 p.m. His evidence confirms that the defendant, in his attempt to explain why the original copy of the agreement did not have Coelho's signature, was telling a lie in stating that the plaintiff was in a hurry to go home. The evidence shows that the defendant with the aid of his solicitor Coelho had taken unfair advantage of the ignorance of the plaintiff, an old illiterate Indian woman rubber tapper aged 53. She gave evidence in a straightforward, rustic manner and impressed me as a witness of truth. The defendant had fraudulently misrepresented to her that she had the sign some documents, which were in the English language, for the loan she took from the defendant and in order to get the land freed from the charge. She was induced to sign these documents not knowing that she was in fact signing a sale agreement relating to the land and simultaneously a purchase of three unapproved sub-lots in her very own land. To my mind it is clear from the evidence that, in making the false or fraudulent misrepresentation to the plaintiff, the defendant did not believe in its truth.The three sub-lots were alleged to have cost her a total of $7,600, which she did not receive. It may be noted that in the letter of June 6, 1978 the defendant's solicitors stated that the plaintiff had collected only $6,500, not $14,100. This adds credibility to the plaintiff's story. I may also point out that the preamble to the three agreements stated that the vendor, the firm of the defendant, was the registered owner of the land when in fact it was not. These three agreements must have been prepared by the defendant much earlier than January 7, 1977, probably with the assistance of his solicitor Coelho, as they were all in a cyclostyled form, each with a proposed sub-divisional plan annexed. The plan had not been approved by the appropriate authorities and did not appear to be prepared by a licensed surveyor. The evidence also shows or clearly implies that the defendant was in a position to dominate the will of the plaintiff for an unfair advantage for himself. As a housing developer at the age of 41, he had the advice and services of his own solicitor, while the plaintiff, a village woman, at all material times was never represented by one. Where a party, especially an ignorant or illiterate one, is unrepresented by an advocate and solicitor in a transaction and the opposite party is represented by one, it is the duty of the advocate and solicitor to explain the terms and conditions of the contract and the legal consequences thereof fully and frankly to the unrepresented party and ensure that this unrepresented party understands the terms and conditions and legal consequences fully, so that neither of the contracting parties has any unfair advantage over the other. Where there is a conflict of interest, as in this case, the advocate and solicitor should advise the plaintiff to be

separtely represented. The advocate and solicitor must at all times maintain his professional ethics, honestly, integrity and independence. He should never abuse his special position and the confidence reposed in him if he is not maintain the public respect for and confidence in the legal profession. I find as a fact that the plaintiff was induced by undue influence on the part of the defendant to sign the agreement of January 7, 1977 and the three agreements for the purchase of the three sub-lots. Section 16(1) of the Contracts Act, 1950 (Revised 1974) defines "undue influence" and section 17 defines "fraud". (See Lloyds Bank v Bundy [1974] 3 All ER 757 at 765, 765, and Re Craig (Deceased), Meneces v Middleton [1970] 2 All ER 390 at 393, 393 on undue influence.) He had failed to prove that these agreements were not induced by undue influence under section 16(3) of the Contracts Act. Neither had he discharged his burden of proving the good faith of the transaction under section 111 of the Evidence Act, 1950. The agreement is voidable at the option of the plaintiff and as a necessary consequence must be rescinded. 1982 2 MLJ 198 at 202 I now give my answers to the six issues, based on the evidence and my finding of fact: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) The document purporting to be a sale and purchase agreement relating to Lot 736 held under E.M.R 1406, Mukim of Linggi, Port Dickson, was not executed freely and voluntarily by the plaintiff. Yes. The agreement must be rescinded. The plaintiff did not give the option. No. No.

I now come to the question of damages which the plaintiff is entitled to receive arising from the defendant's fraudulent misrepresentation (see Doyle v Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd [1969] 2 QB 158 CA; [1969] 2 All ER 119. The plaintiff did not plead special damages in her statement of claim. When she gave evidence on special damages, learned counsel for the defendant did not object to or challenge the several relatively small quantified items of special damages arising directly from the felling of the rubber trees by the defendant. The plaintiff also said she was earning some $ 200 per month tapping the rubber trees on the land; and she stopped tapping after the trees were felled. That was the evidence adduced to prove damages by the plaintiff. The defendant said he felled all the rubber trees on the land at a cost of $ 1,800. Neither party had produced any valuation report on the land. The defendant, however, said the price of the land was $ 18,000 per acre before the issue of individual subdivisional titles. I therefore, after making some deduction in respect of the bicycle, award special damages to the plaintiff as follows: $900 for the house, $200 for the rubber mangles, $ 150 for the bicycle, $ 110 for the cupboard and table, totalling $ 1,360. Damage caused to these items of property was stated in her police report without stating the values.As to general damages in respect of the agreement of January 7, 1977, all relevant factors such as the rubber trees were felled and the plaintiff had stopped tapping must be considered. The rubber trees must be old as the yield per month was not high in terms of income. Both learned counsel inadvertently omitted in their written submissions to submit on the guidelines or principles the court should adopt in the assessment of damages. Whatever measure of damages the court applies, I think its duty is to award damages or compensation as fairly and justly as possible as between the parties based on the evidence before it. The plaintiff said that the rubber trees on about half of the land were felled while the defendant said all the rubber trees on the land (about 5 acres in area) were felled. I find as a fact that about three acres of rubber trees were felled. She had also lost her monthly income of about $ 200. She would not have suffered these losses if the fraudulent misrepresentation had not been made. These losses must be made good. I assess the approximate value of the rubber trees felled at $2,500 per acre. I therefore think that an award of damages against the defendants in the sum of $ 10,000 is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this case, taking into account virtually the damage caused to the rubber trees and the loss of her small income, and bearing in mind that she will retain possession of the land free from encumbrances at its present enhanced value owing to a rise in price in the real property market. As regards the three agreements relating to the three sub-lots they must also be rescinded. But as the plaintiff received no benefit thereunder, no compensation or refund need be made by her to the defendant under section 37 of the Specific Relief Act, 1950 (Revised 1974). At the same time the defendant is not obliged to pay her damages as she did not prove she had suffered anything thereunder.

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The jurisdiction of the court to order specific performance of a contract is discretionary. In the present case since the plaintiff had proved fraudulent misrepresentation, specific performance cannot be enforced in favour of the defendant under the provisions of section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act. The defendant should not be allowed to benefit from his misrepresentation. The counterclaim is therefore dismissed with costs. There will be judgment against the defendant in favour of the plaintiff for the sums of $1,360 and $10,000 with costs. Interest on the sum of $ 1,360 will run from date of filing suit to date of judgment at 4% per annum and thereafter at 8% per annum till realization. Interest at 8% per annum on the sum of $10,000 will run from date of judgment to realization. The plaintiff must refund the sum of $6,500 to the defendant, to be set off against the account of damages payable by him. I order the rescission of the agreement (D5) and the three agreements (D9, D10 and D12). These four agreements, and issue document of title E.M.R. 1406, and the transfer must be returned to the plaintiff for cancellation within one month from today. I direct the Collector of Land Revenue, District of Port Dickson, to remove the private caveat Volume 6, Folio 61, entered by the defendant on January 24, 1981 under section 417 of the National Land Code . Order accordingly. Solicitor: AKJ' D'Cruz & Co; Fernandez & Co

Translation in malay from google:

Malayan Law Journal Reports/1982/Volume 2/LETCHEMY ARUMUGAN ANNAMALAY v N [1982] 2 MLJ 198 - 2 April 1982 4 halaman [1982] 2 MLJ 198. LETCHEMY ARUMUGAN v N ANNAMALAY OCJ SEREMBAN Wong Kim FATT JC Awam ini berlanjutan NO 251 MENGENAI tahun 1978 8 Disember 1981, 9 Disember 1981, 2 April 1982 Kontrak - Jualan Tanah - salah nyataan Penipuan - Pemansuhan - Tuntutan ganti rugi dan faedah Defendan kaunter menuntut prestasi ganti rugi dan khusus - Akta Kontrak 1950 (Disemak 1974), SS 16 & 17 - Akta Relif Spesifik , 1950 (Pindaan 1974), SS 27 & 37 - Akta Keterangan, 1950, s 111 Kanun Tanah Negara, 417 Dalam tindakan ini yang plaintif, yang wanita buta huruf India getah penoreh, mendakwa terhadap Deklarasi dan defendan pembatalan perjanjian yang jualan bertarikh Januari 7, tahun 1977 dan Lainlain dokumen yang disempurnakan oleh beliau, di atas tanah yang salah nyataan palsu atau penipuan di Bahagian defendan berkaitan dengan Lot Tanah 736, Daerah Port Dickson. Beliau juga menuntut ganti rugi dan faedah. Defendan, pemaju perumahan, menafikan Tuntutan dan kaunter-dituntut untuk prestasi dan ganti rugi tertentu. Pihak-Pihak menyenaraikan enam isu-isu untuk penentuan oleh Mahkamah. 1982 2 MLJ 198 di 199 Plaintif cuba membuktikan bahawa defendan dengan bantuan Peguambela dan Peguamcara beliau telah mengambil kesempatan yang tidak adil kejahilan beliau. Defendan telah secara fraud salah nyata kepadanya bahawa dia terpaksa menandatangani beberapa dokumen, yang dalam bahasa Inggeris, bagi pinjaman dia mengambil dari dia dan bagi menunaikan bertanggungjawab. Beliau menyempurnakan dokumen-dokumen ini TIDAK mengetahui dia sebenarnya yang menandatangani perjanjian jualan yang berhubungan dengan tanah dan tiga perjanjian lain untuk Pembelian 3 sub-lot tanah sendiri. Bagaimanapun, defendan menegaskan bahawa dokumen dalam soalan disaksikan oleh Peguamcara yang telah dijelaskan mereka kepada plaintif.

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Diadakan, menolak tuntutan balas itu dan Halloween Tuntutan: (1) plaintif telah dibuktikan salah nyataan palsu, kebenaran yang defendan TIDAK Percaya Dalam. Enam isu yang perlu dijawab dalam memihak kepada plaintif; (2) perjanjian Januari 7, 1977 berkaitan dengan penjualan tanah dan perjanjian untuk 3 3 sub-banyak mesti dihapuskan; (3) plaintif Untitled ganti rugi untuk kerugian yang timbul daripada salah nyata penipuan oleh defendan; (4) defendan TIDAK mesti Manfaat dari salah nyata penipuan, dan pelaksanaan spesifik dan ganti rugi yang dituntut oleh beliau mesti ditolak. Pemerhatian ke atas kewajipan Peguambela dan Peguamcara dalam Transaksi. Kes yang dirujuk kepada Lloyds Bank v Bundy [1974] 3 Semua ER 757 765 Re Craig [1970] 2 All ER 390 393 Doyle v. Olby (Ironmongers) Sdn Bhd [1969] 2 QB 158 CA; [1969] 2 All ER 119 Awam terus Akj D'Cruz bagi plaintif. John Fernandez untuk defendan. Wong Kim FATT JC Dalam tindakan ini, plaintif dalam Penyata Tuntutan Tuntutan Terhadap Deklarasi defendan bahawa apa-apa dokumen yang ditandatangani oleh kononnya beliau untuk menjadi perjanjian penjualan di atas nama defendan sebagai TIDAK SAH dan TIDAK Binding pada dirinya; pembatalan dan pulangan perjanjian jualan dikatakan bertarikh 7 Januari, 1977 dan dokumen lain dan dokumen terbitan hakmilik EMR 1406; kerosakan sampingan dan relif lain atas alasan salah nyataan penipuan di pihak defendan. Hal perkara pertikaian itu adalah sekeping Lot Tanah 736, Mengukur 5 ekar 1 Rood 19 tiang, di bawah EMR 1406, Mukim Linggi, Daerah Port Dickson, Negeri Sembilan Negeri ("Tanah"), dan didaftarkan di atas nama plaintif sebagai tuan punya. Pada permulaan perbicaraan, pihak-pihak telah bersetuju secara bertulis bahawa terdapat enam isu untuk keputusan seperti berikut: "(1) sama ada dokumen yang disempurnakan oleh plaintif pada 7 Januari, 1977, kononnya jualan dan Perjanjian Pembelian Tanah di bawah EMR1406 Lot 736, Mukim Linggi, Port Dickson, telah dilaksanakan secara bebas dan secara sukarela oleh plaintif . (2) sama ada defendan mendorong plaintif untuk melaksanakan dokumen yang disebut dalam (1) di sini sebagai hasil daripada salah nyataan oleh defendan kepada plaintif seperti yang dikatakan dalam perenggan 6 Pernyataan Tuntutan. (3) sama ada dokumen tersebut harus diisytiharkan batal dan TIDAK SAH dan seterusnya penjualan

yang dikatakan dan Perjanjian Pembelian perlu ditamatkan. (4) sama ada plaintif memberikan satu Subramaniam s / o Maruthan on December 25, 1976, pilihan untuk penjualan tanah yang disebut dalam perenggan satu (1) Penyata Tuntutan. (5) sama ada plaintif menerima wang sebanyak $ 14,100 daripada defendan seperti yang disebut dalam perenggan 5 Pernyataan Tuntutan. (6) sama ada defendan Untitled pelaksanaan spesifik dakwaan jualan tanah dalam soalan oleh plaintif. " Plaintif pada perbicaraan itu memberikan keterangan bagi pihak sendiri dalam bahasa Tamil. Beliau berkata bahawa dia telah dikenali defendan sejak dia berumur 14 atau 15 tahun. Dokumen isu hak milik tanah di kedai pajak gadai kerana tuan punya, yang disebut sebagai Soo Kee, bahawa dia telah dipinjamkan berpeluh money.It beliau Dikongsi tanah kepadanya untuk Secure pinjaman yang mana wang sebanyak $ 6.500 masih terhutang pada masa yang material. Beliau seolah-olah untuk melahirkan harapan bahawa jika seseorang telah DIBAYAR ini sejumlah wang, dia akan mendapat gelaran itu kembali dan menjual tanah. Selepas mengadakan pertemuan dengan plaintif di rumahnya, defendan kembali dua hari kemudian dengan cek dia untuk membayar Soo Kee untuk melepaskan pertuduhan itu. Dia TIDAK tahu bagaimana untuk menunaikan cek. Nasihat defendan, beliau kemudian meletakkan beliau di Pasar Lama Seremban. Dia pergi ke pejabatnya, di mana beliau memberitahu, dia mesti menandatangani beberapa dokumen sejak beliau telah membayar wang untuk Soo Kee; sebaliknya defendan TIDAK boleh mengubah tajuk kepada nama tunggal, yang bermaksud pelepasan gadaian ke. Beliau berkata beliau telah menandatangani beberapa dokumen oleh Cetak Thumb itu, memikirkan bahawa mereka adalah untuk pinjaman dia mengambil daripada defendan dan untuk pelepasan gadaian ke. Beliau berkata dia TIDAK memasuki Perjanjian pada 7 Januari, 1977 untuk menjual tanah itu kepada defendan untuk $ 32,000. Dia TIDAK mempunyai niat untuk menjual tanah tersebut, dan tidak pernah dia diberi pilihan kepada sesiapa sahaja untuk menjual tanah. Beliau berkata pada hari itu dia diterima daripada defendan $ 6.500, TIDAK $ 14,100. Dia DIBAYAR sejumlah $ 6.500 Soo Kee. Sebagai bukti, dia menghasilkan Resit bertarikh 7 Januari, 1977 $ 25 (Carta P1) yang dia DIBAYAR kepada peguam caj sebagai kos undang-undang untuk pelepasan gadaian ke. Plaintif kemudian memberikan dokumen hakmilik kepada orang-orang yang dihantar oleh defendan, yang memberitahu dia gelaran itu akan dikembalikan kepadanya dengan seberapa segera yang menjalankan telah acara registered.As ternyata, plaintif telah TIDAK diberi dokumen hakmilik . Beliau membuat laporan polis (Carta P4) di Linggi pada 3 Mei, 1978 tidak lama lagi selepas Discovering bahawa pokok-pokok getah di atas tanah yang telah ditebang oleh defendan. Pada Cross-Peperiksaan Beliau berkata beliau TIDAK melaporkan Penipuan kepada polis kerana dia telah mengarahkan peguam rendelet perkara itu selepas dia Temui pokok-pokok telah ditebang. Apabila disoal tentang mengapa dia telah mengambil satu tahun dan empat bulan untuk melihat peguam itu, beliau menjawab bahawa dia dipercayai defendan, tetapi apabila dia melihat pokokpokok ditebang, dia kehilangan keyakinan di dalam dirinya. Dia TIDAK membuat aduan kepada Majlis Peguam kerana dia TIDAK tahu kewujudannya. Defendan yang dipanggil sebagai yang pertama dan yang paling penting satu Encik Saksi. Coelho, Peguambela dan Peguamcara yang kini TIDAK menjalankan amalan di bawah namanya sendiri. Dalam beliau Peperiksaan Ketua, beliau menyatakan bahawa beliau meletakkan plaintif di pejabat defendan. Beliau memberi keterangan bahawa Perjanjian bertarikh 7 Januari, 1977 (Carta D5) telah disempurnakan oleh plaintif di hadapan beliau. Jumlah sebanyak $ 14,100 telah DIBAYAR oleh defendan Kebanyakannya di Tunai dan Sebahagian oleh jualan 3 keping Cadangan sub-banyak dalam

Page 11

sekeping yang sama tanah yang dimiliki oleh plaintif itu, yang beliau berkata dilaksanakan di 3 perjanjian yang berhubungan dengan itu 3 sub-lot (Exhibits D9, D10 dan D12) 1982 2 MLJ 198 pada 200 serentak dengan pelaksanaan perjanjian jual Januari 7, 1977 ("Perjanjian"). Coelho yang dinyatakan dalam bukti yang hadir pada majlis menandatangani perjanjian berkenaan plaintif, anak perempuannya, anak dalam undang-undang itu, defendan, dan beberapa Pekerja. Beliau juga menyatakan bahawa Borang Berkanun pemindahan (Carta D7) dan Borang pengadilan (Carta D8) juga telah disempurnakan oleh plaintif pada hari itu di hadapan beliau dan beliau menjelaskan kandungan dokumen kepada plaintif. Beliau berpuas hati bahawa pihak-pihak memahami Jenis Dokumen. Lebih banyak bahan Fakta Dinyatakan melalui Peperiksaan Palang-Coelho. Ia kelihatan bahawa tandatangan di atas perjanjian yang telah dilaksanakan dalam dakwat yang berbeza dan dia mengakui bahawa dia TIDAK menulis perkataan salah-dieja "witnes 'di sudut bawah kiri Perjanjian. Tarikh No. Ditaip atas perjanjian itu. Apabila disoal oleh Mahkamah, beliau terus terang mengakui bahawa ia TIDAK adalah perkara biasa untuk mempunyai data Transaksi Tanah di kepala surat firma guaman. Perjanjian pada Ketua Surat berbunyi seperti berikut: "Jual Beli Tanah Di bawah E.M.R. 140 Lot 736 Mukim Linggi, Port Dickson, N.S. 1, Letchumy / o Arumugam (I / C No. 3059093) mengakui Resit dari Syarikat daripada Apt. 13, (Tingkat 1), Birch Road, Seremban, sejumlah $ 14,100.00 Deposit menjadi dan pembayaran sebahagian daripada Harga Pembelian Tanah di bawah EMR Saya 1406 Lot 736 Mukim Linggi, Port Dickson yang terdiri daripada 5a. 19p. Baki Pembelian iaitu $ 17,900.00 akan DIBAYAR kepada saya ke atas tanah yang didaftarkan di atas nama Syarikat Revathy penama atau penama mereka. R. T. P. LETCHUMY D / O ARUMUGAM (I / C No. 3059093) Kami Syarikat No Revathy. 13, (Tingkat 1), Birch Road, Seremban, mengesahkan dan bersetuju kepada perkara di atas. Saksi SYARIKAT REVATHY SD: SD: Coelho N. ANNAMALAY Peguambela Peguamcara & Pengarah Urusan Kuala Lumpur 7/1/77 25/1/77 2/3/77 11/4/77 ". Termasyhur bahawa Perjanjian IT (D5) Salinan Pendua (Carta P14) asal. Coelho dinyatakan secara mutlak bahawa dia pasti bahawa salinan asal perjanjian itu juga akan menanggung tandatangan sebagai membuktikan Saksi, tetapi apabila dokumen asal (P14) telah ditunjukkan kepadanya, beliau adalah pada jumlah kerugian mengapa ia tidak TIDAK menanggung tandatangan. Beliau juga TIDAK dapat memberitahu sama ada Perjanjian (D5) telah ditandatangani pada satu tarikh kemudian. Dia menyatakan bahawa pada hari yang berkenaan, iaitu Januari 7, 1977, pelepasan gadaian diberi

disempurnakan oleh pertuduhan itu telah diserahkan kepadanya. Beliau kemudiannya menyediakan pemindahan dan borang pengadilan di pejabat defendan, plaintif telah menandatangani tiga dokumen. Coelho kemudian menyerahkan-dokumen dan yang dokumen isu hakmilik kepada defendan, untuk siapa dia bertindak sebagai Peguam, pada aku janji untuk membentangkan mereka untuk pendaftaran, yang TIDAK boleh akan dilaksanakan defendan kerana, Coelho berkata, terdapat adalah kaveat masuk oleh plaintif . TIDAK beliau telah menerima baki Harga Belian dari defendan untuk kredit akaun plaintif, dan dia TIDAK Terangkan bahaya kursus kepada plaintif. Bagi Peperiksaan pemindahan berupa sebagai disempurnakan oleh plaintif di bawah tanggapan Thumb dan ditandatangani oleh defendan (kedua-duanya disaksikan oleh Coelho), saya mendapati ia jernih bahawa pemindahan itu sendiri telah menyatakan akan dilaksanakan pada 24 Disember, 1977 NOTA pada 7 Januari, 1977, seperti yang didakwa oleh Coelho awal. Pemindahan ini TIDAK dicop dan tidak pernah Dicetak untuk pendaftaran. Coelho mengakui dalam Peperiksaan Cross-plaintif TIDAK menyekat fakta pertuduhan itu. Kepada dirinya sendiri dari segi percanggahan No. Yang tidak menentu, beliau dalam surat bertarikh 6 Jun, 1978, selepas dia telah mengambil penghantaran caj dan pelepasan dokumen hakmilik keluaran, telah, jika boleh saya berkata demikian euphemistically, keberanian Profesional untuk menulis ( dalam jawapan kepada dakwaan salah nyataan penipuan yang dibuat dalam surat yang bertarikh 29 MEI 1978 daripada peguam plaintif) kepada peguam plaintif surat bertarikh 6 Jun, 1978, (Carta P3), terma berikut sebagai Kedudukan Sebenar: "Pelanggan anda dengan niat untuk menipu Klien kami dikumpulkan dari jumlah $ 6,500.00 untuk jualan yang berkata tanah apabila dia tahu atau patut untuk telah diketahui bahawa tanah yang berkenaan telah Dikongsi MR. Lai Soo Kee. Kami yang kini diarahkan oleh Pelanggan Pelanggan kami untuk memberi notis anda, yang kami dengan ini, itu melainkan jika Pengeluar klien anda Surat ikatan hak milik dalam tempoh tujuh (7) hari dari tarikh ini bebas daripada gadaian itu dan melaksanakan memorandum pemindahan memihak Pelanggan Kami menurut Perjanjian bertarikh Januari 7, 1977 Arahan kami adalah untuk memohon kepada Mahkamah untuk mendapatkan pelaksanaan spesifik Kontrak. " Ancaman tindakan bagi pelaksanaan spesifik tidak pernah dijalankan. Pada hari kedua pendengaran, defendan teringat Coelho, yang kemudian berkata dia TIDAK dapat memusatkan apa yang sebenarnya berlaku. Beliau berkata beliau menulis tarikh "7.1.77", yang adalah dengan dakwat yang berbeza dari yang digunakan untuk tandatangan. Pada Cross-Peperiksaan, beliau berkata beliau TIDAK adalah jurutaip dan oleh itu TIDAK mempunyai tarikh ditaip. Beliau kemudian berkata bahawa asal (P14) Perjanjian (D5) TIDAK mengira tandatangannya. No Beliau tidak mempunyai pilihan tetapi untuk mengakui bahawa jika pemindahan TIDAK bertarikh 7 Januari, 1977, ia TIDAK boleh telah ditandatangani pada tarikh tersebut. Pemindahan yang mengandungi tandatangan sebagai Saksi membuktikan bertarikh 24 Disember, 1977, mencatatkan 7 Januari, 1977. Beliau mempunyai penjelasan No. Untuk percanggahan bahan dalam keterangannya. Ia boleh diperhatikan bahawa bentuk pengadilan bagi tujuan duti setem yang dikatakan telah ditandatangani oleh plaintif juga bertarikh 24 Disember, 1977.It adalah jelas bahawa beliau telah cuba yang terbaik untuk menanam bahagian beliau bermain dan situasi yang tak menimbulkan iri hati beliau dalam. Beliau terpaksa melompat dalam data dan Langkah Ajaib yang tidak memuaskan. Ia menyakitkan hati saya mengatakan bahawa saya tidak dapat menerima bukti Peguambela dan Peguamcara. Coelho TIDAK perlu mempunyai Reynders Perkhidmatan Profesional beliau kepada pelanggan defendan dalam skim untuk mengambilalih tanah untuk Faedah peribadi tanpa mengambil kira kepentingan plaintif. Sebagai Peguambela dan Peguamcara, beliau telah TIDAK dikekalkan, berkata kurangnya,

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Kemerdekaan Profesional. Defendan dalam beliau Peperiksaan Ketua berkata beliau telah dikenali plaintif selama 30 tahun, dan dia memberitahu bahawa dia tidak dapat membayar Soo Kee dan dia mahu menjual tanah. Dokumen yang berkaitan telah ditandatangani di antara 2 dan 2.30 petang. Pilihan-pilihan (Carta D6) telah ditulis oleh seorang Alvar dalam bahasa Tamil. Plaintif TIDAK menandatangani opsyen seperti dia TIDAK boleh menulis dalam bahasa Tamil. Defendan berkata beliau dalam CEPAT 1 dan mengambil asal (P14) Perjanjian (D5) away.Coelho telah meninggalkan setem getah di keretanya dan apabila 1982 2 MLJ 198 di 201 beliau kembali dengan itu, plaintif telah meninggalkan. Defendan memberitahu plaintif untuk datang dan mengambil wang itu. Jumlah $ 14,100 telah dibuat sebanyak $ 6.500 dalam bentuk wang tunai dan baki harga jualan tiga sub-banyak di muka bumi. Plaintif itu, beliau berkata, menuntut baki harga tiga atau empat hari selepas menandatangani perjanjian itu. Terdapat kaveat persendirian yang didaftarkan atas tanah. Beliau mengarahkan Coelho dating pemindahan pada 24 Disember, 1977. Tetapi Coelho tidak pernah berkata apa-apa bagi maksud itu. Di bawah Cross-Peperiksaan, defendan berkata beliau adalah seorang pemaju perumahan tetapi mempunyai Lesen No. Dia telah DIPOHON satu. Beliau berkata beliau telah memanggil sebagai Muniandy Saksi Satu tetapi TIDAK Kamachi, anak perempuan plaintif. Beliau mengakui bahawa dia mengubah tarikh dalam pilihan dari 10.1.76 hingga 10.1.77. Beliau berkata plaintif datang pada jam 1.30 petang dan dokumen-dokumen yang ditandatangani antara 2 dan 2.30 petang Beliau juga berkata dia ditinggalkan di 5 petang, nota mengetahui bahawa ini akan jelas percanggahan bukti sendiri dahulu bahawa dia adalah dalam CEPAT untuk pulang ke rumah. Beliau TIDAK tahu sama ada Perjanjian (D5) adalah di dalam perjanjian atau nota, dan beliau berkata tiga perjanjian di lot kecil telah disediakan pada hari yang sama. Tiga hari selepas menandatangani perjanjian itu, plaintif menuntut pembayaran dan dia fikir akan ada masalah. Dia sangat pasti bahawa pada 7 Januari, 1977, dokumen isu pemindahan hakmilik, dan pelepasan gadaian dalam jagaan Peguamcara beliau. Defendan bersetuju bahawa dari Januari 1977, plaintif telah mempertikaikan Urusniaga Tanah. Beliau telah meminta bantuan undang-undang dan juga bantuan daripada Ahli Dewan Undangan Negeri India. Beliau TIDAK membentangkan pemindahan itu kerana dia menyangka itu tidak selamat untuk berbuat demikian sejak plaintif menuntut pembayaran dari him.All ini jelas menarik perhatian saya bahawa defendan mempunyai Minda gelisah dan Rasa bersalah selepas apa yang peluh pada 7 Januari, 1977. Beliau bagaimanapun memberi Arahan kepada peguam caranya untuk menuntut dokumen hakmilik daripada plaintif, dengan mengetahui bahawa ia adalah dalam miliknya. Saya mendapati bahawa defendan TIDAK Saksi yang boleh dipercayai. Keterangan Tanah Broker Subramaniam (DW3) TIDAK MEMBANTU defendan dalam apa jua cara. Dia, seperti dua saksi pembelaan sebelumnya, kata plaintif telah menandatangani semua dokumen dalam kehadiran Coelho pada 7 Januari, 1977. Beliau berkata anak perempuan plaintif menandatangani pilihan yang memihak kepada beliau bagi pihak plaintif. Beliau mempunyai beberapa kepentingan yang Berkaitan dengan tanah itu, sekurang-kurangnya dalam bentuk Suruhanjaya pembrokeran. Selepas memerhatikan tingkah laku Saksi ini, saya mempunyai No. Teragak-agak untuk menolak keterangannya. Walaupun dia berada di pejabat petang seluruh defendan pada hari yang berkenaan itu, dia TIDAK tahu apa yang termasyhur antara plaintif dan defendan. Dia akan Pilih untuk menjadi jahil apabila dia merasakan bahawa apa yang beliau akan katakan TIDAK memihak kepada defendan. Subramaniam berkata bahawa plaintif adalah dalam pejabat 13:30-05:00 keterangannya mengesahkan defendan bahawa defendan, dalam cubaan untuk Terangkan Mengapa itu salinan asal perjanjian itu tidak TIDAK mempunyai tandatangan Coelho, beliau telah memberitahu satu pembohongan dalam statin plaintif adalah dalam CEPAT untuk pulang ke rumah.

Bukti-bukti menunjukkan bahawa defendan dengan bantuan Coelho Peguamcara beliau telah mengambil kesempatan yang tidak adil kejahilan plaintif, penoreh getah yang buta huruf lama wanitawanita India berusia 53 tahun. Dia memberikan keterangan dalam cara yang jelas, desa dan menarik perhatian saya sebagai saksi yang benar. Defendan telah secara fraud salah nyata kepadanya bahawa dia mempunyai tanda beberapa dokumen, yang dalam bahasa Inggeris, bagi pinjaman yang dia telah mengambil daripada defendan dan untuk mendapatkan Tanah Freed daripada pertuduhan. Beliau telah didorong untuk menandatangani dokumen-dokumen ini TIDAK mengetahui bahawa dia sebenarnya yang menandatangani perjanjian jual berhubungan dengan tanah dan serentak Pembelian Tiga yang tidak diluluskan sub-banyak di bumi sendiri. Pada fikiran saya, ia adalah jelas daripada bukti-bukti bahawa, dalam membuat salah nyataan palsu atau penipuan kepada plaintif, defendan TIDAK Berimanlah truth.The tiga sub-lot yang dikatakan telah menelan belanja sejumlah $ 7,600, yang dia melakukan NOTA Terima. Ia boleh diperhatikan dalam surat 6 Jun, 1978 peguamcara defendan menyatakan bahawa plaintif telah dikutip hanya $ 6500, nota $ 14,100. Ini menambah kredibiliti kepada cerita plaintif. Mungkin saya juga menunjukkan bahawa Mukadimah kepada tiga perjanjian yang menyatakan bahawa Penjual, firma defendan, adalah pemilik berdaftar tanah sedangkan pada hakikatnya ia telah menjaringkan. Ketiga-tiga perjanjian mesti telah disediakan oleh defendan lebih awal daripada Januari 7, 1977, mungkin dengan bantuan Peguamcara beliau Coelho, kerana mereka semua dalam bentuk cyclostyled, masing-masing dengan pelan Cadangan sub-Bahagian dilampirkan. Rancangan itu telah TIDAK diluluskan oleh pihak berkuasa yang berkenaan dan TIDAK muncul akan disediakan oleh Juruukur Berlesen. Keterangan itu juga jelas menunjukkan atau membayangkan bahawa defendan adalah dalam kedudukan untuk Domina kehendaki plaintif untuk kelebihan yang tidak adil untuk dirinya sendiri. Sebagai pemaju perumahan pada umur 41, beliau mempunyai Nasihat dan perkhidmatan Peguamcara sendiri, manakala plaintif, seorang wanita kampung, pada setiap masa yang material tidak pernah diwakili oleh satu. Jika Parti, terutamanya yang jahil atau buta huruf, diwakili oleh Peguambela dan Peguamcara dalam Transaksi dan pihak lawan yang diwakili oleh satu, ia adalah kewajipan Peguambela dan Peguamcara Menanamkan Terma dan Syarat Kontrak dan Akibat undang-undang itu sepenuhnya dan terus terang kepada yang tidak diwakili peguam parti dan memastikan bahawa ini tidak diwakili peguam parti memahami Terma dan Syarat dan Akibat Undang-undang sepenuhnya, supaya tidak Pihak Berjanji mempunyai apa-apa kelebihan yang tidak adil ke atas yang lain. Jika terdapat Percanggahan kepentingan, seperti dalam kes ini, Peguambela dan Peguamcara Penasihat separtely plaintif yang diwakili. Peguambela dan Peguamcara mesti pada setiap masa mengekalkan etika profesional, jujur, integriti dan Kemerdekaan. Dia tidak pernah harus menyalahgunakan kedudukan istimewa dan keyakinan reposed dia jika dia TIDAK mengekalkan penghormatan awam dan keyakinan dalam profesion undang-undang. Saya mendapati sebagai fakta bahawa plaintif telah didorong oleh pengaruh tidak wajar di pihak defendan untuk menandatangani Perjanjian Januari 7, 1977 dan tiga perjanjian untuk Pembelian tiga sub-banyak. Seksyen 16 (1) Akta Kontrak, 1950 (Pindaan 1974) mentakrifkan "pengaruh tidak wajar" dan Seksyen 17 mentakrifkan "penipuan". (Lihat Lloyds Bank v Bundy [1974] 3 Semua 757 ER pada 765, 765, dan Re Craig (meninggal dunia), Meneces v Middleton [1970] 2 All ER 390 pada 393, 393 pada pengaruh tidak wajar.) Beliau telah gagal untuk membuktikan bahawa perjanjian-perjanjian ini TIDAK disebabkan oleh pengaruh tidak wajar di bawah Seksyen 16 (3) Akta Kontrak. Baik sekiranya dia dilepaskan Beban Membuktikan Iman Baik Transaksi di bawah Seksyen 111 Akta Keterangan, 1950. Perjanjian itu adalah terbatal pada pilihan plaintif dan sebagai akibat yang perlu mesti ditamatkan. 1982 2 MLJ 198 di 202

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Saya kini memberi Jawapan saya kepada enam isu, berdasarkan bukti dan Dapatan saya Fakta: (1) Dokumen yang berupa penjualan dan Perjanjian Pembelian berkaitan dengan 736 Lot Dipegang di bawah EMR 1406, Mukim Linggi, Port Dickson, TIDAK dilaksanakan secara bebas dan secara sukarela oleh plaintif. (2) Ya. (3) Perjanjian itu perlu dibatalkan. (4) plaintif TIDAK memberi pilihan. (5) Utara. (6) Utara. Saya kini datang kepada persoalan kerosakan yang plaintif adalah Untitled untuk Menerima yang timbul daripada salah nyata penipuan defendan (Lihat Olby Doyle v (Ironmongers) Bhd [1969] 2 QB 158 CA; [1969] 2 All ER 119 Plaintif TIDAK lakukan. merayu ganti rugi khas di dalam Penyata Tuntutan. Apabila dia memberikan keterangan mengenai ganti rugi khas, belajar Peguam bagi defendan TIDAK membantah Cabaran atau beberapa agak kecil kuantitinya item ganti rugi khas yang timbul secara langsung daripada penebangan pokok getah oleh defendan. plaintif juga berkata beliau mendapat kira-kira $ 200 sebulan menoreh pokok-pokok getah di atas tanah dan dia berhenti selepas menoreh pokok-pokok telah ditebang Itu adalah bukti yang dikemukakan untuk membuktikan kerosakan oleh plaintif defendan berkata beliau ditebang semua getah.. pokok di atas tanah pada kos sebanyak $ 1.800. tiada pihak yang telah menghasilkan apa-apa laporan penilaian di atas tanah. defendan, Walau bagaimanapun, berkata harga tanah adalah $ 18,000 seekar sebelum isu hak milik individu subdivisional. Oleh itu, saya, selepas Potongan beberapa berhubung dengan kerosakan basikal Anugerah, khas kepada plaintif seperti berikut: $ 900 bagi Dewan, $ 200 untuk yang mangles getah, $ 150 untuk basikal, $ 110 untuk almari tersebut dan jadual, berjumlah $ 1,360 Kerosakan yang disebabkan kepada. barang-barang ini hartanah telah dinyatakan dalam laporan polis itu tanpa yang values.As statin untuk ganti rugi am berkenaan dengan Perjanjian Januari 7, 1977, semua Faktor yang berkaitan seperti pokok-pokok getah telah ditebang dan plaintif telah berhenti menoreh mesti dipertimbangkan. pokok-pokok getah mestilah lama sebagai Hasil sebulan TIDAK tinggi dari segi pendapatan. Kedua-dua Peguam yang dipelajari secara tidak sengaja ditinggalkan di Penyerahan Ditulis mereka untuk mengemukakan garis panduan atau prinsip Mahkamah itu seharusnya menerima pakai dalam Penilaian ganti rugi. Walau apa pun ukuran ganti rugi Mahkamah terpakai, saya fikir tugasnya adalah untuk Anugerah ganti rugi atau pampasan yang adil dan saksama yang mungkin antara pihak-pihak yang berdasarkan bukti-bukti sebelum ia. Plaintif berkata bahawa pokok-pokok getah telah ditebang Separuh Mengenai tanah manakala defendan berkata semua yang pokok-pokok getah di atas tanah itu (kira-kira 5 ekar di kawasan) telah ditebang. saya mendapati sebagai fakta 1 bahawa kira-kira 3 ekar pokok-pokok getah telah ditebang. Beliau telah juga hilang pendapatan bulanan beliau kira-kira $ 200. Beliau TIDAK akan telah mengalami kerugian ini jika itu salah nyataan penipuan telah TIDAK telah dibuat Kehilangan ini hendaklah dibuat baik. saya Menilai dengan nilai anggaran yang pokok-pokok getah ditebang pada $ 2.500 bagi setiap ekar. saya itu berfikir bahawa pemberian ganti rugi terhadap defendan dalam jumlah wang sebanyak $ 10,000 adalah adil dan munasabah dalam hal keadaan kes ini, hampir Mengambil kira kerosakan yang disebabkan kepada pokok-pokok getah dan kehilangan pendapatan kecil, dan mengambil perhatian bahawa dia akan mengekalkan milikan tanah itu bebas daripada bebanan di terhutang nilai semasa untuk meningkatkan meningkat pada Harga dalam Pasaran Harta Tanah. Berkenaan dengan tiga perjanjian berkaitan kepada tiga sub-lot mereka juga mestilah dibatalkan. Tetapi sebagai Manfaat No plaintif diterima di bawahnya, No. Pampasan atau pembayaran balik perlu

dibuat oleh beliau kepada defendan di bawah seksyen 37 Akta Relief Spesifik 1950 (Disemak 1974). Pada masa yang sama defendan TIDAK bertanggungjawab untuk membayar ganti rugi kerana dia TIDAK membuktikan dia telah menderita di bawahnya apa-apa. Bidang kuasa Mahkamah untuk memerintahkan pelaksanaan spesifik Kontrak budi bicara. Dalam kes ini sejak plaintif telah dibuktikan salah nyataan penipuan, pelaksanaan spesifik tidak boleh dikuatkuasakan di atas nama defendan di bawah peruntukan Seksyen 27 (b) Akta Relief Spesifik. Defendan TIDAK perlu dibenarkan untuk Manfaat daripada salah nyataan beliau. Oleh itu, tuntutan balas itu ditolak dengan kos. Akan ada penghakiman terhadap defendan dalam memihak kepada plaintif untuk jumlah wang sebanyak $ 1,360 dan $ 10,000 dengan kos. Faedah ke atas jumlah wang sebanyak $ 1,360 akan berlangsung dari Tarikh Pemfailan terus tarikh penghakiman pada kadar 4% setahun dan selepas itu pada kadar 8% setahun setiap Sehingga merealisasikan. Faedah pada 8% setiap setahun ke atas jumlah sebanyak $ 10,000 akan bermula dari tarikh penghakiman untuk merealisasikan. Plaintif mesti memulangkan wang sebanyak $ 6.500 kepada defendan, akan ditolak daripada akaun ganti rugi yang kena dibayar olehnya. Saya memerintahkan pembatalan Perjanjian (D5) dan tiga perjanjian (D9, D10 dan D12). Keempatempat perjanjian, dan isu dokumen hakmilik EMR 1406, dan pemindahan itu perlu dikembalikan kepada plaintif untuk pembatalan dalam tempoh satu bulan mulai hari ini. Saya mengarahkan Pemungut Hasil Tanah Daerah, Port Dickson, diubahsuai kepada Jilid kaveat swasta 6, Folio 61, yang dimasukkan oleh defendan pada 24 Januari 1981 di bawah Seksyen 417 Kanun Tanah Negara. Memerintahkan sewajarnya. Peguamcara: 'D'Cruz akj & Co; Fernandez & Co.