Settlement of Boundary Dispute THE MUNICIPALITY OF SOGOD vs.

ROSAL MEDIALDEA; September 24, 1991 NATURE Petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court FACTS - On June 15, 1950, Congress passed Republic Act No. 522 creating the municipality of Bontoc, formerly a barrio of the municipality of Sogod in the province of Leyte, which shall be composed of the barrios of Bontoc, Divisoria, Onion, Pacu, Beniton, Catmon, Hilaan, Taa, Sta. Cruz, Mahayahay and their corresponding sitios. - A boundary dispute however, later arose between the municipality of Bontoc and the municipality of Sogod with the latter claiming that the former exercised jurisdiction not only over the barrios above-mentioned but also over other ten (10) barrios allegedly belonging to Sogod. - The Provincial Board of Leyte issued Resolution No. 617 directing the holding of a plebiscite to determine whether the people in these barrios would like to remain with the municipality of Sogod or with Bontoc. The plebiscite was conducted on August 1, 1952, and the results thereof show that more votes were cast in favor of Sogod than those in favor of Bontoc. - On April 4, 1959, the Provincial Board of Leyte issued Resolution No. 519 recommending to the President of the Philippines and/or to the Congress of the Philippines that Republic Act 522 be amended so as to include in said Act creating the municipality of Bontoc, the following barrios claimed by Sogod which are in the heart of Bontoc but not included in said law, namely: Baugo, Himakilo, Esperanza, Hibagwan, Pamahawan, Mahayahay, Bunga, Da-o and Maoylab The Board also recommended that a law be enacted annexing to the municipality of Sogod the following barrios which are very near Sogod and are claimed by the latter but are included in the law creating Bontoc, namely: Laogawan, Taa Tuburan, Sta. Cruz and Pangi he board further recommended that the boundary line between the two municipalities be placed at Granada Creek. - On December 28, 1959, Carlos P. Garcia, then President of the Philippines, promulgated Executive Order No. 368, which approved the recommendation of the provincial board of Leyte, and reconstituted the barrios and sitios which shall compose the municipalities of Bontoc and Sogod. The executive order also specified Granada Creek as the boundary line separating Bontoc and Sogod. - However the President of the Philippines sent a telegram to the Provincial Board of Southern Leyte suspending the implementation of EO 368. - The Provincial Board of Southern Leyte passed Resolution No. 62 suspending the implementation of Executive Order 368. The Board also created a committee to conduct the holding of a plebiscite in the barrios and sitios affected by Executive Order 368 and to finally settle the boundary dispute. - The municipality of Sogod filed two civil cases: 1. Certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the provincial board and provincial governor from taking cognizance of the long pending boundary dispute between the two municipalities and to enjoin the municipality of Bontoc from exercising territorial jurisdiction over the barrios allegedly belonging to the municipality of Sogod. 2. For recovery of taxes with receivership against the municipality of Bontoc alleging that the municipality of Bontoc, without any legal basis, exercised jurisdiction not only over the barrios enumerated in Republic Act No. 522 but also over ten (10) barrios belonging to the complainant municipality of Sogod. The complaint prayed that the municipality of Bontoc be ordered to pay Sogod one half of the total amount of taxes collected by the former from the inhabitants of the aforesaid barrios during the period from 1950 to 1959. - The trial court issued an order dismissing the two civil cases for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. MR denied. ISSUE WON the trial court gravely erred in dismissing the two cases for lack of jurisdiction. HELD NO. The law vested the right to settle boundary disputes between municipalities on the provincial board pursuant to Section 2167 of the Revised Administrative Code, which reads: SEC. 2167. Municipal boundary disputes. ? How settled ? Disputes as to jurisdiction of municipal governments over places or barrios shall be decided by the province boards of the provinces in which such municipalities are situated, after an

investigation at which the municipalities concerned shall be duly heard. From the decision of the provincial board appeal may be taken by the municipality aggrieved to the Secretary of the Interior (now the Office of the Executive Secretary), whose decision shall be final. Where the places or barrios in dispute are claimed by municipalities situated in different provinces, the provincial boards of the provinces concerned shall come to an agreement if possible, but, in the event of their failing to agree, an appeal shall be had to the Secretary of Interior (Executive Secretary), whose decision shall be final. (Municipality of Hinabangan v. Municipality of Wright, 107 Phil. 394). Reasoning It is clear from the aforestated legal provision that the authority to hear and resolve municipal boundary disputes belongs to the provincial boards and not to the trial courts. The decisions of the boards are then appealable to the Executive Secretary. Records in the instant case show that when petitioner municipality filed the civil actions in 1970 before the trial court, the provincial board of Southern Leyte had not yet conducted a plebiscite as ordered by the Executive Department in 1960 or rendered any order settling the dispute. Petitioner municipality should have elevated the matter of delay to the then Secretary of Interior (now Executive Secretary) for action instead of bringing it to the trial court. Although existing laws then vested on the provincial board the power to determine or even alter municipal boundaries, the Secretary of Interior or the Executive Department for that matter, was not precluded during that time from taking necessary steps for the speedy settlement of the boundary dispute. In Pelaez v. Auditor General, No. L-23825, December 24, 1965, 15 SCRA 569, which applied Republic Act No. 2370, known as the Barrio Charter, We held that the power to fix common boundaries in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities may also partake of an administrative nature that can be decided by the administrative department, involving as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the laws creating said municipalities. DISPOSITION The petitions are DISMISSED. The assailed orders of the respondent judge are AFFIRMED. Municipality of Jimenez v Baz FACTS: The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by EO 258 of then Pres. Quirino pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Revised Admin. Code. Sinacaban laid claim to several barrios based on the technical description in EO 258. The Municipality of Jimenez asserted jurisdiction based on an agreement with Sinacaban which was approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental which fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez. The Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It held that the earlier resolution approving the agreement between the municipalities was void since the Board had no power to alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in EO 258. Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in the RTC of Oroquieta. Jimenez argued that the power to create municipalities is essentially legislative (as held in Pelaez v Auditor General), then Sinacaban, which was created thru and EO, had no legal personality and no right to assert a territorial claim. ISSUES: I. WON Sinacaban has juridical personality. YES. II. WON RA 7160 Sec. 442(d) is invalid since it does not conform to the constitutional and statutory requirements for the holding of plebiscites in the creation of new municipalities. NO. RATIO: I. Where a municipality created as such by EO is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In the case of Municipality of San Narciso v Mendez, the SC laid the factors to consider in validating the creation of a municipal corporation: 1. The fact that for 30 years, the validity of the corporation has not been challenged; 2. The fact that no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the EO creating the municipality; and 3. the fact that the municipality was later classified as a 5 th class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House.

In this case, the following factors are present: 1. Sinacaban has been in existence for 16 years when Pelaez was decided in 1965 and yet the validity of EO 258 creating it had never been questioned. It was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned. 2. The State and even Jimenez recognized Sinacabans corporate existence. Ex.: AO 33, Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, etc. Moreover, the LGC of 1991, Sec. 442(d) provides that municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban as part of the 2nd District of Misamis Occidental. II. Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the time the 1987 Constitution took effect. It is not subject to the plebiscite requirement. It applies only to new municipalities created for the first time under the Constitution. The requirement of plebiscite was originally contained in Art. XI, Section 3 of the previous Constitution. It cannot be applied to municipal corporations created before, such as Sinacaban.

Municipality of Candijay, Bohol v CA (1995) FACTS: The Municipality of Candijay claimed that the barrio of Pagahat is within its territorial jurisdiction and that it is not a part of the Municipality of Alicia. The trial court ruled for Candijay but this was reversed by the CA. The CA found that the plans submitted by the two municipalities are inadequate insofar as identifying the monuments of the boundary line between the petitioner and the Muncipality of Mabini. The CA ruled that in cases of equiponderance of evidence, the courts must find for the defendant. The petitioner raised the ff issues before the SC: 1. The CA improperly applied the rule on equiponderance of evidence; 2. The respondent municipality does not have a juridical personality since it was created under a void executive order; and 3. the challenged decision throws them back again to their controversy. ISSUE: WON a municipality, created under a void executive order, can be considered as not having a juridical personality in light of the passage of the Local Government Code of 1991. NO. RATIO: The petitioner commenced its collateral attack on the juridical personality of the respondent on 19 January 1984 (35 yrs after its creation in 1949) during the proceedings in this case. After presentation of evidence, Candijay asked the trial court to bar the respondent from presenting evidence on the ground that it had no juridical personality. Candijay argued that EO 265 issued by Pres. Quirino is null and void ab initio since Sec. 68 of the RAC constituted an undue delegation of legislative power to the Prez. The Municipality of Alicia was created by EO 265, or ten years ahead of the Municipality of San Andres, and had been in existence for 16 years when Pelaez was promulgated. Various governmental acts through the years all indicate the States recognition and acknowledgement of its existence. Alicia must benefit from the effects of Sec. 422 (d) of the LGC and should be considered a regular, de jure municipality. According to Sec. 442 (d) of the LGC, municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with, are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights.2

Ordillo v. COMELEC G.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990 Gutierrez, J. FACTS - January 30, 1990, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite. - Results of plebiscite: approved by majority of 5,889 votes in Ifugao, rejected by 148,676 in the rest provinces and city. The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of total population, and as such has the second smallest number of inhabitants, of the abovementioned areas. - February 14, 1990, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of votes cast only in the province of Ifugao. Secretary of Justice also issued a memorandum for the President reiterating COMELEC resolution, stating that Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably then. Alone, legally and validly constitutes CAR. - March 8, 1990, Congress ebacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting elections in CAR of Ifugao on first Monday of March 1991. - Even before COMELEC resolution, Executive Secretary issued February 5, 1990 a memorandum granting authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly created under Executive Order No. 220. - March 30, 1990, President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring among others that the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all offices under Executive Order No. 220 were abolished in view of the ratification of Organic Act. - Petitioners: there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit. - Petitioners therefore pray that the court: a. declare null and void COMELEC resolution No. 2259, the memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 and prohibit and restrain the respondents from implementing the same and spending public funds for the purpose b.declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices to be still in force and effect until another organic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been enacted by Congress and the same is duly ratified by the voters in the constituent units. ISSUE WON the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such region.

HELD - The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. a. The keyword ins Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that region is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term region used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces.

- rule in statutory construction must be applied here: the language of the Constitution, as much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in common use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. b.The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region is infused with provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao constituting the Region. - It can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the autonomous region. - If this were so, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials: a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area. (Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-wise) (Art III sec 1 and 2; Art V, sec 1 and 4; Art XII sec 10 of RA 6766) - Allotment of Ten Million Pesos to Regional Government for its initial organizational requirements can not be construed as funding only a lone and small province [Art XXI sec 13(B)(c)] - Certain provisions of the Act call for officials coming from different provinces and cities in the Region, as well as tribal courts and the development of a common regional language. (Art V sec 16; Art VI sec 3; Art VII; Art XV RA 6766) - Thus, to contemplate the situation envisioned by the COMELEC would not only violate the letter and intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would be impractical and illogical.