University of Utah Western Political Science Association

Fact, Theory, and Democratic Theory Author(s): David C. Paris Reviewed work(s): Source: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Jun., 1987), pp. 215-236 Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/448307 . Accessed: 18/06/2012 23:11
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FACT, THEORY, AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY

DAVID C. PARIS

Hamilton College NE of the persistent problems in contemporary democratic theory has been to specify the proper relationship(s) of democratic ideals to actual political practices. This problem is often expressed in the form of a dilemma between the demands of democratic ideals and empirical constraints on their realization. For example, Margolis argues that, "It may not be possible to develop a theory of liberal democracy which is compatible with both the empirically demonstrated capabilities of the citizenry and the theoretically demonstrated necessity of preserving liberal values" (1979: 93). There seems to be an inevitable trade-off between making democratic theory realistic or practical, on the one hand, and fulfilling democratic ideals, on the other. If we allow empirical research to constrain our ideals by leading us to underestimate what is possible, then we may undercut those ideals and fail to use them to guide us in improving the political system. If we insulate our ideals from empirical evidence and analysis, then we may be merely building elegant but wholly unrealistic and useless analytical systems. This problem is not unique to democratic theory. Any ideals or ideologies simultaneously express the way someone thinks the world does work, should work, and even might work if social and political behavior and institutions were changed. The problem arises when the world does not conform to these expectations. In the face of discrepancies between ideals and reality, one might cling to the former believing that the contrary evidence is merely an aberration or a misinterpretation. Or, more aggressively, it might be demanded that the world itself be changed to conform more closely to the ideal pattern. On the other hand, the collision of ideals and facts may prompt an adjustment in what one believes can and should be done. This latter strategy is often what is anticipated by the injunction to be "realistic" in political and moral affairs, i.e., to temper or modify our moral expectations on the basis of a clear view of empirical evidence and practical possibility. The appeal to realism is thus not unique to arguments in democratic theory but may be used for or against relatively narrow policies or the broadest world views.' The power of the appeal to realism in political argument derives from at least two sources, one evidentiary, the other practical. Realism means both recognizing relevant empirical considerations and responding to them in a practical way. First, empirical evidence can advance or undercut a
Received: October 3, 1985 Revision Received: April 7, 1986 Accepted for Publication: April 28, 1986 For example, it is often argued that Marxists have an unrealistic view of human nature and the possibilities of technology and social organization.

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political argument or theory, or even occasionally adjudicate between two competing arguments or theories. For example, the psychological research presented in the Brownvs. Boardcase - however sound or unsound it actually was - did help to undercut the claim that separate but equal schools could be maintained. One need not be an ethical relativist to believe that there is a greater possibility of reaching some agreement on empirical matters than on vague or contested normative claims. It is tempting to seek just that piece of evidence which defeats or clinches an argument. Second, if political arguments or theories are to be more than mere abstractions or analytic exercises, then empirical information is valuable in suggesting how the argument or theory may be applied to practical concerns. This information is not only valuable as a means of getting theory to guide practice but also as a means of probing the practical limits of theoretical schemes. Theories or arguments must not only speak to the world; they must in some sense answer to it. The clash between ideals and empirical evidence arises in democratic theory as a result of the consideration of the actual political practices of modern Western democracies. Revisions of democratic theory undertaken by Schumpeter, Dahl, Truman, and others (Holden 1973: chs. 5-6; Margolis 1979: 95-124) have attempted to alleviate the apparent tensions between some (ill-defined) "classical ideal" of democratic politics and actual political practices. Although there is no single revisionist theory - or for that matter any one "classical" or participatory theory2 - there remains a consensus among democratic theorists that democratic ideals must come to terms with the findings of empirical research into political practices. A realistic democratic theory requires a clearer view of how central democratic ideals can be maintained in large-scale, complex societies, e.g., through elections and interest groups, without unrealistic demands on citizen competence and participation (Kelso 1978: 13ff.). The power of this appeal to realism was especially apparent in debates between pluralists and participatory democrats. The charge that revised theory in its various forms had compromised democratic ideals was countered by the charge that participatory democrats' theories were unrealistic. Although some consessions could be made to calls for increases in participation and greater material equality (Dahl 1970), participatory democracy was dismissed as unrealistic, "an impossible ideal, a Quixotic dream" (Pennock 1979: 468).3 The purpose of this essay is to examine the methodological issue of what constitutes a "realistic" approach to democratic theory, i.e., to ask how democratic ideals can come to terms with the facts of political life. This is a methodological issue because it involves ascertaining what evidence is relevant to a (realistic) democratic theory, how it is obtained, and above all how it is evaluated and used. This issue will be examined by pointing
2

Pateman (1970) argues that the "classical ideal" of the citizen criticized in revised democratic theories is either a strawman or a myth. This may be true; however, there is some reasonable notion of the (ideal) democratic citizen which seems hardly applicable to contemporary societies. See Margolis (1979: ch. 1) and Mansbridge (1982: chs. 1, 2). Indeed, some have argued that it may even be dangerous (Huntington 1975).

Fact, Theory, and Democratic Theory 217 out several potential problems in linking democratic theory and empirical research and by noting several points of similarity and dissimilarity between scientific and democratic theory (or theories).4 At the outset it should be noted that such a discussion will not, and perhaps cannot or should not, yield a precise methodological algorithm for assessing competing democratic theories. Rather it can suggest some of the more plausible ways in which democratic theories may be linked to and evaluated in terms of empirical research, illustrating these with some examples and problems from current research and democratic theory.
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SOME PROBLEMS

In a number of recent works in democratic theory, careful attention is paid to empirical research and what it implies for democratic theory. Although there is a consensus on the need to take such research into account (to be realistic), these works reach a broad range of conclusions about current political practices and possibilities for proposed reform(s). Some see empirical research as vindicating some form of revised or pluralist democratic theory. They see more participatory schemes as impractical, undesirable or both (Kelso 1978; Pennock 1979). At the opposite end of the spectrum, Margolis characterizes the current situation as the "death of democracy" and suggests a number of reforms to make large-scale liberal democracy "viable" (1979: 125-88). Similarly, there is something of a revival of the case for participatory theory, with Mason (1982) attacking standard interpretations of participation research and suggesting empirical support for the "proximity hypothesis" central to participatory democracy.5 Still other works fall in between, viewing current practices as unavoidable or imperfect approximations of revised theories. For example, in a work which is basically sympathetic to "unitary" democracy, Mansbridge concedes that the modern state is likely to be an "adversary" democracy in which there are profound limits to political participation, equality, and the sense of community (Mansbridge 1982: 278-307). These differences certainly derive in part from disagreements about what the facts of contemporary practice are, how they are to be interpreted, and in normative views - and just as certainly these three categories are interrelated. However, these differences also imply different methodological understandings about the relationship of theory and data, of how facts can speak to critical questions in democratic theory. These different methodological understandings have substantive implications. Some, such as Kelso, suggest that empirical research can adjudicate between competing democratic theories. Others, such as Margolis, suggest that such research merely points up the need for reform. Still others suggest that empirical evidence points up the practical limits on democratic ideals while others such as Mason
4

"Democratic theory" here refers to a set of(often conflicting) theories that seek to define democratic ideals and prescribe democratic practices. For arguments in the same general "camp," see Barber (1984), Boyte (1980), Cohen and Rogers (1983).

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read the same evidence in the opposite way. These differences represent the methodological counterpart to the substantive dilemma stated at the outset. Namely, can we expect empirical research to determine our evaluation of democratic theories and their practical limits or should we use democratic ideals as a way of evaluating or even changing the "facts" of political life? Neither a purely descriptive or prescriptive approach seem appropriate (or, for that matter, realistic). Because democratic theories are, at least in part, normative theories expressing ideals, they cannot be varified or falsified by empirical inquiry. It seems equally undesirable to leave democratic ideals standing in splendid isolation from empirical research or practical constraints as if they were merely analytic creations which are unrelated to the world. Empirical inquiry must enter into the process of evaluating democratic theory, particularlyas there are competing democratic theories (e.g. revised vs. participatory theory); the question is "How?"6 There are two related categories of problems which arise out of responses to this dilemma: (a) problems concerning establishing the facts of (democratic) political life and estimating what empirical findings can do in democratic theory and (b) problems in understanding what democratic theories are and how they affect political practice. The problems in (a) are usually associated with an inductivist approach to democratic theory while those in (b) typically come from treating democratic theories as welldeveloped propositional schemes. In both categories there is a persistent overestimation of what either empirical findings or theory can accomplish. There are also confusions about the structure and function of democratic theories, particularly as they are viewed in ways analogous to scientific theory. A discussion of these problems will suggest some guidelines, to be developed in the next section, for relating empirical research to democratic theory in some "realistic" fashion. (a) Inductivism:Problemsin Moving From "Fact" to Theory As noted previously, there is an understandable temptation to seek empirical evidence which can clinch or undercut arguments in political theory. Difficulties may arise if we overestimate what empirical evidence can do to settle such arguments or, indeed, if we misjudge whether we have evidence which is sound and relevant to these disputes. The specific problem or danger which arises depends upon whether the empirical "testing" of democratic theory is seen as primarily an inductive or (hypothetico-) deductive enterprise. The latter will be discussed in (b). In either case these difficulties are related to misunderstandings about the nature and function of democratic theory, especially as it relates to scientific theory. One of the earliest, and most criticized, versions of the appeal to realism is based on a kind of inductivism. Instead of comparing political prac6

This methodological problem becomes even more complicated as political practices change. For example, recent changes in patterns of electoral participation, the apparent decline of political parties, increases in nonelectoral and unconventional modes of participation, as well as considerations of corporatism and consociationalism, all have implications for (realistic) appraisals of democratic theory. Yet it is not clear how democratic theory, revised or otherwise, should evaluate these changes.

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tices to some received "classical" ideals of democracy, analysis begins by examining, as given, those states which are commonly regarded as democratic. These provide the data for drawing inferences about the characteristics and conditions of democracy and for assessing democratic practices. Dahl defines the "method of description" in democratic theory as the examination of "the members of this class [democracies] to discover, first, the distinguishing characteristics they have in common and, second, the necessary and sufficient conditions for social organizations possessing those characteristics" (Dahl 1956: 63ff.). There is a long-standing tradition of examining the empirical conditions and characteristics of existing democracies including Lipset (1960), Cnudde and Neubauer (1969), and more recently, Pennock (1979) and Powell (1982). There is no gainsaying the value of empirical (inductive) analyses of "democratic" political systems. Any realistic argument in democratic theory would likely make some use of such data, including comparative analyses. However, there are problems in too heavy a reliance on an inductive approach, some of which have already been pointed out by critics of revised theories. First, there is the obvious problem of the "definitional fallacy," "the belief that the meaning of democracy is found by examining systems called democracies" (Holden 1973: 20), undercutting the critical function democratic ideals can and should play. If the meaning of "democracy" is derived by looking at contemporary democracies, then a critique of these political arrangements from the vantage point of alternative ("classical") democratic ideals is made considerably more difficult. This leads to a second problem, the common charge that such an approach is conservative in that it gives current practices (or what is seen to be implicit in current (" practices) the status of ideals. The use of an operational realistic") definition abstracted from those systems called democracies guarantees that existing arrangements and practices will benefit from the commendatory force of labeling any system democratic, thus introducing a bias in favor of these systems (Skinner 1973). Finally, there is the danger of confusing wellestablished hypotheses about institutions and behavior with what might be termed "casual" empiricism. That is, a claim about democracy may appeal to data or facts about behavior and institutions which are intuitive or "obvious" or may appeal to hypothetical (counterfactual) speculations about the possibilities and results of political change. In either case the claims are empirical but involve a more "casual" appeal to the facts than empirically tested hypotheses. Perhaps the most notorious example of this was Berelson et al.'s (1954: 308-25) speculation that some degree of nonparticipation actually enhances democratic stability. This claim simultaneously committed the definitional fallacy by suggesting that current practices functioned so well as to be worthy ideals and went well beyond the survey data (via "casual" empiricism) in offering an argument about participation and
stability.7
7

Participatory democrats have also been guilty of relying on casual empiricism, particularly as they make counterfactual claims about what would follow participatory reforms.

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These problems may seem obvious or even old-hat but they still arise in some more recent works in democratic theory. For example, in a more recent, comprehensive work Pennock (1979) examines empirical research bearing on problems in "operational" democratic theory (e.g., conditions of democracy, representation, etc.). Throughout his discussion he draws upon research which typically assumes that Western polities are paradigmatically democratic. Not surprisingly, then, Pennock finds that the data gives empirical support for types of (pluralist) democratic theory against more "extreme" types which do not correspond as well to existing practices. The norms of these more "extreme" types, however valid or appealing, are not taken as seriously because of their lack of correspondence to current practice. Nor is Pennock's work exceptional in this respect. Some recent work on participationand political parties implicitly or explicitly invokes this approach. For example, Milbrath and Goel's (1983: 144-55) survey of research on participation practically restates Berelson et al.'s functionalist argument concerning nonparticipation. More striking still is some of the literature lamenting the decline of parties and shifts in patterns of voting and participation. Much of this literature expresses a dismay over the decline of parties, voter volatility, and increased unconventional participation, implying that the ideal democratic polity was operationally defined by some earlier revised theories (Huntington 1975; Ladd 1978). This dismay is especially striking because some revised theories were initially touted as realistic because they corresponded (partly or wholly) to actual democratic practice. Current changes are then viewed with alarm because they depart from such (revised) theories even though one could readily argue that recent developments might represent positive shifts toward democratic ideals, e.g. shifts in the public's political "repertory" (Barnes 1979). Again, none of these criticisms deny that data on current "democratic" practices should play an important role in arguments in democratic theory. Certainly descriptions of current practices can pose problems with which democratic theory must deal. There is, however, a common thread to the problems cited above, namely that the use of data on current democratic practices is taken well beyond what these data can support conceptually, normatively, or even empirically. The empirical analysis of problems and conditions in contemporary democracies does not justify a resulting theory (as realistic) because of this point of departure. Moreover, insofar as such a strategy is based on casual empiricism the significant conditions, characteristicsor possibilities abstracted from current practices are not necessarily given, available to any competent observer, nor are they the product of hypothesis testing. Rather they represent some implicit or explicit criteria of what features of "democratic" practice are crucial, as well as untested (or untestable) hypotheses. As difficult as it may be, it is important to keep separate claims based on sound research from those based on a more speculative empiricism. In fairness, it should be stated that many of the best works of revised democratic theory did not claim to be merely describing (realistic) democratic practices. Rather they derived from existing practices a set of implicit ideals of democracy. For example, Dahl's discussion of polyarchy does not claim merely to describe political behavior

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but establishes criteria and conditions for polyarchal regimes, criteria and which cannot be perconditions which he readily admits are idealizations met (1954: 71 ff.). The resulting democratic theory then suggests more fectly precise hypotheses about relationships within polyarchies as well as a normative view of appropriate democratic ideals. The crucial point here is that democratic theory never merely or even primarily describes existing practices. (Again, this point may seem too obvious to mention but there are examples from Berelson through contemporary work which do not take this into account.) It is vital to keep in mind that any democratic theory must be both descriptive, in a broad sense, and normative/prescriptive. It must describe, butas an idealization,how a truly democratic society functions, or might function, state hypotheses about political behavior and institutions in such a society, and normatively justify that society as an ideal worth pursuing. For example, when one states what an ideal polyarchy or participatory democracy would look like, one is describing something that does not exist - unless, as is unlikely, some current society has reached democratic perfection. This description is likely to imply empirical hypotheses (e.g. about participation) which are at least potentially verifiable as well as empirical claims which are less open to test, often involving a more "casual" empiricism. Thus the task of a (would-be) realistic democratic theory is to state clearly the descriptive relationships in and functioning of an ideal democratic society, distinguishing, insofar as is possible, testable hypotheses from broad, "casual" empirical claims. That such a theory might then also approximate existing "democratic" practices does not entitle it to some special standing as descriptive or realistic. Similarly, that alternative or competing theories do not correspond to existing practices should not be taken to mean that they lack descriptive content. The question, then, to ask of any given democratic theory is not whether it closely approximates or is even derived from contemporary (democratic) practices, but whether the hypotheses it implies can be supported by sound empirical evidence, and whether its normative vision is justifiable and attainable. Answering this question requires a further explication of what a democratic theory is and how it may be evaluated in the light of empirical research. Problemsin Theory"Testing" (b) (Hypothetico-)Deductivism: Understanding democratic theories as integrated analytical structures creates a second and slightly different set of difficulties in linking democratic theory and empirical research. These problems arise because there is a temptation to treat democratic theories as if they were competing scientific theories. Certainly there are a number of apparent parallels between scientific and democratic theory. Both organize and make coherent a range of phenomena and permit us to simplify and understand what would otherwise be an unmanageable mound of data. Similarly, that democratic theory involves idealizations, it might be argued is really no different from scientific theories which appeal to ideal situations such as frictionless planes in order to account for real-world phenomena. Finally, and perhaps most important, both scientific and democratic theory can, following Lakatos

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(1970), be structurally characterized as having, first, certain "core" concepts and principles which are typically unfalsifiable. These are the assumptions about a subject area which imply propositions and puzzles on the "periphery" which can be linked to observation. The theories and hypotheses which surround the core simultaneously link it to a "periphery" of supportive observations ("positive heuristic") and defend it against apparently anomalous findings ("negative heuristic"). The latter directs criticism away from the core assumptions while the former specifies the ways in which inferences from the core assumptions to observation should be made. As Lakatos puts it: The negative heuristic specifies the "hard core" of the programme which is "irrefutable" by the methodological decision of the protagonists; the positive heuristic consists of a partially articulated set of suggestions or hints on how to change, develop the "refutable variants" of the researchprogramme, how to modify, sophisticate, the "refutable" protective belt. This positive heuristic of the programme saves the scientist from becoming confused by the ocean of anomalies .... The positive heuristic sets out a programme which lists a chain of ever more complicated models simulating reality: the scientist's attention is riveted on building his models following instructions which are laid down in the positive part of the programme. (Lakatos 1970: 135) The core and periphery/heuristics constitute a "program," a certain way of looking at the world and observations relevant to it.8 Given these structural similarities it is tempting to view empirical research as providing critical tests of competing democratic theories as "research programs," particularly as they imply conflicting hypotheses concerning political behavior and institutions. A good example of this is Kelso's (1978; see also Margolis 1979: ch. 4) claim that empirical research on participation and decision-making clearly demonstrates the superiority of public pluralism over other forms of democratic theory.9 For example, with respect to seven plausible, but also potentially conflicting, criteria for decision-making systems (e.g., legitimacy, economies of scale, etc.) he claims that empirical research shows that alternatives to public pluralism (such as populism, participatory democracy) satisfy only a few of these criteria, because they are too centralized or decentralized, while public pluralism balances all seven. Kelso also claims that many theories perpetually retreat 8 To endorseLakatos'view of the structureof scientifictheoriesis not to endorsehis position on demarcatingand evaluatingtruly scientificresearchprograms;for a critique, is see Laudan(1977). Moreover,the languageof core and heuristics merelya convenient the way to characterize structuralaspectsof theoriesand the ways in which they may be related to observation.As Ball puts it, "Lakatos' point - despite the forbidding jargon in which it is expressed- is essentiallya simple and commonsenseone. It is thatwe can neverget anywhereif we dwellalwaysupon the 'fundamental assumptions' of a theory(or seriesof theories),insteadof its 'payoff.'The 'hands-off policyprescribed by the negative heuristicallows the scientistto get on with his work without having to constantlydefend his core assumptions." (Ball 1976: 164) 9 "Public pluralism"is pluralismin which the governmentplays a significantrole in organizingand regulatinginterestgroups'internaland externalrelations,as distinctfrom laissez-faireor corporatepluralism.

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through a kind of negative heuristic. For example, participatory democrats often "seem inclined to suggest ad infinitumthat if only an additional political or economic change were made, the public would respond as participatory democrats believe they should" (Kelso 1978: 191). This retreat is quite different from what Kelso claims is a substantial body of research, a kind of positive heuristic, supporting public pluralism. When public pluralism is distinguished from other forms of pluralism and compared to other theories in the light of empirical research, it emerges as the soundest, most realistic form of democratic theory. There is some intuitive plausibility to the notion that the hypotheses suggested by different and competing democratic theories should be subject to empirical test, especially in a comparative way. However, it is dangerous to overextend the analogy with theory testing in science. Because democratic theories are (or are part of) ideologies, it is rarely the case that they can be sharply distinguished like (idealized) mutually exclusive scientific theories or subject to critical tests. A well-established scientific theory not only explains some experimental generalizations but also explains the ranges over which they hold, thus permitting the testing, correction, and accumulation of existing generalizations. A democratic theory or ideology, on the other hand, merely covers some existing generalizations and speculates about generalizations which would hold if some political action and reform were taken - and often defies falsification. Kelso's discussion, for example, does not adequately account for these differences. It overstates and oversimplifies the differences among democratic theories and, more important, what the data can do to adjudicate such conflicts. With respect to criteria of decision-making, the question is not whether a theory would try to balance these criteria; presumably any theory would. Rather, the question is how these criteria are interpreted in various theories and how the balance is to be struck. Thus while scientific progress involves the winnowing out of competing theories until ultimately one alone is regarded as best explaining a given body of experimental findings (Copernican succeeds Ptolemaic astronomy), there will typically be several democratic theories, as ideologies, which speak to the same facts. The former should be ultimately accepted on the basis of data whereas the latter is unerdetermined by the facts. It is therefore doubtful that such differences in interpretation of democratic theories, e.g., on criteria of decision-making, can be translated into hypotheses for critical testing, let alone that such "tests" will provide the kind of holistic resolution Kelso describes. This difficulty is only compounded when we consider the prescriptive character of democratic theory. To oversimplify a bit, if democratic and scientific theory are structurally similar, they are functionally distinct. A democratic theory contains imperatives for action in a way which a purely scientific theory does not. The latter may provide guidance concerning ways to achieve our ends but it does not, as the former does, define our ideals and demand that we act to achieve them. Similarly, a discrepancy between theory and observation in democratic theory may be, indeed in some cases mustbe, resolved by changing the "facts," through political reform, to fit the theory - to more closely approximate democratic ideals. In scientific

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theory, someone confronted with a discrepant observation has the options of rejection or reinterpretation of the theory; in democratic theory there is the added option of reform. This option creates the possibility of a wider range of negative heuristics, as Kelso points out with regard to participatory democrats' calls for reform. More important, it creates an added burden for the democratic theorist - to provide empirical evidence that will show how or whether reform will create situations which more closely approximate a democratic vision. For example, perhaps the major failing of participatory theory has been its failure to provide concrete suggestions of how the political problems it delineated could be dealt with on a practical basis: "the steps from an account of potentialities and needs and of the historical and social forces which currently obstruct them, to strategies of change and exemplifications of the new, freer, more communal order are difficult, and rarely made convincingly" (Duncan 1978: 67). At the same time, empirical evidence to support (or undercut) claims for "strategies of change" is difficult to obtain and the temptation to utilize a more casual empiricism grows, e.g., claims that participatory reform would or would not overcome political apathy. That discrepant observations may provide the occasion for reform suggests the most significant difference between scientific and democratic theory, their differing relationship(s) to practice. Presumably scientific theory is not aimed at bringing anything into existence; it merely describes, or more closely approximates, the external world. Its core principles entail no imperatives for action or picture of a morally desirable order. Ideology, on the other hand, suggests which of several possible worlds ought to be chosen, often suggesting means for realizing the preferred order. Ideological core principles, such as those found in democratic theories, not only suggest ways of interpreting observations and puzzles on the periphery but also ways of acting to bring about appropriate political change. Ideology serves a practical, action-guiding function, providing guidance necessarily concerning those things - institutions, practices - which we create and maintain. It is a "theory" which inevitably contains a practical intent. This practical intent points up a final problem with treating competing democratic theories as if they were mutually exclusive such that one (e.g. "public pluralism") should be accepted to the exclusion of others. The expectation in science is that differences between or among research programs can and will be resolved. It is not clear that a similar situation holds, or even ought to hold, in democratic theory. Although we often can reasonably expect one of several competing scientific theories to emerge as "textbook" science on the basis of empirical evidence, we should expect to find a plurality of competing democratic theories to persist even in the face of accumulated, contrary evidence and argument. While some theories will predominate while others fall out of favor, the conflicts between or among variants of democratic theory typically ought to be at least maintained, if not encouraged, for both practical and normative reasons. Practically, different and perhaps even competing principles may be appropriate for different political problems and contexts. For example, Mansbridge (1982: 278-304) persuasively argues that the dominant ideals of "adversary"

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democracy need to be tempered by "unitary" concerns. One type or variant of democratic theory may predominate (e.g., the current consensus in favor of revised as opposed to participatory theory), but we should be loath to dismiss any variant completely. Beyond the obvious consideration of tolerance, the appeal to conflicting ideals is and ought to be a part of democratic practice. If democracy means that the people ought to be able to define issues and even (re)interpret the idea of democracy itself, then competing democratic ideals should be available for consideration. To summarize, both an inductive approach to the empirical study of democracy and the comparative, critical testing of competing democratic theories face significant difficulties. The former strategy risks the definitional fallacy, the latter overestimates the degree to which democratic theories can be holistically treated as competing axiomatic systems. Both strategies may lend themselves to an unwarranted casual empiricism or a failure to see the critical function democratic ideals can play - a function which even competing ideals can play simultaneously. These problems arise from an implicit assumption (and understandable desire) to treat democratic theories in ways analogous to scientific theory and use empirical research as a means of assessing the realism of democratic theory. This desire is supported by interesting structural similarities between scientific and democratic theory (core, heuristics). But scientific and democratic theory are not perfectly analogous; there are important functional differences between democratic theories, seen as ideologies, and scientific research programs. Ideologies typically cannot be falsified or subject to critical test, particularly as they call for reforming social reality to more closely correspond to some ideal(s). Similarly, the interpretive latitude allowed by ideologies and their practical, action-guiding function suggests, for both practical and normative reasons, that competing democratic theories ought to be preserved rather than subject to typically spurious critical or holistic tests. These differences between scientific and democratic theory require a different approach to understanding the connections between empirical research and democratic theory. This approach must not only avoid the common difficulties encountered in linking the two (e.g., the definitional fallacy, casual empiricism, holistic tests), it should provide more positive guidance about how to do and interpret such research and make sense of the common demand for realism. Obviously a methodological recipe cannot be provided here. But some suggestions can be offered based on the problems cited above and the characterization of democratic theories as ideologies having a certain structure (core/heuristics)
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SOME SUGGESTIONS

If democratic theories are seen as ideologies or political, as opposed to research, programs, the issue of realism is not a matter of providing accurate descriptions of external reality. Rather, a realistic democratic theory ought to provide a coherent, justifiable, practical program for dealing with political problems. Thustheappropriate measure therealism a democratic of of is its problem-solving The idea of problem-solving here implies theory capacity.

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that in any democratic society there will always be some perceived difficulty in values, policies, or institutions (often all three simultaneously). These problems provide the occasion for politics and for the reflection on appropriate democratic ideals and how they may best be pursued. This implies the need to consider and compare alternative democratic ideals and their ways of conceiving and dealing with political problems, as well as the arguments and empirical evidence offered in support of competing views. Further explicating the notion of "problem-solving" requires consideration of (a) the distinction between conceptual and empirical problems suggested by the structural characterization (core, heuristics) of democratic theories, (b) the ways in which empirical evidence may be obtained and used to assess how well different theories solve political problems, and (c) whether some overall comparative assessment of competing idealizations is possible, especially given the problems of interpreting democratic theories and the inevitable discrepancies between theory and practice. The issue then is whether the notion of realism as problem-solving can take into account (a)-(c) while still finding a useful place for empirical research into the concerns of democratic theory. (a) Coreand NegativeHeuristics The notion that realism should be understood as problem-solving capacity does not mean that only empirical or practical problems are worthy of consideration. On the contrary, any democratic theory faces both conceptual and empirical problems, the former mainly in its core and the latter mainly in its positive and negative heuristics. Any democratic theory contains a core of assumptions, understandings, and interpretations defining a democratic society; taken together, these constitute the idealization of a truly democratic society. This core will typically include some assumptions about human nature, an understanding of how an ideal democratic society will function in terms of institutional arrangements and individual behavior, and interpretations of concepts relevant to such a society, such as liberty, equality, and democracy itself. More important, the "core" will suggest what are the most crucial political problems and how a democratic society should deal with them. For example, "unitary" or participatory democrats suggest that the crucial problem is simultaneously realizing a common interest and promoting self-development; "adversary" or revisionist democrats are more interested in promoting autonomy and diversity. Accordingly these theories involve different assumptions about human nature (political vs. apolitical man), understandings of key concepts, and suggestions for institutional arrangements (e.g., decentralization). Even the most casual observer can see that different democratic theories involve different and often conflicting "angles of vision" and commitments - they are different ideologies. Understood in this fashion, the core of a democratic theory is typically not realistic in the sense of being subject to direct empirical test. Indeed, we may reasonably expect such a theory not to be realistic in this sense but an idealization, a vision of what a truly democratic society would be. For example, one common criticism of participatory democracy is that it is un-

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realistic because each having a truly equal say would require more meetings and speakers than is physically possible (Dahl 1970; Pennock 1979). But if we think of a theory and its core as creating certain presumptions and ideals about influence and power then such a direct criticism is inappropriate. The participatory ideal should not be taken as a literal requirement that all citizens participate on all issues; it should be taken no more literally than requirements for polyarchy or pluralism (e.g., perfect "balance" among groups) which are similarly "unrealistic." Appeals to realism in this context probably mask some deeper philosophical commitment, rather than tested or testable hypotheses, or reflect casual empiricism which is open to question or simply false. For better or worse, the core of a democratic theory may only be directly challenged (and defended) on conceptual and normative grounds, challenges in which empirical evidence is at most supplementary. A direct challenge to the core of a democratic theory might question its view of an ideal society, e.g., the presumption that widespread participation is necessary and desirable. Similarly, doubts might be raised about some other assumptions at the heart of a theory such as its view of human nature or its interpretation of crucial concepts such as liberty and equality. "Realism" in this context is thus typically a matter of significance, coherence, and plausibility. The core of a democratic theory is realistic in that the basic political problems it poses are significant and its idealized response coherent and plausible. For example, participatory theory has often been challenged on the grounds that its claim that politics is the most significant means of overcoming personal alienation is an implausible view of both individual motivation and political problems. On the other hand, recent books by Mason (1982) and Barber (1984) have suggested that the dominant concept of the political in some democratic theories is too narrow as view of power relations in society, as well as being conceptually and morally incoherent. Again, although these arguments may seem to be making broad empirical claims, they are mainly philosophical arguments. The "descriptive" component of such arguments often involves a kind of casual empiricism. Is empirical evidence, from whatever source, therefore irrelevant to the core of democratic theories? Hardly; empirical evidence is relevant to arguments about the core understandings and propositions of democratic theory, but in an indirect way. Negatively, empirical evidence may point up apparent discrepancies between ideals and reality which occur in any democratic theory. For example, in some revised theories the notion of (rational) man as a self-interested, nonpolitical creature does not square with rates of political participation which far exceed those which we would expect on the basis of such an assumption. Similarly, in situations where participatory experiments have been introduced, there seem to be relatively modest gains in interest and involvement, contrary to the notion that there is some latent, natural desire to participate. In neither case, though, does the evidence overthrow the "program," but rather poses problems with which the theory must deal, i.e., a kind of negative heuristic functions to resist total rejection. Another way to make the same point is to note that if core propositions in democratic theory are idealizations, they are also

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a kind of caricature in that they portray perfectly functioning democracies which probably do not and cannot exist. It is thus all too easy to find evidence which is contrary to the ideal but such evidence does not lead to a clear rejection of the core. For example, it is easy to find examples of imbalances among pluralist interest groups, structural inequalities, and the relatively narrow parceling out of public power to private groups. And yet, this evidence is not taken to overthrow the pluralist perspective - because the evidence is contested or is taken to point to the need for reform or even because there is no ("realistic") alternative to interest group representation in a large-scale democracy. In this way the core of a democratic theory functions as an ideal which is relatively immune from falsification by empirical evidence; it produces its own negative heuristic. It is also a caricature of the real world which nonetheless poses crucial political problems and claims to offer solutions for them. Thus although there can be rigorous discussion and debate about the core propositions of a democratic theory, negative empirical evidence is at best supplementary and not
authoritative. 0

(b) Positive Heuristics The more important relationship between the core and empirical research in a democratic theory concerns the positive, if still indirect, relationship between democratic ideals and political practice. If the core of a democratic theory attempts to solve conceptual and normative problems, each theory has a kind of "positive heuristic" of supportive tests of relevant hypotheses and empirical examples or paradigmatic cases which solve, actually or potentially, the major political problems posed by the "core." It is here that there is the most potentially useful tie between democratic theory and empirical research. Any democratic theory will, perhaps must, be able to cite some empirical evidence that supports its core claims. This evidence will typically attempt to show a connection between certain practices or patterns of behavior, as means, and the ends or ideals of a democratic theory. For example, participatory democrats have argued that increased participation in one arena leads to increased participation in similar contexts, e.g., Mason's (1982) discussion of the "proximity hypothesis." This hypothesis about political behavior becomes significant in terms of democratic theory when increased political participation is seen as a means of promoting equal respect, the development of individual capacities, and the protection of interests - i.e., the core values of participatory theory (Mansbridge 1982). Similarly, Dahl (1954: ch.4) hypothesizes that public support for polyarchy declines as issues become less "autonomous," i.e., as more issues become politicized. Again, this hypothesis is of interest as it expresses the conditions or means, a limited political sphere, to some
10It is possible to imagine a series of conceptual, normative, and empirical problems leading to the complete rejection of a democratic theory. Given the way in which core assumptions and the associated negative heuristic functions, this would be extremely rare. There is almost always some way - by exercising interpretive latitude, by calls for reform - that contradictory evidence and arguments can be countered.

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desired democratic ideal, the preservation of a polyarchy. Although it is difficult to precisely test or verify broad hypotheses such as these, they do provide examples of how core values suggest hypotheses which indirectly suggest the means for realizing democratic ends, e.g., the positive or negative results of increases in participation. The "positive heuristic" connecting democratic values to empirical research is not solely a matter of deriving and testing more or less precise hypotheses. It is equally important for a democratic theory to provide descriptions of paradigmatic cases which indicate how it, as a political program, solves certain political problems. Again, this is a matter of connecting ends or ideals and means or practices, but the connection is less a matter of hypothesized relationships between variables than of describing a pattern of institutionalized problem-solving in accord with some democratic ideals. For example, Kelso (1978) discusses New Deal and antipoverty legislation as instances in which "public pluralism" solves problems created by imbalances in a system of interest groups. Similarly, paticipatory democrats have tended to focus on participatory systems (Yugoslavia, Mondragon, participatory firms) as examples of how a participatory society works. Certainly what constitutes a problem or success for a program will vary, but it remains the case that any democratic theory must point to some "success stories" which support its viewpoint. It is interesting to note here that empirical findings are not brought to bear as a means of falsifying a theory or program. Rather, they are legitimately cited as providing the means for attaining democratic ideals, i.e., they almost always suggest ways of acting to solve problems beyond the cases studied or cite data which support the relevant hypotheses. When the appeal to realism is understood as having empirical support in this way, the appeal of revised theories becomes more apparent. Because they are generally concerned with existing "democratic" practices, they can make at least some primafacie claims to have solved or provided a mechanism for solving pressing political problems (e.g., Dahl 1970). Likewise the major failing of participatory theories has been their apparent inability to provide concrete suggestions of how a range of political problems they delineated could be dealt with on a practical basis. By the same token, however, this kind of appeal also clarifies why revised theories could be characterized (criticized) as conservative and further why their critics focused on their apparent failure to solve pressing problems in times of crisis, as in the late
sixties.

Given this positive heuristic, there needs to be a more expansive notion of empirical evidence relevant to democratic theory. Since the (positive) evidence can range from specific cases to broad hypotheses (e.g., the proximity hypothesis), there needs to be a variety of methodological techniques for relating theory to research. The appropriateness of a technique will depend upon the program and problem involved; quantitative research and modeling, historical-descriptive discussion, and even journalistic accounts may be appropriate. This variability is especially important given the desirability of showing how political programs suggested by democratic theories apply or fail to apply in certain circumstances. That is, the con-

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nection between ideals and practices, ends and means, will have to be qualified; there is no neat or simple correspondence between the two. For example, under what conditions will interest groups fairly represent society (Wilson 1982)? When can local institutions provide better service than more centralized alternatives (Boyte 1980)? Under what circumstances can the scale and complexity of government be reconciled with democratic control and accountability (Yates 1982)? Empirical research cannot answer these questions by testing whole programs or core ideals in democratic theory. Rather, it can provide information about the peripheral implications and puzzles generated by democratic political programs, i.e., the applied problem-solving strategies suggested by one or more democratic ideologies. Looked at in this way, empirical research does not threaten democratic theory but can clarify ways of realizing various democratic ideals rather than confirming (or falsifying) one theory or ideology.l1 Moreover, such research will typically be "local" and context-dependent, first, and most obviously, because it examines only a part of a democratic political program. More important, the ability to apply successfully a political strategy often depends upon contextual factors; the success or failure of a public policy may be as much a function of the circumstances of its application as the plausibility of the policy itself.12 If contextual variables play a significant role in determining the success or failure of a problem-solving strategy suggested by a democratic theory, then research must examine these variables and be cautious about claims of general applicability. For example, strategies of employee participation or even ownership may work in certain industries and not in others. Empirical research then can try to specify how and under what circumstances various democratic ideals may be realized, especially as those ideals may conflict. Indeed, this opens the possibility of a "mixed program" of policy strategies suggested by otherwise competing ideologies, e.g., interest group representation may be valuable in some circumstances but not in others, decentralization of decision-making may be more practical concerning some policies but not others, etc. If a democratic theory ought to both guide and cite empirical research which, positively, demonstrates how a certain variant solves crucial political problems, it should similarly address, if not dispel, doubts about problems it cannot solve. It should acknowledge and try to deal with its "negative heuristic." For example, pluralist democrats need to show how interest groups may be said to provide popular sovereignty in the face of apparent imbalances of group power, nondecisions, etc. (Berry 1984). Similarly, participatory democrats need to show how political participation and local con1

Still, such research may be comparative, i.e., to compare the strategies suggested by different variants of democratic theory. Kelso's (1978) work provides a partial example of this but overstates claims about definitive tests of competing theories. 12 A good example of this is the failure to develop a "family policy." As Steiner (1981) points out, the impulse for some general policy was "irresistible in the abstract and impossible in the particular, at once unifying and divisive." The attempt to devise some single, overarching policy to deal with problems as diverse as unemployment and abortion led to greater confusion.

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trol may be increased without tremendous inefficiency or breakdowns in stability and legitimacy. In many cases the problems of a positive heuristic for one variant may be an aspect of the negative heuristic of the other or there may be categories of problems, such as the ecological crisis (Ophuls 1977) which have not been fully addressed by any variant. Acknowledging this kind of negative heuristic is not an admission of a fatal flaw in a political program. Rather, it may be a spur to rethink the program or to act for political reform. The danger, of course, is that the desirable tenacity in dealing with the negative heuristic may slide off into pure rationalization; no contrary evidence is acknowledged and anyproblem may be solved if only the proper steps or reforms are taken. Perhaps the only safeguard against this is the constant reminder that no democratic theory ought to be expected to solve all political problems and that the search for and acknowledgment of the limits of any theory will make its sensible application more likely. (c) DemocraticTheory,EmpiricalResearch,and PracticalPolitics Thus far it has been suggested that a problem-solving approach to democratic theory involves clarifying the kinds of problems in democratic theory (core, heuristics), acknowledging a more flexible methodological orientation to include more "microscopic" studies of problem-solving strategies suggested by democratic ideologies, and the recognition of the limits of such ideologies (contextual factors, "mixed programs"). Doubts might arise about the value of such an approach, both in terms of the results of such inquiries and the audience to whom they are addressed. If empirical research is inevitably part of a broader ideological debate then it might seem at best inconclusive and at worst a partisan weapon. This may seem especially true if there are differences in methodological approach and if democratic ideology admits "mixed programs" of different problem-solving strategies in different contexts. Furthermore, policy-making which eschews a single perspective or set of principles might be inconsistent or incoherent. Finally, it is not clear what is the relevant community which receives or acts on these results; that is, who is to judge the nature and solution of problems and act on the basis of policy research, especially as there will be conflicting policy suggestions? It might seem that the notion of problemsolving is much too "messy" to be useful. First, the fact that empirical research may be inconclusive does not mean that it has no value. As noted previously, empirical research cannot provide holistic tests of competing democratic ideologies. The most it can do is provide relevant information about the problem-solving strategies suggested by democratic ideologies in specific contexts. Even in this more limited task the empirical evidence will often not be "independently authoritative" (Lindblom and Cohen 1980). Proponents of competing ideologies will interpret problems and empirical evidence relevant to them differently and perhaps take apparently contrary evidence as indicating a need for political reform. For example, revisionist theorists and their critics have generally disagreed over what areas of participation are crucial for democratic theory (e.g., electoral participation vs. participation in the workplace). At

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the same time they have generally agreed that patterns of local government may be crucial for democratic theory, yet disagree over tests of community power (Polsby 1980; Domhoff 1982). Indeed, even apparently contrary facts can be taken not to count against an ideology, but as indicative of a need for political reform, e.g., the participatory democrats' reaction to apparent lack of interest in politics. (Again, as Kelso points out, this can slide off into pure rationalization.) More positively, what empirical research can do is provide, depending upon the problem and context, some support for certain problem-solving strategies. For example, an empirical analysis of successful cases of local participation (Boyte 1980) may provide guidance in other contexts. Similarly, in-depth studies of participatory organizations may point to both the virtues and some of the problems and limits of participation. However, the empirical evidence is supportive and instructive, not conclusive. It might be objected that such inconclusiveness invites the use and evaluation of empirical research in a partisan fashion. However, if the goal is to use empirical research to examine political programs suggested by democratic ideologies, then the results will inevitably be partisan or contested in some sense. The research will have a "value-slope" (Taylor 1967). It is hard to imagine someone looking at policies which, e.g., centralize or decentralize political power, without coming to some implicit or explicit conclusions about the value of those policies - whether they "work." At the same time, to be part of such debate is not to be necessarily reduced to being an ideologue or "mere" partisan. All too often political researchers have aspired to the role of a neutral, technical adviser as if the alternative to (would-be) social scientific advise was pure partisanship. The alleged choice between neutral technician and ad hoc partisan is too narrow. Being part of the debate does not relieve the researcher of the burden of careful observation, relevant evidence, and careful argument. It requires the analyst to show how democratic ideology suggests a certain problem and strategy to deal with it and how empirical research can speak to the soundness of this strategy. The contested character of the problem-solving strategy, and democratic ideology generally, blurs the line between policy inquiry and political debate, but the requirements of good research and reasonable argument do not thereby disappear.13 It might also be objected that if empirical research cannot authoritatively determine the validity of competing political programs, then incoherence in policy-making might result; the problem-solving strategy suggested by one ideological perspective may conflict with another strategy if both are pursued simultaneously. On the contrary, the idea of a "mixed program" suggests that what are generally conflicting ieologies may each have some applicability in democratic practice. The encouragement of decentralizationand political participationmay make good sense in some policy
'3 A useful analogy here might be between arguments in democratic theory and legal argu-

ment rather than between social research and science/engineering. In legal cases dispute is inevitably partisan but rules of evidence, appeals to principle etc. provide some reasoned basis for evaluating claims.

Fact, Theory, and Democratic Theory 233 areas while reliance on interest groups and political elites may be more appropriate in others. What may be apparently inconsistent in theory may be quite sensible in practice. Furthermore, empirical research which is mindful of the possibility of mixed programs is more likely to clarify serious practical inconsistencies between or among problem-solving strategies. Such inquiry should help clarify if and when different problem-solving strategies will prove useful as well as when mixed programs will lead to incoherence in policy. It is an arguable, and ultimately empirical, question as to whether mixed programs and policy research germane to them produces better or more acceptable policies (by some standard) than the vigorous pursuit of one ideology and political program.14 Finally, there is the question of the relevant audience for research, particularly as such research and the policies it suggests are likely to be contested. About all that can be said is that in the last instance the relevant community for debating and acting on research is the community itself. There is no relevant scientific community to authoritatively adjudicate debates in democratic theory. Ultimate decisions as to what constitute problems and appropriate responses to them (with or without empirical research) in a democratic polity reside with the community. This notion of a broader community, though less well defined and authoritative than the scientific community, is another attractive element of relating empirical research to democratic theory through a notion of problem-solving. It produces a notion of research and its role which is consistent with democratic theory itself; it encourages the notion that research should be a part of the democratic process, enhancing the knowledge and rationality of citizens and officials alike. The theorist or analyst may propose; the community ultimately decides. A democratic community and its representatives should be the ultimate judge of how it will look and act upon the political world. Research concerning democratic theory can complement a democratic political process which decides upon its ideals of democracy and (mixed) political programs to realize them. This characterization of realism as problem-solving may seem small consolation for the loss of some systematic and putatively scientific method for adjudicating debates in democratic theory. And yet this does not leave us without comparative assessments: a theory or research program is judged by its problem-solving capacity. This capacity is not gauged by straightforward empirical test but by examination by a relevant community of both empirical and conceptual problems, evaluations by "rules of thumb" which, though nonalgorithmic, can nonetheless be defended as rational.15 Perhaps
14Again, there is a normative reason for encouraging a plurality of democratic ideologies. It would seem to be part of the idea of democracy that varying interpretations of democratic ideals (and challenges to prevailing notions) be permitted and encouraged. 15 Indeed, some recent work in philosophy of science suggests the importance of a notion of rational judgement which is nonalgorithmic. For example, as Brown argues, "crucial decisions as to how a conflict between theory and observation is to be resolved, or how a proposed new theory is to be evaluated, are not made by the application of mechanical rules, but by reasoned judgements on the part of scientists and through debate within the scientific community. This, admittedly fallible, process is offered as a paradigm of

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more important, it is not crucial that holistic comparisons of this sort be made constantly. Rather the idea of problem-solving and "mixed programs" encourages the notion that particular strategies of problem-solving and hypotheses relevant to them are being tested rather than some more global test of competing ideologies. Regardless of the breadth of comparison, it still might seem that this account leaves the political theorist or researcher in ambiguous position, without any firm guidance of how to proceed. If we deny critical ("scientific") tests of democratic theories, broaden the notion of the relevant community for defining and dealing with problems in democratic theory, and discount the prospect of some holistic resolution of competing democratic theories, then it seems (a) the line between theory and research, on the one hand, and partisan political debate, on the other, becomes less clear and (b) there are no firm methodological guides for theory and research. These are only problems if we believe that the role of the democratic theorist should be defined in terms of some unique (and, perhaps, scientific) competence or, similarly, if we fear that anything less would reduce democratic theory to partisanship or "mere" ideology. The former proposition is, on the basis of a variety of considerations discussed above (the problems of inductive or critical "tests"), simply untenable. The latter fear is real enough but need not be realized. Democratic theory has and will continue naturally to produce partisan debates in the course of considering problems in democratic politics. The existence of such disputes need not undercut the ability to more or less rationally weigh the evidence, clarify disagreements, and come to some measure of agreement (or disagreement) on certain problems or agendas for research and discussion. To deny that this can be done would be to seriously compromise the belief in the possibility of a democratic society in which policy emerges from rational interaction and not mere partisan assertion.16 The implied injunction here to "be reasonable" may be less than a precise recipe for (scientific) rationality, but it is also more than rationalization and mere partisanship. The choice is not an either-or proposition and ought not be treated as such. Indeed, exploring this middle ground between science and partisanship may be a way of defining and directing the enthusiasm for the inchoate idea of "policy. inquiry" in which (democratic) theory and research attempt to serve important practical services in politics. REFERENCES Elitism.Boston: Little, Brown. Bachrach,Peter. 1967. The Theory Democratic of Ball, Terrence. 1976. "From Paradigmsto ResearchPrograms:Toward a PostKuhnian Political Science." American Science 151-78. 20: Journalof Political
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