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791

Journal of Food Protection, Vol. 70, No. 3, 2007, Pages 791–804


Copyright 䊚, International Association for Food Protection

Review

Agroterrorism: Where Are We in the Ongoing War on Terrorism?


TAMARA M. CRUTCHLEY,1,2* JOEL B. RODGERS,2 HEUSTIS P. WHITESIDE, JR.,2 MARTY VANIER,3 AND
THOMAS E. TERNDRUP2

1University
of Alabama at Birmingham’s Department of Nutrition Sciences, 1675 University Boulevard, Birmingham, Alabama 35294; 2University of
Alabama at Birmingham’s Center for Emergency Care and Disaster Preparedness, 625 19th Street South, Birmingham, Alabama 35294; and 3Kansas
State University’s National Agricultural Biosecurity Center, 203 Fairchild Hall, Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas 66506, USA

MS 05-644: Received 31 December 2005/Accepted 31 July 2006

ABSTRACT
The U.S. agricultural infrastructure is one of the most productive and efficient food-producing systems in the world.
Many of the characteristics that contribute to its high productivity and efficiency also make this infrastructure extremely
vulnerable to a terrorist attack by a biological weapon. Several experts have repeatedly stated that taking advantage of these
vulnerabilities would not require a significant undertaking and that the nation’s agricultural infrastructure remains highly
vulnerable. As a result of continuing criticism, many initiatives at all levels of government and within the private sector have
been undertaken to improve our ability to detect and respond to an agroterrorist attack. However, outbreaks, such as the 1999
West Nile outbreak, the 2001 anthrax attacks, the 2003 monkeypox outbreak, and the 2004 Escherichia coli O157:H7 outbreak,
have demonstrated the need for improvements in the areas of communication, emergency response and surveillance efforts,
and education for all levels of government, the agricultural community, and the private sector. We recommend establishing an
interdisciplinary advisory group that consists of experts from public health, human health, and animal health communities to
prioritize improvement efforts in these areas. The primary objective of this group would include establishing communication,
surveillance, and education benchmarks to determine current weaknesses in preparedness and activities designed to mitigate
weaknesses. We also recommend broader utilization of current food and agricultural preparedness guidelines, such as those
developed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.

The U.S. agricultural infrastructure is one of the most ments to improve counterterrorism capabilities, including
productive and efficient food-producing systems in the enhancements in the ability to detect, prevent, and respond
world (11, 15, 43, 62, 66). In 2001, food production gen- to terrorist threats and attacks (15, 35, 43, 47). However,
erated cash receipts in excess of $900 billion, about 10% according to several experts, the agriculture and food in-
of the U.S. gross domestic product (9, 11, 62). The U.S. dustries remain highly vulnerable to intentional disruption
agricultural system also contributes about $50 billion an- (11, 15, 35, 43). U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
nually to the national trade balance; the share of U.S. ag- officials estimate that a single agroterrorist attack on the
ricultural commodities sold overseas is more than double livestock industry with a highly infectious agent, such as
that of exports sold by other U.S. industries (11, 15, 43, foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), could cost the U.S. econ-
62). And, while the agricultural community employs less omy between $10 billion and $30 billion (50). This level
than 3% of the U.S. population directly, it employs ap- of impact would have a significant effect on domestic and
proximately 15% indirectly (9, 11). It is this increased pro- international livestock markets. Furthermore, by interrupt-
ductivity and efficiency of the U.S. farming system that ing the physical supply chain, the terrorist can cause not
allows Americans to spend less than 11% of their dispos- only economic harm but also fear (57). This kind of fear
able income on food, compared with the global average of could generate a profound loss of consumer confidence, not
around 20 to 30% (15, 43). Jon Wefald, President of Kansas unlike that caused in the airline and tourist industries as a
State University, said it best when he stated that ‘‘Our abil- result of the 11 September terrorist attack.
ity to produce safe, plentiful, and inexpensive food creates
the discretionary spending that drives the American stan- VULNERABILITIES IN THE AGRICULTURAL
dard of living.’’ INFRASTRUCTURE
The 11 September 2001 Al-Qaeda terrorist attack and Peters (44) states that an attack on the agricultural in-
the subsequent anthrax attacks forced Americans to ac- frastructure is more than a passing interest to the Al-Qaeda
knowledge their vulnerability to terrorism (35, 43). As a terrorist network. Hundreds of U.S. agricultural documents
result, the U.S. Government has made substantial invest- that had been translated into Arabic were seized in Af-
ghanistan following the U.S. invasion of that country.
* Author for correspondence. Tel: 205-996-4508; Fax: 205-975-8037; Many experts agree that the threat of bioterrorism against
E-mail: tcrutchley@uabmc.edu. the U.S. agricultural and food infrastructure is growing and
792 CRUTCHLEY ET AL. J. Food Prot., Vol. 70, No. 3

TABLE 1. Key vulnerabilities in agriculture and the exploitation imal disease outbreak in livestock or poultry over the past
of these vulnerabilities (11, 35, 42) 20 years; therefore, our animals have little or no innate
Key vulnerabilities Exploitation of key vulnerabilities resistance to these foreign pathogens (9, 11, 15, 43). By
policy, we do not vaccinate our livestock and poultry
Concentrated and in- Facilitate rapid spread of the disease against these diseases (10, 43). Third, changes in husbandry
tensive farming and and make it difficult to contain practices and biotechnology innovations designed to in-
production practices Would most likely require the destruc- crease the quality and quantity of livestock and crop pro-
tion of all exposed livestock
duction have led to an increased susceptibility to pathogenic
Diffcult to secure from intruders and
increases the number of entry
agents (11, 43). Modifications, such as sterilization pro-
points grams, dehorning, branding, hormone injections, and use of
Focus on aggregate Delayed recognition; farmers may not
antibiotics, have led to an increase in the stress levels and
rather than individ- notice symptoms of disease until it lowered the natural tolerance of animals to disease from
ual livestock statis- has infected large numbers in a contagious organisms (11, 43). Lastly, the problem is made
tics herd worse by the rapid movement of vast amounts of product
Increased susceptibili- No innate resistance over broad geographies and through many hands from farm
ty of livestock to to fork (11, 15). According to one survey of U.S. barn
disease auctions, 20 to 30% of cattle are regularly dispatched to
Rapid movement of Facilitates the spread of disease over locations at least 48.28 km from their original point of pur-
vast amounts of wide geographies chase and, in many cases, cross several states within 36 to
product over broad Circumvents natural barriers that could 48 h of leaving the sales yard (11). This rapid transfer of
geographies slow pathogenic dissemination livestock only helps to increase the possibility that patho-
Insufficient farm- and Disease-causing microbes can be wea- genic agents will spread well beyond the original site of a
food-related securi- ponized easily—in some cases, by specific outbreak before health officials become aware that
ty and surveillance simply walking onto a farm with a problem exists (12, 15). Clearly, the methods used by the
contaminated shoes U.S. agricultural system to increase productivity and effi-
Inefficient, passive Farmers may be reluctant to report an ciency also contribute to the increase in vulnerability to a
disease-reporting outbreak biological attack (11, 15).
system A general lack of physical security and robust surveil-
Inappropriate veteri- A lack of experience with foreign dis- lance systems further exacerbates our vulnerability to a bi-
narian and diagnos- ease may delay recognition of ological attack (11, 15, 16, 35, 43). According to Chalk
tic training symptoms and facilitate the spread
(11), the majority of the agricultural community has simply
of disease
not thought about, much less physically sought to guard
Mind-set of Ameri- Funding of programs designed to in-
itself against, a deliberate act of sabotage. Most U.S. farms
cans regarding the crease our ability to respond to an
importance of the agroterrorist event is less likely to
tend to operate in a relatively open manner, usually lacking
rural sector be a priority in the minds of many physical security, especially in outlying fields and feedlots,
Americans and seldom with vigorous means to prevent unauthorized
access (11, 43). Food processing and packing plants simi-
larly tend to lack physical security and safety preparedness
that the nation is not adequately prepared to handle such measures (12). Further complicating matters, the current
an attack (9, 10, 16, 43). There are several key vulnerabil- U.S. disease-reporting system does little to promote early
ities (Table 1) within the agricultural infrastructure, which warning and identification of pathogenic outbreaks (12).
makes it the likely target of a bioterrorist attack. Responsibility for reporting occurrences of livestock dis-
First, the U.S. agricultural market is largely dependent eases lies with the agricultural producers; however, produc-
on large populations of domestic livestock and poultry (10, ers are reluctant to report outbreak occurrences for several
43). An average-sized dairy farm in the United States hous- reasons (12). First, channels of communication with the ap-
es at least 1,500 lactating cows at any one time, with some propriate regulatory agencies or primary or secondary per-
of the larger farms containing about 10,000 animals (11). sonnel are often confusing and rudimentary (12). Second,
These herds are usually bred and reared in close proximity there are no standardized and consistent programs to com-
to one another in highly crowded populations (10, 11, 43). pensate producers affected by a pathogenic outbreak, as in-
Furthermore, the size and scale of contemporary agricul- demnity payments are usually determined on a case-by-case
tural facilities have largely precluded the option of farmers basis (11, 12). For example, the 1999 Emergency Supple-
attending to their animals on an individual basis (12). In- mental Appropriations Act provides less than 1% of the
stead, producers are forced to monitor and regulate their budgeted amount for livestock indemnity payments (13).
livestock populations by referring to aggregate statistics, Programs that provide compensation to farmers for depop-
such as total milk yields (12). This factor alone would make ulation of herds are usually for more common diseases,
it difficult to contain a contagious disease, especially if the such as tuberculosis. For example, the Animal and Plant
disease were airborne, as many infectious disease agents Health Inspection Service has implemented changes to the
are easily spread in crowded populations (1, 13). Second, tuberculosis eradication program in the United States to in-
the United States has not experienced a major foreign an- clude payment of indemnity for the depopulation of herds
J. Food Prot., Vol. 70, No. 3 AGROTERRORISM: WHERE ARE WE IN THE ONGOING WAR ON TERRORISM? 793

affected by tuberculosis (43). Furthermore, farmers may not cause the costs and technical difficulties associated with
want to invite quarantine and disease management officials manufacturing disease agents for offensive purposes are
onto their premises because of the perceived message it frequently cited as one of the most significant deterrents to
could send to the surrounding community (11). the use of biological agents (8, 11). Also, since many of
Veterinary training in the area of foreign animal dis- these disease agents cannot be passed to humans, they pose
eases has also declined because of the dwindling number no risk of infection to the perpetrator, thus eliminating the
of students pursuing large animal husbandry (7, 11, 29, 35). necessity for sophisticated containment procedures and per-
Only 25% of veterinarians who belong to the American sonal protective equipment (11). Furthermore, because of
Veterinary Medical Association work in large animal hus- the scale and openness of the food infrastructure and an
bandry, and the literature suggests that the declining num- overall lack of security, terrorists have a number of entry
ber of veterinarians who specialize in livestock treatment is points to choose from when implementing an attack (11,
attributable to a lack of educational support and career fi- 12).
nancial incentives (7, 11, 29). As a result of this decline,
college curricula in many veterinary schools have de-em- POTENTIAL IMPACT OF AGROTERRORISM
phasized foreign animal diseases education, instead focus- The deliberate introduction of a disease agent, either
ing attention on diseases that are endemic to the United against livestock or into the food chain, would have sub-
States, primarily diseases found in ‘‘pet’’ animals (11, 29). stantial economic, political, social, and public health reper-
Consequently, many accredited state and local veterinarians cussions (12, 15, 35, 45). The effect of a major biological
may lack the necessary tools to detect and respond to a attack would result in immediate economic disruption (11,
foreign animal disease outbreak. 35). According to Chalk (11), there are at least three ex-
Lastly, a much overlooked aspect of food safety is the pected levels of cost associated with an agroterrorist attack.
mind-set of many Americans (11, 15, 35). Americans have The first expected level is the economic cost associated
developed a false sense of security that is fueled by the with containment measures and the eradication of disease-
agricultural sector’s relative ‘‘invisibility’’ (11). Addition- ridden animals (11, 50). For example, in 1983, the U.S.
ally, according to Parker (42), there is limited appreciation poultry industry suffered a particularly virulent strain of
for the economic and social importance of agriculture in avian influenza that resulted in about $60 million in erad-
the United States. This is partly because the agricultural ication costs and nearly $250 million in increased consumer
community (10, 11, 35) directly employs less than 3% of costs (71). The second level is the ‘‘indirect multiplier ef-
the U.S. workforce. As a result, it is easy for Americans to fects’’ associated with both the compensation paid to farm-
equate food with supermarkets and restaurants, not farms. ers for the destruction of agricultural commodities and the
Many Americans take for granted that their food is safe and revenue deficits suffered by both directly and indirectly re-
readily available, and since agricultural safety is not a pri- lated industries (11, 50). During the 2001 outbreak of FMD
ority for many Americans, few demands are placed on the in the UK, the British Government paid more than $1.6
government to develop defense strategies (11, 15). Ameri- billion U.S. dollars in compensation to farmers affected by
cans, for the most part, have not been directly affected by the mass culling operations (2, 11). The third level is the
a crop or livestock disasters, such as the FMD outbreak in costs associated with international trade embargoes im-
the United Kingdom (UK), and therefore fail to realize that posed by major external export partners (11). Washington
the downstream effect of a deliberate act of sabotage would State experienced a loss of about $1 million per week be-
be multidimensional, affecting many sectors of the econo- cause of embargoes placed on the U.S. import of beef
my and, ultimately, affecting them directly (11, 15). tongues by Japan after one case of bovine spongiform en-
Taking advantage of these vulnerabilities in the agri- cephalitis was discovered (21). Even the threat of inten-
cultural infrastructure would not require a significant un- tional contamination could have an impact on the export
dertaking (10, 12). There is a large menu of environmen- market economy. For example, the Chilean grape scare of
tally hardy pathogenic agents (Table 2), many of which are 1989, in which the anti-Pinochet extremists threatened to
typically not the focus of concentrated livestock vaccina- lace fruit bound for the United States with sodium cyanide,
tions (10, 11). Of most concern are the List A animal path- resulted in the loss of more than $300 million U.S. dollars
ogens. According to the Office International des Epizooties, in revenue earnings (11, 32).
an intergovernmental organization created by the Interna- A successful agroterrorist attack would have a signifi-
tional Agreement of January 1924 signed by 28 countries cant political impact as well (11, 43). For instance, con-
(each member country works to report animal diseases that sumer confidence in the government’s ability to maintain a
it detects on its territory and then shares this information safe food supply would weaken significantly (6, 11, 14, 35,
with other countries), there are 15 ‘‘List A’’ animal patho- 43, 57). Graphic images of diseased animals appearing in
gens (12, 15, 42). The List A animal pathogens are agents the media would further demonstrate our extreme vulner-
that can be easily disseminated; these have the potential to ability to agroterrorism and further weaken the consumer’s
cause high mortality and public panic and social disruption confidence in the government’s ability to protect the food
and require special action in terms of preparedness and re- supply (11). Such an attack could also elicit fear and anx-
sponse planning (15, 42). Since many of these pathogens iety among the public, especially if the event resulted in
are highly transmissible, there is a reduction in the number foodborne outbreaks or the spread of animal pathogens con-
of obstacles to weaponization (11). This is important, be- tagious to humans (7). The combination of these factors
794 CRUTCHLEY ET AL. J. Food Prot., Vol. 70, No. 3

TABLE 2. Office International des Epizooties (OIE) List A animal diseases (41)
List A disease Causative agent Mortality Animals affected Zoonotic

African horse sickness Orbivirus (family Reovir- 70–95% (horses); 10– Horses, mules, donkey, No
idae) 50% (mules) and dogs
African swine fever African swine fever virus 60–100% Swine No
(family Iridoviridae)
Blue tongue Orbivirus (family Reovir- 0–50% Sheep, cattle, goats, and No
idae) wild ruminants
Classical swine fever Pestivirus (family Flavi- High Pigs and wild boar No
viridae)
Contagious bovine pleu- Mycoplasma mycoides Rates vary greatly Cattle No
ropneumonia var. mycoides
Foot-and-mouth disease Aphthovirus (family Pi- ⬍1% (morbidity near Cattle, sheep, goats, Noa
cornaviridae) 100%) swine, and all wild ru-
minants
Highly pathogenic avian Influenzavirus (family Near 100% Chicken, turkeys, and Yes
influenza Orthomyxoviridae) wild birds
Lumpy skin disease Capripoxvirus (family Variable, depending on Cattle No
Poxviridae) prevalence of insect
vector
Newcastle disease Avian paramyxovirus 90–100% Chickens, ducks, geese, Yes
(family Paramyxoviri- turkey, and wild birds
dae)
Peste des petits ruminants Morbillivirus (family 50–80% Sheep, goats, deer, cattle, No
Paramyxoviridae) and pigs
Rift Valley fever Phlebovirus (family Bun- 10–20% among adult an- Cattle, sheep, goats, ro- Major zoonosis
yaviridae) imals; higher among dents, wild ruminants,
young animals and humans
Rinderpest Morbillivirus (family High Cattle, sheep, goats, and No
Paramyxoviridae) swine
Sheep and goat pox Capripoxvirus (family Near 50%; can be as Sheep and goats No
Poxviridae) high as 95%
Swine vesicular disease Enterovirus (family Pi- Less than 1% (morbidity Pigs No
cornaviridae) very high)
Vesicular stomatitis Vesiculovirus (family Low (morbidity near Cattle, horses, swine, Minor zoonosis
Rhabdoviridae) 90%) deer, and humans
a Humans have developed very mild symptoms as a result of extensive exposure.

could potentially initiate a chain reaction of sociopolitical quired to adequately dispose of diseased carcasses is an
events that have the potential to undermine the public’s trust important issue (11, 15, 35). There is no ecologically
in both state and federal governments (12). friendly manner to dispose of the large number of animals
Public criticism would no doubt result from the re- that would perish in an outbreak (11). During the 2001
quired containment procedures, as hundreds of animals FMD outbreak in the UK, more than three million animals
would need to be slaughtered and disposed of promptly and were slaughtered. Disposal of these carcasses has the po-
properly (11, 15). The culling and disposal of diseased an- tential for long-term effects, such as groundwater contam-
imals would receive vigorous opposition from farmers, an- ination and the rendering of large areas of land unusable
imal rights advocates, and environmental advocates. This for many years (2, 11, 15).
cohort would especially oppose the slaughter of susceptible
but asymptomatic animals (11). The limited news and tele- WHAT ARE THE ISSUES?
vision coverage of the U.S. eradication of livestock has Agricultural bioterrorism will have major consequenc-
precluded the American public from seeing firsthand the es both nationally and internationally (7, 11, 15, 35, 43).
effects of mass animal depopulation (11, 15). According to The consequences of such an event could include human
Breeze (6), most Americans have no visual point of refer- casualties, disruption of markets, difficulties in sustaining
ence for the massive slaughter of animals that would be an adequate food supply, and loss of income and jobs for
required for the containment of a major disease outbreak; many. Experience with naturally occurring outbreaks of in-
consequently, such measures would create a major public fectious diseases has demonstrated that no existing preven-
relations challenge. Furthermore, the actual process re- tive or response system is 100% effective (18, 20, 22, 31),
J. Food Prot., Vol. 70, No. 3 AGROTERRORISM: WHERE ARE WE IN THE ONGOING WAR ON TERRORISM? 795

and yet steps can be taken to improve the speed of detection usually the responsibility of state and local health depart-
of a naturally occurring or bioterrorism event that will, in ments, whereas state agricultural agencies are responsible
turn, help minimize the impact. To improve our prevention for livestock, and state environmental agencies are respon-
and response capabilities, the United States requires better sible for wildlife (20). These various agencies conducted
communication, enhanced surveillance capabilities, and ad- their own investigations with little or no interagency com-
equate training at all levels of government and within the munication or sharing of information (20). Delays in di-
private sector. agnosis were also caused by an inability to quickly access
Effective communication is critical in the management a laboratory to test animal samples. Many veterinary lab-
of an animal disease outbreak (11, 25, 50, 53). However, oratories will test samples only on a fee basis, and public
several factors can often impede communication needs and health laboratories usually lack the capacity to test animal
efforts during times of emergency. For example, commu- samples (20). As a result, the veterinarians were forced to
nication between the agricultural producers and regulatory pursue many different channels to find a laboratory willing
agencies is important, because agricultural producers are to perform additional tests on the bird samples (20). Al-
among the first group to respond in the event of an infec- though public health agencies are now tracking sentinel
tious disease outbreak among animal populations (11, 12). flocks down the East Coast and there is real-time reporting
However, communications between agricultural producers of human infections, several communication problems be-
and the state emergency management regulators are some- tween public and animal health officials remain. For in-
times confusing and rudimentary and lack guidelines that stance, many states lack a centralized communication center
clearly designate the appropriate regulatory agencies or pri- as well as the funding needed to staff these centers with
mary or secondary personnel that need to be contacted in competent professionals, such as epidemiologists, veteri-
the event of a serious infectious disease outbreak (11). narians, wildlife experts, and biologists. Additionally, the
There is also uncertainty about when to report disease-re- communication systems available to most rural areas, the
lated information and to whom such reports should be made areas of most concern during an agroterrorist attack, are
(11, 21). Communication is further delayed by the unreli- outdated and do not permit real-time communication.
able, passive disease-reporting system (11, 12). This system Another important issue is the inconsistency of mes-
does little to promote early warning in the event of an an- sages from the media during an infectious disease outbreak.
imal disease outbreak, mainly because of fear on the part For example, during the 2001 anthrax attacks, media outlets
of the agricultural producers that they will be forced to sought statements from any potential expert, including un-
carry out uncompensated depopulation measures. Since the informed spokespersons, and then disseminated this infor-
United States has not experienced a major animal disease mation to the general public, some of which was not always
outbreak in almost 20 years, there have been few incentives accurate (43, 54). The lack of a coordinated media strategy
to modify the passive disease-reporting system currently in and the dissemination of inaccurate information by the me-
place (11, 15, 43). However, the development of govern- dia, combined with a scared public that was poorly edu-
ment indemnity plans before a crisis occurs and the use of cated about anthrax, resulted in the inappropriate use of
outreach programs designed to inform farmers of whom prophylaxis. This factor, combined with other factors men-
they should contact and when they should contact them in tioned previously, further strained public and animal health
the event of a suspected infectious disease outbreak would resources. Inconsistent and sometimes inaccurate messages
help improve the overall effectiveness of disease reporting from the media were also an issue during the 2004 to 2005
on the part of agricultural personnel. influenza vaccine shortage (71). State health officials re-
Another factor that hinders communication is the bar- ported several instances in which messages from the media
rier between the public and animal health community (20, created confusion. Health officials in California reported
21, 31, 33, 53, 55). The 1999 outbreak of West Nile virus that local radio stations in the state were running two public
in New York City is a good example of how a lack of service announcements simultaneously: one from the Cen-
communication and organization between federal, state, and ters for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) that advised
local agencies and the private sector impedes response ef- those aged 65 years and older to be vaccinated and one
forts when dealing with the early stages of an infectious from the state that advised those aged 50 years and older
disease outbreak (20, 31, 53, 55). Officials indicated that to be vaccinated. The reality of bioterrorism risks means
the lack of leadership in the initial stages of the outbreak that authorities should place higher priority on risk com-
and the lack of sufficient channels for communication were munication to achieve an optimal response. Studies of pub-
primarily responsible for the delay in the initial response to lic opinion and perception of biological weapons suggest
this outbreak (53, 55). Communication and coordinated sur- that many Americans lack basic knowledge about patho-
veillance efforts between the public and animal health com- gens and how they cause disease (43). One study found
munities were lacking, as key public health officials were that 47% of the population surveyed did not know that
not aware of the similarities in the clinical symptoms oc- anthrax does not spread person to person (43). This sug-
curring in the birds and humans until many days or weeks gests that, despite all of the media attention on anthrax from
after the human outbreak began (20, 31, 53, 55). Commu- the 2001 attacks, people still need education about basic
nication was further hindered because state and federal anthrax information. Efforts to train members of the media
agencies within the animal health community are segregat- to communicate effectively with the public will help, but
ed; that is, domestic animals, such as cats and dogs, are identifying spokespeople and developing messages before
796 CRUTCHLEY ET AL. J. Food Prot., Vol. 70, No. 3

they are needed are important priorities. Governmental or- ington postal worker, who later died of inhalation anthrax,
ganizations in conjunction with private-sector health care was sent home from a Maryland hospital with flu-like
clinicians should engage media and risk communication ex- symptoms after a coworker was admitted to another hos-
perts to proactively develop effective communication strat- pital with inhalation anthrax (54). Furthermore, insufficient
egies that consider the message, the messenger, and the re- laboratory capacity and a lack of coordination within the
cipient. laboratory network led to long delays in sample processing
The term surveillance is used to denote the ongoing (54).
efforts to collect, analyze, and interpret health-related data. Although many programs have been implemented to
These data can be used to rapidly detect an infectious dis- improve surveillance, there remain several gaps. For ex-
ease outbreak, thereby improving public and animal health ample, many states and cities currently develop their sur-
preparedness. Since early detection and response is critical veillance programs almost completely independently, which
to the rapid containment of any infectious disease, surveil- generally means that they do not learn from the efforts and
lance is a critical component of bioterrorist response plan- experiences of others, which ultimately leads to wasted re-
ning (11, 20, 46, 53). The effect of poor surveillance was sources (54). The strain on resources is particularly impor-
demonstrated during the 1999 West Nile outbreak (20, 30, tant because many health departments in the United States
31, 53). For the West Nile outbreak, reporting by an alert initiate nearly all the investigations that lead to recognition
physician was crucial to the early detection of the outbreak; of infectious disease outbreaks (54). A strain on resources
however, assessments of the response infrastructure sug- or a lack of resources can lead to understaffing and other
gested that surveillance networks in many locations were problems. Surveillance efforts are also challenged by the
not as well prepared. The lack of a common data set be- passive disease-reporting system for animal diseases and by
tween human and animal health communities that would the continued use of paper-based disease-reporting systems
link the surveillance systems led to duplication in efforts in many locations where surveillance is sporadic and in-
and greatly slowed the investigation (20, 31). To further adequate, resulting in underreporting or delays in reporting
compound the problem, there was also a lack of overlap disease outbreaks (12, 53). And, most importantly, many of
between surveillance networks within the domestic animal the state and local surveillance systems are designed with
health community. As mentioned previously, domestic an- either human or animal health in mind, but with little or no
imals (e.g., dogs, cats) are regulated by state and local
overlap. Since approximately three of every four emerging
health departments, livestock (e.g., cattle, swine) are regu-
infectious diseases that reach humans occur via transmis-
lated by state agricultural agencies, and wildlife (e.g., birds,
sion from animals, the animal health community should not
deer) are regulated by state environmental or wildlife agen-
be overlooked when designing and implementing surveil-
cies (20). The key to identifying the correct source of this
lance systems. Many of the zoonotic pathogens of concern
outbreak was a consensus that the bird and human out-
become established in wildlife before they are transmitted
breaks were related (20, 31, 53). However, since there was
to humans and domestic animals.
no overlap between the public and animal health surveil-
Education and training are also important issues with
lance networks and the surveillance networks within the
regard to emergency planning and response. Since the ini-
animal community, public and animal health officials were
tial detection of an infectious disease outbreak will likely
not aware of the similarities in the clinical symptoms oc-
curring in the birds and humans until many days or weeks occur when a physician, veterinarian, or other first respond-
after the human outbreak began. Once this association was er (e.g., public health worker, extension agent, plant pa-
made apparent, the cause of the outbreak was correctly thologist, biologist, laboratory technician) notices an un-
identified as a zoonotic disease (i.e., West Nile fever). usual case or cluster of cases, it is important that they re-
Clearly, this outbreak has demonstrated a need for a col- ceive adequate bioterrorism-related training to recognize
laborative outbreak surveillance network that would enable the characteristic features of diseases that could represent
local, state, and federal agencies in both human and animal novel infections or acts of bioterrorism (15, 27, 28, 35, 43).
health communities to view the same data in real time. Sim- The priority should be the education of first responders re-
ilarly, there was also the lack of a common data set between garding the clinical presentation of the most important dis-
human and animal health communities during the 2003 out- ease threat agents. According to Franz (19), the most im-
break of monkeypox (20, 53). Furthermore, animal track- portant disease threat agents are those that are highly con-
ing, an important component of surveillance, was difficult tagious, are very stable in the environment, have the ability
because of poor or absent records of sale (20, 53). The to rapidly evolve, or have the ability to cause enormous
combination of these factors during the monkeypox out- economic damage, such as Yersinia pestis (plague), Bacil-
break also led to a duplication in efforts and greatly slowed lus anthracis (anthrax), Influenzavirus A virus (highly path-
the investigation. Surveillance was also an issue during the ogenic avian influenza or ‘‘bird flu’’), and Aphthovirus
2001 anthrax attacks (54). Surveillance during the anthrax FMD). The development of an understanding among the
attacks relied primarily on medical practitioners, some of humans closest to animals regarding when to report a sus-
whom lacked adequate training to respond appropriately. picious case and to whom such a report should be made
For example, while astute physicians in Florida identified should also be a focal point of education. First responders
the probable threat and acted quickly to contain and warn from all areas of health and emergency response should
other citizens, thereby preventing a second death, a Wash- receive similar training related to these issues as well as
J. Food Prot., Vol. 70, No. 3 AGROTERRORISM: WHERE ARE WE IN THE ONGOING WAR ON TERRORISM? 797

similar training regarding the importance of the timely shar- (i) The Agroterrorism Prevention Act of 2001 was
ing of information with other groups. sponsored by Republican George Nethercutt during two
There are several outbreaks that illustrate how the lack separate sessions of Congress but never became a law. Had
of knowledge among first responders regarding infectious this bill been passed, it would have amended the federal
diseases can lead to a delay in diagnosis and containment. criminal code to establish and enhance penalties for animal
For instance, about 40 people in six Midwestern states con- and plant enterprise terrorism (23). Under the guidelines,
tracted monkeypox in 2003, a life-threatening illness related animal and plant terrorism would be a predicate offense
to smallpox (53). This was the first outbreak of monkeypox under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
in the United States, and as such, there was a lack of aware- Act and would have required the Director of the National
ness of this nonindigenous pathogen among public and an- Science Foundation to establish and maintain a national
imal health care providers. Because of the lack of aware- clearinghouse for information on incidents of crime and
ness on the part of the health care providers, testing to terrorism committed against or directed at any (i) animal
determine the cause of the illness took about 2 months. In or plant enterprise; (ii) commercial activity because of the
such cases, early detection is critical to prevent the nonin- perceived impact of such activity on the environment; or
digenous disease from becoming entrenched in our country. (iii) person because of such person’s perceived connection
Another example is the 2001 anthrax attacks, which result- with or support of any enterprise or activity. This act would
ed in 22 cases, five deaths, and billions of dollars to con- have also authorized appropriations of $5 million to the
tain, decontaminate, and investigate (54). During these at- National Science Foundation for animal and plant research
tacks, a lack of knowledge related to detection, surveil- security programs and grants.
lance, and response on the part of medical practitioners and (ii) The Agricultural Terrorism Prevention Response
other first responders, as well as private citizens, made it Act of 2001 was proposed during several sessions of Con-
difficult to contain. The 2004 outbreak of Escherichia coli gress and introduced in the House of Representatives; how-
O157:H7 at a farm animal exhibit in North Carolina also ever, it also never became a law. The Agricultural Terrorism
demonstrated the need for increased knowledge of infec- Prevention Response Act would have established an Inter-
tious diseases (26, 33, 49). During this outbreak, several agency Agricultural Terrorism Committee to coordinate the
children and adults came in contact with farm animals at counterterrorism efforts to protect the U.S. agricultural pro-
an animal exhibit at a county fair. Because of an inadequate duction and food supply system (24). The Agricultural Ter-
understanding of disease transmission, several of the visi- rorism Prevention Response Act would have also directed
tors contracted E. coli O157:H7, which can lead to serious, the Secretary of Agriculture to (i) strengthen cooperation
lifelong complications, such as hemolytic uremic syndrome. with other agencies; (ii) appoint an agricultural liaison to
As a result of this outbreak, the state enacted Aedin’s law, the Homeland Security Office; (iii) establish an Industry
which stipulates that educational outreach programs be im- Working Group on agricultural terrorism to develop coun-
plemented to inform agricultural fair operators, exhibitors, terterrorism measures to protect the U.S. agricultural pro-
agritourism business operators, and the general public about duction and food supply system; and (iv) establish related
the health risks associated with diseases transmitted by training and information programs for agricultural produc-
physical contact with animals (26, 49). Furthermore, this ers.
(iii) The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Pre-
law requires the posting of signage informing the public of
paredness and Response Act (Bioterrorism Act) of 2002
health and safety issues related to contact with animals at
was signed into law by President Bush on 12 June 2002.
all petting zoos and animal exhibitions at state-sanctioned
The Bioterrorism Act directs the Secretary of HHS to de-
fairs.
velop and implement a coordinated strategy, building upon
WHERE ARE WE NOW? core public health capabilities established under provisions
of the act, for carrying out health-related activities to pre-
Tommy Thompson, former Secretary of Health and pare for and respond effectively to bioterrorism and other
Human Services (HHS), expressed concern about the pos- public health emergencies (63). Under these new guide-
sibility of a terrorist attack on the nation’s food supply dur- lines, the Secretary of HHS is supplied with new authorities
ing his resignation speech by saying, ‘‘For the life of me, to protect the nation’s food supply against the threat of in-
I cannot understand why terrorists have not attacked our tentional contamination as well as other food-related emer-
food supply because it is so easy to do!’’ (44). Others agree gencies. For example, Title III of the Bioterrorism Act deals
that the threat is a serious problem for both imported food specifically with agricultural security by increasing inspec-
products and domestically produced food (8, 11, 15, 35, tion capacity at points of origin, improving surveillance at
43). In response to this growing threat, governmental agen- ports of entry, and enhancing methods of protecting against
cies have implemented several initiatives to protect our bioterrorism. As part of this provision, the Secretary is au-
food and agriculture infrastructures (3, 5, 13, 14, 21). One thorized to (i) set forth reporting requirements and authorize
of the primary issues addressed by government is the or- appropriations (Section 302); (ii) permit an officer or qual-
ganization and distribution of regulatory responsibilities. ified employee of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
Several bills have been introduced that address some (FDA) to order the temporary detention of any article of
aspect of terrorism in agriculture. The following is a list of food if the officer or qualified employee finds, during an
some of those new bills: inspection, examination, or investigation, credible evidence
798 CRUTCHLEY ET AL. J. Food Prot., Vol. 70, No. 3

or information indicating that such article presents a threat (iv) carry out all functions of entities transferred to the
of serious adverse health consequences or death to humans DHS; (v) ensure that the functions of the agencies and sub-
or animals (Section 303); (iii) provide for the debarment of divisions within the DHS that are not related directly to
importers for repeated or serious food import violations securing the homeland are not diminished or neglected ex-
(Section 304); (iv) require that any facility (domestic and cept by a specific Act of Congress; (vi) ensure that the
foreign) engaged in manufacturing, processing, packing, or overall economic security of the United States is not di-
holding food for consumption in the United States be reg- minished by efforts, activities, and programs aimed at se-
istered with the Secretary (Section 305); (v) require that curing the homeland; and (vii) monitor connections be-
access be permitted to all records needed to assist the Sec- tween illegal drug trafficking and terrorism, coordinate ef-
retary in determining whether food is adulterated and pre- forts to sever such connections, and otherwise contribute to
sents a threat of serious adverse health consequences or efforts to interdict illegal drug trafficking. Under Section
death to humans or animals (Section 306); (vi) require that 202 of the guidelines, all federal agencies must promptly
all food importers give the Secretary specified prior notice supply the Secretary of the DHS with (i) all reports, as-
(including specified information about the source of food) sessments, and analytical information related to threats of
of the importation of any food for the purpose of enabling terrorism and to other responsibilities assigned to the Sec-
the food to be inspected (Section 307); (vii) require that the retary; (ii) all information concerning the vulnerability of
owner or consignee of food refused admission into the the U.S. infrastructure or other U.S. vulnerabilities to ter-
United States, but not ordered destroyed, affix to the con- rorism, whether or not it has been analyzed; (iii) all other
tainer of the food a label that clearly and conspicuously information related to significant and credible threats of ter-
bears the statement: United States: Refused Entry (Section rorism, whether or not it has been analyzed; and (iv) such
308); (viii) prohibit an importer from port shopping with other information or material as the President may direct.
respect to food that has previously been denied entry (Sec- And, as part of the largest governmental reorganization in
tion 309); (ix) provide notice regarding threats associated 50 years, the DHS assumed a number of government func-
with a shipment of imported food to the appropriate states tions previously conducted by other departments, such as
(Section 310); (x) allocate funds to states, territories, and agricultural border inspection, functions under the U.S.
Indian tribes to assist with the costs of enhancing food safe- Customs Service, and functions under the Transportation
ty efforts as well as costs associated with examinations, Security Administration. Possession of the Plum Island An-
inspections, and investigations where a credible threat of imal Disease Center in New York was also transferred to
adulterated food is present (Sections 311 and 312); (xi) co- the DHS. As a result of the reorganization, the DHS is now
ordinate zoonotic disease surveillance (Section 313); and the third largest cabinet department in the U.S. Federal
(xii) commission officers and qualified employees of other Government, after the Department of Defense and the De-
federal departments or federal agencies to conduct exami- partment of Veterans Affairs.
nations and inspections for the Secretary under the Federal (v) Homeland Security Presidential Directive-9 was
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Subtitle B of Title II directs signed by President Bush in 2004 to establish a national
the Secretary of Agriculture to establish and maintain a list policy to defend the agriculture and food system against
of each biological agent and each toxin that the Secretary terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies by
determines has the potential to pose a severe threat to an- requiring actions in the following areas: (i) awareness and
imal or plant health or to animal or plant products. Subtitle warning; (ii) vulnerability assessments; (iii) mitigation
D of Title II amends the federal criminal code provisions strategies; (iv) response planning and recovery; (v) outreach
concerning the possession of listed biological agents and and professional development; and (vi) research and de-
toxins to provide that whoever (i) transfers a select agent velopment (40, 68). Homeland Security Presidential Direc-
to a person who the transferor knows or has reasonable tive-7 made the DHS responsible for coordinating the over-
cause to believe is not registered as required shall be fined, all national effort to enhance the protection of the critical
imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both; and (ii) infrastructure and key resources of the United States (67).
knowingly possesses a biological agent or toxin where such An important issue in Homeland Security Presidential Di-
agent or toxin is a select agent for which such person has rective-9 is the focus on veterinary medicine as a critical
not obtained a required registration shall be fined, impris- component of food security (41, 68). For example, the pol-
oned for not more than 5 years, or both. icy calls for the creation of a national stockpile of animal
(iv) The Homeland Security Act of 2002 was enacted drugs and vaccines to better respond to serious animal dis-
as a direct result of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks eases; grants to veterinary colleges for expanding training
(66, 73). The primary purpose of the Homeland Security in exotic animal diseases, epidemiology, and public health;
Act was to create the Department of Homeland Security and inclusion of veterinary diagnostic laboratories in na-
(DHS). The DHS was established under Section 101 of the tional networks of federal and state laboratories. Ultimately,
guidelines as an executive department of the United States, the goal of implementing this directive is the development
headed by a Secretary of Homeland Security appointed by of a robust, comprehensive, and fully coordinated surveil-
the President, to (i) prevent terrorist attacks within the Unit- lance and monitoring system for public and animal health.
ed States; (ii) reduce the vulnerability of the United States The policy also directs the Departments of Agriculture,
to terrorism; (iii) minimize the damage, and assist in the Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security to es-
recovery, from terrorist attacks within the United States; tablish internships, fellowships, and other postgraduate op-
J. Food Prot., Vol. 70, No. 3 AGROTERRORISM: WHERE ARE WE IN THE ONGOING WAR ON TERRORISM? 799

portunities for professional development and specialized cation Self-Assessment Tool will allow a self-assessment of
training in agriculture and food protection that provide for vulnerabilities by various sector participants. The National
homeland security professional workforce needs. If imple- Asset Database is a secure, Web-based application for the
mented in its entirety, this document will have a long-stand- exchange of unclassified asset information and is designed
ing and positive influence on animal health and animal ag- to integrate with other, related data repositories. Vulnera-
riculture. bility Identification Self-Assessment Tool assessments will
be linked to the National Asset Database and will provide
As a result of the above-mentioned legislation, federal
a means to assess baseline security system effectiveness
and state agencies have implemented initiatives to address
against a base set of threat scenarios. Ultimately, the goal
agricultural and food defense issues. The following is a list
of this system is to provide data and tools to assess and
of some of the agencies and their initiatives:
quantify risk according to the variables of threat, vulnera-
(i) Since its inception, the DHS has focused its efforts bility, and consequence.
on a six-point agenda: (i) to increase overall preparedness; (ii) HHS is the U.S. Government’s principal agency
(ii) to create better transportation security systems; (iii) to for protecting the health of all Americans and providing
strengthen border security; (iv) to enhance information essential human services. Eleven operating divisions, in-
sharing; (v) to improve financial management; and (vi) to cluding the National Institutes of Health, the FDA, and the
realign the DHS organization to maximize mission perfor- CDC, administer its programs. The Bioterrorism Act of
mance (64, 72). The National Preparedness System was de- 2002 supplied the FDA with more authority to protect the
veloped within the DHS as part of this agenda (14). This nation’s food supply against the threat of intentional con-
system was designed to provide a comprehensive assess- tamination as well as other food-related emergencies (48,
ment of national preparedness and has six basic compo- 63, 70). FDA rules issued in accordance with the provisions
nents: (i) the National Preparedness Goal, which sets a gen- in the Bioterrorism Act can be found at http:www.fda.gov/
eral goal for national preparedness, identifies the means of oc/bioterrorism/bioact.html. For example, Section 305 of
measuring such preparedness, and establishes national pre- the Bioterrorism Act outlines the rules for the registration
paredness priorities; (ii) 15 planning scenarios set forth as of companies involved in the food system. According to
examples of catastrophic situations to which nonfederal new rule, all domestic and foreign facilities that manufac-
agencies are expected to be able to respond; (iii) the Uni- ture, process, pack, or hold food for human or animal con-
versal Task List, which identifies specific tasks that federal sumption in the United States were required to register with
agencies and nonfederal agencies would be expected to un- the FDA no later than 12 December 2003. Registration con-
dertake; (iv) the Target Capabilities List, which identifies sists of providing information, such as the firm name, ad-
36 areas in which responding agencies are expected to be dress, product brands, and categories. Farms, restaurants,
proficient in order to meet the expectations set out in the retail food establishments, nonprofit establishments that
Universal Task List; (v) the National Preparedness System prepare or serve food, and fishing vessels not engaged in
sets out the framework through which federal agencies op- processing are exempt from this requirement. Section 306
erate when a catastrophe occurs; and (vi) the National In- outlines the rules for record keeping and maintenance. This
cident Management System, which identifies standard op- section gives the FDA authority to require that all food
erating procedures and approaches to be used by respondent processors keep production and distribution records. Facil-
agencies as they work to manage the consequences of a ities will be required to make these records available within
catastrophe. According to Bea (4), the National Prepared- 24 h in the event of a suspected food safety problem. Farm-
ness System represents the most comprehensive effort taken ers, retailers, restaurants, and other businesses dealing di-
to develop an emergency preparedness and response sys- rectly with the public do not have to keep records; however,
tem. Ultimately, the National Preparedness System is in- they are required to maintain records on where retail prod-
tended to increase federal involvement in emergency pre- ucts were obtained. Section 307 deals specifically with prior
paredness and response by providing policy makers and notice of food imports. Under the new guidelines, all food
practitioners with the ability to track and improve readiness, importers must give advance electronic notification to the
locate additional resources as needed, and make informed FDA prior to the importation of food. The notice must in-
decisions regarding risk management. The National Bio- clude a description of the article, the manufacturer, the ship-
security Integration System is being updated by the DHS per, the grower, the country of origin, the country from
to enhance information sharing (14). These updates, re- which the article is shipped, and the anticipated port of
ferred to as the National Biosecurity Integration System entry. Other issues outlined in the Bioterrorism Act include
Lite, will integrate data from the CDC, FDA, USDA, and administration detention, debarment for persons convicted
DHS Science Technology Directorate. National Biosecurity of conduct related to the adulteration of imported food, and
Integration System Lite is intended to enable early detection allocation of grant funds to assist with the costs of enhanc-
and characterization of biological trends, provide situational ing food safety efforts and the costs associated with taking
understanding to guide response, and enable the sharing of action when a credible threat of adulterated food is present.
information among its partners. The Vulnerability Identifi- As mentioned previously, the overall purpose of these new
cation Self-Assessment Tool and the National Asset Data- guidelines is to give the FDA the authority and information
base were also developed by the DHS as a way of improv- needed to protect our food supply. Access to records is
ing overall preparedness (14). The Vulnerability Identifi- intended to better facilitate the tracking and control of food
800 CRUTCHLEY ET AL. J. Food Prot., Vol. 70, No. 3

products suspected of being contaminated. The intended ing to terrorism and counterterrorism and for conducting
purpose of prior notification is to ensure that all imports strategic operational planning by integrating all instruments
comply with U.S. regulations and that suspect shipments of national power. The USDA has also implemented several
are identified and inspected. Additionally, through the use programs designed to increase education and skills among
of food facility registration, the FDA will have a more ac- first responders (58, 60). For example, the USDA is work-
curate inventory of its regulatory domain, which will fur- ing with other federal and state agencies to outline a new
ther enhance its ability to trace intentionally and uninten- education and outreach plan, which includes implementa-
tionally contaminated food. tion of hazard analysis and critical control point and the
(iii) Federal responsibilities to protect the agricultural development of a new Website for bovine spongiform en-
infrastructure against acts of terrorism fall primarily with cephalitis information (58, 60). The goal of these outreach
the USDA. Within the USDA, the Animal and Plant Health efforts are to inform producers and affiliated industries of
Inspection Service and the Food Safety and Inspection Ser- the surveillance goals and to encourage the reporting of
vice have the primary authority to protect agriculture and suspect or targeted cattle on farms and elsewhere.
ensure the safety of meat, poultry, and egg products, while
Other initiatives include the following:
the Agricultural Research Service conducts research and
development of countermeasures and diagnostic tools. Un- (i) The Memorandum of Agreement for an Integrated
der the guidance of the USDA agencies, several important Consortium of Laboratory Networks, a collaborative effort
agrosecurity initiatives have been implemented. For ex- between the FDA, CDC, USDA, DHS, and U.S. Environ-
ample, the National Animal Identification System, a collab- mental Protection Agency, was initiated to integrate human
orative state-federal-industry partnership, was implemented and animal laboratory networks (4). The Integrated Con-
as a means to standardize and expand animal identification sortium of Laboratory Networks initially grew from the col-
programs and practices to include all livestock species and laborative work of the U.S. Environmental Protection
poultry (61). The National Animal Identification System is Agency and the CDC and was expanded under this agree-
currently being developed, under the guidance of the ment to include other laboratory networks, such as the
USDA, for all animals that will benefit from rapid trace USDA’s National Animal Health Laboratory Network and
backs in the event of a potential disease outbreak. Many the Food Emergency Response Network, a collaborative ef-
species can already be identified through some sort of iden- fort between the FDA and the USDA’s Food Safety and
tification system, but these systems are not consistently Inspection Service. The long-term goal of this collaborative
used across the United States. Under such a system, all effort is to provide early detection and effective conse-
states will operate under national standards to eliminate in- quence management of acts of terrorism and other events
consistencies and overlap. The National Animal Identifi- that involve a variety of agents or more than one segment
cation System will integrate systems currently in place, of the nation (e.g., humans, wildlife, domestic pets, plants,
such as premise identification, animal identification, and an- food, the environment).
imal tracking systems. Eventually, it will provide health (ii) The Strategic Partnership Program Agroterrorism
officials with the capability of identifying all livestock and Initiative was initiated in 2005 (17). Under this initiative,
premises that have had direct contact with the disease of the DHS, USDA, FDA, and Federal Bureau of Investigation
concern within 48 h after the discovery of a potential out- will collaborate with private industry and the states to help
break. The USDA hopes to make animal identification man- identify sector-wide vulnerabilities and develop mitigation
datory in 2008; currently, the program is voluntary. The strategies to reduce the threat of an agroterrorist attack. To
National Center for Animal Health Surveillance was cre- facilitate the implementation of this initiative, a series of
ated by the USDA in 2004 as a result of the restructuring site visits at multiple food and agriculture and production
of the Center for Animal Health Monitoring in an effort to facilities will be conducted to validate or identify vulnera-
strengthen the U.S. animal health surveillance system (59). bilities at the specific site and the sector as a whole. The
The National Center for Animal Health Surveillance is one information gathered from these site visits will be used to
of three centers within the Veterinary Services’ Center for develop mitigation strategies and lessons learned.
Epidemiology and Animal Health and is organized into two (iii) A cooperative agreement between the National
units, the National Surveillance Unit and the National An- Association of State Departments of Agriculture, the
imal Health Monitoring System. The National Surveillance USDA, the FDA, and the DHS was drawn up to integrate
Unit coordinates activities related to U.S. animal health sur- federal and state response plans for food and agricultural
veillance and addresses recommendations regarding sur- emergencies (64). Implementation of this cooperative
veillance. The National Animal Health Monitoring System agreement will occur in the following three phases. (i) A
is responsible for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating workgroup consisting of federal, state, and local officials
data on animal health, management, and productivity across will gather information about existing state emergency re-
the United States. Information sharing was enhanced with sponse systems and how food and agricultural safety and
the development of a USDA liaison position in the National security emergencies will be handled within the various
Counterterrorism Center (14). The National Counterterror- states. (ii) The information gathered during phase 1, which
ism Center was established by the President in August 2004 will include state and local participation, will be used to
to serve as the primary organization in the U.S. Govern- develop an interagency response plan, to conduct tabletop
ment for integrating and analyzing all intelligence pertain- exercises, to pilot test the functionality of the emergency
J. Food Prot., Vol. 70, No. 3 AGROTERRORISM: WHERE ARE WE IN THE ONGOING WAR ON TERRORISM? 801

response plan, and to refine the plan on the basis of the dinate academic agricultural biosecurity activities with fed-
lessons learned and other input. (iii) The information that eral, state, and local agencies and the public health com-
is gathered during phase 2 will be used to develop guide- munity through the following methods: (i) response plan-
lines for federal food and agricultural regulatory agencies ning and exercises; (ii) education and awareness; (iii) a syn-
to cooperate with state and local emergency response ef- dromic surveillance program; (iv) international initiatives;
forts. Ultimately, the goal of this initiative is to better fa- and (v) efforts on the part of the Biosecurity Research In-
cilitate federal assistance more quickly and appropriately to stitute. The Florida Department of Agriculture and Con-
assist the local response and recovery efforts. The Food sumer Services at the Florida State University has imple-
Emergency Response Plan Template is available on the Na- mented the State Agricultural Response Team, which is de-
tional Association of State Departments of Agriculture signed to coordinate disaster response for animals and ag-
Website (37). riculture (52). The State Agricultural Response Team
utilizes the skills and resources of various agencies to sup-
Universities have taken a lead role in the area of out- port the county, regional, and state emergency management
reach and professional development. Numerous training efforts and incident management teams. Its mission is to
programs and educational Websites have been developed to provide Floridians with the necessary training and resourc-
address bioterrorism education. As mentioned previously, es to enhance all-hazard disaster planning and response for
the shortage of trained personnel in state and local public animal and agricultural issues. The South Central Center
and animal health departments and laboratories is a major for Public Health Preparedness at the University of Ala-
issue. Barriers to finding and hiring adequately trained per- bama at Birmingham, in partnership with the CDC, the
sonnel include noncompetitive salaries and a general short- Health Resources and Services Administration, and the uni-
age of people with the necessary skills to respond to a cat- versities and public health departments in other states, also
astrophic event. The National Center for Food Protection provides public and animal health training related to agro-
and Defense, based at the University of Minnesota, was terrorism (51). The South Central Center for Public Health
established as a Homeland Security Center of Excellence Preparedness held its first Agricultural Security conference
in 2004 (38). The National Center for Food Protection and in June 2005. The focus of this conference was to educate
Defense, a multidisciplinary and action-oriented consor- public health, agricultural, regulatory, and law enforcement
tium, addresses the issues of vulnerability to the nation’s communities about zoonotic diseases and to foster a mul-
food system by (i) making significant improvements in sup- tiagency, multidisciplinary dialogue to ensure the safety of
ply chain security, preparedness, and resiliency; (ii) devel- the food supply for all Americans. The South Central Cen-
oping rapid and accurate methods to detect incidents of ter for Public Health Preparedness also offers several train-
contamination and to identify the specific agent(s) involved; ing and preparedness center courses, online courses, Web-
(iii) applying strategies to reduce the risk of foodborne ill- cast courses, and CD-ROMs that focus on agriculturally
ness due to intentional contamination in the food supply related issues, such as the following: (i) Improving Your
chain; (iv) developing tools to facilitate recovery from con- Communication Skills (training course); (ii) Food as an Ef-
tamination incidents and resumption of safe food system fective Weapon of Terrorism (preparedness course); (iii)
operations; (v) rapidly mobilizing and delivering appropri- The Terrorist Threat to Global Food, Water, & Agricultural
ate and credible risk communication messages to the public; Infrastructure: What Can We Do To Ensure an Ongoing &
and (vi) delivering high-quality education and training pro- Safe Supply of Food & Water (online course); (iv) Agro-
grams to develop a cadre of professionals equipped to deal terrorism & Public Health—Reestablishing an Old Rela-
with future threats to the food system. The National Center tionship (Webcast); (v) Emerging Infectious Diseases &
for Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease Defense, based Bioterrorism Risk (online course); (vi) Agricultural Secu-
at Texas A&M University, was also established as a Home- rity—Avian Influenza: Implications for Agriculture and
land Security Center of Excellence in 2004 (39). Other core Public Health (Webcast, presentation from the 2005 Agri-
members of the National Center for Foreign Animal and cultural Security conference); and (vii) Bioterrorism (part 2
Zoonotic Disease Defense include the University of Cali- of the WMD [weapons of mass destruction] Terrorism Se-
fornia at Davis, the University of Southern California, and ries) (CD-ROM). To expand the pool of ‘‘first detectors,’’
the University of Texas Medical Branch. The National Cen- the Kentucky Injury Prevention Center at the University of
ter for Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease Defense was Kentucky College of Public Health has collaborated with
designed to produce four general products: (i) specific bi- the Kentucky Department of Agriculture and the UK Col-
ological research products and outcomes; (ii) a robust da- lege of Agriculture to develop two online courses on agro-
tabase and models that can be used to assist in making terrorism education (34). To expand the pool of health care
decisions, predicting needs, and testing outcomes; (iii) ap- professionals able to respond to infectious disease out-
plication of the models to specific needs of the Department; breaks, the University of Alabama at Birmingham is pro-
and (iv) expanded professional resources directed to foreign viding online continuing education and information for rare
animal and zoonotic diseases, all of which are directly rel- and emerging infections and potential category A bioter-
evant to countering the threat of agricultural bioterrorism. rorist agents (56). And, to help expand the veterinary work-
The National Agricultural Biosecurity Center was estab- force, the Association of American Veterinary Colleges has
lished by Kansas State University in 1999 (36). The goal lobbied for support of the Veterinary Workforce Expansion
of the National Agricultural Biosecurity Center is to coor- Act, which has not yet been implemented (14). The Vet-
802 CRUTCHLEY ET AL. J. Food Prot., Vol. 70, No. 3

erinary Workforce Expansion Act is a loan repayment pro- fective, it is important that these agencies work together
gram for veterinarians who agree to work in ‘‘shortage sit- with the private sector to develop strategic plans, revise
uations.’’ Such shortage situations are determined in a com- existing plans, and evaluate these plans through the use of
petitive process that is requested by state veterinarians, tabletop exercises. And, finally, there are poorly developed
Area Veterinarians in Charge, and Food Safety and Inspec- educational strategies for allaying public fears concerning
tion Service District Managers. The goal of this program is catastrophic events. Terrorists can use the resulting fear and
to expand capacity and services at existing schools, includ- anxiety to their advantage without having to carry out in-
ing teaching laboratories, research facilities, classrooms, discriminate civilian-directed attacks.
and administrative space.
REFERENCES
FINAL THOUGHTS
1. Alabama Office for Domestic Preparedness. 2005. Terrorism: a real
These programs, along with many others, help increase threat. Available at: http://www.homelandsecurity.alabama.gov/
emergency preparedness and response. However, there has PDFs/CDP%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf. Accessed 21 October 2005.
been little or no evaluation of the effectiveness of these 2. Anonymous. 29 August 2001. FMD report: outbreak’s economic im-
pact. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1515327.stm. Ac-
initiatives. Response efforts during Hurricane Katrina cessed 21 October 2005.
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