ManageriMConflictand Resistance: The Distinct Corporate Cultures of DuPont and Sun Oil

Christiane Diehi-Taylor
Department ofHistory University Minnesota

Scholars interested exploring issue managerial in the of conflictand resistance duringbureaucratizafion not confronted are with a plethoraof sources. they If read synthetic the works such of leading stmcturalists asAlfred Chandler cultural and theorists Thomas as Cochran, notionof managehal the conflict and resistance notably is absent from theirdiscussions bureaucratof izafion[Chandler, 1977;Cochran, 1985].Evenin morerecent worksdealing with the structural cultural and elements bureaucratizafion, asJoAnne of such Yates'sControl Through Communications Olivier Zunz's MakingAmerica and Corporate, managerial conflict and resistance receive only occasional mention [Yates, 1989;Zunz, 1990].While conflict and resistance key themes are for laborhistorians as DavidMontgomery, class such the conflict modelthey employ focuses almost solely theconflict resistance existed on and that between managers theiremployees. discussionconflict resistance and Any of and among managers limited to that which occurredbetween foremen and their is superiors [Montgomery, 1987]. Whilehistorians technology asMonte of such Calvert offer some insight managerial into conflict resistance, focus and their is primarily scientists, on engineers, production and personnel [Calvert, 1967]. What one garners from thesediverse sources regarding subject the is that managers all levels at generally acquiesced bureaucratizafion to because theysupported bureaucratic principles gave to authority. managerial or in The conflict andresistance occurred that tended be among to mid- andlow-level

managers wereengineers, who scientists,production or supervisors, they and

largely argued whatconstituted bureaucratic over best practice. An examination the bureaucratization DuPont and Sun Oil, of of particularly their high explosives refineryoperations, and reveals that this depiction both incorrect incomplete. bureaucratizafion is and The process generated greatdealof managerial a conflict all levels at withinorganizations. Senior officials wellasmiddle lower as and echelon managers argued such over
I thank Hagley the Museum Library theDepartment History, and and of University of Minnesota theirresearch for grants George and Green hisinvaluable for comments during thepreparation thisarticle. of Muchof thefollowing discussion is drawn frommy forthcoming dissertation '3usiness ProceedtheFollowing Shall in Manner:" Corporate Managers, the Bureaucratiation and Creation Process,the ofDivergent Corporate Cultures, !880-!958.

BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC HISTORY,Volume Twenty-six, 2,Winter no. 1997.

Copyright 1997 bytheBusiness History Conference. 0894-6825. ISSN
584

CORPORATE CULTURES OF DUPONT AND SUN OIL / 585

strategic issues authority organization suchtactical as and and matters the as logistical economic and feasibility standardization, best methods of the of standardization, safety and rulesand procedures. Managerial resistance also accompanied process. the While resistance far more prevalent was among middle- and lower-echelon managers than among theix superiors, even executives, particularly those with strong opinions regarding whatconstituted bestbureaucratic practices those and whoremained waryof bureaucratization, resisted certain bureaucratic practices. Whilecorporate cultures some had effect on the natureof managerial conflict andresistance, apparently theix they had greatest impact how fro'ns on responded conflict resistance. to and Although some firmsfelt thatmanagerial conflict resistance beneficial and had outcomes, theyalso believed limiting in theix occurrence, theix and corporate cultures had a significant impact thecontrol on mechanisms chose employ. they to
The Distinct CorporateCulturesof DuPont and Sun Oil

Dueto theix executives' divergent views regarding control, coordination, and maximumefficiency, managers within DuPont readilyadopted bureaucratic practices whileSunattempted relyoninformal to mechanisms aslong for aspossible. In 1902,a new generation DuPonts, of namely Coleman, Pierre(P.S.), andAlfred,acquired reorganized and DuPontand filledexecutive positions withindividuals shared vision ideal who their of corporate organization. the At heart the"new"firmwerethree of operating groups, Black Powder, Smokeless Powder, andHigh Explosives. Eachof these hadplants varying of ages and laborconditions scattered across country some, HighExplosives, the and like alsooversaw theirown engineering chemical and research organizations. For the new executive team,bureaucratic practices represented mostefficient the and effective means controlling coordinating of and these widelydispersed units, whichcarried multiple varied out and activities people divergent with of backgrounds experiences. and Therefore rapidly logistics budgetary as as and constraints allowed, theyestablished formalmanagerial hierarchies, standardizedoperations, developed and formal rules procedures theareas and in under
theix control. 2

The attitudeof Sun executives stoodin sharpcontrast thoseat to DuPont.By 1902,J.N. Pew already headed company a operating fieldsin oil Texas,Ohio, andPennsylvania, refineries, fleetof rail cars,and two oil two a tankers. Moreover during nextthree the decades, complexity, the diversity, and geographic dispersion Sun acfvities of increased. the early1930s, By Sun operations included fleetof oil tankers, pipelines, also a oil gasoline stations,
2 HEOD Circular Letterg93, Oct. 7, 1907,g547, May 5, 1910,g579,July 13, 1910,

Box550,g998,Nov. 14,1912, Box551;HEOD Bulletin g396,June 1913, 20, g415,Sept. 13, 1913,Box 554,PartII, Series Records EIDPDN&CO: Superintendents II, of Meeting
Minutes, Nov. 1905,Oct. 1906,June1907,File 418 - Box 13, Oct. 1909,April 1910,File

418-Box16,April1912, 418- Box15,Series Group10,Longwood File A, Manuscripts.

586 / CHRISTIANE DIEHL-TAYLOR

anda shipyard. wherever whenever Yet, and possible, andhissuccessors, J.N. histwosons Howard J.N.Jr.,attempted operate firmasinformally J. and to the aspossible. Unlike DuPont executives viewed who bureaucratic structures a as means centralizing of control overdispersed varied and activities, three the Pewsfelt that bureaucratic practices diffused authority and did not always improveefficiency facilitate or cooperation. Bureaucracy frequently involved unnecessary work, needless clerical detail,and the shirking managedhal of responsibility [Johnson, p. 21].At the same 1983, timehowever, recogthey nizedthat the increasing complexity dispersion theiroperations and of and suchoutside forces regulation as required them to develop and implement some bureaucratic practices. these Yet hadto be keptas simple possible as because simplidtyreducedthe likelihood limiting cooperation of and coordination losing and control efficiency. and Therefore wasnot surprising it thatwhileDuPontbecame complex a bureaucracy theeveof WoldWar I, by Sunonly emerged a lesselaborate as version its counterpart of duringthe opening months WorldWarII. 3 of
Managerial Conflict Over Bureaucratization

The process bureaucrafization of generated managerial conflictat all levels withinbothSunandDuPont. Despite theirdivergent corporate cultures, senior officials well as middleas andlower-echelon managers both fro'ns in argued overthe strategic issues authority organization such of and and tactical matters the economic logistical as and feasibility standardization, best of the methods standardization, safetyrulesand procedures. cultural of and Yet
differences between the two firms created variances in the rationales their

executives for theirinvolvement conflicts gave in overdailyoperating matters andthe types arguments of supervisory personnel raised during theirdisputes
with one another.

The majorreorganizations DuPontunderwent 1902,1911,1914, that in 1919, and 1921, frequently generated disputes amongcompany executives regarding strategic of whatconstituted idealformof organization. the issue the In 1902,company Treasurer, DuPont,and A.J. Moxham,the headof P.S. Development, argued DuPontshould that completely absorb the various all companies whichit held interest. in Sales head,J.A. Haskell,and Hamilton Barksdale, oversaw HighExplosives who the Operating Department (HEOD), however,statedthat someof the acquired companies shouldretaintheir autonomy to theirprofitability efficient due and means operation of [Chandler andSalsbury, 1971, 110-116]. pp. Duringthe1911reorganization, Engineering Department head,William Ramsay, and HamiltonBarksdale, who then oversaw of DuPont's all operating departments well as engineering as and chemical areas, argued over whetherthe Heat, Light and Power Division

3J.H.Pewto W.D. Mason, Oct.3, 1928, Box132;J.N.PewJr. to A.E. PewJr,June12, 1928,Box 133,Series Inventory Accession IF, #1, 1317.

CORPORATE CULTURES OF DUPONT AND SUN OIL / 587

shouldremain a separate entity or be made part of the Engineering Department. 4 Many of the reorganizations generated also executive arguments over whosedepartment authority had overparticular activities. late 1903 for In example, Moxham tangled Haskell Barksdale whose with and over department would determine priceof dynamite the and identifythe most viablesales opportunities Mexico.Barksdale in claimed that since HEOD manufactured theproduct therefore themostaccurate and had information regarding cost the of manufacturing, shouldset the price.Haskellfek that salesshould it determine boththepriceandthepotential customer Moxham list. countered by claiming since that Mexico a newmarket DuPont, was for development should take on both tasks.The three could not agreeso they presented their arguments theircounterparts thecompany's to on Executive Committee. After muchwrangling, committee the votedthatpricing should remain province the of sales, while development should handlethe gathering competitive of information theidentification viable and of foreign markets. Theirdecision was
short-lived however; in both 1904 and 1906 Moxham and Haskell were once

again arguing overcompetitive information foreign and market identification. s Such strategic issues not,however, onlyfodder thedisputes were the for among DuPontexecutives. number theirconflicts A of revolved around more
mundane tacticalmatters. Between 1902 and 1914, Coleman and P.S. DuPont

continually criticized otherexecutives refusing delegate the for to authority for dealing daily with operating issues theirsubordinates to [Chandler Salsbury, and
1971,pp. 126 308, 312]. The othersenior 6 officials, however, that effective felt management equated active, to on-going participation daily in decision-making. Their attention procedural to detailand the conflicts arosefrom it are that exemplified theirdisputes by overpersonnel practices policies. and Between
1904 and 1908, members of the Executive Committee bickered about the

wording the company's of non-disclosure agreements. 1914,boardmemIn bers, Haskell Moxham, and acting Treasurer, Raskob, company J.J. and President,Coleman DuPont,helddiffering opinions regarding stock the bonus and efficiency ratingsystems proposed partof a new salary as scheme That same year,Executive Committee members department and heads, R.R.M.Carpenter
4 AlfredDuPontto T.C. DuPont,to Executive Committee Members, 27, 1911, Jan. 1911 Administrative Reorganization Box 131, Part III; W.G. Ramsay H.M. File, to Barksdale, 15, 1911,H.M. Barksdale W.G. Ramsay, 20, 1911,T.C. DuPontto Feb. to Feb.
H.M. Barksdale, Feb. 20, 1914, File 1-1 - Box 1003, Part II, SeriesII, Recordsof
EIDPDN&CO.

sA.J.Moxhamto H.M. Barksdale, Nov. 2, 1903,File 18 - Box 806;H.M. Barksdale to

A.J.Moxham, May28, 1904, A.J.Moxham T.C. DuPont, to May31,June8, Oct. 13, 1904, T.C. DuPont A.J.Moxham, 13,Oct.13,1904, Haskell A.J.Moxham, 29, to June J.A. to Jan. Feb.3, 1906,A.J. MoxhamtoJ.A. Haskell, 30, 1906,File 13- Box805,ParrII, Series Jan.
II, Records EIDPDN&CO. of

6 T.C. DuPontto P.S.DuPont,Nov. 21, 1913,File 418 - Box4, Series Group 10, A, Longwood Manuscripts; DuPont to J.A. Haskell, T.C. Jan. 13, 1914,1914Administrative Reorganization Box131,PartII, Series Records EIDPDN&CO. File, II, of

588 / CHRISTIANE

DIEIfiL-TAYLOR

(Development), Irenee DuPont(Vice-presidentcharge Manufacturing, in of Sales, Chemical Research, Development), and Earnmot DuPont(Black Powder

Operating Department), J.J. and Raskob (Treasurer's Office) debated merits the of paying workers check by rather thanin cash. ? Like their executive counterparts, and low-level mid managers in DuPont's High Explosives Operating Department (HEAD) and such allied areas engineering, as purchasing, andthe Chemical sales, Department argued overstrategic matters wellasdailyoperating as issues. Whiletheirsuperiors' divergent opinions regarding authority and organization generally emerged
during periods corporate of reorganization, wasnotthecase such among these lower-echelon managers. the 1907 and 1914 HEaD superintendents At meetings, plantsuperintendents theirassistants vehemently and so disagreed overthe suggested organization thattheydropped matter. plant plans the In 1912,managers from the Engineering Chemical and Departments debated whether experimental engineering should remain the Chemical in Department, whichwasin charge developing new manufacturing of all processes, be or moved the Engineering to Department, whichwasresponsible plantand for equipment construction. The issuewas not resolved until 1917, when experimental engineering became of theEngineering part Department? Disputes overauthority frequently occurred between HEaD managers and their counterparts suchclosely in alliedareas purchasing sales. as and Almost every year, disagreements outbetween broke HEaD plantsupervisors, the heads HEaD's Order and WorksSupplies of Divisions, managers and within the Purchasing Department over raw materialspecifications, supply prices, supply and ordering shipping and procedures. 1906and 1913,the In breach between HEOD andpurchasing became great so that plantmanagers requested each that plant,or at minimum, each operating department, the gain authority doitsownpurchasing. to HEaD andsaks managers persistently also argued whohadfinalsay over oversuch matters theproduct as specifications and usage instructions printedin sales literature the procedures in and used ordering goods materials HEaD plants. and from 9
7 Contracts Employees with 1904-1908, Haskell T.C. DuPont, J.A. to Feb.2, April 14, 17, 1914,T.C. DuPonttoJ.A. Haskell, 29, Feb.6, April 6, 10, 1914,File3c;j.j. Raskob Jan. to P.S. DuPont,Jan.13, 1914,A.J.Moxhamto T.C. DuPont,Mar. 24, 1914,Bonus Plan File- Box 123,PartII, Series Records EIDPDN&CO; IreneeDuPontto J.J.Raskob, II, of Nov. 17, 1914,R.R.M. Carpenter IreneeDuPont,Nov. 20, 1914,IreneeDuPont to H.G. to
Haskell,Nov. 21, 1914,LammotDuPont to IreneeDuPont,Nov. 23, 1914,H.G. Haskellto

IreneeDuPont,Nov. 24, 1914,J.J.Raskob IreneeDuPont,Nov. 28, 1914, Series to H,

Accession 228.

8 Superintendents Meeting Minutes, June1907,May 1914,File418 - Boxes 13,15,17, Series Group10,Longwood A, Manuscripts; Ramsay H.M. Barksdale, 18, 1912, W.G. to July IreneeDuPont to H.M. Barksdale, Aug. 16, 1912,H.M. Pierceto Company Department Heads, April 9, 1917,File 1-1 - Box 1003,PartII, Series Records EIDPDN&CO. II, of 9 F. G. Tallmanto T.C. DuPont, Sept.4, 1905, Box 812; Minutesof Purchasing Department Heads Meeting, May27, 1905,W. C. Spruance toJ. B. Niles,Feb.1, 1911, Jr. H.G. Haskell F. G. Tallman, to May5, 1911,H.G. Haskell Wm. Coyne, to Nov. 28, 1913, H.G. Haskell H.M. Barksdale, 21, 1914,File 19 - Box 1003A,Part II, Series to Jan. II,

CORPORATE CULTURES OF DUPONT AND SUN OIL / 589

HEOD mid and low-echelon managers also argued over the establishment formalstandardized uniform of and practices every in category of activity conducted withintheiroperating department. Disagreements over personnel practices thegamut ran fromwhether notto conduct or physicals on all workers seeking employment withintheirplants the useof piece-part to ratesand premium incentive schemes, acceptable the level of merit pay increases, the procedures and usedin recording employment terminations. Nearly every suggestion standardize portion of the high explosives to a manufacturing process beit asbroad area nitroglycerine an as manufacturing or aslimited topicaswhatscreens used dope a were in preparationledto a lively debate among plantsupervisors, assistants, personnel the their key from Engineering Chemical and Departments, the managers suchHEOD and of support groups theFinished as Goods Division. Members these of same groups alsoargued overthemerits such of formal safety rules procedures the and as proper to discipline way workers broke who match rules, types uniforms the of and safetyshoes workersshouldwear, and safetybarricade construction specifications. To support theirpositions these in debates, participants a the used mixture first-hand of knowledge, experiencesotherexplosives the of manufacturers, empirical Since overwhelming and data. the majority those of participatingin the exchangesbe theylineor staff,university practically or trained, scientist, engineer factory or operative werenot openly opposed theestabto lishment bureaucratic of practices, mostof the debates revolved around the logistical economic and feasibility standardization the"best of and practice" to
standardize. m

Sun Oil managers were alsoa contentious Executive lot. and mid and low-level managers argued overthe same strategic tactical and issues their as DuPontcounterparts. because worked a different Yet they in corporate culture, theirexecutives provided somewhat different rationales theirinvolvement for in disputes over tacticalmattersand their managers substantiated their arguments different using evidence thatemployed DuPont. than at Executive disagreements the strategic over issues organization of and authority emerged during company's the initialyears the oil business. in In 1897,RobertC. Pew,who oversaw Toledorefinery, the and his uncleand company President, Pew,fought J.N. overhowto organize refinery. the That same year, J.N. hadto stepin to settle dispute a between RobertandJohn
McMillan.McMillanclaimed that since oversaw firm'sOhio oil fields, he the he

hadauthority themenworking over those fields. Robert argued since that he wasin charge all Sun's of Ohio activities, production fell underhis the men jurisdiction. Whilethereis littlesurviving evidence conflicts thisnature that of
Records EIDPDN&CO; H.G. Haskell H.M. Barksdale, 4, 1906, of to May May6, 1913,File 418 - Box 4; Superintendents MeetingMinutes, May 1914,File 418 - Box 15, Series A, Group10,Longwood Manuscripts. a0Superintendents MeetingMinutes,1904-1914, File 418 - Boxes13-17, Series A, Group10,Longwood Manuscripts.

590 / CHRISTlANE

DIEILL-TAYLOR

also arose aftertheturnof thecentury, mostlikely they keptoccurring because Sun's formal organizational structure became increasingly complex. themidBy 1920s example, had21 departmentsits Philadelphia for Sun at headquarters and 17 at its Marcus Hook refinery. n Like theirDuPontcounterparts, executives spenta greatdeal Sun also of timeinvolved disputes operational in over detail. Due to theirreticence to relinquish control theirneedto be assured all bureaucratic and that practices werekeptassimple possible, as senior officials actively participatedmost in disputes overdaily operating matters. personnel-related As activities programs and became increasingly bureaucratNed the1920s early theyargued during and 30s, over suchmattersas the wordingof the employee's stockpurchase plan bookletand the meritsof unionization. Over the years,they voicedtheir opinions such on diverse manufacnmng topics the specifications the as for agitators usedin cruderefining, refining stillconstruction specifications, the systematic marking barrels, of storage tank roofingspecifications, the and properway to gaugestorage tanks.Even disagreements performance over reporting accounting and matters not escape participation. took did their They
an active role in the debates over such issues as the standard method used in

valuating in storage thelosses oil and occurring during refining theproper and wayto formally credit shipments. Sunexecutives not the soleparticipants these were in disagreements. Their subordinates the middleandlowerechelons such in of areas refinery as management an activerole aswell.Theserefinery took managers, their like HEOD counterparts DuPont, argued at over the logistical and economic feasibility implementing of bureaucratic methods what constituted and best bureaucratic practice. in contrast the HEOD managers frequently Yet to who usedempirical data to supporttheir arguments, they reliedupon personal experience the experiences other refiners. and of They only beganusing statistics substantiate to their arguments duringthe mid-1920s when Sun exponentially increased amountof manufacnmng financial the and data it formally recorded distributed itsvarious and to refinery managers. u While Sun'smid and low-level refinery managers apparently seldom argued overthe strategic issue organization, frequently of they disagreed over
n RobertC. Pew to J.N. Pew,Jan.30, 1897,Box 22;J. E. Pew to J.N. Pew,Feb. 2,

1897, Box55;John McMillan J.N.Pew, to Sept. 1897, 23, Box51,Series John 14; McMillan toJ.N. Pew,Oct. 1, 4, 1898, Box4, Series Inventory Accession 1A, #1, 1317. 2R.C Pewto J.N. Pew,Dec.21, 1894,Box 18,Mar.28, 1895,Box 19,Jan.30, 1897,
Box22;J.E.PewtoJ.N. Pew,Feb.2, 1897, Box55,Jan.3, 1899, Box56,Series R.C.Pew 14; toJ.N. Pew,May24, 1900, Box 5, Series 1A;J.H.PewtoJ.N. Pew,Mar.29, 1909,Feb.10, 1910,Mar. 10, 1910, J.N. PewtoJ.H. Pew,Feb.22, 1910,Box 14, Series F.S.Reitzelto 1C; S.B.Eckert, Mar. 5, 1925,Box 116;E.M. Hughes J.H. Pew,Mar. 19, 1926, to J.H. Pewto E.M. Hughes, Mar. 20, 1926,Box 122;J.N.PewJr. to F. S. Reitzel, Aug.10, 1926, J.N. Pew Jr. to M.H. Leister, Nov. 10, 1926,Box 123;W.D. Masonto J.H. Pew,J.H. Pew to W.D. Mason, Mar. 24, 1927, Box 128;J.H.Pewto W.D. Mason, Aug.20, 1931,Box 145;J.H.Pew to W.D. Mason,Mar. 23, 1932,Box 147;W.D. Masonto J.H. Pew,Mar. 24, 1932,Box 147, Series Inventory Accession IF, #1, 1317.

CORPORATE CULTURES OF DUPONT AND SUN OIL / 591

the matter authority particularly theircounterpartssuch of with in departments accounting sales. as and Fromthe mid-1920s the early to 30s,refinery andaccounting managers differed whowould over establish fomaulas the for estimating during losses refining storage whohad best and and was qualified to approve standard gauging methods. During same the period, andrefining sales supervisors argued whowould over determine production for such the rate products gasoline motor 3 as and oils. Thus bureaucratization atboth the process DuPont Sun and generated a great of conflict allmanagerial regarding deal at levels strategic aswellas issues
tactical matters. While their culturaldifferences not affectthe typesof did issues over whichtheir managers argued, they did affecttheir executive's

rationale participatingdisputes daily for in over operational matters wellas as howtheirmanagers substantiated varying their points view. of
Forms of Managerial Resistance Bureaucratization to

Justas managerial conflict accompanied bureaucratization at DuPont andSunOil, sotoodidmanagehal resistance. Among executive the ranks, the differences corporate in cultures caused individuals resist to bureaucratization verydifferently. DuPont, At resistance rareandusually was involved forming akemative bureaucratic practices moreto one's liking. Sun, distaste At the for bureaucracy executives led frequently ignorerulesthat even they had to
authorized. The culturaldifferences, however,did not affect the types of resistance shown mid andlow echelon by managers withinthe two firmsor their reasons suchresistance. these for At levels, resistance mostfrequently tooktheformof submitting or incomplete late formal reports, whichmanagers

fekhadless priority thanoverseeing operations. daily WhileAlfredDuPontdidnot adoptbureaucratic practices the Black in PowderOperating Departmenthe supervised quicklyas his cousins, as Coleman and P.S. desired, was not the only DuPont executive he whose position bureaucracy on frustrated them.Hamilton Barksdale, of HEOD, head represented another source frustration. wasnot thatBarksdale of It abhorred bureaucracy. was, fact,oneof thefirm's He in staunchest supporters systemof atization aslongasit wasdone way.WhentheAccounting his Department underP.S.'ssupervision began developing uniformaccounting a system in 1902/1903 and the majorityof the Executive Committee voted to have all areas withincompany adoptthe system, Barksdale, Executive an Committee member, not only voted against plan, but ordered the HEOD's Works Accounting Division keeptwo sets accounting to of records onethatwas acceptable him,the other, accounting. to to Whenthe Executive Committee voted 1908thatallareas to allocate costs, in had their including overhead, the in same manner, Barksdale, again once instructed accounting his group allocate to
t3 S. B. Eckert to J.H. Pew, Mar. 20, 1926,Box 123;W.D. Masonto F.S. Reitzel, Oct. 30, 1926, Box 122;J.H. Pew to W.D. Mason,June 20, 1927, Box 128, SeriesIF, Inventory Accession #1, 1317.

592 / CHRISTIANE DIEHL-TAYLOR

costs ways theoneto hisliking, other, accounfing's two the to [Chandler and Salsbury, pp.152-154; 1971, Johnson Kaplan, and 1987, 74-75). pp. Mid andlow-echelon managers withinHEOD appeared be an even to moreresistant thantheirsuperior, lot Hamilton Barksdale, it came folwhen to lowing formally prescribed performance reporting accounting and procedures. Liketheremainder thecompany, of HEOD emphasized volume low high and cost. assure each To that area withinits numerous widely and dispersed plants optimized theirutilization inputs well as theiroutputs, of as headquarters required each to complete one extensive highly and detailed daily, weekly, and monthly operating costaccounting and reports. Plantsupervisory personnel wereconstanfiy criticized turning incomplete latereports. wasnot for in and It
thatthese individuals thatthereports felt werewithoutmerit.Eachtimeplant superintendents theirmanagerial and subordinates attempted eliminate to or simplify reports, the they decided against suchactions because forms the provided information identifying vital for problems withintheirplants for and

helping themdetermine which approaches techniques and provided optimum results. wassimply It that the reports required muchdatathat theywere so difficult fill outandtooka longtimeto complete. to Moreover, mosthadto be filled bythose charge such out in of areas within plant acid the as recovery and shellpacking, these and individuals' priority first wasproduction report not
completion. TM Not all managerial resistance HEOD's mid andlow-level by managers, however, revolved aroundthe issueof formalreporting. On a numberof occasions, superintendents, assistants, foremen plant their and failed follow to standardized operating procedures established or equipment, material, raw and intermediate and finishedproduct specifications. reasonsfor their The
resistance varied. In someinstances, was due to suchlocal conditionsas the it

inability get spedfled to materials operating a plant with outdated or in equipment. other occasions, On plant personnel were experimenting with materials methods improve and to output rates product or quality, to reduce or operating costs. Some plantsupervisors simply thattheiroldmethods fek were superior those to prescribed, others found difficult break while just it to old
habits[Rumre, 1989,176]?
4 H.G. Haskellto T.W. Bacchus, Jan. 16, 1905,File 40 - Box 418; HEOD Circular

letters 149,Jan.20, 1908,#263, April 28, 1908,# 286,Aug. 10, 1908,#354, Mar. 31, #

1909, #401,July 1909, 3, #489, Jan. 1910, 550,#735April17,1911, 5, Box #755,May25,

1911,#764, June16, 1911,#782,June23, 1911,#836, Dec. 11, 1911,#882, Mar. 7, 1912, Box551;H.G. Haskell F.D. Brown, to May28, 1914, File101- Box1002,PartII, Series II, Records EIDPDN&CO; Superintendents of Meeting Minutes, Oct. 1906,Nov. 1907,June 1908,File 418 -Box 13,Jan. 1909,File 418 - Box 14, Oct., 1909,File 418 - Box 16,April 1911, 418- Box16,April1912, 418-Box15,May1914, 418- Boxes & 17, File File File 15
Series Group 10,Longwood A, Manuscripts.

is J.W.Burns T. W. Bacchus, 3, 1905,File 20 - Box 417;HEOD Circular to Mar.

Letter, R46,March5, 1906, Box553,#108, Oct. 30, 1907,#110, Nov. 6, 1907,#547, May 5, 1910,Box 550;HEOD Bulletin #132, Mar. 15, 1910,#173June14, 1910,Box 553,PartII, Series Records EIDPDN&CO; Superintendents II, of Meeting Minutes, Nov. 1907, 418 File - Box13,April 1912, 418- Box15,Series Group10,Longwood File A, Manuscripts

CORPORATE CULTURES OF DUPONT AND SUN OIL / 593

Whilemanagerial resistance by farmore was prevalent among DuPont's middle- and lower-level managers than amongits executives, such was apparenfiy thecase SunOil.Dueto hispersistent not at dislike bureaucratic of practices,Howard J. Pew,on a number occasions, of refused abide the to by company's formal rules andprocedures. 1924for example, instructed In he Marcus Hook refinery supervisor, Michener ignore ICC mandate H.E. to an

regarding car brakespecifications tank because complying the minor with revision would require company make the to verycosfly modifications.1927 In he admitted that he frequenfiy ignored capital the appropriations approval system, which himself authorized 192436 he had in J. Howard's managerial subordinates chose, occasion, ignore also on to
therules, not simply of a distaste bureaucracy. asin the case but out for Just of the managers withinDuPont's highexplosives operations, mostfrequent the formsof resistance among Sunrefinery managers involved submitting incompleteand tardyproduction accounting and reports. While like theirHEOD counterparts, understood importance communicating inforthey the of such marionto their superiors and recognized usefulness the data in the of improving operating the efficiency the areas of undertheircontrol, theyfelt thatoverseeing production precedence filling forms. took over out Yet, not all resistance thepartof refinery on managers in response was to performance reporting requirements. Sun's adoption sophisticated of but dangerous thermal cracking technology during 1920screated heightened the a concern over safety. a result, As Sunhiredsafety engineers developed who extensive safety programs the Toledo,Ohio andMarcus for Hook, Pennsylvaniarefineries. Yet, plantmanagers workers, and unused havingto pay to extraattention safety, to frequenfiy ignored rulesandprocedures. the Safety engineers responded implementing by a "safety first"campaign. attempt This at instilling heightened a concern safetygenerated for additional displays of resistance. March1931,for example, issue the company In an of newspaper, OurSun, carried cartoon a RubeGoldberg contraption a of like entified "fire protection office for waste baskets." Under rifle, anonymous the the author had noted "approved A.J. Gotand,SafetyEngineer," by and at bottom of the
cartoon,the creatorhad written "Messrs.Soden,MacMurtrie, Wells and other

Marcus Hook executives please note. "? As thesenumerous examples demonstrate, managerial resistance all at levelsaccompanied bureaucratization the process both DuPont and Sun. at While the firms' culturaldifferences affectedthe typesand frequency of resistance exhibited their executives, by they did not generate significant

t6J.H. Pewto H. E. Michener, 15, 1924, May Box111; J.H. Pewto W.D. Mason, June 20, 1927,Box 128,Series Inventory Accession 1F, #1, 1317.

t?Robert PewtoJ.N.Pew, Mar. 12,1896, Box20;Toledo J.N. Pew, to June 1899, 30, Box24,Series A. Pomeroy F. Cross, 14; to Nov. 19,21,Dec.6, 10, 13,1901, Box11,Series 1A;F. Cross A. Pomeroy, to Nov. 20, 1901, Box288,Series 1M;J.N.PewtoJ.H. Pew, June 7, 1911, Box 15,SeriesC, Inventory 1, Accession 1 # 1317; "OpenLetterto Employees," Our Sun (1930)14;Cartoon, Sun (1931)38,Hagley 7 Our 3 Imprints Collection.

594 / CHRISTIANE

DIEILL-TAYLOR

differences thelevels types resistance in and of demonstrated theirmidand by low-level managers.

DivergentMechanisms ControlManagerialConflictand Resistance to

The divergent cultures DuPontandSun,however, significant of had affecton how the two firmsattempted limit anddirect to managerial conflict andresistance. Givenitsexecutives' advocacy bureaucratic of practices,isnot it surprising Dupontusedmeetings, that voting,committees, formalrules,and inspections deal to withmanagerial conflict resistance. theotherhand, and On the on-goingpreference for informal structures and practices led Sun executives continue dealwith managerial to to conflictand resistance an on
informal basis.

Despitetheircultural differences, neither DuPontnor Sunbelieved in

totally eradicating instance managerial any of conflict resistance. and Entirely squelching resistance wouldhavediscouraged managers engineering plant and andscientific personnel experimentation. from Demanding absolute adherence to standards unrealistic. companies' was The widely dispersed facilities operated
undera variety localconditions. managerial of Yet, conflict andresistance had to be limitedanddirected because hadthepotential undermine they to control and the coordination cooperation and necessary efficiently effectively for and operating theirlarge complex and firms. s
The conflict resolution and resistance limitation mechanisms that

emerged DuPont's in High Explosives Operating Department between 1906 and 1913 clearlyreflected the ffrm's reliance bureaucratic on practices. Beginning June1906,HEOD began in holding semi-annual Superintendents Meetings whichit invited plantsuperintendents theirassistants, to ks and the managers keypersonnel allits otherdivisions, thesupervisors and of and from such closely aligned areas theChemical as Department, purchasing, accounting, and sales?One of the keypurposes these of meetings to discuss was and establish standard operating procedures specifications equipment, and for raw materials, firfished intermediate and and products. Formulated diverse by areas and individuals within and outside of HEOD, these proceduresand specifications presented themeetings theformof resolutions were at in which werethendebated theattendees by within allotted an amount free. During of thecourse thediscussion, of participants could offeramendments substitute or resolutions 1957, 34].Participationthedebate generally [Dale, p. in was limited to those would affected thesuggested who be by procedures specifications, and thosewho had formulated them, and thosewho had requested their formulation. theclose debate, At of plantsuperintendents theirassistants and votedon theresolution, themajority and ruled.
t8 See footnotes 2-3.

9Superintendents meetings became annual rather thansemi-annual events 1909due in to thedifficulty experiencedassembling large in the number attendees of together morethan
once a year.

CORPORATE CULTURES OF DUPONT AND SUN OIL / 595

If it wasclear a majority thesuperintendents assistants that of and did not agreewith the originally proposed resolution any suggested or
modification, matter either the was dropped themeeting or attendees selected a committee comprised representatives among superintendents of from the and

thegroup responsible formulating proposed for the procedure specification. or

Theseindividuals then met and developed new resolution series a or of resolutions present to during current a future the or Superintendents Meeting. All committee members equal andthe majority had say ruled.If a majority position appeared impossible achieve, committee to the dropped matter the andreported stalemate to theSuperintendents its back Meeting. 2 By 1909a significant portion theproposed of standard procedures and specifications before coming Superintendents attendees Meeting involved general rules, equipment rawmaterial and specifications,processes in themanuthe used facture nitroglycerine, safety. of and These proved beissues plantsuperto that visory personnel could agree not upon,evenduring course a five-day the of meeting. Therefore between and1911 1909 HEOD officials established standing committees, called Commissions,deal to withthese matters. Theyfeltthatsince superintendents representing plantsof various sizes, locales, and agesand members suchareas purchasing, Chemical of as the Department, enginand eering comprised Commissions, of the differences opinions the most of that wouldarise the Superintendents at Meetings wouldemerge during course the
of committee work and be resolved there. Because there would be less debate at

Superintendents Meetings, attendees could handle moreresolutions rapidly. more Moreover, fewermatters wouldeitherbe dropped sentbackto committee. or Although Superintendents the Meetings werediscontinued 1915,HEOD's in Nitroglycerine, Machinery, Safety and Commissions continued operate. to 2 On a numberof occasions, issues aroseregarding standard operating procedures specifications couldnot be postponed and that until the next superintendents meeting. such In instances, HEOD issued circular a letterto whichall plantsuperintendents otheraffected and managers to respond were with acceptance, objections, If no dissent etc. was voiced,the suggested procedure specification or became standard operating practice. therewere If objections, matter the wasturned overto either standing a committee one or formulated specifically dealing thematter. for with 22
2oHEOD Circular Letter#9, May 27, 1907,Box 550, Part II, Series Records II, of EIDPDN&CO; Superintendents MeetingMinutes,1906-1914,File 418 - Boxes 13~17,

Series Group10,Longwood A, Manuscripts. 2HEOD Circular Letter#553, May20, 1910,Box 550,#747, May9, 1911,File 116Box 1002,#1140,June12, 1914,#1153,Aug.20, 1914,# 1174,Mar. 17, 1916,Box 552; HEOD Bulletin#197, Aug. 19, 1910,#388, Feb. 16, 1913,Box 553, Part II, Series II, Records EIDPDN&CO; Superintendents of Meeting Minutes, 1909,File418 - Box 14; Jan.

April 1911, 418-Box 14,HEOD Machinery Safety File and Commission Recommendations,Aug. 1910- Nov. 1914,File 418 - Box 18; HEOD Nitroglycerine Commission Minutes, 418- Box8, Series Group10,Longwood File A, Manuscripts. 22HED Circular Letter#809, Sept.26, 1911,#983, Oct. 3, 1911,Box 551,Part II,
Series Records EIDPDN&CO. II, of

596 / CHRISTIANE

DIEHL-TAYLOR

While HEOD begandeveloping formalmechanisms dealing for with managerial conflictin 1906, most of its bureaucratic approaches limiting to managerial resistance not appear did until1910.Until thattime,resistance was
met with mild verbal or written rebukes from the head of HEOD or one of his

assistants. informalapproach, This however, apparently not reducethe did number incidents of enough satisfy to HEOD leaders. 1910,the operating In department issued formalrulerequiring plants notifyheadquarters, a all to in writing, whentheydeviated fromestablished product formulas rawmaterial or andfirfished product specifications. rulewasexpanded 1913to include The in departures fromprescribed equipment specifications operating and procedures. Since plantpersonnel to describe, detail, changes had in the made, results the of the changes, the reasons theydeparted and why from established standards, HEOD could easily identify modifications enhancedplant's that a performance and instructits other plantsto make the samemodification. could also It quickly put a halt to thosepractices had a detrimental that effecton plant operations .23 Formalinspection all HEOD plantsand facilities of alsoserved a as meansof limitingmanagerial resistance. While the department had been sending auditors check out to inventories inspectors examine and to finished product quality since earlyin the century, semi-annual general inspections did not becomestandard procedure until 1913. The myriad of criteriathe inspectors usedto judge each plantandfacility included adherence standard to procedures specifications complete timelysubmission reports. and and and of The inspectors prepared formalreports that notedall violations, they and relayed these backto headquarterswell as discussed with the plant as them superintendents theirdirect and reports. These individuals thenexpected were to rectifyall notedviolations the next inspection. encourage by To plant supervisory personnel further,the resuksof each plant inspection were presented discussed Superintendents and atthe Meeting. system The apparently worked because number violations the of dropped dramatically, although and HEOD disbanded program 1914dueto the company's financial the in poor performance,quickly it reinsfitutedin 1916. it 24 Sun's responses managerial to conflict and resistance stoodin sharp contrast those DuPont's to of HighExplosives Operating Department. to Due its executive's on-going apprehension formalstructures, of rules,and procedures, continued rely on informalcontrolmechanisms. unstated it to The ruleregarding managerial conflict seemed bethatthe"warring to parties" were

to meet to face reach agreement face and an acceptableallconcerned. to If they could resolve differences, could not their they appeal whoever authority to had overall those involved thedispute. in Custom appeared dictate as also to that
23HEOD Circular Letter#547, May 5, 1910,#579,July13, 1910,Box 550;HEOD Bulletin#396, June20, 1913,Sept.13, 1913,Box 554, Part II, Series Records II, of
EIDPDN&CO.

24Superintendents Meeting Minutes, May 1914, 418- Box 17,Series Group10, File A, Longwood Manuscripts.

CORPORATE CULTURES OF DUPONT AND SUN OIL / 597

oftenaspossible, individual to assume roleof mediator this was the rather than judge. Any suggestion moreformal that means controlling of conflict wouldbe moreeffective thancurrent methods rejected. was When,for example, W.D. Mason, head theMarcus of Hookrefinery, requestedmeeting J. Howard a with Pewin 1928to discuss formation a development the of committee could that bettercoordinate product new efforts between R&D, sales, the refinery, and J. Howard refused request. the 2s How Sundealt withmanagerial resistance varied from situation situato tionandapparenfiy litfieto dowiththepotential had harmsuch refusal might engender. When the supervisor the MarcusHook refinery of barrelhouse refused comply to with the barrelnumbering system Pew devised, J.N. J.N. instructed Howard,thenheadof Marcus J. Hook, to do whatever deemed he necessaryassure to future compliance, including theman. in response firing Yet to entiredepartments complying safety not with rulesandprocedures, Sun officialsimplemented "safetyfirst' campaign. the Apparenfiy thosewho supervised resistant the manager bytherule, lived "handle yousee "26 as fit.
Conclusion

Thesenumerous examples managerial of conflict resistance and within DuPont and Sun Oil suggest previously that published works regarding business bureaucratizafion anincorrect very present and incomplete of the view role managerial conflictand resistance playedin bureaucratizafion. The examples indicate thebureaucratizafion that process generatedgreat a dealof managerial conflict all levels at withinorganizations. Senior officials well as as middle- lower-echelon and managers argued such over strategic issues authof orityandorganization such and tactical matters thelogistical economic as and feasibility standardization,bestmethods standardization, safety of the of and rulesand procedures. Managerial resistance accompanied process. also the While resistance farmore was prevalent among andlow-echelon mid managers thanamong theirsuperiors, executives, even particularly those with strong opinions regarding constituted bureaucratic what best practice those and who remained waryof bureaucratizafion, resisted certain bureaucratic practices. Whilecorporate cultures some had effect thenature managerial on of conflict and resistance, apparently their greatest they had impacton how firms responded conflict resistance. to and Although some firms thatmanagerial felt conflict resistance beneficial and had outcomes, also they believed limiting in theiroccurrence, theircorporate and cultures a significant had impact the on control mechanisms chose employ. they to DuPontand SunOil, however, only two companies of the are out hundreds large of corporations underwent that bureaucratizafion the during early twentieth century. Until managerial conflict resistance and withinthese
25 W.D. Mason J.H. Pew,Nov. 16,1926, to Box122,Series Inventory Accession IF, 1,
1317; seealso footnotes 11-13.
26 See footnote 17.

598 / CHRISTIANE DIEIlL-TAYLOR

otherorganizationsexamined greater is in detail in relation the fLrms' and to corporate cultures, challenge the current the to interpretation managerial of conflict andresistance is suggested these that by two companies' experiences will lackfurthersubstantiation manyscholars continue relyon the and will to apparently incorrect incomplete and depiction offeredby suchscholars as Chandler, Cochran, laborhistorians, thehistorians technology. the and of
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