Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15 (2004) 255260

Translating social theorya critical commentary

Wai Fong Chua
School of Accounting, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia Received 15 December 2001; received in revised form 4 February 2002; accepted 28 February 2002

Abstract This brief commentary argues that Lowes (2003) criticisms of Laughlins [Acc. Aud. Acc. J. 8 (1995) 63] arguments as being rhetorical and lacking in scientic language are inconsistent with his simultaneous advocacy of Latours writings. Concerns are also raised with respect to Laughlins translation of critical theory in his version of middle-range theorising. 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Translating theory; ANT; Critical theory

Lowe (2002) has two stated aims(1) to provide a brief review of developments in recent European literature dealing with the sociology of scientic knowledge (SSK); and (2) to use/demonstrate this approach. These aims are accomplished via a particular strategy. Lowe uses the writing of a key author in SSKLatourto critically evaluate the writing of another authorLaughlin, who was himself seeking to advance his translation of the work of a group of German critical theorists (in particular, the writings of Jurgen Harbermas). As a result of this combination of aims and strategy, this paper ends up rather like a watery collage, with multiple objects of interest (Latour, Habermas, Science, science, Rhetoric, rhetoric, etc.) and multiple translations (Lowes and Laughlins), but each is painted in rather confusing, runny colours. Since we are in Latourian territory, it is probably appropriate to draw a diagram. Numbers in parentheses indicate strategies that could be adapted by commentators. On the bottom left hand side (this choice of left or right is completely arbitrary), we have the host of folk writing in the SSK domainBarnes, Yearly, Collins, Callon, Latour, etc. We then have Lowes interpretation of their work and his particular focus on translating the ideas of Latour. On the right hand side, we have a group of German critical theoristsHorkheimer,
Tel.: +61-2-9385-5828; fax: +61-2-9385-5925. E-mail address: wf.chua@unsw.edu.au (W.F. Chua).

1045-2354/$ see front matter 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/S1045-2354(03)00069-8

256

W.F. Chua / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15 (2004) 255260

Adorno, Marcuse, Benjamin, and in particular, Habermas. We next have Laughlins translation of German critical theoryessentially, a fabrication called Middle-Range Theory. The bridge between the two sides is provided by Lowes decision to apply (principally) Latours ideas on the construction of scientic knowledge by a critical deconstruction of Laughlin (1995). And now we have this comment (and other comments in this issue) that provides yet another slant on these translations. There are at least four strategies that could be employed to write this commentary on Lowe: (1) Critically evaluate Lowes Latourian-inspired reading of Laughlins translation of German critical theory; (2) Advocate the value of Latours take on science despite a problematic translation; (3) Critically discuss Laughlins translation of German critical theory by putting aside Lowes reading; (4) Advocate the value of German critical theory despite multiple, problematic translations. By and large, I am going to adopt the rst strategy, although brief comments will be made about (2) and (3) as well. (4), I feel is better accomplished by others far more trained and expert in the eld of German social theory.

W.F. Chua / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15 (2004) 255260

257

My most substantive impression is that Lowes paper is schizophrenic in one important dimensionhis lovehate relationship with the concept of rhetoric. In embracing Latour, he appears to accept Latours notion of rhetoric, that is, the discipline that has, for millennia, studied how people are made to believe and behave and taught people how to persuade others (Latour, 1987, p. 30). Latour is centrally concerned with rhetoric (so dened). Much of his book, Science in Action (the main text from which Lowe quotes), seeks to show how scientists use a diverse range of texts, les, documents and artefacts to persuade others to transform what was at rst an uncertain opinion into a more concrete fact. By conceptualising rhetoric as persuasion via human and non-human allies/resources, Latour argues that the practice of science, whether of the natural or social variety, is intrinsically rhetorical and the scientic article is always a rhetorical vehicle. For Latour then, science is not written as Science, an activity that is set apart from and is more superior than mere Rhetoric. Instead, science is a small s activity that is rhetorical because it seeks to persuade others. Following Latours interest in rhetoric, Lowe, rst argues that Laughlins paper is rhetorical. I agree with him. Indeed, I am sure Richard Laughlin will himself agree. After all, Laughlin states explicitly in his paper that he is making an argument for middle-range thinking (Laughlin, 1995, p. 77). Surely, to make an argument for something is to seek to persuade others of the value of that something. Laughlin further writes that he offers his argument in the hope that it has persuasive power although he claims that his primary purpose is not to persuade others to his view. Instead, he seeks primarily to remind all would-be accounting researchers that they too need to argue the merits of their chosen perspective, to defend their position and to be contradicted. On p. 82, Laughlin stresses yet again that he is making an argument which the reader may not nd convincing and he is open that his claims of the strengths of middle-range thinking and the weaknesses of other perspectives are value-laden claims. As a result, I am not sure why Lowe labours this point. Indeed, given that he has chosen to deconstruct a paper that has no empirical evidence, there is not even a single number that might offer a contradictory argument! Now that Lowe, Laughlin and I all agree that Laughlins paper is rhetoricalwhat next? It is this next step which makes Lowes paper schizophrenic, for the critical tonality of his language sets up a Science versus Rhetoric battle. Laughlins paper is now not just rhetorical but his assertions are no more than Rhetorical ploys (Lowe, p. 18, emphasis added). This prompts the questionwhat more does Lowe want? The critique continues, Laughlins conjectures are questionable, his quote on p. 84 (Laughlin, 1995) is overly dismissive of [other] theorists, and his comments are a grave injustice to the so called Fictean alternatives for he misrepresents the work of others. And, to top it all, Laughlin makes statements of value that are not susceptible to rational judgement. But I thought Laughlin admitted in his paper that he was making value judgements, so what is the fuss about here? Also, what kind of rational judgement does Lowe seek? How does he wish to warrant argumentation? Something called Science? For on p. 20 Lowe criticises Laughlin for not using scientic language at a crucial point in his (Laughlins) argument. I nd it ironical that a writer who embraces Latour can, at the same time, express a desire for Scientic rationality. Or perhaps, that is the perverse manner in which desire workswe secretly covet that which we publicly disdain; we deliberately choose science but implicitly covet a Scientic foundation.

258

W.F. Chua / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15 (2004) 255260

A second irony is that Lowe constantly uses rhetorical questions (that is, questions that are not answered in the text itself) as a writing and persuasive strategy (although his grammar leaves much to be desired because he often leaves out the question mark at the end of these questions). Here are some examples (I have taken the liberty of putting in the question marks)but what does greater or more balanced mean and what are we to take from a more sophisticated model? (p. 18). By whom and how are such statements to be judged? (p. 18). How are we to measure tightly clustered, and even if we could what would it mean? (p. 19). Who is to judge whether one perspective straddle[s] cells or is tightly clustered? Is it really tenable to make such criticisms? (p. 19). Who is considered qualied to judge the adequacy of Giddens theory versus that of Habermas or Weber and how is this to be done? (p. 21). How does this differ from the ideas of Giddens and Weber which (sic) are so cursorily dismissed in the quote above? (p. 21). I raise this point not because I have problems with rhetorical questions per se. They are a common enough mode of persuasion. But surely folk who live in glass houses should not throw stones? If Laughlin is to be criticised for being Rhetorical and not sufciently Scientic, where is the Scientic basis of Lowes own argument? Incidentally, in order for that last question not to be misunderstood, I am no believer in Science. A story-teller like me can hardly be Scientic. Back to Lowe. One of the several unhappy outcomes of his rather muddled translation of Latour is that the value of Latours many insights becomes obscured to accounting researchers. Yes, Latour does seek to de-privilege Science with the capital s. Yes, he does wish to show how science is rhetorical and how scientic knowledge is the fabrication of diverse fact builders. But there is morefor the efforts of Latour and other writers on actor network theory offer us a way of bypassing the agency/structure debate altogether. Their work focuses on the relational materiality of both human and non-human entities (see Law, 1999) in the fabrication of knowledge/science and in the constitution of organisational and social life. That is, actor network theory enables us to research how accounting inscriptions, whether written on paper or embedded in cyberspace, warrant/motivate local actions, and how both these actions and the accountings are themselves connected with and mediated by other circulatory ows of localised actions. For example, we can study why the balanced scorecard movement is powerful by following the specic people and events that prompted one company to create a balanced scorecard and see how this particular local effort is related to a sum of other very local and very practical implementations of the balanced scorecard. The rational subjectivity of the local totality is then situated within and related to the imperfect and circulatory sum of institutionalised, total localities. These offerings from actor-network theory, however, are not highlighted via this particular translation. In addition to being schizophrenic, Lowes paper is plain wrong in sections. On pp. 1516, Lowe criticises Laughlin for allegedly reducing a three-dimensional choice process into two. Laughlin argues that researchers make three crucial choices in their research. First, they choose a particular level of prior theorisation. Second, they choose to use particular methodologies that are more or less agreed to by a community of scholars. And nally, they choose to incorporate critique/need for change in various ways. Lowe then argues that without good argument, Laughlin drops the critique/need for change dimension and focuses on only two. But this is quite erroneous. Fig. 2 on p. 70 in Laughlin (1995) has three dimensions except it is shown in a two-dimensional diagram with three axes. Perhaps Lowe and I have different perceptual capacities but I again am not clear what the issue is here.

W.F. Chua / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15 (2004) 255260

259

The nal unhappy outcome of this muddy muddle is that Laughlins translation of critical theory per se is passed over too quickly and is not evaluated substantively. Like Lowe, I have concerns about Laughlins translation but for quite different reasons. My main criticism is that it is not clear what middle range thinking owes to the critical theory of the Frankfurt School in general and to Habermas in particular. I am unsure how Habermass theories of universal pragmatics and knowledge-constitutive interests lead one down a middle path. For this reader at least, they lead down a critical path, which then begs the question of what constitutes critique in critical theory. As Laughlin points out, critical theory is a diverse body of thought but despite this diversity its intellectual foundations are rooted in the work of Marx, Freud and Weber. Given these foundations, critical theory has certain essential theses. Geuss (1981, p. 2) lists three: 1. Critical theories have special standing as guides for human action in that: (a) they are aimed producing enlightenment in the agents who hold them, i.e. at enabling those agents to determine what their true interests are; (b) they are inherently emancipatory, i.e. they free agents from a kind of coercion which is at least partly self-imposed, from self-frustration of conscious human action. 2. Critical theories have cognitive content, i.e. they are forms of knowledge. 3. Critical theories differ epistemologically in essential ways from theories in the natural sciences. Theories in the natural science are objectifying; critical theories are reective. A critical theory, then, is a reective theory which gives agents a kind of knowledge inherently productive of enlightenment and emancipation. These elements of critique, however, are refashioned by Laughlin into a skeletal theory characterised by an undifferentiated notion of a medium-level desire for change. But change towards what and away from what? Middle-range theorising apparently holds open the possibility that the status quo should continue while also keeping open that change is required . . . [it] neither argues that everything is right nor that it is wrong (Laughlin, 1995, p. 84). [T]he medium position on change keeps open the possibility that in certain circumstances critique and ultimate change are important but not in other situations (Laughlin, p. 82). This makes critical theory sound rather like astrology or one of those paper comments that one nds inside fortune cookiesThis week you will go on a difcult journey but there will be good fortune at the end. That is, life is neither all good nor all bad. Whatever happened to ideas like ideologiekritik, emancipation, and genuine consensus as the warrant for social action? They appear to have been erased through translation. Also, the notion of a skeletal theory that is then eshed out empirically does not communicate well the commitment of critical theory to reexive emancipation. Laughlins Table 1 is also ambiguous in two other important aspects. Laughlin argues that with middle-range theorising the observer is important and is always part of the process of discovery. It is unclear how the word discovery is being used there. Positivists tend to talk about discovering empirical generalities. By contrast, critical theorists of quite different ilk, from the likes of Marcuse, Adorno and Horkheimer to Knorr-Cetina, Foucault and Latour talk about the fabrication of knowledge. They write that facts are the work of

260

W.F. Chua / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15 (2004) 255260

the historical practice of communities. It would have been helpful had some clarication been provided as to the concept of scientic discovery. In addition, it is not clear why critical theory necessitates case-study data that is heavily descriptive. Again, can data ever not be analytical, if by that we mean theorised? I nd this distinction between description and analysis rather odd given that critical theorists typically deny that there can be a distinction between observation and interpretation, between fact and value. Perhaps, it would have been more defensible not to imply that middle range thinking had its genesis in critical theory, for that apparent parent appears rather like the proverbial red herring. It seems to me that the meaning of Laughlins middle derives solely from its spatial position from the constructed alternatives on either side of it (see Laughlin, 1995, Table 1, p. 80). That is, its derivation owes little if anything to critical theory; instead its meaning is attributed solely from it being simultaneously between the high/high/low variety on the left and the low/low/low variety on the right. Middle-range thinking would then be warranted by its constructed position as the middle. Thats okfor it is uncertain that Laughlins attempt to manufacture an illustrious lineage accords the argument greater authority or persuasiveness.

Acknowledgements I would like to thank David Cooper for inviting my commentary, giving space to this debate and for his insightful and helpful suggestions.

References
Geuss R. The idea of a critical theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School. Cambridge University Press; 1981. Latour B. Science in action. Harvard University Press; 1987. Laughlin R. Methodological themes, empirical research in accounting: alternative approaches and a case for middle-range thinking. Acc Aud Acc J 1995;8(1):6387. Law J. After ANT: complexity, naming and topology. In: Law J, Hassard J, editors. Actor network theory and after. Blackwell Publishers/The Sociological Review; 1999. p. 114. Lowe A. Methodology choices and the construction of facts: some implications from the sociology of scientic knowledge. Critic Perspect Acc 2002.