Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC GR 136781 October 6, 2000

To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and RA 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are: 1. 20 % allocation combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of total membership of HR, including those elected under the party list. 2. 2% threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the HR. 3. 3-seat-limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of 3 seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats. 4. Proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes. Issue: Whether the 20% constitutional allocation is mandatory? Section 5 of Article VI of 1987 Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress. Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the HR reserved for party-list representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. Congress declared therein a policy to promote proportional representation in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the HR. Issue: Are the 2% threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional? Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. The 2% threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of representation. Under a republican or representative state, all govt authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Thus even legislative districts are apportioned

according to the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio to ensure meaningful local representation. The Three-seat-per-party limit is set by Congress. This ensures the entry of various interestrepresentations into the legislature; thus no single group, no matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.

Ang Bagong Bayani v COMELEC GR 147589 June 26, 2001

With the onset of 2001 elections, COMELEC received several petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. Comelec made verifications as to the status and capacity of these parties and organizations and observed the legal and procedural requirements and deliberations. Thereafter, the registered parties and organizations filed their respective manifestations, stating their intention to participate in the party-list elections. Comelec gave due course or approved the manifestations of 154 parties and organizations but denied those of several others. 1. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections The Constitution and RA 7941 allow political parties to participate in the party-list elections. Sections 7 and 8 Article IX (C) of the Constitution states that political parties may be registered under the party-list system. The purpose of the party-list provision is to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress. Section 3 of RA 7941 expressly states that a party is either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties. 2. W/N the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean that any political party may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. The purpose of the party-list provision is to give genuine power to our people in Congress. The intent of the Constitution is not only by giving more law to those who have less in life but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. It is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, the party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies. Lack of well-defined constituency refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged. 3. Whether the party-list system is exclusively for marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society.

Party-list system is not limited to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors (labor, peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women and the youth) but that it is a type of proportional representation intended to give voice to those who may not have the necessary number to win a seat in a district but are sufficiently numerous to give them a seat nationwide. What the advocates of sectoral representation wanted was permanent reserved seats for marginalized sectors. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution relative to the party-list system is couched in clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by law. The purpose of the party-list system is to promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the HR and that to achieve this end a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the HR shall be guaranteed. How can there be a full, free and open party system if election for the party list system is to be limited to marginalized sectors. After all, what is provided for is a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations each of which is separately defined.

Tobias vs Abalos GR L-114783, December 8, 1994

Herein petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 7675 otherwise known as An Act of Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong. RA 7675 was signed into law on Feb 9, 1994 by Pres Ramos and was deemed ratified by people of Mandaluyong through the plebiscite held. They contended that RA 7675, Article VIII Section 49 is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution. Contentions: 1. The Act contravenes the one-subject bill rule, that it embraces two principal subjects 1. Conversion of Mandaluyong into a HUC; and 2. The division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. Ruling the statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a HUC ordains compliance with the one city-one rep proviso in the Constitution. The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a HUC but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion. 2. The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the HR beyond that provided in the Constitution. Furthermore said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements. Finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts. Ruling the present limit on the number of representative set forth in the Constitution is not absolute. It provides that the HR shall compose of not more than 250 members

unless otherwise provided by law. The present composition may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Petition is dismissed.

Gallego vs Vera GR L-48641 November 24, 1941

Gallego election to the office of municipal mayor of Abuyog Leyte is declared illegal on the ground that he did not have the residence qualification as decided in the Court of First Instance and CA. Issue: W/N Gallego had been resident of Abuyog for at least 1 yr prior to Dec 10, 1940. YES. His departure was temporary. Notwithstanding his periodic absence, he always returned. The term residence as used in the election law is synonymous with domicile which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur: a. Bodily presence in the new locality b. An intention to remain there c. An intention to abandon the old domicile Note: Mere registration in a municipality in order to be an elector therein does not make one a resident of said municipality.

Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC GR 119976, September 18, 1995

Petitioner filed certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of the 1st district of Leyte on Mar 8 1995. Montejo, the incumbent representative and a candidate for same position filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the Comelec alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. 1. W/N petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the 1st district of Leyte for a period of 1 yr at the time of May 9, 1995 elections. Art 50 of CC decrees that for the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence. The concept of domicile to mean an individuals permanent home, a place to which whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return. DOMICILE twin elements: 1. The fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place 2. Animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining w/n an individual has satisfied the constitutional residency qualification requirement. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 1. An actual removal or actual change of domicile 2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose

Aquino vs Comelec GR 120265 September 18, 1995

Comelec contended that in order for petitioner to qualify as a candidate for Rep of 2nd district of Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice. As found by Comelec, petitioner was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac. His alleged connection with 2nd district of Makati is the lease agreement of a condo unit in the area. Comelec pointed out that the intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condo unit instead of buying one. The lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year residence requirement as a qualification for a candidate of Rep.

Domino vs Comelec GR 134015 July 19, 1999

Juan Domino was declared by Comelec to be disqualified as candidate for representative of the district of the Province of Saranggani for lack of the one-year residence requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. 1. W/N judgment of MTC declaring petitioner as resident of Saranggani and not of Quezon City is final, conclusive and binding upon the whole world, including Comelec NO. Comelec has jurisdiction over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. In the exercise of said jurisdiction, it is within the competence of the Comelec to determine whether false representation as to material facts was made in the certificate of candidacy that will include among others the residence of the candidate. The determination of MTC in the exclusion proceedings as to the right of Domino to be included or excluded from the list of voters in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction,

does not preclude the Comelec in the determination of his qualification as a candidate, to pass upon the issue of compliance with the residency requirement. The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters are summary in character. Thus the factual findings of the trial court and its resultant conclusions in the exclusion proceedings on matters other than the right to vote in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction are not conclusive upon the Comelec. 2. W/N he resided in subject congressional district for at least 1 yr immediately preceding May 11, 1998 elections No, Domino was not a resident for at least one year immediately preceding 11 May 1998 election. Records show that his domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and in 1992 acquired a new domicile at Quezon City. A persons domicile once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. Actual and physical is not in itself sufficient to show that from said date he had transferred his residence in that place. To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. While residence simply requires bodily presence, domicile requires not only such bodily presence but also a declared and probable intent to make it ones fixed and permanent place of abode, ones home. General Rule: ELEMENTS OF DOMICILE physical presence in the locality involved AND intention to adopt it as a domicile Dominos lack of intention to abandon his residence is strengthened by his act of registering as voter in one of the precincts in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence. While Dominos intention to establish residence in Sarangani can be gleaned from the fact that he bought the house in Nov 1997, that he sought cancellation of his previous registration in QC on Oct 1997, and that he applied for transfer of registration from QC to Sarangani by reason of change of residence on 30 Aug 1997, Domino still falls short of the one year residency requirement under the Constitution.

Co vs House Electoral Tribunal GR 92191-92 July 30, 1991

Petitioners are asking for reversal of decision of HRET declaring that respondent Jose Ong Jr is a natural born Fil citizen. Father of private respondent was naturalized when he was then a minor of 9 yrs old, thus since 1957 he was already a Fil citizen. Mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of W/N respondent elected to be a Fil citizen.

Issue: Whether or not, in making that determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion. Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Fil fathers and born of Fil mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were natural-born citizens. Jurisprudence defines election as both a formal and an informal process. In the case of In Re Florencio Mallare, the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Phil citizenship. In our jurisdiction, we cannot question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. An attack on a persons citizenship may only be done through a direction action for its nullity. To expect the respondent to have formally in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when he was 9 yrs old. How can a Filipino citizen elect Phil citizenship? When respondent was only 9 yrs old, his father became a naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of Revised Naturalization Act applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in Phils. It was the law itself that had already elected Phil citizenship for respondent by declaring him as such.

Bengzon vs Cruz GR 14284 May 7, 2001

The citizenship of Teodoro Cruz is at issue in this case in view of the constitutional requirement that no person shall be a Member of the HR unless he is a natural-born citizen. He was born in Tarlac on Apr 27, 1960 of Filipino parents thus law applicable was 1935 Constitution. In 1985 he was enlisted in US Marin Corp and took an oath of allegiance to US. As a consequence he lost his Phil citizenship. Issue: Whether a natural born Fil who became an American citizen can still be declared a natural-born Fil upon reacquisition of Phil citizenship. Principle: To be naturalized an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law. The decision granting a Phil citizenship becomes executory only after 2 yrs from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period the applicant has: 1. not left the Phils 2. has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession 3. has not been convicted of any offence or violation of Govt promulgated rules

4. committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Govt announced policies CA No 63 enumerates 3 modes by which Phil citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: 1. by naturalization 2. by repatriation 3. by direct act of Congress Important!!! CA 473 governing law of naturalization as a mode of initially acquiring Phil citizenship. CA 63 governing law of naturalization as a mode of reacquiring Phil citizenship. BY REPATRIATION (2nd mode by which former citizen may reacquire his citizenship): Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized or natural-born Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his PRIOR status as a naturalized or natural-born whichever. Repatriation may be had by those who lost their citizenship due to/Remedy of repatriation available to ff people: 1. desertion of armed forces 2. service in the armed forces of allied forces in ww2 3. service in the armed forces of US at any other time 4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien 5. political and economic necessity Procedure of repatriation taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of Phils (such shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship) and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. HRET empowered by the Constitution to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House. Petition is dismissed.

Valles vs Comelec GR 137000 August 9, 2000

Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. A child follows the nationality of the parents regardless of the place of birth. The signing into law of the 1935 Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Phil

citizenship. The principle of jus sanguinis which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship was subsequently retained under the 1973 Constitution. Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born in 1934 in Australia, with Filipino father and Australian mother. Law applicable was 2 organic acts by which US governed the country. Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of Phils who were Spanish subjects on Apr 11, 1899 and resided in Phils including their children are deemed to be Phil citizen. Lopez father was born in 1879 in Camarines Norte thus under Phil Bill Act of 1902 and Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Phil citizen. By virtue of same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, his daughter Rosalind Lopez is likewise a citizen of the Phils. CA 63 a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship: 1. by naturalization in a foreign country 2. by express renunciation of citizenship by the fact that a person is a holder of a certificate stating that he is an American did not mean he is no longer a Filipino; an application for an ACR was not tantamount to renunciation of Phil citizenship. (Aznar vs Comelec) Holder of an Australian passport and had an ACR are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship (Valles vs Comelec) By the fact that a person was registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was holding an American passport were just assertions of his American nationality. For candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon filing of their certificate of candidacy to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. (Mercado vs Manzano and Comelec) 3. by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining 21 yrs of age or more 4. by accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country 5. by cancellation of the certificate of naturalization 6. by having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of Phil armed forces in time of war unless a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted 7. in case of a woman upon her marriage to a foreigner if by virtue of the laws in force in her husbands country, she acquires his nationality Dual allegiance vs Dual citizenship Dual allegiance is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. Dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual allegiance.

The fact that private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from running for a public office. The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen. This is so bec in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he is a fil citizen and that he will support and defend the Constitution of Phils and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration which is under oath operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Petition is dismissed. Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is adjudged qualified to run for governor in Davao Oriental.

_______________________________________________________________________ _ Section 7 Article VI - TERM of House Member

Term of 3 years which shall begin at noon on June 30 next following their election. No member of HR shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms.

Dimaporo vs Mitra Jr GR 96859, October 15, 1991

Petitioner was representative in Lanao del Sur and later filed with the Comelec for Regional Governor of ARMM. Respondent excluded petitioners name from the Roll of Members of the HR upon being informed of this development. Petitioner lost in autonomous region elections and expressed his intention to resume his seat in Congress but failed. He maintains that when he filed for position of Regional Governor of Muslim Mindanao, he did not thereby lose his seat as congressman bec Section 67 Art IX of Omnibus Election Code is not operative under the present Constitution and therefore not applicable to present members of Congress. Issue: Is Section 67 Art IX of BP Blg 881 operative under the present Constitution? Sec 67, Article IX of BP Blg 881 reads: Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for Pres and VP shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. SC: YES. This statutory provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. TERM vs TENURE The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature but the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer.

Under the provision, when an elective official files a certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure not his term. The term remains and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion.

Farinas, et al vs Executive Secretary GR 147387 December 10, 2003

The petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed by Farinas, Garcia, Escudero and Aquino seeking to declare as unconstitutional Sec 14 of RA 9006 otherwise known as The Fair Election Act insofar as it expressly repeals Sec 67 of BP Blg 881 otherwise known as The Omnibus Election Code for being in violation of Sec 26(1) Art VI of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. Issue: Whether Sec 67 of Omnibus Election Code has been validly repealed by Sec 14 of RA 9006. SC: The legislators considered Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. Congress is not precluded from repealing sec 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo vs Mitra upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of election laws the fair, honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress - is achieved. Petition is dismissed. ____________________________________________________________________________________

Section 8. Date of election. Unless provided by law, it shall be held on 2nd MON of May Codilla vs De Venecia GR 150605 December 10, 2002
Respondent Ma. Victoria Locsin lost to petitioner Eufrocino Codilla Sr by 17,903 votes in May 14, 2001 elections as Representative in district of Leyte. However Rep Locsin has officially notified the House that he shall openly defy and disobey the Comelec ruling. So implementing the decision would result in having 2 legislators occupying the same congressional seat, a legal situation, the only consideration that effectively deters the HOUSEs liberty to take action. Hence, the present petition for mandamus and quo warranto. Petition is granted and Public Speaker of the HR shall administer oath of petitioner Codilla as duly elected Rep of 4th district of Leyte. He shall likewise register the name of petitioner in the Roll of Members of the HR. Decision shall be immediately executory.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Section 9. A special election may be called to fill vacancies but Senator or Member of HR shall serve only for the unexpired term.

Tolentino vs Comele GR 148334 January 21, 2004

After the succession to the Presidency of GMA, she nominated then Senator Guingona as VP and Congress confirmed the nomination of Senator Guingona and took his oath as VP on Feb 9 2001. The Senate passed a resolution certifying the existence of vacancy in the Senate and called on Comelec to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with regular elections on May 14 2001. 12 senators were due to be elected in that election and senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term which ends on 30 June 2004. Contentions: Comelec canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that there were no two separate Senate elections held simultaneously but just a single election for 13 seats, irrespective of term. Petitioners in turn are questioning the validity of the special election. They alleged that Comelec failed to comply with certain requirements pertaining to the conduct of special election.

Issues: Whether a special election to fill a vacant 3-yr term Senate seat was validly held on 14 May 2001. SC: Under section 9, a special election may be called to fill any vacancy in the Senate and HR in the manner prescribed by law. To implement this provision, Congress passed RA 6645 (which was later amended by sec 4RA 7166) Sec 2, RA 6645 reads: The Comelec shall fix the date of the special election which shall not be earlier than 45 days nor later than 90 days from date of such resolution stating among other things that office to be voted for: Provided however that if within the said period a general election is scheduled to be held, the special election shall be held simultaneously with such general election. Did Comelec in conducting the special election comply with the requirements in Sec 2 RA 6645? NO. Nor did Comelec give formal notice that it would proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate receiving the 13th highest number of votes in the special election. The question is whether the special election is invalid for lack of a call for such election and for lack of notice as to the office to be filled and the manner by which the winner in the special election is to be determined. SC said NO. Comelecs failure to give notice of the time of the special election did not negate the calling of such election. In a general election, where the law fixes the date of the election, the election is valid without any call by the body charged to administer the election. This is because the right and duty to hold the election emanate from the statute and not from any call for the election by some authority and the law thus charges voters with knowledge of the time and place of the election. Conversely, where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers some authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a nullity.

Section 10.

Section 11. House members in all offenses punishable by not more than 6yrs imprisonment be privileged from arrest while Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof. People vs Jalosjos GR 132875-76 Feb 3, 2000
Romeo Jalosjos is a member of Congress while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. He filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman despite his having convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense. Issue: Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? SC. NO. One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. A person charged with the crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. It is the injury to the public which State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. SC finds that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. SC is constrained to rule against Jalosjos claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any other right or interest, including the police power of the State.

Principle: Scope of the privilege of speech. It is an absolute protection against suits for libel. Speech or debate includes utterances made in the performance of official functions. To come under the privilege, it is not essential that Congress be in session when the utterance is made. What is essential is that the utterance must constitute legislative action that is, it must be part of the deliberative and communicative process by which legislators participate in committee or congressional proceedings in the consideration of proposed legislation or of other matters which the Constitution has placed within the jurisdiction of the Congress. Like the privilege from arrest, the privilege of speech is intended to leave the legislator unimpeded in the performance of his duties and free from fear of harassment from outside. Moreover the privilege extends to agents of assemblymen, provided that the agency consists precisely in assisting the legislator in the performance of legislative action.

Jimenez vs Cabangbang GR L-15905 August 3, 1966

This is an ordinary civil action for the recovery of sums of money by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of Cabangbang. Upon being summoned, he moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the letter is not libelous and that even if it were, said letter was a privileged communication. Issue: Whether the publication in question is a privileged communication and if not, whether it is libelous or not. The first issue stems from the fact that at the time of said publication, defendant was a member of HR and Chairman of Committee of Natl Defense. The determination depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the phrase speech or debate. SC: The publication involved in this case is not one of privilege communication. It was an open letter to the Pres of the Phils when Congress was not in session and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Phils. In causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof hence, said communication is not absolutely privileged.

Antonino vs Valencia GR L-26526 May 27, 1974

This case arose when the official candidate of the Liberal Party lost to Nacionalista Party for governor in Davao and plaintiff Gaudencio Antonino then a senator of RP and LP head in that province attributed the loss of the LP candidate to the support given by Brigido Valencia then Sec of Public Works and Communications which divided LP votes. Plaintiff stated that had not defendant sabotaged and double-crossed the LP, its official candidate would have won the election.

Plaintiff filed a formal request with Senate to investigate the actions of defendant in connection with anomalous acquisitions of public works supplies and equipment. Defendant issued a two-page press release and contents were published on front pages of six metropolitan papers. There was defamatory and libelous nature of the statements which depicted plaintiff as consistent liar; that he prostituted his high public offices as monetary board member and senator for personal ends and pecuniary gains; and imputed to him the commission of certain serious offenses in violation of the Constitution and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Defendant claimed that he did not cause the publication; that they were made in good faith and in self-defense and that they were qualifiedly privileged in character. Ruling: Defendants imputation against plaintiff were not made privately nor officially as to be qualifiedly privilege that by virtue of their defamatory and libelous nature against the honor, integrity, and reputation of plaintiff, malice in law was presumed that defendant had not overcome such presumption of malice that they were published with good intentions and with justifiable motive. The claim of defensive libel was also rejected. He was not justified to hit back with another libel. Defendant was charged with the commission of anomalous transactions in his capacity as Sec of public works and communications; that said charges even assuming that they contain defamatory imputation would not be libelous because the letter sent by plaintiff was a privileged communication. SECTION 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created nor the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.

Liban vs Gordon Gr 175352 July 15, 2009

Liban filed with the court to declare Richard Gordon as having forfeited his Senate seat. He had been elected chairman of the Board of Governor of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) which the court classified as a GOCC. Consequently, he automatically forfeited his Senate seat for holding an incompatible office in a GOCC. Issue: Whether the office of PNRC Chairman is a Government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13. Ruling: Government owned and controlled corporation is an agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities. Since the government did not own PNRC, it cannot be a GOCC under such definition. PNRC was created by the Congress under a special law but it is not owned by Government.

Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.

Puyat vs De Guzman 113 SCRA 31 (1982)

This suit for certiorari and prohibition is poised against the Order of De Guzman as Commissioner of the SEC granting Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez, then member of Interim Batasang Pambansa, leave to intervene in SEC case. He appeared as counsel of respondent Acero to which Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds of then in force 1973 Constitution that no Assemblyman could appear as counsel before any administrative body, thus, Fernandez did not continue his appearance. Fernandez purchased stocks upon request of Acero to qualify him to run for election as a Director. Deed of sale was notarized and registered. The day following the notarization of the purchase, he filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC case as owner of stocks alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation. So SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Fernandez ownership of said ten shares. Issue: W/N, in intervening in the SEC case, Assemblyman Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in contravention of the Constitutional provision. Ruling: Certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention in the SEC case. He acquired shares after the fact, that is after the contested election of Directors. Before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Acero in the SEC case. Realizing the validity of the objection, he decided instead to intervene on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. Under those facts and circumstances, SC is constrained to find that there has been indirect appearance as counsel before an administrative body and therefore a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The intervention was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. SECTION 15. Sessions (please see San Beda reviewer) 1. Regular

2. Special

3. Joint

4. Adjournment

Section 16. Senate shall elect its President; HR shall elect its Speaker by majority vote of all its respective members.

Avelino vs Cuenco GR L-2821 March 4, 1949

Senator Lorenzo Tanada requested that his right to speak on the floor to formulate charges against then Senate President Jose Avelino be reserved on the next session. Hours before the opening of session Senator Tanda and Senator Sanidad filed with the Sec of Senate a resolution enumerating charges against Senate President and ordering investigation thereof. During the session which it was purposely delayed by the Senate Pres, Sen Tanada repeatedly stoop up to claim his right to deliver his one-hour privilege speech but petitioner continuously ignored him and announced that he would order the arrest of any senator who would speak without being previously recognized by him. Some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery and Senator David, one of petitioners followers moved for adjournment of session. Senator Sanidad opposed the adjournment and seconded by Cuenco who moved that the motion of adjournment be submitted to a vote. Petitioner abandoned the Chair and walked out of the session hall followed by Sen David, Tirona, Francisco, Torres, Magalona and Clarin while the rest remained. Senator Arranz, Senate Pres Pro-tempore took the Chair and proceeded with the session. Resolution 67 entitled Resolution declaring vacant the position of the Pres of the Senate and designating Hon Mariano Cuenco Acting President of the Senate. Said resolution was unanimously approved. Cuenco took the oath and recognized by Pres of the Phils. Issue: 1. Does Court have jurisdiction? SC: No, in view of separation of powers and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president which power should not be interfered with nor taken over by the judiciary. Remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall not in SC. 2.Was the session a continuation of the session validly assembled with 22 Senators; Was there a quorum in that session? SC: Supposing the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the session under Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and a minority of ten senators may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent other 12 senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement.

Was there majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the Senate? YES. 12 senators constitute a majority of the Senate of 23 senators present for the purpose of the quorum. President of the Senate is that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the Senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amendable at any time by that majority. Santiago vs Guingona GR 134577 November 18, 1998 Principle: Political questions refer to those questions which under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regards to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom not the legality of a particular measure. Facts: There is the first regular session of the 11 th Congess and one of agenda was election of officers. Senator Blas Ople nominated Marcelo Fernan and Miriam Defensor Santiago nominated Francisco Tatad. By a vote of 20-2, Senator Fernan was declared duly elected President of the Senate. Senator Tatad was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority while only those who had voted for him the losing nominee, belonged to the minority. Seven senators elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader and Senate Pres recognized Guingona as minority leader of the Senate. Hence this petition alleging that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that according to Senators Santiago and Tatad rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad. Issues: 1. Does Court have jurisdiction over the petition? SC: YES. The validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the senator was not a political question for the choice of these members did not depend on the Senates full discretionary authority but was subject to mandatory constitutional limitations. Thus it has jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings and has the duty to consider and determine the issue. 2.Was there an actual violation of the Constitution? SC: NO. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader. While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority who could thereby elect the minority leader. While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate Pres and a House Speaker, it is however dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the constitutional

provision. Therefore such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself not by the Court. 3.Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader? SC: Usurpation refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. The specific norms or standards that may be used in determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed position have not been laid down by the Constitution. Absent any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingonas assumption and exercise of the powers of the Senate minority leader. Petition is denied.

Arroyo vs De Venecia GR 127255 August 14, 1997

This is a petition challenging the validity of RA 8240 which amends certain provisions of the NIRC by imposing the so-called sin taxes (specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. Petitioners are members of the HR and brought this suit against respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. The bill was signed by the Speaker of the HR and the Pres of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by Pres Ramos on Nov 22, 1996. Petitioners claim that there are 4 different versions of the transcript of Rep Arroyos interpellation. 1. Transcript of audio-sound recording of proceedings in the session hall immediately after the session adjourned at 3.40 pm 2. Transcript proceedings from 3-3.40 pm as certified by Chief of the Transcription Division 3. Transcript proceedings from 3-3.40 pm as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division 4. Published version abovequoted Four versions differ in three points: 1. Audio sound recording the word approved cannot be heard

2. Transcript that was certified the word no appears only once, while in other versions it is repeated three times 3. Published version does not contain the sentence you better prepare for a quorum bec I will raise the question of the quorum which appears in the other versions. Issue: Petitioners principal argument is that RA 8240 is null and void bec it was passed in violation of the rules of the House; that these rules embody the constitutional mandate in Art VI 16(3) that each House may determine the rules of its proceedings and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. SC: It is clear that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of RA 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law. Courts have been denied the power to inquire into allegations that in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing by the Speaker of the House and Pres of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on Nov 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. But, there is no evidence to the contrary, the Court will respect the certification of presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed. Petition is dismissed. Who are members of HR? 1. District Rep 80% 2. Party-list Rep - 20%--- what are four inviolable parameters? Discuss each Is it mandatory? Method of allocating addtl seats? Veterans fed case; Bara is controlling case Rule in computing the seat Major political parties are not allowed to participate in party-list election 3. Sectoral Rep