Formulation of Tsunami Resistant Design Standard for Nuclear Installations in Japan

Kazuyuki Nagasawa*, Hideaki Kiyoura*, Naotaka Imura* Tokyo Electric Power Company INC. 1. Background The biggest earthquake on record in Japan, The Great East Japan Earthquake, occurred on March.11, 2011. The earthquake of M9.0 generated unprecedented huge tsunami, and approx. 20,000 people were died and lost. In Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, core damage caused by Station Black-Out occurred in unit 1 to 3 after the tsunami, and it had great influence on the general public. In Japan, based on lessons from the Fukushima Accident, reconstruction of the safety measures for nuclear power plants against natural disasters has been proceeding in order to enhance the safety of nuclear power plants. 2. Formulation of Tsunami-Resistant Design Standard in Japan After The GEJE, various emergency countermeasures were installed at every NPS in Japan to ensure the plant safety against natural flooding. But, there is no standard describing structural and functional design for structures, systems and components (SSCs) under tsunami condition. Therefore, Japan Electric Association (JEA) is supposed to formulate the tsunami-resistant design standard in Japan. The authors of this paper are representatives of the investigative committee of JEA and believe that our studies will contribute to the IAEA ISSC activity of formulating safety document. 3. The Basic Concept of the Tsunami-Resistant Design JEA has been discussing the fundamental direction of the standards toward attainment of safety shutdown of NPP under the impact of flooding. In order to achieve the safety target of NPP, the selection or combination of the concepts below should be required to prevent lost of function of necessary SSCs under tsunami condition. Dry site concept that requires the ground level should be above the design basis flooding height. Installation of External Barrier (seawaters, breakwaters, etc) to prevent flooding invasion to the site area.

Installation of Incorporated Barrier (watertight doors, penetrations, etc.) to prevent inundation of necessary SSCs. 4. The Contents of the Standard JEA will try to finish the standard in a couple of years and have already started discussions for detailed contents as follows. The safety target of NPP under the design basis tsunami. 119

Under the design basis tsunami condition, the safety function of NPP, that is, attainment of cold shutdown and prevention of radiation accident should be secured. SSCs related to the tsunami safety, which are covered by the tsunami-resistant design standard, will expected to keep their functions under experience of design basis seismic motion. Also, necessity of consideration of beyond design basis tsunami and high frequency / low height tsunami to ensure plant safety would be discussed in the future.

Classification by functions The tsunami safety related SSCs could be classified by functions and the roles for securing safety. Current concept of classification is as follows. (1) The SSCs directly related to safe shut down. (Safety related SSCs that should endure or should be be protected from tsunami force and/or inundation.) (2) The SSCs protecting (1) SSCs from tsunami. (The SSCs which endure tsunami external force and prevent invasion of tsunami to (1) SSCs.) (3) The SSCs holding the potential of negative effect. (The SSCs whose washout caused by tsunami may damage above (1) (2) SSCs.) Definitions of tsunami external force based on tsunami run-up analysis The standard of tsunami run-up analysis methodologies should be required, that will make sure tsunami dynamic forces to each SSC as input conditions for structural design of SSCs.

Performance target and structural design of tsunami safety related SSCs. SSCs, located in the yard and could be affected by tsunami, should endure continuous wave pressure, dynamic force, foundation scour, buoyancy force, etc. generated by tsunami, which will be clarified by the tsunami run-up analysis. Even if above SSCs are non safety related, we have to consider they will transform into debris and will hit to the safety related SSCs. Considering the influence of tsunami force, we will set criteria for the structural intensity of each type of SSCs. Also, criteria for preventing tsunami induced fire and degradation of insulation capacity will be required.

Detection of Tsunami and response to tsunami To install tsunami detection technology would be an important challenge to support operator response to tsunami. Plant shutdown prior arrival of tsunami could enhance plant safety, that is, rapid depressurization could make it possible to operate low pressure water injection system for core cooling. Necessity of Tsunami SCRAM is also controversy.

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