RESTORATION EFFORTS FOR RESTART OF KASHIWAZAKI KARIWA NPS AFTER THE 2007 NIIGATAKEN CHUETSU-OKI EARTHQUAKE

Kazuyuki Nagasawa*, Hideaki Kiyoura* and Takaya Sukegawa* * Tokyo Electric Power Company INC. 1Introduction Although Kashiwazaki Kariwa (KK) NPS was affected by the 2007 Niigataken Chuetsu-oki earthquake (the NCO earthquake), there was no damage to safety related components. We conducted seismic evaluation by inspections and seismic response analysis, then we assessed the quake's impact on components in detail. We had evaluated soundness of all safety related components in Unit-1, 5, 6, 7, and restarted them. 2Damages caused by the NCO earthquake Unit-3, 4 and 7 were automatically shut down by the NCO earthquake (Unit-1, 2, 5 and 6 were in the outage period at the NCO earthquake). Although the recorded earthquake motion in the NCO earthquake far exceeded design basis seismic motion, there was no damage to safety related components (S class components) (Table1). In the case of Unit-7, we inspected 1360 components after the earthquake, and discovered damages on only 21 non safety related components (B or C class components).
Table1
Seismic Safety Class S B

Seismic Safety Class of components and damages caused by the NCO earthquake
Examples of Components Reactor pressure vessel, Primary containment vessel, Control rods, ECCS, Reactor building Turbine facilities, Radioactive waste processing System, Reactor building crane, Fuel handling machine Main generators, Transformers, House steam boilers, Fire protection system Damages caused by the NCO earthquake None Minor Universal joints of overhead crane Some (House transformerExhaust stack duct Piping for fire protection system etc.)

3Evaluation of NPS soundness after the NCO earthquake In order to restart NPS affected by the earthquake that far exceeded design basis seismic motion, we evaluated soundness of NPS in three steps as below. Based on this experience, IAEA Safety report Earthquake Preparedness and Response for Nuclear Power Plants (Safety report series 66) was published in 2011. Step1Component level evaluation We performed basic inspections of components (pump, piping, valve etc.), paying attentions to parts likely to be damaged by an earthquake. For safety related components (S class components), we performed seismic response analysis in addition and comprehensive evaluation by the both results of inspections and seismic response analysis. Step2System level evaluation

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After comprehensive evaluation of components, we confirmed function and performance required for the system by checking activation of interlocks and alarms, motion of valves, system flow rate, etc. Step3Plant level evaluation After functionality test and evaluation, we confirmed the plant parameters and functionality of components under operating condition. Then, we verified the operability of the systems and conducted evaluation of soundness of plant.
Step1
Inspection
Basic Inspections Examples: Visual Inspection Functional Test Leak Test
Y Comprehensive Evaluation Matrix Inspections Analyses Enough Margin (A-1) Less Margin (A-2) Normal (I-1) Abnormal (I-2)

Step2
Seismic Response Analyses Analyses with Simplified Methods

Step3

Not damaged Restoration Further Analyses (Repair /Replace) and/or Inspections N

Abnormal?
N

Result < Allowable Value?

Y

System Functionality Test

Additional Inspections Examples: Non-destructive Test Destructive Test with Mockups Abnormal?
Y I-2
A-2

Analyseswith More Realistic Methods Enough Margin?

N Y

Plant Level Evaluation

N I-1

System Level Evaluation

A-1

Comprehensive Evaluation (see the matrix above)

Fig.1 The procedure of evaluation of NPS soundness 4Enhancement of earthquake preparedness for non safety-related components Some unexpected damages had been found on non safety related components by the NCO earthquake. Therefore, we conducted enhancement of earthquake preparedness for these components for all Tepcos NPSs. In the case of House transformer, connection buses were damaged by subsidence and a fire occurred by a short circuit. In order to prevent such an accident, we unified foundations and put additional pile under the foundation (Fig.2). In the case of Piping for fire protection system, buried lines had been damaged by this earthquake, and then we replaced all the buried lines aboveground.
Secondary side connection bus was damaged. And a fire occurs.
House transformer Foundation Secondary side connection bus Turbine building House transformer

Turbine building

Foundation

Foundation

(2) Unification of foundation (1) Pile foundation method

Subsidence

Fig.2

Enhancement of earthquake preparedness for house transformer

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