ADAZA VS PACANA FACTS: Homobono Adaza and Fernando Pacana were elected as Governor and ViceGovernor respectively.

They both filed their certificate of candidacy during the Batasang Pambansa elections. Adaza won while Pacana lost. Adaza took oath of office as a member of Batasang Pambansa and Pacana took oath as the Governor of Misamis Oriental. Both started to perform their duties of the office they were elected. Adaza petitioned that he be the Governor and exclude the respondent therefrom because of the following reasons: 1. Petitioner was elected as Governor for a term of six years and remains as governor until expiration. 2. Pacana should be considered to have abandoned or resigned as vice governor when he ran for the Batasang Pambansa ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Adaza can simultaneously be a member of the BP and the governor. 2. Whether or not Pacana can still be the vice governor and can succeed as the governor. HELD: Petition is dismissed. 1. Under the constitution, section 10 article 8, it is prohibited to be a member of the BP and a governor at the same time. Section 10 A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa shall not hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet 2. Pacana can lawfully assume the office of governorship as provided by BP 697 Section 13. Governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office. Ang Bagong Bayani vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001 Facts: Petitioner challenged a resolution issued by the COMELEC. Petitioner seeks the disqualification of certain major political parties in the 2001 party-list elections arguing that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented and not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented. Issues: (1) Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections (2) Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized underrepresented sectors and organizations

and

Held: Under the Constitution and RA 7941, major political parties cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections merely on the ground that they are political parties. But while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be elected to the House of Representatives. In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented.

Antonino v. Valencia [May 27, 1974] FACTS: Lorenzo Sarmiento of the Liberal Party lost to Vicente Duterte of the Nacionalista Party in the election for governor in Davao. Subsequently, Senator Antonino issued a statement that the loss was caused by the support given by Valencia, the Secretary of Public Works, to the independent LP candidate Maglana which caused a division in LP votes. Antonino was quoted in various newspapers that had Valencia not Sabotaged and double-crossed them, the LP would have won. Antonino then proceeded to file requests to have Valencia investigated by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee on alleged anomalous acquisitions of public works supplies and equipment. Valencia retaliated by issuing a press release that he will also file charges with the Blue Ribbon Committee regarding anomalous acts of the Senator. This release was published in newspapers Antonino filed this case of damages. Valencia filed a counter-claim. Lower court ruled in favor of Antonino. Valencia appealed. Antonino died and was substituted by Senator Antonino (Wife) ISSUES: 1.W/N the Press Release was issued by Valencia 2.W/N the Press Release is libelous Held/Ruling: YES. The fact that Valencia caused the release and publication of the press release is seen in the following facts: 1.The newspapers reproduced the specific charges filed by Antonino. 2.On the press release there was marked For release under the date. 3.It was indicated on the press release the answers made by Valencia to the charges of Antonino in the same numerical order. 4.The press release indicated that it came from Valencia 5.The press release quoted Valencia and he admitted making the statement in his office in the presence of the press 6.The first page of the press release consisted of quoted statements by Valencia and reports and information he received about Antonino 7.The press release mentioned specific figures which only Valencia could know given the time constraint 8.Valencia did not make any correction or denial of the published statement. YES. The statements issued were defamatory and libelous in nature as they imputed upon him certain corrupt practices. Also, because the statement was not issued privately or officially, malice is presumed and such presumption was not overcome as Valencia did not prove the truth of his statements or that they were published with good intentions and with a justifiable motive or that they were made in the exercise of the right of fair comment on the character, good faith, ability and sincerity of public officials. The court said that had Valencia not been motivated with malice he would have filedcharges against Antonino with the Senate seeing as Antonino was not a candidate forelection and that his term as senator was no yet to expire. Also, Valencia cannot claim that his actions were justified in that Antonino was first in making libelous statements. The anomalous transactions charge was duly filed with the Blue Ribbon. Also, the statement on sabotage and double crossingcannot be considered libelous ascontemporary politics shows that no stigma of disgrace or disrepute befalls one who changes political parties.

Aquino Vs Comelec Facts: Petitioner Agapito Aquino was disqualified from being proclaimed as the winner of the Makati City Congressional elections because his opponents were questioning his residency requirements. Comelec contend that in order that he could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City, Aquino must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice. To prove his residence at Makati, petitioner presented an alleged lease agreement of a condominium in the area. Issue: WON leasing a condominium unit is enough to prove residence, for election purposes. Ruling: Residence, as used in election laws, always mean domicile. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of respondents intention to reside in Makati City it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones original domicile especially since, by its terms, it is only for a period of two (2) years, and respondent Aquino himself testified that his intention was really for only one (l) year because he has other residences in Manila or Quezon City. While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati (and the fact, of his stated domicile in Tarlac) indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his physical residence 27 is not to acquires new residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City. 28 The absence of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions stated above, the lack of identification sentimental, actual or otherwise with the area, and the suspicious circumstances under which the lease agreement was effected all belie petitioners claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution, in the Second District of Makati. Dimaporo V Mitra 202 SCRA 779 / G.R. No. 96859 October 15, 1991 FACTS: Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in the immediately following elections. Upon being informed of this development by the COMELEC, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioners name from the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code which states: Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter addressed to respondent Speaker, expressed his intention to resume performing my duties and functions as elected Member of Congress. He maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under

the present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present members of Congress. In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the House of Representatives, as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of said members may be shortened, are provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides that the Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992, while Section 7, Article VI states: The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. He asserts that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to these constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a congressmans term of office on a ground not provided for in the Constitution. Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman holds another office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding another office or employment. ISSUES: 1. IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION? 2. COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY, BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT, EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING HIM FROM EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH? HELD: The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. 1. The officials running for office other than the ones they are holding will be considered resigned not because of abuse of facilities of power or the use of office facilities but primarily because under our Constitution, we have this chapter on accountability of public officers (both in the 1973 and 1987 constitution). Section 1 of Article XI (1987) on Accountability of Public Officers states that: Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. Under this commentary on accountability of public officers, the elective public officers must serve their principal, the people, not their own personal ambition. Petitioner failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of elective public officials, this statutory provision (Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881) seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents. Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another office, an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the elective office presently being held, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. Forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a

new election or appointment can restore the ousted official. The law does not make the forfeiture dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable. That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its application to present members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that (t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. The expression in the constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not preclude the legislature from prescribing other grounds Additionally, this Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of legislative enactment. To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice. 2. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House Secretary-General perform ministerial functions; It was their duty to remove petitioners name from the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the COMELEC communicated to the House of Representatives that petitioner had filed his certificate of candidacy for regional governor of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his office. Domino Vs Comelec Facts: Petitioner Juan Domino ran for Congressman of Sarangani. He was disqualified on residency requirements. Issue: Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject congressional district for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections. Ruling: Negative. While his intention to establish residence in Sarangani can be gleaned from the fact that be bought the house he was renting on November 4, 1997, that he sought cancellation of his previous registration in Qezon City on 22 October 1997, and that he applied for transfer of registration from Quezon City to Sarangani by reason of change of residence on 30 August 1997, DOMINO still falls short of the one year residency requirement under the Constitution. In showing compliance with the residency requirement, both intent and actual presence in the district one intends to represent must satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. Dominos failure to do so rendered him ineligible and his election to office null and void.

Gravel v. United States (S.Ct. 1972) Facts: Gravel and his congressional aide released government documents to a publisher. Issue: Does the Speech or Debate Clause protect both congressional aides and commercial publication of congressional material? Rule: (White, J.) The Speech or Debate Clause protects congres-sional members against lawsuits and investigations relating to legislative acts. The Clause also applies to congressional aides whose activity, if performed by the member, would be a legislative function. Dissent: (Douglas, J.) The Speech or Debate Clause should insulate a congressional member and his aide from inquiry into private publication of legislative matter. Such publication is a way of informing the public of the executive branchs activities. Dissent: (Brennan, J.) By not considering private publication of congressional matter within the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause, the Court excludes from the sphere of protected legislative activity a function lying at the heart of democratic government informing the public about matters affecting the administration of government. Dissent: (Stewart, J.) The Courts ruling permits a vindictive Executive to subpoena a member of Congress to testify about informants who have not committed crimes and who have no knowledge of crime. It is not clear that the Executives interest in justice must always override public interest in having an informed Congress. People vs. Jalosjos G.R. No. 132875-76, February 3, 2000 Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented. Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

PHILCONSA vs. Mathay G.R. No. L-25554, October 4, 1966 Facts: Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin them from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969. The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964. Petitioner contends that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution. The reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965. Issue: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective? Held: In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to all members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the expiration of the full term of the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word term in the singular, when combined with the following phrase all the members of the Senate and the House, underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure must have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative. The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it will have expired. Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995 Facts: Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. Private respondent contended that petitioner lacked the Constitutions one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives. Issue: Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 6 of the Constitution. Ruling: WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELECs questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected

Representative of the First District of Leyte. For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for only 7 months, because of the following: (a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents; Tacloban became petitioners domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the family to Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC G.R. No. 1136781 (October 6, 2000) FACTS: On May 11, 1998, the first election for the party-list scheme was held simultaneously with the national elections. One hundred and twenty-three parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On June 26, 1998, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed thirteen party-list representatives from twelve parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system. Thirty-eight defeated parties and organizations promptly filed suit in the COMELEC, pleading for their own proclamations. Hence, COMELEC ordered the proclamation of the 38 parties. Such move filled up the 52 seats allotted for the party-list reps. Aggrieved, the proclaimed parties asked the SC to annul the COMELEC action and instead to proclaim additional seats, so that each of them would have three party-list reps. HELD: 1. Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? SC: The 20% allocation is only a ceiling and not mandatory. 2. Are the 2% threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional? SC: Yes. Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system. 3. How then should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined? SC: As to the method of allocating additional seats, the first step is to rank all the participating parties according to the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes as against the total number of votes cast for the party-list system is then determined. All those that garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast have an assured or guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, those garnering more than two percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. The formula for additional seats of other qualified parties is: no.of votes of concerned party divided by no.of votes of first party multiplied by no. of additional seats allocated to the first party. As for the first party, just take it at face value. ( 5% = 2 seats )