GUINTO VS. MEDINA FACTS: Leon Guinto filed an action for forcible entry against Santiago Medina.

The trial court ruled in favor of Guinto. However, Guinto still appealed because the trial court dismissed his claim for damages. While the case was on appeal, Medina died. Medina was substituted by his heirs. ISSUE: WON the heirs of Medina are liable for damages to Guinto in excess of the inheritance they received RULING: The heirs of Medina, having been merely substituted in his place at the time of his death, their liability for damages is only to the extent of the value of the property they might have received, if any, from him. BEATRIZ NERA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs.NARCISA RIMANDO, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. L-5971 February 27, 1911 FACTS:The case involves the probate of the will of Pedro Rimando. The execution of the will was questioned because one of the subscribing witnesses was in the small room with the testator and the other subscribing witnesses at the time when they attached their signatures to the instrument. ISSUE: WON the testator and the subscribing witnesses must actually see each other sign the will in order comply to with the requirements of the law RULING: The question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the instrument in the presence of each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but whether at that moment existing conditions and the position of the parties, with relation to each other, were such that by merely casting their eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each other sign. EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY, and MANUEL RAMONAL, petitioners, vs. EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY, JOSEPHINE SALCEDO, and UEFEMIA PATIGAS, respondents. G.R. No. 123486 August 12, 1999 FACTS: On April 6, 1990, respondents Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, being the devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. De Ramonal, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Misamis Oriental, a petition for probate of the said holographic will. On the other hand, petitioners Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition thereto, alleging that the holographic will was a forgery and that the same was even illegible which gives an impression that a "third hand" of an interested party other than the true hand of Matilde Seno Vda. De Ramonal executed the holographic will. At the hearing, respondents presented six ordinary witnesses and various documentary evidence. Petitioners, instead of presenting their evidence, filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court granted. Respondents appealed, and in support thereof, they once again reiterated the testimony of their ordinary witnesses who testified as to the similarity, authenticity genuiness of the signature of the deceased in the holographic will. On October 9, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision which ruled that the appeal was meritorious. ISSUE: WON the provision of Article 811 of the Civil Code, which provides, as a requirement for the probate of a contested holographic will, that at least three witnesses explicitly declare that the signature in the will is the genuine signature of the testator, are permissive or mandatory wphi1.nt RULING: Based on the language used, Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory. The word "shall" in a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word "shall," when used in a statute is mandatory. CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL., defendants-appellees. G.R. No. L-12957 March 24, 1961 FACTS: The case involves Lot 3368 which originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. According to the cadastral records, upon Saturninos death, he left the aid land to Francisco, his only son with his second wife, Andrea Gutang. Because Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother administered the property for him, declared it in her name for taxation purposes and paid the taxes due thereon. When Francisco died on May 29, 1932 at the age of 20, single and without any descendant, his mother, as his sole heir, executed an extrajudicial settlement and sale whereby, among

other things, she sold the property in question to the appellant, Constancio Sienes. Thereafter, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving half-sisters of Francisco, and who had declared the questioned property in their name, executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes. The Trial court declared both sale as void and ordered that the property be reverted to the estate of Cipriana Yaeso, the lone surviving relative and heir of Francisco Yaeso at the death of Andrea Gutang. ISSUE: WON the sale of the property by the ascendant who is obliged to reserve the property is valid although at the time of his death, there are still surviving relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came. RULING: The land in question was reservable property. Francisco Yaeso inherited it by operation of law from his father Saturnino, and upon Francisco's death, unmarried and without descendants, it was inherited, in turn, by his mother, Andrea Gutang. The latter was, therefore, under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came, if any survived her. The record discloses that when Andrea Gutang died, the lone reservee surviving her is Cipriana Yaeso. The reserve creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came. The reservista has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of the reservable property; that he may alienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienation transmitting only the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservists, the rights acquired by the transferee being revoked or resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the death of the reservista. The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the condition that the vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor died without being survived by any person entitled to the reservable property. When Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive; thus, the previous sale made by the former in favor of appellant became of no legal effect and the reservable property passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana. On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar resolutory condition. The reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the third degree belonging to the line from which the reservable property came, constitutes a real right which the reservee may alienate and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the condition being that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reservee survives the person obliged to reserve. In the present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of the reservees, was still alive when Andrea Gutang, the person obliged to reserve, died. Thus the former became the absolute owner of the reservable property upon Andrea's death. IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELODIA FERRARIS. FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant, vs. GAUDENCIA FERRARIS DE BORROMEO, CATALINA FERARIS DE VILLEGAS, JUANITO FERRARIS and CONCHITA FERRARIS, oppositors-appellees. G.R. No. L-19382 August 31, 1965 FACTS: Melodia Ferraris was was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and distributing her estate among her heirs. She left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was survived only by her collateral relatives, her aunt who is a half-sister of her father, and her nieces and nephew, who were the children of his only brother of full blood who pre-deceased her. These two classes of heirs claim to be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to participate in her estate. ISSUE: WON the decedents aunt concurs with or is excluded by the decedents nephew and nieces. RULING: A decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed. The absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. An aunt of the deceased is as far distant as the nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong, degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and then descending to the heir.