S E C R E T // NOFORN I 2O32OIO9 I DEPARTMENT DEFENSE OF

HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASKFORCE GUANTANAMO U.S.NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO CUBA BAY, APOAE 09360

JTF-GTMO-CDR

9 Januarv2007

MEMORANDI-IM FOR Commander, United StatesSouthernCommand,3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL33172 SLIBJECT: Recommendationfor Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9YM-000259DP(S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

l. (S/NF) Personal Information: o o o o o o JDIMSAIDRC Reference Name: Fadil Husayn Salih Hintif Aliasesand Current/True Name: Fadil Bin HussienBin Saleh Bin Hautash"Mansour al-Dahhi. Mansur Muhammad Salih Placeof Birth: Al-Jawf. Yemen (YM) Dateof Birth: 1981 Citizenship: Yemen IntemmentSerialNumber (ISN): US9YM-000259DP

(U//FOUO) Health: Detaineeis in good health.

3 . (S/NF) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends for this detainee TransferOut of DoD Control (TRO). JTF-GTMO previouslyassessed detainee ContinuedDetentionUnder as DoD Control (CD) with Transfer Languageon 19 January 2006. b. (S/NF) Executive Summary: Detaineeis assessed be a possiblememberof alto Detaineeis linked to known al,Qaida recruiters and guesthouses.Detaineewas Qaida. arrestedtryrng to flee from Afghanistan (AF) to Pakistan(PK). JTF-GTMO determinedthis detainee be: to

CLASSIF'IEDBY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON:E.O. 12958, AMENDED,SECTION1.4(C) AS DECLASSIFY ON: 20320109

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S E C R E T // NOFORNI I 2O32OIO9 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT:Recommendation Transfer for Out of DoD Control(TRO) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9YM-000259DP (S)
o o o A MEDIUM risk, as he may posea threatto the US, its interests and allies. A HIGH threat from a detention perspective. Of LOW intelligencevalue.

c. (S/NF) Summary of Changes: Therewere no significantchanges detainee's to assessment sincethe last JTF-GTMO recommendation. 4. (S/NF) Detainee's Account of Events: The following section is based,unless otherwise indicated, on detainee'sown account. These statementsare included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability. a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detaineecompletedelementary schooland part of middle schoolin Yemen. Detaineeleft schoolin 1995because startedfights and got into trouble he at school. Detaineeworked on the family farm for four or five years.' In 1998,detainee's cousin,Moussaed MuhammadNaji, won a scholarship the University of Damascus.That to May detainee along with his cousintraveledto Damascus, Syria (SY). While there,detainee met Muhammad Hussein al-Waili OIFI), a fellow Yemeni attendingthe university. Detainee acceptedan invitation from al-Waili to travel to han (IR). The two stoppedin Tehran, IR, for two days,rarely leaving the hotel room. They proceeded Mashad,IR, for 10 days, to where they attendedan annual Shi^a pilgrimage.' Detaineeleft al-Waili in Mashad and returnedto his hometown al-Jawf.' In July 2000, detaineereceived his shareof inheritance from his father's estateand then moved to Sanaa,YM. In Sanaadetaineepurchaseda taxi to make his living. Detaineelived in Sanaa with three students from the University of Sanaa.a b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: While living with the students Sanaa, in detainee attendedthe Abu Bakr al-Saddiq Mosque where he met Abu Yasserwho was applying to study at the mosque. Yassersuggested detainee could help the poor in Afghanistan. Detaineeagreed,thinking it would be a good way to honor his father. While in Sanaa, detaineetook a ten-day coursein religion, prayer, and the Hadith taught by Sheikh al-Wadii.
000259 302 16-APR-2002, Analyst Note: Detaineehas provided conflicting accountsduring separateinterviews. In a July 2003 interview, detaineestatedhe left school in 1997 at the age of 17 due to disagreements with his classmates, majority of which were from a different tribe. He also claimed to have worked for two years on the the family farnu which he statedwas 100 donems,which is approximately 62 acres. See000259 SIR 28-ruL-2003 and 000259SIR 1l-AUG-2003. 2 Analyst Note: Mashad is consideredthe holiest city in Iran, and is home to the shrine of Imam Ridha (variant: Reza), a frgure that many Shia believe was killed by a jealous Sunni ruler. Millions of Shia travel every year to visit the shrine. 3 IIR 6 034 162803 o 0002s9 MFR 11-AUG-2003 Analyst Note: His father died when detaineewas four years of old. '

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s E c R E T // NOFORN I I 20320109 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendationfor Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9YM-000259DP(S) Detaineealso met Omar al-Sharqi (varianJSherqi aka Abu Omar al-Shamali), who also encouraged him to travel to Afghanistan.5 After approximately one month of driving the taxi and making very little money, detaineesold his taxi. Detaineeinformed his brother Ghaleb of his intention to travel to Afghanistan. Ghaleb gave detainee3000 Saudi Riyals for the trip. Detaineepromised his family he would stay in Afghanistan no more than three months.o Lr July or August 200I, detaineedepartedYemen for Afghanistan. While waiting for his flight, he met Khuttaiba al-Adani AIFI), who also was traveling to Afghanistan.T They flew to Karachi, PK, and continued to Quetta,PK. Al-Adani led detaineeto a guesthouse where they met Daoud (NFD.8 Al-Adani and detaineedepartedQuetta later that day and traveled to Kandahar,AF. They stayedfive or six days at a guesthouse Arabs in Kandaharrun by for Abu Khoulouh al-Yemeni.' He statedthat he kept all his travel documentson his person,and that al-Yemeniwas the only armedindividual at the house.r0Al-Yemeni told detainee that al-Sharqi,his recruiterfrom Yemen,was at Hamzaal-Ansari'shousein Kabul, AF.ll Detaineeand six Afghans left in a t"qxifor Kabul, leaving his acquaintance Khuttaiba alAdani at the Kandaharguesthouse.'' c. (S/ND Training and Activities: Detaineemoved into al-Sharqi'shousein Kabul, where he remained for approximately two months. Al-Sharqi reportedly secureddetaineea job transportingpatients for the Afghan Red Crescent. Through his work as a Koran teacher, al-Sharqi knew an Afghan namedAbed al-Kahar al-Afghani (I.IFD that worked as a driver for the Red Crescent. Al-Sharqi informed al-Kahar that detaineewished to work for a humanitarian organization. Detaineestartedworking directly with al-Kahar on a daily basis. Detainee'sdaily dutieswere to ride with al-Kaharand pick up medical supplies,food, and blankets,then deliver them to different locations around Kabul. A white Toyota cargo van with a red crescenton the side was used for deliveries. An individual named Qary (variants Kari, and Qari) Bilal supervisedal-Kahar and other Afghani workers at the supply warehouse in Kabul. Detaineereported that he saw no other Arabs working for the Red Crescent." Detaineedenied attending any training c:Impsin Afghanistan, saying he had already received ' ooozsg r6-APR-2002 302 uooozsg MFRu-AUG-2003 ' ooozsg MFRl I-AUG-2003 t ooozsg I6-APR-2002 302 nOOOZS9 30-SEP-2003, SIR Analyst Note:Khoulouh al-Yemeni assessed Ibrahim is to be Ba'alawi (Abu aka
Khulud),a knownal-Qaida recruiter manager an al-Qaida and of safehouse Kandahar.Ba'alawiwasreportedly in killed duringthebombing of theKandahar airportin November 2001. toooo259 MFR r8-AUG-2003 t' ooo259 16-APR-2002 302 tt ooo25g MFR 18-AUG-2003 " IIR 6 034 1545 03

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S E C R E T / / NOFORN / I 2O32OIO9 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendationfor Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9YM-000259DP(S) training in Yemen (NFD.14After the terrorist attackson 11 September 200l,but beforethe US invaded Afghanistan, detainee,al-Sharqi, and al-Sharqi's wife left for Logar Province, AF, where al-Sharqi rented a house. One month later, the group learnedthat Kabul had fallen to the Northern Alliance (NA), so they moved_tothe residenceof Abd al-Sattal G.IFD in Jalalabad, AF, where they remainedfor 20 days.'' Detaineedeniedhaving everheardof Tora Bora.l6 5. (S//NF) Capture Information: a, (S/A{F) Locals in Jalalabadreportedly told al-Sharqi and detaineethat NA forces were killing Arabs and they should go to Pakistan. An unidentified Afghan helped guide them into Pakistan. The guide told al-Sharqi and detaineeto sanitize themselvesof any papers indicatingthey were Arabs. Detaineegavehis passport al-Sharqi. The Afghan reportedly to took families first, and planned to escort al-Sharqi and his wife to Peshawar,PK, and then retum for detainee. The Afghan returned and took detaineeby car to the mountains. From there, detaineewas to walk into Pakistan. On his way, detaineemet anotherAfghan who guide. They stoppedat a housewhere detainee assumed responsibilityas detainee's saw other Arabs. The guide told detaineeto eat and rest before they crossedinto Pakistan. Severaldays later they arrived at the border, where detaineeobservedPakistanipolice. The guide directed him to surrender,and informed detaineethat he would be returnedto Yemen.^' Detaineecompliedwith the advice,but Pakistaniauthorities ultimately transferred detaineeto the custody of US forces in Kohat, PK, on 3 January 2002.18 b. (S) Property Held: o o CasiomodelA159W watch 8,000PakistaniRupees

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMOz 26 April2002 d. (S/NF) Reasonsfor Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the followins:

'nooo259 3o-APR-2004 sIR

tt

'uooo259 o9-ocr-2003 sIR 'i ooo259 16-APR-2003 302 '8tn-3t+/00845-02

000259302 16-APR-2002. Analvst Note: NA forcesenteredKabul on 13 November2001

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S E C RE T / / NOFORN I I 2O32OIO9 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendationfor Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9YM-000259DP(S) o Generalinformation on safe housesusedby Arab fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan,including points of contact and transportprocedures . Generalinformation on personnelwho worked in safehousesin Afghanistan and Pakistan,as well as personnelwho worked for the Red Crescent of 6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee'sAccount: Detaineehasprovidedvaried accounts his his probablerole as a to details. Detaineehas attempted minimize activitieswith inconsistent medical assistantin support of Taliban and al-Qaida combat operations. In a late December medicinefor the Taliban.re Sincehis admittedto dispensing 2001 custodialinterview, detainee arrival at JTF-GTMO, detaineehas diverged from his earlier confession. In a November 2002 interview, detaineestatedhe servedas a medical assistantonly to sick children and landmine victims. When askedif any of thesepatientswere membersof the Taliban or al-Qaida, detainee saidthey were not, but could not articulatewhy he believedthat to be the case. Detainee'sstated timeline and route of travel roughly mirror that of many mujahideen;however, aspectsof his story are questionable. For example,it is doubtful that detaineeentrustedhis passportto alSharqi, as al-Sharqi was also an Arab. Detaineehas not accuratelyaccountedfor severalmonths betweenhis travel to Afghanistan in early 2001 and his purported work with the Red Crescent beginningin July or August of 2001. Detainee'spilgrimageto a major Shia shrineis highly questionable, possibly a cover for unidentifiedactivitieswhile in Iran. and 7. (S/NF) Detainee Threat: to a. (S) Assessment: Detaineeis assessed be a MEDIUM risk, as he may posea threatto the US, its interests and allies. to b. (S//NF) Reasonsfor Continued Detention: Detaineeis assessed be a possible member of al-Qaida. Detainee associated with known al-Qaida members,who recruited him and facilitated his travel. Detaineeadmitted to providing aid and comfort to the Taliban, and his name appearedon a recoveredal-Qaida document. Detaineepossibly attendedtraining at the al-Qaida sponsoredal-Faruq training camp and stayedin various al-Qaida and Taliban guesthouses. o (S//I\fF) Detaineewas recruited and assistedby known al-Qaida recruiters and facilitators in Yemen. Detaineeattendedcourseinstructedby Abu YasserNaji, Shaykh Muqbil al-Wadii, and Abu Omar al-Sharqi; eachplayed a role in recruiting detaineeand facilitating his travel. Naji and al-Wadii are known al-Qaida recruiters and facilitators.

tt to-3t4/00963-02 tt IIR 6 034 1533 IIR 6 034t44o04 03.

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S E C RE T / / NOFORN I I 2O32OIO9 JTF-GTMO-CDR for SUBJECT:Recommendation Transfer Out of DoD Control(TRO) for Guantanamo (S) Detainee, ISN: US9YM-000259DP
o Detaineewas recruited by Abu YasserNaji, a graduateof the al-FarqanInstitute and a travel facilitator who worked with Shaykh Muqbul al-Wadii.'' Naji also recruitedMajid Mahmud Abdu Ahmad, ISN US9YM-000041DP(YM-041).22 o (S/AfD Detainee admitted being instructedby Shaykh Muqbil al-Wadii. AlWadii operatedthe al-FarqanInstitute in Damaj, Af'. Al-Wadii was pro-jihad and financed the travel of many mujahideento Afghanistan.23 o (S/A{F) Abu Omar al-Sharqi recruited detaineeand helped to facilitate his travel.2aDetaineeclaimed he gave his passportto al-Sharqi, with whom he stayed while in Kabul and Logar prior to crossinginto Pakistan.25 . (S/A{F) Abd al-RahmanMaadha Dhafir al-Hilala al-Umari, ISN US9SA000199(SA-199),identified al-Sharqi,aka (Abu Omar al-Shalami),as fighting along side him in Tora Bora.26(Analyst Note: SA-199's accountsuggests that detainee may alsohavebeenin Tora Bora with al-Sharqi.) o (S/A{F) Detaineeassociated with Qari Bilal, an individual identified as a Taliban leader and guesthouse manager. DetaineestatedQari Bilal was detainee'ssupervisorat the Kabul Red Crescentwarehouse. Other detaineesidentified Qari Bilal as a Taliban commanderand guesthouse managerin the Kabul areaof operations. o (S/AIF) Abdul Rahman Atah Allah Mahmood Shubutti, ISN US9YM-00224DP just (SA-224),reportedthat Qari Bilal ran a Taliban guesthouse outsideof Kabul.27 o (S/AID Toufiq SaberMuhammadal-Maraw I, ISN US9YM-000129DP(YMI29), admittedhe stayedfor severalmonths at a Taliban guesthouse called al-Said. An Arabic speakernqmed Qari Bilal operatedthe house,which was reportedly 30 km from the front lines.28 o (S/AIF) Muhammad Abd al-RahmanAbid al-Haythani al-Qurashi, ISN US9SA000214DP(SA-214),reportedthat Bilal was an Afghan Taliban commander reportedly in chargeof approximately fifteen people on the Bagram, AF, front line.2e o (S/A{F) Ali Moshen Salih, ISN US9YM-000221DP(YM-221), reportedthat Qari Bilal was a leader of his fifteen man unit on the front lines near Baeram and positionsto new arrivals.30 responsible assigning for

22IIR6 034 r44o04,00004r sIR 02-AUG-2004, 000041 23-AUG-2004 sIR " 000259 302 16-APR-2002 'o ooo25g 16-ApR-2002, 302 IIR 6 034 1628 03 tt ooo25g o7-MAY-2003 302 tu ooor99 302 2o-FEB-2ooz 27 6 034033802 IIR " 000129 302 r4-ocr-2002,IIR 4 2ot 2570 04 tnIIR 2 340615r 02,IIR 2 3406432 02 'o ooo22lsIR 2r-FEB-2002

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S E C RE T / / NOFORN I I 2O32OIO9 JTF.GTMO-CDR for Out of DoD Control(TRO) for Guantanamo SUBJECT:Recommendation Transfer (S) Detainee, US9YM-000259DP ISN:
o (S/AfD Muhammad Ali Abdullah Muhammad Bwazir, ISN US9YM-000440DP (YM-440), statedthat^QariBilal operateda guesthouse Kabul about fifty minutes in from the Said Center.'' o (S/n\fD Analyst Note: The precedingbullets substantiate Bilal as a member of the Taliban, guesthouse operator, and front line commander. Detaineeworked directly under Bilal in the Red Crescentand can probably provide more information and on Bilal's connectionwithin the Taliban, personnelthat stayedat the guesthouse, actions that Bilal conductedon the front lines. o (S/A{F) Detainee admittedly stayedat al-Qaida's al-Ansar Guesthouse Kandahar in for five days prior to traveling to Kabul. The emir of al-Ansar was Abu Khouloud, aka (Ibrahim Ba'alawi)." (Analyst Note: Al-Ansar Guesthouse was a known transitpoint for known Islamic extremistsen route to al-Faruq and other training camps in the Kandahar area.)33 FadelHusseinHantai and alias,Monsour al-Dahhi, o (S/ {F) Detainee'snrrne, appearedon a list of 324 Arabic names,nationalities, and trust account contents recovered during raids of al-Qaidasafehousesin Karachi. The list associates a detainee with trust accountnumber615 353, and indicatesthat he possessed Yemeni passportand an ID card.3a(Analyst Note: Such lists are indicativeof an often individual's residence within al-Qaida,Taliban, and other extremistguesthouses for the purposeof training or coordination prior to travel to the front lines or abroad. Trust accountswere simply storagecompartmentssuch as envelopesor folders that were used to securethe individual's personalvaluablesuntil completion of training or other activity.)35 o (S/A{F) Detaineepossibly attendedparamilitary training at the al-Qaida sponsored al-Faruq training camp near Kandahar in the fall of 2000, months before detainee's admitted travel to Afghanistan. o (S/A{F) A variant of detainee'salias, Abu Mansour, was found on a large document from the Military Committee of the Office of Mujahideen Affairs recoveredfrom an al-Qaida housein Kandahar. According to the document,Abu Mansour was from al-Jawf (variant al-Jouf), had a high school education,and was referred by Abu al-AbbassQ.IFDand Anagashahal-Makki (NFD. The individual was scheduledto arrive at the camp on the 3'd day of the 7thmonth in the Hijt'- year I42I. On the samedocument.the n,lme Mansour al-Yamani is on a list of individuals to be

" 000440 MFR 24-MAY-2002 t' ooo25g o7-MAY-2003 302 " TD-3r4/5097i-02 to TD4A/q0693-02 " IIR 6 034084403

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S E C RE T //NOFORN I I 2O32OIO9 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendationfor Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9YM-000259DP(S) (Analyst Note: The dateconvertsto 30 registered a "Tactical Course."36 for 2000. The tacticalcourseis assessed be basicparamilitarytraining.) September to o (S/A{F) Detaineewas capturedwith a Casiomodel A159W watch. (Analyst Note: This model of watch is linked to al-Qaida and radical Islamic terrorists which use the watch to designimprovisedexplosivedevices(IEDs). Reportsindicatethat al-Qaida distributed Casio watchesto studentsin the "Watch Timer Course" which is included in explosivestraining. There is no pdditional information to confirm that detainee completedexplosivestraining.)" c. (U//FOUO) Detaineeos Conduct: Detaineeis assessed be a HIGH threatfrom a to detentionperspective.Detainee'soverall behaviorhasbeennon-compliantand hostile toward the guard force and staff. Detaineecurrently has 40 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS, four of which are for assaults.The most recentoccurringon 6 December2006, when detaineewas found in possession food rolled up in letters from his of attomey. Other incidentsfor which detainee beendisciplinedinclude assault, has medication misuse,participatingin a massdisturbance, unauthoized communications, failure to follow guard instructions, damageto property, and possession food and non-weapontlpe of contraband. Detaineehas one Report of Disciplinary Infraction for assaultin2006 occurring on 31 August 2006,when detainee repeatedlyspatin the face of guardswhile they escorted him back to his cell. 8. (S/NF) DetaineeIntelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessment: Detaineeis assessed be of LOW intelligencevalue. Detainee's to most recentinterrogationsession occurredon 14 November 2006. b. (S/NF) Placement and Access: Detaineeprobablyreceivedbasicparamilitarytraining at the al-Qaida sponsoredal-Faruq training camp. Detaineespent severalmonths in Taliban guesthouses, which would have affordedhim access personalities those to at guesthouses, guesthouse information on operations,and possibly limited and indirect exposureto al-Qaida command and control information. No reporting indicatesdetainee servedin a leadershipor operationalplanning capacity. Detaineehas not been identified by any senioral-Qaidaor Taliban figures. c. (S/NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detaineeshouldbe able to provide information on alpersonalities,and operations. If detaineedid servein a humanitarian Qaida guesthouses,
36 Apcp-2002-8oo32l " 000002 MFR 24-APR-2002, CasioWatches MFR 24-Apr-2002,Analyst Note: Detainee claimed purchased he thewatchin Sanaa, YM, whenhe first started workingasa taxi driver. See000259SIR 23-SEP-2003.

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s E c RE T / / NOFORN I | 20320109 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendationfor Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9YM-000259DP(S) or medical capacity,detaineecould provide information on Taliban battlefield medicine. While the detaineehas provided conflicting accountswith questionableveracity, there is no additional reporting to confirm or refute his story. Further investigation is necessary to verify detainee'spossible training at al-Faruq and his alleged employment with the Red Crescentin Kabul. The information available indicatesdetainee'sinvolvement with al-Qaidaelements was limited. d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation: o o o Al-Qaida guesthouses, personalities, operations associated and Activities and personnelwithin the Afghan Red Crescent Recruitment and facilitation in Yemen

9. (S) EC Status: Detainee'senemycombatantstatuswas reassessed 11 November 2004, on and he remains an enemy combatant.

YB.H

JR.

Rear Admiral, U Navy Commanding

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